NARRATIVE AND VISION:
CONSTRUCTING REALITY IN LATE VICTORIAN
IMPERIALIST, DECADENT AND FUTURISTIC FICTION

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This study deals with works of imperialist, decadent and futuristic fiction written roughly between 1885 and 1904. The main authors under discussion are Conrad, Kipling, Haggard, Pater, Wilde, Huysmans and other European decadents, Wells, Morris and Hudson, and its primary aim is to show the similarity of vision between late nineteenth century authors writing in different genres or fields.

The thesis starts by taking the 'strange' worlds presented in the fiction of these writers and relating them to the aesthetic idea that fiction involves the construction of the world of the text, a world which is determined according to the principles of art and perception, a world which is not simply imitative of a supposedly actual world of facts. To support this, the thesis proceeds to analyse late nineteenth century ideas on observation, representation and mythologization.

The focus then shifts from the concept of the world to that of the self as the thesis investigates the complicated relationship between the fictional human subject and the society or world of the novel in which he or she figures. After this, the thesis examines how the late Victorian fictional individual seeks, through the power of narration, to remake the world according to his or her aspirations. It also records the violence associated with this ambition when it is put into practice and the failure which ensues when the subject's imagination makes him or her unable to distinguish between what is real and what is not. Indeed, that which forms the late Victorian fictional subject's experience of the world tends more to destabilize his or her identity than to strengthen it.
The final chapter considers the fiction's imagery of fluidity, disintegration and collapse, paying close attention to the frequent appearance of crowds, chaos, darkness, rebellions and catastrophes in the texts. The conclusion looks again at the nature of late Victorian aesthetics, reviewing the importance of perception, oppositionality, balance and closure to the works.
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Does man not eternally create a fictitious world for himself because he wants a better world than reality?

(Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power)
This doctoral thesis has emerged out of a study of works of imperialist, decadent and futuristic fiction largely written in the last fifteen years of nineteenth century England. My first thoughts were to write a broad thesis on the different types of fiction written in this period but, when I soon realized I had neither time nor word-space in this project to deal with the material in the way I wanted, I reduced my sights and settled on a comparative study of works from three genres or fields of fiction which I felt had more in common than first sight allowed. In addition, each of these fields seemed particularly constitutive of the sentiments and ideas of the age: the late Victorian period has long been considered as providing some of the finest fiction of empire; decadence is regarded as a literary movement that was born, lived and died within those years; science fiction, whether political or
purely diverting, evolved at this time into a widely-read and significant genre.¹

I was further attracted to these fields on account of their notional distinction from mainstream social fiction: I wanted to examine how this fiction, so particular to the period and yet so ec-centric, was able to image the age's central interests and concerns. Although many works of imperialist, decadent and futuristic fiction are often idiosyncratic and sometimes present extremes of fictional behaviour, at the same time they tend draw attention to their relationship with mainstream social fiction through the affirmed English or European identity of their main protagonists. Imperialist fiction tells of protagonists who reaffirm or refute (often contradictory) English values while they are in the very act of engaging with strange peoples and continents. Decadent fiction often portrays a more obviously European social world but, in doing so, it privileges private aesthetic experiences and fantasies over the public conventions of social relations. Science fiction uses images of a notional future and technology either to show the consequences of society's persisting in the activities and attitudes in which it is already engaged or to depict a more harmonious world founded on very different principles to those of late nineteenth century Europe. In general, late Victorian writers of fiction in these fields fabricated locations and scenarios away from representations of normal British society which enabled them and their protagonists to express with greater freedom the desires and fears embodied within the social novel.

Many literary critics of the last thirty years seem undecided as to whether late Victorian fiction is merely evidence of a transitional experimentation and diversity which marks the passage from high Victorian to modernist literature or whether the 1880s and 1890s form a distinctive period in literary history justifiable by the merits simply of its own artistic output. In this debate the consideration of field or genre has been a convenient way for critics to organize their
ambivalent responses to a period of literature which sometimes only appears integrated by its commitment to a diversity of form and content. Such an approach, however, has tended either to produce an image of the period as a web of artistic cliques or to divide the literature into isolated strands, which gives the impression that there is no real connection between the various fields. As regards the three fields under discussion (ignoring those critics who specialize in a single author), imperialist fiction has mostly been the province of critics of (literary) imperialism and not of late Victorian fiction; English decadent fiction has either been treated as a sub-group of French decadent fiction or as a momentary aberration in the development of English literature; analysis of late Victorian science fiction, when not by those interested in socialist utopianism, has been more interested in the development of the genre than in the fiction of the period in which it was written.

These broad lines certainly do not describe the critical map exactly and, admittedly, in the last ten years critics have responded much more to the idea that the different fields are part of the one large discourse of late Victorian fiction. With this in mind two methods of criticism stand out: the thematic approach and the perspective which is concerned with cultural politics. The former, either by alluding to a large number of works or by analysing in depth about five or six, takes a single unifying theme in whose light individual works are analysed. While this method often makes for a coherent read, it sometimes moves beyond revealing paradigms of late Victorian aesthetic thought to producing stereotypes, owing to the singularity of its theme and the narrowness of its scope. In addition, those critics who have examined only a small number of fictional texts have often analysed largely the same works. Hence their readers' vision of literary production in this period has got no broader. Indeed, it has sometimes become confused, for the restricted focus of the criticism tends to offer readers analyses of works which allegedly transcend their time. Moreover, this type of approach has
meant, according to John Sutherland, that the vast field of Victorian fiction has steadily shrunk during the twentieth century 'effectively [to] become a lost continent of English literature'.

The second method, currently in vogue and using a wide range of texts, is to see literary works as products and expressions of the social relations of the age in which they were written. In the arena of late Victorian studies it seems that this approach began with the analysis of the attitudes of white novelists and protagonists towards the African and Asian races represented in imperialist fiction. Critics of this type of fiction were then accompanied by analysts of gender and class politics who now seem to dominate the critical market-place, if only because more late Victorian texts deal with relations between genders and classes than between races. This is evidenced in the increased critical interest in the New Woman novelists and in the class-concerned social fiction of Arnold Bennett, George Gissing and H. G. Wells. Critics of this type too have collapsed the distinction between genres in order to show the pervasiveness of cultural attitudes and reveal the interconnectedness of images of race, gender and class in late Victorian writing.

The problem with this approach as regards literary narratives is that it often shows no commitment to the mode of fiction. As a method of criticism it gives off the impression that literature is an interesting field of study owing to its imaginative content, metaphoricity and sense of narrative; fiction is engaging because it permits free use of the many tools available to literary criticism. Indeed, the fact that the works analysed are fictional or in a strict sense untrue becomes a point of awkwardness amongst critics of this type, something either to be ignored or to be resolved by comparing the literary text with examples of allegedly comparable evidence in different modes and forms: letters, journals, articles, essays, works of sociology and psychology. In the field of late Victorian studies this critical approach has frequently required that all textual information be
rationalized in order to show that late Victorian society was becoming rationalized; it is a materialist method of criticism which echoes perhaps too closely the assumed techniques of its object and makes little of the period's strong interest in the metaphysical and the spiritual.

My own approach to late Victorian fiction has appropriated elements from the critical methods I have described without subscribing to their theoretical foundations. I have chosen the fiction of three significant fields, yet not dealt with them as fields; my interest is with the individual work of fiction and those texts written within a few years of it. Indeed, I have not defined what is meant by 'imperialist, decadent and futuristic fiction', having decided to use the labels as themes as much as as fields or genres in order to deal with a wider variety of texts. I have seen late Victorian fiction as a literature in transition yet have concentrated on those features which seem to draw its disparate works together. My thesis analyses its chosen texts in relation to a particular idea (the construction of fictional reality) yet this central idea is necessarily treated so broadly that it perhaps loses its integrity as a focal theme. The complicated concept of 'reality' is something that emerges from the thesis as a whole; it is not defined at the beginning. Indeed, I have regarded the experimentation in late Victorian fiction and that fiction's dissatisfaction with the tired realist mode of the previous decades as a result of late nineteenth century Europe's increasingly problematic conceptualization of reality, its shifting or manifold visions of the human subject and his or her relationship with a not-so-familiar world.

From the assumption that fiction-making and the construction of meaning is integral to a satisfactory existence in this world I have approached late Victorian fiction through the premise that the individual work of fiction constructs its own reality which is both separate to and a part of the real world. With this in mind, I have looked at the relative strengths of communal and individual
constructions of reality in late Victorian fiction, and at the
tensions that arise between that fiction's 'society' and those
who do not conform to its conventions. I have examined how
works of imperialist, decadent and futuristic fiction show
that excessively rigid or fantastic constructions of reality
either engender equally strong oppositional discourses or
simply bring about their own dissolution. In other words, I
have understood late Victorian fiction to offer both self-
contained worlds and be reflective, even in its construction,
of human experience. Nevertheless, in my view any equation
between the fictional world presented in a novel or story and
the actual social relations of the time in which it was
written must take into account both that period's sense of
aesthetics and its attitude towards the status of fiction.¹⁰

The authors about whose works I have written in this
thesis include Joseph Conrad, Rudyard Kipling, H. Rider
Haggard, Robert Louis Stevenson, Walter Pater, Oscar Wilde,
Joris-Karl Huysmans and other European decadents, H. G. Wells,
William Morris and W. H. Hudson. Although I have referred to
a larger number of writers, any selection for a project of
this scope is to a certain extent eclectic and ultimately no
more than a representative sample of authors and works in the
nominated fields. Moreover, the thesis is interested in a
prevailing climate of ideas rather than in a comprehensive
study of particular areas of fiction.

The thesis is not concerned with the influence of one
writer on another; nor does it involve itself with either an
author's literary development or the events in their life. It
does not even relate (except in passing) the fiction of the
age to a historical base in political, social or economic
events. It does not deny the importance of any of these
factors; I have simply chosen to examine the similarities of
vision, plot, characterization, themes and concerns between
individual works written in different but equally fictional
fields or genres. My contention is that the authors of this
period have drawn from a common pool of ideas, experience and
imagery for their work and that it is often not possible, let
alone worthwhile, to determine the specific origin of such inspiration. Furthermore, ideas are remoulded as they move from text to text and come to mean different things to different people; they become re-presented in different ways under different circumstances, a fact which sometimes requires contradictory interpretations of texts.

The literary critic with this approach is therefore left with Freud's understanding of the elements of dreams: in the words of Tzvetan Todorov, 'one symbolizing element may evoke innumerable symbolized elements' while 'one symbolized element may be designated by an infinite number of symbolizers'. Although my approach does not make a taxonomy of comparable symbolizers or signifiers, it does adopt a loosely structural(ist) approach to late Victorian fiction. Furthermore, the angle of the thesis depends to a certain extent on a dialectical method which sees a literature of transition being torn on every issue in two opposing directions: between past and future, continuity and rebellion, reality and fantasy. On the other hand, I have deliberately used archaic critical topics or ostensibly humanistic concepts around which to build my chapters in order to integrate more solidly the relative modernity of the approach with the fiction and concerns of the period. Moreover, by concentrating on the modes of thought of both the author and the perceiving experiencing fictional subjects in their struggles to represent 'reality', even desired and feared realities, to themselves and to others, the thesis has found a flexible methodology with which to analyse some of the central (literary) concerns of the late Victorian age.

In this project I am indebted to those who have written on the fiction of this period already and, although for lack of space I have been unable to engage them in overt critical debate, I hope I have acknowledged all my borrowings. I would like to thank all those in the Department of English at University College London who have given me advice and encouragement over the last few years, especially my supervisor John Sutherland. Moreover, I am very grateful for
the three-year grant from the British Academy which has made this research possible. I would also like to thank both those friends off whom I have been able to bounce ideas (in particular those who have given back with interest) and those who have simply helped keep spirits high. Above all, however, I would like to acknowledge the constant support, encouragement and criticism of my now-wife Kate, which has ensured the completion of this project.
INTRODUCTION:

THE FICTION OF REALITY

Rudyard Kipling's "Baa Baa, Black Sheep" is a work of fictionalized autobiography which tells of how he, or Punch, as the young protagonist is called, was uprooted from India at the age of five with his sister and abandoned by his parents to a draconian guardian on the south coast of England for five years. At one point Punch comes across an old copy of *Sharpe's Magazine* and finds the story therein of a wicked griffin and its come-uppance much more exciting than the formulaic 'the Cat lay on the Mat and the Rat came in' with which his 'Aunty Rosa' was teaching him how to read. Much of the vocabulary, such as 'falchion', 'base ussurper', and 'verdant me-ad', is beyond him, but he decides that 'this... means things, and now I will know all about everything in all the world.' He read till the light failed, not understanding a tithe of the meaning, but tantalized by glimpses of new worlds hereafter to be revealed' (*WWW* 270).

Fiction becomes for Punch a means of understanding the 'world' and of glimpsing 'new worlds' (*WWW* 270); the two are synonymous for the child. Fiction is an agent of both
education and fantasy; it expresses truth and untruth with the same signs, and thus becomes an important factor in Punch's apprehension of reality. The reading of fiction becomes mixed with other forms of experience which also confuse Punch's ability to distinguish what is real from what is not. Aunty Rosa justifies her authority and the beatings and deprivations she inflicts upon Punch by reference to an 'abstraction called God' (WWW 268) which is the 'only thing in the world more awful' than the guardian herself (WWW 269) and the context within which she can explain the boy's minor misdemeanours as 'possession by the Devil' (WWW 280) and descent into the 'Nadir of Sin' (WWW 284). Reading therefore becomes an activity wherein Punch can find release from the unfair punishments and trials of everyday life: 'if he were only left alone Punch could pass, at any hour he chose, into a land of his own, beyond reach of Aunty Rosa and her God, Harry [Aunty Rosa's cruel son] and his teasements, and Judy's claims to be played with' (WWW 271). It is a way of attaining independence, but it means replacing one untrue version of reality with another.

Aunty Rosa develops a dislike for Punch and repeatedly accuses him of telling 'tales' (WWW 270) when he was not, so the concept of a 'tale' readily becomes the truth that is perceived as falsehood. As Punch grows older he is driven to lying and, when he becomes able to fool Aunty Rosa, so the 'tale' becomes also the falsehood that is perceived as truth. Indeed, this household has so thoroughly destroyed all bond between word and deed that reality becomes, for Punch, a violently unstable blend of fact and fiction in which he is alternately the victim and the aggressor. The reader of tales having become the teller, Punch is stimulated by his reading, his sense of isolation and his increasing short-sightedness to fabricate further the narrative of his superiority over Aunty Rosa. 'So Black Sheep', as he is now known, 'brooded in the shadows that fell about him and cut him off from the world, inventing horrible punishments for 'dear Harry', or plotting another line of the tangled web of deception that he wrapped
round Aunty Rosa' (WWW 283). These plottings largely remain as private fantasy, although he does almost strangle a class­mate, run at Harry with a table-knife (WWW 280), suck the paint off his toys in a suicide attempt and threaten Aunty Rosa to her face with burning down her house and killing her.

There is an idea in this of fiction not as the offspring of the ebullient or fertile imagination but as a reaction against felt oppression, as an essentially defensive activity against a self-threatening reality. Punch's boldest lie, about his progress at school (when there was none), is made at the onset of his short-sightedness, when the 'pages of the open-print story-books danced and were dim' (WWW 283). As the world dissolves into a haze of 'shadows' and uncertainty (WWW 283), Punch replaces this formlessness with a firmly-outlined construct with himself at the centre: the oft-repeated narrative of the young hero's triumph over adversity: the staple plot of fairy-tales. Punch's adherence to these tales expresses his determination to counter one version of reality with another, to convince himself of his independence in defiance of the real situation.

Because Harry is 'Aunty Rosa's one child', Punch immediately becomes the 'extra boy about the house' (WWW 268). He is 'forbidden to... explain his ideas about the manufacture of this world and his hopes for his future'; he becomes 'of no account in this his new life' (WWW 268). Punch's own tales of the world and of himself are silenced. The tale-telling, or lying, which this ban engenders is of course succeeded by the tale "Baa Baa, Black Sheep" itself, and it is here, in the public denunciation of the 'aunt's' narrow-minded sadism, that Punch (or Kipling) takes his revenge. Kipling's 'concealed' autobiography is a complicated blend of anecdote and fable, truth and falsehood fashioned both as a testament to and as a fictionalization of his first five years in England. It rationalizes Punch's psychological development and assumes the worldly authority and sense of irony that the young Punch's fabrications lacked. Kipling's autobiographical fragment Something of Myself, written later, tells a similar story, and
it is noteworthy that one of Kipling's biographers, Charles Carrington, questions the accuracy of some of the autobiography's details, observing that one incident common to both accounts has a strong precedent in David Copperfield. Kipling's story unites power and the word: the most skilful manipulator of language and narrative justifies the vilification of his or her opponent. It is not enough simply to tell stories: one must be able to convince others of their truth. Indeed, in Something of Myself Kipling claims that the 'bullying' or 'torture' he received 'made me give attention to the lies I soon found it necessary to tell: and this, I presume, is the foundation of literary effort' (SOM 6). Despite the perpetual lies told by all the protagonists in "Baa Baa, Black Sheep", Kipling still convinces the reader of the reality of his tale; it has a certain psychological veracity that subordinates the monstrosity of its characters and their actions. On the other hand, its self-conscious approach to its subject emphasizes its status as art. Indeed, along with much late Victorian literary production, notably imperial(ist) and decadent fiction, the tale seems uncertain as to whether it wants to impose its own reality upon the reader or whether it wants to highlight its literariness and its deliberate slant. Here, irony and sentimentality are dished out with an even hand.

Kipling's story acknowledges in its own way a whole range of ideas associated with perception, reality, aesthetics and fiction that are constitutive of late Victorian fiction's conceptualization of its own identity. I would, however, like to leave my analysis of this story as it stands and to examine in a more general context some of its assumptions. The example of Punch and the other protagonists suggests that the
individual's conception of the world outside them and their place in it, their understanding of reality, is formed through that individual's perceptions modified by their understanding of their experience, which includes the apprehension of their desires and fears. Kipling's story associates this understanding of reality with the process of reading; he is concerned with the application of traditional narrative forms to empirical events, with superimposing fairy-tales and religious sermons upon the events of everyday life. The confusion of real and unreal narratives, although intrinsically detrimental to the understanding of real relations, nevertheless allows one to take up a positive stance upon reality, to assert a definite position for the self and the subject in the world. For Aunty Rosa, Punch is the Devil incarnate; to himself he is both the victimized Cinderella and St George confronting the dragon.

Fiction, it seems, occupies a central place in one's practical relations with the world: it is easier to identify with an archetype or a paradigm than to work out one's position from first principles. As the narrator of Walter Pater's *Marius the Epicurean* maintains, 'all that is real in our experience [is] but a series of fleeting impressions'; the 'perpetual flux' of things and of souls... make[s] all fixed knowledge impossible'. Late Victorian fiction is very often aware of the inefficacy of the real, that what is 'out there' behaves very differently to how it is most frequently depicted, that there are vast areas of life beyond man's knowledge, and that by and large the interaction of people and ideas in society takes place within a rhetoric of assertion and persuasion. Human society is aestheticized in order for it to make sense: individuals, classes, genders and races are categorized and placed, judged by nominal criteria of sameness and difference. In the same chapter of *A Modern Utopia* H. G. Wells both writes about the 'necessity for real and imaginary aggregations to sustain men in their practical service of the order of the world' and asserts that 'crude classifications and false generalizations are the curse of all organized human
The perception of this problematic, emergent at a time when sociologists like Charles Booth were searching for an objective language for their work and the documentary pretensions of realist fiction were being supplanted by a more clinical and earthy naturalism, produced a form of vision which 'rooted aesthetic experience in the human subject rather than in an increasingly alien natural world'. As a consequence, the individual consciousness and the subjective reception of the world through impressions were centralized, while the objective reality of the world was pushed to an insecure distance. On the other hand, the distancing of 'facts' by concentrating on perceptions of them, although enabling diverse and variable visions, gave licence to a certain unaccountability, for under such circumstances the original 'facts' become so marginalized as to be almost irrelevant. In fiction, however, there is no real referent to which a text refers; fiction offers a world or a reality that is constructed rather than revealed, that is hermetically sealed by the language of the text, no matter how much influence it may come to assume over other spheres. One simply has versions and visions that helplessly expose their own textuality and artistry, their coherence around an aesthetic mode of thought rather than around objective representation. In the words of Oscar Wilde, 'books are well written, or badly written. That is all'. 'The morality of art consists in the perfect use of an imperfect medium' (*TPODG [3]).

The late Victorian novel was therefore wrenched in two directions, torn between its desire to ignore its detachment from reality and its desire to flaunt it. In the first case, fiction became a vehicle of persuasion: whether the world depicted did or did not appear familiar to the reader, the success of the work as fiction, rather than as art, was self-consciously based upon its power to sustain the illusion of the existence of its world, protagonists and events in some place at some time. This did not restrict a writer to 'safe'
subjects for, although 'man can never believe the improbable', he 'can believe the impossible'. Indeed, according to Wells, 'for the writer of fantastic stories to help the reader play the game properly, he must help him, in every possible unobtrusive way, to domesticate the impossible hypothesis'. The writer's skill was therefore that of tapping into readers' imaginations and producing narratives which imaged their thoughts, fears and desires. To quote Wilde again, 'an idea is of no value till it becomes incarnate and is made an image'. It was not the specific setting that was important, but the attitudes of the protagonists towards the world in which they found themselves: aesthetic experience was rooted in the human subject. As V. S. Pritchett commented, 'Mr E. M. Forster once spoke of the novelist sending down a bucket into the unconscious; the author of She installed a suction pump. He drained the whole reservoir of the public's secret desires'.

A moment interesting to this argument occurs half way into Dracula. Bram Stoker, when the reader has surely either been convinced by the Count's insidious existence or has given up on the book, spends many pages showing how the psychologist Dr Seward becomes convinced of the reality of vampirism. At this stage in the story Lucy has just died of a wasting disease but only the reader has read Harker's journal of his experiences in Transylvania. It is as though Stoker has suddenly made a distinction between what the reader will readily believe in on the premises of a fictional reality, and what the protagonists of the text, allegedly stalwart Victorians, will tolerate as an objective actuality.

Preparing to introduce the idea of vampirism, Van Helsing tells Seward that he (Seward) is 'too prejudiced', that he does not 'let [his] eyes see nor [his] ears hear', that he is constrained by a science that 'wants to explain all; and if it explain not, then it says there is nothing to explain'. Van Helsing claims that 'there are always mysteries in life' (D 230) and offers a list of what Seward describes as 'nature's eccentricities and possible impossibilities' (D 231).
Although Seward's imagination is 'fired', he feels he is going in his 'mind from point to point as a mad man, and not a sane one, follows an idea' (D 231). Van Helsing simply wants Seward to 'believe', to have an 'open mind', for a willingness to understand is the first step to understanding (D 232). As Seward reformulates it, Van Helsing wants him 'not to let some previous conviction injure the receptivity of my mind with regard to some strange matter' (D 232).

Seward's training in psychology makes him rationalize insanity: his is a discipline which does not prepare him for Van Helsing's claim that 'sweet' Lucy has been molesting young children on Hampstead Heath, that she who has just died is actually Un-Dead, that the recent victim of an unfamiliar illness has become the notorious 'bloofer lady' (D 213). Seward promptly accuses his mentor of madness, and Van Helsing replies ruefully that 'madness were easy to bear compared with truth like this' (D 233): his claims emerge from a public factual reality within the text and are accountable to it; they are not the product of some private fantasy. Van Helsing's convincing of Seward is closely detailed by Stoker: every aspect of Lucy's condition and the solution for it has defied Seward's scientific knowledge and Victorian values, and he finds his whole identity undermined by the information or truths that Van Helsing provides. His instinctive response is that he 'could not accept such an overwhelming idea as [Van Helsing] suggested' (D 240). When apart from Van Helsing Seward sees the Dutchman's ideas as 'monstrous', as 'outrages on common sense'; he pleads with himself for 'some rational explanation for all these mysterious things' (D 244). He suspects that the 'abnormally clever' doctor might be the culprit (D 244-5), 'off his head' and taken by some 'fixed idea'; he assumes his professional stance and determines to 'watch' the Dutchman carefully (D 245). Ultimately, however, only by seeing Lucy's new mode of being is he convinced. Her sweetness has turned to 'adamantine, heartless cruelty, and the purity to voluptuous wantonness' (D 252); her lips are 'crimson with fresh blood', and her eyes 'unclean and full of
Seward acts as a clear cipher for the (male) Victorian reader and Stoker wantonly indulges in seeing how far he can draw them both into condoning and accepting unnatural forms of behaviour. In my view Stoker was out to offend Victorian scientific knowledge (through vampirism and the Un-Dead), Victorian codes of behaviour (through the desecration of Lucy's grave and the treatment meted out to her body) and Victorian Protestant theism (through the Resurrection parody which Lucy enacts and the papist use of the Host by Van Helsing) by presenting unfamiliar forms of actual Victorian desires (like immortality) and practices (like dissection). The more outrageous the novel becomes, the more it taps into whole regions of Victorian anxieties, fears and desires. The treatment of the central dangerous protagonists, Dracula and Lucy, shows the author playing with late Victorian xenophobia and misogyny, and the novel thereby has links both with the invasion-scare novels of the 1870s to 1890s and with the much-depicted figure of the femme fatale.

The novel presents its eponymous anti-hero first by introducing him as one would an ordinary, if slightly disturbing, protagonist, and then by gradually adding more and more fantastic details which turn the Count into an unparalleled monster. In order then to maintain the reader's belief in Dracula's reality, particularly when the setting becomes more thoroughly entrenched in what is allegedly late Victorian society, the novel both fabricates newspaper articles and appeals to the reader's uncertainty about the world beyond his or her knowledge by referring to tales about vampires from far-off countries. In a manner not dissimilar to that of "Baa Baa, Black Sheep", Dracula fuels the world of science, psychology and society with data from sailors' yarns, folk-lore and fantastic literature. The difference between the two stories is Dracula's lack of irony as regards its scenario. In order to avoid becoming camp or ludicrous Dracula cannot afford entertain notions of its own artistry; it is presented in the form of extracts from journals,
diaries, letters and newspapers - modes associated with non-fictional writing. It exploits the idea that one has to open one's mind to the apparently impossible in order to understand, confront and destroy one's fears about a menacing external reality. According to the novel, English society can only preserve its existing values and codes of conduct by flouting them.13

II

I would like to introduce one further story on the subject of persuasion. Wilde's "The Portrait of Mr. W.H." tells of how Cyril Graham becomes convinced that Shakespeare's sonnets were dedicated to a young and fickle actor called Willie Hughes whose identity can apparently be revealed through a punning word-play in the sonnets. Belief in this word-play leads by further hermeneutical procedures to the establishment of Willie Hughes' history, personality and relationship with Shakespeare. Unfortunately, however, there is no external or 'independent evidence' for the existence of Willie Hughes: his name appears nowhere in the 'list of the actors of Shakespeare's company as it is printed in the first folio', nor in any contemporary register or document.14 Graham asks his friend Erskine to 'dismiss from [his] mind any preconceived ideas [he] might have formed on the subject, and to give a fair and unbiassed hearing to [Graham's] own theory' on the Sonnets (OWCSF 146) and, when Erskine continues to disbelieve in Willie Hughes, Graham has a portrait painted of the actor in order to convince his friend of the young man's existence. Some time later Erskine finds out that the portrait is a forgery and tells Graham that if he (Graham) had really believed in the truth of the theory, he 'would not have committed a forgery to prove it' (OWCSF 151). Graham claims that the forgery 'does not affect the truth of the theory' (OWCSF 151) and promptly commits suicide to show Erskine 'how firm and flawless his faith in the whole thing was' (OWCSF
Objectively speaking, Graham is correct, for the forged portrait is irrelevant to the historical facts of Shakespeare's life. It does affect, however, the process of persuasion: as an interpretation of the text Graham's theory is convincing, but it begins to lose its authority as the appearance of the forged portrait stresses the artistic and imaginative elements of Graham's efforts rather than his skills in biographical deduction and inference. On the other hand this portrait, however false, provides an actual image of Willie Hughes around which further investigations can be focused: the representation of Willie Hughes in art (Wilde's story and the picture) becomes more real than his absence from historical documentation. In addition, the story of Cyril Graham and his becoming a martyr of literature also has a certain power of persuasion. Erskine tells the story to the narrator of Wilde's tale and ironically 'convert[s]' him to a theory in which he (Erskine) does not himself believe (OWCSF 153). Erskine warns the narrator about being 'carried away by the sentiment of the... story', reminds him that a 'thing is not necessarily true because a man dies for it' (OWCSF 152), and observes that Graham's trail starts 'by assuming the existence of the very person whose existence is the thing to be proved' (OWCSF 153).

Wilde's story shows reading and the activity of making meaning to be a process of construction and identification, a form of exploration and investigation, an imaginative self-projection whereby the reader or listener takes up the subject position in the text being presented, identifies the object in relation to their own perceptions, and draws the assumed reality of that world around themself. (The same is also true for the author: according to Joseph Conrad, 'every novelist must begin by creating for himself a world'.) The reader brings their already assimilated experience to the imagery of the work and the behavioural characteristics of its protagonists. In other words the reader, by imbuing the work's many elements with the apparent facts of their
remembered experience and understanding of language, invests the totality of the work of fiction with truth, an action which sanctions the reality of its fictional world. To reformulate this with a twist, the reader does not judge the potential expression of truth in a work of fiction by comparing the work to the world external to it; he or she examines how the external world lives up to the truth embodied in the work of fiction. During the act of reading at least, that is the primary reality.16

Cyril Graham becomes obsessed with the referentiality behind the word 'Will' in the 'punning sonnets, CXXXV and CXLIII' (OWCSF 147) and with the possible puns on 'Hews' and 'use' (OWCSF 148) in sonnet XX. The act of reading (fiction) is an act of participation which brings about a confusion of the real and the unreal; what the reader brings to the text is as important as what is in the text itself. Reading is the conversion of an object fact (the book as text) into a subjective reality (the imagined fictional world), the replacement of an actual presence in the physical world (the book) by an imagined presence (the fictional world) which is actually separate from the physical world, although sometimes imaginatively confused with it. It is an act of self-persuasion as much as an act of being persuaded by the author. Nevertheless, it is significant that the narrator of Wilde's story loses his faith in the theory immediately after writing a passionate and closely argued letter to Erskine detailing his faith in the actor's existence. The implication is that the narrator, by entering the field of writing, is forced to consider more carefully the nature of literary production and the art of persuasion, and therefore becomes disillusioned.

The fictional 'world' is not a simple presence behind the words of the text, but an absence which is remedied by the unificatory imagination of the individual reader, the reader's desire for coherence. In other words, the work of fiction is only a blueprint for a world which does not exist either in the physical world or on the page: it is a model of the structural relations of a world that is only realized, or even
real, in the reader's imagination. Its vitality comes from the fact that it is never fully realized; like the protagonists who 'inhabit' it, it is not fleshed out in every aspect; it is but a series of imaged perspectives whose viewpoints form or are dictated by the narrative. Indeed, according to Paul Armstrong, for the novelist the 'secret of realistic representation is to arrange the aspects and indeterminacies in the work so as to persuade the reader to bring its world to life by remembering his or her own everyday practices of understanding - understanding that is similarly perspectival, never fully determinate, and actively compositional'.

Indeed, Marius' 'natural susceptibility' towards beauty, 'enlarged by experience,'


seems to demand of him an almost exclusive preoccupation with the aspects of things, with their aesthetic character, as it is called - their revelations to the eye and the imagination: not so much because those aspects of them yield him the largest amount of enjoyment, as because to be occupied, in this way, with the aesthetic or imaginative side of things, is to be in real contact with those elements of his own nature, and of theirs, which, for him at least, are matter of the most real kind of apprehension. (MTE 187)

The concept of imaged perspectives is therefore analogous to the nature of experience itself: the construction of reality from a series of impressions, the assumption of meaning. An episode in Conrad's Heart of Darkness describes a native attack on the steamboat in the Congo with this dual stress on the reality of the subject's perceptions and on the nature of things. Marlow tells how he 'threw [his] head back to a glinting whizz' that came into the pilot-house and disappeared out the far side. This phenomenon gradually materializes during the paragraph: 'something big' then appears at the shutter-hole; it appears to be a 'long cane'; it then becomes 'that thing', then 'that cane', before finally revealing its purposive reality as the 'shaft of a spear' which has just caught his helmsman below the ribs (HOD 81). The narrative describes the sensory impressions which eventually cohere into
an understanding of the event that has taken place; it tells the story of Marlow's apprehension and experience of the incident.

In the words of Henry James, 'it seems probable that if we were never bewildered there would never be a story to tell about us'. It is merely a question of to what extent the path to understanding is determined by a true reception of impressions from the world or to what extent it is dictated by misunderstandings (willed or otherwise), self-projection, or wishful thinking. The narrator of *Marius* suggests that the light which creeps at a particular hour on a particular picture or space upon the wall, the scent of flowers in the air at a particular window, become to ["the orderly soul"], not so much apprehended objects, as themselves powers of apprehension and doorways to things beyond - the germ or rudiment of certain new faculties, by which she, dimly yet surely, apprehends a matter lying beyond her actually attained capacities of spirit and sense. (MTE 226)

Literary impressionists explore how one constructs reality by interpreting it, how one comes to believe not only in the physical properties of a certain world but also in the spiritual, metaphysical, aesthetic, moral and epistemological foundation to it. The human need to know, or assume, is presented as the transcendent attribute of the fictional world.

The conception of reality in late nineteenth century fiction oscillated between an emphasis on the power of the perceiving subject to create or shape the world, after the idealisms of Berkeley and Kant respectively, and an emphasis on the power of the world to determine the individual, after the theories of Darwin and Victorian sociology. The theory on reality that embodies elements of both perspectives came from F. H. Bradley, the late Victorian philosopher who was responsible for a more widespread reception of German Romantic philosophy in England. Bradley rejected both the Kantian and Berkeleyan positions in favour of a vision of reality as a totality which emerges out of the interrelationship between self and not-self. Although interested in the knowing mind,
he dismissed the primacy of the self, the Hegelian ideal of reality as an actualization of Mind, for this would swallow up the 'glory of the experienced world'.\textsuperscript{20} The role of perception in the construction of reality was subsumed by Bradley into the concept of experience: for him there was 'but one Reality, and its being consists in experience. In this one whole all appearances come together'.\textsuperscript{21} Subject and object, self and not-self, come into existence simultaneously; one cannot exist without the other.

This balance and dependent oppositionality is the basis of late Victorian fiction: reality became an aesthetic totality centred in the human subject but manifesting itself in the textual object, the work of art. On the other hand, the non-identity between the literary work and the human subject means that the text became both a representation of the discourse of the self or subject and a representation of an alien world: it was/is both an ideological figuration and an empirical other at the same time. Furthermore, the conflict between the two, as between opposing visions and interpretations of reality, as between Hegelian idealism and Bradleyan experience, developed in late Victorian fiction into a competition in the field of narrative authority. It appeared as the theme of identity (subjective or objective) and as the problem of representation with its oscillation between excessive coherence and unclarity, obscurity or contradiction.

III

Nevertheless, as a composite of self and not-self, regardless of the internal or structural competition, the work of fiction presents as real an unreal world. If the reader is to make the world of the text their primary reality during the act of reading, then the art of most fiction is to persuade the reader that what is untrue is nevertheless real, and that what is unreal is nevertheless true. Even though the way in which
the reader interprets or organizes the signs of the fictional work often corresponds to the way he or she interprets or organizes the signs offered by the extra-textual world, the 'language of facts', a fictional world is unique to an individual work of fiction and its mode of construction particular to literature; it does not enter into a referential relationship with an extra-textual world or reality as, according to Tzvetan Todorov, the 'sentences of everyday speech often do'. For 'literature is created from literature, not from reality'; 'every literary work is a matter of convention' (Todorov 1973 10). Todorov quotes Northrop Frye: 'literature shapes itself, and is not shaped externally'. Indeed, according to Wilde, 'art never expresses anything but itself'; 'it has an independent life, just as Thought has, and develops purely on its own lines'; hence the 'only history that it preserves for us is the history of its own progress' (TAAC 319). 'Literary discourse cannot be true or false, it can only be valid in relation to its own premises' (Todorov 1973 10); for Frye it depended 'not on descriptive truth' but on 'conformity to [its] hypothetical postulates'.

In Frye's words, 'literature, like mathematics, is a language, and a language in itself represents no truth, though it may provide the means for expressing any number of them'. For Wilde too literature was not constrained by its supposed insularity and self-referentiality: in his Preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray he claimed that 'it is the spectator... that art really mirrors' (TPDG [3]) and in De Profundis he argued that his Art was for him 'the great primal note by which I had revealed, first myself to myself, and then myself to the world' (TLOOW 447). These different views imply a radical ambivalence about the relationship between art and the reader and/or writer. Indeed, the near paradox between fiction representing no truth although providing the means for expressing any number of them is the core of the position of fiction. For the subtle interface between the falsehood of representation and the truth of expression indicates the
reader's (and/or writer's) simultaneous detachment from and participation in the fictional world of the text and in a reality external to the work. The signs of the text function in a closed context, yet the totality of that context cannot avoid informing or being informed by an external reality as the text's signs are the same as those used by the reader in non-fictional and really denotative situations.

This duality is exemplified in the case of the paintings of James Abbott McNeill Whistler, a man who complained, in relation to the general Victorian attitude to art, that people had 'acquired the habit of looking not at a picture, but through it, at some human fact, that shall or shall not, from a social point of view, better their mental or moral state'. Whistler himself saw art simply as an 'amazing invention' that depended on putting 'form and colour into... perfect harmony'. On the other hand, Algernon Charles Swinburne noted that Whistler's art was unable to be enclosed by its self-referential aspirations. He pointed out that Whistler's paintings contained qualities 'which actually appeal to the mind and heart of the spectator' and that Whistler would be a fool to deny the 'intense pathos of significance and tender depth of expression [in] the portrait of his own venerable mother', a painting which Whistler tried to pass off as an "Arrangement in Grey and Black".

In an inverse conceptualization Conrad wondered what a novel was if it was not a 'conviction of our fellow-men's existence strong enough to take upon itself a form of imagined life clearer than reality and whose accumulated verisimilitude of selected episodes puts to shame the pride of documentary history' - having already published a number of novels which seem to foreground a will-to-style or at least a literary impressionism which had developed out of a careful consideration of the impossibilities of adequate representation. Late Victorian fiction evinced a confused sense of aesthetics wherein the novel was both imitative of the real world and a compensation for it. Moreover, the late Victorian conception of literature both reflected man's
problems in his relations with the world and provided him with the means of raising himself above the brutality of evolutionary existence. Indeed, late Victorian fiction self-consciously emerged from the mode of classic realism whose texts, according to Catherine Belsey, installed themselves comfortably in the 'space between fact and illusion through the presentation of a simulated reality which is plausible but not real'. In this lay their 'power as myth' (Belsey 1980 111).

The apparent similarity and confusion between the signs of a work of fiction and the signs of ordinary speech, the blurring of contexts, whilst enabling the illusion of an external referentiality for the novel, also contribute to the aestheticization of social relations. The novel becomes part of the reader's experience and part of their vocabulary for articulating their understanding of the external world; their understanding of the work reflects their relationship with the culture (of the individual) that produced it. The signs of the text function as illusory representations and 'all representations', in the words of Edward Said, 'because they are representations, are embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representer'; indeed, a 'representation is eo ipso implicated, intertwined, embedded, interwoven with a great many things besides the 'truth', which is itself a representation'.

Indeed, regardless of referentiality, the literary text is more rooted in perceptions of the world and the desire for coherence than in an obligation to truth. As Henry James wrote, 'representation is arrived at... not by the addition of items... but by the art of figuring synthetically', by the 'order, the reason, the relation, of presented aspects' which offer the 'successfully foreshortened thing' (TAOTN 87-8). One is reminded that the art of representation in "Baa Baa, Black Sheep" embodies the need to objectify and contain within language a self-threatening reality; it is part of the discourse of the subject rather than a disinterested
description of events. After all, representations operate 'for a purpose, according to a tendency, in a specific historical, intellectual, and even economic setting' (Said 1995 273).

Although the signs within a work of fiction do not refer to any external reality, are not strictly representations of anything, as images they can still be expressive of perceived, desired, or feared realities that are external to the text. Hence, although the conscious subject of this thesis is late Victorian fiction rather than late Victorian culture or life, the various conceptions and constructions of reality in late Victorian fiction do say something about the structural relations perceived by late nineteenth century individuals and social groups between themselves and the world external to them. As Sherlock Holmes might have put it, much can be observed, deduced and inferred from these traces.
CHAPTER ONE: 'DOCUMENTING' THE EXTERNAL WORLD

The late Victorian interest in the nature and the efficacy of the fictional 'world' was contemporaneous with a much wider cultural uncertainty as to the nature and purpose of the world external to the text and the role of the late Victorian individual in it. The concept of reality becomes an issue or a preoccupation when its familiarity, nature, or even existence is unclear and in this period the anxieties aroused by Darwin's theories on evolution, imperialist activity, the analyses of the human sciences, and the long economic depression caused not only the nature of reality in general to be questioned but also the assumed reality of the fictional world and its easy relationship with the world of Victorian society. Old Hammond, an Englishman of the future in William Morris' News from Nowhere, reflects this change in attitude. He bluntly claims that

in the nineteenth century, when there was so little art and so much talk about it, there was a theory that art and imaginative literature ought to deal with contemporary life; but they never did so; for, if there was any pretence of it, the author always took good care... to disguise, or
exaggerate, or idealize, and in some way or another make it strange; so that, for all the verisimilitude there was, he might just as well have dealt with the times of the Pharaohs.  

Late Victorian fiction shows English literature in transition. Although no fixed date can be given for the beginning of this movement, it seems to have commenced in the 1880s when the homogeneity of Victorian fiction (to a certain extent brought about by the dominance of the morally-concerned lending library market) started to crack under economic and cultural pressures. It is no easier to judge exactly when this transitional phase ended, but perhaps one can say that English fiction became more assured of its direction when it congealed into the split aesthetic of early twentieth century fiction: high modernist art and the popular novel.  

Anyway, in the last twenty years of the century the cutting edge of European fiction moved beyond the constraining ethics of realism, with the ostensible aim of more accurately representing the nature of reality and human experience. Indeed, Henry James thought that the 'air of reality' was the 'supreme virtue' of the novel form and that the 'attempt to represent life' was the 'only reason' for its 'existence'. According to Conrad, art involved a 'single-minded attempt to render the highest kind of justice to the visible universe, by bringing to light the truth, manifold and one, underlying its every aspect'. On a conceptual level this development of literature can be interpreted as evidence of a desire for a closer and more profound understanding of the world but, methodologically, fiction found itself polarized into the opposing styles of naturalism and impressionism with their very different procedures for addressing reality.

The former relied on the technique of recording observations; it was a radical exaggeration of the documentary pretensions of traditional realism, entailing an almost scientific presentation of a multitude of details which left no banality of life unmentioned. Naturalism is the 'incarnation of materialism... filth and the flesh are their all in all', claims the less than enthusiastic Des Hermies in
Joris-Karl Huysmans' *Down There.* 'This fetid naturalism eulogizes the atrocities of modern life and... rejects every ideal' (*DT 8*), he continues; it becomes a 'sickening jargon of chemist's slang serving to display a layman's erudition, which is about as profound as the scientific knowledge of a shop foreman' (*DT 9*). Its plots are 'murder, suicide, and accident stories copied right out of the newspaper' (*DT 9*).

On the other hand, Des Hermies concedes, a writer like Émile Zola is a 'master of backgrounds and masses and... his tricky handling of people is unequalled'; naturalism has at least created 'visible and tangible human beings... and put them in accord with their surroundings' (*DT 8*). In contrast, impressionist fiction relied much more on the representation of the dialectic between the narrator's perception of the world beyond themself and their reception of that world as experience. It tended to express not knowledge, but the difficulties of knowing; it was always coming to terms with the fact that one's perceptions and understanding of things change. I will write little more about impressionism here as these elements in late Victorian fiction are analysed later on in the thesis.

The mid-Victorian realist novel seemed inadequate for a society with an 'explosion' of information emerging from many quarters about its depths, limits, desires and concerns. And, once the finest exponent of the old tradition was dead (George Eliot, in 1880), and there was no obvious single claimant to her throne, fiction was free to expand into and to explore new directions. Victorian thought of the 1860s and 1870s appears dominated by discoveries, developments and analyses in the fields of biology, ethnology and sociology, with psychology opening up yet another perspective on human behaviour towards the end of the century. As forms of scientific or semi-scientific understanding, studies in these fields contributed both to the archive of knowledge, the vast self-justifying vaults of information that were the British Library and the British Museum, and also to the domains of politics and practice which allowed late Victorian society to change or
confirm the ways in which man could deal with his existence. It was inevitable, therefore, that fiction, seeking a new identity that was closer to the actualities of late nineteenth century life, would appropriate this information for its own ends.

Indeed, interdisciplinarity, the ready movement of ideas and writers from field to field, is a significant feature of the late nineteenth century human sciences. Wallace wrote both evolutionary and ethnological works; Durkheim contributed to psychology as well as to sociology; Bourget was both novelist and psychologist; Frazer examined the identity between ancient fertility rituals and Christianity. Most famously, of course, Darwin extended the principles derived from his study of the evolution of 'lower' life-forms to mankind, and Freud was to adopt the narrative models from ancient mythology to explain his psychological deductions. There was a strong feeling that everything was, or should be, part of the same discourse of existence, that the principles from one field had or should have equal validity in another. Laws derived from the scientific analysis of particular sets of phenomena were regularly treated as narrative paradigms which were relevant to other discourses. Indeed, they were used aesthetically, as metaphors, as ways of constructing reality and meaning, while still maintaining the notional objectivity of their scientific origin. According to Wells, 'we never invent a term but we are at once cramming it with implications beyond its legitimate content' (AMU 190).

Whether or not this exemplified the need to replace the increasingly discredited notion of a God-ordained universe, the result served to sanction the authority of British society. The (not strictly) Darwinian concept of the 'survival of the fittest' came first to justify capitalist doctrine and the inequalities enforced by the (English) class system, and then to sanction imperial activity abroad, the exploitation of Africa and Asia. Rather than acknowledging the common ancestry and humanity between people, social darwinism served to endorse the separation of classes and
races, to validate their categorization into 'higher' and 'lower', and to sanction the domination of the latter by the former.

'Degeneration' was another concept employed both by eminent scientists and the popular press. For E. Ray Lankester, a biologist, it meant a 'gradual change of the structure in which the organism becomes adapted to less varied and less complex conditions of life'. But the term soon had a function for (amateur) sociologists: in the hands of Max Nordau, a scare-mongering middle-brow cultural critic, the term referred to a form of apparently decadent behaviour that was threatening western civilization: the word became a means of social categorization, a political tool to stigmatize individuals, classes and races. Knowledge, meaning, reality and articulation became fused in increasingly outrageous fictional versions or representations of the actual world which served to support the hegemonic agenda of a white, male, London-based ruling class.

I

I would now like to examine the image and ideological function of the human sciences or discourses of knowledge in relation to another conceptualization of the world whose basic principles can be seen to be resurfacing in the late Victorian period. In the fundamental Romantic situation, as proposed by Fichte, the ego can only become conscious of itself under its 'empirical determinations': the ego requires something external to itself, a 'sphere for... action', which is the 'real, actually present world, such as we find it'. In other words, a dialectic is produced wherein one cannot conceive of the ego without reference to a non-ego; the ego is dependent on the world for its self-realization. Yet, in order for self-realization to take place, the world (or Nature) must be overcome, for the connection between the ego and the transcendental or pure ego of which the ego is the
finite conscious form is founded on an absence of any,
oppositionality or resistance: it is predicated on a 'faith in
our own freedom and power, in our own real activity'.

Hegel, though, had a problem with the fact that this free
activity and the activity which produces the external world as
an object to be surmounted are identical: he recognized that
there is a conflict between the world, which he had projected
as an entity alienated from man and therefore menacing in its
objectivity, and the world-self, which is trying to
reintegrate self and world through dialectical process, to
trace the 'objective world back to... our innermost self'.

Hegel saw the split between the ego and the world necessary
for self-consciousness as a hindrance to the further
development of the spirit; indeed, he claimed that 'Spirit' is
'at war with itself. It must overcome itself as its own enemy
and formidable obstacle' in order to redress the problem of
self-alienation.

However, despite Hegel's aggressive desire to
(re)appropriate what he saw to be an alien phenomenal self,
the image of 'man against himself' became reconceptualized in
the nineteenth century as 'man against the world'. Indeed,
despite Hegel's injunction that the 'inward life' of man and
the 'objective entirety of external existence which confronts
him... must wholly lose the appearance of two worlds which are
either indifferent to or not homogeneous with each other, and
forthwith proclaim themselves as harmoniously related and
identical in substance', the world of the nineteenth century
became increasingly regarded as unfamiliar by the European.

Nevertheless, this strange world could be most thoroughly
categorized and understood by a set of (pseudo)scientific
discourses whose claims worked, like Hegel's, round first
principles and a total vision of existence. The discourses of
science or knowledge, in professing objectivity and therefore
truth, asserted that there was but one world and that there
was a guiding regulation which informed and unified all its
elements. Whereas this had been God, or Nature, and then
God's 'self-consciousness in the person of historical man', it
then became conceived of as a non-divine mechanistic process to which Victorian analytical reasoning sporadically thought it had discovered the key.\textsuperscript{16}

But the matter complicates itself again, for the objectivity claimed by the discourses of knowledge, the assertion that their models for existence revealed or represented the hidden processes at work within the universe, should be considered in relation to Kant's dictum that the 'order and regularity in the appearances, which we entitle \textit{nature}, we ourselves introduce. We could never find them in appearances, had not we ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set them there'.\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, if the barrier between Hegel and true self-knowledge was the spectre of a disturbingly objective and irreconcilable world then the nineteenth century scientific discourses seen through Kant were shut off from the truth about the world by their reliance upon a mode of apprehension which could not transcend its own subjectivity, which in fact could not access the actual world at all.\textsuperscript{18} The discourses of knowledge were, of course, however formalized, institutionalized and technical they may seem, no more than human agencies created to bring some order to man's perceptions of the world in which he was living. In this bringing of order, as Foucault, Said and others have repeatedly shown, their scholarly language conceals the political and ideological positions from which their arguments and analyses emerged.

Both modes of thought can be seen as idealistic attempts to organize the world, to subject the law of nature to that of man. Such attempts, however, became less optimistic as the century progressed. According to Friedrich Nietzsche, there was a 'naïveté' in Romantic philosophy's taking an 'anthropocentric idiosyncrasy as the \textit{measure of things}, as the rule for determining 'real' and 'unreal'\textsuperscript{19}. Indeed, Hegel's expansive claim that the aim of knowledge was to 'find ourselves at home' in the world by divesting the 'objective world that stands opposed to us of its strangeness', tracing it 'back... to our innermost self', was reconstructed in a
more limited form in impressionist writings. Pater's carefully considered aesthetic 'doctrine' of 'the subjectivity of knowledge' (MTE 112) readily acknowledged a 'scepticism which developed the opposition between things as they are and our impressions and thoughts concerning them - the possibility, if an outward world does really exist, of some faultiness in our apprehension of it' (MTE 112). 'Our knowledge is limited to what we feel' (MTE 113), reckons the narrator of Marius, and the individual is consequently only 'to himself the measure of all things' (MTE 110). Likewise, when science proved itself unable to answer all questions, mankind was left with a pessimism which projected the degeneration of mankind in opposition to the expectation of progress. At his most positive man was, in Kipling's words, a hunter ever going 'up against the darkness that cloaked him and every act of his being... to find out what order of created being he might be'.

The struggles of the Romantic philosophers and of the discourses of science can be seen as competing, conflicting, and yet ultimately comparable forms of idealism whose intentions were to organize first man's perceptions of the world and second the world itself. The end of the 'self-cognitive journey' for Hegel was 'absolute knowledge'; it was 'God's completed consciousness of himself and therefore actualization of himself in the mind of the philosopher'. Man's omniscience, and his positioning of himself at/as the source of the world, was the sign of his Godhead. Likewise, the aim of the Victorian scientist was not simply to know the world but to control it, to adapt it to the needs of (Victorian) man. If Romantic thought found its apogee in vision, then the triumphs of the scientific discourses were in practice, in the techniques of converting energy, production, fertilization, hybridization, colonization, et cetera. And, in the end, Wells' The Island of Doctor Moreau does not differ wildly from Mary Shelley's Frankenstein.

On the other hand, the different approaches of Romantic philosophy and the scientific discourses engendered an
antagonism between them which plays itself out in the late Victorian fiction which became influenced by both modes of thought. Romantic idealism made the world a part of the self in order to assert the subjective nature of reality; the discourses of science made the self a part of the world in order to assert their own objectivity. In Romantic discourse the perceptions and experience of the individual became the measure of everything; the world had no independent objective existence. But, in the field of science, the individual was decentralized, normalized, classified or excluded in accordance with the demands of an allegedly impersonal system: the individual simply provided or became data which could be compared 'objectively' with other data to provide information or knowledge on a world of facts and phenomena.

II

In both approaches the sensation of the world's resistance induced a desire or a need to represent it, to make sense out of it, to disempower its apparent chaos, to subject it to linguistic control. For the sense of identity achieved by an individual or a culture is conditioned by that individual or culture's (mis)understanding and lack of understanding of their/its environment and the world which they/it inhabit. Indeed, as Nietzsche claimed, the 'essential fatality of error on earth' lies in the fact that while 'one believed one possessed a criterion for reality in the forms of reason... one in fact possessed [the forms of reason] in order to become master of reality, in order to misunderstand reality in a shrewd manner' (TWTP 314). Man should own up, he thought, to his needs and desires, to his 'expedient falsification' of the world (TWTP 314).

For Schiller, the assumption of power began with 'contemplation (or reflection)'). Consequently, the world (or 'Nature'), 'that which hitherto merely dominated [man] as force, now stands before his eyes as object'.
Whatsoever is object for him has no power over him; for in order to be object at all, it must be subjected to the power that is his. To the extent that he imparts form to matter, and for precisely as long as he imparts it, he is immune to its effects; for spirit cannot be injured by anything except that which robs it of its freedom, and man gives evidence of his freedom precisely by giving form to that which is formless. Only where sheer mass, ponderous and inchoate, holds sway, its murky contours shifting within uncertain boundaries, can fear find its seat; man is more than a match for any of nature's terrors once he knows how to give it form and convert it into an object of his contemplation.

One way to objectify nature, to prevent the fear its formlessness can inspire, is to chart its boundaries, to form an economy of knowledge about its limits, to find the fixed points around which all variations turn. This can take the form of principles, equations, diagrams or, in their widest sense, maps. Like the young Marlow of *Heart of Darkness*, the late Victorians had a 'passion for maps' (*HOD* 33). For, quite apart from prompting the desire for adventure, maps provide means for locating the physical self; they give the impression of offering an objective sense of the subject's position. In the nineteenth century they functioned as symbolic landscapes over which the European could cast an eye and upon which he or she could place a finger saying 'I am here', before rolling up several hundred miles of territory and replacing them among their belongings. Even Pater used the terminology. Marius, in a chapter entitled 'Animula Vagula' (little wandering soul), 'set himself - Sich im Denken zu orientiren - to determine his bearings, as by compass, in the world of thought... An exact estimate of realities, as towards himself, he must have - delicately measured gradation of certainty in things' (*MTE* 106-7).

But maps are not simply useful for self-orientation; they are also crucial in situations of both aggression and self-protection. In Kipling's *Kim* the British Secret Service masquerades as an ethnological survey and protects the Empire by mapping its frontiers and other points of weakness; it records alien structures and identities which might threaten imperial security. In Erskine Childers' *The Riddle of the
Sands it is through charts of the North Sea coast of Germany that a German invasion of England is both planned and thwarted. Dracula's library in Transylvania contains shelves of books which hint at his nefarious intentions - 'history, geography, politics, political economy, botany, geology, law - all relating to England and English life and customs and manners' (D 30); he even possesses a number of directories, almanacs and Lists, and an atlas. On the other hand, as the Count himself tells Jonathan Harker, a 'stranger in a strange land, he is no one... I have been so long master that I would be master still - or at least that none other should be master of me' (D 31). The forces of good tracking Dracula towards the end of the novel use a similar array of maps, timetables and telegraph networks to hunt their quarry down. In order to defend mankind they use the same weapons of information used by their foe.

When Kipling's protagonist Morrowbie Jukes stumbles into, and becomes stuck in, a sandpit of the living dead in the heart of the Indian sub-continent, he immediately falls back on the techniques of the ethnographer and engineer to preserve himself from hysteria. He describes and details the measurements of the pit: the height of the sand walls and their angles, the number and shape of the dwelling-holes in the ground, the number, gender and form of dress of the pit's occupants (WWW 188-9). As Van Helsing cries in Dracula, 'our hope now is in knowing all' (D 340). Similarly, Wells' Time Traveller says to himself soon after arriving in the year 802701, 'face this world. Learn its ways, watch it, be careful of too hasty guesses at its meaning. In the end you will find clues to it all'. His scientific approach smacks of the positivism of Sherlock Holmes, whose techniques of observation, deduction and inference aim to 'dispel magic and mystery' and 'make everything explicit, accountable, subject to scientific analysis' (Belsey 1980 111). As Holmes himself asserts, 'it is a mistake to confound strangeness with mystery'.

But, unlike Holmes, and indeed the situation in Dracula
where the team from England is able to pursue the Count back to Transylvania and destroy him by use of the 'resources of science' (D 285), the Time Traveller is proven wrong in nearly all his deductions. Life in the future is no 'Golden Age' (SSS 40), and he misunderstands for a long time the relationship between the Eloi and the Morlocks, the 'Upper-worlders' and the 'Under-grounders' (SSS 48). 'Very simple' was his initial 'explanation, and plausible enough - as most wrong theories are' (SSS 34). He compares the reality of the future world to the utopian writings he has read and notes that while 'details' about 'building, and social arrangements, and so forth' are 'easy enough to obtain when the whole world is contained in one's imagination, they are altogether inaccessible to a real traveller amid such realities as I found here' (SSS 40). The Time Traveller thus implies that he aestheticized the limited data that he did have for this world in order to construct a meaningful reality. As Belsey has written about the Sherlock Holmes stories, 'in claiming to make explicit and understandable what appears mysterious, these texts offer evidence of the tendency of positivism to push to the margins of experience whatever it cannot explain or understand' (Belsey 1980 117).

The Time Traveller's self-conscious comments about problems of observation, perception and meaning both draw attention away from and ironically refer to the patent fantasy of The Time Machine's romance plot. In earning the approval of the reader, the empirical veracity of the Time Traveller's reflections throws all his previous confident assumptions, and thus the foundations upon which future and fictional realities stand, into question. Likewise, although the reader accepts at face value the authoritative expositions of Moreau and Griffin on the potential of vivisection and on the way to achieve invisibility, he or she remains unconvinced by Allan Quatermain's tentative pseudo-scientific explanation of what he calls so precisely the 'huge pillar-like jet of almost white flame': 'how it first became ignited it is, of course,
impossible to say - probably, I should think, from some spontaneous explosion of mephitic gases'. The self-consciousness of the need to explain undermines the intentions of the act and, by focusing on the needs of the subject, the 'other' (or world) is made unreal by comparison. In addition to being plausible, explanation must eschew self-doubt in order to succeed, in order to appear real for those at whom it is directed.

On the other hand, if it does eschew self-doubt it becomes blind to the fallibility of its subjectivity and enters the realm of willed misrepresentation. Consequently, nineteenth century European knowledge is sometimes portrayed in fiction as a self-contained system of truth separate from actuality rather than as a framework by which more can be discovered about the empirical world. The maps in Stevenson's Treasure Island and Haggard's King Solomon's Mines are artificial products which describe systems of knowledge pertinent only to the texts in which they are printed. The directions on how to get out of the pit of the undead in "The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes" do not really make sense even within the fictional world of the text. In (scientific) romances at least, this type of 'knowledge' reflects and often actually constitutes the conceptual base of the fictional world.

Kipling ironized the human need for techniques of ordering one stage further in "The Brushwood Boy", wherein George Cottar, a grown man, draws out a map of the landscape of an imaginary world which he has visited in his dreams for many years. However, even within this relatively familiar although sub-conscious world, there are regions of the 'fourth dimension', in a 'sixth quarter of the globe, beyond the most remote imaginings of man', which make Cottar panic and desire to 'return swiftly... to known bearings' (TDW 294). He is most relieved when he can see once more the 'old world with the rivers and mountain-chains marked according to the Sandhurst rules of map-making' (TDW 294).

By and large late Victorian fiction simply exposed the
fact that nineteenth century European knowledge was not an absolute standard by which everything could be judged. In fictional worlds that are unfamiliar to the European protagonists its premises are challenged, its ideological assumptions are revealed, and its usefulness is questioned. Indeed, in Kipling's "The Bridge-Builders" the engineer Findlayson realizes that, in spite of the 'Findlayson truss' and the 'Findlayson bolted shoe', acres of calculations and 'flights of formulae' (TDW 44), there is no guarantee the bridge he is building will withstand the flood rushing down the Ganges. For 'what man knew Mother Gunga's arithmetic?', he asks himself (TDW 44). Nevertheless, it comes as no surprise that Marlow, confronted by the opacity of the Congo jungle, welcomes the discovery of a scientific manual even though it bears no relation to the task at hand. He ironically claims that the copy of Towson's *An Inquiry into some Points of Seamanship*, sixty years old and full of 'illustrative diagrams and repulsive tables of figures', made him 'forget the jungle and the pilgrims in a delicious sensation of having come upon something unmistakeably real' (HOD 71).

III

Scientific explanations turned object reality into an aesthetic possession: the world could be catalogued and marvelled at, in the manner of Stein's impressive collection of butterflies in *Lord Jim* (LJ 193-5). Simultaneously, however, like Lurgan's mechanical detailing of cultural forms in *Kim* and his Hindu protegé's clinical descriptions of semi-precious stones (K 205-9), scientific explanations emptied culture of meaning and turned it into a soulless inventory of functions. The models of reality offered by nineteenth century science depended on fixing variables, on keeping personal experience and the external world at a distance, on repressing the world's potential subjectivity. In response to
this attitude the narrator of *Marius* complains that 'uncorrected sense gives... a false impression of permanence or fixity in things'; 'it attributes to the phenomena of experience a durability which does not really belong to them. Imaging forth from those fluid impressions a world of firmly outlined objects, it leads one to regard as a thing stark and dead what is in reality full of animation, of vigour, of the fire of life' (*MTE* 108).

For the Victorian scientist, however, life was increasingly but a product of cause and effect, and he or she aimed to use their data and expertise to see into the dim reaches of time, into both the obscurest past and the dimmest future. In order to do so, however, the scientist had to make a certain leap in the dark in their interpretation of data. As Lankester wrote, the method of biology was to assign the 'facts which come under our observation to their causes, or, in other words, to their places in the order of nature'; it was not about the mere 'inspection and cataloguing of objects'.\(^32\) Indeed, biologists should largely be occupied with 'products of the imagination. All true science deals with speculation and hypothesis'; 'our conclusions are no less accurate because they are only probably true'.\(^33\) Victorian scientific discourses tended to privilege internal consistency, an adherence to their premises and initial discriminations, over the objective documentation of actuality. Nature, according to Lankester, must be 'interrogated by questions which already contain the answer she is to give... The observer can only observe that which he is led by hypothesis to look for: the experimenter can only obtain the result which his experiment is designed to obtain'.\(^34\)

Indeed, scientific explanation, despite being a product of the hard rationalism which undermined the biblical vision of the universe, can be seen as but another version of man's 'conception of existence', as Marlow puts it, 'that shelter each of us makes for himself to creep under in moments of danger' (*LJ* 274). In Marlow's vision this 'conception' stems
from a concern for self-preservation rather than from a desire for aggression, and thus the world, 'thanks to our unwearied efforts... is as sunny an arrangement of small conveniences as the mind of man can conceive' (LJ 274).  

W. H. Hudson, a late Victorian and early twentieth century naturalist and writer of fiction, deplored the 'false notion, which classification studied in books invariably produces, that nature marshals her species in a line or row, or her genera in a chain'. Moreover, he was obsessed neither with the mere presentation of semblance nor with discovering every last detail about an object. He consciously worked at a more humanistic or imaginative form of understanding; he wanted to fathom the subjective reality of the object being experienced. In one of his later works, The Book of a Naturalist, he described the act of killing creatures as a means to knowledge, claiming that 'to kill is no profit' for it denies one access to the 'living thing' and its 'common life habits'. The study of corpses prevents an emotional and insightful engagement with the object of interest. Indeed, Hudson reckoned that 'heart and soul' should be 'with the brain in all investigation'. The 'main thing' he noticed after his 'shooting and collecting days' was the

wonderfulness and eternal mystery of life itself; this formative, informing energy - this flame that burns in and shines through the case, the habit, which in lighting another dies, and albeit dying yet endures for ever; and the sense, too, that this flame of life was one, and of my kinship with it in all its appearances, in all organic shapes, however different from the human.  

For him the 'dreary remnants of dead things' displayed in museums were 'profoundly depressing'.  

The act of identification was fundamental for Hudson. He believed that all life on earth was part of one world and that there was therefore a bond between all natural creatures, including human beings. This contrasts with the general nineteenth century attitude, described in Morris' News from Nowhere, which was 'always looking upon everything, except mankind, animate and inanimate - 'nature', as people used to
call it - as one thing, and mankind as another. It was natural to people thinking in this way, that they should try to make 'nature' their slave, since they thought 'nature' was something outside them' (*NFN* 200). As the typically Victorian Time Traveller reckons, in time 'things will move faster and faster towards the subjugation of Nature. In the end, wisely and carefully we shall re-adjust the balance of animal and vegetable life to suit our human needs' (*SSS* 32).

On the other hand, despite his assertion of an identity between all forms of life, Hudson admitted there was a certain natural resistance to this desired kinship, an element to existence which prevented the subjects of his interest from being anything more than objects which he could observe: 'in spite of all our prying into nature's secrets, all our progress and the vast accumulations of knowledge at our disposal, we do not and can never know what an insect knows or feel what it feels'. Sometimes this was also true as regards his fellow humans: Hudson once wrote, in reference to meeting an old woman whilst out walking, that 'this may be nothing but conjecture or fancy, but if she had been a visitor from another world she could not have seemed more strange to me'. The duality of Hudson's response, the man's interest in the 'other' as being something both like himself and yet not like himself, his 'basic respect for [a person's] personhood', his 'openness towards experience' and 'modes of appearance' (Miller 1990 33), involved an acknowledgement of the other's subjectivity, even though this lay in a consciousness to which he did not have access.

IV

Man's desire to organize the world should be seen as part of his desire to organize himself; ethnology, for example, is a practice whereby, in Todorov's formulation, one comes to 'know the other by the self, but also the self by the other'. Indeed, according to Daniel Bivona the 'discourse on the other
is primarily an inadvertent form of self-representation or self-revelation on the part of its producer'. After all, Hegel saw the world as an alienated part of the self, a part which was as yet unknown or unassimilated and, for the purposes of the discourses of Victorian science, man was a material worldly object which required dispassionate examination like everything else.

Jacques Derrida has written that, for ethnology to have been 'born as a science', a 'decentering' must have come about, and he places this birth at a moment when European culture began to feel 'dislocated' and unable to consider itself as the 'culture of reference'. When 'language invaded the universal problematic' 'everything became discourse' (Derrida 1978 280), thereby undermining metaphysics, subjectivity and selfhood. Fact became recast as phenomenon, statement as ideology. On the other hand, because the need 'to be highly organized' was still the 'object of man's existence' (TPODG 61) and because the presence of a 'centre', with or without a metaphysical foundation, 'limit[s] what we might call the play of [a] structure' (Derrida 1978 278), thereby allowing 'anxiety' to be 'mastered' (Derrida 1978 279), the concept of centricity could not simply be rejected by Victorian ethnologists. As Yi-Fu Tuan has put it, the 'illusion of superiority and centrality is probably necessary to the sustenance of culture. When rude encounters with reality shatter that illusion the culture itself is liable to decline'. Moreover, the fiction of a 'centre' gives one the sense that there is still point in the turning world, that objectivity is possible. Consequently, 'whether he wants to or not, ... the ethnologist accepts into his discourse the premises of ethnocentrism at the very moment when he denounces them' (Derrida 1978 282).

In Kipling's "Without Benefit of Clergy" an English civilian (Holden) and an Indian woman (Ameera) live together in a corner of the city where their miscegenetic act will go unnoticed by his colleagues and friends. She is profoundly superstitious, he more pragmatic, yet very much an adherent to
social convention. Towards the end of the story, Ameera and their son catch cholera and die. Elliot Gilbert, in his analysis of the story, writes that

comparatively primitive people turn to ritual as a means of ordering the physical universe. They long to control the forces of life, and in their elaborate ceremonies they often seem to be presenting to the universe models of behaviour in the hope that the universe will comply and shape itself a little closer to their desires. More sophisticated men, on the other hand, who have surer if less dramatic methods of dealing with nature, nevertheless persist in their own adherence to ritual, not so much because they think it will help them to organize the universe as because they hope that it will help them to establish a little order in themselves.

The two reasons for ritual offered by Gilbert seem appropriate not only for the distinction between Ameera and Holden but also for the complex presentation of imperialism in late Victorian fiction. On the level of the individual and their experience, the latter reason applies: Hummil, Spurstow, Lowndes and Mottram persist in their weekly card-game in Kipling's "At the End of the Passage" in order to see fellow Englishmen and not to forget their cultural identity. In general, Europeans in India tried not only to congregate when possible but also to maintain a barrier against the vast and chaotic tide of Indian life they saw around them by incorporating an array of rituals and conventions into their daily life.

However, as regards the individual and his desire, or the activity of a society in general, the first reason is more apt. In "The Man who would be King" the freebooting Dravot considers that his mastery of the tropes of freemasonry have confirmed his authority in the remote and unexplored land of Kafiristan, that he really has become a descendant of Alexander the Great. On a wider level, British imperialism frequently justified its activities by the motive of bringing the light of civilization to dark and heathen places and by attempting to impose good conduct on others and to bring order to the universe by its own example. Indeed, according to the
cultural critic J. A. Hobson, 'imperialism has been floated on a sea of vague, shifty, well-sounding phrases which are seldom tested by close contact with fact'.

Much late Victorian fiction aimed to represent human desire and human experience, to narrate the problematic tale of man's life, his engagement with himself and with the world. Because, however, the world, except in its ideal manifestation, was either alienated from man or at least resistant to his desire to know it thoroughly, there arose a desire for knowledge about the self, for a certain fixity and coherence within the self which could be used to counter the uncertainties outside it. Furthermore, when or if the world's resistance was acknowledged, it tended to be imaged in a positive way to enable the subject to take up an oppositional stance against it. Because the inexplicable which one needed to and could not explain was self-destroying, the self was strengthened by a discourse founded on a distinction, separation and balance between self and other. As Frederic Jameson has summed it up, the other is not feared because he is evil; 'rather, he is evil because he is Other, alien, different, strange, unclean, and unfamiliar'. Or, as Wilde wrote in reference to the English artist, although he flourishes best under conditions that are supportive, he 'gains something by being attacked. His individuality is intensified. He becomes more completely himself' (TAAC 274).

The solidification of one's identity is, of course, a partial victory; it gives the illusion of security, of self-preservation; it is a defiant response to a world over which one can never attain mastery. But an oppositional discourse is very incomplete, for it only acknowledges that part of the world which affects the self, and which the subject can actively place in opposition to itself. Therefore, the detail that is in opposition to the self is actually dictated or determined by the self; it is part of the subject's perception of his or her own identity.

Much late Victorian imperialist fiction oscillates between acknowledging total ignorance about the foreign
countries experienced by its protagonists and claiming great knowledgeability about them on a level which suggests that making sense of the country, being able to organize it conceptually, is more important than actually knowing it. As Isaiah Berlin has put it,

to understand is to perceive patterns. To offer historical explanations is not merely to describe a succession of events, but to make it intelligible; to make intelligible is to reveal the basic pattern; not one of several possible patterns, but the one unique pattern which, by being as it is, fulfils only one particular purpose, and consequently is revealed as fitting in a specifiable fashion within the single 'cosmic' over-all schema which is the goal of the universe, the goal in virtue of which alone it is a universe at all, and not a chaos of unrelated bits and pieces. ... The more inevitable an event or an action or a character can be exhibited as being, the better it has been understood... the nearer we are to the one ultimate truth.

This attitude is profoundly anti-empirical.\(^{53}\)

Furthermore, although many protagonists are at times overwhelmed by their experience, lost for words, they often project that experience onto the object reality itself. 'Knowledge' is actually enabled by the denial of experience; the resistance offered by an object reality is either effaced or written into a discourse wherein it is opposed and inferior to the category of self.

Indeed, according to Said, the discourse of orientalism is governed by, in addition to the role of experience, a 'battery of desires, repressions, investments, and projections' which attempt to subdue the Orient and cancel out its hostility (Said 1995 8). Moreover, as André Gide observed in a footnote on the subject of the European treatment of their African servants, 'experience rarely teaches us anything. A man uses everything he comes across to strengthen him in his own opinion and sweeps everything into his net to prove his convictions... No prejudice so absurd but finds its confirmation in experience'.\(^{54}\)

Ironically, it is the apparent resistance or unfamiliarity of the object reality which enables the subject to demarcate its attributes as other. Henry Morton Stanley,
without thinking twice, wrote in his African journal that 'this enormous void, blank as it is, has a singular fascination for me'. He deliberately emptied the landscape of its features and inhabitants and then wrote that 'never has white paper possessed such charm for me as this has, and I have already mentally peopled it, filled it with the most wonderful pictures of towns, villages, rivers, countries, and tribes - all in the imagination...'. Moreover, it is because the Congo region was uncharted territory on the map Marlow looked at as a child that it was a 'blank space of delightful mystery' for him, a 'white patch for a boy to dream gloriously over' (HOD 33).

The distant continent for Victorians was always to a certain extent a site of fantasy. Indeed, as Thomas Richards has observed, 'an empire is partly a fiction... a nation in overreach'. On the other hand, the Victorian discourses of knowledge and assertion tended to appropriate the external world in name only; moreover, the power the finger had on the map bore little relation to the power it exercised on the ground. The relationship between the discursive symbols differed from the connections between the genuine facts, even though the symbolic relationship often became the justification for actual political praxis. In other words, as much as the scientific or political discourses tried to fix, delimit and contain the world, they often made it more menacing for being but partly known, for having drawn attention to the limits of European knowledge and the gap between the assumed power of the European subject and reality.

By the time Marlow has grown up, the Congo has ceased to be a 'blank space' (HOD 33). Nevertheless, although explorers like Stanley had charted the region and trading companies had moved in to exploit whatever they could, the Congo had not offered up all its secrets; indeed, it had become a 'place of darkness' (HOD 33). The problem for historical (and fictional) Europeans in Africa and India was their reliance upon an incomplete blend of fact and imputation which excused their failure to know all by the labels of blankness, mystery,
magic and evil which were attributed to the aspects of the world the protagonists did not understand. Looking just at the imagery of blankness, often in Kipling India is, 'great, grey, formless' (K 143). In Flora Annie Steel's *On the Face of the Waters* the sub-continent is 'stagnant! - featureless! - A dead sea! - A mere waste of waters without form or void'.\(^{58}\) The African jungle appears 'almost featureless' to Marlow; it has an 'aspect of monotonous grimness... so dark-green as to be almost black' (HOD 39); it is the 'heart of darkness' (HOD 68). The imperialist assumption is not that Marlow or any other narrator is incapable of describing the strange land; the fundamental characteristic of that land is that there is nothing to describe. It is barren and empty, especially in comparison to the self which is a plenitude of richness, culture, ideas and feelings. That the narrator sometimes feels horror means not an undermining of his or her sense of selfhood but simply that the object is horrible.

'Only the visitor... has a viewpoint,' Tuan has written; 'the native, by contrast, has a complex attitude derived from his immersion in the totality of his environment' (Tuan 1974 63). The 'viewpoint' enables a degree of descriptive mastery because it allows the foreigner to replace incomprehension by simplification, a selection of detail dictated by his or her vision of the world.\(^{59}\) The 'visitor's evaluation of environment' is therefore 'essentially aesthetic'; 'the outsider judges by appearance' (Tuan 1974 64). Place becomes a ''known unknown'' (Davis 1987 55), with a superficial fixity; it becomes represented by a set of archetypal images with symbolic freight. The imagery of Conrad's early fiction falls into the nexi of jungle, river, sea, sun and ship; Kipling's 'India' is divided into plains, hills, and the cities, encampments and stations where the British are able to make their presence felt. In this way, although the country is still by and large unknown, mountains and deserts unexplored, cities labyrinths wherein 'each man's house is as guarded and as unknowable as the grave' (*PTFTTH* 167) and customs darkly mysterious, it is still able to be
'represented'. As Nietzsche put it, 'appearance is an arranged and simplified world, at which our practical instincts have been at work; it is perfectly true for us; that is to say, we live, we are able to live in it: proof of its truth for us...'; it is contained both by our 'logic' and by our 'psychological prejudices' (TWTP 306).

Under strict empirical determinations late Victorians were obliged to recognize that the unknown was not blank but already occupied; the problem lay with the inquiring subject and not with the nature of things. In the discourse of imperialism territory was colonized, but only within the framework of what was already there; it was neither mastered nor transformed. As Kipling wrote, 'underneath our excellent administrative system... runs wholly untouched and unaffected the life of the peoples of the land'; 'immediately outside of our own English life, is the dark and crooked and fantastic, and wicked: and awe-inspiring life of the 'native''. Indeed, Steel, in Miss Stuart's Legacy, made the ineffectuality of British rule even clearer:

Outside the parallelograms of white roads centred by brown stretches of stubbly grass, and bordered by red and blue houses wherein the European residents of Faizapore dwelt after their kind, and our poor Belle lay dreaming, a very different world had been going on its way placidly indifferent, not to her only, but to the whole colony of strangers within its gates. The great plains, sweeping like a sea to the horizon, had been ploughed, sown, watered, harvested: children had been born, strong men had died, crimes had been committed, noble acts done; and of all this not one word had reached the alien ears.

The European attempt at geometric order for their 'station' with its clear lines and colours stands in defensive opposition to the vaster ebb and flow of Indian life.

The partial knowledge of the British administration in India can be contrasted with the power and authority over natives attained by Kurtz and Kipling's policeman Strickland. The former owes his power to his ability to be both at one with the natives and different; the latter, by being English and disguising himself in native dress, is able to solve all
manner of dark crimes. Whereas Kurtz's tribe 'adored him' (HOD 94-5), 'natives hated Strickland'; nevertheless, 'they were afraid of him. He knew too much'.\(^6\) This dual identity of both men offers them a form of complete knowledge (simultaneously internal and external) which is convertible into total control.

V

The increasingly obvious fraudulence of much purported representation (and not just in imperialist texts) moved late Victorian writers either to strengthen the representational pretences of their work by adopting the techniques of naturalism (or a more unstinting realism) or to move towards centring the novel in the impressions of the world received by human subject. Significantly, both late Victorian naturalism and impressionism show evidence of an increased use of adjectives, a fact which suggests a narratorial need to describe and a defamiliarized world. The 'dream' in works which use many adjectives may be that of the 'natural object's surrender of its properties to the analytical observer' and consequently the 'maximal exploitation' of the object, but the tone is often self-protective or fraught with difficulty rather than confident in its mastery.\(^6\) After all, 'adjectivally-rendered reality is reality that has lost its self-evidence and calls out for interpretation' (Coates 1988 72). Moreover, if there is, according to Sandison, in the works of Kipling, Conrad and John Buchan 'still a occasional glimpse of nostalgia for the object, what is much more obvious is their fear of it, and the aggressiveness of the Hegelian spirit is now seen to derive from a defensiveness which admits not just a lack of confidence in the outcome of the engagement but a despairing realization that the battle is all' (Sandison 1967 58).

Under these conditions late Victorian narratives became less descriptions of an object reality than representations of
the subject's experience of that object reality, the process of creating form out of matter. As Pater wrote about art criticism, 

''to see the object as in itself it really is,' has been justly said to be the aim of all true criticism whatever; and in aesthetic criticism the first step towards seeing one's object as it really is, is to know one's own impression as it really is, to discriminate it, to realize it distinctly' (WPTMT 71).64

Even though, for Pater, things 'have really changed their nature in the very moment in which we see and touch them' (MTE 108) and thus 'all fixed knowledge [is] impossible' (MTE 109), one is in contact with one's experience, and the subject's need to make sense of the world for their own preservation imposes a shape on this experience. Despite the clouds of adjectives and negative descriptions (not this... not that) which generate the nebulous atmosphere of Heart of Darkness, Marlow (or Conrad) does have it under control. The African jungle may have been 'sheer mass, ponderous and inchoate... its murky contours shifting within uncertain boundaries', but Marlow has managed to represent his impressions of it, and it is these which come to define the jungle.65 The confusion of the experience has been replaced by the confusion of the jungle. Moreover, Marlow's impressions have been aestheticized to make them the 'culminating point of [his] experience' (HOD 32) and, in this process, adjectives have served to 'buffer the immediate shock of the experience of the object' (Coates 1988 71). By using them, art 'domesticates' the dangerous world (Coates 1988 71).

This type of fiction does not simply misrepresent object realities but, finding the object reality difficult to engage with in its essence, concentrates on the experience and perceptions of the narrator/perceiver which, when placed in a structured narrative context, conform to the subject's need to make sense of the world. The impressions either find an aesthetic order in their confusion or displace their own bewilderment onto the object reality which consequently
becomes chaotic, menacing, and other.

According to Conrad, however, it never occurs to the novelist that a book is actually a 'deed, that the writing of it is an enterprise as much as the conquest of a colony'. Art, it seems, is not actually to do with experience; indeed, it is only by denying experience that the verbal art which is fiction can be made. In the words of Schiller man, in his capacity as artist, 'gives form to matter when he annuls time..., when he affirms persistence within change, and subjugates the manifold variety of the World to the unity of his own Self'.

This attitude is borne out by Thomas Mann's young writer, Tonio Kröger, who believes that 'one must die to life in order to be utterly a creator'; 'nobody but a beginner imagines that he who creates must feel'. He agrees with his friend, the novelist Adalbert, who resents the onset of spring because one cannot 'get hold of a single sensible idea' (TK 151). 'Can you sit still', he asks, and 'work out even the smallest effect, when your blood tickles till it's positively indecent and you are teased by a whole host of irrelevant sensations that when you look at them turn out to be unworkable trash?' (TK 151). For Tonio the 'artist must be unhuman, extra-human; he must stand in a queer aloof relationship to our humanity'; only then is he in a position to 'represent it, to present it, to portray it to good effect' (TK 152). Like Derrida's ethnologist, Tonio's artist looks for a place outside the game. The 'literary man', according to Tonio, labours under the impression that, 'if the whole world could be expressed, it would be saved, finished and done' (TK 158). He does not understand that 'life may go on living, unashamed, even after it has been expressed and therewith finished' (TK 158). For Tonio's literary man literature is to make sense out of life, to cure man of his complex experience, to serve as a sort of 'mild revenge on life' for those with 'fine souls in uncouth bodies' (TK 159).

On the other hand, Tonio dissociates himself from the 'vain and frigid charlatan' (TK 158) which many a literary man
becomes. Literary men are for him 'daemons, kobolds, impious monsters, and spectres dumb with excess of knowledge' (TK 159); they are 'proud cold beings who adventure upon the paths of great and daemonic beauty and despise 'mankind'' (TK 190). There is something exciting about their quest to create art and to bend the universe to their will, but Tonio finds it difficult to accommodate this facet of himself with his 'love of the human, the living and usual' (TK 190), reality in its everyday non-organized state.

Tonio's dilemmas apart, late nineteenth century fiction was invigorated, if not made vital, by the development of an aesthetic which freed literary works from pretending to document the external world. Fiction increasingly became acknowledged as an art form with laws of its own, which proposed worlds that did not exist in any referential relationship with reality but simply conformed with various structures of thought existent in the reader's consciousness and imagination. Art became a question not of giving form to matter, but of presenting invention as reality, and thus 'activity, that same ceaseless, voracious activity which had been for Hegel the essence of spirit, becomes the chief instrument of illusion' (Sandison 1967 59).

If nothing actual is being represented, and if the late nineteenth century author is to a certain extent an impious 'monster', a figure separated from the rest of humanity and someone who forces the reader to enter the world of his or her choosing rather than trying to ascribe to communal notions of reality, then the adjectival style which once sought to track down and investigate an elusive external reality becomes a means of individualizing the fictional world offered by the late Victorian text. It becomes, as indeed does the creation of the fictional world in general, a sign of the writer's authority. While Coates has related the appearance of the adjectival style to a fear of the homogeneity of mass-produced objects in an industrialized society (Coates 1988 70), his realistic vision of fiction has led him to feel that this stylistic development began to make reality disappear 'behind
an ornamentative growth of adjectives outnumbering nouns' and 'stunning' verbs (Coates 1988 72). Ornament, however, is actually constitutive of the reality of the text and aspirations to any external representation are illusory. For late Victorians such as Ruskin, Morris and Wilde ornamentation was not an artistic addendum to an object fairly much complete already, it was part and parcel of that object's identity. As Pater wrote, the 'form, [the] mode of handling, should become an end in itself, should penetrate every part of the matter' (WPTMT 156).

VI

In the above scenarios late nineteenth century fiction, whether influenced by the developments of the human sciences or by ideas from Romantic philosophy, became, by its concern for order, a means of enhancing life. But art also redeems man from mere biological existence simply by enabling him to get 'as many pulsations as possible into the given time', a feat which can be achieved by 'poetic passion, the desire for beauty, the love of art for its own sake' (WPTMT 220). Art, indeed, according to Pater, 'comes to you proposing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your moments as they pass, and simply for those moments' sake' (WPTMT 220). This latter conceptualization of art distinguishes art from the products of the more materialistic discourses of knowledge; indeed, it seems to lead the human subject away from the end-relatedness of the material world and towards a more moment-by-moment elevation and enjoyment. As Conrad more realistically put it, the aim of art is to 'arrest, for the space of a breath, the hands busy about the work of the earth, and compel men entranced by the sight of distant goals to glance for a moment at the surrounding vision of form and colour, of sunshine and shadows; to make them pause for a look, for a sigh, for a smile' (TNOTN li). Art should convey 'all the truth of life' (TNOTN li); it should not merely be
the fictional record of man's relative ability to establish or
deduce some sort of order in the world.

Significantly, the post-Darwinian explosion of knowledge
in the second half of the nineteenth century was swiftly
followed by, or engendered, a revival of spirituality and an
interest in the metaphysical. According to John Lester, in
the late nineteenth century 'reason became narrowed, hardened,
crystallized out into a single, rigorously disciplined faculty -
crystallized out, in short, into the scientific method as
the sole source of 'a sound view of the world'.' My
contention is that fiction, as much as it embraced the new
discourses of science and knowledge for offering ways of
rejuvenating the increasingly tired and routine sociology and
individualism of Victorian realism, was also suspicious of the
reification of the individual (and society and culture) that
these discourses offered.

On the other hand, the dominance of the 'scientific'
discourses decreed that 'spiritual aspirations fell 'quite
outside the province of rational belief'' (Lester 1968 26).
Nevertheless, a number of writers and other Victorians found
some kind of solace in the discourses that defied the new
information: the supernatural, folklore and the Catholic
Church. Huysmans' Durtal, although fictional and French,
stands in well for the disaffected late nineteenth century
Victorian intellectual. His main criticism of naturalism is
that naturalism rejects 'every ideal' (DT 8) in its absurd
pursuit of the real, and he is concerned that an 'unsatisfied
need for the supernatural was driving people, in default of
something loftier, to spiritism and the occult' (DT 11).
Indeed, much of the new genre fiction of the late nineteenth
century had a strong interest in the supernatural, be it in
ghost stories, science fiction, or imperial romances. Writers
as diverse as Wilde, Kipling, Henry James and Wells wrote
stories with occult or uncanny elements.

Durtal's own preference, however, is for a 'spiritual
naturalism', a novel that would combine the element of the
soul with that of the body, and these ought to be
'inextricably bound together as in life' (DT 10). Furthermore, despite having 'no faith' and being scared of letting himself go, 'trustingly, without reserve, into the sheltering shadows of immutable dogma' (DT 16), he acknowledges that if religion was 'without foundation it was also without limit and promised a complete escape from earth into dizzy, unexplored altitudes' (DT 17). It offers a refuge for his soul, which is 'torn with earthly conflict' and wearied by the 'repeated annoyances of existence' (DT 16). Durtal is also attracted to the Church by its 'intimate and ecstatic art, the splendour of its legends, and the radiant naïveté of the histories of its saints' (DT 17). He is seduced by the sense of tradition, the apparently organic relationship between the religious institution and the mystical folklore of the past.

Whereas the discourses of science were stressing the power of knowledge, the discourses of spiritualism (and thus also of fiction) began to lay emphasis on unknowns. Durtal 'did not believe, and yet he admitted the supernatural'; like Van Helsing (D 230) he considers that 'right here on earth' man is 'hemmed in by mystery' and that it is 'really the part of shallowness to ignore those extra-human relations' and to attribute anything unforeseen to fate (DT 17). This kind of late nineteenth century desire or need for mystery popularized the 'doctrine of Mysticism', a creed which presented its adherents 'not with an explanation of any mystery, but with a theory of life which makes us familiar with mystery'.

According to Symons, 'mystery is no longer feared... We are coming closer to nature, as we seem to shrink from it with something of horror, disdaining to catalogue the trees of the forest'. Humanity is closer to the world in which it lives when it refrains from trying to know, analyse and master it.

For Symons the literary movement which responded most creatively to these requirements was symbolism, which he saw as an 'attempt to spiritualize literature, to evade the old bondage of rhetoric, the old bondage of exteriority.
Description is banished that beautiful things may be evoked, magically'. Symbolism appealed to a set of narratives or relationships deeply and organically rooted in the human consciousness which had apparently been suppressed, reorganized, or reified by the more demanding or rationalist discourses of society and knowledge. It found its timeless and schematic 'forms' in the symbolic patterns of human experience revealed in myths, folk literature, dreams, ancient epics and communally written fairy-tales. It presented the world in different forms, relationships, combinations and hierarchies to conventional structures; it embodied a belief not in 'objects as objects', as addressed by scientists and materialists, but in objects as 'symbols replete with connotative significance, [as] locales of exchange between the visible and invisible worlds'. As Symons put it, symbolism established the 'links which hold the world together'; it affirmed the 'eternal, minute, intricate, almost invisible life, which runs through the whole universe'. The artist, in Conrad's words, speaks to 'our sense of pity, and beauty, and pain; to the latent feeling of fellowship with all creation' (TNOTN xlviii).

On the other hand, the stress on mystery also allowed fiction to be exploratory in mode, thus imitating the scientific and imperialist discourses which had attained widespread respectability. Moreover, responding to the need to be revelatory, fiction became able to anticipate and improve on the findings of the (social) sciences, just as those discourses had 'claimed' realist fiction as an outmoded version of their own activities. Alternatively, fiction could oppose naïve positivist conclusions and desires with empirical situations which undermined them, and could argue against wanton exploration by revealing base acquisitive and capitalist motives. *Heart of Darkness* both takes the reader deep into the dark continent and denounces imperialist exploitation; many of Wells' stories are both thrilled by the expectations of technological progress and cautionary tales about the irresponsibility of scientific meddling.
Fictional works of the late Victorian period seem torn between different genres and between opposing thematic concerns: realistic modes often present fantastic situations; elaborate styles often come to terms with the everyday. For such writers it was a case of being unable to ignore the persistent and pervasive changes in the modern world, and of trying to find a means of fictional representation that was both new and consistent with literary tradition.

Whereas the Victorian 'archive' of knowledge and its agents aspired towards completeness, many writers of fiction made it their business to draw attention to issues the sciences had glossed over: they opened up old quandaries, found a vitality in incompleteness, in what remained unknown, and were determined to pursue it to their advantage. They reasserted that the truths of fiction were those one felt aware of but could not readily or fully articulate, those that involved an imaginative leap towards meaning by author and reader. As Regeneration (a work published anonymously in answer to Nordau's Degeneration) declared,

Science... when asked, Where is truth? Where is the ideal? could only point to a pile of facts laboriously built up like a brick wall, and had to confess that what it wished to give instead of religion was mere speculations. The ultimate conclusion it pointed to was selfishness, irresponsibility, and a mere animal existence. It failed entirely to satisfy the great moving power in the scheme of humanity - emotions - and could not therefore satisfy human yearnings and aspirations.  

On more literary grounds Haggard complained at the 'pestilent accuracy of the geographer' which was ruining the field for writers of romances, while Andrew Lang wrote that

as the visible world is measured, mapped, tested, weighed, we seem to hope more and more that a world of invisible romance may not be far from us... The ordinary shilling tales of 'hypnotism' and mesmerism are vulgar trash enough, and yet I can believe that an impossible romance, if the right man wrote it in the right mood, might still win us from the newspapers, and the stories of shabby love, and cheap remorses, and commonplace failures.
Fiction thrives on the gaps between the fragments of information it provides rather than depending wholly on the fragments themselves. Authorial manipulation of these 'gaps' creates drama and suspense: it involves the reader in the machinations of plot and discourse. The excitement of Dr Jekyll's experiments is that their results seemingly lie just beyond the achievements and knowledge of contemporary medicine and psychology; "The Turn of the Screw" gains its power from the 'central informational gap' as to whether or not the ghosts are real and from the tale's 'mutually exclusive systems of clues designed to fill it in'. Both stories occupy the realm of informed fantasy, and informed fantasy, at once self-conscious, perceptive and creative, is as close to reality as the fiction of any age gets without losing its status as fiction.
CHAPTER TWO:

THE HUMAN SUBJECT (I)

While much late Victorian fiction sought to present simplified images of the world, a substantial body of work showed an interest in the complication or collapse of this type of vision. This more self-conscious fiction tended to balance homogenizing generalizations with a close attention to the specific, addressing itself to variety, the moment, and the individual. For many of these writers vision was but a feature of the individual rather than an all-encompassing outlook on reality. Moreover, these writers saw their task as trying to articulate the experience of the individual, thus finding for fiction a role that was not yet occupied by the discourses of knowledge and still different from the 'baggy monsters' of previous decades. Authors became interested in narratives of the self rather than in documents of social reality.

Writers of fiction found that the best way to counter a discourse that objectified people was to turn them into subjects. Consequently, they sought to present protagonists through their perceptions, through their narration or through
their centres of consciousness rather than through description, and to encourage in the reader a sympathetic, identificatory relationship with the fictional figures as opposed to a detached appreciation of them. Texts became shorter in length, some focusing upon an individual protagonist or a 'fragment of human life in a state of tension and crisis', a 'situation' rather than a 'sequence of situations', to such an extent that they are often no more than tales or novellas.²

Late Victorian fiction tends to investigate the individual's understanding of the primal relationship between self and not-self (or world), the position of the individual in relation to society rather than the function of the individual in society. Indeed, in this fiction individuality is very often conceived of as a necessary expression of selfish personal will which runs counter to, and hence is opposed by, the cohesive forces of society: it is a question of 'Man versus the State' (AMU 20). The less egotistical human subject has at best an ambivalent relationship with society; for them society is both self and not-self. At the bottom of the conceptual order in late Victorian fiction is the mass-man, the member of the herd who, either silently or vociferously, endorses the conventions, aspirations and realities upheld by society. According to Wells, the 'modern' insistence on individuality and the 'significance of its uniqueness... intensifies the value of freedom'; 'only the dead things, the choiceless things, live in absolute obedience to law' (AMU 20).

However, while 'free play for one's individuality is... the subjective triumph of existence', Wells also recognized that 'man is a social creature' (AMU 20) and thus even in an ideal world of fully developed individuals 'liberty is a compromise between our own freedom of will and the wills of those with
whom we come into contact' (AMU 21). If late Victorian fiction became increasingly interested in the intricate position and composition of the individual, it was perhaps to compensate for the impersonal approach of contemporary sociology with its use of statistics and categories and its construction of concepts of normality. As Hobson wrote, for sociologists 'society is dependent upon a certain homogeneity of character, interests, and sympathies of those who form it' (I 165). Indeed, as Holmes paraphrases Winwood Reade,

while the individual man is an insoluble puzzle, in the aggregate he becomes a mathematical certainty. You can, for example, never foretell what any one man will do, but you can say with precision what an average number will be up to. Individuals vary, but percentages remain constant. So says the statistician. (CSH 137)

This type of rationalization had its origins in Romantic idealism as much as in a concern for public health or social stability. Schiller reckoned that since experience never shows us 'human nature as such, but only individual human beings in individual situations, we must endeavour to discover from all these individual and changing manifestations that which is absolute and unchanging...

True, this transcendental way will lead us out of the familiar circle of phenomenal existence, away from the living presence of things, and cause us to tarry for a while upon the barren and naked land of abstractions. But we are, after all, struggling for a firm basis of knowledge which nothing will shake. And he who never ventures beyond actuality will never win the prize of truth. This hyper-positivist method, however, can work 'only by... treating uniques as identically similar objects in this respect or that' (AMU 233), and for Wells such classification was a 'departure from the objective truth of things' (AMU 228) because it aimed to ignore individual attributes through an emphasis on quantity and the law of averages. Wells rejected the logic of aggregatory processes because they regard the mind as an 'instrument of knowledge' which 'persists in handling even such openly negative terms as the Absolute, the
Infinite, as though they were real existences' (AMU 232).

Wells considered that 'only finite things can know or be known' (AMU 233). Indeed, he thought the obsession with 'aggregatory ideas' and 'classificatory suggestions' was one of the 'chief vices of human thought' (AMU 190). For 'it is not averages that exist, but individuals' (AMU 196), and the 'fertilizing conflict of individualities is the ultimate meaning of the personal life' (AMU 8). 'The necessity for marking out classes has brought with it a bias for false and excessive contrast' (AMU 190), he wrote, and the 'natural tendency of every human being towards a stupid conceit in himself and his kind, a stupid depreciation of all unlikeness, is traded upon by [a] bastard science' (AMU 194). (Holmes, of course, unlike the 'conventional' (CSH 27) detectives from Scotland Yard, avoids the blindness of prejudice by combining his sociological or criminological approach with a most careful study of the individual evidence provided by the crime scene; for him there is 'nothing more deceptive than an obvious fact' (CSH 204).)

Man, Wells claimed, has a 'desire to assert his individual differences... for distinction' (AMU 188). No matter how intense or comprehensive the aggregatory affiliations, there is a natural barrier even between humans of the same nation, race, class, or gender which enforces sensations of individuality; all humans are to a certain extent unknown to each other, whether inside or outside the perceived social community. As Conrad's Marlow says, it is 'impossible' even to 'convey the life-sensation of any given epoch of one's existence - that which makes its truth, its meaning - its subtle and penetrating essence. ... We live, as we dream - alone...' (HOD 57).

If the 'life-sensation' is inexpressible by the individual who experienced it, then it is most definitely beyond the reach of an external observer. Indeed, the 'part of the inexplicable should be allowed for in appraising the conduct of men in a world where no explanation is final', according to Conrad; 'everything that falls under the judgment
of our imperfect senses' is 'deceptive' (APR 35). This vision of reality dominates the world of Lord Jim. Brierly's chief officer, in telling Marlow of the night his Captain jumped overboard, claims that 'we never know what a man is made of' (LJ 86). Towards the end of the novel Doramin, trying to guess at the intentions of Gentleman Brown, reflects on the same sentiment, telling his council that 'there was no more reading of hearts than touching the sky with the hand' (LJ 334). 'How am I to understand?' Jewel asks Marlow (LJ 275), and what Jim has been unable to tell her comes from a way of life and an identity from which he has dissociated himself and which would never be believed in Patusan where they know he is 'not afraid of anything' (LJ 323). 'It is impossible to see [Jim] clearly', even for Marlow; 'the language of facts... [is] so often more enigmatic than the craftiest arrangement of words' (LJ 293). One can make an effort to interpret them, but

it is when we try to grapple with another man's intimate need that we perceive how incomprehensible, wavering, and misty are the beings that share with us the sight of the stars and the warmth of the sun. It is as if loneliness were a hard and absolute condition of existence; the envelope of flesh and blood on which our eyes are fixed melts before the outstretched hand, and there remains only the capricious, unconsolable and elusive spirit that no eye can follow, no hand can grasp. (LJ 175)

According to Marius, 'of other people we cannot truly know even the feelings'; 'common experience' is aesthetic, 'only a fixity of language' (MTE 113). In Gabriele D'Annunzio's The Triumph of Death Giorgio complains to Ippolita that, 'like every other human being, you carry a whole world in you, into which I cannot enter'; 'the soul is incommunicable' and thus 'even in our supremest raptures we are and remain apart - solitary'. The 'father of the house' in Hudson's futuristic fantasy, A Crystal Age, wonders at the 'unfathomable mysteries of a being compounded of flesh and spirit'; Durkheim saw the human capacity for feeling as an 'insatiable and bottomless abyss'; Haggard came to consider
that the 'spirit of man' was like an iceberg, with 'four-fifths of [its] bulk beneath the water'.^ 'Dissection presupposes a corpse' (TTOD 8), remarks Ippolita in relation to her lover's restless tendency to 'pick [his] thoughts to pieces' (TTOD 7); one is reminded of Hudson's abandonment of shooting and collecting specimens in order to engage with the 'living thing', the 'eternal mystery of life itself'.^ As the narrating mind comments on the white whale in Moby Dick, 'dissect him how I may, then, I but go skin deep; I know him not, and never will'.

Ishmael's conclusion is influenced by both science and folklore; so too are the reflections of Chief Inspector Heat when confronted by the 'heap of nameless fragments', the material stuff of humanity, on the mortuary slab in The Secret Agent. While his 'calm face' peers at the table with the 'trained faculties of an excellent investigator' his mind is beset by the 'inexplicable mysteries of conscious existence' (TSA 88). Science, indeed, cannot say definitely whether man is, as Watson suggests, a 'soul concealed in an animal' (CSH 137), or whether, as Jekyll suspects, the 'seemingly so solid body' has but a 'trembling immateriality', a 'mist-like transience', and is a malleable product of consciousness. For some late nineteenth century writers man was individualized by his or her individual corporeal form and joined to their fellow humans by the identificatory capabilities of consciousness; for others the body was the sign of man's bond with (or imprisonment by) society and the mind the means of their separation (be that alienation or liberation).

Ultimately, as Holmes opines, man is a 'strange enigma' (CSH 137). Wilde, addressing Lord Alfred Douglas in De Profundis, claimed that to be entirely free, and at the same time entirely dominated by law, is the eternal paradox of human life that we realize at every moment: and this, I often think, is the only explanation possible of your nature, if indeed for the profound and terrible mysteries of a human soul there is any explanation at all, except one that makes the mystery more
Like so many 'explanations' in late Victorian fiction the implied duality of man is self-consciously inadequate. In one reading Wilde's conjecture contains echoes of Jekyll and Hyde, a neat fantastic division between the civilized being and the wild man; in another it merely suggests the old literary theme of hypocrisy. Either way, both interpretations are dwarfed by a rhetoric which suggests that the 'human soul' is an unresolvable 'mystery', 'marvellous' and exciting for the very fact that it cannot be articulated. However, even if empirical honesty meant that the mistiness enclosing human existence could not be penetrated, or the 'veil' covering it never drawn back, many late Victorian writers felt obliged to assert or suggest the existence of the unknown, despite the necessarily metaphoric nature of their articulation. Assertions, oppositions, private musings, metaphysical digressions and clouds of adjectives are ultimately unsatisfactory, but they do draw attention to genuine anomalies, aporias or voids in perceptual experience, and to ignore these difficulties or incompletenesses is to confuse or elide man's state of being with human nature and behaviour.

Nevertheless, the aesthetic duality of man recalls the civilization versus nature, evolution versus ethics, debates which were central to the late Victorian understanding of human identity. Haggard's Quatermain writes about the thin 'veneer' of civilization covering the far more substantial 'savage portions' of European man (AQ 7). For him 'in all essentials the savage and the child of civilization are identical' (AQ 5); there is no 'great gulf fixed' (AQ 4). On the other hand Quatermain, although asserting that 'human nature is like an iron ring', admits that 'man's cleverness is almost infinite, and stretches like an elastic band' (AQ 6), and T. H. Huxley, although primarily referring to the relationship between Europeans and animals, used the similar distinction of intelligence to reassert the 'vastness of the gulf between civilized man and the brutes'. Whether 'from' the brutes or not, Huxley wrote, civilized man is 'assuredly
not of them'. Huxley committed himself to the view that civilization was an ethical construct rather than an evolutionary product, that the 'ethical life... grows into an independent, self-conscious, self-creating order that justifies itself by reference to its own intellectual ideals' (Huntington 1982 14). Whereas Quatermain (and others) think that civilization has produced a degenerate element in mankind, for Huxley (and others) civilization was the means to social and technological progress.

Wells was careful to delineate a balanced image: for him 'civilized man' was a combination of the 'natural man' and the 'artificial man' (EWSSF 60). Man was both a 'product of natural selection, the culminating ape', a 'type of animal... obstinately unchangeable', and a 'highly plastic creature of tradition, suggestion, and reasoned thought' (EWSSF 60). Even from this cautious perspective Huxley's conception of mind as an epiphenomenon, as a small yet significant element which possibly raises man above simple natural determination, can be taken beyond its concern with civilization. The individual can be considered as an epiphenomenon in relation to society: the individual provides the genius, both per se and in its inventive capacity, whereby the distinction of man from animal can be asserted. Furthermore, the significance of mind as epiphenomenon bears upon the individual's conception of their own identity: it enables a degree of self-realization, self-fabrication and self-determination, factors which allow the individual to rise above the problems of the material world and take his or her place in a more transcendent sphere of spiritual or aesthetic contemplation.

II

On the other hand, according to Wilde, 'people whose desire is solely for self-realization never know where they are going' (TLOOW 488). Although it is 'necessary', the 'first achievement of knowledge' even, to 'know oneself', 'to
recognize that the soul of a man is unknowable... is the ultimate achievement of Wisdom. The final mystery is oneself' (*TLOOW* 488). This opposition, however, engenders a further paradox: it opposes the desire to represent a self distinct from that produced by the discourses of knowledge and culture with the unknowability of the self, which itself is essential in distinguishing the self from constructs of the discourses of knowledge.

Wilde reckoned that 'expression is the only mode under which [an artist] can conceive life at all' (*TLOOW* 481) and claimed that his Art was for him the 'great primal note by which I had revealed, first myself to myself, and then myself to the world' (*TLOOW* 447). Indeed, Wilde hoped there was no gap 'between Art and myself' (*TLOOW* 490); as Hegel had asserted, the 'work of an artist is the consummate fruit of that artist, and reflects precisely what he is, and only what he is, and all that remains behind in the temple of his soul is a naught or nothing'.

But Wilde also admitted that there had grown, since his trial and imprisonment, a 'wide gulf' 'between my art and the world' (*TLOOW* 490). Although he was primarily referring to his demonization in the eyes of the public, there is something created or fictional about Wilde's concept of the self. Indeed, the conceit that 'Art [is] the supreme reality, and life... a mere mode of fiction' blurs whatever boundary there might be between art and life (*TLOOW* 466); Wilde, in his narrative, has made reality a function of the needs of the self. His conclusion seems to be that although what cannot be articulated is to all intents and purposes unknown, its existence should be recognized; conversely, what is articulated is known, but not always true. *De Profundis* shows a clear disjunction between the narrating subject and the identity of 'Wilde' as deducible from the complete text; the Wilde of *De Profundis* is much less in control of his narrative than he thinks he is.

Wilde and Marlow have stable perceiving selves, by means of which they can realize and express a conscious vision of
Yet, at the same time, these selves are flexible and expansive: Marlow can tolerate the failings of Jim and Kurtz, can even sympathize or identify with them; Wilde can avoid despair by believing his suffering to be good for himself and for others. Both, however, put these individual experiences into a wider context: Marlow repeatedly asserts that Jim is 'one of us' (*LJ* 74 etc.), declares that 'all Europe contributed to the making of Kurtz' (*HOD* 86); Wilde inscribes his suffering into the respectable framework of Christian narratives, most specifically into the 'last act of Christ's Passion' (*TLOOW* 478). For the self, although forged in individual experience, is authorized in part by convention, society and communal experience; it is stabilized by being produced or articulated in a communal language. This ultimately makes the self a 'show', even though it does not actually deny that one's 'own reality' is 'what no other man can ever know' (*HOD* 59-60).

This concept of a dualistic human and fictional identity frequently manifests itself in symbolic terms in late Victorian fiction. The reappearance of the double has often been explained by the fact that its main exponents - Henry James, Conrad, Wilde and Stevenson - are figures 'suspended between languages and cultures' (Coates 1988 2). But this fails to understand the appearance of the double as a wider historical phenomenon. Coates points out that, with the increasing socialization of the individual in the nineteenth century, the imagination came to be regarded as a form of compensation (Coates 1988 5-6). The construct of the double is consequently a fantastic or pathological by-product of the split between public and private identities as engendered by the discourses of desire, fiction, capitalism and knowledge. Wilde himself stands as the best example of this: in *De Profundis* he sees himself as hero, poet and martyr, but realizes that in the public imagination of the day he sits 'between Gilles de Retz and the Marquis de Sade' (*TLOOW* 431). Conversely, Dorian Gray has a charming (if somewhat insidious) social persona whilst his private life, as revealed in his
portrait, is full of corruption, decadence and cruelty.

The same split is addressed in *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*. Jekyll's youth was frustrated by the 'almost morbid sense of shame' he felt at having to conceal his 'pleasures' (*DJAMH* 81) from a censorious society in order to preserve and advance his respectability. It is to liberate this private side, to make it autonomous, that he pursues his experiments to separate the elements of his identity. When he succeeds, however, the conflict between the sides of his personality is maintained because they are obliged to compete with each other for possession of the one body.

Henry James was no less direct in some of his tales. "The Private Life" tells of a Lord Mellifont who is 'so conspicuously and uniformly the public character' that the narrator concludes 'he was all public and had no corresponding private life'. When left to his own devices the man disappears into thin air, becomes 'reabsorbed... into the immensity of things' (*TAP* 127). In contrast, Clare Vawdrey is a 'great novelist' (*TAP* 100) who seems to spend all his time uttering 'sound and second-rate' opinions (*TAP* 101) at dinner parties until the narrator discovers the public man's 'other self' (*TAP* 121) hard at creative work in his bedroom at the same time. The narrator concludes that 'the world was vulgar and stupid, and the real man would have been a fool to come out for it when he could gossip and dine by deputy' (*TAP* 130).

Another of James' tales from the 1890s, "The Death of the Lion", starts with Neil Paraday as a fine novelist and as an intensely private man: 'my obscurity protects me' (*TAP* 163), he claims. However, when his most recent novel gets seized upon by *The Empire*, the 'big blundering newspaper' 'proclaim[s] and anoint[s] and crown[s]' him; Paraday finds that his place is assigned to him 'as publicly as if a fat usher with a wand had pointed to the topmost chair' (*TAP* 164-5). The poor man becomes a social sensation and is appropriated by the forceful Mrs Wimbush to be the centre of attention at house and dinner parties. At her country house
(called Prestidge!) he contracts a chill and becomes very ill but, because his interest to Mrs Wimbush is purely as a social commodity (and other celebrated writers are arriving daily), he is ignored. The only copy of a plan of his next work, itself a 'mine of gold, a precious independent work' (*TAP* 162), is lost through careless handling by one of Mrs Wimbush's guests. When Faraday's illness worsens and he dies the reader is left with the implication that it was the neglect of Faraday's private needs that brought about both the death of the individual and the end of his creative output. All that remains is his reputation, which seems likely to be short-lived.

III

Although the late Victorian author was to a certain extent at an intellectual distance from the forces moving society, at the same time he or she was becoming increasingly dependent upon market forces owing to substantial changes in the publishing world. As if to counter this, writers of fiction began to stress the independence of art from other discourses. According to Henry James, the 'good health of an art which undertakes so immediately to reproduce life [i.e. fiction] must demand that it be perfectly free' (*TAOF* 8); I quote again Conrad's dictum that 'every novelist must begin by creating for himself a world' (*NLL* 6). 'Art', claimed Wilde in "The Soul of Man under Socialism", 'should never try to be popular. The public should try to make itself artistic' (*TAAC* 271). Indeed, a 'healthy work of art is one the choice of whose subject is conditioned by the temperament of the artist' and whose 'style recognizes the beauty of the material it employs' (*TAAC* 275). To be an artist, therefore, one has to 'believe absolutely' in oneself, to be absolutely oneself (*TAAC* 273).

An 'unhealthy work of art', by contrast, 'is a work whose style is obvious, old-fashioned, and common, and whose subject is deliberately chosen... because [the artist] thinks that the
public will pay him for it' (TAAC 275). Indeed, as soon as an artist tries to supply the demand of the public, he 'ceases to be an artist' (TAAC 270), for the 'form of government that is most suitable to the artist is no government at all' (TAAC 282). Wilde warns of the 'danger' in interference from Princes, Popes and the People (TAAC 282). The prescriptivism of the first two are historically in decline, but that of the People is in the ascendance. Their authority is a 'thing blind, deaf, hideous, grotesque, tragic, amusing, serious and obscene' (TAAC 283). It is 'aggressive, offensive, and brutalizing' (TAAC 271), and enforces its opinion through a journalism which is obliged, through poverty or other 'unhealthy conditions' (TAAC 277), to 'supply the public with what the public wants' (TAAC 278). Indeed, late Victorian (as opposed to late nineteenth century French) society is 'dominated by Journalism' (TAAC 276) and, as a consequence, 'no country produces such badly written fiction, such tedious, common work in the novel-form, such silly, vulgar plays as England' (TAAC 271).

Art, on the other hand, is the 'most intense form of individualism that the world has known' (TAAC 270) and, because of this, the public are 'afraid of it' (TAAC 272). They are frightened of its capacity to 'disturb... monotony of type, slavery of custom, tyranny of habit, and the reduction of man to the level of a machine' (TAAC 272). The public find Art's 'novelty' and 'Individualism... disintegrating' (TAAC 272) and desire simply that it 'please their want of taste... flatter their absurd vanity... tell them what they have been told before... show them what they ought to be tired of seeing... amuse them... distract their thoughts when they are wearied of their own stupidity' (TAAC 270-1). They consequently try to 'exercise over [art] an authority that is as immoral as it is ridiculous' (TAAC 270). 'Public Opinion' is a 'monstrous and ignorant thing' (TAAC 275), according to Wilde, which exerts its pressure through the buzz-words of ''unintelligible'', ''immoral'', ''exotic'', and ''unhealthy'' (TAAC 274), terms which Wilde interprets as actually meaning
new, true, entrancing, and healthy respectively. The people try to check the 'progress of Art' by comparing it to the 'classics of a country' (TAAC 273), even though to 'measure' art by the 'standard of the past is to measure it by a standard on the rejection of which its real perfection depends' (TAAC 279).

Wilde's argument creates the illusion of an autonomous and independent authorial vision, an assertion that is deconstructed by the realization that this 'vision' is both grounded in cultural desires and anxieties and formulated within a public medium. It is only when authors and readers are experienced in the public discourses of their community that writing and reading can become meaningful activities. Indeed, Huysmans' Durtal re-orientates Wilde's oppositions and denies the existence of the true artist in late nineteenth century society. For him the 'literary man' is either 'thoroughly commercial... spoiled by the public, and drained dry in consequence, but 'successful', or he is 'utterly impossible', part of a class of 'bohemians' who 'cried their wares, aired their genius, and abused their betters' (DT 20). The literary man is obliged to be a member either of the 'café crowd' or of the 'drawing-room company' (DT 20).

For Conrad, Henry James and Wilde, however, illusion seemed the only means by which one could construct reality and upon which one could base one's relationship with the world. Marlow considers that between truth and illusion there is 'so little difference, and the difference means so little' (LJ 207); indeed, illusions are 'visions of remote unattainable truth, seen dimly' (LJ 281). James believed that 'humanity' was 'immense', and 'reality' had a 'myriad forms' (TAOF 10). Similarly, for Dorian Gray man is a being with 'myriad lives and myriad sensations, a complex multiform creature that bore within itself strange legacies of thought and passion' (TPODG 111). Indeed, everything took place 'in the brain' for Wilde (TLOOW 483); with an echo of Marius he claimed that 'things... are in their essence what we choose to make them. A thing is, according to the mode in which one looks at it' (TLOOW 511).
There was no objective reality for Wilde, no truth that was not subjective, no reality beyond that which was perceived: 'the false and the true are merely forms of intellectual existence' (TLOOW 466). 'Everything must come to one out of one's own nature' (TLOOW 448), he asserted; 'nothing seems to me of the smallest value except what one gets out of oneself' (TLOOW 467). It is a way of seizing or maintaining control over one's identity: one must get 'rid of all alien passions, all acquired culture, and all external possessions be they good or evil' (TLOOW 479) and live in the manner that seems to a person 'most suitable for the full realization of his own personality' (TAAC 285).

Just as 'Art' is defined against the demands of 'Public Opinion' in "The Soul of Man", so the individual subject for Wilde was defined against society. Similarly, Marlow intensifies the individual nature of his experiences in the Congo in order to ignore his complicity in common imperialistic enterprise. These assertions reject the sociological and dualistic visions of man in favour of a more personal Romantic construction of identity; both men try to seize total control over their destiny by claiming that one's real self relies upon self-perception alone. Likewise, for Nietzsche the individual was 'something quite new which creates new things, something absolute; all his acts are entirely his own' and he 'derives the value of his acts from himself' (TWTP 403). Self-realization is not a given; it is something that has to be claimed and asserted. 'It is tragic how few people ever 'possess their souls' before they die', wrote Wilde; 'most people are other people. Their thoughts are someone else's opinions, their life a mimicry, their passions a quotation' (TLOOW 479). Henry James distinguished between those beings who are 'finely aware' and the 'stupid, the coarse, and the blind' (TAOTN 62); 'I was inevitably committed, always,' he acknowledged, 'to the superior case' (TAOTN 223). While Nietzsche contrasted the 'great man' with the 'timid' and 'inert' 'herd', Hardy divided people into the 'mentally unquickened, mechanical, soulless; and the living,
throbbing, suffering, vital. In other words into souls and machines, ether and clay'.

Wilde placed the blame for dullness of soul not on nature but on society: he scorned the 'modern type', those who were 'made stupid by education' (TLOOW 485). He, like Christ apparently, could not bear 'dull lifeless mechanical systems that treat people as if they were things, and so treat everybody alike' (TLOOW 485). One immediately senses in this a personal resentment of the British prison system where vitality and changefulness were repressed by the 'inflexible laws of an iron formula' (TLOOW 457). But the sentence has wider ramifications, echoing Nietzsche's ideas on the State's 'enslavement of the individual' through 'morality' (TWTP 387) and Marx's ideas on life under industrial capitalism wherein individuals become increasingly a function of commodity relations. 'All means for the development of production', wrote Marx, 'transform themselves into means of domination over, and exploitation of, the producers; they mutilate the labourer into a fragment of a man, degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine'. Wilde directed his criticism towards the 'blind, mechanical forces of [late Victorian] Society' which, led by Philistines, 'does not recognize dynamic force... either in a man or a movement' (TLOOW 492) and brings about the commodification or rationalization of consciousness.

Conrad was at times even more pessimistic about the nature of society. In "An Outpost of Progress" two incompetent Europeans are sent up the Congo to collect ivory. The narrator, anticipating their failure and deaths, remarks that

few men realize that their life, their very essence of character, their capabilities and their audacities, are only the expression of their belief in the safety of their surroundings. The courage, the composure, the confidence; the emotions and principles; every great and every insignificant thought belongs not to the individual but to the crowd: to the crowd that believes blindly in the irresistible force of its institutions and of its morals, in the power of its police and of its opinion."
'Society, not from any tenderness, but because of its strange needs', had taken care of Kayerts and Carlier, 'forbidding them all independent thought, all initiative, all departure from routine; and forbidding it under pain of death. They could only live on condition of being machines' (TOU 87).

Wilde's remark about 'dull, lifeless... systems' can be taken on a third level. Evolutionary theory had for many turned the universe and its denizens into soulless objects evolving through unalterable yet unpredictable mechanical process. Haggard's protagonists are crushed by the 'great wheel of Fate [which] rolls on like a Juggernaut' (AQ 1); in The Island of Doctor Moreau the narrator refers to a 'blind fate, a vast pitiless mechanism' which seems to cut and shape the 'fabric of existence'; Conrad once described the universe as a vast and 'indestructible' 'knitting machine', the 'most withering thought' about which 'is that the infamous thing has made itself; made itself without thought, without conscience, without foresight, without eyes, without heart'. Wilde, however, by proclaiming the independent perceiving consciousness to be what creates reality from the external world, reasserted a vitality to man's existence that did not rely on the (dead) materialism of scientific progress or imperial activity. His vision considered civilization to be a product of man's consciousness of his own existence and of the existence of others rather than the structure which determines them, as proposed by the discourses of science. As Marius considers, it is 'easier to conceive of the material fabric of things as but an element in a world of thought... than of mind as an element... in a world of matter' (MTE 211).

IV

Despite these arguments some authors, noticeably writers of imperialist fiction, were more equivocal about the benefits of consciousness. Although Conrad accepted that consciousness
made life thrilling, passionate and vital, he also recognized that the irrepressible role of consciousness as a mediator between the subject and the world introduced both solipsism and relativism, modes of perception which complicated the traditional values by which he wanted to live. 'Systems could be built,' he suggested, 'and rules could be made - if we only could get rid of consciousness' (JCLCG 70). In his view the persistent need to create meaning and value, to define and redefine one's relationships with others, separated person from person and brought about a wasteful perplexity that both sanctioned the outrageous and caused a woeful hesitancy and inaction. He would have sympathized with the sentiment that appears in Haggard's Ayesha: 'the Power that limited our perceptions did so in purest mercy, for were it otherwise with us, our race would go mad and perish raving in its terrors'.

The ambivalent attitude towards the individual in late Victorian fiction also comes from the parallel desires and reluctance of the individual and society to see each as an image of the other. On the one hand, the individual had to chart out a life and an identity in defiance of a hostile environment, for which he or she was to be celebrated, admired, and reckoned symbolic of a society which saw itself asserting an identity above mere evolutionary determination. On the other hand, for a society trying to retain some moral or even metaphysical justification for its actions, a value in a fixed set of principles or a code of conduct, and also a sense of unity, the individual, with his or her selfish aspirations and personal vulnerability, was a liability, an anarchic force that could only undermine that society's self-monumentalizing aims. According to Wells, to most contemporary sociologists individuals were only 'defective copies of a Platonic ideal of the species' (AMU 107). Instead of being regarded as a 'new experiment for the direction of the life force' (AMU 52), individuality was but an 'impertinence' (AMU 107).

The individual had potential to be a heroic figure in service to society, an icon of society's exploring, inventing,
conquering and artistic aspirations ('in the initiative of the individual above the average, lies the reality of the future' (AMU 107)), but they could also be a skeleton in society's closet, that which might undermine society's coherent and universally applicable values. The tone of "The Man who would be King" oscillates between admiration for the pioneering imperialism of the British Dravot and Carnehan and censure for the overweening ambition of a couple of outcast freebooters. Kim and Kurtz are both talented individuals recruited into imperial(ist) endeavour but, whereas Kim saves British India from the Russians, it is reckoned that Kurtz has 'done more harm than good to the Company' by his 'vigorous action' (HOD 102). It is no coincidence that the British administration in India saw itself as responding to the needs of the whole sub-continent while Kurtz works for a private trading company 'run for profit' (HOD 39).

Jim, 'outwardly so typical of that good, stupid kind we like to feel marching right and left of us in life' (LJ 75), truly becomes an individual as regards society at the moment he jumps from the Patna, the moment he exhibits cowardice or prefers self-preservation to duty. As Marlow notes, 'the real significance of crime is in its being a breach of faith with the community of mankind' (LJ 158); crime is, in Nietzsche's words, a 'revolt against the social order' (TWTP 391). Comparably, Jim's attempt to redeem himself in Patusan ultimately comes across as egotistical pride and romantic idealism rather than as adherence to duty or British fortitude. The political naïveté of his final self-sacrifice still shows a greater constancy to himself than to others: in giving himself up to Doramin he betrays his responsibility to the political stability of Patusan and his commitment to Jewel.

If the individual is regarded in two opposing lights in late Victorian fiction, then so too is the 'creed' of individualism. Nietzsche considered individualism to be a 'modest and still unconscious form of the 'will to power'' whereby the subject sets themself against the 'totality' (TWTP
411). In this quest to 'get free from an overpowering domination by society' socialism is 'merely a means of agitation employed by individualism' (TWTP 411); for Wilde, indeed, 'Socialism... will be of value simply because it will lead to Individualism' (TAAC 257), the 'perfect conditions' for the flowering of 'personality' (TAAC 263). Likewise, for Morris the freedom to be brought about by socialism would enable the development of personality and the realization of desires. For Hobson, democracy and equality would liberate an expansion of individuality which would lead to internationalism and mutually beneficial relationships between groups from different nations.

Bellamy, however, in his Looking Backward 2000-1887, saw individualism as the 'animating idea' of late nineteenth century capitalist society and responsible for the widespread miseries and uncertainties of the age. The acme of capitalist individualistic enterprise was the form of autocratic rule engaged in by Kurtz, Dravot and others: as Wells noted, 'perfect human liberty is possible only to a despot who is absolutely and universally obeyed' (AMU 20). And, of course, it was a similarly total form of government which ensured the success of authoritarian socialist utopias by repressing the selfishness of individual desires. In the judgment of Wells, 'both Individualism and Socialism are, in the absolute, absurdities; the one would make men the slaves of the violent or rich, the other the slaves of the State official' (AMU 52).

As the State took over more and more from the family and other institutions as the measure of value in society towards the end of the nineteenth century, so the individual in late Victorian fiction was less the orphan, the runaway, the parricide, the spinster and the bachelor than the person who played against the State, against society, against the race, against national interest, or who inflicted a bad reputation upon those entities. Obviously there are cross-overs between the two conceptions; nevertheless, the late Victorian individual was increasingly simply the loner, the fantasist,
the decadent, the criminal, the anarchist, the exile, the miscegenist and the homosexual.

Even the most archetypally English heroes were censured and contained. At the end of King Solomon's Mines Haggard's adventurers complete the traditional romance plot by returning to England to become (once more) landed gentry. At the beginning of Allan Quatermain, however, they reject the 'strict limits of the civilized life', 'this prim English country, with its trim hedgerows and cultivated fields, its stiff formal manners, and its well-dressed crowds' (AQ 4). This consciously anti-social decision distinguishes the second adventure from the earlier quest to find Curtis' brother George, the desire to reunite a divided family. It is therefore unsurprising that Quatermain dies on this adventure, while Curtis and Good confine themselves at the end in the remote and inaccessible African kingdom of Zu-Vendis. Although Curtis and Good do not suffer the same fate as Carnehan and Dravot in their similar situation, the fantasy of individualistic supremacy is at the expense of a social (English) reality.

Julian West's criticism of society's inequalities in Looking Backward rather more obviously brings about his ostracism. Near the end of the fantasy West, now living in the late twentieth century, recounts a nightmare he has just had in which he had woken up in nineteenth century Boston blest with an ideal vision of what the future could be (i.e. thinking his life in the twentieth century to be a but a prophetic dream). In this nightmare he saw the misery and waste in his city with fresh and outraged eyes and, at a dinner party, he began to rail about inefficiency and suffering. Instead of agreement, faces immediately filled with 'aversion and dread', and he was interrupted with 'shouts of reprobation and contempt' (LB 229). He was labelled a ''madman!'', a ''pestilent fellow!'', a ''fanatic!' and an ''enemy of society!''; to cap it all, the father of his betrothed demanded that he be 'put... out' of the house (LB 229).
Sherlock Holmes only really 'lives', literally as a fictional character as well as metaphorically, when a fiendish mystery interrupts London's bland urban normality. By solving the case he reconsigns himself to the 'dull routine of existence' (CSH 90) which is alleviated only by injections of cocaine and morphine (CSH 89-90, 158). The highly individual detective seems killed off at the end of each case; his 'singular character' is condemned to a 'dual nature', an oscillation between 'devouring energy' and 'extreme languor' (CSH 185). His eccentricity is only tolerated when it serves to exorcize an even less tolerable abnormality. Society, in the words of Conrad, 'forbid[s] all independent thought, all initiative, all departure from routine; and forbid[s] it under pain of death' (TOU 87). As Holmes complains, 'what is the use of having powers... when one has no field upon which to exert them? Crime is commonplace, existence is commonplace, and no qualities save those which are commonplace have any function upon earth' (CSH 93). The brilliant Holmes is truly killed off in the same moment that he manages to rid the world of Professor Moriarty, the 'Napoleon of crime' and 'organizer of half that is evil and of nearly all that is undetected' in London (CSH 471); both men go over the Reichenbach falls in mortal struggle.

Late Victorian fiction may be about individuals but ultimately it confirms and re-establishes the norm. The individuals of late Victorian fiction can be divided into two types: those who are reintegrated into society by the end of the novel and those whose recalcitrance or independence does not permit them to survive the demands of society. There are very few, such as Curtis in Allan Quatermain and Attwater in The Ebb-Tide, who are able to run their own show beyond the ending, and it is significant that although Curtis and Attwater fully embody the mythical British upper-class, independent, adventuring spirit and desire for firm government they can only express these values thousands of miles from England. Those who are reclaimed by society include Marlow, Kipling's Mowgli, Strickland, Trejago and Kim, Abel (in
Hudson's *Green Mansions*) and Huysmans' *Des Esseintes*; those who are destroyed include Kurtz, (Lord) Jim, Dravot, Jekyll, Dorian Gray, Marius (the Epicurean), Griffin (in Wells' *The Invisible Man*), Wells' Moreau, Huysmans' de Rais, Tess (of the D'Urbervilles), Jude (the Obscure) and Smith (in Hudson's *A Crystal Age*).

Pater's stories after *Marius* also tell of the individual on the fringe of society: Denys l'Auxerrois is a good-looking young man in the Middle Ages who is suspected of witchcraft; Sebastian van Storck rejects the conventions of seventeenth century Dutch culture for a contemplation of the absolute; "Apollo in Picardy" details the experiences of two monks temporarily liberated from their monastery. All end up dead; Denys is torn apart by the people of Auxerre.

The same author's "Emerald Uthwart" deals with the formative powers of education and their effect on the self. It is a disturbingly told story of a young Englishman from an old family in the early nineteenth century, and it is not without similarity to *Lord Jim*. Uthwart is born into a rural idyll and a loving family where he can live with 'unrepressed noise' and 'unchecked hours'; he is 'literally without the consciousness of rule' (*WPTMT* 345). It is decided, however, that whereas his brothers had been 'indulged with lessons at home', Emerald 'is to go to school' (*WPTMT* 346). At boarding school he meets the 'decisive word of command' (*WPTMT* 347); he must 'systematize' his 'vagrant self' (*WPTMT* 349) for the 'genius loci' of the school has a 'claim to mould all who enter it to a perfect, uninquiring, willing or unwilling, conformity to itself' (*WPTMT* 350). Uthwart is 'frankly recommended' to 'put... aside' all 'sense of intellectual ambition' (*WPTMT* 356); he is taught the glories of 'submissiveness' (*WPTMT* 355). He learns that there is a 'demand in the world about him' (*WPTMT* 351).

Uthwart becomes a model of this ideal of education so reviled by Wilde, Morris and Hobson and, after a spell at Oxford University, he joins the army for the war in Flanders. All goes well, and he and his friend Stokes achieve
'unpurchased promotion' and 'responsibility' (WPTMT 362). But one day, seduced by 'delightful heroism! delightful self-indulgence' (WPTMT 364), the friends break the deadlock of trench warfare with a cunning plan and a handful of men. On account of this disobedience they are court-martialled for desertion. Their good character tells against them and they are sentenced to death. Stokes is shot, but Uthwart's sentence, because he is the 'younger of the two offenders', is 'commuted to dismissal from the army with disgrace' (WPTMT 366-7). Humiliated, he makes his way back home where he flickers between childish self-indulgences and acts of submission. A few years later, his case is reopened and the judgment reversed but, in the emotional excitement of being offered a new commission, Uthwart dies of an old bullet wound. He requests that his coffin should have 'no plate or other inscription upon it' (WPTMT 372), an entreaty which symbolizes the effacement of his individuality and self-realization as brought about by the systematized nature of his upbringing.

Analogous stories include Henry James' "Owen Wingrave" and Octave Mirbeau's Sebastian Roch. In the former, Owen rejects the long military tradition of his family for the sake of 'intellectual pleasure' but, when accused of cowardice by the young woman he loves, he responds by spending the night in the room haunted by the family ghost. He is killed by the spirit and ironically becomes 'all the young soldier on the gained field' (TTOTS 78); he is prevented from realizing his individuality and is reclaimed by the Wingrave family tradition that all males die in battle. Sébastian Roch tells of a young man who, educated at the prestigious Jesuit College of Vannes, 'cannot formulate a moral concept of the universe... free of all hypocrisy and all religious, political, legal and social barbarities, without at once being seized by the social and religious terrors instilled in [him] at college'. He feels that there is in the country, or particularly in his town, a 'force of inertia, strengthened by centuries of religious and authoritarian tradition, that cannot be overcome'. He feels the futility of things too
much to make a stand against this 'tradition' and, having capitulated, ends his life on a battlefield of the Franco-Prussian war.

V

In the last sections of this chapter I would like to examine the position and role of the human subject in several late nineteenth century utopias. Although the ideal nature of utopias makes them inherently unreal, within the context of fiction they are no less real than other fictional worlds; indeed, they are expressive of desired realities. Looking Backward evinces a very different view of nineteenth century society to that portrayed by Pater, James and Mirbeau; on the other hand, Bellamy's vision of progress was based upon re-orientating and strengthening the very structures from which protagonists such as Uthwart, Wingrave and Roch are trying to escape. For Bellamy the appalling state of nineteenth century society with its vast gulf between rich and poor and its inefficiencies in labour, production and distribution can be put down to the dog eat dog mentality engendered by private capital and private enterprise. Society then was founded on the 'pseudo-self-interest of selfishness, and appealed solely to the antisocial and brutal side of human nature' (LB 196); life was a constant and aggressive 'struggle for... existence' where the 'law of self-preservation' compelled men to break the 'laws of conduct' (LB 197). At all levels of the social ladder 'for the sake of those dependent on him, a man... must plunge into the foul fight - cheat, overreach, supplant, defraud' (LB 197). With each working 'solely for his own maintenance at the expense of the community' 'men engaged in the same industry' and 'regarded each other as rivals and enemies to be throttled and overthrown' (LB 170). It was a mode of existence which produced a system of 'unorganized and antagonistic industries... as absurd economically as it was morally abominable' (LB 177-8).
Many of these sentiments are put into the mouth of Doctor Leete, a man of the future who looks back on the late nineteenth century with the advantage of hindsight. His addressee is a well-to-do Bostonian insomniac (West) who allowed himself to be mesmerized in the year 1887 and who does not come out of his trance until the year 2000, when it appears he has been preserved with 'no waste of the tissues' (LB 52). In the intervening years society has very much altered for the better: it now operates under the principles of cooperation, equality, fraternity and efficiency. Gone are the 'haphazard efforts of individuals' (LB 223), the 'waste from mistaken undertakings... the waste from the competition and mutual hostility... the waste by periodic gluts and crises... the waste from idle capital and labour' (LB 169). The society of the future is a realization of the concept that 'from the moment that men begin to live together, and constitute even the rudest of society, self-support becomes impossible' (LB 110). 'A complex mutual dependence becomes the universal rule. Every man... is a member of a vast industrial partnership, as large as the nation, as large as humanity' (LB 110). The class system which had 'weaken[ed] the sense of a common humanity' has been replaced by 'equal wealth and equal opportunities' which make people 'members of one class', turning the 'idea of the solidarity of humanity, the brotherhood of all men' into a 'real conviction and [a] practical principle of action' (LB 125).

Society has been unified by the nationalization of all capital and labour which has enabled social equality and the abolition of money (LB 83). Furthermore, the reformed 'nation guarantees the nurture, education, and comfortable maintenance of every citizen from the cradle to the grave' (LB 85) regardless of a citizen's productivity. But such a world demands the full cooperation of its inhabitants, the subordination of their personal desires to the communal needs of their fellow citizens: it becomes the 'duty of every citizen to contribute his quota of industrial or intellectual services to the maintenance of the nation' (LB 69). Doctor
Leete claims that this is 'rather a matter of course than of compulsion... so absolutely natural and reasonable that the idea of its being compulsory has ceased to be thought of' (*LB* 69). Obedience and service are 'honourable', even a 'fundamental principle' of this society (*LB* 102). Workers are impelled by 'service of the nation, patriotism, passion for humanity' (*LB* 89). Indeed, the most frequent metaphor in the novel for the workforce of the late twentieth century is the 'army of industry', which is so described 'not alone by virtue of its perfect organization, but by reason also of the ardour of self-devotion which animates its members' (*LB* 89). Indeed, the sole redeeming element of West's nightmare of nineteenth century Boston at the end of the novel is a military parade whose 'perfect concert of action' makes him 'compare the scientific manner in which the nation went to war with the unscientific manner in which it went to work' (*LB* 225).

Bellamy found his ideal in the complete subordination of the individual to society, a process which starts with childhood education. While it is the 'right of every man to the completest education the nation can give him on his own account', it is also the 'right' of that man's 'fellow citizens to have him educated, as necessary to their enjoyment of his society' (*LB* 164). At the age of twenty-one the educated person is forced to serve 'three years as a common labourer' (*LB* 74), a 'strict' school in which the 'young men are taught habits of obedience, subordination, and devotion to duty' (*LB* 105). After this he 'passes... into the comparative liberty of the trades' (*LB* 73), his choice of employment being dictated both by his talents and by his desires. Each man is judged according to his abilities; each job pays the same; each job's hours depend upon the difficulty and desirability of the work. A complex system of gradation and classification enables promotion to work meritocratically. The system operates to 'stimulate' rather than to 'discourage' (*LB* 107), so there are 'special privileges and immunities in the way of discipline, which the superior-class men [who become 'officers'] enjoy' (*LB* 106).
Despite this hierarchization, everyone has the same life-pattern, beginning and ending work at the same age (except those who become judges or president). The system is so much the 'logical outcome of the operation of human nature under rational conditions' (LB 101) that there is little room for individual variation. Leete comments on the 'splendour of our public and common life as compared with the simplicity of our private and home life' (LB 126), but there is almost no evidence of either in the text. Bellamy, indeed, had little interest in showing or examining the quality, nature or mentality of fraternal and cooperative existence beyond asserting the 'sympathy' repeatedly offered West by Leete's family. His main preoccupation was the solidity of his future world and the rational egalitarian principles at its foundation; his concern was to present a way of life that remedied the social problems of his own age. His business was with efficiency rather than with humanity; the citizen finds his or her fulfilment in the system, rather than the system finding its fulfilment in the individual. Indeed, the concept of society is so dominant that Leete can say without embarrassment that even 'if it were conceivable that a man could escape it, he would be left with no possible way to provide for his existence. He would have excluded himself from the world, cut himself off from his kind, in a word, committed suicide' (LB 70).^3

Bellamy's utopian vision can judiciously be compared with the extreme and somewhat ironic fantasy of an idealized systematic existence offered by Wells in The First Men in the Moon. Among the moon-dwellers, or Selenites, there is perversely as much physical individuation as there is lack of genuine individuality. There are 'almost innumerably different forms of Selenite'; nevertheless, 'every citizen knows his place. He is born to that place, and the elaborate discipline of training and education and surgery he undergoes fits him at last so completely to it that he has neither ideas nor organs for any purpose beyond it'.^4 The Selenite is moulded for his work and 'discharges in perfect happiness the
duty that justifies his being' (TFMITM 167). Selenites exist 'only in relation to the orders they have to obey, the duties they have to perform' (TFMITM 168); each is a 'perfect unit in a world machine' (TFMITM 167). Wells' scientific narrator, although uncomfortable with this process, sensing sometimes a 'sort of limp appeal for lost possibilities', decides that 'it is really in the end a far more humane proceeding than our earthly method of leaving children to grow into human beings, and then making machines of them' (TFMITM 170).

Cecelia Tichi has ascribed Bellamy's approach in Looking Backward to his 'private religion of solidarity', in which Bellamy believed that a person was divided into two parts: the 'personal' - selfish, animalistic, weak and narrow-minded - and the 'impersonal' - which allowed that person to achieve a 'serene state of equanimity and social brotherhood'. Here too the human subject has a dual identity, and there are discernable parallels between the visions of Bellamy and Stevenson through the strong Calvinist upbringings of the two writers. Indeed, this dualism was also recognized by Wells for, in his modern utopia, 'order' and 'discipline' lead to 'devotion' and a 'spiritual grace' which 'means triumph over the petty egotisms and vanities that keep men... apart' (AMU 101). On the other hand, Bellamy also had ideological links with Conrad and Kipling: both writers of imperialist fiction stressed the need to subordinate the individual self to a sense of social duty, national service and moral purpose, to the 'sovereign power enthroned in a fixed standard of conduct' (LJ 80). Like Bellamy, Marlow believes in the importance of the 'solidarity of our lives' (LJ 208) but, whereas Bellamy envisaged this as part of man's evolution, an element in 'progress' (LB 36), for Conrad this sentiment was associated with a lost age of chivalry and right-doing, nostalgia for which informs the troubled romance elements of his narratives.

Furthermore, Conrad, Bellamy and Wells mitigate the sense of 'waste' from the selfish and competitive consciousness of the individual by advocating public efficiency. Imperialism's planned 'conquest of the earth' (HOD 31), the modern design
for the 'eventual unification of the world as one nation' (*LB* 117), and the actual world-state on the moon are all justified by an 'unselfish belief in' (*HOD* 32) and 'devotion to efficiency' (*HOD* 31). The vocabulary of Marlow's justification for imperialist exploitation uncannily echoes Leete's way of describing the (proto-fascistic) State of the future but, whereas Leete is the mouthpiece for Bellamy's sincerely felt idealism, Conrad used Marlow's endorsement of imperialism somewhat bitterly, as a means of noting that the utilitarian discourse of efficiency was all that was left of once-universal certitudes of good and evil.

VI

Morris, who also looked back to an earlier age for a simpler, kinder state of society, disagreed with (Conrad and) Bellamy about the desirability of a fixed system and fixed principles of conduct. In his review of *Looking Backward* he repeatedly accused Bellamy of possessing a 'temperament' that was 'unhistoric and unartistic' (*NFN* 354), of being unable to conceive of anything other than the 'machinery of society' (*NFN* 356) which produced no more than a 'machine-life' (*NFN* 357). He complained that in Bellamy's fantasy man's free choice in occupation conflicted with his career-pattern which took place according to 'compulsion', and he was unhappy with the 'impression' *Looking Backward* produced of a 'huge standing army, tightly drilled' (*NFN* 356). He felt that the system of 'State Communism, worked by the extreme of national centralization' (*NFN* 356), allowed men to 'shuffle off the business of life on to the shoulders of an abstraction called the State' (*NFN* 358). He would have preferred the unit of administration to be 'small enough for every citizen to feel himself responsible for all its details, and be interested in them' (*NFN* 358). Likewise, for Wilde no authoritarian socialism would do because 'under an industrial-barrack system... nobody would be able to have any... freedom at all'
"It is only in voluntary associations that man is fine" (TAAC 260); 'all authority is quite degrading' (TAAC 266) and 'dreadfully demoralizing' (TAAC 267). Again, in Wells' modern utopia 'the State is for Individuals, the law is for freedoms, the world is for experiment, experience, and change' (AMU 53-4).

Like Bellamy's world, the projected idyllic future in News from Nowhere is classless and egalitarian. It differs, however, as regards the concept of society and its impingement upon the life of the individual. Whereas Bellamy's America claims to have neither laws nor government, it clearly has structures, rules and a 'Congress'. Morris' late twentieth century England, by contrast, truly has neither laws nor government: 'the whole people is our parliament' (NFN 107), claims one citizen; the old Houses of Parliament are used as a 'storage place for manure' (NFN 69). There is no form of buying and selling at all, no state to be accountable to, no private property (NFN 91), no compulsion, no cities; merely a thoroughly democratic community of individuals living in harmony. The way of life stands against that of the nineteenth century when people were 'engaged in making others live lives which [were] not their own, while they themselves care[d] nothing for their own real lives' (NFN 228). There is not even any 'code of public opinion' in the future which might be 'tyrannical and unreasonable', 'no unvarying conventional set of rules by which people are judged' (NFN 93). Whereas the world of Looking Backward has been accused of being procrustean, Morris' Hammond specifically asserts that there is 'no bed of Procrustes to stretch or cramp... minds and lives' (NFN 93). In fact, every man is 'quite independent of every other, and... thus the tyranny of society [is] abolished' (NFN 120), producing a way of life which contrasts with Bellamy's ideal society of 'mutual dependence' (LB 110).

Work is indulged in entirely voluntarily in the England of the future, not under threat of excommunication, and it is the people's pleasure in that work, the engagement of the
individual with their fellow men and women, which generates a
sense of community and the 'religion of humanity' (NFN 159).
Everybody seeks work (NFN 127) for 'all work is now
pleasurable' (NFN 122). Indeed, it is almost a condition of
being truly content: 'happiness without happy daily work is
impossible' (NFN 123). The absence of artificial coercion as
regards work extends to education. Children 'get to know' or
'pick... up' languages (NFN 67); they learn things by
enthusiasm and example rather than through formal instruction.
Hammond considers that nineteenth century schools 'subjected'
their pupils 'to a certain conventional course of 'learning''
'whatever their varying faculties and dispositions might be'
(NFN 97); no attention was paid to the individual qualities or
stage of growth of the child. The 'theory' was that it was
'necessary to shove a little information into a child, even if
it were by means of torture', and Hammond thinks that 'no one
could come out of such a mill uninjured' (NFN 97).

Curiously, however, the new freedoms of this future seem
to engender a reduction in some aspects of individuality.
Indeed, although Wilde felt that the 'perfect conditions'
(TAAC 262) for the development of personality were 'not
rebellion, but peace' (TAAC 263), he also recognized that
conflict could intensify individuality (TAAC 274). Just as
Wells warned in The Time Machine of a 'too perfect triumph of
man' (SSS 34) with its ensuing decline in mental and physical
abilities, so life in Morris' ideal rural future can be
accused of being boring. As the Time Traveller notes,
although an 'animal perfectly in harmony with its environment
is a perfect mechanism', it is also a form of intellectual
'suicide'; 'there is no intelligence where there is no change
and no need of change' (SSS 72).

These sentiments are expressed by what Morris' world
calls a 'grumbler' (NFN 173). This man considers the books of
the nineteenth century to be 'much more alive than those which
are written now'; 'there is a spirit of adventure in them and
signs of a capacity to extract good out of evil' which the
literature of his age 'quite lacks' (NFN 174). Likewise, he
reckons that the narrator is 'brisker and more alive' than his own countrymen because he comes from a society which has 'not wholly got rid of competition' (NFN 174), an observation which emphasizes the isolation of the narrator in this new world. Indeed, as the narrator disappears back into the past at the end of the romance, his new friend Ellen throws him a 'last mournful look [which] seemed to say, 'you cannot be of us; you belong so entirely to the unhappiness of the past that our happiness even would weary you'' (NFN 228).
CHAPTER THREE:

THE HUMAN SUBJECT (II)

The young botanist Smith in Hudson's *A Crystal Age* also finds himself more alive than the inhabitants of the rural, nature-loving future in which he finds himself marooned. The distinctive feature of this world, however, and the guarantee of its authoritarian social stability, is its ignorance of true passion. There is 'only one kind of love' (*ACA* 120), and that is a dull warmth. Yoletta, the object of Smith's love, accuses him of being 'like some hungry animal that wanted to devour me', and states that she can 'appreciate your love without having my lips bruised' (*ACA* 119). Smith, desiring Yoletta and seeing no way back to the past, resolves to become part of this world; conversely, he realizes that his desire and passion will always prevent his full assimilation into the community. He wants Yoletta to give herself to him 'body and soul' (*ACA* 175, 236), and her absolute inability to understand what he might mean makes him fear that his 'passion, mocked and baffled again and again, would rend me to pieces, and hurl me on to madness and self-destruction' (*ACA* 176).

Towards the end of the work Smith learns the 'secret of
that passionless, everlasting calm of beings who had for ever outlived, and left as immeasurably far behind as the instincts of the wolf and ape, the strongest emotion of which my heart was capable' (ACA 235). He despairs that Yoletta 'could never love me as I loved her - that she could never be mine' (ACA 236). On the other hand, seeing a bottle whose contents claim to cure a 'darkened' soul, he instinctively holds off: 'better a thousand times the thoughts that lead to madness than this colourless existence without love' (ACA 238). Nevertheless, this opportunity makes him contemplate the relationship that existed between passion and misery in the past (ACA 239) and, realizing the futility of passion to him in this world of the future, he thinks through the advantages that would come from his release. In order best to possess Yoletta within the environment and conventions of her world, he drinks the potion. Ironically, the liquid turns out to be poison, and he dies.

Hudson's own view, however, as expressed in the Preface to the 1906 edition, was that the 'ending of passion and strife is the beginning of decay' (ACA vi). I have already noted this opinion imaged in Wells' degenerate Eloi, and Wells also explored a very similar scenario to Hudson's in his story "The Country of the Blind", even though this story shifts the centre of interest from passion to sight and the imagination. If the future of Hudson's romance is authoritarian (to Smith's plea of 'ignorance of the customs of the house' the father of the house replies that 'no man... is so ignorant as not to know right from wrong' (ACA 93)), then the world of the blind is positively totalitarian, a product of truly stunted and self-protective imaginations. The mountaineer who stumbles upon the valley of the blind, on the other hand, is an 'enterprising man' who has 'seen the world' and who reads books 'in an original way' (SSS 125). This combination of a man of action; experience, imagination and learning enables him to be the model imperialist, and his first thoughts on arrival concern the proverb which dictates that 'in the Country of the Blind the One-eyed Man is King' (SSS 129). He
entertains the selfish fantasy that he is to be their 'heaven-sent king and master' and he thinks that he must bring the blind 'to reason' (SSS 133). It appears, however, that 'much of their imagination had shrivelled with their eyes' (SSS 132), and their cultural and physical isolation has narrowed their frame of reference and determined what they are prepared to believe in. The blind go about their 'ordered world' with 'confidence and precision', though, because everything in it has 'been made to fit their needs' (SSS 135).

In these conditions, Nunez's faculty of sight is useless. Furthermore, the 'incredulity' of the blind people at Nunez's tales of sight soon becomes 'condemnatory' (SSS 136), and he begins to oscillate between assertions of his own nature and being influenced by his environment. After his failed attempts to impose his will the 'valley became the world for him, and the world beyond the mountains where men lived in sunlight seemed no more than a fairy tale' (SSS 141). That he becomes incorporated into this way of life is imaged, as in most 'otherworld' romances, by his falling in love with a member of the community, in this case Medina-saroté. Indeed, he almost submits to being blinded in order to conform to their way of life. On the dawn of the operation, however, he sees, in an almost Blakean vision, the 'morning like an angel in golden armour, marching down the steeps...' (SSS 145). His 'imagination soared' over the wall of rock that surrounds the valley to the 'great free world he was parted from' (SSS 145). Memory of the outside world combines with his desire for it, and he resolves to chance an escape through the mountains, regardless of the danger.

Workable total systems are a fiction; their aesthetic holism cannot accommodate the individual. He or she must give up all claims to distinction or else face death or expulsion. Fiction, and late Victorian fiction in particular, however, has a fundamental interest in both these apparently incompatible elements: fiction is predicated on the concept of world-construction yet has as its remit the presentation of human experience and desire, the life of individuals. The
previous two chapters have introduced these ideas, and the present chapter expands on the interaction between the individual and the structures which try to contain him or her.

I

Kipling's 'Law of the Jungle' is a collection of communal and personal rights, notings of precedence and required forms of behaviour. It concludes with a celebration of the bond between the member and the community, and their dependence on each other for survival: 'For the strength of the Pack is the Wolf, and the strength of the Wolf is the Pack'. The Pack functions through the vitality of the individual wolves who adhere to the overall principles of the system: they are the 'Free People' only when they can uphold the Law, and the 'head and the hoof of the Law and the haunch and the hump is - Obey!' When the system disintegrates and 'lawlessness' takes over, many become 'lame' and 'mangy' from careless living and from 'eating bad food'.

Rather, the system does not disintegrate; the wolves merely fail to uphold it. In late Victorian fiction the system is an ideal concept which, in being abandoned on a practical level, is not diminished theoretically. The system only engages with the actual world through its adherents, and their failure to make it work signifies their own shortcomings rather than any problem in the system. In Kipling's Indian tales an Anglo-Indian's imperial identity is formed by their racial origin and their immersion in the work which justifies their presence. In "The Bridge-Builders" Findlayson remembers that the 'spirit' of Lockhart, a fellow engineer, 'broke in him and he died' when his 'big water-works burst and broke down in brick heaps and sludge'. The return to formlessness of the water-works heralds the immediate disintegration of Lockhart's sense of selfhood, and therefore his life, a bond emphasized in the repetition of the word 'broke'. Findlayson's own project, the bridge over the
Ganges, is threatened by the river in spate, and he consequently feels that his whole purpose in life, and hence his identity, indeed his life, is also under threat. His main concern is that the 'men of his own profession... his own kind would judge him by his bridge, as that stood or fell' (TDW 44); as his overheadman Peroo neatly puts it, 'my honour is the honour of this bridge' (TDW 35).

At this moment of pressure, Findlayson's self-consciousness separates his individual self from the professional, cultural, national and imperial values with which he has hitherto associated himself. By being externalized they become other to him, an outside force that threatens his stability of personality; equally importantly, it is clear that he has become other for them. The institutionalized values are thrown up as ideal and faultless concepts in whose discourses of power Findlayson has renounced his right to participate having accepted that he is actual and fallible. While the survival of his bridge is in the balance, Findlayson spends his time in limbo, stranded on an island in the middle of the river, chewing opium and hallucinating that the Indian pantheon have convened there to decide whether India should and will remain under British rule. Even though the fate of the bridge is apparently connected to the survival of British rule in India, during this time of uncertainty Findlayson stands apart from his people and his authority.

What determines Findlayson's identity is ultimately not what he does but what he undergoes. His self-consciousness is a product of his consciousness of his experience as divorced from his habitual activity. This split construction suggests that the 'system' is a structure served by a populace rather than being the product of the activity of like-minded individuals. Furthermore, such a distinction seems connected to the way nineteenth century imperialism began as liberalist private enterprise and ended as a global confrontation between powerful European nations jostling for spheres of influence and using their citizens and those of the countries they occupied as pawns in the process.
In *Lord Jim* the infallible system is represented by the 'unthinking and blessed stiffness before... outward and inward terrors' (*LJ* 75) held by the imperial class, and it is imaged in the attitudes of the court, Marlow, Brierly, Chester and the French lieutenant. It is internalized by Jim through his social background and the stalwart and heroic world of the light fiction that he reads. When on the *Patna* he actually proves not to live up to this ideal, the system does not complicate its values in order to understand his motivation; it merely seeks to ostracize and forget about him and his fellow cowards as quickly as possible. In order to affirm the 'sovereign power enthroned in a fixed standard of conduct' (*LJ* 80) the system cannot tolerate anything like Jim's asking of Marlow what he would do under similar circumstances (*LJ* 121).

Kipling's "The Madness of Private Ortheris" offers a slightly different case again. Ortheris asks 'wot's the good o' sodgerin'?' (*PTFTH* 243) and claims he is 'sick to go 'Ome' (*PTFTH* 245). The private's frustration with his life in India manifests itself in a tirade against the very institutions for which he has most respect and to which he has sworn his allegiance. He rails against army life and then against the 'Widder [Victoria] sittin' at 'Ome with a gold crownd on 'er 'ead' (*PTFTH* 245). Such 'fits', however, come upon Ortheris only when there is 'nothin' to do' (*PTFTH* 244), in other words, when he feels least like a soldier, least like a functionary of the British Empire. Inaction forces a self-consciousness upon Ortheris which externalizes that which he would usually see as fundamental to his identity. What stands out in his tirade is that in India 'there ain't no women and there ain't no liquor worth 'avin', and there ain't nothin' to see, nor do, nor say, nor feel, nor think' (*PTFTH* 245). In his eyes there is nothing worth venting anger upon apart from himself and the system which supports him and, consequently, it is the association between the two that he regrets: soldiering is a 'dorg's life' (*PTFTH* 246).

This process makes him realize that there is a whole side of himself which the activity of soldiering has repressed or
constrained: he claims to want a 'decent name' instead of a 'number', the chance to have a 'little wife' and open up a taxidermist's shop in Hammersmith (PTFTH 243). This greater individuality can only be liberated under the more congenial conditions of 'Ome', away from 'this 'ere a-Hell' that is India (PTFTH 247) where one is forced to an unnatural extent to bond with those of one's colour and nation, and thus with the ideas of one's nation's ruling class, in order to secure oneself against a menacing other. Ortheris' fellow private Mulvaney and the narrator decide they cannot put Ortheris' fits down to his 'breedin' which is nothin'', nor to his 'edukashin which he niver got' (PTFTH 248), but neither are they willing to contemplate an individuality for Ortheris: he is simply the private from London. For them individuality is a concept regulated by class and upbringing, and Ortheris does not qualify on either count; what he has is 'devils' (PTFTH 248), an old-fashioned, even biblical, label designed to avoid serious confrontation with the issue.

The narrator offers Ortheris a chance to desert and the two men swap clothes. While the narrator goes into town to get some money, the private is left on the river bank in 'civilian kit' (PTFTH 248). By the time the narrator returns Ortheris is 'plunging wildly through the grass' (PTFTH 248), desperate to be back in uniform. Indeed, the 'rasp of his own 'greyback' shirt and the squeak of his boots seemed to bring him to himself' (PTFTH 248). The tale, having posited the possibility of Ortheris' individuality, now begins to deny it, to present it as a brief yet recurring fantasy; army life is confirmed as being the foundation of Ortheris' identity and alternative private conceptions of selfhood are dismissed. If Ortheris is somewhat disoriented when he is an inactive soldier, he is completely at a loss when this structure is taken away from him. At the end of the escapade, he offers himself to be belted by Mulvaney; as with Findlayson, there is a sense of masochism in his willingness to be judged by his peers.

If the system rejects the individual who does not conform
to its rules, then the aggregation holds with deep suspicion the member of the group who shows interest in identities outside that group. On the other hand, while the nineteenth century Englishman abroad emphasized his origins by an ostentatious conformity to conventions, that Englishman was also suspended between cultures by virtue of his environment, was forced to receive impressions from the strange world in which he found himself. "Beyond the Pale" tells of a man who 'wilfully stepped beyond the safe limits of decent everyday society, and paid for it heavily' (PTFTH 162); it is a tragic story about the love between the Englishman Trejago and the young Indian widow Bisesa which ends with an attempt on his life by her guardian uncle who has already punished her by cutting off her hands. The narrator's initial satisfaction at the story's fulfilment of the maxim that a man should 'keep to his own caste, race and breed' (PTFTH 162), his savage moral and aesthetic glee, gives way during the telling to a form of vicarious excitement at Trejago's self-indulgence in a forbidden private desire. The narrator ends, however, with a muted sympathy for Trejago's loss and the smug recognition that the Englishman now 'pays his calls [to white women] regularly, and is reckoned a very decent sort of man' (PTFTH 167).

The 'double life' (PTFTH 164) of Trejago resembles the 'profound duplicity' (DJAMH 81) engaged in by Jekyll. Similarly, Holden (in "Without Benefit of Clergy") cannot reconcile his private (or native) life, his love for Ameera and their child, with his public face as an Englishman; indeed, he has no one with whom he can talk when they die from cholera. The person who is more open about this dual identity, who is more literally Anglo-Indian, is the drunken McIntosh Jellaludin, an 'Oxford Man' turned 'loafer' who lives in the Serai with a native woman (PTFTH 272). The man's mind is a 'perfect rag-bag of useless things' (PTFTH 273), yet he has his 'hand on the pulse of native life' (PTFTH 275); he claims to be 'as the Gods, knowing good and evil, but untouched by either' (PTFTH 274). On his deathbed McIntosh
entrusts the narrator with a grimy manuscript of the 'Book of McIntosh Jellaludin' (*PTFTH* 276), a mostly autobiographical account of the realities of native life.

The narrator shows McIntosh's book first to the policeman Strickland, whose unconventional methods of investigation, namely disguising himself as a native, has proved to be very effective in the catching of criminals. Strickland held the 'extraordinary theory that a Policeman in India should try to know as much about the natives as the natives themselves'; he 'dabbled in unsavoury places which no respectable man would think of exploring'; 'he was perpetually 'going Fantee' among the natives, which, of course, no man with any sense believes in' (*PTFTH* 51). Unlike McIntosh, Strickland is successfully doing the business of Empire, even though his methods 'did him no good Departmentally' (*PTFTH* 52). 'People did not understand him. So they said he was a doubtful sort of man and passed by on the other side' (*PTFTH* 51). Furthermore, 'when a man once acquires a taste for this particular amusement, it abides with him all his days', and Strickland has come even to take his holidays in disguise, to be 'swallowed up for a while' in the 'brown crowd' (*PTFTH* 52). On the other hand, he also falls in love with Miss Yougal. Her father forbids the match, however, on the grounds of Strickland's dubious reputation. Nevertheless, after a farcical plot which involves the intervention of a flirtatious old general and Strickland working as an Indian groom for the Yougals in order to be close to his loved one, parental consent is granted, but only on the 'strict understanding that Strickland should drop his old ways, and stick to Departmental routine, which pays best and leads to Simla' (*PTFTH* 56).

If Strickland, like Trejago and Findlayson, is welcomed back into the imperial fold from his participation in native life, this thematic complex of identity, desire, experience, activity and origin is more fully explored in *Kim* and *The Jungle Books*. Kim, apart from his natural assumption of superiority, is no different from the other children in the bazaar at Lahore. His encounters with the Tibetan lama, the
Afghan horse-dealer Mahbub Ali and the spymaster Colonel Creighton, however, throw into confusion his understanding that he is the son of all India, free to come and go as he pleases, constrained by no sense of authority or duty. With everyone pulling him in different directions (Christian schooling, Buddhist quest, imperial espionage, native life), the only thing he knows is that 'this is the great world, and I am only Kim' (K 166). But 'who is Kim?' he asks; 'he considered his own identity, a thing he had never done before, till his head swam. He was one insignificant person in all this roaring whirl of India' (K 166). Near the end of the novel, having helped outwit the Russians, his 'unnerved brain' once more becomes frustrated by the 'bigness of the world' which 'swept linked thought aside' (K 331). He looks 'with strange eyes unable to take up the size and proportion and use of things'; he feels that his 'soul was out of gear with its surroundings' (K 331). 'I am Kim. I am Kim. And what is Kim?' (K 331) he asks repeatedly. He dissolves into tears and 'with an almost audible click he felt the wheels of his being lock up anew on the world without. Things that rode meaningless on the eyeball an instant before slid into proper proportion'; things become 'comprehensible' (K 331).

Conan Doyle's Dr Watson, like many late Victorians, wonders 'how far any singular gift in an individual was due to his ancestry and how far to his own early training' (CSH 435). This question is dramatized in The Jungle Books where Mowgli is brought up by a wolf-pack, but grows into a man. The adolescent Mowgli's sensation of a 'poison' (TJB 329) in his stomach is actually a product of his increasing consciousness of likeness and difference, a refinement of his processes of identification. Like Jekyll, Mowgli thinks he is two people in one body: during the 'spring-running' he hears a 'double step upon my trail'; he wishes he had been 'torn in two by Red Dog' (TJB 340). He even has two mothers: Mother Wolf and Messua. In the final story Kaa (the python) reminds him of the 'Master-words' of the Jungle, that 'we be of one blood, thou and I' (TJB 340), but Baloo advises him to 'make thy lair
with thine own blood and pack and people' (TJB 341). As Bagheera has already told him, he is 'of the Jungle and not of the Jungle' (TJB 222). Now conscious of this paradox, Mowgli can only moan, 'I know not what I know' (TJB 340, 341).

Although the law of the Jungle is predicated upon a culture of obedience, Baloo asks 'who shall question Man in his ways?' (TJB 341). The young Mowgli's movement between the village and the Jungle, however, has given him a multiple and increasingly unfocused identity. Although this is temporarily resolved by becoming Master of the Jungle, the accolade ultimately heightens his sense of isolation rather than diminishes it. He becomes alienated from the Pack that fostered him, reminded that he was never truly accommodated by the Law. Alternately, he is driven out of the human community for being a 'wolf's brat' and a 'jungle-demon' (TJB 93). As with Kipling's other protagonists, Mowgli cannot have the best of both worlds: he is ultimately a victim of circumstance, of actuality, and must renounce one world for the other. And the concept of a choice is an illusion: 'Man goes to Man at the last, though the Jungle does not cast him out' (TJB 341).

II

If Kipling's central protagonists are frequently suspended between societies or worlds, Mann's *Tonio Kröger* also deals with the situation of the individual who does not fully fit into society, who falls between two conceptions of identity. The novella begins in a town on the North Sea coast of Germany where the schoolboy Tonio wonders why he is 'different,... at odds with the schoolmasters and like a stranger among the other boys' (TK 133). He is contemplative, writes verse, and is 'in the habit of bringing home pitifully poor reports' (TK 132). By contrast, his friend Hans Hansen is a 'capital scholar, and a jolly chap to boot, who was head at drill, rode and swam to perfection, and lived in the sunshine of popularity' (TK 133). Tonio's father is a prominent
businessman, 'dignified and respectable' despite intimations of a more carefree past (*TK* 132), and whose 'ancestral home was the finest house in all the town' (*TK* 130). His mother, however, is a musician, 'beautiful', 'black-haired', and 'absolutely different from the other ladies in the town because father had brought her long ago from some place far down on the map' (*TK* 132). Tonio, with his 'finely chiselled features of the south' (*TK* 130), has clearly inherited most of his looks and attitudes from his mother, although he has considerable respect for his father's way of looking at things. His character is almost entirely determined in this way: Tonio says that 'I am what I am and will not and cannot alter' (*TK* 133). His dual identity is fixed in his name: the respectable Germanic 'Kröger' and the 'crazy... foreign... special... queer' 'Tonio' which he is called after his mother's brother (*TK* 136-7).

This inheritance, although it is not his 'fault' (*TK* 136), denies him the comfort, enjoyed by the 'solid majority', of 'knowing that everybody knows just where they stand' (*TK* 133). Tonio is neither inside nor outside his peer group. Although he has not schematized his recognition of the two sides to his character in the way that the narrator has, he laments the impossibility of a simple identity. He makes 'no attempt to be like Hans Hansen'; he simply wants 'Hans Hansen... [to] love him' (*TK* 134). On the other hand, despite wanting to have a bond with Hans exclusive of any other relationship Hans might have, Tonio is firm that Hans must not become like him (*TK* 138). In addition, whereas it might seem natural that Tonio would become attracted to Magdalena Vermehren, whose dark and serious eyes resemble his own, it is Ingeborg Holm whom he loves: 'blonde, jolly Inge, who most assuredly despised him for his poetic effusions' (*TK* 142). Magdalena is clumsy at dancing, like himself; she understands him (*TK* 145), and wants to read his poetry (*TK* 141). But Tonio is fascinated only by that side of himself with which he is not fully in touch. It is as though by befriending or loving that side of himself in another he can reunite the
opposing features of his identity.

After the death of his father, Tonio's mother marries an Italian musician and goes back south. Tonio also goes south, and surrenders himself there to the 'power of intellect, the power of the Word, that lords it with a smile over the unconscious and inarticulate' (TK 147). With 'knowledge', however, comes 'solitude' and, with 'his heart being dead and loveless, he fell into adventures of the flesh' (TK 147). His northern temperament re-emerges, though, and fills him with 'disgust and hatred of the senses' (TK 147-8). Indeed, he oscillates between these 'two crass extremes' until the 'painful thoroughness of the experiences he had gone through, combined with a tenacious ambition and a persistent industry, joined battle with the irritable fastidiousness of his taste and under grinding torments issued in work of a quality quite uncommon' (TK 148). Both sides of his character conspire in this activity, but the result is a rejection of them both because Tonio comes to believe that 'one must die to life in order to be utterly a creator' (TK 149); the artist 'must be unhuman, extra-human; he must stand in a queer aloof relationship to our humanity' (TK 152).

Any involvement in one's subject-matter causes 'a mess', sentimentality, 'something tiresome and banal' (TK 152). Unfortunately, however, Tonio's love of life explodes in a diatribe of frustration against his ''calling'', or 'curse' (TK 153); his experience as a human being rises up against his identity as an artist. He claims he is 'sick to death of depicting humanity without having any part or lot in it' (TK 153), and spring dazes him 'with the triflingness and sacredness of the memories and feelings it evokes' (TK 152). A literary calling makes one feel 'set apart, in a curious sort of opposition to the nice, regular people', separated by an 'ironic sensibility' and a 'knowledge' which kindles 'self-consciousness' (TK 153-4). The more individual Tonio feels himself the more he has a 'surreptitious hankering... for the bliss of the commonplace', the 'normal, respectable, and admirable... life, in all its seductive banality' (TK 159).
Tonio compares himself to 'Hamlet', but his friend Lisabeta describes him more aptly as a 'bourgeois manqué' (TK 161).

In the autumn he travels north and, on his way to Helsingor (Elsinor), he stops off at his home town where he finds that his family house has been turned into a Public Library (TK 167). Otherwise, the town is the same, and he wanders through it hoping to 'wake up' from his disjointed relationship with life (TK 166). He wants to be taken 'to task for his excesses' by his father (TK 167), to re-enter life, but, ironically, the person who does take him to task, the town policeman, is concerned to separate him from normal life by trying to identify him as an 'individdle... of unknown parentage and unspecified means... wanted by the Munich police' (TK 171). In the eyes of the 'guardians of civic order' (TK 171) there is little distinction between the individual, the artist, and the criminal.6

At Helsingor Tonio passes several days in contemplation by the sea; he 'enjoyed profound forgetfulness, hovered disembodied above space and time; only now and again his heart would contract with a fugitive pain, a stab of longing and regret, into whose origin he was too lazy to enquire' (TK 179). One night, quite by chance, Hans and Inge appear at an informal ball in his hotel. They were Hans and Inge not so much by virtue of individual traits and similarity of costume as by similarity of race and type. This was the blond, fair-haired breed of the steel-blue eyes, which stood to him for the pure, the blithe, the untroubled in life; for a virginal aloofness that was at once both simple and full of pride... (TK 184-5)

Tonio is suddenly overcome by 'home-sickness', by the longing to be 'regular' like them, 'simple and normal and cheerful, in conformity and understanding with God and man, beloved of the innocent and happy' (TK 185). He wants to live 'free from the curse of knowledge and the torment of creation... in blessed mediocrity' (TK 185). He longs to establish a 'little contact with them', but knows that they 'would not understand him', for 'their speech was not his speech' (TK 186).7 His feelings
oscillate between envy and self-contempt. There is even a 'pale girl' (TK 188) at the party with 'black swimming eyes' (TK 186) from whom he both turns away and later helps up after a fall. Tonio goes to bed and thinks of the
dreamy adventures of the senses, nerves, and mind in which he had been involved; saw himself eaten up with intellect and introspection, ravaged and paralysed by insight, half worn out by the fevers and frosts of creation, helpless and in anguish of conscience between two extremes, flung to and fro between austerity and lust... (TK 189)

The novella ends with a letter to Lisabeta wherein Tonio claims to have had 'experiences' (TK 189). In this missive he formalizes the opposing influences from his parents and concludes that he is thus a 'bourgeois who strayed off into art, a bohemian who feels nostalgic yearnings for respectability' (TK 190). He 'stand[s] between two worlds... at home in neither, and... suffer[s] in consequence' (TK 190). As I have already quoted, he 'admire[s] those proud, cold beings who adventure upon the paths of great and daemonic beauty and despise 'mankind'' but he does not envy them, 'for if anything is capable of making a poet of the literary man, it is my bourgeois love of the human, the living and usual' (TK 190), which is the 'source of all warmth, goodness, and humour' (TK 191). Tonio expresses a desire to 'redeem' those 'shadows of human figures' like himself who are suspended between identities but, in doing so, finds himself 'looking into a world unborn and formless, that needs to be ordered and shaped' (TK 191). He needs to create a new category from the traditional oppositions in order to create a stable independent identity.

III

Tonio's thought-processes, like those behind this highly schematic novella, merely succeed in rationalizing his opposing feelings and desires and presenting him as a
receptacle of social and genetic determinations; they do not truly reconcile the opposing aspects of his character into an individual personality. He is very close to claiming, in the manner of West in Looking Backward, that the 'idea that I was two persons, that my identity was double, began to fascinate me with its simple solution of my experience' (LB 78).

On the other hand, as some of the examples in this chapter have shown, late nineteenth century fiction is probably as full of narratives of individuals wanting to (re)join society as it is of people wanting to break away. West wants to reject his past identity in order to fit into the world of the year 2000; Jude (the Obscure) wants to transcend his working class roots in order to enter educated society. Jekyll wants his experiments to liberate a just self that could 'walk steadfastly and securely on his upward path, doing the good things in which he found his pleasure', untainted by an extraneous evil (DJAMH 82). When Hyde begins to dominate his life he longs for the restitution of the old order, his unequivocal position in society. In addition, there is a sense that imperialist individuals must go to the extreme depths of Africa and Asia in order to re-enter English society. The free-booting Dravot in "The Man Who Would Be King" wants to be 'on equal terms' with the Viceroy and says he will 'hand over the crown [of Kafiristan]... to Queen Victoria' in exchange for an English knighthood (WWW 235). Jim tries to reforge his honour and his imperial identity in darkest Patusan; Kurtz wants to be met by kings at railway-stations on his return home (HOD 110).

Indeed, the tensions between the individual Kurtz and the Company men who go to reclaim him are also played out in the person of Marlow, in the sailor's contradictory aspirations. The young Marlow both abhors some of the activities of imperialism and likes the 'idea' behind them. He separates his captaincy of the steamboat from the mission of his passengers, but it is he who retrieves Kurtz when the sick man flees back into the jungle. Furthermore, the narrating Marlow claims he does not want to 'bother' his listeners much with
'what happened to me personally' (HOD 32), but then proceeds to narrate just that: he wishes both to communicate with his (ex-)imperialist listeners and to remain true to his private experience. Grunts and comments from the listeners punctuate Marlow's narration to let him know when his opinions border on the unacceptable; they mark when the individual Marlow has gone beyond what the group desires. After all, there is an unspoken connection between the listening professional men who no longer follow the sea and the men who run the trading company in the Congo. The wide imperialist web is suggested linguistically: the accountant at the outer station has 'backbone' (HOD 46); the natives in the 'grove of death' (HOD 47) are 'black bones' (HOD 44); the Accountant on the Nellie toys with the 'bones' of dominoes (HOD 28), which one assumes are made of ivory, the reason for the presence of the trading company in the Congo. 

The Marlow who receives the Congo commission is something of a waster: he is 'loafing about, hindering you fellows in your work' (HOD 32); for some reason, ships will not even look at him. When he desires and then gets a job, he considers himself an 'imposter' (HOD 39). He is still alienated from 'the group' when he arrives in the Congo and takes a swift aversion to the Company men he has to take up-river. Indeed, on an empirical level, he identifies with the source of their anxiety, Kurtz; he too becomes 'unsound' (HOD 102) in their estimation. The 'pilgrims' goal is to bring back Kurtz, to reclaim or eliminate him, not really because of his unsound methods or exploitation of the Congo natives, for the Company too lacks an ethical code, but because he has compromised imperialist conventions as regards behaviour and identity. Kurtz is bad for Company morale because he has made a success of going native; he has disclosed the veneer of civilization that covers European society for a sham.

Although this exposure ties in with Marlow's own cynicism, the young man's fascination with this more extreme version of himself is tempered by his horror at Kurtz's aspirations and activities. Although Marlow shows his
'loyalty' to Kurtz long after his return from the Congo (HOD 112-3), and still sees him as a 'remarkable man' (HOD 112), the narration aboard the Nellie, owing to its confessional tone, does seem to appropriate the narrative of Kurtz's capture in order to effect a reconciliation with society for Marlow. Marlow's story charts his problematic relationship with individualism to the point where he is 'permitted to draw back my hesitating foot' (HOD 113), to the moment when he can lay the 'ghost of [Kurtz's] gifts at last with a lie' (HOD 84).

The complexities of Marlow's position and his ambivalent relationship with his listeners can also be seen in the style of his narrative, in the way he tries to get his listeners to identify with attitudes and sensations they might not want to acknowledge. Marlow starts talking about the Roman invasion of Britain, a situation in which a foreign power was the imperial civilization and the ancestors of his English listeners were 'savages' (HOD 30), a place and time nowhere near the Congo of a few years before. Marlow calls upon his audience to exercise their brains: 'imagine the feelings of a commander of a fine... trireme... Imagine him here... Or think of a decent young citizen in a toga... The fascination of the abomination - you know. Imagine the growing regrets, the longing to escape, the powerless disgust, the surrender, the hate' (HOD 30-1). The listeners are lured by this imaginative red-herring of a history lesson and the abstract ideas about cultural engagements which seem so innocently to emerge from it into projecting themselves into the world of Marlow's coming tale, into participating, into adopting the subject-position in the narrative. They do not suspect that their ability to remain independent of the narrator is reduced by this approach and that, as darkness separates each man from the group on deck, they are forced to identify more and more with the voice that is asking for this commitment, regardless of that voice's ambivalent relationship with imperialist culture. As Wilde observed in relation to theatre, the proper spectator should not 'dominate the work of art... The
spectator is to be receptive' (TAAC 279).

The frame narrator suggests that for Marlow the 'meaning of an episode was not inside like a kernel [of a 'cracked nut'] but outside, enveloping the tale which brought it out only as a glow brings out a haze' (HOD 30). Meaning does not reside in a single objective truth, but emerges from the acts of interpersonal identification which form the bond between teller and listener; the situation is similar to Marlow's imaginative apprehension of Kurtz. Although the listeners cannot actually 'see anything' (HOD 57), Marlow asserts that they can see more than he could then because they see him whom they know (HOD 58). As Jonathan Culler has written, 'experience' is an 'indispensable point of reference, yet never simply there'; it is 'already behind us as something to be recovered, yet still before us as something to be produced'. Indeed, it becomes more manageable with distance and, what was for Marlow 'not very clear' at the time, gradually becomes the 'culminating point of my experience' (HOD 32).

Nevertheless, although Marlow has clearly made something of the episode already, the verbal cloud that he throws up for his listeners functions more as an impression of an impression with which they can empathize than as a simple representation. Marlow tries to impress the complex nature of his experience upon them; a more conventional or crisp description of places, people and events would signify a false or superficial mastery. Thus, although the wordiness of the text obfuscates the process of signification, it aids the transmission of meaning. Moreover, not only does Marlow, perhaps subversively, force the group on deck to empathize with his experiences in the Congo, he also leads them into an identification with Kurtz, both despite and because of his 'vile desires' (HOD 116), and to an acknowledgement of the 'remote kinship' (HOD 69) between Europeans and Africans. As he says (although somewhat ironically) to the Intended, 'intimacy grows quickly out there' (HOD 118).

By appealing to the fundamental level of human
experience, Marlow can divide his audience into individual units; he can make them focus on him and deny them access to their collective censorious mentality. As he tells his listeners in Lord Jim, 'you too in your time must have known the intensity of life, that light of glamour created in the shock of trifles, as amazing as the glow of sparks struck from a cold stone - and as short-lived, alas!' (LJ 209). As Conrad himself admitted, 'in everything I have written there is always one invariable intention, and that is to capture the reader's attention, by securing his interest and enlisting his sympathies for the matter in hand, whatever it may be, within the limits of the visible world and within the boundaries of human emotions'. By using art's appeal to the 'senses', he wanted to reach the 'secret spring of responsive emotions' and make the reader 'see' (TNOTN xlix).

For Pater, however, art addressed 'not pure sense... but the 'imaginative reason' through the senses' (WPTMT 153). Nevertheless, with similar intentions to Conrad's, by deliberately constructing the sentences of Marius so as to give the impression of thought in progress, Pater ensured his reader's contact with the individual consciousness of Marius, rather than with his mere changing philosophical positions. According to Buckler, Pater 'distanced thought to the experience of thought'. Indeed, the individual and the narrator become figures of mediation in late Victorian fiction: the individual, as I have shown through McIntosh, Kim and Mowgli amongst others, bridges the gap between different cultural constructions of reality; the narrator spans the distance between the world of the text/narration and the world of the reader/listener. Both appear as points of reference for the reader; they present themselves as ways into the text, or as doubles of the reader, particularly in texts whose world is very different to that of the reader. They are devices which enable the reader to colonize the world of the text; after all, the double emerges through a 'pathological attempt to replace the image of the other with that of the self' (Coates 1988 2).
Heart of Darkness is not simply presented as a tale, or even as Marlow's narration: the (male) reader is drawn into the story by the male group on the Nellie, all of whom have respectable professions and seem to endorse by their presence the frame narrator, who himself endorses Marlow, who tells of an event in his life. This structure partly authorizes the Congo narrative: the listeners both contain the narrative's potential to turn into anti-social rant or madness and facilitate the reader's participation in the story. As a mechanism of filtration, the various mediating characters do draw aside or hold back certain elements of the story, but the effect is also that the core of the story is more focused: weight is taken off social comment and applied to Marlow's experiences. Kipling's "The Man who would be King" has a similar structure of concentric narrators to Conrad's novella. In this story, however, the reader is asked to identify with the frame narrator who is a journalist rather than with the narrating protagonist Carnehan, a device which effectively distances and objectifies the adventurers, and presents Carnehan's narrative as a fantasy or an adventure story rather than as a vital experience.

On the other hand, Kipling was very much aware that as a writer of fiction, as an encapsulator of the nature of Anglo-Indian experience, he enjoyed a certain individuation or isolation from the community which he allegedly served. It was not enough for the author simply to reassert imperial ideology in his early fiction; he wanted to investigate the actuality of the Englishman's engagement with India, to represent the boredom and frustration of living there, and to balance the fantasies of control with the fears of failure and Indian uprising. Furthermore, whereas imperial ideology advocated racial segregation and the simple performance of duty, as a writer appealing to real people Kipling sought to represent the difficulties of maintaining that ideal and the compromises which ensued.

Indeed, although the narrator of "Beyond the Pale" reprimands Trejago for his 'interest in native life' (PTFTH
162), for his knowledge of the Arabian Nights and his ability to 'translate object-letters' (PTFTTH 163), he (the narrator) makes it very clear that he knows about all these things too. He is thus prevented from being the true mouthpiece of British imperial culture; his knowingness extends beyond what he really should know. This is a common feature of the young Kipling's narrators: they tend to broadcast their own and, indeed, their author's considerable knowledge of Indian life as well as the life of his own 'caste, race and breed' (PTFTTH 162). As a journalist, a freemason and a generally inquisitive young man Kipling explored all aspects of the world(s) with which he had contact. His night-time wanderings through Lahore are perhaps best described in his story "'The City of Dreadful Night'". In having and desiring this mobility, however, he seems to be as much excluded from the cultural conditions which surrounded him as he was able to express the complex responses of his kind to a difficult environment.

IV

Because of late Victorian fiction's interest in the individual, a remarkable number of late Victorian fictional texts are presented as narratives of the self, are (hi)stories which are either directly spoken by the central protagonist or which emerge from that protagonist's consciousness. The narrative form allows the subject to come to terms with his or her identity, becomes a means of constructing that identity from the subject's experiences. As I have shown by examining the aesthetic sensibilities of Heart of Darkness in this chapter and in chapter one, narrative enables the conversion of disordered or inchoate experience (or not-self) into a constituent part of the self, and its 'veracity' is guaranteed by the 'bond, the basic intimacy in discourse, between the one who speaks and what he is speaking about'. Furthermore, under the conditions of a mode of thought which considers that
'our knowledge is limited to what we feel' *(MTE 113)*, that the 'material fabric of things [is] but an element in a world of thought' *(MTE 211)* by dint of its inaccessibility, experience is all that can be deemed real. Indeed, the 'object, the experience, as it will be known to memory, is really from first to last the chief point for consideration in the conduct of life' *(MTE 61)*.

Writing becomes more a means of presenting the self than of representing the other. Prendick's narrative which forms *The Island of Doctor Moreau* tells of his privations and strange experiences in the Pacific; it exerts a narrational authority on what happened to him and acts as a means of averting the terror that still sometimes assails him. Harker is to a certain extent steadied by the journal he writes in Transylvania; the frame narrator of Kipling's "The Phantom Rickshaw" advises Pansay, who believes he is being pestered to death by the ghost of a woman with whom he once had an adulterous affair, to 'write out the whole affair from beginning to end, knowing that ink might assist him to ease his mind' *(WWW 156)*.

The creation of such a narrative, however, very often goes beyond the mere interest of the writer. Although Prendick's story is not discovered until after his death and is 'unaccompanied by any definite request for publication', the narrator of the Introduction to *The Island of Doctor Moreau*, Prendick's nephew, implies that the story should enter the public domain to support the 'strange account' that his uncle gave after being rescued from the ocean and which made others consider him 'demented' *(TIODM [3])*). With only a little more concern for public opinion, the Due de Fréneuse in Jean Lorrain's *Monsieur de Phocas* leaves the narrative or 'confession' of his relationship with the evil Claudius Ethal with a man he has never met before yet whom he respects, before 'exiling myself from France, perhaps forever'.

Fréneuse believes that the frame narrator 'alone can understand me' *(MDP 28)*, that he alone can see through the fantastic rumours of opiate-crazed decadence that have built
up around him. Whilst heading out to Asia (France cannot contain his visions), Fréneuse nevertheless needs someone from that society to whom he can 'cry out... the pangs of my anguish' (MDP 30).

This dual motivation also encourages Pansay. Pansay feels beholden to explain himself; his account of his haunting and mental decline is written first for himself, then for Kitty Mannering, the woman to whom he was so recently engaged, 'as some sort of justification of my conduct' (WWW 175). Whether the repeated appearances of Mrs Wessington to Pansay after her death are the product of his guilty imagination or actual supernatural hauntings, Pansay admits that he treated his lover after the break-up of their affair with 'openly-expressed aversion' and 'cutting brutalities' (WWW 158). He refers to his 'shameful story' and his 'iniquity' (WWW 165) which the reappearance of Mrs Wessington recalls for him after he had conveniently forgotten her. At the end of his narration he awaits the 'last portion of his punishment', for 'as surely as ever woman was killed by man, I killed Mrs Wessington' (WWW 177).

While the narrating subject's main desire is often to reaffirm their own sanity, a purely internal logic is worthless if the listeners/readers consider the narrative to be untruthful, deluded, absurd, or insane. Pansay knows no one will believe his story and therefore feels like a 'condemned criminal' (WWW 157). Narratives of the self, although monologues, ultimately present the subject as object, request the recognition and ratification of that subject, or that version of events, by the external world. The subject's narrative is thus a means of self-exposure with the aim of reintegrating or reconciling the individual subject with the world, or society. Despite the potentially highly individual qualities of the narrative, the narrative demands to be placed alongside and assimilated into the archive of the society of which the narrating individual is ostensibly a member.

The narrating subject requires his or her singular narrative to be grounded in an object reality, which is first
represented by the community within the text and then by the community outside it, as embodied by the reader. Prendick feels he has been 'helped... mightily' by a 'mental specialist' who 'had known Moreau, and seemed half to credit my story' (TIDDM 128). This muted or equivocal endorsement is more than is offered Pansay. Indeed, whereas Pansay is willing to confess to most unpleasant behaviour in order for the reality of his experience to be recognized and hence his sanity affirmed, the doctor who treats him and who, according to the frame narrator, has the 'right to speak authoritatively', asserts that 'overwork started [Pansay's] illness, kept it alight, and killed him, poor devil' (WWW 156). He prefers to cast doubt on Pansay's confession of caddishness in order to portray the supernatural elements of the narrative as 'nonsense' (WWW 156). The doctor's materialism goes some way towards convincing the less-sceptical frame narrator who comes to view Pansay's narrative as but Pansay's 'version of the affair' (WWW 157).

Because the narrator is beholden upon the listener/reader for the approval, even authorization, of his or her story, the truth quotient is inevitably tempered by the desire to persuade. West, the narrator and main protagonist of Looking Backward, claims in the Preface that he has written a pedagogical text which he has cast in the form of a 'romantic narrative' (LB 35): its ostensible aim is to note the 'prodigious... moral and material transformation' that has taken place in the world in the 'brief... interval' between 1887 and 2000 (LB 35). What he has really written, however, is a narrative of his experiences, and it is ultimately not for others, but for his own benefit. Prompted by his feelings of partial alienation from the society of the future, the traumatic 'mental confusion' (LB 80) brought about by his understanding of what has happened and his concern that he is 'outside the system' of that new world (LB 137), his narrative is a record of the difference between his existence in 1887 and his existence in 2000. It therefore becomes an attempt to explain his own selfish behaviour in the past by the social
conditions which were then his environment and to contrast them with his new environment which has produced for him a new identity.

The clue that this underlies the narrative perhaps does not come until the final pages when West presents the dream in which he believes that the reality of the year 2000 is actually a dream from which he has awoken back into the Boston of 1887. He is immediately disgusted with nineteenth century existence and, on telling his friends about it, he earns their opprobrium and his own ostracism. On really waking, still in the year 2000, he realizes he 'had been a man of that former time... every whit as indifferent to the wretchedness of my brothers, as cynically incredulous of better things, as besotted a worshipper of Chaos and Old Night, as any of my fellows' (LB 230). He had done nothing to bring about the 'deliverance' and 'salvation' of mankind, and an inner voice of guilt tells him that it would have been 'better' for him 'had this evil dream been the reality, and this fair reality the dream'; he is now 'drinking of wells [he] digged not, and eating of trees whose husbandmen [he] stoned' (LB 230). Going outside, he finds the object of his love Edith and, 'kneeling before her, with my face in the dust, I confessed with tears how little was my worth to breathe the air of this golden century' (LB 231). The final sentence of the narrative reads that 'fortunate is he who, with a case so desperate as mine, finds a judge so merciful' (LB 231).

This private confession, ostentatiously humble and solemn with its biblical cadences, is of course made widespread by West's publication of the narrative: West offers up his case to society as a whole. On the other hand, the narrative works as much as a vehicle of persuasion as it does as a confession or even as a record of historical transformation. West presents himself both as a testament to and as a symbol of the progress made by mankind over the space of a hundred years, staking a claim for his admission into this new world. And his application addresses society advertising Edith's support.

The interest of the narrative of the self to society is
not just as a record of the conflict between individual and world but also as an indicator of the correctness of the manner in which the individual responded to their experience. As an individual the subject is obliged to narrate their history in order that the nature and degree of their divergence from mainstream society can be charted. Indeed, while the process of self-narration literally subjectifies the self, the technique of confession subjects the self to a 'law' external to it; in Foucault's words, the 'subject who is constituted as subject - who is 'subjected' - is he who obeys' (Foucault 1990 85). The self is made subject not only to its own determinations, but to those of the world, or society; it is presented for interrogation and examination by a 'law' which is external to the individuality of that self even though the acts of subjection and confession exhibit the subject's intrinsic acceptance of that law. Indeed, while the 'truthful [medieval] confession was inscribed at the heart of the procedures of individualization by power' (Foucault 1990 58-9), the 'agency of domination does not reside in the one who speaks... but in the one who listens and says nothing' (Foucault 1990 62). Truth reaches 'completion' in the 'one who assimilate[s] and record[s]’ (Foucault 1990 66).

Foucault has written that while 'discourse transmits and produces power', it 'also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it' (Foucault 1990 101). Society, in its guises as both consumer and archivist of people and literature, can appropriate and reject as it chooses those narratives which offer themselves for incorporation within its collective discourse. Just as the 'Director of Companies', the 'Lawyer' and the 'Accountant' (HOD 27-8) contain Marlow's narrative, so the 'Psychologist', the 'Provincial Mayor', the 'Medical Man' and the 'Very Young Man' (SSS 7-10) act as an audience for Wells' Time Traveller; wild tales are consciously framed by a bland, faceless, listening circle of Victorian males. Other audiences, of which one member often acts as secretary to the narrative being told, thus 're-authorizing' it, include the journalist
in "The Man Who Would Be King", the country house guests in "The Turn of the Screw", and the dinner guests wallowing in 'good chairs' with a 'box of decent cigars' in Lord Jim (LJ 68). As Marlow says, 'I could be eloquent were I not afraid you fellows had starved your imaginations to feed your bodies. I do not mean to be offensive; it is respectable to have no illusions - and safe - and profitable - and dull' (LJ 209).

Foucault writes about a 'metamorphosis in literature', the growth of a 'literature organized according to the infinite task of extracting from the depths of oneself, in between the words, a truth which the very form of the confession holds out like a shimmering mirage' (Foucault 1990 59). Significantly, Foucault's imagery is Conradian: he refers to the 'self-examination that yields, through a multitude of fleeting impressions, the basic certainties of consciousness' (Foucault 1990 60), and he too acknowledges the view that language is but the expression of version and vision.

For Foucault the juridical, medical, psychological, or sociological case study is the replacement for the medieval confession as the agency for 'self'-analysis. In offering up a narrative of the self, in asserting an individual identity, in submitting themself to examination by the wider discourse of society, the narrating subject is literally on trial. For a few moments, the narrative of the individual is allowed to impose itself upon that wider discourse, to stake its claim. Often, however, its influence is contained by a court, cell, or consulting room setting which tries to de-personalize the narrative and view it as the description of an objective event rather than as the impression of a subjective ordeal. Jim wants to 'tell honestly the truth of [his] experience' (LJ 63), but the court convened to look into the Patna incident only wants material facts, things 'visible, tangible, open to the senses, occupying their place in space and time' (LJ 65). 'They wanted facts. Facts! They demanded facts from him, as if facts could explain anything!' (LJ 63). Jim wants to 'go on talking for truth's sake, perhaps for his own sake also';
his mind is like a 'creature that, finding itself imprisoned within a closure of high stakes, dashes round and round... trying to find... some opening through which it may squeeze itself and escape' (LJ 65). Nevertheless, the 'serried circle of facts... had surged up all about him to cut him off from the rest of his kind' (LJ 65); the facts make him a criminal.

Jim tries to replace the facts of the case with his own narrative, but society, or rather the inquiry, presenting itself as an objective authority, aligns itself with the object reality of the incident. As Marlow articulates it later, the inquiry feels beholden to assert the 'sovereign power enthroned in a fixed standard of conduct' (LJ 80). As a seafaring and imperial body dependent on high self-esteem, the colonial society of this 'Eastern port' (LJ 63) has been confronted by a fact that is 'as naked and ugly as a fact can well be' (LJ 69), a fact which reveals the white man's desertion of duty, abandonment of responsibility and rank cowardice. Those who should have had an 'unthinking and blessed stiffness before the outward and inward terrors... a faith invulnerable to the strength of facts' (LJ 75) have shown themselves wanting, and Jim's narrative, his confession of inadequacy, will be the means by which he will be exiled from the imperial community.

On the other hand, because Jim's narrative details an experience rather than a sequence of facts, it connects Jim to the community through his simple humanity. The trial, despite there being 'no incertitude as to facts', is 'well attended', on account of its 'human interest' (LJ 84). 'Whether they knew it or not, the interest that drew [the crowd] there was purely psychological- the expectation of some essential disclosure as to the strength, the power, the horror, of human emotions' (LJ 84). Unlike the inquiry, the sailors and waterside businessmen want to know the 'fundamental why', not the 'superficial how', of the affair; this, according to Marlow, is the 'only truth worth knowing' (LJ 84).

Because of the individual listener/reader's willingness and ability to identify with a protagonist and their ordeals
from a safe distance, the narrative of the self has the power to infiltrate a community and its values. Indeed, in an increasingly homogenized world the individual becomes an object of fascination for being an entity upon which ordinary people can project their fears and fantasies, upon which they can expend their purely compensatory imaginative energy. For this reason the narrative of the self must be repressed by society: just as Kipling's Anglo-Indians are encouraged not to let their experience of India get to them, so either Jim's narrative must be reduced to facts, or the young man must be made to run away, or he must be officially punished, or he must be exonerated. Jim thwarts the first two suggestions, and the last is impossible, despite Marlow's unconscious hope that he will 'find that something, some proud and redeeming cause, some merciful explanation, some convincing shadow of an excuse' (LJ 80).

Marlow suspects that this hope might be purely for 'my own sake' (LJ 80). After all, as Marlow continually asserts, Jim is 'one of us' (LJ 74 etc.); he is 'of the sort you like to imagine yourself to have been' (LJ 137). Marlow is forced to engage with Jim personally because the interrogation of the young man at the inquiry is so unsatisfactory; he needs to know the 'fundamental why' (LJ 84), in order both to understand Jim's connection with him and to prevent the influence of that connection from corrupting him, from destroying his belief in a 'fixed standard of conduct' (LJ 80).

Marlow acts as confidant, confessor, psychotherapist and father to the young man. On his part, Jim believes it is 'good' to talk, to 'make a clean breast of it to an elder man' (LJ 137). On the other hand, there is in Jim's confession the desire to persuade: he tells Marlow his tale on the condition that the older man believes him (LJ 139); he asks Marlow what he would have done if he had been on the Patna (LJ 111). 'He appealed to all sides at once', Marlow claims; 'he swayed me' (LJ 111-2). Despite his principles and his affiliation with good unthinking men, Marlow comes to see the 'human being' who
is 'one of us' \((LJ\ 112)\); Jim manages to reach the 'secret sensibility of my egoism' \((LJ\ 155)\). Jim forces a dialogic construction of Marlow, breaks through the social persona, makes the older man realize that responsibility is an individual conscious act and not just a product of duty. Life cannot be reduced to a 'few simple notions' \((LJ\ 75)\).

\[\text{V}\]

Wilde too, in the post-trial narrative that is \textit{De Profundis}, needs to persuade himself and others of his version of events. 'What lies before me is my past,' he states at the end of the letter, and his task is to make himself, the 'world', and God look on this past 'with different eyes' \((TLOOW\ 511)\).

This I cannot do by ignoring it, or slighting it, or praising it, or denying it. It is only to be done by fully accepting it as an inevitable part of the evolution of my life and character: by bowing my head to everything that I have suffered \((TLOOW\ 511)\).

Wilde, like \textit{Tonio Kröger}, appears very determinist; in truth, however, his is a more active form of persuasion even than Jim's, and his narrative is less confessional. Just as he blames Douglas for the course of events ('from beginning to end you were the responsible person'; 'you were the true author of the hideous tragedy' \((TLOOW\ 448)\)), he (Wilde) increasingly claims that the letter is written for the benefit of the young man. In the first paragraph he acknowledges a dual purpose, the letter being 'as much for your sake as for mine' \((TLOOW\ 424)\), but thereafter he claims he has to 'write your life to you, and you have to realize it' \((TLOOW\ 448)\). It is as though Wilde is subjecting Douglas to the same treatment he underwent in court himself. In his letter Wilde acts as prosecutor, victim and witness, presenting a deposition on Douglas' behaviour that is no less damning than 'Lockwood's appalling denunciation' of himself \((TLOOW\ 502)\).\(^{15}\)

Wilde offers a narrative of the previous four years so that Douglas can repent his actions. For, until Douglas
accepts 'responsibility' for Wilde's imprisonment, Wilde's version of events will remain tendentious and vertiginous. At the moment it is overshadowed by Queensberry's version which 'has now actually passed into serious history' (TLOOW 456). Wilde requires a communal acceptance of his individual self-construction in order to live peacefully in a wider community than his cell; he wants the letter to be taken on its own terms, but to be ratified by everyone.

First he must persuade Douglas to reject his [Douglas'] interpretation of events and to accept his [Wilde's] own as truth. He continually stresses the young man's inability to realize what he was doing: the 'one really fatal defect' of Douglas' character, according to Wilde, is his 'terrible lack of imagination' (TLOOW 445), imagination for Wilde being the 'quality that enables one to see things and people in their real as in their ideal relations' (TLOOW 508). This defect disqualifies the young man's version of events but, unfortunately, it also means that Douglas is unlikely to realize the 'truth' of Wilde's version. Wilde insists that one day Douglas will 'have to realize' his responsibility for Wilde's imprisonment otherwise his (Douglas') whole life will have been 'mean, starved, unimaginative' (TLOOW 508). Douglas should look at his own past 'face to face', for the 'supreme vice is shallowness' (TLOOW 508). Wilde tries to bully Douglas just as he claims the young man bullied him.

Wilde's belief that it is 'in the brain that everything takes place' (TLOOW 483) and that 'everything must come to one out of one's own nature' (TLOOW 448) enables him to make the best of a bad situation without denying the facts as they stand. He tries to reorganize what he has been through to bring about a 'fresh mode of self-realization' (TLOOW 467). All experience therefore becomes for him a beneficial use of time and energy for to 'reject one's own experiences is to arrest one's own development. To deny one's own experiences is to put a lie into the lips of one's own life. It is no less than a denial of the Soul' (TLOOW 469). Suffering, the keynote of his prison life, therefore becomes a significant
ordeal, not because it forms part of his punishment by society, but because of its qualities _per se_: it is the 'means by which we exist, because it is the only means by which we become conscious of existing; and the remembrance of suffering in the past is necessary to us as the warrant, the evidence, of our continued identity' (_TLOOW_ 435). As Marius acknowledges, 'we are constructed for suffering' (_MTE_ 270). A subdued masochism in _De Profundis_ elevates suffering into a mystical experience: suffering becomes 'the secret of life' (_TLOOW_ 473); 'where there is Sorrow there is holy ground' (_TLOOW_ 459).

Wilde, by ignoring the 'external things of life', intends to arrive at an 'intensity of individualism' (_TLOOW_ 467). He wants to reshape his identity by a particular attitude towards his experience, for 'within the circle of actual experience is my creed made perfect and complete' (_TLOOW_ 468). Wilde must be able to explain why he is in prison, to have a vision of the past that exonerates him from blame, and to give life to that vision by expressing it in words. For 'while there were times when I rejoiced in the idea that my sufferings were to be endless, I could not bear them to be without meaning. Now I find hidden away in my nature something that tells me that nothing in the whole world is meaningless, and suffering least of all' (_TLOOW_ 467). (Jim too 'had the gift of finding a special meaning in everything that happened to him' (_LJ_ 267).) In the seclusion of his cell Wilde's recollection, examination, reinterpretation and articulation of past events both creates and confirms his new and desired identity.

Wilde claims that 'it is only by realizing what I am that I have found comfort of any kind' (_TLOOW_ 469). At the same time, however, he admits that he 'treated Art as the supreme reality, and life as a mere mode of fiction' (_TLOOW_ 466). As Donadio has put it, the recreation of oneself in art is ideally to 'bring to consciousness all of one's experience as material and to realize it entirely in form' (Donadio 1978 60); the separation of truth from illusion is irrelevant. The self is a fictional construct; it is simply what is realized
and, as the refrain of the letter goes, 'everything that is realized is right' (TLOOW 425 etc.). Wilde predicts a future self that will not be riled by the world. Penniless and homeless, he will sleep 'in the cool grass in summer' and in a 'close-thatched rick' or a barn in winter (TLOOW 467). He romanticizes his destitution: 'with freedom, books, flowers, books, and the moon, who could not be happy?' (TLOOW 489), he asks with a certain naïveté. He imagines himself living peacefully abroad, rediscovering his creative faculty; he even envisages a reunion with Douglas in a 'quiet foreign town like Bruges' 'when the June roses are in all their wanton opulence' (TLOOW 510). He constructs a fantasy about the future which is as much a part of his present identity as it will never be a part of his future reality.\textsuperscript{18}

Wilde's letter was a means of giving solidity to his desired identity, a way of making it literally real. As even Carlyle, usually an advocate of work without talk, acknowledged, silence meant 'annihilation for the Englishman of the Nineteenth Century'; one must 'wag the tongue with dextrous acceptability' in order to succeed as a soldier of literature.\textsuperscript{19} On the other hand, as Marlow suggests, 'no man ever understands quite his own artful dodges to escape from the grim shadow of self-knowledge' (LJ 102). Wilde cannot embody the identity he has fabricated for himself; like Jim, he penetrates 'deeper into the impossible world of romantic achievements' (LJ 104). Nor could Wilde persuade Douglas of his role in Wilde's downfall, of this version of the past: Douglas was to tear up his copy of the letter, thinking it was the only one.

The dependence upon a readership (be it simply Douglas or wider) casts suspicion on Wilde's assertions of truth. Despite his claim that there is 'nothing' in the letter 'of rhetoric' (TLOOW 503), my attitude towards De Profundis is that it is an essentially fictional narration of the self which disguises its desperation under a smattering of metaphysical theory repeated from "The Soul of Man under Socialism". As a reader, still less as a critic, one is not
truly convinced by the world of *De Profundis*. One does not think, as Dorian Gray does of the suggestions of Lord Henry, that there is a 'subtle magic' in the 'mere words, that their ability to 'give a plastic form to formless things' makes them exquisitely 'sweet' and supremely 'real' (*TPDG* 21). 20

Unlike "Baa Baa, Black Sheep" and *Lord Jim* which are fiction and can therefore internalize conflict, *De Profundis* wrestles with a real political situation external to itself. It does not present a contrapuntal or dialogic narrative as those fictional texts do; it is a monologue which merely alludes to a version of the previous four years which seems to have carried much more weight than its own. Nevertheless, *De Profundis* is still a text which draws attention to the relations of power which engendered it, still details the individual's attempt to impose themself upon the world, or society; as I have already quoted, Wilde claimed that his art was for him 'the great primal note by which I had revealed, first myself to myself, and then myself to the world' (*TLOOW* 447).

For Wilde, the 'basis of character is will-power' (*TLOOW* 429); 'what a man really has, is what is in him' (*TAAC* 262). 21 Such absolute declarations, however, are products of fantasy; the individual as an independent entity is an ideal concept. As Nietzsche considered, man cannot have relative transcendence; man must 'either overcome all... limitations or be subjected to them all, for with respect to the conditions of existence he can be only master or slave' (Donadio 1978 115). 22 To reconstruct this in relation to *De Profundis*, although Wilde is 'creator' in his own private world, he is 'creature' in the wider world of human society; he is simultaneously subject and object of his text, master and slave. 23 The reader who assumes the position of subject in his narrative will be convinced by its internal logic; to the reader who refuses to become 'I', the narration will seem no more than a smoke-screen, an idealized projection of a more anxious and less resolved reality.
If Wilde himself tried to assert an autonomous identity, Lord Henry in *The Picture of Dorian Gray* laments that by and large 'people are afraid of themselves, nowadays. ... The terror of society, which is the basis of morals, the terror of God, which is the secret of religion - these are the two things that govern us' (*TPODG* 19-20). He believes that if one man were to give form to every feeling, expression to every thought, reality to every dream - I believe that the world would gain such a fresh impulse of joy that we would all forget the maladies of mediaevalism... But the bravest man amongst us is afraid of himself. The mutilation of the savage has its tragic survival in the self-denial that mars our lives. We are punished for our refusals. (*TPODG* 20)

In the world of fiction, however, the realm of 'imagined adventures', there are 'no policemen, no law, no pressure of circumstance or dread of opinion', according to Conrad; there is nothing to restrain the writer from realizing his wildest dreams apart from his own 'conscience' (*APR* xviii).

Indeed, if Conrad frequently blurred the line between
realism and romance or fantasy in his fiction, Wells gleefully wrote about *The War of the Worlds* that in it 'I completely wreck and sack Woking - killing my neighbours in painful and eccentric ways - then proceed via Kingston and Richmond to London, which I sack, selecting South Kensington for feats of peculiar atrocity'.⁰ Fiction in the late nineteenth century became a form in which extraordinary and anti-social aspirations could be freely expressed. In the hermetic environment of its total world fiction began to portray extreme situations in which the individual subject set themself in opposition to society and tried to make reality the exclusive property of their desires. This chapter further develops the theme of the struggle for authority between the individual and society in late Victorian fiction which has driven much of this thesis; moreover, it deals with the apex of the perceived or desired power of the individual in the genres or fields under discussion. For, while the desire for power implies a lack of it, representations of this aspiration exhibit the (temporary) achieved reality of this position, even if the spheres of influence of such protagonists are geographically or historically far removed from late Victorian England.

Ⅰ

Before analysing the activities and will of these selfish or power-hungry characters, however, I would like to begin with some gentle, or suicidal, extremists, a group of protagonists who exert their will to reduce their place in the material world rather than to assert their domination of it. They seek merely liberation from the constraints imposed by material reality. Indeed, although their existences are governed by self-denial, it is significant that they do, although often reluctantly, engage with the material world and 'save' members of that world who have no transcendental interests. By the end of *Kim* the lama 'has won salvation for himself and his
beloved' (K 338); Pater's Sebastian van Storck dies 'saving' a young child from a flood (WPTMT 300); Wilde's Happy Prince saves some of the poor people in his city from starvation and misery. Indeed, the Happy Prince's will is such that he persuades a migrating swallow to help him alleviate the suffering in the city by taking all the jewels and gold leaf from his body (the Prince is a statue) and distributing them to those in need, an activity which brings about the bird's death from cold and the destruction of the statue. By this deed the Prince moves from representing the city and its society's glory to representing its poverty; his selfless philanthropy contrasts with the selfish bourgeois materialism of the city's academics and Town Councillors.

The aim of Buddhist lama in Kim is 'deliverance' (K 338) from the 'Wheel of Life', from a 'great and terrible world' (K 98 etc.); in his eyes 'we be all souls seeking escape' (K 261). Those who 'follow the Way must permit not the fire of any desire or attachment, for that is all Illusion' (K 140), a 'new binding upon the Wheel' (K 171). In his quest for a state of mind which will reveal the whereabouts of the River of Healing (immersion in which renders one 'free from sin' (K 338)) the lama must be wary of that 'little-understood beast', the Body, for it is a 'delusion' which 'insists on posing as the Soul, to the darkening of the Way' (K 321). He believes in a passive relationship with the world and, when he recognizes that his wanderings in the Himalayas had caused him to delight in 'life and the lust of life' (K 309), he sees himself as an embodiment of 'Ignorance and Lust' (K 310). 'I measured the strength of my body, which is evil, against the high Hills' (K 309), he confesses; he had not acted solely to 'acquire merit' (K 261). Nevertheless, since the aim of life is to reach 'Knowledge' (K 333), 'who can read the Cause of an act is halfway to Freedom' (K 310). At the end of the novel, the lama describes how, on finding the special river, his 'wise Soul loosed itself from the silly Body and went free'; it 'passed beyond the illusion of Time and Space and of Things' and became 'all things, having reached the Great Soul'
Just as the lama is another version of Purun Bhagat, the holy man from *The Second Jungle Book* who abandons his elevated role in society to strive 'day and night... to think out his way into the heart of things, back to the place whence his soul had come' (*TJB* 201), so Pater's Sebastian van Storck is another version of Marius. Sebastian is the son of a prosperous seventeenth century Dutch Burgomaster who, possessed from an early age with an 'intellectual fearlessness' which seemed to lead him out 'upon the practical' (*WPTMT* 282), becomes alienated from the 'whole talkative Dutch world' and the 'busy and busy-looking house' of his family (*WPTMT* 286). Whereas this house is 'crowded with the furniture and the pretty little toys of many generations' (*WPTMT* 286) and governed by the 'elegant conventionalities of life' (*WPTMT* 291), his own room is a 'kind of empty place... mentally put to rights by the working-out of a long equation, which had zero is equal to zero for its result' (*WPTMT* 286). The 'mortal coldness of [his] temperament... seemed to necessitate straight-forward flight from all that was positive' (*WPTMT* 291), and he becomes the 'sworn chevalier' of a 'calm, intellectual indifference' (*WPTMT* 293). Making the ''Infinite' his beginning and his end', he comes to 'think all definite forms of being, the warm pressure of life, the cry of nature itself, no more than a troublesome irritation of the surface of the one absolute mind, a passing vexatious thought or uneasy dream there' (*WPTMT* 294), a belief which echoes Marius' emergent belief in the world as 'reflections in, or a creation of... one indefectible mind' (*MTE* 211).

On the other hand, while 'pure reason' tells Sebastian that the 'world is but a thought', that it exists 'solely in the mind' (*WPTMT* 294-5), he is unable to separate what should be pure 'intellectual abstraction' from the 'accidental associations of the personal history which had prompted it' (*WPTMT* 294). He becomes the 'finished egotist' (*WPTMT* 294): his 'self-absorption' shows him that the universe is 'actually
the product, so far as he really knew it, of his own lonely thinking power - of himself, there, thinking: as being zero without him: and as possessing a perfectly homogeneous unity in that fact' (WPTMT 295). However, after searching in vain within himself for the 'generative source of that creative power of thought', he decides that it must indeed come from outside, from the 'perturbation of the one absolute mind' (WPTMT 295). 'Wisdom', therefore, lies in the 'suppression of ourselves', in the 'extinction in one's self of all that is but correlative to the finite illusion', in order to restore 'equilibrium, the calm surface of the absolute, untroubled mind' (WPTMT 296).

Accordingly, Sebastian quashes those 'passing 'affections'' that are ever trying to 'assert' themselves and 'die[s] to self' (WPTMT 297). Out of this death, however, his intellect 'attained a freedom of its own' (WPTMT 297). Instead of binding him to existence, the material world and the 'ideal' world of art set Sebastian 'on the thought of escape... into a formless and nameless infinite world, quite evenly grey' (WPTMT 298). The vibrancy and vitality of the object reality becomes the 'measure of [its] distance from what really is' (WPTMT 298), and Sebastian abandons society for a 'desolate house' where he can 'make 'equation' between himself and what was not himself' (WPTMT 300).

Whether he be ill, proud, nihilistic, fanatic, or none of these, Sebastian's attitude to the material world is 'really a vehement assertion of his individual will' (WPTMT 298). Like Kim's lama, who claims that one cannot 'choose Freedom and go in bondage to the delight of life' (K 310), Sebastian believes that the two are mutually exclusive. Although it is freedom and not power that the gentle extremists seek, their situation is essentially Nietzschean: a single attachment to the material world fully negates the chance of autonomy. Both the lama and Sebastian (and the Happy Prince) react against the materialist desires of their country and age, the influence of social forces and the 'external things of life' (TLOOW 467), in an effort to perform acts of self-
obliteration. In the case of the Happy Prince this self-effacement is literal: he gives away the sapphires which are his eyes and his skin of gold leaf; his lead body, excluding his heart, is melted down to be reused. Whereas the lama and Sebastian attain an equilibrium with the soul of things on a metaphysical level, the Happy Prince is physically redistributed among the needy populace.

While it is tempting to compare these characters with Wilde's 'individual' in their similar political situations and high regard for the will, the self-realization of Wilde's individual is an act of self-assertion rather than of self-negation. Moreover, Wilde's distinction between the individual and the 'egotist... who makes claims upon others' (TAAC 285) further complicates the attempted correlation. For Wilde, 'unselfishness recognizes infinite variety of type as a delightful thing' while 'selfishness always aims at creating around it an absolute uniformity of type' (TAAC 285). Although the technique of the gentle extremists is that of self-denial, and their desired relationship with the material world that of 'escape', their narratives can still be seen in terms of conquering the object reality of the physical world. They desire to annihilate the power of a threatening world in order to transcend material and environmental determinations.

II

The problem faced by those protagonists of late Victorian fiction who are obsessed by the will to power (rather than by the will to freedom) is that they want that power within a material context; rather, they assume that power in relation to an object reality will give them freedom from the restrictions imposed by that material or object environment. On the level of basic existence, both types of extremist desire to make 'one substance' (WPTMT 295) of the self and the world, an indivisibility between subject and object. But, whereas the gentle extremists as good as dissolve into the
background, those who have a will to power demand that the world emanate from them, that it be a product of their creative imagination. Huysmans' Des Esseintes is a most ineffectual disciple of this latter method. He shuts himself off from the world in his house and believes that, by contemplating what is timeless (art, perfumes, literature, plants, religion), he can confirm himself in his individuality and hold the degenerative forces of capitalist society at bay. Des Esseintes' mistake is to seek an autonomous spiritual state of being through concentration on fragments of worldly culture, physical sensations and the artificial. He cannot dominate (even his personal) reality simply by possessing, contemplating and reorganizing various symbols of it and in the end he has the choice either to re-enter the society for which he has so much 'contempt' and make a 'good recovery' or to end up with 'insanity speedily followed by tuberculosis' and death. As Schiller observed, man possesses 'sovereign right' over the 'world of semblance' 'only as long as he scrupulously refrains from predicing real existence of it in theory, and as long as he renounces all idea of imparting all existence through it in practice'.

This type of extremist, some of whom are more successful than others, also includes Nunez from "The Country of the Blind", Ostrog from Wells' When the Sleeper Wakes, George Arthur Rose (who is elected pope) in Frederick Rolfe's Hadrian VII, and Sherlock Holmes. The imperialist field contains the power-hungry freebooters Case (from Stevenson's The Beach of Falesà) and Brown (from Lord Jim), the latter of whom has 'bullied' the world for twenty years (LJ 304) and has 'bent' his sailors 'to his will' (LJ 306). Indeed, one must also mention Jim himself who is 'accustomed to regulate the affairs of his world' of Patusan (LJ 345). Again, Kipling's Dravot is in a similar situation: by the time of the final crisis he has 'monopolized and appropriated all meaning and power into himself' (Sullivan 1993 107). He has reduced the 'facts of consciousness to a purely personal world' created by himself alone; he thinks that the 'positive reality of the world' of
Kafiristan has been 'as it were crushed and squashed, in other words, idealized'. Freely mixing his imperial references, Dravot has turned Kafiristan into another England ('these men aren't niggers; they're English!' (WWW 234)) and himself into a reincarnation of Alexander the Great. The Kafiristani under him will both protect India from Russia and be an 'Empire' (WWW 235) in its own right. Dravot, however, like Des Esseintes and Jim, has not managed to assimilate everything in his world: he has ignored, denied, or misrepresented to himself the self-interest of the Kafiristani priesthood, who resent his usurpation of their power.

The story of Willems in Conrad's An Outcast of the Islands examines most closely the effect of this type of will to power upon the imperialist subject. Willems, a young Dutch colonial in Macassar, 'patronize[s]' and 'tyrannize[s] over' his wife's family, whom he considers to be the 'degenerate descendants of Portuguese conquerors'. The family's admiration 'rounded and completed his existence in a perpetual assurance of unquestionable superiority' (AOOTI 13); 'they lived now by the grace of his will. This was his power. Willems loved it' (AOOTI 14). As Royal Roussel has written, Willems' 'blindness to others denies them any ground in his own self'; he reduces them to the level of 'objects without a consciousness of their own'. His high sense of his own worth engenders an ambition to rise in the world, to become a partner in the trading company in which he is now only a 'confidential clerk' (AOOTI 13): the 'road to greatness' and the 'brilliant goal of his ambition' lie 'plainly before his eyes' (AOOTI 19).

In order to rise more quickly Willems 'appropriate[s] temporarily' some of his employer's money (AOOTI 19), thus violating the codes of honesty and duty which bind him to the company and signify his identity within white society. He sees everything in terms of himself and not in terms of the 'sovereign power enthroned in a fixed standard of conduct' (LJ 80): Willems' attitude is that 'where there are scruples there can be no power' (AOOTI 17). His egotistical vision does not
consider his theft 'cheating' (AOOTI 17), merely an 'idiotic indiscretion' (AOOTI 28), a momentary stepping off of the 'path of his peculiar honesty' (AOOTI 27). Indeed, it is because of the personal and 'ill-defined' nature of this 'track' that it 'took him some time to find out how far he had strayed amongst the brambles of the dangerous wilderness' (AOOTI 27).

Discovered and exposed, Willems is forced to leave Macassar. Fortunately, though, he is offered shelter by the trader Lingard in Sambir, a small trading station in the middle of nowhere. But here Willems is forced to rely wholly on the 'temple of the self' (AOOTI 34) for the surrounding jungle seems immeasurably hostile and alien. Significantly, Conrad has already observed that 'there is always some one thing which the ignorant man knows, and that is the only thing worth knowing; it fills the ignorant man's universe. Willems knew all about himself' (AOOTI 15). Willems' egotism has sealed him off from reality, and his sudden 'clear perception of the cause of his disgrace' (AOOTI 34) builds or reveals an opposition between his vision of the world and the way that world actually works. Although, as William James put it, the 'fons et origo of all reality, whether from the absolute or the practical point of view, is... subjective, is ourselves', subjectivity has to distinguish between conceived and 'sensible objects' in order to work out what is real and what is but imaginary. Although 'any object which remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute reality', the 'mere fact of appearing as an object... is not enough to constitute reality'; 'conceived objects must show sensible effects or else be disbelieved'.

Because of his isolation, egotism, demoralization and confusion between vision and reality Willems is susceptible to being influenced by the external world. He has no internal defences or barriers apart from his own (now unfocused) will; without the principles and support of his cultural identity he is a hollow man. After his chance meeting with Aissa, the Malay woman who emerges from the jungle and is thus an image
of it, Willems is assailed by the 'fear' that 'something unknown... had taken possession of his heart... something inarticulate and masterful which could not speak and would be obeyed' (AOOTI 66). He wants to tame Aissa, but finds that his 'very individuality was snatched from within himself by the hand of a woman' (AOOTI 70), and a 'complete savage' (AOOTI 72) at that. 'There was no safety outside of himself - and in himself there was no refuge; there was only the image of that woman' (AOOTI 72). He sees himself as 'surrendering to a wild creature the unstained purity of his life, of his race, of his civilization' (AOOTI 72). Helpless and irresolute, he responds to the 'novelty of the sensations' (AOOTI 72), decadently giving himself up to what is 'terrible and sweet' (AOOTI 110).

Willems reckons that his 'clear duty... to make himself happy' (AOOTI 121) is more important than any allegiance he might have to others. He is 'possessed' by the 'immovable conviction of his own importance' (AOOTI 265); 'he cared for nobody' but himself (AOOTI 110). In this he is not so dissimilar to Giorgio in D'Annunzio's The Triumph of Death, a man who professes that he has 'always lived for myself alone'; 'I have never exerted myself for anyone else's benefit' (TTOD 83). Giorgio sees it a 'defect' in his 'moral nature', a form of 'impotence', that, despite his 'burning desire to live, to bring all my powers into rhythmical subordination, to feel myself a complete and harmonious whole' (TTOD 65), he feels both porous and amorphous. 'Each day a part of my life slips from me through countless invisible fissures', he complains; 'I am like a half-filled vessel which assumes a different shape with every movement of the liquid within' (TTOD 65). He feels he is not in control of his life but, 'mayhap, in the power of some mysterious and unknown being' (TTOD 66). Because of this feeling he decides that 'in this world, there is but one joy that lasts: the certainty, absolute and incontrovertible, of the possession of another creature' (TTOD 120).

Giorgio reaches this conclusion by 'avoid[ing] probing
his thoughts to the bottom' (TTOD 120). He has a 'reluctance to confront reality': he simply wants to 'obtain the thing most directly opposed to his nature - certainty' (TTOD 131). Giorgio's motives are decadently based upon his own 'enjoyment' (TTOD 120) and 'happiness' (TTOD 131); his 'whole being succumbed to the despotism of his senses' (TTOD 132). He gets to work on Ippolita, a somewhat vulnerable (financially and health-wise) young woman, taking her to an isolated villa in the countryside where, with the 'thrill of a creator', he witnesses the 'metamorphosis of the woman... to his own image' (TTOD 141). He watches her 'gradually adopt his thoughts, his judgment, his tastes, his prejudices, predilections, and melancholy... Even her handwriting grew to be like his. Never had the influence of one being upon another been more rapid or more intense' (TTOD 141-2). While Giorgio becomes an 'essential element' in Ippolita's life (TTOD 143), she becomes a perfect 'instrument' for his desire (TTOD 149); her 'expression' comes to suggest an 'inward and spiritual grace [which] superimposes on the precise lines of reality a much higher and more complex order' (TTOD 141). She thus 'offered to the passionate observer a constant incentive to emotion and to dreams' (TTOD 141).

In his more 'clear-sighted' moments, though, Giorgio recognizes the 'crude realism' of Ippolita (TTOD 148) and realizes that 'out of his first impressions... he [had] constructed for himself a phantom which had the power of giving an infinitely stronger impulse to his nerves than the actual object present' (TTOD 149). He acknowledges that this has come from his 'mania for making a complete structure out of his illusions and dwelling in it' (TTOD 182). He is haunted by the dichotomy that Ippolita is for him both real, animal, coarse and dull, yet also an ideal being 'moulded by my desire' (TTOD 229). Despite her being a 'mere motive force to his imagination... stripped... of all value', he is increasingly attracted by her material blemishes and defects, to the point of 'carnal obsession' (TTOD 235). But, because Ippolita, as an object reality, resists his need to subsume
her into his own discourse, he tries to 'shake off that ingrained indifference which for so long had rendered him impervious to any agitation not proceeding from himself' (*TTOD* 179). He does his 'best to find some striking accordance between his own soul and surrounding Nature, that thereby he might reconcile himself finally with her and remain true to her eternally' (*TTOD* 179).

At other times, however, he decides to go on the offensive. Because he has begun to consider Ippolita as a 'destructive' and 'indomitable creature', as the 'Arch-Enemy' (*TTOD* 176), he thinks that he must 'destroy in order to possess'; he must turn her into a simple 'subject for reverie, a pure ideal' (*TTOD* 177). Ippolita, however, seizes upon her depiction as the enemy and makes something of it: she constructs herself as a femme fatale. She boasts of being 'stronger than [Giorgio's] thoughts', able to 'clothe myself in witching falsehood which shall provoke [his] desire unceasingly' (*TTOD* 237). She evinces a craving to keep him at her side, to 'dominate, to possess him wholly' (*TTOD* 246). But the 'ingenuity of her egotism' (*TTOD* 256), which moves from 'play to abuse', 'burn[s] her in her turn'; it 'intoxicated and blinded her to the great shadow that was deepening day by day over the head of her slave' (*TTOD* 257). Giorgio sees himself as losing control over Ippolita: for him she is now 'Lust triumphant... for ever invincible... stronger than all thought. [Her] perfume has the power to dissolve a world in [him]' (*TTOD* 308). Giorgio's 'inner life' seems to 'fall to pieces, to dissolve in a ferment which spread to the deepest strata of his being, casting up to the surface shapeless fragments of a totally diverse nature, unrecognizable as forming a part of the life of the same man' (*TTOD* 312). To compensate for this formlessness, Giorgio becomes 'possessed by one overruling idea' and the 'necessity for prompt action' (*TTOD* 312). He leads Ippolita to a cliff-top and throws both her (against her will) and himself to their deaths.

Giorgio's desire for destruction (including self-
destruction) is a sign of his powerlessness, of his inability to consider or believe in certain ideas without immediately being haunted by their opposites. This inability to master reality engenders his interest at one point in the 'limitless power of music... the sole means by which man can free himself from the delusions of the Apparent and discover in the inner world of the soul the true essence of things' (TTOD 253). During this phase Giorgio moves from the will to power to the simpler desire for freedom from the impositions of the external world. He wants to 'dissolve' into the 'universal Will', or the 'Great All' (TTOD 254). But the music which appeals most to him is Wagner's Tristan and Isolde with its tempestuous narrative of 'superhuman aspirations' ending in a 'frenzy of destruction' (TTOD 278) when the protagonists realize the 'impossibility of passing the material limits of their senses' (TTOD 284).

If between Giorgio and Ippolita there is a 'great gulf' (TTOD 277), Willems and Aissa too are 'surrounded each by the impenetrable wall of their aspirations'; they are 'hopelessly alone... each the centre of dissimilar and distant horizons; standing each on a different earth, under a different sky' (AOOTI 270). Their relationship too seems governed by the 'mortal antagonism of the sexes' (TTOD 176): each tries to subject the other to their will. Aissa's initial 'surrender' is the 'beginning of her power' (AOOTI 270); like Ippolita, she is constructed as a femme fatale. Willems thinks that she has 'destroyed his future, his dignity of a clever and civilized man'; he sees in her eyes the qualities of an 'animal', of an 'incomplete soul' (AOOTI 270). Just as Giorgio manipulates the class difference between himself and Ippolita, so Willems tightens the antagonism of the sexes by use of racial prejudice: he erases his own weakness by inscribing it into the narrative of superior European values being corrupted by contact with dark and inferior races. Indeed, this relationship reflects the wider political narrative of the novel in which Lingard's paternal despotic rule of Sambir is complicated, undermined and usurped by the
ambitions of rival Malay and Arab traders. However, while Willems becomes 'lost amongst shapeless things were dangerous and ghastly' (AOOTI 72), Lingard is able to maintain a 'strong consciousness of his own personality' (AOOTI 223).

III

Above these frustrated egotists in the hierarchy of obsession with power and freedom is a group of protagonists who either have or obtain supernatural or fantastic forces which help them in their quest to overcome the resistance of the material world. These next extremists are bogeymen who embody the paradox that late nineteenth century British desires to (re)construct the world were also British society's deepest fears. They exemplify the problem of the rampant individual who brings the world one step closer to anarchy. Into this category fits Dracula, the brave, charming, unscrupulous and violent Master from Stevenson's The Master of Ballantrae and Svengali, the insidious, unpleasant musician who captivates concert-going audiences in George du Maurier's Trilby by harnessing the vocal chords of a tone-deaf Irishwoman through hypnosis.12

Others attain entry into this group through their exploits in the field of scientific discovery. Doctor Jekyll starts experimenting with the 'duality of man' (DJAMH 82) because of the estrangement he feels on account of his 'shame' at having to conceal his irregular 'pleasures' from the rest of society (DJAMH 81). On drinking the potion he has concocted he feels, after the agonies and disorientation of transformation, a 'solution of the bonds of obligation, an unknown but not an innocent freedom of the soul' (DJAMH 83). Jekyll, or rather Hyde, has become separated from the respectable doctor who is his other self. Jekyll thinks he can now plunge at will into a 'sea of liberty': 'safety was complete' because the 'I' bonded with society 'did not even exist' (DJAMH 86). In contrast to Jekyll's public persona,
Hyde's 'every act and thought centred on self': he drinks 'pleasure with bestial avidity from any degree of torture to another'; he is 'relentless like a man of stone' (DJAMH 86). 'Tempted' by 'ambition', Jekyll has fallen in 'slavery' to his 'new power' (DJAMH 85), to his 'original evil' (DJAMH 84). Just as Giorgio tries to bend Ippolita into being an embodiment of his ideal, and eventually becomes dominated by the corporeal reality of the woman, so Jekyll becomes enthralled and undone by Hyde. His slumbering conscience (DJAMH 87), like Willems' 'peculiar honesty' (AOOTI 13) and Giorgio's desire to 'ador e the illusion' (TTOD 216), becomes a means of self-deception. Jekyll can change appearance but not reality.

If Jekyll's delight is to 'strip off these lendings and spring headlong into the sea of liberty' (DJAMH 86) (an action reminiscent of Lear's descent into madness), Wells' Invisible Man is obliged to follow this plan of action verbatim in his quest for power. After becoming increasingly alienated from a prying and money-oriented society whilst researching into the pigmentation of blood, the ambitious student Griffin becomes 'ruled' by the 'fixed idea' of invisibility, of whose 'mystery', 'power' and 'freedom' he has a 'magnificent vision'. He imagines that an Invisible Man would not only be free from conventional impositions but would also be able to exert pressure on society. When he actually achieves invisibility, however, Griffin realizes that an Invisible Man is a 'helpless absurdity' for, although invisibility enables one to attain the objects of one's desire, it is 'impossible to enjoy them' (TIM 121). The material nature of the object world defeats the realization of Griffin's fantasies: he is forced to prowl naked in a 'cold and dirty climate and a crowded civilized city' (TIM 121). As he laments, 'ambition - what is the good of pride of place when you cannot appear there?' (TIM 121). He sees himself as but a 'wrapped-up mystery, a swathed and bandaged caricature of a man' (TIM 122), and complains that it is 'wonderful how little a man can do alone! To rob a little, to hurt a little, and there is the
end' (*TIM* 124).

After he has made himself invisible, and thus fully estranged himself from normal society, Griffin becomes still less accountable to common codes of conduct. He commits robbery, arson and assault without compunction. When Kemp, the doctor to whom he tells his tale, mentions the 'common conventions of humanity', Griffin interrupts him to say that they are 'all very well for common people'; like other characters in this chapter, Griffin justifies his actions by his individual 'position' (*TIM* 118) rather than by more universal principles. Indeed, he wants to impose himself upon reality, to manipulate the world according to his will. He wants to 'establish a Reign of Terror', to 'take some town like... Burdock and terrify and dominate it. ... And all who disobey his orders he must kill, and kill all who would defend them' (*TIM* 125). He sends a letter to Kemp telling him that 'Port Burdock is no longer under the Queen' but under him: 'this is day one of year one of the new epoch - the Epoch of the Invisible Man' (*TIM* 134).

Kemp describes Griffin as 'mad... inhuman... pure selfishness' (*TIM* 127). He urges the young man not to play a 'game against the race... How can you hope to gain happiness? Don't be a lone wolf. Publish your results; take the world - take the nation at least - into your confidence' (*TIM* 125-6). And, when Griffin escapes from the police Kemp has summoned, Kemp pronounces that Griffin 'has cut himself off from his kind. His blood be upon his own head' (*TIM* 129). Indeed, the Invisible Man anticipates the scenario of *Dracula*, wherein a foreigner intends to install himself in London where, according to Harker, he might, 'amongst its teeming millions, satiate his lust for blood, and create a new and ever widening circle of semi-demons' (*D* 67). This novel too becomes the record of a struggle for power between one being who quite literally wants to force his vision into other people and a wider society whose freedom depends on the systematic destruction of the person who attacks it.

While other people are simply an obstacle that Griffin
must overcome, Dracula actually needs them for his own survival and freedom: he is dependent upon drinking their blood for his continued existence. Similarly, Mr Abney in M. R. James' "Lost Hearts" kills children because he believes that, 'by absorbing the personalities of a certain number of his fellow-creatures, an individual may gain a complete ascendancy over those orders of spiritual beings which control the elemental forces of our universe'. This policy should grant him an 'enlarged and emancipated existence', place him 'beyond the reach of human justice', and eliminate to a great extent the 'prospect of death itself' (GSOAA 35-6). Fortunately, however, he is killed by the violent vengefulness of his victims' ghosts.

Like Jekyll and Griffin, the Professor of The Secret Agent has scientific inclinations; more specifically, he has an ambition to develop the 'perfect detonator' (TSA 69). Furthermore, as with Griffin, his alienation from humanity instils a desire for its destruction: 'exterminate, exterminate! That is the only way of progress', he reckons; 'every taint, every vice, every prejudice, every convention must meet its doom' (TSA 303). Like Morris, he believes that the 'great edifice of legal conceptions sheltering the atrocious injustice of society' (TSA 80) require a terrific blow to bring them down, that the 'framework of an established social order cannot be effectually shattered except by some form of collective or individual violence' (TSA 81). He sees himself as a 'moral agent' and by 'exercising his agency with ruthless defiance he procured for himself the appearances of power and personal prestige' (TSA 81).

Indeed, the Professor's main strength lies in the aesthetics of destruction rather than in its actual instigation: his authority is based upon the 'force of personality' (TSA 68), upon being a nexus of resistance rather than a true functionary of violence. He carries a flask of high explosive permanently attached to his body, a weapon which he is able to detonate by a device concealed in his hand. Although this is his way of making himself 'deadly', he
realizes that by itself this is 'absolutely nothing in the way of protection. What is effective is the belief... people have in my will to use the means. That's their impression. It is absolute. Therefore I am deadly' (TSA 68).

Ordinary people are 'inferior' to him because their character is built upon conventional morality. It leans on the social order. Mine stands free from everything artificial. ... They depend on life, which, in this connection, is a historical fact surrounded by all sorts of restraints and considerations, a complex, organized fact open to attack at every point; whereas I depend on death, which knows no restraint and cannot be attacked. (TSA 68)

Indeed, the Professor scorns the other anarchists of the novel for being no better than the forces arrayed against them: these anarchists are 'slaves of the social convention' by virtue of the fact that, by simply wanting to 'revolutionize' convention, it 'governs' their thought (TSA 69). 'Revolution' and 'legality' are simply 'counter moves in the same game' (TSA 69). The Professor, however, thinks of his 'perfect detonator only' (TSA 69); he wants to live purely in the realm of his own desire, of his own aesthetic, out of which he intends to form reality.

The ability to destroy anyone who tries to attack him is the 'supreme guarantee' of the Professor's 'sinister freedom' (TSA 81). But the fact that this freedom relies on the threat of death, including his own, strengthens the idea that the freedom or power that he seeks is a concept entirely dissociated from the material conditions that contain him. From his earliest days and 'humble origin' the 'extreme, almost ascetic purity of his thought, combined with an astounding ignorance of worldly conditions, had set before [the Professor] a goal of power and prestige to be attained... by sheer weight of merit alone' (TSA 80). Furthermore, his 'hard work' at self-advancement had filled him with 'such an exalted conviction of his merits that it was extremely difficult for the world to treat him with justice' (TSA 75), and the thwarting of his 'frenzied puritanism of ambition' opened his eyes to the 'true nature' of a world whose morality
was 'artificial, corrupt, and blasphemous' (TSA 81).

Lacking the 'great social virtue of resignation' (TSA 75), the Professor alienated himself from society. Now his 'sinister loneliness' is haunted by the 'resisting power of numbers, the unattackable stolidity of a great multitude' (TSA 95) which he wants to 'exterminate' on the grounds that, although they are weak, vice-ridden, prejudiced and conventional, 'they have power. ... Theirs is the kingdom of the earth' (TSA 303). As Nietzsche wrote, 'everywhere the mediocre are combining in order to make themselves master' (TWTP 458). In the Professor's eyes only he should 'remain', at the cost of whatever violence is necessary: 'blood alone puts a seal on greatness' he asserts; 'look at history' (TSA 304). Like Knut Hamsun's Ivar Karen, he believes in the necessary return of the 'great terrorist, the living essence of human power, the Caesar'.

The Professor raises his glass to the 'destruction of what is' (TSA 306). In his view only the 'force' of 'madness and despair' can act as a 'lever' to 'move the world' (TSA 309), can bring about its 'regeneration' (TSA 311).

IV

Conrad wrote that in this last quotation he wanted to give the Professor a 'note of perfect sincerity. At the worst he is a megalomaniac of an extreme type. And every extremist is respectable' (JCLCG 170). But this is easy enough to write about someone whose extreme views are never converted into actual policy. In fact, none of the protagonists in the previous section are able to exert their power in the way that they would like; all find that the object reality of English society, however cumbersome and 'conventional', manages to resist their plans for it. Other protagonists of late Victorian fiction, though, are able to practise what they preach, often with notably gory consequences, and their success can be attributed to the fact that they happen to
exercise their will either in the darkest past or in the
darkest reaches of the globe, in environments that are more
easily malleable by the aspiring egotist.

Haggard's She, who can certainly be considered
'supernatural' like some protagonists of the previous section,
autocratically rules over the Amahagger tribe from the ancient
and ruined city of Kôr in a region of Africa unknown to
Europeans. She is reputed to be immortal, beautiful beyond
comparison, and to have 'knowledge of the secrets of nature'
and 'power over all things'. For the narrating Holly her
'loveliness' lies in a 'visible majesty, in an imperial grace,
in a godlike stamp of softened power, which shone upon that
radiant countenance like a living halo' (S 155). It is
'sublime... and yet, the sublimity was a dark one - the glory
was not all of heaven - though none the less was it glorious';
it is 'evil' (S 155).

She freely indulges in Griffin's desire for 'judicious
slaying' (TIM 125): she swiftly sentences to torture followed
by death those Amahagger who had tried to murder the English
explorers Ludwig Holly and Leo Vincey. She asks the prisoners
whether it had not been taught to them from childhood that the
'law of She is an ever fixed law, and that he who breaketh it
by so much as one jot or tittle shall perish' (S 174). On the
other hand, she tells Holly that she rules 'this people... not
by force', for she has only one regiment of guards, but 'by
terror' (S 175). Her 'empire is of the imagination' (S 175),
she claims: like Kurtz and the Professor She relies upon her
knowledge of her people and their illusion of her unlimited
power. She convinces others that the narrative she offers of
herself is real and by this method even Holly and the reader
become 'much involved in the web of her fatal fascinations' (S
177); they are manipulated into believing the stories that
circulate around her.

Everything She does is self-oriented: as she confesses to
Holly, 'those who live long... have no passions, save where
they have interests' (S 176). As Durkheim observed, the
weaker the groups to which the individual belongs, the 'less
he depends on them, the more he consequently depends only on himself and recognizes no other rules of conduct than what are founded on his private interests'.[17] She instructs Ustane, an Amahagger woman, to abandon, on pain of death, her claims to Leo, the young man whom She thinks is the reincarnation of her lover of long ago, Kallikrates. Although, as Holly observes, Ustane is 'guilty' of nothing of which She herself is not guilty (i.e. love), her 'sin' according to She is that she 'stands between me and my desire' (S 201). She sees the world through the twin filters of her power and her passion: 'my empire shall be all my own', she asserts (S 202). In her eyes the survival of the fittest prevails: 'day by day we destroy that we may live, since in this world none save the strongest can endure. Those who are weak must perish; the earth is to the strong, and the fruits thereof' (S 202-3). Morality is irrelevant, for 'out of crimes come many good things, and out of good grows much evil' (S 203). Anticipating the sentiments of Conrad, Holly is appalled by this casuistry and wonders

what may not be possible to a being who, unconstrained by human law, is also absolutely unshackled by a moral sense of right or wrong, which, however partial and conventional it may be, is yet based, as our conscience tells us, upon the great wall of individual responsibility that marks off mankind from the beasts? (S 203)

She lays on a sacrificial dance for her guests, and lights the 'entertainment' with 'human mummies' (S 217), the embalmed corpses of an ancient civilization. Although this prompts a comparison with Nero's use of 'live Christians soaked in tar' to illuminate his gardens (S 218) and combines with the 'fiendish cancan' of the Amahagger (S 219) to prefigure the 'unspeakable rites' (HOD 86) attended by Kurtz, it is but an overture to a demonstration of the true perversity of She's power. She blasts the persistent Ustane to death by some 'mysterious electric agency or overwhelming will-force' (S 227) right in front of Leo and then woos the young man over his lover's dead body. Leo is swiftly
fascinated by She's unveiled splendour and her 'dread beauty' takes 'possession of his senses, drugging them, and drawing the heart out of him' (S 229). 'The magic of her beauty and concentrated will and passion entered into him and overpowered him' (S 230). As Holly cynically, piously and enviously puts it, 'with the corpse of his dead love for an altar, did Leo Vincey plight his troth to her red-handed murdress' (S 230).

In order to elevate Leo to her near-immortal level, She wants the young man to bathe himself in the rolling pillar of Life. In her view 'long life and strength and beauty beyond all measure mean power and all things that are dear to man' (S 251). To Holly's suggestions that ambition is but an 'endless ladder', that there is a limit to the pleasure wealth can bring, and that wisdom only serves to 'compass out our ignorance' (S 251), She replies that 'love... makes all things beautiful' (S 251). She wants to go to England with Leo and rule there, having overthrown the present queen, Victoria. She scoffs at the idea that 'real power' in England rests 'in the hands of the people' and claims that she will be 'above the law', as will her 'Kallikrates' (S 255). Holly worries that her 'proud, ambitious spirit would be certain to break loose and avenge itself for the long centuries of its solitude' (S 256), but he can see little way of stopping her. He thinks she will assume absolute rule over the British dominions, and probably over the whole earth' and, although he is sure it would be the 'most glorious and prosperous empire the world has ever seen', he also knows it would be at the cost of a 'terrible sacrifice of life' (S 256).

However, like Griffin and Dracula, She is prevented from fulfilling her imperial dreams. Just at the moment when 'all the avenues of the Possible were for a space laid open to the footsteps of the Real', when even Holly thinks he is 'another and most glorified self' (S 288), comes disaster. She, on entering the flame of life to prove its safety to Leo, ages two thousand years in just a few minutes. Holly sees in this the 'finger of Providence', for She 'would have revolutionized society, and even perchance have changed the destiny of
Mankind' (§ 295). She had 'opposed herself against the eternal Law, and, strong though she was, by it was swept back to nothingness' (§ 295). The object reality resistant to the material aims of the individual will is now revealed to be an agent of the guiding principle of the universe.

V

Kurtz also exercises his will in the heart of the 'dark' continent but, whereas She, despite her whiteness, is non-European, 'all Europe contributed to the making of Kurtz' (HOD 86). Kurtz is a 'first-class' (HOD 46) agent who is 'of the greatest importance' (HOD 51) to a Belgian trading company in the Congo. He is a 'prodigy... an emissary of pity, and science, and progress... a special being' (HOD 55), no less than a 'universal genius' (HOD 58). Nevertheless, his high-minded idealism which considers that every Company station should be a 'beacon on the road towards better things... for humanizing, improving, instructing' (HOD 65) is tempered by his 'unsound method' (HOD 102) of ivory collection which has allegedly 'ruined the district' (HOD 97) under his control. He has 'collected, bartered, swindled, or stolen more ivory than all the other agents together' (HOD 83); with the help of natives who 'adored' him he 'raided the country' (HOD 94). As Marlow notes, the 'appetite for more ivory had got the better of the... less material aspirations' (HOD 96). Indeed, Kurtz wholly 'lacked restraint in the gratification of his various lusts' (HOD 97): when Marlow first sees him, Kurtz's wide open mouth gives him a 'weirdly voracious aspect, as though he had wanted to swallow all the air, all the earth, all the men before him' (HOD 99).

Lesser imperialists simply have power over the Congo natives' material existence, as is apparent from the broken bodies of the natives in the 'grove of death' (HOD 47). Kurtz, however, has power over their minds: his control depends on the natives' strength rather than on their
weakness, on their adoration rather than on their mere acquiescence. To reach this position he has to be both inside and outside the natives' way of life, to participate in their 'unspeakable rites' (*HOD* 86), but only as the figure to whom offerings are submitted. According to his report on native customs, white men 'must necessarily appear to... [savages] in the nature of supernatural beings - we approach them with the might as of a deity... By the simple exercise of our will we can exert a power for good practically unbounded' (*HOD* 86-7). He indulges in the simplistic anthropology of imperialism and late Victorian adventure stories such as *King Solomon's Mines* and "The Man who would be King" before revealing his true recommendation to 'exterminate all the brutes' (*HOD* 87).

Kurtz's ability to influence is balanced by his ability to be influenced. While he has 'enlarged' the harlequin's mind (*HOD* 92) and inspired great passion within his native followers, he would often 'forget himself amongst these people' (*HOD* 95). Marlow has intimated throughout his journey up the Congo that the landscape has a profound effect on the individual: after meeting Kurtz he suggests that the 'wilderness had found [Kurtz] out early, and had taken on him a terrible vengeance for the fantastic invasion'; 'it had whispered to him things about himself which he did not know... and the whisper had proved irresistibly fascinating' (*HOD* 97). As Marlow wonders, 'everything belonged to [Kurtz] - but that was a trifle. The thing was to know what he belonged to, how many powers of darkness claimed him for their own. ... He had taken a high seat amongst the devils of the land - I mean literally' (*HOD* 85). Kurtz claims it is 'my Intended, my ivory, my station, my river' (*HOD* 85), but Marlow, although in no little awe of Kurtz's influence, achievements and 'immense plans' (*HOD* 107), sees the man as a 'hollow sham', a 'soul satiated with primitive emotions, avid of lying fame, of sham distinctions, of all the appearances of success and power' (*HOD* 110).

Marlow sees Kurtz as a man who has set himself up as a fetish or a deity, someone who has become the material
embodiment for the natives' and the harlequin's aspirations and has manipulated their illusions by being false to his own real identity. The Kurtz Marlow meets is a 'shadow insatiable [both] of splendid appearances [and] of frightful realities; a shadow... draped nobly in the folds of a gorgeous eloquence' (HOD 116). According to those who knew him in Europe, Kurtz could have been a musician, a journalist, a politician: 'he could get himself to believe anything... He was an - an - extremist' (HOD 115). Marlow tells his listeners that they 'can't understand' Kurtz's position; they are too conventional, are too used to a 'solid pavement' under their feet, to being 'surrounded by kind neighbours' who, with 'warning' voices, can whisper of 'public opinion' (HOD 85). The 'utter solitude' (HOD 85) of Kurtz sets him apart: according to the harlequin, 'you can't judge Mr Kurtz as you would an ordinary man' (HOD 95), and Marlow finds that he has to deal with a being to whom I could not appeal in the name of anything high or low. I had, even like the niggers, to invoke him - himself - his own exalted and incredible degradation. There was nothing either below or above him... He had kicked himself loose of the earth. Confound the man! he had kicked the very earth to pieces. He was alone, and I before him did not know whether I stood on the ground or floated in the air. (HOD 107)

In the steamboat Kurtz's 'intelligence' is 'concentrated... upon himself with horrible intensity'; it is clear that his soul has 'gone mad' from looking within himself (HOD 108). His 'ivory face' registers the 'expression of sombre pride, of ruthless power, of craven terror - of an intense and hopeless despair' (HOD 111). His final cry 'the horror! The horror!', though, is spoken in a 'supreme moment of complete knowledge' (HOD 111). As Marlow later realizes and respects, it is an 'affirmation, a moral victory, paid for by innumerable defeats, by abominable terrors, by abominable satisfactions' (HOD 113). Kurtz has reached a state of full self-knowledge by submitting himself to the extremities of human experience and, even though he ends as 'something in a
muddy hole' (*HOD* 112), his corporeal defeat is dwarfed by a climactic self-realization that has kinship with the lama's attainment of freedom. However, whereas the lama sought to escape from self and to join the unity of being, Kurtz's imperialist version plays itself out in the material world. As Foucault has repeatedly asserted, Western culture has always placed the highest of values on the discovery or knowledge of self. Kurtz is, therefore, a 'hero of the spirit', an archetype to be identified with, and Marlow's contemptuous attitude towards the 'commonplace' Belgians 'going about their business in the assurance of perfect safety' on his return (*HOD* 113) echoes the self-importance of his mentor.18

VI

Kurtz is one of the greatest or most notorious monsters of late Victorian fiction, but he is also simply an extension and combination of Willems and Lingard: the white man swallowed by the wilderness and yet sure of his convictions, his customized European values. While for Lingard 'common sense and experience taught a man the way that was right' (*AOOTI* 166), the narrator of *An Outcast of the Islands* observes that a 'man does not live for years beyond the pale of civilized laws without evolving for himself some queer notions of justice' (*AOOTI* 193).

Attwater in Stevenson's *The Ebb-Tide* is also very similar to Lingard: he too is a lone figure unaffiliated to any company; he too is sure of his rightness. Stevenson's novel tells of how three destitute white seamen in Papeete are offered responsibility for a schooner on which there have been cases of small-pox. Before long, however, they become stranded on a small uncharted pearling island in the South Seas belonging to an aristocratic Cambridge-educated missionary named Attwater. Attwater is a 'huge fellow, six feet four in height, and of a build proportionately strong',
and his seeming 'languor' is contradicted by an 'eye of an unusual mingled brilliancy and softness, sombre as coal and with lights that outshone the topaz; an eye of unimpaired health and virility; an eye that bid you beware of the man's devastating anger' (DJAMH 240-1). Desperate, and irritated by Attwater's 'easy incivility' and 'silken brutality' (DJAMH 242), two of the men, the American Davis and the cockney Huish, decide to steal Attwater's pearls and kill him.

Herrick, however, feeling an Oxbridge bond between himself and Attwater, seems possessed of a larger conscience. Talking with Attwater, he finds that the man has had a business, a colony and a mission of his own. 'I was a man of the world before I was a Christian', asserts Attwater; 'I'm a man of the world still, and I made my mission pay' (DJAMH 253). Like the company men in Heart of Darkness (HOD 64), he claims to be able to 'do anything' (DJAMH 258). During an exotic epicurean feast he lays on for his guests ('not a tin had been opened' (DJAMH 261)), Attwater tells how he used to 'run' thirty natives 'single-handed' (DJAMH 265). 'One got the law after a fashion', he muses, impersonalizing himself; 'one got it knocked into their heads that they must work, and they did' (DJAMH 265). Having earlier described himself as a 'judge in Israel, the bearer of the sword and scourge' (DJAMH 253), he now recounts how, when once his 'justice had been made a fool of' (DJAMH 267), he had summarily executed the culprit without trial. Indeed, Attwater claims to be a 'fine shot' (DJAMH 258), never missing, and to have successfully quelled a 'mutiny' on the island (DJAMH 260). In addition, he admits to being a misanthropist, disliking men and hating women (DJAMH 254).

Herrick, instead of seeing Attwater as a 'helpless victim' of the plans of Davis and Huish, comes to see the man as 'mysterious and menacing, the angel of the Lord's wrath, armed with knowledge and threatening judgment' (DJAMH 260). He succumbs to Attwater's opinion that he (Attwater) is both an 'experimentalist' and a 'fatalist' (DJAMH 259), that his success is divinely ordained, that he is actually an agent of
the Old Testament God, that his 'bullets go true' (DJAMH 271). Moreover, this is apparently borne out by the plot. When Huish comes at Attwater with a bottle of vitriol concealed in his hand, Attwater shoots it to pieces. 'For the twinkling of an eye the wretch was in hell's agonies, bathed in liquid flames, a screaming bedlamite; and then a second and more merciful bullet stretched him dead' (DJAMH 296). Attwater follows up this necessary ruthlessness by snicking Davis with bullets until the American agrees to ask God for forgiveness before being executed. When Davis makes his peace with Heaven, Attwater pronounces that it is made with him too. Davis' life is spared, and he ends the novel a convert to Christ, having decided to remain on the island.

On the other hand, although Attwater considers himself an agent of God, the novel suggests an identity between him and Huish. Both men are described as 'beast' (DJAMH 286, 288) and Attwater is reckoned a 'monstrous being' (DJAMH 268), even though his wickedness is seemingly eclipsed by Huish's 'precedency in evil' (DJAMH 287). The comparison makes one wonder if Herrick, Davis and the reader are not simply in thrall to Attwater's suave university tones with their sharp-shooting imperialist assurance and contemptuous of the rough Cockney English of a vitriol-throwing villain. The fact that the two men oppose one other in combat does not mean that one is right and the other wrong. As Huish suggests, 'murder ain't genteel, it ain't easy, it ain't safe, and it tykes a man to do it' (DJAMH 288). Attwater's exploits with his rifle make him resemble a (figuratively barbaric) 'red Indian' (DJAMH 297), and they echo the actions of a (figuratively savage) 'old king one knew in the western islands' (DJAMH 258) as much as they smack of imperial autocracy. Both Attwater and Huish justify themselves repeatedly through the Bible and, although Huish is an intruder on Attwater's island, he is little more of an interloper in the South Seas than Attwater himself.19
Huish, like the Professor, is diminutive in stature, a fact which becomes symbolic of his humble origins and his inability to rise in the world. In contrast, Attwater and Kurtz are very tall (Kurtz seems seven foot to Marlow) and well-educated; both are imposing, eloquent and persuasive. Wells' Doctor Moreau is also physically distinguished: he is first described as a 'massive white-haired man' (*TIDO* 20), 'powerfully built... with a fine forehead and rather heavy features... the fall of his heavy mouth at the corners gave him an expression of pugnacious resolution' (*TIDO* 24-5). Like Attwater, Moreau 'owns' and tyrannizes over a small island in the South Pacific. Unlike his compatriot, who seems to have chosen to live and work abroad, Moreau was 'howled out' of England for 'wantonly cruel' (*TIDO* 32) experiments on animals. In fact, as Prendick notes, Moreau 'might perhaps have purchased his peace by abandoning his investigations, but he apparently preferred the latter, as most men would who have once fallen under the overmastering spell of research. He was unmarried, and had indeed nothing but his own interests to consider...' (*TIDO* 32).

Moreau has become God and Master of his island, just as the drunken Captain of the *Ipecacuanha*, the ship which picked the shipwrecked Prendick out of the water, claims to be 'Captain and Owner' of his vessel, the 'law and the prophets' (*TIDO* 15), and 'king' (*TIDO* 21). Prendick's first encounter with Moreau's vivisected creations, the Beast People, makes him think he was 'already dead and in another world' (*TIDO* 56); and indeed he is, for he is in a world whose parameters are designed by Moreau. The Beast People obey Moreau's 'Law' and chant its 'mad litany' (*TIDO* 56) all the time; Prendick thinks that the physiologist has 'infected their dwarfed brains with a kind of deification of himself' (*TIDO* 57). After the prohibitions of the Law come the affirmations of Moreau's authority and power: 'His is the House of Pain', 'his is the Hand that makes', his is the Hand
that wounds', 'his is the Hand that heals', 'his is the lightning-flash', 'his is the deep salt sea', 'his are the stars in the sky' (*TIODM* 57). Like She and Attwater, Moreau's judgments and laws are final. Disobedience means a return to the House of Pain, or death: 'evil are the punishments of those who break the Law. None escape' (*TIODM* 58).

Rather, as with other protagonists in this chapter, Moreau's power depends on having conveyed these illusions. However, whereas the impression of power engendered by Kurtz and the Professor depends on the voluntary acceptance of its premises, Moreau's technique has involved an actual remodelling of his creatures' brains as an extension of more traditional vivisection. He admits to having 'implanted' 'certain Fixed Ideas... in their minds', which have 'absolutely bounded their imaginations' (*TIODM* 78). His creatures are either 'triumphs of vivisection' (*TIODM* 68) or, as Prendick puts it, 'monsters manufactured' (*TIODM* 69), 'grotesque travesties of men' (*TIODM* 78). The experiments are an 'abomination' (*TIODM* 73): Moreau anticipates Dracula in that not only does he physically make acolytes out of other beings, but he too entered the field of vivisection through his early experiments with the 'transfusion of blood' (*TIODM* 70). Moreau claims to have devoted his life to the 'study of the plasticity of living forms', to techniques of modifying the 'chemical rhythm' of a creature as well as to methods of 'grafting', 'building up... breaking down and changing' (*TIODM* 69). Moreover, his experiments have shown that the 'mental structure' of a being is 'even less determinate than the bodily'; hypnotism has promised the 'possibility of replacing old inherent instincts by new suggestions, grafting upon or replacing the inherent fixed ideas' (*TIODM* 70).

Moreau sees himself as a sculptor (his Beast People are 'animals carven and wrought into new shapes' (*TIODM* 69)) and as a creator of reality in the mould of the Old Testament God, whose representation in iconography he so resembles. Indeed, he claims to have 'sought out' the 'ways' and 'laws' of 'this world's Maker' (*TIODM* 72). The 'study of Nature', however,
'makes a man at last as remorseless as Nature' (*TIDDM 73*), and Moreau talks about the 'strange colourless delight' of his 'intellectual desires' (*TIDDM 73*). One is reminded of Tonio Kröger's assumption that an artist creates with 'bland and serene mastery' (*TK* 152), that one must 'die to life in order to be utterly a creator' (*TK* 149). Moreau is not interested in the pain he causes, for 'pain is simply our intrinsic medical adviser to warn and stimulate us'; he sees it as a 'useless thing' that will eventually be 'ground out of existence by evolution sooner or later' (*TIDDM 72*). Indeed, the 'store men and women set on pleasure and pain', Moreau remarks, is the 'mark of the beast upon them, the mark of the beast from which they came' (*TIDDM 72*). Man's material nature, his worldliness, in this case represented by his body, frustrates his wider spiritual aims, and thus Moreau aspires towards a non-physical realm that transcends the sensual. Indeed, it is in response to the frailty of the body that the lama seeks the River of Healing, that Giorgio seeks self-forgetfulness in love, music and death, that She seeks immortality.

Moreau has become a prisoner of his obsessive will, and this has made him 'irresponsible... utterly careless' (*TIDDM 93*): he imagines that his world of scientific endeavour is the only 'world' on the island. Ultimately, however, this world is but one of 'painful disorder' (*TIDDM 93*) and the 'fabric of existence' is 'cut and shape[d]' by a greater force than Moreau's will (*TIDDM 94*). Using the same imagery as Haggard and Conrad, Prendick feels that 'blind fate' is a 'vast pitiless mechanism' which crushes everything 'ruthlessly, inevitably, amid the infinite complexity of its incessant wheels' (*TIDDM 94*). Like She, Moreau tampers with Nature and pays the price. Moreover, there is an 'unspeakable aimlessness' about his experiments (*TIDDM 92*) from the scientific point of view. Moreau's creations serve only to demonstrate his own skill and knowledge. Confined on the island, they are of value only to Moreau's conception of himself and his aspirations.
Moreau, it seems, although the human form appeals to his 'artistic turn of mind' (*TIODM* 71), wants to make a 'rational creature of my own' (*TIODM* 76) rather than more human beings. After observing that men and women still possess the 'mark of the beast from which they came' (*TIODM* 72), he expresses a desire to 'burn out all the animal' (*TIODM* 76) from his creatures: he wants to make *animal rationale*, not merely *animal rationis capax*. But Moreau's desire for progress towards dispassionate enlightenment is thwarted by the reversion of his creatures: the 'beast' in them 'begins to creep back, begins to assert itself again...' (*TIODM* 76). The plasticity of form which enabled Moreau's initial successes ultimately subverts his desire to fix his changes. Furthermore, there is 'something that I cannot touch', he admits, 'somewhere... in the seat of the emotions' (*TIODM* 76). Moreau is sickened with a 'sense of failure' (*TIODM* 76) and finally killed by a creature he has shaped but not managed to bend to his will; the would-be God is placed on the same level as his creatures.

VIII

Although Moreau distances himself from wanton cruelty, sensuality and medievalism by stressing the dispassionate, intellectual and modern nature of his work, he does acknowledge a historical link between his own experiments and the 'operations of those mediaeval practitioners who made dwarfs and beggar cripples and show-monsters' (*TIODM* 70). He also recognizes a connection between his work and the enterprises of 'clumsy-handed' 'tyrants... criminals... [and] the breeders of horses and dogs... working for their own immediate ends' (*TIODM* 70). He considers that no doubt the 'chief aim' of some of the inquisitors was 'artistic torture, but some, at least, must have had a touch of scientific curiosity...' (*TIODM* 70). Conversely, he repeatedly refers to the artist in himself, an admission which links him to the
fleshly and exotic aesthetic of late nineteenth century decadent fiction. Parallels can be drawn between Moreau's lush island laboratory and Octave Mirbeau's Chinese Eden of horrors in his *Torture Garden* of 1899. In addition, Moreau's quest echoes in some respects the attempts of Wilde's aesthete, Lord Henry, to arrive at a 'scientific analysis of the passions' by the 'experimental method' (*TPODG* 50). And Lord Henry shares some interests with Lorrain's English painter, Claudius Ethal, who has an aesthetic fascination with 'moral perversity and physical affliction, mental and emotional distress' (*MDP* 146). However, while for these decadents aesthetic experience is rooted in the human subject, in the sensual impressions of the here and now, Moreau has no interest in either sadism or pain and tries to harmonize himself with the vastness of the universe (*TIODM* 72-3).

Moreover, while continental writers gave the impression that sadism was a peculiarly English trait, to be best referred to as *le vice anglais*, possibly the most heinous and depraved experimenter on human flesh in late nineteenth century fiction is French, and he appears in Huysmans' *Down There*. Durtal's history of Gilles de Retz, or de Rais, shows the medieval aristocrat to have been initially a 'good and hardy captain' who, unlike his king, 'never seems to have evaded responsibility and wallowed in debauchery'; he was even 'entrusted by Charles [VII] with the 'guard and defence' of the Maid of Orleans' (*DT* 45). After this charge, though, de Rais retreats to his castle at Tiffauges (comparable to the islands of Moreau and Attwater) where he shuts himself in. Here the 'artist and man of letters develop in Gilles and, taking complete possession of him, incite him, under the impulsion of a perverted mysticism, to the most sophisticated of cruelties, the most delicate of crimes' (*DT* 48). He seeks the 'delicate delirium of art' and dreams of a literature 'soul-searching and profound'; he glories both in the music of the Church and in the art of evoking demons. He revels in what is 'rare and difficult to obtain' (*DT* 48); he is the 'Des Esseintes of the fifteenth century' (*DT* 49). He falls out
with his family (DT 50), and becomes 'dominated by the passion for alchemy, for which he was ready to abandon all else' (DT 51). This, like Moreau's attempts to make a rational creature, is his pseudo-science.

Durtal considers that de Rais was a 'true mystic', and that 'from lofty Mysticism to base Satanism is but one step. In the Beyond all things touch' (DT 52). In this respect, the Maid of Orleans was 'to a certain point' 'responsible for his career in evil': 'she roused an impetuous soul, ready for anything, as well for orgies of saintliness as for ecstasies of crime' (DT 52). De Rais becomes influenced by 'savants obsessed by Satanism' (DT 52) who want 'everything': 'knowledge, power, riches' (DT 54), the same goals that obsess most ambitious protagonists in late Victorian imperialist fiction. Furthermore, the unity of oppositions in mysticism brings together the apparently conflicting spiritual and material forces of late nineteenth century fiction.

The failure of his alchemical experiments leads de Rais to conclude that 'no discovery was possible without the aid of Satan' (DT 79). His magicians claim that in order to 'bring Satan to him Gilles must make over his soul and body to the Devil or commit crimes' (DT 154). De Rais 'refuses to alienate his existence and sell his soul, but he contemplates murder without any horror' (DT 154); in this he is not unlike the Professor, who would not call a man 'master' even for 'ten years of time' (TSA 306). De Rais too rejects the Faustian pact even though it would be a simple way to riches and near-immortality (DT 82).

Having 'despised' the contact of women (DT 154), de Rais begins his crimes with choir-boys. Although overcome with guilt by his first murder, he fulfils the law of Satanism which demands that the 'elect of Evil, once started, must go the whole way' (DT 155). An 'overconservative' estimate reckons that he committed in excess of seven hundred rapes and murders (DT 157). Initially de Rais merely sodomizes, disembowels, dismembers and murders his young victims; then, on becoming 'weary of these fecal joys', he begins to appease
the 'rage of his senses' \((DT 158)\) with necrophilia and vampirism. When these 'terrifying atrocities, these monstrous outrages, no longer suffice him, he corrodes them with the essence of a rare sin' \((DT 159)\). Indeed, his 'ferocity... becomes spiritual' and, through this, he 'lands plump in the darkest depth of Evil' \((DT 159)\). De Rais pretends to save a child from his (de Rais') accomplices, thus earning the boy's affection, and then violates the child during the moment in which that child 'loves him' \((DT 160)\), thereby making the boy 'suffer both in body and soul' \((DT 159)\).

Furthermore, de Rais even orders his 'diet so as to kindle the fury of his senses': strong-tasting food to spur himself and his guests to 'frenzies of lechery' and 'monstrous dreams' \((DT 112-3)\). But, although he can claim that 'there is no man on earth who dare do as I have done', Durtal points out that the 'out-of-the-world possibilities of Evil are limited' \((DT 160)\).

In his excesses of stupration and murder the Marshal cannot go beyond a fixed point. In vain he may dream of unique violations, of more ingenious slow tortures, but human imagination has a limit and he has already reached it - even passed it, with diabolic aid. Insatiable he seethes - there is nothing material in which to express his ideal. \((DT 160)\)

Realizing this, de Rais tries to become less evil. As soon as he adopts this attitude, though, 'remorse overtakes him' and 'overwhelms him' \((DT 160)\): he is 'besieged by phantoms' \((DT 160)\) and goes mad in the forest of Tiffauges where he is attacked by the corpses of his victims and a whole range of incubi and succubi (male and female evil spirits). The hallucination ends when he 'adjures Christ to have pity, supplicates Him to spare a sinner' \((DT 163)\).

Durtal divides de Rais into 'three different persons': the 'fighting man', the 'artistic criminal', the 'repentant sinner [and] mystic' \((DT 205)\). This tripartite arrangement can also be seen in Dracula who, owing to his ancient struggle with the Turks, is a medieval warrior; the Count is also a refined criminal and, as Mina says, a 'poor soul' who should
be 'destroyed in his worser part that his better part may have spiritual immortality' (D 367). Similarly, Kurtz is an imperialist raider, a poet with an 'unsound method' of ivory collection (HOD 102) and a man who finally sees the full horror of what he has become. For Durtal, de Rais is a 'mass of contradictions and excesses': he 'bounds from spiritual pole to spiritual pole'; he dies having 'completely exhausted the possibilities of joy and grief' (DT 206). He has 'nothing more to try, nothing more to learn, here below' (DT 206); he is the ultimate decadent.

When eventually put on trial, de Rais utters extreme imprecations and refuses to answer questions for fear of perjuring himself on oath. On being excommunicated, however, he begs for forgiveness and offers to confess his crimes. He offers a full, frank and public narrative of his self, the 'frightful rosary of his crimes', then begs 'mercy and pardon' from God and 'succour' from the prayers of the parents of his victims (DT 232). Everyone prays for him: 'driven beyond human limits of horror and pity, the crowd tossed and surged' (DT 233). In addition, later, in his cell, awaiting execution,

thunder-smitten by grace, in a cry of horror and joy, he... suddenly [saw] his soul overflow and sweep away the dank fen before a torrential current of prayer and ecstasy. The butcher of Sodom... destroyed himself, the companion of Jeanne d'Arc... reappeared, the mystic whose soul poured out to God, in bursts of adoration, in floods of tears. (DT 234)

De Rais, far more than Kurtz, is a 'hero of the spirit'.

For Durtal the communal prayer and the reception of grace are supreme moments: he writes in relation to the former that 'in its white splendour the soul of the Middle Ages burst forth radiant' (DT 232). Although his romanticization of the Middle Ages stresses different qualities to that of Morris, both men contrast the vibrancy of that age with their own. While Morris ascribes this to a rural feudalism, Durtal seems to put it down to a profound belief in God: for him the atheist 'Marquis de Sade is only a timid bourgeois, a mediocre
'fantasist', beside the Satanist de Rais (DT 53). For Durtal 'society has done nothing but deteriorate in the four centuries separating us from the Middle Ages': 'the race has... become moderate'; it has replaced the 'instincts of carnage and rape' with the 'monomania of business, the passion for lucre' (DT 114). The clergy of the nineteenth century, instead of launching itself into 'superhuman transports' in order to attain God, 'checks ardent thoughts and preaches sobriety of mind, continence of postulation, common sense in prayer, bourgeoisie of soul' (DT 115). Mysticism survives only in renegade pockets, thinks Durtal, in a secret continuance of Satanist beliefs. His own adulterous affair, his 'spiritual conflict', is but 'commonplace and bourgeois' (DT 163); he remains 'fettered to earth' (DT 178).

Is 'there no means of escaping out of one's self, out of earthly limitations', he wonders, 'and attaining an upper ether where the soul, ravished, would glory in its giddy flight?' (DT 178). He thinks that 'in Love and Well-doing the infinite is approachable for certain souls' (DT 160), but he has neither a firm faith in God, nor a true love. His disillusion and self-consciousness deny him free enjoyment of the senses, and he can have nothing more than general moral disgust for the Black Mass in which he participates. For, as with de Rais, one must believe in God, Christ the Redeemer and transubstantiation for Satanist rituals to be mystical and have the thrill of sacrilege; Durtal is merely 'saddened' by his actions (DT 251).

Exercises of the will which take place in the material world for material ends are but an expression of a deep spiritual desire to be free of the apparently inexorable workings of a mechanistic universe, the all-consuming brutality of an object reality. But, however this transcendental desire manifests itself in fiction, through the discourses of neo-platonism, mysticism, theosophy, Buddhism, Christianity, the supernatural, or those vain material and imperial employments of power, it always brings with it the weight of its failure. It comes suffused with a sense of
loss, with the intuition of a vanished golden age of the past, and with the apprehension of a vital mode of existence which has now withered and which one cannot again revive.

According to Wilde, the only person who could make the world correspond to his own vision, in a material and spiritual sense, was that supreme Romantic and individualist, Christ: he was both author and protagonist of his own life. Indeed, 'out of his own imagination entirely did Jesus of Nazareth create himself' (TLOOW 482). Not only this, but 'his whole conception of Humanity sprang right out of the imagination and can only be realized by it' (TLOOW 477). Christ's greatness, however, lies not simply in imagining that he could 'bear on his own shoulders the burden of the entire world', but in 'actually achieving it' (TLOOW 477). Christ's teachings in relation to his life have the persuasive force or the external divine sanction that Wilde's own imaginings or writings ultimately lack. Consequently, Christ's place is 'with the poets' (TLOOW 477) whereas Wilde, as he saw himself in the popular imagination of the day, sits 'between Gilles de Retz and the Marquis de Sade' (TLOOW 431).25
CHAPTER FIVE:

THE CONFOUNDING IMAGINATION AND THE ROLE OF DREAMS

As I have quoted earlier, Conrad reckoned that for the writer of fiction there are no forces of restraint save that of conscience in that 'interior world where his thought and his emotions go seeking for the experience of imagined adventures' (APR xviii). The fluid world of the mind is potentially decadent, a place where the desire for sensations can lead astray one's fidelity to a purpose. Haggard too saw the imagination as a dangerous tool. Late in life he remarked that it was a 'great gift, but a terrible steed to ride. Those that dwell under the shadow of its wings eat the fruit of both good and evil, for if genius and inspiration is theirs, so also is madness and misery undreamed of by those of more phlegmatic mind'. The imagination that is the source of a coherent and creative vision is also the faculty that throws up conflicting and subversive images.

In the mythic narratives of "The Bridge-Builders" and "The Brushwood Boy" Kipling manages to get the best of both worlds. Although the supernatural or imagined worlds of Findlayson and Cottar manifest themselves in moments of
crisis, and seem to undermine the work of the men's waking existence, the dream-worlds ultimately confirm and support the day-worlds. It turns out that the Hindu gods who convene in the middle of the Ganges in "The Bridge Builders" to debate the survival of the British bridge are bound by a process of historical inevitability and that this process also seems to approve the extension of colonial rule by making the Ganges of insufficient strength to destroy the bridge. Furthermore, men and gods alike are dependent upon the dreams of Brahm, the unity of the cosmos, and, 'when Brahm ceases to dream, the Heavens and the Hells and Earth disappear' (TDW 59). Dreaming and the shifting contents of dreams do not oppose reality, but constitute it; the world is the offspring of a primal creative imagination.

The activity of Brahm, however, is redolent of the imperial imagination and, of course, the main dreamer in Kipling's story is the imperial engineer Findlayson. Whereas his anxious dreaming was initially associated with his separation from the British imperial identity on account of his responsibility for the bridge which seemed so fragile, the act of dreaming is now appropriated by the total aesthetic of the story. For, ironically, the gods exist in the story only while Findlayson dreams; the flood and the dream which seem sent to torment him ultimately verify his judgment as an engineer and his identity as a sanctioned member of the imperial community. Although the individual accidents or incidents of nature are beyond British control, the British empire is an integral part of the process of history. Indeed, in relation to the Hindu gods, it is revealed near the end of the story that Findlayson has spent much time in the previous three years shooting Black-buck (whose form Indra, the father of the Hindu gods, takes on earth) with a young rajah who is steadily breaking from Hindu tradition.

Likewise, the dream-world of "The Brushwood Boy" assails Cottar's sleep at periods of insecurity in his life, primarily when he is a child, when he is serving in the British army in India, and when sexual matters enter his brain. In a sense
the dream-world is an unruly place, reflecting reality: it is an extensive landscape wherein a number of things, predictable and unpredictable, pleasant and unpleasant, can happen. On the other hand, 'uncontrollable features in the outside world are... dismissed and internalized into his more significant inner life' (Sullivan 1993 132-3). Emerging when the six-year-old 'Georgie' Cottar discovers the 'new power' (TDW 284) of telling himself stories, this use of the imagination allows the boy to transform 'daytime incompletion into nighttime mastery' (Sullivan 1993 132): the marginalized child becomes 'prince, pasha, giant-killer, and all the rest' (TDW 284). Because of the dangers of confusing the real with the unreal and of permitting the unconscious to take over, Kipling repeatedly stresses that these fantasies of heroism, power and revenge work best when the dreamer has a 'clear understanding that it was all make-believe' (TDW 297), when it is simply a case of self-indulgence. Cottar is much happier when close to the 'known limits' of the brushwood pile (TDW 297) than when exploring the furthest and least known regions of his unconscious.

Cottar never even properly confronts or comes to understand the menacing figures who populate his dream landscape. 'They' (the 'mob of stony white people') and 'It' (the 'Sick Thing') (TDW 296) are no more than 'dream objects petrified by the dreamer's need to dehumanize, simplify, and classify Others into stony anonymity in order to control them' (Sullivan 1993 138). The Sick Thing, most likely a symbol of his ignorance of sexual matters, is regarded merely as an object of abject horror. The story ends with Cottar wooing Miriam, a woman he has met but once before, as a child, and yet who both participates in his dream-adventures and dreams exactly the same things herself; moreover, he engages with her by reference to their common dream-experiences rather than to their separate conscious existences. At this point, the material and spiritual worlds of the lovers form a single and mystically saccharine reality.
While Kipling's stories are more concerned with the sensations of experience and the uncertainties of their dream-worlds than, say, *News from Nowhere*, the reader feels at the end that everything is controlled by the closed and predetermined desires of the author. The rigorous structure of these stories makes them metaphoric statements of the author's aesthetic and political agenda at the expense of creating the illusion of an independent world wherein the protagonists have a freedom of choice. Even Cottar finds the 'permanence' of his dreamscape suspicious, for his 'ordinary dreams were as formless and as fleeting as any healthy dreams could be' (*TDW* 297). Kipling's literary approach seems similar to what Wells called 'directed thought', a mode of cogitation which is purposeful and eager for conclusions, regardless of the sacrifices required. Directed thought considers the 'surface sequence of events', the data of life, to be 'merely the symptoms of 'historical process'' (Huntington 1982 6). There is no tension to directed thought, only inevitable progression.

By contrast, Wells also referred to a form of imaginative thought which was checked by experience and which differed from dreaming 'only in its closer touch with reality'; this he considered to be 'undirected'. Undirected thought walks in the 'maze of balances and conflicts that compose history' (Huntington 1982 4), and is both morally complex and aesthetically pleasing; it exists in a close relationship with the possible order and complications of the actual world. While directed thought seeks solely to order reality, to anticipate the structures of the future, to show 'single answers and solutions' (Huntington 1982 116), undirected or 'undisciplined' thought is often oblique, ambiguous and diffuse. In relation to directed thought undirected thought is simply a mess; seen on its own terms, however, undirected thought is the stuff of fiction, even, indeed, the stuff of life.
Whereas the previous chapter considered the imagination in relation to the will and to the singular desires of a protagonist, this chapter considers the imagination in relation to experience, to the subject's reception of impressions from a disorganized world. In particular, it explores the relationship between the imagination and unwanted dreams in late nineteenth century fiction, and the relationship between what is real and what is unreal within the world of the literary text. Consequently, this chapter largely discusses texts that have more interest in the protagonist as perceiver and experiencer than in the abstract set of ideas in relation to which he or she is figured. It is interested in texts wherein the narrative's attention to the inconsistent and unsuccessful attempts of the perceiving individual to refigure mentally for their own ends the world which they inhabit decentralizes the world of the novel, or the work's overall vision. In this way, the chapter deals more with the process of thought than with the product.

Although Against Nature is often thought of as a handbook of the Decadent movement, the novel is actually a kaleidoscopic and often disordered account of Des Esseintes' thoughts and feelings concerning art and life. Indeed, there is a tension between the fact that the books, paintings, plants and perfumes with which Des Esseintes surrounds himself are material objects in their own right and the fact that they only feature in his house in order to endorse his version of the world. They act as correlatives to his thought. When he finds his book collection too disparate, or when he does not understand why he has certain books, he gets rid of them; when his deliberately artificial-looking plants begin to die, to reveal their mortality, he throws them away. These objects, or possessions, like his house, act as buffers between him and the outside world of Paris with its physical squalor and its citizens' inimical attitudes to life. Like the imperialist abroad, Des Esseintes is isolated from those who live about him: he wants the outside world to reflect his desires but realizes that he can only achieve this within the empire of
his own home. The object reality is caught up and contained in the processes of appropriation and acquisition: it is received only in an ideal, aesthetic, or uncomplicated form. The decadent subject needs items from the material world to stimulate their imagination so that he or she can escape from the material world into a transcendent realm; paradoxically, however, the decadent subject only wants to escape from the material world because they find that reality so uninspiring.

Like Des Esseintes, and Count Sperelli in D'Annunzio's *The Child of Pleasure*, Dorian Gray (who is influenced by an unnamed book which Wilde later admitted was *A Rebours*) fills his house with beautiful objects. They are not, however, important to him as objects intrinsically beautiful in themselves: 'these treasures, and everything that he collected in his lovely house, were to be to him means of forgetfulness' (*TPODG* 109), means of escape both from the mundane nature of reality and from watching the ravages undergone by his portrait in the attic. Consequently, although objects, they have significance only as figures in the discourse of the subject, as sites for the construction of self-ish fantasies, sites wherein the subject's imaginary control over the external world can be enacted. Dorian's lack of interest in the shared or actual world becomes more pronounced as the novel progresses; he comes to resent that 'out of the unreal shadows of the night comes back the real life that we had known. We have to resume it where we had left off' (*TPODG* 102). His disaffection entertains a 'wild longing... that our eyelids might open some morning upon a world that had been refashioned anew in the darkness for our pleasure. ... It was the creation of such worlds as these that seemed to Dorian Gray to be the true object, or amongst the true objects, of life' (*TPODG* 102).

Moreover, in his search for 'sensations that would be at once new and delightful, and possess that element of strangeness that is so essential to romance', Dorian often adopts 'certain modes of thought that he knew to be really alien to his nature' (*TPODG* 102). He 'abandon[s] himself to
their subtle influences, and then, having, as it were, caught their colour and satisfied his intellectual curiosity, leave[s] them' with a 'curious indifference' (TPODG 102). Although he appears to follow an approach to experience similar to that of Marius the Epicurean (TPODG 103), in truth Dorian but toys with the trope of experience. Everything has to be on his own terms; the decadent protagonist must ultimately remain in control of his or her vision. Moreover, what separates Against Nature and The Picture of Dorian Gray from the two Kipling stories, apart from Huysmans' and Wilde's greater focus on the perceiving subject, is simply the ironic sensibility of the decadent writers, the fact that they know and delight in their protagonists' affectations and impending failure whilst in the process of documenting their innermost thoughts and desires.

The great fear of the decadent subject is that of being overwhelmed by the external world. Apart from the imaginative appropriation of phenomena, a relatively common way to lessen the impact of the world in late nineteenth century fiction is to submit to it under the influence of narcotics, to blur knowingly the borders between what is real and what is unreal in order to hold at bay a menacing object reality which seeks to undermine one's desired identity. Dorian frequents the East End opium dens by night in order to avoid confronting the reality of his self as depicted in his portrait; it is under the influence of opium that Findlayson 'sees' the debate between the Hindu deities which endorses the survival of his bridge. Lucian, in Arthur Machen's The Hill of Dreams shuts himself off from the world to write what he considers is a literary masterpiece. After his bizarre death, his nonsensical manuscript is discovered next to an empty bottle of laudanum.

In this way the use of narcotics becomes a metaphor for how concrete experience is regarded, manipulated, transformed and contained in much late Victorian fiction. In the words of the French psychologist Paul Bourget, 'opium and hashish, and, to a lesser degree, that cruder opium of the West, strong
drink, are one way of unlocking the door to a more intense, more systematic, and more opulent dream world. Watson observes that Holmes, when he has no case to solve, no opportunity by means of which he can attempt to master the external world, gets very depressed with frustration. The detective 'cannot live without brainwork' (CSH 93); his 'mind... rebels at stagnation' (CSH 89). He cannot bear the 'contemplative mood which occasionally predominated in him' (CSH 185), the unfocused thought which is a sign of his infection by the chaotic forces of the world. Consequently, Holmes has in times of inactivity either to stimulate and clarify the mind with cocaine, or to sedate it entirely with morphine. Cocaine heightens the distinction between subject and object, and gives Holmes the illusion that he can dominate the reality that seems to be oppressing him; morphine dissolves the distinction between subject and object, self and not-self, a process which also reduces the sense of oppression by an external reality.

While Holmes takes morphine when he has no work, Gabriel Misquitta in Kipling's "The Gate of the Hundred Sorrows" asserts that opium has rendered him incapable of work: the 'Black Smoke does not allow of much other business', and he reckons that he 'couldn't do a day's work now to save my life' (PTFTH 238). Misquitta's world has shrunk to encompass no more than the opium den in which he lives and will surely die: he exists in a vapid semi-conscious state of being which simply accepts whatever may pass. Indeed, 'nothing is strange when you're on the Black Smoke, except the Black Smoke. And if it was, it wouldn't matter' (PTFTH 240). The effacement of barriers between self and not-self effected by the use of opium or hashish destroys the oppositional nature of the self's engagement with the not-self. The subject is therefore left with an experience that is somewhat purposeless, purely sensory or sensuous rather than an increase in knowledge: fantastic rather than real.
The decadent imagination works best under artificial conditions, with stimuli that can help create a purely imagined reality. Des Esseintes' imagined experience of sea-bathing and his imagined trip to London are well-known examples; they, like his habit of sitting in a sledge at the hottest time of the year, wrapped in furs, shivering 'until he almost convinced himself that it really was cold' (AN 173), function solely in relation to himself and have no place in the external world. Although Des Esseintes can in the main distinguish between the real and the unreal, he idealistically resists the real world until his doctor tells him he will die if he continues. Likewise, Durtal in Down There also prefers the world of his imagination. For him, 'existence must be admitted to be abominable' and 'only the unreal is not ignoble and empty'; 'imagination is the only good thing which heaven vouchsafes to the skeptic and pessimist' who is 'alarmed by the abjectness of life' (DT 181).

In his biography of de Rais too he allows the unreal to dominate the real: although he is working from primary source texts, he considers history to be a subject where 'exactitude was impossible' (DT 22). 'The best he could do was to imagine himself in the midst of creatures of that other epoch, wearing their antique garb, thinking their thoughts, and then, having saturated himself with their spirit, to convey his illusion by means of adroitly selected details' (DT 22). This naïve vision of history as imaginative empathy connects in its method the bathing 'experience' of Des Esseintes, Graham's conviction of the reality of 'Shakespeare's' Willie Hughes in Wilde's "The Portrait of Mr. W.H.", and Marlow's appeal to his audience to 'imagine the feelings of a commander of a fine... trireme' encountering savage Britons for the first time (HOD 30). The parts of de Rais' life that are not chronicled, the Marshal's private thoughts and dreams, are imagined by Durtal and written out to become the reality of his text. On the other hand, like Des Esseintes, Durtal is to a certain extent
his own worst enemy: his 'mania for thinking', for 'previsualizing an incident so vividly that actual enactment was an anticlimax' wrecks his sexual relationship with Madame Chantelouve; his mind jeers at the efforts of his 'used up' body (DT 180).

The machinations of Dorian, Des Esseintes and Durtal suggest that decadent forms of experience are often markedly unreal; the reception of impressions is so dictated by the preconceptions or desires of the subject that the external world becomes merely a lifeless back-drop. As a contributor to Le Décadent summed it up,

emotions once felt, the decadent analyses them. He cultivates them in the recollection of his reverie, he brings them into focus, moulds his thought to them in order to capture their most delicate convolutions... He wishes to know himself, he observes himself, he analyses and notes everything, down to the most evasive of half-felt emotions... and by means of this deep, meticulous, remorselessly pursued investigation, he is constantly pushing back the frontiers of the unconscious.³

All interest is focused on what is within; what is outside is irrelevant. Indeed, according to A. J. A. Symons the intense self-consciousness of decadence grew out of the horror felt by a 'minority' concerning the 'bleak materialism' they saw around them in the late nineteenth century; they 'looked inward to the only verities that had not seemed to crumble... the cultivation of the self, the consolations of art'.⁹

For the decadent mind the 'external world is never anything more than a projection of each individual consciousness, and, this being so, there is no possible way of distinguishing between hallucination and perception, or, rather, the distinction between them no longer has any rational basis for existence' (Pierrot 1981 66). Objective knowledge and real contact with others are mere illusion; the result is that 'every individual consciousness possesses an untrammeled capacity to create a universe in conformity with its own aspirations' (Pierrot 1981 66). While Victor-Émile Michelet claimed that, 'by the fact that a mind has created it, every imaginary conception is as real as the most everyday
object or being', Schuré asserted that 'mind is the only reality' and matter merely its 'inferior and changing expression'.

However, with a philosophy determined, either for aggressive or for defensive reasons, to dissolve all distinctions between the real and the unreal in their focus upon the desires of the self or subject, decadent protagonists and writers opened themselves up to assault from the blind-spots in their vision, from those aspects of the actual world which are neither acknowledged nor represented in their versions. The decadent (or imperialist) form of vision, which seeks to replace a dangerous and uncertain external world, becomes dangerous and uncertain itself. Although the imagination is often a tool for transcending the material world, it is also an agent of failure and irresolution, the means whereby individual inability and chaos is revealed. The imagination, which is an assistant to desire and the discourse of the subject, is also an agent for the discourse of the other, or experience. The Des Esseintes who tries to use the world of dreams to 'cross the frontiers of thought' and explore the 'unknown' in his 'craving to escape from the horrible realities of life' (AN 115) is also plagued by 'abominable dreams' (AN 107) and unpleasant hallucinations.

The most detailed of these comes after he decides that the colourings and blotches on his exotic plants resemble the markings of syphilis. On falling asleep he finds himself walking through a forest with a woman who looks 'rather like a booth-keeper at a fair' (AN 103). Both are suddenly accosted by a skeletal 'sexless creature' on horseback who has 'green skin and terrifying eyes of a cold, clear blue shining out from under purple lids' and 'pustules all round its mouth' (AN 103). Des Esseintes identifies the figure as an 'image of the Pox' (AN 103) and flees to a nearby summer-house. Trying to escape from this building through a tap-room door he sees, in the middle of a vast clearing, 'enormous white pierrots... jumping about like rabbits in the moonlight' (AN 104). He realizes he would be trampled to death if he advanced, but
seized by the Pox if he stayed still.

Just as he gives up all hope of survival, this situation vanishes and Des Esseintes is confronted by a 'hideous mineral landscape', desolate and lifeless apart from himself and an 'ashen-faced woman' who is 'naked but for a pair of green silk stockings' (AN 105). The woman's features slowly begin to resemble his exotic plants and then, in parallel to his waking thoughts, the markings switch 'from vegetation to the Virus' (AN 105): he now notices the 'frightening irritation of the mouth and breasts', the 'spots of bistre and copper' on the body (AN 105). To his horror, he suddenly finds himself impelled towards the woman. Although he is 'utterly nauseated' (AN 106) and pushes away the black plants which spring up on every side and stab at her belly, he becomes caught in the woman's embrace. 'Pale with horror', he sees the 'savage Nidularium blossoming between her uplifted thighs, with its swordblades gaping open to expose the bloody depths' (AN 106). Fortunately, he wakes up at this moment, 'choking, frozen, crazy with fear' (AN 106).

A close parallel to Des Esseintes and his out of control imagination can be found in Monsieur de Phocas. At a party thrown by Claudius Ethal, Fréneuse is induced to smoke a 'greenish paste' (MDP 133) which is described as opium although Sir Thomas Welcome later claims that it was hashish (MDP 155). The immediate effect of the narcotic is 'oppression'; it brings about a 'dreadful silence' (MDP 133). As Fréneuse watches the 'whirling' of a dancer he becomes covered by an 'icy sweat' (MDP 135). Suddenly, though, he finds himself in a street watching a 'blonde and delectable' woman in a ball-gown struggling with 'two horrid louts' who have 'vile fishy profiles' (MDP 136). When they force her to the ground and begin 'sawing at her neck with a cutlass' he, like the woman, is 'paralyzed by terror': 'two invisible hands, two talons, took me by the throat also' (MDP 136). At this point he wakes and is horrified by the 'veritable human tide of cold green flesh' around him which his fellow party-goers seem to have become; he watches the 'abomination' who is
the Duchess of Althorney "share bite, or rather suck ('for in her haste the teeth had fallen from the rotten gums'), at the neck of a young girl (MDP 137). After this, Fréneuse sinks into a 'chaos of brief, incoherent and bizarre hallucinations, in which the grotesque and the horrible kept close company'; he flounders in 'anguish and dread, oppressively ridden by the most unbridled nightmares' (MDP 139).

Like the woven dragons that 'move about and fight' in Misquitta's opium den (PTFTH 239), for Fréneuse a 'whole series of monsters and avatars swarmed in the shadows, coming to life amid draughts of sulphur and phosphorus like an animated fresco painted on the moving wall of sleep' (MDP 139). In 'dizziness' and 'confusion' he flies towards the 'abyss' (MDP 139) and passes through fantastic Oriental landscapes before finding himself in a damp crypt. There, 'bogged down' by a thick and fluid tide, he is plagued by 'little fat and hairy bodies' (MDP 140) which wriggle all over him and flutter their wings against his face before biting him. He is 'prey to innumerable blood-suckers: fetid beasts shared my body between them, insidiously violating the entirety of my naked form' (MDP 141). They turn out to be an 'army of enormous bats' whose persistent caresses force him to 'quiver with atrocious pleasure' (MDP 141). Close to 'some climactic spasm... something hairy, flaccid and cold entered into my mouth' (MDP 141). Fréneuse bites, and his throat fills with a 'sudden spurt of blood: the taste of some dead animal was bitter on my tongue; a tepid gruel adhered to my teeth' (MDP 141).

Fréneuse is completely bewildered by his dream experience; after it, he is unable to get a sensible perspective on the evening and on life in general. While his journal entry for the party indicates that it took place on the ninth of October 1898, a subsequent diary entry, dated the ninth of November, suggests that the 'opium party' was just 'three days ago' (MDP 144). Whether this be a simple error or a sign as to the addled state of his brain, Fréneuse admits to Welcome that he no longer knows what he is doing. He is 'no
longer in control' of himself: 'I am turned upside down and bumped about, and I feel that I am staggering into an ambush, into terror... Since that last soiree in Ethal's studio, the nightmare figures and hallucinations of that appalling night... I have not recovered my soul' (MDP 145). As if this was not enough, Welcome claims that when he was under the spell of Ethal, 'possessed by the dream' and 'beset by hallucinations', for years on end, 'numbed' and 'annihilated', he 'lived a wretched waking nightmare' (MDP 147).

Although there is much that can be interpreted or deduced from the nightmares of Des Esseintes and Fréneuse, especially in relation to sexual anxieties and misogyny, I am more interested in the shifting nature of the imagery, the helplessness of the of the participating dreamer within the world of the dreaming subject's unconscious, and the relationship between the participating dreamer and the figures they have to confront in that world. In the dream the distinction between real subject and real object is dissolved for three reasons. First, the figure of the participating dreamer is not identical to the dreaming subject; second, the images opposed to the participating dreamer are not truly strange or other because they have emerged from the dreaming subject's unconscious; third, the figures of the participating dreamer and the objects which he confronts seldom have any formal consistency. By 'becoming' the participating dreamer (whether through drugs, sleep, or imaginative endeavour) the dreaming subject renounces their established identity and their ability to make sense of the real world. Indeed, the subject's desire for order becomes overwhelmed by their experience as dreamer, and thus perceptions of real relations and a reckoning of the distinction between the real and the unreal are destroyed. As Freud wrote, 'in dreams - as a rule... - we appear not to think but to experience; that is to say, we attach complete belief to the hallucinations. Not until we wake up does the critical comment arise that we have not experienced anything but have merely been thinking in a particular way, or in other words dreaming'.

Fréneuse "experiences the pleasure of absolute degradation, the double pleasure of being both observer and observed, dominant subject and passive object" (Birkett 1986 204). What Fréneuse observes, or rather what fantasies spring to his mind, he then enacts both as aggressor and as victim. The first and last scenes of his dream end with death and spurting blood: in the first, Fréneuse appears to identify most strongly with the murdered woman; in the last, he is the killer of the small animal in his mouth. On the other hand, he also finds the murder of the woman intensely exciting and, at the end, the biting into the animal brings about his own death in the dream: he wakes up. He therefore participates in all that goes on; he kills and dies at the same time. Between these scenes are a mass of smaller incidents, many of which describe acts of vampirism of one kind or another and in which, by and large, Fréneuse identifies with the victim: he is the receiver of experience.

Moreover, all the dream figures are but different versions of aggressors or victims: the thugs and the duchess and the vampire bats come from one element of Fréneuse's self-conception, and the beautiful woman, the young girl and the participating dreamer himself come from another. As Freud noted, 'one symbolizing element may evoke innumerable symbolized elements' in dreams, and also 'one symbolized element may be designated by an infinite number of symbolizers'.\[13\] Fréneuse envisages multiple versions of himself attacking other versions of himself, and these narratives emerge from the conflict between morality and decadence raging within him: he delights in what he knows should disgust him until he becomes disgusted at his own delight. Nevertheless, although the drug-induced 'reality' liberates the free play of these sentiments, it offers no means of resolving them.\[14\]
The patterns of confusion between subject and object, and the real and the unreal, occur in all fields of late nineteenth century writing. Indeed, many fictional protagonists are unaware as to the distinction between the shared world and their perceptions of it. The philosopher Bradley described a form of primary experience associated with a pre-relational consciousness in which there is 'no distinction between my awareness and that of which it is aware. There is an immediate feeling, a knowing and being in one, with which knowledge begins.' Moreover, according to Bradley 'from such an experience of unity below relations we can rise to the idea of a superior unity above them. Thus we can attach a full and positive meaning to the statement that Reality is one' (AAR 462). Bradley's sophisticated ideal of transcendent experience finds structural affiliation with all those struggling fictional protagonists whose mental activity can variously be labelled romantic, dreaming, confused, delusional, idealistic, insane, or psychotic.

One is reluctant, however, to ascribe narrow categories of personality to fictional protagonists, especially to those such as Prendick, Jim and James' governess who have no extratextual existence and who emerge from texts that are deliberately thematically ambiguous. The imaginations of these protagonists both close down some options as to the exact nature of reality and, by making sudden and fleeting associations and identifications, cause these subjects to abandon a sense of reality for a wider realm of possibility. Indeed, the imagination is both the mainstay of Giorgio's existence in The Triumph of Death and the cause of its collapse. After fantasizing with Ippolita about going to Orvieto, Giorgio decides, like Des Esseintes in relation to his trip to London, that they will not go there: they have already, 'in imagination, enjoyed the best part of our pleasure and tasted the delicate essence of our sensations'; he thinks that they 'ought to give up the idea of translating
it into reality' (*TTOD* 21-2). Yet, while for much of the time his imagination functions as a coherent, if decadent, force (he believes he has imaginatively 'moulded' (*TTOD* 229) Ippolita into an ideal being), he still often finds himself in a 'curious and indefinable condition of mind' with the feeling of having 'lost the sense of the reality of his surroundings' and of having fallen prey to a 'vague terror' (*TTOD* 84).

On one occasion, in the one-time rooms of his dead uncle Demetrio where the old furniture and books revive a multitude of memories, he becomes unsure as to whether the 'representations' he is making in his mind are assisted by the supernatural, or are 'of the same substance as dreams', or are merely the 'agitation' of his 'overstrung nerves' (*TTOD* 110). The trauma of trying to work out what is real and what is not leaves him 'perplexed, fascinated by the mystery of it all, trembling and terrified at finding himself on the borders of the undiscovered country' (*TTOD* 110).

Giorgio's mind is 'naturally inclined to weirdness and superstition': when an old woman talks about the countryside swarming with the 'children of the Evil One', his 'imagination clothed the phantoms... with a terrible and illimitable reality' (*TTOD* 166). Indeed, anything that comes from outside is a phantom; it only becomes real when accepted by his mind. Because of this 'self-isolation' (*TTOD* 215) Giorgio thinks he must 'renounce for ever the vain search for a fixed point, a stable and assured support'; he feels like a 'man condemned to stand upon a perpetually oscillating surface'; the ground is for ever giving way beneath his feet (*TTOD* 215). Despite this complaint, he feels that in order to live one must 'avoid truth and certitude', believe all one sees and accept all one hears; one must 'look not beyond the world of appearances created by [one's] own vivid imagination'; one must 'ador the illusion' (*TTOD* 216). Just before murdering Ippolita and committing suicide he feels that his 'every movement, everything he saw and heard', has a dream-like unreality... and at the same time a significance as profound as that of an allegory' (*TTOD* 309); his imagination both undermines his
sense of a shared world and produces a coherent vision which justifies his psychotic desires.

In *Torture Garden* too the central male protagonist views a woman as the mediating point between himself and the real world: the decadent sensation-monger Clara is 'life, the real presence of life and the whole of life'. She is, moreover, the mediator between the torture garden of the East and European civilization: she, like the garden, embodies the 'red stain' (*TG* 189) which is in all levels of society and in all types of person and, ultimately, in the 'whole of nature' itself (*TG* 190). On the other hand, despite the 'marvellous and so vibrant reality of her body' (*TG* 187), the symbolic associations Clara has for the narrator in relation to his perceptions of his own moral turpitude makes her seem unreal to him. He wonders if she really exists, whether she was not 'born from my debauchery and fever', if she is not

one of those impossible images that hatch out from nightmare... One of those criminal temptations shaped through lust to inflame the imagination of sick people who become murderers and madmen... Maybe she was nothing but my soul projected out of myself, despite myself, and materialized in the form of sin. (*TG* 187)

In other words, Clara plays Hyde to the narrator's Jekyll. Towards the end of the novel, when Clara lies unconscious on account of the strength of her delight in the torture garden, the narrator imitates her immobility: his limbs are 'leaden' and his chest feels 'oppressed as if in a nightmare' (*TG* 199). He ceases to have a 'sensation of reality'; all he sees is 'mutilated images rising up again from the surrounding shadows and the abyss of the river, fantastically distorted' (*TG* 199).

IV

A confusion between the real and the unreal is not confined to decadent fiction. Conrad's Jim fills his dull actual experience of the East, which he finds 'strangely barren of
adventure' (LJ 50), with 'imaginary achievements' (LJ 58); indeed, Marlow claims that the young man had that 'faculty of beholding at a hint the face of his desire and the shape of his dream, without which the earth would know no lover and no adventurer' (LJ 171). Just as the fantastic and rare butterfly Stein had once 'dreamed' of fell promptly into his hands (LJ 197), so Patusan becomes for Jim the 'chance he had been dreaming of' (LJ 212) to testify to the values he would like to uphold. Stein avers that Romantics like Jim are destined to 'follow the dream' (LJ 201) regardless of its consequences; indeed, it is Jim's 'dream' (LJ 301), his egotistical idealism, that makes him leave Jewel at the last and go to meet his death at the hands of Doramin.

The imagination that enables Jim to maintain his authority in Patusan, however, is no different to that which forced him to leap from the Patna. While in Patusan he draws all things to one, to himself, on the Patna Jim's imagination disintegrates his sense of identity, purpose and obligation; he allows his stable vision of the world to be dissolved first by fantasy (his dreams of heroism) and then by terror. The imagined or anticipated experience of the sinking Patna, with its 'horrors of panic... trampling rush... pitiful screams, boats swamped' (LJ 108), guides Jim's actions and makes him abandon ship with the other white crew. Instead of helping to regulate his relationship with reality, Jim's imagination replaces the actual world with an imagined situation and makes him behave in a way which destroys his desired-for firmness. As the narrator of the first part of the novel notes, the Imagination is the 'enemy of men, the father of all terrors' (LJ 51). Indeed, according to Holmes, 'where there is no imagination there is no horror' (CSH 37).

The pervasive imagery of dreams and dreaming in Lord Jim is also present in Heart of Darkness: Marlow's days in the Congo are pervaded by what he calls a 'dream-sensation' (HOD 76). Earlier in the narrative he is more explicit, describing the 'life-sensation of any given epoch of one's existence' in terms of the qualities of dreams, in terms of the 'dream-
sensation, that commingling of absurdity, surprise, and bewilderment in a tremor of struggling revolt, that notion of being captured by the incredible which is of the very essence of dreams' (HOD 57). Whatever it is, it is beyond language.

Marlow's problems with the past are further reflected in the varying confidence of the narrating imagination. Sometimes the jungle and the natives are unreal in relation to Marlow and his fellow imperialists: they are shadows, phantoms and apparitions (HOD 45, 100-1, 116) that drift through Marlow's memories and haunt him. At other times it is the imperialists who are 'mean and greedy phantoms' (HOD 110). At one moment, even, everything becomes phantasmal in opposition to Towson's *An Inquiry into some Points of Seamanship*, the discovery of which makes Marlow 'forget the jungle and the pilgrims in a delicious sensation of having come upon something unmistakably real' (HOD 71). At the centre of the story, however, Kurtz mediates and compounds Marlow's fantastic experiences in the Congo. His ordinary words have behind them, to Marlow's mind, the 'terrific suggestiveness of words heard in dreams, of phrases spoken in nightmares' (HOD 108). Kurtz is an 'eloquent phantom' (HOD 120), a 'shadow insatiable of splendid appearances, of frightful realities' (HOD 116), and it is this incorporeality, starting with the mere rumours that circulate about him soon after Marlow's arrival in the Congo, that allows Kurtz to destabilize Marlow and his conception of the strange world around him.

On his return from the Congo Marlow sneers at the narrow-minded Europeans for their limited understanding of life: their dreams are 'insignificant and silly', and they are merely 'commonplace individuals' who go about their business in the 'assurance of perfect safety' (HOD 113). On the other hand, Marlow admits that he was 'not very well at that time', that his imagination 'wanted soothing' (HOD 114); his thoughts are dislocated from the reality of European life. Ultimately, however, when he lays the 'ghost' of Kurtz's gifts to rest 'with a lie' (HOD 84), having failed to impose the reality of
his Congo experience upon European life, Marlow sows the seeds for his reintegration with European society, a decision which closes off his chance of fully resolving for himself what went on up-river.

Willems too has an unsettling and dream-like experience in a jungle up a river, although he does not live to tell the tale. His exile in Sambir initially feels unreal to him; he feels he has been unfairly wrested from his civilization and his destiny. Whereas Macassar was a world of work his life in the jungle is one of passivity and disintegration. Aissa appears out of the forest to him: 'through the checkered light between them she appeared to him with the impalpable distinctness of a dream' (AOOTI 64). Very soon Willems becomes frightened that 'something unknown... had taken possession of his heart' (AOOTI 66), something which he feels compelled to obey. Consequently, after first making love with Aissa, Willems determines to have nothing more to do with her and to regain control of himself. This, however, turns out to be more difficult than planned because his lack of respect for Sambir and its inhabitants, his attitude that the place is not truly real, has meant that he has not adopted a confrontational pose towards it and that, because of this, he has now become as insubstantial and as indeterminate as he assumes the community to be. Willems has a 'notion of being lost among things that were dangerous and ghastly', and thus he commits himself to Aissa in the knowledge that there is 'no safety outside of himself - and in himself there was no refuge; there was only the image of that woman' (AOOTI 72).

Whereas he initially seeks to define his patent reality against Sambir's unreality for the sake of maintaining his old European superior identity, Willems subsequently decides that he would be more secure in this new environment if he integrated himself with the dominant local Malays. One night, while dozing with Aissa in her father's compound, Willems considers that his 'doubts' and 'regrets' as to his decision to accept Sambir as his primary reality 'seemed far away, ages ago - as unreal and pale as the fading memory of some
delirium' or 'infamous nightmare'; 'true life was this' (AOOTI 124). However, no sooner has he reflected upon this than he falls back upon his earlier ascriptions of reality and unreality. When a head suddenly appears out of the doorway to Omar's hut he immediately assumes it is part of his 'idle fantasy or... the beginning of another short dream, of another vagary of his overtired brain' (AOOTI 125). When he swiftly determines, though, that it is 'no dream' (AOOTI 125) but blind Omar crawling towards him, he still labels the man an 'apparition' and likens him to the 'shadow of some nightmare' (AOOTI 125). Willems has once more adopted the European mentality as regards orientals and, while Omar gropes towards him with a kriss (knife) in his mouth, Willems moves from 'dreamy numbness' to being 'paralyzed with dread' (AOOTI 126). He is helpless until Aissa wakes and knocks her father out of the way.

Towards the end of the novel, particularly when by himself, Willems' reality blends the actual and the imagined. Like Giorgio, he considers the physical features of the external world to be symbolic of powers which are conspiring towards his destruction: 'he saw it - the sure death - everywhere... It poisoned all he saw, all he did' (AOOTI 267-8). The leaves of trees and creepers seem to be 'so many enormous hands with broad palms, with stiff fingers outspread... watching for the opportunity to take him, to enlace him, to strangle him, to hold him till he died; hands... that would cling to his body for ever till it perished - disappeared in their frantic and tenacious grasp' (AOOTI 268). All the life of the forest would continue after his death, he imagines, while his slowly rotting corpse would be assaulted by 'endless and minute throngs of insects, little shining monsters of repulsive shapes, with horns, with claws, with pincers' who would 'swarm countless, persistent, ferocious and greedy - till there would remain nothing but the white gleam of bleaching bones in the long grass' (AOOTI 268).

It is ironic, although appropriate, that a man who is exiled from his own society, living in a community where
everyone wants him dead, and where 'no one would remember him' (AOOTI 268) if he was, uses images of frenzied desire for his body: the trees and insects appear to want him desperately. The vision becomes a reflection both of his desire to integrate himself into the life of Sambir, and of the fact that, because he is so distrusted by the Malays, the only way this might occur is through death. On the other hand, although this is a fantasy of integration or completion, the vision's countless small images of frenzied activity represent the opposite of the mental rest he truly desires: what he wants is 'sleep without memory and without dreams', 'annihilating sleep' which would allow him to 'tumble headlong... out of daylight into the night of oblivion' (AOOTI 269). Sleep is his only respite from the existence which he 'lacked the courage to endure - or to end' (AOOTI 269).

Abel in Hudson's Green Mansions quite definitely goes insane, deep in the jungles of Guyana. Usually, the imagination is the bread that gives him strength, the wine that exhilarates, in times of hardship. But, when he learns that Rima, the semi-supernatural girl of the forest with whom he is in love, has been killed by the savages of a neighbouring tribe he begins a descent into madness. He swiftly takes a bloody revenge on the tribe. He kills one of their number as he flees from them and then persuades a rival tribe to come and massacre the rest. He 'experienced a feeling of savage joy' (GM 274) as he kills his Indian and soon forsakes all claims to civilized superiority. He becomes like them; it is a 'period of moral insanity' in his life (GM 279). Nevertheless, although he admits to being 'driven' by passion, Abel claims that his 'sense of right or wrong - of individual responsibility - was more vivid than at any other period of my life' (GM 279).

In subsequent days, when he is alone in the jungle, or forest, Abel becomes 'more forgetful of self, more eager, and like a wild animal with no thought and feeling beyond its immediate wants' (GM 283). The need to survive makes him kill whatever animals he can find for food, a fact which haunts him
because Rima was a militant vegetarian. Moreover, the experience of physical hardship alienates Abel from his environment and engenders a fear of the 'strange ghostly gloom of the woods at night-time full of innumerable strange shapes' and sounds (GM 286). His health deteriorates, and he grows weak.

By night he develops an 'unfailing vision' (GM 287) of Rima in order to hold the darkness at bay. Then, however, a 'torturing voice' inspired by his reflection in a forest pool tells him that he is 'going mad' (GM 290), that whereas the 'low-minded savage, cut off from all human fellowship, keeps his faculties to the end', Abel's 'finer brain' will prove his 'ruin' (GM 291). To counter this idea Abel comes to think that Rima might actually still be alive and that her death was merely a story manufactured by the 'natural deceit' of the savages (GM 292). It does not take long, though, to discover her burnt bones and ashes in the forest and, when he does so, he places them in a special urn. The end of each day now brings 'not sleep and dreams, but waking visions' (GM 301). He knows that the Rima he sees and who talks to him is only a 'phantom, an illusion', yet she seems 'more real than reality' (GM 302). She is a 'Rima of the mind, one of the shapes the ever-changing black vapours of remorse and insanity would take; and all her mournful sentences were woven out of my own brain' (GM 302).

As soon as he can gather enough food Abel sets off for the coast. The impressions of nature received during that sick period are blurred, or else so coloured and exaggerated by perpetual torturing anxiety, mixed with half-delirious night-fancies, that I can only think of that country as an earthly inferno, where I fought against every imaginable obstacle, alternately sweating and freezing, toiling as no man ever toiled before. (GM 309)

Abel is 'pursued by phantom savages and pierced by phantom arrows', 'persecuted' by 'creations of the Indian imagination', including 'that superhuman man-eating monster supposed to be the guardian of the forest' (GM 310). The
monster, though, cannot harm Abel because, like Carnehan with Dravot's head on the journey back from Kafiristan, Abel is protected by the ashes of Rima. On the journey his determination to defy death becomes stronger still, even though he concedes that his 'conviction that the will would triumph grew to something monstrous, a parent of monstrous fancies' (GM 313). He admits that his 'fevered imagination... corrupted everything that touched me and gave it some new hateful character' (GM 313). Eventually, however, the two conflicting aspects of his imagination, the will and the unconscious, cease struggling and Abel recovers his health.

V

Durtal's vision of the state of de Rais' soul when the Marshal is overtaken by 'remorse' for his crimes (DT 160) also uses the complicated imagery seen in An Outcast of the Islands and Green Mansions. Here too a protagonist who did have control over his imagination and his life comes to find himself dominated by the imagination's anarchic and independent qualities. 'Besieged by phantoms', de Rais 'howls like a wounded beast'; he 'promises to found pious institutions' (DT 160), but actually 'precipitates himself into new debauches... raving with delirium' (DT 161). He wanders in the 'dark, impenetrable forests' that surround his castle and 'beholds obscenity in the shapes of the aged trees'; 'it seems that nature perverts itself before him, that his very presence depraves it' (DT 161). The trees commit sexual acts before his eyes. 'Obscene forms' emerge from the ground and from the clouds; they 'accord with the sombre bulging of the foliage, in which now there are only images of giant or dwarf hips, feminine triangles, great V's, mouths of Sodom, glowing cicatrices, humid vents' (DT 162). The 'landscape of abomination' then produces on the trunks 'frightful cancers and horrible wens... ulcers... sores... chancres'; it is a veritable 'venereal clinic' (DT 162).
When de Rais returns to the castle to sleep the incubi and succubi vanish and the corpses of his victims, which have been reduced to ashes and scattered, 'return to the larva state and attack his lower parts' (*DT* 163). 'He writhes, with the blood bursting his veins... crawls to the crucifix... [and] adjures Christ to have pity'; finally he hears, 'terrified, in his own voice, the lamentations of the children crying for their mothers and pleading for mercy' (*DT* 163).

Just as de Rais' knowledge of his guilt eventually torments him by means of his imagination, so too Kipling's Pansay is haunted by the figure of Mrs Wessington, the woman he treated badly. Whether she is truly a ghost or merely a figment of his imagination, Pansay is forced to live in two different and mutually incompatible worlds: 'Mrs Wessington' acknowledges neither the rules of the material world nor the existence of other people; no one at Simla apart from Pansay can see her. Pansay is therefore obliged to have 'two selves' (*WWW* 172), the self that woos Kitty Mannering in the social world of Simla and the self that confronts Mrs Wessington whenever she appears. Like Jekyll he develops a composite self and a more private self which is locked in its own anti-social and monstrous world. Pansay tosses 'from mood to mood', sometimes behaving entirely normally and at other times thinking that Mrs Wessington's rickshaw and himself are the 'only realities in a world of shadows', that all the 'men and women I knew were all ghosts' and that the 'great grey hills themselves [were] but vain shadows designed to torment me' (*WWW* 173).

After a stretch in bed Pansay feels well enough to return to 'everyday' life (*WWW* 174). Mrs Wessington soon returns, however, and he comes to think this communication with his former lover a 'marvellously dear experience' (*WWW* 175). Over the following week Pansay 'hungered to be among the realities of life; and at the same time I felt vaguely unhappy when I had been separated too long from my ghostly companion' (*WWW* 176). He leads a double life, reluctant to commit himself wholly to, or to abandon, either world, even though he knows
ultimately that this strange mingling of the 'seen and the Unseen' will 'hound' him 'to the grave' (WWW 177). For Pansay, as Arthur Symons was to declare in relation to symbolist literature, the 'visible world is no longer a reality, and the unseen world no longer a dream'.

A similar two-world situation occurs in Wells' "The Remarkable Case of Davidson's Eyes", although the mechanism here is definitely supernatural or scientific rather than the more likely perceptual disorder. A young scientist stoops between the poles of a large electromagnet and suddenly finds that, while his body remains in north London, the object of his sight is an island in the South Seas. As his body moves around London so he sees different aspects of the island. While both worlds are real to Davidson, for his friends the world of the South Seas is 'altogether phantasmal' (SSS 180) or 'hallucinatory' (SSS 177). Davidson himself only seems to adopt this attitude when his vision of the island begins to break up: he then describes it as an 'infernal phantom world'; according to the narrator, he now becomes able to 'distinguish the real from the illusory' (SSS 181). Even if this phenomenon can be explained by the 'kink in space' theory, the idea that 'two points may be a yard away on a sheet of paper, and yet brought together by bending the paper round', the whole experience remains shrouded in 'mystery' (SSS 182). In a similar story by Wells ("Under the Knife") a young man who is chloroformed for an operation on his liver suddenly has an out-of-body experience. While his material form is being opened up, he finds himself observing the surgical procedures and then spinning off into deep space where he eventually comes to perceive that the 'whole Universe of Matter' is but a spot of light on the ring on the forefinger of some vast Being (SSS 251-2).

If these stories wittily and provocatively play with the trope of subjectivity, The Wonderful Visit suggests a two-world situation that is more objectively schematic. When an angel is accidentally shot down and then sheltered by a vicar, both parties learn that angels and human beings consider that
the world of the other is a mythical place. However, whereas mortals assume the world of angels to be heavenly, angels assume the world of mortals to be a nightmare. The two worlds operate entirely exclusively of each other, and yet both apparently exist with equal authority.

In *The Time Machine* completely different worlds co-exist in the same place but at different times, and these worlds too are presented as realities and not as dreams or fantasies. Because the Time Traveller knows exactly how he has arrived in the future and in what year, he does not suffer like West in *Looking Backward* whose 'mental image of the old [Boston] was so fresh and strong' that it 'contended with' his first impressions of that city in the year 2000 so that it was 'first one and then the other which seemed the more unreal' (*LB 79*). On the other hand, the returning Time Traveller's tale is disbelieved by his audience who are firmly rooted in the nineteenth century. Seeing their scepticism, the Time Traveller asks them to take the tale as a 'prophecy' (*SSS 79*) or as a work of 'fiction' in relation to which his 'assertion of its truth' should be taken as a 'mere stroke of art to enhance its interest' (*SSS 80*). Indeed, the atmosphere of doubt and the strangeness of the Time Traveller's experiences make the man himself wonder whether everything was not 'only a dream' (*SSS 81*). 'They say life is a dream', he muses, 'a precious poor dream at times - but I can't stand another that won't fit. It's madness. And where did the dream come from?' (*SSS 81*). He begins to doubt himself and is relieved to find that the time machine does really exist. Within the context of the novel, at least, the Time Traveller's tale is the truth; it is *The Time Machine* itself, the work of fiction, which is the 'gaudy lie' (*SSS 81*).
CHAPTER SIX:

THE FIGURATION OF EXPERIENCE

Carlyle reckoned that 'Nature, Universe, Destiny, Existence, howsoever we name this grand unnamable Fact in the midst of which we live and struggle, is as a heavenly bride and conquest to the wise and brave, to them who can discern her behests and do them; a destroying fiend to them who cannot'. Whether one assumes the 'world' or not-self for the human subject to be society, mankind, the material world, or the wider concepts as suggested by Carlyle, human experience can either be the means of solidifying the self in that world or a means of the self's disintegration. Late Victorian fiction saw experience as an agent of both self-formation and self-dissolution. Wilde's Lord Henry, indeed, declares both that 'every experience is of value' (TPODG 61) and also that experience is 'merely the name men [give] to their mistakes': it has neither 'ethical value' nor 'motive power' (TPODG 50). Moreover, just as late Victorian fictional society saw the individual as a destabilizing force more often than as a supreme contributor, so the concept of experience seems to undermine its recipients more often than it benefits them.
The idea that experience is 'our educator, our sovereign helper and friend' does not ring true very often. The protagonists of the previous two chapters, despite their intelligence, strength and charisma, are unable to harness the world to their will for any sustained length of time. After a time the world reasserts itself, forces either the submission or the destruction of the ambitious individual by making that individual respond to the actual world rather than simply to their own desires and fantasies. For, while 'Reason' demands 'unity', 'Nature demands multiplicity; and both these kinds of law make their claim upon man. The law of Reason is imprinted upon him by an incorruptible consciousness; the law of Nature by an ineradicable feeling'. Experience means 'experience of something foreign supposed to impress us, whether spontaneously or in consequence of our exertions and acts', and the subject is therefore 'transformed' from being a self-determining organism into being a construct of environmental conditions. At the very least, the tension between internal and external forces destabilizes the subject's willed self-image. Most of this thesis so far has concerned itself with experience that has been interpreted by the subject as being meaningful: Jim, for example, has the 'gift of finding a special meaning in everything that happened to him' (LJ 267). In such instances the object reality is understood by the subject only in harmony with their principles and desires; the world finds meaning and validity in accordance with what is already in the 'house of thought' (MTE 111), in relation to man's 'strange legacies of thought and passion' (TPODG 111).

In other words, a true reception of the world is repressed. This chapter, however, considers first the concept of experience as a positive and thrilling means of engaging with the world and second the perception of experience as inchoate, as a force which assails the subject without allowing any real or greater understanding of the world. In this second type of situation the subject is unable to assimilate the object reality to their own satisfaction and is
left in a world that is still wholly other or strange. Even if the experience is represented afterwards in tranquillity, the narrative of the self cannot conceal its own destabilization, the marks of its traumatic ordeal.

From this perspective, the subject who is dominated by their experience in late Victorian fiction is figured as an animal: he or she is unable to transcend mere existence, the need to survive; he or she is thrown hither and thither by external forces and prevented from realizing an individual self-determined identity. On the other hand, experience was considered by late Victorian aesthetes and decadents to be the acme of civilized sensuality, that in which one could indulge when one had mastered or transcended the simple functions of existence. According to The Picture of Dorian Gray

the worship of the senses has often, and with much justice, been decried, men feeling a natural instinct of terror about passions and sensations that seem stronger than themselves, and that they are conscious of sharing with the less highly organized forms of existence. But it appeared to Dorian Gray that the true nature of the senses had never been understood, and that they had remained savage and animal merely because the world had sought to starve them into submission or to kill them by pain, instead of aiming at making them elements of a new spirituality, of which a fine instinct for beauty was to be the dominant characteristic. (TPODG 101)

The aim of the new Hedonism, indeed, is 'experience itself, and not the fruits of experience' (TPODG 101), sensations rather than product. 

Decadents desired aesthetic stimuli, to receive intense sensual impressions from the extreme and the rare and the beautiful and the refined. For, according to Pater, art 'comes to you proposing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality to your moments as they pass' (WPTMT 220), and 'getting as many pulsations as possible into the given time' (WPTMT 220) enables one to 'burn always with [a] hard, gemlike flame' (WPTMT 219). To 'maintain this ecstasy, is success in life' (WPTMT 219).

Although aesthetes and decadents liked to think they were in control of their experience, it is often clear that they
were not, and the fine line between mastery and receptivity or submission can be seen in the Wilde of *De Profundis* who both embraces experience ('within the circle of actual experience is my creed made perfect and complete' (*TLOOW* 468)) and also asserts that 'everything must come to one out of one's own nature' (*TLOOW* 448). Wilde tries to have the best of both approaches to the world, even though it is clear from the text and the subsequent history of the man that his imprisonment was not exactly helpful to him.

Just as the reader of *De Profundis* is soon sceptical about Wilde's acceptance of his hardship in prison, so Marlow is suspicious of the Russian sailor's enthusiasm for the Congo wilderness. When the Russian tells Marlow about his time with Kurtz and claims that 'when one is young one must see things, gather experience, ideas; enlarge the mind' (*HOD* 91), the Englishman finds the sailor 'improbable, inexplicable, and altogether bewildering' and judges his wanderings to be essentially desolate and 'futile' (*HOD* 93). On the other hand, he does admit to a certain 'admiration' and 'envy' for the man (*HOD* 93). 'If the absolutely pure, uncalculating, unpractical spirit of adventure had ever ruled a human being', he considers, 'it ruled this be-patched youth' (*HOD* 93).

Adventuring differs from imperialism in that it lacks an ideal of conquest as regards those lands which the adventurer enters; pure adventure is not even a quest for knowledge. According to Conrad, it is 'stamped with the futility of a chase after mere emotions'; 'it lays a man under no obligation of faithfulness to an idea and even to his own self... There is nothing in the world to prevent a mere lover or pursuer of adventure from running at any moment' (*NLL* 189-90). Adventure for Conrad is a valuable activity only when it is a condition of productive toil: 'a man is a worker. If he is not that he is nothing' (*NLL* 190). Indeed, even though the notion of adventure is idealized in the novels of Haggard, Allan Quatermain is obliged to defend the British 'spirit of adventure' from being either 'mere luxury' or a 'mild form of lunacy' by reference to the 'colonies, each of which will in
time become a great nation' (AQ 114). Pure adventure has an 'eager fatalism' (HOD 94) about it; it expresses a wilfully receptive attitude towards the world, a willingness to be buried under a 'flood of external objects' which press upon us with a 'sharp and importunate reality, calling us out of ourselves in a thousand forms of action' (WPTMT 218).

I

Marius the Epicurean has a truly enthusiastic attitude towards experience; in fact, Marius makes the reception of experience the object of his life. To his adolescent mind fresh away from narrow, traditional and religious world of his father's villa the 'real world seemed... boundless, and himself almost absolutely free in it, with a boundless appetite for experience, for adventure, whether physical or of the spirit' (MTE 62). Marius becomes obsessed by the reception of a world that is 'absolutely real... and, on the face of it, so desirable' (MTE 63); he sees an opposition between the 'organic whole' of 'old pagan culture' and the 'actual world in all its eager self-assertion' (MTE 92).

Under the influence of Flavian he comes to believe that education increases one's 'capacity for enjoyment' (MTE 65): it refines one's sensitivity and receptivity, and expands the parameters of one's self-conception and individuality rather than simply assisting in the incorporation of the subject into society. In time Marius acquires a 'vigorou s intelligence' which prevents him, after Flavian's death, from falling prey to the 'enervating mysticism... of old religion or theosophy' (MTE 105) with their 'mechanical arcana' (MTE 106). Indeed, his sense of loss makes Marius become something of a 'materialist' (MTE 106): he begins to seek an 'exact estimate of realities... towards himself' (MTE 107). As Schiller noted, when man is 'merely a passive recipient of the world of sense... he is still completely One with that world', and therefore 'there exists for him as yet no world'.

"Only
when, at the aesthetic stage, he puts it outside himself, or *contemplates* it, does his personality differentiate itself from it, and a world becomes manifest to him because he has ceased to be One with it.\(^7\)

In Pater's conception, though, contemplation, or 'reflexion', reduces objects to a 'group of impressions', and thus the 'whole scope of observation is dwarfed into the narrow chamber of the individual mind' (*WPTMT* 218). Experience becomes 'ringed round for each one of us by that thick wall of personality through which no real voice has ever pierced on its way to us' (*WPTMT* 218). All that is 'actual' in experience, therefore, is a 'single moment, gone while we try to apprehend it' (*WPTMT* 218). Consequently Marius, in his quest for an 'exact estimate of realities... towards himself' (*MTE* 107), finds affinity with the teachings of Heraclitus which advocate the 'denial of habitual impressions, as the necessary first step in the way of truth' (*MTE* 108).

According to Heraclitus, the 'perpetual flux' of things and of souls prevents 'any real knowledge' of them from being 'attainable' (*MTE* 109).\(^8\) In other words, the 'momentary, sensible apprehension of the individual was the only standard of what is or is not' (*MTE* 109). This is 'all that is real in our experience' (*MTE* 117): one must not attribute to the 'phenomena of experience a durability which does not really belong to them' (*MTE* 108). The flux of life precludes one from ever truly understanding the external world; one can only 'maintain a harmony with that soul of motion in things, by constantly renewed mobility of character' (*MTE* 113). This rigorous approach prevents the subject from attaining a stable identity and substitutes for the aim to conquer an object reality the 'practical ideal' of a 'general completeness of life' (*MTE* 115). The maxim of *Life as the end of life* expresses the 'desirableness of refining all the instruments of inward and outward intuition, of developing all their capacities, of testing and exercising one's self in them, till one's whole nature [becomes] one complex medium of reception, towards the vision... of our actual experience in the world'
Indeed, this 'right education of one's self' demands 'freedom' from 'all partial and misrepresentative doctrine' and from preoccupation with the past and the future; it posits an 'insight through culture' (MTE 115) in order to 'make the most of what [is] 'here and now'' (MTE 117). As Wilde reckoned in "The Soul of Man under Socialism", 'what man has sought for is... simply Life' (TAAC 288).

Marius is also swayed by the philosophy of Aristippus of Cyrene who transforms the potentially nihilistic theory that 'things are but shadows' (MTE 111) and 'all is vanity' into a 'stimulus towards every kind of activity' and a 'perpetual, inextinguishable thirst after experience' (MTE 112). Cyrenaic philosophy only uses theory to justify intellectually its 'exclusive concern with practical ethics' (MTE 114). Indeed, at the times when Cyrenaicism was popular, men's minds felt 'oppressed by the weariness of systems which had... outrun positive knowledge' to the point where they devoted 'great metaphysical acumen' to the function of 'proving metaphysical speculation impossible, or useless' (MTE 114).

Abstract theory was to be valued only just as far as it might serve to clear the tablet of the mind from suppositions no more than half realizable, or wholly visionary, leaving it in flawless evenness of surface to the impressions of an experience, concrete and direct. (MTE 114)

'Cyrenaic doctrine' was a 'school to which the young man might come, eager for truth', and from which he might be sent back 'to experience, to the world of concrete impressions, to things as they may be seen, heard, felt by him; but with a wonderful machinery of observation, and free from the tyranny of mere theories' (MTE 115) and ideologies. Marius himself decides that it is 'reassuring' and 'natural' to 'rely exclusively upon the phenomena of the senses' after so long a debate about the 'rival criteria of truth' (MTE 113), and his new creed brings about a life of 'realized consciousness' (MTE 118) based upon 'energy, variety, and choice of experience' (MTE 120).

Marius' attitude towards experience and truth requires
his 'reception' of the world rather than the imposition of himself upon it: his outlook is one of negative action, or of determined passivity. He lives out an apparently paradoxical existence: 'though with an air so disengaged, he seemed to be living so intently in the visible world' (MTE 123). This is his mode of living for, just as the boy Marius is 'more given to contemplation than to action' (MTE 49), the last chapter of the novel claims that Marius' 'temper, his early theoretic scheme of things [Cyrenaicism], would have pushed him on to movement and adventure. Actually, as circumstances had determined, all its movement had been inward; movement of observation only, or even of pure meditation' (MTE 288). Marius sees truth as 'ampler vision', as a form of 'revelation' (MTE 294). Because his life has been an 'elaborate... education of his receptive powers', on his death-bed his 'unclouded receptivity of soul, grown so steadily through all those years, from experience to experience, was at its height... the tablet of the mind white and smooth' (MTE 294). Indeed, Marius intends to leave the world 'with the same fresh wonder' with which he had entered it (MTE 294), with the 'consciousness of some profound enigma in things' (MTE 295).

This attitude makes 'Marius' difficult to pin down or represent except through the body of his experience: he is shaped and reshaped, 'consumed and renewed' (MTE 109) by his understandings of and responses to the phenomena of life. He refuses to fall back upon the false principles of egotism and 'knowledge' to construct an identity which would allow him a greater freedom of movement and self-determination in the world. His self is seen subjectively, in movement rather than in stasis: it is ever 'coming to be' (MTE 109), following the requirements of 'that strange, perpetual weaving and unweaving of ourselves' (WPTMT 219). Nevertheless, he, like Aristippus of Cyrene, is aware that the subject's reception of 'metaphysical formulae' is to a certain extent determined by the 'company... already present' in the 'house of thought' (MTE 111), and old pagan culture, for example, is 'so weighty
an authority it exercised on every point, being in reality
only the measure of its charm for every one' (MTE 92). As
William James put it, while 'every thought we have of a given
fact is, strictly speaking, unique, and only bears a
resemblance of kind with our other thoughts of the same fact',
'experience is remoulding us every moment, and our mental
reaction on every given thing is really a resultant of our
experience of the whole world up to that date'.

Experience in Marius is expressive of the 'deep original
materialism or earthliness of human nature', the intimate bond
between man and the 'sensuous world' (MTE 117). In the words
of Hudson, who was less of an impressionist than Pater, real
experience brings a 'sense of the thing itself... something,
let us say, penetrative, special, individual, as if the
quality of the thing itself had entered into us, changing us,
affecting body and mind'. Indeed, the philosopher Bradley's
rejection of Hegel's vision of the Absolute of reality as an
actualization of Mind was based on the fact that Hegel's
approach 'swallows up the glory of the experienced world'
(Brooker 1994 195). In Bradley's eyes, 'there is but one
Reality, and its being consists in experience' (AAR 405).

II

In a small villa overlooking the Adriatic Giorgio and Ippolita
in The Triumph of Death begin the 'New Life' (TTOD 148). While
he is tortured by self-consciousness and his desire for
control over his life, she is 'actuated by spontaneous
curiosity, and by an instinctive need of multiplying her
sensations, and of throwing herself, heart and soul, into her
surroundings' (TTOD 151). She has a facility for 'entering
into communion with all forms of natural life', for
'conversing with domestic animals and understanding their
language', for 'finding numberless analogies between humanity
and the aspect of objects the most divergent from it' (TTOD
151). Giorgio reckons that, on account of these
identifications, Ippolita is possessed by the 'lower instincts of life' (*TTOD* 151); for him true life is associated with the imaginative control of reality. Whereas he is self-contained, Ippolita is self-expansive; she has an 'inextinguishable desire to be out of doors... to explore unbeaten paths' (*TTOD* 152). She is delighted by the textural strangeness of caterpillar cocoons which so disgust her lover (*TTOD* 153).

Giorgio thinks that Ippolita is 'wholly occupied in cultivating and adorning her sensations' and his own (*TTOD* 156); 'she was made for this life of indolence and freedom, of physical enjoyment and absence of care' (*TTOD* 155). She makes him taste the honey of a violet she has plucked; her words are full of the 'liveliness of real sensations' (*TTOD* 156). After some weeks of this undesired education Giorgio decides to 'go to meet' life, to 'find and pluck it from the realities of the natural world' (*TTOD* 179). But this rapacious attitude exhibits a wrong frame of mind and he strives to no great effect to 'find some striking accordance between his own soul and surrounding Nature' and to 'shake off that ingrained indifference which for so long had rendered him impervious to any agitation not proceeding from himself' (*TTOD* 179). Only once, when he and Ippolita play at shaking dewy trees and bushes in order to soak each other, does he burst out laughing, 'forgetful suddenly of all his phantasms' (*TTOD* 190). He allows himself to be 'carried away and penetrated by the gay seductiveness of youth and the vivifying freshness of the night, which drew out all the fragrance of the earth' (*TTOD* 190).

The following day, however, the couple go to participate in the mass Vigil to celebrate the anniversary of a vision of Our Lady of Compassion. Whereas Ippolita is keen on account of her 'periodical fits of religious fervour', Giorgio decides that it is a 'necessary part of his scheme' to go, to 'make one of this agglomeration of uncivilized humanity', to 'try the effect of physical contact with the lower strata of his race, those dense and unchanging layers in which the primitive imprints were preserved almost intact' (*TTOD* 189).
The scene at the shrine, though, defies all studied motives. The 'whole population of the mountains and the sea-coast had journeyed to the sacred spot to ask for pity on their sufferings' (TTOD 188) and the place is utter chaos. Giorgio and Ippolita are overcome with nausea, and yet the 'attraction of this strange human spectacle was still stronger, and constrained them to remain in the thick of the crowd, or carried them to the spots where the profoundest misery, the worst excesses of cruelty, of ignorance and pain, were displayed' (TTOD 200). They are drawn into the body of the crowd, are literally incorporated; their independence and individuality is slowly whittled away. When they suddenly witness an epileptic attack, their identification with the crowd becomes complete, because Ippolita too is an epileptic. Indeed, Ippolita's epilepsy has always been an implicit metaphor in the novel for her acceptance of experience and her love of sensations. In other words, the background presence of epilepsy associates experience with disease, mental disorder and self-destruction, an equation which is explicitly and literally rendered during the shrine scene. This thirty-page episode embodies a vision of human experience as suffering and suffering as a product of human experience; moreover, it makes no distinction between the effects of toil, disease, or genetic disorder. As Wilde and Pater reckoned, suffering, by making the subject conscious of their existence, is the 'secret of life' (TLOOW 473).

Giorgio and Ippolita catch the 'contagion': Giorgio feels that he is 'no longer master of himself; his nerves dominated him, and imposed upon him the disorder and excess of their sensations' (TTOD 206). Indeed,

hustled by the mob, confused, sick at heart, and wretched as the rest, in need, like them, of pity and succour, weighed down, like them, under the burden of the flesh, - for the moment they were veritably in touch with the multitude in the midst of which they too trembled and suffered, and both for one moment forgot the narrow limits of their own soul in the immensity of human pain. (TTOD 205)

In the church, 'certain figures developed a sudden magnetic
attraction' (*TTOD* 211) for Giorgio. He feels 'their cries echo in his heart' and, like Marlow in *Heart of Darkness* (*HOD* 69), he gradually becomes 'infected by their delirium' and 'conscious of a brutal desire to howl and writhe with them' (*TTOD* 212). On the other hand, Giorgio also feels he is in an 'unknown world, in the presence of a nameless people, participating in rites of most obscure origin' (*TTOD* 211). Moreover, the 'faces of the men and women appeared... stamped with a humanity other than his, fashioned of different clay'; he can find no 'analogy' between them and the expressions of the humanity he is used to (*TTOD* 211).

Outside, later on, the couple sit 'speechless, almost deprived of the power of thought, though still shaken from time to time with a shudder of horror'; they had been 'fearful of losing their senses' (*TTOD* 213). Giorgio now describes his 'strange and hideous experiences' (*TTOD* 214) as assaults from outside. He rejects his acts of identification and considers the 'result' of his 'experiment' of 'contact with the inferior strata of his race' to be 'unmitigated horror'; 'he was as much a stranger to these people as if they were a tribe of South Sea islanders' (*TTOD* 215). As in *Heart of Darkness*, the subject's problematic relationship with his own culture is compared to the ignorance of Europeans about the races of other continents.

III

While he is lost in the crowd, his time at the shrine is a self-expanding experience for Giorgio: it throws into disarray the narrow identity he has constructed from his 'power of self-isolation' (*TTOD* 215). Indeed, the theme of open-mindedness in relation to reality appears in much late nineteenth century fiction, from the drug-induced reveries of decadent fiction to the aspirations of New Women protagonists, and from the strange geographical discoveries of imperialist or adventure narratives to the projected futures of science
fiction. In the introduction I discussed this theme from the viewpoint of narratorial persuasion, referring to Van Helsing's pleas to Seward in Dracula 'not to let some previous conviction injure the receptivity of [his] mind with regard to some strange matter' (D 232). Likewise, Marlow tries to keep the minds of his audiences receptive towards what he is telling them, and Graham asks Erskine in Wilde's "The Portrait of Mr. W.H." to 'dismiss from [his] mind any preconceived ideas [he] might have formed on the subject, and to give a fair and unbiased hearing to [Graham's] own theory' on Shakespeare's Sonnets (OWCSF 146). Wilde himself uses the same approach in De Profundis in his attempt to alter the British public's image of him. In the most extreme form of open-mindedness, Marius seeks to maintain a tabula rasa of his mind in preparation for the correct reception of experience and ideas (MTE 114).

True open-mindedness defamiliarizes that which is in the 'house of thought' (MTE 111), dissolves the influence of prejudice and convention upon the reception of impressions from the world. In other words, it reduces the subject's bond with the culture in which he or she exists and places them in a more real and individual relationship with the material world. Furthermore, by denying the structures of authority which help order daily life, open-mindedness as regards experience actually makes things 'unknown' or strange. Indeed, experience even makes the world strange for those closed-minded protagonists of late Victorian fiction who are not 'too much of a fool to go wrong' (HOD 85); many protagonists suddenly find themselves in environments or worlds whose mechanics and practices they do not understand and with which they are (at first) not capable of dealing.

Fiction with this as its subject tends to fall into two categories: fiction of the young person and fiction of subversion. The former category encompasses narratives of a rites of passage movement from inexperience to experience (or death) and includes Kipling's tales about children (in particular Kim, The Jungle Books, "Baa Baa, Black Sheep") and
stories with somewhat older protagonists such as "Thrown Away" and "Only a Subaltern". Also in this group are Heart of Darkness and Lord Jim, Marius the Epicurean, Trilby, Tess of the D'Urbervilles and Jude the Obscure, D'Annunzio's The Child of Pleasure and Hudson's The Purple Land. As the narrator of Marius claims, 'Cyrenaicism will always be more or less the special philosophy... of the young, when the ideal of a rich experience comes to them in the ripeness of the receptive, if not of the reflective, powers' (MTE 183). The fiction of subversion consists of narratives wherein a fixed and stable relationship with the world is overturned and a new order or disorder imposed. Examples include Wells' The War of the Worlds, The Island of Doctor Moreau and When the Sleeper Wakes, Hudson's A Crystal Age, Lord Jim again, Dracula, the ghost stories of M.R. James, and Kipling's "At the End of the Passage" and "The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes".

IV

In Monsieur de Phocas open-mindedness is shown through the motif of travel. Sir Thomas Welcome advises the enervated Duc de Fréneuse to travel to the Far East, to 'liberate oneself from all those conventions, futile attachments, relations and prejudices that are so many burdens weighing us down, and so many dreadful prison walls erected between ourselves and the reality of the universe' (MDP 150). He recommends living the 'life of the soul and the instincts, far from the artificial, overheated and hysterical existence of Paris and London' (MDP 150). Welcome believes that the 'secret of life is to be a voyager' (MDP 151): 'the external world will then become... a source of unalterable joys, so much more perfect because our being is only their mirror' (MDP 151-2). His method is to 'allow the universe to enter into yourself, [and] thus to take slow and voluptuous possession of the whole world' (MDP 153). Using the same writing tablet imagery as appears in Marius, he advises being a 'wise and conscious wax which takes the
impressions of nature and art' (MDP 153).

G. O. Trevelyan would agree in part with the over-passionate Welcome. Writing in an Anglo-Indian tradition which scorned metropolitan (mis)understandings of the Orient, he reckoned that 'a man gains more new ideas, or, which comes to the same, gets rid of more old ones, within his first month on Indian soil than during any equal period of his life'. This mental overhaul, however, was often represented in imperialist fiction as being more traumatic than the simple refurbishment that Trevelyan implied. If the subject has not a language for the 'new ideas', or is forced to relinquish their old ideas without finding substitutes, then, in the words of Schiller, the 'inchoate' nature of the 'sheer mass' of object reality can enable fear to 'find its seat'. The subject is unable to impose any real authority or explanation on reality and is forced to receive an array of bewildering impressions which he or she cannot assimilate in accordance with their identity. In extreme circumstances this brings about death.

After she has aged two thousand years in two minutes Holly and Vincey find out that their servant Job, who had enjoyed not one moment of the adventure, is dead. 'His nerves, already shattered by all he had seen and undergone, had utterly broken down beneath this last dire sight, and he had died of terror, or in a fit brought on by terror' (S 296). Holly reckons that this fact may 'help people to understand how overwhelmingly awful was the experience through which we had passed': 'it seemed quite natural that the poor old fellow should be dead' (S 296).

This, of course, is an extreme incident, but the inability to assimilate or deal with a strange world produces the same results in more realistic stories. The opening sentence of Kipling's "Thrown Away" declares that 'to rear a boy under what parents call the 'sheltered life' system is, if the boy must go into the world and fend for himself, not wise'; it suggests that such a person may come to 'extreme grief simply from ignorance of the proper proportions of
things' (PTFTH 42). The unnamed Boy is exactly such a person and, when he is posted from the easy-going army life of England to colonial service in India, he is unable to recognize that, owing to the difficulty of the environment, 'India is a place beyond all others where one must not take things too seriously' (PTFTH 43). Being 'sensitive', though, he takes quarrels, gymkhanas, gambling debts and hangovers 'seriously', and his excesses strike him 'personally' (PTFTH 43-4). While 'one-half of this came from inexperience', the other half came from the 'dizziness bred by stumbling out of his quiet life into the glare and excitement of a livelier one' (PTFTH 44). He begins to believe himself 'ruined beyond redemption' (PTFTH 45) and, when a woman makes an unkind remark about him to his face, he goes to a Canal Engineer's Rest House and shoots himself.  

Sensitivities apart, the theme of the problematic nature of the Anglo-Indian experience is frequently presented by Kipling. "At the End of the Passage" is set in and around the bungalow of a railway engineer in the middle of the Indian plains, and the story is more concerned to establish the relationship between four men and their environment than it is to detail the relationships between them. Heat and darkness dominate the story: in the first scene the men can only just distinguish the markings on their playing cards, and the reader learns that 'outside lay gloom of a November day in London'. The reader is ironically asked to imagine the oppressive nature of the Indian desert on a summer night by reference to an antithetical climate, season and type of place; Kipling taunts and compares at the same time. 'There was neither sky, sun, nor horizon - nothing but a brown purple haze of heat' (LH 156). Giving force to this negativity, other images simply collapse: 'a whirling dust-devil would scutter across the plain for a couple of miles, break, and fall outward' (LH 156).

The four whist-players have uncertain existences outside their cultural identity: one is a civil servant who lives in constant fear of being poisoned because he has been assigned
to examine the accounts of the king of a native State; another is a doctor of the line who works in a 'cholera-stricken camp of coolies' (LH 157). All were 'lonely folk who understood the dread meaning of loneliness' (LH 157). The hot weather and living alone amongst Indians have worn them down and destroyed their self-confidence: there are fifteen deaths a day in the doctor's camp and the engineer's assistant has recently committed suicide. After telling his boss that he was 'going home to see his wife, in Market Street, Liverpool, that evening', the assistant went to his room to clean his rifle, 'fumbled with the trigger, and shot himself through the head - accidentally' (LH 161).

The Englishmen can get no hold on a reality that is resistant to description and organization; moreover, their activities, on account of their limited success, render them little more than observers of Indian life. They cannot distance themselves from the heat which smothers the whole land. The temperature is one hundred and four degrees; the air is 'heavy with the foul smell of badly-trimmed kerosene lamps; and this stench, combined with that of native tobacco, baked brick, and dried earth, sends the heart of many a strong man down to his boots, for it is the smell of the Great Indian Empire when she turns herself for six months into a house of torment. (LH 166)

The men's memories of England seem insubstantial, as transient as the tunes that get hammered out on the 'ragged keyboard' of the 'battered little camp-piano' (LH 162). The 'crazy tinkle' holds at bay only momentarily the 'roaring' dust-storm that envelops the house in the 'choking darkness of midnight' (LH 163), and the men's fond memories of the 'smell of hay... bats - roses - milk and midges... mothers' (LH 164) draw attention to the bleakness of their situation.

After two of the men have left, Hummil the engineer reveals to Spurstow the doctor that he has not slept for ages; he is desperate, frantic, 'nearly mad' (LH 167). He has developed a fear of dreaming, of being 'caught' in a 'place
down there' which has 'made every night hell' to him for months past (LH 169). When Hummil describes his feelings to the doctor the sensations recur and, 'as a sponge rubs a slate clean, so some power unknown to Spurstow had wiped out of Hummil's face all that stamped it for the face of a man, and he stood at the doorway in the expression of his lost innocence. He had slept back into terrified childhood' (LH 169). In this story too the extreme effect of experience on the mind is presented through the image of a *tabula rasa*. Spurstow leaves the following morning and 'no living man knows what that week held for Hummil' (LH 172). When his friends arrive the following Sunday, however, the engineer is dead, and in his 'staring eyes was written terror beyond the expression of any pen' (LH 172). Whether his death is the result of heat-apoplexy or of 'some other visitation' (LH 173), the implication is that Hummil's experience of 'India' destroyed his sense of selfhood and killed him. The story ends with his friends trying to repress any supernatural explanation and to put this incident behind them; they need to keep their 'wits together' (LH 175).

In "The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes", one of Kipling's more fantastic tales which play upon Anglo-Indian paranoia, another engineer is accidentally and physically trapped in a sand-pit in the desert with sixty post-choleric Indians. Jukes feels 'overmastered' by the 'sensation of nameless terror' (WWW 193), as 'helpless as a child and completely at the mercy of his native neighbours' (WWW 196). He is 'powerless to protest... all my energies being devoted to a struggle against the inexplicable terror that threatened to overwhelm me again and again' (WWW 196). He cannot get his head round the bizarre reason for the Indians' confinement there and his own enforced proximity to them on no better than 'equal' (WWW 193) terms. Gunga Dass, an Indian who takes Jukes 'under his wing' (WWW 199), tells him that the pit is a 'Republic' which operates under the Benthamite maxim of the 'greatest good of greatest number' (WWW 201), and Jukes is unable to assert any European superiority. He wants to show
them that he is 'master' (WWW 199) but the Indians show no interest in his hysterical behaviour.

V

As Wells pointed out, 'in all this type of story the living interest lies in their non-fantastic elements and not in the invention itself'. The fantastic element, the 'strange property or the strange world, is used only to throw up and intensify our natural reactions of wonder, fear or perplexity. The invention is nothing in itself...'; the human responses are all. His The Island of Doctor Moreau, like Kipling's tale about Jukes, tells of an Englishman trapped in a bizarre situation many miles from home and forced to live on the same level as creatures which he instinctively regards as inferior.

Everything on Moreau's island is initially 'strange' (TIODM 29) to the shipwrecked Prendick yet, while the strangeness increases, Prendick becomes more flexible and manages to adapt himself to the phenomena that present themselves to him. On his first exploration of the island Prendick, a naturalist, is pursued at dusk by a creature he cannot identify. He pleads almost hysterically with Moreau's assistant Montgomery for an explanation, but is merely told that what he saw was probably a 'bogle' (TIODM 47). As he gradually receives information as to Moreau's activities on the island Prendick begins to distance himself both from the 'Beast People' and from his fellow Englishmen. On the other hand, because he is marooned there, he comes to absorb the ideas and to take on the characteristics of both groups. In this sense Prendick comes to echo Moreau's 'first man' (TIODM 73), the gorilla-man to whom Moreau gave a 'clean sheet, mentally' and who had 'no memories left in his mind of what he had been' (TIODM 74). Again the tabula rasa. The parallel between the gorilla-man and Prendick is strengthened by the fact that at this stage Prendick still fears he is destined to be experimented on by Moreau.
Before long, though, Prendick's 'eye' becomes 'habituated' to the forms of the Beast People, and he begins to think of himself as 'ungainly', 'so relative is our idea of grace' (*TIODM* 80). Nevertheless, when Moreau is killed by an escaped puma he was working on, and the breakdown of his authority and violent behaviour seem imminent on the island, Prendick is forced to take up the role left vacant by Moreau in order to save his own skin. He has to abandon the civilized, notionally anti-vivisectionist identity he brought out from England because the oppositional reality of the island established by Moreau requires that Prendick be either master or slave (*TIODM* 84). Prendick tells the Beast People that Moreau has merely 'changed his body' (*TIODM* 101), that their former ruler still watches them. He takes on the rhetoric of the 'Law', and assumes the power and right to administer death.

The mantle of power, however, is not a natural fit for Prendick, and he fails to keep up the charade. (He believes in retrospect that, had he not allowed his courage to ebb away in 'solitary thought', he might have 'grasped the vacant sceptre of Moreau, and ruled over the Beast People. As it was, I lost the opportunity, and sank to the position of a mere leader among my fellows' (*TIODM* 114-5).) Moreover, after the deaths of Moreau and Montgomery, and the burning down of the laboratory, Prendick is compelled to go and live with the Beast People: it is in their huts, ironically, that he can find food and is most safe from their more aggressive members. On the other hand, he also tries to maintain an identity distinct from them: he erects a 'flimsy barricade' to warn him of any possible attack (*TIODM* 115). Ironically, though, the majority of the Beast People consider him to be one of them, and believe that 'there is no Master now' (*TIODM* 116). Indeed, the Monkey Man assumes, 'on the strength of his five digits, that he was my equal' (*TIODM* 120), and Prendick admits that he 'became one among the Beast People' (*TIODM* 116). In order to maintain the slightest independence he has to prove himself in their 'simple scale of honour' which is based
mainly on the 'capacity for inflicting trenchant wounds' (TIODM 119).\(^{18}\)

This state of affairs is altered by a combination of biological determinism and the need to adapt according to circumstances. As Moreau had lamented, his creations always reverted to type: the 'beast begins to creep back, begins to assert itself again'; the creatures have the 'souls of beasts', and are only a 'travesty of humanity' (TIODM 76). Prendick first notices in the Beast People a 'growing coarseness of articulation, a growing disinclination to talk', then an inability to assume the 'vertical attitude' (TIODM 120) and increasingly rudimentary feeding and sexual habits. Whereas for the Beast People reversion to type and adapting in accordance with one's conditions take the same form, with Prendick the two actions work counter to each other. On the one hand, he becomes filled with 'horror' at the 'quasi-human intimacy' he had had with some of the animals (TIODM 121); on the other, he realizes that his own eyes have acquired a 'strange brightness and a 'swift alertness of movement', that his hair has become 'long' and 'matted' (TIODM 122), qualities previously associated with animals. Just as the Beast People 'abandoned at last every stitch of clothing' (TIODM 121), so Prendick's 'clothes hung about me as yellow rags, through whose rents glowed the tanned skin' (TIODM 122).

Disgusted by his intimacy and fearful of the coming chaos, Prendick leaves the village and builds a 'hovel' amid the 'black ruins of Moreau's enclosure' (TIODM 121). Although the site has a human past and is a place associated with pain for the Beast People, Prendick's dwelling embodies apprehension rather than mastery: it has 'such a narrow opening that anything attempting to enter must necessarily make a considerable noise' (TIODM 124). He calls it a 'den' (TIODM 124) which, like 'hovel', is a word associated with the Beast People. Moreover, most of the other creatures have also left the village to make themselves 'lairs, according to their tastes, among the thickets of the island' (TIODM 124); he is doing nothing different. When the creatures begin to sleep by
day and be active by night, Prendick follows suit, for self-protection. Again, whereas Prendick depicts the animals as lapsing into 'carelessness and disorganization' (*TIODM* 121), he oscillates between fruitless 'watching for a ship' (*TIODM* 122) and failed attempts to build a raft. He hacks frustratedly at trees with his axe (clawing bark was forbidden to the Beast People under the Law (*TIODM* 57)), and his desire to 'massacre' the remaining creatures (*TIODM* 124) is symptomatic both of his separation from them and of his similarly psychopathic mentality.

When he does actually reach England, Prendick proves to have been transformed irredeemably by his experience. He admits that he 'may have caught something of the natural wildness of my companions' on the island and claims to see the 'animal surging up through' his fellow humans; 'none... have the calm authority of a reasonable soul' (*TIODM* 128). Unable to trust or get on with his fellow men, Prendick hankers after the Absolute, a 'sense of infinite peace and protection' which he finds in studying the 'vast and eternal laws of matter' (*TIODM* 129) through astronomy and chemistry, even though this idealism both rejects the real world and is not so dissimilar to Moreau's ambition to create a 'rational creature of my own' (*TIODM* 76) from a 'remorseless... Nature' (*TIODM* 73).

VI

While imperialist or adventure fiction presented the trials and tribulations of living or travelling abroad, other late nineteenth century fiction sought to portray such a complete transformation of the subject's home country that it appears to be a completely new world. The subject's perception of the phenomena of existence and their own identity is confused; he or she can no longer rely on many of the structures of reality that they were used to. This is most apparent in the dystopian and totalitarian England of Wells' *When the Sleeper Wakes* and the utopian individualistic England of Morris' *News*
from Nowhere: neither operate under the conventions and laws of late Victorian England. In addition, waking up in Boston in the year 2000 is a 'tremendous experience' for West in Bellamy's Looking Backward, and he has to fight for his sanity: in his mind 'all had broken loose, habits of feeling, associations of thought, ideas of persons and things, all had dissolved and lost coherence and were seething together in apparently irretrievable chaos' (LB 78). The idea that he might be 'two persons' he considers to be a 'simple solution of my experience' (LB 78). He comes to see himself as 'some strange uncanny being, a stranded creature of an unknown sea' (LB 209) and feels that he cannot fit into the system of the future (LB 137).

Wells' The War of the Worlds substitutes a powerful alien invasion for the mechanism of time travel or extended sleep. Moreover, Wells' general message here warns about complacency rather than indicating the possibilities of a future utopia or dystopia. In the first page the narrator refers to man's 'disillusionment' as regards his assumed 'empire over matter' (TWOTW 1). Man is undone by his 'vain' assumption that there is no 'intelligent life' on Mars to exceed his own (TWOTW 2).

The Martian landings on earth immediately disorganize humanity. People first abandon their daily activity in order to view the crater and its capsule; then, when the capsule opens and the devastating heat-ray is first used, the crowd of curious spectators turns into a terrified self-interested mob. The narrator had expected to see something 'in all essentials a man' to emerge from the cylinder and, when a 'big greyish, rounded bulk' that 'heaved and pulsated convulsively' and 'glistened like wet leather' appears, he is 'gripped' by an 'ungovernable terror' (TWOTW 17). The Martian defies description by conventional terms; it does not obey the physiognomical properties of earth creatures; it is a 'strange horror' (TWOTW 17). The narrator describes it as much by the features it lacks as by those it possesses: it has an 'absence of brow ridges, the absence of a chin'; its 'tumultuous breathing' (TWOTW 17-8) means it does not even keep a fixed
shape.

The narrator uses the same vocabulary to represent his responses as appears in "At the End of the Passage" (LH 169). After the Martian has dealt death among the crowd it came to me that I was upon this dark common, helpless, unprotected and alone. Suddenly like a thing falling upon me from without came - Fear. ... The fear I felt was no rational fear, but a panic terror, not only of the Martians, but of the dusk and stillness all about me. Such an extraordinary effect in unmanning me it had that I ran weeping silently as a child might do. (TWOTW 23-4)

Fear falls upon him 'from without': the vocabulary used to describe his internal coordination echoes exactly the method of the concrete Martian invasion, and the narrator begins to lose control of his life.

In addition, the English social body comes to imitate the Martian shapelessness as the aliens exert their authority over the earth. During the mass exodus from London all human values fall apart: the departure becomes a stampede. 'By ten o'clock the police organization, and by midday even the railway organizations, were losing coherency, losing shape and efficiency, guttering, softening, running at last into that swift liquefaction of the social body' (TWOTW 90). People are 'trampled and crushed' and 'stabbed', and the police, in their frustration, 'were breaking the heads of the people they were called out to protect' (TWOTW 90). The main road at Barnet becomes a 'boiling stream' (TWOTW 96). Everyone fights each other for passage: the brute struggle for individual survival prevails over cooperation and generosity. Each fugitive becomes a 'human agony of terror and physical distress', a 'dot' in a 'stampede gigantic and terrible - without order and without a goal... driving headlong' (TWOTW 103). Indeed, the narrator goes on to claim that the Martians 'do not seem to have aimed at extermination so much as at complete demoralization and the destruction of any opposition' (TWOTW 104).

At one point, the narrator is trapped in a ruined house for fifteen days, during which time he is forced to kill his
companion, a curate, lest the man give them away to the Martians. On leaving the house, the narrator finds himself in the 'landscape, weird and lurid, of another planet' (TWOTW 144). England is covered in a 'Red Weed' (TWOTW 144). He feels an 'emotion beyond the common range of men, yet one that the poor brutes [such as rabbits] we dominate know only too well' (TWOTW 144).

I felt... a sense of dethronement, a persuasion that I was no longer a master, but an animal among the animals, under the Martian heel. With us it would be as with them, to lurk and watch, to run and hide; the fear and empire of man had passed away. (TWOTW 144)

As in The Island of Doctor Moreau, on account of being dominated by the world man has become beast.

VII

Fear, terror and horror are key words in the late Victorian fictional reception of experience, in the subject's inability to represent the world in which he or she finds themself by the discourse they are accustomed to using. As Durtal notes, the 'unknown frightens a man's reason away' and the 'unembodied puts the soul in ferment' (DT 124). Fear is figured in terms of assault, and the subject feels that what they are forced to experience is often not simply unfamiliar, but unnatural: the limitations of the subject are represented as the unknowability and hostility of the object. At times the invading reality is even considered supernatural and, indeed, the late Victorian ghost story tended to abandon the traditional idea of spirits returning from the dead with important messages and almost exclusively fed on the concept of the unknown and on its readers' understandings of the protagonists' sensations of horror.

As a genre, 'horror' is obsessed with experience, with disabusing its protagonists and readers from their complacent relationship with the world and forcing them to accept the existence of unseen and sinister forces which might interrupt
at any moment their drab existence. At its best, 'horror' provides a very pure form of experience because the unknown nature of these strange forces informs the protagonist that there is nothing in their experience or knowledge to date which will enable them to understand, assimilate, appropriate, reduce or destroy this phenomenon. Indeed, according to William James a 'rare experience... is likely to be judged more real than a permanent one, if it be more interesting and exciting'.\textsuperscript{19}

Often, however, late Victorian fiction is deliberately unclear as to whether anything supernatural has actually happened: the perceptions or assertions of the experiencing protagonist may be questioned; the incident has left no evidence of supernatural agency; non-supernatural explanations seem just as likely to be true, if not more so. Either way, even if they are not replaced, traditional reckonings of reality are disturbed, or even relativized. Kipling claimed in the Preface to \textit{The Phantom Rickshaw and Other Tales} that the collection was 'not exactly a book of real ghost-stories... but rather a collection of facts that never quite explained themselves' (WWW 403).

Indeed, the subject's failure to understand the workings or reality of a particular environment or situation not infrequently induces a 'vision' of something supernatural in late Victorian fiction. By extension, the 'presence' of supernatural phenomena under these conditions indicates the moral foundation of the world of the text: if real, the supernatural comes to demonstrate the complexity and invincibility of the world; if unreal, it is at least a manifestation of the perceiving subject's conscience. In "The Phantom Rickshaw" Pansay is made to feel guilty about his bad treatment of Mrs Wessington by the repeated 'appearance' of her ghost. The possible supernatural elements in "At the End of the Passage" and "The Bridge-Builders" suggest both the inherent strangeness of India and English anxieties as to the validity of colonial rule. Somerton, in M. R. James' "The Treasure of Abbot Thomas", is attacked by a diabolical
creature as he tries to steal a thousand pieces of medieval gold hidden in a well; the same author's "Lost Hearts", "The Ash-tree" and "The Mezzotint" detail ghostly reprisals for some form of murder. In *Down There* de Rais is attacked in the forest of Tiffauges by the larval forms of the corpses of his victims, and in *The Picture of Dorian Gray* Dorian is constantly reminded of his selfish, cruel and murderous personality by the portrait in his attic. Moreover, it is an attempt to destroy this image that brings about his death.

Not dissimilarly, in Henry James' "The Turn of the Screw" the figures seen by the governess, whether real or imagined, seem connected to the young woman's uneasiness over her authority at the Essex country house. The governess has difficulty describing to the housekeeper the male figure she has seen on the roof at Bly: he is simply a 'horror' for her (*TTOTS* 145). Likewise, she pronounces the female figure a 'horror of horrors' (*TTOTS* 158). Although the labels set her experience at a distance, separate subject from object, good from evil, the governess actually 'redraws and 'justifies' her frame of reference to include the new facts which have intruded upon it'; she takes in and incorporates 'disorders' and 'perils' that come from outside'. While she rather menacingly comes to imitate Quint and Jessel, both physically by standing where they stood, and mentally by her possessive desire for influence over the children in her charge, her attitude appears to be a 'genuinely responsible kind of authority' (McWhirter 1993 138), to embody an openness towards finding the truth. The governess eschews a 'paranoid refusal of the inconceivable, the labelling of what exists outside of 'normal' or socially sanctioned conceptual boundaries as 'mad' - evil, perverted, or illegitimate' (McWhirter 1993 138). On the other hand, her 'willingness always to take in more and still more' becomes a 'formula for moral and psychological vertigo' (McWhirter 1993 137), a cause of the hysteria which collapses the stable authority of her vision, her sense of selfhood, and her confidence in her ability to protect the children. Indeed, she comes to think that she walks in a
world of [the children's] invention - they had no occasion whatever to draw upon mine' (TTOTS 153).

The novella never clarifies whether the figures the governess sees are supernatural or psychic phenomena; nor does the text explain satisfactorily how and why the figures manifest themselves. The governess' narrative simply thrives on the conflict between the woman's growing conviction of evil intentions and her inability to find unambiguous corroboration. The resultant indeterminacy of the text and the uncertain nature of the reality it depicts inspires the participating reader to search for a singular explanation which might encompass the considerable and conflicting detail. By contrast, M. R. James' "Oh, Whistle, and I'll Come to You, My Lad!" is disturbing for its bare presentation of the 'facts'.21 The experiences of Parkins, a Professor of Ontography, derive their power from the academic reticence with which the story is told, the conflict between the central protagonist who declaredly does not believe in ghosts and the narrator who does and who relishes Parkins' come-uppance. Parkins, whilst golfing on the East Coast, finds an old whistle engraved with an odd Latin inscription in a small cavity where the altar of a preceptory belonging to the Templars' used to be. On the way back to his hotel he has the impression that someone is running after him, although the figure he sees appears to be making no headway. That evening, he blows the whistle (twice), thinking that this might help explain one of the inscriptions which, translated, means 'who is this who is coming?' (GSOAA 115). A great wind suddenly gets up and continues through the night. When asleep, Parkins repeatedly dreams of a man who is pursued along the beach and who hides behind one of the groynes; he always wakes up, however, before the 'ill-defined' 'figure in pale, fluttering draperies' catches up (GSOAA 118).

In the morning it appears that both beds in Parkins' room have been slept in. The Professor, however, denies having tried them both. When he gets back from playing golf with an old Colonel later in the day, he meets a boy who has been
terrified by a figure waving to him from Parkins' room. That	night, on becoming aware of something in the spare bed,
Parkins gets up and moves to the window. A figure with an
'intensely horrible... face of crumpled linen' (GSOAA 128)
gets up too and seems to search blindly for the Professor.
Parkins is nearly maddened with fear (GSOAA 128) and struggles
with the figure. The contest is interrupted by the Colonel
but, by the time the older man reaches the window, Parkins is
lying on the floor with a 'tumbled heap of bed-clothes' beside
him (GSOAA 129). The next day the Colonel burns the bed-
clothes and throws the whistle into the sea.

Although the truth of the supernatural phenomenon appears
to have been ratified by the boy and the Colonel, the bare
facts are not convincing: a wind, a bad dream, a rumpled bed,
and a non-existent figure wrapped in bed-clothes. Ironically,
however, it is the investment of these routine elements with
supernatural power that is disturbing, and this suggests the
possible presence of strange forces right at the centre of
ordinary experience. Until the final incident Parkins, an
avowed disbeliever in ghosts, assumes the apparent sequence of
events to be but a product of accident, coincidence and an
excited imagination, even though there is nothing to explain
what actually generates the images of his dreams, or the
significance of the running man and his pursuer, or how they
relate to the figure in the sheet, or the relevance of the
Templars. In addition, the story itself shows a remarkable
ambivalence towards the whistle, its one concrete fact. The
whistle goes unnoted among the 'small objects on tables and so
forth' (GSOAA 125) when Parkins suspects someone has been in
his room; it is only shown to the Colonel as an afterthought.
The whistle is blown only on the first evening, and Parkins
does not bother to translate the second inscription; he simply
intends to present the object to one of the university museums
(GSOAA 126). At the end, of course, the Colonel throws it
into the sea, thus preventing any repetition of the
experiment.²²
The late nineteenth century fictional protagonist is often reduced to hysterics by their experience. He (or she) is frequently emasculated, feminized, or reduced to behaving like a child. Both Hummil and the narrator of *The War of the Worlds* are made infantile by their fear (*LH* 169, *TWOTW* 23-4); after Lucy's funeral Van Helsing 'cried till he laughed again; and laughed and cried together, just as a woman does' (*D* 210). When the narrator of *Torture Garden* expresses his horror or disgust at the mutilations and agonies he finds framed by beautiful displays of flowers, his guide Clara accuses him of being a 'little old woman' and tells him he will 'never be anything but an insignificant little old lady' (*TG* 123). Later, when she reduces him to tears, she calls him a 'little puppy' and a 'darling baby' (*TG* 164). She herself, of course, like Aissa for Willems and Ippolita for Giorgio, comes to embody a menacing and aggressive world: she is 'life, the real presence of life and the whole of life' (*TG* 190).

Late Victorian fictional protagonists are also drained and/or penetrated by experience, deprived of their old identity and/or given a new one in a separate and complex nexus of images. In *Dracula* Lucy is literally and repeatedly emptied of blood by the Count and then refilled by the Englishmen who are fond of her. She becomes an object being fought over by competing male interests: she loses all sense of her own identity. On the evening of Dracula's final attack, she writes in her diary that she is getting 'so strong again that I hardly know myself' (*D* 164). Wells' Martians also drain their foes: the narrator observes that they neither 'eat' nor 'digest'; they took the 'fresh living blood of other creatures, and *injected* it into their own veins' (*TWOTW* 124). In *The Secret Agent* the rich and powerful are described as 'nourishing their greed on the quivering flesh and the warm blood of the people' (*TSA* 51). By extension, Stevie's bombed remains are likened to an 'accumulation of raw material for a cannibal feast' (*TSA* 86): the vast majority of humanity is
presented as being unable to get beyond mere suffering existence.

In "At the End of the Passage" the life-force of the British in India is sucked out in the form of sweat whilst heat and darkness seep into them and drive them mad. Because imperialism aims to negate the oppositional relationship between self and world through conquest it requires a certain risky submission of the self or subject to the world in order truly to draw the world into the discourse of the subject. This method, however, allows the wilderness to take upon Kurtz a 'terrible vengeance for the fantastic invasion' (HOD 97). Just as Hudson wrote about the 'thing itself' being 'penetrative', the wilderness enters Kurtz and 'echoe[s] loudly within him because he was hollow at the core' (HOD 97). Alternately, just as Kurtz tries to 'swallow' (HOD 99) and 'devour' (HOD 116) the earth and its inhabitants, so he is consumed by the jungle, first mentally and then physically: he ends as 'something in muddy hole' (HOD 112). The brute force of the universe triumphs over everyone in the end.
CHAPTER SEVEN:

IMAGERY OF CHAOS AND COLLAPSE

While the sense of reality may be fluid in late Victorian fiction, with the concept of an objective observable material world giving way to subjective perceptions and individual experiences of it, the types of imagery used to structure the fictional protagonist's unconscious life are the same as those used to represent their conscious existence. Indeed, even when the dream-worlds undermine or resolve the world perceived by the conscious individual, they express the same desires for order and fears of disorder that seem to govern that individual's waking life. Therefore these types of images come to shape the world of the novel. Since, however, the themes of the self (identity, identification, desire and order) have been discussed earlier in the thesis, this chapter concentrates on the themes or constituents of the other in late Victorian fiction: crowds, chaos, fragmentation, darkness, destabilization and catastrophe.
Crowds are constitutive of the nature of experience itself. While Pater considered ordinary impressions to be multitudinous and fleeting, the complexity of colonial or imperial experience in late Victorian fiction was often represented through the presence of vast numbers of strange people, through the imperialist's sensation of being hugely outnumbered. Moreover, just as experience in late nineteenth century fiction tends to subvert the structured reality desired by the organizing intellect, so crowds, through the strength of their anger, fear, or aimlessness, often ruin European aspirations towards empire. Although Kipling's Dravot and Carnehan manage to take control of Kafiristan quite easily, they reckon they are outnumbered a million to one in that country and, when the fraud of their divinity is exposed, the people rise against them. They liken the event to the Indian Mutiny of 1857 (WWW 241), the historic uprising which forced the British to realize ever after the tenuous nature of their power in India.

The oscillation between imperial complacency and paranoia in relation to the crowd is as important as the crowd's actual behaviour in late Victorian fiction. On the Patna the eight hundred Moslem pilgrims are referred to as 'cargo' (LJ 55) or 'cattle' (LJ 54): they are reified and bestialized. Jim and his fellow whites look down from the bridge with a sense of superiority over this apparently servile group. When Jim thinks that the ship might sink, however, his 'confounded imagination' (LJ 108) makes a correlation between the multitude of things that might happen if the ship went down and the actual crowd on deck. Indeed, he justifies to himself his blurred vision of the 'horrors of panic, the trampling rush, the pitiful screams, boats swamped' (LJ 108) by the concrete fact of the numbers of passengers, thereby ignoring the demands of his job and its duty of care.

Jim's panic is reflected after the incident in the case of the engineer of the Patna who ends up in a hospital bed.
suffering from delirium tremens. The engineer claims he is 'famous' for his eyesight and alleges that he saw the Patna go down (LJ 81). He also declares that the ship was 'full of reptiles', rather 'millions of pink toads... as big as mastiffs, with an eye on the top of the head and claws all round their ugly mouths' (LJ 81-2): his own instability is displaced onto apparently external objects which now form his sense of reality. According to him, the white men had to jump ship in order to escape from the toads; on the other hand, he believes that the toads still surround him. Desperate both to escape from the toads and to inflict extreme violence upon them, he is held in a form of paralytic imaginative stasis which prevents the achievement of either desire. The sense of the crowd and the uncontrolled imagination has separated him from his manageable apprehension of an external material world.

The imagery works in a similar way in An Outcast of the Islands. The raindrops from a tropical storm press and dash at Willems 'as if flung from all sides by a mob of infuriated hands' (AOOTI 232) and, near the end of the novel, Willems has a vision of his body being assaulted by the creepers, leaves and trees of the jungle and then devoured by 'countless' 'repulsive' insects (AOOTI 268). The crowd-dream signifies the loss of an ordered identity and reflects the trauma of Willems' actual experience. Cavor in The First Men in the Moon tells of the 'horrors' and disorientation he felt when, stranded on the moon, he found himself 'weaponless and with an undefended back... amidst a crowd' of Selenites (TFMITM 174), even though he knew that Selenites form a highly organized society. While he was able to refrain from frenzied violence by strenuously exercising his 'will-power' (TFMITM 174), Kipling's Jukes lashes out when he is stuck in a pit with sixty Indians.

The imperial fear of the native crowd and its potential for insurgency is paralleled in late Victorian fiction by domestic English society's fear of class war and social revolution. As in imperial fiction the political situation
and the sensations of the minority are confused: the mass and the crowd become perceived as one entity. In *News from Nowhere* a working-class crowd protesting in Trafalgar Square against their poor standard of living is machine-gunned by the army (*NFN* 143), and this massacre triggers off a popular revolution. In Wells' *When the Sleeper Wakes* London is a densely-packed city of thirty-three million people, the vast majority of whom are 'slaves' of the Labour Company, an arm of central government. Although Ostrog actually manages to galvanize the People to overthrow the 'aristocratic tyranny' of the ruling Council, he considers the Crowd to be a 'huge foolish beast' which is capable of being 'tamed and driven'.\(^2\) He intends to rule autocratically in the place of the deposed Council but does not realize that the masses, now politically motivated and aware of their strength, will not slip back into easy subservience. On the other hand, despite his documentation of this general move towards a better society, for Wells the crowd never seems to transcend being a 'monstrous' and congested mass of 'indistinguishable people' (*WTSW* 72); the crowd is very much observed by someone who is not part of it.

Indeed, the crowd horrifies the individualist. Conrad's Professor feels 'lost' amidst the London populace (*TSA* 81) despite the sense of individuality and security he derives from the explosives attached to his body. The mass of mankind 'swarmed numerous like locusts, industrious like ants, thoughtless like a natural force, pushing on blind and orderly and absorbed, impervious to sentiment, to logic, to terror, too, perhaps' (*TSA* 82). Just as Willems imagined himself attacked by insects in the form of a crowd, so the Professor imagines the crowd as insects. Like Conrad's earlier adventurers the egotistical Professor feels threatened by the 'resisting power of numbers, the unattackable stolidity of a great multitude' (*TSA* 95), and he would love to 'exterminate' this horde which is all-powerful despite being 'weak' and 'slavish of mind' (*TSA* 303). Whereas large numbers of people en masse are generally thought likely to disrupt the social
order imposed from above, for the Professor the mass of humanity is offensive because it is so reactionary.

Crowds are an anathema to Griffin too. Although he manages to elude the posse of locals in the Coach and Horses in Iping by virtue of his invisibility, it is the resistance of sheer numbers of people to his megalomaniacal plans that brings about his downfall. In London the 'stream of people' in the 'afternoon throng of Oxford Street' (*TIM* 103) makes him realize what a 'helpless absurdity an Invisible Man was - in a cold and dirty climate and a crowded civilized city' (*TIM* 121). Crowds are immediately the source of accidental injury, and eventually they become the means of his detection: at the end of the novel he is run to ground in the centre of Port Stowe by a crowd of frenzied people who strike wildly at him until he is mortally wounded.

Griffin's death echoes the fate of Pater's Denys l'Auxerrois who is torn apart by a crowd during a town pageant. Moreover, the Roman crowd in *Marius* quite literally bays for blood in the amphitheatre: its vulgar brutality and amorality dismay the finely-tuned sensitivities of Marius. Indeed, Hobson lamented the fact that the late Victorian 'cheap' Press (*I* 60), in its role as popular educator, had 'opened up a panorama of vulgar pride and crude sensationalism to a great inert mass' (*I* 101). For him such wanton incitement enabled 'jingoism': it aroused the 'lust of the spectator, unpurged by any personal effort, risk, or sacrifice, gloating over the perils, pains, and slaughter of fellow-men whom he does not know, but whose destruction he desires in a blind and artificially stimulated passion of hatred and revenge' (*I* 215). Jingoism becomes the 'nucleus of a sort of patriotism which can be moved to any folly or to any crime' (*I* 216).

In *The War of the Worlds* the crowd's capacity for violence is directed internally: the panic engendered by the Martian invasion induces in those fleeing from London a code of practice based on self-interest at all costs. All sense of civilization and compassion is lost; the main road through
Barnet becomes a 'boiling stream of people... blundering into one another' in confusion (TWOTW 96-7). If a hansom cab unknowingly knocks into an invisible Griffin, people in this panic deliberately and uncaringly run over others in their single-minded need to escape. Other people are merely obstacles; their human identity is irrelevant. As the narrator notes, it was a 'stampede - a stampede gigantic and terrible - without order and without a goal, six million people, unarmed and unprovisioned, driving headlong. It was the beginning of the rout of civilization, of the massacre of mankind' (TWOTW 103).

In *The Triumph of Death* the violence of the crowd of pilgrims at the Vigil is even more internalized: self-laceration is much practised. The pilgrims compose an 'ignorant and bewildered multitude', a 'medley so strange, so wild, so dissimilar, that it outdid the maddest visions of a nightmare' (TTOD 196). Differing types of people, values, objects, sounds, smells and activities are all thrown together to make the crowd an intense sensuous experience. Individual lives and identities do not emerge from the throng: D'Annunzio's descriptions are merely a mass of physical details. On display is every conceivable deformity of muscle or bone, every diversity of human ugliness, all the indelible marks of labour, of intemperance, of disease; skulls pointed or debased, bald or woolly-haired, covered with scars or excrescences; eyes white and opaque like balls of curd, or mournful and glassy like those of great solitary toads; noses flattened to the face as if by a blow from a fist, or hooked like vultures' beaks, or long and fleshy like a proboscis, or eaten away by ulceration... (TTOD 201-2)

Moreover, the crowd-members are 'swept along by a savage frenzy which impelled them... to torture their flesh by the most inhuman devices' (TTOD 204) in order to 'render themselves worthy to approach the altar and lift their eyes to the Divine Image' (TTOD 207). Giorgio and Ippolita lose a sense of their individuality and become 'veritably in touch with the multitude': they forget the 'narrow limits of their
own soul in the immensity of human pain' (*TTOD* 205).

While this episode, as I have discussed in the previous chapter, makes a clear connection between experience and suffering, it also links the crowd or populace with disease: the pilgrims have come to the church to be cured of their (often horrific) ailments and deformities. Consequently, although disease is an agency that saps the masses of strength, it is at the same time a potent symbol of the populace's capacity for destruction. Moreover, while diseases tend to attack the masses before the richer classes, they can only reduce the size of the populace by killing individuals. They can never actually destroy the populace: the masses and disease imagistically are one.³

The disease which seems to capture the tone of the late nineteenth century, on account of its transmission through sex and its dramatic markings on the body, is syphilis. The sequence of 'macules, papules, tubercules, pustules, blebs, tumours, lesions, scales, crusts, ulcers, chancre, gummas, fissures, and scars' followed by cardiovascular disturbances, blindness, dementia and death (Showalter 1990 192-3) lends itself to graphically detailed and potently symbolic images of human debilitation and degeneracy. Indeed, according to J. E. Chamberlin, 'cultural health in the last decades of the nineteenth century was most often measured by its evidence of disease', and thus the disease-ridden body is often the focal image of late nineteenth century society in decay.⁴

Huysmans' novels are riddled with images of the disease, in an array of graphic descriptions, metaphors and symbols; Zola's Nana, having infected all Paris, decomposes into darkness at the end of the novel. In addition to the considerable number of people who had contracted the disease (the director of the Institut Pasteur reckoned in 1902 that there were one million contagious syphilitics in France (Showalter 1990 188)), campaigners for public health stirred up widespread paranoia about the disease to the point where syphilophobia became a disorder that was frequently encountered by late Victorian nerve specialists (Showalter
1990 196). Organizations such as the National Vigilance Association (founded 1885) and the Social Purity Crusade (founded 1901) claimed to uphold the values of society, and blame for syphilis was variously apportioned to sexually incontinent men, prostitutes, homosexuals, foreigners and the working class which, according to Charles Bernheimer, was 'fantasmatically the ultimate source of all disease'.

Fictional late Victorian diseases tend to come from abroad and to take hold in major cities. In Wells' "The Stolen Bacillus" an anarchist attempts to release what he thinks is a deadly Asiatic cholera bacillus into the water supply of London in order to stir up chaos by decimating the city's population. In Dracula the decadent foreign Count comes to London to prey upon its 'teeming millions' (D 67) and apparently plans to spread his blood-infection by attacking Englishwomen. The equation of the decay of a civilization, foreign hordes and disease is also strongly felt in Marius where Lucius Verus, 'returning in triumph from the East' after a 'cruel massacre' in Seleucia, unwittingly brings with him 'one by no means a captive': his soldiers return carrying a plague which baffles 'all imaginable precautions and all medical science' (MTE 97). Many thousands perish in Rome alone and blame is placed upon the Christians, the aliens within. Wells, indeed, recognized that 'science has scarcely touched more than the fringe of the probabilities associated with the minute fungi that constitute our zymotic diseases' and that 'for all we know we may be evolving some new and more terrible plague - a plague that will not take ten or twenty or thirty per cent.... but the entire hundred'.

If disease in the late nineteenth century was a major fear of society and the scourge of the populace, it was also a favoured motif of decadent writers. Indeed, Arthur Symons described the literature of decadence as a 'new and beautiful and interesting disease', a phrase which alludes to that literature's intended opposition to normality, society and tradition. In France 'male writers became obsessed with the idea of syphilis and madness as proud badges of the poete
Baudelaire, Flaubert, Maupassant and the Goncourt brothers 'celebrated' their syphilis, hallucinations, ennuis, depressions, seizures and tremors in the confidence that their 'horror of life' and embrace of le mal made them 'superior to the bourgeoisie and representative of a more advanced, if less hardy, creative humanity' (Showalter 1990 198).

II

The domestic and imperial crowds of late nineteenth century fiction seldom conform to the ruling class' desire for them to be an obedient workforce. At its most potent the crowd can become an army that defies centralized authority; most often, though, it is simply an agent of chaos. Indeed, many late nineteenth century thinkers came to believe that there was actually very little method, regularity and harmony in the universe. Nietzsche scorned the idea that humanity and the world were progressing towards perfected forms and an ideal relationship, claiming that the 'whole animal and vegetable kingdom' was evolving 'all at the same time, in utter disorder, over and against each other' (TWTP 363). Wells asserted that the universe was composed of completely unique units and that the classifications of science and other perceptions of order in nature were artificial and illusory. Moreover, he thought that his age was a period of 'quite extraordinary uncertainty and indecision upon endless questions - moral questions, aesthetic questions, religious and political questions'. The narrator of The Time Machine laments 'these latter days of weak experiment, fragmentary theory, and mutual discord' (SSS 83).

Nordau maintained that certainty was being 'destroyed' by an onslaught of 'shadows' and that forms in general were losing their outline and being dissolved in 'floating mist'. The 'established order' was coming to an 'end' and moral direction was lost in a 'chaos of thought'. Likewise, for Conrad in the late 1890s faith became a 'myth' and beliefs
shifted like 'mists on the shore' (JCLCG 65). Thoughts vanished, words died as soon as they were uttered, and the 'memory of yesterday [was] as shadowy as the hope of tomorrow' (JCLCG 65). Every image began to float vaguely in a 'sea of doubt' for the author, and doubt itself became 'lost in an unexplored universe of incertitudes'.

His fictional characters endorse the same sentiments. Lingard, whilst acknowledging that one's understanding of the universe is defined by 'those we know', is conscious of the fact that 'beyond our last acquaintance there lies only a vast chaos; a chaos of laughter and tears which concerns us not; laughter and tears unpleasant, wicked, morbid, contemptible - because heard imperfectly by ears rebellious to strange sounds' (AOOTI 165). Willems underwrites this vision: he is not frightened by death but by the 'horror of bewildered life where he could understand nothing and nobody round him; where he could guide, control, comprehend nothing and no one - not even himself' (AOOTI 127). Marlow too is driven out of his sheltering 'conception of existence' and momentarily has a 'view of a world that seemed to wear a vast and dismal aspect of disorder' (LJ 274). The fact that he still holds fast to the idea that the world is actually 'as sunny an arrangement of small conveniences as the mind of man can conceive' (LJ 274) epitomizes the way in which the total desires, visions and structures which dominate the foregrounds of late nineteenth century novels are always seen against backgrounds of horrific confusion, fear, chaos and catastrophe.

The split between foreground and background in Conrad's work reflects the detachment of surface from depth, sign from referent; indeed, Conrad often juxtaposed the concrete and the abstract to indicate a depth he could not truly describe, to suggest qualities about whose exact nature he was lost for words. Marlow uses the word 'mystery' and a variety of vague images to convey what he means but, in doing so, these words become as much positive descriptions in the general aesthetic of his narrative as confessions of narratorial helplessness as regards reality. The problem is simply that 'when you have to
attend to... the mere incidents of the surface, the reality... fades' (HOD 67). While it is often convenient that the 'inner truth is hidden' (HOD 67), thereby saving one from perpetual sensations of uncertainty and from being, like Jim, 'overwhelmed by the inexplicable' (LJ 294), it does mean that

life knows us not and we do not know life - we don't even know our own thoughts. Half the words we use have no meaning whatever and of the other half each man understands each word after the fashion of his own folly and conceit. ... words, once pronounced, die... only the string of my platitudes seems to have no end (JCLCG 65).

On the other hand, according to Marlow life is 'too short for that full utterance which through all our stammerings is of course our only and abiding attention' (LJ 208). Conrad's writing oscillates between the verbal fluidity and felicity of the 'platitudes' and the inarticulate struggle of the 'stammerings'. Although he presents Romantic forms of perception and praxis as means of coping with existence, he ultimately rejects the narrowness of their vision and shows how they do not permit the subject to understand the multifaceted nature of existence. Like Henry James, who believed that the 'only reason for the existence of a novel' was its 'attempt to represent life' (TAOF 5) and that art was 'all life, all feeling, all observation, all vision... all experience' (TAOF 17), Conrad's style emerges from a desired fidelity to the real world and from the hope that art can in some way represent it. His style ends, however, as expressive of a complex protomodernist aesthetic in which his celebrated technique of delayed decoding can be seen as a means of almost cynical authorial control and reader manipulation which runs counter both to the aim to render faithfully an impressionistic reality and to the idea of an external world that resists assimilation into language. Conrad's approach seems to have constructed a poetic fictional universe 'in the likeness of one of these misty halos that sometimes are made visible by the spectral illumination of moonshine' (HOD 30), and it is unclear as to whether it is the author or the world
who is holding back his/its secrets.

*The Triumph of Death* draws attention to the same problem with language. Near the beginning of the novel Giorgio asks Ippolita how much of her he can call his own and, when she replies 'all', he contradicts her and says 'nothing - or next to nothing' (*TTOD* 6). For him 'words are an imperfect vehicle of expression' and the 'soul is incommunicable' (*TTOD* 6). Later, when he comes to read the love-letters he sent Ippolita over a two-year period, Giorgio finds the passages that note 'trivial facts' (*TTOD* 43) more satisfying than those that wrestle with emotions. The 'practical inadequacy' of language does not help the lover who is 'not fully conscious of all he wishes to express' and so the lover strives to convey the intensity of his love by resorting to 'exaggerated phrases and... the commonplace tricks of rhetoric' (*TTOD* 43). 'And that is why one love-letter differs so little from another, and the language of the sublimist passion is little more than jargon' (*TTOD* 43). Giorgio's inability to reconcile his present self with his past self becomes ultimately a question of language and aesthetics.

Indeed, to Marlow the 'meaning of an episode was not inside like a kernel but outside, enveloping the tale which brought it out only as a glow brings out a haze' (*HOD* 30). There is no 'direct simplicity' (*HOD* 30): Marlow allows for the inexplicable and the unresolved, the role of intertextual implications. He (and Conrad) refute the closure or teleogenicity of the traditional novel in order to prevent the listener (and reader) from returning to their assumptions as to how the world works. Thus fiction can remain faithful to, even if it cannot represent, reality. Likewise, whereas Lisabeta in *Tonio Kröger* sees literature as a 'guide to understanding' and evidence of the 'redeeming power of the word' (*TK* 156), Tonio reckons that the majority of artists despair about the 'horrible invention of existence' (*TK* 157) over which one is meant to be morally superior and yet which is beyond one's control and knowledge. He claims that 'all knowledge is old and tedious' to literary people: 'utter some
truth that it gave you considerable youthful joy to conquer and possess - and they will all chortle at you for your naïveté' (TK 157).

Indeed, Conrad's ironic presentation of Marlow's desires for fixed standards of conduct, fixed racial identities and a direct relationship between man, language and object reality enables him to deconstruct not only the mythology of British imperialism but the whole patina of confidence upon which the self-conception of English civilization rests. Wells had a similar imaginative imperative in the 1890s: he described man's general complacency and fundamental failure to understand the world and how it was evolving. While his main protagonists often have access to new and important 'knowledge' or 'information' on this subject, society's ignorance or rejection of this knowledge both alienates these main protagonists from their fellow humans and ultimately estranges humanity from the world.1] The future world of The Time Machine shows that the 'growing pile of civilization' is only a 'foolish heaping' (SSS 83) doomed to failure and not an indication of everlasting progress. Indeed, Wells' 'anti-utopian' approach attempts to 'see through... [or] dismember a world' (Huntington 1982 141), to decompose monolithic structures, ironize expectations, reopen old conflicts and expose inconsistencies. Anti-utopianism is a 'mode of relentless inquisition, of restless sceptical exploration of the very articles of faith on which utopias themselves are built' (Huntington 1982 142). As Ishmael warns in Moby Dick, 'any human thing supposed to be complete, must for that very reason infallibly be faulty' (MD 147).

Haggard's Holly is for ever reckoning that the 'Infinite' is 'not for us to know' (S 117): the 'truth is veiled' and 'full knowledge is not for man as man is here' because the human 'vessel is soon filled' and even a thousandth part of the wisdom that directs the universe would shatter it 'into fragments' (S 118). 'Too much wisdom would perchance blind our imperfect sight' (S 117), he claims, and make us drown in the 'depths of our own vanity' (S 118). Indeed, Holly
believes that man's increased knowledge of the world as a result of a close observation of the workings of Nature has induced man to question the 'existence... of any intelligent purpose beyond his own' (S 118). Holly dreams of gazing with the 'spiritual eyes of noble thoughts deep into Infinity' and of not being 'tossed this way and that, by forces beyond our control' (S 118) but concludes that 'thinking can only serve to measure out the helplessness of thought' (S 119). Man's 'dim intelligence' cannot 'read the secrets of that star-strewn sky' and sees there instead only 'fantastic visions' and 'echoes' of his own dreams (S 119).

Towards the end of the novel Holly reasserts these ideas: human knowledge is impotent (S 244) and wisdom 'brings not consolation' (S 250); the more we learn the better only can we 'compass out our ignorance' (S 251). His anti-positivistic sentiments are frequently echoed in late Victorian fiction: Allan Quatermain recalls the saying that 'He who increaseth knowledge, increaseth sorrow' (AQ 189); the narrator of Marius reckons that 'it is as if the increase of knowledge were but an increasing revelation of the radical hopelessness of [Marius'] position' (MTE 274). For Kipling and Conrad knowledge was either a guess in the dark or a manifestation of conventional assumptions: one gets by on what one can assert. The more Marlow comes to understand Jim the less he feels he actually knows; the more Kipling's protagonists experience of India the less certain they become about the strength of imperial rule. Likewise, for Wells science was a 'match' that man had 'only just got alight' at the end of the nineteenth century and, instead of seeing a temple whose walls were 'inscribed with wonderful secrets' and whose pillars were 'carved with philosophical systems wrought into harmony', all man could see by this small light was a 'glimpse of himself' and the 'patch' around him: all the rest was 'darkness still' (EWSSF 30-1).

Bourget believed that the 'experimental method' of science contained, 'by very definition, an assured principle of despair, for, by condemning itself to the acquisition of
facts alone it thereby condemns itself also to an ultimate phenomenalism, which is the same as saying to nihilism'.\textsuperscript{15} The more one learns the more one perceives how much more there is to learn; no absolute meaning is revealed. Indeed, according to Hake, 'each mystery [science] unravelled revealed a series of new mysteries behind it, and the explanatory task of science grew with its own progress. In fact, while the explanations increased by simple arithmetical progression, the mysteries rose up in geometrical progression'.\textsuperscript{16} Consequently, although Hudson reckoned that we are 'bound as much as ever to facts', he declared that 'facts in themselves are nothing to us: they are important only in their relations to other facts and things - to all things, and the essence of things, material and spiritual'; 'whether we know it or not, [we] are seeking after something beyond or above knowledge'.\textsuperscript{17}

III

In Conrad's work the sea conveys the uncertainty of ordinary life. The sea is both a material part of Conrad's fictional worlds, the environment that tries the mettle of his protagonists, and a symbol for a wide range of existential possibilities. It comprises a visible (if formless) surface and an invisible depth. Whilst being the 'greatest scene of potential terror, a devouring enigma of space' (\textit{NLL} 184), the sea also kindles a sort of 'unholy fascination' (\textit{NLL} 185). Although it has increasingly become merely a prosaic facilitator of trade for a 'calculating crowd of cold and exacting masters' (\textit{AOOTI} 20), the sea is by tradition the 'element that gave the life and dealt the death' (\textit{AOOTI} 20). 'Like a beautiful and unscrupulous woman, the sea of the past was... capricious, enticing, illogical, irresponsible; a thing to love, a thing to fear'; 'its cruelty was redeemed by the charm of its inscrutable mystery'; it was a 'restless mirror of the Infinite' (\textit{AOOTI} 20). Lingard, who seems to hail from a more Romantic age, is both empowered and disempowered by the
sea: he is its 'master... lover... servant' (AOOTI 20). 'The sea took him young, fashioned him body and soul; gave him his fierce aspect, his loud voice, his fearless eyes, his stupidly guileless heart' (AOOTI 20-1).

The sea has a 'charm' that is 'calculated to keep men morally in order' (NLL 185). Sailors are obliged to define themselves against it, by keeping themselves and their ships afloat, by working their passage. On the other hand, the changeable sea tends to reflect the vagaries of experience and the imagination; the sea's essential formlessness comes to suggest the realm of possibility, truths yet to be ascertained. Hence, despite the 'magic monotony of existence between sky and water' (LJ 50), the complacent Jim interprets from the 'silent aspect of nature' a 'great certitude of unbounded safety and peace' (LJ 55-6) which brings on the feeling of a 'very excess of well-being' (LJ 57). This rash self-indulgence which inspires his 'imaginary achievements' (LJ 58) indicates a lack of respect both for the sea and for life in general and, significantly, it is an object reality hidden under the sea's surface that knocks the Patna and provokes Jim into panicking. Jim's imagination, used only to trivial day-dreams, is incapable of dealing with the situation sensibly. As Marlow comments, 'trust a boat on the high seas to bring out the Irrational that lurks at the bottom of every thought, sentiment, sensation, emotion' (LJ 132).18

In other late nineteenth century fiction the imagination finds an objective correlative in the sky, deserts, forests, labyrinthine cities, mountain ranges and women, in 'landscapes' which simultaneously encourage both uncertainty and dreams of domination. The surface of the moon in Wells' novel is the 'landscape of a dream' (TFMITM 56): 'everywhere was a confusing sameness' (TFMITM 62), and its lack of gravitational pull means that it has 'no discipline' (TFMITM 58). After accidentally eating some hallucinogenic mushrooms, Cavor and Bedford announce their desires to colonize and annex the satellite; on the other hand, the mushrooms deprive the two men of coordinated speech, thought and motion.
Consequently, they are captured and imprisoned by the Selenites.

The darkness inside the moon parallels the disorder of the surface: it indicates to the late Victorian fictional protagonist what cannot be assimilated by the self. References to the dark continent of Africa and to the dark world of the unconscious in late nineteenth century fiction draw attention to what is unknown, or other. Likewise, the frame narrator of The Time Machine acknowledges at the end of his narrative that the 'future is still black and blank - is a vast ignorance, lit at a few casual places by the memory of [the Time Traveller's] story' (SSS 83). Moreover, this metaphoric darkness is proven real in the Time Traveller's glimpse of the furthest future of the earth. A terrible 'blackness' creeps over a bleak and desolate landscape bringing with it cold wind and snow (SSS 77). The Time Traveller is freezing and finds breathing painful. Beset by a 'deadly nausea', he suddenly feels 'giddy... sick and confused' (SSS 78). He has a 'horror of this great darkness' and escapes before he becomes too 'helpless' (SSS 78). At this point in the future there is no place for human intelligence on earth.

It would be a thesis in itself to analyse adequately the many references to 'darkness' in late Victorian fiction, so this sub-chapter simply examines the structure of the relationship between the darkness and the imagination. Darkness, like the other, is often assumed to be evil on account of the fact that it encompasses that which is unknown to the perceiving subject. Indeed, as Jameson has written, as regards the other, the 'point... is not that... the Other is feared because he is evil; rather he is evil because he is Other, alien, strange, unclean and unfamiliar' (Jameson 1981 140). The concept of darkness is therefore caught up in the cultural or collective imagination and this collective subject's attitude towards a supposedly hostile world: what is unknown is presented as an abstract entity rather than as a positive reality. Its strength is simultaneously reduced and
made more insidious.

The 'Dark Powers' (LJ 132) in Lord Jim are a form of Fate which presents people with unkind or tricky circumstances and allows them to avoid or bring about their own downfall. Although the Dark Powers are 'always on the verge of triumph', their 'real terrors', according to Marlow, are 'perpetually foiled by the steadfastness of men' (LJ 132), by men who are loyal to the principles of work, unimaginative observation and the fellowship of race. Jim fails the test of these Powers on the Patna; however, by remaining alive, he has to face their 'assault' (LJ 224) again, which he does successfully through intelligent and courageous action soon after his arrival in Patusan. Towards the end of the novel, though, Brown, 'running his appointed course', becomes a 'blind accomplice of the Dark Powers' (LJ 304) and Jim, outwitted by their or Brown's treachery, admits defeat, having decided that the 'dark powers should not rob him twice of his peace' (LJ 345).

There is no real correlation between the Dark Powers and the East; it just happens that Lord Jim is set in the Indian ocean and Indonesia. Indeed, there is no real connection between Chuma's idea in "At the End of the Passage" that Hummil has 'descended into the Dark Places' and been caught there (LH 173) and the fact that Hummil dies in the middle of India. Nor, moreover, is there any real link between the setting of Simla and the possibility that Pansay died when a 'little bit of the Dark World' came through a 'crack' in his head and 'pressed him to death' (WWW 156). After all, the official verdicts in these incidents are personal weakness, overwork (LH 171), and overwork (WWW 156), respectively. Nevertheless, the interweaving of imperial and metaphysical elements aligns these stories with the sub-genre of 'imperial Gothic'. Again, there is no explicit connection between the more literal darkness, night, and the India in which a number of mysterious incidents, such as the disturbing dreams of Hummil and Findlayson, the marking of Fleete by the Silver Man and the strange ride of Jukes, are set.

The connection is more established in "Bubbling Well
Road" where the Anglo-Indian narrator, alone apart from his
dog, enters ten square miles of tall Indian jungle-grass in
order to hunt for a long-tusked pig. Both man and dog soon
become lost and unable to see more than two yards in any
direction. The narrator then stumbles across and nearly falls
into a deep well which is totally obscured by the jungle-
grass. The well first appears as a 'black gap in the ground',
and in the water which is 'black as pitch with blue scum atop'
'black things' can be seen moving (LH 281). More unpleasant
still, the well not only echoes what the narrator says but
seems also to provide sounds which are not echoes of anything.
There is a suggestion that the dark well is symbolic of the
black core of a disorientating India; it is even guarded by a
cowardly and mysterious priest who seems to come from a dark
past owing to the fact that he bears the scars on his face of
torture by a 'native prince in the old days' (LH 279). Indeed, those states still run by native princes are reckoned
in "The Man who would be King" to be the 'dark places of the
earth, full of unimaginable cruelty, touching the Railway and
the Telegraph on one side, and, on the other, the days of
Harun-al-Raschid' (WWW 212). The Native States bridge past
and present, and, of course, it is the fear that those days
may return (and they could only do so through mutiny or
revolution) which inspires the paranoid British imperial
imagination.

The 'darkness' is not truly a reality: it is merely the
projection or displaced image of an anxiety about the nature
of the external world. On the other hand, its abstract or
subjective qualities are often made real within the world of
the text in order to deny indications of ignorance,
hallucination or madness in the perceiving and experiencing
subject. The narrative of Heart of Darkness, as this thesis
has shown in chapters one, three and five, blends both
attitudes towards the darkness. Even before he has arrived at
the mouth of the Congo in his story Marlow has described the
jungle as 'so dark-green as to be almost black' (HOD 39);
description and perception merge and begin to draw upon the
European experience of the 'dark continent'. Conrad ensures that soon there is actually a black object reality in the text: the outer station is the work-camp of a large number of native Africans. These natives, however, move from being 'like ants' (*HOD* 42). They then become 'dark things' and 'black people' (*HOD* 42); their human qualities move in and out of focus until increasingly they are 'black shapes', 'moribund shapes', 'black bones', 'phantom[s]', or 'creatures' (*HOD* 44-5).

Marlow's vision, a confusion of detached observation, inter-human identification and imperialist reification combines the reality of the natives with an apprehension which is dominated by culturally ascribed symbols. Consequently, not many pages later, Marlow is penetrating 'deeper and deeper into the heart of darkness' as the steamer toils along 'slowly on the edge of a black and incomprehensible frenzy' (*HOD* 68). When he later wonders 'how many powers of darkness claimed [Kurtz] for their own' (*HOD* 85), his observations of the jungle, the European attitude towards Africa and his own personal ignorance and fear combine in an aesthetic, or even metaphysical, conception of the darkness up the Congo.

The darkness becomes associated with Marlow's explorative and receptive imagination: it marks the frontier where his 'voice... the speech that cannot be silenced' meets the 'truth' out there; it draws the line separating the self from that 'fiendish row' (*HOD* 69). In doing so, the darkness is neither simply a sign of ignorance nor an indication of the other: it is a totality which suggests something bleak about the nature of life on earth. Indeed, darkness is omnipresent in the novella. The two women in Brussels who 'feverishly' knit 'black wool as for a warm pall' (*HOD* 36-7) (an image which anticipates the black 'woolly head[s]' (*HOD* 45) of the Africans) guard the 'door of Darkness' (*HOD* 37). Although this door symbolically leads to Africa for Marlow, it more literally leads to a 'great man' who 'had his grip on the handle-end of ever so many millions' (*HOD* 36). At the end of the novella the Intended is dressed 'all in black' (*HOD* 117)
and, as she and Marlow speak, the darkness deepens around them (HOD 118-9).

The telling of the main narrative of Heart of Darkness takes place in darkness. While the words of Marlow's tales are to some extent what keeps the darkness at bay, they are also one with the darkness that isolates, surrounds and enters into the listeners on the deck of the Nellie. The novella's vision of England is dominated by darkness too. Before the story begins the reader is told that the 'air was dark above Gravesend, and further back still seemed condensed into a mournful gloom, brooding motionless over the biggest, and the greatest, town on earth' (HOD 27). The sun disappears ominously as the narrative begins, as if 'stricken to death by the touch of that gloom brooding over a crowd of men' (HOD 28). Moreover, Marlow's first words claim that Britain too 'has been one of the dark places of the earth' (HOD 29). As if with a nod to Kipling's earlier use of the phrase, Marlow talks about the barbarity and savagery of the Britons who confronted the Romans and, as in "The Man who would be King", the suggestion is that even though times have changed, a residue of that savagery remains. The cultural relativism that Marlow is intimating ripples throughout the text and it seems that, narratologically, the Englishman discovers the darkness abroad and then also notices it in his own country.19

The London of The Secret Agent, The Picture of Dorian Gray and the Sherlock Holmes stories is a place of disorder and darkness. The vast city is neither the hub of nor monument to Victorian imperial civilization: it is a labyrinth of poverty and disease which is inhabited by self-seeking people who are locked into a ruthless economic system based upon capital. The metropolis lacks both a centre and an outline: in The Secret Agent the city is dominated by 'enormous piles of bricks' (TSA 81) and is for ever dissolving in the 'watery atmosphere' (TSA 100) of rain and fog. Near the beginning, Verloc leans his forehead against the 'cold window-pane - a fragile film of glass stretched between him and the enormity of cold, black, wet, muddy, inhospitable
accumulation of bricks, slates, and stones, things in themselves unlovely and unfriendly to man' (TSA 56). The dark and chaotic world outside the window, from which Verloc is only minimally and temporarily separated, is fragmented, atomized, and also curiously homogeneous. London embodies the menacing unconscious of British life: the city is a product of man and yet also other. The city offers a 'surreal landscape... where policemen surge out of lamp-posts and skins of wild beasts ride in victorias', and pianos play tunes in opposition to the tone of the scene described; it is a 'place of blind cruelty and violent disorder, actively resistant to human attempts to impose meaning'.

In the 1920 Author's Note to the novel, Conrad wrote that the tale is set in a 'monstrous town more populous than some continents and in its man-made might as if indifferent to heaven's frowns and smiles; a cruel devourer of the world's light' (TSA xxxvi). His vision of London recalls the nightmarish and overcrowded London of When the Sleeper Wakes (indeed, the novel is dedicated to Wells), but this vision owes little either to the role or the desires of the anarchists who haunt the novel's pages. All the protagonists view London in the same way. The Assistant Commissioner making his way through the city is 'enveloped, oppressed, penetrated, choked, and suffocated by the blackness of a wet London night' (TSA 150); the street is like a 'slimy aquarium from which the water had been run off' (TSA 147). When Winnie steps outside after killing her husband, a 'slimy dampness enveloped her, entered her nostrils, clung to her hair' (TSA 269). She finds herself 'alone in London: and the whole town of marvels and mud, with its maze of streets and its mass of lights, was sunk in hopeless night, rested at the bottom of a black abyss' (TSA 270-1). Moreover, this perceived landscape outside of her reflects what is within: wearing a 'black veil' (TSA 270), Winnie suffers from a confusing 'abstract terror' (TSA 268) and is swamped by a 'wave of faintness' that overtakes her 'like a great sea' (TSA 270).
In late nineteenth century fiction the imperialist, scientist or decadent feels threatened by the object reality which does not conform to the requirements of empire, science or the self. The darkness, or the object reality which is designated by images of darkness, menaces the self by its resistance to description and assimilation. Although the native of imperial mythology is imaged as unchanging, feminine and lethargic, there is an equally strong late Victorian figuration of the other which runs counter to this 'ideal' docility. It is often remembered that the native is a vital being or, at least, is capable of a sudden vitality: he or she possesses a subjectivity and an agenda which instinctively conflicts with the aims of imperial administration. 'Immediately outside our own English life', wrote Kipling, 'is the dark and crooked and fantastic, and wicked: the awe-inspiring life of the native'.

In late Victorian fiction the contrary figurations of the native are played off against each other. In "The Man who would be King" Dravot mistakes the apparent acquiescence of the Kafiristani priests for servility and pays the price. Moreau and Montgomery do not realize that they have lost control of the Beast People until it is too late. Arabs and Malays join forces to break the absent Lingard's trade monopoly in Sambir in An Outcast of the Islands. In "The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes", "Bubbling Well Road" and "At the End of the Passage" Englishmen are trapped in the middle of India; Haggard's heroes always spend time immured underground in Africa. In Lord Jim Marlow presents the country of Patusan as having 'captivated' Jim: the 'land, the people, the friendship [with Dain Waris], the love [for Jewel], were like the jealous guardians of his body' (LJ 236). The more powerful Jim becomes the more he is imprisoned: 'every day added a link to the fetters of that strange freedom' (LJ 236). Kurtz, although he is treated as a god by the Congo natives is, according to Marlow, in thrall to the
'powers of darkness' (HOD 85).

However, incidents of European self-loss and rebellion against empire are not confined to far-off continents. Late Victorian fiction depicts the consequences of imperial endeavour beginning to haunt and invade the hub of an empire which has grown soft and decadent, an empire whose impressive public image belies the moral bankruptcy and greed of some of its agents. Early on in The Sign of Four Holmes, Watson and Miss Mary Morstan travel through London to visit one Thadeus Sholto in what seems from the outside to be a 'third-rate suburban dwelling-house' (CSH 100). Down a 'sordid and common passage', however, lies a den of Eastern luxury bursting with the trophies of empire: rich curtains and tapestries, thick carpets, oriental works of art, tiger-skins, a hookah and a scented lamp (CSH 100). It is an 'oasis of art in the howling desert of South London' (CSH 100). If Thadeus is an offspring of the exotic and decadent aspect of imperial Britain his brother Bartholomew represents the ugly materialism. Because a box of Indian jewels to the value of half a million pounds is supposed to have been hidden in Bartholomew's house by their father he has torn the building to pieces hunting for it; the 'grounds look like a gravel-pit' (CSH 108). By the time Holmes arrives, though, the treasure has been found and stolen, and Bartholomew has been mysteriously killed by a poisonous dart.

On this and other evidence, Holmes suspects that one of the culprits must have been one of a tribe of diminutive murderous cannibals native to the Andaman islands in the Bay of Bengal where the Sholtos' father was stationed during his time in India. When Holmes and Watson catch up with the malefactors after a chase through London and on the Thames, the smaller of the two men turns out to have a 'great, misshapen head and a shock of tangled, dishevelled hair'; he is a 'savage, distorted creature'; never has Watson seen 'features so deeply marked with all bestiality and cruelty. His small eyes glowed and burned with a sombre light, and his thick lips were writhed back from his teeth, which grinned and
chattered at us with half animal fury' (CSH 138). Holmes and Watson are ruthless: they shoot the 'unhallowed dwarf' (CSH 139) on sight lest he cause more damage.

Somewhat disturbingly, however, the creature falls overboard and is lost to sight. 'Somewhere in the dark ooze at the bottom of the Thames lie the bones of that strange visitor to our shores' (CSH 139), assures Watson, but the image of the dark ooze recalls the darkly gothic portrait of London evoked in the novel. London is a city full of disturbing elements; it has already been colonized by darkness. Furthermore, the lack of corpse, like the jewels that are now spread over the bottom of the Thames, suggests a certain irresolution and incompleteness in the affair which the romance ending of the marriage between Watson and Miss Mary Morstan cannot quite sweep out of the way. Moreover, the surviving culprit (Jonathan Small) reveals that the whole sequence of events began when he and three Sikh soldiers stole a box of priceless jewels during the chaos of the Indian Mutiny. Somewhat later, while Small was serving a life imprisonment for murder in the Andaman islands, he told two hard-up British officers (Sholto and Morstan) about the jewels and promised them a share if they would help him and his friends escape. Sholto, though, went back on his word and took the jewels for himself. Small vowed revenge and, when he eventually escaped from the islands with the help of a diminutive savage islander who was loyal to him, he pursued the man to England. The whole saga therefore emerges from incidents of failure, corruption and treachery in the business of empire. What goes around inexorably comes around; distance is no obstacle for revenge.

While Doyle's "The Crooked Man" also deals with revenge in England for imperial treachery in India after the Mutiny, Wells' "The Flowering of the Strange Orchid", like The Sign of Four, has the Andaman islands as a source of menace. Winter-Wedderburn receives a strange orchid from the islands and, when the plant flowers, it releases poisonous gases that overcome the collector and nearly kill him. The orchid
becomes a symbol of the repressed, exploited and fetishized East which, although it has been subjugated under British rule and pillaged, has lost neither its desire for independence nor its lethal potential.

As revealed by Holmes' assured destruction of the Andaman islander, the presence of non-servile Asians or Africans in England is one of the great paranoias of the metropolitan imperialist mind. Marlow, in order to give an accurate parallel as to why the Congo population had cleared out from wherever the white man had wanted to base himself, reckons that 'if a lot of mysterious niggers armed with all kinds of fearful weapons suddenly took to travelling on the road between Deal and Gravesend, catching the yokels right and left to carry heavy loads for them... every farm and cottage thereabouts would get empty very soon' (HOD 48). Not only does he indulge in a logic of cultural relativism, he also deliberately provokes horror and indignation in his listeners through this image of black Africans in power in Kent. While Wells' Bedford gleefully reflects on the response if 'decent Londoners' should come across unearthly beings 'careering about among the sheep in Hyde Park' (TFMITM 78), Wells exceeds Marlow's provocativeness in When the Sleeper Wakes. He has Ostrog attempt to quell the uprising of the People with the 'African agricultural police' (WTSW 163): they are a reality within the text, not merely a hypothesis. Although the future is racially egalitarian, Graham, the Sleeper, is upset: he does not want 'any negroes brought to London. It is an archaic prejudice, perhaps, but I have peculiar feelings about Europeans and the subject races' (WTSW 168). For him, as for the nineteenth century reader, the vision of an armed negroid police force trying to enslave the populace of London is the acme of an inverted imperialism.

Wells unscrupulously uses the race ticket to unite his readers behind the popular revolution. As Ostrog summons the 'infernal negroes' (WTSW 196) to London Graham reflects on the situation, describing the 'blacks' as 'savages, ruled by force, used as force. And they have been under the rule of
the whites two hundred years. Is it not a race quarrel? The race sinned - the race pays' (WSW 214). Although he momentarily accepts this proposition, he soon decides that this would be 'vicarious atonement' and that to 'stand wrong is to share the guilt' (WSW 214). Indeed, all moral equivocation vanishes when the Black Police arrive: Graham in his 'aeropile' swoops down like a 'hawk' upon the 'black multitude' approaching London in a vast aeroplane (WSW 224).

Those who were not limp in the agonies of air-sickness... were craning their black necks and staring to see the filmy city that was rising out of the haze, the rich and splendid city to which 'Massa Boss' had brought their obedient muscles. Bright teeth gleamed and the glossy faces shone. ... They knew they were to have lordly times among the 'poor white' trash. (WSW 224)

In the "The Lord of the Dynamos" (set in the 1890s) Wells presents a black man called Azuma-zi who has come 'out of the mysterious East' to 'worship at the shrine of civilization' (SSS 184-5). He works as helper to Holroyd who is chief attendant of the three dynamos at Camberwell that drive the electric railway. To 'define' Azuma-zi is apparently 'beyond ethnology', although he is 'more negroid than anything else' (SSS 184). The reader is told that Azuma-zi's 'head... was broad behind, and low and narrow at the forehead, as if his brain had been twisted round in the reverse way to a European's'; 'in conversation he made numerous odd noises of no known marketable value, and his infrequent words were carved and wrought into heraldic grotesqueness' (SSS 184). Wells' laconic tone belies the racism of his description, even when the narrator describes how the sadistic Holroyd bullies the negro. Believing that the largest dynamo is a mighty God demanding a sacrifice, Azuma-zi pushes his brutal boss into the contact rings, thus electrocuting him and trapping seven or eight trains in the 'stuffy tunnels' (SSS 190) in the process. Another oriental deals out an alarming death in central London.

The narrator ascribes Azuma-zi's act to a form of 'madness' brought on by the 'incessant din and whirl of the
dynamo shed [which] may have churned up his little store of knowledge and big store of superstitious fancy, at last, into something akin to frenzy' (SSS 188). This analysis is confirmed when Azuma-zi tries to kill in the same manner the scientific manager of the station, who has done him no injury. This time Azuma-zi ends up in the clutches of the dynamo: he commits suicide when this second assault goes wrong. Thus oriental power in London is again violently exorcised. In this ending Holroyd's injustices are ironically obliterated; everything is put down to the (racial) madness of Azuma-zi.

Dracula also tells of the need to destroy the outsider who enters England; the Count, indeed, has a conscious agenda of power, unlike either Azuma-zi or the Andaman islander. Although Dracula is not personally the victim of colonial oppression there are elements of the exotic to him: according to Van Helsing, vampirism is found in the Argentinian Pampas and in 'some islands of the Western Seas' (D 230); a fact comparable to the Count's mode of living is that of the 'Indian fakir' who can be buried for over a year before rising again (D 231). Much earlier in the novel Lucy makes an unconscious reference to Othello pouring a 'dangerous stream' into the ear of Desdemona (D 74).

Dracula also introduces the idea of disease being an assault from abroad. On the other hand, whereas the Count chooses to go to London, the deadly Asiatic cholera germ in "The Stolen Bacillus" was bottled and brought to London by British scientists; moreover, it is an English Anarchist who threatens to release it from the test-tube. Likewise, the plague that threatens Rome in Marius is thought to have been carried home by the soldiers of Lucius Verus who massacred the inhabitants of Seleucia and plundered the temple of Apollo, the 'old titular divinity of pestilence' (MTE 97). 'It seemed to have invaded the whole empire, and some have even thought', the narrator claims, 'it permanently remained there' (MTE 97). Many thousands die in the city, and elsewhere farmsteads, towns and neighbourhoods 'continued without inhabitants and lapsed into wildness or ruin' (MTE 97).
It is *The War of the Worlds*, however, that arguably most exploits the late Victorian anxiety that what goes around comes around. Although the creatures that invade England are wholly alien to earth, the novel does seem to be or to play on an imperialist 'guilt fantasy'; the novel simply displaces the retributive aggression from cultures which were real but could not realistically at that moment invade Europe to a culture which was unreal but could quite easily take over the planet. The opening pages refer to the 'great disillusionment' which destroyed (British) man's complacent 'assurance of [his] empire over matter' (*TWOTW* 1) in the early twentieth century. Before then no one had considered the existence of a species in the universe whose minds were to men's 'as ours are to those of the beasts' (*TWOTW* 1). The invasion is given an explicitly colonial orientation when the narrator demands that before we 'judge' the unsympathetic intellectual Martians too harshly we must 'remember what ruthless and utter destruction our own species has wrought, not only upon animals... but upon its own inferior races' (*TWOTW* 3). He cites the 'extermination' (*TWOTW* 3) of the Tasmanians by European immigrants as an example. Ironically, of course, it is the lower life-forms of common earthly diseases which wipe out the Martians at the end of the novel.

V

In *News from Nowhere* the domination of the working classes by a much smaller number of Masters is destroyed by spirited coherent rebellion; in *When the Sleeper Wakes*, a similarly oppressed People revolt first against the White Council and then against Ostrog. In *The Time Machine*, by 802701 the lower classes have evolved to such an extent that they have turned their erstwhile superiors into free range food. In less obviously political narratives too that which is underneath and repressed explodes to the surface in the late Victorian period: forces of disorder and new order destroy the
established structures of reality. The supernatural forces its way into the natural world; emotion wins out over reason; the unconscious competes with the conscious as regards the determination of the self. Alien forces shatter the routine of everyday life; they make reality infinitely complicated, large and unresolved.

Narratives of revolution, whether these uprisings eventually be for the better or for the worse, require individuals, families, tribes or nations to undergo some kind of catastrophe. Moreover, all minor incidents presage the final upheaval, disaster, annihilation or Armageddon which captured the paranoid late Victorian imagination. The concept of catastrophe in late Victorian fiction signifies the destruction of all that man or society has established, acquired and desired by a force that is essentially unknown. Wells' Martian invasion inspires little in the English psyche apart from the desire for self-preservation, a fact which hinders cooperation between individuals and leads to demoralization and unnecessary casualties. On the other hand, the invasion of earth is but the Martian response to the catastrophe they are undergoing at home: their presence on earth is rationalized neither by curiosity nor by greedy imperialism but by the need to vacate their dying planet and find somewhere else to live. Indeed, the idea of catastrophe re-orientates the concept of man (or other beings) from the axis of civilization to that of evolution; it aligns man with those other creatures of Nature which man has tried for so long to conquer. A catastrophe is a great leveller: as a plot device it is the ultimate reduction of man's sense of superiority over the society, world or universe in which he lives.23

Conversely, by marking the end of an aspiration, a catastrophe denotes a restoration of reality: according to Marlow the 'truth can be wrung out of us only by some cruel, little, awful catastrophe' (LJ 283). Indeed, all the little upsets and destabilizations of (daily) experience count as catastrophes: they wreck fantasies and enforce new or more
profound understandings of the world upon a self that is naturally reluctant to change. As Wells saw it, human evolution was a 'race between education and catastrophe'. Hobson wrote in a similar vein about imperialism, with the Indian Mutiny in the back of his mind. He believed that the aim of imperialism was surely a 'gain to world-civilization, instead of some terrible débâcle in which revolted slave races may trample down their parasitic and degenerate white masters' (I 230).

Late Victorian fiction from *Lord Jim* to *The War of the Worlds* is full of warnings about complacent attitudes and impending disasters. The internal plausibility of futuristic fiction, however, turns the alleged possibility for the external world into the actuality of the imagined or textual world; in the mode of fiction speculation becomes a form of reality. However, while the future may offer only chaos and destruction, it also seems that few utopias can be formed without a violent and cathartic obliteration of traditional values and entrenched abusive practices.

Although there is much in Hudson's 'picture of the human race in its forest period' (*ACA* vi) that is not ideal, its agricultural family-centred tranquillity is a welcome relief from the selfish, industrial, urbanized competitiveness and squalor of the nineteenth century. The father of the house contrasts their rural world with an 'irrational world' where 'between the different kinds... there reigns perpetual strife and bloodshed, the strong devouring the weak and the incapable' (*ACA* 57). He goes on to discuss this other race's undiscriminating pursuit of knowledge, their desire to learn at whatever cost the 'secrets of nature' in order to have 'absolute dominion' over it (*ACA* 60). The 'madness' of these people's minds 'preyed on their bodies, and worms were bred in their corrupted flesh', and these, becoming like winged ants, flew from body to body and 'filled the race of men in all places with corruption and decay' (*ACA* 60). Only the humblest survived, and the earth 'covered all [the] ruined works with her dark mould and green forests' (*ACA* 61). Just as man took
life and destroyed Nature to gain knowledge, so Nature eventually obliterated man and his works.

Towards the end of the romance, Smith again ponders on the past, understanding only that

there has been a sort of mighty Savonarola bonfire, in which most of the things once valued have been consumed to ashes - politics, religions, systems of philosophy, 'isms and 'ologies of all descriptions; schools, churches, prisons, poorhouses; stimulants and tobacco; kings and parliaments; cannon with its hostile roar, and pianos that thundered peacefully; history, the press, vice, political economy, money, and a million things more... (ACA 228)

He wonders 'in that feverish, full age... in the wilderness of every man's soul, was not a voice heard crying out, prophesying the end?' (ACA 228-9). He recalls his own intimations of apocalypse when, 'in the quick, blighting fire of that intolerable thought, all hopes, beliefs, dreams, and schemes seemed instantaneously to shrivel up and turn to ashes, and drop from me, and leave me naked and desolate' (ACA 229).

Wells drew particular attention to the question of responsibility in relation to catastrophes in "The Man Who Could Work Miracles". This 'Pantoum in Prose' tells of a how man who does not believe in miracles suddenly finds that he has the gift for them. (For the purposes of the story a miracle is defined as 'something contrariwise to the course of nature done by power of Will, something that couldn't happen without being specially willed' (SSS 299).) After a few menial and amusing experiments with his newly-discovered powers, Fotheringay soon becomes reckless: he decides to make the earth stop moving. The peaceful village in which he lives is immediately turned into a 'wilderness of disorder' (SSS 313) for, although Fotheringay had requested the earth to stop moving, he had made 'no stipulation concerning the trifling movables upon its surface' (SSS 314). Everything had therefore been 'jerked violently forward at about nine miles per second' and thus had been 'smashed and utterly destroyed' (SSS 314). Fortunately, thanks to his ability to work
miracles, Fotheringay is able to reassemble the world. He then wills his power of miracles to vanish and never return.

In other turn of the century fiction minor catastrophes occur through unknown creatures of Nature: in Wells' "The Sea-Raiders", for example, human-eating deep-sea monsters arrive off the coasts of Devon and Cornwall; in "The Empire of the Ants" a race of ants in the upper Amazon begins to march on civilization; in "The Star" a vast object hurtles towards the earth from outer space. Wells, indeed, was very interested in the possible rise of other creatures and the usurpation of man. He wrote that 'so far as any scientist can tell us', it may be that, instead of man's permanent ascendancy,

Nature is, in unsuspected obscurity, equipping some now humble creature with wider possibilities of appetite, endurance, or destruction, to rise in the fullness of time and sweep homo away into the darkness from which his universe arose. The Coming Beast must certainly be reckoned in any anticipatory calculations regarding the Coming Man (EWSSF 168).

The imagery is apocalyptic, predating the slouching beast in Yeats' "The Second Coming". Civilization gives way to evolution: neither the Eloi nor the Morlocks evince a high degree of humanity or culture, and there seems no life in the furthest future except giant crabs and the football with tentacles. In a French decadent parallel, J. H. Rosny's story "The Death of the Earth", Targ hunts for water on a dried-out planet upon which a 'new race of ferro-magnetals with the power of propagation are taking over' in order to save a mankind on the verge of extinction.

Nordau reckoned that recently there had arisen in 'more highly developed minds vague qualms of a Dusk of the Nations, in which all suns and all stars are gradually waning, and mankind with all its institutions and creations is perishing in the midst of a dying world'. Similarly, the warnings or visions of catastrophe in late Victorian fiction are designed to make the future live in the present, to impose a sense of doubt and caution upon mankind's reckless complacency and ambition. The imperial fear of insurgency and reverse
colonialism and the capitalist fear of militant socialism and popular revolution imagine and give textual reality to events which would mean the end of their world. Moreover, those texts which deal with the concept of catastrophe are divided between those who earnestly seek to delay or prevent such an event and those who think that a catastrophe would give the world or society a fresh start: late Victorian fiction is torn between Victorians and anti-Victorians. On the other hand, there are all those in the middle for whom such speculation is not an issue. There are all those who are blinded by a 'cheery optimism' and a 'general belief in [a] 'national destiny'' which will enable them 'somehow to muddle through' if they do their best and do not look too far ahead (I 209). Nevertheless, while Hobson deplored this 'rough-and-ready, hand-to-mouth, 'take-what-you-can-get' politics' which had 'paralyzed judgment' (I 209), Conrad felt that the 'attitude of cold unconcern', although 'hateful', was the 'only reasonable one' (JCLCG 65).

For him what made mankind 'tragic' was 'not that they are victims of nature, it is that they are conscious of it'; 'to be part of the animal kingdom under the conditions of this earth is very well - but as soon as you know of your slavery the pain, the anger, the strife - the tragedy begins' (JCLCG 70). Mankind can have too much reality for its own comfort; one should, to a certain extent, 'adore the illusion' (TTOD 216).
CONCLUSION:

THE AESTHETIC WHOLE

Several chapters in this thesis have discussed the interplay within the fictional world of the text between the documentation of an 'object reality' and the representation of a perceived or subject reality. These chapters have explored the differences between the various worlds as received and understood by the apparently conscious fictional subject. Indeed, although the fictional world itself ostensibly purports to be an object reality, to be the (re)presentation of a world which exists outside the pages of the text, it is actually a subject reality, a world constructed from the conventions of fiction, the significations of human experience and the imaginations of the author and readers.

Whereas mid-Victorian novelists believed in the efficacy of their powers of representation and communication, and in a significatory bond between the fictional work and a real world outside it, late Victorian fiction includes texts which uneasily fuse Victorian confidence with fin de siècle longing and late Victorian aggression with proto-modernist anxiety. While the mid-Victorian fictional protagonist confirms his (or
her) identity through socialization, by coming to 'know himself and to fulfil himself by way of other people', the late Victorian protagonist appears more self-conscious and is frequently perceived simply in terms of the 'honesty and integrity of [his] perceptions'.\textsuperscript{1} Indeed, whereas the mid-Victorian novel depends on the 'mastery of space and time in an unfolding narrative' (Schwarz 1989 22), a structure which enables the reader to chart a protagonist's physical, mental and moral progress against an apparently fixed background, the complex perceptual blend of self and not-self that comprises the late Victorian fictional reality prevents the world and morality from attaining any objective validity.

This world oscillates for the protagonists between being a self-ordained aesthetic totality and being an unfamiliar and menacing environment. The boundary between self and not-self/other seems at times weaker and at times stronger: conceptual oppositions have the capacity both to merge into each other and to become rigid polarities. Thus the tone of late Victorian fiction swings between confusion and exaggeration; plots move swiftly from impasse to endgame. While an isolated subject and a world that is utterly unknown to them have no relationship whatsoever in the eyes of the subject, the similarly oppositional construct of self and not-self/other share a conceptual frame. Although they are two different provinces in that which composes the subject's sense of reality, self and not-self/other are in fact interdependent: they are counter-balancing features in the one discourse. While in the allegedly objective discourses of knowledge or science the attributes of the self are analysed in relation to that which is not-self, in narratives of the subject the identity of the not-self/other tends to be defined in the first instance in opposition to the self rather than by concepts external to the relationship. As I have quoted earlier, the 'discourse on the other is primarily an inadvertent form of self-representation or self-revelation on the part of its producer' (Bivona 1990 viii).

Indeed, just as the signs of a fictional text refer
inward to each other and do not represent anything real, the self/not-self or self/other opposition is an aesthetic construct, a tool of perceptual classification by which the human subject attempts to order and position an object reality in relation to themself. On the other hand, because of its unreal foundation, its dependence upon the mere fluctuating will, imagination, perceptions and experience of the individual subject, this opposition is one which frequently fails to maintain the required separation of elements. However, although the 'reality' of the fictional world destroys the wilful compartmentalization of phenomena, it does so without removing the oppositional configurations. While the literal boundaries between self and not-self/other may be absent, the ensuing osmosis of elements takes place for the subject within the aesthetic preconditions of self and not-self/other. Moreover, this dissolution of boundaries within the fictional world does not mean the destruction of the barrier between the fictional world and the actual world outside the text, even though it may provide a more slippery sense of reality which might assist the reader's self-projection into the world of the text. This type of text is both hermetically closed and strongly resonant at the same time.

By way of example, as often recognized, Marlow's journey up the Congo becomes both a journey into the other and an exploration of the self. A disenchanted Marlow travels deep into Africa to find a fellow European; the strange world in which he finds himself seems to reflect the tensions in his own mind. On the other hand, if from this angle the other seems to imitate the self or seems shaped by the subject's preoccupations, a less self-centred vision of the text might consider that the self seems to imitate the other, that Marlow becomes unduly influenced by his environment. The anxieties of imperialist fiction are, after all, motivated by the dual fears that the self is unfit and that the other is hostile. A balanced perspective, however, might concur with Todorov's rather cavalier assertion that 'human life is confined
between... two extremes, one where the I invades the world, and one where the world ultimately absorbs the I' (Todorov 1987 247). Conrad, indeed, on the subject of explorers, imagined 'worthy, adventurous and devoted men... nibbling at the edges' of 'regions unknown', 'conquering a bit of truth here and a bit of truth there, and sometimes swallowed up by the mystery their hearts were so persistently set on unveiling' (LE 19-20).

If the initial ascriptions of self and other in Heart of Darkness are culturally motivated and refer to racial and environmental differences, in Doyle's "The Final Problem" two Englishmen fill these positions. Holmes reckons that in Moriarty he had 'at last met an antagonist who was my intellectual equal. My horror at his crimes was lost in my admiration at his skill' (CSH 471). It was only when a criminal of the calibre of Moriarty appeared that Holmes, an agent of society (although private), could demonstrate his singular gifts. On the other hand, it is precisely such singularity which incurs the distrust of ordinary detectives and members of society: Holmes' abilities become associated with the evil with which he is capable of dealing. Conversely, Moriarty's genius, talents and powers of organization are attributes which society intrinsically admires and assumes it possesses. The two men thus form a duality which suggests that they are inseparable. Similarly, Conrad's Chief Inspector Heat knows he can

understand the mind of a burglar, because... the mind and the instincts of a burglar are of the same kind as the mind and the instincts of a police officer. Both recognize the same conventions... Products of the same machine, one classed as useful and the other as noxious, they take the machine for granted in different ways, but with a seriousness essentially the same. (TSA 92)

As the Professor puts it, the 'terrorist and the policeman both come from the same basket'; revolution and legality are 'counter moves in the same game': they are 'at bottom identical' (TSA 69). Self and other are welded to the exclusion of all other versions of reality in order to compose
a fantastic fictional world.

In late Victorian fiction the sea is both other and self, dreams both self and other; darkness is both outside and inside the self. As Wilde wrote, in relation to the vision of the world held by late nineteenth century science, 'we are part/ Of every rock and bird and beast and hill,/ One with the things that prey on us, and one with what we kill'. In *The Island of Doctor Moreau* Prendick finds he both is and is not on a level with the Beast People. In *Allan Quatermain* the party of adventurers come across a colony of enormous cannibalistic crabs in the centre of Africa. Although the screaming and flesh-tearing beasts are a 'sickening and unnatural sight', Quatermain has the sensation that there is 'something so shockingly human about these fiendish creatures - it was as though all the most evil passions and desires of man had got into the shell of a magnified crab and gone mad' (*AQ* 139). At the end of the novel Curtis consciously recollects the spectacle of the ruthless and intelligent crabs as he tells how he will not hand over the 'beautiful country' of Zu-Vendis to be 'torn and fought for by speculators, tourists, politicians and teachers' (*AQ* 333). With the theme of cannibalism resurfacing in *Heart of Darkness*, *The Secret Agent* and *Dracula*, in late Victorian fiction what is conventionally ascribed to the other is often actually a quality of the self.

Indeed, the duality of self and other is contained within the presented fictional individual: he or she is both self and other as regards the world or society of the text. While the individual is heroic or anti-heroic, noteworthy or notorious, by virtue of being different to their fellow humans, he or she can have neither identity nor meaning within the world of the text without having an equation with it. Although Jim must be exiled by imperial society, he is still 'one of us'; conversely, although Dracula is a vampiric decadent foreigner with dreams of world-domination, he is also a sophisticated nobleman whose focused imperial ambition and persistent virility echo characteristics attributed to the category of
Moreover, a number of late Victorian fictional protagonists appear to have two aspects to their characters. Either their past self is different from their present self, or they behave differently with different people or in different environments or countries. Some protagonists are not the same person by night as they are by day; others lead separate actual and fantasy lives; others again have an image of themselves which is very different to the image of them held by those who are acquainted with them.

In addition to the trials and tribulations of facing a hostile society or world, the late Victorian fictional individual often has to wrestle with the other within. All the oppositions of Heart of Darkness are reduced to the 'inconceivable mystery of a soul that knew no restraint, no faith, and no fear... struggling blindly with itself' (HOD 108). Likewise, in Lord Jim Marlow suggests that Jim, in explaining why he abandoned the Patna, was 'in a dispute with an invisible personality, an antagonistic and inseparable partner of his existence - another possessor of his soul' (LJ 111). It was a 'subtle and momentous quarrel as to the true essence of life' (LJ 111).

When Jekyll comes to recognize the 'thorough and primitive duality of man' (DJAMH 82) by analysing his own personality, he thinks it a 'curse of mankind... that in the agonized womb of consciousness... polar twins should be continuously struggling' (DJAMH 82). Although he wants to liberate his better self, he still feels a 'leap of welcome' when the evil Hyde emerges: 'this, too, was myself. It seemed natural and human' (DJAMH 84).

But Jekyll's desire to separate, classify and categorize the elements of his identity in order to defuse the internal conflict is doomed to failure: the greater the separation of elements the greater the polarization and, consequently, the greater the conflict if these elements are actually dependent on each other for existence. In a similar way, the individuals, societies or discourses of late Victorian fiction
which attempt to impose rigid distinctions between genders, between classes and between races are very often faced with turbulence and catastrophe.

When an individual's personality seems to divide into two opposing elements, a literal double is sometimes produced. Hyde expresses openly the desires that the respectable Jekyll prefers to conceal from the public gaze. Dorian Gray displays himself in society as a charming Adonis, but his portrait reveals the 'loathsome' (TPODG 168) hypocrisy, cunning and deceit that informs his real character. Indeed, while realist novelists 'fight shy of the image of the Double' in order to 'protect the illusion of the actual existence of their characters' (Coates 1988 3), the non-realist late Victorian novelists found in the double both a correlative for their psychological and perceptual concerns and an aesthetic device which could blend the real and the unreal, the actual and the imagined, the natural and the supernatural, in febrile gothic literary concoctions. The figure of the double alerts the reader to the fallacy of realism: the novelist, claimed Conrad, in writing about 'imaginary things, happenings, and people', is really 'only writing about himself' (APR xiii). 'Every novel contains an element of autobiography', he added (APR xv-xvi); indeed, the novelist is the 'only reality in an invented world' (APR xiii).

From the perspective of the fictional world the loss of frontiers or the dissolution of barriers between opposites are both imperialist and decadent features: they suggest a lack of fixed standards, and the ensuing osmosis of self and other has connotations of transgression and degeneracy. In addition, the image of the human subject in conflict with themself subverts traditional notions of a singular, homogeneous and obedient identity. The debates between private and public selves, desire and duty, and the factors of evolution and civilization parallel the wider textual scenarios of inter-class and inter-race rivalry; they conflict with the desired reality of a single unified hierarchical world.

When, however, those fictional individuals who
internalize the struggle between differentiation from and conformity to society are forced to choose between sides of their personality, they die. The 'system' or aesthetic of the text (which is not simply expressive of the requirements of its 'society') depends on the confluence and interconnectedness of self and other. If this perceived bond is broken the whole dynamic of the textual world collapses. Dorian Gray cannot destroy the portrait which depicts his evil qualities without dying himself; when Hyde commits suicide Jekyll dies too. Holmes finds it a 'congenial' (CSH 480) solution that he and Moriarty should kill each other at the Reichenbach falls; neither Kurtz nor Jim can suddenly abandon their jungle-selves and return to European civilization.

* * *

Late nineteenth century fiction was driven or led in a multitude of directions. It came to be perceived both as an agent of truth and as an agent of falsehood without really being either; it presented realistic and fantastic worlds with unblinking equanimity. Moreover, while wild fantasies were often realized with documentary precision, the familiar daily world of author and readers was revealed as being inherently mysterious, complex and unfathomable. In an age of revaluation fiction was forced both to examine its relationship with other discourses and to assert its independence from them. As A. J. A. Symons was to conclude, in the 1890s 'art was itself and nothing more': if it was 'useful', it was so 'unintentionally and by accident'. In Pater's words, art came to the late Victorian 'proposing frankly to give nothing but the highest quality' to his or her 'moments' as they passed, and 'simply for those moments' sake' (WPTMT 220).

In this scenario the artist, after the model set out by Schiller, was able, by use of the imagination, both to 'join together things which nature put asunder' and to 'separate...
things which nature has joined together'. In this type of activity nothing need be 'sacred' to the artist 'except his own law', providing he 'observes the demarcation separating his territory from the actual existence of things, that is to say from the realm of nature'. If the artist should try to confuse the two domains he 'transgresses his proper limits, alike when he attributes existence to his ideal world, as when he aims at bringing about some determinate existence by means of it'. 'Only inasmuch as it is honest (expressly renounces all claims to reality), and only inasmuch as it is autonomous (dispenses with all support from reality)', is 'semblance', or the world of appearances, 'aesthetic'. Otherwise, art is 'nothing but a base instrument for material ends, and affords no evidence whatsoever of any freedom of the spirit'.

Late Victorian fiction, at once self-conscious and aggressive in its search for new directions, seems to test the validity of Schiller's assertions both in substance and in style. In projecting new or strange worlds it deliberately undermined or relativized those worlds which were already familiar. Indeed, while each individual novel's concern with reality sought to persuade the reader of the existence of its world, so many different realities and definitions of reality were put forward in late Victorian fiction as a whole that reality itself became the subject of the form.

According to Nietzsche, however, artists, unlike nihilists and 'men of knowledge', who are essentially not creative, 'at least fix an image of that which ought to be; they are productive, to the extent that they actually alter and transform' (TWTP 317). The fictitious worlds of literature are responses to (perceptions of) reality. But instead of depicting, as Nietzsche proposed, a 'better world than reality' (TWTP 321), an absolute world which is 'not self-contradictory, not deceptive, does not change' (TWTP 316), most late nineteenth century fiction took one step back and told of man's vain search for this ideal. In late Victorian fiction the protagonists' desires and goals are attained for a moment only, before the omnipotent forces of a
multifarious world destroy all human attempts at self-determination.

In the same way, the fictional world exists but for a while in the reader's mind: as Wells wrote about his scientific romances, they 'aim... only at the same amount of conviction as one gets in a good gripping dream'; the instant the reader 'closes the cover he wakes up to their impossibility'. The representation of aesthesis both enables art to fabricate reality and requires that art acknowledge its limits. The fictional world of an individual work may well assert its detachment from and indifference to the organization of the real world external to it, but that fictional world is still conceived by human beings for human beings. It can transform reality for the moment only. Anything other is literally imperialist, decadent and utopian.
## THE FICTIONAL WORKS CONSULTED,  
BY YEAR OF PUBLICATION IN BOOK FORM

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<td>1911</td>
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<td>1912</td>
<td>Mann</td>
<td>Der Tod in Venedig (Death in Venice)</td>
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### ABBREVIATIONS OF THE FICTIONAL WORKS DISCUSSED, AS USED IN THE MAIN TEXT

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TIODM  The Island of Doctor Moreau (Wells)
TJB    The Jungle Books (Kipling)
TK     Death in Venice, Tristan, Tonio Kröger (Mann)
TLOOW  The Letters of Oscar Wilde (Wilde)
TNOTN  The Nigger of the 'Narcissus' (Conrad)
TOU    Tales of Unrest (Conrad)
TSA    The Secret Agent (Conrad)
TTOD   The Triumph of Death (D'Annunzio)
TTOTS  The Turn of the Screw and Other Stories (H. James)
TWOTW  The War of the Worlds (Wells)
TWTP   The Will to Power (Nietzsche)
WPTMT  Walter Pater: Three Major Texts (Pater)
WTSW   When the Sleeper Wakes (Wells)
WWW    Wee Willie Winkie and Other Stories (Kipling)
NOTES

As this thesis is not interested in textual variants I have chosen to quote from reliable modern editions of late nineteenth century fiction which can be easily consulted by the reader. Quotations from these works and from other frequently used primary sources are referred to, after their first appearance, by the first letter of each word in the work's short title followed by the page number in the edition used. A checklist of abbreviated titles appears after the main text of the thesis. Secondary sources are referred to, after their first appearance in the thesis, by the name-date procedure. Where I first found and used a quotation from a primary source in a work of criticism, I have acknowledged both sources in the notes and checked the quotation with the primary text. Seeing as this thesis is largely about English literature I have studied and quoted from English translations of works in foreign languages. For the sake of consistency I have also referred to these works under the titles given to them by their translators. Quotations in English from works in foreign languages which appear in critical texts have been translated either by the author or by the translator of the critical work. All instances of italics in quotations in this thesis follow the editions used.
NOTES: PREFACE

1. Suvin's graph of science fiction books published in the United Kingdom shows that, whereas from 1871-86 an average of 6.13 books a year were published, from 1886-1900 this rose to an average of 21.2 books a year. Darko Suvin, *Victorian Science Fiction in the UK: the Discourses of Knowledge and of Power*, Boston: G. K. Hall, 1983, p. 326. In the same book, John Sutherland's essay on "Nineteenth Century SF and the Book Trade" proposes that these figures show the 'evolution of SF from a satirical device to a genre' (Suvin 1983 123).

2. Perhaps it would be more instructive, although it is less often done, to approach late Victorian fiction through the cross-generic modes of realism, naturalism, impressionism and symbolism, or to make a study of late Victorian fiction in relation to the novel and romance forms.


6. The list tends to include *Heart of Darkness*, *She*, *Dracula*, *Tess of the D'Urbervilles* and *Kim*.


9. By 'realist' I here mean the idea that the world of the text supposedly represents or reflects the world known by the people of the period in which the work is set; I do not mean the more radical literary style whose rigorous desires for documentary veracity and social analysis are similar to the principles of naturalism.

10. In this thesis I have taken aesthetics to be concerned with three things: the conditions of sensuous perception, the appreciation of the beautiful, and the possession of refined taste. As defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary*.


NOTES: INTRODUCTION


6. Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray, ed. Donald L. Lawler, New York: W. W. Norton, 1988, p. [3]. This critical edition contains both the 1890 and the revised 1891 versions of the novel and I have used the latter for this thesis.


9. From Wilde's letter to Lord Alfred Douglas from H. M. Prison Reading, January-March 1897. Oscar Wilde, The Letters of Oscar Wilde, ed. Rupert Hart-Davis, London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1962, p. 481. This edition has used the manuscript of the letter. Future references to this letter will use this edition but will refer to the work by name as De Profundis.


11. H. G. Wells' The Invisible Man has a similar attitude to persuasion. In chapters nineteen and twenty Griffin explains to Kemp the scientific processes which enabled him to achieve invisibility.

13. The conflict between idealism and necessity is also the subject of much imperialist fiction and appears in many analyses of imperial activity.


16. And afterwards, sometimes. On reading *Robinson Crusoe* the child Kipling 'set up in business alone as a trader among savages' down in the basement of the house in Southsea, using a 'piece of packing-case' to keep off 'any other world' (SOM 9). 'Thus fenced about, everything inside the fence was quite real, but mixed with the smell of damp cupboards. If the bit of board fell, I had to begin the magic all over again' (SOM 9).


26. James Abbott McNeill Whistler, "Mr Whistler's "Ten O'Clock"", The Gentle Art of Making Enemies, London: William Heinemann, 1890, p. 138. Fuller, p. 125. For an extrapolation of the same ideas see José Ortega y Gasset's The Dehumanization of Art and Other Essays on Art, Culture and Literature, tr. Helene Weyl, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 11. 'During the nineteenth century artists proceeded in all too impure a fashion. They reduced the strictly aesthetic elements to a minimum and let the work consist almost entirely in a fiction of human realities. In this sense all normal art of the last century must be called realistic. ... Seen from the vantage-point of our day Romanticism and Naturalism draw closer together and reveal their common realistic root.'


28. Fuller, p. 126. Fuller does not give the source for this quotation.


32. In Armstrong's words, 'representing a world is basically figurative - a process of aligning parts in a whole which plays on the reader's sense of the figurative activity by which he or she constructs the world' (Armstrong 1987 16).

NOTES: CHAPTER ONE

See also Pater's more subtle expression of the same criticism in his imaginary portrait of "Sebastian van Storck", wherein seventeenth century Dutch bourgeois 'genre pieces - conversation, music, play', which are reckoned to be the 'equivalent of novel-reading for that day', apparently represent that time's 'own actual life, in its own proper circumstances, reflected in various degrees of idealization, with no diminution of the sense of reality (that is to say) but with more and more purged and perfected delightfulness of interest'. Walter Pater, *Walter Pater: Three Major Texts*, ed. William Buckler, New York: New York University Press, 1986, p. 284. Compare p. 238 for another expression of the same idea. This edition contains all four Imaginary Portraits, *Appreciations: with an Essay on Style and The Renaissance*; it also includes "Emerald Uthwart" and "Apollo in Picardy". The texts of all the portraits and Appreciations are based on the New Library edition of 1910; that of *The Renaissance* is based on the 1893 edition, and contains the notorious Conclusion.


9. See Nordau's *Degeneration* (1895).


18. It is ironic, however, that conventional wisdom has ascribed the shortcomings of Romanticism to subjectivity and those of the discourses of knowledge to the elusive principles of an objective reality, rather than the other way round.


21. Rudyard Kipling, "Surgeons and the Soul", address to the Royal College of Surgeons, 1923. Quoted in J. M. S. Tompkins' *The Art of Rudyard Kipling*, London: Methuen, 1959, p. 196. Wells used the same image of darkness in his article "The Rediscovery of the Unique" when he described how the 'match' of science which man had just got alight was only able to illuminate the 'patch he stands on' and that all around him was 'darkness still'. *H. G. Wells: Early Writings in Science and Science Fiction*, ed. Robert M. Philmus and David Y. Hughes, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, pp. 30-1.


26. The story is entitled "The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes".

27. H. G. Wells, *Selected Short Stories*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958, p. 38. This volume includes The Time Machine and a selection of stories that were mostly collected in *The Stolen Bacillus and Other Incidents*, *The Plattner Story and Others*, *Tales of Space and Time*, *Twelve Stories and a Dream* and *The Country of the Blind*.


31. Kipling has a series of comparable episodes to the discovery of Towson's manual when Pansay (WWW 174-5), Findlayson (TDW 44) and Kim appear to resort to reciting to themselves the multiplication-table as a way of calming themselves down in order to be able to distinguish between what is real and what is merely hallucination. What they are really doing, however, is associating themselves with what is ideal or absolute as against the (real or apparent) world which they are obliged to experience. They want the complex world to be like the formulaic system which has the same unequivocal correct answers each time it is questioned. Third reference: Rudyard Kipling, *Kim*, ed. Edward Said, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987, p. 202. The text is taken from the American Burwash Edition (1941) which is based on the definitive Sussex Edition (1937-9).
32. Lankester, p. 2. See also Wells' belief that the 'essential thing in the scientific process is not the collection of facts, but the analysis of facts. Facts are the raw material and not the substance of science. It is analysis that has given us all ordered knowledge'. H. G. Wells, "The Discovery of the Future", The Works of H. G. Wells, London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1924, vol. IV, p. 374.

33. Lankester, pp. 2-3.

34. Ibid., p. 9.

35. Even Darwin acknowledged that the categorizations of science (species, genera, etc. in his case) had arisen out of discursive 'convenience' rather than out of the actual world: they are 'merely artificial combinations'. Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, ed. J. W. Burrow, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968, p. 456. The text is based on the first edition of 1859.


43. Hegel, in The Philosophy of Fine Art, expressed the same attitude towards the world. In his view, if Nature 'in all friendliness on her own part' fails to supply man with 'what he needs, man must 'take possession of that which Nature possesses, set to rights the defects which appear, modify their form... in short, convert Nature's raw material into means through which he will be able to attain all that he proposes'. Indeed, mankind is 'actively employed in adapting the objects of Nature to its practical needs and purposes'. Hegel, The Philosophy of Fine Art, pp. 345, 348.


64. The quotation is from Pater's *The Renaissance*. All quotations from Pater in this thesis that are not from his fiction are from *The Renaissance*.


70. Among those Victorians interested in folklore and/or the supernatural were J. M. Barrie, Marie Corelli, Bithia Croker, Arthur Conan Doyle, H. Rider Haggard, Henry James, M. R. James, Rudyard Kipling, Arthur Machen, William Sharp, Robert Louis Stevenson, Bram Stoker, Oscar Wilde and W. B. Yeats. Among those interested in Catholicism were Aubrey Beardsley, Ernest Dowson, Henry Harland, Lionel Johnson and Wilde.


72. Ibid., p. 10.

73. Ibid., p. 9.
NOTES: CHAPTER TWO

1. The Wells who became increasingly interested in World States also declared that everything was unique. See "The Rediscovery of the Unique", H. G. Wells: Early Writings in Science and Science Fiction, pp. 22-31. See also Pater's belief that 'habit is relative to a stereotyped world, and meantime it is only the roughness of the eye that makes any two persons, things, situations, seem alike' (TMT 220). While many of the quotations I have taken from Wells in this chapter demonstrate his inclination towards individualism, it is worth bearing in mind that he frequently adopted the opposite stance. In "The Discovery of the Future" he remarked that there are 'those who believe entirely in the individual man and those who believe entirely in the forces behind the individual man, and for my own part I must confess myself a rather extreme case of the latter kind. The Works of H. G. Wells, vol. IV, p. 379.

3. At the beginning of *Imperialism* Hobson quotes John Stuart Mill on the subject of nationhood. In Hobson's somewhat inaccurate quotation, Mill claimed that a 'portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nation if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and others', and he lists as causing these sympathies 'identity of race and descent... community of language and community of religion... geographical limits... identity of political antecedents, the possession of a national history and consequent community of recollections, collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past' (I 5). John Stuart Mill, *Representative Government*, London: Parker, Son, and Bourn, 1861, p. 294.


5. Quotation from Wells' philosophical paper "Scepticism of the Instrument" which he appended to the first edition of *A Modern Utopia*.


11. Middle quotations: Robert Louis Stevenson, *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde and Other Stories*, ed. Jenni Calder, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979, p. 82. The text is based on the first edition of 1886. This edition also includes *The Beach of Falesa* and *The Ebb-Tide*. The text of the former is based on the edition prepared by J. C. Furnas in 1956; the text of the latter is based on the first book edition of 1894.
12. See Elaine Showalter's *Sexual Anarchy: Gender and Culture at the Fin de Siècle*, New York: Penguin, 1990, pp. 144-68, for an analysis of late Victorian use of veils and unveiling, although her discussion is largely in reference to female sexuality.


15. Among those ambivalent about the value of scientific and cultural progress was Lankester, who warned that 'we have to fear lest the prejudices, pre-occupations, and dogmatism of modern civilization should in any way lead to the atrophy and loss of the valuable mental qualities inherited by our young forms from primaeval man'. On the other hand, Lankester also claimed that 'to us has been given the power to know the causes of things, and by the use of this power it is possible for us to control our destinies. It is for us by ceaseless and ever hopeful labour to try to gain a knowledge of man's place in the order of nature. When we have gained this fully and minutely, we shall be able by the light of the past to guide ourselves in the future'. Lankester, pp. 61, 61-2.

16. Wells, "Human Evolution, an Artificial Process".


19. *De Profundis* actually refers to the 'strange influence' that 'Pater's Renaissance' had on Wilde (TLOOW 471) and contains a brief analysis of *Marius the Epicurean* (TLOOW 476). See also Nietzsche's assertion that its is 'only after the model of the subject that we have invented the reality of things and projected them into the medley of sensations' (TWTP 297). 'There are no things-in-themselves! ... Something unconditioned cannot be known; otherwise it would not be unconditioned! ... In short: the essence of a thing is only an opinion about the 'thing'" (TWTP 301).

20. Compare with Wells' claim that the utopias of Plato, More, Howell, Bellamy, Comte, Hertzka, Cabet and Campanella are all built on the hypothesis of the 'complete emancipation of a community of men from tradition, from habits, from legal bonds, and that subtler servitude possessions entail' (AMU 7). Fundamental for Wells is a recognition of the importance of 'human freedom... the human power of self-escape, the power to
resist the causation of the past, and to evade, initiate, endeavour, and overcome' (AMU 7).


23. Joseph Conrad, Tales of Unrest, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, pp. 85-6. The concerns expressed in this passage can also be found in Schiller, who wrote that 'we suffer all the contagions and afflictions of society. We subject our free judgment to its despotic opinion, our feeling to its fantastic customs, our will to its seductions; only our caprice do we uphold against its sacred rights. Civilization, far from setting us free, in fact creates some new need with every new power it develops in us'. Schiller, p. 27.


32. Although I am about to deal with the work of the socialist writers Bellamy and Morris, the 'Parnassians and Decadents', according to Hake (the author of *Regeneration*), also 'sought for confirmation of their theories in the possibility of a Utopia... a state of things under which the self should have unlimited latitude for self-realization'. [Hake], p. 241. According to Wilde, moreover, a 'map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at' (TAAC 269).

33. *Marius the Epicurean* (MTE 179) and most of Conrad's fiction also draw attention to the sense of alienation which is felt by the individual who is excluded from or exiled by society.


37. Tichi, in her "Introduction" to *Looking Backward*, claims that 'modern readers' find the 'idea of an industrial army... procrustean and even proto-fascistic' (LB 24). See also Wells' comment that culture in general is 'but a mould of interpretation into which new things are thrust, a collection of standards, a sort of bed of Procrustes, to which all new expressions must be lopped or stretched'. Wells, *The Works of H. G. Wells*, vol. IV, p. 365.
NOTES: CHAPTER THREE

1. The self-ordained 'Republic' (WWW 201) in the pit in Kipling's "The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes" parallels this story: here too a group of people who are effectively imprisoned set up a strange system of living which enables them to survive.


3. I have used the term 'Anglo-Indian' to refer to an English person living in India, which is how Kipling and his contemporaries understood it.

4. I am not sure that Kipling intended that the one word 'Private' in the title should embody both poles of Ortheris' identity. Its capitalization reveals nothing, and in this story Ortheris is described as a friend of the narrator before he is described as a Private of the Line (PTFTH 242).

5. Simla was the hill-station where Anglo-Indian society congregated in the hot season.

6. There is a similar incident in Wells' *A Modern Utopia* when the narrator and his companion, who are obviously strangers to this world, are assumed to be criminals on the run because they seem to be unwilling to reveal the identity registration numbers that they do not actually have (AMU 93-5).

7. Visitors to 'utopias' also face problems of communication with those who seem to speak the same language.


9. Chapter one of this thesis has looked at *Heart of Darkness* from this angle: the narration as an object text rather than as a communication between consciousnesses.

10. See also 'which of us here has not observed this [feeling of the 'vanity of effort' in times of extreme hardship], or maybe experienced something of that feeling in his own person...?' (LJ 108).


15. Sir Frank Lockwood was Solicitor-General at the time and worked for the prosecution in this case.

16. The Marquess of Queensberry was Douglas' father.

17. Marlow feels similarly 'bullied' by Jim's rationalization of his desertion of the *Patna* (*LJ* 121).

18. Although he did actually meet up with Douglas in Italy, Wilde never really got back into writing and by 1900 he was dead.


20. Even Conrad believed in the 'power of mere words' (*APR* xi): 'give me the right word and the right accent and I will move the world' (*APR* xii), he claimed. See also Kipling's belief that the 'magic' of words can 'lead whole nations into and out of captivity, can open to us the doors of the three worlds, or stir us so intolerably that we can scarcely abide to look at our own souls'. Rudyard Kipling, "On Literature", *Kipling's Lost World*, ed. Harry Ricketts, Padstow: Tabb House, 1989, p. 74.

21. See Hegel's remark that the 'organic individual produces itself; it makes itself actually into that which is in itself (potentially)'. Hegel, *Reason in History*, p. 69. Compare with William James' more cautious statement that 'our self-feeling in this world depends entirely on what we back ourselves to be and do. It is determined by the ratio of our actualities to our supposed potentialities'. William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, London: Macmillan, 1910, vol. I, p. 310.

22. Donadio's gloss on ideas contained in *Beyond Good and Evil*.

NOTES: CHAPTER FOUR


2. Nietzsche would have considered the approaches to the world by the protagonists of the previous section 'disguised forms of the will to power'. For him these were '1. Desire for freedom, independence, also for equilibrium, peace, co-ordination... 2. Enrolment, so as to satisfy the will to power in a larger whole... 3. The sense of duty [and] conscience' (TWTP 406).


4. Schiller, p. 197.


10. William James, vol. II., pp. 296-7, 301.

11. Ibid., pp. 289, 295, 301.


17. Durkheim, p. 209.


19. Huish's fury at Attwater anticipates Gentleman Brown's envy of the clean-cut Jim. 'As if he couldn't have said straight out, 'Hands off my plunder!' blast him!' (LJ 297), splutters Brown. 'That would have been like a man! Rot his superior soul!' (LJ 297). In this version, however, Jim 'hadn't devil enough in him to make an end' of Brown (LJ 297) and the lower-born man manages to take revenge upon his social superior.

20. Wells later revealed that he had been thinking about Wilde's trial at the time of writing this novel, about the 'graceless and pitiful downfall of a man of genius'. In doing so he had found humanity to be 'but animal rough-hewn to a reasonable shape and in perpetual internal conflict between instinct and injunction'. Wells, "Preface" to *The Island of Doctor Moreau*, *The Works of H. G. Wells*, London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1924, vol. II, p. ix.

21. Coincidentally or significantly, this captain has the same name as the drunken captain in *The Ebb-Tide*: John Davis.

22. In the comparable field of eugenics She claims to have 'bred' her discreetly deaf and dumb servants, noting that it took 'many centuries and much trouble; but at last I... triumphed' (S 154). Previously, however, she had bred a race that was so ugly she 'let it die away', and once a 'race of giants' until 'Nature would no more of it, and it died away' (S 154). Similarly, Attwater thought he was 'making a new people' on his island until the 'angel of the Lord smote them and they were not' (*DJAMH* 253): he lost twenty-nine out of his thirty-two Polynesian servants to small-pox.

23. See also Marlow's musing: 'is not mankind itself, pushing on its blind way, driven by a dream of its greatness and its power upon the dark paths of excessive cruelty and of excessive devotion? And what is the pursuit of truth, after all?' (LJ 301).
24. See the complaint put forward in Regeneration that late nineteenth century science could neither 'satisfy' the world's 'emotional aspirations' nor bring about that 'balance between our emotional and intellectual natures on which a healthy life depends'. [Hake], p. 238.

25. Wilde, it is worth noting, is referring to the public reputation of de Rais as a child-abuser and child-murderer rather than Huysmans' vision of the man as a sensualist and mystic.

NOTES: CHAPTER FIVE


3. Ibid., pp. 66-7.

4. 'Undisciplined': ibid., p. 68.

5. See also Arthur Symons' view that we 'find our escape from [life's] sterile, annihilating reality in many dreams, in religion, in passion, art; each a forgetfulness, each a symbol of creation'. Arthur Symons, The Symbolist Movement in Literature, p. 172.


7. For William James, at least, 'so long as we take the analytic point of view', 'Sensation... differs from Perception in the extreme simplicity of its object or content. Its function is that of mere acquaintance with a fact. Perception's function, on the other hand, is knowledge about a fact; and this knowledge admits of numberless degrees of complication'. William James, vol. II, pp. 1-2.


11. The use of narcotics in late nineteenth century fiction also has its down-side. Recreational drugs leave Fréneuse in Monsieur de Phocas utterly disorientated, and Watson is worried by the 'black reaction' brought by morphine which might leave Holmes with a 'permanent weakness' (CSH 89). The 'crude stimulants' (AN 173) of laudanum, opium and hashish taken by Des Esseintes to cure his nightmares and ill-health, merely succeed in robbing him of sleep, inducing vomiting and bringing on violent nervous disorders. In addition, the potions taken by Jekyll and Griffin have disturbing and permanent effects on their bodies, and alienate the protagonists irrevocably from their fellow humans.


14. Freud noted that 'in dreams the personality may be split', and asserted this is 'precisely on a par with the splitting of the personality that is familiar to us in hallucinatory paranoia'. Freud, vol. IV, p. 91.


16. Strictly, however, Bradley's position is different because of his belief that reality is a unity of self and not-self and not simply a construction internal to the perceiving subject.


NOTES: CHAPTER SIX


5. See Pater's Conclusion to *The Renaissance*: 'not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the end' (*TMT* 219).

6. Schiller, p. 183. See also Bradley's belief that 'experience in its early form, as a centre of immediate feeling, is not yet either self or not-self' (*AAR* 465).

7. Schiller, p. 183.

8. Wells reckons near the beginning of *A Modern Utopia* that 'nothing endures, nothing is precise and certain... there is no being, but a universal becoming of individualities' (*AMU* 13-14). He rejects Platonic idealism and suspects that Heraclitus 'may perhaps be coming to his own...' (*AMU* 14).

9. William James, vol. I, pp. 233-4. Despite his keenness to see everything as if for the first time, one must not assume Marius to be an absolute isolationist. From time to time he does identify strongly with certain individuals, and he does contemplate at length the 'idea of Humanity - of a universal commonwealth of mind' (*MTE* 178). He realizes that a fully insular reception of impressions fails to 'satisfy us permanently', and what theories about this 'really need for their correction... is the complementary influence of some greater system, in which they may find their due place' (*MTE* 183).


13. Durkheim claimed in a dateless set of statistics that there were 103 suicides per 100,000 British soldiers aged between 35 and 40 years old who were serving in India in the late nineteenth century. Interestingly, amongst those aged between 20 and 25, only 13 per 100,000 killed themselves. Durkheim, p. 232.


15. As Bradley conceived the general rule, 'the Other... is found on inquiry to be really no Other. It implies against its will and unconsciously, some mode of experience' (*AAR* 463).


17. Ibid.

18. See also "The Strange Ride of Morrowbie Jukes" wherein Jukes reckons that the professed 'Republic' (*WWW* 201) in the pit is a sham and that there is 'no law save that of the strongest' (*WWW* 199).


21. "'Oh, Whistle, and I'll Come to You, My Lad'" and "The Turn of the Screw" seem to have avoided the main failings of fictional representations of the supernatural as decided by Andrew Lang. Lang reckoned that 'description, if attempted, is usually overdone and incredible' whereas 'suggestion is apt to prepare us too anxiously for something that never becomes real, and to leave us disappointed'. Lang also wondered whether the 'power of learning to shudder' might 'die out in a positive age... To us it descends from very long ago, from the far-off forefathers who dreaded the dark, and who, half starved and all untaught, saw spirits everywhere, and scarce discerned waking experience from dreams'. Lang, pp. 273, 279.

22. It is worth noting that the Colonel recollects a 'not very dissimilar occurrence in India' (*GSOAA* 130), a fact which both aligns domestic and imperial modes of perception and shows James aware of the sub-genre which has since been labelled 'imperial Gothic' (*Brantlinger* 189, 227 etc.).
23. Hudson, *A Hind in Richmond Park*, pp. 35-6. Miller, p. 43. See also Nietzsche's remark in *Beyond Good and Evil* that 'when you look too long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you'. *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, p. 279.

NOTES: CHAPTER SEVEN

1. One might also refer to these elements as the themes or constituents of reality. As Nietzsche wrote, in the nineteenth century the world became perceived as 'false... precisely on account of the properties that constitute its reality: change, becoming, multiplicity, opposition, contradiction, war' (*TWTP* 314).


3. As a different way of looking at the correlation between crowds and disease, if the crowd undermines the structure of society, disease destroys the individual subject's ability to deal with the world. Marius' friend Flavian succumbs to the plague: towards the end *delirium* broke the coherent order of words and thoughts'; he dies 'passively, like some dumb creature' (*MTE* 100).


14. Compare with Arthur Symons' claim that 'it is with a kind of terror that we wake up, every now and then, to the whole knowledge of our ignorance'. Arthur Symons, *The Symbolist Movement in Literature*, p. 171.


18. Just as Jim abandons ship, so *Moby Dick* warns that the dreamer who neglects his duty at the mast-head of a whaler, who 'takes the mystic ocean at his feet for the visible image of that deep, blue, bottomless soul, pervading mankind and nature' (*MD* 172-3), will fall to his death.

19. General William Booth of the Salvation Army deliberately echoed the title of Stanley's *In Darkest Africa* (1890) for his work on the living conditions of the poor, *In Darkest England and the Way Out* (1890) in which he wondered 'as there is a darkest Africa is there not also a darkest England?'. He makes a lot in the first few pages of the similarities between the Congo forest and inner-city London, stressing in particular the 'monotonous darkness... malaria and... gloom' common to both places and their 'dwarfish de-humanized inhabitants' who are subjected to 'slavery... privations and... misery'. William Booth, *In Darkest London and the Way Out*, London: International Quarters of the Salvation Army, 1890, pp. 11, 12. John Law (i.e. Margaret Harkness) continued the image of darkness still further with her *In Darkest London* (1891), which was a 'new and popular edition' of *Captain Lobe, a Story of the Salvation Army*, now with an introduction by Booth.


23. The chapter which tells of Moreau's death at the hands of the escaped puma is entitled 'A Catastrophe'.

24. Remark attributed to Wells by Arthur C. Clarke in his "Introduction" to The First Men in the Moon, p. xxxiii.

25. This idea (from the essay "Zoological Retrogression") echoes the ending of "The Extinction of Man" wherein Wells warned that the 'coming terror may be crouching for its spring and the fall of humanity be at hand'. Wells, Certain Personal Matters, p. 179. This fantasy is also intimated in "The Discovery of the Future" where he claimed that 'man is not final' and that the 'question what is to come after man is the most persistently fascinating and the most insoluble question in the whole world'. The Works of H. G. Wells, vol. IV, p. 383. Unsurprisingly, the 'place which Man occupies in nature', his origins, the extent of his power and the 'goal' to which he is 'tending' was the 'question of questions' for Huxley. Huxley, p. 71.


27. Nordau, p. 2.

28. The inevitable cooling of the planet was predictable in the late nineteenth century from the Second Law of Thermodynamics.

NOTES: CONCLUSION


4. Schiller, p. 197.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid. In other words, to find in a real object aesthetic semblance 'all that is required is that a judgment of it should take no account of that reality'. Ibid., p. 199. See also Ortega y Gasset's remark that an 'object of art is artistic only in so far as it is not real' (Ortega y Gasset 1968 10).

8. Schiller, p. 197.

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