Abstract

In my thesis I examine certain aspects of the political history of Athens in the early Hellenistic period, that is after the battle of Chaironeia in 338 B.C. and until the late 260s.

For Athens this was a transitional period; she had to face a completely new political reality: she was no longer the great power of the fifth or even the fourth century B.C., Macedonia rose to power, then Alexander created a huge empire and his death triggered endless struggles for power among his Successors, in which Athens found herself involved.

Independent foreign policy then on the part of Athens was impossible; on the other hand, diplomacy became more delicate and demanding than ever. I focus on the ways in which the Athenian leadership (the generals and the orators) adjusted to the circumstances.

Firstly, I have examined the role of the generals in diplomacy in order to establish that they did assume increased responsibilities. Secondly, I have examined the role of the orators in the formation of relations with the various monarchs, in an attempt to trace the changes that Athenian diplomacy underwent. Finally, I have dealt with an important aspect of the orators' career and an important instrument in diplomacy: the passing of honours for kings and their officials as well as for Athenian citizens. My purpose was to establish the ways in which euergesia (benefaction) was affected by the circumstances as well as the influence it exercised on foreign relations.

The aim of my thesis is to demonstrate that the Athenian political system did survive in this period; Athens proved to be quite flexible, capable of responding to the new situation; whatever changes were made, they were due to practical considerations, without affecting the substance of the system.
Corrigenda

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c) Demochares' first period of activity (the fourth century)
The alliance with Boiotia
d) Diplomacy on a large scale after 287
The recovery of Eleusis
Demochares and Antigonos Gonatas

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also: The first case of the highest honours for an official: Asandros

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PREFACE

Transliteration of Greek names has always been a laborious task for anyone dealing with ancient literature or history. With regard to the names of ancient authors and the titles of their works I have resolved to use their customary latinised forms, i.e. Diodorus or Hyperides. On the other hand, with regard to the names of the various individuals and the toponyms that recur in the text I have opted for simple transliteration of their names, with the notable exceptions of 'Philip', 'Alexander', 'Corinth' and 'Aegean'. Finally, I have used the form 'Macedonia', as an intermediary form between 'Macedon' and 'Makedonia'. This latter form would have been problematic since it would have involved the use of the ethnic 'Makedones', not customary among historians.

As to the Greek texts quoted in my thesis I have used the Oxford series of Greek texts and the Teubner edition of Greek authors. I have translated Greek quotations myself (wherever I deemed it necessary) with the help of the Loeb Classical Library of Greek Authors.

All dates are B.C. unless otherwise stated.

In the bibliography I have tried to include all relevant recent articles and books with the notable exception of two books that came out too late to take account of them: C. Habicht, Athen. Die Geschichte der Stadt in hellenistischer Zeit, Munich 1995; S. V. Tracy, Athenian Democracy in Transition. Athenian Letter Cutters of 340 to 290 B.C., University of California Press 1995.

Finally, I wish to express my gratitude to my supervisor Professor M. H. Crawford and to Professor J. A. North, who was my second supervisor, for their most valuable guidance. I am indebted to Mr. G. J. Oliver, also a PhD student of early Hellenistic Athenian History, the discussions with whom proved to be most beneficial.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.

Ancient authors and works.¹

Ael. Aelian
V H Varia Historia
Aes. Aeschines
Arist. Aristotle
Ath. Pol. Athenaios Politeia
Pol. Politics
Rhet. Rhetorica
Arr. Arrian
Anab. Anabasis
Athen. Athenaeus
Cic. Cicero
De rep. De republica
Curt. Quintus Curtius Rufus
Din. Dinarchus
Dem. Demosthenes
D.S. Diodorus Siculus
Diog. Laer. Diogenes Laertius
Dion. Halic. Dionysius of Halicarnassus
Hdt. Herodotus
Hyp. Hyperides
Epit. Epitaphios
Nepos Cornelius Nepos
PHerc. Papyri Hercolanesi
Pap. Oxyr. Papyri Oxyrynchi
Paus. Pausanias
Phil. Philochorus
Plut. Plutarch
Alex. Life of Alexander
Demetr. Life of Demetrius
Dem. Life of Demosthenes
Phoc. Life of Phocion
Pyrrh. Life of Pyrrhus

¹ Titles of works are cited in italics.
Collections of Inscriptions

FD

IG II²

IG² IV

IG XII

ISE

Osborne

Reinmuth

SEG
Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum, Leiden 1923-.

SIG³
W. Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, I, Leipzig 1915 (3d ed.).

Tod

Journals

AJA
American Journal of Archaeology

AJP
American Journal of Philology

AHB
Ancient History Bulletin

AncSoc.
Ancient Society

AncW
Ancient World

AC
L’ Antiquité Classique

AClass
Acta Classica
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<td>AD</td>
<td>'Αρχαιολογικόν Δελτίον</td>
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<td>AE</td>
<td>'Αρχαιολογική 'Εφημερίς</td>
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<td>Athena</td>
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<td>BE</td>
<td>Bulletin Epigraphique.</td>
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<td>Bulletin de Correspondance Hellenique</td>
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<td>BSA</td>
<td>Annual of the British School at Athens</td>
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<td>BSAA</td>
<td>Bulletin de la Société d’Archaéologie d’Alexandrie</td>
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<td>Comptes rendus de l’Academie des inscriptions et Belles Lettres</td>
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<td>GIF</td>
<td>Giornale Italiano di Filologia</td>
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<td>Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies</td>
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<td>Hesp.</td>
<td>Hesperia</td>
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<td>Hist. Einz.</td>
<td>Historia Einzelschriften</td>
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<td>HSCP</td>
<td>Harvard Studies of Classical Philology</td>
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<td>Liverpool Classical Monthly</td>
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<td>Mnem.</td>
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

It is widely acknowledged that the battle of Chaironeia in 338 B.C. marked the beginning of a new era in the history of the Greek world. The failure of Athens to defeat Macedonia in the open field embodies the failure of the small *polis* organisation when confronted with a monarchy equipped with a potent army. Inability to overcome their particularism, inability to surrender sovereign powers, especially in the field of foreign relations, are some of the explanations put forward to account for the limited life of the *polis* organisation.

The greatest misfortune that a modern Greek historian inevitably confronts is the absence of a contemporary literary source such as Herodotus, Thucydides or Xenophon; the surviving fragments of the Atthidographers can by no means make up for it. Moreover, speeches which are such a valuable source of information for the fifth and even more the fourth century almost disappear from the record after the 320s. Apart from the decline in the role of civic oratory, the blame must also lie with the later grammarians who considered hardly anything produced after 322 as worth citing. The same attitude is responsible for the extremely few fragments of contemporary historical works such as the *Atthis* of Philochorus and the *Histories* of Demochares. At any rate, one has to depend on much later sources, e.g. Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch or Pausanias, whose attention was attracted by the glory of individual kings and of course of Rome. This perception of events perhaps partly accounts for the attitude of modern historians who focus their interest on the exploits of Alexander's Diadochoi, on the kingdoms created after the collapse of Alexander's empire or on the federal states of Aitolia and Achaia. The Greek *poleis* are either neglected or they are examined in a perspective of decadence. Suffice it to point to titles such as *Athens in Decline* (by C. Mossé). The admirers of the miracle of classical Athens in
particular, deeply exasperated by the “sad fate” of the *polis par excellence*, largely neglect Athenian history from 338 onwards, or to be more precise, after 322, when Athens was defeated in the Lamian War and Antipatros installed a garrison in the city.

Given the lack of contemporary literary sources, the unavoidable difficulty is that the period extending roughly from 338 onwards - the so-called Hellenistic period - is extremely complicated compared with the classical period, which is the result of the emergence of new kingdoms and of the continuous change in the balance of power among them. The aforementioned interest of ancient sources and modern historians in the struggles of the Diadochoi and their corresponding neglect of Athens was one of the major incentives that led me to concentrate precisely on the history of this particular city. Athens found herself entangled in these struggles and I believe that her reaction and adjustment to the circumstances presents great interest.

It is precisely the fact that Athens is no longer the great power of the past that I find particularly stimulating: Athens of the early Hellenistic period deserves no less attention than the great power of the fifth or even the fourth century; the history of early Hellenistic Athens is a transitional period, particularly interesting from the viewpoint of the survival of democratic institutions and of possible political changes or transformations.

The notion of decadence, so commonly attached to the history of Athens after 338, is an additional incentive; my own view is that this label has been too easily attached and, in fact, prevents any clear appreciation of Athens’ political role after 338.

Complicated as is this period, I believe it is essential to lay down very briefly the basic events of early Hellenistic Athenian history (that is the period extending from roughly 338 to the 260s), as well as the events leading to the confrontation with Macedonia in 338.

* * *
The extent to which the Greek *poleis*, Athens in particular, could have prevented Philip II of Macedonia from rising to power, has always been a tantalising problem. The speeches of Demosthenes easily lead us to think that Athens should have been alarmed and was guilty of not reacting decisively when there was still time. In fact, Demosthenes’ perception of Philip’s role prevents us from estimating how the Athenians of the time would have perceived his role and power. Rapid rise to power and aspirations to imperialism were not a novel phenomenon in the Greek world. The past had witnessed, in turn, Athenian imperialism, the short-lived imperialism of Sparta and, finally, that of Thebes or Jason of Pherai. Philip’s power then would have seemed as nothing so exceptional and, for this reason, no more and no less alarming than the recent, sudden rise of Thebes or Jason had been. Furthermore, the Greek world and Athens in particular might have expected that Philip’s power would be limited; it would reach a peak and then it would collapse. All this, on the other hand, does not amount to denying that the Greek world had miscalculated or rather underestimated Philip’s diplomatic and military skills.

Philip was able to build up his power very rapidly in the 350s while Athens found herself entangled in a war against members of the second Confederacy, the so-called Social War. After the end of the war Athens was almost bankrupt and leadership passed into the hands of a group that tried to put Athenian finances in order and also to abstain from military risks which were thought to be unnecessary.

It would seem that only when there was imminent danger would the Athenians act rapidly and vigorously as when they prevented Philip from crossing Thermopylai in 352. Demosthenes’ speeches reproach the Athenians for their inactivity and for their failure to perceive Philip’s real intentions. In 351 he insisted that they should dispatch a force consisting of 2000 infantry and 500 cavalry to ravage Philip’s territory (*Ist Phil. 22*). Yet, he himself admitted that this would not be a significant force and that Athens could not afford the maintenance,
which was quite true; Athens' resources alone could not possibly match Macedonia's.

Apart from these factors, Philip's strong point was that he excelled in diplomacy and was thus able to take advantage of the dissension among the Greek states. The 'Sacred War' between Thebes and Phokis gave Philip the opportunity to form an alliance with Thebes and to be established as the head of the Amphiictyonic Council. As a result he confronted Athens, which had taken sides with Phokis. In 346 Athens acceded to the precarious peace of Philokrates. Thereafter the Athenians appear to have been alarmed at Philip's political and military manoeuvres; the period until 338 witnessed intense Athenian military activity in the Hellespontine and the Northern Aegean area. A new 'Sacred War' led to direct confrontation at Chaironeia in 338, where Philip gained an overwhelming victory. Admittedly, Athens did not have to endure any visible signs of Macedonian supremacy such as a garrison. However, she did join the League of Corinth which was established by Philip in order to pursue the war against Persia.

* * *

Generally speaking, Athens did demonstrate caution in the fifteen years after Chaironeia. There were occasions on which Athens could have participated in suicidal uprisings, such as after Philip's death in 336 when Thebes revolted against Alexander or in 330 when Agis III, king of Sparta, led a war against Antipatros, the regent of Macedonia. The overall impression is that Athens generally clung to a wait-and-see policy, expecting Persia to defeat Alexander.

A dominant figure of the period and one who occupied an extraordinary position in Athenian public life is Lykourgos, who set out to reorganise Athenian finances and to improve the military profile of Athens. It is probable that he aimed at an Athenian uprising at the right, perhaps distant, moment.

However, Athens revolted almost immediately after Alexander's death in the summer of 323 and led the so called Lamian War against
Antipatros in which she was defeated. As a result Antipatros installed a
 garrison on the Mounychia Hill and limited citizenship rights.

Antipatros died in 319 after having appointed to the regency Polyperchon. Things, however, became complicated because Antipatros’
son, Kassandros, thought he had the right to succeed his father. The
inescapable conflict between him and Polyperchon was bound to involve
Athens. Polyperchon’s edict proclaiming the return to the state of affairs
before 323 and the restoration of the exiles made the Athenians believe
that they would be granted the withdrawal of the garrison, since the
latter was taking orders from Kassandros. It was a period of internal
turmoil for Athens which ended in 317 when Kassandros succeeded in
driving Polyperchon out of Athens and went on to appoint Demetrios
Phalereus as the epimeletes of Athens. The garrison was retained but
citizenship rights were more widespread among the Athenian population.

Despite the financial prosperity that Athens enjoyed during his
regime the Athenians were eager to shake off his rule, or rather
Kassandros’. The famous edict of Antigonos Monophthalmos in 315
proclaiming freedom and autonomy for the Greek poleis gave rise to
hopes that were only materialised in 307 by Antigonos’ son Demetrios
Poliorcetes. Athens threw her gates open and hailed him as a saviour.

In the following year (and for three more) Athens fought by the
side of Demetrios against Kassandros in the so called Four Years War.
The struggle between the two belonged to the much wider context of
Antigonos’ war for the maintenance of a unified empire. But Antigonos’
dreams of the restoration of Alexander’s empire came to an end at the
battle of Ipsos in 301. Demetrios was left without a kingdom, and this
was precisely the time that Athens denied him access to the city.

It was a tremendous internal conflict that brought Demetrios back
to Athens. Lachares, general of the mercenaries, usurped ultimate power
after his conflict with Charias (as well as with others), general of the
infantry. Pausanias informs us that Lachares became tyrant at the
instigation of Kassandros. It is possible that Lachares had his moral
support but there is no way of knowing whether this was translated into actual financial or military help.

A number of Athenians who had been followers of Charias sought refuge in the Peiraieus, thus causing a separation of the astu from the harbour. At this point Demetrios intervened to support them and forced the astu to capitulate by means of a siege. This time he installed a garrison on the Mouseion Hill, in the astu itself, and even established a government with oligarchic features. Then, all of a sudden, Demetrios acceded to the throne of Macedonia in autumn of 294, an event which alarmed the other Diadochoi, and new coalitions were formed.

In the early summer of 287 Athens revolted and expelled the garrison from the Mouseion Hill. The honorific decree for Kallias reveals that Egyptian aid had been substantial. The astu was freed but Athens continued her efforts to re-acquire the forts in Attika and the Peiraieus. In this context belong the embassies to various rulers asking for and succeeding in obtaining supplies in corn and money.

Demetrios' surrender to Seleukos in Asia brought about a new state of affairs: Lysimachos, ruler of Thrace, became king of Macedonia in spring 284 and Demetrios died a year later while his son and heir, Antigonos Gonatas, was left to struggle for his position. The growing power of Lysimachos posed a threat for the other Diadochoi and the situation led to the battle of Kouropedion in which Lysimachos died. His death and the invasion of the Celts created chaos in Northern Greece which was put to an end by Antigonos Gonatas. With his decisive defeat of the Celts in 277 he established his authority in Macedonia.

Very few facts are known with any precision about Athens' relations with Antigonos. There must have been hostilities in the 280s or in 272 when Pyrrhos, king of Epeiros, attempted to drive Antigonos out of Macedonia, and the Athenians sent him a delegation.

Athens rose again in the 260s; the war is called Chremonidean, named after the Athenian who proposed the decree of alliance with
Sparta against Antigonos; Ptolemy II was also an ally of Athens. Athens capitulated with only a brief spell of freedom in 229 to come.

* * *

No-one can maintain that Athens of the late fourth and of the third century B.C. played the same role in Greek affairs she had played in the fifth or even in the early fourth century B.C. It is equally obvious that Athens was declining in terms of military power, especially after 322. She was no longer the leader of an empire as she had been in the fifth century; she did not even enjoy the position she had enjoyed in the fourth century when she became the head of a second Confederacy and led the war against Sparta, or when she later led the war against Macedonia. However, until the Chremonidean War decline was a slow process, and Athens was to face many ups and downs before she finally capitulated. And military decline does not necessarily entail political or moral decadence as a consequence.

A common distorting factor in our understanding of the period is that the entire Hellenistic period is perceived as a perfectly homogeneous period. The situation described by P. Rhodes should not be taken to refer to the *early* Hellenistic period: “In the Hellenistic period Athens ceased to be important, and increasingly the democracy became a sham: almost certainly most annual boards disappeared...”. The key-word in this passage is the “increasingly”: certainly, Athens did not cease to be important from one day to the other, and the early Hellenistic period has to be distinguished and treated separately since it is a transitional period.2

One has to take into consideration that there are divers ways of exercising control and authority and that Athens on different occasions was treated with extreme leniency by the Macedonians. After the battle of Chaironeia Philip could have installed a Macedonian garrison in

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Athens itself or in the *chora* of Attika; he could even have sold the Athenian captives as slaves. Instead, he released them without ransom and he even returned to Athens the islands of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros. In 335 Alexander razed Thebes to the ground as a punishment for her rebellion. Athens’ role in the rebellion was quite suspect: evidently, Alexander believed that certain Athenian leaders had urged Thebes to revolt and demanded their surrender. Athens could have suffered a fate similar to that of Thebes, but in fact she did not even surrender the leaders.

The sentimental factor should not be ignored with regard to the treatment of Athens by the kings: admiration, respect for her past glory, played their part. According to Plutarch, Antigonos Monophthalmos had remarked that “Athens was the beacon-tower of the world which would speedily flash the flame of their deeds to all mankind and concluded what he desired was its good will” (*Demetr.* 8). Despite the anecdotal character of the passage Antigonos did intend to have Athens on his side, since this would make his plans for a world-kingdom easier: her geographical position, her cultural excellence and even her resources would be significant. Her geographical position of course made her a bone of contention, first between Kassandros and the Antigonids and then between Antigonos Gonatas, king of Macedonia, and Ptolemy Philadelphos of Egypt. But generally speaking, the Diadochoi - the Antigonids in particular - were very careful to avoid imposing direct control over the Greek *poleis*. Freedom and autonomy was the *leitmotif* of their policy. Polyperchon was the first to make a propagandistic attempt, followed by Antigonos Monophthalmos and later by Ptolemy. With particular reference to the proclamation of Antigonos in 315, it might be stated that it was an instrument of propaganda, but on the other hand it was actually very successful.

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The tantalising questions concern the extent of independence and initiative left to the *poleis* - Athens in particular - as well as the ways in
which external interference affected internal civil life. More specifically: in a period during which Athens was faced with quite a few changes of regime and also found herself involved in struggles of which she was not the initiator, did she manage to achieve something in her own interest? Under what circumstances did she try to overthrow foreign rule?

Another essential distinction to be made is between reality and the extent to which this is accepted: did Athens accept Macedonian rule as a definite fact? The Lamian War, the revolt against Demetrios Poliorketes, the Chremonidean War testify to the contrary. Modern historians use the benefit of hindsight to generalise about the failure of such attempts, but the Athenians of the time could not possibly know the outcome of their efforts. Tradition persists and shapes the mentality and the behaviour of people. All the more so in the case of a polis which had been the 'school of Hellas' for about one hundred and fifty years. Military inferiority does not inevitably entail a decline of ambition; therefore it is not sensible to surmise that Athens immediately abandoned any thoughts of revival, or even of re-assumption of her previous leading role. Rather than being progressively cowed, the Athenians passed from periods of peaceful or even intimate relations with Macedonia to sudden outbursts.

The Athenian status in the international scene had changed; the aims of Athenian foreign policy had similarly changed direction. Circumstances required different skills, both in the military and in the diplomatic sphere. Instead of leading expeditions abroad, the Athenians had to endure the almost continuous presence of Macedonian garrisons and, even worse, they had to sustain a siege more than once. As a result they could be expected to develop defensive techniques and tactics.

The major change in the political position of Athens was, however, that now she had to conduct her interests by diplomacy, whereas in the past diplomacy had been of secondary importance compared to force. P. Veyne, trying to summarise Athenian foreign policy in the Hellenistic period, has drawn a negative picture. In my opinion, he does not escape the schematization according to which the entire Hellenistic period was a
period of debasement and humiliation for Athens, in which any expression of ambition was useless and out of tune. The basic fault of his account lies again in that he has taken the entire Hellenistic period to be a homogeneous era. He has concluded the following:

"La fierté patriotique d' Athènes hellénistique produisait tous ses effets sur la scène internationale; la vieille cité essayait de jouer les grandes monarchies les unes contre les autres et recherchait de préférence des alliances puissantes, mais lontaines; par nostalgie de sa grandeur, (de sa polypragmosyne, dirait Thucydide), elle refusait d' adhérer à des ligues de cités, ses semblables et ses voisines, parmi lesquelles elle aurait conservé son indépendence, mais non la possibilité de mettre sa marque personnelle sur les événements; elle s'était inventé un rôle à la taille de ses possibilités; elle était un centre de culture et ... distribuait à travers le monde des décrets pompeaux qui agaçait Polybe et qui étaient des certificats de bonne conduite ou de philhellénisme. Voilà une certaine idée de patriotisme." \(^3\)

Failure to form a coalition is no more characteristic of Athens than it is of other states, especially after the rise of the Achaian League and even more so by the time of Philip V of Macedonia. We cannot hastily conclude that Athens chose from the beginning of Macedonian predominance to keep her distance from neighbouring states and peers, which of course would be quite an unreasonable policy on her part. In fact quite the contrary was the case, at least during the last decades of the fourth century. Athens, through the agency first of Leosthenes and later of Olympiodoros, concluded fruitful agreements with the federal state of Aitolia whose star was then on the rise. Furthermore, through the agency of Demochares she established a treaty with the neighbouring state of Boiotia. Veyne actually implies that Athens sought the benevolence of distant allies solely because they were too far away to pose any threat on her. But with regard to early Hellenistic times this is an oversimplified, if not false, explanation of Athens' motives. Equally

\(^3\) *Le pain*, p.240.
oversimplified is to see nothing more than vanity and nostalgia as the motives for the bestowal of honours. He appears to ignore the fact that Athens had pursued a perfectly plausible policy and had benefited from 'friends' like Lysimachos of Thrace or Spartokos of Bosporos or Audoleon of Paionia; in other words that she had pursued a fruitful policy. Finally, it was not only Athens that had invented for herself a central role in international developments; the Diadochoi regarded it as such as well.

It is true that on certain occasions Athens tried to play off one king against the other. Taking a close look at her situation, one wonders whether this was not the only course of action open. Since her geographical position made her a bone of contention between the various Diadochoi, it was not unreasonable that Athens would try to take advantage of this. The problem was the extent to which the Athenian people had realised the dynamics of the new world they lived in; correspondingly, whether they could rise to the occasion and whether they had the means and the leadership to pursue such a policy. In fact we should take into account the major risk involved for Athens in her effort to calculate how a monarch could be helpful. The Athenians had to find ways in which they could extract benefits without being reduced to an inferior or even humiliating position, which of course was not always feasible. Athens had never in the past - with the exception of Jason of Pherai - come into close contact with an absolute ruler.

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Diplomacy was a matter much more delicate than it had been in the past. P. Veyne has remarked that "Or les dignités publiques ne sont guère, pour la plupart où le plus souvent, que d' échelle municipale; ce sont des dignités pour lesquelles n' importe quel dilettante fait l' affaire. La profession politique ne suppose plus de talents, une vocation personelle". This statement could apply to the late Hellenistic period and even more so to the period of the Roman conquest, but it is certainly

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4 Le pain, p.257.
not applicable to early Hellenistic times, particularly with reference to Athens. Now that Athens lacked imperial power, politics presupposed talent more than ever. Athenian politicians needed to develop skills in negotiating, persuading and extracting benefits. Above all it was a question of making the right choices at the right moment. For fifth century Athens there had hardly ever been a problem of choices: Athens had an all powerful fleet and could impose her own will. In the fourth century there had appeared a problem of choice as to the attitude Athens should adopt towards Thebes and Sparta and the conflict between them. But the rise of these powers had been time-limited; in the case of Alexander’s Diadochoi, however, when one lost power another would appear to take his place.

A recent article by J. Gabbert puts Athenian politics of early Hellenistic times in the right perspective. The very title of the article, “Pragmatic Democracy...”, is in my view quite appropriate as part of an overall characterisation of Athenian politics at the time. The pragmatism of Athenian politics concerns basically the ease with which the Athenian took sides with one king or another. J. Gabbert examines briefly the careers of the most prominent men to conclude that all of them did what they thought best for their polis. But Gabbert plays down the issue of Athenian ideology which, in her view, is of secondary importance compared to the issue of autonomy.\(^5\) It is impossibly clear-cut to argue that the ideology was set aside without any second thoughts. At least Gabbert should have allowed for the possibility that the issues of autonomy and democratic ideology would at some point clash. In fact, I would rather oppose salvation to ideology instead of autonomy.

However, my own starting point has been that the relations formed by the Athenian leaders with powerful monarchs cannot be interpreted in the narrow perspective of democratic or oligarchic convictions, pro- or anti-Macedonian leanings, betrayal or patriotism as has been the trend

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\(^5\) "Pragmatic Democracy", 29-33.
among scholars in the past. Especially the term pro-Macedonian has been applied invariably to leaders who are thought to have ardently supported the Macedonians for personal benefits as well as to those who thought that Macedonia would be beneficial to Athens.

C. Habicht has crucially pointed out that the politicians of the period were much too flexible to fit into the careless division of politicians into pro-Macedonians and anti-Macedonians; their course of action was always dependent on the circumstances and they could at one point come to an understanding with a Macedonian ruler and at another create a front against him; it could not be any different in a period when Athens’ position wavered between freedom and salvation.

Habicht, however, is more interested in problems of chronology and focuses on certain periods only: the regime of Lachares, the revolt of 287 and the Chremonidean War. On the other hand, he is not interested in analysing political activity as a whole. My own aim in this thesis is to analyse the forms of flexibility, the ways in which Athenian leadership was adjusted to the circumstances, the fields of activity of the rhetores, the responsibilities undertaken by the military leaders and finally the ways in which Athens employed euergesia in her foreign policy, its adjustment and even its development.

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7 Untersuchungen, p.62.
CHAPTER I: THE ROLE OF THE GENERALS

i. The renewed importance of the generals after the battle of Chaironeia

In the period under examination there occurs a major shift in the position of Athens: from a period during which an independent foreign policy was possible she passes to one during which a wholly independent foreign policy is simply impossible. As the leadership of the polis tries to adjust to the new circumstances, it is imperative to examine who are the persons who assume a leading place in Athenian life and the ways in which they try to secure Athens’ place in this entirely different world.

Among the interesting features of this era is that alongside the rhetores Lykourgos, Hyperides, Demosthenes, Demades, Demetrios of Phaleron, Stratokles of Diomeia, Demochares of Leukonoe - we find a number of generals being instrumental in the formulation and implementation of Athenian foreign policy. Moreover, they undertake a role beyond the purely military realm. It would seem that not only had their prestige not suffered from the defeat at Chaironeia, but that instead their position was strengthened. In his speech against Leokrates (51) Lykourgos assigns to the generals a place next to the tyrannicides, thus attributing them a primary part in the preservation of the democratic constitution:

"εὐφήσετε παρὰ μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν ταῖς ἄγοραῖς ἀθλητὰς ἀνακειμένους, παρ’ ὑμῖν δὲ στρατηγοὺς ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τοὺς τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείναντας".

At first sight it is somehow curious that, after a major defeat (Chaironeia) and in a period during which Athens suffers from military inferiority, the generals would acquire anew a prominent position. But this may testify to an awareness of the Athenians that they would have to strengthen their military apparatus and take up arms again.

8 "You will find in the market-places of other communities statues of athletes; but here you will find statues of brave generals and of those who killed the tyrant". Translation of the Greek texts belongs to the author unless otherwise stated.
There appears to have taken place a modification of the practices pursued in the fourth century until 338. In this period the division between the political and the military field was relatively clear-cut, in contrast with the fifth century when the same men led the army and dominated the *ekklesia*. The *rhetores* and the *strategoi* in the fourth century developed into two distinct groups. Konon, Timotheos, Chabrias, Chares all played a major part in the formation of the foreign policy of their *polis*; they waged war, they brought over to Athens various cities of the Hellespontine and the Aegean area, they even formed agreements, but rarely did they appear before the *ekklesia* and, contrary to what we can observe after the battle of Chaironeia, they very rarely served as ambassadors. Yet, we should be careful not to attach the label of professionalism to either the *strategoi* or the *rhetores*. One should not imagine a political situation in which the orators laid down the guidelines of foreign policy and the generals simply carried out orders. In fact, in the fourth century there is an interaction between the expeditions led by the generals and the policies pursued by Athens. Orators might put to the vote and dictate the course of action or the kind of military expedition to be undertaken but, conversely, sometimes the generals would take the initiative *ad hoc* and the course of action followed would then dictate the policy to be pursued in the future. M. H. Hansen has demonstrated that the *rhetores* and the *strategoi* together are the nearest equivalent of what

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9 L. Tritle ("Virtue and progress in Classical Athens", *AncW* 15, 1992, 71-88) has maintained that the distinction between *rhetores* and *strategoi* is a modern conception, stemming from a modern historiographical myth. He assembles and presents the historical works of the nineteenth century which to a lesser or greater extent conceived Athenian leadership in terms of a division of labour and professionalism: military men are confined to the battlefield whereas the conduct of diplomacy remains in the hands of orators. The roots of such a model according to Tritle is to be found in the influence "of the Scottish conjecturalists, especially Adam Smith, who were interested in such ideas as the progress of society and the specialisation of occupations". In the nineteenth century works in question professionalism is regarded as the cause of Athens' decline. In another article ("A Missing Athenian General: Meidias Kephisodorou Anagyrasios", *Athenaeum*, N. S. 70, 1992, 487-494) Tritle has gone so far as to maintain that there was no distinction between these two groups. Unfortunately, he uses the extremely dubious case of Meidias to back up his argument. Even if Meidias (largely known from his trierarchies and from his rivalry with Demosthenes) had been elected to the generalship, this would not prove that the groups of generals and orators overlapped. The fact remains that there is very little evidence of rhetorical activity on the part of the most prominent generals of the century who for the most part busy conducting expeditions abroad. Therefore I can only accept that the term 'professional' should be avoided, but I am not prepared to believe that there was no distinction between the *rhetores* and the *strategoi*. 
we call today ‘politicians’ and that we should avoid calling politicians only the rhetores, both groups were regarded by their contemporaries as being to an equal degree the political leaders of Athens. By means of a series of citations from literary texts Hansen has shown that rhetores were almost invariably mentioned in conjunction when it came to referring to Athens’ fortunes. It is true that ancient literary texts distinguish between rhetores and strategoi, and quite frequently one group is praised at the expense of the other, but on the other hand there is unity in the juxtaposition. Hansen has advanced four reasons as to why the Athenians of the fourth century would regard military commanders as political leaders as well; firstly, in a period when war was the rule it was natural that political leaders would include generals as well; secondly, certain members of the two groups often collaborated; thirdly, the fact that in the fifth century leadership consisted of generals who were identified with rhetores and vice versa would lead the Athenians of the fourth century to think that the leadership consisted of two categories; finally, that both served occasionally as envoys was a unifying factor.10

For my purposes, however, I have to underline that rhetores and strategoi were equally prominent in events until the end of the ‘Social War’ between Athens and the members of the second Confederacy in 355. Thereafter, the generals disappear from the scene to reappear only a few years before 338; but they only play a limited role. After 338 the strategoi rose again to prominence assuming both military and political powers. In a period of military conflicts of which Athens is rarely the initiator the generals are given the opportunity to exercise influence through other channels. Most notably, they undertake missions as envoys to various rulers.

In a period of continuing hostilities among the Diadochoi in which Athens finds herself entangled, it is not unreasonable that the generals with their knowledge of military matters, their appreciation of certain situations and their general expertise would acquire - anew - a prominent

position. Furthermore, Athens has to deal with Macedonian military men whose ability in the battlefield had been amply demonstrated, and it is only sensible to use in the various negotiations men who would be esteemed highly. Detailed research into the careers of the generals of the late fourth and early third centuries B.C. is essential in order to understand the extent to which they shaped Athenian foreign policy and the way in which they influenced the course of events.

A passage of Aeschines referring to Demosthenes (III.159) substantiates my point about the renewed importance of the generals in the political scene:

"καταγαγούσης δ’ αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν πόλιν τῆς ἀπορρόωκήτου σωτηρίας, τοὺς μὲν πρῶτους χρόνους ύπότρομος ἦν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ παριῶν ἠμιθνῆς ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα, εἰρηνοφύλαξ ἦμας αὐτὸν ἔλεγε χειροτονεῖν. 'Ὑμεῖς δὲ οὖν' ἐπὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα εἶστε τὸ Δημοσθένους ἐπιγράφειν ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ Ναυσικλέι τοῦτο προσετἀττετε".\textsuperscript{11}

Aeschines relates that immediately after the battle of Chaironeia Demosthenes repeatedly asked the Athenians to vote him εἰρηνοφύλαξ, but they were so outraged against him that they would not even allow his name to be included in the decrees. Plutarch on the other hand illustrates a completely different attitude of the Athenians towards Demosthenes in the aftermath of Chaironeia: his rival orators organised a co-ordinated attack against him but the people retained their favourable disposition so far as to assign him the task of delivering the funeral speech for the dead of Chaironeia (Dem. 21.1-2). How are we to reconcile this latter fact with the passage of Aeschines? The orator may very well exaggerate, but it is possible that the very immediate reactions of the Athenians were quite hostile towards the orator Demosthenes who had so strongly advocated war against Philip while they could be mollified as time went by; in any case we are not aware of the specific circumstances of Demosthenes’

\textsuperscript{11} "At first he was timid and coming on to the platform, half-dead with terror, he asked you to appoint him guardian of the peace; but you did not even allow for his name to be inscribed on the decrees, and instead you assigned this to Nausikles".
appointment to deliver the funeral speech. However, Aeschines cannot be lying with regard to the appointment of an εἰρηνοφύλαξ. It is the last clause in Aeschines’ passage that is particularly stimulating: “ἄλλον Ναυσικλῆς τοῦτο προσέτατε”. The clause has commonly been understood to mean that the Athenian demos allowed Nausikles to carry decrees of Demosthenes under his own name but E. Harris has argued persuasively that the clause should be connected with the request of Demosthenes to be appointed εἰρηνοφύλαξ and not with the refusal of the demos to have Demosthenes propose decrees. Thus the correct translation would be: “you assigned the office of εἰρηνοφύλαξ to Nausikles”. What was this office? T. T. B. Ryder thinks it most likely to be the office of the Athenian representative at the League of Corinth, a quite plausible conclusion which, coupled with the new translation of Aeschines, bears great significance for the change in the respective roles of the orators and the generals and in the attitude of the Athenians towards them. Although it has to be borne in mind that in the long run Demosthenes’ position in Athenian politics proved to be very stable, the fact remains that a military man was elected instead of him to represent

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“Nausicles”, 378-385. Harris’s new translation is based both on internal, structural reasons as well as on external factors like the animosity between Nausikles and Demosthenes. This latter does not seem to be quite convincing: the political standing of Nausikles after Chaironeia is not quite clear. For instance J. K. Davies (APF, pp.396-7) maintains that after 338 he became a follower of Demosthenes. At any rate, Harris is right in pointing out that if the “τούτο” in the last clause refers to the proposal of decrees, then the main sentence concerning Demosthenes’ request to be appointed “εἰρηνοφύλαξ” remains pending. Apart from that it would be quite an absurd practice to arrange so that the decrees of A would be carried under the name of B; all the more so in our case if the Athenians were ill-disposed towards Demosthenes.

13 “Demosthenes and Philip’s Peace of 338/7 B.C.”, CQ, N.S. 26, 1976, 85-87. Ryder’s article is essentially directed against G. L. Cawkwell’s view, who on the basis of Xenophon (Poroi 5.1) thought that Aeschines was referring to the election of Demosthenes as Commissioner of the Theoric Fund in 337/6 (“Eubulus”, JHS 83, 1963, p.56). Ryder’s argument, on the other hand, amounts to the hypothesis that such an office (whether or not this was its actual title) should consist of wider duties than those referring to trade; he added in support a passage from Isokrates’ Panegyrikos (175) referring to the king of Persia as φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης and also a passage from [Dem.], XVII, referring to the ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ φύλαξι τεταγμένοι (15).

Since the passage refers to cheirotonia it seems that the states which were members of the League of Korinth elected them. Ryder (p.87, n.11) conjectures that there should have been more than one Athenian representative at the synedrion, since the Phokians and the Lokrians had three.
Athenian interests. That Demosthenes was overlooked does not have to be
due only to the wrath of the Athenians, as Aeschines would like us to
believe, and to disapproval of Demosthenes' past policy: it indicates that
at least at this point they thought that military expertise was essential
and they felt that they should entrust more responsibilities to a military
man. Had we known whether there were any other Athenian
representatives and if so who they were, we would be able to establish
whether this appointment of Nausikles was an exception or if it complied
with a more general pattern.

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ii. General observations on the generals' political activity

a) Activity in the *ekklesia*

Political activity basically comprises the following elements: participation in the *boule*, speaking in the *ekklesia*, proposal of decrees and participation in embassies. Thus, in order to appreciate correctly the role of the generals it is essential to examine the extent to which their careers comprised these activities, especially the last three which depend in whole or in fact on personal initiative.

The extent to which the generals appeared before the *ekklesia* is a matter of speculation, since in most of the cases evidence is only implicit. It has to be observed that there have not been preserved decrees proposed by strategoi, which is an indication at least that they did not loom large in this field.

Phokion is a special case. According to Plutarch he was the only leading figure of the fourth century to resemble the men of the fifth century in possessing both military and political abilities.\(^{14}\) Certainly, this is a far-fetched and misleading statement. Phokion never played the significant role the other generals of the fourth had. In fact, he became a central figure in Athenian politics only after the battle of Chaironeia, and then he is not so much known for military as he is for political activity (although he does hold the generalship), who addresses the people most frequently to prevent them from rushing into action against Macedonia.

Leosthenes, the commander in chief in the Lamian War, also possessed rhetorical skills. There is Plutarch’s testimony (*Phoc. 23. 2–4*) about a verbal conflict between him and Phokion before the *ekklesia*. The issue at stake was whether or not Athens should get involved in the revolt against Macedonia, after Alexander’s death. Leosthenes was clearly victorious in this conflict with Phokion. It appears that apart

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\(^{14}\) Bearzot (*Focione*, pp.81–2) has argued that the number of generalships provided by Plutarch is exaggerated and that only eleven generalships are attested with reasonable certainty; in the period after Chaironeia he was probably a general in 335/4, 322/1, 321/0 and in 319/8. J. M. Williams (*Athens without Democracy*, p.26, n.75) thinks that, though difficult to believe, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility if we remember that a mediocrity like Philokles had been elected general ten times.
from the long-standing preparations, his exhortation of the people played a part in leading Athens to war. Athens was ready in terms of military preparations and only needed the man or the men to urge her on. Almost immediately after the battle of Chaironeia, Athens, under the leadership of Lykourgos, engaged in a gigantic effort to become competent in terms of military training and equipment. The funds of Harpalos (the treasurer of Alexander who had escaped to Athens) provided an additional incentive. Yet Athens had remained inactive until Alexander’s death was confirmed. According to Hyperides, Leosthenes was the one to urge her. Additionally, there is the evidence provided by the Papyrus Hibeh I, no. 15, where Leosthenes appears to exhort his soldiers and presents himself as an outstanding patriot. Now, this may be a later rhetorical exercise, but even so the fact that Leosthenes was chosen as a speaker might reflect a real situation. As a matter of fact, Mathieu has underlined the fact that Leosthenes appears to speak before young men and he goes on to associate this speech with his generalship epi ten choran in 324/3; it was actually as such that he was praised by the ephebes of the tribe Leontis (Reinmuth 15, left side).

Lachares, “ο τῶν ξένων ἱγούμενος” (the leader of the mercenaries; Pap. Oxyr. XVII 2082, frg.1, ll.5-6) is referred to by Pausanias as “προεστηκότα ἐς ἑκεῖνο τοῦ δήμου” (having been leader of the people for that purpose; I.25.7). He must have commanded certain rhetorical skills in order to have acquired any kind of popularity among the demos, although we lack information about any sort of military activity which could have conferred a certain fame on him.

Olympiodoros is attributed by Pausanias with the honour of having inspired the Athenians to revolt and of having restored their ancestral glory (I.26.3). The circumstances of his election were also special. He seems to have been elected specifically for the assault on the Mouseion

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15 Lykourgos had carried up plentiful weapons and thousands of missiles to the Akropolis: IG II 457; [Plut.], X Orat. Vit 849a.
16 “Guerre”, p.66.
during the Athenian revolt against Demetrios Poliorketes in 287.\textsuperscript{17} One thing that could have prompted the Athenians would be the fact that Olympiodoros had exhorted them and inspired in them the bravery required.

In the decree in his honour (\textit{IG} II\textsuperscript{2} 682) Phaidros of Sphettos is said to have appeared regularly before the \textit{ekklesia} “\textit{ἀποφαίνομενος ἂεὶ τὰ κράτιστα}” (always giving the best advice) (l. 34), “\textit{διετέλεσε λέγων κοι πράττον ὁ ἀγαθὸν ἡδόνατο περὶ τοῦ δήμου}” (he continuously said and did whatever good he could for the people) (ll.41-2) and even to have advised the people on a very important occasion, during the revolt of 287: “\textit{συμβουλεύσας τῷ δήμῳ συντελέσατι}” (ll.36-7: most probably to come to an agreement with Demetrios Poliorketes).

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\textbf{b) Political convictions}

It has to be stressed that we can only speculate on the political convictions of the generals (and of the orators). Most of the time their activities bear multiple or even diametrically opposite interpretations. It is certainly sensible to avoid explaining their actions under the perspective of pro- or anti - Macedonianism which is too simplistic and quite misleading. It is impossible to define sharply their political views and motives, or try to explain the various courses of action they followed on different occasions. It will emerge that almost all the leading figures in Athens - and not only the generals - were highly controversial and ambivalent. It cannot be established with certainty where diplomacy and manoeuvring stops and pro-Macedonianism begins. Problems of interpretation are confronted by acute problems of chronology; for example, as will be argued later, the activities of the general Phaidros can be interpreted in two entirely contradictory ways, depending on when the regime of Lachares is to be dated.

It was, of course, a period during which everything changed rapidly and the leading men of the Greek states tried to catch up, without really

\textsuperscript{17} M. J. Osborne ("Phaidros", 182-194) advances convincing arguments to date the revolt in 287 B.C., and not in 286 B.C. as T. L. Shear had proposed ("Kallias").
knowing what was best. There were not many ways open to the elite of the poleis other than to become philoi (‘friends’) of a king. The philoi of the kings were either those officials in their service or those who in one way or another were associated with them and benefited from this. The leader of the various poleis necessarily came into direct contact with the kings and they had to become their philoi in order to retain their position and also to benefit their poleis. But being philos of a monarch carried an unfavourable aspect: they could be regarded as traitors.

Being a "φίλος καὶ ξένος" (guest-friend) of Alexander was bound to place Phokion in a very ambiguous and precarious position (Plut., Phoc. 17.9). These honours would at the same time provoke the suspicions of his compatriots but on the other hand they would render him useful in the dealings of Athens with Macedonia. The saying of Phokion transmitted to us by Plutarch concerning the relations of Athens with those in power ""Ἡ τοῖς ὀπλοῖς κρατεῖν ἢ τοῖς κρατοῦσι φίλους εἶναι"" (either be superior in arms or be friends with those who are superior: Phoc. 21.1) actually applies to the overall policy of Athens at the time.18 Early scholarship treated Phokion quite unfavourably, essentially regarding him as a fervent pro-Macedonian. To take the most detailed accounts of his conduct among the most recent scholars, C. Bearzot is the most severe critic of Phokion’s activities - she in fact accuses him of high treason but she does avoid resorting to the term ‘pro-Macedonian’.19 H-J. Gehrke, on the other hand, takes at face value almost everything that Plutarch says in praise.20 Both of them hold extreme views. L. Tritle stands somewhere in the middle, rather favourably disposed, close enough to Gehrke but with a more balanced attitude. He rejects any notion of Phokion being pro-Macedonian, and thinks - I believe justifiably so - that it is “erroneous to fix Phokion’s political position to any concept of a party or factional ideology.”.21

18 The origin of this saying seems to be traced back to Philip II ([Plut.], Mor. 178c) and thereafter it became a topos, for example it appears in Plutarch’s Marius (31.5) as well as in the history of Memnon of Herakleia (FGH 434, F18).

19 Focione.

20 Phokion.

21 Phocion the Good, pp.115, 132.
There is no way of proving that Phokion did not honestly believe that Athens was not in the military and financial position to face Macedonia and thus chose the way of compromise trying to make the most out of his connections with the Macedonians. Besides, he was proved right at least as far as the Lamian War was concerned.

Thymocharis of Sphettos is labelled by Tarn as "a devoted adherent of Kassandros" because it so happens that he was the commander of the Athenian contingents in Kassandros' campaigns (during the period of Demetrios Phalerus).

True, we do not hear of any other Athenian general assuming command in these campaigns. On the other hand, could Thymocharis have had any choice? There is also the curious information in the honorific decree for his son Phaidros (IG II 682), passed in the period of Antigonos Gonatas (250s) that he managed so that the Athenian contingents would not have to participate in the siege of Oreos by Kassandros (II.14-18). This can be interpreted either as indicating a lack of commitment to Kassandros' affairs together with an interest in preserving Athenian lives or it can be seen solely as a means of flattering Antigonos Gonatas, whose father Demetrios Poliorketes was at war with Kassandros at the time of the siege.

Lachares, the so-called tyrant of our sources, is perhaps the darkest figure. At some point in the first decade of the third century he came to supreme power. We know nothing about his early career that would help us explain his political conduct. What is more, we know nothing about his origins, and his name is rather uncommon. He surely enjoyed a degree of popularity with a certain part of the people in order to have been elected strategos epi ton xenon. W. W. Tarn has placed him among "the more oligarchic section of the moderates" who came to power after 301.

Various problems are connected with his regime: chronology, the extent of involvement of Kassandros, the extent to which Lachares was regarded as a tyrant by his contemporary Athenians.

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22 Gonatas, p.45.
23 Gonatas, p.43.
24 The case of Lachares will be discussed in a separate section.
The cases of Phaidros and Olympiodoros equally exemplify the impossibility of expressing rigid views on an Athenian leader's conduct.

Olympiodoros was the hero of the Four Years War against Kassandros. Most scholars assume that at first he was on Lachares' side, but that later on he fought by the side of Demetrios Poliorketes against him; subsequently he became an archon for two successive years, which has come to be considered as a sign of oligarchy. Yet, he was the one to lead Athens to revolt against Demetrios Poliorketes in 287.

We also lack any coherent picture of Olympiodoros' activities and role after the revolt; the only reference to him is to be found in *PHerc.* 1418, col.33, dated to c.280-277, which apparently has something to do with Mithres (official of Lysimachos) being kept in captivity in the Peiraeus. Olympiodoros is referred to as a general, but the only thing we can make out is that he had sent certain letters to someone. At any rate, it is significant that Olympiodoros was still active, six years after the revolt, which gives substance to the possibility that his presence was continuous in Athenian public life.

The problem of Phaidros' convictions will be discussed further in connection with the revolt of Athens from Demetrios in 287, but at this point we should try and establish his relationship with Lachares' regime and with Demetrios Poliorketes in the 290s. He was general *ἐπὶ τὴν παρασκευὴν* twice in 296/5. If the latter part of the archon year 296/5 marks the fall of Lachares, then he had held the generalship under Lachares, but retained his position under the new regime. Most probably he had co-operated with Demetrios and thus ingratiated himself with him.

In the years to come Phaidros was elected several times to the generalship, though we do not know exactly when. However, the chronological arrangement of the decree in his honour renders it most

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25 See *Cronache Ercolanesi* 7, 1977, p.43. The problem of Mithres' captivity is connected with the extremely vexed problem of the re-acquisition or not of the Peiraeus.

26 P. Gauthier ("La réunification", pp.379-92) separates this double tenure of office from the archonship of Nikias, but the δις in ll. 21-3 clearly qualifies the participle *χειροσκοπηθείς*.

probable that he was a general in 294/3 and/or 293/2. Plutarch reports that Demetrios Poliorcetes, after having overthrown Lachares, κατέστησεν ἀρχὰς αὐτὸν προσφιλεῖς τῷ δῆμῳ (Demetr. 34.4). It is quite probable that these archai included the generalship and therefore Phaidros must have in some way ingratiated himself with Demetrios.

It is perfectly reasonable in the cases of both Olympiodoros and Phaidros that they could ‘betray’ Lachares and provide help to Demetrios, or at least remain neutral with regard to both Lachares and Demetrios. Thus, they would gain a prominent position under the new regime and regain the favour of the demos, that is to the extent it had been lost. Tarn finds it astonishing that Phaidros “could steer so successfully between Scylla and Charybdis” but it is not that astonishing if we consider that Lachares was not exactly ‘Scylla’, as Demetrios was not exactly ‘Charybdis’. It is difficult to believe with J. Gabbert that both Phaidros’ and Olympiodoros’ activities should be seen under the perspective of personal loyalty to Demetrios Poliorcetes. In the case of Olympiodoros she concedes genuine patriotism as well. I find personal devotion to a monarch quite weak as a motivation: patriotism and loyalty when the latter is directed to a foreign ruler can be incompatible.

Phaidros’ career in the 280s is even more perplexing. It emerges that he appeared regularly before the ekklesia (ll.34, 36-7, 41). The nature of his convictions is a matter of dispute and therefore so is the evaluation of his behaviour during the revolt of 287. T. L. Shear classifies him among the pro-Macedonians and argues that he operated against the success of the revolt. M. J. Osborne on the other hand maintains plausibly that he was moderate and co-operated with his brother Kallias. His most important argument is that had he intended to prevent the Athenian uprising, he would certainly not have helped with the gathering of the harvest; this would surely have helped the Athenians to endure a siege.

28 Gonatas, p. 45.
29 Antigonus Gonatas, pp.144, 147.
30 “Phaidros”, p.188.
However, Phaidros had advised the Athenians to a certain effect, most probably with regard to Demetrios Poliorketes. We can only speculate as to the nature of his advice. The hypothesis advanced by Shear, Habicht and Osborne seems to me to be quite plausible: he urged the Athenians to seek peace with Demetrios. If so, then this does not render him pro-Macedonian or pro-Demetrian but only cautious.

Osborne rightly remarks that with every probability he participated in the peace negotiations with Demetrios. His observation is only strengthened by the fact that it was the college of the strategoi that assumed responsibility at that time (Kallias decree, ll.33-40).

There remains to solve the problem of Phaidros' disappearance from active political life after the revolt of 287. How can we explain that after 286 Phaidros was only elected to minor offices, or rather not politically significant. Was it the revenge of the restored democracy, as the consensus of scholars has it (whether they regard Phaidros as pro-Macedonian or as a moderate patriot)? Was he old enough to withdraw from public life? We know hardly anything about the period after 286; in particular we cannot put our finger on the leading men of this period.

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31 Shear, "Kallias", p.70; Habicht, Untersuchungen, p.56.
32 "Phaidros", p.187 and n.18, p.188. The problem of the nature of the peace treaty will be discussed below in connection with the informal contacts of the generals.
iii. Embassies

a) The fourth century

Participation in embassies is an element of political activity about which there is explicit evidence in the sources, for the most part literary ones. Unfortunately, testimonies are much more detailed with regard to the embassies belonging to the period from 338 to 318. For the rest we have to content ourselves with only passing references. Even detailed references prove to be quite problematic with regard to either the central figure of a mission or the degree of responsibility to be ascribed to the envoys on various occasions, or the motives behind their activities.

It has been mentioned above that the generals were frequently employed as envoys to various rulers, something that marks a shift from the practices employed in the fourth century until 338. Instead, the parallel is to be observed in the fifth century. The leading men of the period, Themistokles, Aristeides, Kimon etc., had undertaken embassies. On the contrary, in the fourth century we only read about Autokles who was dispatched to Sparta in 371, Derkylos and Nausikles. The latter two were involved in the negotiations with Philip in 346, but it is significant that they did not influence the course of events. That military men now undertake embassies points to an effort on behalf of the Athenian demos to unify the political and the military fields; it indicates, however indirectly, that the Athenians had lost faith in the practice pursued in the fourth century, e.g. diplomacy lying completely in the hands of rhetores, and decided to resort to older practices.

From 338 to the 260s there are recorded c. 30 missions and about the same number of envoys. In the years between 338 and 322 there were c.12 embassies consisting in all of c.17 ambassadors among whom Phokion and Leosthenes were generals; Demetrios of Phaleron also held the strategia when he was an ambassador in 307. Between 319 and 318 we read about two embassies in which two generals participate (Phokion,

33 Mosley, Envoys, p.43.
Konon). In the period of Demetrios Phalereus (317-307) there is explicit reference to an embassy to Polemaios (general of Antigonos Monophthalmos) and a vague reference to secret embassies dispatched by the Athenians to Antigonos. From 306 to 300 there are recorded c. 3 embassies, one of them conducted single-handed by Olympiodoros, but it is questionable whether he was a general at the time. In the third century and until the 260s there are recorded c. 8 embassies. Four out of eight ambassadors in this latter period were men with distinguished military careers and they conducted their missions single-handed. It becomes immediately obvious that the strategoi appear much more in the forefront of events.

Absolute numbers and statistics do not give us a clear picture. The generals are outnumbered by those men who served as ambassadors but had no distinguished military career to display. Fewer though they were, it remains significant that Athens chose to elect generals. The inevitable question arises: what were the circumstances, what could have prompted them? What was the extent of influence the generals exercised upon Athenian foreign policy? Did they manage to facilitate Athens' relations with the various kings? Each of the generals demands separate examination in order to reveal the different circumstances accompanying the various missions and answer the above-mentioned questions. As will be demonstrated, all the embassies conducted by generals were of the utmost importance.

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Phokion in 338 and in 335

The first embassy in which we find a man with a military career, Phokion, participating occurs in 338, in the aftermath of the battle of Chaironeia. The other two envoys were Demades and Aeschines.34 This embassy was brought about after Philip had sent Demades (a captive after the battle of Chaironeia) to Athens with an offer. As a result Philip treated Athens with extreme clemency, in sharp contrast with the cruel
treatment of Thebes. He allowed Athens to retain possession of Samos, Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros and the administration of Delos; he restored Oropos and returned the captives without ransom. Various explanations could be advanced: admiration for the cultural glory of Athens to start with. Another attractive hypothesis is that, had he tried to attack Athens he would have been considerably delayed since immediately after the battle the Athenians had come up with measures to face a siege and their navy was still efficient. On similar grounds rests the suggestion that Philip needed Athenian manpower and her navy for his forthcoming expedition to Asia and therefore would have been unwise to impose harsh terms on Athens. All these explanations minimise the role of the ambassadors and explain Athens’ fate in terms of Philip’s preconceived plans.

The second embassy occurs in 335, after the destruction of Thebes by Alexander. Actually, there had been two successive embassies: according to Arrian (Anab. 1.10.3-6), just after the revolt of Thebes and immediately before her destruction, Demades had proposed that ten envoys should be dispatched to congratulate Alexander on his safe return from his campaign. Of course, the real intention was to placate Alexander’s anger since Athens’ role in the revolt of Thebes was quite suspect. However, Alexander treated the envoys with clemency but demanded the surrender of certain prominent Athenians whom he regarded as warmongers. It emerges from Plutarch’s narrative that the Athenians were quite perplexed as to whom they should dispatch the second time (Dem. 23.6). He even states that Demades was offered five talents in order to participate, but he insists that it was Phokion who

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35 [Arist.], Ath. Pol. 62.2; D.S., XVIII.56.7; Plut., Alex. 28.2. For Delos: IG II² 1652; for Oropos, [Demades], On the Twelve Years, 9; D.S., XVIII. 56.6.
36 Sealey, Demosthenes p.199.
37 Cawkwell, Philip, p.111.
38 According to Plutarch (Dem. 23.3) Demosthenes was included among the envoys but the prospect of meeting Alexander was intimidating enough to make him abandon the mission halfway. On the other hand, according to Diodorus (XVII.4.7-8) there were also rumours that he had been bribed by the Persians in order to pursue a policy hostile to Macedonia; see Chapter II, p.109.
39 Plut., Dem. 23; id., Phoc. 17; Arr., Anab. 1.10; D.S., XVII.15.1.
contributed the most to the mission. The purpose of this second mission, which consisted of only Demades and Phokion, was to persuade Alexander not to insist on his demand to surrender the Athenian leaders. Additionally, Athens requested to be allowed to provide refuge for the Theban fugitives. Their request was granted with the exception of Charidemos who sought refuge in Dareios' court. It is interesting that after having previously dispatched ten envoys, the Athenians now opted for only two. It points, however indirectly, to a realisation that ten envoys were useless.

In both 338 and 335 the Athenians must have counted on the great esteem Alexander would have for the aged Phokion because of Philip's esteem for the man: "τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ψήφισμα ἐδέξατο κομίσθεν παρὰ Φωκίωνος, τῶν πρεσβυτάτων ἄκούων ὅτι καὶ Φιλίππος ἔθαύμαζε τὸν ἀνδρα τούτον" (Plut., Phoc. 17. 6). Now, this statement would be naturally made in a work aiming at glorifying Phokion's personality. However, the subsequent treatment of Phokion by Alexander indicates that there is at least an element of the truth in Plutarch's testimony. He was considerably older than his fellow ambassadors, which must have carried a certain respect; and his efforts to prevent the Athenians from rushing into action must have been known to Alexander. This mission has been problematic with regard to its protagonist. Plutarch underlines the importance of Phokion by mentioning that the people insisted on his participation. On the other hand certain scholars express doubts as to the validity of Plutarch's testimony. For example, Bearzot rejects it on the grounds that Phokion hardly enjoyed any popularity among the demos. But where can we base the view that he was not popular among the people? Perhaps, only his absence from the board of generals in 338

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40 It is a problem by whom Demades was offered this exceptionally high amount of money; although there is the possibility that this is an exaggeration. My suggestion is that whatever the amount of money was, it is implausible that it would have been provided by private contributions; rather, it must have been provided by individuals who had access to public funds.

41 D.S., XVII.15.1-5; Plut., Dem. 23.4-6; Arr., Anab. 1.10.1-6.

42 "He accepted the second decree because he was told by the oldest people present that Philip also admired this man."

43 Focione, pp.145-146.
could substantiate such a view. Even if Phokion was not the people’s favourite, what mattered to the Athenians was that in the past he had been on good terms with Philip and they could take advantage of it. They did not hesitate to restore Demades his civic rights in 322 in order to help them out of their difficulties with Antipatros (D.S., XVIII.18.1-2). Popularity was not a *sine qua non* for the election of these men as ambassadors. Expediency and the needs of the moment prevailed in the mind of the Athenian *demos*. R. Sealey as well attributes credit solely to Demades for the success of the embassy, but this view discounts the testimony of Plutarch completely. He refers briefly to Phokion but in sharp opposition to Bearzot he argues for the full support of Phokion for the Athenian cause.44

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**The peace negotiations of 322**

In 322, after the defeat at Krannon, Demades proposed that they should appoint πρέσβεις αὐτοκράτορας (ambassadors invested with full powers). Phokion was sent as an ambassador to Antipatros together with Demades and certain others to conclude a peace treaty (Plut., *Phoc.* 26-7; D.S., XVIII.18.2-3). This mission is problematic with regard to the actual number of the envoys dispatched, as well as to the central figure of the mission. Neither Plutarch nor Diodorus specify the number of envoys who accompanied Demades and Phokion. Diodorus’ summary account of the mission has Demades as the central figure and makes a vague reference to some others (τινῶν ἔτερων). In sharp contrast Plutarch mentions by name only Phokion and the philosopher Xenokrates and, of course, the former is the leading figure. In fact, Plutarch’s narrative discerns two phases in the mission: in the first it was established that the negotiations would take place in Thebes (where Antipatros was at the time). In a fragment of a speech attributed to Demetrios of Phaleron we

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44 Demosthenes, pp.208-9.
are informed that he too was an envoy, most probably in the first mission; whether he participated in the second mission is unclear.45

There were then at least three envoys in both stages of the mission; how many were the other presbeis referred to vaguely by both Diodorus and Plutarch?46 In the past, whenever peace-terms were the aim of the mission ten envoys were dispatched. Moreover it is in connection with such missions that we find envoys endowed with full powers, and this in three cases out of ten.47

Appointing ten men on an embassy meant (most of the time) including the widest possible variety of opinions among the citizen-body. Thus the risk was eliminated that there would be debates as to the outcome after the return of the envoys. Additionally, the dispatching of people of different political convictions ensured that one would keep an eye on the other. But on the other hand such a variety of opinions could protract the negotiations or, worse, the lack of co-ordinated action could render the mission fruitless, as had been the case on certain occasions in the past.48 It seems, however, that the Athenian attitude was different in 322.

Whatever the number of envoys, it seems that the Athenians had chosen them rather carefully. Phokion, Demades and Demetrios Phalereus were all regarded as being - to a lesser or greater extent - friendly towards Macedonia. The rest (apart from Xenokrates) did not object to Antipatros' terms, or rather they even found them to be moderate, which indicates, at least, that there was no visible difference in the views of the envoys. Xenokrates was the only one to object, but

45 De Elocutione 289 = Wehrli, frg. 183; see Chapter II, p.133.
46 The presence of the Athenian Kallimedon, reported by Plutarch and, according to him, by other sources as well, is quite problematic. Plutarch records (Dem. 27) that just before the outbreak of the Lamian War he (along with Pytheas) joined the embassies of Antipatros to the Arkadians to deter them from joining the revolt. We do not know when he returned to Athens, but in 320/19 we find him as a mine-lessee (IG II 1587, 1.12). He could have returned to Athens just after the end of the war, in which case he could have been dispatched to Antipatros by the Athenian demos who would have counted on his connections with the Macedonian regent; in fact this is the view of Tritle who calls him an associate of Phokion (Phocion the Good, p.130). On the other hand, it remains possible that he had remained constantly with Antipatros, until after the terms of the peace had been agreed upon.
47 Mosley, Envoys, p.56.
48 Mosley, Envoys, pp.54-61, for the different opinions that might be combined.
being a philosopher, he was probably elected as a symbol of Athens' cultural glory.\textsuperscript{49}

Evidently then, one of the aims of the Athenians was to eliminate the possibility of conflict among the envoys in the course of the negotiations. Difference in the political profile of the envoys was not a hindrance as long as the aim of the mission was pre-established. On the other hand, it could certainly prove to be a major obstacle if the aim of the embassy was not clearly defined or rather when Athens was in the dark as to the actual terms that would be offered.

The importance of the assignment of full powers should not be exaggerated. Essentially, the attitude of the \textit{demos} vis-à-vis the envoys and vice-versa remains the same: full powers or not these envoys are or feel obliged to report back to the \textit{demos} as had always been the case.\textsuperscript{50} In this respect, therefore, Athenian policy is along traditional lines. As D. J. Mosley has asserted: “in no instance did a party to negotiations make an opening move by sending ambassadors with full powers. In no instance of genuine negotiations was a delegation given free authority to accept terms of which there had been no previous consideration. It is interesting to note that in one of the very rare instances that the envoys were given ‘carte blanche’ to accept any terms which they thought acceptable, they are not described as having full powers and that they failed to achieve their purposes”.\textsuperscript{51}

Demades had proposed in this case that the ambassadors should be granted absolute power in order to negotiate with Antipatros (Plut., \textit{Phoc.} 26.3). It appears that though this was granted, Phokion and the others were not inclined to bear the responsibility for the outcome; for after their meeting with Antipatros in Thebes they returned to Athens in order to report to the \textit{demos} the intention of Antipatros. It is not so much that they were unwilling to undertake the responsibility for the outcome of

\textsuperscript{49} See Appendices, Chapter II, 3. Philosophers as envoys: Xenokrates and Krates.

\textsuperscript{50} Rhodes (\textit{Athenaion Politeia}, p.402) comments that for individuals or boards to be elected \textit{autokratores} was equated to being “given a free hand to do a particular job with less interference or need to secure approval ... but precisely how far and in what respects they were to be free tends not to be specified”.

\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Envoys}, p.35.
the negotiations, as that they were obliged to refer to the demos. Being autokrator meant employing any means as long as the ultimate goal was achieved, a goal set by the Athenian people. In the case of the embassy of 322, what could be the goal of Athens? Or, in other words, could Athens have set a priori a specific target? It is possible that the Athenians expected a treatment analogous to the one reserved for them by Philip in 338. It appears that the prime aim of Athens was to negotiate on the spot, i.e. not in Attika; only then would she proceed with the terms of the treaty. Ultimately, it was the Athenian demos who decided that they should yield to Antipatros’ demands; the ambassadors simply transmitted their will.

The fundamental distorting factor in our understanding of the peace of 322 and of the role of the envoys is the belief that Athens was in a position to negotiate and that, consequently, the envoys could have achieved better terms. On the contrary, I think that the matter was entirely at the discretion of Antipatros; very little was left for the envoys to achieve.

According to Bearzot, both Diodorus and Plutarch tend to obscure the responsibility of the ambassadors for the terms imposed by Antipatros. She adds in support the statement of Pausanias (VII.10.4-5) that Antipatros’ priority was to return to Asia and therefore he was indifferent as to whether he should leave Athens free or in servitude. But Pausanias is quite unreliable at this point (for chronological if for not any other reasons) and consequently Bearzot’s remark is far-fetched and it does not seem to derive from a correct appreciation of the situation. Antipatros might have negotiated rapidly, but he would surely not leave his rear unguarded. He would not risk allowing Athens the opportunity for another revolt; all the more so since the allied army had enjoyed a few victories in the Lamian War and the battle of Krannon had not really crushed the Athenian army. A small garrison on the Mounychia Hill

52 Focione, p. 170.
53 Williams (Athens without Democracy, p.129, n.344) has pointed out that the alleged preoccupation of Antipatros with warfare in Asia is misplaced since hostilities with Perdikkas started later.
would be instrumental in imposing fear on the Athenians. Besides, both Plutarch, who wants to present Phokion in a favourable light, and Diodorus, who is not very well disposed towards Athens, state that the people were forced to accept Antipatros’ terms (υπ’ ἀνάγκης).

We have to deal with the discrepancies between Plutarch and Diodorus as to the dominant person in the mission. The first presents Phokion as the principal envoy and as the one who was able to work out the best deal for Athens. Diodorus, on the other hand, minimises his contribution and puts forward Demades. One has to bear in mind that, in his effort to present an ideal statesman and general, Plutarch often exaggerates but on the other hand he provides us with a much more detailed account of the events while Diodorus is writing a world history and it is inevitable that he squeezes events and does not pay attention to details. Additionally, Cornelius Nepos attributes Phokion a significant role, though he appreciates it negatively (II. 1-3). The latter’s testimony, therefore prevents us from dismissing Plutarch’s account.

As I will argue in the next chapter, Demades was a central figure before and after the embassy. As to the actual mission I believe that there was not much room for negotiations. One notable achievement, however, involves Phokion; had the latter not insisted on negotiating outside Attika (Plut., Phoc. 26.5), Antipatros would have probably ravaged it, just to demonstrate power and to inspire fear.

We should not doubt that Phokion did request Antipatros to leave Athens ungarrisoned, which was naturally not granted. The answer of Antipatros “πάντα σοι χαρίζομαι βουλόμεθα πλην τῶν σε ἀπολούντων καὶ ἡμᾶς” (I wish to grant you any favour apart from those that will destroy both you and us; Plut., Phoc. 27.7) is thought by Bearzot to reveal the pro-Macedonian and anti-democratic disposition of Phokion. Actually, she does not cast any doubt on the request itself; she rather chooses to focus on the answer of Antipatros. In this manner it is implied that she takes the request to be meaningless, made simply for the sake of appearances. Even if the story is true, it is not imperative that it bears
testimony to Phokion's political convictions; instead, it could be taken simply to mean that if there was no garrison, the Athenians would revolt again, the Macedonians would intervene, which would probably lead to Phokion's death. Actually, the story bears a strong anecdotal character and even Plutarch questions this incident: he refers to other writers who report that Antipatros asked Phokion whether he could guarantee that the Athenians would not take up arms against him, a question the latter failed to answer. These other sources appear to be more credible all the more because they report the presence of another Athenian, Kallimedon, who answered in an insulting manner;\footnote{Kallimedon shouted: "If he speaks so foolishly, will you trust him and not do the things you have resolved to?" The nature of Kallimedon's remark is intriguing: it is commonly understood to be directed against Phokion and to be actually urging Antipatros to install the garrison.} in any case, for our purposes, it remains significant that there was more than one source which reported the request of Phokion.

The other harsh clause of the treaty, namely the limitation of the franchise to those who possessed a fortune above 2000 drachmai, is more difficult to explain. Gehrke thinks that it was the Athenian envoys, or rather Phokion, who being inspired by the constitution of the five thousand in 411, proposed a similar model of constitution which was gladly accepted by Antipatros.\footnote{Phokion, p.87.} Bearzot also regards Phokion as responsible but attributes the limitation of the franchise to his much more selfish interest in securing his position in Athens. It is again her hostile attitude towards Phokion that is responsible for this interpretation. Whatever Phokion's motives were, I believe that Antipatros would surely be interested in limiting the number of citizens. The installation of a garrison and the limitation of citizenship rights are normally set within the wider policy of Antipatros of installing oligarchies backed up by a Macedonian garrison in 'troublesome' cities. In the case of Athens, however, limitation of the franchise could very well have an additional purpose. It was not so much because Antipatros thought that the poorer citizens were the warmongers but because he wanted to diminish
significantly the numerical power of the Athenian navy which was basically manned by the poorer Athenian citizens. Hence, it is implausible to hold that the ambassadors could have come up with better results. On the other hand, could things have been worse? Referring to Antipatros’ initial demand for unconditional surrender, L. Tritle has observed that at some point the ambassadors must have persuaded him to abandon this thought. Instead, I would rather believe that had Antipatros really wished unconditional surrender he would have demanded it immediately after the battle of Krannon; his initial demand should be seen as an attempt to humiliate the envoys. Besides, he would not have yielded to the demand of Phokion to negotiate outside Attika. Moreover, Antipatros did not proceed to establish an epimeletes as Kassandros did a few years later, which indicates that at least for the moment he was not interested in putting Athens under a more firm grip. Additionally, there is the curious remark in Plutarch (Phoc. 28.1) that the Athenians were not so much horrified by the garrison as insulted, which is an indication of mild behaviour on the part of the garrison.

In the ensuing period from 322 to 318 Phokion was a central figure in Athenian politics. The primary purpose of the Athenian demos was liberation from the Macedonian garrison, towards which end they tried to make use of Phokion’s relationship with Antipatros. A passage of Plutarch (Phoc. 30.8) referring to Athenian efforts is rather intriguing. At first sight it appears as if the demos had lost the upper hand and could no longer impose its will; more specifically, although the people repeatedly called for an embassy of Phokion to Antipatros he always managed to swing the matter. That the people were not convinced about the futility of the effort is revealed by the fact that they next resorted to Demades. The above mentioned passage is revealing in more than one

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56 Williams (Athens without Democracy, p.120) wonders why would Antipatros have based the new regime on that part of the population which constituted the hoplite class and the one that had led the rebellion against him. In my view, Antipatros’ aim was not so much to find supporters among those retaining the franchise, as to ensure that Athens would be deprived of the means and manpower to lead another revolt; rather than relying on Athenian supporters, he would rely on the garrison he had established.

57 Phocion the Good, p.130.

58 See Chapter II, pp.129-132.
way. Firstly, it reveals what could precede the election of an ambassador: a possible reconstruction of the procedure could be the following: certain Athenians would appear before the ekklesia proposing an embassy and calling for Phokion to undertake it. He would then come to the front and argue against the proposal. Secondly, the passage demonstrates that the personal relationship of Phokion with Antipatros, on this particular occasion, counted more in the Athenian mind than Demades’ generally much more energetic activity in the ekklesia.

Phokion might very well have known that the Athenian claim could hardly meet with acceptance. However, he did engage himself in an effort to make life a lot easier for the Athenians.59

Things became much more complicated when Antipatros appointed as regent Polyperchon instead of his own son Kassandros, and the former marched to Attika to force Nikanor (appointed phrourarch by Kassandros) out.

An embassy to Nikanor consisting of Phokion, Konon and Klearchos, asking him to withdraw from Mounychia was unsuccessful. This embassy is mentioned only by Diodorus (XVIII.64.4–5); its significance is twofold: firstly, it underlines the belief of the Athenians that Phokion was in a position to influence the commander at Mounychia. Secondly, it is the second time that an embassy includes two military men: Phokion and Konon.60 Undoubtedly, Phokion was the leading member of the mission, yet it is dubious whether he sincerely believed in its chances of success. It took place after it had become quite obvious that Nikanor not only had no intention of withdrawing, but instead had strengthened his position by seizing the Peiraieus as well. On the other hand, it is interesting that this mission was preceded by embassies to Polyperchon asking him to effectuate his proclamation of the return of Greek affairs to the status quo established by Philip II (D.S., XVIII.64.3). It is possible that the Athenians had received some sort of reassurance from Nikanor

59 See pp.60–5.
60 General in 334/3: IG II² 2970, 1.5; also in 333/2: IG II² 2976, 1.9; Hesp. 9 1940, pp. 62–3, no.8.
and made a final attempt to avoid warfare in Attika, as they probably thought would be the case if Polyperchon marched to Attika.

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**Changes in practice**

Looking at these embassies as a whole we are presented with certain interesting characteristics. First of all, apart from Demosthenes in 335 and Xenokrates in 322, the other envoys were supposed to be well disposed towards Macedonia. Athens, therefore seems to abandon the practice of dispatching people of varying or even conflicting political convictions. Not only that, but the Athenians appear to have elected people among whom there existed previous ties. Phokion had been called upon as a witness for the defence of Aeschines at his trial in 343/2; Klearchos was the son of Nausikles, the general who participated in the negotiations for the Peace of Philokrates together with Aeschines and Demosthenes, and who together with Phokion had taken the side of Aeschines at his trial.

The presence of both Phokion and Demades in three embassies of major importance indicates a change in the Athenian practice of selection of envoys which in the past had not been notable for its interest in continuity, with the notable exception of the peace of Philokrates in 346. Yet, the three missions involved on that occasion had the same objective and were conducted within a very short period of time whereas the embassies under examination were much more widely spread and had relatively different aims. Phokion and Demades (together with Leosthenes) are the most important emissaries of the period. Their participation in the embassy of 338 was a direct result of their being on good terms with Philip. Once proved a fruitful practice, the Athenians established a more clear view of how and through what kind of envoys they should handle their relations with Macedonia.

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61 Mosley, *Envoys*, pp.59-61; notorious examples are the embassy to Sparta in 371 (Xen., Hell., 6.3.2-17) and the embassy to Philip in 346 (Aes., II; Dem., XIX).

62 Dem., XIX; E. Harris, “Nausicles”, p.382.
Olympiodorus’ mission to Aitolia

In 306 there broke out the Four Years War between Kassandros and Demetrios Poliorketes, in which Athens found herself menaced by the ruler of Macedonia. Olympiodorus, a man unknown to us up to this moment, was dispatched immediately to Aitolia. It is only thanks to Pausanias that we get a glimpse of his long and glorious career. Otherwise, J. K. Davies has conjectured that he could be the son of Diotimós who distinguished himself in the third quarter of the fourth century. In IG II² 1629 (II.539-41, 622-9) his heir Olympiodorus pays the two naval debts incurred by his father. Another interesting point of Davies is that we could restore Olympiodorus’ name in IG II² 408 as that of the lieutenant placed in charge of the corn supply by Diotimós. Such an identification, Davies concludes, would be chronologically acceptable and in line with the family’s democratic traditions. The identification seems to me quite plausible, since, as Davies notes, he was the only prominent man of the period bearing this name.

At any rate, we are informed by Pausanias that Olympiodorus sailed to Aitolia which indicates that the land route was blockaded and that Kassandros’ army was very close to Attika. It is obvious that the situation of Athens was extremely precarious and called for immediate action. It has already been mentioned that there is no concrete information about Olympiodorus’ career before this mission that would help us speculate on the grounds for his election. Even accepting Davies’ identification there is still a considerable gap in his career between the 330s and the 310s. However, he was probably alone on the mission to Aitolia, something that is quite unusual and bears a

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64 He had a consistent interest in mining leases and had also assumed the trierarchy; more importantly, he had been a general in 338/7 and in 335 successfully carried out a campaign against the pirates, for which he was honoured in 334/3; 338/7: IG II² 1628, II.396-7, 915-6; IG II² 1631, II.10-1. 334/3: IG II² 1623, II.276-85; for the honours: [Plut.], X. Orat. Vit. 844a; IG II² 414a+ Schweigert, Hesp. 9, 1940, pp.340-1.
65 APF, pp.164-5.
66 Though Pausanias does not use the actual term, it is fairly certain that Olympiodorus was officially appointed and did not go to Aitolia on his own initiative as Leosthenes had done (see pp. 51-60).
resemblance to the mission of Leosthenes. Rapidity and secrecy were absolutely essential and thus we can deduce that he must have been quite a trustworthy person. We cannot conclude with safety that he was a general when he was dispatched, but since his later record includes military exploits and a generalship of the infantry, it is likely that he held a military office at the time of his embassy. The mission to Aitolia re-established the link that Leosthenes had created and brought the two nations once again together fighting against their common enemy: Macedonia. Moreover, it was an alliance that bore much more fruit than the previous one. Athens escaped capture from Kassandros due to the armed intervention of the Aitolians (Paus., I.26.3). Some time later Athens narrowly escaped danger when Kassandros laid siege to Elateia and Olympiodoros forced him to withdraw his army with the aid of the Aitolians (Paus., X.18.7; X.34.3). Had Kassandros been successful in the siege, the route to Attika would have been open and he would have been free to march on Athens. Olympiodoros’ being given the leadership of this expedition was, with every probability, due to his previous successful contact with Aitolia. It was only sensible on behalf of the Athenians to elect a man who was already familiar with Aitolian leadership and with Aitolian techniques of warfare. Flacelière actually labels Olympiodoros a partisan of the Aitolo-Athenian alliance and a warm supporter of the Aitolian party, which is an exaggeration. A trend towards Aitolia due to their mutual hostility to Macedonia and even alliance on certain occasions was only natural, but to infer so much as the existence of a pro-Aitolian party is based on modern political thought.

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b) The third century

Phaidros’ contact with Egypt

During the first decades of the third century embassies become more frequent and there occurs a widening of directions. Athenian
diplomacy is basically focused on securing money and food supplies; more specifically, we read about missions to the various rulers of the Black Sea area, to Kassandros, to Lysimachos, as well as to Ptolemy of Egypt. The former need not detain us here since they are undertaken by men who are not military figures.

The date of Athens' first diplomatic contact with Egypt is a matter of speculation. Most scholars identify the embassy of Phaidros of Sphettos (IG II² 682, ll.28-29) with one of the embassies proposed by Demochares in the 280s and successfully carried out afterwards ([Plut.], X Orat. Vit. 851d-e). From a historical point of view an embassy in the 280s fits very well in the context of a series of embassies to various rulers in order to secure corn supplies and money. The disturbing point is that if we accept this date, we will also have to accept that Phaidros' activities are not listed in chronological order. The decree runs as follows: “έπι Νικίου μὲν ἄρχοντος στρατηγὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου χειροτονηθείς δῖς ... καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν χειροτονηθεῖς πλεονάκις καὶ ἐπὶ τούς ἕνωσις γενόμενος τρῖς ... πρεσβεύσας δὲ πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα Πτολεμαῖον ... χειροτονηθεῖς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἐπὶ τὰ ὀπλα στρατηγὸς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν ἐπὶ Κύμανος ἄρχοντος...” (ll.24-31). Osborne has pointed out that the only solution would be to see ll.24-30 as a general reference to his positions, but the specific references in ll.21-24 are then awkward. On the other hand, the possibility of an embassy prior to the revolt of 287 is quite strong since it emerges from the honorific decree for Kallias that the relations between Athens and Egypt certainly preceded the uprising of 287. Additionally, the embassy to Egypt is listed in the decree after Phaidros' generalship epi ten paraskeuēn in 296/5 and after his multiple strategiai epi ten choran. On the basis of the chronological sequence of Phaidros' offices I would venture to date his embassy to Ptolemy at the beginning of the 280s and also suggest that he undertook his mission in order to secure Ptolemy's contribution to the forthcoming revolt. The Athenians would have expected Demetrios Poliorketes to lay siege to

69 For a date after 287 see Davies, APF, p.526; Habicht, Untersuchungen, p.24 and n.23.
their city, as had happened in the past in order to expel Lachares. Furthermore, an embassy prior to the revolt would at least partly explain how Ptolemy came to the point of providing military assistance as well; it would provide the missing link in the relations of Athens and Egypt. As far as concerns the orthodox view, which dates Phaidros’ embassy after 287, it is still possible that he did participate in the embassy proposed by Demochares, given his previous connection with the Ptolemaic court.

Another problem with Phaidros’ selection concerns the reason that led the Athenians to dispatch him in particular. Why should he be the one to open relations with Egypt? The most likely answer lies in his brother Kallias. Kallias has become known to us from the decree in his honour as an Athenian in the service of Ptolemy, who offered immense support to the Athenian revolt of 287. It emerges that at some point he left Athens as a result of his opposition to the regime, probably at the same time that Demochares did (late fourth century). If he had already acquired prominence in the Ptolemaic court, he would have been able to facilitate Phaidros’ effort to contact Ptolemy and to come up with success.

It is most probable that Phaidros conducted his mission single-handed though I have to admit that this is an argument ex silentio. However, if this is so, then Phaidros’ mission is aligned with the previous ones conducted by Leosthenes and Olympiodoros. We can stress the resemblance even more by observing that all three fall in a period of emergency.

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After the embassies to the kingdoms of the North and to Ptolemy, there is evidence for one embassy to Aitolia (SEG 18.239), (before the Chremonidean War). Unfortunately, there has not been preserved the name of the ambassador from the deme of Halai. The embassy probably falls in a period during which Athens was still struggling against Antigonos Gonatas. Flacelière maintains that if an alliance was concluded

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71 “Kallias”, pp.48-51.
at the time, it would probably have been defensive since it did not constrain the Aitolians to participate in the Chremonidean War. Additionally, there is evidence for an embassy to Pyrrhos in 272, enemy of Antigonus Gonatas at the time (Justin XXV.4.4) but we lack information as to the envoys or the purpose of the mission. It is possible, however, that the Athenians asked Pyrrhos for help against Antigonus Gonatas.

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**The military men in the Chremonidean War**

It is extremely unfortunate and frustrating that our sources, both literary and inscriptive, for the decade preceding the Chremonidean War are considerably reduced. Most notably, we lack the evidence of both Diodorus and Plutarch. The evidence provided by Justin (book XXVI) is unfortunately only an abridged version of the history of Pompeius Trogus. Evidence is even less with regard to the Athenian *dramatis personae*, i.e. the men who prepared the way to the war, and became Athens' leaders. Even our knowledge about the person after whom the war was named, i.e. Chremonides, is extremely poor. The only events of his career that we know of with certainty are that he carried the decree of alliance with Sparta which is commonly supposed to have signalled the start of the war, and that after the end of the war he sought refuge in Egypt (along with his brother) where he became a counsellor of Ptolemy and an admiral of the Ptolemaic fleet. In any case, judging from the evidence we have, it appears that the war was conducted by men who combined, to an equal degree, both military and political abilities.

Chronology and the causes of the war are similarly no less vexed questions. The date of its start depends upon our dating of the archonship of Peithidemos in which Chremonides carried the decree of alliance with Sparta (*SIG* 434/435). The most widespread opinion among

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72 "Rapports", p.475.
73 Teles, *Περὶ φυγῆς* = O. Hense, Tübingen 1909 (2nd ed.), p.23; Polyaenus V.18 for Chremonides being in command of a Ptolemaic fleet.
scholars is that Peithidemos should be assigned to 268/7, something that has been vigorously resisted by B. D. Meritt (and others) who has Peithidemos in 265/4, even though according to such an interpretation the Chremonidean decree post-dates considerably the start of the war: *IG II*² 665 and 666, dating before 265/4, refer to war being already in progress, a piece of evidence which I find to be conclusive.

The most popular interpretation of events presents Ptolemy as the instigator of the war and Athens as a pawn in the struggle between Ptolemy and Antigonos, fighting for her freedom and finally being crushed. In sharp contrast, C. Habicht has advanced a quite radical interpretation: not only is Athens not a pawn of the kings but she is actually the main instigator and drags into the war a not so enthusiastic Ptolemy.⁷⁴

It emerges from the Chremonidean decree that there had been two bilateral alliances: one between Ptolemy II and Sparta (and her allies: the Eleians, the Achaians, the Tegeans and the Orchomenians) and another between Athens and Ptolemy. It is after these that the alliance between Athens and Sparta is concluded; ambassadors are to be dispatched in order to administer oaths with other cities. For our purposes the interest lies in the election of two *synedroi*. One of them is Kallippos (the other's name is missing), the general who led the Athenian contingent of 1000 *epilektoi* against the Celts in 279 (Paus., I.3.5; 4.2; X.20.5). The duties of the *synedroi* are not clearly defined: they are going to take care of the common interest (II.69 ff). One is allowed to surmise that they were not confined to military preparations. That Kallippos was elected as a *synedros* underlines the importance the Athenians attributed to military knowledge. His case is in fact reminiscent of the case of Nausikles who had participated in the *synedrion* of the League of Corinth in 338/7, though the circumstances are fundamentally different.

We come across Kallippos again, together with Aristeides of Lamptrai and Glaukon, this time in a decree of Arkadian Orchomenos.

⁷⁴ *Untersuchungen*, p.108-111; *Athen*, p.144.
dating to the beginning of the war \( (\text{ISE} 53) \)\(^75\). The decree is disappointingly brief and uninformative; the circumstances under which the men were dispatched are not recorded on the stone. It must post-date the Chremonidean decree; relations of Athens with Orchomenos were probably a result of her alliance with Sparta. Furthermore, we are not informed whether the envoys had offered some sort of special services to Orchomenos in order to be awarded the titles of proxenos and euergetes.

In the same year the Orchomenians honoured with a statue king Areus of Sparta, ally of Athens and of theirs in the Chremonidean War. A comparison between the decree for the Athenian ambassadors and the inscription at the base of the statue for Areus proves to be quite interesting. Areus is honoured because of his benefactions to both Orchomenos and to king Ptolemy of Egypt, also an ally against Antigonos Gonatas. Areus and Ptolemy had concluded a bilateral alliance and hence it is plausible that Orchomenos is flattering, indirectly, Ptolemy. One would expect the latter to be mentioned in connection with the Athenian ambassadors as well, since Athens had also concluded an alliance with the king of Egypt. Yet, the Athenian ambassadors are praised only \textit{per se}.

Though literary sources for the period are hopelessly inadequate, it cannot be accidental that there is no orator among the envoys. Men with military knowledge and prestige were the only appropriate ones to explain the situation to their potential allies. At least two of them had behind them a long career and Glaukon was experienced in ‘international’ politics. On the basis of the order of appearance of their names on the stone, it has been suggested that Kallippos was the leading figure among the three envoys. This view is largely based on his being a synedros. At any rate it is not imperative that somebody should lead the mission, and the names could very well be inscribed at random.

As Pouilloux has remarked, Glaukon has suffered from comparison with his brother Chremonides\(^76\). The latter proposed the aforementioned

\(^{75}\) See Habicht, \textit{Untersuchungen}, pp.85-6, for the date, contra Moretti who dates it to 265/4; see also Appendices, Chapter I, I. The causes and the date of the Chremonidean War.

decree of alliance with Sparta, and eventually the war was named after him (Hegesandros of Delphi was the first to record the war by this name);77 this is partly how posterity came to remember Chremonides and neglect Glaukon. On the contrary, epigraphic evidence suggests that Glaukon had been a prominent figure both in political and in military terms, if not more prominent than his brother. In any case it should be accidental that there has not been preserved an inscription referring to offices held by Chremonides.78 However, Glaukon was honoured with a monument in 282/1. There has been preserved its inscribed base (IG II² 3079) which informs us that he had acquired the offices of phylarchos (II.7-9) and of strategos epi tous hoplitas, sometime in the 280s and before the archonship of Nikias in 282/1. More crucially, B. D. Meritt has restored his name in a fragmentary inscription where he has also restored the name of the archon as Nikias Otryneus, the archon of 266/5; according to this restoration Glaukon was strategos epi ta hopla in that year.79 Glaukon then had assumed both political and military power during the war. That later he became symboulos of Ptolemy (as has been mentioned) adds to the portrait of a man with constant and consistent political and military activity.

Proxenos of Rhodes (IG XII 1, 25), proxenos of Delphi (FD III 2, 72), victor at the Olympic games (Paus., VI.16.9), helped Athens to establish an expanded network of relationships. The proxeny decrees are quite uninformative, quite unlike their Athenian counterparts; they offer no description of the motives that led to the bestowing of honours. The Delphian proxemy is commonly dated before the end of the Chremonidean war. According to W. W. Tarn, Glaukon’s services to Delphi must have been connected either with the events following the

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78 There has been preserved the base of a statue for Chremonides, but Ch. Pelekides (Melêtes Arxaias Istoriás, Ioannina 1979, p.50, n.47) has argued that it should be dated after 229, contrary to the view of Moretti (ISE 21) who dates it between 270 and 260. In any case it does not provide us with any specific information.
79 “Greek Inscriptions”, Hesp. 37, 1968, pp.284-5, no.21. Meritt notes (n.44) that he dates the offices of Glaukon mentioned in IG II² 3079 before 282/1 on the assumption that these citations were not added after the erection of the monument in his honour.
retreat of the Gauls, or with the time of Pyrrhos' invasion, when Athens had cultivated for a time the good will of Delphi and Aitolia. G. Daux, on the other hand, has proposed more convincingly a date sometime between 290 and 280, but in any case before 279/8, thus dissociating the proxeny from the Celtic invasion.\textsuperscript{80} It is possible that we can fix a date for this proxeny in the mid 280s on the basis of the existence of another decree attributing collectively the proxeny to three Athenians in 284/3.\textsuperscript{81} Habicht has observed that thereafter and until 272/1 we do not come across proxeny decrees bestowed by Delphi on Athenians; in any case, Glaukon's proxeny should be ascribed to a pattern of cultivation of friendly relations with Aitolia (under whose control the sanctuary of Delphi was).\textsuperscript{82} 

The date of Glaukon's Rhodian proxeny cannot be fixed with any precision; similarly, we can only speculate as to the occasion that produced it. Given the close association of Glaukon with the Ptolemaic court before (and during) the Chremonidean War as well as his being a Ptolemaic official after the war, we can only conjecture that the decree should antedate the breach in the relations of Rhodes with Egypt after the Chremonidean War. Unfortunately, we cannot say with any degree of precision how soon or how long after the war Rhodes fell out with Egypt.\textsuperscript{83} Étienne and Piérart, assuming that this occurred immediately after the war, conclude that the Rhodian proxeny was bestowed while Glaukon was still in Athens. It is not impossible that Glaukon would have visited Rhodes before the war, in quest of money and/or ships.

The least known figure among the envoys to Orchomenos is Aristeides of Lamptrai. He is known to have been a strategos from \textit{IG II}\textsuperscript{2} 2797, a decree passed in the archonship of Telokles in 290/89 which bestows honours upon the \textit{bouleutai} because of \textit{arista bebouleukenai}.

\textsuperscript{81} FD III, 2, 198-200; also Flacelière, \textit{Les Aitoliens}, Appendix II, no. 14b, pp.430-1.
\textsuperscript{82} Habicht, \textit{Untersuchungen}, p.82.
\textsuperscript{83} For the breach in Rhodian - Egyptian relations and the rapprochement of Rhodes with the Seleukids, see R. M. Berthold, \textit{Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age}, Cornell Univ. Press 1984, pp.89-91; a notable incident of their conflict is the naval defeat inflicted by the Rhodians on Chremonides.
Meritt's remark about the co-operation between the political and the military spheres of the government is very interesting but highly speculative. Nothing of the kind is recorded on the stone; the Ἀριστείδου λαμπτρέως στρατηγοῦντος bears the character of a chronological reference (the participle in the genitive absolute is certainly temporal), but it is interesting that he was prominent enough to be singled out. It seems, however, that the embassy to Orchomenos was not the only diplomatic mission he had undertaken in the context of the Chremonidean War; his activity was directed towards Boiotian Oropos as well, as is indicated by a decree from Oropos awarding Aristeides and his descendants the proxeny.

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84 See Meritt, "Greek Inscriptions", Hesp. 7, 1938, p. 105 and "The Archons of Athens", p. 172, for the date of the archonship.
85 AE 1952, p. 172, no. 4; see Habicht, Untersuchungen, p. 86 for the date.
iv. **Diplomacy and authority**

In order to establish the limits of the generals' activities it is essential to examine their contacts outside the framework of the *ekklesia* and/or of the *boule*, the circumstances that prompt them, the implications for the working of democratic institutions. There are occasions in which the generals and the *boule* appear to operate together, outside the framework of the *ekklesia*, the problem is whether this affects drastically the constitution or whether it is only due to practical considerations. The first instance of this sort has the general Leosthenes as its protagonist.

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**a) Leosthenes' informal contacts**

Leosthenes is quite a dark and ambiguous figure. An Athenian citizen, a mercenary in the service of either Dareios or Alexander, he arranged for the transportation of a large band of mercenaries (discharged by the Persian satraps) to Tainaron (in the Southern Peloponnese), most probably in early 324.86 A few months later he was elected *strategos epi ten choran*. At about the same period or shortly before, the rumour was spread that Alexander meant to restore the exiles in the various cities, a measure which would most seriously affect Aitolia and Athens; for the latter it meant that her cleruchs on Samos would have to evacuate the island (D.S., XVIII.8.2-7). Athenian reaction to these measures has always been an intriguing problem for modern scholars. Did Athens mean to resist by warfare or by diplomacy; if, at least initially, by diplomacy, what does this indicate for the Athenian attitude towards Macedonia?87 Athens did revolt (the so called Lamian War), but more than a year after the restoration of the exiles had been announced, and after Alexander's death. What is the part played by Leosthenes in the events that led to the Lamian War? When did he appear energetically on the scene? What was his contribution to shaping Athenian attitudes?

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86 Paus., 1.25.5; for a detailed discussion of the transportation of the mercenaries and the role of Leosthenes, see Badian, "Harpalus", p.27.
87 Things became further complicated by the arrival of Harpalos, the Treasurer of Alexander, with a huge amount of money and 7000 mercenaries. His reception by Athens and the scandal involved will be discussed in connection with the policy of the orators in the same period and the part they played in the events; See Chapter II, pp.112-118.
Hyperides (in the Funeral Speech) and Pausanias (I.25.3-6) present him as a real hero whereas Plutarch regards him as responsible for the disaster inflicted upon Athens in the Lamian War (Phoc. 23.1). Both categories of sources agree on one point: Leosthenes was the one who urged Athens to revolt; they are differentiated in their appreciation of this fact. Hyperides states that “τῆς τε προσώπως γὰρ εἰσιθητής τῆς πόλεως ἐγένετο” (he became the initiator of the city’s attitude) and “ὄρων τὴν Ἑλλάδαν τεταπεινομένην...ἐπέδωκεν ἑαυτὸν μὲν τῇ πατρίδι τῇ δὲ πόλει τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.” (Epit. 3, 10). Yet it is too simplistic to say that Leosthenes inspired in the Athenians a hope that they did not entertain themselves. Accepting Hyperides’ and Pausanias’ testimonies, we can conclude that he was the one to transform aspirations into reality.

Leosthenes’ contacts with Aitolia present us with a variety of problems; for one thing there is a problem in the succession of things that Leosthenes was doing. Diodorus reports two separate contacts of his with Aitolia: one in the context of 325/4 (XVII.111.3) and a second in the chronological framework of Alexander’s death in 323 (XVIII.9.2-4). Assignment of these diplomatic overtures to their appropriate context is essential for our understanding of the ideological background, the process and the diplomatic manoeuvres that led to the Lamian War. In the first passage Diodorus relates that a few months before Alexander’s death Leosthenes was given fifty talents and weapons by the boule and was instructed to make secret contact with the mercenaries at Tainaron. He then, without instructions by the boule, dispatched an emissary (or emissaries) to Aitolia. It is to be noted that Leosthenes does act on his own initiative and his motives in doing so are not irrelevant to his having been supreme commander of the mercenaries and consequently under

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88 “Seeing Greece humiliated, he offered himself to his country and to his city he offered freedom”.
89 Worthington (“IG II² 370”, p.141) believes that Diodorus is incorrect when he relates that it was the boule that gave money and weapons to Leosthenes, because the boule could not have done so without authorisation from the ekklesia. Rhodes’ interpretation of the passage (The Athenian Boule, p.42, n.5) on the other hand, is more flexible and the one I choose to adopt since it does not completely discards Diodorus’ testimony. He argues that “his supplies must in the last resort (my italics) have been voted by the assembly, but it is perfectly credible that he outlined his plans at a secret meeting of the boule”.

pressure to keep them busy. It has to be noted beforehand that Diodorus' chronology with regard to the first mission is confused and it should be assigned to the archon year 324/3, as both Badian and Worthington have pointed out.90 What was the actual result of these overtures?

A gravely mutilated inscription (IG II² 370) refers to *philia* between Athens and Aitolia (the word *symmachia* is entirely restored), yet both its content and its chronology are under serious doubt. Mitchel wants it to refer to a secret agreement of alliance prior to the archon year 323/2, made public by the erection of a stele only in 323/2 (so that it would not provoke a Macedonian reaction). According to Mitchel’s reconstruction of events, Leosthenes, acting on behalf of the *boule*, had come into a secret agreement with Aitolia (either in 325/4 or in 324/3) before news of the king’s death had reached Athens, thus attributing the Athenians a will to resist by warfare at an early date.91 Contrary to this interpretation, I. Worthington has plausibly pointed out that if there had been a secret agreement it would have ceased to be secret almost immediately and there actually need be no lapse of time between the agreement and the setting up of the stele.92 Diodorus’ testimony refers only to indirect overtures between Leosthenes and Aitolia: far from being an agreement (even a secret one) they simply prepared the ground for Leosthenes’ visit to Aitolia. The phraseology of Diodorus with regard to the kind of agreement later concluded between Leosthenes and Aitolia corroborates the exclusion of any notion of a previous treaty: Diodorus refers specifically to *koinopragia*. Had an agreement pre-existed the next step should be a formal alliance.93 Badian has advanced a quite interesting argument, according to which there was a connection between the dealings of Leosthenes with Aitolia and those of Antipatros with the latter which also had reason to be alarmed about Alexander’s intention to

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90 Diodorus places Leosthenes’ activity in the context of 325/4 whereas in the same passage he refers to Alexander’s campaign against the Kosseans which took place in the winter of 324. See “Harpalus”, p.34, n.137; Worthington, “IG II² 370”, p.142.
91 “A Note on IG II² 370”, *Phoenix* 18, 1964, 13-17; see Chapter II, p.112.
92 “IG II² 370”, p.141.
93 Mitchel, (“A Note in IG II² 370”, p.16, n.8) has rightly observed that Leosthenes could not have entered Aitolia accompanied by a force of 7000 mercenaries without the previous consent of the inhabitants.
restore the exiles. He believes these transactions to have been a part of a co-ordinated reaction against Alexander. According to his reasoning, the Athenians tried to take advantage of the breach in the relations of Antipatros and Alexander and started negotiations with the former for an alliance.94 Under this perspective Leosthenes becomes a valuable source of information for the Athenian people, and a link with Antipatros.

Even if we accept a date in 324/3, the first contact of Leosthenes with Aitolia needs to be dated with more precision: how close was it to Leosthenes’ second mission to Aitolia (after the death of Alexander on June 10th)? Was it after the Areiopagos had announced its verdict on the accused in the Harpalos affair in the spring of 323 and after the return of the embassy to Alexander? Or was it before the declaration of the Areiopagos, sometime between winter and spring 323? If it was before, then we will have to conclude that Athens was playing a very dangerous game: on the one hand sending an embassy to Alexander on the issue of Samos, but on the other, coming to secret dealings with the Aitolians which were translated into war preparations. If Leosthenes’ mission took place after the embassy to Alexander had returned, probably with bad news, then we have to conclude that Athens resorted to war only after she had lost hope of diplomatic settlement of the issue of Samos. Is it impossible that the Athenians, not having much faith in Alexander’s good will would have tried to prepare the grounds for war at the same time that they dispatched an embassy? Amidst all these uncertainties I find Badian’s dating and interpretation quite plausible: the first informal contact between Leosthenes and the mercenaries and subsequently with Aitolia preceded Alexander’s death by almost a year; it must have taken place in the autumn of 324.95 Since he was strategos autokrator of the mercenaries he would be responsible for their welfare and as a result in need of money at an early date. The Athenian boule then did play a risky diplomatic game.

An indication of the Athenian attitude could be the very fact of the election of Leosthenes to the post of the *strategos epi ten choran* in 324/3. How did the Athenians come to the point of electing a man whose entire career had nothing to do with Athens up to that moment? On the other hand their attention could have been attracted by the fact that the mercenaries at Tainaron had declared him to be their *strategos autokrator* (D.S., XVII.11.3). The time of his first election to the generalship would have coincided with the rumours about the restoration of the exiles. I would not go so far as to attribute the Athenians a clearly aggressive policy at this early stage; only a will to prepare themselves for a breach in their relations with Alexander which might result in armed conflict.

How are we to interpret the exclusion of the *ekklesia* from the dealings between Leosthenes and the *boule*? P. J. Rhodes has shown that such meetings between the *boule* and the orators or the generals were not altogether extraordinary, or rather that they did occur under circumstances of war. Before jumping to conclusions then about an increase in the powers of the *boule* at the expense of the *ekklesia* we should reconsider the circumstances in 324. An open discussion in the *ekklesia* would inform not only the Athenians but Macedonian spies as well. Were the *boulē*’s dealings in conformity with the people’s intentions? I hope to show when discussing the Harpalos affair that the people were quite uncertain as to the attitude they should employ. Thus the *boule* appears to take the situation into its own hands, yet not against the wishes of the *demos*.

The passage of Diodorus referring to the second mission of Leosthenes seems to be devoid of chronological confusion and consequently Athenian attitudes appear to be much more clear cut than in the previous case: the mission is set in the context of rumours about Alexander’s death. We should not fail to observe the rapidity with

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96 I cannot agree with the judgement of Worthington (“IG II² 370”, p.141) on Diodorus’ mention of the *boule* giving money and weapons to Leosthenes as being incorrect. However, Diodorus could be confused with regard to the provision of money and weapons, which could be connected more plausibly with the second mission.

97 The Athenian Boule, pp.40-6.
which Leosthenes was dispatched, before verification of the news. We are not told by whom he was asked to negotiate with the mercenaries but judging from the emphasis on secrecy we can deduce that it was by the boule.

Leosthenes' mission to Aitolia is sometimes considered among the embassies but it is not, at least not in the sense of an official mission. Diodorus' language (XVIII.9.5) is extremely informative: At first Leosthenes was instructed to make secret contacts with the mercenaries assembled at Tainaron without authorisation of the demos and, after Alexander's death, "...φανερῶς πράττειν τι τῶν συμφερόντων. Ὅ δὲ διαδόους τοῖς μισθοφόροις τάς συντάξεις καὶ καθοπλίσας τοὺς ἀνόπλους παρῆλθεν εἰς Αἰτωλίαν συνθησόμενος κοινοπραγίαιν." 98 Diodorus does not say that the people elected Leosthenes as an envoy whereas he does not fail to mention specifically further down that the Athenians dispatched embassies to the Greek states to promote the cause of the war. He makes it quite clear that Leosthenes was still at Tainaron at the time he was presented with a message to do anything that would be of use.

The main aspect of the open conduct could be to make Athens' intentions to go to war known to the other states. There remains the problem concerning the extreme vagueness of the instructions given by the demos. This produces the question: if the Athenians had opted for war, why did they not clearly instruct Leosthenes to advocate their intentions to the other Greek states? Later it is revealed that the debate concerning the war was carrying on fiercely in the ekklesia even after the instructions to Leosthenes and while embassies were dispatched to the Peloponnese; therefore the Athenians had not irrevocably made up their minds.99 It is possible to see in the ongoing debate the reason for not

98 "...openly do anything that would be of interest; and he, after having given the mercenaries their wages, went to Aitolia in order to form an agreement of common action".
99 The embassies of 323 to Arkadia indicate not only that there was not a unanimous view about the war, but also that the demos was not entirely in control of the activities of those who were against it. More specifically, according to Plutarch (Dem. 27), the rhetores Pytheas and Kallimedon (who had a bad reputation among the people) left Athens and joined the embassies of Antipatros to Arkadia in order to argue against the proposals of the Athenian
issuing specific orders. It is still possible that secrecy was needed with respect to the mission to Aitolia: there was fear of a counter-embassy on the part of the Macedonian regent in order to deter the Aitolians from joining the League.

If we take at face value everything that Diodorus says, it then emerges that Leosthenes proceeded to conclude agreements of common action \((koinopragia)\) with Aitolia on his own initiative, something that is without precedent. At first sight it seems problematic that further down Diodorus (XVIII.10.11) writes that "Αἰτωλοὶ μὲν πρῶτοι συνέβεντο τὴν συμμαχίαν.....". \(Symmachia\) = alliance is certainly not identical in meaning with \(koinopragia\) = agreement on common action. It would thus appear that Diodorus was either insensitive to details or wrong. I do not think that Diodorus was wrong in using the term \(koinopragia\), which is a term less common than \(symmachia\) and quite specific. Leosthenes could not and did not conclude a formal alliance without authorisation from the \(demos\). However, immediately after his agreements with the Aitolians, he dispatched emissaries to the Phokians and the Lokrians in order to promote the war cause. Obviously, it was after these overtures that the \(demos\) dispatched official embassies to the various Greek states to urge them to war and form an alliance.\(^{100}\) Retrospectively then, the agreements of Leosthenes with Aitolia, Phokis and Lokris could be transformed into an alliance. This is how Diodorus could describe in two different terms the state of relations between Athens and Aitolia.

In the past states had entered major wars after having signed a treaty of alliance. But on this occasion Leosthenes had to convince the Aitolians soon and there was no time to ask the approval of the \(demos\);

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\(^{100}\) A. Oikonomides ("Athens and the Phocians at the Outbreak of the Lamian War = IG II\(^2\) 367", \(AncW\) 5, 1982, 123-127) has calculated that Athens must have been on the path of war c. seventy days after Alexander's death. The basis of his argument is \(IG\) II\(^2\) 367 honouring an Athenian ambassador to Phokis on October 27th, 323 who, according to his calculations, must have accomplished his mission at least a month before while the decision to dispatch him must have antedated the mission by c. a month. I am sceptical as to the latter estimation; given the circumstances, the decision to send an envoy and the actual mission could be much more closely connected chronologically.
there was no time for proposals and counter-proposals. Therefore we encounter here a notable point of departure from previous practices. It appears that the Athenians were only interested in ultimate success but they were not actually interested in the means. The mission of Leosthenes marks also the lack of participation on the part of the orators. One should not be unfair to them: it was probably one or a group of them who had proposed that Leosthenes should carry on. Yet the fact remains that they did not suggest a specific course of action. Of the orators, Hyperides supports Leosthenes (Plut., Phoc. 23.3) but this most probably happened after the latter had concluded the agreements. It is significant that there is no solid evidence of Leosthenes co-operating with any of the orators or any mention of them suggesting in the ekklesia an embassy to Aitolia or elsewhere. It was only after Leosthenes had achieved the agreements that they resolved to send envoys to other Greek states.

Diodorus' narrative seems to bear out the idea that Leosthenes remained uninterruptedly in Aitolia and that he set out against Antipatros without returning to Athens. On the other hand, Plutarch records a conflict of Leosthenes and Phokion on the issue of the war in the ekklesia, which excludes any notion of secrecy. How can we reconcile this passage with that of Diodorus which refers to specific orders for secrecy? Either Diodorus is wrong in implying that Leosthenes did not return to Athens in the period between his koinopragia with Aitolia, and thus the debate would have occurred between July and August 323; or the conflict with Phokion occurred before Leosthenes’ dispatch which in return would render Diodorus’ reference to secrecy meaningless. Worthington states that Leosthenes would have returned to Athens perhaps in August 323 bringing news of the alliance with Aitolia but he does not discuss the Diodorus passage. Diodorus’ sequence of events (XVIII.9.2-5) flows quite naturally, all the more so since it refers to Leosthenes’ diplomatic activities with Aitolia as his base.

“Διό καὶ τούτους προσέταξαν ἐν ἀπορρήτοις Λεωσθένει τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀναλαβεῖν αὐτούς ὡς ἰδιοπραγοῦντα χωρὶς
Diodorus treats the Lamian War quite extensively, but even in an extensive narrative it is possible that he could have omitted a brief return of Leosthenes to Athens. Otherwise, it would be more awkward to place the debate in the *ekklesia* immediately before Leosthenes' dispatch and thus discard Diodorus' notice on secrecy.

By concluding these agreements Leosthenes opened the way for Athens and other Greek cities to revolt. Moreover he put Athens at the head of a Greek coalition, for the first time in many years. This is what Hyperides actually praises; for, by the time he writes his *Epitaphios*, things were not going well for the coalition army and therefore he did not praise so much military achievements as Athens' supreme position in the allied army.

Another moment in the course of the Lamian War demonstrates the margin of initiative left to the generals and the diplomatic skills they had developed: The Thessalians were persuaded, obviously by the generals in command of the allied army, to desert the Macedonians and side with the coalition army. Thus, they actually gained their most ardent contingent. It was the Thessalian cavalry that gained victory over the Macedonian army (D.S., XVIII.14.3-4) and at the battle of Krannon they were entrusted with hopes of victory (D.S., XVIII.17.4).
In Diodorus’ narrative (D.S., XVIII.17.8) it appears that it was the generals who accepted the conclusion of the war and abandoned any plans to face Antipatros in another battle. The decision of the generals in command to withdraw their forces after the defeat at Krannon was taken on the spot, without consultation with the *demos*. It is interesting that Diodorus ascribes collective responsibility to the board of generals for the decision to start negotiations with Antipatros (D.S., XVIII.17.8). Apparently, the discussions of the Athenians with the generals took place after the return of the troops. This is not a serious divergence from previous practices; in fact, one would have expected the generals to assume increased responsibilities under circumstances of war.

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b) Phokion and his friends

The period extending from 322 to 318 is commonly described as an oligarchy because of the limitation of the franchise but also because of the central role played by Phokion and Demades. Since they were the principal negotiators of the peace they have come to be considered as the leaders of the oligarchy. The overall impression is that Phokion was a central figure of the new regime. The fact that Plutarch devoted to Phokion one of his *Lives* is to a great extent responsible for this impression, and the tendency to attribute to Phokion the most important role is reflected in historical bibliography: there is no book devoted to Demades whereas in the last decade there have been four focusing on Phokion. The title of J. M. Williams’ work is revealing: *Athens without Democracy. The Oligarchy of Phokion* . Yet, the regime of 322 was quite different from the constitution of the four hundred.101 It has to be observed that we do not hear of either Phokion or Demades taking steps towards a more rigid form of authority.

Phokion’s outstanding position has to be seen in the perspective of the network of ‘friendships’ he established with leading Macedonians, Antipatros and the two successive phourarchs of Mounychia. It is

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101 See Cloché, “Phocion”, p.180 and n.l for the differences; also Williams, *Athens without Democracy*, pp.117-131, for the uncertainties pertaining to the nature of the regime.
through these connections that Phokion found himself in a position to exercise a certain degree of control over Athenian politics, although it is hard to tell whether this control was exercised deliberately or coincidentally.

It is not possible to tell to what extent Phokion’s efforts to ameliorate Athens’ position after the Lamian War were undertaken on the initiative of the general himself, without formal instructions from the demos. However, public opinion must have exercised a lot of pressure upon him. The privileges awarded to Athens were a product of informal meetings with Menyllos, the phrourarch installed by Antipatros, and, after his replacement, with Nikanor. One of Phokion’s major achievements was that Athens would not have to pay the indemnity for the Lamian War at once; furthermore, he managed to rescue numerous Athenians from exile (Plut., Phoc. 29). J. M. Williams places Phokion’s diplomatic activity which resulted in the amelioration of Athens’ position in the course of the second peace-embassy. Yet Diodorus’ narrative does not allow such a synchronisation of events. Phokion’s activity appears to have started after the establishment of peace and to have covered a long period of time. It seems quite improbable that Antipatros would change his mind so radically and in such a sort period of time. Instead, I am inclined to believe that such a change of mind would require ‘slow’ diplomacy, tactics, patience.

Through his contact with the Macedonian garrison and his friendly relationship with Menyllos (Plut., Phoc. 28.1), Phokion must have acquired a certain knowledge of the intentions of the Macedonians. His intermediate position turned him into a source of information. Moreover, this position of his endowed him with the power to control and manipulate Athenian sentiments and reactions. It appears that Athens expected him to be aware of any move of the Macedonians and make it known. His compatriots were outraged with him precisely because they

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102 "Demades", p.25.
expected him to know about the replacement of Menyllos by Nikanor (Plut., Phoc. 31.2).

It is Phokion’s relationship with Nikanor that has given rise to the most severe criticism. Recently A. B. Bosworth identified Nikanor with a grandson of Antipatros and placed the relations between Phokion and the phrourarch in the perspective of guest-friendship since the latter would have inherited his grandfather’s relationships.\(^\text{103}\)

It is hard to tell whether Phokion intended to deceive the Athenians when he persuaded Nikanor to provide the Athenians with gifts and to become an agonothetes (Plut., Phoc. 31.3). Phokion’s entire conduct of Athenian affairs tends to be interpreted from the perspective of his really suspicious behaviour in the last couple of years of his life. These years (319 and 318) are marked by significant changes in the kingdom of Macedonia. Antipatros died after having named Polyperchon as his successor to the regency, a choice that was not accepted by the former’s son Kassandros (Plut., Phoc. 31). His struggle for power against Polyperchon involved Athens, which became the theatre of military and diplomatic operations. In 319 Polyperchon proclaimed the return to the status quo that Philip and Alexander had created and the restoration of the Athenian democracy (D.S., XVIII.56). The Athenians believed that this was their chance to regain their independence. Nikanor attempted to calm down excited Athenian spirits, but he did not do so via a speech in the ekklesia; instead a meeting was convened between Nikanor, the boule and at least two generals, Phokion and Derkylos, who was then strategos epi ten choran. Why was the ekklesia set aside? Two overlapping reasons can be put forward and they lay with Nikanor himself. Firstly, he must

\(^{103}\) Until very recently Nikanor the phrourarch was commonly identified with the son in law of Aristotle and officer of Alexander, who in 324 announced the restoration of the exiles at the festival of Olympia. However, A. B. Bosworth (“A New Macedonian Prince”, CQ, N.S. 44, 1994, 57-65) challenged this identification quite persuasively and argued that the phrourarch was a Macedonian prince, the son of Balakros (an official of Alexander) and Phila, daughter of Antipatros. Bosworth’s main arguments are that the office of the phrourarch was a very important and a delicate one and demanded someone who would be in the absolute confidence of Kassandros; this could hardly be a Greek and an officer of Alexander (with whom Kassandros had been on quite unfavourable terms). Furthermore, Bosworth underlines the fact that Kassandros - when he wanted to get rid of Nikanor- took the pains to bring him to trial by an army assembly (and not simply assassinate him), something that indicates that Nikanor was a quite high rank Macedonian.
not have trusted the excited mood of the Athenian people and, secondly, he would not leave the security of the Mounychia where he would be surrounded by his own troops. On the other hand, the fact that the boule was dispatched points to a will, on the Athenian part, to include in the discussions a representative part of the citizen body to bear the responsibility for the negotiations and their outcome. The alternative would have been to dispatch a limited number of envoys.

Even according to Plutarch, his great admirer, Phokion is to be accused of fatal misjudgement, totally inappropriate to someone who was simultaneously "a general and an archon" (Phoc. 32.7-9). The tantalising matter is that he put too much trust in Nikanor. His public declaration of confidence in him prevented the Athenians from seizing him though there were reasonable suspicions that he was assembling mercenary forces. Supporting his judgement, Plutarch adds that Phokion did not even use the excuse of fear of an armed conflict if he had Nikanor seized. It was the general epi ten choran, Derkylos of Hagnous, who expressed openly his conviction that Nikanor was guilty of deceiving the Athenian people and demanded his immediate seizure. Thus we witness a debate with two military men as protagonists. It is these two who steer and shape Athenian sentiment and opinion. Apart from the fact that it is Phokion who is victorious, it remains significant that another general was ready to take the situation into his own hands.

Hereafter, Phokion appears to act independently, without consideration of the people's will. He had prevented the phrourarch's seizure, but the people were not convinced about his honourable intentions and thus it was decreed by Philomelos of Lamptrai that the citizens should take up arms and obey Phokion the general. But Phokion did not lead them against Mounychia: "ἡμέλησεν ἀχρὶ οὗ προσάγων ὁ Νικάνωρ ἐκ τῆς Μουνυχίας τὰ ὀπλα τὸν Πειραιᾶ περιτάφρευσε" (Plut., Phoc. 32. 10). F. Mitchel finds it surprising that the Athenians

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104 "he neglected the matter until Nikanor marching with his troops out of Mounychia surrounded Peiraieus with a ditch".
would have passed over Derkylos and assign command to Phokion.\footnote{“Derkylos of Hagnous and the date of IG II² 1687”, \textit{Hesp}. 33, 1964, 337-351, p.341.} Yet, it indicates that the Athenians continued to trust Phokion and we should once more be cautious about attaching labels. Phokion’s behaviour is also indicative of the increased authority of a general under certain circumstances at the expense of an orator’s proposals.

The word “\textit{µέλησεν}” puts very mildly what Phokion really did. Why did he put off the decisive assault? Unfortunately, we do not know how many mercenaries Nikanor had assembled. They were evidently numerous enough to occupy the Peiraieus as well. Hence, it is possible that Phokion did not see any chance of success. One cannot help wondering what would have been their chances of success had they attacked the Mounychia Hill in time. G. De Sanctis first and recently C. Bearzot have expressed their conviction that the capture of the Peiraieus was brought about with the consent of Phokion. De Sanctis in particular argues that we should otherwise have to suppose that Phokion was really naive.\footnote{De Sanctis, \textit{Scritti minori}, p.254 and n.4; Bearzot, \textit{Focione}, p.214.} Yet, political mistakes and naivété are not to be excluded as explanations. Diodorus provides us with an account of the aftermath which testifies to a different opinion of the Athenian people: after the seizure of the Peiraieus by Nikanor, the Athenians were discussing the course of action to follow and resolved to send an embassy to the phourarch which included Phokion (D.S., XVIII.64.1-4). Therefore, either the Athenians did not believe that Phokion had not done his duty as a general, or even if they did believe this, they still counted upon his friendly relations with Nikanor. In any case, they did not think of him as a traitor. From Phokion’s viewpoint, it might be that he truly believed in his ‘friendship’ with Nikanor whereas for the latter practical politics and expediency mattered more; such an interpretation seems all the more plausible if we bear in mind the fundamental role that ‘friendships’ had played in the past in Greek politics.\footnote{See Herman, \textit{Ritualised Friendship}, pp.130-61.}
To make things worse Alexander (Polyperchon’s son) marched to Attika to drive Nikanor out. There is Diodorus’ interesting information that “those around Phokion” met Alexander in secret and asked him to keep the fort until Kassandros was repulsed (D.S., XVIII.65.4). Phokion is certainly guilty of a miscalculation. He thought that there was room to exercise secret diplomacy but he had not counted on the possibility that Nikanor and Alexander would co-operate. In fact, it is after the Athenians acquired knowledge of the contacts between the two Macedonians that Phokion fell out of favour. His second mistake is that he thought that he would find refuge with Polyperchon (Plut., Phoc. 33.4). Thus, instead of playing off one Macedonian against the other, he was the one to be played off and to be regarded as a traitor by Macedonians and Athenians alike: Polyperchon, trying to win Athens’ co-operation, surrendered Phokion for trial.

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c) Increased responsibilities of the military men in the 280s
The role of Phaidros in the peace negotiations of 286

An opportunity for the generals and the boule to operate together occurred in 286 when the generals together with the boule worked out the details of the negotiations with Demetrios Poliorketes. This case is perhaps more notable, because at first sight it seems to mark a shift of power from the ekklesia to a few men of expertise. However, it is imperative to note that there were more people involved in the negotiations, apart from those immediately interested. There was for one thing Sostratos, a representative of Ptolemy, king of Egypt, and possibly Pyrrhos, king of Epeiros. The decree for Kallias records that Sostratos was acting in Athens’ best interest; it also records that the boule and the generals instructed Kallias to act as Athens’ envoy (II.36-39). At this point it is essential to discuss the views of C. Habicht about the nature of

108 In Plut., Demetr. 46.1-2 there appears the philosopher Krates, who according to Plutarch was responsible for the lifting of the siege. The decree for Kallias has rendered the situation even more complicated since it reveals that Ptolemy offered military help to the revolt of 287 and that a representative of his, Sostratos, participated in the negotiations. All these accounts should be regarded as complementary rather than contradicting; see also, Appendices, Chapter II, 3. Philosophers as envoys: Xenokrates and Krates.
the negotiations and the contents of the treaty or treaties that were
concluded. Instead of the single treaty that Shear had envisaged between
Demetrios and all of his adversaries, Habicht has argued quite
convincingly that there was a bilateral treaty between Ptolemy and
Demetrios Poliorcetes and another between the latter and Pyrrhos; this
latter treaty however, always according to Habicht, was conducted after
Demetrios had left Athens; both these treaties were essentially directed
against Lysimachos. That there had been two treaties, I find quite
plausible; their precise contents, on the other hand, is a quite intriguing
problem. For our purposes, however, Habicht’s most challenging view is
that Athens was not actually a signatory to the peace because most
probably Demetrios would not tolerate the presence of second rank
Athenian officials, all the more so because Athens was defeated.
According to Habicht Athens’ interests were represented solely by
Ptolemaic officials, Sostratos and Kallias. On the other hand, M. J.
Osborne has argued that the Athenian general Phaidros most probably
participated in the negotiations. He thought that the erased lines
referring to Phaidros’ second hoplite generalship in 287/6 could only
mention something in connection with the peace negotiations which took
place precisely in that year, since they definitely referred to Demetrios.
Though an argument ex silentio, it is quite reasonable if we take into
account that the lines were erased deliberately in 200 as a sign of protest
against the house of the Antigonids. In support of Osborne’s argument
we can add the testimony of Plutarch (Demetr. 46.1-2) about the embassy
of the philosopher Krates to Demetrios on Athens’ behalf. Plutarch goes
as far as to attribute to Krates the lifting of the siege, which should not
be completely overlooked. If Demetrios was willing to hear a non-

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109 T. L. Shear ("Kallias", p.76) actually conjectures that the decree for Artemidoros of
Perinthos (/G II2 662 + II3 663), an official in the service of Lysimachos who had been sent by
the king in connection with certain embassies, was the result of his successful representation
of Athenian interests; in the negotiations of 286. Objecting to this, F. Landucci Gattinoni
(Lisimaco, pp.195ff) has argued convincingly that Artemidoros is not honoured in his capacity
as plenipotentiary representative of Lysimachos, which is an indication that Lysimachos did
not participate in the negotiations. I would have thought that a peace treaty between all the
Diadochoi would take some time to be concluded; furthermore, the events to follow indicate
that there was no peace at least between Demetrios and Seleukos.
110 Untersuchungen, pp. 62-7; for Athens’ role in particular see p.62 and n.75.
Athenian representative of Athenian interests, then it is quite possible
that he would have conceded the presence of Athenian envoys.

It is true that Athens’ revolt took place while Lysimachos, Pyrrhos,
Seleukos and Ptolemy have created a united front against Demetrios.\textsuperscript{111} Thus the revolt could be regarded by them as being only a part of the
hostilities, a matter that could be dealt with among themselves. It is
equally true that Athens was not granted the possession of the garrison
forts and of the Peiraieus, which could be seen as a result of lack of
representation. But one has to bear in mind that Athens had been under
siege and that she did benefit from the peace: Demetrios withdrew his
forces and left for Asia and the astu remained free and democratic.
Could this have been solely the result of pressure by the representatives
of Ptolemy? Mention has already been made of Sostratos and Kallias, and
Pyrrhos had actually been invited by Athens, though it is uncertain
whether he arrived in Athens before or after Demetrios’ departure for
Asia.

In the decree for Phaidros it is mentioned that during his second
hoplite generalship he obeyed the decrees of the boule and the ekklesia
\textit{(IG II\textsuperscript{2} 682, ll.45-7)}. These decrees must have been related to the on-going
negotiations; Phaidros, therefore, was somehow involved. If he was not
officially authorised by the Athenian demos, then there remains the
possibility that he was watching the evolution of the proceedings, acting
 unofficially via his brother Kallias and because of his previous
connections with the Ptolemaic court in general \textit{(IG II\textsuperscript{2} 682, ll.28-9)}. At
this point Landucci Gattinoni’s conclusion on the nature of the peace can
be of considerable help. Contrary to C. Habicht who thought that the
treaties were essentially directed against Lysimachos, she argued plausibly
that both treaties were limited to defining Athens’ status and did not aim
at isolating Lysimachos. Admittedly, her argument is much more
convincing with regard to the treaty concluded between Demetrios and
Ptolemy. Habicht’s point was that the Ptolemaic fleet did not obstruct

\textsuperscript{111} Plut., \textit{Demetr.} 44; \textit{Pyrrh.} II; Paus. I.10.2; Polyaeenus, IV.12.2; Justin XVI.21-2; Pompeius
Trogus XVI Prologue.
Demetrios’ departure for Asia; this line of argument was adopted by Marasco who argued additionally that at about the same time Demetrios married Ptolemais, the daughter of Ptolemy I and Eurydike;\(^{112}\) consequently, it has been concluded that Ptolemy and Demetrios concluded a peace treaty which defined relations between them. Against this Landucci Gattinoni has maintained that the first argument is an argument \textit{ex silentio}, and has underlined that it was Eurydike, estranged wife of Ptolemy I, who gave Ptolemais to marriage; more significantly, Ptolemy decided to have his son and heir married to Lysimachos’ daughter.\(^{113}\) Therefore, there is neither proof of Ptolemy’s favourable neutrality nor of a breach in his relations with Lysimachos. I would add that it would be a unique phenomenon if a treaty between two kings had not been concluded by the kings themselves, but by a king on the one side and a representative (Sostratos) on the other. Consequently, the treaty between Ptolemy and Demetrios would have to concern Athens and Athens alone.\(^{114}\) This in turn suggests that if she was the only beneficiary from the treaty, then it seems quite probable that she was officially represented.

Habicht’s case, however, is stronger with regard to the treaty concluded between Pyrrhos and Demetrios (Plut., \textit{Pyrrh.} 12.4-5). That Pyrrhos invaded Thessaly shortly after the departure of Demetrios for Asia, does not offer proof that the treaty he had concluded was not directed against Lysimachos, as Landucci Gattinoni thought.\(^{115}\) Plutarch states clearly that Pyrrhos concluded a treaty which he shortly afterwards breached. At least part of the treaty then concluded between Pyrrhos and Demetrios defined relations between themselves. It is very difficult to establish whether it concerned Athens as well.

\(^{112}\) “L’ ultima spedizione di Demetrio Poliorcète in Asia”, \textit{Res Publica Literarum} 8, 1985, 149-163.
\(^{113}\) \textit{Lisimaco}, pp.195-6.
\(^{114}\) An additional argument by Landucci Gattinoni (\textit{Lisimaco}, p.193) concerns the subsequent relations between Athens and Lysimachos. It runs as follows: if the treaties were directed against Lysimachos, then Athens, being a protégé of Ptolemy, could not have continued being on favourable terms with Lysimachos. Athens though was neither under the rule of Ptolemy nor had she conducted a formal alliance with him; even if Lysimachos and Ptolemy had parted company, this would not necessarily bring about the former’s hostility against Athens.
\(^{115}\) \textit{Lisimaco}, p.194.
Another important aspect of the peace negotiations of 287 relates to the part played by Kallias in connection with the part played by the generals and the boule (II.37-8). He was not officially elected by the Athenian demos as an envoy: the stone records πρεσβεύων ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου non αἰρεθεὶς or χειροτονηθεὶς; thus I prefer to adopt Shear’s translation of the participle: acting as an envoy. Kallias could not be officially elected as an envoy: his status of Athenian citizen was subordinate to that of a Ptolemaic official. An election by the Athenians might put him in very awkward position. From the Athenian standpoint, he was only informally assigned authority which the decree in his honour comes to make official a posteriori. At the time of the negotiations Kallias was in effect a philos of Ptolemy. It was customary for Athens by that time to employ the services of philoi of the kings.

It was the generals and the boule that took the initiative of asking Kallias to act as an envoy. It would thus appear that the responsibility for the transactions had been removed from the ekklesia. Yet it would be neither pragmatic nor feasible on behalf of the Athenians to hold successive meetings while all these people from different backgrounds were involved. The generals were in a position to approach Kallias easily since they had already co-operated in the past year for the gathering of the harvest. On the other hand, the Phaidros decree refers to decrees of the ekklesia and the boule, which points to a certain activity of the assembly while complicated negotiations were taking place. We are not dealing with a case of the generals and the boule removing power from the people; instead, it may be the assembly of the people that delegates powers to the boule and to the board of generals. After his departure from Athens Kallias continued to serve Athenian interests, co-operating with the Athenian embassies which reached the Ptolemaic court.

116 "Kallias", p.5.
It is significant that the contact between the board of generals and Kallias goes on until later in the 280s, when Ptolemy II ascended the throne of Egypt (in 283/2): they urged him to exercise his influence on Ptolemy so that the latter will send money and corn to Athens as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{117} Their ultimate goal was most probably the re-acquisition of the Peiraieus and the other forts. Again we are here dealing with an unofficial representation of Athenian interests. Osborne has suggested that this mission could be identical with the embassy mentioned in the Demochares decree since both procured fifty talents, thus identifying the Ptolemy of the Demochares decree with Ptolemy II.\textsuperscript{118} But the intervention of Kallias procured twenty thousand medimnoi of wheat as well, which are not mentioned in the Demochares decree; furthermore, Kallias did not act in the official capacity of an Athenian envoy. Kallias acted unofficially, as an intermediary, and no Athenian envoys are mentioned in this context.

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\textbf{The abortive attempt to recover the Peiraieus}

In the same context of the struggle for the re-acquisition of the forts and the Peiraieus we can ascribe two more incidents (the second more notably so) of military men assuming increased authority.

Perhaps more than the recovery of the forts, it was the re-acquisition of the Peiraieus that was the primary aim of Athenian politics, and it is a problem that has caused endless discussions among historians.\textsuperscript{119} We lack information as to the means employed or as to specific attempts, apart from one incident (recorded by Polyaenus V.17.1, dating probably to 286 or slightly later) which again illustrates the initiative left to the generals, because of the circumstances.\textsuperscript{120} Polyaenus records that the Athenian generals (whom he mentions by name) met, in secret, with Hierokles, leader of the mercenaries and a subordinate of Herakleides, the commander of the Peiraieus, and they exchanged oaths

\textsuperscript{117} Kallias decree, II.43-50.  
\textsuperscript{118} Naturalization. II, p.156, n.678.  
\textsuperscript{119} See Appendices, Chapter I, 2. The problem of the recovery of the Peiraieus.  
\textsuperscript{120} Habicht (\textit{Untersuchungen}, p.98) dates it to June 286 or later.
to the effect that Hierokles would open the gates to Athenian soldiers who would kill Herakleides; but Hierokles performed treachery at the expense of the Athenians who were slaughtered in their attempt to enter the gates. The Athenians then were ready to employ treachery in order to achieve their purpose; it is probable that they had attempted an open assault on the Peiraieus in the past, or that they had tried to employ bribery. However, in the case of the present incident, the initiative and the responsibility for this secret contact lies with the generals. We should not imagine that the generals would have discussed such a proposition in the *ekklesia*. It remains possible that they had discussed their plan, certainly in secret, with certain *rhetores*. Even so, the fact that the *strategoi* and only they dealt with Hierokles should at least indicate that at that moment, it was thought expedient that secret dealings would be restricted to military men.

The honorific decree (*ISE* 15) for the taxiarchs who were dispatched to Boiotia in order to participate in the festival of the Basileia probably provides another example of military men assuming political responsibility. The decree does not record any kind of diplomatic transaction, but Moretti notes that these taxiarchs belonged to very notable families and conjectures that their dispatch could belong to the wider context of Athens’ attempt to establish friendly relations with the neighbouring state of Boiotia.\(^{121}\) Admittedly, the evidence is far from being explicit but perhaps we could take account of the fact that Boiotia had a formidable cavalry which could prove quite useful in the struggle to regain control of the countryside; in such a case the taxiarchs could have had informal contacts with Boiotian leaders.\(^{122}\)

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\(^{121}\) *ISE* 15, p.33.

\(^{122}\) It appears that in the late 280s cavalry officers had met with increased duties and popularity among the Athenian people, which in turn suggests that this period witnessed increased cavalry activity which can only be associated with the effort to regain the forts and the Peiraieus. Contemporary with the decree for the taxiarchs is a decree for the hipparchs and the phylarchs who succeeded in increasing the number of cavalrymen and in abolishing the law forbidding to become phylarchos anyone among the hippeis (J. Threpsiadis & E. Vanderpool, "Πρὸς ταῖς Ἐρμοῖς", *AD* 18, 1963, 103-109, pp.104-105 = *ISE* 16).
v. The extraordinary cases of Lachares and Olympiodoros

a) Lachares’ tyranny

That the men who hold an elective office assume partly the role of a rhetor as well might indeed have far-reaching consequences for the constitution. We have to ask whether this concentration can lead towards some kind of oligarchy or even to tyranny as is pointed out both in the 
Athenaion Politeia and in the Politics of Aristotle:

“θαρρούντος ἢθη τοῦ δήμου, τότε πρῶτον ἔχρησαντο τῷ νόμῳ ὑπὲρ τῶν ὀστρακισμῶν, ὡς ἐτέθη διὰ τὴν ὑποψίαν τῶν ἐν ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ὅτι Πεισίστρατος δημαγωγὸς καὶ στρατηγὸς ἂν τύραννος κατέστη.”

(Ath. Pol. 22.3-4).

On the contrary, a rhetor is able to lead the people but he can never acquire excessive power because he lacks military skills. In other words persuasive skills come second to generalship; skill in speeches comes second to the prestige of generalship in terms of influence on the people:

“ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχαίων, ὅτε γένοιτο ὁ αὐτὸς δημαγωγὸς καὶ στρατηγὸς εἰς τυραννίδα μετέβαλον.... αἰτίων δὲ τοῦ τότε γίγνεσθαι νῦν δὲ μὴ, ὅτι τότε μὲν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἦσαν ἐκ τῶν στρατηγοῦντων (οὐ γὰρ πω δεινοὶ ἦσαν λέγειν), νῦν δὲ τῆς βουλικῆς ἡγεμόνης οἱ δυνάμεις λέγειν δημαγωγοῦσι μὲν, δι’ ἀπειρίαν δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν, οὐκ ἐπιτίθενται, πλὴν εἰ ποῦ βραχὺ τι γέγονεν τοιοῦτον.” (Pol. 1305a 4-5).

Lachares falls precisely in the category of someone being simultaneously a demagogue and a military man who reached supreme power. He is labelled a tyrant by both Pausanias (I.25.7) and Plutarch.

123 “The people feeling confident, they put in force for the first time the law on ostracism which was enacted due to the suspicion raised against those in power; because Peisistratos, being at the same time a general and a demagogue, then became a tyrant.”

124 “In the ancient times, whenever the same man was a demagogue and a general he would then become a tyrant.... And the cause of this happening then but not now is that then the demagogues were generals (because they had not developed rhetoric). On the contrary, now that rhetoric has developed competent orators can become demagogues (= leaders of the people) but due to their lack of experience in military matters they cannot acquire predominance, with the exception of a few instances”.
However, the problem of his disposition cannot accept a final solution and we should allow for retrospective application of the politically controversial characterisation ‘tyrant’.

Chronology has been a most intriguing problem. Apart from the testimonies of Plutarch and Pausanius, there is also the most valuable evidence provided by the *Papyrus Oxyrhynchus* XVII 2082 which describes the events preceding the regime of Lachares as well as events during his regime but it provides us with only a single chronological indication (Kassandros’ death). Views as to the chronology of Lachares’ period range from 300 to 295.\(^{125}\) Apparently there was a constitutional change in 296/5 when a miniature prytany year was introduced on Elaphebolion (roughly March) 12th. An archon year started in that month and it was divided into twelve prytanies which lasted only a few days; the archon, Nikias, retained his position but was designated as Hysteros.\(^{126}\) Scholars in favour of a late date for the regime of Lachares attribute the miniature prytany year to its establishment whereas those in favour of an early date attribute it to its fall. Furthermore, there is the problem concerning the length of time that it took Demetrios Poliorketes to ‘liberate’ Athens from Lachares and re-establish his authority. If we accept that the tyranny began in 295 and ended in 294, we have to squeeze the events described in the papyrus plus the intervention of Demetrios Poliorketes in a single year: the *stasis* of the generals, the short lived regime of Charias, the starvation of the *demos*, Charias’ overthrow by Lachares, the siege of the Peiraieus by the latter and finally the siege laid by Demetrios. Also we have to ignore the dearth of decrees

\(^{125}\) a. G. De Sanctis (“Atene”, pp.134-53 & 252-73); T. L. Shear (“Kallias”, pp.53, 56, 65 ) and C. Habicht (*Untersuchungen*, pp. 2-8) date the tyranny in Elaphebolion 295 and its fall in 294; Lately, however, Habicht (*Athen*, pp.140-1, n.2) appears to have changed his mind and to be in favour of Ferguson’s and Osborne’s view of an earlier chronology.

\(^{126}\) W. S. Ferguson. (“Lachares and Demetrius Poliorcetes”, *CP* 24, 1929, 1-31) dates its establishment in 300; A. Hunt (ad *Pap. Oxyr*. XVII, 2082). Meritt (*Hesp*. 11, 1942, p.279) and M. J. Osborne, (*Naturalization II*, pp.146-152) date it before the death of Kassandros in 297 and its fall in Elaphebolion 295. IG II\(^*\) 644, 645 and *Hesp*. II, 1942, 281, no.54. P. Gauthier (“La réunification”, pp.379-92) advances the view that Nikias Hysteros is the Nikias of 282/1 and connects the designation Hysteros with re-acquisition of the Peiraieus in 282/1; for a convincing refutation of his views see Osborne, “Nikias Hysteros”, pp.278-81, especially with regard to the chronology of Phaidros’ double tenure of the generalship *epi ten paraskeuen* in the archonship of Nikias.
in the archon-years 298/7, 297/6, and in the first half of 296/5. The suggestion of De Sanctis that Lachares himself re-established democracy in the second half of 296/5 in order to placate the people at the Peiraieus and create a united front against Demetrios seems quite improbable.\(^{127}\) As M. J. Osborne has remarked, Lachares had neither reason nor time to celebrate his accession to power by introducing a miniature year.\(^{128}\)

The precise context and the causes of the internal upheaval have to remain obscure. Pausanias mentions that the tyranny was brought about at the instigation of Kassandros and in *Pap. Oxyr.*, XVII 2082 (frg. 3, l.15) the establishment of Lachares' regime precedes the death of the ruler of Macedonia. Yet, unfortunately there is no evidence of Kassandros' actual help. Therefore, we cannot establish to what extent Kassandros was really interested in establishing Lachares as a tyrant. It is legitimate to suggest, however, that Lachares could have met Kassandros in the course of one of those embassies referred to in *IG II*\(^2\) 641, but other than that there is no explicit evidence for any contact between the two.

The usurpation of power by Lachares is described as a direct result of his conflict with Charias, the hoplite general and the other generals who seized the Akropolis (frg. 1, ll.3-8). We are in the dark as to the cause of the *stasis*. Accepting the statement of Pausanias as to the involvement of Kassandros and taking into account the fact that an embassy was dispatched to the ruler of Macedonia in 299 (*IG II*\(^2\) 641), it is possible to see the cause of the *stasis* in a reaction of a faction of the generals (under the leadership of Charias) against a rapprochement with Kassandros. The involvement of Kassandros should be seen in this perspective of his interest to keep Athens by his side and prevent a renewal of the bonds with Demetrios.

In the Lachares episode we watch the generals trying to acquire ultimate power and thus creating a tremendous upheaval. It is the culmination of a process of increasing intrusion of military men in the

\(^{127}\) "Atene", p.255.
\(^{128}\) "Nikias Hysteros", p.277.
administration of political life in Athens. It is imperative to underline that there were more than one general involved in the Lachares episode, who were later on executed, having taken sides with Charias.

It is worth pointing to the actual role of Charias. It is he who took the initiative and seized the Akropolis. Could he have become a tyrant, instead of Lachares, had he succeeded? G. De Sanctis was the first to notice that Charias’ conduct was worthy of criticism and wondered whether the taking up of arms against Charias was a defence of democracy. Thus he pointed to another dimension of Lachares’ character, that of a defender of the constitution. Though it is still possible to argue that Charias seized the Akropolis in order to prevent Lachares from doing it, it is noteworthy that at first people did not resist Lachares’ establishing himself in power. Instead they condemned Charias to death (frg. 2, ll.11-12). One reason could be that he proved unable to provide food for them (frg. 1, ll.8-9). There arises the question concerning the extent to which Lachares was regarded as a tyrant by his fellow Athenians. Immediately connected with this problem is the identification of the Peiraikoi stratiotai (frg. 2 ll.3-4, 15). Were they on the side of Lachares at first or did they fight against him from the start? At any rate, it emerges from the papyrus that a faction of the people did leave the astu and withdrew to the Peiraieus, thus causing a split between the astu and the harbour. There might be a clue as to who actually followed Lachares in frg. 1, l.15 where the hippeis are mentioned. It is significant that those who remained in the astu resisted stoutly the siege of Poliorketes to the point of starvation (Plut., Demetr. 33). Is it that even a tyrant’s regime was to be preferred to a new intervention by a foreign ruler? In the past the Athenians had thrown their doors open to Demetrios Poliorketes to liberate them from Demetrios of Phaleron and,

129 It is in the same period (after 301) that we find military officials in charge of Athenian finance: IG II 641 and B. D. Meritt, Hesp II, 278-9 no. 53. They are also attested in IG II 646, 649 but not as paymasters; M. J. Osborne, Naturalization II, p.138 and n.597. In three inscriptions of the period we find the exetastes (inspector) and the trittyarchoi (leaders of one third of the tribe) being in charge of the disbursement of funds for the setting up of the inscriptions.
130 "Atene", p. 253
indirectly, from Kassandros. Lachares' regime caused a division of mind and attitude in the Athenian people to become apparent: there were those who would rather prefer any kind of genuinely Athenian regime, but there were also those who would rather be ruled by a foreign king than by an Athenian whose political conduct they strongly disapproved.

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b) The double archonship of Olympiodoros

The case of Olympiodoros is different and equally interesting and intriguing. He was archon for two successive years, 294/3 and 293/2,\textsuperscript{131} which is at odds with democratic practice together with the presence in the inscriptions of the anagrapheus instead of the prytany secretary.\textsuperscript{132} Plutarch mentions that Demetrios Poliorketes, after he had expelled Lachares in 295, "κατέστησεν ἁρχὰς αἱ ἰσαν προσφιλεῖς τῷ δήμῳ" (\textit{Demetr.} 34.4); the archonship must have been one of these archai. What conclusions could one draw from Plutarch's statement? When did this happen? What is the meaning of the words "κατέστησεν" and "προσφιλής"? The latter may denote someone popular with the people but it could also be that the people were somehow indifferent to him. I would suggest however that the word προσφιλής should be translated as agreeable. As to the "κατέστησεν" C. Habicht argued convincingly that the clause should be translated "he appointed persons" and not "he restored democracy", which seems quite plausible;\textsuperscript{133} all the more so, since Plutarch relates that a few years later, after their successful revolt, the Athenians restored their constitution (\textit{Demetr.} 46.1). Along the same lines M. J. Osborne holds the view that Demetrios "caused to be selected as magistrates persons who were popular in Athens".\textsuperscript{134} However, according to Osborne's dating of Lachares' fall (spring 295), Demetrios...

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{IG} II\textsuperscript{2}, 649, \textit{IG} II\textsuperscript{2} 378, 389 + B. D. Meritt, \textit{Hesp} 7, 1938, pp. 97-9, no 17.

\textsuperscript{132} That the regime had oligarchic features is also testified by Plut., \textit{Demetr.} 46.1 who referring to the constitution after the revolt of 287 writes: "ἀρχοντας αἱρεσθαι πάλιν ὁσπὲρ ἄν πάτριον"; Osborne, "Nikias Hysteros", pp.275-282.

\textsuperscript{133} \textit{Untersuchungen}, pp. 28 ff.

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Naturalization} II, pp.147-8, 151.
restored, temporarily, democracy only to establish an oligarchy in the following archon year (294/3).

Accepting that Demetrios re-entered Athens in March 295, then why did he not install people that he favoured right from the beginning? The answer probably lies in Demetrios’ departure from Athens in the following archon year. For so long as he was present he could control the situation himself and could afford to keep up appearances of democratic election of magistrates.

How could Olympiodoros have been equally agreeable to the Athenian people and to Demetrios? On the grounds of his establishment as an archon by Demetrios most scholars have argued in favour of a participation of Olympiodoros in the events associated with the establishment of Lachares’ regime. More specifically, it has been argued by G. De Sanctis that at first he was the leader of the Peiraic troops who initially supported Lachares against Charias only to desert him when he realised that he was heading towards tyranny; Olympiodoros then became the successor of Charias and accepted the alliance with Poliorketes. The problem is that such a reconstruction of his career is based on a series of hypotheses and is therefore highly conjectural, particularly the first part concerning the supposed support for Lachares. On the other hand there is no source to provide us with the slightest clue. The only thing that seems certain is that he had not joined hands with Charias; otherwise he would be among those generals executed by Lachares (Pap. Oxyr., XVII, 2082, frg. 2, ll.6-13).

Olympiodoros’ double tenure of the archonship is most frequently designated as a dictatorship, but this is far-fetched. First of all, it is an anachronism. If we ignore the anachronism and accept the implications that the term conveys, we will have to search for elements that convey absolute authority. Archonship in Athens in itself did not carry actual power; only prestige. G. De Sanctis went one step in the right direction when he remarked that the only thing missing from

135 “Atene”, p. 147; a similar view is held by Lund, Lysimachus, p. 92.
Olympiodoros' dictatorship and the one which would assimilate him with Lachares, was the *strategia epi ta hopla* (generalship of the infantry). Still, he was thinking in terms of a modern 'junta'.

Archonship did not in itself entail control of the people. Olympiodoros had acquired great fame in the Four Years War against Kassandros and he must have enjoyed a considerable degree of popularity. If indeed Olympiodoros had fought by Demetrios' side in order to overthrow Lachares, then his establishment in the archonship could be a way of paying tribute to his services. On the other hand, Demetrios, by establishing Olympiodoros in the archonship, was removing him from active political or military life. Secondly, had Demetrios really meant Olympiodoros to exercise control over the Athenian people, would it not be a much more effective step to install him in one of the generalships? As has been mentioned, the archonship would have conferred upon him no real power. On the other hand, we cannot reject the possibility that Olympiodoros had indeed fought by the side of Demetrios against Lachares. However, even so, this would not necessarily have made him a partisan of Demetrios rather than an enemy of Lachares and would not necessarily gain him the confidence of the king.

As a conclusion then, it seems to me that Demetrios' move was much more carefully calculated; by establishing Olympiodoros as an archon he actually aimed at depriving him of real power. Moreover, he could have also aimed at essentially diminishing his prestige in the eyes of the people who would have thought of him as a partisan of Demetrios.

On the other hand, as a general he could have urged the people to revolt earlier than 287. Actually, in this perspective it is possible to solve the problem of inconsistency in Olympiodoros' career. G. De Sanctis once remarked that the evidence could be used to portray Olympiodoros in two entirely different ways: either as a patriot who acted according to

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138 Treves ("Dinsmoor", p.187) challenged the hypothesis of a dictatorship of Olympiodoros by pointing out that had he any intention of becoming a dictator he would not have restricted his power within the limits of the archonship; my own view differs in that I discuss Olympiodoros' authority in the perspective of Demetrios Poliorcetes' will.
Athens' best interest or as an opportunist who readily changed sides a few years after the Lachares' episode. He was the one to inspire Athens and to put her on the path of rebellion (in 287) against Poliorcetes. But, it is far simpler to try and interpret his activities in the perspective of expediency and not that of opportunism. At a certain time Demetrios could be regarded as a saviour from the tyrant Lachares, as he had once been regarded when he had overthrown Demetrios Phalereus; when the time was ripe he could be seen as what he really was: a foreign intruder. However, Pausanias (I.25.2) credits Olympiodoros with a major achievement: he infused courage in his compatriots and inspired them to revolt (in 287). It is a passage that echoes strongly Hyperides' praise of Leosthenes and aligns the two men in terms of their services to Athens.

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139 "Atene", p.268.
vi. Assignment of command

a) Election and assignment on particular posts

Independent election of a state’s, or in our case a city’s officials is the ultimate expression of its independence. Until the 260s the overall impression is that Athens normally carried out without external interference the election of her military officials, with the exception of one appointment in the Four Years War and also the possible exception of 294 when Demetrios appointed officials; but we are not certain whether the generals were included.

In this section I hope to illustrate that election of the generals in the early Hellenistic period was more than ever dictated by the needs of the moment and thus can be ascribed to the more general pattern of flexibility in Athenian political behaviour, rather than to external influence or to a changed institutional structure.

By the time that the Athenaión Politeia was written in c. the 320s, there seemed to be a division of labour among the generals:

“καὶ τούτους διατάττουσι τῇ χειροτονίᾳ, ένα μὲν ἐπὶ τοὺς ὀπλίτας, δὲς ἠγείται τῶν πολιτῶν ἃν ἐξίσωσιν, ἕνα δ’ ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν, δὲς φυλάττει, καὶν πόλεμος ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ γίγνεται, πολεμεῖ ὁδοῦς. Δύο δ’ ἐπὶ τὸν Πειραιᾶ, τὸν μὲν εἰς τὴν Μουνυχίαν, τὸν δὲ εἰς τὴν Ἀκτῆ, οἱ τῆς φυλακῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν Πειραιᾷ. Ἐνα δ’ ἐπὶ τὰς συμμορίας” (61.1).

From 338 to the 260s there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the Athenians did not observe the rules described in the Athenaión Politeia. The pattern described in this work corresponds to a very specific period of time and it is not to be taken as a standard. For instance, the στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὰς συμμορίας (general of the symmories) ceases to exist after the abolition of the trierarchy. We do read about

140 “And they assign them (the generals) at the election; one in charge of the hoplites who leads the citizens whenever they campaign out of the borders; one in charge of the countryside who guards it and, if there is a war, defends it; two in charge of the Peiraeus - one on the Mounychia Hill and the other on the Coast - who are in charge of the garrisons and of those at the Peiraeus; one in charge of the symmories”.
141 Ferguson, ΗΑ, p.58.
the offices mentioned in the *Ath. Pol.* but we read about other postings as well.

Quite frequently what a general does is not what he is supposed to. More specifically, generals transgress their supposed sphere of action and take up duties which should belong to other generalships.

During the early Hellenistic period Athens was besieged more than once; the Athenians had to deal with foreign garrisons in the Peiraeus or the garrison forts or even in the *astu* itself. Correspondingly, military command had to be restructured. The duties of the various military officials were diversified from those in the previous centuries and even multiplied. At the same time multiplication of duties accords well with flexibility in the pattern of command. It will be maintained that the generalship was quite a flexible magistracy, adaptable to the needs of the moment and far from being restrained by rules; furthermore, that there occurred 'irregular' postings supports the view that assignment of particular commands was a process distinct from the *cheirotonia* (election).\(^{142}\)

There is enough evidence to suggest that election of the generals was a separate process from the assignment of particular commands to each one of them and that election or assignment of generals was a much more flexible process than commonly thought and was determined by the various occasions. P. Rhodes set the problem quite precisely, when he remarked that "it is not clear whether generals were elected directly to particular posts or first elected generals and then by a separate vote assigned to particular posts".\(^{143}\) I would argue that a separate vote might not have always been required. Depending on the circumstances a separate vote could immediately follow the *cheirotonia* or it could be discussed in another meeting of the *ekklesia*.

Already by the end of the fifth century Xenophon mentions (*Hell.* 2.1.16) that the Athenians, in order to prepare for a naval battle

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\(^{142}\) Translation in the English of the different kinds of generalships and commands, though helpful, cannot make clear the variations in meaning of the Greek terms.

\(^{143}\) *Athenaion Politeia*, p. 678.
proseilonto = chose in addition three more generals. This particular incident illustrates another aspect of generalship. We deal here with an initiative of the generals and an *ad hoc* decision of theirs. It is improbable that on the eve of the battle the Athenian army would have waited for new generals to arrive from Athens. It is highly probable that these three generals were already present in the Aegean area, and that the generals already elected sorted out the situation by themselves. A possible reconstruction of the procedure could be the following: Athens had sent out all these generals, but only a certain number of them were assigned leadership of the campaign. In the course of events they realised that it was necessary to share responsibility and thus named the additional three. Alternatively, it is possible that no more than three generals were dispatched and this would mean that these three appointed the additional generals from within the army.

In an inscription for Andros dated in 357/6 it is specifically recorded that the general to be sent there is to be chosen among those already *χειροτονηθέντες*: “*έλεσθαι στρατηγίων ἐκ τῶν κεχειροτονημένων, [τὸν δὲ αἰ.]ρεθέντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ["Ανδροῦ"]” (to choose a general among those already elected; and for him to take charge of Andros; Tod 156, l.12-13).

In the aftermath of the battle of Chaironeia, the Athenians faced the strong possibility of a siege by Philip. Therefore, there appeared the necessity to give a general charge of the *astu*. Plutarch (*Phoc. 16.4*) records a debate in the *ekklesia* between those who favoured Charidemos and those who preferred Phokion.

A new fragment in the decree for Epichares is illuminating in many ways: first of all, as far as concerns the election procedure and the assignment of specific commands. It is interesting that Epichares is called “*χειροτονηθεὶς στρατηγὸς τοῦ δήμου*” and then “*τάξαντος ἐπὶ τὴν παραλίαν*” (elected general by show of hands and then assigned command of the coast). In *IG II²* 1260, l. 7 we read “*ἐπὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς*

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κατασταθεῖς” (appointed in charge of the Peiraieus); in IG II² 682, l.15 we read “ἀποσταλείς στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν” (dispatched as a general in charge of the ships). Now, κατασταθεῖς or ἀποσταλείς are certainly not identical in meaning with χειροτονηθεῖς. They are procedures following the cheirotonia.

Special postings for the generals appear in an earlier period. True, they are very rare but they mark a tendency to create offices ad hoc in order to deal with various difficult situations. In the inscription for Andros the general is especially appointed to take charge of Andros (Tod 156, ll.12-15) whereas in another inscription of the same year a number of generals are listed without specification of their duties (Tod 153, ll.20-4). N. G. L. Hammond cites certain passages which refer to appointments of generals and argues that the partitioning of the generalship was well under way in the fifth century, after the Persian Wars. But all these passages serve as examples of ad hoc solutions and not as proof of a well-developed and regular procedure. At any rate it is in 407/6 that two extraordinary appointments occur: Alkibiades is appointed “στρατηγὸς ἀντικράτωρ” and with him two other generals are assigned “κατὰ γῆν” (Xen., Hell. 1.4.20-21). We have to get to 352/1 in order to be presented with the first inscriptional evidence of generals appointed epi ten choran (IG II² 204, ll.19-20). In 350/1 Ephialtes is designated as “στρατηγοῦντος ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν” (being a general of the countryside; Phil., FGH 328, Fl55).

After 338 there was marked development. Ephebic inscriptions of the 330s testify to a regularisation of the command epi ten choran, or rather command has been transformed into an office since the title is consistently “ἐπὶ τῇ χώρᾳ”. Still terminology with regard to other offices is far from being rigidly formulated. For example, in a single

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145 IG II² 1623, ll.279-280 refers to the triereis which sailed under the command of Diotimos strategos “ἐπὶ τῆν φυλακήν τῶν ληστῶν”. Another flotilla was sent under the general Thrasyboulos “ἐπὶ τῆν παραπυρrhῆν τοῦ σίτου” (IG II² 1628, l.40). Sarikakis (“Ἀθηναίοι στρατηγοὶ”, p.257) presents these as examples of special appointments of generals; but the clause is directly connected with the triereis and not with the general.  
146 “Strategia and Hegemonia”, pp.III-144.  
147 Reinmuth 5; 7; 9, Col.III, ll.10-11; 15.
inscription (*IG II²* 682) Thymochares is called *strategos epi to nauticon* (in charge of the fleet) (1.5) but further down he is described as *epi ton neon* (in charge of the ships) (II.14-15). More often than not generals are mentioned without any further specification of their office. To be sure, this occurs quite frequently in garrison inscriptions where we can be fairly certain that they are about the general *epi ten choran*. The hoplite general is called *epi ta hopla, epi ton hopliton, epi tous hoplitas*. This lack of a clear and standard formulation points to a lack of strict professionalism and corresponds to a certain fusion of offices.

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b) **Response to the circumstances after 338**

**Concentration of duties with the strategos *epi ten choran***

During the early Hellenistic period the Athenians continue the old practice of creating offices *ad hoc*. There were years in which there was urgent need to prepare for a siege and they could therefore very well use more than one general *epi ten paraskeuen*, or in case of a naval campaign they needed a general *epi to nauticon* (or *epi ton neon*). The need for the protection of the countryside led to a concentration of duties and power as well as a significant ‘confusion’ of the duties of the hoplite general with those of the general *epi ten choran*.

The generalship *epi toi Peiraiei* disappears after 307. Before this date it is to be found in certain ephebic inscriptions (Reinmuth 8, 9, 15): "[στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ] τῷ Πειραιαῖ[τῃ] Κώνων Τιμοθέου Ἀναφλύστου"; the same man is praised in another contemporary inscription. Philokles was "στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὴν Μουνυχίαν καὶ τὰ νεώρια" (general in charge of the Mounychia Hill and of the shipyards) in 325/4 (Din., III.1). In 324/3 Dikaiogenes was "στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῷ Πειραιαῖ" while Pherekleides was "στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῇ Ἀκτῇ" in 324/3. It appears that the terms *epi toi Peiraiei* and *epi ten Mounychian* were interchangeable. In an inscription of 307/6 we read "ἐπὶ τοῦ Πειραιῶς
κατασταθείσ" (IG II² 1260, l.7). It is noteworthy that as a strategos epi
tou Peiraieos he goes to the rescue of Sounion, a task that should have
been undertaken by the strategos epi tei Aktei, had the office been still in
existence. It could be that the office still existed and that the general in
charge of the Peiraieus assumed responsibility for both the harbour and the
Akte only for the moment. However there is no mention of a
strategos epi toi Peiraiei after this date.

In the same inscription there occurs another ‘confusion’ of offices:
it appears that the duties of the general epi tei Aktei were taken over by
the strategos epi ten choran: "καὶ νῦν χειροτονηθεὶς ύπὸ τοῦ δήμου
στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν ἐπιμελέστατι Σούνιον καὶ Ραμνούντος
καὶ τῆς ἄλλης παραλίας πάσης" (II. 21-23). 151

The prevalent opinion among scholars is that the division of
generalship epi ten choran into generalship epi ten paralian and ep’
Eleusinos took place after the end of the Chremonidean War. On the
basis of IG II² 1260 J. & L. Robert have argued that specialisation of the
generals is attested already by the end of the fourth century and that the
office of the strategos epi ten paralian was not created after the
Chremonidean War. 152 It has to be made clear that specialisation or
steps towards it is different from regionalisation of office, in the sense of
a legal division of the chorai. As a matter of fact the very inscription
shows that the paralia and Eleusis are still united: a general epi ten
choran is praised because he took care of "πάσης τῆς παραλίας". This
does not point to a distinct generalship; as it is formulated generalship epi
ten choran has been identified with command epi ten paralian.

The wording of the decree for Epichares is instructive: Epichares is
not described as "χειροτονηθεὶς ἐπὶ τῆς παραλίαν". His cheirotonia
preceded his assignment of command epi ten paralian. During the
Chremonidean War the danger for Athens was from the sea and,
naturally, the Athenians would take great pains to protect the paralia

151 “...and now having been elected general in charge of the countryside, he takes care of
Sounion and Rhamnous and the rest of the coastal area”.
152 BE 81, 1968, 456, no 247.
from being ravaged and to prevent Antigonus Gonatas from setting a firm foot on the west coast. It is another ad hoc solution.

Generalship *epi tous xenous* also appears spasmodically and it is not always clear whether it is distinct from generalship *epi ten choran*. Lachares is described as such in *Pap. Oxyr. XVII* 2082 and the general in *IG II²* 379 is "χειροτονηθείς ἐπὶ τῶν ξένων" (elected by show of hands in charge of the mercenaries). On the other hand Phaidros is designated as "γενόμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς ξένους" (designated commander of the mercenaries) (*IG II²* 682 l. 25 ) which implies that he was not elected general *epi tous xenous*, but that he was simply given command of the mercenaries. It is the only time in the decree that Phaidros' military office is not preceded by the participle "χειροτονηθείς".

The decree in honour of Phaidros of Sphettos (*IG II²* 682 ) is at the same time extremely informative and a source of great bafflement. There are various tantalising problems with regard to his military career interwoven with his political affiliations. Let us start with his generalship *epi ten choran* and his command of the mercenaries: "καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν χειροτονηθείς πλεονάκις καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ξένους γενόμενος τρίς" (II.24-5).153

Dinsmoor has argued that his three commands *epi tous xenous* were generalships distinct from those *epi ten choran*.154 W. Schwan on the other hand holds that "πλεονάκις" (many times) and "τρίς" (three times) are identical.155 Contrary to Dinsmoor T. L. Shear advanced convincingly the view that there was not enough time between the mid 290s and the archonship of Kimon in 288 to accommodate numerous generalships *epi ten choran* and another three commands *epi ton xenon*.156 An additional argument in support of Shear's view is the participle that introduces Phaidros' command of the mercenaries. Instead of "χειροτονηθείς" we find "γενόμενος". In conclusion, the most

153 "having been elected in charge of the countryside many times and having been designated in charge of the mercenaries three times".  
154 *Archons*, p.66.  
155 RE Supp. 6, 1935, col. 1091.  
156 "Kallias", p.66, n. 193.
plausible hypothesis is that while a strategos epi ten choran he was also sometimes designated commander of the mercenaries; and certainly pleonakis is not identical with tris.

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c) Special appointments in the Four Years War and in the 280s

It is on two particular occasions that we note a series of special and important appointments: the Four Years War and, even more notably, the revolt of 287 and its aftermath.

During the Four Years War there is notice of a general epi Salaminos in IG II² 1260. The inscription is to be dated at the beginning of the war since it refers to extensive preparations and repairs. The general is even praised for advancing (as a loan) the funds necessary. He was succeeded by a certain Aischetades who lost Salamis and consequently his life (Paus., I.35.2). However, this office emerged as a product of the necessity to protect Salamis from Kassandros and, naturally, it disappeared after its loss.

In 307/6, the first year of Demetrios Poliorketes' war against Kassandros, Athens faced the situation by appointing more than one general "ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ πολέμου παρασκευήν" (in charge of the preparations for war). Athens would have probably expected Kassandros to invest the city, which actually happened. IG II² 1487 (ll.92-3) bears witness to extensive preparations and stock-piling of (defensive) weapons such as catapults and arrows.

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Adeimantos strategos epi ten choran

Recently, the discovery of an honorary inscription, at the fortress of Rhamnous, dating to the Four Years War has upset the picture we held of the appointment of Athenian military officials: until recently, historians believed that it was only after the Chremonidean War that the Antigonids interfered with the election of the generals.¹⁵⁷ The new

¹⁵⁷ Notice of the inscription is provided by V. Petrakos (Ergon 40, 1993, p.7) who dates it c.303/2. Unfortunately, he does not provide us with the actual text.
inscription refers to the honours conferred by the soldiers of Rhamnous upon Adeimantos, most probably the same person as the one appointed to an important post at the synedrion at Corinth, who was appointed by Demetrios strategos epi ten choran, something that could be seen in a perspective of excessive interference. Yet, there was quite a rational basis for his appointment, which could be acceptable to the Athenians. Athens and Demetrios were fighting a common war against Kassandros; Athens was trying to retain or regain her forts and Demetrios was helping her. Plutarch informs us that the Athenians, faced with serious difficulties, called Demetrios to relieve them from the siege laid by Kassandros in 304/3. It is plausible then to suggest that at precisely this point Demetrios undertook completely the responsibility of the defence of Athens. Furthermore, it would appear natural if, after the raising of the blockade, he had appointed one of his own officials to co-operate with the Athenians in the defence of the countryside. Unfortunately, we are not provided with a precise date; Petrakos dates the inscription c. 303/2 (Ergon 40, 1993, p.7), but further precision would have helped us to establish whether the appointment of Adeimantos occurred at the expense of his Athenian counterpart. The most that I could conjecture is that Demetrios could have appointed Adeimantos immediately after the blockade in 304 and not wait until the next archon year, and in this perspective Adeimantos would have co-operated with the Athenian general of the countryside (it is inconceivable that in 304 in particular the Athenians would not have elected a strategos epi ten choran). On the other hand, if Adeimantos’ election took place in 303/2, then it is possible that there was no Athenian general epi ten choran.

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**Phaidros protos strategos**

Unification of command epi ten choran and epi ton xenon is not the only extraordinary feature of Phaidros’ military career. For the 280s it is again the decree in his honour that presents us with the most
interesting information concerning the duties and the responsibilities of the *strategoi*.

In the context of the revolt of 287, and while he was a hoplite general, he undertook the duties of the *strategos epi ten choran*: Gathering of the harvest, repair of the forts, provision of food and weapons, protection of the harvest and the countryside.

His appointment as "πρῶτος στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τοὺς ὀπλίτας" (first general in charge of the infantry) (II. 44-5) has caused much discussion and various explanations have been put forward. Most early discussions of the term interpret it as first after a major change of governmental change or other critical event. If there was a description of the event, it must have stood in the following erased lines. But Pritchett and Meritt have rightly observed that ll.44-7 are unconnected syntactically. Another interpretation is that he was the first of the two hoplite generals elected in the same year. Along these lines T. L. Shear maintained that Phaidros was deposed after the revolt and was succeeded by Olympiodorus. If this is the case, there would naturally be no mention of his deposition. Even so the phrase hardly makes sense in an honorific decree. If the proposer of the decree wished to keep vivid the memory of his generalship he could very well achieve it without reminding the people of a disgraceful incident. If we take into account that the decree is carried in a period of Antigonid control (250s) then it would be all the more unreasonable on behalf of the Athenians to remind Antigonos Gonatas that they had once deposed Phaidros as a result of his alleged pro-Macedonian outlook.

The most crucial objection to Shear's version of events is the one advanced by Pritchett and Meritt. They draw attention to the fact that Phaidros' tenure of office is described as lasting the whole year: *epi ton eniauton*, that is, Phaidros held the generalship *the whole year*.

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160 "Kallias", p.67.
161 For the date of the decree see A. Henry, "The Archons Euboulos and the Date of the Decree for Phaidros of Sphettos", *Chiron* 18, 1988, 215-224.
Therefore, they conclude, “πρῶτος” is to be understood as first in rank on the board of generals. The greatest difficulty with this explanation is that there is no previous parallel of a general being designated specifically as “πρῶτος” = superior to his colleagues, whereas we do find “στράτηγος, πέμπτος, δέκατος” which do not bear any connotations of priority.\(^{162}\) Shear objects that there was no need to distinguish this office, held in the archonship of Xenophon, because Phaidros had held the same office with the same priority in the archonship of Kimon.\(^{163}\) Fatal to Shear’s view is that the stone does not record Phaidros as “πρῶτος στρατηγός” in Kimon’s archon year, but only in Xenophon’s. Shear is trapped by his firm conviction that Phaidros was operating against the Athenian democracy and therefore assumes that the term protos cannot possibly bear any connotation of superiority in status. In opposition to him M. J. Osborne argues persuasively that Phaidros co-operated with his brother Kallias for the success of the Athenian revolt in 287 which consequently wipes out any view of Phaidros as pro-Macedonian. Osborne goes on to argue that due to Phaidros’ cautious outlook, the more adventurous Olympiodoros was preferred to lead the assault on the Mouseion Hill (a view to which I shall return further below), but he remains silent with regard to the term protos.\(^{164}\)

My own view of the problem is that Pritchett and Meritt were on the right lines, however unique the appointment was. Besides, the assignment of priority in command was not that extraordinary. In the past, prominent generals had been granted extensive authority. M. Jameson has pointed out that we possess literary references to only one general in cases where inscriptions show that there were more involved; inscriptions, he concluded, point to the *de iure* situation whereas literature records the *de facto* situation.\(^{165}\) In 430 the Athenians elected Perikles and “πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐπέτρεψαν” (entrusted him with

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162 Dover, “Δέκατος αὐτός”, pp. 61-77.
163 “Kallias”, p.67, n.194.
164 “Phaidros”, pp.189.
165 “Seniority in the Strategia”, *TAPA* 86, 1955, 63-87, p.78.
administration of all affairs) (Thuc., II.65.4), though there is no mention of attribution of legal superiority. On the eve of the Sicilian expedition the *ekklesia* appointed three generals - Nikias, Lamachos and Alkibiades - as "αὐτοκράτορες" (Thuc., VI.8.2; VI.26.1), that is to say, responsible for managing Athenian interests, without direct control by Athens. Decisions were taken on a majority vote, without any of them assuming precedence over his colleagues (Thuc., VI.50.1). However, in 407/6 there occurred a shift in the procedure: Alkibiades was appointed *strategos autokrator* to be accompanied by two other *strategoi*. It is clear that these two were not invested with the same authority (Xen., *Hell.* 1.4.20-1). Xenophon’s passage is quite revealing: "ἀναρρηθεῖς πάντων ἡγεμόνι όντοκράτωρ" (having been proclaimed leader with absolute power). As K.J. Dover has shown the participle "ἀναρρηθεῖς" shows that he was designated *autokrator* sometime after his election to the *strategia* and, secondly, that this ascendancy was not confined to the moral level.166

What actually happened in the case of Phaidros was an evolution from verbal recognition of moral authority to official, legally established, written attribution of priority. Being first in rank is translated into exercise of authority over one’s colleagues as well as into being in charge of any operations. It is possible that the Athenians realised the necessity of a central authority in order to co-ordinate action. Accepting Osborne’s chronology of the revolt - in the later months of Kimon’s archon year - and his assigning of Phaidros’ gathering of the harvest to this year as well as taking into consideration his connection into the Ptolemaic court, we could conclude that the Athenians endowed Phaidros with the power to superintend military and diplomatic operations during the next archon year. One might ask what would have been the necessity to appoint a *protos strategos* when Athens was already free. But, it was only the *astu* that was liberated; there remained Peiraieus and the fortresses.

Olympiodoros was appointed especially for the assault on the Mouseion Hill in 287. Unfortunately, Pausanias does not mention the

166 "Δέκατος αὐτός", p.62 and n.7.
authority with which he was invested. It is not imperative that his command was rigidly defined and it is probable that he belonged to those unassigned. There remains the question why they chose Olympiodoros for the assault. Various factors could have operated, for instance his military competence which had been amply demonstrated against Kassandros. It was probably a spontaneous decision, taken on the spur of the moment, possibly after an exhortation of the demos, as is indicated in Pausanias' narrative. Yet, there probably operated other more practical reasons: In a recent paper G. Oliver pointed out that the main body of the Athenian army would have been occupied in the countryside under the leadership of Phaidros, which is supported by Pausanias' mention of children and older men participating in the assault.167

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The hoplite generalship and the importance of the chora

Scholars normally take it for granted that it is the office of the hoplite general that was the most important one. Theoretically this holds very well; if we examine the careers of Phaidros and Glaukon, we see that the office of the hoplite general is the last one they acquire. But, in practice, in a period during which there are hardly any pitched battles undertaken by Athens on her own behalf, what could be the practical use of the office of the hoplite general? There are very few clear references to the hoplite general in the inscriptions of our period and considerably fewer in literary passages. The first inscriptive reference occurs in IG II² 556, l. 14: "ὁ στρατευός ὁ ἐπὶ τὰ ὀπλα”, c.305. The next reference is supposed to belong to the beginning of the third century and it concerns Olympiodoros (IG II² 2429, l.8), but nothing excludes the possibility that it could be dated a few years earlier. At about the same time Charias is "στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῶν ὀπλῶν τεταγμένος" (assigned in charge of the arms) (Pap. Oxyr. XVII, 2082, frg.1). Two more tenures belong to Phaidros

of Sphettos; later on Glaukon was designated *strategos epi ton hoplon* before 282/1 and *strategos epi ta hopla* in 266/5.168

Leosthenes, Olympiodoros and Kallippos are the only cases of generals leading the army outside the borders. The precise title of the first in the Lamian War has not been preserved, but it is commonly assumed that he led the allied army in his capacity as hoplite general since it is he who, according to the *Athenaion Politeia*, was in charge of expeditions outside the borders of Attika (61.1).169 In addition, it has been argued that he must have been *strategos autokrator* (endowed with absolute power).170 Surely, the impression that one gets from Diodorus' narrative is that Leosthenes was the supreme figure in the allied army. But to hold with Larsen that the allies used to their own advantage the machinery of the League of Corinth and formally elected him general with absolute authority is to regard the League of Corinth as a version of a Federal state like Aitolia or Achaia.171 If he had been appointed *strategos autokrator*, this would have happened either *in absentia*, or during his brief return to Athens. That he organised the alliance was reason enough to assign him supreme command without formalities. His position in the Athenian army was ambiguous. It seems that above all he was regarded as a leader of mercenaries but he was incorporated in the framework of the *polis* as such. A mercenary, most probably in the service of Dareios, he returns to Athens at some point in the 320s to become a syntrierarch (*IG* II² 1631) and then a *strategos epi ten choran* in 324/3. He was also the one who arranged for 8000 mercenaries to be transported to Tainaron (Paus., I.25.5; VIII.52.5). The band of mercenaries assembled at Tainaron had chosen him as their commander (D.S., XVII.111.1-3). Hyperides seems to be conscious of this ambivalence when he emphasizes that he became leader of both citizens and mercenaries: "καὶ ξενικὴν μὲν δύναμιν συστησάμενος, τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἡγεμῶν.

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169 Mathieu, "Guerre", p.169.
170 Larsen, "Leagues", p.64.
171 "Leagues", p.63.
καταστάς” (Epit. II). It is as if Hyperides is trying to remind his fellow citizens that Leosthenes was their leader as well. It is significant that in spite of efforts to present Leosthenes as a hero equal or even superior to those of the fifth century, quite frequently Hyperides wavers between “ἡγεμόν” (Epit. 3, 11, 13) - a title appropriate to both a leader of mercenaries and a leader of a citizen army - and “στρατηγός” (1, 3, 10).

Similarly the title of Kallippos who led the Athenian army against the Celts in 279 has not been preserved. Ironically, had their titles been preserved, they would have been the only examples of hoplite generals, together with Olympiodoros who campaigned to Elateia, leading the Athenian army abroad; it is possible to associate the hoplite generalship of Olympiodoros, referred to in IG II² 2429, with this campaign but this has to remain only a speculation.

The only time that we can be fairly certain that the hoplite general was involved in serious warfare is in 266 - in the middle of the Chremonidean War - when we find Glaukon elected hoplite general.

In most of the cases our evidence is quite fragmentary, but in combination with the absence of any other testimony we can be fairly sure that the hoplite generals achieved nothing too spectacular in the battlefield. However, whatever conclusions we draw, they do not conform with the evidence of the Athenaion Politeia (61.1) where the hoplite general is supposed to lead the Athenian army outside the borders of Attika. The main reason for this is that Athens hardly ever had the opportunity to lead an army abroad; warfare had been transferred inside Attika and the basic problem and aim was to preserve Athens and Attika.

Instead, we find the hoplite general being assigned non-hoplite duties. The case of Phaidros demonstrates that the office still carried great importance but it could be transformed in order to include other offices. The underlying principle is the change in warfare. The paralia and the chora had acquired great importance. Instead of abolishing the office of the hoplite general the Athenians simply widened his field of

172 “and on the one hand he assembled a mercenary force and on the other he was appointed leader of the civic forces”.
activities. From a certain point of view it can be regarded as lack of professionalism but from a different viewpoint it can be seen as concentration of powers.

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vii. **Concluding remarks**

Until the Lamian War Athenian attitude is generally very cautious but the Athenians do seem to believe that the issue of Macedonian supremacy will be dealt with in the battlefield; the huge military preparations of Lykourgos testify to this. The speech of Lykourgos against Leokrates, the funeral speech of Hyperides for the dead of the Lamian War and the speech of Dinarchus against Demosthenes (in the context of his trial for the Harpalos affair) betray a need for military leadership, which in turn indicates that the Athenians perceived their defeat in 338 in terms of inadequate military leadership. On the other hand, it is interesting that the Athenians condemned only one of their generals after the defeat - Lysikles - and in 330 they awarded Demosthenes a crown - the man who was mainly responsible for Athenian policy vis-à-vis Macedonia. We deal here with two different levels of perception of events. Yes, Athenian policy had failed, but the Athenians would not openly renounce it. However, immediate Athenian reaction after the defeat was to confer increased responsibilities upon a military man, namely Nausikles, but in the long run this did not deprive the orators of their authority, as we shall see in the next chapter.

With particular reference to the speeches of Hyperides and of Dinarchus, it is significant that both can be ascribed to the context of the Lamian War; the one immediately before it and the other during its course. The factor of the Harpalos affair should not be ignored: it contributed a lot towards discrediting the orators and increasing the prestige of military men, or rather one of them: Leosthenes.

In his speech against Demosthenes Dinarchus singles out the generals of the fourth century Konon and Timotheos to juxtapose them with Demosthenes and to praise them (14, 16). He chooses to view Athens’ past as built upon the deeds of single individuals: basically Timotheos and Konon but also Aristeides, Themistokles and certain orators who belonged to the generation immediately preceding that of Demosthenes. Dinarchus strongly emphasizes that the cities’ fortunes are
entirely dependent upon individual leaders and generals (72). It is in this perspective that he views the past glory of Thebes: the city of Thebes grew powerful because she had Pelopidas and Epaminondas as her leaders. Conversely, he attributes her fall to the corruption of her leadership (74). The interest lies not in the correctness or not of the interpretation of Thebes’ fortune but in that he offers a model for Athens’ rise and fall: "ἡ γὰρ ὑπὸτη ἑστία καὶ πόλεως καὶ ἔθνους ἐστι, τὸ προστατῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ σπουδαίων συμβούλων τυχεῖν" (76-7).

It is not his purpose to digress on the details of the exploits of the leaders of the remote past, on the grounds that they are very well-known (75). He is interested in describing the achievements of the more recent past. The significance is twofold: firstly, Dinarchus wants to establish that the fourth century witnessed glorious days and not just the military defeat at Chaironeia; secondly, he is referring to specific military leaders but does not fail to mention the orators Archinos and Kephalos. The overall impression is that the generals carried the burden while the orators offered the backing to their activities. He does insist, however, that by condemning Demosthenes Athens is not going to be at a loss for leaders.

The first man to answer this demand for a military leader was Leosthenes, at least according to Hyperides and Pausanias. Some fifteen years after the battle of Chaironeia Hyperides’ funeral speech for the dead of the first year of the Lamian War turns out to be a praise of a single individual: the leader of the Athenian and of the coalition army, Leosthenes. On the other hand in Hyperides’ text the praise of the polis or of the Athenian army seems to have yielded prominence to the enkomion of a single man. It is clearly stated by Hyperides that Leosthenes was the leader long awaited and needed:

"Ὁ Λεωσθένης γὰρ ὅρων τὴν Ἑλλάδαν πᾶσαν τεταπεινωμένην... καὶ τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἡμῶν δεομένην ἀνδρός, τὴν δὲ Ἑλλάδα πᾶσα πόλεως ἥτις προστήναι δυνῆσεται τῆς ἡγεμονίας, ἐπέδωκεν ἑαυτὸν
The need for military leaders coincides chronologically with the participation of military men, basically Phokion, in important embassies to Philip, Alexander and Antipatros. Set alongside the case of Nausikles and the praises of the orators for military men, this could be taken to indicate a really conscious shift on the Athenian part towards an undertaking of foreign policy by military men. Yet, it should not escape our attention that alongside Phokion, there is an orator, Demades. I am inclined to believe that the apparent change is to a large extent coincidental; that is it so happened that Phokion had the right connections - with Philip - and the Athenians consciously decided to exploit the opportunity they were presented with. In fact, the same principle applies to Demades' election as well. What Athens does very carefully is the choice of her envoys to Macedonia: she persists with certain persons, agreeable to the Macedonian rulers.

The case of Phaidros' election as an envoy to Egypt can also be ascribed in this pattern of coincidental and yet very careful choice. It so happened that his brother was an important Ptolemaic official and could thus provide the link between Athens and Egypt. However, the case of Phaidros is quite notable since he was probably one of the most able generals, energetic on both the diplomatic and the military front; by the time he undertook his mission (beginning of the third century) the Athenians might have been more conscious of the importance of military men in diplomacy. In my view, by the 260s Athenian mentality had reached a point at which they thought that military expertise was essential in negotiations. This, I think, was largely due to the revolt of 287 when Phaidros and the other generals participated actively in the negotiations with Demetrios. This marks quite a development in the Athenian practice, particularly if we remember that the peace of

173 "Leosthenes seeing that all of Greece was humiliated... and that our city was in need of one man and Greece was in need of a polis that would be able to assume leadership, he offered himself to his country and the city to Greece for the sake of freedom".
Philokrates had been concluded without any referral to the generals.\textsuperscript{174} The election of Kallippos at the \textit{synedrion} which prepared the Chremonidean War as well as the election of the same man alongside two other generals (most notably Glaukon) as an ambassador in the course of the same war indicates a very conscious, positive appraisal of the generals' role. It is the culmination of a process that had started immediately after the battle of Chaironeia.

The "opportunistic" character of the election of military men as envoys should in no way diminish the importance of their election and of the fact that the Athenians are prepared to take such a step after about seventy years in which the practice had elapsed to practically non existence. That Athens turned to her military men on every single occasion that war was either imminent or in progress touches upon the issue of the Athenian readiness to employ any useful means.

It is noteworthy that despite the usurpation of power by a military man (Lachares) at the beginning of the third century, the Athenians were not led to deprive their military men of power; instead, in the revolt of 287 but also later, the \textit{strategoi} were seriously involved in diplomatic transactions.

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CHAPTER II: THE RHETORES

The fact that the strategoi assume increased responsibilities does not reduce the rhetores to a role of secondary importance; quite the contrary. Only for two rhetores, Demades and Demochares, do we possess evidence (of a very dubious nature) that they might at some point have held the strategia. On the other hand, the generals do not appear to dominate the ekklesia, while the rhetores are active both as proposers of decrees and as envoys.

In this chapter I am going to examine the reaction of the rhetores to the new political reality, the ways in which they deal with the various monarchs.

Athenian diplomatic activity until the end of the Lamian War is to be examined as a separate entity since in this period Athens has still to face only Macedonia. I will focus on the role of the rhetores in the Harpalos affair in order to establish the extent of their influence on events in relation to that exercised by Leosthenes. Demades’ political activities will be discussed in the context of the first attempts to take advantage of the conflicts of the Diadochoi and also as related to the role of Phokion.

The situation after Alexander’s death and even more so after Antipatros’ death becomes much more intriguing. The new international situation brought about a novel kind of politicians, much more flexible than those of the previous generations because that was what the constant changes in the balance of power (which affected Athens) demanded. Above all there was a question of choices: could the Athenians remain neutral? If not whose side would they take and in which way?

The overall impression left by the historians’ treatment of these men’s policies is that there is a serious problem of vocabulary which stems from the effort to tailor the activities of the Athenian leaders to suit the model of democratic or otherwise. I will attempt to analyse why

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and how labels such as democrat, extreme or radical democrat, moderate, oligarchic, pro- or anti-Macedonian are inappropriate and inadequate; that they prevent us from gaining a clear and overall appreciation of these men’s activities. Describing the political orientation of these men using just one word is simply impossible (as is also the case with generals like Olympiodoros and Phaidros). The observations of C. Habicht with regard to the flexibility of Athenian politicians in this period who at some point could come to terms with a Macedonian ruler and at another create a front against him form the main guideline of my examination.\(^2\)

I will try then to define the activities of the \textit{rhetores} in the perspective of the relations they establish with one monarch or the other, abstaining from attaching any kind of label. The degree to which they favoured one monarch or the other, the reasons and the means they employed to express their favour is the background of their activities. And again these relations should not be seen in the perspective of personal loyalties as Gabbert would think. Gabbert has envisaged these relationships as emanating partly from genuine patriotism and partly from personal loyalties.\(^3\) I would instead argue that these “loyalties” were directly relevant to the expediency and the needs of the moment. However, it has to be underlined that for Athenian politicians to develop friendly relations with a monarch was translated into becoming their \textit{philoi}; their status would come to resemble that of the monarchs’ officials. In order to benefit their \textit{polis} the \textit{rhetores} would have to provide some sort of support or services to a king (or kings). This was an inevitable reality and Athenian politics had to adjust to it. The degree and the means of adjustment depended on the circumstances.

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\textbf{i. Rhetores in charge of military preparations}

The policies pursued by Athens in the period after the battle of Chaironeia are indicative of an uncertainty as to how to treat Macedonia. Diplomatic relations were indeed established with the Macedonian court

\(^2\) \textit{Untersuchungen}, p.62

\(^3\) \textit{Antigonus Gonatas}, pp.146-8.
but, on the other hand, Athens got engaged in a large scale program of military re-organisation and preparations, which indicates that she was expecting yet another confrontation with Macedonia in the battlefield. Yet, as we shall see below, Athens avoided military confrontation, particularly after the destruction of Thebes in 335. However, it is with two rhetores that the responsibility for military preparations rests: Lykourgos and Demades.

Lykourgos is the statesman whose conduct is normally described in terms of absolute patriotism; he had expressed his hostility against the Macedonians, but only on a verbal level and he did not proceed to armed combat. He is differentiated from other Athenian statesmen in that he was not so much engaged in foreign policy as preoccupied with internal administration. S. Humphreys thought that "his absence of any constructive foreign policy shows a lack of political insight and imagination". In fact, I do not think that Lykourgos could have predicted what happened some fifteen years later; it is quite plausible that he thought that the supremacy of Macedonia was only a temporary reality as it had been the power of Thebes.

My own purpose, however, is to establish the boundaries of Lykourgos' activity as related to the military sphere of action.

We do not possess evidence as to whether Lykourgos had been elected to the generalship. It is certain that in the battle of Chaironeia, shortly before he assumed prominence in the Athenian administration, he was not included among the leaders of the Athenian army.

In the decree in his honour (proposed by Stratokles) it is mentioned that he was elected in charge of the preparations for war: "χειροτονηθεὶς δ' ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ πολέμου παρασκευῆς..." but it is not specified whether this was a civic office created ad hoc or if we deal here with a generalship. T. Sarikakakis has listed this office among the

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5 [Plut.], X Orat. Vit. 851f - 852e; 852c for his election in charge of the preparations for war.
generalships;\textsuperscript{6} the basis of his argument is, I suppose, that all other occurrences of an office \textit{epi ten paraskeu{\`e}n} refer to a generalship.

It is significant that, similarly, in the foregoing clause Stratokles does not specify what office Lykourgos held when he accumulated plenty of money on the Akropolis. The overall impression from the decree is that Stratokles was not concerned with specific titles. In the next clause it is mentioned that Lykourgos took charge of the shipyards and of the \textit{skeuotheke}, but again it is not mentioned in which capacity he did so. Therefore we are faced with two possibilities: either Stratokles was more concerned with deeds than offices or “in charge of the preparations for war” was an office. If this office was a generalship, that is to say the only one that Lykourgos ever held, then I think that Stratokles would not have failed to mention it. However, the reason of this election would lie in his being in charge of finance. It would be a natural extension of his fiscal duties, and he would have been able to use the funds he had accumulated for the purchase of arms. We deal with a concentration of duties on Lykourgos’ part, which points to a very practical mentality on the part of the Athenian \textit{demos}. It is interesting to point out that a few years later (during the Four Years War) the responsibility of the preparations for war shifted to six generals (\textit{IG II}\textsuperscript{2} 1487, II.92-3).

The other great program of Lykourgos concerned the re-organisation of the military institution of the \textit{ephebeia} (\textit{Ath. Pol.} 43.3): for two years young Athenians were liable for service in the Peiraieus and in the other garrison forts of Attika. Reinmuth demonstrated that Lykourgos was most probably responsible for making the service \textit{continuous} throughout the two years of their liability; moreover the training program was organised on a much more ‘professional’ basis under the guidance and the surveillance of the \textit{sophronistes}; specialists were appointed to teach the Athenian ephebes in the use of all sorts of arms, both offensive (the arms of a hoplite) and defensive (including the use of catapults).\textsuperscript{7} Such a program clearly demonstrates that Lykourgos

\textsuperscript{6} “Αθηναῖοι στρατηγοί”, p. 270.

\textsuperscript{7} Reinmuth, pp.129-32.
was operating with his mind set on a future conflict with Macedonia; moreover, he was aware of the increasing importance of defensive techniques in warfare and he was prepared to modernise the Athenian military apparatus.

Demades also took an active part in the re-organisation of Athenian military apparatus. F. Mitchel has established that Demades’ name should be restored in IG II² 1493 as that of the Treasurer of the Military Fund in 334/3. Through this post Demades was able to persuade the people to keep the money for their own use and not to join Agis, king of Sparta, in his rebellion against Macedonia.

From 332/1 to 326/5 Demades was predominantly concerned with the maintenance and improvement of the Athenian navy: there are three decrees dealing with collection of naval debts and with the removal of damaged vessels and the allocation of triereis to trierarchs (IG II² 1627, II.241-65, IG II² 1629, II.516-43, 859-69); furthermore Demades took steps towards improving the Peiraieus market area (SIG³ 313), E. Badian did not fail to observe that the maintenance of the fleet was his main interest. He observes that Athens had actually been keeping up with new technical developments, but further on he remarks that Demades prevented Athens from participating in Agis’ war because he was a friend of Antipatros. I find it impossible to reconcile these two observations: interest in the maintenance of a ‘modern’ fleet points to an interest in keeping Athens powerful; the naval lists of 325/4 give us a picture of a force to be reckoned with (IG II² 1629, II.808f; IG II² 1631, II.172f), which was quite an achievement and rendered Athens a threat for Macedonia. It is because Demades had established contacts with the Macedonian court that scholars often see a hidden motive behind his activities.

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8 "Demades of Paeania and IG II² 1493, 1494 and 1495", TAPA 93, 1962, 213-227, pp.219-20 and n.17. Mitchel thinks that, at the time, this must have been a quadrennial office, running from Panathenaia to Panathenaia (Ath. Pol.43.1), and it is to this office that the Pseudo-Plutarch’s Moralía (818e) refer: “ὅτε τὰς προσόδους έίχεν ωφ’ ἑαυτοῦ τῆς πόλεως”.
9 Dem., XVIII.48.2; [Plut.], Mor. 818e-f; Plut., Cleomenes 27; Phoc. 30.2
10 "Agis III", Hermes 95, 1967, p.182 and n.2; IG II² 1627, II.266, 275.
ii. Diplomacy from 338 to 323

a) Before the Lamian War

The years after Chaironeia witnessed the political coexistence of Lykourgos, Demosthenes, Hyperides and Demades, to refer to the most prominent orators. It is significant that as long as Lykourgos was alive (until 326) these people, who according to the *commnis opinio* did not share the same political or ideological principles, managed to co-operate quite successfully. In fact, the only clash to be observed is between Lykourgos and Demades when the former attacked with a *graphe paranomon* the honours proposed for the latter (Lykourgos, frg. 14). Otherwise, on the level of practical politics, modern scholars have not failed to observe the co-operation between the two in the sphere of public finance as well as that of religion; both Demades and Lykourgos represented Athens at the celebration of the Pythais at Delphi (*SIG*³ 296) and in 329/8 they supervised the celebration at the Amphiarai.¹¹

Hyperides is commonly designated as the anti-Macedonian *par excellence* but neither in 335 nor especially in 330 do we hear of any conflict of his with other leaders who advised the Athenian people to abstain from military risks.¹² I believe that it is basically due to the speech he delivered against Demosthenes in 323 that his policy has been characterised as belligerent. Yet this belligerence is only retrospectively applied.

Demosthenes' position in the political scene is well worth examining. Was his prestige diminished? It would appear that this was the case immediately after Chaironeia when the Athenians denied him the office of *eirpnofoyla* (Aes., III.158–9). However, when immediate impressions faded he was honoured with delivering the Funeral speech for the dead of Chaironeia. E. Badian ardently rejects the "myth - implied or expressed in many modern accounts, but unknown to the sources - that Demosthenes was kept out of power and had little

¹² Mitchel, "Lykourgan Athens", pp.185–6 for an appraisal of Hyperides' not so belligerent policy.
influence.” after 338 and believes him to have been a protagonist in the moderate foreign policy of Athens. Badian is right but only to a certain extent: Demosthenes appears to give way to Demades and Lykourgos, or at least he does not dominate the *ekklesia* the way he did before 338.

Demosthenes and Demades are quite frequently grouped together as practising the same cautious policy. Plutarch in his *Life of Demosthenes* often compares Demosthenes and Demades in terms of their rhetorical talent and he appears to favour the latter; it is emphasized that Demades surpassed Demosthenes in improvising and even that his improvisations were superior to Demosthenes’ well-prepared speeches (7, 10). In support of this view Plutarch adds that Demades supported Demosthenes on various occasions in the *ekklesia* but the latter never reciprocated it. Now, this could be taken to mean exactly what it says but there might be more to it; namely, the passage indicates a lack of active support on Demosthenes’ part for Demades’ policy. Demosthenes, however, does not appear to have opposed Demades’ policy of conferring honours upon Macedonian officials; he did not oppose the honours for Philip or other Macedonians, and as far as concerns the honours for Alexander, he opposed them at first only to change his mind later. Both Demades and Demosthenes seem to have shared opinion on ill-timed military activities, like the revolt of Agis III in 330. A. Lingua has treated the changed political profile of Demosthenes after Chaironeia and has pointed out that both he and Demades favoured neutrality and were both prepared to attribute Alexander divinity. I would not go as far as to describe relations between Demosthenes and Demades as collaborative

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13 “Harpalus”, p.34 and n.134.
14 Mitchel, “Lykourgan Athens”, p.175 on Demosthenes’ secondary role in the *ekklesia*.
15 [Plut.], *X Orat Vit.* 842d, *Mor.* 804b; Polybius XII.12; Din., I.94; Hyp., *Epit.* 21; id. V. col.31. See I Worthington, *A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus: Rhetoric and Conspiracy in Later Fourth Century Athens*, Ann Arbor 1992, p.61; he argues quite plausibly that the reason for his change was his wish to increase the chances of Athens to gain Alexander’s favour on the matter of Samos.
16 Plut., *Dem.* 24; Aes., III.166; Din., I.35. Both Aeschines and Dinarchus accuse Demosthenes for Athens’ (supposedly) lost opportunity to join Agis’ war.
or to hold that Demosthenes approved of Alexander’s deification, but it is useful, when passing harsh judgements on the political behaviour of Demades, to bear in mind that Demosthenes had also compromised his position, especially after the revolt of Thebes in 336/5.

Immediately after the battle of Chaironeia there were developed contacts with Macedonia; a feature shared by Demosthenes and Demades (and by Phokion), but not by Lykourgos and Hyperides, is that they established connections with the Macedonian court. Demades was a philos of Antipatros (D.S., XVIII.48.2; Plut., *Phoc.* 30.2) and most probably a xenos of Philip II; Demosthenes had established some sort of link with Hephaistion but there is no evidence of a more regular contact. On the other hand, it seems that Athens at the same time was relying on Persia to destroy Macedonian power; there is evidence that Demosthenes was communicating with the Persian court. In fact, Persia played an important in the revolt of Thebes in 336/5 and the involvement of Athens in it.

The only time before the Lamian War that Athens found herself involved in an uprising was when Demosthenes launched a campaign in support of the Theban revolt (Plut., *Dem.* 23.1-2). Philip’s death in 336 and even more so the rumour that the young Alexander had died in Illyria made Demosthenes and even Lykourgos think that this was Athens’ opportunity, and the people voted to dispatch an army, but Athens did not pursue her belligerent policy to the end. Hammond and Walbank provide a detailed and comprehensive account of the various dealings during the revolt of Thebes; Demosthenes was in contact with Attalos (the man who had doubted Alexander’s right to the Macedonian throne) as well as with generals of Dareios; the latter had offered three hundred talents which the Athenian demos had cautiously denied but the

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18 The policies of Demades and the honours passed for Macedonians will be discussed separately below.
19 Aeschines (III.162) reports that Demosthenes dispatched a certain Aristion of Plataia to Hephaistion with the purpose of establishing some sort of arrangement. A fragment of Marsyas of Pella (*FGH* 135, F8) recorded by Harpocratin (s.v. Ἀριστίος) provides a similar account.
20 *Macedonia III*, pp.56-60.
rumour was that Demosthenes had taken the funds and equipped the Thebans (Aes., III.238-9; Din., I.10, 18; D.S., XVII.4.8); at the same time, one or more envoys were dispatched to Persia (Curt., III.13; Arr., Anab. 2.15.2); Demosthenes even went to Arkadia in order to prevent the Arkadians from joining Alexander ([Plut.], X. Orat. Vit. 851b). Alexander’s notoriously rapid advance to the South (D.S., XVII.8.6) caused the Arkadian allies of Thebes to withdraw their support from the revolt and offer it to Alexander instead. Both Aeschines (III. 239-40) and Dinarchus (I.20-1) accuse Demosthenes of not offering the funds necessary to maintain the loyalty of the Arkadians, but of course they want to present him in the most unfavourable light. It is reasonable that Demosthenes, and Athens as a whole, would withdraw his support when he heard about Alexander’s rapid advance to the South. Not only that, but the people were intimidated enough to send a mission to congratulate Alexander on his safe return from his campaign. Demosthenes was elected as an envoy but he never made it to his destination. Plutarch records that the prospect of meeting Alexander was intimidating enough to make him return halfway to Athens. Alternatively, Diodorus interprets his action as a result of having been bribed by Dareios to pursue an anti-Macedonian policy (XVII.4.7-8). I do not see why this particular embassy should be interpreted as a pro-Macedonian move, when its aim was to save Athens from Alexander’s rage. At any rate, Demosthenes was absent giving way to Demades and Phokion.

The revolt of Thebes occurred only two years after the battle of Chaironeia, when memories were still fresh, and before the true dimensions of the Macedonian power had become visible and before it had outgrown Greece. In the future, however, after Alexander’s victories, Athens was to become more and more cautious or even uncertain and rely more on diplomacy.

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**Athenian missions after 335**
The circumstances after Philip’s death, i.e. the absence of Alexander in Asia, offered only the possibility of limited or indirect contact with the Macedonians. The period extending from 335 (after the destruction of Thebes) until the Lamian War is marked by a series of rather insignificant diplomatic missions; most notably, probably two to Alexander and two to Dareios. It is quite noteworthy that, most frequently, the members of these missions are rather undistinguished. Why did Athens refrain from dispatching her leading statesmen? Various explanations could be put forward: Athens did not consider these missions important enough and she would rather use the services of her leading statesmen internally. On the other hand, who of the leading statesmen of the time would be willing to undertake a mission to either Alexander or Dareios when the journey would be so distant and probably dangerous? Alexander had once demanded the surrender of Demosthenes, and similarly Hyperides was out of favour. Demades or Phokion would be the obvious candidates but Phokion was too old to embark upon such a distant journey and Demades was engaged in establishing his political position and in reorganising military finance and the navy.

The two missions to Dareios, in 332 and in 330, (Arr., Anab. 2.15.2) are indicative of a dangerous diplomatic activity on Athens’ part. Their exact purpose is not specifically recorded but they were probably asking for some kind of support against Alexander. Yet, the people participating in these missions had no spectacular career. Aristogeiton could have been the well-known demagogue (Plut., Phoc. 10.3, 9) who had brought a graphe paranomon against Hyperides’ motion to give civic rights to the slaves after Chaironeia ([Plut.], X. Orat. Vit. 849e); Iphikrates was the son of the famous general Iphikrates but he himself did not have a marked career; he was in fact captured by Alexander who treated him quite honourably. Athens then was very careful not to dispatch her leading statesmen, basically for two reasons: should they be captured their loss would be an unfortunate event for Athenian political life and also

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21 Arr., Anab. 2.15.2; ibid. 3.24.4; Curt., III.13.15; id., VI.5.9.
because, in such a case, Alexander would be more irritated than if the
envoys were important politicians. It is noteworthy that there is no
information about embassies to Dareios after 330, i.e. after it had become
obvious that he had been defeated and could no longer be of any use.

The objective of the embassy to Alexander in 331 (Arr., Anab. 1.29.5;
Curt., IV.1.9) was to obtain the liberation of the Athenian mercenaries
who had fought in the army of Dareios and were captured by Alexander
after the battle of Granikos (Arr., Anab. 3.6.2-3). About a year later there
occurred a significant turn in Athenian policy, expressed in the embassy
undertaken by Ktesiphon. Ktesiphon, the well-known proposer of the
golden crown for Demosthenes, was elected in 330 envoy to Kleopatra
(Alexander’s sister) to offer his condolences for the death of her husband
Alexander, king of the Molossians (Aes., III.242). In fact, this is the only
recorded mission to Alexander’s court. I would venture to suggest that
Ktesiphon, given his association with Demosthenes, would have
undertaken this mission on the suggestion or at least with the approval of
Demosthenes. At any rate, this mission represents the first, official
attempt to establish a connection with Alexander’s court, and it is
significant that this occurred as soon as it became obvious that Athens
could not count on Dareios’ defeat.

After that and for a few years we do not hear of any Athenian
contacts with either Alexander or members of his court. However, an
important issue arose in 324 when Alexander issued the edict for the
restoration of the exiles which seriously affected Athens: the Samian
exiles would return too and the Athenian cleruchs would have to
evacuate the island of Samos (D.S., XVIII.8.2-7). Athens resorted to
diplomacy: Demosthenes was sent as an architheoros to the festival of
Olympia (Din., I.81f). An architheoros is a religious ambassador but this
supposedly religious mission took place at a festival where exiles from all
over the place had gathered to listen to Nikanor (Alexander’s official)
proclaiming their restoration to their cities.22 It is plausibly speculated

22 Davies (APF, p.138) characterises it as “blatantly political”.
that Demosthenes took advantage of the opportunity to discuss the edict with Nikanor.23 The results of the meeting are obscure and it is quite dubious whether Demosthenes could achieve anything since Nikanor was only responsible for the proclamation but not for the restoration of the exiles (Antipatros was: D.S., XVIII.8.4). It is important to note, however, how Athens was willing to employ diplomacy before resorting to more drastic measures, that is, war.

A few months later an embassy was probably sent to Alexander in order to plead the Athenian case for Samos (D.S., XVII.113.3-4; Arr., Anab. 7.19.1), though it is not clearly recorded in the sources. Diodorus reports that Alexander received last those envoys who had come to object to the restoration of the exiles, and it is conceivable that Athenian envoys would have been included since Athens (together with Aitolia) were the states most affected by Alexander’s edict.24 The names of the envoys are not recorded in our sources, an indication of their not being of high political standing.

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b) The Harpalos affair and the Lamian War

The role of the orators in the Lamian War and especially in the events preceding it, i.e. the Harpalos affair, is quite ambiguous. My purpose is to clarify some aspects of the conduct of the orators that played a significant part in the events and also to establish whether or not their activities can be related to those of the general Leosthenes. I am particularly interested in establishing the degree to which the Lamian War was the product of the joint efforts of the rhetores and Leosthenes or whether one of the two parties was more influential. Normally, among the orators it is Hyperides to whom is ascribed the most belligerent policy; Demosthenes’ political standing, at least before the war, appears to be quite ambivalent. He certainly worked for the Athenian cause after

the war had been openly declared, but it is dubious whether he approved beforehand of an Athenian uprising at that moment.

It is a matter of dispute whether the Athenians prepared to revolt against Alexander immediately after the proclamation of the restoration of the exiles or if they set out to revolt only after the embassies to Alexander had failed to promote Athenian claims (on Samos) or even after Alexander's death. N. G. Ashton attributes to the Athenians a determination to settle the issue by force of arms immediately after the restoration of the exiles had become known. I. Worthington, on the other hand, rejects any such notion and argues that the Athenians (apart from such "war-hawks as Hyperides") were inclined to settle the issue rather by diplomacy than by armed resistance. Interwoven with this question is the question concerning the extent to which the preparations for the Lamian War were triggered by the arrival of Harpalos. He was the Treasurer of Alexander who had escaped from Asia with an enormous amount of money and asked asylum in Athens. He arrived in Greece shortly after the arrival of Nikanor who had come to proclaim the restoration of the exiles at the Olympic Festival (end of July - beginning of August), an edict which was extremely disturbing for Athens. At first he was denied access to the city but when he appeared for the second time the Athenians allowed him entrance only to arrest him shortly afterwards on the proposal of Demosthenes; in addition the latter proposed that Harpalos' funds should be kept on the Akropolis (Hyp., V. cols.8-9).

27 I follow the chronological pattern presented by I. Worthington ("The Chronology of the Harpalus Affair", SP 61, 1986, 63-76, pp.70-71) according to which Nikanor arrived in Greece in the first week of June while Harpalos' first arrival in Athens should be dated in mid-June; his second arrival and subsequent arrest is to be dated at the beginning of July. In mid-July Demosthenes went to Olympia to discuss with Nikanor the issue of the exiles to return by mid-August. A couple of weeks later Harpalos fled, and shortly afterwards an Athenian embassy left to meet Alexander. See, however, Badian, "Harpalus", pp.42-43 for a slightly different chronological arrangement of events.

As to the initial refusal of the Athenians to accept Harpalos, Badian ("Harpalus", p.31) thinks that this was because the Athenians feared that the band of mercenaries he was accompanied by would cause upheaval in the city; Ashton, on the other hand, ("The Lamian War", p.57) argues that the Athenians were not aware of Harpalos' escape and feared that he
The presence of Harpalos brought about a dilemma over the attitude Athens should employ towards him and consequently towards Alexander. To provide him refuge was translated into causing Alexander’s irritation. The question is: did the Athenians feel ready to face Alexander’s wrath?

Why did the Athenians allow Harpalos entrance in the city (on his second arrival), when it had become known that he had escaped? Was it because he had returned as a suppliant? Was it because they had in mind to lay their hands on Harpalos’ funds in order to use them for the war they were preparing? Why did they vote Demosthenes’ proposal to arrest him? I think that the motives of the Athenian people as a whole are as difficult to establish as those of Demosthenes in particular. We should ascribe validity to Plutarch’s notice (Dem. 25.3) on Demosthenes’ advice not to face Alexander on an unjust cause, i.e. the issue of Harpalos in particular; this notice indicates that, in Demosthenes’ opinion, Athens was not prepared, yet, to face Alexander. I am rather inclined to think that the Athenians had not resolved on the course of action to follow (diplomacy or war), but they bore in mind that there was a very strong possibility of war. It is significant that Harpalos was an honorary Athenian citizen (Athenaeus 586d, 596a) but the Athenians did not treat him as such; in other words, by not showing friendliness towards Harpalos they expressed, indirectly, a more favourable disposition towards Alexander. Still, they did not yield to the latter’s demand for surrender, which was very risky, and instead they adopted Demosthenes’ proposal to wait for an official delegate from Alexander. The pressure on Athens was quite hard: there arrived envoys from Philoxenos, governor of Kilikia, (Hyp., V. col.8), from Olympias (D.S., XVII.108.7), and probably from Antipatros ([Plut.], X. Orat. Vit. 846b). I. Worthington has maintained that Demosthenes put Harpalos under arrest in order to use was on a punitive mission, ordered by Alexander. I think that neither possibility should be excluded; both could operate simultaneously on Athenian minds.

28 "οἵ δὲ Δημοσθένης πρώτον μὲν ἀπελαύνειν συνεβούλευε τὸν Ἀρπαλον, καὶ φυλάττεσθαι, μὴ τὴν πόλιν ἐμπρόσθιον εἰς πόλεμον ἐς οὐκ ἀνυγκαίας καὶ δικαιας προφάσεως." See also Ashton, “The Lamian War”, p.59.
his surrender as a means of pressure in his negotiations with Nikanor and also kept an eye on his funds to be used for the possible war. I am not sure that we can ascribe the first motive to the Athenian people but the second seems plausible enough. As a conclusion then, I think that the Athenian attitude can only be explained in terms of indecisiveness. The arrival of Harpalos complicated matters but I do not believe that it affected Athenian attitude directly and drastically. His funds would have made the possibility of war seem more feasible, but it was not the catalyst that brought about the war. In fact, the Athenian inclination was to solve the problem of the exiles through diplomatic means, if possible. How else could we explain the interval of a whole year between the announcement of the restoration of the exiles and the outbreak of the war? The reliance on diplomacy, though indicative of caution or even fear does not have to be identified with subservient behaviour.29

In his speech against Demosthenes (in the context of his trial for the Harpalos affair) Hyperides connects the presence of Harpalos with preparations for war and states that his (Demosthenes’) proposal to arrest Harpalos forestalled united Greek military action against Alexander, thus implying that Demosthenes’ aim was to placate Alexander and to avoid military action (V, col. 19).30 He makes it seem as if the Greek cities (Athens included) sent envoys to Alexander only after Athens (through the agency of Demosthenes) had failed to lead them to war.

We cannot draw safe conclusions about Hyperides’ militant policy based on this speech; surely, he seems to have been war oriented, but his main objective in this speech is to secure the conviction of Demosthenes by casting on his policies the worst possible light, i.e. that he did not want the people to be liberated from Alexander. On the other hand, why had not Hyperides come up with a counter-proposal? I would think that

29 For the Athenian subservient behaviour see Worthington, “The Harpalus Affair”, p.329.
30 “ταύτα σὺ παρασκεύασας τῶν ψηφίσματι, συλλαβὼν τῶν Ἀρπαλοῦν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν Ἐλληνας ἀπαντᾷς πρεσβεύεις συνειδητοὺς ὡς Ἀλέξανδρον, σὺν ἑξοντας ἀλλήν] οὐδεμίαν ἀποστροφῆς, τούτως δὲ σχιστάσας, οἱ αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ σκότον ἐκσκότησεν πρὸς ταύτην τὴν δύναμιν, ἑξοντες τὰ χρήματα καὶ τοὺς] στρατιῶτας ὅσους ἑκατὸς αὐτῶν εἰχεν, τούτως ἕμπιάσας σὺ μόνον κεκάλυκας ἀποστήναι ἐκείνου τῆς συλλήψει τῇ Ἀρπαλοῦν".
Hyperides agreed with Harpalos’ arrest, for whatever reasons, but he later on parted company with Demosthenes and when the scandal of the embezzlement broke out he became his prosecutor. It would seem that he was not clear of suspicion: before the Areiopagos announced its verdict there were rumours of his having been bribed as well.\textsuperscript{31}

However, Harpalos escaped and his escape was followed by a tremendous scandal: it was discovered that half of the money he had brought with him and deposited on the Akropolis was missing. Demosthenes entrusted the Areiopagos with the investigation; it took the Areiopagos c. six months to publish the results. Almost every leading Athenian statesman was involved: those who were not defendants became prosecutors; only Phokion was not in any way involved. Plutarch records that he was indeed approached by Harpalos but that he declined his offers (\textit{Phoc. 21.3–4}). It is significant that Phokion was not included among the prosecutors either, perhaps because of the fact that his own son-in-law, Charikles, was charged with receiving bribes (Plut., \textit{Phoc. 22.3–4}). Demosthenes and Demades were persistently grouped together by Dinarchus and Hyperides as those who had principally received bribes, and both were found guilty. Whether or not Demosthenes was guilty has always a vexed historical problem; if he had indeed misappropriated Harpalos’ funds, had he used them to provide for the maintenance of Leosthenes’ mercenaries at Tainaron?

E. Badian has argued for co-operation between Demosthenes and Leosthenes in connection with the treasure of Harpalos. He bases his argument on a passage of Hyperides (V. cols.12-13) in which Demosthenes admits having received a certain amount of money from Harpalos but holds that he used it for a public cause, the nature of which could not be revealed. Badian concludes that only secret dealings with the mercenaries at Tainaron would be too hazardous to reveal at that moment. Moreover, he traces the link between Demosthenes and Leosthenes back to Leosthenes’ father when both were (allegedly) associates of

\textsuperscript{31} On this point I would rather adopt Davies’s conviction (\textit{APF}, p.351) that Hyperides actually “saved his skin” by prosecuting Demosthenes.
Kallistratos. Even accepting this political affiliation with Kallistratos I think it does not provide stable grounds on which to base a close relationship between Demosthenes and Leosthenes (the younger). As to their co-operation during the Lamian War, we lack any evidence for direct contact between them. Similarly, I find farfetched Badian's view that Demosthenes would be so magnanimous as not to defend his own life for the sake of the public cause; confessing before the council of the Areiopagos would not be as if he spoke in front of the ekklesia (although this is no guarantee of absolute secrecy); the Areiopagos, however, could have withheld the information and postponed its judgement on Demosthenes.

Even if Leosthenes had access to the treasure through the agency of Demosthenes I think that he would not have delayed to approach the boule; it would be more expedient on his behalf to try and acquire - simultaneously - more long-lasting support, i.e. that of the boule and, subsequently, that of the Athenian people as a whole.

By the time of the trials Leosthenes was being elected for the second time to the generalship, probably again with a view to his connection with the mercenaries and possible future warfare. Diodorus is very specific when he is defining the chronological framework of Leosthenes' second secret dealings: in the summer of 323. During the previous months the orators were preoccupied with the trials and I would suggest that they were in no position to come into contact with Leosthenes, apart perhaps from Hyperides who was also the most prestigious among those not accused. Even before the time of the trials (spring 323) the orators would be useless to Leosthenes as they could not provide him with money, even more so because there were pending suspicions and charges.

In 323, shortly after Leosthenes had concluded the agreement of common action with Aitolia, a series of embassies were sent by Athens to various Greek cities. Two orators, Hyperides and Polyeuktos, undertook

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the responsibility to talk the cities of the Peloponnese into the war.\footnote{Justin XIII.59f; [Plut.], X. Orat. Vit. 846c; Plut., Dem. 27.} Informally, without authorisation from the *demos*, Demosthenes joined the embassy (he was in exile after he had been found guilty of bribery in the Harpalos affair). Two leading orators then co-operated for the success of the Lamian war, but this was after Leosthenes had triggered its start. Leosthenes, Hyperides and Demosthenes worked for the common cause but the former independently of the others. Hyperides supported Leosthenes at a meeting of the *ekklesia* but this most probably occurred during a brief return of Leosthenes to Athens, after the agreement with Aitolia had been concluded and just before the outbreak of the war (Plut., *Phoc.* 23.1-2). Otherwise there is no evidence for any sort of co-operation.

We can only speculate as to the role played by Demades in the Lamian War; it seems to have been a positive one. He had gone into (self-imposed) exile after his involvement with the Harpalos affair (Din., I. 89, 104) but was back surely after Alexander’s death if not earlier (Plut., *Phoc.* 22.3). We are not informed as to the circumstances of his return but Badian speculates that this might be due to his connection with Antipatros and to the (possible) negotiations between the latter and Athens (before Alexander’s death). In any case, *IG II*² 1631 (ll. 605-6) provides testimony for co-operation between Demades and Leosthenes during the war: the two had been *synteleis* for a trireme.

The Harpalos affair then prevented the *rhetores* from taking an active part in the preliminaries that led to the outbreak of the war and left the way open to Leosthenes. The war itself seems to have buried the scandal in oblivion and brought the previously discredited *rhetores* back into action, but, still, Leosthenes was the hero of the war, as the *Epitaphios* of Hyperides manifestly illustrates.

After the Lamian War a prominent *rhetor* reappeared forcefully in the political scene; Demades was sent to Antipatros, to Perdikkas and again to Antipatros where he met his death. However, Demades is quite a controversial figure and examination of his embassies necessarily involves
examination of his overall policy; thus I intend to deal with him separately.

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iii. Demades

a) Brief survey of views on Demades

Demades became prominent in the political scene when he swore to the peace treaty with Philip and thereafter became the initiator of a policy of rapprochement with Macedonia, materialising it in the form of decrees for the Macedonian kings and prominent men who had supported the Macedonian cause and/or were in the service of the Macedonian kings. The fact that he was a *philos* of the Macedonian rulers as well as his involvement in the constitutional change of 322 has often led to viewing his policies with contempt.

Theophrastus, when commenting on the rhetorical skills of Demosthenes and Demades, in the perspective of their relationship to Athens, states: Demosthenes is worthy of Athens while Demades is ‘beyond’ her: “Ὑπὲρ τὴν πόλιν” (Plut., *Dem.* 10), a statement which implies that Demades’ policies transgressed the traditional limits of Athenian politics. The comparison with Demosthenes is drawn more sharply when applied to their policies: According to Plutarch Demosthenes pursued a consistent policy throughout his life, quite contrary to Demades. The remark of the latter as to that belongs to a series of apophthegms for which he is supposed to be renowned: “ἀπολογούμενος τὴν ἐν τῇ πόλις μεταβολὴν ἔλεγεν αὐτῷ μὲν αὐτὸς τάναντια πολλάκις εἰρηκέναι, τῇ δὲ πόλει μηδέποτε” (13.3).34

This remark touches upon the issue of political consistency as opposed to practical politics, which is a fundamental feature of Demades’ career; it implies that Demades often had to adjust his policy to suit the needs of the moment and the changes in the balance of power.

There are very few works examining in detail Demades’ career. Apparently, historians are faced with difficulties when it comes to appraising Demades’ conduct, policy and influence, a task which becomes all the more difficult if the historian tries to interpret his actions using

34 “giving a justification of the changes in his political conduct, he used to say that he often talked against himself but never against the city”.

characterisations such as 'radical', or 'pro-Macedonian'. Among earlier scholars, J. Beloch assigned Demades a place among the pro-Macedonian democrats while Ferguson saw in him the leader of the propertied democrats, as opposed to Phokion who was the leader of the aristocrats. P. Cloché saw in him a politician endowed with a remarkable ability of adjusting to the circumstances; the impression is that Cloché translates Demades' ability to adjust into an ability to extract material benefits for himself only. Williams considers him as one of the leaders of the oligarchs, given his prominent position in the regime of 322.

P. Treves in his article on Demades is largely concerned with the authenticity or not of the sayings that have come down to us, and it is only at a secondary level that he deals with his policy; furthermore, Treves' appraisal largely originates from a romantic attitude towards politics. It is obvious from the concluding quotation in his article that he evaluates politics in terms of magnanimous spirit and not in terms of results, which has always been, even in ancient times, quite unrealistic:

"Uno può combattere, può morire per suo paese, e può essere un uomo indegno. La grandezza non é nell' azione, é nello spirito... . Se in quella azione c' é vanità, o ambizione, o desiderio di onori, o di emozioni, o di avventure, quale grandezza?". With particular regard to the love of honours Treves could not have been more wrong. As Arthur Adkins has shown, love of honours had always been the fundamental motivating force of all leading Greek men in antiquity, being adapted in different social contexts. More crucially, Treves does not back his argument about Demades' lack of magnanimous spirit with incidents from his career. However, he does credit him with an element of generosity and

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36 "Demades", pp.24-5.
37 "Demades", 105-121.
38 "A man might fight, might die for his country and yet not be a worthy person. Magnificence does not lie in action but in spirit... . If there is vanity, or ambition, or love of honours, or of emotions, or of adventure in action, then where is the greatness?".
magnanimity when he went as an envoy to Antipatros in order to make Macedonian domination less burdensome for Athens.\(^{40}\)

The most extreme observation of Treves concerns the duration and the influence of Demades' policy. More specifically, he observes that Demades’ policy vanished after his death.\(^{41}\) But he is basing this argument on the disappearance of his rhetorical speeches. Quite to the contrary I would argue that Demades became the initiator of a policy which not only found its successor a few years later in the policy of Stratokles of Diomeia, but more crucially it promoted a different mentality and attitude of Athens vis-à-vis the Macedonians and generally with regard to diplomacy and international relations.

Among recent scholars F. Mitchel on the one hand writes: “he had no qualms whatsoever...” and on the other he concludes that after all he was a patriot. Nevertheless, Mitchel underlines the fact that he, the alleged pro-Macedonian, co-operated with Lykourgos for the restoration of Athenian finance.\(^{42}\) More recently, J. M. Williams has, rightly, pointed out that almost every scholar in the past put emphasis on the man’s character and on his acceptance of gifts and judged his policy accordingly.\(^{43}\) He too, however, has not avoided labels: quite an interesting variety of characterisations for Demades flows in his article on Demades’ last years (pp.23-5): Athens’ ace diplomat, leader of the oligarchs or even moderate like Demosthenes!

Williams, however, has given a quite favourable treatment of his policy and has tried to assess his contribution to Athenian foreign policy to conclude that his bad reputation is an injustice of history. According to him he was the “single person with the most influence over Athens’ foreign policy” and “he sought merely to reconcile Athens’ interests to Macedonia’s demands as best he could”.\(^{44}\) In my own examination of

\(^{40}\) "Demade", p. 121
\(^{41}\) "Demade", p.105.
\(^{42}\) "Lykourgan Athens", pp.177, 180.
\(^{43}\) "Demades", p.19; acceptance of gifts formed a normal part of Greek diplomacy, provided of course that their acceptance did not lead to actions against the citizens' interest (Williams, "Demades", p.21 and n.12).
\(^{44}\) Athens without Democracy, pp. 20, 21 and n.61.
Demades' policies I have basically adopted this final observation, but without reducing his policies to the over-simplified model of pro-Macedonian or oligarchic leanings (contrary to Williams, I have not minimised the role of Phokion). The policies Demades pursued, especially after 322, were essentially based on the bonds of *xenia* and *philia* he had developed with the Macedonian rulers, and it is against this background that we should try and assess his policy. Williams suggests quite plausibly that Demades was probably made *xenos* of Philip after the peace treaty and perhaps even *proxenos* of Macedonia, given the fact that he was responsible for Athens' joining the League of Corinth and for honouring Macedonians. The first suggestion seems quite probable to me, but as to the second I think that there was no need for Demades to be a *proxenos* in order to promote honours for Macedonians. In any case, Demades was also a *philos* of Antipatros (Plut., *Phoc.* 30-2); it is possible that the link was formed already after the battle of Chaironeia, when Antipatros had visited Athens. Being a *philos* of the king and later of the regent seems to automatically cast shadows on Demades' policies. It was very difficult for Demades (and for every Athenian politician after 322) to maintain the balance between the bonds of *xenia* and *philia* with a foreign ruler on the one hand and the interests of the Athenian people on the other.

We could say that there is an inherent dichotomy in Demades' policy until the Lamian War: on the one hand he resorted to diplomacy and tried to establish connections with the Macedonian court and, on the other, he took an active interest in the fleet and even co-operated with Leosthenes during the Lamian War. Actually, it is after the defeat at Krannon that he got engaged in diplomacy of an ambivalent and precarious nature; more than Phokion he was in fact the first to try and take advantage of the strife among the Diadochoi.

Lack of scruples then or full perception and acceptance of Athens' weakness? The latter was bound to irritate many of his contemporary

45 "Demades", p.21.
Athenians as well as modern historians of antiquity. He was quick and perhaps more cynical than others to respond to the new reality in a way that was not practically harmful to Athens.

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b) Demades' decrees

Demades proposed c. 24 decrees, of which ten refer to proxeny or citizenship. Others propose an embassy to Alexander in 336, the trial of the orators whose surrender Alexander had demanded, an embassy of plenipotentiary ambassadors to Antipatros in 322 and the atimia of the orators who opposed Macedonia in 322. He largely owes his reputation of being a pro-Macedonian to the secular honours he proposed for Philip (D.S., XVI.92) and the divine ones for Alexander (Ael., V H. 5.12) as well as to the decree that led to the death of the orators in 322; also responsible for this reputation are the honorific decrees he passed for members of the Macedonian court. The common view about Demades' activity in the ekklesia is that he distributed honours to numerous Macedonian officials. In fact, a closer examination of the decrees does not allow such an assumption and should make a historian more cautious.

It is for two of them that we know with certainty that they bestow honours upon officials of Philip or Alexander: those for Euthykrates the Olynthian and the son of Andromenous. Two more can be added: the one for Choiros Larisaioi and the one for Amyntor; of various other decrees we possess only the beginning; thus we lack any information about the status of the beneficiaries, or the specific nature of their services to Athens or whether they were awarding proxeny or citizenship. For four of them we know that they are proxeny decrees, one citizenship (for Amyntor), and for the rest we can only speculate.

46 List of his decrees in A. Oikonomides, "Demades", p.106. E. Schweigert has actually joined IG II, 289 to 372, but we are only informed that this was a proxeny decree (Hesp. 8, 1939, 175, no.4). Oikonomides includes among the decrees proposed by Demades the one for Alkimachos, but, in fact, the fragment has not preserved the name of the proposer. Oikonomides has attributed it to Demades probably on the assumption that all decrees for Macedonians were proposed by Demades.

47 See Chapter III, pp.201-3.
On the basis of the four decrees for Macedonians, historians assume that whenever Demades proposed proxeny or citizenship for someone, this invariably referred to an official in the service of Macedonia. Though not an unreasonable assumption, it lacks substantiation in the preserved sources. However, I do not deny the significance of the existing extant decrees; Demades did become the initiator of a policy of rapprochement with Macedonia. To this end he employed proxeny and citizenship; citizenship had been employed by Athens in the past in order to establish connections with a king and his court and extract benefits, that is with the Odrysian kings, the kings of Bosporos and Molossia, (though with dubious results).48

On the other hand, we should bear in mind that this sort of activity might not have been entirely or always the product of Demades' and others' free will. Hyperides, in his speech Against Philippides (5. col.4), dating to c.338-336, alludes to certain honours for Macedonians which were conferred after certain external pressure. Demades does not appear to have been involved in the events related by Hyperides, but we could infer that he was aware of the interest of the Macedonians to be honoured by Athens. Hyperides himself does not argue against the initial decision to honour the Macedonians; what he does oppose is the motion to honour the proedroi of the ekklesia who had allowed the motion to pass.

That the period immediately following Chaironeia and the peace treaty between Philip and Athens should witness two decrees for Macedonians is quite understandable. By means of a proxeny Athens expresses gratitude and tries to secure continuous favourable treatment of Athens by Philip.

It is interesting that after the Lamian war and until 320/19 there have been preserved five fragmentary decrees among which three, dating to 320/19, do not seem to show any relation with Macedonia; the other two do not even record the name of the honorand. Taking into account the harsh terms imposed by Antipatros on Athens, we can imagine that

48 Osborne, Naturalization III, 41-4, 49-50, 62, 65-6, 80, 85, 87, III-3; id., Naturalization IV, p.188-90.
she would need someone belonging to Antipatros’ environment to promote her interests but there is no evidence. Decrees for Macedonian officials then are conspicuously absent in this period. Did Demades abstain from such activity or is it that there were hardly any Macedonians or other foreigners to promote Athenian interests at the time? The latter explanation seems preferable, particularly if we remember the plethora of such decrees in the Four Years War. Antipatros’ disposition towards Athens was much less favourable than Philip’s or Alexander’s had been, and it is possible that his officials would have been discouraged. The Athenians might have thought it preferable to pursue the amelioration of their position through other channels like the ‘friendship’ between Phokion and Antipatros or between the latter and Demades.

However, as emerges from the decree passed by Demades for Eucharistos (IG II² 400) the problem for Athens in 320/19 was a severe rise in the price of grain: Eucharistos, obviously a trader, imported grain at the established price. We are in the dark as to the benefaction of Eurylochos in 320/19 (IG II² 399) but the decree records that he had upheld the paternal eunoia towards Athens. As to the services of Nikostratos (Hesp. 13 1944, 234, no.6), only bits and pieces are preserved on the stone after the introductory clauses, but these do not allow us to associate Nikostratos with the Macedonian court. These three decrees demonstrate that Demades was quite capable of proposing honours for individuals who could benefit Athens without being associated with Macedonia.

Demades’ activity as proposer of decrees is by no means confined to the passing of honours; as has already been mentioned he took steps towards maintaining and modernising the Athenian fleet.

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c) The relationship with Phokion

Our sources have not left any clear trace of the relationship between Phokion and Demades. Apart from their participation in three
embassies our sources do not allow us to assume any kind of co-operation. On the contrary, Plutarch in particular suggests that their views were entirely different on certain matters. In addition, there is Aelian's testimony (a much later source) who mentions that Demades beat Phokion in the election for the *strategia*, at an unknown date (*V. H.* 14.10). The nature of the evidence, though, is quite flimsy and we cannot deduce any conclusions either with regard to Demades' generalship or his relationship with Phokion.49

Commonly, they are grouped together by modern scholars as leaders of the pro-Macedonians but not necessarily as co-operating or as being on harmonious terms. J. M. Williams, though he admits that both Demades and Phokion established connections with Macedonian princes, considers Demades the principal, if not the only agent of the benefits that Athens extracted because he was the one to carry decrees.50 He ignores though the importance of the 'friendships' of Phokion. Williams contrasts Demades' role in the government with the lack of evidence about 'concrete political activity' on the part of Phokion, thus debasing the latter's role in Athenian politics. As he has crucially observed, Demades proposed numerous decrees whereas Phokion none, particularly after 32251 It is possible but unlikely in my view that this is accidental. It is important to inquire into possible explanations and into further interpretation of this fact. Why would Phokion refrain from proposing decrees? All the more so since he appeared regularly in the *ekklesia*. One has to consider that putting decrees to the vote involved a certain degree of risk. A proposer was liable to a *graphe paranomon* which could even bring about the death penalty. It is possible that Phokion was afraid of precisely such a failure to convince the *ekklesia*. His policy was a

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49 M. H. Hansen has persuasively rejected this testimony ("Rhetores and Strategoi": Paper delivered at Oriel College Oxford, May 5th 1994.
50 *Athens without Democracy*, p.113.
51 "Demades", pp.26, 29. There is only indirect evidence that Phokion had on one occasion proposed a decree. In 343 the Megarians asked him in secret to help them against Boiotia. Phokion convened the *ekklesia* and after the Athenians had cast a favourable vote, he immediately led them to take up arms (Plut, *Phoc. 15.1*). Tritle (*Phocion the Good*, p.99) believes that it was Phokion who proposed the decree, which is a quite plausible view. Yet, this is the only evidence that testifies to the proposal of decrees by Phokion and it should be rather regarded an exception.
negative, passive one: he would try to prevent the Athenians from acting, he would even negotiate but he would not take the initiative.

We have to allow for two kinds of diplomacy operating simultaneously. If by concrete political activity Williams means official proposing of decrees, then it is true that Phokion did not loom large in this field, but his unofficial contacts, out of the context of the *ekklesia*, with Menyllos or Nikanor were quite fruitful. It is in terms of the framework of operation that their activities should be defined. The fact remains that Phokion did not try to counterbalance Demades' influence by proposing his own decrees; thus, we could say that Demades was a much more predominant figure in the *ekklesia*. On the other hand, a common feature of both Phokion's and Demades' policies is that they had established bonds of *philia* and *xenia* with leading Macedonians and both conducted Athenian foreign policy on the basis of these relationships.

Plutarch actually records a confrontation of his with Phokion on the issue of the peace in 338.\(^{52}\) It was the general who had his reservations; his military experience dictated that the demands in manpower and money that a treaty of alliance with Philip entailed would be considerable. Yet, it was not ignorance of military considerations that prompted Demades to talk the people into the peace and alliance with Philip. It was pure necessity and common sense to realise that they had no other choice. Our surviving evidence suggests strongly that no matter how many were the members of the embassy, it was Demades who was regarded as the principal author of the treaty. The discrepancy between Plutarch and Diodorus as to whether it was he or Phokion who played the most influential role in the embassies first to Philip and then to Alexander has already been discussed. On the basis of the honours voted for Demades (Din., I.101) one could argue in favour of Demades, particularly with regard to the embassy of 338.

With regard to the embassy of 335 to Alexander I believe that Plutarch is right in attributing the primary role to Phokion. His

\(^{52}\) Plut., *Phoc. 16.5*; [Demades], *On the Twelve Years*, 14.
subsequent treatment by Alexander offers enough proof that the king was impressed and considered him significant enough to award him impressive gifts, which, according to the dubious statement of Plutarch, were rejected by Phokion (Phoc. 18.1-8). On the other hand there is no information for an analogous treatment of Demades. Demades though was the leading figure in the events immediately preceding the embassy. He was the one to prepare the grounds for a more favourable reception of the mission by Alexander. According to Diodorus (XVII.15.3) after Alexander had demanded the surrender of nine orators and one general, Demades, ingeniously, carried a decree proposing to leave the demos to decide who were the ones deserving punishment. Thus, on the one hand, he did not enforce Alexander's will on the Athenians and on the other he showed Alexander that Athens was not averse to his will. This is something to bear in mind when trying to draw conclusions about Demades' relationship with other orators. This was his opportunity to dispense with his rivals and he did not do it. However, Diodorus describes his election as an envoy as a direct result of his proposal of the decree whereas Plutarch records a more complicated situation in which the Athenians were at a loss as to whom they should elect.

In the case of the embassy in 322 Plutarch (Phoc. 26.3) records that after Demades had proposed that the Athenians should dispatch plenipotentiary envoys to Antipatros, the people turned to Phokion for advice. It is certain that Plutarch wants to magnify the role played by his hero; apart from that there is no conflict recorded. Apart from Plutarch and Nepos, Diodorus and Pausanias present Demades as the protagonist of the embassy to Antipatros in 322. Pausanias in particular casts quite an unfavourable light upon him; he describes his conduct as absolutely treacherous (VII.10.4-5). Williams discards, rightly, this testimony and treats Demades quite favourably with regard to the terms imposed by the

53 Gehrke, (Phokion, pp.143-6) dismisses the statement of Plutarch completely, but I think that there might be an element of truth. Although Phokion was a xenos of Antipatros, which would excuse bestowal of gifts, on the other hand too many gifts would increase Phokion's obligations to Antipatros and would arise the suspicions of the Athenians. See G. Herman, Ritualised Friendship, for the tension between loyalty towards one's xenos and one's own country.
regent. He believes that his part was crucial in persuading the regent not to impose the narrow oligarchy he had favoured for other cities but, in fact, nowhere in the sources are the precise intentions of Antipatros recorded. Williams has been driven to this conclusion by his firm belief that Phokion despised the *demos* and that a narrow oligarchy would be to his liking; therefore he did not object to Antipatros’ plans while Demades did. I think that it was rather in the aftermath of the embassy that Demades was the protagonist than in the embassy itself. This, coupled with the fact that he was a *philos* of Antipatros, is what has influenced ancient sources and modern historians alike to attribute him, retrospectively, far greater responsibility than he deserved. Antipatros had demanded the surrender of certain orators, primarily Demosthenes and Hyperides; from Arrian (*FGH* 156, F9.14) we learn that Demades enacted the decree for their condemnation. J. M. Williams at first judged severely Demades’ role on this occasion; in his view he should have objected to Antipatros’ demand, and above all he should not have carried the relevant decree later on. He even charged Demades with lack of dignity and insists that he should have not yielded to Antipatros’ demands on the grounds of illegality. This, however, is a quite unrealistic estimation of the situation. Even if Demades had used this excuse, Antipatros would not have changed his mind and Demades’ behaviour would have been quite suspect as well. True, this attitude was not dignified but it was practical.

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**d) Trying to play off one ruler against the other**

It is in two other missions that Demades is the central figure. A fragmentary papyrus (*Ber. Pap.* 13045) records a mission of his to Perdikkas in order to obtain permission from him to retain the Athenian cleruchy on Samos. This mission was in fact instigated by Antipatros who

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54 *Athens without Democracy*, p.129 and n.344, p.130.
56 *Athens without Democracy*, p.21, n.61.
57 In his subsequent article on Demades ("Demades", p.25), Williams acknowledged the fact that Athens and Demades had no other choice but to submit to Antipatros’ demands.
refused to deliberate on the subject and referred it to Perdikkas (D.S., XVIII.18.6). The mission was unsuccessful but, apparently, contact between Demades and the chiliarch continued on a correspondence level. By doing so Demades actually tried to advance from a dictated mission to independent diplomacy and a very precarious one: relations between Perdikkas and the other Diadochoi deteriorated and the situation led to an armed conflict (D.S., XVI.16, 22-3, 25, 28-37). After Perdikkas' death there were discovered a series of letters he had received from Demades and their contents signalled the orator's death later on. This sort of contact is well worth examining. It is an activity undertaken, evidently, without any authorisation of the demos. Surely, under the circumstances, occupation of the Mounychia Hill by Antipatros' troops and with the latter campaigning against Perdikkas, there was no possibility of open discussion in the ekklesia concerning the ways in which Perdikkas could be of some use. Whether or not the Athenians would have approved - had they known - has to remain an open question.

Cloché sees the overtures between Demades and Perdikkas as yet another manifestation of Demades' (supposed) taste for intrigues. He even conjectures that Demades might have turned to Perdikkas because Antipatros would have become tired of his continuous material demands, thus implying that Demades saw in Perdikkas solely a potential source of benefits. Cloché bases his view on the ill reputation of Demades of being eager for gifts and does not take into account the wider political and military context of his activity. The Athenian rhetor would have been aware of the tension in the relations of Perdikkas with the other leading Macedonians, and particularly with Antipatros. A weakening of Antipatros' position could, in fact, prove most beneficial for Athens. Demades then takes the initiative and attempts to change Athens' status in the way he envisages as the most expedient: playing off one ruler against the other.

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As a matter of fact, Demades' overtures bear a certain similarity to the contacts of Phokion with Alexander (Polyperchon's son). Phokion's friends, and we can assume Phokion himself, had - in secret - suggested to Alexander that he should occupy the Mounychia Hill until Kassandros was repulsed (D.S., XVIII.65.4). Demades had suggested that Perdikkas should occupy Mounychia and release Athens from Antipatros. Both acted secretly, both tried to take advantage of strife between the Diadochoi. Demades' activities though were much more calculated whereas Phokion's was a spontaneous reaction to the danger he and those around him faced. Phokion's behaviour was judged as treacherous by the Athenians and the same could hold for Demades'. Occupation of Mounychia could be equated to simply changing masters and not to being liberated from Antipatros; moreover, this could also mean extensive warfare in Attika. Yet, the only way in which it could be regarded as treason is if Demades wanted Antipatros ousted solely for personal motives, for example if he had fallen out with Antipatros, of which there is no notice.

According to the *Ber. Pap.* 13045 (I.I.197-8), Demades faced the charges of Deinarchos (not the rhetor) on his allegedly treacherous relations with Perdikkas. Demades tried to justify his activities by saying that Antipatros was an enemy while Perdikkas was a benefactor, but he provided no rational basis for this excuse. Against this it could be argued that Perdikkas not only had not proved himself a benefactor but he had not conceded the Athenian claim on Samos. In fact Deinarchos charged Demades with treacherous conduct on that embassy as well and blamed him alone for the loss of Samos (*Ber. Pap.* 13045, I.I.214-6). However, Deinarchos' argumentation is quite suspect; he appears to be biased in favour of Antipatros whose attitude he describes as quite mild (I.I.272-3) while he describes Perdikkas' as tyrannical (I.I.280-1). For Deinarchos the problem was which rule was more preferable and not complete freedom for Athens. There is a hint in his speech however that Athens' welfare
was in his mind; he points out that the result of these transactions would be that the city would be the theatre of military operations.

At any rate, Demades’ attempts proved fruitless and were brought to an end by Perdikkas’ death. Nevertheless, the main goal of the demos continued to be the withdrawal of the Macedonian troops from Mounychia. To this end, according to Plutarch, they exercised pressure upon Phokion (Plut., Phoc. 30.8) who refused; then the people turned to Demades. In both cases the people must have counted on their philia with Antipatros. Phokion’s refusal has already been discussed and there remains to examine Demades’ motives for accepting the mission when the people turned to him. Had he had the slightest suspicion that his letters had fallen into the wrong hands he would have avoided confrontation with Antipatros and, moreover, he would not have been accompanied by his son. Diodorus (XVIII.48.1-4) states that Antipatros after having discovered the letters did not express any kind of hostility towards the orator. The lack of action on the regent’s part is not altogether inexplicable: he was quite ill at the time and he might not wish to provoke Athenian reaction by demanding Demades’ punishment. However, when Demades reached the Macedonian court he was faced with the consequences of his correspondence with Perdikkas; the Berlin Papyrus has supposedly preserved the actual dialogue between Demades and his accuser Deinarchos. Demades’ situation was hopeless and he was put to death by Kassandros (D.S., XVIII.48.1-4).

The kind of diplomacy Demades exercised on this occasion represents a tentative attempt to benefit from strife among the Diadochoi, a practice which Athenian politicians would consciously adopt, on a much broader scale a few years later.

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59 Plut., Phoc. 30.8, writes Antigonos instead of Perdikkas, but in Plut., Dem. 31.4-6 as well as in D.S., XVIII.481-4 we find the name of the latter.
60 Williams (Athens without Democracy, p.135, n.359) discusses the possibility that either Phokion or his supporters were somehow involved, on the basis that the accuser of Demades was Deinarchos who accompanied Phokion to Polyperchon and was executed by the latter. He does not offer any solution but he thinks that Beloch’s view of an organised conspiracy against Phokion is surely exaggerated (Griechische Geschichte, (1st ed), vol.III, Strasburg 1904, pp.98-9).
iv. Foreign relations in the period of Demetrios Phalereus

a) The embassies of Demetrios Phalereus

Demetrios of Phaleron is widely known as the disciple of the Peripatetics and legislator who ruled Athens between 317 and 307. His condemnation to death by the Athenian people in 318 and his connections with the commander of Mounychia Nikanor eventually led to his establishing favourable relations with Kassandros himself who regarded him as trustworthy enough to establish him epimeletes of Athens. His case represents an extreme example of philia developed between an Athenian politician and a foreign ruler. The balance between the two aspects of his career, that of the Athenian representative and that of the philos of a ruler, was overturned in favour of the latter; in effect Demetrios Phalereus became first and foremost an official of Kassandros.

Demetrios Phalereus was politically active though before his establishment as an epimeletes. Most notably he participated in the first embassy to Antipatros in 322, but no source ascribes to him a major role in that embassy. He was assigned a place next to Phokion and Demades as a result of their similar political beliefs. According to a speech attributed to Demetrios he strongly disapproved of Krateros' arrogant reception of the Athenian envoys (De Elocutione 289 = Wehrli, frg. 183). I am not altogether convinced that Demetrios Poliorketes did express at that particular moment his opinion of Krateros' reception or whether he did so later and in private. However, the people regarded him as equally responsible for the outcome and they condemned him to death in 318 (D.S., XVIII. 35.5). It is not clear whether he participated in the second embassy to Antipatros. Williams thinks that he was probably excluded on the grounds of his inappropriate behaviour towards Krateros in the course of the first embassy. Yet, Demetrios' remarks on Xenokrates' conduct during that second mission should make us more sceptical; they betray rather a first hand knowledge (Wehrli, frgs. 158, 159).

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61 Athens without Democracy, p.100; "Demades", p.24.
The impression with regard to foreign policy (as well as civic politics) is that during Demetrios’ regime Athens remained confined within her boundaries, as if the outside world and its turmoil did not exist, with the exception of the expedition to Lemnos, undertaken on the advice of Kassandros but also in Athens’ own interest. Foreign relations are limited to a minimum; the period is marked by two embassies, one that led to Demetrios Phalereus’ establishment and one that officially terminated it. In the interim, as we shall see below, there was in Athens a short-lived move in favour of Antigonos Monophthalmos.

In 317 Demetrios apparently undertook an embassy to Kassandros and negotiated the terms of the establishment of an oligarchic regime in Athens. Though it is not mentioned clearly in Diodorus that he was a member of that embassy, it is clearly stated in the decree of the deme of Aixone (IG II² 1201). The reason for his assignment to the mission is provided by Athenaeus. He records that after the death of his brother Himeraios (he belonged to those whose condemnation Antipatros had demanded) Demetrios was in constant contact with Nikanor (XII.542e = Wehrli, frgs. 9, 35). The Athenians therefore counted upon the connections he had developed.

Bearzot denies Demetrios any important part in this embassy or rather she ascribes to him a negative role and prefers to view the lowering of the franchise to 1000 drachmai as an achievement of his fellow ambassadors who would have been the democratic ones. Firstly, we do not know the composition of the mission to Kassandros. However, even accepting Bearzot’s view as to the diversity of views between the members of the embassy, it seems to me unlikely that Kassandros would have initially favoured the lowering of the franchise (and the consequent increase of the citizen body); it also seems unlikely that Kassandros would have been inclined to turn a favourable ear to Athenian claims. Who else then could convince him that the lowering of the franchise would not be a threat to his rule, other than a man with whom he was familiar and who

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62 Focione, p.247.
knew him to have previously fallen out with the Athenian people? We are perhaps allowed to conjecture that Demetrios told Kassandros that the increase of the citizen body would gain for him the favour of those previously disfranchised.

The decree of the deme of Aixone treats this embassy quite favourably. Of course, one has to bear in mind that it was carried in the period of his regime. It is quite revealing that nowhere does it mention the recipient of the embassy: Kassandros. Moreover, the struggle of Athens against the Macedonian garrison is presented as a separation of the astu from the Peiraieus and as a stasis (II. 5-9). Thus, Demetrios Phalereus is presented as a promoter of internal peace and the essential factor in the unification of the astu with its harbour.

According to Polyaeenus (IV. 7.6) he was a general when he was sent as an envoy to Demetrios Poliorketes (D.S., XX.45.4). Ironically, his embassy in 307 concerned his own removal from power. Demetrios Poliorketes treated him with extreme leniency. It is probable that Demetrios Phalereus negotiated the terms of his removal and made sure that no punishment would be imposed upon him; there was nothing to be agreed about Athens since the Athenians were all too anxious to welcome Demetrios Poliorketes.

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b) Attempts at rapprochement with Antigonos

Apart from the two missions of Demetrius there is notice in Diodorus of Athenian attempts to benefit from the proclamation of Antigonos Monophthalmos of the restoration of freedom and autonomy to the Greek states. Diodorus states that at first there were made secret attempts; unfortunately, he does not record the names of those who asked Antigonos to liberate Athens (D.S., XIX.78.4). In 313 Polemaios, general in the service of Antigonos, appeared in Aegean waters in order to effectuate Antigonos’ declaration. (D.S., XIX.77.2). The Athenian demos, we are told, imposed its will on Demetrios and obliged him to send an embassy to Polemaios to negotiate (D.S., XIX.78.4-5). It is quite
problematic whether or not Demetrios himself was absolutely against such a mission. As Kassandros' 'protégé' one would expect him to be. Was the fact that he accepted then a diplomatic manoeuvre to gain time and avoid open conflict with the people? Yet, an embassy would give him a chance to negotiate, even to deter Polemaios from acting, as actually happened. We are in the dark as to who were dispatched. Of course it is possible that Polemaios was not wholly committed to the Athenian cause at this point. We are also in the dark as to the reason that prompted Demetrios not to undertake the mission himself. It is possible that he wished to remain in the astu in order to remain in control of the situation. Alternatively, it is possible that he did not wish to make Kassandros suspicious.

No matter if the attempt failed, it remains significant that certain Athenian politicians turned promptly to take advantage of Antigonus' propaganda. This policy was very similar to that of Demades, that is, an attempt to take advantage from the struggle between the Diadochoi. It is impossible to tell whether, at this point, the Athenians had realised that the proclamation was not so innocent. In any case, they did not have much choice: with a Macedonian garrison in the Peiraieus they had to rely on foreign help for their liberation. Marasco underlines the fact that the subjection to Kassandros did not prevent the rivals of Demetrios Phalereus from acting, thus implying that there was enough freedom of political opposition allowed by Demetrios.63 I would think that Athenian opposition at the time was not so much a question of freedom of action allowed by the current regime as it was a question of being encouraged by an external factor.

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63 Democare, pp.34-5; this is also the opinion of Ferguson, HA, p.54; see Chapter II, p.160.
v. Stratokles' policy in the Four Years War: putting all eggs in one basket

a) An extreme democrat? an extreme pro-Demetrian?

Stratokles of Diomeia is probably the most controversial rhetor of the period and the man who became notorious for carrying divine honours for Demetrios Poliorketes and his father as well as numerous decrees for prominent Antigonid officials during the Four Years War, practically dominating activities in the ekklesia.\(^{64}\)

Stratokles' first appearance on the political scene should make us extremely cautious in our characterisation: in 324/3 he had been among those orators who charged numerous Athenian orators with having been bribed by Harpalos, Alexander's treasurer who had escaped to Athens (Din., I, 20-21). We cannot be sure about the motives of his involvement in the obscure Harpalos affair. It was his first appearance on the Athenian political scene and it could be that he simply saw it as an opportunity to get rid of prominent rivals. On the other hand he was one of the minor prosecutors; he certainly did not have the same prominence as Hyperides. Though he had supported armed resistance to the restoration of the exiles he is not likely to have done much after that since he was not included among the orators whose surrender was demanded by Antipatros.

Thereafter there is a considerable gap in his career. Between 322 and 317 it seems that he had completely given way to Phokion and Demades. His career after 307 shows that he was very energetic in

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\(^{64}\) A list of Stratokles' decrees is provided by Dinsmoor, Archons, pp.13-14:
307/6: IG II\(^2\) 455, 456, 457, 460, 461, 566+ unpublished (A.M. 1914, 281); SEG 3.86.
306/5: IG II\(^2\) 469, 471.
304/3: IG II\(^2\) 486.
303/2: IG II\(^2\) 492, 495, 496 + 507 (add.)
c. 303/2: IG II\(^2\) 559 + 568 (add)
302/t: IG II\(^2\) 499, 503.
301/0: IG II\(^2\) 640 (add).
c. 307/301: IG II\(^2\) 560, 561.
293/2: IG II\(^2\) 649.
140/39 (reference): IG II\(^2\) 971.
uncertain: IG II\(^2\) 739 + unpublished E M 4598, SWA 1925, 81.
To this list J. K. Davies, (APF, p.495) adds the following:
Hesp. 1 1932, p.44, no.4; Hesp. 7 1938, p.297, no.22; Hesp. 11, 1942, p.241, no.46.
proposing decrees for prominent foreign officials. Why then did he not compete with Demades in that field? An explanation that comes easily to mind is that he did not much favour the regime established by Antipatros and therefore would not do anything to stabilise it and would even abstain from participating in it. On the other hand, it should be taken into account that both Phokion and Demades were included among Antipatros’ ‘friends’ whereas Stratokles was not. Consequently, he did not have access to the Macedonians which in turn would not facilitate any efforts of his to become prominent. The regime of Demetrios Phalereus did not much favour activity in the ekklesia, and it is significant that in this period there is only one decree for a Macedonian official (Asandros). Should we then grant Stratokles a sincere belief in the policy of Demetrios Poliorketes? Or was it that after the ‘friends’ of Antipatros’ house had been (violently) removed, he finally had his opportunity to become the leading rhetor of his time? I am inclined to think that the latter is the case. Through the policies of Stratokles the philia pattern of relationship between a foreign king and an Athenian politician was established as an essential means of Athenian foreign policy. Stratokles was in effect a philos of Demetrios Poliorketes much more than Phokion and Demades had been of Philip II, Alexander or Antipatros.

His case manifestly illustrates the confusion emerging in historical studies when it comes to applying a general characterisation to policies of someone who was a philos of a monarch. The denomination most commonly applied to him is that of the extreme democrat or extreme pro-Demetrian democrat. This classification has brought about a major difficulty: Demochares, who at some point openly declared his opposition to Stratokles’ policy is also classified among the democrats (or the nationalists). But the category of the democrat and that of the extreme

65 Dinsmoor, Archons, p.13; pro-Macedonian; Marasco (Democare, p.47) classifies him among the radical democrats; Shear, “Kallias”, p.49 calls him an extreme democrat.
66 More mildly, Ferguson (H A, pp.123, 137) also classifies Stratokles among the democratic group. Marasco (Democare, p.51) calls Demochares a nationalist; Treves (“Dinsmoor”, p.188”) sees in him the leader of the extreme democratic party; similarly, Erskine (The Hellenistic Stoa, p.75) places Demochares, alongside Chremonides, among the radical democrats.
democrat only implies a difference in the degree of democratic credentials and not any fundamental contrast of political beliefs. Stratokles, however, was charged by Philippides with *katalysis tou demou.* Along these lines Landucci Gattinoni produced the explanation of a fraction within the democratic party which produced major opposition, more than the discontented oligarchs.67

It seems that following a policy favourable towards Demetrios has been identified by historians with being an extreme democrat (conversely, anyone not favouring Demetrios is regarded as moderate). I think that this identification has its origin in Demetrios’ role in Athenian history: because of the fact that he overthrew Kassandros’ rule, thus re-establishing the democratic constitution, anyone pursuing a policy favourable to him is considered an extreme democrat (like Stratokles) as opposed to those (like Demochares) who were content with the restoration of the democratic constitution but would rather maintain neutrality vis-à-vis Demetrios and even as opposed to those who favoured a policy of rapprochement with Kassandros.

Being an extreme democrat is often identified with manipulating the people, being a demagogue in the pejorative sense of the word. At this point Plutarch’s assimilation of Stratokles with Kleon (*Demetr.* II), who had a bad reputation of a demagogue, must have played a large part in the creation of the image of an extreme democrat.

P. Treves, applying a different categorisation, identifies the extreme democrats with those who did not develop bonds with Demetrios Poliorketes; he prefers to see Demochares the leader of the extreme democratic party while he sees in Stratokles the leader of the rigidly pro-Demetrian group;68 if there has to be a categorisation, the latter is a more plausible one. On the other hand, the categories of the ‘democrat’ or ‘extreme democrat’ cannot accommodate the notion of a *philos* and they have to be abandoned; the activities of *philoi* transgress the limits of the traditional groups of democrats or oligarchs. Irrespective of

68 “Dinsmoor”, p.188.
democratic or oligarchic leanings, Athens, through the agency of her leaders, had to express, energetically, her gratitude towards the Antigonids. The democratic credentials of a politician were not an issue as long as the interests of the king coincided with those of the polis.

At least initially no feelings for or against democracy can be attributed to Stratokles. He simply took the course of action that seemed to be the most expedient for Athens and, especially, for himself. There had already been a precedent in the policy of Demades, only that this time it was applied on a much broader scale. The restoration of the democratic constitution by Demetrios would inevitably produce overwhelming public response in his favour. Strong ties were forged between Demetrios and Athens; thereafter he used the city as his capital, and Athens was dependent on him for her salvation from the expected attack by Kassandros. In fact Demetrios was an all powerful presence; Athenian politicians had to be in contact and co-operate with him and his officials for the salvation of their polis. An obvious platform to prominence for an Athenian politician would be to establish connections with Demetrios, most frequently by establishing connections with members of his entourage, and this is precisely what Stratokles did.

Not every Athenian politician, however, would have gone about gaining prominence in the same way, with the same audacity or even cynicism. Furthermore, there would still be some, like Demochares, who would try to refrain from demonstrating a favourable attitude towards Demetrios. Stratokles was more cynical in his acceptance of the new political reality in Athens: that Demetrios, liberator though he might be, was, nonetheless, the dominant figure in Athenian politics, and decided to concentrate all of his efforts in that direction and cast his lot with Demetrios.69 It is useful to bear in mind, when attempting to assess Stratokles’ extraordinary policies, that Demetrios Poliorketes had liberated Athens and, moreover, it was the first time that Athens was

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69 Gabbert ("Pragmatic Democracy", p.30), while she ascribes the activities of Stratokles in the framework of pragmatism, calls him as the one probably known as a sycophant and a fool, which is quite an extreme view, especially the part concerning his foolishness.
allied to one of the Diadochoi; the experience was novel and, therefore, it is not unnatural that an Athenian politician would have gone to extremes.

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b) Stratokles’ activities

Stratokles’ period of predominance can be divided in two periods: before and after the upheaval of 303. Most of his decrees are carried in a period of three years, from 306/5 to 303/2, that is from the beginning of the Four Years War till a year after it. More specifically, the great majority of the decrees were passed in 307/6, the year of Demetrios Poliorketes’ arrival at Athens, and in 303/2.

Stratokles’ policy during the Four Years War is combined with Demochares’ policy of alliance with Boiotia and of increasing the city’s capacity to sustain a siege. Different or even cross purposes have been ascribed to each one of them: Demochares aimed at Athens’ reinforcement with an eye to the future whereas Stratokles aimed at Demetrios’ victory over Kassandros.\(^70\) Commonly, it is Demochares that takes the credit for the successful conduct of Athens during the war whereas Stratokles attracts all the harsh criticism on the grounds of servile behaviour vis-à-vis Demetrios. Whatever were the motives hidden behind their activities, the fact remains that under the guidance of both Athens expanded to a very considerable extent her network of international relationships. In fact, it would be reasonable to assume that, at least before the incident of 303 (see below), not only had they not crossed swords, but they must have co-operated by distributing among themselves their fields of activity.

Williams described Stratokles’ policy as servile and the honours themselves as disgusting, obviously adopting Demochares’ view on the matter.\(^71\) They do indicate weakness on the part of the Athenians, but on the other side the polis, on certain occasions, would demonstrate extreme lack of gratitude had she not rewarded a certain number of these benefactors; The Antigonids and their officials had offered important

\(^{70}\) Ferguson, *HA*, p.120.

\(^{71}\) *Athens without Democracy*, p.210, n.555.
military services as well as provisions and money. Additionally, as I will explain in more detail in the next chapter, there must have been exercised a certain degree of pressure and, consequently, Athens and her politicians did not have much choice, at least on certain occasions. In rewarding the officials with citizenship the polis tried to assure their friendliness in the present and in the future, should need arose. And in fact, it should have been obvious that Athens would not find peace as long as the balance of powers among the Diadochoi was an unsettled issue. Stratokles had perhaps realised more than others the precarious situation of Athens, the fragile balance of powers. One could object that there was moral harm. But I think that much of the criticism is owed to the very status of these honorands and also to the image that the Greek world had of them. These recipients of honours were in the eyes of the Greeks simple kolakes = flatterers, whereas they actually held very high postings. This misunderstanding is partly responsible for the unfavourable treatment of Stratokles. In the past Athens had rewarded the Thracian rulers and certain of their officials that had helped her out of difficult situations, but much less is said on those occasions about Athenian weakness, precisely because Athens was still a great power.

It is commonly ignored that although Stratokles was preoccupied with proposing decrees for Demetrios' entourage, he also took steps towards forging or rather renewing the bonds with other Greek poleis. Priene (SEG 3.86) and Kolophon (IG II² 456); it emerges that Athenian envoys had been dispatched to Priene to ask for help and we can suppose a similar mission to Kolophon.

* * *

Stratokles' policy after 303 and the attitude of the Athenians

More than the honours he distributed, Stratokles owes his ugly reputation to the political upheaval of 303 (Plut., Demetr. 24.3-5). It was then that he transgressed the limits and placed himself in Demetrios'
service, against Athenian interests. The upheaval was brought about by the open interference of Demetrios in civic matters. By means of a letter (he was campaigning in the Peloponnese at the time) he demanded that a certain Athenian (Kleainetos) be freed of his debts; the *demos* in return decreed that no letter of Demetrios should be read in the *ekklesia* again, but when Demetrios’ displeasure became known Stratokles succeeded in passing a decree voting whatever Demetrios said just to men and righteous to the gods. What followed condemned Stratokles in the eyes of posterity: those who had proposed the decree, according to Plutarch, were either put to death or driven into exile. This has come to be envisaged solely as Stratokles’ doing. On the contrary, it seems to me that we should see Demetrios behind this situation. The question to ask is whether he would have left reaction against him to die out or whether he would have taken more active steps to face the situation. I believe the latter to be the case; Demetrios must have acted in a manner similar to that of Antipatros in 322 when he had demanded the surrender of certain *rhetores*. In this perspective Stratokles would have found himself in a position similar to that of Demades who put the actual decree of condemnation to the vote; an undignified behaviour, one might say, but I do not think that there was much choice left.

On Mounychion 302 Demetrios Poliorketes demanded that he be initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries at the wrong time of the year; in order to comply with his demands Stratokles passed a decree which violated the Athenian calendar (he changed the names of the months; Plut., *Demetr.* 26; D.S., XX.110.1). By that time the relationship between Athens and Demetrios had irrevocably changed; Demetrios was obviously acting as a ruler and not as a protector of Athens; consequently, Stratokles’ policies would seem subservient.

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74 I would not go as far as Dinsmoor (*Archons*, p.14) and describe the reaction against Demetrios as an uprising or state that Stratokles was displaced. The reaction was too short-lived to be called an uprising.
We are not informed as to the attitude of the people towards Stratokles and his policies before 303. Evidence as to reaction against him pertains only to the period after 303. Gabbert thinks that his policies did not endanger his credentials as a democrat. On the contrary, I would think that this observation holds for the period before 303 whereas, after that date, he was condemned in the eyes of his contemporaries (and those of the posterity) as having acted against the people. The decree for Demochares clearly connects his exile in 303 with the katalysis tou demou; there is no specific mention of his name but the chronological arrangement of the decree alludes to Stratokles: "ἀνθ’ ὁν ἐξέπεσεν ὑπὸ τῶν καταλυσάντων τὸν δήμον" (Plut., X. Orat. Vit. 851e).

Shear has shown that the phrase katalyein ton demon was employed to describe the activities of Stratokles: the famous fragment of Philippides which criticises the scandalous manipulation of the calendar concludes: ταῦτα καταλύει τὸν δήμον, οὔ κωμῳδία (Plut., Demetr. 12.4). The katalysis should be understood as destruction of the people’s power to make decisions and execute them. Further below the same decree records: "καὶ φυγόντι ὑπὲρ δημοκρατίας"; though demos and demokratia are not identical in meaning, Laches seems to identify the katalysis of the demos with an assault against the democratic constitution. It is also possible that the Kallias decree (ll.79-81) alludes to the same situation when stating: "τεὶ πατρίδι Καλλίας οὐδεπότε θυ<π>ομείνας [...]καταλελυμένου τὸν δήμον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν ἐ[αυτοῦ] προέμνος δόσιν δοθῆναι ἐν τεὶ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ...". However, I am not so sure that the phrase "would at once conjure up the spector of the “tyrant”", as Shear thought. It is undeniable that the phrase is found in the context of laws against tyranny, but it is not identical in meaning with establishing a tyranny. Attempt to tyranny is a

75 “Pragmatic Democracy”, p.31.
76 “Kallias”, pp.49-52.
77 Shear (“Kallias”, p.50) maintains plausibly that the terminology “is juxtaposed in such a way as to make it clear that the “destruction of the Demos” is not the same thing as the oligarchy”.
78 "Kallias", p.50.
more specific notion than the *katalysis* of the *demos*, this latter formulation may involve less serious offences against the people and/or the constitution than a tyranny.

It is perhaps indicative of the real Athenian attitude towards Stratokles that there is no trace of a decree in his honour. If this is not an archaeological accident, then he is the only prominent Athenian figure of the early Hellenistic times that was not honoured. The 290s, after Demetrios’ re-entrance in Athens, would have offered a favourable context, and Stratokles would have had a long enough career behind him. The 250s even would also be an appropriate context, had Stratokles left any descendants to ask for honours, which does not seem to be the case.\(^79\) It should be significant however that, to the best of our knowledge, there is no Athenian we know of who rose in the *ekklesia* to propose honours for Stratokles, or if he did the demand must have been denied.

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\(^79\) Davies, *APF*, p.495 for Stratokles’ age and for his leaving no known descendants.
vi. Moderate political behaviour after 301? The widening of diplomatic horizons

The defeat of Demetrios Poliorketes at Ipsos presented the Athenians with the opportunity to exercise an independent foreign policy, for the first time in many years, in the sense that they felt free to choose the attitude they would adopt towards the monarchs; in reality the question became one of whose monarch’s side they would take. The Athenian people denied access to Demetrios and declared their intention not to allow any king access to the city (Plut., Demetr. 30.4). Yet Athens did not remain neutral; precisely during this period there occurs a widening of diplomatic horizons: Kassandros was approached and a regular contact was established with Lysimachos. My purpose here is to challenge the common view applied to Athenian politics after 301, namely, that Athens was governed by moderates or even oligarchs, as related to Athenian attitudes towards the kings. Scholars tend to view the entire period from 301 to 287 in the perspective of the turbulent years of Lachares’ regime and the oligarchy established by Demetrios Poliorketes in 294; instead, I intend to examine the few years until the accession of Lachares to power as a separate entity.

A most notable feature of Athenian politics is that much diplomacy is conducted by individuals who, previously, had not pursued an active, ‘professional’ political career. These people became, in effect, to a lesser or greater extent, philoi of the kings Lysimachos and Kassandros. With the exception of the highly controversial case of Lachares, those who undertook the responsibility of Athenian politics in this period were able to maintain a balance between the interests of the kings and those of Athens; a major factor contributing to this end was that these kings never set foot in Athens.

* * *

a) Formation of relations with Kassandros

Whatever the Athenian people declared their intentions to be, they nevertheless favoured Demetrios’ rivals. With particular regard to the
development of relations with Kassandros, I find it surprising that such a
turn in Athenian politics, or rather those politicians who had promoted it,
could ever be thought as ‘moderate’ (in the broad sense of the word). I
have discussed above how the term ‘extreme democrat’ came to be
applied to Stratokles (and his like, such as Dromokleides of Sphettos);
applying the principle reversed, those who were against Demetrios have
been characterised as ‘moderates’, or even oligarchs, presumably
assuming that since Kassandros himself favoured oligarchies, then those
favouring Kassandros would also have the same sympathies. It is not
even necessary to assume that those politicians who favoured friendly
relations with Kassandros after the battle of Ipsos were only those same
people who had favoured the regime of Demetrios Phalereus.
Circumstances after 301 were such that they dictated, at least, a breach of
relations with Demetrios Poliorketes; Athens needed the protection and
help of Demetrios’ rivals and this should have been obvious to everyone.

The term moderate has partly stemmed from taking at face value
the declaration of the Athenian intention not to accept any king but also,
as I believe, because of the fact that after 301 the Athenians adopted a
much more balanced behaviour towards the kings and they did behave
moderately, in the broad sense of the word, in the sense that they did not
bestow any extravagant honours upon the kings.

Historians, however, have paid more attention to the statement of
Plutarch rather than to the fact that Athens lost no time in approaching
Kassandros, Demetrios’ rival and, for twenty years, her own bitter enemy.
This was quite a shift in Athenian foreign policy; it presupposed a quite
flexible attitude towards politics and a readiness to change sides, which
would have been the product of the circumstances; on the other hand, this
move would establish a precedent in Athenian political behaviour.

We do not know with whom lay the initiative - Athens or
Kassandros - for the turn in their relations. It is conceivable that the

80 Dinsmoor, Archons, p.14; Treves, “Dinsmoor”, p.188; Marasco, Democare, p.65; Shear,
“Kallias”, p.51; in p.54 he calls Philippides of Paiania an oligarch.
ruler of Macedonia would have immediately sought to cultivate Athens’
good will to the effect that she would go on being on bad terms with
Demetrios and to the effect that the latter would not be able to use the
polis and its harbour as his base; but this should not diminish the
importance of the shift in Athenian politics.

Poseidippos Kothokides (along with others), was employed in the
formation of bonds between Athens and Kassandros; he was sent as an
envoy to Kassandros in 301/0 in which he was obviously successful since
he was honoured (*IG II² 641*) with a crown of *thallos*, which in turn
indicates that he was an artist. Probably, the Athenians took into account
the scholarly interests of Kassandros.\(^2\) On the other hand, employing an
artist as her envoy was for Athens a means to remind Kassandros of her
own cultural prestige.

The man who proposed the honours for Poseidippos, Philippides of
Paiania, is also plausibly considered among those who favoured a turn of
Athenian politics towards Kassandros.

Philippides’ case presents a special interest because he appeared on
the political scene towards the end of his life. The decree in his honour
(*IG II² 649+Dinsmoor, *Archons*, pp.7–8*) provides testimony for his career;
in addition there is the information deriving from the naval lists of the
330s and the 320s which gives the image of a man engaged in lavish
expenditure for his city. Apart from his lavish display of generosity
towards Athens he also had a generalship *epi to nautikon* to display (11.23–
5) and more than one ambassadorship, successful and in the people’s
interest (11.34–5). As to his political conduct there is disappointingly little
information before his policy of rapprochement with Kassandros. In his
speech against Meidias in 348 Demosthenes notes that he would expect
him to speak in defence of Meidias (21.208, 215), a remark on which we
cannot base any safe conclusions about his political affiliations or about
continuous animosity towards Demosthenes and his policies.

\(^2\) Kassandros had connections with the Peripatetics, especially with Theophrastus; see
Diogenes Laertius V.37.
We lack any information about his political conduct in the intervening fifty years. P. Treves maintains, because of his association with Meidias, that at first he was a conservative politician who moved to the left in the 330s and the 320s. The basis of his argument is that Philippides' trierarchic activity falls precisely in this period. But this as J. K. Davies has pointed out can be a mere proof of the "effectiveness of Demosthenes' navy law of 340". At any rate Davies does not avoid the application of modern political notions; he denies the application of a 'left' policy to Philippides on the grounds that he was still 'Kassandros' man' in 299/8", an adherent of a moderate government which pursued a 'centre' policy. The Athenian government immediately after 301 has often been characterised as moderate because the Athenians declared their intention to remain neutral vis-à-vis the kings. Contrary to that, as I have already argued, an approach to Kassandros, though dictated by financial need and by a need to protect themselves against Demetrios, was not at all moderate (if we have to use such a notion). It was quite a radical shift in Athenian politics as seen from the perspective of the traditionally hostile attitude towards the house of Antipatros which had lasted c. twenty years. In fact, the rapprochement with Kassandros has to be divested from any notion of conservative or radical politics, democratic or oligarchic. It was simply one the very few means left to Athens, if Demetrios Poliorketes was to be kept away; furthermore, it points to a realisation that Athens could not remain free without external help.

We are in the dark as to the actual number, the date and the recipient of Philippides' missions. If we take into account that he was the proposer of the honorific decree for Poseidippos (IG II² 641) who carried out successfully a mission to Kassandros, then we could suggest that he was probably a member of a similar mission to Kassandros, and most probably he had participated in the same one that Poseidippos had and had thus acquired first hand knowledge of his conduct. This would

83 RE 19, 1938, 220ff, s.v. Philippides.
84 APF, p.550.
also would provide us with the reason for the vagueness of reference: the decree is carried in a period of Demetrios Poliorketes' rule over Athens; and he and the ruler of Macedonia had been bitter enemies. Moreover, the embassies could have fallen in the period of Lachares; Osborne has actually maintained that he co-operated with Lachares, which is rendered quite plausible if we remember that Lachares' regime was thought to have been brought about at the instigation of Kassandros.  

Similarly with Philippides' generalship: it would have been mentioned if he had offered his good services to Athens and to Demetrios during the Four Years War. We have to deal with a period preceding the last decade of the fourth century and in any case nothing too spectacular is involved.

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b) The 'coincidental' rapprochement with Lysimachos

The formation of friendly relations between Athens and Lysimachos is the product of different circumstances. There is hardly any evidence testifying to an organised effort on the part of Athens. Rather than being part of a deliberate policy, the rapprochement between Athens and Lysimachos was brought about coincidentally, by the presence of a distinguished Athenian poet in the court of Lysimachos, Philippides of Kephale, who managed to become one of the king's philoi (Plut., Demetr. 12.5).

We do not hear of any other Athenian leader coming into direct contact with Lysimachos with the purpose of solidifying the link created by Philippides. It is significant that in the detailed list of his services before the revolt of 287, in the decree in his honour (IG ii² 657) there is no allusion to his having facilitated the efforts of Athenians who reached Lysimachos' court, whereas there is reference to presbeuontas and Philippides' help in the post-revolt context (1.38).

His case deserves special attention. In fact, together with Kallias of Sphettos he is the only prominent Athenian of whom we know with

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85 "The Last Athenian", p.95.
certainty that he remained for a long time in the court of a monarch. Kallias, however, assumed an important military office whereas there is no evidence of Philippides having assumed any political or military office. Furthermore, Kallias acted as an official of Ptolemy rather than as an Athenian citizen and became a representative of Athenian interests only after 287. It is commonly argued that Philippides of Kephale left Athens c. 302 as a result of his disagreement with Stratokles. Actually, the decree (1.10) records simply ἀποδημήσας = went away, and it is assumed that he was either exiled or self-exiled on the basis of the notice in the decree that he never acted against the democracy (ll.48-50), which clause is taken to allude to Stratokles and his policies. Philippides of Kephale might have objected to Stratokles’s policies but had he been exiled, the decree would have alluded to that, as in fact happens in the decrees for Demochares and Kallias which allude to the katalysis of the demos in 303.

At any rate, Philippides went to Lysimachos in Thrace where he held a very prominent position. It emerges from the decree in his honour that his status in Lysimachos’ court was that of a philos, something that is nowhere stated on the stone. As such he was able to benefit Athens in more than one way. His services can be divided into two periods: the aftermath of the battle of Ipsos and the 280s (after 287). He arranged so that 10,000 medimnoi of wheat would be distributed to the Athenian people (ll.11-3); furthermore, he talked Lysimachos into sending a new mast for the peplos of Athena (for the celebration of the Panathenaia): Philippides even contributed funds from his own pocket for the burial of the Athenian dead at the battle of Ipsos while he arranged for the release of the captives (ll.19-28). There is a considerable gap in his services which has to be attributed to the upheaval caused by Lachares and even more so to Demetrios’ re-establishment in Athens in 295. After the revolt of 287 Athens consciously exploited Philippides’ presence at court; Philippides

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86 According to Shear (“Kallias”, p.49) Philippides went as self-imposed exile to the court of Lysimachos before the battle of Ipsos. Quite rightly he rejects Tarn’s view (Gonatas, p.94 and n.12) that Philippides was not exiled but was officially sent as an ambassador to Lysimachos.

87 Shear, “Kallias”, p.49; Herman, Ritualised Friendship, pp.83, 86, 97, n.86.
assumed a role similar to that of Kallias of Sphettos in the Ptolemaic court: he facilitated the effort of Athenian ambassadors.

Through the agency of Philippides Athenian foreign policy continued to operate on the basis of *philia* relationships. His continuous presence in the kingdom of Thrace renders him the only permanent Athenian representative of Athenian interests in a foreign state, although he was not officially authorised by the Athenian *demos*. Quite rightly C. Franco has underlined that Philippides' status has to be distinguished from that of ambassadors.\(^{88}\) By voting the decree the Athenians actually recognise his good services and incorporate his activities in the framework of the *polis*; they attribute him - retrospectively - authority.

At the other end of the spectrum, Philippides served Lysimachos' purposes as well, that is his propaganda against Demetrios Poliorketes, only that this time it was conducted outside Athens and thus Lysimachos could not dominate Athenian life the way Demetrios Poliorketes had.

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c) The 'reconciliation' of the late 290s

Scholars comment that in the regime established by Demetrios Poliorketes in 294 there occurred a political reconciliation among the leading men of Athens who in the past had pursued different political causes: Olympiodoros, Philippides of Paiania and Stratokles of Diomeia. The elements of the supposed reconciliation are the election of Olympiodoros to the archonship and even more so the honorific decree proposed by Stratokles in honour of Philippides of Paiania.

Scholars however are not agreed as to who instigated this reconciliation or what it was aiming at (if anything). Thus Dinsmoor envisages it primarily as a move of Stratokles towards his political opponent Philippides; he even goes so far as to suggest that it may have prepared the way for the revolt of 287 and moreover that Demetrios, foreseeing that the events would turn against him, put an end to Olympiodoros' dictatorship. On the contrary, P. Treves asserts that such a

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\(^{88}\) "Lisimaco e Atene", in *Studi Ellenistiche*, a cura di B. Virgilio, Pisa 1990, 113-134, p.117.
reconciliation could have never taken place without the consent or even the instigation of Demetrios; the concord achieved was the product of the will of the “comune padrone”. P. Treves has been led to this conclusion because he assumes that Stratokles could not have functioned in any other way than as Demetrios’ man.

It is an observation that I find rather surprising and superficial; supposing that a reconciliation occurred, it could not have been under the auspices of Demetrios; in fact it would be quite against his best interests: lack of dissension between the major political personae could, in the long run, lead to a coalition against him. Therefore, if such a concord was achieved, it will have to be seen in the perspective of an initiative taken by the Athenian leaders themselves.

Both Treves and Dinsmoor, in their discussion of the decree for Philippides, are agreed that we deal here with a coming to terms between the party of the moderates who had governed Athens after the battle of Ipsos and the party rigidly loyal to Demetrios or a coalition between the pro-Macedonian and the extreme democratic parties as Dinsmoor phrases it. Since further down he describes Philippides as one of the leaders of the moderate democrats, he has presumably identified moderate democratic beliefs with pro-Macedonian sympathies (hinting at the turn of Athenian politicians to Kassandros).

I have already discussed how the term ‘moderate’ cannot be applied to those who undertook Athenian politics after the battle of Ipsos, as seen from the perspective of foreign relations. I also question the existence of a party continuously loyal to Demetrios. The perception of parties with a consistent political behaviour towards one ruler or the other distorts our picture of Athenian political behaviour. Loyalty was time-limited and totally dependent upon the specific historical moment. There had been a group of rhetores who had pursued a policy favourable to Demetrios in a specific historical context, there followed another

89 Dinsmoor, Archons, pp.13-4; Treves, “Dinsmoor”, p.188. I have analysed in the previous chapter the reasons because of which Olympiodoros cannot be envisaged as a dictator.
group of *rhetores* who favoured friendly relations with Kassandros, again on a very specific, different historical occasion.

The tacit assumption is that since Stratokles had so openly favoured Demetrios and his officials, he could necessarily have been continuously averse to a rapprochement between Athens and Demetrios' adversaries, Kassandros in particular.

The assumption fails to take account of the fact that we do not know what sort of policy Stratokles pursued after Demetrios had been denied access to Athens in 301. Furthermore, we are completely in the dark as to the attitude he adopted towards Lachares.

That a politician favoured one ruler at some point did not necessarily bring about his constant hostility towards his rivals. That Philippides of Paiania favoured a rapprochement with Kassandros does not inevitably have to mean that, in the past, he had been hostile to Demetrios. Conversely, that Stratokles manifestly demonstrated his favour towards Demetrios does not have to mean that he would constantly be hostile to Kassandros; only for as long as the fate of Athens was inextricably bound with that of Demetrios.

Still, the fact that Stratokles, the supposed adherent of Demetrios, carried an honorific decree for Philippides of Paiania, the man who had helped to turn Athens' policy towards a rapprochement with Kassandros, Demetrios' bitter enemy needs further attention. Though quite vague in formulation and in its recording of Philippides' exploits, the decree nonetheless was an open approval of Athens' past policy. More specific mention would inevitably involve Kassandros and would irritate Demetrios.

What were Stratokles' motives for proposing such a decree? I would be tempted not to exclude personal gain as his motive, given Philippides' wealth, but this has to remain purely conjectural. The climate in Athens towards Demetrios would have surely been different from that of the Four Years War. Moreover, Demetrios was no longer present, which in turn meant that Stratokles could not count on benefits from that side. It
is possible that Stratokles made the move towards Philippides in order to present a more likeable image of himself; by putting the honorific decree to the vote he would have made the demos doubt his adherence to Demetrios Poliorcetes.

Whatever Stratokles' motives, the decree represented an approval of Athens' past policy of rapprochement with Kassandros, one of the very few ways left to the Athenians to express, however indirectly, their falling out with Demetrios.

Other than that, it is rather difficult to adopt Dinsmoor's view and think that this 'coming to terms' opened the way to the revolt of 287, either on purpose or coincidentally. Such a hypothesis presupposes active political co-existence. Were Olympiodoros, Philippides and Stratokles simultaneously active in the Athenian political life? It does not seem that way. Philippides was at the very end of his career, and we do not hear of him after 293/2. Similarly, we do not hear of Stratokles, and it is possible that he died before the revolt of 287. There remains Olympiodoros, but his power was effectively confined to the limits of the archonship. Athenian spirits might have been orientated towards revolting but that came about only when the international situation favoured it.

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vii. Demochares

a) The view of G. Marasco on Demochares' policy

Demochares of Leukonoe, nephew of Demosthenes, is perhaps the only Athenian leader in the period that not only has not attracted criticism, but is regarded as a true heir to his uncle’s patriotic policy. He was active in the last decade of the fourth century and a contemporary of Stratokles. Then he went to exile to return only in 286/5.

To the best of my knowledge, there is only one book on Demochares, by Gabriele Marasco. The book is an effort to cover every aspect of Demochares’ career: those of the orator, the statesman and finally that of the historian. Marasco has managed to assemble all the bits and pieces of evidence referring to Demochares as well as fragments of his historical work and rhetorical activity; inevitably, his book is going to recur in my chapter as a point of reference.

The starting point of Marasco’s study is Demochares’ democratic ideals. Too much emphasis is laid on these thereafter as in fact has been the case with any other scholar who has commented on Demochares’ politics. It is the final clauses of the decree in his honour that are basically responsible for this reputation. I do not deny altogether this reputation but I do wish to draw attention to the fact that this in combination with his relationship to Demosthenes may prevent us from appreciating Demochares’ activities and from setting them in their appropriate context.

Marasco has argued that Demochares was firmly attached to the political directives of Demosthenes, that is opposition to Macedonia. Demosthenes, before 338, had employed every means to throw Athens into war with Macedonia. Did Demochares employ a similar policy? That he was exiled as a result of his conflict with Stratokles does not offer proof of solid anti-Macedonian activity along the lines of Demosthenes’ policy. There is testimony that he expressed his disapproval of the policy of bestowing honours on Demetrios Poliorketes,

90 Democare.
91 Democare, p.25.
his mistress and prominent officials in his service, but on the other hand there is no evidence that he actually urged the Athenians to revolt. Neither is his active involvement in Athenian policy after the revolt of 287 indicative of political behaviour identifiable with that of his uncle. That Demochares strove for Athens’ liberty does not carry the same political weight as if he had advocated a hostile policy towards Demetrios before the revolt. Moreover he was in exile and most probably returned only after the political and military situation was stabilised. It seems to me that what has led scholars to identify Demochares’ policy with that of Demosthenes is precisely their family relationship.

Marasco undermines the significance of Demochares’ policy on the basis of the generally limited scope of politics that Athens could exercise in those days. Moreover, he maintains that Demochares was anchored in the past and far from being adjusted to the new reality, he was still attached to the ideals and political forms of the past. I find it extremely difficult to believe that our information bears out such an assertion. On the contrary I would like to stress the multiplicity and ample scope of Demochares’ activities and of Athenian politics as a whole, particularly in the 280s; when we turn to the aitesis of his nephew Laches for posthumous honours for his uncle we get the impression of a man seriously involved in every aspect of political activity ([Plut.], X. Orat. Vit. 851e-f)\(^2\) As we shall see further below he in fact became engaged in quite large scale diplomacy.

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b) **Was Demochares a strategos?**

It is a crux whether Demochares had at some point held the strategia. Pseudo-Plutarch and Polybius provide us with vague information about the military aspect of Demochares’ career. Pseudo-Plutarch records that he excelled in war and that he was worse than none in political speeches (X. Orat. Vit. 847c), but he does not actually mention

\(^2\) The actual decree of the demos for Demochares has not been preserved; Pseudo-Plutarch has preserved the demand of his nephew Laches which was accompanied apparently with a list of his uncle’s deeds; presumably, the actual decree would have incorporated this list.
that he had held any kind of generalship. It would appear that the people held a similar opinion; when they awarded him a statue, the sculptor chose to depict him in the way he had appeared before the *ekklesia* when Antipatros had demanded the surrender of certain orators: wearing the *chiton* and carrying a sword. Marasco denies the credibility of the notice and advances the explanation of the intervention of a probably periegetic source who tried to explain the symbolism of the statue.\(^93\) His main objections are two: the atmosphere was intimidating enough to discourage any display of bravado, and, secondly, armed appearance in the *ekklesia* was contrary to democratic practice. Starting from the second objection: an armed appearance would surely be quite extraordinary; but times after the Lamian War were quite extraordinary too and rules and customs could be easily overridden. Marasco's own view of the problem is that the sword simply symbolises Demochares' military activity.\(^94\) Such an explanation is possible but it would imply that Demochares had achieved great success in the military field. I would not discard this piece of evidence and I would prefer, instead, to take sides with Habicht in believing that we should at least attribute credibility to the basic point of the notice, that of Demochares' opposition to Antipatros.\(^95\) In this perspective, the depiction has more to do with Demochares' fierceness on the bench and his courage to stand up against Macedonian demands rather than his performance in the battlefield.\(^96\) Moreover, the decree in his honour as preserved by Pseudo-Plutarch does not record any generalship. On the other hand Polybius (XII.13.5) records specifically that the Athenians honoured him by electing him to the generalship but unfortunately does not give any chronological indication. Since Demochares spent most of his life in exile, the span available for a *strategia* of his is considerably reduced. A possibility would be the re-

\(^93\) Davies (*APF*, p.142) also expresses his doubts as to the credibility of this anecdotal evidence, on the grounds that it is quite dubious whether he was politically active already in 322; but, as Davies admits, the age of Demochares' mother does permit a birth year in the 350s for Demochares, which, in turn, makes it very plausible that he was already involved in politics in 322.

\(^94\) *Democare*, p.25 and n.15; p.27 and n.16.

\(^95\) *Athen*, p.254.

\(^96\) For Demochares' *parrhesia*: Polybius, XII.13.8; Cicero, *Brutus* 83.286; Seneca, *De Ira* 3.23.2.
acquisition of Eleusis, which is ascribed to Demochares' credit but this was too important an occasion to fail to mention a generalship.

We have to consider various possibilities: it could be that not every detail has been preserved in the *aitesis*, which does not seem very likely since there have been preserved in detail the results of his diplomatic missions; therefore, Pseudo-Plutarch must have followed his source very closely. Another possibility is that Laches deliberately chose to refer to specific deeds rather than offices which did not bring about anything spectacular. In this case the supposed generalship would have to be dissociated both from the Four Years War and from the recovery of Eleusis; the span of time available would have to be reduced to the years following the recovery which occurred between September 285 and May 284.\(^\text{97}\) The final possibility is that Polybius inferred that Demochares acted in the capacity of a general, which seems to me to be the likeliest possibility;\(^\text{98}\) if the Athenians had honoured Demochares by electing him to the generalship after the recovery of Eleusis, Laches would have mentioned it.

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c) Demochares' first period of activity (the fourth century)

Demochares was active in different fields: participation in embassies, putting decrees to the vote and restoration of the walls comprise the basic elements of Demochares' activity: "εὐεργέτη καὶ συμβούλω γεγονότι ἀγαθῷ τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ εὐεργετηκότι τῶν δήμων τάδε πρεσβεύοντι καὶ γράφοντι καὶ πολιτευμένω." \(^\text{851d}.\)\(^\text{99}\) It is notable that Laches puts emphasis on the diplomatic aspect of his career; more than ten lines are devoted to the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Boiotians and to his successful efforts to approach Lysimachos and Ptolemy via embassies.

97 Shear, "Kallias", pp.84-5 for the date.
98 See Marasco, *Democra*, p.189 on Polybius' sources on Demochares; he suggests that Polybius could have employed the testimonies of Duris and of Hieronymus of Kardia.
99 "because he became a benefactor and a good councillor of the Athenians and because he became a benefactor of the people by participating in these embassies, by proposing these decrees and by exercising politics in this manner. ... Building of the walls...".
Demochares came to prominence in the period of the Four Years War, at the same time with Stratokles. Very little is known about his career before that period. There is a single testimony as to his opposition to Antipatros' demands in 322 ([Plut.,] *X. Orat. Vit.* 847c) but we lack substantial information on his conduct during the regime established by Antipatros. Polybius (XII.13.7-12) records that a lot of Antipatros' friends had accused Demochares of prostitution. Regardless of the veracity of the statement, the testimony indicates a hostility between Demochares on the one hand and Antipatros and his Athenian friends on the other. In the same passage, Polybius records that Demochares wrote against Demetrios Phalereus' regime, but there is no explicit evidence as to open conflict between the two. Marasco suggests that an indirect evidence is afforded by the involvement of Demochares in the charge of impiety against Theophrastus; given the charges of Demochares against Aristotle and the close association of Demetrios Phalereus with the Peripatetics and also in combination with the testimony of Polybius, Marasco infers that there was a more energetic opposition to Demetrios Phalereus on Demochares' part. As a consequence, Marasco argues quite plausibly that Demochares must have been one of the leading politicians behind the attempt at rapprochement with Antigonos Monophthalmos. Accepting this suggestion, we come up with interesting results as to Demochares' attitude towards the Diadochoi and his adaptability to the circumstances: he too, like Demades, attempted to take advantage of strife among the Diadochoi. Furthermore, it is thus implied that he favoured the Antigonids, to a certain degree.

Demochares however did not express his gratitude to the Antigonids in 307, at least not in the same manner as Stratokles did. He largely owes his reputation of being an ardent democrat (or even extreme, according to Dinsmoor) to the fact that he did not try to establish a closer link with Demetrios and his officials through the distribution of honours; at least no honorific decree passed by him has been preserved. In this

100 *Democare*, pp.32-5.
sense, yes we could say that he was old-fashioned. However, one cannot ascribe to him a reaction against Stratokles’ policies before 303. The incident in 303 (Plut., Demetr. 24.3-5) has already been referred to; it is legitimately supposed that Demochares was among those who had proposed the decree against Demetrios’ interference. The proposal of such a decree indicates that the proposers had not been aware of the fact that Demetrios had not simply and only liberated Athens to realise his father’s previous proclamation of autonomy for the Greeks. Before this incident, Demochares simply did not interfere with Stratokles’ policies. The pejorative picture he draws in his historical work of Athenian behaviour towards Demetrios and his officials (FGH 75, F 1, 2) belongs to a period after 307 or even 304 and it seems to me unlikely that his history, at least the part concerning Demetrios Poliorketes, was in circulation before his exile.\textsuperscript{101}

The Four Years War witnessed the co-ordinated action of military officials and orators. Demochares saw to the stockpiling of weapons and to the restoration of Athens’ walls and defences in co-operation with Habron, Lykourgos’ son, who was then \textit{ho epi tei dioikesei (IG II\textsuperscript{2} 463, l.36)}: “οἶκοδομήν τειχών καὶ παρασκευήν ὀπλῶν καὶ βελῶν καὶ μηχανημάτων καὶ ὕψωσαμένω τὴν πόλιν ἐπὶ τοῦ τετραετοῦς πολέμου” ([Plut.], X. Orat. Vit. 851e). The evidence afforded by this passage, when combined with the decree for the restoration of the Long Walls (IG II\textsuperscript{2} 463) suggests that it was Demochares who proposed the actual decree of the restoration,

As in the Lykourgos decree, it is not recorded in which capacity Demochares was acting.\textsuperscript{102} It seems to

\textsuperscript{101} Ferguson (H A, p.171) thought that Demochares wrote his Histories between 280 and 270, after he had withdrawn from public life. Against this view Marasco (Democare, p.88) argued that at least the part of his work concerning Demetrios Phalereus must have been in circulation long before that date because Demetrios seems to have replied (Polybius, XII.13.12); additionally, the contents of the Histories provide us with the image of a very active politician. I would think that Marasco has a point with regard to the part involving Demetrios Phalereus, but it is rather incredible that Demetrios Poliorketes would have tolerated a work against him.

\textsuperscript{102} H. N. Fowler (Loeb ed., 1936, p.452, n.4) adopts Westermann’s view that after πολιτευμένωρ in the introductory clause there is a gap to be filled by a qualification such as ἀκεῖ καλλός καὶ καθαρός καὶ κατεργασαμένωρ, and not something involving an election.

Marasco (Democare, p.49 and n.40) is certain that Demochares, in organising the modernisation of the defences of Attika, was acting in the capacity of the general; he bases his view on [Plut.], X. Orat. Vit. 847c where Demochares is described as \textit{kai kata polemon}
me quite dubious whether he was in fact acting in any particular, official capacity (whatever that might be); as the clause is formulated it might simply point to proposal of decrees, without this having to be ascribed in the framework of a particular office.

During 305/4 there is evidence that he co-operated again with Habron, who at the time held the office of the Treasurer of the Military Fund (IG II² 1492, II.123, 127): he was the one to propose the accumulation of funds, another aspect of his effort to increase Athens' possibilities to sustain a siege. Marasco has observed the parallel between Demochares' activities and those of Lykourgos as well as the fact that individuals who had once been associated with Lykourgos were now active again. Accordingly, he views the political climate as analogous to that of the era of Lykourgos when individuals with diverse political convictions had co-operated. But analogies should not be pushed too far; the situation in 307 (and in the next few years) was such that it made unthinkable any lack of co-operation.

Marasco envisages Demochares' defensive policy as a reaction against the neglect of military preparations during the regime of Demetrios Phalereus, without ignoring the factor of the threat posed by Kassandros. I would think that this latter was the only consideration of Demochares as well as of any other Athenian. We simply do not know what Demochares would have done had war not been in progress.

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The alliance with Boiotia

During the Four Years War apart from Olympiodoros' mission to Aitolia there is also recorded Demochares' mission to Boiotia, though there is no precise chronological indication. ([Plut.], X. Orat. Vit. 851e).  

103 Democare, p.41 and n.13.  
104 Democare, p.49.  
105 G. De Sanctis offered an extremely radical interpretation of the "τετραετοῦς πολέμου" mentioned in the decree for Demochares (Scritti minori, pp.291-3). In his view, this war cannot possibly be identified with the war conducted between Demetrios and Kassandros and consequently the Athenian alliance with Boiotia cannot possibly belong in the very last years of the fourth century. His basic objection is that the aforementioned war was not a four
Ferguson prefers to date it to the beginning of the war in 306 since there is inscriptive evidence of friendly relations between Athens and Boiotia in March 306. He conjectures that the Boiotians had probably joined Kassandros initially to be talked into an alliance by Demochares later. Under this perspective this alliance (coupled with Olympiodoros' success) represents an effort to secure Athens' borders against an attack of Kassandros by land who thus could only attack by sea. Ferguson assumes that the Boiotians changed sides in the course of the war; thus, Kassandros was able to advance rapidly to the Attic frontier in 304. In the final stage of the war Demetrios Poliorcetes forced Kassandros to retreat beyond Thermopylae and concluded an alliance with the Boiotians (Plut., Demetr. 23.3; D.S., XX.100.6). Marasco's view on the other hand is that the alliance concluded by Demochares should be dated later than 306 and should be identified with the alliance concluded by Demetrios. According to this interpretation, Demochares' alliance is subordinate to the wider context of Demetrios' policy and it does not represent independent Athenian action. My own view of the problem is that Ferguson is along the right lines. A victorious Demetrios could have easily induced the Boiotians to ally themselves with him without the agency of an Athenian politician. Additionally, how likely is it that the decree would have referred to an act that facilitated Demetrios' efforts? Thus, Demochares' policy has to be seen under the perspective of independent policy, undertaken solely for the safety of Athens.

As has already been mentioned in 303/2 he crossed swords with Stratokles and went to exile only to return in 286 (Plut., Demetr. 24.4-5).
d) **Diplomacy on a large scale after 287**

Demochares re-appeared on the Athenian political scene in the 280s (he had been in exile for more than fifteen years). His main fields of activity were two: organisation of Athenian finance (and cutting down the expenses) and foreign policy.

Reducing the expenses of the administration would seem to fall naturally in the activities of *ho epi tei dioikesei* but the *aitesis* does not actually ascribe Demochares this title; it is possible though that Laches is interested in describing the *results* of his having been elected to this office.109

In his foreign policy he united and even took advantage of the efforts of previous politicians to widen Athens' directions and approach the Diadochoi. More specifically, Demochares took advantage of the *philia* established between Philippides of Kephale and Lysimachos; his policy is also aligned with the policy of rapprochement with Ptolemy which was carried out previously by Phaidros.110 Phaidros and Philippides of Kephale had established the essential links and facilitated Demochares' efforts to secure corn and money for Athens. He was at the same time laying down the guidelines of Athenian foreign policy as well as undertaking the responsibility to carry it out himself. It is recorded in the *aitesis* that he himself was an ambassador to Lysimachos twice and to Antipatros while he proposed an embassy to Ptolemy. All these missions had the specific aim to facilitate Athens' struggle against Demetrios for the re-acquisition of the Peiraieus and the forts.

Shear has endorsed rightly, as I believe, the view of Ferguson and of Tarn that Demochares must have spent his exile in Lysimachos' court.111 In this perspective and as a result he would have formed the connections that proved instrumental in his approach to Lysimachos after

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109 Both Marasco (*Democare*, p.71) and Shear ("Kallias", p.80) think that this was the actual office.

110 The date of Phaidros' embassy to Ptolemy of Egypt has already been discussed and I have concluded that it should antedate Athens' revolt from Demetrios Poliorketes in 287.

the revolt. That Demochares undertook missions to Lysimachos' court, but not to Ptolemy's, is indirect evidence that he had personal connections in the former's court, but not in the latter's. In this perspective, it is not unreasonable to assume that during his exile his status was in effect that of a philos of Lysimachos. This in turn suggests that Demochares as well, far from being anchored in the past, employed the new means in Athenian foreign policy, the philia with a king. I would even venture to advance the hypothesis that he largely owed his prominent position in the 280s precisely to these connections.

The embassy to Ptolemy proposed by Demochares would have probably been one of those that co-operated with Kallias of Sphettos, after his departure from Attika. In proposing this mission Demochares consciously exploited the philia between Kallias and Ptolemy.

The identification of Antipatros has been problematic. It was once thought that he must have been one of Kassandros' sons, a view which would place Demochares' mission before 294 (the year of Demetrios' accession to the throne of Macedonia). The most recent commentators however identify Antipatros with Antipatros Etesias who was king of Macedonia for forty five days in 279 (D. S., XXII.4). Even accepting this identification, the dating of Demochares' mission remains problematic. If we accept that the decree sticks to a strict chronological order, then the mission to Antipatros has to precede the recovery of Eleusis in c. 285-4, since it is mentioned immediately before. Shear dates the mission to Antipatros very closely with those to Lysimachos; he adopts Tarn's plausible suggestion that Antipatros had sought refuge as an exile in Lysimachos' court, thus implying that Antipatros and Demochares met in Lysimachos' court, in the course of one of the embassies to Lysimachos in 286. His view is upheld by Marasco who

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112 Kallias decree, II.40-3; Shear, "Kallias", pp.25, 82. The Ptolemy of the Demochares decree should be identified with Ptolemy I and not with Ptolemy II; this latter view is suggested by Osborne (Naturalization II, p.156, n.678)

113 So Marasco, Democare, pp.73-4; also Shear, "Kallias", p.82 and n.225, for previous views on Antipatros' identity.

114 Tarn, Gonatas, p.37; Shear, "Kallias", p.82; in fact Shear does not state clearly where the two had met.
argues in addition that Antipatros Etesias would hardly be in a position to help Athens in 279, due to the invasion of the Gauls.\textsuperscript{115}

Yet, the problem with this view is that the decree records the encounter with Antipatros as a \textit{separate official mission}, different from that to Lysimachos; the latter is the first mission to be recorded, then comes the embassy to Ptolemy and finally that to Antipatros. I would suggest then that with regard to the second phase of his career the decree records different kinds of achievements: all the embassies are grouped together and in chronological order, but the recovery of Eleusis stands as a separate deed. In this perspective the embassy to Antipatros could have taken place precisely in 279, when he was king; he might have counted on Athenian help to repulse the Gauls. Besides, if Antipatros was an exile before 279, how could he have been in control of such resources as to give Athens twenty talents? However, the suggestion of Shear as to the place of their initial encounter remains valid and we could thus view this mission of Demochares in the perspective of \textit{philia} networks.

Demochares then irrevocably widened Athens’ diplomatic horizons and established a much more energetic presence of Athens on the international scene.

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\textbf{The recovery of Eleusis}

It is ascribed to Demochares’ credit that he managed to recover the fort of Eleusis, sometime in the 280s, after the revolt of 287. There is nothing in the decree to imply military action and P. Gauthier has persuasively advanced the view that Eleusis was recovered via diplomacy.\textsuperscript{116} His basic points are the following: firstly, the garrisons would be willing to negotiate after Demetrios’ surrender to Seleukos and while Antigonus’ authority and resources were considerably reduced; in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{115} \textit{Democare}, pp.73-4.
\item \textsuperscript{116} “La réunification”, pp.368-72; he has even advanced the parallel of the recovery of the Peiraeus in 229, when the Macedonian garrison, or rather its commander, was bribed out of the fort.
\end{itemize}
the decrees of the period there is no mention of military aid; only requests for grain and money; the decrees of the period connect these requests explicitly with the recovery of the forts and the Peiraieus. Eleusis then most probably came back into Athenian hands by the employment of persuasion and even bribery. As I have already mentioned Laches would not have failed to mention his uncle’s military deeds, had any occurred.

If bribery was the basic means for the recovery of Eleusis, it was not something to be recorded in an honorific decree (though it is possible that there had occurred some minor assaults on the fort). The omission of the means is indicative of the Athenian attitude towards such a non-glorious means. It is certain that nothing heroic is involved, otherwise Laches would have mentioned it. On a second level, accepting that Eleusis became once again Athenian via diplomacy, certain conclusions can be deduced concerning Demochares’ range of activities and responsibility. That he had to come in constant contact with the Macedonian garrison, or rather its leader, gave him ample space for initiative. To what extent is it likely that he reported to the demos each time he had a meeting with the phrourarch? It is a pity, however, that these transactions have not left a trace.

It is significant that Demochares substituted military action for diplomacy which is indicative of a development of more ‘sophisticated’ techniques.

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**Demochares and Antigonos Gonatas**

Next to nothing is known about Demochares after 280/79, the date that he proposed honours for his uncle Demosthenes. The only information we possess consists of a curious anecdote, found in Diogenes Laertius (VII.14), according to which Demochares told Zeno, the Stoic philosopher, that he could ask anything from Antigonos Gonatas and it

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117 This point could be doubted since the decree for Bithys (IG II² 808) points to some sort of military presence; nonetheless, the fact remains that there is no hint in the sources of military activity specifically involving Eleusis.
would be granted; Zeno, allegedly, never spoke to Demochares again. Ferguson and Tarn had once thought that Demochares was taking care of his personal interests; on this point I would agree with Erskine, firstly that it is quite dubious whether Zeno responded in this manner and secondly that there is no way in which Demochares could have benefited personally, since Antigonos was away from Athens; his request must have necessarily been of political nature, probably concerning the Peiraeus. Erskine has ingeniously combined with this evidence another anecdote according to which Zeno negotiated with Antigonos on behalf of the Athenians (Aelian, V. H. 7.14) and has concluded that there was “a desire for dialogue on the part of the extreme democrats”. I would prefer not to employ the term “extreme democrat” particularly with regard to Demochares, but in any case, this rapprochement, however, is indicative not only of the difficulties that Athens was facing, but it also shows that Demochares was a much more flexible politician than commonly thought, adjusted to the circumstances and ready to employ every diplomatic means, in this case the intervention of a philosopher.

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118 Ever since Tarn, it has been a dominant view that Antigonos Gonatas was closely associated with Zeno. Recently, however, first Habicht (Untersuchungen, pp.68-75) and later Erskine (The Hellenistic Stoa, pp.79-84) challenged this view; Habicht maintained that Antigonos had no access to Athens after 287 and, consequently, he was not in touch with Zeno; Erskine elaborated on the point and maintained that if there has to be a connection between Antigonos and Zeno, this has to be before 287 because thereafter the philosopher was disappointed by Antigonos’ policies. As to the great number of anecdotes concerning Zeno and Antigonos, Erskine argues persuasively that their origin is Perseus, Zeno’s pupil, who needed to emphasize and strengthen his friendship with Antigonos and his place in the king’s court.

119 H A, p.172; Gonatas, p.94, n.11
120 The Hellenistic Stoa, pp.87-9.
Concluding remarks

The pattern of leadership that can be established demonstrates that, especially after 318, military men are invested with increased authority and responsibility when war is either imminent or in progress (with the notable exception of Phaidros who was active before the revolt of 287, or even Lachares). The traditional rhetores, on the other hand, are always prominent and they lay down the guidelines of Athenian policy.

It would emerge that there is always a division of labour between rhetores and strategoi in the sense that the former do not assume the generalship whereas the latter do not undertake the responsibility of proposing decrees.

From 338 to 323 both diplomacy and military organisation were entirely (with the exception of Phokion) in the hands of the rhetores: Demosthenes at first, most notably Lykourgos, and even Demades. Particularly the latter two were in a position to control and even prevent military action.

Evidence is very scanty with regard to the relations between the two groups of the strategoi and the rhetores; it is rather inferred than directly testified by the sources. Phokion and Demades participated in embassies together but there is no evidence of actual co-operation between 322 and 318. The pair Demades - Phokion is quite interesting: Phokion was the man who came to the front while Demades was the one to draw the lines of policy and even operate behind the scenes; on the other hand, to a great extent, he also exercised influence from within the ekklesia by putting decrees to the vote while Phokion operated outside of it, in direct contact with the Macedonians.

It is during the Four Years War that we can conclude with a reasonable degree of certainty that there was co-operation between the two groups; The general Olympiodoros secured the alliance of Aitolia while the orator Demochares concluded an alliance with Boiotia; Demochares proposed the decree for the restoration of the Attic defences while the responsibility of preparing for the war was delegated
to six generals in charge of the preparations. It is significant, however, that it is principally Stratokles who proposed decrees while there is no trace of decrees of the general Olympiodoros or any other military man.

After the battle of Ipsos we can infer the co-operation, or at least the common political orientation of the general Lachares, of Philippides of Paiania and of the poet Poseidippos.

As has already been mentioned the generals assumed a very important role throughout the revolt of 287 as well as in its aftermath; after the peace the responsibility of foreign policy was undertaken by a rhetor Demochares, but the generals continued to be active diplomatically.

The Chremonidean War was the product of the joined efforts of three generals - Glaukon, Kallippos and Aristeides -, and of a rhetor Chremonides. It has to be noted, however, that Chremonides might have held a military office as well: His subsequent career in Ptolemy’s court comprised both the activities of a counsellor and that of an admiral.

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The main task of the rhetores of the time was to establish some sort of connection with one king or the other; not only that, but connections with a king became the main platform to prominence in political life. Their role is impossible to assess unless seen in the perspective of flexibility and opportunism.

It has to be noted that the Athenian attitude towards the rulers of Macedonia and the others is not static; Athens proceeds from military opposition to employment of diplomacy. The Athenian diplomacy depends on the changes in the balance of power; the impression is that at least until the revolt of 287, the Athenian diplomacy is more opportunistic and coincidental than a conscious and consistent adoption of a particular political line. At first the guideline of Athenian politics was that Macedonia was the enemy and, consequently, Athens would take sides with her enemies.
One should not fail to comment on the swiftness with which Athens entered the game for power among the Diadochoi and perceived where her interests lay, i.e., seeking the friendship and protection of the one against the other. The birth of this practice can be seen in the attempt of Athens, or rather of Demosthenes, to use Persia as a barrier against Macedonia. To be sure, this was a rather limited policy, and it was not conducted on a large scale; after Alexander's advance in the Persian empire it basically consisted of simply watching and expecting Dareios to defeat Alexander.\textsuperscript{121}

However, the dealings of Demades with Perdikkas against Antipatros and slightly later those of Phokion with Polyperchon against Kassandros mark a significant development. The precedent of dealings with a distant king through intermediaries does not carry the same weight as coming into direct contact with the Diadochoi themselves. Clearly, the latter presupposed higher diplomatic skills and, furthermore, it carried considerable danger for the one who carried the actual policy; both the cases of Demades and Phokion manifestly illustrate this danger. Although both failed, we should at least credit Demades a will to risk. Phokion's attempt was much more amateurish; rather than being the product of political calculation, it was an attempt dictated by quite personal motives of survival.

The liberation of Athens by Demetrios Poliorketes from their enemy of thirty years (Macedonia) led the Athenian \textit{rhetores} (most notably Stratokles) to adopt a 'single-minded' policy: almost all diplomatic efforts were concentrated on his direction; Demetrios' presence in Athens has to be considered as an important factor leading to this attitude.

The defeat of Demetrios at Ipsos showed the Athenians that 'putting all eggs in one basket' was not a safe policy and as a result they

\textsuperscript{121} See G. L. Cawkwell, "Demosthenes' policy after the Peace of Philocrates", \textit{CQ}, N.S. 13, 1963, 120-138, esp. p.130; while Athens refused to offer alliance to Persia against Egypt in 344, after 341 Demosthenes repeatedly suggested that Athens and Persia should form a defensive alliance against Macedonia (\textit{3d Philippic} 71; \textit{4th Philippic} 33; [Dem.], 12.6. Even after the battle of Chaironeia, Demosthenes attempted to establish contacts with Dareios' generals (Plut., \textit{Dem.} 23.2).
widened their fields of diplomatic activity. From 301 the major question became one of which monarch's side they would take, and obviously choices were much more important than they had ever been. The choice seemed inevitable: Athens had to seek the support of Kassandros, Demetrios' and her own enemy up to that point. Athens leaders turned to him purposely simply because he had been an enemy in the past and could be again in the future. The Athenian attitude towards Kassandros is characteristic in terms of political flexibility or even cynicism: not only did Athens not hold on to her traditional hostility but she did not hesitate to approach him when this was thought to be a means of protection against Demetrios.

Athenian diplomacy had not yet grown so sophisticated as to try and create a network with all of Demetrios' enemies; it was only coincidental that there was created a link with Lysimachos as well (because of Philippides of Kephale's presence in Lysimachos' court). It is possible that in 301 the Athenians truly entertained the hope that they could preserve their neutrality.

The return of Demetrios Poliorketes to Athens caused a temporary break in the Athenian quasi independent foreign policy; his departure brought Athens to the path of rebellion and back to the international scene. After her liberation in 286, Athens consciously pursued diplomacy on a quite broad scale; the need to regain the forts and the Peiraieus after 287 led to the creation of a quite expanded network of relationships which included every single adversary of Demetrios as well as others. Obviously, it was the only sound policy to follow: gaining the favour of all the rivals of the Antigonids.

In the years to follow, almost all the adversaries of the Antigonids, whose favour Athens had obtained (Seleukos, Lysimachos and Pyrrhos), met their deaths; there remained only the Ptolemies to pursue a policy antagonistic to that of Antigonos Gonatas and to act as a barrier. Our sources offer a picture of almost continuous contact between Athens and Egypt, especially at the beginning and at the end of the 270s.
Unfortunately, they fail us as to precise information with regard to Chremonides' (or Glaukon's) contacts with Egypt prior to the revolt. However, taking sides with Ptolemy was Athens' only hope to recover the Peiraeus and annihilate the continuous threat posed by Antigonus Gonatas.

* * *
CHAPTER III: HONOURS AND POLITICS

i. The kings

This chapter will examine in detail a crucial aspect of the rhetores’ career, namely the honorific decrees they proposed.

Distribution of honours by the poleis to various distinguished personalities had been quite a common phenomenon in the Classical period. In the Hellenistic period, however, it became an essential feature of the policy of the Greek cities towards the kings and their officials. Athens figures predominantly among the cities which honour the kings, Demetrios Poliorketes as well as others. The initiative for distributing honours to kings and to royal officials rests primarily with two individual orators, Demades, and later on Stratokles. Although modern historians have recognised the hidden political necessity, the scale of the honours has brought about characterisations of flattery, servility or of sacrilegious behaviour. The Athenian attitude is not devoid of signs of undignified behaviour but the present study will endeavour to abstain from labels of this sort. My purpose is to relate the honours to the circumstances, and to establish the changes in Athenian political mentality and behaviour towards the rulers via the honours they attribute.

The starting point of my discussion is the one established by Gauthier, namely, that at least in the early Hellenistic period, there is neither a decline in the significance of honours nor do they mark any moral decline of the polis. I intend to examine three categories of honorands: the kings, the officials in their service and the Athenian citizens; the pattern of development and the interaction between them: how does the bestowal of honours upon kings trigger and influence honours for Athenian citizens? Furthermore, I would like to argue that these honours aim primarily at the maintenance of the democracy, which marks an essential contradiction in Athenian politics of the period: in order to maintain or re-acquire their democratic constitution they have to pay homage to kings whose very presence threatens the existence of their polis.
I have to mention beforehand that there have not been preserved the actual decrees for Philip, Alexander and the Diadochoi, which is in fact quite peculiar. Three possibilities are open: either the Athenians did not inscribe on stone their decision and they simply let the kings know; secondly, they could have sent the decrees to the kings who eventually disposed of them; or, the decrees were set up in Athens and, at some point, were deliberately destroyed. This last view could have some substance with regard to Demetrios Poliorketes; we know that in 200 the Athenians were outraged against the Antigonids and deliberately set out to render their memory extinct. However, we do not have any evidence of a similar discontent against the other kings. In the end, the problem is insoluble and we will have to content ourselves with later literary testimonia. Be that as it may, it is only with regard to Demetrios Poliorketes that the literary sources have preserved a detailed account of the honours conferred upon him by the Athenians.

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Precedents in the classical period

The most notable honours for the various rulers are, of course, those concerning deification. Various Greek poleis, mostly those belonging to the periphery, deify the various kings in the hope of securing their help or in return for favourable treatment and material benefits. In mainland Greece, however, the phenomenon was less widespread.

Heroic honours for dead men was quite an ordinary phenomenon of Greek civilisation from very ancient times, and it was conferred upon founders of cities (ktistai), lawgivers or upon those who had contributed essential help on critical occasions. In any case, it was in return for very pragmatic benefits, and this is something constantly to be borne in mind; in E. Fredricksmeyer’s words: “the real test of divinity was functional and pragmatic rather than theological. Consequently, if a man like the gods performed great deeds and wielded great power so as to affect profoundly the lives and fortunes of others, for benefit or harm, he not
only might be called divine or god. Sooner or later the time would come, especially when the power of the immortals became less manifest and reliable, when such a man would also be honored like, or as, a god and become the recipient of a cult.”¹ Although I agree with Fredricksmeyer on the pragmatic function of the divinity, on the other hand I think that we cannot argue from the establishment of divine honours for mortals that faith to the traditional gods was generally diminished. I think that on this latter point Fredricksmeyer is picking upon a very specific incident, namely the ithyphallos for Demetrios Poliorcetes, where it is indeed stated that the traditional gods do not offer any help while Demetrios is a powerful presence.

An interesting example from the Classical period is that of the Spartan general Brasidas whom the city of Amphipolis honoured, posthumously, as a ktistes, grateful for its liberation from Athens (Thuc., V.11).

Bestowal of divine honours for living men was not entirely without precedents in the Classical period, no matter how disputable our cases are. In the late sixth and fifth century certain personages had claimed divinity for themselves like the doctor Menekrates, the philosophers Pythagoras and Empedokles.²

Although the historical consensus has it that the divine honours for Alexander mark the beginning of the era of ruler cult, it would appear that divine honours for a distinguished man during his life time begin with Lysandros, the Spartan admiral, at the very end of the fifth century or at the beginning of the fourth.³ Recently L. J. Sanders has offered the attractive hypothesis that Dionysios I of Syracuse also had his share of

² For Menekrates: Plut., Ages 21.5; [Plut.], Mor. 191a, 213a; Ael., V. H. 12.51; Suidas, s.v. Διατεχθής; Athen., VII.289a-290a; for Pythagoras see W. D. Ross (ed.), Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta, Oxford 1959, pp.130-2; for Empedokles see H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, Berlin 1952 (6th ed.), Vol. I, Katharmoi B. frg.112.4-9.
³ Duris, FGH 76, F21; Plut., Lys 18.5-6 (transmitting Duris); Paus., X.9.7; historical consensus has on the whole accepted the validity of the testimonies on a cult for Lysandros. See, for instance, P. Cartledge, Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta, London 1987, pp.83-96. E. Badian, however, has denied that Lysandros was honoured during his lifetime. (“Deification”, pp.34-6); he infers that the passage of Duris focuses on the wisdom of the young Plato, which I find rather implausible.
divine honours, thus providing a link between the divine honours for Lysandros and those for Alexander. Sanders has even attributed the Syracusan example decisive influence on other rulers like Klearchos the tyrant of Herakleia Pontika and especially on Philip II.

It is reported that the city of Pydna honoured king Amyntas of Macedonia and even that Amphipolis honoured Philip II, but these cases are far more dubious. However, Philip in particular, even if he had not been awarded divine honours, had demonstrated aspirations in that direction, like giving his own name to cities and having his statue carried in procession alongside those of the twelve gods (D.S., XVI.95).

It is certainly true that our evidence is quite scanty and peripheral and one simply cannot draw definite conclusions, but still the ground was to a certain extent prepared for the establishment of the ruler-cult in the Hellenistic period.

* * *

a) Philip and Athens

After having briefly examined the precedents of ruler cult we can return to the case of Athens. Before getting to the notorious bestowal of divine honours upon Demetrios Poliorketes it is imperative to treat the subject of Athens' honorific behaviour towards Philip II and Alexander.

The first king to be honoured after the battle of Chaironeia was Philip II. The initiative rests with the orator Demades who had concluded the peace treaty with Philip on quite favourable terms for Athens.

Admittedly, our evidence with regard to Demades' proposals for Philip is quite meagre and derives from much later sources. Regarding Philip, there is only the statement in the pseudo-Demadic speech On the Twelve Years, 9: “ἐγέρασα καὶ Φιλίππο τιμάς, οὐκ ἀρνοόμαι”, without

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5 Marmion, FGH 434, Fl; Justin, XV.5.8-12; [Plut.], Mor. 338b (on Klearchos).
6 Schol., Dem., Olyn. 15; Aristides, 38.480, p.415 (Dindorf) for both Amyntas and Philip. Habicht (Gottmenshentum?, p.12) has associated the cult of Philip at Amphipolis with the establishment of a democratic regime by Philip in 359. E. Badian, on the other hand, has discarded the evidence for both Amyntas and Philip (“Deification”, p.40); whereas E. Fredricksmeyer (“Divine Honors”, p.51 and n.39) asserts that a temple of Amyntas did exist at Pydna; he is more sceptical about Philip and Amphipolis but he does believe that Philip entertained ideas of divinity (p.52).
any further definition of the *timai.* In Plutarch’s *Life of Demosthenes* (22.3) it is recorded that the Athenian *demos* voted citizenship for Philip and his descendants; Diodorus in the context of the marriage of Philip II’s daughter, Kleopatra, refers to an Athenian embassy bringing a golden crown for Philip (XVI.92). It is possible that Demades had proposed the mission.\(^7\)

A piece of crucial evidence comes from Pausanias (I.9.4) who states that there was a statue of Philip erected in the *agora* (which was later to be found in the *Odeion*), and there is no compelling reason to reject this testimony. Philip’s case then marks a significant turn in Athenian honorific practices: only once in the past had a foreign ruler been awarded a statue. This honour had been normally confined to Athenian citizens: the tyrannicides, probably Kleon, and the victorious generals of the fourth century.

The vexed problem with Philip’s honours (as with Alexander’s) is whether divine honours were also voted for him in Athens. The only relevant testimony comes from a considerably later source, Clement of Alexandria (*Protrepticus* 4.54.2-6). Clement states that the Athenians voted by means of a law the worshipping of Philip at Kynosarges. Habicht discards this evidence without giving any justification.\(^8\) On the contrary, E. A. Fredricksmeyer, based primarily on the historicity of Clement’s account concerning the deification of Demetrius Poliorketes, suggests the credibility of his testimony about Philip as well.\(^9\) An additional ‘internal’ argument of Fredricksmeyer is that the case of Philip is coupled, syntactically, with that of Demetrios; he emphasises that Clement would not include a testimony that would discredit his account as a whole. However, contemporary sources are manifestly silent about a deification of Philip by Athens. Hyperides for instance could have at least alluded to it when he described what Athens and Greece had suffered from Macedonia and how the *poleis* were forced to honour

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\(^7\) See A. Oikonomides, “Demades”, p.122.

\(^8\) *Göttmenschentum*, p.13

Alexander as a god (*Epit.* 21-2). True, the argument *ex silentio* is quite a shaky methodological approach, but in this case I think it should be seriously considered. Tackling the problem of the silence of the sources Fredricksmeyer advances the suggestion that the cult of Philip was abolished not long after his death and that "subsequently Alexander acquiesced. Its short duration would explain why it is not attested in the extant contemporary sources."¹⁰ The only possible date for this alleged abolition is 336, immediately after Philip’s death and before the destruction of Thebes by Alexander but I find it incredible that Alexander would have not reacted to such an event.

Gauthier has discussed the honours for Philip (and Alexander) in the context of a transitional period and even notes how the pattern of honours corresponds to the status of the recipients: the greatest for the king (a statue), one step below for the son (citizenship).¹¹ The kind of honours conferred upon Philip betrays the ambivalent and uncertain disposition of the Athenians. One the one hand, Athens is still functioning in the traditional institutional framework of *euergesia* that she knows and treats Philip like other kings in the past (by bestowing the citizenship); on the other, the Athenians modify the institution of *euergesia* to accommodate the case of Philip and they treat him as superior (awarding a statue). The only precedent of a foreign king being awarded a statue is that of king Evagoras of Salamis, at the very beginning of the fourth century (Isokrates, IX.57; Paus., I.3.2). His case, however, is markedly different from that of Philip since he had indeed offered very important services to Athens by opening the way to relations with Persia.¹²

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¹⁰ "Divine Honors", p.60, n.58.
¹¹ *Bienfaiteurs*, p.44.
¹² The statue of Evagoras is closely connected with the statue for Konon. D. M. Lewis & R. Stroud, in their publication of the decree rewarding Evagoras with a statue ("Athens Honors King Evagoras of Salamis", Hesp. 48, 1979, 180-193) have ingeniously suggested that Evagoras was praised for his services to Hellas as a whole but the hidden reason was that he introduced Konon to Pharnabazos; Konon entered the service of the Persian king; subsequently, he defeated the Persian fleet at the battle of Knidos in 394 and rebuilt the Athenian walls with Persian money.
The entire Athenian conduct until 323 (stockpiling of weapons, re-organisation of military institutions) indicates that they still believed that the issue of Macedonian power had not yet been settled and would be dealt with in the battlefield; that they awarded Philip a statue, on the other hand, indicates an awareness of the precariousness of their situation, but still they would not go to extremes.

Rewarding a foreigner, either a king or an official, with a statue, though not without precedent in Athens, becomes an established practice with the honours for Philip. The practice commencing with Philip spread to include the Thracian rulers as well. In the 330s Demosthenes proposed the erection of statues for the kings of the Pontic region Pairisades, Satyros and Gorgippos. Our only evidence is afforded by a passage of Dinarchus (I.43) in which the orator attacks Demosthenes for his proposal. Osborne’s view is that since Dinarchus castigated Demosthenes, the honours must have surely been passed. Perhaps the most conclusive evidence is afforded by the decree for Spartokos III in 285/4 where it is stated his ancestors received bronze statues in the agora and in the emporion.

Regardless of the fate of Demosthenes’ proposals it is worth commenting on the fact that a politician took the important step to further expand the category of recipients of statues. Demosthenes probably felt that the traditional honours (crown and citizenship) were inadequate with regard to such old benefactors, and particularly under the circumstances of the 330s; this inadequacy has to be connected with the weakening of Athens’ position in the Aegean and her difficulties in getting corn from the Bosporos region (the Macedonian fleet was present).

Dinarchus is interested in blackening Demosthenes’ motives and it is important to note that he is doing so showing no concern for practical needs of the moment. He does not seem however to attack the shift from citizens to foreigners, and we may in turn wonder to what extent were his

13 Naturalization III, p.43.
contemporary Athenians aware of the shift or, if they had become aware, if they opposed it.

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b) The divinity of Alexander

There are literary references to citizenship conferred upon Alexander, but we lack information as to who was the proposer. However, given the fact that it fairly certain that it was Demades who had proposed secular honours for Philip, it is reasonable to assume that he was the one to propose citizenship for Alexander as well. The opportunity for this probably arose shortly after Chaironeia, when the young Alexander came as an ambassador of peace bringing the ashes of the Athenian dead back to Athens.

The crux in the history of Athenian relations with Alexander is whether Athens attributed him divine honours in 324; furthermore, it is equally a crux whether Alexander himself had officially declared to the Greek cities his wish to be deified.

Aspirations of Alexander to divinity have been a principal theme in historical discussions. It is true that long before 324, divinity was a major component of his image (Plut., Alex. 33.1). Apart from the possible influence of his mother Olympias who had propagated divine parentage for him ever since he was born, the watershed in the creation of an image of divinity was Alexander’s visit to the oracle of Ammon in the Siwah desert in 332/1, when the priest of the temple declared him son of Ammon. It is, however, quite dubious whether Alexander employed the identification of the Egyptian god with Zeus in order to be regarded as son of Zeus as well.

14 Schol. Aristides, Panathenaikos, 178.16 (Dindorf); Justin IX.4.5
15 See Osborne, Naturalization, III, p.70.
16 Balsdon, ("Divinity", pp.363-70) has adequately refuted Tarn’s view that the political theories of Aristotle or of Isokrates exercised any decisive influence on the mentality of the young Alexander.
17 For the propaganda of Olympias see Arr., Anab. 2.10; 4.10.2; Justin XII.16.2; for the visit to the oracle of Ammon see Arr., Anab. 3.3.5; DS, XVII.49.2; Justin XI.2.2; Curt., II.7.16
18 According to Timaeus (FGH 566, F155) Kallisthenes had propagated parentage by Zeus and even invested Alexander with the symbols of Zeus. Curtius Rufus emphatically says that Alexander not only ordered himself to be called son of Zeus but he even entertained such a belief; Apelles depicted him holding a thunderbolt (Pliny, NH, 35.92; Plut., Alex. 4.2; [Plut.], Mor. 335b.)
The second instant of tremendous importance in the discussions of Alexander's divinity is his unsuccessful attempt to introduce *proskynesis* (prostration) in 327, a Persian ritual, by his Macedonian subjects as well. Balsdon's view is that Alexander's purpose was to bring Greeks and Persians on an equal footing, especially the nobles, so that they would cooperate in the highest rank of administration, a view which is also embraced by Cawkwell. This is a quite plausible suggestion but it does not necessarily exclude the possibility of growing megalomania in Alexander.

There exists, therefore, sufficient background, against which a request of Alexander for deification in 324 would not appear all that extraordinary. Yet, our sources are quite problematic in the sense that they are, for the most part, quite late and they do not provide us with a specific historical and chronological context. Plutarch in his *Life of Alexander* says nothing of a specific demand whereas Aelian specifically records that he asked the Greeks to vote him a god (*V H* 2.19); the Spartan Damis is supposed to have declared that "if Alexander wants to be a god let him be one" ([Plut.], *Mor.* 219e). In fact, this statement (supposing its historicity) should not necessarily be taken as proof that the Spartans conceded to vote deification; it could simply mean that they did not care for whatever Alexander wished.

It would appear that Alexander's divinity had already been discussed in Athens prior to 324: Pseudo-Plutarch's *Moralia* have preserved (though we do not know the extent of distortion) traces of contemporary reactions to Alexander's divinity, most notably that of Lykourgos who protested on religious grounds (*X Orat. Vit.* 842d). Unfortunately, this remark is given completely out of context. We do not

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19 *Arr., Anab.* 4.10.5; *Curt.,* VIII.5.5-21. See also *Arr., Anab.* 4.12.3-5 and *Plut., Alex.* 54.4-6 for an interesting version of the event according to which Alexander's attempt was the product of a previous secret agreement with certain members of the Macedonian court.
20 "Divinity", p.376; Cawkwell, "Deification", p.296.
21 It seems that certain cities of Asia Minor had proclaimed divine honours for Alexander, though precise chronology is impossible; see E. Badian, ("Deification", p.62) who argues that there is no positive evidence for cults in Asia Minor in 332/1 and that it is doubtful whether they existed in 327 and that, therefore if they had indeed been established, this should have happened during the last four years of Alexander's life; see also Habicht, *Gottmenschentum*, p.22.
know, therefore, whether Alexander had specifically asked the Athenian demos to deify him or whether Lykourgos was simply reacting to Alexander’s claims to divinity. Another Athenian orator, Pytheas, is reported to have scornfully remarked that “the man you (attempt? to) vote to become a god is younger than me!” ([Plut.], Mor. 804b) but we do not know whether his reaction was provoked on the same occasion as Lykourgos’. Diogenes is reported to have remarked that “if the Athenians voted Alexander to be a god, then you can make me Sarapis” (Diog. Laert., VI.63).

Alexander’s motives for supposedly demanding honours are also a matter of dispute. Tarn firmly declared his belief that Alexander did demand deification in order to provide himself with the necessary constitutional basis for his leadership of the League of Corinth while his immediate purpose was to ensure acceptance of the exiles’ decree.\(^{22}\) This view has been adequately refuted by Hamilton who maintained that a god had no legal standing whatsoever in a Greek city. He accepted the validity of literary testimonia which referred or implied Alexander’s request (or order) for deification and concluded that Alexander asked for them for their own sake.\(^{23}\) More to the point, Balsdon maintained that the decree was issued before there was any confirmation of his being granted his (alleged) demand. Therefore, if Alexander had indeed made such a demand, it would be for reasons other than political.\(^{24}\)

It seems to me that we should rely on Plutarch’s silence and assume that Alexander had not officially issued an order for deification. A. B. Bosworth’s quite flexible phraseology seems to apply best to the problem: “the anecdotal tradition of the debates at Athens and Sparta seems to presuppose some sort (my italics) of request. At the very least it proves that the enactment of divine honours was well known to be something the king greatly desired. It is neither impossible nor improbable that when Alexander sent formal letters requesting or demanding a hero-cult


\(^{23}\) “The Origins of Ruler-Cult”, *Prudentia* 16, 1984, 3-15, p.14

\(^{24}\) “Divinity”, p.387.
for Hephaistion, he also suggested that recognition of his own divinity would be welcome and appropriate."^^ If Alexander had not issued officially such a demand then the initiative lay with cities which would then have played upon his well known image of divine origin.

With regard to Athens we know that Demades proposed divine honours for Alexander in 324, that Demosthenes initially opposed the motion and that both Dinarchus and Hyperides accused him of changing his mind. (Din., I.94; Hyp., V. cols 31-2; Epit., 8) According to Athenaeus (VI.251b) Demades proposed to make him a god while Aelian (V H 5.12) states that the proposal was to make him the thirteenth god. The passage is suspiciously similar to the passage of Diodorus narrating Philip's placing a statue of himself alongside those of the twelve Olympian gods (D.S., XVI.92.5; 95.1); it seems to me that the 'thirteenth' could be due to confusion. Other than that we do not know whether the Athenian demos finally resolved to honour Alexander as a god.26 It was the first time, however, that Athens' very pragmatic interests, the maintenance of Samos as a cleruchy, were associated by a politician with a king's divinity. It is to this context that the famous witty remark of Demades as to how Athens' concern for heaven could make her lose the earth is assigned (Val. Max., VII.2, ext.13). At any rate, Demades incurred atimia and a fine for his proposal, probably after Alexander's death (one hundred talents according to Aelian (V H 5.12) but only ten talents according to Athenaeus (VI.58).

A crucial passage in Arrian (Anab, 7.23.2) belonging to 323/2 refers to embassies bringing golden crowns from the Greek cities ὀς θεοροὶ δῆθεν, the interpretation of which is extremely problematic. Balsdon takes the δῆθεν to have a sarcastic meaning and translates the passage: "as if they had come on a sacred embassy to honour a god" and thinks

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26 Bickerman rejected the existence of such a cult in Athens ("Sur un passage d' Hypéride", Athenaeum, N.S. 41, 1963, 70-85.). Badian ("Deification", p.55) aligns himself with Habicht in believing that a cult was indeed established but he presumes that it did not survive his death (Gottmenschentum", pp.28-30).
Similarly, Hammond and Walbank (Macedonia, III, p.82) accept the existence of a cult of Alexander in Athens.
that its evidence should not be pressed too hard. More crucially, Badian has observed that Arrian insists on using the term *presbeis* while the δήθεν should be taken to mean that this is how the embassies would look to an *observer*.

The most important evidence comes from the contemporary speeches of Dinarchus and especially of Hyperides against Demosthenes; additionally, there is the obscure evidence afforded by Hyperides’ *Epitaphios*. Both orators charge Demosthenes with changing his mind about Alexander’s deification: “καὶ τοτὲ μὲν γράφων καὶ ἄπαγορεύων μηδένα νομίζειν ἀλλὸν θεὸν ἢ τούς παραδεδομένους, τοτὲ δὲ λέγων ὡς οὐ δεῖ τὸν δήμον ἀμφίσβητειν τὸν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ τιμῶν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ...” (Din., I.94). Hyperides attacks Demosthenes because he wanted to have a statue of Alexander erected: “...ἐβούλετο... στήσας εἰκόνα Ἀλεξάνδρου βασιλέως... κατ’ τοῦ θεοῦ.” (Hyp., V. col.32). It is true that this passage is gravely mutilated but the use of the verb “ἐβούλετο” suggests only an attempt. I believe that had actually Demades (he is probably the subject of the verb) succeeded (with Demosthenes’ co-operation), this would be the first charge to be directed against Demosthenes. In the *Epitaphios* (21-2) Hyperides describes what Greece in general and Athens in particular have suffered from Macedonian domination: “Φανερὸν δ’ ἔξ ὅν ἄναγκαζόμεθα καὶ νῦν ἐτιθυσίας μὲν ἀνθρώποις γι’ γνώμενας ἐφοράν, ἀγάλματα δὲ καὶ βασιλείς καὶ ναοὺς τούς μὲν θεοὺς ἀμελῶς, τοῖς δὲ ἀνθρώποις ἐπιμελῶς συντελοῦμεν, καὶ τοῖς τούτων οἰκέταις ὀσπέρ ἡρωας τιμᾶν ἡμᾶς ἄναγκαζόμενος.”

Cawkwell’s translation and interpretation of this crucial passage establishes that Hyperides is drawing a line between what other *poleis* had been forced to do, i.e. worship

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29 “and at one time proposing and forbidding anyone to believe in any god other than the traditional, and at another saying that the *demos* ought not dispute with Alexander celestial honours”.
30 “and it is obvious from what we are even now forced to endure; on the one hand we are forced to witness sacrifices in honour of men and on the other, the statues, the altars and the temples of the gods are neglected whereas those of men are treated with care; and we are forced to worship their servants as heroes.”
Alexander as a god, and what Athens herself was forced to do: attribute heroic honours to Alexander’s oiketai, namely Hephaistion.\(^1\)

Athenian refusal to yield to political necessity should be seen in the context of the excited climate of 324-323: the order for the restoration of the exiles had created mixed feelings; on the one hand, there were those who were very careful not to go to extremes, but on the other there would have been quite a few who would see the edict as a provocation to war.

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**c) Honours for Demetrios**

A living’s man divinity was not a novel idea; Athens, however, had resisted employing it to the extreme for political benefits. The honours, therefore, with which Demetrios Poliorketes was honoured some thirty years after the battle of Chaironeia mark a quite significant shift. Athenian conduct vis-à-vis Demetrios is responsible for the impression of servile behaviour towards the Diadochoi as a whole. On the contrary, I would like to stress that Demetrios’ case is an exceptional one, a product of the coincidence of unique circumstances, and it did not establish a precedent. We can discern three phases: 307/6, 304 to 302, and the 290s during his second stay in Athens.

In 307 Demetrios liberated Athens after ten years of practical subjection to Kassandros and divine honours as well as others were showered upon him. A simple list demonstrates a unique behaviour and one to be observed only with regard to Demetrios (and his father Antigonos in 307/6) and no other king: golden crowns, statues next to those of the tyrannicides, the title of Saviours, an altar and a priest for them, the insertion of their image on the peplos of Athena, an annual festival, the creation of two new tribes (Plut., *Demetr.* 10.3-4; D.S., XX. 46).\(^2\) These are the honours that can securely be dated in 307 but C.

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\(^1\) "Deification", pp.297-9; Cawkwell has rejected both the assumption that Alexander demanded from the Greek cities that they make him a god as well as that Athens ever honoured him as such.

\(^2\) The account of honours as provided by Diodorus is markedly shorter that the one provided by Plutarch; as Gattinoni ("Divinizzazione", p.119 and n.20) has observed, Plutarch
Habicht has shown that Plutarch's account of the honours does not stick to a chronological order; rather Plutarch tends to ascribe, loosely, the vast majority of them to 307. Thus he includes the altar of Demetrios Kataibates among the honours conferred in 307; according to Habicht this altar, erected on the spot where Demetrios had descended from his chariot fits much better in the context of 304, when Demetrios had arrived at Athens by land whereas in 307 he had come from the sea.33

Similarly the denomination of the ambassadors as theoroi belongs to 304 (Plut., Demetr. II.1) as well as the offering of the Parthenon as a residence (Plut., Demetr. 23.3); the initiation to the Eleusinian Mysteries in the wrong time of the year undoubtedly belongs to 302 (Plut., Demetr. 26.1; D.S., XX.110.3).

There are further problems with another set of honours related by Plutarch (Demetr. 12.1-2): the renaming of the last day of the month to Demetrias, the renaming of Mounychion to Demetrion, and finally the renaming of the Dionysieia to Demetrieia. Habicht notes that Mounychion is attested in inscriptions dating between 307 and 288 while Demetrias is not epigraphically attested.34 As far as the Demetrieia are concerned, it seems that Plutarch had misinterpreted his source since the Dionysieia are epigraphically attested between 307-294, without the Demetrieia whereas the latter are attested for the first time in 292, in the decree for Philippides of Paiania, together with the Dionysieia. It is plausible then that we are dealing with one festival bearing a double name and that this celebration in Demetrios' honour had been established shortly before, on the occasion of Demetrios' re-entrance to Athens.35

The last set of honours for Demetrios (Plut., Demetr. 34) falls in his second period in Athens (after 295) - a proposal by Dromokleides to request an oracle by him concerning the dedication or rather the

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33 Gottmenschentum², pp.49-54.
34 Gottmenschentum², pp.51-55.
restoration of the shields at Delphi (Plut., *Demetr.* 13); again a proposal by Dromokleides to hand over to him Mounychia and the Peiraieus (Plut., *Demetr.* 34); and the *ithyphallos* (*FGH* 76 (Duris of Samos), F 13). These have a different origin: in 301 Athens had denied Demetrios access (Plut., *Demetr.* 30); in 295 he took advantage of internal turmoil, laid siege to the city and finally re-entered triumphally (Plut., *Demetr.* 33). C. Habicht has advanced three supplementary factors leading to these honours: Demetrios had freed Athens from the tyrant Lachares; he had treated unexpectedly mildly the Athenians of the *astu* who had resisted him; finally, he offered a gift of 100,000 medimnoi of wheat. While I largely agree with the last two, I think that we should add a qualification to the first factor: Plutarch has drawn a very vivid picture of the Athenian *astu*, under the leadership of Lachares, resisting the siege of Demetrios to the point of starvation; therefore, those who saw Demetrios as a liberator would have been only those who had seceded to the Peiraieus and fought by his side against Lachares. We should not ignore, then, the factor of fear.

The famous *ithyphallos* song in 290 was an expression of gratitude for Demetrios’ rescuing Athens from Aitolian raids. The hymn has been commented upon from various viewpoints: the declining importance of the Olympian gods emanating from the violent changes in the cities’ fate, while Demetrios was raised above them – a powerful presence and a source of great benefits. For my purposes I have to underline that the Athenians were probably still intimidated enough not to resist the extravagant vocabulary of the (unknown to us) composer.

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36 Plutarch actually places the request of an oracle in the chronological framework of 304, but I prefer to adopt Habicht’s chronology and interpretation of the incident (*Untersuchungen*, pp.34-44). He maintains that these shields should be identified with the Persian and Theban shields, dedicated at Delphi after the Persian Wars, which were snatched away by the Aitolians in c. 291; the proposal of Dromokleides should then come after the victory of Demetrios over the Aitolians and be placed in the same context as the *ithyphallos*.

Interpretation of Athenian behaviour

The honours of 307 and 304 bear multiple interpretations. Various factors contributed to the inflation of honours, least of which is aimless flattery. The honours of 307/6 should be seen under the perspective of both sincere gratitude and political calculation for the benefit both of the people and of Stratokles who had proposed the vast majority of the honours.

Part of the explanation lies in the fact that Demetrios was directly and deeply involved in Athenian life as no other king ever was; in fact we do not know the extent of control he might have exercised indirectly. As I will argue in more detail below, the presence of certain of his officials together with their troops suggests control of Attika, although there is no way of telling the extent to which this was overt or tight. The best example of Demetrios’ extensive interference is his appointment of Adeimantos of Lampsakos as strategos epi ten choran in c.303, although this was probably a product of the needs of the war against Kassandros.

The grounds for the honours of 304 was that Demetrios had succeeded in rescuing Athens from Kassandros’ siege. On the other hand, it is precisely from 304 onwards that Demetrios appears to interfere in Athenian life, and it is also in this period that Stratokles and others who favoured Demetrios appear to exercise even more influence and drive into exile those who opposed them. It is possible then, that these honours did not win the approval of the majority of the Athenian people.

Along these lines I would argue that Demetrios might have had supporters from within the Athenian citizen body, and I do not mean solely Stratokles and his like. There is a curious decree, passed not by the demos but by the ethelontai epilektoi (ISE 7, II.11-2, 12-16). They apparently had fought by the side of Demetrios in the Peloponnese and they paid tribute to Demetrios’ military valour, by voting a statue for him. Two things are notable about the decree: firstly, the very fact of the proposers being volunteers and, secondly, that they determined where the
statue would be placed without, seemingly, any consultation with the demos.

Even if part of the people was averse to the honours, the immediate threat presented by Kassandros in 307 as well as later did not allow for internal disputes as to how Demetrios (or his officials) should be honoured.

A political explanation commonly advanced is that these honours were a means of incorporating Demetrios in the traditional framework of the polis; that divine honours invested him with the essential legal apparatus, without which the Athenians would violate the democratic constitution. Yet, there is evidence which supports the view that by conferring divine honours to Demetrios the Athenians did not automatically invest him with the political authority to interfere in civic affairs. When in 304, he attempted to enforce his will on the Athenians, there followed an open rupture in their relations. It is significant that this episode occurred shortly after Demetrios had rescued Athens from the siege of Kassandros; in other words there was no room for gratitude when interference in civic affairs was the price. However, the Athenians not only did not stick to their hard-headed policy, but when Demetrios’ displeasure became obvious they voted a decree which deemed whatever Demetrios said righteous to the gods and just to men, which points to a previous misunderstanding of Demetrios’ role in Athens as well as a sudden realisation accompanied with fear.

We should also distinguish the motives of the people from the motives of Stratokles who carried out the major part of the honours for both Demetrios and his officials. Although, one cannot argue that Stratokles did not have in mind Athens’ benefit, it is also legitimate to suggest that he also had in mind his personal interest. On his part going to such extremes would have been the route to political prominence of which he had been deprived in the past fifteen years after having been one of the protagonists in the Harpalos affair. Personal antagonism

39 Manni, *Demetrio Poliorcete*, p.22.
between the orators must have also played its part in the influx of honours for Demetrios Poliorketes and his officials. Other rhetores had also perceived where their interests lay and proposed further honours in order to develop contacts with the Antigonids and their court. Since Stratokles had established a precedent of extravagant honours, they could only propose equal or higher honours in order to assume a prominent position. Plutarch (Demetr. 12.1, 13, 23) holds them in contempt for this reason and states that they surpassed one another in servility and flattery but this view ignores the fact that it was the first time that Athenian politicians came into such close contact with a foreign ruler and one on whom Athens depended for her salvation.

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**The ambivalent status of Demetrios**

The honours reflect an uncertainty as to how Demetrios should be treated. He is proclaimed a god but his godhead does not seem to move Athenian common opinion; he is again a man when he wants to be initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries in 302 (Plut., Demetr. 26). F. Landucci Gattinoni has underlined the contrast between the acclamation of Demetrios as a god in 307 and his being regarded as a simple mortal in 302. Furthermore, she has compared the violent changes of the calendar in order to initiate Demetrios with the violation by Alkibiades a century earlier (Thuc., VI.27) and observed that the Athenians would have similarly regarded the irregularities of 302 equally as an attempt to subvert the democratic constitution, which I think is a rather inappropriate comparison.\(^{40}\) Alkibiades had been accused of profanation of the mysteries whereas Demetrios' motivation for being irregularly initiated was precisely the great importance he attributed to the Mysteries.

There are still other instances indicative of the ambivalence of Demetrios' status. In the civic decrees he is always a king, never a god (as in fact is the case with the decrees of other Greek cities). One of the

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\(^{40}\) "Eleusi", pp.119-20.
decrees proposed by Stratokles is in the same way revealing: he proposed that the ambassadors sent to Demetrios should be called theoroi, like those participating in sacred embassies to the sanctuary of a god. It is worth underlining that this was not self-evident from the moment Demetrios was proclaimed a god; a decree of the people was the necessary intermediate step.

On the basis of the Antigonids giving their names to two new Attic tribes Osborne has inferred citizenship conferred upon them as well since the other tribes were named after their eponymous heroes. Gauthier, on the other hand, has challenged this view; he asserts that no Hellenistic king be it a Seleukid, an Antigonid, a Lagid or an Attalid was ever inscribed as a citizen in a Greek city concluding that cult honours placed a king above the citizen body. On this point he is actually in agreement with Habicht who maintained that whenever a king became the eponymous hero of a tribe he would rather enter the circle of the twelve Olympian gods.

An aspect of the problem concerns the incompatibility or not of secular and divine honours. Another is whether the Athenians would have taken institutional measures in order to render the establishment of the new tribes flawless. As has already been mentioned, the Athenians did not consistently regard Demetrios as a god. Why then, could they not regard him and his father simultaneously as citizens and heroes on the one hand and gods on the other?

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Reaction to the honours

Scholars normally suggest that at least part of the Athenian people objected to the honours awarded Demetrios. F. Landucci Gattinoni thinks that the verses of Philippides of Kephale indicate that at least part of the Athenian people if not the majority was averse to the honours on religious grounds. This is possible, but in fact there is evidence of

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41 Bienfaiteurs, p.45; Add., pp.208-9.
42 Gottmenschenum, pp.91, 154.
43 “Divinizzazione”, p.121 and n.124, p.123. Contrary to her view, I find it quite difficult to believe that religious attacks originated with the Peripatetics who, having been supporters of
(short-lived) strong opposition to Demetrios in 304, and this clearly is of political nature.

Landucci Gattinoni divides reaction against Demetrios into political on the one part, and religious on the other; in the first group belongs Demochares (and the Samian Duris) who pronounced a political judgement on his compatriots' behaviour whereas the poet Philippides of Kephale emphasised the sacrilegious aspect of their behaviour. I think that this classification is false. In fact, even in Philippides' poems what is emphasised is the κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου; he is using aspects of sacrilege to emphasise a political point:

"ό τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν συντεμὼν εἰς μήνα ἔνα
ό τὴν Ἀκρόπολιν πανδοκείον ὑπολαβὼν
καὶ τὰς ἑταίρας εἰσαγαγὼν τῇ παρθένῳ
δι' ὄν ἀπέκκαυσεν ἢ πάχυς τὰς ἀμπέλους,
δι' ὄν ἀσεβοῦς ὁ πέπλος <del>ερράγη</del> μέσος
τὰς τῶν θεῶν τιμᾶς ποιοῦντα ἀνθρωπίνας
ταύτα καταλύει δήμου οὐ κομωδίαν". Plutarch states twice that Philippides' target was Stratokles (Demetr. 12.4, 26); it is the proposer of the honours then and Demetrios who are his target and not so much the Athenians. Even more significant for our purposes is the date of Philippides' plays. The theory that he was sent into exile after a conflict with Stratokles should be dismissed; the decree in his honour does not suggest anything of the kind. He might disapprove of what was going on in Athens but nonetheless he left willingly. Since he refers to the Eleusinian Mysteries his comedies commenting on the relations of Athens with Demetrios were written after 302 or 301 or in any case after he had left Athens for Lysimachos' court. We should read multiple meaning in this dating: Philippides did not protest while he was in Athens where he could suffer the consequences; more significantly he protested when

Demetrios Phalereus, tried to exalt his rule by presenting reprehensible aspects in the conduct of the man who had sent him away from Athens. I do not deny that the Peripatetics could harbour strong feelings against Demetrios Poliorketes but such feelings could be easily provoked in any other Athenian's mind.

44 "Divinizzazione", p.120.
Demetrios was of no use and even dangerous for Athens to be associated with. Mastrocinque would, in fact, view Philippides’ plays as a result of Lysimachos’ propaganda. The plays could have been a result of Lysimachos’ propaganda, but it is equally plausible to ascribe more to Philippides’ own initiative; had the attack been merely orchestrated by Lysimachos it would have focused more on Demetrios himself rather than Stratokles. In this case the factor of personal hostility should be considered.

It should also be born continuously in mind that Philippides was a writer of comedies, not a historian, and as such he would employ incidents that would easily provoke the people’s reaction; in our case what could be more fascinating than sacrilege and the outrage of the gods? As to Demochares’ charges (FGH 75, F 1, 2) against the Athenian people of behaving with servility, it should be stressed that these belong to a period later than 307 and that there is no evidence of him having initially opposed the honours for Demetrios: “έλύπει μὲν καὶ τούτων ένια αὐτὸν, ὡς έοικεν, οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα γε παντελῶς αἰσχρὰ καὶ ταπεινά, Λεαίνης μὲν καὶ Λαμίας Ἀφροδίτης ίερὰ καὶ Βουρίχου καὶ Ἀδεμάντου καὶ Ὀξυθέμιδος τῶν κολάκων αὐτοῦ καὶ βωμοί καὶ ἤρωα καὶ σπονδαῖ. τούτων ἐκάστῳ καὶ παιάνες ἠδοντο ὡστε καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Νημήτριον θαυμάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς γινόμενοι καὶ λέγων ὁτι ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ οὐδείς Ἀθηναίος γέγονε μέγας καὶ ἀδρὸς τὴν ψυχήν.” (F1). Furthermore, it is quite probable that Demochares’ charges were formed in the same environment as those of Philippides, that is the court of Lysimachos, where Demochares had probably asked refuge when he went into exile. Marasco has noted that charges, similar to those of Demochares, against Demetrios’ mistress, Lamia, and his officials were quite fashionable in Lysimachos’ court - as it emerges from Plutarch’s narrative; moreover, Plutarch records a series of insults exchanged between Lysimachos and Demetrios. It is important to note that these

46 “Demetrios Tragodoumenos (Propaganda e letteratura al tempo di Demetrio Poliorcete)”, Athenaeum N.S., 57, 1979, 260-276; sources have preserved exchanges of verbal assaults between Lysimachos and Demetrios (pp.264-5).
47 Marasco, Democare, pp.191-2
insults date to c.302 or shortly afterwards. Setting aside his personal
disapproval then, Demochares' charges could also be seen as forming part
of Lysimachos' propaganda against Demetrios and as aiming at securing
Lysimachos' benevolence towards Athens and his help against Demetrios
in the future.48

In conclusion then, neither Philippides nor Demochares appear to
have presented any obstacle in 307/6 when Demetrios had indeed rescued
Athens from Kassandros' grip. To both of them religion had not been an
issue for so long as Demetrios did not act as a god invested with political
authority.

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d) Honours for the other Diadochoi

The effect of the battle of Ipsos

Thus far the general pattern that can be established runs as follows:
from a rather sober attitude towards Philip, Alexander and their officials
the Athenians take a tremendous turn and go over the top in honouring
Demetrios. After 301, however, they assume a much more balanced
attitude.

The defeat of the Antigonids at Ipsos in 301 would have probably
shown to them all too clearly the instability of a king's fate and that,
therefore, the honours they had once distributed could place them in a
very awkward position. Consequently, a natural reaction would be to be
very cautious as to whom and how they should honour.

The Athenians approached Kassandros and Lysimachos at first and
later Ptolemy and they did benefit, but they demonstrated a much more
sober attitude.49 In return for Lysimachos' substantial gifts of corn and
for his quite lenient treatment of the Athenian captives after the battle
of Ipsos, they only rewarded him with a crown, a traditional and quite
moderate expression of gratitude. Nevertheless, one should not fail to

49 H. Lund (Lysimachus, p.86) holds that a treaty of alliance was concluded between Athens
and Kassandros; however, while there is surely evidence of a rapprochement (the embassy of
Poseidippos and others) or even of increasing influence on Athenian affairs (Plut., Demetr. 30
on Lachares), there is none as to an actual alliance.
comment on the way in which Athens by bestowing this crown took sides with Lysimachos in his struggle against Demetrios, but only indirectly and quite cautiously.

Evidence for an *aristeion* crown for Lysimachos is provided by *IG II² 1485A*, ll.28-9, which however gives no specific information as to the actual date. Previously, it was thought that the crown should belong to a period prior to the assumption of the title *basileus* by the Diadochoi since no title appears on the stone and that, therefore, a possible date could be 307. S. Burstein has plausibly demonstrated that a date prior to the battle of Ipsos in 301 should be excluded on the basis of the correlation of power among the Diadochoi. The only remaining restriction is that the crown should belong to a Panathenaic year. Always according to Burstein, the omission of the title should not be significant since it is omitted from the title of a Pontic ruler as well (Spartokos III according to him); the likeliest *terminus post quem* is 299/8 when Athens received a gift of grain and new mast and sail for the *peplos* ship of Athena. Most probably the bestowal of the crown followed immediately afterwards.

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Honours for the kings in the 280s

This brings us to the next set of honours, namely, the statues of Ptolemy, Lysimachos and Pyrrhos erected in the Athenian *agora* as a result of the help they had provided to Athens during and after the revolt of 287 against Demetrios. As the decree for Kallias reveals, Ptolemy's help had been the most important: he had offered ships and mercenaries as well as corn and money after the revolt while Pyrrhos had been instrumental in the peace-negotiations of 286; Lysimachos' contribution in corn and money had been substantial after the revolt.

50 *IG II² 1485A and Athenian Relations with Lysimachus*, *ZPE* 31, 1978, 181-185: a date in 307 would require friendly relations of Lysimachos with the Antigonids and, consequently, a breach in his relations with Kassandros. Thus their later cordial relations "would have to represent a resumption of ties between Lysimachus and Cassander after a new rupture between the former and Antigonus, a sequence of events that is not even hinted at in any source" (p.182); hostility between Lysimachos and Antigonos remained uninterrupted.

51 For Lysimachos: Paus., I.9.4; for Ptolemy I and Ptolemy II id., I.8.6; for Pyrrhos id., I.11.1; for Seleukos id., I.16.1.
There was also a statue of Seleukos (in the *Stoa Poikile*) and of Ptolemy II Philadelphos and of his wife Arsinoe in the *Odeion*. Seleukos’ benefaction most probably had something to do with the restoration of their autonomy to the Athenian cleruchs on the island of Lemnos (Phylarchus, *FGH* 81, F29), a claim which Lysimachos had not conceded. This development in the relations between Athens and Seleukos should also be seen in the perspective of Demetrios’ surrender to Seleukos and his being held in captivity by the latter (Plut., *Demetr.* 50). This was translated into preventing, for good, Demetrios from attempting another assault against Athens, which in turn would bring about an increased popularity of Seleukos in Athens.

No precise date can be established for the statue of Ptolemy II. According to the Kallias decree (11.44–53), Ptolemy Philadelphos provided Athens with 20,000 medimnoi of corn and fifty talents of silver as soon as he ascended the throne, in which case a date in 283/2, when Ptolemy ascended the throne, would be quite possible; a second possibility could be 282 when Athens participated in the celebration of the first Ptolemaia or when Ptolemy provided the *peplos* for the Panathenaia c. 282 or shortly afterwards (Kallias decree, ll.55–70); finally, another possibility would be a date c.270, when Kallias is honoured and it seems that there are some dealings going on between Athens and Alexandreia. The statue could have been erected together with the statue of his wife Arsinoe, which would give us a span of time between c.279–275 (the date of Arsinoe’s marriage to Ptolemy II) and 268 (the date of Arsinoe’s

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52 See Osborne, *Naturalization* III, p.116. Lund (*Lysimachus*, p.203–4) agrees as to the chronological context and she would rather interpret Seleukos’ action as a political deal with Athens rather than as pure benefaction to the Lemnians; she adds that Seleukos would have counted on Athens’ naval support. This latter seems to me quite dubious since the Athenian navy was rather insignificant at the time.

53 A date in the late 280s is offered by Osborne, *Naturalization* III, p.116.

54 Habicht (*Athen*, p.142 and n.10) has established that, initially, the Ptolemaia were intended to be a one-off event, forming part of the funeral ceremonies for Ptolemy I in 282; the *Ptolemaia* of the Kallias decree should be dated to the summer of 282 and not be identified with the penteteric festival established in 279/8.
However, my own preference is for the first option: it would be a wise political move on the part of the Athenians to secure Ptolemy’s good will immediately, from the very beginning of his reign, all the more so if we take into account that he was the only source of help left to Athens after having been disappointed from Lysimachos’ policies.56

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Change in the Athenian attitude towards the kings

The intriguing matter is the quality and quantity of the honours offered to the monarchs. Again, it is Osborne who offers the most challenging view, namely that the statues were part of a set of honours which must have included citizenship. Under Habicht’s and Gauthier’s perspective this would have been impossible on the grounds that no Successor was ever inscribed as a citizen in a Greek city.

Osborne follows the same line of argument when he discusses (briefly) the honours for Ptolemy III Euergetes and for Ptolemy V Epiphanes. He asserts that it can hardly be doubted that the honours for Ptolemy III Euergetes included citizenship, but he does not offer any proof. His case for Ptolemy Epiphanes is much stronger though it is misleading to assert that he is known to have been granted citizenship. Osborne employs the evidence of an inscription, probably dating in 178/7 (IG II² 2314, ll.40ff) according to which king Ptolemy, son of Ptolemy, of the Ptolemais tribe was a Panathenaic victor. He concludes that he was a citizen qua eponym of a tribe.57 That the Athenians thought that they should include the tribe to which the king belonged, exactly as they would do in the case of a citizen, does bear a strong flavour of citizenship. Retrospectively then, we could ascribe the same attitude to the Athenians of the previous century. I would not be as affirmative as Osborne but that there was no parallel of citizenship for the Diadochoi

56 Habicht, Untersuchungen, pp.79-80.
57 Naturalization II, pp.93-4.
elsewhere does not provide enough proof that the Athenians did not include citizenship among the honours for them.

The fact remains that there is no trace in our sources of any higher honours, like divine or at least cult honours, which is rather surprising particularly with regard to Ptolemy whose contribution had been analogous to that of Demetrios a few decades earlier on: freedom for Athens. Athenian behaviour becomes even more notable if we place further emphasis on the kind of benefactions the *polis* received. Corn and money or the restoration of the autonomy of the Athenian cleruchs on Lemnos were essential to Athens’ survival; with the Peiræaeus and most of the forts in the hands of Antigonus Gonatas, the Athenians would often have had difficulties in getting adequate provisions for their daily life. In reality then, Athens was in quite a precarious position, which could have favoured extreme expressions of gratitude.

It is worth making a comparison with the honours attributed to the Thracian rulers Audoleon (*IG* II² 654) and Spartokos in the same period: crown, citizenship and statue; in fact Spartokos gets two statues (*IG* II² 653, ll.40–2). His honours are the product of recent material benefactions but they are also the culmination of a long-standing history of benefactions to Athens. It is notable then that Athens does not discriminate in favour of the Diadochoi.

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**Athens’ changed position in the 280s**

Athenian attitudes of the 280s should be interpreted under the perspective of Athens’ changed position in the international scene of events. It is the first time that she comes into direct contact with all of the Successors and moreover they share a common goal; the destruction of Demetrios. S. Burstein’s useful observations on the alignment of forces in the Balkans in the mid-280s provide support to my own estimation of the way in which Athens perceived her position after the revolt. I quote: “...while the alliance lasted on the firm basis of mutual need: on Lysimachus’ need for allies in Greece to prevent Antigonus from
supporting Pyrrhus, and on Athens’ need for assistance to recover those positions in Attica still held by Gonatas”.*

That Athens’ alliance was deemed necessary would make the Athenians feel that they were on an equal footing with Demetrios’ rivals. More significantly, no one, not even Ptolemy, was directly or deeply involved with Athenian civic affairs and no one was ever interested in making Athens his capital. Athens emerged from the revolt free of external control although the Peiraieus and the forts remained to be recovered. The kings could now simply be regarded as a source for corn and money. Athens even gets to the point of exercising an independent foreign policy; the honours for the Paionian king Audoleon testify to this. It has been observed by Marasco that the reinforcement of relations between Athens and Audoleon who was on hostile terms with Lysimachos also provides testimony for the worsening of the relations between Athens and Lysimachos (because the latter was refusing to restore Lemnos to Athens). It seems to me, however, that Athens’ prime consideration in honouring Audoleon was the material help he could offer, and that independently of or even without regard to his relations with Lysimachos.

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58 “Bithys”, pp.41, 47, n.13. Burstein bases his assumption of a formal alliance between Athens and Lysimachos on the honours voted for Artemidoros (IG II* 662 and 663); I am not so convinced though that the relationship between the two should necessarily be defined in terms of a formal alliance; nevertheless, they were surely based on mutual interest.

For the alignment of Pyrrhos with Antigonos Gonatas see Paus., I.10.2; Justin XVI.3.1-2; Plut., Pyrrh. 12.5.7; a fragment of Auletrides (a comedy of Phoenicides) suggests a treaty of alliance (Kock, CAF III.333)
ii. The officials

a) Officials of Philip and Alexander

The category of benefactors from 338 onwards widened in order to include officials in the service of the Macedonian kings and later of their successors. Up till then, foreign recipients of honours included most commonly either kings (for the most part those of the Thracian region) or important citizens of other poleis who commonly became proxenoi of Athens. There had been precedents for the practice of honouring officials mostly dating to the first half of the fourth century; on one occasion they concerned officials of the Persian satrap Ariovarzanes and on certain others people connected with the Thracian rulers. Therefore, when Demades sets out to honour officials in the service of Philip he is still functioning in the traditional lines of Athenian foreign policy; he always perceives diplomatic relations in terms of establishing Athens' way through a network of officials.

An intriguing piece of evidence, is provided by a fragment found in the Athenian agora (I 4990). S. Tracy joined the fragment to IG II² 402 and offered a very interesting reading of the decree. The purpose of the decree is to secure the benevolence of as many friends of the kings and Antipatros as possible, after they have been honoured by the demos. More details would certainly be most welcome, but the importance of the decree lies in the fact that the proposer has understood that honours for Macedonian officials would please either Philip or Alexander and Antipatros (it is not clear to which of the two the decree alludes), to say the least. On the other hand, it is dubious whether the decree testifies to overt external pressure. The speaker, Archedikos of Lamptrai is commonly thought to have been on good terms with Antipatros since he was anagrapheus in 320/19 (IG II², 380-384), but this does not allow us to draw any conclusions as to whether Antipatros had made known a wish or

59 Osborne, Naturalization IV, p.190.
60 "DE ANTIPATRO ET ARCHEDICO LAMPTRENSI. IG II² 402 + Agora I 4990", Hosp 62, 1993, 249-251. Tracy offers two equally possible dates for the decree: either the immediate aftermath of Chaironeia or after the accession of Alexander to the throne, when he had departed for Asia.
if Archedikos had simply inferred it. The speech of Hyperides against Philippides (5.col.4), if coupled with the decree seems to point to the first solution. Hyperides states that there was a necessity for the *demos* to vote honours for certain Macedonians, a necessity that he himself does not seem to question. The factor of pressure on the part of Macedonia then should be taken into account, although it is impossible to establish the extent to which this was overt and also the degree to which it determined the Athenian policy.

The tendency to exaggerate the number of officials who had been honoured on a motion of Demades has already been commented upon in the previous chapter. In fact not only has their number been exaggerated but it has also attracted harsh criticism on moral grounds. Mitchel thinks that “they would be deemed unworthy of a still sovereign state” while Williams thinks that the frequency with which Demades distributed honours led to their cheapening. In fact it is the honours for Philip that could be taken to indicate that Athens was not the supreme power of the past. As to the decrees for officials they are neither so numerous nor does their vocabulary bear any flavour of a servile attitude. Furthermore, even if we accept that honours were distributed more frequently than they had been in the past, this could hardly be translated into loss of their importance. On the contrary; honours were bestowed precisely because they were thought to be an essential political means of establishing connections. In fact, there are certain periods in Athenian history in which we encounter a quite high number of recipients of honours, most notably so in the 360s.

However, of the existing ten proxeny or citizenship decrees proposed by Demades, it is only for four that we can be reasonably certain that they concern people in the service of Macedonia. They are extremely brief and they are a result of the officials facilitating Athenian

62 See the list provided by Osborne, *Naturalization IV*, pp.211-14, esp. p.213.
63 IG II2 240 = Tod 181 for the son of Andromenous; IG II2 353 for Choiros Larisaious; IG II2 405 for Amyntor; Suidas, s.v. Ανδρόμακης and Hyp., frg.76 (κατὰ Δημάδου παρανόμων) for Euthykrates.
relations with Philip. My purpose is to relate Demades’ policy and the Athenian politics in general between 338 and 322 to the underlying Athenian mentality and attitude towards foreign officials; furthermore, I intend to compare this policy with the policies pursued later on (in the last decade of the fourth century, the 290s and the 280s), always in relation to the Athenian mentality and its development through the years and under different political and/or military situations.

Although most of our preserved inscriptions are heavily mutilated, it would appear the citizenship was rarely awarded between 338 and 322 and furthermore that it corresponded to the official’s rank in the court. More specifically, a securely attested case of citizenship concerns a high ranked official like Amyntor, who in all probability was Hephaistion’s father. My case would be stronger, if I could add Antipatros as well; unfortunately, there is only a fragment of Hyperides testifying to secular honours voted for Antipatros, the interpretation of which causes perplexities. Hyperides states that ἀντίπατρον καὶ Ἀλκίμαχον προξένους καὶ πολίτας ἐποιησάμεθα’; the obvious difficulty is that no-one was honoured simultaneously with both proxeny and citizenship. I believe that Osborne is right in dissociating the two cases; he offers two interpretations with a slight preference for the second one: either Hyperides is speaking loosely or the two were first made ἐξουσιοδοτοί and later on citizens. Since there has been preserved the first clauses of the decree for Alkimachos, I would suggest that Hyperides does speak loosely, that Alkimachos was awarded the proxeny whereas Antipatros, who was of a higher rank, was awarded the citizenship.

The activity of Alkimachos (IG II² 239 = Tod 180) has not been preserved but if we accept the restoration Ἀλκιμάχου Πελαγίου Ε], then we deal with a general and ambassador of Philip and later of Alexander and it is legitimate to speculate that he would be an appropriate person to facilitate relations between Athens and Philip (Arr.,

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64 Hyp., frg 77 = Harpocratio, s.v. Ἀλκίμαχος.
65 Naturalization IV, pp.70-1.
Anab. 1.18.1; 6.28.4). For the unknown son of Andromenes it is recorded that he facilitated the efforts of the Athenians who arrived at Philip's court (IG II 240, II.10-5). It seems therefore that there was a compelling reason, at least for this latter decree.

IG II 405, passed in 334/3, records citizenship for Amyntor, son of Demetrios. M. J. Osborne leaves the matter of his identification open. It is equally problematic that his services are not recorded; only a vague reference to eunoia towards the Athenians. Osborne argues that this could be due to the fact that Demades passed at least another decree that day and consequently he did not have the time to propose a detailed decree.67

As I have already mentioned in the previous chapter, the factor of Macedonian pressure for attribution of honours, alluded to in the speech of Hyperides Against Philippides (5, col.4), should also be taken into account, apart from Athenian initiative. Although the state of evidence does not allow us to draw any definite conclusions, I would think, that at this stage and in the majority of our cases, Athenian initiative prevails.

* * *

Hephaistion

Heroic honours were probably attributed to Hephaistion on the orders of Alexander but our evidence with regard to Athens basically consists of the aforementioned passage of Hyperides in the Epitaphios (21) and even there Hephaistion is not mentioned by name.68 However, I do not see any compelling reason to reject the assumption that by referring to honours for Alexander's oiketai Hyperides is hinting at Hephaistion. According to G. L. Cawkwell, heroic status for Hephaistion was a product

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66 The restoration is suggested by Oikonomides ("Demades", p.8 and n.3) and Osborne (Naturalization III, p.71) on the basis of Arr., Anab. 1.18.1. See also C. Schwenk, Athens in the Age of Alexander. The Dated Laws and Decrees of the Lykourgan Era 338-322 BC, Chicago 1984, pp.28-30, for the identification of the Alkimachos of the decree with the Alkimachos mentioned by Harpocration (quoting Hyperides) and Arrian.

67 Naturalization II, pp.86-7. A. Oikonomides, wrongly, classifies this decree among the proxeny decrees, ("Demades", pp.106, 116.)

68 Arrian (drawing on Ptolemy) states that Ammon denied divine honours for Hephaistion; thus Alexander obeyed the god and honoured Hephaistion as a hero (Anab. 7.14.7; 23.6). In sharp contrast Justin (XII.12.12) and Diodorus (XVII.115.4) state that Ammon did approve of Hephaistion’s deification, which has been unanimously rejected by scholars on the basis of the credibility of Arrian and his source as well as on Hyperides.
of religious necessity to obey the god Ammon whose oracle had assigned Hephaistion such status. Cawkwell has denied (rightly, as I believe), that the Athenians conferred divine honours upon Alexander, thus by extension implying that they did not yield to political necessity. Thus, he apparently thought that it was not political necessity that led the Athenians to honour Hephaistion, posthumously, as a hero; instead the reason should be sought in religious necessity. To my mind though, it seems quite doubtful whether the Athenians - no matter their previous long-standing relationship with the oracle of Ammon - would turn an obedient ear to a foreign god if this did not aim at some important material need, in this case obviously Samos. Although, their religious feelings would not allow them to deify Alexander, they could attribute heroic status to Hephaistion; deification and heroisation did not carry the same religious weight.

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Harpalos

A noteworthy citizenship is the one conferred upon the treasurer of Alexander, Harpalos. The actual decree has not been preserved; mention of the honour is made solely by Athenaeus (586b) sometime in the 320s (and one which in the long run put the Athenians in a very awkward position). It is necessary to comment upon the Athenian motives for this particular citizenship. Contrary to the cases of Amyntor and perhaps of Antipatros for which the motives were rather vague, i.e. being close to the king and facilitating Athenian efforts on all occasion, in the case of Harpalos it was his very real and substantial gift of grain that prompted the Athenians.

69 "Deification", pp.300-2. Actually, Cawkwell attributes the famous saying of Demosthenes that Athens ought not argue with Alexander about celestial honours (Din., I.54) to the context of a debate for the honours for Hephaistion. C. Habicht (Gottmenschentum, p.30) thinks that Alexander did not wait for the pronouncement of the oracle in order to establish a cult for his friend, and Athens simply followed his orders. He is partly basing his argument on an article by P. Treves ("Hyperides and the Cult of Hephaestion", CR 53, 1939, 57-57.) but all that the latter maintained was that the return of Alexander's envoys from the oracle of Ammon could not possibly be dated as late as May 323.

As a matter of fact Harpalos' gift signals the beginning of a series of gifts to Athens by wealthy individuals, be they officials or, more often, kings. Apparently, there was a severe shortage in the grain supply in the 320s, a situation that was going to become a repeated characteristic of the Athenian situation in the Hellenistic period. In 320/19, Eucharistos was awarded the citizenship (on a motion of Demades) for securing supplies for Athens at a fixed price ($IG\ II^2$ 400). In this perspective the honours for Harpalos should rather be dissociated from his position in the Macedonian court; anyone offering grain in those times would have been awarded the citizenship.⁷¹

What could be the motives of Harpalos himself? Did he act on his own initiative or did he follow Alexander’s orders? I believe that these possibilities are not mutually exclusive. Athenaeus comments: "Γλυκέρας οὗτος ὁ σῖτος ἧν" alluding to the notorious relationship of Harpalos with the Athenian *hetaira* and implying that the gift was donated to Athens for the sake of Glykera. This might sound naive but Harpalos’ previous bonds with Athens should not be ignored (Plut., *Phoc.* 21.3). On the other hand it is quite plausible that Alexander would be interested in Athens’ welfare and her good will and hence he ordered Harpalos to send the grain; in any event the problem is insoluble since we do not know the actual date of the decree.

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**The first case of the highest honours for an official: Asandros**

During the regime of Demetrios Phalereus (317-307) there is a considerable dearth of decrees; we are in possession of a single honorific decree for a foreign royal official Asandros, the satrap of Karia, in 314.

⁷¹ See P. Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World*, Cambridge 1988, pp.150-64 for the repeated crises after 338 and until 323; warfare between Macedonian and the Greek states rendered grain fleets coming from the Bosporos quite vulnerable; consequently Athens had to turn her attention to the south-east and western grain sources and to rely on the generosity of individuals like Herakleides of Salamis.

See also G. Marasco, “Sui problemi dell’ approvvigionamento di cereali in Atene nell’ età dei Diadochoi”, *Athenaeum*, N.S., 62, 1984, 289-294. Marasco sees the grain provision as a major factor in the adoption of a particular policy towards one or the other of the *Diadochoi*.
In fact he is the first foreign official to be awarded the highest honours (sities in the Prytaneion and a statue). The actual text (IG II² 450) does not offer a sufficient amount of illuminating details, but what is there presents the exceptional case of a foreign satrap coming to Athens, in person, in order to provide troops and ship. Lemnos is nowhere alluded to but we know from other sources that it was the need to re-capture Lemnos, which had been snatched away by Antigonos Monophthalmos, that produced the need for ships and men (D.S., XIX.68.3). The struggle for the re-occupation of the island belongs to the wider context of hostilities between Kassandros and Antigonos, but Athens had a special interest in her own right: with Lemnos in Antigonos' hands, and being herself under Kassandros' grip, Athens would be deprived of essential grain supplies. Lemnos had always been a major supplier for Athens and her maintaining cleruchs on the island was an additional incentive for fighting against Antigonos. Asandros was, of course, acting in the interest of Kassandros but this would not diminish his contribution in Athenian eyes. On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that Kassandros' rule might be the most important factor that led to the highest honours instead of the more traditional crown and citizenship.

With the honours for Asandros the practice of honouring a foreigner with a statue spreads to include the officials of a king. However, as we shall see below, the number of royal officials awarded a statue is rather limited.

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b) Officials of Demetrios.

When we move to the officials in the service of Demetrios a change becomes instantly obvious with regard to the proliferation in the
number of honorands. Although quite a few of the decrees are terribly mutilated, the number of the honorands between 307 and 300 is extremely high. The vast majority of the decrees were proposed and carried by Stratokles. Their great number can be associated with the political will of Stratokles to establish as many connections with Demetrios' court as possible, and again a distinction should be drawn between his motives and the motives of the people who voted the honours.

Osborne holds that, since Demetrios Poliorketes re-established the democracy and given the fact of the on-going struggle for its maintenance, it should not have been surprising that all these people were honoured by the *demos*; finally that there was no change in attitude as it was the precarious circumstances that produced this high number of beneficiaries. I largely agree especially with regard to the circumstances, but I think that there are ramifications to his view, and we could add further parameters to the circumstances. I would like to allude to certain implications which go beyond the rationale of diplomatic benefits.

Osborne has included the officials of Demetrios among those beneficiaries permanently residing away from Athens, and this is my own point of departure. Contrary to this view, I hold the view that, although these people were not permanently residing in Athens, they nonetheless were present off and on (to say the least) and this consists a major difference with far reaching consequences.

'Being close' to Demetrios suggests that the officials accompanied him in his campaigns, in other words they were in Attika whenever he was, and quite a few of the decrees were passed at times when Demetrios was in fact in Athens. Therefore that they were in a position to provide diplomatic, let alone military aid, in quite a few of our cases presupposes their presence in Attika. It is noteworthy that quite a high number of the decrees was voted in 303/2, after Demetrios had returned from the

73 Naturalization IV, pp.207-9.
Peloponnesian and in the chronological context of the preparations for the re-establishment of the League of Corinth.

The decrees recording military aid provided by the officials present the greatest interest. The honorand of *IG II²* 503 (II.13-7) had put himself at the service of the hipparchs; Apollonides had probably offered his help during the siege laid by Kassandros (*IG II²* 492, II.8-II, 14); Medeios had been dispatched with Demetrios to set the Greeks free and had proved himself useful and favourably disposed to the salvation of the demos (*IG II²* 498, II.15-20); an Athenian general reported to the demos about the services of Neaios during a campaign involving Eleusis (*IG II²* 553, II.2-10) and others unknown are praised for having made themselves available to the common cause. Setting aside the fact that they have contributed to Athens’ salvation, there appear certain implications of quite a different nature. Given their high rank, it is highly unlikely that they simply put themselves under the command of an Athenian general; it is fairly certain that they commanded their own troops. This in turn suggests that foreign troops (consisting of mercenaries) were present in Attika for long periods of time. At this point I come to question the picture of cordial relations between the Athenians and Demetrios (during his first stay in Athens). I do not intend to propound the view that these troops were in fact employed directly to intimidate the Athenians; as a matter of fact they were instrumental in Athens’ salvation from Kassandros; but nonetheless their mere presence suggests control of Attika by Demetrios however indirect.

Gauthier presumes that a great number of the officials wished to be honoured by the Athenians and that, therefore, they had asked for the

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74 To these we could add the honorand of *IG II²* 559+568+Add., p.662, who having been dispatched to Greece with Demetrios fought for freedom and democracy (II.7-10), Oxythemia who worked for the freedom of the Hellenes (*IG II²* 558, II.11-14), Nikomedes of Kos (Osborne 51, II.3-5) and even Vianor and Antimedes who were dispatched to Greece with Demetrios (*SEG* 16.58).

Although it has not been preserved on the stone whether Neaios was in the service of Demetrios, the kind of services he rendered to Athens as well as the fact that the stone has suffered a quite peculiar mutilation, very similar to the one observed on the stone of the Herodoros decree (another official of Demetrios), has led Osborne to assume that Neaios too was in the service of the king; furthermore, he has quite plausibly argued that his services could not belong to 295 since at that time Eleusis was lost to Athens; see “The Damnation of Neaios”, *ZPE* 19, 1975, 143-158, p.154 and n.21, p.155.
honours; since they had no direct access to either the *boule* or the *ekklesia*, they would employ the help of an Athenian citizen who would present a favourable account of the candidate’s activities, most commonly ambassadors or generals; if the candidate was present in Athens, then he might present himself to the *ekklesia* to present his claim after having been introduced by an Athenian. Such a reconstruction fits well the evidence provided by the decree for Neaios where it emerges that it was because of the favourable report of the Athenian general that he was honoured (*IG II²* 553, ll.6-10); similarly, it was the Athenian ambassadors that presented a favourable account of Herodoros’ conduct (*IG II²* 646, ll.17-8). However, I would like to draw attention to the possibility that some decrees could have been the product of the initiative of an Athenian citizen, who would have assumed that bestowal of honours would have been pleasing to a certain official. At any rate, I would think that the officials at least made known their wish to be honoured. What would have prompted them? An answer that comes immediately to mind is that they functioned in the traditional context of *euergesia* and they demanded a recognition of their services. Still, there may have been other, practical, parameters in their demand. Through these honours a network of Demetrios’ officials established itself in Athens.

That Demetrios had an acute interest in establishing his own officials in the framework of the *polis* of Athens as her citizens is amply demonstrated by the way in which honours were conferred upon Eupolis in 304/3. It is clearly stated in the motivation clause that Demetrios, by means of a letter, notified the Athenians of Eupolis’ favourable disposition towards the kings and the *demos* (*IG II²* 486, ll.12-4). The stone breaks down at precisely this point but it is easy to infer that either Demetrios directly asked for citizenship for Eupolis or the Athenians simply inferred his wish (It would not make much sense if Demetrios had taken the trouble to write a letter for lesser honours, like a crown).

75 *Bienfaiteurs*, Appendix II, pp.181-3.
Fifteen years earlier Sonikos and Eu- had most probably been awarded the citizenship (IG II² 387++Add., p.660) on the request, or rather order of Polyperchon (again by means of a letter). Citizenship for their officials then was indeed regarded by both Polyperchon and Demetrios as an important asset in their relations with Athens. On a theoretical level this was translated into creating an image of integration with the Athenian people. From a practical point of view and in the long run, these honorary Athenian citizens would help transmit Demetrios’ will to the demos (through their connections with native citizens). The recently discovered inscription at Rhamnous, referring to Adeimantos, one of the honorands, as general of the countryside (Ergon 40, 1993, p.7) supports the notion of the officials’ infiltrating the world of the polis and even controlling Attika. We do not know then, if the Athenians had much choice.

Moreover, for three of the officials, – Adeimantos, Oxythemis and Bousiris –, Demochares provides us with the information that they were assigned cult honours (FGH 75, Fl). M. J. Osborne believes that, at least with regard to Adeimantos and Oxythemis, they were the sequel of the secular honours voted respectively in 302 and c.303/2.76 Unfortunately, there is no way of establishing the date of these cult honours.77 Osborne plausibly suggests that, if Oxythemis had settled the issue of the Athenian prisoners, referred to in IG II² 558, then the Athenians could have expressed their gratitude by voting heroic honours for him. In the case of Adeimantos I would think that the cult could be a by-product of Adeimantos’ being appointed to a high position at the synedrion of the League of Corinth; on the other hand, we have to leave open the possibility that in his case the cult honours could precede the secular ones of 302/1 and be associated with his generalship of the Athenian countryside.

The Athenians already had a precedent for these cult honours in the cult which had been voted for Hephaistion; only that Hephaestion had

76 For Oxythemis: IG II² 558; for Adeimantos: Moretti, ISE 9.
77 Naturalization II, pp.124-6.
never been of benefit to Athens. At least with regard to Oxythemis we know that an important service, concerning some prisoners, was expected from him. Still, there is no means of establishing whether these cult honours were a product of Athenian initiative or whether Demetrios had suggested or even demanded cult honours for certain of his officials.

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**Attribution of the highest honours**

The highest honours – crown, *proedria*, *sitesis*, statue and citizenship – for officials are rare: we know of four or five cases all in all, the first one is the one already mentioned for Asandros in 314 and the last c. 295/4.

Apart from Asandros the other recipients of the highest honours were officials of Demetrios: Asklepiades of Byzantion who was honoured c. 304/3, Herodoros in 295/4 (*IG II*² 646), Aristonikos of Karystos possibly between 307 and 304 (*IG II*² 385) together another whose name and services have not been preserved (*IG II*² 648).²⁸

The decree for Asklepiades (*IG II*² 555) is quite peculiar in the sense that it does not provide a detailed justification of the *megistai timai* although the procedure is described elaborately (II.13–26). Furthermore, the statue is going to be set up in Byzantion, and not in the Athenian agora. This provides us with the grounds to suspect that Asklepiades’ deeds had more to do with Byzantion and his being an official of Demetrios rather than the welfare of Athens. Such an interpretation fits neatly in the context of more extensive interference on Demetrios’ part from 304 onwards. One wonders again whether the Athenians had much choice in their bestowal of honours (at least on certain occasions).

Mention has already been made of how Athens denied access to Demetrios in 301 and how a few years later taking advantage of the

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²⁸ Aristonikos of Karystos, a famous ball-player who had been in the service of Alexander, was also awarded citizenship and *sitesis* and, presumably, a statue as well (*IG II*² 385). Osborne (*Naturalization* II, pp.128–9) dates the decree between 307 and 303, though he leaves open the possibility of the early 290s; rightly, he finds it difficult to believe that his extreme skill in ball-playing could be the motivation for his honours, in sharp contrast to the other beneficiaries; employing the evidence of an Eretrian inscription which testifies to cult honours for Aristonikos in the early third century, he concludes that he too had performed services of a political nature; I would in turn suggest that Aristonikos might have offered money as well, like the doctor Evenor of Akarnania in c. 307–303/2 (*IG II*² 374).
internal turmoil caused by Lachares' regime, he laid siege to the astu and made his way into Athens once again. Plutarch has preserved a quite vivid picture of the polis' suffering during the siege, and how relieved they felt afterwards to be treated leniently by Demetrios. Therefore, it becomes understandable that they would honour anyone who had contributed to this; they probably thought that Herodoros (as well as the others) exercised decisive influence on Demetrios to this end. However, two things are notable about the Herodoros decree: its details and its emphasis on the maintenance of the democracy. The author of the decree does not fail to refer to the previous good will of Herodoros towards the king Antigonos and the Athenian demos (ll.11-13). Ten lines (13-22) are devoted to describing Herodoros' efforts during the negotiations between Athens and Demetrios. That his efforts were indeed very important is emphasised by their connection with the maintenance of the democracy. We encounter for the first time the clause connecting the re-acquisition of the astu (later on it will be the Peiraieus) with the maintenance of the democracy (ll.22-5).

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c) The honorands of the 280s

Officials of Ptolemy

In the 280s we find three recipients of crown and citizenship but not of proedria, sitesis and statue. One of them, Philokles (Hesp. 9, 1940, p.352, no 48) was in the service of Ptolemy while Artemidoros (SEG 16.62) and Bithys (IG II² 808) were in the service of Lysimachos. Admittedly, only the decree for Artemidoros is preserved complete but I believe that all of the decrees involved very similar honours and are products of the same attitude towards officials. With the exception of the Philokles decree there have survived the final clauses which enumerate the honours and what we miss from the very bottom of the stele could not possibly refer to additional honours.79

79 M. J. Osborne (Naturalization II, p.163, n.732) believes that Sostratos, the Ptolemaic representative who had negotiated with Demetrios Poliorcetes (Kallias decree, ll.33-44) had received equally high honours with Philokles, though no decree has survived. Shear ("Kallias", p.23) accepts Sostratos' identification as son of Dexiphanes of Knidos, a very wealthy and
Additionally, we are in possession of something more than the beginning of a decree for another Ptolemaic official (*IG II*² 650), namely Zenon, dated to the 11th of Hekatombaion in the archonship of Diokles in 286/5. He is referred to as commander of light vessels and his activities had something to do with grain. It seems to be beyond doubt, however, that we have here an honorific decree in the lost part of which crown and citizenship would have been conferred upon Zenon.

Shear’s reconstruction of Zenon’s activities runs as following: the troops of Kallias had sailed from Andros on board Zenon’s light vessels while the two had later closely co-operated during the harvest operations in Attika: Kallias had been in charge of the protection of the Attic harvest while Zenon would have been responsible for the delivery of *local* grain; Habicht, on the other hand, thinks that Zenon was responsible for the transportation of foreign grain to Athens and not for the gathering of her own harvest. Similarly Osborne excludes the synchronisation of activities proposed by Shear because, in his view, this is solely based on Shear’s false dating of the revolt in 286. Although, I agree that Shear’s dating is wrong this does not have to exclude the possibility that Zenon was present in the waters of Attika a year earlier, or that he had in some way supported Kallias. Osborne seems to take it for granted that the decree for Zenon should *immediately* follow his activities, in the course of the same archon year. Notwithstanding the fact that the evidence is inconclusive, it is not inconceivable that Zenon had at least supervised Kallias’ activities (according to Osborne he was an important Ptolemaic official and concludes that the simple reference to him in the Kallias decree indicates that his status was higher than that of the mercenary leaders Kallias and Zenon. In support of this he cites Strabo (XVII.6) who refers to Sostratos as one of the *philoi basileon* and as the one who dedicated the Pharos in Alexandria). Such a view, in fact corroborates Osborne’s view about high honours for him but I have to remain sceptical, and in any case the mere absence of a decree renders the discussion pointless. Nonetheless, it would indeed be quite peculiar if the Athenians had not voted crown and citizenship for Sostratos. On the other hand, it is an insoluble problem whether a statue would have been included. To my mind, however, it seems that we should abandon any parallelism with Philokles: Sostratos’ status did not call for the highest honours in the 280s.

80 “Kallias”, pp.21, 63, 69; in I.17-8 Shear restores: ἐπιμελεῖται τῷ σύντοντι μεγάλως ὃν ἀφαλέστατο εἰσθανόμενον αὐτῷ συνσχένοις; contrary to this, Habicht prefers to restore [καὶ τῷ κομμάτι τῷ]. and δίὰ instead of εἰς in I.18 (*Untersuchungen*, pp.48-50).
81 *Naturalization* II, p.163, n.728.
the third in command Ptolemaic officer in the Aegean) and continued to be of use to Athens in the course of the next archon year by importing grain.

An absolutely precise date for the decree for Philokles is impossible. Though we lack information as to whether and to what extent Philokles was involved in the activities of the other Ptolemaic officials (Sostratos, Kallias and possibly Zenon) in the Aegean during and after the revolt of Athens in 287, it seems possible that he would be, especially in the perspective of Osborne’s and Merker’s restoration of the hierarchy of the Ptolemaic officers in the Aegean according to which Philokles was the senior Ptolemaic officer; moreover he would probably have acted as the co-ordinator of action.82

There has been preserved a similarly undated statue base (IG II2 3425) with the name of Philokles inscribed which causes additional problems of interpretation. Both Shear and Osborne believe that the decree and the statue belong to the same context but they part company as to the date. M. J. Osborne actually believes that the statue must have been referred to in the lost part of our decree and thinks it should be dated in either 286/5 or very soon afterwards.83 Shear, on the other part deems it possible that both the decree and the statue belong to 279/8 in the context of the celebration of the first Ptolemaia, established by Ptolemy II Philadelphos in honour of his father to which Athens was invited to send theoroi.84 A decree of the League of the Islanders (SIG3 390) informs us that Philokles and Bakchon transmitted the same invitation to the Islanders and Shear believes, quite plausibly, that it was Philokles who conveyed the invitation to Athens as well, perhaps in

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82 Naturalization II, pp.162-3 and n.729; Zenon was the commander of the afracta ploia and a subordinate of the nesiarch Bachon, who must have been subordinate of Philokles the nauarch, “almost certainly the senior Ptolemaic officer in the Aegean.” I. L. Merker (“The Ptolemaic Officials and the League of the Islanders”, Historia 19, 1970, 141-160, pp.148-9, 153) also propounds seniority but he deems the evidence inconclusive as to the application of the term nauarch to the office held by Philokles; he concludes, however, that the office held by Philokles was “in effect that of Viceroy of the Ptolemaic possessions in the North”. Otherwise, Merker’s restoration of hierarchy is identical to that of Osborne.83 Naturalization II, p.163.
84 Kallias decree, ll.55-64; “Kallias”, pp.33-4, 44. This celebration, however, is not to be identified with the Ptolemaia mentioned in the Kallias decree; see, p.197 and n.54.
person. He goes on to suggest that this would have been the occasion for Philokles' honours and not 286/5 since Sostratos was then the chief Ptolemaic envoy. However, it still seems to me quite possible that Philokles was awarded some kind of honours immediately after the revolt, for the reason I suggested above.

It is not imperative that the citizenship decree and the statue should have emanated from the same occasion. Philokles demonstrated a continuous activity in the Aegean and Athens kept in contact with the Ptolemaic court after the death of Ptolemy I; thus, if the decree belongs to the mid-280s, the statue could be dissociated from the revolt of 287 and its immediate aftermath, and be placed in c.280 - 277. If we can discern two steps in the bestowal of honours upon Philokles, then it seems reasonable that the second one would have involved higher honours. On the other hand, it has to remain a possibility that both the decree and the statue came as a pair, in which case I would adopt Shear's view and date them to the context of the first Ptolemaia, or slightly later, when we have evidence of extensive dealings between Egypt, Philokles and the Greeks.

An additional important factor that should be taken into account is that although Philokles was in the service of the king of Egypt and his help to the Athenians would be under the auspices of the king, he was also the king of Sidon and precisely this status could have called for the same treatment with the Thracian rulers.

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**Officials of Lysimachos**

It appears that through the agency of his officials Lysimachos had established a much more regular contact with Athens than Ptolemy, after the revolt. This should be seen in the light of Lysimachos' need to find allies in mainland Greece against Pyrrhos and also in the light of Athens' claims on Lemnos and Imbros, which would inevitably bring about successive negotiations.

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85 "Kallias", p.34, n.79.
There have been preserved decrees for two officials of Lysimachos, Artemidoros of Perinthos and Bithys of Lysimacheia.

It is reported in the decree for Artemidoros (*IG* II² 662 + 663) that he had been sent as an ambassador to Athens more than once (II.5-9). The precise nature of his services is not recorded; only a vague reference to his being a friend and in the confidence of king Lysimachos and to his *eunoia* towards the king and the Athenian *demos*, both in Athens as well as in the course of Athenian embassies to Lysimachos’ court. C. Habicht has plausibly suggested that these repeated missions should involve the Athenian claims on Lemnos and Imbros, (the vital grain suppliers of Athens). This view is corroborated by the fact that there is no mention of a request for corn and money while others decrees of the period are quite explicit about this problem.

Bithys of Lysimacheia, an important member of Lysimachos’ court, is honoured in *IG* II² 808. Until very recently his identification had been problematic, but a new inscription from Kassandreia settled the issue and the decree can now be dated in the 280s.⁸⁷

The Athenian decree apparently contained information of a military nature, although only *eis tagma katachorizei* is crucially preserved from the motivation clauses. The present tense employed most probably points to quite recent activity involving a squadron of soldiers (mercenaries?). Burstein suggests that Bithys’ presence in Attika could be connected with recruiting of Athenian mercenaries but he is unsure as to whether Bithys provided military assistance for the recovery of the Attic forts; rather he is inclined to discard the latter hypothesis and conjectures that “Lysimachus’ failure to support may well account for Athens’ inability to achieve her principal military goal, the recovery of the Peiraieus”.⁸⁸

What was then the reason that prompted the Athenians to honour Bithys? As it is preserved the decree does not provide any clue as to

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⁸⁷ See Appendices, Chapter III, 1. Bithys’ identity.
⁸⁸ “Bithys”, p.45; Burstein draws a parallel with Philippides of Kephale assigning Athenian soldiers to mercenary squadrons (p.48, n.45).
whether his assigning the soldiers in a squadron involves military activity in Attika or if it concerned recruiting soldiers for fighting in some other place in the North.

In any case, the assignment of soldiers to squadrons is Bithys’ final activity, and judging *ex silentio* it seems to me that his must have been a rather detailed decree referring to a very specific instance. I would further conjecture that since this was the last activity to be referred to, it did not result, at least not at the time the decree is passed, in military achievement. It could be that Bithys simply organised Athenian military activity by forming squadrons or that he brought mercenaries with him whom he enlisted in *tagmata*. On the other hand, I find it rather incredible that the Athenians would have honoured Bithys without his having come to Athens for some reason directly concerning her. However, unless new inscriptive evidence comes to light Lysimachos’ military help for Athens will remain a matter of speculation.

The implications of a dating in the 280s are far reaching, firstly with regard to Lysimachos’ involvement in the affairs of mainland Greece and of Athens in particular. As Burstein has pointed out, *IG II²* 808 is our only evidence for Lysimachos’ military help to Athens, which must necessarily be related to the Athenian struggle for the recapture of the forts. This in turn indicates that the Athenian cause was all too important for Lysimachos (perhaps more important than it was to Ptolemy in those years).

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**d) Perception of an official’s role**

**Attitudes towards the philoi**

G. Herman, in an extremely illuminating article, has analysed the status of royal officials and the attitude of antiquity towards them. In brief, he has amply demonstrated that their being described as mere flatterers and parasites is clearly a distortion, and it is largely due to the inability of the *poleis* to come to terms with the notion of someone being

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89 “Friends”, 103-149.
in the service of a king (i.e. being inferior). More to the point, Herman has critically observed that Athenian inscriptions for royal officials (as well as others from Samos, Ephesos and Delos) until about the 280s systematically avoid recording the precise title or office they held in the court of the king whereas literary sources quite frequently provide us with the title and rank of the official in a king's court. He concludes that this happens precisely because Athens did not hold a particularly high opinion of their position and thus avoided recording it in a public document. My own purpose is to add some observations as to the causes underlying the omission of an official's title in an Athenian document.

Herman has observed the term *philos* can bear either a formal or an informal sense and it is not always easy to tell which sense is implied in each case. The first sense "implies informality, symmetry and equality between the partners involved" whereas "*philos* as a rank or title implies an institutionalised, asymmetrical and therefore hierarchical relationship". I would think that the Athenians were quite conscious of the second type of relationship and consequently they were aware that the officials were acting on the king's orders but they preferred to forget about it. Therefore, I would like to argue then that by recording on the stone that someone 'was close to a king' or that he was his *philos* the Athenians maintained an image of free benevolence towards Athens and, on the other hand, they kept hidden the fact that the officials were acting upon orders; in other words that favourable disposition might not be the motivation. A supplementary factor operating in the 'omission' of title is an issue that Herman himself has touched upon when he remarked that "from the viewpoint of the Greek cities the friends were a visible sign of monarchical rule". In this manner, it was easier for the Athenian *demos* to incorporate the *philoi* in their citizen body.

Occasionally, the Athenians prefer to describe the official's activities in some detail but without referring to the actual capacity in which he acted. Herman is right when stating that it is from the 280s

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90 "Friends", p.111.
91 "Friends", p.117.
that we can observe a change in Athenian attitude towards titulature. However, I would like to draw attention to an exceptional case dating well before the 280s. The first sign of a change in Athenian attitude is provided by the decree for Adeimantos of Lampsakos which is one of the very rare occasions on which the precise title of an official is recorded, dating (probably) to 302/1. Adeimantos is explicitly referred to as appointed to some office or capacity (katastatheis) in the synedrion of the League of Corinth, probably that of proedros (ISE 9, 1.7). In fact this office and the activities pertaining to this are the cause of the honours. The decree refers to the invitation Adeimantos addressed to the Athenians and the other Hellenes to participate in the synedrion (II.10-2), and also contains one of the clauses that should have been included in the foundation decree of the League. This office was, in every respect, a very honourable one: the leaders of the synedrion aimed at protecting Athens and the other Hellenes against foreign aggression. Furthermore, scholars have long since recognised that Adeimantos was an extremely

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92 In IG II² 561 (dating to the same period) Philippus and Iolaos are probably referred to as somatophylakes of Alexander; no reference has survived though as to the actual office they held at the time the decree was passed.

93 I. Calabi Limentani (“I proedroi nella lega di Corinto e la carica di Adimanto di Lampsaco”, Athenaeum NS., 28, 1950, 55-66, pp.63-5) argued that the actual office to which the Athenian inscription referred was that of the strategos of the League who was the second in command after Demetrios; the basis of her argument was that such an important official as Adeimantos could not have been simply one of the five proedroi of the synedrion; additionally, she argued, there was the restriction that the proedroi would have to come from cities participating in the League, and Lampsakos was not one of them. Objecting to this G. Daux (“Adeimantos de Lampsaque et le renouvellement de la ligue de Corinthe par Démétrios Poliorcète”, AE 1953-54, I, 245-254) pointed out that, according to the foundation decree of the League, the proedroi would be appointed by Demetrios for so long as the war lasted (IG² IV, I, 68, frg. 3,1,36); therefore this office in those particular times was quite important and it was not imperative that a proedros’ birthplace should belong to the League. Daux himself opts for the restoration proedros though he admits that this is somehow awkward in combination with II.13-14 where we should rather restore proedreuon; therefore he suggests synedros as an alternative restoration in 1.7, which would make Adeimantos acting in the capacity of proedros on that particular occasion. C. Habicht (Gottmenschentum, p.56, n.4) is also uncertain as to whether Adeimantos was a strategos or proedros. As a conclusion, however, I would point out that whatever we should restore, it is possible that Adeimantos was the strategos of the League.

For the importance of Adeimantos see L. Robert, “Adeimantos et la Ligue de Corinthe”, in Hellenica II, Paris 1946, pp.15-33; on the role of the proedros see IG² IV, I, 68, II.21-36.

94 It is obscure whether Adeimantos’ proposal directly concerned Athens; G. De Sanctis (“Un decreto del Sinodrio di Corinto”, RFIC, N.S., 19, 1941, 194-7, p.196) suggested (and L. Moretti (ISE 9, p.19) accepted) that a possible restoration of the lacuna after II.15 could be ἐξ [τῆς ἔλατε] ἐλευθερίας in the perspective of Olympiodoros’ liberation of Elateia in 302/1. But this restoration depends on a quite uncertain dating and, in any event, it seems to me more plausible that the clause should refer to an attack on Athens itself.
important official, and perhaps the most influential person in the League after Demetrios himself.

The recording of the title must have also been connected with Adeimantos’ previous incorporation in the Athenian military leadership. Mention has already been made of the recently discovered inscription from Rhamnous (Ergon 40, 1993, p.7) in which it is reported that Adeimantos was appointed by Demetrios strategos epi ten choran; his previous holding of an Athenian office would have assimilated him more to the Athenians and would have made his status of a philos less reprehensible.

The second instant in the development of the Athenian attitude towards titulature is marked by the case of Zenon. It is clearly recorded in the decree (II.11-2) that he was appointed (katastatheis) epi ton afrakton. Though rather descriptive, it is, nonetheless, a clear reference to Zenon’s office. Various factors could have contributed to this change. One of them could be the fact another Ptolemaic official so happened to be an Athenian citizen of a distinguished family. An even more important factor was the benefactions that Athens had enjoyed from Egypt. Whether Zenon had imported foreign grain or he had helped with the gathering of Athenian harvest, the result was the same: Athens had been saved from starvation. Perhaps, the major factor was the nature of the relationship between Athens and Egypt, or at least the way the Athenians perceived it. The vocabulary of the decrees passed after the revolt suggests that the Athenians regarded Ptolemy as their ally, since they were fighting a common enemy - Demetrios Poliorketes. Consequently, they could view a Ptolemaic official as someone who was serving a common cause and not as a subordinate of the king.

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From proxeny to citizenship

The decrees of the first period (338-320s) follow the pattern of the fourth and of the fifth centuries. Here, as in the case of the citizenship for Philip, Athens operates in the traditional framework of euergesia and
proxenia she is accustomed to and can make an official of Philip her own proxenos. Did the Athenians truly believe that these people would promote their own interests? There is no way of giving a conclusive answer but to my mind it seems that again we should read the proxenies or citizenships conferred in the light of Athens' perception of Macedonia's position as being temporary and not as having reached definite supremacy.

Therefore, it should not in any way be accidental that no official of Demetrios or of any other king is recorded as having become proxenos of Athens; instead the honours consist of either a crown or citizenship or commonly both. What is then the underlying change of Athenian attitude towards the royal officials and, correspondingly, what does this imply about Athens' perception of her position? A proxenos was supposed to promote the interests of the polis that attributed him the title in his own state. The first major difficulty is that most of the officials had actually ceased to be active citizens of their own state; they were moving around promoting Demetrios' interests. Their place of birth was no longer important; it was who they were that mattered. Secondly, what were the odds that the officials of Demetrios or of any other king would be constantly interested in the fortune of Athens unless it was closely linked to that of Demetrios or the other kings? Royal officials could not be called upon at any time to provide their help as was the case with the traditional proxenoi. To my mind, it appears that the Athenians had become aware of the fact that these honorands promoted their interests so long as they coincided with those of the kings; therefore, they were aware that it would be pointless to make them proxenoi. One might object that they conferred citizenship upon them and their descendants, which bears a strong notion of perpetuation. In the past proxeny had always been practically orientated whereas citizenship bore a more honorific character: hardly ever was it expected to be implemented apart from the case of metics and exiles.95 The important exception to this are

95 See Osborne, Naturalization IV, p.148 and n.148.
the numerous citizenships conferred upon Thracian rulers and even their officials during the 360s. In their case the Athenians had acknowledged that these people could not be employed as *proxenoi* of Athens. Similarly, citizenship for royal officials in early Hellenistic Athens replaced proxeny and it acquired some of its attributes, while, in Athenian eyes, it would have retained its prestige as the higher honour in the scale of honours. It is precisely because, with regard to the promotion of Athenian interests, proxeny ceases to function that Athens starts to employ citizenship.

The Athenians then opted for honours which were very highly valued by the honorands themselves. Furthermore, there was indeed practical value in the bestowal of citizenship, especially when conferred upon officials of Demetrios; it created a situation that suited both. Athens expressed her favourable disposition towards Demetrios' entourage and indirectly to him. In this manner the Athenians established the right connections that would help them transmit their problems to Demetrios, especially when he was away from Athens. At the other end of the spectrum, though, Demetrios could exercise his policy and transmit his will without even having to be present, through the agency of these honorary citizens. This, in fact, is the major difference of these citizenships from those conferred upon the Thracians; the latter had not asked for the honours and, furthermore, they were not in a position to interfere in Athenian political life. This in turn produces a major question: to what extent did Athenian citizenship operate in the interests of Athens and, conversely, to what extent did it operate in the interests of the officials and Demetrios? Could it be that this highly valued Athenian prerogative was more in the interests of the foreigners on whom it was bestowed? I would think that the balance was too precarious.

In the case of the honorands of the 280s Athens established the essential links in the courts of the kings that would help them present their requests about corn and money. But these were seen by the Athenians as the products of specific and chronologically restricted needs;
they would cease the moment Athens would (hopefully) re-acquire the forts and the Peiraieus. The decrees refer to specific services, not to their being 'close' to the king. The recipients of honours in the 280s did not infiltrate Athenian life the way the officials of Demetrius had in the sense that they either were present very briefly during the revolt or they operated and exercised their influence far away from Athens.

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iii. Athenian honorands

In this section I intend to examine the ways in which and the extent to which the inflation of honours towards Demetrios and his officials affects the attitude of the Athenian demos towards Athenian leaders who had (in one way or the other as we shall see) promoted Athenian interests. My starting point is that in the early Hellenistic period for an Athenian leader to be able to promote the interests of his polis was an issue far more complex than it had ever been in the past: in this period there was a question of choices and to make the right one at the right moment was a major issue, and great risk was involved. On the other hand, if indeed an Athenian benefited Athens he was much more worth of praise and honours than in the days of the empire or even in the fourth century. It is only in this context that the bestowal of the highest honours can be absolutely justified. A brief survey of the Athenian honorands and their status as well as of the principal views on the subject is essential in order to provide the more general characteristics of Athenian honorific practice in this period.

From the Hellenistic period eight honorific decrees have been preserved in all for Athenian citizens who are recipients of the megistai timai (most probably the fragmentary decree for Eurykleides awarded him the megistai timai as well):

Lykourgos: \( IG \ I^2 \ 457 \ (SIG^3 326) + IG \ I^2 \ 513; [Plut.], X Orat. Vit. 851f-852e.\)

Philippides of Paiania: \( IG \ I^2 \ 649 + Dinsmoor, Archons, pp.7-8.\)

Philippides of Kephale: \( IG \ I^2 \ 657.\)

Demosthenes: [Plut.], X Orat. Vit. 850f-851c.

Demochares: ibid., 851d-f.

Kallias of Sphettos: Shear, "Kallias".

Phaidros of Sphettos: \( IG \ I^2 \ 682 (SIG 3 409).\)

Kephisodoros: B. D. Meritt, Hesp. 5 1936, 419-28.\(^{96}\)

\(^{96}\) This is a list of decrees basically as provided by Gauthier, Bienfaiteurs, p.79; for Lykourgos I have preferred to adopt Osborne’s view (“Lykourgos Again?”, ZPE 42, 1981, 172-174) who thinks that \( IG \ I^2 \ 513 \) represents the final section of \( IG \ I^2 \ 457.\) However, in this chapter I prefer to follow the manuscript tradition which represents a fuller version.
The first thing to be observed is that it is only Kephisodoros who was active at the beginning of the second century. Demosthenes was active until the late 320s, Lykourgos was prominent between 338 and 326; both of them had connected their name with opposition to Macedonia (although they did not necessarily follow exactly the same course of action). The rest were active before the Chremonidean War, and more specifically in the 290s and the 280s. It is not accidental that Athens resolves to honour these men who (as will emerge further below) pursued the same line of policy, namely multiple embassies to anyone who could prove useful or in any case men who had established connections with the kings. Apart from Lykourgos, all the rest had served, at least once, as ambassadors (after 338).

Turning to their status we come up with very interesting results. Lykourgos, Demosthenes and Demochares were *rhetores* with a distinguished political career; Philippides of Paiania had been a general but his diplomatic career was much more notable; Philippides of Kephale was a poet and a *philos* of Lysimachos as well as an unauthorised ambassador; Kallias had been an Athenian citizen and at the same time a *philos* and an official of Ptolemy. Actually, we are in possession of only one honorific decree for a man with a quite significant military career, Phaidros of Sphettos, but even his career goes much beyond the boundaries of the military realm.

The number is increased by one if we count among the honorands Olympiodoros as well; for the latter we do not actually possess an honorific inscription, but the information provided by Pausanias presupposes the existence of such an inscription. Employing the evidence of literary testimonia we have to include among the recipients of the highest honours the orator Demades who was honoured sometime after

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Gauthier (*Bienfaiteurs*, p.81) notes that *sitesis* for Kallias and his descendants was not included among the honours and explains it in terms of his family situation which neither required nor authorised hereditary honours.

97 There is a notice in Pseudo-Plutarch's *X. Orat. Vit.* 841e-f of Lykourgos' participation in an embassy to the Peloponnesian and some other states, together with Demosthenes and Polyeuktos during "the second war of Athens against Philip". Other than that there is no evidence of Lykourgos' participating in an embassy after 338.
335 (not much later) as well as Phokion; the latter was honoured posthumously but the precise date is disputable (Plut., Phoc. 38.5).

Philippides of Kephale, Demochares, Kallias, Phaidros and Olympiodoros were all active in the 280s, uniting their efforts to liberate Athens from Demetrios Poliorketes. All of them were engaged in multiple and diverse activities: embassies, stockpiling of weapons, securing of corn provisions or administration of Athenian finance. Times and the kind of warfare did not allow for pitched battles or, at any rate, for display of bravery. Only in the case of the Phaidros’ decree do we get a hint of military activity; but it is concerned with the gathering of the harvest rather than a collision of two armed forces (II.35-36), although this would have entailed minor conflict with some troops of Poliorketes who would be engaged to prevent the Athenians from gathering the crops.

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a) Gauthier's interpretation of the decrees

At this point it is essential to summarise the main points of P. Gauthier’s work Les cités grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs which has broken new grounds in our understanding of the institution of euergesia in the Hellenistic period (as well as in our perception of the period in general).

Gauthier’s most important contribution to the understanding of honorific practices has been the fact that he refused to succumb to the notions of degradation and decadence with regard to the period following the classical (in sharp contrast with P. Veyne whose book Le pain et le cirque, as far as it concerns the Greek world, is based on these ideas); moreover, he established that the essential distinction to be made was the one between the early and the late Hellenistic period since, in his view, this is when important changes occur in the attitude of the poleis to honours. Gauthier’s starting point is that a distinction should be drawn between political history and institutional history without of course rejecting the influence that political events exercise on institutions and vice versa.
As to Athens, he observes that between the fourth and the third centuries the changes to be observed in the institutions are less significant than the very fact of their continuity, a point that I wholly embrace. Gauthier has indeed traced changes in Athenian attitude and mentality with regard to her leaders on the basis of a thorough examination of literary testimonia as well as of the lengthy honorific decrees awarding the highest honours to Athenian leaders.

For our purposes the most useful point of Gauthier is that in the fourth century the highest honours were confined strictly to victorious generals whereas in the early Hellenistic period there occurs an extension of the category of beneficiaries to include the orators as well. He has observed that the spontaneous character of honours in the fourth century had strongly favoured glamorous military victories rather than low-profile diplomatic successes. Conversely, he has connected the extension of the highest honours to the orators with Athens' diminished role in the international scene; in other words, according to Gauthier, it is a result and a sign of her weakness. Moreover he regards this reformation (at least partly) as a result of the realisation by the Athenians of the risk they took in awarding the *megistai timai* to still young generals.

Gauthier has contributed the most towards understanding the reasons that prompted Athens to give in to the demands of her citizens for honours, and also the underlying mechanism of the attribution of honours and has amply demonstrated that the pattern of relations between the *polis* and its leading men cannot be reduced to the oversimplified relation of someone being dominant and someone else being inferior. Instead, as is argued by Gauthier, at the same time that the *polis* yields to individual demands she turns the tables by actually

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98 *Bienfaiteurs*, 4-5.
99 *Bienfaiteurs*, 95-103 for the highest honours for generals in the fourth century; the first man to be awarded *sitesis* and *proedria* was Kleon in the fifth century (Aristophanes, *Hippeis*, 280-1, 702-4, 709, 766, 1404). Konon was the first general to receive a statue in the fourth century (Dem., XX.70). Iphikrates' honours are referred to in Aes., III.243; Dem., XXIII.130, 136; Honours for Chabrias are mentioned in Aes., III.243; Arist., *Rhet* 1411b; D.S., XV.33-4; Nepos, *Chabrias* 1.2-3. Finally, honours for Timotheos are mentioned in Dem., XX.146-7; Aes., III.243.
100 *Bienfaiteurs*, p.112.
having them ask for their award, by making them subject to a *dokimasia*,
and by making quite clear in the various honorific decrees that it is only
within the framework of the *polis* and by the *polis* that a man can
acquire honour and privileges.\(^{101}\) Thus, distinguished members of the
*polis* acquire the prominence and the honours desired but it is the *polis*
who ultimately benefits from their abilities.

A closer examination indicates that Athens did not make a one
hundred and eighty degrees' turn and did not rush to reward prominent
citizens. P. Gauthier has given due emphasis to the fact that *megistai
timai* were attributed - at least in the early Hellenistic period - quite late
if not at the end of a citizen's career. The *polis*' decision was a cold-
blooded one, taken with caution. Actually, Lykourgos, Demosthenes and
Demochares were rewarded long after their death. The rest were
honoured quite late in their career, after they had proved their patriotism
and continuous commitment to their *polis* by constant benefactions.
Olympiodoros' case is quite perplexing since he could have been awarded
the highest honours immediately after his victory over Kassandros at
Elateia in the 300s, but it is equally probable that he was awarded them
in the 280s after his recapture of the Mouseion Hill.

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*The law in IG II² 832*

Osborne and Gauthier, based on the phraseology of the decrees,
regard the delay and the broadening of the category of benefactors as
part of legislation passed by Lykourgos, while in fact our first reference
to categories of benefactors, be they foreign or citizens, comes from a

\(^{101}\) *Bienfaiteurs*, pp.77-89, 124-128. The demand (*aitesis*) is explicitly referred to in the
decrees for Demosthenes, Demochares, Philippides of Kephale, Phaidros and Kephisodoros; it
does not figure in the decrees for Lykourgos, Kallias and Philippides of Paiania. Gauthier
(*Bienfaiteurs*, p.86-92) assumes that, with regard to Kallias and Philippides, this was an
accidental omission and that they had submitted a demand while he leaves the case open with
regard to the Lykourgos decree. This is though an argument drawn from analogy with the
other decrees, which although rational enough, still does not offer solid proof. Gauthier's
case is strong enough with regard to the decree for Kallias which does bear a strong
resemblance to the decrees for Phaidros and Kephisodoros in terms of the procedural details
like the *dokimasia*, the decree for Philippides of Paiania is, in my view, more problematic; I
will return to the problem when discussing separately the individual cases.
decree of 229 (IG II² 832) awarding megistai timai to Timosthenes of Karystos:

έπειδὴ καὶ οἱ νόμοι προστάττουσιν, ὅσους
ὁ δήμος ὁ Ἀθηναῖοι τρόπαια στήσαντας ἢ κατὰ γῆν ἢ
κατὰ θάλασσαν ἢ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἐπιανορθώσαντας
ἡ τὴν ἱδίαν οὐσίαν εἰς τὴν κοινὴν σωτηρίαν θέντας
ἡ εὐεργέταις καὶ [συμβούλους ἁγαθοὺς γενομένους
ἐτίμησεν σῖτῳ ἐμ πρυτανείωι, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι αὐτῶν
καὶ [ἐκ]ήγονοι τὴν βουλήν καὶ τὸν δήμον, διδόναι δὲ καὶ
θυγατέρον εἰς ἔχθεσιν τὸν [δήμον πῖροικα [ὁ]σὴν ἀν βοῦ
λα[τ.] ἔρει”

(II.12-19).

Gauthier has underlined the diversity of activities of the honorands and has argued that this law must have originated in the period of the reorganisation of Athenian administration by Lykourgos. In a previous, more detailed discussion of the problem Osborne has similarly argued for a date in the era of Lykourgos. Osborne’s starting point is that the law recorded in the decree of 229 is not necessarily different from the famous Prytaneion decree (IG I² 77), dating probably in the 430s and which in its preserved clauses specifies as eligible for sittēsis in the Prytaneion those who have a right either by inheritance or ex officio, the rest of the clauses would probably specify other categories. The category of the victorious generals, always according to Osborne, should go back to the 420s when Kleon was awarded sittēsis in the Prytaneion; for the categories two and three he establishes 338 as the terminus post quem since it is then that eleutheria is lost; category four should certainly precede 307/6 (the date of the decree for Lykourgos) because there seems to be a standardised form of curriculum vitae, followed most notably in the decrees for Demosthenes and Demochares (two other famous

102 “because the laws so command: whoever the Athenian people - because they erected monuments of victory either on land or on the sea, or because they restored freedom, or because they offered their fortune to the common salvation, or because they proved benefactors and good councillors - have honoured with dinner in the Prytaneion, the boule and the demos should take care of them and of their descendants...”.

103 Bienfaiseurs, pp.104-106. C. Habicht (Untersuchungen, pp.50-1 and p.28) thinks that there must have been some sort of legislation setting the attribution of the highest honours at the end of an Athenian’s public career, probably after his sixtieth year of age.
It is particularly the *eleutheria* and *soteria* clause in the law that has led Osborne to ascribe the last three categories to the context of Lykourgos' re-organisation of Athenian administration; he thinks that they echo Lykourgos' frequent references to the same principles.\(^{105}\)

Osborne believes that it was the spontaneous and highly contestable honours for Demades that provoked Lykourgos' reaction who proceeded to codify the qualities of a benefactor in a law. I agree that the case of Demades would have made the Athenians to think more thoroughly on the qualities of their benefactors. But on the other hand, I think that, though the qualities of the benefactors are similar as well as the formulae, it is not imperative that we should see their employment as a result of a legislation. My basic point is that once a formula was employed for the first time, it could start being employed regularly. Osborne himself has argued that the various categories are attested at different dates: category two is supposed to be attested for the first time in 295/4 in the decree for Demetrios' official Herodoros; category three in the decree for Asandros in 314; category four in 307/6 in the decree for Lykourgos.\(^{106}\)

He himself then has hinted at the possibility that practice can precede law, which is my main objection to both Osborne's and Gauthier's viewpoint. Furthermore, I think that the 'managerial' character of Lykourgos' policy and his re-organisation of many aspects of Athenian administration leads scholars to assume that he was responsible for every change or innovation or law.

One would expect the first decree conferring honours on a citizen to have cited this law; particularly so if we remember that the initiative for this lay with an individual (Stratokles), and not a member of the *boule*.

A closer examination of the intriguing clauses of *IG II*\(^2\) 832 in fact renders it very dubious whether there had ever been a law codifying the categories of benefactors. To start with, the clause refers to *nomoi* in the

\(^{104}\) "Entertainment", pp.158-63.

\(^{105}\) "Entertainment", p.165 and n.38. He also finds the same principles echoed in the famous law against tyranny of 337/6 (*Hesp.* 21, 1952, p.355ff).

\(^{106}\) "Entertainment", p.164.
plural, which is a quite vague formulation and not only does it not allude to a specific nomos in the singular, but could very well have the meaning of moral obligations rather than written laws. Along these lines I would add that the nomoi in the clause (be they written or oral) are syntactically connected with the epimeleisthai (1.17); they refer to the obligation of the boule and the demos to take care of those whom the demos honoured with sitesis as well as of their descendants. Between the verb prostattousi and its object epimeleisthai there is parenthetically inserted a long clause specifying those who were honoured by the demos. As a conclusion then, I am inclined to believe that there had never been a law specifically dealing with the definition and codification of the categories of benefactors. IG II² 832 belongs to 229, the year that Athens seemed to have acquired independence, after thirty years; During the past years there had been hardly any important honorific decrees. It would be natural at the time they carry again an honorific decree to look in the previous decrees and retrospectively resume the qualities and categories of past honorands.¹⁰⁷

* * *

b) Contextualising the decrees

Attitudes towards the strategoi and the rhetores after 338

What is then the climate after 338? Lykourgos' speech against Leokrates bears out the view that only victorious generals should be honoured with a statue. As late as 330 Lykourgos takes pride in the fact that the Athenians are the only people who still honour only brave men; that is generals, and only they are placed side by side with the tyrannicides. Precisely at the same time Aeschines in his speech against Ktesiphon (243) connects the award of a statue with military achievement and he refers to the famous generals of the past, Chabrias, Iphikrates and Timotheos. Of course, one must bear in mind that it is specifically Demosthenes who is Aeschines' target; by magnifying the role of the

¹⁰⁷ Osborne, (Naturalization IV, pp.153, 157, 163, 166, 172) has pointed out that it is precisely from 229 onwards that there are observed numerous and significant changes in the procedure and even the implementation of citizenship grants.
generals he is trying to degrade his rival. Earlier on in his speech "On the False Embassy" (80) he had attributed to the ambassadors the role of peace-makers and had opposed them to those who won in the battlefield; the underlying principle was that achievements in peace-time were inferior compared to deeds in war-time. Furthermore, according to Aeschines it was only the ambassadors that were liable to *euthunai* whereas the generals got the *doreai*.

Dinarchus in his speech against Demosthenes in 323 (I. 14–7) contrasts the deeds of the generals with the embassies of Demosthenes. His account bears a certain similarity to that of Aeschines: both agree that the generals of the past were well worth praise and awards. It is specifically Demosthenes’ embassies (to Thebes) that are opposed to Timotheos’ deeds, and not embassies in general. But, if we take into account that it was basically through embassies of Demosthenes that foreign policy had been conducted in the recent past, then Dinarchus does speak about embassies in general. This is corroborated by the question he poses further down: "Ο τοιούτος, ὁ Δημόσθενες, πολίτης,... οὐ λόγοις ἄλλα ἔργοις μεγάλα τὴν πόλιν ἄγαθα ποιήσας" (17). The underlying principle is the old juxtaposition between *logoi* and *erga*, as Gauthier has remarked. Moreover, this passage is actually a criticism of Athenian policy prior to Chaironeia. It seems that in the 330s embassies are not as yet regarded as *erga*. The past is seen by Dinarchus largely as a result of the achievements of the Athenian generals. Reference to distinguished politicians is not entirely lacking but the impressions are overwhelmingly in favour of the generals; orators, according to Dinarchus, offered only the essential backing (I.72–5).

Gauthier taking into consideration this difficulty of the ideological environment of 330 has dated the supposed law after 330 (in which case, the law could not have been a reaction against the honours for Demades, or otherwise it would be a very delayed reaction). It seems to me, however, that nothing happened in the early 320s to compel Lykourgos or any other Athenian to change his mind on the importance of the
generals. In the 330s, quite shortly after the battle of Chaironeia, and even until the Lamian War, the Athenians would probably believe that the issue of Macedonian domination would be settled on the battlefield. They were not ready to realise and accept the extent to which diplomacy was equally a battlefield, although they must have realised how much Philip had gained via diplomacy. It was a rather slow process, facilitated by the continuous changes in the balance of power among the Diadochoi.

Although Gauthier’s study has been fundamental in our understanding of the transition from military men to politicians, I would venture to modify some of his conclusions by placing the individual cases of Athenian honorands in their specific historical context. My starting point is that the appearance of various categories of benefactors should precede any form of categorisation. Moreover, I would associate the delay in the demand of honours not so much or not only with legislation but with specific external circumstances, in an attempt to interpret the changes in mentality under the perspective of specific political and/or military circumstances, which did not come into Gauthier’s field of examination. Although, I acknowledge the importance of the differentiation between institutional and political history, I also believe that the rigid application of this principle might prove misleading or leading to half of the truth. Gauthier is interpreting aspects of the underlying mechanism of control on the part of the Athenian demos and associates it with democratic practice in general. My task will be to show that this mechanism was not solely the result of a ‘self-preservation’ feeling but also the product of particular historical context; in fact its employment might be much more opportunistic and subconscious than thought by Gauthier.

* * *

The honorific decrees and the circumstances

Demades was the first orator to deal quite successfully with both Philip and Alexander; consequently, and most probably after 335, he was awarded a bronze statue in the agora and sinesis in the Prytaneion. (Din.,
1.101; Apsines L.300); these honours had been a spontaneous expression of gratitude for Demades’ successful negotiations first with Philip and most importantly with Alexander. Demades however was a controversial figure practising an overall policy which did attract criticism and his example must have showed the Athenians that an orator’s achievements or failures and their full impact might not always be immediately obvious and liable to assessment. Thus his honours had been attacked by Polyeuktos and Lykourgos (Against Kephisodotos, frgs.1-2) and at some point cancelled (probably after Alexander’s death).\textsuperscript{108} It is possible that we could ascribe in this context some sort of legislation putting at a late date in an orator’s or a general’s career the right to demand honours from Athens, but it seems to me less clear whether Lykourgos codified in a law the qualities pertaining to a benefactor, thus establishing four categories of them.

In any event, Athenian mentality was not ready to accept such a turn in the estimation of an ambassador’s role even if Athens had escaped harsh treatment due to the diplomatic skills of this man; the honours were repeatedly contested and finally renounced. The whole incident is indicative of the confusion in Athenian mentality but it also marks a very radical step. Diplomacy then, under certain compelling circumstances, could indeed provide the route to a success commensurate to that of a general and provoke spontaneous honours.

However, Demades’ case established a precedent; as has already been mentioned, there have been preserved seven or eight honorific decrees awarding the \textit{megistai timai} to Athenians engaged in multiple activities, of which diplomacy is predominant, but contrary to Demades’ case, quite late in their career.

The first orator to be honoured after Demades was the already dead Lykourgos in 306, on the initiative of Stratokles. There is no

\textsuperscript{108} [Plut.], Mor. 820e relates that the Athenians turned the statues of Demades to pots and pans, which might be an exaggeration.
demand by Lykourgos' eldest son recorded in the decree, and I am inclined to believe that there was not any.109

It seems to be quite peculiar and particularly indicative of the dichotomy in Athenian political mentality that, on a motion of Stratokles, they award a (dead) Athenian orator and politician the highest honours while at the same time they go over the top in honouring a foreign ruler, two incompatible practices at first sight. From the viewpoint of the demos the decree represents a bold expression against Macedonian rule, but I would equally envisage it as an attempt to counterbalance the impact of the honours for Demetrios and to present their own model for a leader. Again we should distinguish Stratokles' motives; he probably hoped that the Athenians would attribute him the same basic political ideal: opposition to Macedonia. Elaborating on the practical considerations of Stratokles, it is worth observing what it is that he is actually praising in Lykourgos. The decree does not so much emphasise his ideological opposition to Alexander, which seems to me rather peculiar, as describe at great length his fiscal and organisational activities: his accumulation of money and its distribution to the people, his rebuilding of the shipyards and of the walls, his stock-piling of arrows and other defensive weapons. Turning to Athens' needs at that particular moment in 306, we discover that what Lykourgos had achieved during the 330s had to be done once again; Athens was on the verge of a major clash with Kassandros, and should the course of events take this path, the ruler of Macedonia would invest the city with a siege (which in fact happened in 304), in which case arrows and other weapons as well as plenty of money would be essential. Therefore, a plausible inference is that Stratokles was actually inspired by Athens' pressing needs in that particular military situation; that the sort of details he provided in the decree were a result of his very pragmatic interests of the moment.

I. L. Merker has touched upon the issue of the connection between the honorific decree for Lykourgos and the fact that his son Habron was

109 There is no trace of a demand either in the manuscript tradition or in IG II² 513.
in charge of the administration in precisely the same year; he has seen the decree in the perspective of an attempt "to claim a share of the inheritance" of the dead orator.\textsuperscript{110} This, however, is one aspect of the background that led to the bestowal of honours upon Lykourgos. Along the line of pragmatism and political necessity of the moment, then, I would think that Stratokles could have thought that honours for the father would secure the benevolence and co-operation of the son, which was essential to Athens' survival at the time.

Had a law not existed, could Philippides of Paiania and Philippides of Kephale have obtained honours at an earlier date than 293 and 283 respectively?

The case of the former is quite intriguing. Firstly, as in the Lykourgos decree there is no demand recorded; on the other hand, the final clause of the decree allows Philippides to add to the \textit{stele} a detailed list of the \textit{epidoseis}, the \textit{trierarchiai} and the other liturgies he and his ancestors had performed (a right which, apparently, Philippides did not make use of), which has led Gauthier to conclude that Philippides had submitted a demand accompanied by a detailed list of his material benefactions.\textsuperscript{111} Still, it seems to me rather peculiar that, as in the Lykourgos decree, there is no trace of the procedure which is to be observed in all the decrees explicitly mentioning the demand as well as in the Kallias decree which does not. This seems to me to be an indication that Philippides had not in fact officially asked for honours.

It is the kind of career that Philippides pursued that is mainly responsible for the delay in his honours. The existing evidence shows that whereas he was engaged in constant lavish expenditure for his city he became politically prominent only very late in his life, at the end of the fourth century, by establishing connections with Kassandros. There followed the turbulent years of Lachares' regime and the re-entrance of Demetrios, a sequence of events that did not leave room for honours. If indeed Philippides had at some point favoured Kassandros, (as the fact

\textsuperscript{110} "Habron the Son of Lykourgos of Boutadai", \textit{AncW} 9, 1986, 41-50, p.49.

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Bienfaiteurs}, pp.90-1.
that he proposed honours for Poseidippos, ambassador to Kassandros, indicates) then there would be no inclination towards honouring him in 294 either. The decree is passed at a time that Demetrios is established on the throne of Macedonia but still it carefully avoids any details of Philippides' political career. Extremely important though his material benefactions were, it would be singular if he had received the highest honours solely for these; but the span of time left in which an honorific decree could have been passed is very limited.

Philippides of Kephale's contribution to Athenian welfare started off at the end of the fourth century and went on in Lysimachos' court as one of his philoi for about twenty years. The services he rendered can be divided into two categories: close contact with Lysimachos which proved extremely fruitful for Athens and on the other hand lavish expenditure from his own pocket. Through him Athens obtained corn, mild treatment of Athenian captives, and the job of envoys was also facilitated. During this time Athens was under the firm grip of Demetrios and Philippides himself was away in Thrace: there was no possibility of the latter demanding honours. It is not self-evident that for him to be a philos of Lysimachos would instantly make him a worthy candidate; the honours for the various other foreign philoi in the past for much the same things must have played a considerable part in orientating Athenian mentality towards honouring him. On the other hand, it is significant that it is only after Philippides has returned to Athens and has performed an agonothesia that he asks for his timai. Time for his honours, then, would be ripe only in the chronological environment of 283/2 (or a couple of years earlier).

Another aspect of the decree, indicative of its connection with the practical interests of the moment is the dominant position of Lysimachos; it would thus appear that he was on good terms with Athens. Yet his maltreatment of Lemnos (Phylarchus, FGH 81 F29) which was a vital grain supplier for Athens should have been a major issue. Therefore, I am inclined to see the decree also as an attempt to remind Lysimachos of
his previous behaviour and point out to him an analogous course of action in the future.\textsuperscript{112}

The posthumous honours for Demosthenes in 280/79 ([Plut.], \textit{X. Orat. Vit.} 850f-851c) should not be interpreted in the perspective of legislation prescribing at a late date the honours for a distinguished personality. It is of course significant that the proposer was Demochares who was his nephew but it would be rather simplistic to attribute him just a wish to pay due respect to his uncle.\textsuperscript{113} It has frequently been commented that the honours for Demosthenes represent praise for the democratic constitution of Athens of which he had been an ardent supporter, and it has generally been ascribed to the context of ‘nationalistic pride’ of those days. I do not deny that in praising Demosthenes, Athens is praising his opposition to Alexander and to Antipatros, but had only this been the motivation, the decree would have been even more fit in 285, immediately after Demochares’ return from the exile. Unfortunately, the last years of the 280s (and the 270s) are very obscure but it appears that Athens was going through difficulties in her effort to recapture the forts and the Peiraieus, perhaps even some thought of the possibility of reconciliation with Antigonos Gonatas. Demochares could have employed the decree to reinforce Athenian morale. I do not wish to push the evidence too far but there might be some connection with the fact that in 280 there took place a campaign of Sparta (under the leadership of Areus) and other Greek cities against the Aitolians, but in reality against Antigonos Gonatas. I agree with Habicht that Athens was too weak to participate and Demochares would have probably been aware of this weakness, but nonetheless a Greek hostile move would have given birth to hope.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{112} See Habicht, \textit{Untersuchungen}, pp.79-80 for the deterioration of Athenian relations with Lysimachos after 285 and even more so after 284, when Lysimachos became king of Macedon, Paonia and Thessaly; Audoleon (king of the Paionians) and Pyrrhos who were both Athens’ friends became Lysimachos’ victims. Habicht plausibly suggests that the successive Athenian embassies to Lysimachos, referred to in the decrees for Artemidoros and for Demochares, concerned mainly the restoration of Imbros and Lemnos to Athens.

\textsuperscript{113} Marasco, \textit{Democare}, p.77.

\textsuperscript{114} See Justin XXIV.1.1-8 who clearly states that the declared aim of the campaign was that restoration of the status quo in the Amphictyonic Council, before the Aitolians had seized
Demochares himself was a central figure in Athenian politics of the mid 280s who was honoured posthumously in 271/0 on the demand of his son. Why had he not asked himself earlier? Demochares was active in the Four Years War, but then he went into exile; hence, there is a considerable gap in his career whereas Philippides, because of his connection with Lysimachos already by the late fourth century, had been able to (continuously) demonstrate his usefulness even from abroad, while nothing of the sort happened with Demochares. He returned from the exile in the archonship of Diokles (286/5) and, of course he could not have demanded honours either in that year, or the next one, since this would be too early. There are only left a couple of years before our last reference to Demochares (his decree for Demosthenes), and it is possible that he died shortly afterwards; if he died later and supposing that there was a law on delay, Demochares was old enough to acquire his honours while still alive. Again then, a law on delay cannot explain the date of Demochares' honours. Why did his son not ask earlier? I think that the answer probably again lies in the unstable political climate from the end of the 280s onwards and the precarious freedom of Athens. Apart from Eleusis, all the other forts and in every probability Peiraieus as well remained in Antigonos' hands. A decree for Demochares whose career in the 280s had been devoted to the re-acquisition of the forts might provoke the reaction of Antigonos. On the other hand the decree is very close chronologically to the decree for Kallias and it could be set in a context of more intense preparations for war, with the help of Egypt.

A quite notable feature of the decrees for the three orators (Lykourgos, Demosthenes, Demochares) is their very pragmatic character in the sense of their very strong emphasis on the financial aspect of their career. Mention has already been made of the amount of details in the Lykourgos decree concerning his accumulation of weapons and money. Similarly, more than half of the decree for Demosthenes is dedicated to the numerous choregiai he performed on various occasions. Again the

control of Delphi, but he also makes it clear that the campaign was essentially directed against Antigonos; see Habicht, Untersuchungen, p.84.
decree for Demochares insists on describing at length his rebuilding of the Walls during the Four Years War, his successful embassies and the amount of money he obtained through them. This pragmatic character has to be associated with the needs of Athens in those years. All three decrees were passed at times that Athens needed money either to face a siege or to re-occupy the forts and these needs determine the contents of the decrees.

The case of Kallias is quite intriguing: he had offered his services to the revolt of 287, but in his capacity as a Ptolemaic official. Did the Athenians regard him first and foremost as an Athenian citizen and attribute his status of Ptolemaic official only secondary importance? Or was the reverse the case? In Gauthier’s perspective, Kallias is regarded as a citizen of Athens, hence the delay in his honours. Shear, on the other hand, seems to imply that the Athenians regarded him primarily as an officer of Ptolemy when he comments that: “the fact that Zenon, and not Kallias, was praised at once in the first flush of success would suggest his seniority in command”. My own view of the problem is that Kallias’ status was quite ambivalent and that the Athenians did not quite regard him as an Athenian citizen. At any rate, Kallias’ help had indeed been most valuable and it would be rather unusual if he had not been honoured immediately after the establishment of peace in the astu. We could suggest that Kallias received without delay some kind of honours but not the highest ones. However, specific historical context does play a major part at the timing of the highest honours. Shear has advanced the quite possible framework of the negotiations with Ptolemy which led to the Chremonidean War. Accepting this, we can discern still another hidden aspect of Athenian mentality: Kallias was honoured precisely at the time that he contributed to an alliance that placed Athens in the lead after many years.

The military career of Phaidros of Sphettos was interwoven, or rather coincided with his political activities, but one gets the impression

115 “Kallias”, p.21.
that the author of the decree regarded his career in the assembly more prominent than his military career. It is noteworthy that some fifteen lines (11.34-50) are devoted to his political convictions and activities. That the lines 37-50 were erased at the time of Philip V as a sign of protest against the house of the Antigonids is an indication that they referred to some sort of contact of Phaidros with Demetrios Poliorketes.\textsuperscript{116} The chronological order of events in the decree precludes any possibility of these lines referring to military action since they refer to events following the uprising of 287. His appointment as first in rank hoplite-general in the archonship of Xenophon has already been explained in terms of the need to co-ordinate action while negotiations with Poliorketes were carrying on. Is it precisely in these activities that we should look for the reason for his demanding honours only in the 250s when Athens was actually ruled by Antigonos Gonatas, while his probably younger brother Kallias had been honoured in 271/0? The decree for Kallias points to good Athenian terms with the king of Egypt or rather to their reinforcement. On the other hand, there was a rising hostility between Ptolemy II and Antigonos Gonatas. Hence, it would be inconsistent or rather unwise to honour Phaidros who though he had co-operated with Kallias during the revolt of 287, had demonstrated a conciliatory mood towards Demetrios Poliorketes.

If there has to be a law (or laws) concerning benefactors before 229, then this should rather refer specifically to Athenian citizens and it should rather define procedural matters, transplanting the procedure followed in the case of foreign benefactors. In fact, the first time that the \textit{aitesis} and the interval of days specified by the law are referred to is in 283/2, in the decree for Philippides of Kephale. The \textit{dokimasia} is referred to for the first time in the decree for Kallias in 270/69 but we cannot rely on Plutarch to conclude that it was not included in the decree for Demochares as well. I would rather believe that after the revolt of 287, at the time of the resurgence of the democracy, the Athenian people

\textsuperscript{116} Livy, XXXI.44.4-6.
would have taken pains to ensure that no Athenian citizen would acquire excessive prestige and they would have established the procedure of *aitesis* and then that of the *dokimasia*. As to a law on delay, the Kallias decree might be an indication to its existence but still it does not afford any conclusive evidence.

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**Change of attitude towards diplomacy**

The Athenian *demos* does appear to have modified to a considerable extent its disposition towards ambassadors or 'politicians' in general. Instead of seeing this as a result of weakness, I would suggest that these decrees indicate a positive reappraisal of the role of politicians and ambassadors by the Athenian people and, consequently, a new perception of events and of Athens' position on the international scene. Now that Athens was actually striving for salvation and did not have the military apparatus to face its opponents in the battlefield, she could very well demonstrate flexibility in her attitude and express visible gratitude to people who facilitated her effort. Apart from the force of tradition which favoured *andragathia* in the battlefield (before 338), the fourth century did not present Athenians with the right opportunities to achieve an impressive diplomatic success (without this having to mean that the orators were reduced to a role of only secondary importance). Political issues were eventually resolved in the battlefield; on the contrary and particularly after 322 diplomacy became the real battlefield for Athens.

The people seem to have been past the stage of entertaining romantic ideas about military prowess and to have landed in reality. If we remember the antithesis between *logos* (word) and *ergon* (deed), we can conclude that to the Athenian mind the former *logos*, or embassy in our case, has acquired the status of *ergon*. They appear to have realised or to have admitted that diplomacy was at least as much a means of extracting benefits, particularly when they had to confront men who extensively employed diplomacy in order to secure their purposes.
All of the decrees are exclusive in the sense that they are products of specific circumstances and almost all are linked with efforts to maintain democracy. The contradiction between maintaining democratic practices and honouring individual leaders is transformed into a presupposition; in order to retain democracy, individuals have to contribute and to be honoured.

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iv. Vocabulary of the decrees

In this final section I am going to deal with certain aspects of the vocabulary that the Athenians employ in their decrees; my purpose is to examine the image that Athens projects through her decrees with regard to her relations with the various rulers, their officials, her own citizens as well as the other Greeks; these in relation with the perception of her own position in the military and political scene on different historical occasions.

One should not imagine that the *demos* has from the start a fixed vocabulary tailored to suit the officials or the kings or the citizens. Similarly, there is no fixed pattern of what should be included in an honorific decree and what would be insignificant. The contents of a decree are dependent on the circumstances at the actual moment the decree is passed; with this I do not mean only the nature of the regime, but also Athens’ needs at the moment. Additionally, the contents depend on the nature of the services, the persons, the relationship of Athens with them, the perception of Athens of her role in the events.

An aspect of this interaction can be obtained through the comparison of the length of the decrees: how Athens moves from the extremely brief decrees of the 330s and the 320s to the (probably) lengthier decrees of Stratokles in the last decade of the fourth century to finally get to the much more detailed decrees for citizens in the third century. The lengthier the decree the more information we obtain about the honorand but also about the *demos* and the *polis’* needs and situation at the time as well as her relations with the various rulers.

Decrees for royal officials are generally insufficient in terms of details, which is not accidental but rather determined by the nature of services offered and by the part played by Athens. In any case, some of the decrees of the last years of the fourth century record the services of the officials in a rather detailed manner, and I believe that it is not accidental that these details normally concern military aid; on the other hand, the vast majority of the decrees concerns officials who have
facilitated Athenian relations with the Antigonids by being close (*diatribontes*) to the king (Demetrios) or the kings (Demetrios and his father Antigonos), and it is legitimate to suspect that nothing too spectacular occurred.

A most useful measure of comparison are the decrees for foreigners who did not belong to a king’s entourage; most frequently, if not always, the recipient of honour was someone who had promoted Athenian interests in the past as well, most commonly in the days of the Lamian War; and then the decree tends to be much more verbose than those decrees for officials who had provided services of a general nature. Referring to the help the former honorands provided is for Athens a means to describe her own role in the events and take pride in her own glory.

Similarly, it is not accidental that the decrees for citizens are considerably more detailed than those for foreigners. The abundance of information has to be seen in relation to the services offered to Athens as well as the Athenian perception of the citizens’ role in the events.

* * *

a) The attitude and the role of the kings

*Philip and Alexander*

It has already been mentioned that there have not been preserved the honorific decrees for Philip, Alexander and his Diadochoi; thus, with regard to inscriptional documentation of the relations between Athens and the kings, we have to content ourselves with the impression we can gather from other decrees. Consequently, more will be said in the section dealing with the role of the officials.

As far as concerns Philip, next to nothing can be deduced from the decrees for his officials; they are completely silent about the attitude of Philip towards Athens and vice versa.

Similarly, little can be said about Athens’ attitude towards Alexander (always as it is reflected in the decrees); furthermore,
whatever knowledge we have is derived from decrees dating long after Alexander’s death.

It is interesting to compare the decree for Ainetos of Rhodes (SEG 21.310), passed in 319/8, with the decree for Lykourgos, passed more than ten years later. The Ainetos decree is perhaps the only Athenian document that refers to Alexander without any pejorative connotations. On the contrary, the fact that Ainetos fought nobly by the side of Alexander in Asia is one of the motivations for his honours, the other one being his previous relationship with Athens (II.14-8).

Osborne plausibly suggests that this decree must have been passed after the edict of Polyperchon proclaiming the restoration of the status quo had become known to Athens; furthermore Ainetos would probably have fought by the side of Polyperchon in Asia. Thus the decree can be interpreted as a friendly gesture to the Macedonian regent, and the reference to Alexander’s campaign becomes much more understandable.

This decree may not represent the true sentiments of Athens towards Alexander, which may be, nonetheless, reflected in the decree for Lykourgos. The epigraphical version of the decree provides us with considerably more details at this point than the manuscript version of the decree, which, in any case, summarizes the whole situation; Alexander aimed at ruling over all the Greeks after having established his authority over the whole of Asia: “Ἀλέξανδρου τε τοῦ βασιλέως ἀπασαν μὲν τὴν Ἀσίαν κατεστραμμένου, κοινῆ δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς Ἐλληνικοί ἐπιτάττειν ἀξιοῦντος,” (Plut., X. Or. Vit. 852d). The epigraphical tradition rather presents the situation as more definite: “καὶ φόβων καὶ κινδύνων μεγάλων τοῦς Ἐλληνας περιστάντων Ἀλέξανδρωι αὐτῶν ἐπικρατήσαντι” (IG II² 457, 11.9-11). Nevertheless, the stone goes on to present the reaction of Lykourgos in this period: “δι[ε]τέλει ἐναντιομένος ὑπὲρ τοῦ δῆμου ὁδιάφθορον καὶ ἀνεξέλεγκτον αὐτῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος καὶ τῆς τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἀπάντων σοστηρίας] διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου παρέχων καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὴν πόλιν ἐλευθέραν εἶναι

117 Naturalization II, p.97.
καὶ αὐτόνομον πάση μηχανή ἀγωνιζόμενος” (II.13-7). These lines point to continuous external pressure exercised on Athens and the continuous threat to her freedom, but they emphasize that Alexander did not succeed.

Both versions present a quite unfavourable aspect of the Athenian relations with Alexander on a specific historical occasion: “ἐξαιτήσαντος Λυκούργον ὡς ἑναντία πράττοντα αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἐξέδωκεν ὁ δήμος <δίὰ τὸν> παρ’ Ἀλεξάνδρου φόβον” ([Plut.], X. Orat. Vit. 852d). More emphatically, the stone records: “ὁ δήμος ἀπέγνω μὴ συγχωρήσαι”, presenting this attitude as a result of the demos’ appreciation of Lykourgos’ policy (II.17-9). The incident is the well known demand of Alexander to surrender certain rhetores whom he thought responsible for igniting the revolt of Thebes in 336/5. As K. Rosen has observed, these lines are indicative of the new relationship established between state/community and sovereign: it is obvious that Alexander has forcefully invaded Athenian political life. It is important to note though that, on the other hand, the demos does not fail to take pride in the fact that it steadfastly resisted his demand to surrender Lykourgos in 335. The implications of such a statement are far-reaching: Alexander’s demand was part of his plan to rule over the Greeks; thus the refusal of the Athenians to succumb to the demand is translated into resisting his plans to establish his rule over the Greeks.

It is also interesting that the people chose not to refer to Macedonia in general, but specifically to Alexander. It is possible that in doing so the Athenians had in mind the Macedonian origin of Demetrios Poliorketes himself; it would be rather clumsy to refer to Macedonia as a whole.

Even more than Alexander, it is Antipatros who attracts Athenian attacks. In the decree for Timosthenes of Karystos (IG II² 467+Add., p.661 = Osborne 43) the Lamian War is defined as the war against Antipatros (I.7; the word Antipatros is entirely restored but the stoichedon

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style of the decree renders the restoration fairly certain). Again here, we
note the same preference for attacks on a personal level rather than on a
national one.

Antipatros is the object of a rather bitter attack in the decree for
Demosthenes ([Plut.], X. Orat. Vit. 850a-851c); it is not so much that
Demochares (the proposer of the decree) employs pejorative phraseology
as that he provides us with details of Demosthenes’ death which was the
result of the man-hunt that Antipatros had unleashed (851c).

* * *

The role of the Antigonids

As we shall see in more detail further below (in the discussion of
the vocabulary employed for the officials), Antigonos and even more so
Demetrios are ever present in the decrees passed for their officials. The
motivation for the latter’s honours is, most frequently, their connection
with the kings and their favourable disposition towards them. On the
rare occasions that we get better information the kings are presented as
the saviours of Athens and the champions of Greek liberty or even of
democracy (demokratia), which is to a certain extent the result of
Antigonos’ propaganda. On the other hand, the Athenians of the time,
given the fact that Demetrios had liberated them from Kassandros, would
have viewed the proclamation of Antigonos as a sincere intention.

A decree unique in the phraseology employed for Demetrios is the
one passed by the ethelontai epilektoi, probably in 303/2 (ISE 7, 1.2) where
the king is called Μέγας. The same decree provides us with far more
details about Demetrios’ campaign of liberation of the Greeks than any
other decree (II.2-11). In fact the authors of the decree seem to be more
interested in describing Demetrios’ role with respect to the Greeks and to
themselves rather than to Athens: ‘‘... ἐλευθέρωσε τῆν] χώραν τῶν
’’Αθηναίων καὶ τῶν ἀλ[λ]ῶν πλείστων Ἑλλήνων, νῦν δὲ παραγέγονεν
βοηθήσων μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ μείζονος καὶ τῶν ἔχθρων
περιγενόμενον πολλάς μὲν ἢδη πόλ[ε]ις Ἐλληνιδάς προσηγόγετο τῇ
έαυτοῦ] βασιλεία, κίνδυνον καὶ πόν[ον σὰῦτος μὲν πάντα ύπομένων,
I have alluded elsewhere to the possibility that this selected corps, which had fought by the side of Demetrios, was linked with him with a special bond and was instrumental in the maintenance of his authority; this would go a long way towards justifying the laudatory phraseology.

A method of expressing the falling out with Demetrios and his house was to drop altogether the title of the king in official documents, as Shear has observed in the decree for Kallias.\textsuperscript{119} The same kind of \textit{damnatio} is observed in the decree for Strombichos (\textit{IG} II\textsuperscript{2} 666+Add., p.663, l.8) as well as in the decree for Philippides of Kephale (\textit{IG} II\textsuperscript{2} 657, ll.16-18). This is an interesting formulaic development, if we remember that the title of Alexander was not omitted in the Lykourgos decree. The clearest example of \textit{damnatio memoriae} is offered by the Phaidros decree, although this occurred quite late, in 200; all lines referring to Demetrios were deliberately erased when the Antigonid descendant, Philip V, king of Macedonia, invaded Attika.

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\textbf{Lysimachos and the Ptolemies in Athenian life}

The decrees dating after 287 reflect the significant role played by the kings Lysimachos and Ptolemy in Athenian life and the survival of the \textit{polis}. I have analysed before how Athens came to the point of regarding the kings much more cold-bloodedly, as a source of benefits. The kings assume importance because they offer substantial gifts and services; on the other hand, particularly in the decrees for citizens, the \textit{demos} and the honorands attract a greater share of attention.

It is undeniable that Lysimachos is a powerful presence in the decree for Philippides of Kephale. It is implied that Lysimachos' word was the ultimate authority on which the people relied to honour Philippides(II.36-8). In the past the Athenian \textit{demos} relied on the information provided by generals and/or ambassadors in order to vote

\textsuperscript{119} "Kallias", pp.16-7.
honours for someone; in the case of Philippides of Kephale it is Lysimachos who assumes this role.

Although Philippides is only the intermediary between Athens and Lysimachos and not the real benefactor, he is nonetheless represented as such. As much as it is Lysimachos who bestows the gifts, nonetheless, the author of the decree persistently lays emphasis on Philippides' soliciting the gifts of Lysimachos. In ll.10-2 it is Philippides who secures a gift of 10,000 medimnoi of wheat and not Lysimachos who offers it; similarly with the Athenian captives: Lysimachos forgives them but Philippides secures their acquittal (ll.20-1).

It is perhaps noteworthy that the Athenians make no mention of Lysimachos' motives for his donations to Athens, his eunoia for instance. In contrast the decree for Kallias of Sphettos refers to the eunoia of king Ptolemy I, in compliance to which Kallias acted during the Athenian revolt (ll.22-3). Ptolemy I and his son Ptolemy Philadelphos are commonly referred to as the object or in connection with various missions undertaken by Kallias, the result of which were important material benefits for Athens. The importance the Ptolemies had assumed in Athenian life is also indicated by the prolonged reference to the celebration of the Ptolemaia in honour of Ptolemy I and Kallias' participation in it (ll.55-62).

It is worth noting that the Kallias decree describes at length the initial stages of Kallias' campaign to Attika without recording from the start that he was acting on Ptolemy's orders; instead, we have to get to ll.22-3 to be informed that he was acting in compliance with Ptolemy's eunoia towards the demos. Further below (ll.32-9), it is recorded that Ptolemy dispatched Sostratos to accomplish the best for the polis; moreover, it is recorded that in the ensuing negotiations Kallias acted in the best interest of the polis alone; nothing is mentioned about the interests of Ptolemy. Similarly, when Kallias was stationed at Halikarnassos he worked eagerly for the success of the Athenian embassies (ll.71-4); his relationship with Ptolemy is again ignored.
The decrees for Philippides and Kallias illustrate the tension within the activities of someone who was simultaneously an Athenian citizen and a *philos* of the king. On the one hand Philippides and Kallias were attributed a central role in the events and were praised for their remarkable achievements for the sake of the *polis*; on the other, it could not be hidden the fact that it was through their relationship with a foreign ruler that they benefited Athens and, moreover, that they also served the interests of the king.

The Philippides and the Kallias decrees refer to the urgent need to recapture the forts with the help of the kings Lysimachos and Ptolemy respectively, a need that is also recorded in the decrees for Spartokos and Audoleon. A difference in the vocabulary is that the decrees for the Thracian rulers emphasize that these kings *share* with the Athenians the feelings of joy for the liberation from Demetrios: ... συνῆσθη τοῖς εὐτυχήμασι τοῦ δῆμου (IG II² 653, ll.22-3); more elaborately, Audoleon’s fate is linked with that of Athens: “συνῆσθη τοῖς γεγενημένοις εὐτυχήμασι νομιζοῦν εἶναι κοινὴν καὶ αὐτοῖ τὴν τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν” (IG II² 654, l.18-21) The Athenians then probably thought that these people with whom they have enjoyed a long standing friendly relationship share their keen interest in ἔλευθερία. Lysimachos and Ptolemy, on the other hand, are seen more as a source of benefits, without sentimental connotations.

Progressively, Ptolemy II Philadelphos assumed the role that the Antigonids had once propagated for themselves: that of the liberator of the Greeks, a role that is stressed in the decree of Chremonides (IG II² 687, ll.16-9): “ὁ τε βασιλεὺς Πτολεμαῖος ἀκολούθως τεί τῶν προγόνων καὶ τεί τῆς ἀδελφῆς προαμέσσει φανερὸς ἐστιν σπουδάζων ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς τίων Ἑλλήνων ἔλευθερίας". It is interesting that the same role is applied retrospectively to Ptolemy’s ancestors, that is his father Ptolemy Soter. The latter, although at some point he had tried to present himself as liberator of the Greeks, had not demonstrated commitment to
the cause. Nevertheless, the ancestral good will served to intensify Philadelphos' good will.

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b) From *eunoia* to action: the development in the role of officials

*Eunoia towards the demos*

It has already been mentioned that the decrees for Macedonian officials passed after the battle of Chaironeia and until 322 are extremely brief. This brevity should not be seen as accidental; furthermore, it should not be seen only as the first step towards a more detailed, biographic type of decree while the decrees are still formulated along traditional lines. This represents part of the explanation but, at any rate, I think that the most important reason is that these honorands had not in fact offered services on specific, pressing circumstances, but they had simply demonstrated their good will towards the Athenians who arrived at the Macedonian court. The measure of comparison are the decrees passed for people who were not connected with the Macedonian court and had provided Athens with corn: they are certainly much more detailed and illuminating.

It has also been pointed out that the award of *proxenia* to certain of these Macedonians, apart from being a sign of the operation of tradition, indicates, above all, that Athens has not accepted Macedonian supremacy as being a definite fact. Tradition surely operates in the formulation of these decrees but it should not be seen as a mechanical reaction, but as one which is the result of a certain conscious attitude.

The common motivation for the honours is the *eunoia* towards the Athenian *demos*; nothing is as yet said about their *eunoia* towards the king (which becomes quite common later on). For instance in the citizenship decree for Amyntor we read: “[ν ἐπαινέσατι Ἀμύντορα ἐνδείκνυται περὶ Ἀθηναίους” (*IG* II² 405, 1.9); or in the proxeny decree for the son of Andromenous: “... δεδόχθαι τῷ δήμῳ [ἐ]πειδὴ ......Σ....ο[ς Α]νδρομ[έ]νους ......[ό]. τόν δήμον [τίν] Ἀθηναί[ων]
I would venture to suggest that this latter decree indicates that the honorand had offered his services in the course of Athenian missions to Macedonia whereas the nature of Amyntor's services is quite vague, and it is quite dubious whether he had offered any. That Amyntor was awarded a higher honour, - the citizenship -, is a result of his high status (in all probability he was Hephaistion's father).

The demos still demonstrates 'selfishness', one could say, and envisages the actions of the Macedonians solely from the perspective of its own benefit. An additional explanation of a different nature is that the Athenians would have still not acquired a clear idea of the relationship between a king and his entourage, his philoi, which in any case had not yet fully developed.

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**Eunoia towards the Antigonids**

It is devastating that from almost every decree proposed by Stratokles and others for officials of Demetrios only the first ten lines or so have been preserved, which prevents us from having any clear idea of the length of the decree or acquiring precise knowledge of these men's services. However, judging from the preserved extant decrees they should have been rather brief but not as brief as those of Demades.

In these decrees the officials' eunoia towards Demetrios (and almost always towards his father Antigonos) is almost invariably strongly emphasized, which consists a marked difference with the vocabulary employed for officials of Philip and Alexander. Various factors contributed to this change of vocabulary: these honorands played a major part in the application of Demetrios' policies and they were present in Athenian life, playing a very energetic role. Thus the Athenians would have obtained a clearer picture of the relations between the king and his philoi.
Most of the times the favourable disposition of the officials towards Antigonos and Demetrios is mentioned before their good will towards Athens. Even so, this is presented as a result of their being close (diatribontes) to the kings. This in turn indicates that the Athenians were very well aware of their debt towards Demetrios and their (continuous) dependence on him. In these decrees the demos appears to be solely the object of the officials’ eunoa, without actively participating in the events.

The commonest form, describing the status and the activities of the Antigonid officials, is διατρίβων λέγων καὶ πράττων τὰ ἄριστα; in most of our cases no specific services are recorded. On a couple of occasions, however, there are significant variations of the form; in the decree for Medeios we find the common form διατρίβων λέγων καὶ πράττων τὰ ἄριστα (II.12-3), but it is also recorded that χρήσιμος ἦν καὶ εὔνοος τῷ τοῦ δῆμου σιωπηρίαι (II.19-20); it is in particular the word χρήσιμος which denotes that Medeios had offered more substantial services than others. A confirmation of this view is provided by II.16-8 which record that Medeios was dispatched to Greece to liberate the polis and the other Greeks: ἔλευθερώσοντα τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας. The importance of Medeios’ services is further emphasized by the repetition, in a slightly variant form, of the clause concerning his continuous commitment to the interests of the demos, both by word and deed: “διετέλει λέγων καὶ πράττων τὰ συμφέροντα τῷ δήμῳ” (II.20-1).

Similarly, in the decree for Apollonides (IG II² 492) we find at first the common formula (being close to the kings, he says and does whatever is best for the demos, II.18-9) but immediately afterwards the decree returns to the subject of Apollonides’ deeds, this time in the context of his mission to Greece (II.20-2).

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120 IG II² 471, II.14-5; IG II² 492, II.17-9; IG II² 495, II.11-2; IG II² 498, II.11-2; IG II² 555, II.2-3; IG II² 560, II.7-9; IG II² 562, II.3-5; DSI, I.2
The decrees for officials tend to be much more verbose when they concern people who offered substantial military help to Athens;\(^{121}\) in other words they concern occasions when Athens' fortune was at stake and, furthermore Athens had, presumably, on these occasions a much more active role in the events. The length of the decree is directly relevant to the importance of the services offered, and, apparently, the Athenians employed detailed description of one's activities as a means of expressing their gratitude.

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**The pragmatic character of the decrees in the 280s**

In the 280s the term *diatribon* seems to disappear from the vocabulary of the decrees (admittedly very few); in this period what matters the most is what the officials actually do for Athens in very specific instances.\(^{122}\)

With regard to Bithys of Lysimacheia, the first part of the decree in his honour is lost to us; therefore we cannot know whether it contained any information about his relationship with Lysimachos. However, what is preserved concerns only his disposition towards the Athenians: "καὶ ἐ[σ]τιν περὶ πάντας Ἀθηνα[ῖ]ο[ὺς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ εὐνο[υς] τῶι δήμῳ" (IG II\(^2\) 808, II.10-1).

In the Artemidoros decree instead of the *diatribon* term we find a different formula describing his relationship to the king: it is emphasized that Artemidoros is a friend and in the confidence of Lysimachos (IG II\(^2\) 662, II.6-7) which is a more elaborate formula and even elevates the status of Artemidoros. Immediately afterwards the decree refers to his embassies to Athens and to his *eunoia* towards the king and the *demos* (in this order), *specifically* in the course of these missions. Moreover, it is stated that Artemidoros "[.. χρήσιμος ἤν τῶι τε βασιλεῖ Λυσιμ[άχῳ καὶ τῶι δήμωι τῶι 'Αθηναίων" (IG II\(^2\) 663 = 2nd copy, II.4-5); the

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\(^{121}\) IG II\(^2\) 492, II.8-11, 14; IG II\(^2\) 498, II.15-20; IG II\(^2\) 503, II.13-7; IG II\(^2\) 553, II.2-10; IG II\(^2\) 558, II.11-4; IG II\(^2\) 559+568+Add., p.662, II.7-10; D51, II.3-5; SEG 16.58 (possibly).

\(^{122}\) *Eunoia* towards the *demos* alone does appear in the decree for Philokles (Hesp. 9, 1940, p.352, no.48), but the greatest part of the stone is lost and, therefore, we do not know whether there was any reference to his relationship with Ptolemy.
*chresimos* should again denote very specific services. In this clause it is implied that Athens and Lysimachos share a common cause; thus Athens places herself on the same level as Lysimachos.

The actual office of the Ptolemaic official Zenon is recorded but nothing about his relationship with Ptolemy. He appears to be honoured largely as a result of his help to Athens on a very specific occasion and, on a secondary level, because of his help towards various Athenians he encountered. We do find the formula εὐνοοῦσ ὃν but this concerns strictly Zenon’s attitude towards the Athenian people (*IG II² 650, l.12*). More elaborately, Zenon says and does whatever best he can for the sake of the *polis* “λέγων καὶ πράττων ἁγαθὸν ὃ τι δύναται ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως” (ll.15-6).

A pragmatic reason for this different treatment is that there were repeated, very delicate transactions (concerning the restoration of Lemnos to Athens) between Athens, Artemidoros and Lysimachos for which confidence between the king and his official was instrumental whereas contact between Athens and Zenon was much more limited and it was a result of specific orders of Ptolemy.

The decrees for Artemidoros and Zenon betray, however indirectly, a different kind of relationship between Athens and Lysimachos on the one hand, Athens and Ptolemy on the other. More specifically, Athens was in more need of Lysimachos than of Ptolemy, since she expected from Lysimachos the return of Lemnos, her basic grain supplier.

In contrast with the image presented in the decrees for officials of Demetrios, after 287 and as a result of the pride for the restoration of freedom in 286, it is underlined in the Zenon decree that the *demos* had an active part in the events whereas in the past it had been a mere spectator in most of the cases. The means of expressing this participation is the use of compound verbs starting with the preposition *syn*, it is thus stressed that foreign help and Athenian effort contributed to an equal degree to Athens’ salvation: “συναγωνιζόμενος τῇ τοῦ δήμου σωτηρία”. 
The afore-mentioned decrees show Athens presenting herself as an independent power; in effect, Athens also presents herself as an ally of Lysimachos and Ptolemy against Demetrios Poliorketes. This was an illusion but, nonetheless, it is important that this is how Athens perceived her role. The collective character of the effort for Athens’ salvation in 287 is again underlined in the decree for Strombichos (IG II² 666+Add., p.663) some twenty years after the revolt: Strombichos was συναίτιος (1.13), and οἱ συνεπολιόρκητες (1.14) the Mouseion Hill. It is significant that it is the demos as a whole that appears to have persuaded Strombichos to change sides (1.10) and not one of its representatives. In this manner it is implied that Strombichos was bound to the entire body of the Athenian demos.

The justification of the honours operates on two levels: description of Strombichos’ motives as well as description of his activities; we find a unique formula which betrays his previous hostile attitude: οἱ όμοιοι δειν μὴ ἐνίστασθαι τοῖς πόλεως συμφέροντι (II.12-3); instead of the chresimós there is the more elaborate variant τὰς λοιπὰς χρείας ἀπροφασίστως παρασχόμενος (1.16).

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c) Athens and the citizens

The form of long narrative

The Athenian citizens awarded the megistai timai were engaged in multiple and diverse activities: legislation, re-organization of finance, building programs, embassies, negotiations with the kings, defence of the chora.

In fact that there appear decrees for Athenian citizens who are engaged in multiple activities, other than military engagements, is partly the result of the widening of the category of foreign benefactors and the services they offered and partly the result in the increase of the opportunities and the expansion of the field of activities that the Athenian leaders were presented with. The fact that foreigners had been
honoured for various reasons would have made the *demos* appreciate the role of its own leaders and want to commemorate it.

I. Calabi Limentani has observed that the style of the decrees for citizens assumes the form of a narrative of *res gestae* in which the difference between citizen and foreign benefactor tends to become abolished; this type of decree for citizens commences in 307 with the decree for Lykourgos.123 I would agree that there is a similarity in the form of narrative but, on the other hand, the citizen decrees stand out by the amount of details they provide. Moreover, the range of the citizens’ activities is far wider, although there are common elements, like soliciting gifts of corn and money, manifestly illustrated by the cases of Philippides of Kephale and Kallias of Sphettos.

A reason for the abundance of details in the decrees for citizens could very well be that a citizen candidate was in a position to provide a more detailed account of his achievements but Gauthier has demonstrated that foreign candidates were in a position to feed the *demos* with sufficient information, either presenting themselves to the *ekklesia* or the *boule* or through the agency of an Athenian citizen.

Another reason could be that, since they were voted at the end of the citizens’ career, a substantial amount of information had been accumulated. Yet, these decrees insist on very elaborate details, and the question is why and how these details came to be considered important enough to be inscribed on the stone; their mere existence does not offer enough reason.

The long detailed narrative serves more than one purpose; firstly, it aims at rendering the decrees non-assailable and absolutely justifiable in the eyes of the *demos*. Employing the conclusions of Gauthier as to the superimposing of Athens over powerful individuals, we can discern still another aspect of the Athenian mentality. The Athenian *demos* has come to regard the attribution of the highest honours to citizens and the consequent increased prestige they provided them as more of a threat to

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the powers of the *polis* than the honours for officials; when honouring an official the Athenians do not feel obliged to digress into the most minuscule details of their activities. Providing as many details as possible about a citizen’s career is a means for Athens to exert as much control as possible over his achievements whereas those of a foreigner are regarded much more cold-bloodedly. There are also other aspects of the long narrative type which need emphasizing. Apart from justifying the attribution of the highest honours, recording the honorand’s deeds in detail is also a means of taking pride in a citizen’s achievements. Furthermore, in the face of all these powerful officials and kings, the Athenians assert the role and the notable qualities of their own representatives.

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**The ancestral eunoia**

The decrees for Lykourgos, Philippides of Paiania and Phaidros introduce the subject with a reference to their ancestors’ *eunoia* towards the *demos*. The latter two decrees in fact dedicate quite a substantial portion of the whole text. In this respect, the honorand’s behaviour is to be seen against the background of a family tradition of achievements for the benefit of the Athenian people. Moreover, there is thus provided a link with Athens’ past history, which becomes manifestly evident in the Phaidros decree where significant instances of his father’s career are recorded, dating to the period of Kassandros’ rule over Athens.

After the recording or the description of the ancestors’ *eunoia* there comes as a natural consequence the *eunoia* of the honorand himself. In this perspective, it is rather surprising that the decree for Phaidros’ brother Kallias ignores completely his ancestors while, apparently, there were a lot to be recorded. Not only that, but there is no introductory line on Kallias’ favourable disposition towards the people, which seems otherwise to be the norm. Instead, the proposer is eager to get right to the point: Kallias’ campaign to Athens as soon the revolt against Demetrios Poliorketes broke out. The implication is that the Athenians
distinguished Kallias from other Athenian recipients of the highest honours; rather they had come to regard him more as a Ptolemaic official whose help proved to be extremely valuable on a specific occasion and less as an Athenian citizen.

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The abstract qualities of the honorand

In the motivation clauses alongside the arete we find qualities such as dikaiosune (in the Lykourgos decree), eutaxia (in the decree for Philippides of Paiania) and philotimia. Philotimia words (philotimoumenos, philotimos) are found in the decrees for Philippides of Paiania, Kallias and Phaidros. These abstract qualities are combined with phrases such as καλός καὶ φιλοτίμως, ύπερ τοῦ δῆμου or ύπερ τῆς πόλεως, distributed all over the decree. More specifically, each kind of activity is almost invariably related to the benefit of the demos; we read, for instance about Lykourgos: “νόμους τε πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς ἔθηκε τῇ πατρίδι” ([Plut.], X. Orat. Vit. 852a). On Demosthenes’ career we read: “εὐεργήτη καὶ συμβοῦλω γεγονότι πολλῶν καὶ καλῶν τῷ δήμῳ; δυνάμεις ἃς συνεστήσατο τῷ δήμῳ” ([Plut.], X. Orat. Vit. 850f, 851b). Philippides of Paania “ἐστρατήγησεν καλῶς καὶ συμφωνεὶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ δῆμου; καὶ ἄγωνος ἄξιος εἰρηθεὶς περιπόθηκεν τῷ ἄγωνῳ καὶ τοὺς θείους πιάνατας καλῶς καὶ φιλοτίμως; ἢ [πρεσβεῖας] καὶ καλῶς καὶ συμφεροῦσας τῷ δήμῳ ἢ περιπέβαλεν” ([IG II² 649+ Dinsmoor, Archons, pp.7-8, 11.24-5, 30-1, 34-5).

It is important to note that the decree for Kallias persistently ignores his career before 287, and this is because he operated outside the framework of the polis. On the other hand, the decree lays emphasis on his expedition to Attika; it was precisely in the course of this expedition that Athens presented herself as an ally of Ptolemy. It is also in the Kallias decree, more than any other, that we find the greatest concentration of phrases relating emphatically the activities of the honorand with the benefit of the polis (ll.29, 32, 38-9, 43, 51-2, 58, 62-3.

124 The main concern of the demos and the most important quality of the citizen honorands is their commitment to the democracy; this is an issue I will deal with in the conclusion.
The obvious interpretation relates to the nature of his services and the circumstances in which they were offered: Kallias contributed the most to the liberation of Athens, which must have been viewed by the contemporary Athenians as the most important exploit that one could accomplish; the author of the decree meticulously describes the extremely difficult circumstances pressing Athens at the time.

The decree for Philippides of Kephale, with regard to his career before 287, simply enumerates his benefactions without reminding us each time who was their recipient (i.e., the demos or the polis). I suspect that this 'omission' was not accidental, and I would interpret it as a result of his operating outside the framework of the polis, and even without its authorization. On the contrary, the clause referring to his help after the revolt of 287 connects it with the salvation of Athens: "διετέλεσε λέγων καὶ πράττων τὰ συμφέροντα τεί τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν" (ll.32-3); similarly, his agonothesia (after his return to Athens) was undertaken for the sake of the demos and the sacrifices were attended to for the sake of the polis (ll. 41, 46).

**Φιλοτιμία**

D. Whitehead has asserted that philotimia words were integral to the language of achievement and reward in all Athenian honorific decrees, not only for the classical period but for as long thereafter as such decrees were enacted. "Taking all types together there are well over 250 stelai upon which the philotimia phraseology is completely or partially preserved ...".125 This is a most useful observation, but a generalisation nonetheless, which needs to be analysed in detail. More specifically the principle does not strictly apply to royal officials. Out of all the preserved extant decrees for royal officials in our period only three record philotimia as one of the attributes of the honorand; Asklepiades seems to have been a very important personality, Neaios had offered military help, and Herodoros was awarded the megistai timai. Philotimia

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125 "Philotimia", p.62.
words in these texts have either a general sense or the sense of military valour (the Neaios case).

On the other hand, in the case of citizens awarded the *megistai timai*, the occurrences of *philotimia* words concern, for the most part, spending or providing money for the *polis*. This equation is manifestly illustrated by the case of Philippides of Paiania: his *eunoia* and *philotimia* are demonstrated by his generosity in the *epidoseis*, the *trierarchiai*, the *choregiai* και ταῖς ἀλλαῖς [...], καὶ φιλοτιμίας πόσαις (*IG* ΙΙ 649, ll.20-3). Similarly, Kallias (as a result of his meeting with Ptolemy) "φιλοτιμώς ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ἐκόμισεν τῷ δήμῳ ἀργυρίῳ μὲν τάλαντα πεντήκοντα, πυρῶν δὲ δισμυρίους μεδίμνους δωρεάν" (ll.51-3). The liturgies undertaken by Phaidros were performed ἐν τῇ ἱμέρᾳ τῆς ἐξουσίας (*IG* ΙΙ 682, ll.61-2) and the games during his *agonothesia* were worthy of the *demos’ philotimia* (ll.55-6); this latter also involves money expenditure. On certain other occasions the *philotimia* conveys the notion of ‘striving eagerly’, as when Kallias strove eagerly for the success of the Athenian embassies (l.72) or when Phaidros attended to military preparations (ll.23-4); the fact remains, however, that the abstract notion of philotimia is commonly connected with very pragmatic interests, i.e., provision with money and/or corn.126

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d) Athens and the Hellenes

The role of Athens in the Lamian War

The decree or rather the decrees for Euphron of Sikyon (*IG* ΙΙ 448) present great interest in more than one respect; there are reflected the Athenian view of the Lamian War a few years after the defeat as well as the Athenian view of the regime after 322.

Euphron had offered substantial services during the war (ll.14-5) and as a result he was honoured while it was still in progress (in the archonship of Kephisodoros in 323/2). The second decree records that the honours for Euphron were annulled by those who conducted Athenian

126 For this link see Whitehead, “Philotimia”, pp.64-5.
politics during the oligarchy (ll.61-3). The re-affirmation of the honours in 318 is commonly viewed as a means of the restored democracy to express its strong disapproval of the regime established after 322.127

With regard to the information provided for the Lamian War it is interesting that the re-affirmation contains a lot more details about Euphron’s activities during the war than the original decree. In the latter it is only recorded that Euphron brought Sikyon into the Athenian alliance (ll.9-13), first among the Peloponnesian cities, whereas the re-affirmation describes the events that preceded the alliance between Athens and Sikyon: how Euphron returned from exile to expel the foreign garrison from Sikyon. Perhaps, it was precisely the defeat that further highlighted the importance of Euphron’s contribution.

The most interesting feature of the account of the Lamian War concerns the way in which the role of Athens is presented. Again, there is a quite important difference between the two decrees: the leading role of Athens is strongly emphasized in the second decree, but much less so in the first: “καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ, δὲν ἐνεστήσατο ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ἀθηναῖων ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἑλλῆνων” (ll.44-6). The Lamian War is represented as a war of the Greeks undertaken by Athens for the sake of the Greeks.

The phrase συνέβη τῇ Ἐλλάδι ἄτυχη[σ]όση (l.53) is employed to describe the defeat at Krannon; its result was the enslavement of Hellas, not just of Athens (l.57). It is noteworthy that the second decree does not end the account of Euphron’s services with the defeat, but goes on to cite his devotion to the democracy which led him to choose a noble death after the war.

Athens then did not assert her leading role at the beginning of the war but a few years later, despite the defeat and its deplorable results.128

127 Osborne, (Naturalization II, p.107) argues in addition that apart from the ideological background, the decree was designed to serve as an incentive to Sikyon to resist Kassandros’ attack.

128 Hyperides’ Epitaphios emphasizes the leading role of Athens (and of Leosthenes) already in 322 (a year after the outbreak of the war). It is plausible to suggest that the second decree for Euphron was influenced by this speech and its ideological attributes; like the speech of
It is conceivable that, after the death or the exile of those who had been politically active during the regime of 322, and given the fact that Polyperchon had proclaimed the return to the status quo as it had been in 338, the Athenians would feel that the defeat had, after all, only temporary effects and that the democratic constitution had been re-established for good (II.63-4).  

More than ten years later, in the honorific decree for Timosthenes of Karystos (IG II² 467+Add., p.661 = Osborne 43), passed in 306/5, the demos still stresses the leading role of Athens in the Lamian War as well as her role of protector of the Greeks. It has to be observed that Athenian memory is at this point significantly selective; there is not the slightest hint at the defeat. Furthermore, it is rather surprising that while Athens is seriously threatened by Kassandros and while Timosthenes has offered his services on this particular occasion, the author of the decree chooses to focus on his services of the past, during the Lamian War, the Hellenikos polemos as it is referred to in the decree, while the ongoing war seems to be of little concern to the author. The war against Kassandros was probably regarded as a sequel of the war against his father Antipatros and, therefore mention of the Lamian War was quite appropriate. Still, it is undeniable that the past appears to be more important, which becomes understandable if we take into account the fact that the Lamian War was Athens' war whereas in the war against Kassandros Demetrios had the lead.

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**Athens and the Hellenes in the period of Demetrios Poliorcetes**

Hyperides the second decree for Euphron lays emphasis on the role of Athens as champion of the Greeks.

129 The war against Antipatros is again defined as Hellenikos in the honorific decree for Nikandros and Polyzelos (IG II² 505, 116), in IG II² 506, 11.9-10 and finally in Plutarch, Phoc. 231. N. G. Ashton, (“The Lamian War-stat magni nominis umbra”, JHS 104, 1984, 152-157) provides us with a pattern of the distribution of the terms Lamiakos and Hellenikos polemos both in literature and in inscriptions; the latter term is to be found solely in inscriptions with the exception of a single passage in Plutarch and precedes chronologically the use of the term Lamiakos, the origins of which are to be found in the historical work of Hieronymus of Kardia.
Another aspect of the relationship of Athens with the Greeks can be observed in a number of decrees for officials of Demetrios. Athens and the Greeks are again united, but this time under the auspices of Antigonos and Demetrios.

In certain decrees the fate of Athens is connected with that of the other Hellenes; the help the officials provided to Athens is seen in the wider context of the liberation of the Hellenes from Kassandros. Oxythemis of Larisa is honoured so that others will strive in conformity with the kings' will and the freedom of the Greeks (IG II² 558, ll.13-4). This should be seen as a result of the extensive propaganda of the Antigonids for the liberation and autonomy of the Greeks in general. However, it has to be noted that there is almost always distinction in the unity; the decrees, though they refer to the demos in conjunction with the Hellenes, at the same time carefully distinguish between the two groups. Medeios has been dispatched to liberate the polis and the rest of the Greeks (in this order; ll.17-8); the polis of Athens is part of the Greek community even if she still has to be seen as a separate entity. The same distinction occurs in the decree for Apollonides; he does what is best for the kings, the demos and the rest of the Greeks (ll.20-1); similarly, Osborne 63 is supposed to serve as an incentive to act in the interest of the Athenian demos and for the salvation of the other Greeks (ll.5-7).

In the honorific decree for Adeimantos of Lampsakos it is stated that he continuously acts in the interest of the kings, the Athenian demos and the other allies; furthermore, he has asked all the Hellenes to participate in the synedrion at the Isthmos (ISE 9, ll.11-3). E. Badian and Th. R. Martin have pointed out that this clause “would prima facie imply that the Athenians and the other allies were not members of the group, which would be absurd in the perspective of Athenian relations... The
Athenians and the allies are to be seen as constituting the Hellenes in the context of an Athenian decree.\textsuperscript{131}

Although I agree with Badian and Martin that it is inconceivable that Athens would not have participated in the League of Corinth in 302, given her close association with Demetrios, I think that the Hellenes of the decree are a wider group, to which Athens and the allies belong: "... καὶ εὐνοίας τῆς περὶ τὸν δήμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τὴν συμμάχους καὶ ἀπαντας τοῦς Ἑλλήνας, ..." (II.23-5). More specifically, the symmachoi should be the allies of Demetrios and, consequently, it seems to me that the way in which the word Hellenes is employed in the decree indicates that it refers to those Greeks who would not, as yet, participate in the League of Corinth, but the Antigonids and Athens expected them to join it at some point in the future. The Antigonid propaganda then makes its presence felt in this Athenian decree.

At any rate, there is still distinction in the unity; it is significant that the Athenians insist again on singling out themselves. The Athenians would have been surely aware of the fact that the liberation of their polis had been part of the wider plan for the restoration of Greek autonomy, but on the other hand they were justified in singling out themselves since their polis was used by Demetrios practically as his capital. It is even possible that their strong ties with Demetrios, stronger than with any other Greek polis, would have made them feel that they would have a more prominent position in the League than the other Greek cities.

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**The Chremonidean War**

Athens was again involved in a struggle for Greek freedom in 268/7, but this time she was not the head of the coalition; the decree of alliance with Sparta (proposed by Chremonides) presents the war as a joint struggle. The introductory clause serves as a reminder of the glorious war of Athens and Sparta against the Persians; thus the present

\textsuperscript{131} "Athens, Other Allies, and the Hellenes in the Athenian Honorary Decree for Adeimantos of Lampsakos", *ZPE* 61, 1985, 167-172, pp.170, 172.
war is aligned with the glorious past (IG II² 687, ll.8-13): “πρότερον μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι οἱ ἐκατέρων φιλίαν καὶ συμμαχίαν κοινὴν ποιησάμενοι πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς, πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς ἁγῶνας ἠγονισάντο μετ’ ἀλλήλων πρὸς τοὺς καταδουλοῦσθαι τὰς πόλεις ἐπιχειροῦντας, ἐξ ὧν ἑαυτοῖς τε δόξαν ἐκτίσαντο καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις "Ελλησιν παρεσκεύασαν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν". It is interesting that the decree refers vaguely to those who attempted to enslave the Greeks; thus, it becomes easier to include Ptolemy who was in fact a Macedonian descendant.

The goal of the alliance is again the liberation of the Greeks, but the following clauses introduce the new most important factor: Ptolemy II. Fifteen lines (ll.14-28) of the text (almost half of it) are dedicated to describing Ptolemy’s proairesis, who is presented as the moving force behind a series of alliances. The ultimate purpose of the alliance is to achieve homonoia (ll.31-2).

At any rate, a fragment of Hegesandros of Delphi (FHG IV, p.415, frg.9) suggests a different perception of Athens’ role by the contemporary Athenians: “οἱ δὲ δημαγωγοῦντες, φησίν, ... , τὰλλα μὲν ἐφασκον πάντα εἶναι κοινὰ τῶν 'Ελλήνων, τὴν δ’ ἐπὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνθρώποις φέρουσαν ὁδὸν 'Ἀθηναίους εἰδέναι μόνους". It would appear then that Athenian leaders insisted on asserting the different or even superior position of the Athenians vis-à-vis the rest of the Greeks. This attitude is not irreconcilable with the image presented in the Chremonidean decree; neither Sparta’s nor Ptolemy’s role could be minimised. Athens was in need of both, and in an official document Athens could give out a more balanced attitude. Internally, however, the politicians could magnify Athens’ role.

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e) Athens and the chorai

132 Erskine, (The Hellenistic Stoa, p.94), has observed the coincidence between Stoic ideals and Ptolemaic propaganda; there is also a fragment of the comic poet Alexis Hypobolimaios in which Ptolemy, Arsinoe and homonoia are grouped together (Kock, CAF, vol.II, frg.244). It is not easy to tell the extent to which the decree echoes Ptolemy’s propaganda or Stoic ideals, popular in Athens at the time. A solution is to say that the Athenians saw in Ptolemy the embodiment of their own ideals.
One of the most acute problems of Athens in this period was the presence of foreign garrisons either in the Peiraieus and the forts or in the astu itself or even in both the chora and the astu. Kassandros had employed the garrisons to subvert the democratic constitution and keep a watchful eye on the Athenians. When Demetrios liberated Athens from Kassandros in 307, the chora became the theatre of military operations, a situation which continued throughout the Four Years War as well as later, during the regime of Lachares.

The fragmentation of Attika then or rather the separation of the astu from the countryside and the Peiraieus would have been considered by the Athenians as the most important symptom of weakness; lack of access to the chora, and especially to the harbour, posed a constant threat to the survival of the astu or rather to their democratic constitution itself. Consequently, a constant problem of the Athenians was to either obtain or maintain control of the chora. Yet, the issues of peace, control of the chora and, finally, that of the constitution often clashed.

The keen interest to keep the astu and the chora united appears for the first time in the decree of the deme of Aixone in honour of Demetrios of Phaleron (IG II² 1201). According to the decree, Demetrios reunited the astu with the chora, thus restoring peace in Attika; no mention is made of the means employed. No allusion is made to the fact that peace was made at the expense of independence and of the democratic constitution. On this occasion then peace and democracy were two conflicting issues.

In certain decrees dating to the period of the Four Years War the salvation (soteria) of the demos is mentioned. The countryside had witnessed extensive warfare; even worse, Athens found herself in deadly danger in 304 when the astu was besieged, and it took Demetrios' intervention to drive Kassandros out. There is no mention though of the unification of the astu with the chora, and the explanation lies probably with the fact the forts were indeed threatened or even occupied at some
point by Kassandros but not for long; most importantly the Peiraieus had remained in Athenian hands, or rather in the hands of Demetrios.

The Athenians were not unconscious of the fact that a defeat would bring about the establishment of Kassandros in control of their affairs (to say the least). The soteria of their polis was part of the liberation of the Greek poleis in general; on a couple of occasions eleutheria is coupled with the demokratia, but it is not specifically the demokratia of the Athenians. One should not hurry to draw the conclusion that the Athenians had adopted a universal approach to the issue of freedom; there is again echoed here the Antigonid propaganda of freedom and autonomy for the Greeks.

In the decree for Herodoros in 295/4 the unification of the astu with the harbour is a result of the peace treaty with Demetrios; the demos expresses the wish that this will lead to the restoration and the maintenance of the democracy. But Demetrios had installed a garrison on the Mouseion Hill; this kind of democracy then was connected with the presence of a foreign garrison in the polis itself, which are two irreconcilable issues.

The decree is drafted from the viewpoint of one of those who had asked for refuge in the Peiraieus and had later taken sides with Demetrios against Lachares. It is significant that it refers to the re-acquisition of the astu (1.24) and not of the Peiraieus; the astu then, as the decree implies, had been in hostile hands. It is inevitable that the decree would adopt such a view since it was expressing gratitude for the liberation from Lachares.

The reference to the democracy indicates that the author of the decree held the view that the regime in the astu had not been democratic and, on the other hand, he hoped that Demetrios would restore democracy, a hope that proved to be false.

133 Osborne 51 for Nikomedes of Kos (c.306-303/2), 1.4: τῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς δημοκρατίας συστρατευόμενον; IG II² 559+568+Add., p.662, II.7-10: ἀπεσταλμένος εἰς τὴν Ελλάδα συνηγονιζότο ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ τῆς δημοκρατίας.
After the revolt of 287 there occurred a marked transformation in the connotations of the unification of the astu with the chora.

The astu was liberated from the garrison of Demetrios Poliorcetes, but this was a very precarious kind of freedom; the position of Athens and her constitution were in danger as long as the forts in the countryside and the harbour were in foreign hands.

In the decrees for the Thracian kings Spartokos and Audoleon the phrases ὁ δῆμος κεκόμισται τῷ ἀστῷ (IG II² 653, II.22-3) and κομισαμένου τοῦ δήμου τῷ ἀστῷ (IG II² 654, II.19) are employed to denote the expulsion of the garrison from the Mouseion Hill. In the decree for Philippides of Kephale, however, we find instead the phrase κομισαμένου τοῦ δήμου τῆν ἐλευθερίαν (IG II² 657, I.31). Has the freedom of the astu come to be identified with freedom in general, albeit of a very precarious nature?

The decrees for Audoleon and Spartokos as well as the decrees for the Athenians Philippides of Kephale and Kallias reflect the extreme joy of the people felt for the liberation and at the same time the strong anxiety for the future which is the result of the lack of provisions and money. The decree for Audoleon, passed a few months after the decree for Spartokos, is much more explicit. Like Spartokos, Audoleon has promised to provide for the needs of the demos, but the decree for Audoleon explicitly establishes that these needs concern the recapture of the Peiraieus and the freedom of the polis (II.33-5): "...ἐπι[α]γγέλλεται δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ λοιπόν παρέξεσθαι χρείας συνεργῶν [εξ] τῆς τοῦ Πειραιέως κομιζόντων καὶ τῆς τῆς πόλεως ἐλευθερίαν." The Athenians then did not feel completely free without having control of the Peiraieus. Furthermore, it is significant that the people do not refer to the forts, which indicates that Peiraieus was regarded as the most important factor of freedom. The need to recapture the forts is recorded in the decree for Philippides of Kephale but here again the Peiraieus assumes greater importance by being mentioned before them (II.35-6).
The Peiraieus is once again singled out in the decree for the ex-archon Euthios in 282/1; the *demos* promises to reward him with more honours as soon as the Peiraieus and the *astu* are again united (*ISE* 14, ll.29-31).

In 283/2 and after the fort of Eleusis had been re-captured, the need to regain control of the harbour and the other forts had become much more pressing. In the decree for Philippides we read that corn and money were essential for the maintenance of the *demos*’ freedom and the recapture of the Peiraieus and the forts *as soon as possible*: “ὅπως ἄν διαμένει ὁ δήμος ἑλεύθερος ὁν καὶ τὸν Πειραιῶν κομίσθηται καὶ τὰ φρούρια τὴν ταχίστην” (*IG* II² 657, ll.35-6).\(^{134}\) It has to be observed that the freedom of the *demos* is distinguished from the problem of the Peiraieus and the forts; it is perhaps for the maintenance and stabilisation of freedom that the unification with the *chora* is deemed essential.

Why is it that the re-acquisition of the Peiraieus is deemed more important than that of the Attic forts? Apart from the fact that lack of control over the harbour precluded the possibility of the maintenance of a sizeable fleet (Athens’ most valuable asset), the reasons should be looked for in the political history of Athens at the beginning of the third century. The political separation of the *astu* from the harbour, caused by the regime of Lachares, had provided Demetrios Poliorcetes with the opportunity to re-establish his control over Athens and a more restrictive one than in the past. The loss of the harbour then would have been viewed as the cause of the loss of freedom.

It is important that neither the decree for Audoleon nor the one for Philippides refers to the maintenance of the democracy; the predominant goals of the Athenians are ἑλεύθερια and σωτηρία, slogans which are also echoed in the decree for Strombichos (*IG* II² 666+Add., p.663, ll.9, 11, 14). This does not have to mean that the Athenians were too preoccupied with their immediate need to recover the forts and the Peiraieus to give any thought to the constitution. On the

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\(^{134}\) It seems that the archon year 283/2 had witnessed intense activity aiming at recapturing the forts: it is recorded in the Kallias decree (ll.44-9) that when Ptolemy II ascended to the throne, in 283/2, the Athenian generals requested from Kallias to secure the king’s help in corn and money *as soon as possible*. 

contrary, *eleutheria* was the absolutely essential prerequisite for the existence and operation of the democratic constitution. The term "ελευθερία" is employed to cover the issue of "δημοκρατία"; the latter seems to have acquired the meaning of freedom from foreign military presence.

Scholars frequently comment that the decrees of the 280s bear a strong 'nationalistic' pride; I would rather modify the observation, without of course denying it. The democratic ideology is undeniable but these same lines betray a strong anxiety for the survival of the democratic constitution; the Athenians are perfectly aware that they might lose it again at any moment and they feel insecure.

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v. Concluding remarks

Athens demonstrated a notable flexibility in their employment of the institution of *euergesia*, she modified the institution initially to accommodate a king with superior military power (Philip), but also later on the institution is adaptable to the circumstances and to particular individuals. It has already been noted how Athens after having passed an exceptional and extravagant period with Demetrios Poliorketes, came to the point of honouring the kings in the same way she had honoured officials of Demetrios and identically with the Thracian rulers. This change of attitude has been explained in terms of the resurgence of Athens in the 280s. Pausanias (I.9.4) attempted to single out Ptolemy as the benefactor *par excellence* in the eyes of the Athenian people, but if his estimation is correct, the Athenians did not express it via the honours they attributed him. Pausanias has commented upon the, in his view, diametrically different motivations of the Athenians in honouring the kings (Philip and Alexander's Diadochoi); the honours for Philip were the product of flattery; those for Lysimachos were the product of the interests of the moment; Ptolemy is singled out as the only king to be truly regarded as a benefactor. Flattery then, practical interest and genuine gratitude were three different factors and probably mutually exclusive according to Pausanias. Firstly, I would like to argue that at least the last two could operate together on different occasions. Secondly, it is worth commenting on the ‘Egyptocentricity’ of the passage. Pausanias writes at a quite late date, employing testimonia referring to the alliance between Athens and Ptolemy in the Chremonidean War and, perhaps, even to their continuity after the war. In fact, in the early Hellenistic period, it is only with Ptolemy (among the Diadochoi) that Athens concluded a genuine alliance (there had been one with Kassandros in 317 but this could hardly be characterised as a genuine one; the other one with Demetrios Poliorketes turned out to have been conducted under false pretences); in other words, it was only with Ptolemy that Athens had *officially* been of the same status.
In the case of the royal officials Athens employed invariably the citizenship as a means of expressing her good will towards the kings as well as getting material benefits. The tantalising problem is whether this practice proved to be more to the interest of the kings rather than of Athens, thus causing a disturbance in the balance in the exchange of favours. Surely, there was always an inherent risk in the practice of bestowing honours upon men who had such powerful connections.

It is in particular with regard to the citizenships obtained by the officials of Demetrios Poliorcetes that there is good reason to believe that the balance was indeed disturbed after 304, when Demetrios openly and extensively interfered in Athenian life. In the case of the officials of the other kings, however, the balance was preserved, mainly because the kings and the respective officials were far away from Athens. It can hardly be accidental that from the 280s there have been preserved only four honorific decrees for royal officials, which indicates that the number of officials coming into contact with Athens had been considerably reduced.

The influx of honours for foreign kings and their officials was a factor which exercised important influence on the attitude of Athens as a polis towards her leading citizens and, vice versa, the Athenian leaders were partly prompted to ask for honours because of their influx for foreigners. It was not however a mechanical reaction, simply the increase in the number of foreign honorands spreading down to the citizens. The ground was prepared by the challenging political circumstances which provided the opportunity of excellence in diplomacy.

The Athenian leaders would have obtained a clear appreciation of their role in the events. Their reaction was in fact identical with that of their fourth century military counterparts; only that they asked, or in any case were honoured for a different and even more complicated kind of contribution to the welfare of Athens. The demos, on the other hand
would have been aware of the complexity and difficulty of the circumstances and would not have been reluctant to attribute its leaders their due share of honours. Moreover, it is conceivable that being surrounded by all these powerful, foreign men, the Athenians would have also aimed at singling out their own leaders.

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It is significant that the Athenians did not invariably set out to honour in identical manner everyone who had provided important help of some sort. Whenever someone other than a king or a royal official was concerned they appear to be much more reserved. The honours for the metics Nikandros and Polyzelos as well as those for the mercenary leader Strombichos reveal that the status of a benefactor played a major part and that, at least with regard to the resident non-Athenians, Athens could retain a balanced attitude no matter how great their contribution or how pressing circumstances had been.

Although Nikandros and Polyzelos had offered substantial amounts of money, contributed to the rebuilding of the walls, and even participated in the war against Kassandros, they only got a crown of thallos, isoteleia and enktesis, not citizenship (IG II² 505, ll.28-40).

The case of the mercenary leader Strombichos can be accommodated in the more general context of balanced attitude towards benefactors in the 280s. Strombichos, who belonged to the guard of the Mouseion Hill, betrayed Demetrios and took sides with the Athenians in the revolt of 287 (IG II² 666+Add., p.663 + IG II² 667, ll.7-15). However, the Athenians did not recognise his good services immediately, in sharp contrast with their treatment of royal officials in the same period; instead they voted citizenship for him only in 266, after he had once again offered his services to the war (most probably the Chremonean).

The underlying principle of this markedly different treatment is the mercenary status of Strombichos; perhaps, we could even add that his

135 Osborne (Naturalization II, p.164 and n.739) maintains that there is no reason to believe that Strombichos was not in some way honoured shortly after the revolt; he even conjectures that Demochares would have been inclined to discriminate in favour of truly high rank officials.
very betrayal of Demetrios would render the Athenians as to his commitment and devotion to Athens as well, especially more so if he had been bribed (which is quite possible). Last but not least, the fact that Strombichos was not associated with any king would have made the Athenians less inclined to honour him.

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The vocabulary of the various decrees reflects the different patterns of relationships established under different historical circumstances between Athens on the one hand, the kings, their officials and the Athenian citizens on the other. The pattern of foreign relations can be schematically arranged as following: from 338 to 322 the Athenian demos prevails at the expense of the Macedonian kings and their officials; the situation changes dramatically in the period of Demetrios Poliorketes: the Antigonid kings are dominant while the demos' interests form part or even are subordinate to the plans of the kings; quite frequently, the motivation for the honours is first and foremost their relationship with the Antigonids.

In response to the balanced distribution of honours after 301 and, especially, after 287 the decrees employ a vocabulary that indicates the new status and attitude of Athens. The presence of the kings is always strongly felt but by now the demos' interests receive an equal or even greater share of attention; moreover, it is for very pragmatic reasons that the beneficiaries receive their honours. Similarly, in the decrees for citizens, the demos is depicted as an all powerful entity.

* * *
CONCLUSION

Athens' change of status on the international political scene has often caused historians to view the policies Athens pursued in the Hellenistic period in terms of insignificance and even of decadence. My aim in this thesis has been to present the ways in which the Athenian leadership responded to the new political reality and to demonstrate that the diplomatic means employed are of great historical interest.

Far from employing the concept of decadence, I prefer to view Athenian diplomacy in the perspective of adaptability to the circumstances.

Adaptability basically implies employing already existing practices, but modified in order to suit the needs of the moment. This flexibility should be understood as an attempt to match Athens' needs to the policies of Philip, Alexander and the Diadochoi. The major factor that distorts our appreciation of the ability of Athenian leaders to adjust to the circumstances is their having been obliged to conduct diplomacy from a militarily, and even politically, inferior position. The flexibility itself brings along the image of servile conduct: certain aspects of adaptability can sometimes be regarded as compromising democratic values or even as leading to the destruction of the Athenian democracy. The major difficulty has been to avoid labelling individual leaders and policies as 'pro-Macedonian', oligarch (or even patriot) and to try instead simply to present and analyse crucial aspects of their role in the formation of foreign policy.

The politically necessary has often been weighed against the honourable policy and found to be wanting. Yet, it is important to accept the principle of political necessity without applying any pejorative evaluation to it; otherwise our picture of Athenian politics becomes distorted.

As emerges from our examination of Athenian leadership the process of adaptation was rather slow at first. Although rhetores like Hyperides and Dinarchus had diagnosed a crisis in Athenian leadership,
they were not led to propose drastic changes; only an improvement in the existing structure. Foreign policy remained in the hands of the two traditional groups, the *rhetores* and the *strategoi*. The first change to be observed, one that involves only *practical* aspects in the exercise of diplomacy, is the expansion of the generals’ diplomatic responsibilities without diminution of the *rhetores’* authority. The fact that military men undertook embassies was far from being a novel practice: it had also been the practice in the fifth century. Progressively, military men assumed more and more responsibility in the various negotiations. Similarly military command was also formed according to the needs of the moment, which had also been the case in the past, often leading to the concentration of duties.

After 338 and until 323 diplomacy followed the traditional path of the attribution of proxeny or citizenship to the king’s officials. Phokion and most probably Demades facilitated Athenian diplomacy by forging bonds of *xenia* with the Macedonian court; *xenia* as a political means was certainly not a novelty. As a matter of fact there is very little in this first period to indicate changed political behaviour or even disregard for democratic institutions, although certain of the honours passed became the subject of debate.

On the contrary, under the guidance of Lykourgos, Athens took steps towards reinforcing democratic feeling. It is in this period (in 336) that Eukrates proposed the law against tyranny, which indicates strong fear and at the same time represents an attempt to safeguard the constitution against Macedonian aggression (though not explicitly mentioned):

“ἐὰν τις ἐπαναστατῇ τῷ δῆμῳ ἐπὶ τυραννίδι ἢ τὴν δημοκρατίαν τὴν Ἀθήνησιν καταλύσῃ... μὴ ἔχειναι δὲ τῶν βουλευτῶν τῶν τῆς βουλῆς τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου Πάγου καταλελυκένοι τοῦ δήμου ἢ τῆς δημοκρατίας τῆς Ἀθήνησιν ἀνδέναι εἰς Ἀρείου Πάγον”.

The relief of the stele depicts the *Demos* being crowned by

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Demokratia. The interest in Demokratia is quite strong in the late 330s: there is a dedication to Demokratia by the boule of 333/2 as well as public sacrifices by the generals in the next couple of years (IG II² 1496, II.131-2, 140-1). Raubitschek has observed that in the same period Alexander was establishing “democracies” all over Greek cities, that is, he was openly interfering with their constitutions.137

Athenian politics became extremely complicated and highly controversial after the battle of Krannon in 322. From this point onwards, part of the process of adaptation should be understood as an attempt to enter the power game among the Diadochoi.

Athens’ second defeat inevitably affected the way the people envisaged their relations with Macedonia; there could be no doubt as to Macedonia’s superiority, all the more so since Antipatros openly interfered with the constitution. Consequently, the people who had developed contacts with the Macedonian court would be viewed with suspicion.

Up to 322, a large part of foreign policy was conducted in terms of euergesia relationships, supposedly operating on a basis of reciprocity of interests. After 322 those who undertook the responsibility of Athenian politics were obliged to develop a policy to fit the in fact unequal philia pattern of relationship established between the kings and their entourage.

Adjustment of the concept euergesia operated on two fronts: that of Athenian citizens vis-à-vis the kings and that of foreign benefactors vis-à-vis the polis. It was not always clear whether Athenian politicians were more ‘friends’ of the kings than representatives of the Athenian interests; the boundary between diplomatic manoeuvring for the sake of the people and personal gain occasionally appeared to be transgressed.

As to the relations with the kings’ officials and philoi the Athenians were very quick to perceive that they had to cultivate their good will in order to secure the kings’ good will. Attribution of honours to the officials of a king was certainly not a novelty. Contacts with the

right persons in the right places was, as it had always been, an all important factor in politics; only now the place was the court of a king and not another *polis* or state. Adaptability consists in conferring solely citizenship and not proxeny; as has been explained, these officials were not acting as representatives of a particular *polis* or state.

The overt shift from previous practices is marked by the attribution of divine honours to Demetrios Poliorketes and his father Antigonos. The Athenians responded to the situation created in 307 by adopting a practice that had already been established in the Greek cities of Asia Minor. The aspirations of Alexander to divinity would have shown the Athenians that divine honours would be most welcome by a monarch. In fact, this is the only period for which the view could be sustained of degenerate political conduct by certain Athenian politicians. On the other hand, the people did react to Demetrios’ demands and I believe that their reaction deserves our attention more than their failure to impose their will.

It has to be stressed that the last decade of the fourth century was an exceptional period from the perspective of political attitudes towards a powerful ruler. Athens, though needing to cultivate the good will of Alexander’s Diadochoi continuously, did not really go to extremes at any time except the last decade of the fourth century.

Another aspect of adaptability is Athens’ tendency, especially after 301, to change the direction of her diplomatic efforts according to which of the kings was the most powerful and most valuable to her.

Our sources do not provide a clear picture of the Athenian people’s reaction to the various policies pursued by their leaders or to the various political upheavals. Generally speaking, they seem to have been willing to accept modifications or even shifts in practice as long as they benefited from them and as long as they could exercise some control over policy.
Both Phokion and Demades were accused of subverting the constitution by later writers as well as by modern historians. Whether contemporary Athenians held the same opinion is a different matter. The same writers seem to imply that the people believed that Demades and Phokion worked for Athens' benefit. It was only in late 318 that Phokion's policy became so ambivalent that it was regarded as treacherous.

Formation of foreign relations on the basis of *philia* between the king, his officials and Athenian leaders transgressed the limits especially after 304 and until 301. It was no longer a question of adapting Athens' needs to Demetrios' plans; adaptability was transformed into obedience to his demands.

On this matter we are better informed about the people's attitude. The vocabulary employed in the decrees from 286 onwards reveals that the people deeply resented what had happened between 303 and 287 and that their democratic beliefs were as strong as ever. The policies of Stratokles and his like after 303 were regarded as destructive for the *demos*; Pseudo-Plutarch connects Demochares' exile with the *katalysis* of the *demos* "ονθ' ὄν ἐξέπεσεν ὑπὸ τῶν καταλυσάντων τὸν δῆμον" ([Plut.], *X. Orat. Vit.* 851e).

The decrees conferring the highest honours upon Athenian citizens almost invariably emphasize that *demokratia* was the framework and the ultimate goal of their activities. Already in 307, in the decree for Lykourgos it is recorded that he conducted his policy blamelessly ἐν ἐλευθέρᾳ καὶ δημοκρατομένῃ τῇ πόλει ([Plut.], *X. Orat. Vit.* 852d). The statement comes as a conclusion of the immediately preceding clause where the conflict with Alexander was recorded, emphasizing that the king was not able to enforce his will on Athens. *Eleutheria* is coupled with *demokratia* once again in the decree for Demosthenes but in a slightly different context. *Eleutheria* and *demokratia* do not form simply the framework of the politician's activities; they form his goal: τῶ δῆμῳ συμβούλῳ γεγονότι καὶ πεπολιτευμένῳ τῶν καθ' ἐαυτὸν πρὸς
It is particularly after 287, after having experienced all sorts of policies and upheavals, that the Athenians define the essential qualities of their leaders at the same time as they describe their deeds and their transactions with the various monarchs. Philippides of Kephale never acted against the democracy either by word or deed: “...οὐθέν ὑπεναντίον πρὸς δημοκρατίαν οὐδεπώποτε [ἐποίησεν ο]ο[ῦτε λόγωι ο]ὔτε ἔργοι (IG II² 657, ll.48-50). The decree for Demochares insists on making it clear that he took no active part in any oligarchy and did not hold any office during the katalysis tou demou. “φυγόντι μὲν ὑπὲρ δημοκρατίας, μετεσχηκότι δὲ ὀυδεμιᾶς ὀλιγαρχίας οὐδὲ ἀρχὴν ὑπεδιέτο ἤρχότων καταλελυκότος τοῦ δήμου· καὶ μόνος Ἀθηναίων τῶν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἤλικίαν πολιτευσμένων μὴ μεμελήκοτι τὴν πατρίδα κινεῖν ἑτέρῳ πολιτεύματι ἢ δημοκρατία.”

The proposer of the Kallias decree employs similar phraseology in order to demonstrate the commitment of the honorand to the democracy. Again, we observe the same ‘negative’ approach to the issue. The author of the decree does not state at this point what Kallias actually did for the democracy, but that he did not act against the laws and the democracy of all Athenians: “τεὶ πατρίδι Καλλίας οὐδεπώποθ’ ὑ<π>ομείνας [...]καταλελυμένου τοῦ δήμου ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ὀυσίαν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ προέμενος δόσιν δοθῆναι ἐν τεὶ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ ὡστε μηδὲν ὑπεναντίον πράξαι μήτε τοῖς νόμοις μήτε τεὶ δημοκρατία τεὶ ἐξ ἀπάντων Ἀθηναίων” (Kallias decree, ll.79-83). This latter expression is unique and one that gives additional weight to the issue of democracy.

Eleutheria, demokratia and the laws are grouped together once again in the Phaidros decree (about thirty years after the revolt of 287): καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐλευθέραν καὶ δημοκρατουμένην αὐτόνομον παρέδωκεν καὶ τοὺς νόμους κυρίους τοῖς μεθ’ ἑαυτῶν” (IG II² 682, ll.38-40). Freedom and democracy are translated into free operation of Athens laws, without external interference.
The fact that Athens experienced two oligarchies based on limitation of citizenship rights (in 322 and in 317) and certain other periods which bore non-democratic features often leads to the false assumption that the Athenians had lost faith in the democratic constitution. External interference with the constitution, however, does not necessarily lead to loss of democratic beliefs. On the contrary, our evidence demonstrates that despite all these upheavals, or perhaps because of them, the faith of Athenians in their demokratia emerged as strongly as ever, so strongly that it led them to one final, major confrontation with Macedonia - the Chremonidean War.

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APPENDICES

CHAPTER I

1. **The causes and the date of the Chremonidean War**

The war of Athens, Sparta (and her allies), and Ptolemy II against Antigonos Gonatas was named Chremonidean, after the proposer of the Athenian decree of alliance with Sparta. Yet, this does not automatically entail that it was principally Athens’ war; as will be shown, the situation was much more complicated.\(^{138}\)

The traditional view had once been that Athens had been a pawn in the struggle of the Diadochoi.\(^{139}\) Will and Gabbert saw the war as a preventive measure of Ptolemy II against the growing power of Antigonos.\(^{140}\) Habicht, on the other hand, challenged all these views arguing that it was Athens’ war in order to regain control of the Peiraeus.\(^{141}\) Hammond and Walbank, however, have pointed out that this view ignores the fact that the alliance between Sparta and Ptolemy antedated that between Athens and Sparta.\(^{142}\)

In his forthcoming thesis on the Ptolemaic policies outside Egypt A. Meadows analyses the forms of Ptolemaic propaganda and control of Greece in the fifteen years or so preceding the Chremonidean War and demonstrates that Ptolemaic influence on Greek affairs was considerable. With particular regard to the war, Meadows underlines that in the Chremonidean decree there are visible signs of Ptolemaic policy and propaganda: Athens, after having concluded an alliance with Ptolemy, urges the Greeks to follow her path, thus undertaking the responsibility to carry out Ptolemy’s policy; the Spartans concluded an alliance with Athens because they were friends and allies of Ptolemy \(^{(JG II^2 687, II.19-23)}\): "ὁ δήμος Ἀθηναίων συμμαχίαν ποιησάμενος πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ

\(^{138}\) The name Chremonidean is found for the first time in Hegesandroς of Delphi (\textit{FHG IV}, p.415); L. Prandi (“Perché “guerra chremonidea”? Egesandro di Delfi \textit{FHG IV} p.415 fr.9 e la fortuna di un nome”, \textit{Aevum} 63, 1989, 24-29) argues that the passage bears an attitude hostile to Athens and that Hegesandros employed a name that he found in a philo-Antigonid source.

\(^{139}\) See Will, \textit{Monde hellénistique}, p.220 for previous views on the causes of the war.

\(^{140}\) \textit{Monde hellénistique}, pp.220-4; Gabbert, \textit{Antigonus Gonatas}, p.173.

\(^{141}\) \textit{Untersuchungen}, p.108.

\(^{142}\) \textit{Macedonia III}, p.279.
How can we explain then Ptolemy’s minimal contribution to the war? His lack of commitment can be explained by the general military situation: Antigonos kept garrisons at strategic locations thus preventing Ptolemy from taking more active steps.143

We cannot say that Athens and Sparta were pawns in Ptolemy’s hands. Both these cities had their own very strong motives. In this perspective Habicht is right: it was as much Ptolemy’s preventive war as it was Athens’ struggle to recover the Peiraieus. Hammond and Walbank have given the best description of the situation: “in 268/7 these convergent interests came together”.144

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The allocation of Peithidemos in whose archonship there was signed the alliance between Athens and Sparta is essential for the dating of the Chremonidean War. Habicht, Heinen and Osborne date the archonship of Peithidemos and the beginning of the war to 268/7.145 Meritt on the other hand, insists on allocating Diogeiton to 268/7 and Peithidemos to 265/4 on the assumption that Peithidemos should start a secretary cycle.146 Heinen refutes Meritt’s view by pointing out that Diogeiton is mentioned in an inscription from Thermo, dating to 240 (IG IX I, 2, 73).147 More recently, Meritt attempted to restore the name of Peithidemos in an inventory of the Asklepieion (IG II² 1534B, 1.145), dating to 265/4, but only P can be read with safety, perhaps also E

144 Macedonia III, p.280.
145 Habicht, Untersuchungen, pp.95-112, 133ff; Heinen, Untersuchungen, pp.95ff; Naturalization II, pp.165-166 and n.750.
146 The Athenian Year, Berkeley 1961, p.223; “The Archons of Athens”, pp.161-91. According to the principle of secretary cycles, each year the secretary should be assigned according to tribal order until all tribes were represented; but, as M. J. Osborne has pointed out (“Nikias Hysteros”, pp.275-95), this rule was quite often breached in the third century.
147 Untersuchungen, pp.115-117.
whereas all the rest is completely restored; his assumption therefore has hardly any basis at all, as S. B. Aleshire has shown.\textsuperscript{148}

The Chremonides decree then has to be dated with the help of external evidence rather than internal. Habicht has underlined that \textit{IG II}\textsuperscript{2} 665, 1.7 and \textit{IG II}\textsuperscript{2} 666, 1.8 (266/5) provide irresistible proof that the war was already in progress by the time that these decrees were carried out. S. V. Tracy, who accepts Heinen and Habicht's dating of Peithidemos, also thinks that these two decrees indicate that if not war, at least preliminary hostilities were in progress.\textsuperscript{149} In fact, even Meritt in his aforementioned recent article (p.83) accepted the possibility of preliminary hostilities, but according to his dating they would have to be really protracted (c. three years).

As to the end of the war, Heinen ardently supported a low date, in the spring of 261, which finds in agreement the scholarly consensus.\textsuperscript{150} Additional evidence is provided by the Amphictyonic lists, according to which Athens did not send representatives to the Pythia at Delphi in the archonship of Peithagoras. Given the hostile relations between Aitolia and Antigonos Gonatas, dispatching representatives to the Pythia is commonly seen as a sign of independent policy; Athens then could not have sent representatives after her subjection to Antigonos Gonatas. Étienne and Piérart moved Pleiston's archonship to 262/1 and that of Peithagoras to 261/0, thus placing the capitulation of Athens shortly after the Pythia of 262/1.\textsuperscript{151}

J. Gabbert opts for a shorter chronology of the war based on the assumption that Athens could not withstand a siege for long but she is not


\textsuperscript{149} "A Fragmentary Inscription from the Agora praising Ephebes", \textit{Hesp.} 59, 1990, 543-547, p.545.


\textsuperscript{151} "Glaucion", pp.59-62.
absolutely positive. Although our information on the course of the war is obscure, it seems that there were three campaigns until Areus’ death in 265/4, in three successive summers (267, 266 and 265). After Areus’ death, it is possible that there was enough diversion in the North for Antigonos Gonatas to delay the capitulation of Athens.

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2. The problem of the recovery of the Peiraieus

The need to recover the Peiraieus is ever present in the Athenian decrees. There was at least one attempt to recover Mounychia by treachery (Poly., V.17.1) and it is possible that there was also a direct assault.

It is a major crux whether Athens ever regained control of the Peiraieus and if so for how long. The basic evidence employed is a passage of Pausanias (I.26.2): “Ολυμπιοδώρῳ δὲ τὸδε μὲν ἐστὶν ἀργὸν μέγιστον χωρίς τούτων ἄν ἐπραξε Πειραιά καὶ Μονυχία ἀνασωσόμενον· ποιουμένων δὲ Μακεδόνων καταδρομήν ἐς Ἑλευσίνα Ἑλευσίνιος συντάξας ἐνίκα τοὺς Μακεδόνας”. Habicht translates the *anasosamenos* as saved or preserved. U. Bultrighini, on the other hand, examining the use of the verb in Pausanias concludes that it should be taken to mean recaptured. The problem with this view is that...

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153 Justin, XXVI.1.8; Paus., III.6.4-6; D.S., XX.29; Hammond & Walbank, Macedonia III, pp.280, 283-6 and n.2.
154 In the same context as the abortive attempt to recover Mounychia by treachery Habicht (*Untersuchungen*, p.98) tentatively places the death of Chairippos (recorded in a private epigram: *ISE* 13) who fell under the walls of Mounychia. Moretti (*ISE*, p.27), though he is inclined to date the decree in 287/6, notes that Chairippos’ name does not figure among the names of the commanders fallen in the attempt recorded by Polyaeus; moreover, the epigram records that Chairippos fell under the walls and not in Mounychia. Finally, he does not exclude the possibility of a date in 307/6 or in 295/4. The problem is inconclusive, but I would think that there would have been more than one attempt to regain Mounychia and the Peiraieus, and, accepting that Chairippos’ death did occur in the 280s, I would rather assign it to a different context than that of the incident recorded by Polyaeus; Chairippos’ way of death rather indicates a direct assault. Trying not to push the evidence too far, I would venture to say that an open assault on the walls would have preceded an attempt by means of treachery; conversely, I would believe that the death of eight generals and four hundred hoplites would have excluded the possibility of a future direct assault.
155 *Untersuchungen*, pp.102-6.
156 “Pausania 1, 26, 3 e la liberazione del Pireo”, RFIC, N.S. 112, 1984, 54-62. Gauthier (“La réunification”, p.371) also thinks that Peiraieus was recaptured but via negotiations and not military offensive.
Pausanias lays emphasis, in the previous clause, on Olympiodoros' recapture of the Mouseion Hill and then on his victory over the Macedonians at Eleusis (the τόθε should be understood to refer to the previous clause where there is described Olympiodoros' recovery of the Mouseion). A recovery of the Peiraieus in the 280s would have been his greatest deed, and it would have been worth much more detailed description.

Apart from this passage there is no solid evidence that the Peiraieus was ever recovered by Athens. Gauthier attempted to employ as additional evidence the phraseology in the Euthios decree, passed in 282/1; Athens promises to reward Euthios with more honours as soon as the astu and harbour are united (ISE 14, II.29-31). Gauthier thought that these lines were indicative of imminent recovery. It is true that c. 283-282 there was intense activity, but this does not prove that the harbour was, after all, recaptured.

Moreover, Gauthier identified Nikias Hysteros, whose archonship was divided in two, (a sign of change of government) with the Nikias of 282/1, arguing that the miniature prytany year was introduced in order to incorporate in the affairs of the polis the citizens of the Peiraieus. This argument has been adequately refuted by Osborne who pointed out that it was based on a misunderstanding of the Phaidros decree: "καὶ ἐπὶ Νικίου μὲν ἄρχοντος στρατηγὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ δῆμου χειροτονηθεὶς διὰ πάντων ὤν προσήκεν ἐπεμελήθη". Gauthier ignores that the διὰ qualifies the χειροτονηθείς; Phaidros was elected twice as a strategos in the archonship of Nikias I, the archon of 296/5.

Habicht cites three more testimonies pertaining, in his view, to evidence for Macedonian control of the Peiraieus after 281. A letter of the philosopher Epicurus informs us that the official of Lysimachos, Mithres (previously held in captivity at Corinth by Antigonos' brother

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158 "La réunification", pp.378-94.
159 "Nikias Hysteros", pp.279-80.
Krateros), is now at the Peiraieus and Epicurus is apparently negotiating his release (*PHerc* 1418, col.33). Habicht dates the letter c.280-277 whereas both Gauthier and Reger believe that a date before Lysimachos’ death in 281 is more likely, since it is then that Mithres would have been of more use to his captors; both, however, prefer not to push the argument too far.\(^{161}\)

The second testimony is more intriguing. In the Amphiareion at Oropos, Hierokles, appointed by Antigonos Gonatas in charge of the Peiraieus, discusses with the exiled philosopher Menedemos of Eretria a plan to recapture Eretria which had revolted from Antigonos (*Diog. Laer.*, II.127). Habicht dates the discussion to c.273/272 whereas Reger vigorously propounded a date after 268, in the course of the Chremonidean War.\(^{162}\) Reger’s argument runs as follows: Menedemos would not have asked refuge at Oropos between 273 and 268 because Eretria and Oropos were on friendly terms at the time, as is indicated by their common participation in the Delphic Amphictyonia. Secondly, Menedemos was at Delphi in 268, probably involved with the Amphictyonia, and it is unlikely that he would have been entrusted this responsibility if he had been an exile. Finally, given the favourable treatment of Eretria by Antigonos, Reger thinks that it is unlikely that she would have revolted in 274/3 when other Greek cities did; on the contrary, a breach in the relations of Eretria with Antigonos occurred early in the Chremonidean War, when a cult of Arsinoe Philadelphos is attested in Eretria. The conclusion is then that the discussion between Hierokles and Menedemos took place during the war and so did Hierokles’ appointment *epi tou Peiraios*.

Admittedly, Reger’s argument is quite forceful but, nevertheless, even if we remove this testimony as evidence for Macedonian control of the Peiraieus, there is still no evidence pertaining to the contrary. In any

\(^{161}\) “*La réunification*”, pp.374-7; Reger, “*Athens and Tenos*”, p.373.

\(^{162}\) “*Athens and Tenos*”, pp.374-8.
case there is hardly any objection that Antigonos had control of the harbour during the war.

Finally, as Habicht has suggested, the terms imposed on Athens by Antigonos are quite illuminating: Pausanias and Apollodoros record the installation of a garrison on the Mouseion Hill but nothing is mentioned about the Peiraeus, which indicates that there was already installed a Macedonian garrison.163

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163 The most recent solution to the problem is the one suggested by G. Oliver in his PhD thesis, namely that Athens never regained full control of the Peiraeus but, nonetheless, some sort of compromise was achieved and Athens managed to have access to the harbour.
CHAPTER II

1. Lykourgos' office

The entire career of Lykourgos is summarised in the decree in his honour, carried by Stratokles of Diomeia. This has been preserved both in manuscript and in the epigraphical tradition. Pseudo-Plutarch has preserved a full version but we are in the dark as to its resemblance to the original. On the other hand we possess two fragments of a decree (IG II² 457), and another fragment (IG II² 513) has recently been identified by Osborne as belonging to the same decree.¹⁶⁴

Scholars are agreed that they cannot put their finger on the exact office that Lykourgos held or on the duration of the tenure of his office. The inscribed stone is broken precisely at the point where the office would have been mentioned whereas Plutarch's text calls him "ταμίας τῆς κοινῆς προσόδου". Hyperides' reference to the office is quite interesting because it seems to be that of ταμίας ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει (5. col.18 and frg. 118).¹⁶⁵ Moreover, there is an inscription, dated to c. 334-326, where Xenokles is referred to as κ<α>ταστάθηκες δ' ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει τῆς πρόλεως (according to Meritt's restoration), which seems to confirm the view that there was established an office dealing with the dioikesis.¹⁶⁶ Additionally, in IG II² 513, l.6, which refers to the official

¹⁶⁴ "Lykourgos Again?", ZPE 42, 1981, 172-174. A. Oikonomides ("The Epigraphical Tradition of the Decree of Stratokles honoring 'Post Mortem' the Orator Lykourgos. IG II² 457 and IG II² 513", AncW 9, 1986, 51-54) has set the three versions side by side but his commentary is disappointingly brief. However, he remarks that the decree as provided by Plutarch is more verbose than the version preserved on the stone and as a consequence he does not seem to put much credit on the manuscript tradition. Contrary to this view I would maintain that what is preserved in IG II² 457 is quite similar both in length and in content with Plutarch's text, in particular the introductory clause and frg. b of IG II² 457. In fact IG II² 457, frg.b is more detailed with regard to the overall policy of Lykourgos towards Alexander (II.9-20).

¹⁶⁵ Hyp., V. col.18: [..... τοῦ δὲ ἐπὶ ἐπὶ νῦν δὲ—
[τοῦ...... ἐπὶ τῆς δὲ—
[οἴκησιν τῆς αὐτοῦ
ἀπασαν ταμίας ἐξει—
ῥωτόνδῃσαν ὑπολογίσαμ—
Hyp., frg 118: ταχθεὶς δ' ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει τῶν χρημάτων εὑρε πόρους.

¹⁶⁶ "Greek Inscriptions", Hesp. 29, 1960, p.2, no.3.
who was responsible for disbursing the funds for the statue, Osborne restored [δοῦναι τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει κεχειρο]τονημένον. On the other hand, no such office is mentioned in the Athenaion Politeia (written in the 320s), which would lead us to think that an office dealing with the διοικήσεις existed already by the 330s, but had not yet been regularised. J. J. Buchanan’s view is that Lykourgos’ office “was an extraordinary office,..., a token, as it were of a coalition government wherein party differences were to be put aside in favor of getting on with the necessary business at hand”.167 Furthermore, Buchanan denies any identification with the office of ὄ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει on the grounds that the first secure reference to this occurs in 307/6 (IG II² 463). However, as B. D. Meritt has put it “there may well have been no fixed title until after the restoration of the democracy in 307/6”.

Though I would not like to stress the evidence too far, it could be significant that the manuscript records “γενόμενος” = appointed with reference to Lykourgos being “ταμίας τῆς κοινῆς προσόδου”; further below Stratokles seems to emphasize the legitimacy of his tenure of office by advancing the participles “αἱρεθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου” and “χειροτονθεῖς”. None of these clauses mentions the exact title of office. It would seem then that the career of Lykourgos was marked by a series of offices created ad hoc. In this perspective, Rhodes’ suggestion that the office of Lykourgos may have been created especially for Lykourgos, not by law but by decree, seems quite plausible.168

2. The position of Demetrios Phalereus

Demetrios of Phaleron was established by Kassandros as an “ἐπιμελητής” (superintendent) of Athens (D.S., XVIII.74.3). IG II² 1201 (1.11) informs us that he was elected to a certain position, most probably that of the nomothetes, a restoration advocated by Dow and Travis: [νομοθέτης αἰρεθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ἀθηναίων, νόμου] ἔθηκεν

168 Athenaion Politeia, p.516.
καλούς καὶ συμφέροντας τῷ πόλει, which finds support in his extensive legislative activity and in the fact that Cicero placed Demetrios next to Solon for his legislative work (Cic., De rep. 2 1–2). In any case, I believe that the etheken excludes the possibility that this particular office was the strategia, the most popular restoration before Dow and Travis’ restoration.

It was also commonly argued, on the basis of IG II² 2971, that Demetrios held numerous times the strategia. Recently, however, S. Tracy removed the inscription from the period of Demetrios Phalereus to redate it in the 250s and has it refer to Demetrios Phalereus’ grandson. Thus, we only know with reasonable certainty that in 309/8 Demetrios held the archonship and that in 308/7 he was a strategos (Poly., IV.7.6). The removal of this crucial evidence, however, does not exclude the possibility that Demetrios had held the strategia more than once. An argument for successive strategiai is that Demetrios would wish to control military affairs, which seems reasonable enough. On the other hand, the Macedonian garrison at the Mounychia would provide enough support without Demetrios being a strategos. In the present state of evidence, I would only risk to suggest that there would be more need for Demetrios to hold the generalship after Kassandros’ enemy, Antigonos Monophthalmos had launched a campaign of liberation of the Greek cities and, consequently there was more need of control over the restless Athenians.

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3. Philosophers as envoys: Xenokrates and Krates

169 See S. Dow & A. Travis, “Demetrius of Phaleron and his Law-Giving”, Hesp. 12, 1943, 144–161 for a detailed discussion of previous restorations and the title under which Demetrios governed Athens.
170 This information is still nowhere in print, but I was informed that Tracy is going to publish it in the next volume of the Boiotika.
171 Williams, Athens without Democracy, p.198.
172 It is certain that Demetrios was interested in military affairs since among his treatises there was included a book titled Στρατηγικῶν, a fragment of which is most probably recorded by Polybius (X.24.7); Demetrios deals with assignment of a specific place and duty to every soldier in a military camp.
In 322, in the second mission to Antipatros there was included Xenokrates, the head of the Academy. It is a puzzle why the Athenians should decide to dispatch a metic - something quite unusual - and one rather hostile to Macedonia. According to Plutarch (Phoc. 27.2) he was the only one to protest against Antipatros' demands. G. Maddoli maintains that dispatching Xenokrates was a way for the Athenians to have their true, uncompromised feelings expressed nobly, whereas the other envoys could only compromise for what was expedient, which is a quite reasonable point. Whitehead also believes that Xenokrates had a role different from that of his fellow envoys; Xenokrates was a "supernumerary representative" actually treated as such by Antipatros: he persistently ignored him. Whitehead's view is that Xenokrates' rejection of Antipatros' terms would "have been no obstacle to their reception and confirmation by the ekklesia on the recommendation of their citizen "πρεσβευταί." However, it seems to me that in employing Xenokrates Athens, first and foremost, consciously attempted to take advantage of her cultural prestige or rather to remind Antipatros of it. Their past experience of the lenient treatment of both Philip and Alexander towards their polis would have made them aware of the effect their cultural prestige exercised on Macedonian monarchs. On the other hand, use of their cultural prestige by the Athenians does not exclude the interpretation offered by Maddoli; it seems that Xenokrates had a reputation of speaking freely his own mind, regardless of the circumstances or the persons he was addressing, a characteristic of which the Athenians would have been aware.

173 The only precedent could be the supposed embassy of the orator Lysias, another metic, to Dionysios I of Syracuse in 393 (Lysias, 19.19-20)
176 According to Cloché ("Phocion", p.166) Xenokrates would have been elected in order to placate Antipatros' violent disposition by means of his great personal (my italics) prestige. Although, this could operate (in fact it did not), I believe that Xenokrates was more valuable as a symbol of Athens' cultural glory rather than per se.
177 Pher. 224 = Philodemus Rhetorica II, p. 173 (Sudhaus): τὸν δὲ ξένον[κράτην, ὡς] εἰῶθει, διαπεραίνεσθαι πρὸς θέσιν ἐν Ἀ[καδημία, τὸν αὐτὸν τρό[πον...]θεσθαι καὶ τὸ [σιωπάν καὶ λέγει]ν Ἀντιπαράτρ -
A philosopher was dispatched as an envoy once more quite a few years later: in 286: Krates, a popular Cynic philosopher, was sent to Demetrios Poliorketes to negotiate the lifting of the siege of Athens, a mission which according to Plutarch (*Demetr.* 46.1–2) was quite successful. T. L. Shear has accepted the validity of Plutarch’s notice pointing out that the imminent arrival of Pyrrhos and of the Ptolemaic representative would have been a crucial factor in Krates’ success. As has already been pointed out, the negotiations and their content were much more complicated than this particular passage of Plutarch would allow us to assume and, at any rate, it is quite obscure when the siege was lifted and even more so whether Krates was the chief person responsible for the lifting of the siege. As it is, our information does not allow us to conclude with safety whether Krates was sent alone to Demetrios. My own view is that if Athens had chosen to send a single envoy to Demetrios, it is unlikely that they would have chosen a non-political man, a practice quite extraordinary up to that time.

Dispatching philosophers as envoys became a quite widespread practice in the later Hellenistic period. In the case of Xenokrates and, even more so, of Krates we encounter the birth of this phenomenon, but as far as concerns the impressive success attributed to Krates by Plutarch, it is possible that Plutarch is applying to him, retrospectively, the prestige that philosopher – envoys acquired in a later period.

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179 Habicht, *Athen*, p.240; the most notable embassy undertaken by philosophers is dated to 155, when the heads of the Academy Kritolaos, Karneades and Diogenes carried out successfully a mission to Rome.
CHAPTER III

1. Bithys’ identity

Until very recently there was a debate as to the precise identity of the official Bithys and, consequently, as to the date of the decree in his honour. Most scholars and among them M. J. Osborne identified Bithys of IG II² 808 with an officer in the service of Demetrios II who was known to have defeated Aratos of Sikyon at the battle of Phylakia in the mid-230s (Plut., Aratus, 34). Objecting to this dating S. Burstein alone suggested that Bithys should be identified with one of the members of Lysimachos’ entourage, who is depicted as a parasite in Phylarchus (Athen, XIV.614f; also id, VI.246e). Burstein had employed the evidence afforded by certain formulae in the decree, such as the form eis ten proten ekklesian, the stated price formula and finally the accidental – in his view – omission of the judicial scrutiny. Osborne, on the other hand attempted to refute his arguments by showing that the first formula appears in at least one quarter of the decrees of the period 262–232; as to the price formula he argued that differences in terminology are insignificant; as to the omission of the judicial scrutiny he argued that it can only be explained if the decree is dated after 262, since the scrutiny is a regular component of the decrees dating to the period 286–262 but not of those dating to the period 262–229. Although, I agree with Osborne that the presence or absence of procedural clauses such as the latter are of extreme importance, there had been precedents, as in the decree for Herodoros, albeit very rarely. As to his other arguments, I think that the only thing he has demonstrated is that the evidence of epigraphic formulae is indecisive. A. S. Henry argued against Osborne that the

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181 One of Osborne’s arguments against a dating of the decree in the 280s was that the decree for Philippides of Kephale did not provide us with any evidence of Lysimachos’ military involvement in Attika (Naturalization II, p.175); but the decree for Philippides evolves around actions and benefits that were brought about only because of him, either directly or indirectly.
formula *eis ten proten ekklesia* and more so that of the specified price are without parallel after c.270.182

At any rate, a recently discovered inscription from Kassandreia *(SEG 38.619)* has caused a turn in favour of Burstein’s view: Lysimachos donates pieces of land to Limnaios whose neighbour is *Bithys Kleonos*. According to M. B. Hatzopoulos the inscription should be dated after 285 and before 284/3 (on the basis of its representing Lysimachos as master of Chalkidike distributing land.).183 It would be too much of a coincidence if two people had the same patronymic while it is much more economical to assume that we deal with one and the same person.

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2. The non-democratic honours for Phokion

We possess literary testimonia referring to honours for Phokion, the date of which are quite obscure and, consequently, so is the political climate that favoured their attribution. Plutarch is our only source which specifically refers to a bronze statue erected in Phokion’s honour after his death. Concluding his *Life of Phocion* (38.5) he states that the Athenian people deeply regretted their treatment of Phokion and not long after his death they restored his reputation by awarding him a bronze statue.

Apart from that there is a reference to *doreai* proposed for Phokion by Meidias ([Plut.], *X Orat. Vit.* 850b). According to this passage Hyperides brought a *graphe paranomon* against Meidias in the archonship of Xenias, but his motion was unsuccessful. The greatest difficulty with this passage is that Xenias is completely unknown as an archon. The majority of scholars has attempted to discard this evidence and thought

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182 "Bithys, son of Kleon of Lysimacheia: Formal Dating Criteria and IG II² 808", in E. M. Craik (ed.), *Owls to Athens*, Essays on Classical Subjects Presented to Sir Kenneth Dover, Oxford 1990, 179-189. Recently, P. J. Rhodes ("One Treasurer Oligarchic, Many Treasurers Democratic?", in *Tria Lustra. Essays and Notes presented to John Pinsent* (LCM), Liverpool 1993, pp.1-3) has neatly summarised the considerable difficulties presented by attempts to date an inscription based on certain epigraphic formulae and has drawn attention to the need to be "very careful in basing arguments on the absence of a standard clause from certain texts". However, with particular regard to the problem of Bithys he thinks there is sufficient ground to agree with Henry.

that there must have been some confusion with a decree proposed by Glaukippos, Hyperides' son, against Meidias (a different one) who had also proposed *doreai* for Phokion. A. Schaefer first emended the archon's name from Xeniou to Euxenippou, thus dating the decree in 305/4 and, consequently, dismissing Hyperides' name as proposer of the decree; instead, he suggested that Glaukippos, Hyperides' son was the proposer while Meidias was the son of the well known rival of Demosthenes. Some sort of support of this view was provided by a passage in Plutarch (*Phoc. 4*) where Glaukippos appears to have spoken bitterly against Phokion. F. Robert accepted Schaefer's position, but thought that there must surely have been honours for Phokion during the regime of Demetrios Phalereus which were annulled in 307 with the coming of Demetrios Poliorketes only to be proposed anew by Meidias in 305.

Trittle is the only commentator not to dissociate the decree from Hyperides, although he admits that the archon's name has to remain an obscurity; he attempts to date the decree based on historical probability. He believes that the only appropriate context for this decree would be 340/39 when Phokion had prevented Philip from capturing Byzantion while the 330s or the 320s should be dismissed since there would be little occasion for *doreai* for Phokion or any other Athenian commander; Hyperides would have had first hand knowledge of the events since he was a syntrierarch at the time. Although I agree with Trittle that there had been such a decree by Hyperides, I do not see why a date in the 330s or the 320s should be excluded. To have precise knowledge of someone's activities, in our case Phokion, did not form a necessary prerequisite to bring against him a *graphe paranomon*. Additionally, it is not imperative

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185 "Des jüngerer Meidias, ehrendecret für Phokion", *Philologus* 9, 1854, 163-165.
186 "La réhabilitation", pp.526-35. J. Traill as well ("The Bouleutic List of 304/3 B.C.", *Hesp.* 35 1966, 205-240, pp.234-235.) accepts the dating of the decree but expresses his doubts as to the identification of Meidias; he underlines that the name 'Meidias' was quite common in the deme of Anagyrrhous.
187 *Phocion the Good*, pp.150-1.
that Phokion would have been honoured as a commander. On the other hand, it was precisely the 330s that witnessed the highest honours for Demades; it would not be surprising if the proposed honours were a result of Phokion’s participation in the embassies to Philip and Alexander. At any rate, I think that we can only secure a *terminus ante quem* for the decree, that is 322, the date of Hyperides’ death. We do not know the precise nature of the *doreai*, but it is not impossible that they would have included a statue.

If we insist on retaining Hyperides’ name as the proposer of the *graphe*, then are we allowed to suggest that, nonetheless, another Meidias had proposed honours in 305 which provoked Glaukippos’ attack? As Tritle has observed, *X Orat.Vit.* 850b referring to the bitter things Glaukippos said against Phokion, is very general and does not afford any conclusive evidence. In fact, Tritle has suggested that the occasion for this would have arisen in 317 when Phokion was honoured with a statue. For reasons I will analyse below, I find it implausible that the occasion for Glaukippos’ attack would have been a supposed renewal of honours in 305.

F. Robert at first and recently C. Bearzot have thoroughly discussed the rehabilitation of Phokion by Athens after his death, trying to relate it to specific political circumstances. Robert places the decision for the bronze statue referred to by Plutarch in the wider context of the negotiations with Kassandros in 317. Using basically the relevant passage of Diodorus (XVIII.74.1-2) he concludes that the oligarchic partisans of Phokion prevailed in the discussions of the *ekklesia* and took advantage of their predominance to promote the honours for Phokion; Robert believes that negotiations for an armistice and distribution of honours are not necessarily incompatible practices but he does not examine whether there was an ulterior motive, i.e an attempt to win Kassandros’ favour. Both Robert and Bearzot believe that the honours of 317 were annulled in

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188 Bearzot, *Focione*, pp.242-55.
189 "La réhabilitation", p.529.
307; therefore, the decree of Meidias dating, in their view, to 305 represents only a re-affirmation. However, Bearzot is differentiated in that she prefers to place the attribution of honours in the period of Demetrios Phalereus and not in the one immediately preceding it. Her basic argument is that the passage of Diodorus does not testify to a predominance of the oligarchic elements among the Athenians just before the establishment of Demetrios Phalereus; furthermore, Bearzot discards Plutarch's testimony that it was the people as a whole who, changing radically their minds, restored the memory of Phokion.

To my mind Bearzot's view is the most plausible one: Plutarch would have certainly presented the memory of his hero as having been completely restored in the eyes of the people, and I think that the negotiations with Kassandros were far from being the appropriate context for carrying an honorific decree.

The supposed re-affirmation of 305 demands further examination. The existence of such a decree, I believe, would imply a tremendous dichotomy in Athenian mentality.

According to Bearzot, the reconciliation between Kassandros and Polyperchon in 309 or in 308 led to obliteration of Phokion's memory and the fervent democratic climate of 307 led to the annulment of the honours; the re-affirmation of 305 lay with the partisans of Phokion.

I find it incredible that the environment in Athens of the last decade of the fourth century favoured the proposal of honours for Phokion. Why would the Athenians have changed their evaluation of his activities? In fact, the feeling against Macedonia was more hostile than ever, and Phokion had been regarded as its supporter. Therefore, we have to dismiss any hypothesis of re-affirmation of the honours for Phokion in 305; the statue for Phokion coupled with the statues for Demetrios

190 "La réhabilitation", pp.531-2; *Focione*, pp.245-6.
191 *Focione*, p.248.
Phalereus are the only honours for the period which are not an expression of genuine gratitude on the part of the demos.  

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3. The inconclusive case of Olympiodoros

I have already noted that the glorious career of Olympiodoros is alluded to solely by Pausanias (I.26.1-3; X.18.7; ibid., 34.3). C. Habicht has observed that the account of his exploits as provided indicates that Pausanias' source was an honorific decree, but to my mind this does not seem quite clear. If all the details provided by Pausanias come from a single honorific decree, then this should have been passed after 287. On the other hand, Pausanias could have employed the testimony of another source, most probably the historical work of Demochares who was an exact contemporary of Olympiodoros. The account of Olympiodoros' achievements covers a long period in his career, if not the whole of it; Pausanias starts from the recapture of the Mouseion Hill to proceed with his rescuing of the Mounychia Hill and to culminate with his leading the Eleusinians against the Macedonians. Pausanias mentions that there was a statue of Olympiodoros as well as a monument in the Prytaneion and connects them with Olympiodoros' achievement at Eleusis. This in turn suggests that either there was no honorific decree in 287 rewarding Olympiodoros with a statue or if it did exist it had not come to Pausanias' knowledge. Immediately afterwards Pausanias refers to the statue awarded Olympiodoros by the Elateians when he had repulsed Kassandros and it is fairly certain that their decision was spontaneous. It is possible then that the Athenians imitated them, especially if we think that his victory over Kassandros was the first over a Macedonian ruler, counting out those minor successes in the first year of the Lamian War. Such a date could have far-reaching implications for the Athenian mentality lying behind the attribution of honours as well as for the assumption of a

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192 For the 360 statues erected for Demetrios Phalereus see Strabo IX.1.20; [Plut.], Mor. 820e. Although this number seems to be a gross exaggeration, the statues should have been numerous.

193 Pausanias, p.92.
legislation arranging for an Athenian citizen to demand honours from the polis only at the end of their career. Two possibilities are open: either Olympiodoros was honoured early and no such legislation existed or it existed but the Athenians would override it in order to attribute the honour proper to a military exploit. As I have argued in the third chapter, there is no need to envisage such a legislation. Olympiodoros was honoured early in his career as a result of a glorious military victory. It was only because of the lack of military encounters that spontaneous honours for strategoi did not appear, and not because of any fear of the power young, ambitious generals could acquire as Gauthier thought.194

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194 Bienfaiteurs, p.112.
Appendix of Documents

I. Decrees for Athenian citizens


Δυκόφρων Λυκούργου Βουτάδης ἀπεγράψατο αὐτῷ εἶναι σίτησιν ἐν πρυτανείῳ κατὰ τὴν δοθεῖσαν δωρεὰν ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου Λυκούργῳ Βουτάδῃ; ἐπὶ Ἀναξικράτου ἄρχοντος, ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀντιοχίδος ἔκτης πρυτανείας. Στρατοκλῆς Εὐθυδήμου Διομειδὺς εἶπεν· ἐπειδὴ Λυκούργος Λυκόφρωνος Βουτάδης παραλαβὼν παρά τῶν ἐαυτοῦ προγόνων οἰκεῖαν ἐκ παλαιοῦ τὴν πρὸς τὸν δήμον εὑνοιαν <…>, καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι οἱ Λυκούργου, Λυκομήδης τε καὶ Λυκούργος, καὶ ζῶντες ἐτιμώντο ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τελευτήσασιν αὐτοῖς δι᾽ ἀνδραγαθίαν ἔδωκεν ὁ δήμος δημοσίας ταφὰς ἐν Κεραμεικῷ· καὶ Λυκούργος αὐτὸς πολιτευόμενος νόμους τε πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς ἔθηκε τῇ πατρίδι, καὶ γενόμενος τῆς κοινῆς προσόδου ταμίας τῇ πόλει ἐπὶ τρεῖς πενταετηρίδας καὶ διανείμας ἐκ τῆς κοινῆς προσόδου μύρια καὶ ὀκτακισχίλια καὶ ἐνακόσια τάλαντα· πολλὰ δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν διὰ πίστεως λαβών καὶ προδανείσας καὶ εἰς τοὺς τῆς πόλεως καιροὺς καὶ τοῦ δήμου τὰ πάντα ἐξακόσια καὶ πεντήκοντα τάλαντα· δόξας δὲ ἀπαντα ταῦτα δικαίως διωκηκέναι πολλάκις ἐστεφανώθη ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως· ἔτε δὲ αἱρεθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου χρήματα πολλά συνήγαγεν εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, καὶ παρασκευάσας τῇ θεῷ κόσμον. Νίκας τε ὁλοχρύσους πομπεία τε χρυσᾶ καὶ ἀργυρᾶ καὶ κόσμον χρυσοῦν εἰς (C) ἔκατόν καννηρόφους· χειροτονηθεὶς δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ πολέμου παρασκευῆς ὁπλὰ μὲν πολλὰ καὶ βελῶν μυριάδας πέντε ἀνήνεγκεν εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, τετρακόσιας <δὲ> τριήρεις πλωίους κατεσκεύασε, τὰς μὲν ἐπισκευάσας τὰς δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ναυπηγησάμενος· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἡμίεργα παραλαβὼν τοὺς τε νεωσοίκους καὶ τὴν σκευοθήκην καὶ τὸ θέατρον τὸ Διονυσιακὸν ἔξειργάσατο, καὶ ἐπετέλεσε τὸ τε στάδιον τὸ Παναθηναίκον καὶ τὸ γυμνάσιον τὸ κατὰ Λύκειον κατεσκεύασε, καὶ ἄλλας πολλὰς
Decree for Philippides of Paiania (IG II² 649 + Dinsmoor, Archons, pp.7-8. 293/2).

μηιαν, πολλάς [μ]έν καὶ με[γ]άλας χρείας παρέσχον[τ
ο τόι δήμων, πολλά δὲ ε[λ]’ [τάς] ἐπιδόσεις καὶ τρίηρ
ἀρξίας καὶ χρονιγίας καὶ τής [ά]λλης λειτουργίας
ἐκ τῶν ἑ[πί]διαν χρήματα ἀ[νά]πλωσ[αν], ἄν ὑπομνήματα ἔ[ν
ήματα καὶ α]λλα ἱερά[πται] καὶ στρατηγίας καλάς [καὶ
ἐν ἁ]ποδευκνύμενος ἐν τε τοῖς ἐπιδόσεις καὶ τῷ
ὑπαρχίας [κ]αὶ [χρονιγίας καὶ ταῖς ἀλλαῖς [λ]ε[ίτ
ὑπαρχίας καὶ φιλοτιμίας καὶ πάσας καὶ ἐξοροφὸν
θεῖς στρατηγός] [ἐ]κ τὸ [ν]ιαυτικὸν ἔστρατη]γη]σαν
tῶν ἀλλ[ων] ἀπαντῶν τὸ[ν] ἐν τεὶ ἄρχει ὅσα οἱ [ν]όμο[ν
ὁ]ροδοκύτως καὶ ἀγ[λο]νοθέτης αἱρεθεῖς πε[π]όηκεν
tῶν ἄγ[ων]ᾶς τοῖς θεοῖς [π]λάντας καλῶς καὶ φιλοτι-
μῶς καὶ τὰς ἀλλαῖς ἐπ[ιμελεί]ας πάσας ἐφ’ ὡς [αὐτὸ
[κ]αὶ ἀγανιστὴν ὁ αὐτός [ὑ πέρ τῶν τῶι] πατρ[ῆ]ις σ[υνφορούσας ἐν πάσιν τοῖς [κ
αιροῖς] παρέσχεται δι[δ]ο] ὁθαῦ τῶι δήμοι ἐπανε[σ
αὶ [Φιλιππίδῃς, Φιλομήλῳ Παιανία τῆς τε τῶν π’
ογόνων εὐταξίας καὶ ἄρ]τῆς ἐνεκα καὶ φιλοτιμί
ἀς πρὸς τῶν δήμων καὶ στελφανώσαι αὐτῶν χρυσοῖ [σ
τεφάνωι ἅπα τῆς ἸΗΗ ἰδραμὼν κ]αὶ [ἀ]νεπεῖν τῶι στεφά
νον Διονυσίων τῶι ἐν ὡ[στ]ὐι καὶ Δημητρί[ν]ὸ τρ[α
γωιδῶν τῶι ἄγων τῆς δ’ ἀν]αγορεύσεως ἐπιμεληθῆ
να τῶν ἀγανιστῆτας. στή]σαὶ δ’ αὐτό] τῶι δήμω καὶ
ἐκόνα χαλκῆν ἐν ἀγοράι] εἶναι δ’ αὐτῶι καὶ ἐγκόν

Decree for Philippides of Kephale (IG ΙΙ2 657. 283/2).

[ἐ]πὶ Εὐθίου ἄρχοντος ἐπὶ τῆς Ἁ[καμαντίδο]ς τρ[ίτης] [π]ρυτανείας, εἰ Ναυσιμένης Ναυσικόδου Χολαρ[γεύ] [κ] ἐγραμμάτευς· Βοηθομιῶν ὁγδόει ἐπὶ δέκα, ἐ[ν] [ν]άτει καὶ δεκάτει τῆς πρυτανείας· ἐκκλησία κυ[ρί] θὼν προέδρων ἐπεσφηζεν Ἰερομνήμον Τεισιμάχ ου ἐκ Κοίλης καὶ συμπρόεδροι· ἐδοξεν τῇ βουλεί κ α] τοί δήμωι· Νικήρατος Φίλεοι Κεφαλῆθεν ἐπεν· ἐ πείδη Ἐυλιππίδης διαστελλεκεν ἐν παντὶ καιρῷ[ι] ἀποδεικνύμενος τὴν πρὸς τὸν δήμον εὐνοιαν καὶ ἡ ποδήμησας πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα Λυσίμαχον πρότερον τε διαλεκθεὶς τοῖ βασιλεῖ ἐκόμισεν τοὶ δήμωι δω ρέαν πυρὸν μεδίμνους· Ἀττικοὺς μυρίους τοὺς δια δοθέντας πάσιν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπ᾽ Ἐυκτήμονος ἄρχοντ ός, διελέχθη δὲ καὶ ὑπὲρ κεραίας καὶ ἰστοῦ ὅπως ἄν δοθεὶ τῇ θείῃ εἰς τὰ Παναθήναια τῶι πέπλωι ἀ ἐκο μίσθη ἐπ᾽ Ἐυκτήμονος ἄρχοντος· καὶ νικήσαντος Λυ σιμάχου τοῦ βασιλέας [τῇ]ν máχν τὴν Ιψιᾶ γενομένην τὴν πρὸς Ἀντίγονον καὶ Νημέτριον τοὺς μὲν τελευτ ήσαντας ἐν τοῖς κ[ινδύνω]ι τῶν πολιτῶν ἐθαυμεν τοῖς έαυτοῦ ἀναλώμασιν, ὡσοὶ δὲ αἰχμάλωτοι ἐγένοντο, ἐμφανίσας τοῖς βα[σιλεῖ καὶ] λαβὼν αὐτοῖς ἄφε[σ]ιν, τ
ούς μὲν βουλομένους στρατιεύεσθαι διώκτησεν ὁπως ἂν καταχωρισθῶσιν [ἐν] ἡγεμονίας, τοὺς δὲ προαριουμένους ἀπιέναι ἀμφιέσας καὶ ἐφόδια δοὺς παρ’ ἐαυτοῦ ἀπέστειλεν οὖ ἐκαστοὶ ἡβ[ο]ύλοντο πλείον ως ὄντας ἢ τρακοσίους· παρειτήσατο δὲ καὶ ὅπως ἃν ἀφεθῶσιν καὶ ὅσοι τῶν πολιτῶν κατελήφθησαν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ εἰργήμενοι ὑπὸ Δημητρίου καὶ Ἀντιγόνους καὶ τοῖς ἀεὶ περιτυγχάνουσιν Ἀθηναίων χρήσιμοι ὃς ὄν διατελεῖ αὐθὸτ ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν παρακάλε ἕ, καὶ κομισμένου τοῦ δήμου τὴν ἐλευθερίαν διατελεσκέλει λέγων καὶ πράττων τὰ συμφέροντα τεῖ τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίας, καὶ παρακαλῶν τὸν βασιλέα βοήθειαν καὶ χρήμασιν καὶ σίτων, ὅπως ἂν διαμένει ὁ δήμος ἐλεύθερος ὃς καὶ τὸν Πειραιάν κομίσῃ καὶ τὰ φρούρα τὴν ταχίστην, καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτων πᾶν ἢντων πολλάκις μεμαρτύρηκεν αὐτῶν ὁ βασιλεὺς πρὸς τοὺς πρὸς ἐσθεύοντας Ἀθηναίων πρὸς ἑαυτόν· καὶ χειροτονοῦν ἔγον ἀγαθοθέτης ἐπὶ Ἰσαίου ἀρχοντός ὕπηκουσεν [ν τοῖ δήμων ἐθελοντῆς ἐκκ τῶν ἰδίων, τὰς τε πατρίοις θυσίας ἐθύσεν τοῖς θεοῖς ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῇ Ἐν..] ἐδώκεν πάσιν Ἀθηναίοις πάντας τοὺς ἀγάνακας, καὶ ἐπὶ θετόν ἀγάνα κατασκέυασεν τεῖ Δημήτριον καὶ τεῖ Κόρην [πρότος ὑπομηνία τῆς τοῦ δήμου ἐλευθερίας, ἐπεμελήθη δέ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀγάναν καὶ τῶν ἱυσίων ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως], καὶ εἰς ταῦτα πάντα ἐκ τῶν ἴδιοις ἀναλώσας πολλὰ χρήματα τὰς εὐθύνας δέδωκεν κατὰ τῶν νόμων καὶ οὔθεν ὑπεναντίων πρὸς δῆμος ἑμοκρατίαν ὑδατάποτε [ἐποίησε] ἐν ὁμολόγῳ οὕτω ἐργαὶ· ὅπως ἂν οὖν φανερὸν εἴπناس, ὅτι ὁ δήμος ἐπὶ σταταῖ ἱρίτας ἀποδιδόναι ήθος εὐεργέταις ἀξίων ἂν ἐν ὑπερεγετήσωσιν, ἀγαθεὶς [τύχους δεδοχθαί τε] ἡ βουλεία, τοὺς προεδρους οὖ ἄν ὀρίζοντο προεθρυόν υπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἡμῖν ἐραὶ τῆς αἰτίσεως χρηματισία τοῦ πρώτου εἰς τής πρώτης ἐκκλησίαν κατὰ τῶν νόμων άνω[μὴν δὲ ξυμβ]
ἀλλεσθαὶ τῆς βουλῆς εἰς τὸν δήμον, ὅτι δοκεῖ ζεῖ βάρει ὁυλεῖ, ἐπαινέσαι Φιλιππίδην Φιλοκλέους Κεφαλῆσέν τιν ἄρετῆς ἐνεκα καὶ εὐνοίας ἓς ἔχων διατελεῖ περί τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ στεφανῶσαι αὐτὸν ρυσόι στεφάνιοι κατὰ τὸν νόμον καὶ ἀνειπεῖν τὸν στέφανον Διονυσίαν τῶν μεγάλων τραγωδιῶν τῶν ἀγώνισα τῶν θεάς τόμων και εἰκόνα χαλκῆν ἐν τοῖς θεστής ρωι καὶ εἶναι αὐτῶι σήτησιν ἐν προτανείωι καὶ ἐκ γόνων ἀεί τού πρεσβυτάτωι καὶ προεδρίας ἐπὶ πάσι ἔτοις ἄγῳσι τοῖς ἡ μόλις τίθησιν ἕτος δὲ ποιήσεως τοῦ στεφάνου καὶ τῆς ἀναγορέύσεως ἐπιμεληθῆναι τούς ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσει ἀναγράψαι δὲ τόδε τὸ ψήφι σμα τὸν γραμματέα τὸν κατὰ προτανείαν ἐν στήλη λιθίνει καὶ στήσαι παρὰ τὸν νεώ τοῦ Διονύσου, εἰς δὲ τὴν ἀναγραφὴν τῆς στήλης μερίσαι τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς διοικήσει ΔΔ δραχμάς ἐκ τῶν εἰς τὰ κατὰ ψηφίσματα αὐτοὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἁναλησκουμένων τῶν δήμων.

ὁ δήμος

Decree for Demochares (Plut., X orat. Vit. 851d-f).

ἀρχων Πυθάρατος: Λάχις Δημοχάρους Λευκονοείς αἰτεῖ δωρεάν τήν βουλὴν καὶ τὸν δήμον τῶν Ἀθηναίων Δημοχάρην Λάχιτας Λευκονοεῖ εἰκόνα χαλκῆν ἐν ἀγορῇ καὶ σήτησιν ἐπὶ προτανείω <αὐτῶ> καὶ τῶν ἐγγόνων ἀεὶ τῷ πρεσβυτάτῳ καὶ προεδρίαν ἐπὶ πάσι τοῖς ἄγῳσι, εὐφρέτῃ καὶ συμβούλῳ γεγονότι ἀγαθῷ τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων καὶ εὐφρετηκότι τὸν δήμον τάδε προσβεύσατε καὶ γράφοντες καὶ πολιτευμένῳ ... οἰκοδομήν τείχον καὶ παρασκευήν ὀπλῶν καὶ βελῶν καὶ μηχανημάτων καὶ (Ε) ὁρυνωσάμενῳ τὴν πόλιν ἐπὶ τοῦ τετραετοῦ πολέμου, καὶ εἰρήνην καὶ ἀνοχὰς καὶ συμμαχίαν ποιησάμενῳ πρὸς Βοιωτοῦς ἂνθεὶ δὲν ἐξέπεσεν ὑπὸ τῶν καταλυσάντων τὸν δήμον καὶ ὡς κατήλθεν ἐπὶ Διοκλέους ἀρχοντος ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου, συστείλαντες τὴν διοίκησιν πρώτῳ καὶ ρεισαμένῳ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων καὶ προσβεύσαντες πρὸς Λυσίμαχον καὶ λαβόντες τῷ δήμῳ τριάκοντα τάλαντα ἀργυρίου καὶ πάλιν ἄτερα ἑκατὸν καὶ γράψατε.
πρεσβείαν πρὸς Πτολεμαίον εἰς Αἰγυπτον, καθ’ ἣν ἐκπλεύσαντες πεντῆκοντα ἐκόμισαν τάλαντα ἀργυρίου τῷ δήμῳ καὶ πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον πρεσβεύσαντι καὶ λαβόντι εἰκοσι τάλαντα ἀργυρίου καὶ (F) Ἑλευσίνα κομισαμένῳ τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ταύτα πείσαντι ἐλέσθαι τὸν δήμον καὶ πράξαιντι, καὶ φυγόντι μὲν ὑπὲρ δημοκρατίας, μετεσχηκότι δὲ οὐδεμιάς ἀλιγαρχίας οὐδὲ ἀρχήν οὐδεμαίαν ἥρχοτι καταλελυκότος τοῦ δήμου· καὶ μόνῳ Ἀθηναίων τῶν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἥλικιαν πολιτευσμένων μὴ μεμελετηκότι τὴν πατρίδα κινεῖν ἐτέρῳ πολιτεύματι ή δημοκρατία· καὶ τὰς κρίσεις καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ τὰς οὐσίας πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις ἐν ἁσφαλεῖ ποίησαντί διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ πολιτείας καὶ μηδὲν ὑπεναντίον τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ πεπραχώτι μῆτε λόγῳ μῆτε ἔργῳ.


ὁ δήμος
Καλλίαν
Θυμοχάρου
Σφήττιον

ἐπὶ Σωσιστράτου ἀρχοντος ἐπὶ τῆς Πανδιονίδος ἐκκτις πρυτανείας εἰ Ἀθηνόδωρος Γοργίππου Ἀχαρνεῖς ἐγραμμ ἀτευεν· Ποσιδέων διὸ γιδάει ἐπὶ δέκα, μιᾷ καὶ εἰκοστῇ μιᾷ ἡ πρυτανείας· ἐκκλησία κυρία· τῶν προέδρων ἐπεψήφιζε ἐπὶ Ἐπιχάρης Φειδιστράτου Ἐρχεῖς καὶ συμπρόεδροι ἐδὸξεν τεῖ βουλεῖ καὶ τῶν δήμων· Ἐυχάρης Εὐάρχου Κοννυλῆθεν εἶπεν· ἐπειδὴ Καλλία[ζ] γενομένης τῆς ἐπαναστάσεως ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἐπὶ τὸ ὡς κατέχοντας τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἀστεως στρατιώτας ἐγβαλόντος, τοῦ δὲ φρουρίου τοῦ ἐν τοῖς Μουσεῖοι ἐτί κατεχομένου καὶ τῆς χώρας ἐμ πολέμῳ ἡ ὁμοῖα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ Πειραέως, καὶ Δημητρίου παρὰ γιγνομένου ἐκ Πελοποννήσου μετὰ τοῦ στρατοπέδῳ
υ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀστυ, πυθόμενος Καλλίας τὸν κινδύνον τὸν περὶ τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἐπιλεξόμενος τῶν στρατιώτῶν χιλίους τῶν μεθ’ αὐτοῦ τεταγμένων ἐν Ἀνδρωι καὶ ἀνάδοσις ὁμόφων αὐτοῖς καὶ σιτομετρῆσας παρεγένετο ἀθῶν εὐθὺς εἰς τὸ ἄστυ τῷ δήμῳ ἀκόλουθα πράττων τεί τοῦ βασιλέας Πτολεμαίου πρὸς τὸν δήμον εὐνοία, καὶ ἐξάγων εἰς τὴν χώραν τοὺς στρατιώτας τοὺς μεθ’ αὐτοῦ πρὸ εκάθεντο τῆς τοῦ σίτου συνκομιδῆς πάσαν ποιούμενος σπουδὴν ὅπως ἄν εἰς τὴν πόλιν σῖτος ὡς πλείστος εἰσὶν ομισθεὶ· καὶ ἐπειδὴ παραγεινόμενος Δημήτριος καὶ περιστρατοπεδεύσας ἐπολιόρκει τὸ ἄστυ, ἀγωνιζόμενος ωστὶ πρὸς τὸ δήμον Καλλίας καὶ ἐπεξίων μετὰ τῶν στρατιῶτῶν τῶν μεθ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ τραυματίας γενόμενος κίνδυνον οὐθένα· ὑποστελλόμενος οὐδὲ ἐν ἐνὶ καρπῶι ἕνεκα τῆς τοῦ δήμου σωτηρίας· καὶ τοῦ βασιλεί(λ)έως Πτολεμαίου ἄποστειλαντος Σώστρατον τὰ συμφέροντα πράξοντα ταῖς πόλεις, καὶ Σώστρατον μεταπεμπομένου προσβείαν τοῦ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰς Πειραιὰ μεθ’ ἕς συνήθησε τὰ περὶ τὴν εἰρήνην ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως πρὸς Δημήτριον, ὑπακούσας εἰς ταῦτα τοῖστρατηγοῖς καὶ ταῖς βουλεύταις Καλλίας καὶ τῷ πρεσβεύον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου καὶ πρὸς τῶν πράττων τὰ συμφέροντα ταῖς πόλεις· καὶ συμπαραμελεῖνας ἐν τῷ ἄστει μετὰ τὸ ὅν στρατιωτῶν ἐὼς· ἔειρήνη σφυντελέσθηκε· καὶ ἀναπλεύσας τοῖς πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα Πτολεμαίον ταῖς πρεσβείαις τὰ ἄποστελλομέναις ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου συναγωνιζόμενος εἰς πάντα καὶ συνεργῶν εἰς τὰ συμφέροντα ταῖς πόλεις· καὶ παραλαβόντος τὴν βασιλεί(α)ν Πτολεμαίου τοῦ νεωτέρου βασιλέας ἐπιδημήσας εἰς τὸ ἄστυ Καλλίας, καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν καλεσάντων αὐτῷ καὶ ἐμφανιζόμενων τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἐν ὅις ἦν καὶ παρακαλοῦντο[ν] αὐτὸν σπουδασμένος ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα Πτολεμαίον ἅπας· ὅπως ἐν βοήθεια τῆς γέννησα τὴν ταχύτατον εἰς τὸ ἄστυ σίτωι καὶ χρήμασιν, καὶ ἀναπλεύσας εἰς τὸ βασιλεί[α]ν Καλλίας εἰς Κύπρον καὶ ἐντυχὼν ἐκεί τῶι βασιλεί[ε]ι φιλοτίμως ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως ἐκόμισεν τῶι δήμοι ἀργύριυ μὲν τάλαν.
τα πεντήκοντα, πυρών δὲ δισμυρίους μεδίμνους δωρεάν οἱ παρεμπτηθήσαν ἐγ' Δήλου τοῖς ἀποσταλεῖσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ
unteer καὶ ως ὁ βασιλεὺς πρῶτον ἐποίη τὰ Πτο[λεμαῖα τῆς ν θυσίαν καὶ τοὺς ἀγώνας τούς πατρὶ, πηφή[σ]α[μένου τοῦ δήμου οἱ θεωρίαν πέμπειν καὶ αξιώσαντος ὑπακουόσαι Καλλί]
Decree for Phaidros of Sphettos. (IG II² 682. ca.255).

ος Γλαυκέτου καθειληφότος Κύθνον καὶ καταγαγόντ
ος ἑντεύθεν τὰ πλοῖα τήν τε πόλιν ἐλαβεν καὶ αὐτὸν
Γλαυκέτην καὶ τὰ πλοῖα τὰ μετ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ παρεσκεύ
ασεν ἀσφάλειαν τοῖς πλέουσι τὴν θάλατταν. Καὶ
σάνδρου δὲ πολιορκοῦντος Ὄμρεν ἀποσταλεὶς στ
πατηγὸς ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν τῶν τῆς πόλεως τοὺς πολίτας
τοὺς πλέοντας ἐν ταῖς ναυσίν παρειτήσατο ὦστε τ
ὼν συμμάχοιν μόνους Ἀθηναίους ἀλειτουργήτους
eῖναι τῶν ἔργων τῶν πρὸς τὴν πολιορκίαν· καὶ αὐ
tός δὲ Φαίδρος τὴν αὐτήν αἴρεσιν ἔχων τοῖς προγό
[γονίςις] διατετέλεσεν ἑαυτὸν ἄξιον παρασκευάζω
ν τῆς πρὸς τὸν δήμον εὐνοίας· καὶ ἐπὶ Νικίου μὲν ἄρ
χοντὸς στρατηγὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου χειροτονηθεῖς ἐπὶ
tὴν παρασκευὴν δις πάντων ὃμι προσήκεν ἐπεμελήθ
η καλός καὶ φιλότιμος· καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν χειροτον
θεῖς πλεονάκις καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ξένους γενόμενος τρὶς
tὴν πᾶσαν ἐποίησατο σπουδὴν ὅπως ἂν οἱ στρατιώται
ὡς ἄριστα κατασκευασάμενοι παρέχωνται τὰς χρε
ιὰς τῶν δήμων· πρεσβεύσας δὲ πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα τὸν
Πτολεμαίον ἐκόμισεν τῶι δήμῳ σῖτον
καὶ χρήματα· χειροτονηθεῖς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἐπὶ τὰ
ὀπλα στρατηγὸς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν ἐπὶ Κιμωνὸς ἄρχοντ
ος διετέλεσεν ἄγανιζόμενος υπὲρ τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρί
ας, καὶ περισσάντων τεῖ πόλει καιρῶν δυσκόλων διεφύ
λαξεν τὴν εἰρήνην τῆς χώρας ἀποφαινόμενος ἀεὶ τὰ κράτ
ιστα, καὶ τὸν σῖτον ἐκ τῆς χώρας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καρποὺς
αἷτιος ἐγένετο εἰςκομισθῆναι, συμβουλεύσας τῷ δήμῳ
ι συντελέσαι [----------------------]
[...] καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐλευθέραν καὶ δημοκρατούμενην αὐ
tόνομον παρέδωκεν καὶ τοὺς νόμους κυρίους τοῖς μεθ’
ἄιτον [----------------------]
[---------] διετέλεσεν καὶ λέγων καὶ πράσσων ἀγαθ
ὁν ὁ τι ἦδύνατο ύπὲρ τοῦ δήμου [---------]
[----------------------]
[......] χειροτονηθεῖς ἐπὶ τὰ ὀπλα πρῶτος ύπὸ τοῦ δήμου
στρατηγὸς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν ἐπὶ Ξενοφῶντος ἀρχοντὸς
dιετέλεσσε πάντα πράττων ἀκολούθως τοῖς τε νόμοις καὶ
τοῖς τής βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου ψηφίσμασιν [---]

καὶ ἀγωνοθέτης χειροτονηθείς ύπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἐπὶ Νικίο
ν ἀρχοντὸς ἐπεμελήθη τῶν τε θυσιῶν ὅπως ἂν συντελεί[
[θεί] πάσαι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ οἱ ἀγάνες ὧς κάλλιστοι
[γένοι]ται καὶ άξιοι τῆς τοῦ δήμου φιλοτιμίας, καὶ ὡς[
[ροὐ] τοῦ ὑο Ῥημοχάρου ἀγωνοθέτου χειροτονηθέντος
[τόν] ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν ἐπὶ Εὐβούλου ἀρχοντὸς συνεπεμε
λήθη καὶ τούτων πάντων, φανερὰν ἀποδεικνύμενος
ἐμ πάσιν ἢν ἔχει πρὸς τὸν δήμον εὐνοιαν· καὶ τὰς ἀλ

λας δὲ πάσας λειτουργίας λειλειτούργησεν φιλοτιμ
ως, καὶ ὅσαι ἐπιδόσεις γεγόνασιν ἐν ταῖς δήμοις πα


καὶ ἀγαθεὶ τūχει δεδό

χθαι τε βουλεῖ, τοὺς προέδρους οἰτίνες ἃν λά

χωσιν προεδρεύειν ἐν ταῖς δήμοι, ὅταν αἱ ἡμέραι

αἱ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ἔξηκσιν, χρηματίσαι περὶ τοῦ
tων, γνώμην δὲ ξυμβάλλονται τῆς βουλῆς εἰς τὸν
dήμουν, ὅτι δοκεῖ τε βουλεῖ, ἐπανέστεισα Φαῖδρο


ν Ῥημοχάρου Σφήττιον καὶ στεφανῶσαι αὐτὸν

χρυσῷ στεφάναι κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἀρετῆς ἕνεκ

καὶ εὐνοίας ἢν ἔχων διατελεῖ περὶ τὸν δήμον τ

ἐν Ἀθηναίων· καὶ ἀναγορεύσαι τοῦ στεφάνον Δι

ονοσίων τῶν μεγάλων τραγωδῶν τῶι ἀγάνι τῶι
cαινῷ καὶ Παναθηναίων τῶν μεγάλων τῶι γυ


νικῆς ἀγάνων· τῆς ἔπος τοῦ στεφάνου

καὶ τῆς ἀναγορέυσεως ἐπιμεληθῆναι τὸν ἐπὶ
tεῖ διοικήσει· στῆσαι δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸν δήμον καὶ
eἰκόνα χαλκῆν ἐν ἀγοράι καὶ εἶναι αὐτῶι σίτ
ησιν ἐμ πρυτανείωι καὶ ἐκγόνων τῶι πρεσβυτ
ἀτωὶ ἀεὶ καὶ προεδρίαν ἐμ πάσι τοῖς ἅγωσιν
οἷς ἢ πόλις τίθησιν· χειροτονήσαι δὲ τὸν δὴ
μον ἢδη τρεῖς ἀνδρας ἐξ Ἀθηναίων οἰτίνες
ἐπιμελήσονται τῆς τε ποίσεως τῆς εἰκόνος
καὶ τῆς ἀναθέσεως· ἀναγράψαι δὲ τόδε τὸ ψήφι
σμα τὸν γραμματέα τὸν κατὰ πρυτανείαν ἐν σ
[τήλει λιθίνει καὶ στήσαι παρὰ τὴν εἰκόνα,
εἰς δὲ τὴν ἀναγραφὴν τῆς στήλης μερίσαι τ
ὁν ἐπὶ τεῖ διοικῆσει τὸ γενόμενον ἀνάλωμα.
Λύανδρος Λυσιάδου Ἀναφλύστιος εἰπεν· ἀγα
[θεὶ τύχει, δεδόχθαι τῷ δήμωι, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα
[πάντα πράττειν περὶ τῆς δωρεᾶς ἢς εἰτηκεν
Φαίδρος κατὰ τὸ πρότερον ψήφισµα ὁ Λύανδρο
η εἶπεν. τοὺς δὲ θεσμοθέτας εἰσαγαγεῖν αὐτ
Dİ τὴν δοκιμασίαν τῆς δωρεᾶς εἰς τὸ δικαστ
ἡριον κατὰ τὸν νόμον. ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνάθεσιν τῆς εἰκόνος
οἶδε κεχειροτονηνται· Θυμοχάρ
ἡ Σφήττιος, Μένων Ἀχαρνεὺς, Στράτων
Σφήττιος.

ἡ βουλὴ
ὁ δήμος

II. Decrees for foreigners

*IG II² 558, ca. 303/2, (11.6-19)*

[δήμωι ἐπαίνεσαι μὲν Ὀξύθεμεν Ἰπ
[ποστράτου Λαρισαίῳ]ν ἀρετῆς ἐνε
[κεν τῆς πρὸς τοὺς βα]σιλεῖς καὶ τὸ
[ν δήμῳ τὸν Ἀθηνα]ϊων καὶ στεφανῶ
[σαι αὐτὸν χρυσᾶ]ι στεφάνωι κατὰ τ
[ὁν νόμον· ὁπος δ'] ἀν ἐφάμιλλον> ἦ πα
[σι συναγωνίζεσθαι ἀπροφασίστω
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[ζ τή τε τῶν] βασιλέων προαιρέσει
[καὶ τή τε τῶν] Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίαι, τ
[μομένων] ὑπὸ τοῦ δῆμου κατ’ ἀξίαν
[τῶν ἀποδεικνυμένων] τὴν εἰς τὰ πρ
[ἀγματ]α εὐνοιαν, εἶναι "Οξύθεμιν Ι
[ππο]στράτου Ἀθηναίον αὐτὸν καὶ ἔ
[κγ]όνους

ΙΓ II² 553, ca 304/3, (11.2-14)
[.....χρείας παρέχετο τῶι δ[ῆμωι τῶι Ἀθηναίων]
[........α]ύτοι καὶ οἱ ἔγερμόνες οἱ τε μετά.]
[.......κ]λείδου τοῦ στρατη[γο]ύ καὶ οἱ ........]
[...]ου, καὶ ταῦτα πρότερο[ν τε] ἐπέ[στειλε]..... κλ.
[eἰδής] περί [Νεαίου] τή βου[λή]τι καὶ τῷ δήμῳ, καὶ ν]
[ῦν] παρὼν αὐτὸς ἀποφαίνει τῶι δῆμωι[ν ὃτι ......]
ροις ἔτι προσεπέδωκε Ν[εαίος] τῶι δῆμῳ .....ε]
ἰ τὸν πόλεμον, δεδόχθαι τῶι δήμῳ [ἐπαινέσαι μὲ]
ν [Νεαίον] φιλοτιμίας ἑνεκά καὶ εὐνοίας τῆς εἰς τ]
ὁν δήμον τὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ στεφανώσ[αι αὐτὸν χρυ]]
σῶι στεφάνωι ἀπὸ Ἐκ. δραχμῶν ε[ἰ]ναι δὲ α[ὐτόν καὶ Α]Θ]
ηναῖον καὶ φυλῆς καὶ δήμ[ο]υ καὶ φρατ[ίας ἐξε]ναι]

ΙΓ II² 646 (SEG 25.86), 295/4, (11.10-25)
[..........]ς εἰπεν· ἐπειδὴ Ἰρόδωρ
[ος πρότερον τε] διατριβῶν παρ’ Ἀντιγό
[νοι τῶι βασιλε]ϊ εὐνοὺς ἢν τῶι δήμωι τ
[ὁι Ἀθηναίων κα]θ] νῦν ἐμ πίστει<ν> ὅν τῶι βα
[σε]ι Ασκετρίκ]οιν ἀγαθὸν ὅτι δύναται
[πράττει κοιν]εῖ τε ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως κα
[ι ἰδίαι ὑπὲρ ἐκ]κάστου Ἀθηναίων ἀει το
[ν δειμένου, ἀποφαίνουσιν δ’ αὐτόν και
[οι πρέσβεις οἱ] πεμφθέντες ὑπὲρ τῆς ε]
[ἱρήνης πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα Δημήτριον σ]
[υγαμωνίσασθαι] τῷ δήμῳ εἰς τὸ συντ
[ἐλεσθήναι τήν] τε φιλιάν τὴν πρὸς τὸν
[βασιλέα Δημήτρ]ιον καὶ ὁ δῆμο
[ζ ἀπαλλαγε[ις το]ῦ πολέμου τὴν ταχίστ
[ην καὶ κομισάμε]νος τὸ ἀστυ δημοκρατ
[ὶαν διατελῇ ἐ]χων· ἀγαθὲ τὺχει δεδὸ
[ἐπαινέσαι Ἡρόδωρον]