FROM SUBSISTENCE TO PETTY CAPITALIST LANDLORDS: A STUDY OF LOW-INCOME LANDLORDS IN SOUTH AFRICA'S FREEHOLD TENURE SETTLEMENTS

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Abstract

There has been a general agreement among low-income housing analysts of developing countries that in order for the governments to improve low-income householders' access to shelter, they should refrain from providing housing. Instead, the role of government should be to facilitate the provision of land, securing tenure, providing infrastructure, all of which are necessary to support the initiatives of low-income householders in pursuance of homeownership.

However, this shift in the role of government and in the meaning of housing policy has been the subject of much controversy. Some have argued that these "non conventional housing policies" have led to higher costs of production for the poor, forcing these householders to become tenants. Others have associated the cost of production with the rise in different forms of low-income landlords.

This thesis is a contribution to the study of low-income landlords. It unveils some of the shortcomings of low-income housing literature on landownership. Implicit in these studies, is the assertion that the promotion of secured tenure, tenure legalisation and freehold landrights in low-income settlements promote the ownership of land by low-income householders. However, they do not explore in any systematic way if the benefits of landownership can affect levels of investment in rental housing.

This thesis investigates the impact of promoting landownership by granting freehold land tenure. Using three freehold tenure settlements in South Africa, as case studies, it demonstrates the links between the promotion of landownership, the rise in informal land relationships and the development of three forms of landlords. On the question of landownership, the principal hypothesis advanced by the research is that various forms of state intervention in land, transform non capitalist forms of access to land and contribute towards multiple-plot investments. Regarding the development of forms of landlordism, it is argued that when the government intervenes in land markets to promote freehold landrights, it creates divisions among low-income householders, based on the ability to purchase a titled plot. As a consequence, three groups of householders will appear: those who have been priced out by the cost of a freehold titled plot and rely on informal land relationships, those who have voluntarily chosen to enter into these land relationships and finally, those who can afford to invest in multiple-plot ownership.

The thesis finds that the introduction of freehold land rights in South African low-income settlements does not lead to the universal ownership of land by low-income householders. Instead, it accelerates the rise in multiple plot ownership and the development of informal land relationships between the landowners and the non landowners. It concludes by suggesting the inclusion of low-income landlords in the South African government policies on land and housing to alleviate housing shortages.
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Isiza
A none refundable deposit payable to the landowner by the householder seeking a rented plot.

Umakhi
Multipurpose builders of mud houses. Skills are acquired informally.

Messelaan
Builders of permanent houses constructed of bricks and blocks. Their services may also be utilised by those living in mud houses to cement floors and walls.

Ukubhanda
The final preparation of mud houses. Tasks mainly performed by women and children, for example giving the exterior of the mud house a smooth finish.

Ukuchofa
A stage prior to ukubhanda, where women place mud between wattles to dry.

Ukugandaya
Levelling of the site prior to the commencement of the construction of mud houses. The task involves women, children stamping on the ground to make it level.
This activity may also be performed prior to the cementing of floors.

Ilima
Voluntary none paid building groups.

Togt labour
Seasonal paid labour used by the householder to do various tasks, for example clearing the site.

Outbuilding
Is a building not part of the main house

Stockvel
Credit rotating associations

Ilobolo
A bride-wealth, cattle or money, conveyed in a marriage arrangement from the man’s household to the woman’s

Spaza shop
Unlicensed informal shops

Zozo hut
Portable huts

Umthengi
All those who have bought land with freehold title deeds

Umqashi
All those who do not have title to land and who rent land from landowners on which they have built houses.

Isibhalo
Forced labour system in which the chiefs, in collaboration with the Labour Bureaux identify potential migrant workers from their villages.

Black spot
Areas deemed unsuitable for certain racial groups.

SNA
Secretary for Native Commission

SANAC
South African Native Affairs Commission

Exchange Rate
(1995)
5.606 Rands =Approximately £1 Sterling
3.649 Rands =Approximately 1 US$

Measurements
1 Morgen, =approximately 4.1 acre
1 acre = approximately 4046.92 square metres
1 Morgen,= approximately 0.86 hectare
5 Morgen, = approximately 4.18 hectare
INTRODUCTION

Ownership of more than one plot has often been denounced as exploitative and has often led to several governments of the developing world employing drastic measures to curtail the spread of multiple plot-ownership, such as confiscating any plots above one, imposing land quotas, and compelling householders owning more than one house to cede them to the state. This is often done in the name of the poor, as the following extract explains:

Let us set a limit to the amount of land an individual may own, give excess land to those who really need it, and put a stop to the concentration of landownership in the hands of the few (Angel, 1983:110 quoting Tung Chung-Shu).

The exploitative effects of the landowner and non-landowner relationship are multifold, and have often been observed at the theoretical, policy and local levels. In low-income housing studies in general, it has led to a redirection of studies from the subject of tenancy to home ownership. Home ownership is seen as a solution to tenant exploitation. This has prevented any further investigating of the landowner and non-landowner relationship taking place as this relationship is assumed to have disappeared when the government acted as a mediator between landowners and tenants to provide secured tenure. As large-scale ownership of land became increasingly associated with wealth, there was a growing trend among researchers to dissociate themselves from landownership, and instead to concentrate on home ownership, tenancy, squatters, illegal settlements and so on, as they too did not want to be seen supporting the wealthy landowners.

At the theoretical level, housing studies that previously dealt with these relations used the landlord/tenant relationship as their starting point for any analysis of low-income rental housing. This occurred in several ways. First, preoccupation with the scale of letting such as the number of rooms landlords let, houses, plots owned, how much landlords charge for rent, and the ratio of rents to tenants' income were all accepted as concepts to conceptualise landlordism and, above all, to express exploitation. Secondly, the ease with which landlords double or even treble their profits within months of taking over as landlords was highlighted. Thirdly, in further explaining the landlord/tenant relationship, evictions, mobility within tenant households, rent increases, and the use of intermediaries to conceal identities were concepts used to explain tenants' poverty as
opposed to landlords' wealth. Finally, concepts were developed by investigating tenants.

Since little was known about landlords, let alone the production of rental housing, at the policy level, government interventions often favoured tenants, and encouraged home ownership and the purchasing of condominiums. In most cases rent-control measures were introduced, contracts were signed between landlords and tenants to prevent evictions, and courts were set up. Due to the failure to analyse landlords' operations and the production process, these interventions scaled down landlordism, but reduced private rental stock and led to the deterioration of buildings which were no longer maintained. At the local level, these interventions by the government have sometimes created conflicts between landlords and tenants.

**Research Problem**

The research is not about whether large-scale landownership is good or bad but it unveils some misconceptions about the subject. It explores the relationship between landowner and non-landowner, particularly informal land relations that have developed in low-income settlements, which form the basis through which low-income households have been able to access land, participate in self-help housing and, above all, be providers of low-income rental housing. Therefore, landowners are viewed not as exploiters, but as providers of land, and facilitators of self-help housing production, whether for rent or for owner occupation.

The concern about low-income landlords has arisen from the failure of literature to adequately explain the effects of land policy on low-income landlords. The preoccupation of low-income housing studies with home ownership, settlement upgrading and site and services schemes, only emphasised the role of state in regularising tenure, as far as it aided the process of attaining home ownership. The only links established between land regularisation being an indirect effect, leading to tenants' eviction, as the settlement improves, houses are upgraded and landlords are able to charge higher rents.

Central to the land tenure regularisation is the link between secured tenure and home improvements. Richartz (1990) and Martin (1983) have noted an increase in house investments
due to tenure regularisation. Again, the concern here is on houses constructed for home ownership and not for rent. The question of whether the same factors can, for instance, explain variations in rental housing investments is still left unanswered. Does the ownership of land by landlords increase investment in rental housing?

Another concern relates to the inability of these studies to explain the development of informal land relations within regularised settlements and how these relations are also a by-product of the promotion of ownership of land and their role in determining investments made on low-income housing.

Although absentee landlords have been observed on a large scale, misunderstanding about the concept and their roles persist. Some scholars have suggested that "large-scale landlordism exists, but only sporadically" (Wahab, 1984:14). Describing large-scale landlordism, Wahab (1984:25) argues that "large-scale landlordism does exist; [and] these landlords appeared to be powerful and influential people in the colonies where they rent out". Recognising the incidence of multiple plot-ownership, Wahab (1984:25) writes, "their motives and future plans for letting did not become clear, but it seems though, speculation is the motive". Absentee landlords are somehow linked to the well-off, who could afford to purchase more than one plot, the motive being speculation. Because of the lack of studies that focus on the nature and conceptualisation of absentee landlords, it has not been possible to distinguish whether multiple-plot ownership means the same thing as access to multiple plots, or whether an absentee landlord who invested in plots, through purchase, operates on the same level as an absentee landlord who rents plots from the landowner. Should we continue to regard the latter as a speculator, even though he/she has no legal ownership of those plots and can barely meet his/her level of subsistence?

One other problem relates to the explanation of the concept “mobility”. Previous studies on residential mobility associated mobility with labour forces, and perceived mobility as the consequence of job shift. Studies on residential mobility have sought to offer answers to the following questions: What are the characteristics that distinguish mobile households from stable households? What effect does mobility have upon residents’ social structure in an area?

Rossi (1955), in addressing the question of why families move, suggests that housing needs and
dissatisfaction arise from changes in a household's life cycle. Clark and Onaka (1983) distinguish between forced (involuntary) moves, necessitated by public institutional intervention, and "adjustment" moves, due to lack of space.

Edwards (1983:133) makes a distinction between desired and actual mobility where desired mobility is "a stated preference for a particular type of tenure or accommodation", and "household characteristics are fundamental in determining actual mobility". Others, like Turner (1976), have focused on the mobility between types of residential tenure (tenancy to home ownership). The concept of "desired mobility" is of limited use when applied to low-income landlords. First, it is concerned with the mobility between housing tenures than within the form of landlords. Second, mobility is neither linked to the effects of land policy nor the informal land relations. Finally, the role of the mobility to landlords, and to the beneficiaries of low-income rental housing such as the tenants observed in low cost form of rental housing lack exploration.

There is a need to modify the theoretical framework developed by Kumar (1992) for analysing low-income landlords in South African settlements. The perspective identifies three forms of landlord, subsistence, petty bourgeois and petty capitalist landlords. The difference between subsistence landlords and petty capitalist landlords is that the former owns a single plot, and rental income plus household income is below the poverty line. The latter has invested in more than a single plot and has income plus rents which are above the poverty line. Petty bourgeois landlord owns a single plot and has income plus rents which are above the poverty line. The definitions of petty capitalist and subsistence landlord are partially applicable in the South African situation. There were subsistence landlords who had access to more than a single plot, although they were very poor, and there were also petty capitalist landlords who invested in plots but continued living below the poverty line.

Why is the study of low-income landlords so important?

While a considerable number of studies have focused on tenancy (Amis, 1984; Gilbert, 1983; Green, 1988), reference to landlords has only been noticed when they are compared to tenants (Pennant, 1990; Lee-Smith, 1990; Gilbert & Varley 1989). Apart from McDowell and Allen
lands, landlords are rarely made the focus of investigation. Gilbert and Varley (1989:1) confirm this contention:

In order to stimulate rental housing it is, of course, necessary to know who lets accommodation ... but ... neither the academic literature nor government publications provide us with information.

Very little is known about low-income landlords in South Africa. Low-income housing studies have focused on public rental housing (Morris, 1980), informal settlements (Mathva, 1987), the impact of redevelopment policies on low-income tenants (Moodley, 1993), and the constraints of transforming state tenants into homeowners (Hardie & Hart, 1989). A handful of studies which have highlighted the predominance of landlordism have made reference to landlordism only in drawing a link between forced removals and landownership. The emphasis is, however, on the effects of removal on tenants (Cross & Preston-Whyte, 1989). A recent study of violence and tenure in Inanda, Durban, by Cross and Preston-Whyte (1989) fails to explore the role of landlords in providing shelter, and refers to landlords merely serve to highlight the impact of violence on landownership.

Although landlords are numerically small compared to non-landlords, they have a significant role in providing rental accommodation for low-income urban households. According to Kumar (1996), landlords in Naduvankari, a colony in Madras, India, comprise 19% of all households, but are able to house 24% tenant households. In Chinna-Karakuttai, also in India, it is reported that (23%) of landlords accommodate 181 tenants (62%).

While the literature points out at the predominance of absentee landlords, no studies have dealt with absentee landlords. Evers (1984) points out that in South East Asian cities, 55 per cent of land is owned by individual landlords, 14 per cent by companies, nine per cent is owned by churches and other institutions and 22 per cent is in the hands of government.

Investigations of absentee landlords have received the least attention (compared to tenancy and ownership), since landlords often use intermediaries to conceal their identities. Amis's (1984) documentation of squatter landlords in Nairobi, Kenya, found that 28 per cent were using
intermediaries.

Similarly, McDowell and Allen (1989) report the use of intermediaries by landlords in Britain. Yonder (1987) reports that landlords were unknown to their tenants. Kumar (1996) and Wahab (1984) have shared similar views.

The form of landownership, is often cited as the reason for the lack of studies on low-income landlords. Joint plot-ownership increases the likelihood of tenants not knowing their landlords. Aina (1990) observes how tenants have to deal with co-landlords. Moitra et al (1987) suggests a three-tier system where landowners rent land to occupants, who then build houses and rent them out to tenants.

The second problem relates to absentee landlords' failure to openly admit to renting space, in fear of taxation. Wahab (1984:8) illustrates this:

While [we were] interviewing a tenant in his rented house his landlord came in. The man immediately ordered the tenant to leave the room and forbade him to give any information whatsoever. After that the landlord tried to convince us the man we had been talking to wasn't a tenant at all. He was a relative and, of course, he didn't have to pay any rent.

Historical conceptualisation of landlordism has also created difficulties in investigating landlords. Keans (1994:11) summarises the attitude of people towards absentee landlords as: "speculative middlemen, a curse to society, ... generally entirely lost to any sense of responsibility and seeking only continually evade their liabilities under the law."

Finally, for political reasons landlords may prefer to hide their identities (Amis, 1984).

Research hypothesis

In response to the limited studies of low-income landlords, in particular, the effects of land-tenure regularisation on the development of form of landlordism, the study is designed to answer the
The following research questions.

- What forms of low-income landlords operate in South African settlements?
- Which form of landlordism dominates in these settlements?
- What prevents/promotes conversion from one form to another?

The objectives in undertaking a study of low-income landlords in South Africa were as follows:

- To investigate the different forms of landlordism operating in South African low-income settlements and to explain the causes of and variations in such forms of landlordism.
- To investigate the effects of promoting landownership by the granting of freehold tenure in the development of low-income landlordism.

In order to provide answers to the research questions, as well as to explore the effects of land tenure, freehold tenure settlements have been chosen as case studies. "Freehold" denotes that householders have title deeds to plots, having purchased them from existing land markets. Three settlements, selected from three cities, were used for investigation. They include Caluza, Edendale, near the city of Pietermaritzburg; St Wendollins, near Pinetown, Durban; and Winterveld, outside Pretoria. Low-income landlords are the focus of the research, with non-landlords used as a control group. The tools used for collecting information include the use of quantitative research methods (questionnaires), qualitative methods and secondary data.

The study of low-income landlords has its limitations. First, its focus on freehold land rights settlements meant the exclusion of settlements characterised by leasehold tenure and those without formal tenure, such as squatter settlements. Second, freehold settlements that had not originated as self-help settlements were also excluded. Finally, the comparison relates to freehold settlements rather than between settlements characterised by different forms of land tenure. Policy recommendations relate specifically to freehold landright settlements.

The theoretical hypotheses advanced by the study can be divided into two forms. The main
hypotheses and subhypotheses. The main hypotheses state that:

Various forms of state intervention, currently observed through the implementation of land policies, in low-income settlements, transform the non-capitalist form of accessing land and contribute to the rise in multiple-plot investment.

The State’s promotion of land ownership, by granting freehold tenure, encourages the polarisation of low-income householders into two distinct levels, distinguished by their relation to land and financial circumstances.

The theoretical subhypotheses state that:

At one level, ownership of land allows the growth of petty capitalist landlordism: petty capitalist landlords respond to the opportunities created by the transformation process by using land as an investment.

At a lower level freehold tenure creates a group of householders, restricted by a lack of income to purchase a plot with title, who are forced to enter into informal land relations with landowners. Establishing ties with landowners is a means of satisfying shelter needs.

Subsistence form of landlordism, arising from the landowner/non-landowner relationship is of two forms. Residential and absentee form.

Tenure, non-ownership of land and informal land relations lower investment on rental housing, and reinforce poverty and dependence on rents.

Between these two extremes are low-income landlords who enter into informal land relations with landowners, not out of desperation to satisfy shelter needs. But informal land relations are an incentive to landlordism, mobility and capital expansion. Petty bourgeois landlords arise from voluntary informal land relations.
**Approach to the research**

Regarding landlords, the thesis is aligned with the works of Kumar (1992; 1996) who conceptualised landlords operating in low-income settlements as "petty commodity producers". This approach clearly distinguishes low-income landlords, who operate in the cities of developing countries from those in the developed world. They are called "petty commodity producers" because they operate outside the rules governing capitalist production. At one level they seem totally divorced from the capitalist system and, at another, they may share some features with capitalist system. Like the capitalist landlords, they may rent sites, houses, and so on, but access to sites is done informally. A verbal agreement secures access to a piece of plot, there are no leases, or papers to sign.

Under this approach, low-income landlords are not a homogeneous group. There are three forms: subsistence, petty bourgeois, and petty capitalist landlords. The reasons for low-income householders becoming landlords differentiate one form from another. Subsistence landlords let space as a survival strategy, to earn cash in order to meet basic household needs, such as food, clothing, and so on. The petty bourgeois, also in need of an extra cash, let space, but not out of desperation as they can continue to subsist even when rents are not forthcoming. Petty capitalist landlords are motivated by a desire to expand capital, and purchase properties as a means of increasing their wealth. While these forms of landlords are clearly distinguishable from one another, in this study landlordism is not perceived as a static process. Landlords may change from one form to another, such as from being a subsistence to petty bourgeois landlord only if financial circumstances change, and rents are not regarded as a survival strategy. Also, landlords may begin letting space as petty bourgeois or petty capitalists and at any time may stop participating as landlords. Landlordism, according to this approach, is a temporary phenomenon.

However, this research is a departure from the study of low-income landlords developed by Kumar (1992), whose starting point was the state's withdrawal from housing provision, and landlords within site-and-services and upgrading programmes. Here, the starting point is the effects of state land policies, patterns of landownership developed as a result of state intervention, and how these landowner/non-landowner relations have the potential of explaining variations in
subsistence and petty capitalist landlords. There are two forms of subsistence landlords, residential and absentee. Petty capitalist landlords are also divided into two, those living below and above the poverty line. Upward and downward mobility can take place within the same form of landlordism. The mobility from residential to absentee subsistence landlord can take place when the landlord has access to a second plot. The sudden loss of income among the petty capitalist landlords may put them below the poverty line whereas improvements in household income can lead to upward mobility putting them above the poverty line. The research therefore demonstrates that it is when low-income landlords are examined within land-tenure systems that we are able, first, to show an interconnectedness between state land policies, patterns of landownership and the development of landlordism, and, second, to illustrate that access to more than a single plot is not an indication of wealth.

**Contributions**

The thesis, therefore, makes two contributions. First, it adds to the limited research on the impact of land policies, and the influence of the landowner/non-landowner relationship on proliferation of low-income landlords. It therefore makes a theoretical contribution by exploring variations in subsistence and petty capitalist form of landlordism, and how these can be understood only when low-income landlords are examined in the context of government policies on land. It further examines some implications of policies based on a limited understanding of these relations.

It contributes towards an understanding of the influence of these informal land relations on investment and the consolidation of low-income housing. Access to land influences the quality of housing produced, rentals and even the tenants of rental accommodation. Thus, if low-income rental housing is to be promoted and expanded, the factors underlying the production process and land tenure will have to be uncovered.

Second, the general concern of the study is to make a contribution to the understanding of dynamic changes in low-income landlords, particularly of the mobility between different forms of landlordism, an attempt is made to link mobility to various state land policies. This is because, first, different forms of landlordism operate in low-income settlements; they include subsistence, petty bourgeois and petty capitalist landlordism (Kumar, 1992;1994). The transition from one
form of landlordism to another will have an impact on the future production of the rental accommodation by, on the one hand, increasing the rental stock if the transition is geared towards petty capitalist landlordism, where access to more than one plot indicates an increase in rental accommodation through construction. On the other hand, it can be regarded as downward mobility, which may be accompanied by a reduction in rental housing or its quality, or even the total withdrawal of the rental accommodation when a landlord seizes it to re-rent the space. Low-income landlords therefore influence the production and consumption of rental accommodation by either increasing or decreasing the production process. Thirdly, understanding the mobility of low-income landlords calls for policies that will be able to deal specifically with landlords, which will understand the dynamic changes in the nature of landlordism and the rental housing stock. Finally, the mobility of low-income landlords has not been researched. The thesis, therefore, expands on Kumar's definition of landlords and mobility and explores the role of land tenure as an external factor in explaining landlordism and other internal factors.

In addition to the above contributions, the thesis goes beyond the understanding of room rental as the only type of rental accommodation found in low-income settlements, but highlights how the land tenure system may also influence the quality of rental housing, the types of accommodation produced and even dictate the sustainability of landlordism.

**Organisation of thesis**

The thesis has eight chapters. Chapters 1 to 3 are devoted to concepts, Chapters 4 to 6 discuss the historical background of South Africa, and the following two, Chapters 7 to 8, present the case studies. Chapter 9 is the conclusion.

The aim of Chapter 1 is to link the study of low-income landlords to existing literature on housing. The chapter reviews the literature on low-income rental housing and provides a critique of approaches. It emphasises the merits of perceiving low-income landlords as producers, introduces a typology of landlords to be used throughout the research and explains how these have an ability to overcome conceptual problems.

Chapter 2 is devoted to the discussion of the theoretical framework used for analysing low-
income landlordism and the production of low-income rental accommodation. It expands on the forms of landlords presented in Chapter 1, by linking their development to the capitalist intervention and the transformation of non-capitalist forms of landownership. It stresses the relevance of the theoretical framework to dependent capitalist societies.

The focus of Chapter 3 is on approaches to non-conventional land policies, the emphasis being on the effects of transforming non-capitalist forms of landownership to low-income landlords. The chapter demonstrates the relation between the State's promotion of individual tenure, freehold ownership, and the rise in multiple-plot investment, informal land relations and forms of landlordism.

Chapter 4 is designed to explore the relationship between South African land policies and the development of informal land relations. It focuses on various ways in which non-commercial form of land were converted into individual tenures. It covers the legislation through which land was made inaccessible, such as The Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, The Group Areas Act, The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, and various “Homeland” policies, all of which contributed either directly or indirectly to the formation of informal land relationships.

Chapter 5 is about research design and methodology, and devoted to three freehold settlements selected as case studies. It highlights the relevance of case studies to the research hypothesis. It explains similarities, differences and why settlements were chosen. It further discusses the aims of the study, various methods used for collecting data are highlighted and questions covered by the questionnaire.

Chapters 6 to 7 discuss the results of the case studies. Chapter 6 illustrates the effects of government land policies at settlement level and discusses how the land owner/non-landowner relationship has developed since the origin of these settlements. Some social, political and economic factors elucidating land relations are discussed. The present conditions of these settlements are further discussed, including the inhabitants, the composition of households, dependants, sources of income and occupation. The significance of landlordism is further examined, as indicated by dwellings on plots, plot sizes, the number of years landlords have been
providing rental accommodation, tenant households, multiple-plot holders and rental-income contributions.

Chapter 7 discusses the influence of land-tenure systems in the construction of, improvements to, and investments in low-income housing. The chapter is important as it lays the foundation of how rents are derived, the quality of housing and the relation of landlords to landownership, informal land relations as well as their position within the poverty line. It presents various methods in which low-income householders have accessed land, looks at the importance of informal land relations in gaining easy access to land, and how low-income householders have improved their houses, as indicated by the durability of materials of construction, form of labour, financing and the levels of service. It argues that, while informal land relations between landowners and non-landowners guarantee access to land, they influence investments made in low-income housing production.

Chapter 8 addresses the research question which seek to determine forms of landlordism operating in South Africa. It uses land-tenure systems to explain the development of low-income landlordism and to demonstrate how even the conversion from one form of landlordism to another, the sustainability of landlordism, the increase and improvement in rental accommodation are influenced by land-tenure systems. It also highlights variations between settlements.

Chapter 9 concludes by pointing out the implication of land-tenure systems, particularly in the development of landlordism and the expansion of rental housing. It identifies areas for future research.
CHAPTER 1
RENTAL ACCOMMODATION AND THE CHANGING PERCEPTION OF LANDLORDISM

1.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to review the available literature on low-income rental housing. However, private rental housing cannot be understood without actually discussing the components of this sector, particularly those who are involved in the provision of housing – namely landlords, tenants, and the state, as well as the legislation surrounding the private provision of rental housing, and internal and external factors that have shaped current perceptions of the rental sector. The chapter focuses on two concepts: tenancy and landlordism.

Under tenancy, the chapter considers two interpretations: first, tenancy as a transition to homeownership and, second, tenancy as a lack of any alternative – therefore, permanent housing tenure. The former is related to the work of John Turner and in the latter, the emphasis is on Alan Gilbert and all those sharing his views. It will be shown that both proponents have ignored the significance of self-help policies in explaining the rise in tenancy. Further, by investigating tenants, focusing on how rental accommodation is consumed and the composition of families occupying such housing, and comparing landlords and tenants, not only does the approach fail to advance our understanding of the production of rental accommodation (and, in particular, low-income landlords), but policies derived without an understanding of how rental accommodation is produced will negatively affect the production and expansion of such accommodation. In an attempt to redress these problems, the final section is devoted to the concept of landlordism. It reviews the work of Sunil Kumar, how he differs from his predecessors, and at his conceptualisation of the role of landlords in overcoming the problems noted in studies on tenancy. It is argued that consumption-oriented approaches are inadequate tools for analysing the growth of low-income landlords.
1.2 Tenancy as a transition to homeownership

Scholars who have written about tenancy have suggested that tenements are located at city centres. City tenements have been called by a variety of names. Green (1988) reports on tambos, in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. Coloumb (1989) states that before the 1930s, vecindad housing in Mexico city was the common form of rental accommodation. In Sri Lanka, centrally located tenements were known as tenement gardens (Drakakis-Smith, 1981). They have been referred to as yards in Johannesburg, South Africa (Hellman, 1948) and as musones in El Salvador (Stein, 1989) and as conventillos in Santiago, Chile (Gilbert, 1993).

The location of tenements in the city centres serves the needs of migrants and those who want to be near their places of employment. Green (1988) states that the original purpose of tambos, in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, was to provide temporary accommodation to those who came to cities to sell produce.

Turner (1976) defines “renting” as a temporary form of tenure in which migrants arriving in cities are accommodated by the rental sector until they have enough money to buy land on the periphery, and realise their dreams of becoming homeowners. What is fundamental in Turner’s model is, first, the perception of renting as a transitional stage to homeownership. He distinguishes between two forms of migrants, the “bridgeheader” and the “consolidator”. The former refers to newly arrived migrants, and the latter to those who have established themselves and are in the process of consolidating their houses. He states that “at this stage of the city’s development, the generally extensive squatter or clandestine developments are the products of the ‘consolidators’ in as much as they are too far from the centres of unskilled employment and subsistence costs are too high for the ‘bridgeheaders’ ” (Turner, 1968:359).

Secondly, the lack of income among “bridgeheaders” forces them to rent rooms in the city centres and near places of employment:

More significant and influential as a factor of urban development is the case of the less poor and more stably employed, but uninsured workers. Able to choose their location within a much wider radius (the established wage can afford to commute), many of the
families in their situation are able to buy or even seize a plot at the edge of the urban area (Turner, 1968:357).

Thirdly, the renting of rooms offers flexibility to migrants who are able to access a cheap form of accommodation while saving for house construction. Turner writes:

[A] very cheap bedspace or, if he has a family, a rented room in a run down tenement would be far more appropriate than a modern standard dwelling that would absorb an impossibly high proportion of his income. Unlike the mortgaged house, the rented room can be given up with very short notice, and the occupier is free to move quickly to another location (Turner, 1968:355).

Seen from this perspective, rental accommodation is associated with impermanence.

Others, like Drakakais-Smith (1981) have suggested that tenements often consisted of rows of two-roomed units with communal and sanitary facilities. In some cases tenements were leased bedspaces, which were occupied in succession by single men working in shifts. Hence, city tenements are different from rental accommodation found on the periphery. Kumar (1996) distinguishes between city tenements and tenements in self-help housing. While the former arises from the conversion of houses, the latter refers to the construction of rental housing.

The perception of rental accommodation as temporary tenure became significant in studies on low-income housing. Turner, who had purported tenancy to be temporary tenure, was vocal in convincing the governments that tenancy was impermanent tenure and only a means to homeownership. His views were important in directing policy towards homeownership.

Rental housing, according to these proponents, was beneficial in serving the needs of the migrants and facilitating upward mobility (from tenancy to homeownership). Mobility was regarded as upward, viewed from the tenants’ perspective.

Secondly, the rents migrants had to pay for rooms also played a significant role in allowing
them to save for a new home. Since early studies on tenancy sought to explain why this form of tenure was regarded as temporary, the focus was on tenants. Cheap forms of rental accommodation would be beneficial to migrants, enabling them to achieve their goal of becoming homeowners.

Thirdly, rental accommodation is also beneficial to migrants as it offers a choice of accommodation. Renting is therefore associated with a lack of income. Advocating homeownership became noticeable in most housing studies, where the housing policy studies promoted homeownership rather than tenancy. Turner, in his later writings identified constraints to ownership, such as land, infrastructure, finance, technology, and so on, and constantly called for government to intervene to promote this type of tenure (Turner, 1976).

There were also several reasons for promoting homeownership. Chung and Tyab (1991) have also argued that homeownership serves three purposes. First, it is a means of enhancing political support and commitment from a diverse and largely immigrant population. Secondly, it promotes racial integration by breaking up racial enclaves. Finally, it leads to environmental improvement and an enhanced social life.

One of the social consequences of the portrayal of rental accommodation as a temporary form of tenure, as well as its association with inadequate income has sometimes led to the stigmatisation of the rental sector as housing tenure for poor householders. Keans (1994:15) reports on how tenants were portrayed as people of low status in Dublin. He writes that they were “apparently at ease and perfectly assimilated to their habitious filth and stench [apparently] ... congenial to their status”. Tyab and Chung (1991) have also warned about the dangers of concentrating on homeownership. Making reference to housing policy in Singapore, they state that the government’s advocation of 100 per cent homeownership of public housing by 1997 had an impact on the rental sector. First, it is only those aged between 21 and 29 who are eligible for rental accommodation. This has placed restrictions on young households and couples in need of rental flats. Secondly, the rental sector compares unfavourably with the ownership sector. It is reported that the conversion of houses into three-bedroom flats has increased the waiting period for tenants from two to three years.
This section has discussed the perception of tenancy as temporary tenure. It has concentrated on the location of rental accommodation and whose needs it serves – migrants and those who came to cities on a temporary basis. Rental accommodation was therefore associated with lack of finance to purchase or to build houses. However, it played a significant role for migrants; it enabled them to save for a plot. The relation between this form of accommodation, migrants and rents is that it represented a cheap form of accommodation that was easily available and could be occupied within a short space of time. Under these conditions tenancy enabled the transformation of migrants to homeownership. Mobility, according to this perspective, is only upwards, it begins when a migrant rents a room and starts saving for a plot, and ends when a plot is purchased and the goal of becoming a homeowner is fulfilled. Secondly, since the emphasis of these studies is on tenancy, renting is presented as in an advantageous light. It should also be noted that those pointing out the impermanence of tenancy have acknowledged that homeownership and the construction of low-income housing took place in the peripheral settlements; self-help settlements are explicitly linked with the construction of houses for ownership (consumption) rather than for rental. Implicit in this perspective is the notion that tenancy ends in the city centre, while ownership flourishes in self-help settlement. Since the conceptualisation of tenancy focuses on how tenants consume houses, little emphasis is placed on the production of tenements as well as on the producers (landlords). However, the existence of landlords is implicitly referred to when relating to the role of cheap accommodation for migrants. Turner has for instance acknowledged the multipurpose usage of housing by owners. He writes: “the owner or possessor-occupier can use his house as a workshop, or rental property” (Turner, 1968:357-358). Therefore, by concentrating on the consumption of housing, and associating tenancy with impermanence, these proponents fail to go beyond the consumption of rental accommodation and to realise that houses in low-income settlements are increasingly produced for both consumption and for rental. As will be shown in Chapter 2, the redirection of studies from consumers of rental accommodation (tenants) to producers (landlords) of low-income rental housing unveils the forms of low-income landlordism found in low-income settlements.

As the objective of the thesis is to investigate the development of landlords, the perspective has limitations since it begins its investigation by focusing on tenants.
1.3 Tenancy as a permanent tenure

This section examines the proposals put forward by writers who have argued that renting is not a transition to ownership but increasingly becoming a permanent tenure. The cost of land and the production of low-income housing may force some low-income householders to become tenants while others may choose to become tenants. As the section progresses, it highlights some of the policy implications emanating from the consumption-oriented approach. It will be argued that both the former (proponents of tenancy as temporary tenure) and the latter (those viewing tenancy as permanent tenure) have failed first, to recognise the role of producers (landlords) and second, to explain why tenants are increasing; although renting takes place in self-help settlements, they fail to link tenancy with self-help policies. The failure to do so gives the perspective limited value, not only in understanding the relationship between self-help policies and the development of low-income rental housing but, by focusing on the consumption of rental accommodation, it prevents any further investigation of producers from taking place. In short, by remaining at the consumption level it is not possible to investigate different forms of low-income landlordism.

Gilbert's (1991) work, together with others, such as Green (1988) and Edwards (1982), has questioned the validity of Turner's model of “bridgeheaders” and “consolidators”. Turner had argued that renting was a transitional stage to homeownership and that it was the lack of income during migrants' early occupancy cycle that prevent them from owning homes. Thus, rental accommodation was appropriate to migrants, more especially because it enabled them to save for house construction.

Gilbert's starting point is that tenancy is increasing. Drawing his conclusions from the Mexico City, Gilbert (1993:26) notes that “during the nineteenth century the majority of Mexican families lived in rental housing and only 14 per cent of the city [Mexico City] population owned homes in 1940”. Tenancy studies in Africa also indicate a high proportion of people renting homes. In South Africa, Jenkins et al (1986:51) report that “land in Amaoti is primarily used for shack farming and has been a source of wealth generation for both legal and illegal landowners”. It is estimated that in Amaoti, near Durban in KwaZulu-Natal, 70 per cent of
inhabitants are renting. In Georgedale, also in KwaZulu-Natal, renters are estimated at 88 per cent (Jenkins et al, 1986).

It has also been reported that tenants characterise both site-and-services and upgraded settlements. In George, an upgraded settlement in Zambia, the population of tenants increased from 14 per cent in 1967 to 20 per cent in 1973 and 46 per cent in 1986 (Pennant, 1990). If the upgraded scheme is compared with the site-and-services scheme, by 1986 renters in upgraded settlements were estimated at 52.4 per cent in 1986 compared to 29.1 per cent in site-and-services schemes (ibid). In an article entitled *The commercialisation of unauthorised housing in Nairobi, Kenya*, Amis (1984) observes the predominance of tenancy in squatter settlements.

Having demonstrated the high proportion of low-income householders who do not own homes, this section will examine the arguments put forward by Gilbert and his supporters in explaining why tenancy is increasingly becoming a permanent tenure.

Gilbert first argues that access to land is a major determinant of tenure. In countries where land is cheap and easily accessible, homeownership will be high and few people will rent their homes. In cases where land is scarce and inaccessible, the proportion of tenants increases. Gilbert and Gugler (1985:201) explain: “where land is in short supply, prices will be high and the large proportion of people will be priced out of the market and fewer low-income householders will be able to own property as land prices rise”. The cost of land is used to explain how inaccessible homeownership has become among poor households. For Gilbert, the price of land is the “key ingredient explaining differences in patterns of residential tenure” (Gilbert, 1991:41). Comparing the cities of Bogota, Mexico and Valencia, he concludes that in Bogota the price of land is higher than in Mexico and Valencia. Inhabitants of Bogota would, for instance, require 14 months’ of a minimum salary to purchase a site, whereas in Mexico City, where land is still available in the periphery, Mexicans would be required to have a minimum of two months’ salary to purchase a site (ibid). Gilbert further argues that not only does the accessibility of land determine the structure of tenure, but methods and forms of land alienation also impact on tenure. Ownership is high in cities where invasions were the important means of acquiring land. He writes: "where land was relatively open to access by
the poor, ownership became much more common in each city” (Gilbert, 1991:37). The trend was noticeable in Mexico city after the 1940s, when ownership increased, but with the restrictions placed on land after the 1970s, non-ownership increased. However, methods of accessing land without purchase are coming to an end, as Doebele (1987:16) notes: “the relations of the future will be more probably be a housing market in which a much larger proportion of the poor dwell in rental units, and for whom hope of ownership of land and house will become increasingly remote”.

Gilbert further distinguishes between tenants and sharers. The former is distinguished from the latter by the payment of rents while the latter, often related to the house owner, may be required to make contributions towards the household. According to Gilbert’s perspective, the cost of land has also restricted their households to their own families.

Explaining why homeownership is increasingly becoming inaccessible for low-income householders, Gilbert uses age as an indicator to explain constraints to ownership. He compares tenants to homeowners. In a study of tenancy in Mexico City, Gilbert and Ward (1985) found that, on average, renters were 7.5 years younger than homeowners. However, in Guadalajala and Puebla, in both old and recent settlements, homeowners were younger than tenants. Gilbert and Ward’s treatment of age and household income to explain the permanence of tenancy also led to the conclusion that income is not always the determinant of tenancy. They argue:

> With similar incomes some households choose to move into a peripheral township, whereas others choose to rent. Given a variety of housing alternatives, households with different socio-economic characteristics may take different choices (Gilbert & Varley, 1991:105).

At this stage it is also possible to highlight the differences between both Turner and Gilbert’s use of age and income as variables to explain the stage at which householders become tenants. For Gilbert, age is used to compare landlords and tenants, implying that the longer householders have been tenants, the more difficult it is to become homeowners. While, according to Turner, income was used as an explanation for tenancy, during the early stages of
household formation, for Gilbert, income may not always be the determinant of tenancy, as people earning similar incomes may choose different tenures. Even those who can afford to own homes may decide to rent.

1.4 Limitations: tenancy as a temporary and permanent tenure

Both proponents acknowledge the role of government in determining housing tenures, whether low-income households are to become homeowners or tenants. Low-income householders are viewed in relation to housing tenures, be it rented or owned. Turner's call for the intervention of government is based on the premise that first, homeownership, as in squatter settlements had often taken place without the residents actually owning land. Second, this form of homeownership prevented the residents from making meaningful investments on housing, because of the insecurity of tenure. Finally, the role of state here, is crucial because by legislating tenure, positive effects such as the promotion of ownership of houses and land, may also lead to the development of neighbourhood. Implied here, is that homeownership and landownership become one. A number of contradiction arise from the perception of low-income householders as either homeowners or tenants. If the discussion is limited to the provision of secured tenure, it can be argued that the presence of government in low-income settlement, participating in land improvements, lead to an increase in the cost of land. This is noted in the introduction of tax systems, the manner in which householders have to pay for sites and even the operation of financial institutions, providing credit for land. In short, the land becomes expensive, since it is affected by these factors. The consequences are that the poor are increasingly excluded. The promotion of secured tenure is contradictory because, while the aim of intervention had been to promote homeownership and landownership, the two are separated. The reintroduction of homeownership without landownership. This is observed in freehold tenure settlements in South Africa where it is possible for low-income householders to become homeowners without owning land (chapter 7). Second, the informal tenures, previously deemed unsuitable and responsible for the minimum investments on housing are increasingly being re-introduced. The only difference between the informal tenures and informal settlements being that the former is an impact of the promotion of secured tenure, created in legalised settlements, but in a different format. Access to land is no longer
free, householders have to pay rent and the arrangements are mediated by the landowners and intermediaries. Finally, the problems of landownership are recreated elsewhere. These may further affect investments, consumption of services between landowners and non-landowners.

Because householders continue to be perceived as homeowners and tenants, without being located within land tenure systems, even these concepts are subjected to several criticisms. A homeowner, according to these perspectives is distinguished from a tenant, as the former owns home and the latter rents space from the landlord. Under the category of tenants, Gilbert, introduces another category of sharers, who may not necessarily own homes but share them with kin and other members of the household. Tenancy, as used by both Turner and Gilbert, hide other forms of land relations that may exist, which may not simply be explained by the fact that one pays rent or not and whether he/she owns a dwelling. If the analysis begins with the ownership of land and relate these forms of housing tenures to ownership and non-ownership of land, there would be several degrees of tenancy. Such as, a tenant who rents a room; a tenant who rents land but has build his/her house; a tenant who rents land but did not build a house for owneroccupation, instead, rent space to another tenant; a tenant who has double classification, being the homeowner and a tenant at the same time. Homeowner, for having full ownership of a dwelling and a site where the dwelling has been constructed, and being a tenant on other sites on the grounds that he/she rents land. For instance, when the concepts are applied in some situations, they may be confusing, when one stops being a tenant and become a homeowner? Is it when he/she owns a home and land? Or owns a home and not land? For instance, a homeowner and a tenant could be the same person. A homeowner can be a landlord as well, when the home he/she owns is used for other purposes, such as being let to tenants. Or does homeownership depend on what the house is used for? Shall this category continue to be applied even if, in this case homeowners are now deriving rents from renting space? One of the policy implication that may arise from the lack of understanding of these groupings is the detrimental effects that they may have. Because each grouping will require policy interventions that are specific to its formation.

Even the category of a homeowner, may include a landowner, whose relation to land is that of ownership. If tenancy is used to mean the renting of space, unless these are studied within land tenure systems, the concept is inapplicable under certain conditions. There are
householders whose relation to land is neither that of tenancy nor a sharer, but access to land is determined by the landowner. It is only when the analysis move away from the categorisation of low-income householders as tenants and homeowners, and concentrate on the low-income householders’ relation to land, development of low-income landlords that we are able to overcome these conceptual problems. Also, categorising low-income households into homeowners and tenants is of limited use to the study of low-income landlords. They tell us little about the forms of landlords operating in low-income settlements, their relation to ownership of land, which are the aims of the research.

While tenancy studies often imply that tenancy has resulted from the commodification of land, as Amis (1982) making reference to the commercialisation of land in squatter housing in Nairobi, Kenya, puts it: “It is beginning to look as if the subsistence shelter aspect of urban squating is a transitional urban phenomenon” (Amis,1982:23). Edwards and Amis fail to establish a relationship between self-help policy and tenancy. The two are viewed separately. The development of tenant markets seems to be divorced from the production of self-help housing. This misrepresentation of self-help policies is due to a number of factors, the main being that the focus of these studies is on tenants, who they are and why they consume rental housing. Secondly, by remaining with the consumption of rental housing, the perspective fails to explore the production of such housing. These conceptual problems have not only prevented us from understanding the producers, as the approach conceals the range of affordable low-income rental accommodation produced, they also have implications for housing policy in general, and the understanding of the development of low-income landlords – which is the object of this study. As Section 1.5 demonstrates, policies derived from the investigation of tenants are detrimental to landlords and affect the production of low-income rental housing.

The consumption approaches explain the mobility within tenant households by basing their analysis on rents, evictions and the relationship between landlords and tenants. Evictions – interpreted as high mobility among tenant households, are based on tenants’ inability to pay rents, conflicts and so on. In reference to the relationship between landlord and tenant in Caracas, Venezuela, Gilbert and Varley (1991:167) state: “… what most characterises
relations between owners and tenants, especially in the self-help settlements, are the informal legal arrangements, the 'solidarity', and the mutual trust, which contribute to the 'good' relationship, 'without problems' '' (quoting CEU, 1989).

How mobility is defined under the production oriented approach is in respect to landlords than tenants. Mobility can take place between forms of landlords and even within the same form of landlordism. Subsistence landlords can either be residential or absentee. Mobility can be from residential to absentee subsistence landlordism. It is not accompanied by evictions as the movement requires access to a second plot. The implication of the consumption oriented approach if applied to the study of low-income landlords is that; it is not designed to suit the investigation of landlords since it originated from tenancy studies. Additionally, high mobility among tenant households has no relevance to the study of low-income landlords since there is no relation between the mobility of tenants and the origin of the forms of landlords. Mobility is one of the significance's of informal land relations. Mobility from residential to absentee subsistence landlords is determined by land tenure and informal land relations with an ability to have access to a second plot without purchase. There are various reasons why low-income householders converted into landlordism. These include a desire to earn extra income to save for a second plot and embark upon capital expansion.

Rents, as used by the consumption approach are another cause of eviction leading to mobility. Rents play a different role for landlords. For subsistence landlords' households, rents may be the only source of regular income. Households may even sacrifice the space they have and let it to be shared by tenants. To petty bourgeois landlords, rents may be used to purchase household items, savings for education, medical insurance and so on. Rents, together with household income are used as a yardstick, to determine the form of landlordism within the poverty line.

The difference between the two approaches, in so far as rents are concerned raise the question. Whether a meaningful government intervention policy derived from a limited understanding of the analysis and the role or rents can ever be capable of addressing the needs of low-income landlords. This may lead to the inaccurate categorisation of landlords, since the approach does not acknowledge the role of rents or even the variations between the petty
capitalist landlords (Chapter 2) as some may be heading households whose level of subsistence is below the minimum level.

While evictions may be related to estranged relationships between tenants and landlords, rent cannot always account for mobility within tenant households. Kumar (1992; 1996; Section 1.7) has stated that the production of low-income rental accommodation should be analysed within the production-exchange continuum. Rental housing can move from commodity to non-commodity status. Low-income rental housing can enter the market when it is made available to tenants through the payment of rents, and it is also possible for low-income rental housing to be removed from the market, when the producers, the landlords, revert to non-landlordism. Therefore, the production of rental accommodation should be explained in terms of both internal and external factors underlying the production process, and not only by the investigation of tenants, the number of evictions, the relationship between landlords and tenants, and so on. Furthermore, in his definition of landlords, Kumar has suggested that some householders can be forced to provide low-income rental housing (subsistence landlords) in order to meet other expenses, such as loan repayments. This form of rental accommodation results in the conversion of rooms for tenants, meaning the sharing of premises by both the producer (landlord) and the tenant. It is also possible for the production of rental accommodation to be a deliberate attempt by the low-income householders to increase the value of landed property. This may result in the ownership of more than a single plot (petty capitalist landlords). In line with the production process, it is obvious that the relationship between a landlord, operating at a subsistence level, and the tenant with whom he/she shares his/her house will tend to be direct, whereas under the petty capitalist landlords the relationship may be indirect, with the landlord owning several plots and delegating some of his responsibilities to intermediaries, caretakers, and so on. On another level it is possible to have a producer, who has produced more than a single structure on a piece of land, but who occupies a separate house from the one rented to tenants. Even here the relationship between tenant and landlord may not be as direct as in the case where a house is shared with tenants. Thus the relationship between the two cannot be effectively be explained by merely focusing on tenants; how low-income rental housing is produced plays an important role in determining these relationship. Other factors, such as the size or acreage can also explain the direct and indirect relationship between the producer (landlord) and the consumer (tenant). Does house-
sharing by landlord and tenants make tenants less mobile? And landlords more friendlier? Are landlords who do not share plots with tenants more hostile and tenants highly mobile? It is argued that, while the approach has contributed towards understanding of the consumption of rental accommodation, it tells us little about why rental accommodation was produced. Therefore, the relationship between landlord and tenant is best understood if located within the land tenure system.

Even with regard to the producers Gilbert has argued that diversities exist among landlords. Some were found to be as poor as the tenants and others were generally better off than the tenants. Commenting on landlords in Bogota, he states: “most landlords are themselves poor and are renting one or two rooms in their own house to supplement their own limited incomes. Renting seems to be an essential part of the consolidation process; without tenants, ownership would be more difficult for the landlords” (Gilbert, 1983:472). While Gilbert refers to the heterogeneity among landlords, some being poor and some being rich, his arrival at this conclusion is often based on the scale of operation. Gilbert and Turner’s understanding of the role of rents is worth mentioning. On one level, Turner has suggested that cheap forms of rental accommodation are beneficial to migrants who are not so much concerned about the quality of the accommodation. They can put up “in a run-down” tenement, as long as they can save for a plot and a new house. On another level Turner has implicitly acknowledged the role of rents to landlords when he states: “often families will deliberately build their houses as duplex apartments-one for themselves, the other for rent or for occupation by the second generation who will then be on hand to assist the parents in their old age” (Turner, 1968:357-358). For Turner, rents benefit landlords as well as tenants. To Gilbert, rents are essential during the consolidation of houses.

1.5 Consumption oriented approaches: implications to low-income landlords

This section examines some of the implications of consumption and production-oriented approaches in the analysis of low-income landlords. It stresses why the approach may not be applicable in the study of low-income landlords. It argues that, while policies derived from consumption-oriented approaches tend to be misdirected, productive approaches have a positive impact.
The scale of letting, type of building and property is sometimes used to categorise landlords. The categorisation of landlords according to the scale of letting is misleading in our attempt to explain the development of forms of landlords. If one takes into consideration, ownership and non ownership of land as the basis for analysing landlords, subsistence landlords do not own land. Having gained access to land by entering into informal land relations with the landowners. This method of accessing land can lead to subsistence landlords entering into multiple informal land relations with landowners resulting in that they no longer have access to single plots or there could be more than a single dwelling on a piece of plot. Amongst the residential subsistence landlords, multiple dwellings are also possible. This classification presupposes a relation between dwellings, plots and the financial position of landlords. For instance, subsistence landlords may be viewed as large scale landlords and better off. Where in actual fact they have income which barely meet the minimum level of subsistence. The approach may associate multiple-plot access to multiple ownership, whereas the former can take place without the householders having made investment on plots through purchase. Relating this category to petty capitalist landlords, it is an adequate tool since it does not take into consideration the changing financial status of petty capitalists. While petty capitalists may differ from subsistence landlords in the ways in which they acquired plots through purchase. Indicating that the different financial circumstances and financial positions of the petty capitalist is not static concept as it may be affected by both internal an external factors. For instance, a petty capitalist landlord who had previously reflected a better financial position, may today live below the poverty line, despite the fact that he/she had previously invested on plots. Therefore, the scale of letting on its own, may have no relevance to their present status. Another problem arises from the failure to relate the scale of letting to rents, (derived from multiple-plots investments, and the contribution of dwellings in the form of rents) to landlords' income and whether this contributes to the understanding of landlords' households living below or above the poverty line. The concept is not flexible enough to accommodate changes and even variations between and within similar forms of landlord.

The concept does not differentiate between those who have actually invested in properties, such as petty capitalist landlords with multiple-plot investments or those who have not invested on plots at all and subsistence landlords with no income to purchase plots.
Landlords are forced to continue letting space because they cannot sell properties or evict tenants. The perspective implies the ownership of properties by the landlords. It is argued that it is when low-income landlords are examined in relation to land tenure, ownership and non-ownership of land that we are able to reveal that landlords relation to land does not always reflect ownership. Landlords may not own land but may have acquired it through some informal land relations between the landowner and the non-landowner. Therefore, under these conditions, the mobility of landlords, whether downward, upward or even the dissolution of landlordism is influenced by these relations. The dissolution of landlordism cannot always be linked with the selling of plots for profit, because their ownership of plots may not have existed in the first place.

To define rents as either high or low, based on the amount of the tenants' income used for rent is misleading. Rents only make sense when they are related to forms of landlords and tenure. Rents are affected by the land tenure systems, whether land is owned or not and investments made on plots, plot sizes, quality of accommodation, services provided and the types of rental accommodation. Plot sizes and land tenure further determine the level of investments and how the land is used; such as combining residential and commercial lettings. Even within the same form of landlordism and settlements, there would be variations in way landlords charge rent. It may not reflect the investments made on rental housing since rent may be charged according to the status of the tenants, room sizes or even the number of year’s tenants have been renting space from the same landlord. Rents, under the production approach are a function of land, plot sizes and tenure.

The consumption approaches arrive at different conclusions to those advanced by the production approach, when poverty among low-income households is considered. Amis, uses poverty to explain the implication of landlords to tenants. As a result of the commercialisation of land, squatters who have previously had access to free land are subjected to poverty when they become tenants. While the productive oriented approach acknowledges the transformation of non-commercialised forms of land. The commercialisation of land, forces low-income householders to enter into informal land relations and become landlords. Poverty, expressed by the inability of low-income households to afford a piece of plot will be evident in the rise in the number of informal land relations. They are forced to enter into these relations
and to become landlords. However, it cannot be implied that commercialisation of land generates poverty among low-income households nor the establishment of informal land relation be equated with poverty, as some householders voluntarily enter into these relationships. Therefore, the various effects that land transformation has on low-income households is best understood if examined within the forms of landlords. For instance, to some householders poverty can be expressed by an inability to purchase a plot (subsistence landlord). For petty bourgeois landlords, entering into informal land relations is not a reflection of poverty as they can afford to purchase a plot. Poverty, should not be considered as the only explanation of landlordism as petty bourgeois landlords may enter into informal land relations in order to have an extra cash income. Petty capitalist landlords may also enter into these land relations in order to expand capital. They let space for different reasons than those of subsistence landlords. Rent is not a cause of poverty.

Because the consumption oriented approaches deal with tenancy and landlords only in passing and not in relation to land, there are limitations in the use of the concept, absentee landlords. Absentee landlords are equated with ownership of more than one plot and are therefore considered to be slightly better off. The approach does not distinguish between absentee landlords according to their relation to land. The transformation of non commercialised land systems observed during the introduction of individual tenures and freehold land rights, may render this form of land tenure to be less attainable by the poor. Absentee landlords may result from combining informal methods of accessing land that do not involve purchase.

One of the misconceptions advanced by the consumption approach is that of associating tenants with poor households and landlords as financially better off, in particular those owning more than a single plot. This misconception is evident in Amis who reported that in one of the squatter settlements of Nairobi, Kenya, where landlords are reported to be deriving rental profits ranging between 100 and 144 per cent. If one looks at the profits landlords make through letting, the claim of exploitation of tenants is justified. Amis, himself has constantly referred to the commercialisation of squatter settlements, where access to land is no longer free but settlements are inhabited by tenants. Then, because the approach explains the profits derived from renting by keeping housing at the consumption level, the production of self-help housing is increasingly divorced from the production of low-income rental accommodation. As
a result of less recognition of how self-help housing is produced, and the circumstances under which houses initially produced for consumption are also let to tenants, some of the writers have fallen into the trap of basing the role of rents on consumption, and presupposing wealthiness to prevail among the landlords, and exploitation and poverty to be the universal lot of tenants. If we do not know how landlords produce rental accommodation, apart from the profits they make, and understand the forms and variety in the quality of rental accommodation they produce, how can the profitability of rental accommodation be assessed? Secondly, as explored in Section 1.7, it was shown that defining profits of rental accommodation solely from the consumption side, divorced from the production of low-income rental housing, the relation of rents to landlords' income, the expansion of rental accommodation, and profits alone, does very little to further our understanding not only of how rental housing is produced but also of how profits are being used to generate new low-income rental stock. Thus policy intervention has often emphasised the protection of tenants from exploitative landlords. These interventions have been of different forms, rent control being the most common. Controlling rents simply means the fixing of rental standards by courts and introducing measures such as the stipulation of monthly rentals based on the age of the building and building costs (Lemmer, 1987; Kumar, 1994; Seong-Kyu, 1987; Aina, 1990).

Another concern on the part of governments to protect tenants has been noticed through the intervention and formation of tenant organisations, and tenant ordinances. Wahab (1984:10) illustrates the impact of rent-control policies on landlords in Baldia township, in Karachi:

... a man who had paid and still was paying the same amount of rent for the last fifteen years. Some of his neighbours who rented from the same landlord had also stopped paying rents. Instead of paying the usual Rs 250 every month, they now gave the landlord Rs 25. There was nothing the landlord could do about this, as, the man said, "we are protected by the law".
1.6 Landlordism

Landlords are often defined according to the physical appearance of the accommodation rented by tenants. Means (1883), quoted by McCrone (1989), describes landlords of Britain as following:

Going through these rooms we come to one in which a hole, as big as a man’s head, has been roughly covered and how?... a piece of board from an old soap box has been fixed over the opening by one nail, and the tenant has been given a yard and a half of paper with which to cover it, and for this expenditure perhaps 4d, at the outside 3d, as well has been put upon the rent.

Landlords are also defined according to the scale of letting, the distinction being between small-scale and large-scale landlords. Pennant (1990), in his definition of small-scale landlords compared with large-scale landlords, has included a combination of those owning a single property, one or two properties and those with more than two buildings. Cullingworth (1963) defines a “small landlord “as one owning one property. Large-scale landlords have often been referred to those owning more than ten properties (Basset & Short, 1980). Sometimes the definition of landlord is based on how properties were acquired, distinguishing between those who have inherited and bought properties (ibid). Similarly, Gilbert and Varley (1991) differentiate between large- and-small scale, the former denoting the owner occupiers. They wrote, “In certain Colombian cities, landlords are mainly owner occupiers and even absentee landlords rarely own more than two or three properties” (Gilbert & Varley, 1991:133). In some cases a distinction between large and small landlords is based on the type of accommodation being rented and the number of tenant households. These authors further contend: “Half-a-dozen landlords owned two or three rental properties ... larger operators exist ... one landlord owned eight flats and a house for rent” (1991:134).

Green (1988) suggests three types of landlord, entrepreneur landlords, who operate on a large scale, small-scale landlords who own less than ten rental units (usually rooms rather than houses) and live on the same plot, and the state which provides subsidised properties for renting.
The various definitions of landlord have an impact on policy. They raise a number of questions. If the criteria are based on lettings, for instance, is a landlord who rents part of his house the same as those who have built several houses and let them to tenants? Is a farmer who has 220 families living on his land, and rental payments are made in the form of labour, the same as an entrepreneur who has built hostels for his workforce? If they are the same, what forms of policy interventions should the government adopt, and who are the beneficiaries? Which landlords are in greatest need of government financial support? And who are the non-beneficiaries? How are decisions going to be made as to how much support landlords receive?

One other problem that is created by several definitions of landlords is that no distinction is made between landlords operating in developed countries and those in low-income settlements of developing countries. Little attention has been given to the production of rental accommodation. Because of the over-concentration of these definitions on rental housing, and trying to define landlords by physical appearance and the quality of the housing, the conceptualisation of landlords not only creates confusion but implies homogeneity among landlords. As Section 1.7 demonstrates, it is at the production level that forms of landlordism should be analysed, and the forms of landlordism and the rental accommodation they produce cannot be understood by whether landlords rent flats, houses, and so on to tenants. For instance, Green’s definition of landlords includes even the subsidised housing provided by the state. Again, as it will be argued in the following chapter, it is through the analysis of housing production that we are able, first, to distinguish between housing produced as commodities, and housing that is not and, second, to locate the production of low-income housing in developing cities and hence low-income landlords. The production of housing in developing cities is on a small scale, some is owner built, some built in stages on untitled land, without observing building codes and housing standards. If fundamental differences exist between the production of housing in the developed cities and production in self-help settlements, surely low-income landlords cannot be the same as capitalist landlords? If they indeed are, the definition of landlord should be flexible enough to accommodate forms of low-income rental housing produced by low-income landlords on small scale, in unregulated settlements. Even the definitions should be able to spell out clearly what constitutes a capitalist landlord and what a low-income landlord.
Secondly, another conceptual problem relates to the lack of distinction between landlords operating in self-help settlements and those operating in the city centres. Gilbert and Varley (1991) have repeatedly argued that, because of the lack of space in the city centres, tenancy is dominant in peripheral settlements, or self-help areas. When describing the large-scale landlords they suggest that “there were more large properties in the central areas, although some were also found in self-help areas” (1991:138). The location of tenements seems to be a distinguishing feature of landlords. Again, because of the failure to go beyond the description of the houses being rented, whether in the city centre or on the periphery, we are unable to distinguish between the form of rental accommodation, the landlordism in the central city and that found in the periphery. Do the large-scale landlords operating in the city tenements rate the same as those operating in self-help settlements? One other problem relates to the forms of rental housing produced. The large-scale landlordism in central areas has resulted from the conversion of houses into rental accommodation, and rental accommodation in self-help settlements is the consequence of the construction of self-help housing. Although Gilbert and Varley have in their writings implied the increasing location of low-income rental accommodation in peripheral settlements, the failure to link the production of self-help housing with the development of tenancy and landlordism, in particular, creates difficulties not only in distinguishing between landlords operating in city tenements, but also between the forms of rental accommodation they produce. Above all, policy implications based on this misconception are even greater. Is, for instance, a landlord who has converted his house into tenements the same as the one who has produced low-income rental housing, through construction, in the self-help settlements? Can they be served by similar government policies? If not, what are the underlying similarities between the two?

Under the consumption-oriented approach, the production of low-income rental housing and the role of landlords as producers are both insignificant. The emphasis is on tenants, the stage at which the rental accommodation is consumed, the percentage of their income that goes on rent, how often the rent is increased, the relationship between tenant and landlord, and the extent of evictions and mobility within tenant households. Landlords are treated as consumers of housing, rather than the producers. The rise in landlordism is associated with profits from renting space, implying the continuance of landlordism where renting is profitable, and the reduction of rental stock where landlords are dissatisfied with rents.
1.7 Landlordism: the changing perception

The section reviews Sunil Kumar's conceptualisation of landlords, the extent to which the concept of landlord is different from that discussed under the "consumption" approach, some conceptual and policy implications of the consumption approach with regard to three forms of landlord, and the strengths inherent in the conceptualisation of landlords as petty commodity producers in overcoming conceptual problems.

Kumar's starting point is the recognition of low-income landlords as petty commodity producers. He argues that the concept of "petty commodity underpin[s] the production of low-income rented housing and help[s] to establish the various forms of landlords" (Kumar, 1996:107).

Relating the production of self-help housing to the production of low-income rental housing, he argues that the latter results from the conversion of non-commodity (low-income housing) into commodities. Therefore, low-income householders who have entered the production process by producing housing for home consumption may for a variety of reasons convert houses into commodities when the aim of production is that of exchange. The conversion of houses produced for consumption to units satisfying the need for exchange, is also not a static process. Low-income housing that has assumed the status of rental housing can easily be withdrawn from the market, and revert to the status of low-income rental housing. Thus, according to this perspective, the production of low-income rental housing oscillates between commodity and non-commodity status. Kumar's location of the production of low-income rental housing within the processes of low-income housing production distinguishes his conceptualisation of low-income rental from that of the consumption-oriented approach. It should be remembered that, under the consumption approach, the continuity of the existence of low-income rental accommodation was based on rents and the profitability of the rental sector. Implicit in this perspective was the association of withdrawal of rental stock from the market and the profitability of rental housing. Rents remained the incentives, both for the continuity of landlordism and the production of low-income rental housing. This perspective has also used the mobility of tenants to explain high rents, and the hostile relationship between landlords and tenants. However, according to the productive approach, even the mobility
within tenant households, explained by the conversion of commodity forms of housing to non-commodity forms is better understood if located within the production process. As the approach begins its analysis on how low-income housing is produced, and insists on the ability of low-income rental housing to oscillate between commodity and non-commodity status, rental accommodation cannot have a fixed status. Therefore, the conversion of rental accommodation from a commodity to a non-commodity form, meaning the withdrawal of rental housing stock from the market, and evictions and tenants' mobility, is also best understood if the analysis begins at the level of production rather than consumption.

The temporary exchange of housing, argues Kumar (1996), is different from permanent exchange. The difference is determined by whether property rights have been transferred from the producer (landlord) to the tenant. Under temporary exchange, access to housing is determined by the ability of the tenant to pay rent. The house being rented to tenants remains in the possession of landlord. The exchange is deemed temporary because the landlord may discontinue letting and the "property rights" have not been transferred to tenants. With permanent exchange, landlords cede the property rights to tenants. Again, since the temporary nature of rental of low-income housing is based on whether property rights are in the possession of tenants or landlords, this also implies the relationship between the two is temporary, determined by the duration of tenancy, the extent to which landlords continue renting space. Hence the various forms of policy intervention, such as those forcing landlords to sign contracts with tenants, stipulating when and under what circumstances tenants can be evicted are in contradiction with the nature of landlordism, which is a temporary phenomenon.

Kumar further locates the development of low-income landlords by emphasising the interaction between the capitalists' and non-capitalists' production. Identifying the characteristics of petty commodity production he states that the production is market-oriented, and that ownership of the means of production, the level of technology, workforce and output all operate on a small scale. He states that the production of low-income rental accommodation requires the producer to have access to elements of housing production. These include land, capital, and building materials. One other characteristics of petty commodity production which distinguishes it from the capitalist forms of production is "the
reproduction of the labour power of households attained directly either through commodity production, or a combination of commodity production and the sale of labour power” (Kumar, 1996:119).

In defining low-income landlords, Kumar places them within the production and exchange continuum. On the extreme end of the continuum is the production of low-income rental housing which has resulted from the conversion of use value into exchange value. This refers to the changes in the purpose of low-income housing production, whereby the production is no longer geared to the satisfaction of the producer’s consumption but is later converted to rental housing and let to tenants. Explaining the circumstances leading to the conversion of houses produced for consumption as that of exchange, he states that the production of low-income housing requires the producer to have access to capital. Finance will enable him/her to purchase building materials, land, engage in a construction process using paid labour, family labour or a combination of both. The construction process often increases household expenditure as it does not constitute a separate budget. While elements of housing production continue to be purchased from an unchanged household budget, producers are also expected to continue to satisfy human basic needs such as food, clothing, travel, educational expenses, and so on. Where loans have been used to purchase land, building materials, and so on, household budget increases as the producers are expected to make repayments. In order to meet these expenses, producers are forced to convert houses produced as use value, into exchange value to satisfy consumption. This results in the conversion of one or more rooms that are let to tenants in order to meet these expenses. Kumar states that subsistence landlordism is a form of landlordism arising from these conditions. This form of landlordism is associated with the lowest income earner owning a single plot. The production of low-income rental housing is characterised by large usage of unpaid labour, second-hand and cast aside materials, while manufactured and industrialised materials are used on a small scale. It is also possible during the construction phase for subsistence landlords to hire the services of specialised labour, such as for laying the roof (Kumar, 1992).

In the middle is a form of landlordism that has not arisen as a desperate means by the producers to supplement their income; in this case rents are important only for the improvements of dwellings. Rents can also be used to purchase household items. Therefore,
renting under this form of landlordism should be regarded as “a deliberate attempt to generate additional income” (Kumar, 1992:22). Since the petty bourgeois landlord in this form of landlordism may have started as a subsistence landlord, when the need for rental income was essential for consumption, but later decided to use rents to finance home improvements, the motive behind the production of rental accommodation is not “necessarily intended as an exchange” (ibid). Like the subsistence landlord, petty bourgeois landlords own single plots. The production process includes greater usage of skilled waged labour, and mechanically operated equipment. There are possibilities for petty bourgeois landlords to use the services of members of their families such as carpenters to reduce the cost of housing production (ibid). Under this form of landlordism, it is possible to have upward and downward mobility.

At the end of the continuum, Kumar states that petty capitalist landlordism is different from subsistence and petty bourgeois forms of landlordism, in so far as the purpose of production is concerned. Under the petty capitalist form of landlordism, the production of low-income rental housing is a deliberate attempt to expand one’s capital. This is also evident in the ownership of more than a single plot.

Again, the upward and downward mobility could characterise petty capitalist form of landlordism. It is possible for petty capitalist landlords to have started as subsistence landlords for the purpose of production of rental accommodation to have changed from that of earning additional income for home improvement to that of producing rental accommodation solely for exchange and to expand capital, as signified by the ownership of more than a single plot (ibid).

In contrast to Edwards (1990) and Gilbert and Varley (1989), who suggest that the production of low-income rental housing is “landlord-led investment”, Kumar makes a distinction between two forms of low-income rental housing production, subdivision and tenant-led investment. The former occurs when low-income housing produced for self-consumption is converted into rental housing. Under this form of production, householders convert one or more rooms, which are let to tenants. The latter is evident in circumstances in which landlords request tenants to engage in house construction. The dwelling unit is later occupied by the tenant and the expenses incurred during the production process are adjusted
against rent. While subdivision, according to Kumar is common among subsistence landlords, landlord-led investment characterises petty capitalist landlords.

It is worth noting the fundamental differences between the consumption-oriented approach and the productive oriented approach, and their treatment of rents in particular. Under the former, rents are used as a distinction between landlords and tenants. On one level, rents contribute to poverty and the exploitation of tenants; as Edwards (1990:264) notes, the payment of rent by the tenant results in income being redistributed to landlords, thereby making the overall distribution of income more unequal. On another level, rents seem to determine the continuity of the production of rental accommodation, implying that where renting is profitable it will serve as an incentive for landlords to continue renting space. The latter’s emphasis is on what the rent does to household income and its ability to eliminate poverty. Rents serve as a regular source of income, as an upliftment of standards of living where they make substantial contributions to the level of subsistence, as an income to maintain homes, and as a form of investment for a new plot, hence they make a contribution to the expansion of low-income rental accommodation. Because the productive oriented approach insists on the differentiation of landlords, not according to the type of accommodation produced such as the number of rooms, houses, flats and so on, but according to the purpose of production, they cannot be viewed as a homogeneous group. Thus the claim that they are exploitative remains unfounded. Another difference lies in the treatment of rents to explain the continuation of the production of low-income rental housing. As the production approach stresses that the production of low-income rental housing should be located within the productive exchange continuum, and even production itself oscillates between commodity and non-commodity whether profitable or not, low-income rental accommodation can at any time be removed from the market when it ceases to cater the needs of tenants. Likewise, the mobility between one form of landlordism and another, regarded as upward, downward or even the dissolution of landlordism itself, is determined by the role of rents, when they cease to be regarded as important in meeting a minimum subsistence level and begin to be used to maintain dwelling units. According to this perspective, landlordism does not continue because landlords are making a profit, but again what matters is what rent does to household income rather than whether renting is profitable or not.
Under the productive approaches, low-income landlords are not separated from self-help housing production. Therefore, low-income landlords are the object of investigation. First, low-income landlords are not perceived as a homogeneous group but are divided into three distinct groups, differing according to their financial circumstances as well as the purposes for letting space. The underlying motivation among subsistence landlords is a desperate need for cash while petty capitalists have a desire to make profits. This is also evident in the behaviour of these landlords and their financial circumstances. Subsistence landlords live below the poverty line. Such differentiation of landlords helps to eliminate some of the misconceptions of landlords as wealthy landowners. As policies address the conditions of the people they were created for, the promotion of rental housing production is landlord-oriented, and acknowledges diversities within forms of landlordism that may call for different policy interventions. Second, landlordism is not a permanent phenomenon. Landlords may choose to rent accommodation and may stop at any time; this may be determined by both internal and external factors. Landlords may have accumulated so much that they no longer wish to continue renting space, the rental space might be required for household expansion, and so on. Thus policies designed with a prior knowledge of landlordism, and rental housing production as being temporary phenomena, will be aware of the oscillation between landlordism and non-landlordism, and will refrain from imposing the need to sign contracts on landlords and tenants, prescribing when, and under what conditions tenants will be accommodated, or evicted, as these will be inconsistent with the nature of landlordism. Thirdly, rents are viewed neither as a source of conflict between landlords and tenants (which is erroneously interpreted as the cause of many evictions among tenant households), nor as a symbol of wealth (as some landlords may remain poor while receiving rents). Imposing rent-control measures without considering the rents' contribution to the landlords' income will severely impact upon subsistence landlords, whose survival depend on rents, albeit below the poverty line. Such policies will further perpetuate poverty, by depriving landlords of the only source of regular income available to them, namely rents. Finally, as mobility between one form of landlordism and another, particularly towards petty capitalist forms, is not viewed as being exploitative as it means the expansion of rental housing, policies, instead of legislating against multiple ownership of plots and houses, should encourage such movement.
1.8 Conclusion

Low-income rental housing production, and landlords in particular, have in the past received little attention from researchers of low-income housing or from policy makers. A number of factors explain the lack of recognition. Early writers, such as John Turner who portrayed rental housing as a temporary form of accommodation, diverted policies towards homeownership, as everyone aspired to this form of tenure. As a consequence, housing policies were adopted which were aimed at promoting ownership. Rental housing continued to be viewed as an inferior tenure that prevented full participation by citizens, and could not be used as security, and ownership of land became the economic symbol of prosperity, which further gave citizens the right to vote.

Low-income housing studies that emerged in the early eighties were very critical of the perception of tenancy as a temporary form of tenure. It has been demonstrated that, as a result of the scarcity of land on which low-income householders may build houses, tenancy has become permanent tenure. Income, which was previously used to explain the impermanence of tenancy, and which enabled householders to save for a new plot, was found not to be adequate to explain the tendency among those who could afford to own homes to have chosen to rent. While these studies were vocal enough to redirect attention from ownership to tenancy, theoretical problems emerged. The major failure was the lack of recognition of landlords and low-income housing production. At one level these studies sought to understand the production of rental housing, yet, self-help housing production was rarely incorporated into any analysis of tenancy. Tenancy is divorced from self-help housing, yet it is houses that are produced in self-help settlements that are rented to tenants. At another level the investigation concentrated on tenants, without any balance being reached between landlords and tenants. As a consequence, several definitions have been used to analyse landlords, based on their scale of production, the rooms rented, whether they lived on the same plot as tenants, the profits generated, and so on. Misconceptions about landlords continue to persist.

The study of low-income landlords that has emerged in the 1990s has made a positive contribution to the subject of low-income landlords. The impact of this study is multifold. As landlords are the object of investigation, they are not conceptualised as a homogeneous group;
landlords can be poor, as well, and barely able to meet the minimum subsistence level. Therefore the assertion that landlords are wealthy is no longer acceptable. Landlordism is no longer viewed as a permanent phenomenon because it is determined by internal and external factors, both underlying the purpose of renting space. These may affect houses produced for rent which can be withdrawn, sold or merely used for owner occupation. As rental housing production is associated with self-help housing production, government policy interventions will not be as detrimental as they used to be, since they will be based on the acknowledgement of the production process and the non-static nature of landlordism. Therefore, the effects of policy interventions such as rent control, contract signing and others prohibiting investment in low-income rental housing are minimal.
CHAPTER 2
FROM NON CAPITALIST TO CAPITALIST FORMS OF LANDOWNERSHIP : IMPLICATIONS FOR PETTY COMmodity PRODUCERS AND RENTAL HOUSING INVESTMENTS

2.1 Introduction

Housing, unlike other commodities, has a unique set of features. While it is often produced by the users themselves to satisfy their own housing needs, either by self-building or self-administration, it is also produced by non-users for letting and for sale. However, the production costs of housing distinguish it from other commodities, resulting in the intervention of financial institutions, in the form of loans, mortgages and the consumption of houses prior to full payments.

The aim of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework for the analysis of low-income landlords as petty commodity producers of rental accommodation. It has two purposes:

- It examines the role of land in the production process, its production, distribution, use as a vehicle of investment and the various actors involved in land acquisition, as well as the role of the actors, landowners, landlords, their relation to the capitalist system and the contribution to the commodification of land, and the effect of rents.

- The last section is devoted to the development of a framework for analysing low-income landlords and the impact capitalist intervention had on self-help land-delivery systems. It begins by posing a question as to whether the concepts of capitalist landowners, landlords, rents, land relations, and investments in land observed under capitalist systems can be equally applied to low-income landlords. And, if not, what kind of framework is appropriate to these settlements. A theoretical framework locating low-income landlords within land-delivery systems is presented.
2. 2 The role of land in production: land as a use value

In order to locate low-income landlords within land-delivery systems and the
investments made in rental housing, the following sections will examine the role of land
in a capitalist society, its production, distribution, use as a vehicle for investment and
the various actors involved in land acquisition. The roles of these actors, landowners,
financial institutions and their contribution to the commodification of land is also
discussed.

Marx defines land in its original state as “the original sources of all wealth, universal
subject of human labour” (Marx, 1976:507). It has potential-use value, which is
“spontaneously provided by Nature” (Marx, 1976:178). However, when land is
privately owned, it is used by the owners to express monopoly, resulting in the total
exclusion of others. As land is capable of being monopolised, like other commodities, it
can be sold and rented. Harvey (1982) argues that, under certain conditions, it may not
be possible to establish private property rights. He defines land as a reproducible and
non-reproducible asset. In the case of the former, use values are not only embodied in
land, but they can also be created through commodity production, such as in the form
of houses, shops, factories, embankments and so on.

Harvey (1982) maintains that land as use value serves three functions. First, as the
basis for the reproduction and extraction. Second, as space, place and location. Finally,
as location, fertility and processes of production. Land, as the basis of reproduction,
is viewed as a condition or element of production, and as an instrument or means of
production. Land contains use values that can be extracted, as in the case of minerals;
under the circumstances its value is seen as a condition or element of production.
When land is used for agricultural purposes, it functions as a supplier of nutrients that
can later be converted into food. The production itself is embodied within the soil.
Land therefore functions as an instrument or means of production.

According to Harvey (1982) the use values of land as “free gifts of Nature” vary with
quality and quantity. Surplus value (excess profits) accrues to capitalists with access to
use values of superior quality, such as land with mineral resources or even fertile agricultural land. Surplus value is regarded as a permanent fixture.

According to Marx, use values may not be a product of human labour, for example, a waterfall, and can require human labour, such as coal, minerals. In the case of the latter, human labour can be used to extract minerals and to operate machinery. Manufacturers who own a waterfall, for instance, are in a position of excluding “those who do not from using this natural force, because land, and particularly land endowed with water power, is scarce” (Marx, 1981:645). They benefit in excess profits, which they may continue to have for indefinite period. Profits are an outcome of the exclusive benefit landowners enjoy, by owning natural resources. Landowners appropriate excess profits, which are converted into ground rents.

Natural forces can be subjected to modifications when human labour is used. The use of technology, for instance, chemicals, irrigation, fertilisation, creates changes in the soil as a means of agricultural production. Land capital, responsible for this transformation, is supposed to earn interest.

Referring to land as space, place and location, Harvey states that ownership of private property gives exclusive power to private persons. It “entails an absolute conception of space, one of the most important properties of which is principle of individuation established through exclusivity of occupation” (Harvey, 1982:338). Exclusive control of space is not only found in private ownership, but may even extend to State’s. Thus the recording of private property in land by means of mapping, cadastral survey demarcate the “portion of the earth's surface over which private individuals have exclusive monopoly powers” (ibid).

Explaining the function of land as location, fertility and prices of production, Harvey states that different activities exhibit a different degree of sensitivity to location, as opposed to the other qualitative attributes of particular sites. Agricultural production is affected by location and fertility whereas the siting of houses is sensitive to location. Competition over the use of space for different activities takes place. The role of
capital investment is significant in modifying the quality of land at particular sites. For instance, improving transportation through capital investment may create exploitation by opening more land for development.

2.3 Transition: feudalism to capitalism

2.3.1 Patterns of land ownership

Massey and Catalano (1978) argue that the transition from feudalism to capitalism did not lead to the demise of large landowners. Referring to agricultural production where capitalist forms of production were established, there were tenanted estates with direct producers separated from the land, the capitalists' tenant farming being established with hired labour. The process of production consisted of large landowners, tenanted estates, direct producers separated from the land, and capitalist farming established with hired labour. The passage from feudalism to capitalism did not follow the same pattern, but varied from country to country. The authors argue that in France it was characterised by the expropriation of the property of the nobility resulting in a very small scale of peasant farming being established. In Prussia, capitalism in agriculture was established by the landowner becoming the capitalist farmer. As a result, the previous Junker economy was reduced to a system of agricultural workers.

The transition from feudalism to capitalism was not only noticed in patterns of landownership, but played an important role in giving rise to three distinct classes within agricultural production. First, the emergence of large-scale landowners who appropriated ground rental. Second, capitalist tenant farmers who paid the rents. Finally, the landless agricultural labourers, hired by the capitalist tenant farmers (Massey & Catalano, 1978).

Changes in production brought about by capitalism meant the development of a division between owners and non-owners of land. To non-landowners, the payment of rent further reinforced these divisions. Appropriation of ground rents by landowners characterised property relations, and the continued existence of tenant farmers was
mediated by rents. Landowners emerged as a ruling class and were often incorporated in the “capitalist bourgeoisie ... this in turn enabled and reinforced the retention of a degree of political power by such landowners, and guaranteed their continued influence on the nature and change undergone by political institutions” (Massey & Catalano, 1978:5).

The authors further suggest a dichotomy in the emergence of large-scale landownership that formed the basis of political power, influencing the ruling class in Britain. Any changes in political institutions, landownership and its survival were equally influenced by the particular characteristics of the transition to capitalism that led to changes in the social structure of the pattern of landownership in the 19th century. Massey and Catalano (1978) further enumerate changes in patterns of landownership. First, the decline of big landowners and landed aristocracy, caused by conflicting interests between agricultural landowners and landowners subordinated to industry. Agricultural commodities generated additional sources of conflict. In an attempt to continue keeping the price of food low, leading to the reduction of working-class living standards and wages, the manufacturing industry was in conflict with landowners. This contributed to the decline of large estates held by landowners.

The second explanation for changes in patterns of landownership in Britain lies in the shift from “acreage and percentage holding terms from tenancy to owner occupation” (Massey & Catalano, 1978:6). Land farmed on a tenancy basis was reduced by half. In 1873, 90 per cent of farm land was tenanted; by the early 1970s this figure had been reduced to under 50 per cent (1978:6). In housing production the emphasis on owner occupation rose from 10.6 per cent in 1914 to 53 per cent in 1975 (1978:6).

Third, there was the increase in the role of State agencies. The authors argue that State agencies account for 19 per cent of the total acreage, with central government owning between 7 and 9 per cent, the local authorities about 7 per cent, nationalised industries 2.5 per cent and the various conservation authorities about 1.5 per cent (Massey & Catalano, 1978).
Finally, property companies, insurance companies, pension funds and so on began to enter into landownership. The independent and powerful financial sector was thus entering the structure of society.

2.3.2 Land investments and tenancy relationships

This section explores land relations established in the capitalist society as a result of this transition, and the effects of these relations.

The passage from feudalism to capitalism was characterised by the emergence of capitalist tenant farmers, whose relationship towards landowners was mediated by the payment of rent. Furthermore, a class of landless labourers, whose survival was based on their ability to sell their labour to capitalist tenant farmers. Under these forms of land relations the significance of land to both landowners and capitalist farmers is crucial. To the former, it is the means through which ground rental is appropriated, and to the latter the ability to increase production, accumulate profits and further exploit waged labour depends on the size of the landholdings. The insecurity of tenure characterising these property relations meant that the use of land could only continue as long as rental payments were made. Apart from the landowner benefiting from rents, the improvements made on land by tenants reverted to the landowners at the end of the tenancy. This served as a basis of increased rents passed on to the new tenant. Massey and Catalano (1978) argue that the system had an impact on tenants as it reduced the investments in improvements and, furthermore, their standard of living.

Land relations that developed within this system of landownership further accounted for barriers in the acquiring of land for urban housing. As the cost of land increased, so did the cost of housing, leading to the construction of high-density housing. Making reference to the cost of land in Britain, Massey and Catalano (1978) state that, between 1895 and 1907, London County Council land cost 34.4 per cent of the price of development. As the value of land rose, working-class housing, though built on cheap land, absorbed a large percentage of the income of these households, leading the government to intervene in land matters.
2.3.3 Capitalist rents, landownership and the system of production

It is argued that the capitalist mode of production dominates capitalist societies. The capitalist mode of production, defined as "the particular form of organisation of society which ensures the means by which the product of that society is produced, and the manner in which it is appropriated" (Massey & Catalano, 1978:23). The definition of rents and landownership will vary from one mode of production to another. Under the capitalist society, the mode of production consists of two distinct classes, the appropriators of surplus, often dominating ideologically the political scenes, the bourgeois, and those exploited by the system, with only labour power to sell, the workers. Contrary to the capitalist mode of production, the feudal mode of production consisted of feudal lords and serfs. Property ownership by feudal lords and subsequent relations that developed, based on the right to land and to extract the surplus, further differentiated the lords from the serfs. Serfs, in the feudal mode of production were expected to supply labour, and this was regarded as their means of earning a living, providing labour for the lords, appropriated in relation to produce, in cash or in labour hours.

Under the capitalist mode of production, these relations have been transformed: "the means of production are owned, not by those who perform the surplus labour, but by those who appropriate it, who control the process of production" (Massey & Catalano, 1978:24). The production of surplus occurs as a result of the manufacture of commodities. Even the relationship between the two classes, proletariat and bourgeois, is different from feudal modes of production, where serfs possessed the means of production and the surplus labour was "defined juridically as the right of the landowner, as the rent" (1978:24).

If the feudal mode of production was being transformed, what form did it take under capitalism? The authors argue that the capitalist mode of production has not taken over from feudalism, but the latter has been increasingly incorporated into "social formation dominated by capitalism, and realignment of the elements and relationships of feudalism to that dominant structure" (Massey & Catalano, 1978:24). Therefore, the relations of different groups of landowners towards transformation influence particular
forms of landownership. Even ownership of land, in itself, does not imply control over the processes of production and “neither is its ownership a basis on which surplus product itself is either produced by or appropriated from the direct producers” (ibid).

According to Marx (1973:95), capitalist rent represents a structure of distribution:

> The structure of distribution is completely determined by the structure of production. Distribution is itself a product of production, not only in its object, in that only the results of that production can be distributed, but also in its form, in that the specific kind of participation in production determines the specific forms of distribution, i.e. the pattern of participation in distribution.

Participation in production is a consequence of a particular historical distribution of the means, instruments and conditions of production. How the surplus value, produced by surplus labour, will be distributed under capitalism, depends on the structure of ownership of the necessities of production. For example, merchants as owners of commercial capital receive returns while owners of money capital may receive interest. Landowners operating within private ownership receive their share in accordance to the structure of ownership and the distribution of surplus value. Under capitalism, landownership commands rental payment, regarded as “a monopoly by certain persons over definite portions of the globe (Marx, 1976:615). Ground rent is regarded as “the specific economic expression of landed property” (Marx, 1976:622). The payment results rather from the social relationship than a return from the productivity of land itself. The social product, produced in the form of value, is capable of being produced by labour, leading to the creation of surplus value. Land, argue Massey and Catalano (1978) is not a produced means, has no value and embodies no labour. “Value is labour. Therefore surplus value cannot be earth. Absolute fertility on the soil affects nothing more than the following: a certain quantity of labour produces a certain product in accordance with the natural fertility of the soil” (Marx, 1976:815). Therefore, what landlords receive as rent forms the portion of surplus value resulting from the prior distribution of ownership of a condition of production. Landownership, and not land, commands rent.
Rent, according to Massey and Catalano (1978), is a structural category with a distinct form taken by a part of the total surplus value as a result of its appropriation by the owners of land. Rent indicates a particular position held by the owners of land within the capitalist social formation.

The existence of rents has effects on the functioning of capitalist systems. First, rent as a category may continue to exist even under industrial capital which owns land. Rent is often paid in advance, in the form of land purchase. Second, since industrial capitalists own land they are also aware of the rent to be charged on it. As Marx explained:

The capitalist operating on his own capital, like the one operating on borrowed capital, divides the gross profit into interest due to himself as owner, as his own lender, and into profit of enterprise due to him as to an active capitalist performing his function. As concerns this division, therefore, as a qualitative one, it is immaterial whether the capitalist really has to share with one another, or not. The employer of capital, even when working with his own capital, splits into two personalities – the owner of capital and the employer of capital; with reference to the categories of profits which it yields, his capital also splits into capital-property, capital outside the production process, and yielding interest of itself, and capital in the production process which yields a profit of enterprise through its function (Marx, 1976:375).

2.3.4 Rent as a social relation

Massey and Catalano (1978) define land as an external but necessary condition of existence of capitalism. It is possible to have different forms of relations of landownership, individual private ownership, church ownership, industrial and State ownership of land. These relations of landownership conditions the form of rent appropriated. The specific forms of rent are determined by the forms of landownership.

According to Marx (1968), there are four forms of rent, monopoly, absolute
rent, and two forms of differential rent. The monopoly rent, first, assumes monopoly is held by private owners of land. Second, users can freely compete for plots of land of different quality and locations. Finally, competition exists among landowners over the rents commanded by plots in different locations. It is also possible for the competitive conditions not to characterise monopoly rents (Harvey, 1982). Monopoly rents are realised when property owners, controlling land of a special location and quality, are able to extract monopoly rents from those willing to use the land. Under these circumstances, the sale of land, once it produces high-quality products, can fetch a monopolistic price. Thus, a “monopoly price creates the rent” (Harvey, 1982:350). It is possible for landowners not to release unused land for sale unless “paid such a high rent that the market prices of commodities produced on that land are forced above value” (ibid). The withholding of land depends on the position of landed interests, collective class power and the scarcity of land. Harvey maintains that the rent charged creates the monopoly price. Monopoly prices affect the cost of working class housing.

Absolute rent arises when capital of a certain size in agriculture produces greater surplus value than it receives in the form of profit, because sectors contribute to the total social surplus value according to the labour power they employ and receive surplus value according to the total capital they advance (Harvey, 1982:351).

Within absolute rent, it is possible for products to trade above the price of production, although selling below or above their values. Absolute rent takes place without infringing the law of value (Harvey, 1982). Absolute rent depends upon supply and demand conditions, as well as upon the area of new land taken into cultivation.

Absolute rent is associated with landlords who will require payment for the use of land, regardless of whether differential profits can be generated. This form of rent continues to exist because landed property owners refuse to release land for production without payment. Under these conditions, landed property creates a barrier to investment and increases the price of commodities above their price of production. Where landed property does not exist, “the barrier to investment posed by absolute rent would be
removed, and prices would be equal to the prices of production” (Massey & Catalano, 1978:42).

Land is regarded as the basic means of production. Therefore, the value of the products produced has a market value, a fixed price. The price of products is affected by a combination of factors such as the quality of land, locational advantage, transportation and so on. Producers on better land are able to command higher profits than those having poorer land. Massey and Catalano (1978) argue that the variation in output is not a consequence of special characteristics of the particular capital employed, but a consequence of specific conditions associated with the land on which production takes place. Differential rent arises because “capitalists located on a favoured plot of land will therefore make surplus profits equivalent to the difference between that individual price of production and the ruling price of production” (Massey & Catalano, 1978:42). It is an effect of the capitalist mode of production. Hindess (1972:15) notes the difference between differential and absolute rents, with the latter not dependent on private property:

Its existence does not depend on private property on land. The latter is a specific effect of landed property: i.e. it is an effect of the specific form of combination of the feudal and capitalist modes of production.

Differential rents are produced under unequal conditions. They can exist even where private ownership of land has been abolished:

Differential rent inevitably arises in capitalist agriculture even if the ownership of land is completely abolished. Under the private ownership of land, this rent is appropriated by the landowner, for competition between capitals compels the tenant farmer to be satisfied with the average profit on capital. When the private ownership is abolished, the rent will go to the state. That rent cannot be abolished as long as the capitalist mode of production exists (Lenin, 1907:297-298).
2.4 Effects: rent appropriation

2.4.1 Conflicts: land rent appropriators, labour and the built environment

Ball (1985a:72) argues that rents are part of the capitalist system and they influence the functioning of the construction industry:

In the case of urban areas this means that the effect of land rent on the construction industry cannot be ignored. Where the activities using the structures produced by the building industry are themselves operating on capitalist criteria there is a double influence of rent: on the production process going on within buildings as well as on the production and cost of built structures themselves.

Further explaining the effects of rents on capitalist production, he states that the impact on production is caused by the monopoly ownership of a plot of land inherent in landed property and the need to pay rent, in capitalised form, or land price. Landownership is viewed as one of the social relations involved in a structure of building production.

Under modern contracting, Ball states that the capitalist construction firm builds specified structures for known clients who may be the State, private individuals, capitalist enterprises wanting to use the structures for owner occupation, and so on. The building capitalist/landowner relationship is one in which the contractor has neither a legal nor a financial relationship with the landowner prior to the commencement of the project. The role of the building firm is to tender for the work. When the client gains control, either through renting or purchase of the land site, he/she bears the burden of land costs.

Speculative builders are different from contracting firms because they build for the general market and not for a specific client. Thus, land development and even the building process may be carried out by separate capitalist agencies. Speculative building entails the acquisition of land, long before the buildings are built or even sold. Land purchase, and leasing by building firms, influence the production process as the
motive for land acquisition if profit-oriented. The effect of rents on production is of significance in the social division within housing provision between landowners, developers and capitalist builders. Landowners sell or lease land to developers, who are responsible for laying out and servicing the building estates, or subdividing plots later sold or leased by speculative builders, who in turn sell or lease houses built to landlords. Thus, according to Ball, land development enhances ground rentals, which further attract most of the capital and entrepreneurial talents in house-building.

Ball’s (1985a) starting point is that land rent plays an important role in analysing the built environment. Land rent is viewed as a social relationship, a payment made by individuals in order to have the right to use land. The appropriators of payments, being landowners, have a monopoly over land. It is also possible for more than one person to have rights to land, such as, when land is leased, the lessor and lessee have claims over it. Property rights may be shared, for example by the State, via zoning regulations and planning. Ball further differentiates between ground rent, paid to the landowner for the use of land and the payment used as an advance for the structures built on land. He criticises the neoclassical writers’ approach to urban rent, on the grounds that, first, they focus on the demand for urban land and how it is influenced by transportation costs and the attractiveness of particular locations. Second, demand is the principal determinant of land rent. Finally, he criticises them for failing to consider the structure of building provision, the agents involved in the production, and the distribution of the built structure. He concludes that if the role of land rent is limited to the payments made to landowners for the use of land, its role is insignificant, as long as it is not incorporated and spread throughout a structure of building provision. A distinction is made between land rent and building rent. The former is associated with the revenue appropriated by the landowners and the latter is paid to the building owner. Ball argues that in cases where the landowner owns the building, the payment of ground rents does not exist.

Marxists identify three categories of social agent, whose roles have to be considered if the effects of rents, and conflicts arising from land relations, are to be understood. These are first, landowners, the appropriators of rent, and second, capitalist farmers,
paying rent to landowners as a condition of capital accumulation. Finally, there are agricultural workers, selling their labour to capitalist farmers. The relationship between landowner and capitalist is simply a capital-labour relationship. Conflicts are viewed as an outcome of the struggle between capital and labour. Rents’ categories are used to explain how economic forces further create conflicts between landowner and capital.

Ball is criticised by Clark (1987) on three grounds. First, the reformulation of land rent in urban context, based on Wieser and second, a misconception of Marx’s reference to payments to landed property, that ground rents may exist even where landowner and land user are not identical.

Nothing is altered if the capitalist owns the waterfall himself. He still draws the surplus profit ... not as a capitalist, but as the owner of the waterfall; and for the precise reason that this excess arises not from his capital as such, but rather from his disposal over a natural force that is limited in scope, separable from his capital, and monopolizable, it is transformed into ground-rent (Marx, 1981:785).

The third criticism is that ground rent plays a minimal role in urban contexts, office development in particular. He states that

[i]dentifiably separate landowners who appropriate ground rents are empirically rare. Developers, office building firms, and financial institutions profit from the creation and ownership of offices, and between them generally they successfully manage to ensure that no landowner takes away a large share of the potential profits. Once again, building rent should not be confused with land rent (Ball, 1985b:523).

Pointing out at Marx’s explanation of when interest on improvements to land becomes land rent, only “as soon as the capital laid out is amortized”, and improvements “are the product of capital, they operate just like the natural differential quality of the soil” (Marx, 1981:844,880). Building rent is defined as “interest and armortization for the capital invested” in the building, and site value refers to land. Thus “it is ground-rent
and not the houses themselves that forms the real objective of speculative building” (ibid:909). Clark concludes that Ball’s misunderstanding of land rent and building rent leads to the presupposition that the costs of constructing a building do not vary, irrespective of where it is built. He maintains that Ball’s interpretation of land rent is incapable of explaining why an office rent, charged per square metre, varies from that for an identical building located in a different city. So what Ball refers to as profit accruing to agents involved in office buildings, such as landowners, developers, financial institutions, building firms and so on, is interpreted by Clark as fixed capital invested by these agents on urban land, and comprises urban land rent.

2.4.2 Freehold, leasehold land rights and tenancy relations

Archer (1973:2) defines land tenure as the group of property rights that private persons and organisations can hold in land, by law or by contract. The significant role of these land rights is to allow the holders to have exclusive control of parcels of land assigned to them. The control may take different forms, holders may develop land, conserve it or use it as a means of investments. Archer maintains that land rights are not static and are subjected to State regulation.

Under the freehold tenure system, freeholders have four main land rights:

- the right to use the land;
- the right to lease it for rent for a specified time;
- the right to subdivide it; and
- the right to transfer it by sale or gift (Archer, 1973:2).

However, the right of the freeholder to use land is subjected to building regulations and planning permissions. Even the right to lease, subdivide and transfer land is regulated by the State. Where landowners decide to lease land to landlords, tenancy relations between the landlord and tenant may be subjected to landlord and tenant regulations. Even the right to subdivide and to sell are subject to price control.

What differentiates leasehold from freehold tenure and what are the relations of these systems to the capitalist system? It can be argued that freehold tenure, closely
associated with private ownership of land, has given rise to various actors with interests in land. Under the leasehold land-tenure system, the terms and conditions on which the ground landlord (lessor), and the lessee can use the land are explicit. These relate to the lease period, the purpose of the lease, the development conditions and the land rent charge. The period of lease clearly stipulates the fixed time when the site would revert to the owner and under what conditions the lease period would be extended, whether the lessee is entitled to compensation for improvements made during the lease period and how improvements would be calculated. Also, the contract stipulates the land rent charge payable for the site, when and how periodic rent reviews will take place, and factors to be considered, the conditions under which repairs would be undertaken, and the lessor’s forfeiture and repossession rights. It is clear that under the leasehold system the roles of various participants are clearly defined, such as those of the landowners, the ground landlord, the lessor and the lessee.

2.5 Significance of transformation

2.5.1 Impact: capitalist intervention in low-income settlements

The section argues that the nature and the effects of land transformation in low-income settlements differ from capitalist societies, and increase the need for a framework more applicable to these settlements.

The land, which is parcelled out to individual householders in South African freehold settlements may have been legally acquired, with freehold title deeds. It may be fully serviced with infrastructure, electrical cable connections, garbage removal services and other community services. It is also possible for a piece of land to be jointly owned, having been acquired through inheritance. The parcelling of land to householders may take different forms. First, it could be through sale, whereby the landowner sells part of his/her land. Second, it could be through land rental, with householders allowed to use land on condition that they pay rent. In some cases neither sale nor land rental may characterise access to plot, since it could have been offered as a gift or the householder allowed to use land free of charge. In cases where land is acquired through purchase, it may be vacant land or land previously occupied by tenant households. Access to rental land or vacant land for
sale is through informal networks. The landowner may play an important role during the transaction, negotiating sales, payment methods, and so on. At a later stage, land sales may involve hiring the services of surveyors to clearly demarcate the size of the plot for sale. In some cases landowners may appoint estate managers, thus totally divorce themselves from land transactions. The land which is sold has freehold title deed, so the landowners merely transfer some of the land rights they have acquired through sale to the second person. Where landowners choose to rent land there are no formal lease agreements between the landowner and the tenant. There is a mere verbal agreement that can be terminated at any time should the landowner need his land for some other purpose. There can also be no restrictions imposed on the tenant on how to use the rental land, for instance he/she may rent several sites from different landowners. There may not be any restriction on the number of houses built on a rental plot, and on how those houses are to be used. The layout of rental plots does not follow any municipal planning codes, and even the houses built may be below minimum health standards. In some cases planning officials may indirectly participate in house construction by regulating the building materials to be used, providing advice, and even inspecting houses prior to occupation, even on informally accessed plots. It is also possible for landowners not to provide land, but to have constructed houses for rental to tenant households. They can even combine the two, providing rented land and houses. It could be argued that landowners operate outside the capitalist laws governing the assembly and sale of land. At one level the land in question is legally owned, with title deeds. It is purchased from the capitalist land markets, and properly surveyed, with services. At another level, informal land relationships have developed between landowners and non-landowners and enabled non-landowners to participate in self-help housing production, purely for owner occupation. Other interests have also developed, whereby non-owners of land construct self-help housing for rent.

Under the capitalist system the relation of landowners to land is for economic purposes, to use land to generate profits. The framework developed below illustrates the relationship between rents, ownership of land, informal land relations and forms of landlordism.
2.5.2 Subsistence form of landlordism

Kumar (1992:1994) has emphasised that the conversion of low-income householders into subsistence forms of landlordism results out of a desperation to meet basic human needs. Rents form an important source of income which householders use to repay loans. Without rents, subsistence landlords could barely survive. As rents are a regular source of income, they make a substantial contribution to subsistence households whose income remains below the minimum level of subsistence, even when rents are added. One other distinguishing feature of subsistence landlords is that they have access to one plot.

In the previous paragraph, two aspects were used in defining subsistence landlords – income and access to a single plot. While the framework about to be developed for analysing subsistence landlords is in line with the assertion that renting within these forms of landlordism is a survival strategy, it is necessary to point out the limitations of the concept “subsistence landlord”, and why the location of subsistence landlords within the land tenure system has the potential of accommodating diversities characterising low-income settlements in South Africa.

It is hypothesised that State intervention in land policies, by granting freehold land rights, encourages the development of householders who are restricted by their income to purchase a titled plot.

They are forced to enter into informal land relations with landowners. Entering into informal land relations is the only means of satisfying their shelter needs.

Subsistence landlords arise from the landowner/non-landowner relationship. Tenure, non-ownership of land and informal land relations lower investments in rental housing, reinforce poverty and a dependence on rents.

Under certain conditions it is possible for a low-income householder to rent land, as well as structures built on plots, assuming the role of a landlord, yet access to this accommodation involves a lack of participation in construction process and even the non-purchase of plots. The conditions under which the subsistence form of landlordism which has access to more
than a single plot develops make it possible to distinguish between a residential and absentee form of landlordism, although under certain circumstances the distinction may be blurred. The former is associated with the subsistence form of landlordism having access to a single plot. Landlordism may have arisen from letting parts of houses to tenants. The landlord may live in the house with the tenant, sharing communal spaces such as the kitchen, bathroom, ablution systems, and so on. The relationship between the landlord and the tenant is direct because even the house is shared by landlord and a tenant. Tenants may even form part of the landlord’s household, they can participate in household chores and in times of financial need the landlord may turn to the tenant for financial assistance. Rent-collection methods involve the landlord himself, without his having to assign responsibilities to intermediaries, as even the landlord operates on a small scale. The absentee form of subsistence landlordism is associated with landlords having access to more than a single plot. The relationship between the landlord and the tenant may be indirect. A landlord may reside in the same settlement or in another settlement, may or may not share his/her house with tenants. He/she may or may not be involved in a direct relationship with tenants, such as rent collection, allocation of rooms and so on, involving the use of intermediaries, or caretakers. It is also possible for the subsistence form of landlords to share a house with tenants and have a rented house in another plot which is not shared with the tenants. This means that, at one level, the relationship between landlord and tenant may be direct, as most facilities are shared, and on another level the status of subsistence landlordism may be indirect, and defined by the absentee form of landlordism prevailing on the sites, which denotes that a landlord can be present at only one plot.

Mobility within subsistence landlordism can either be upward or downward. For instance, absentee subsistence landlords may revert to residential subsistence landlordism, when they have access to a single plot. Land relations explain the circumstances under which the mobility and the dissolution of landlordism may occur. It is possible for a subsistence landlord who has access to more than a single plot to have the number of plots reduced, and hence the rental income derived from renting space reduced when the relationship established between the legal landowner and the landlord who has not purchased land ceases to exist or even when the landowner requires land for other purposes.
Subsistence landlords' relation to land, non-ownership, further limits the investment made in rental housing. As rents are influenced by the quality of materials used for construction, rental income is also affected. Poor quality leads to very low rentals, further perpetuating poverty and increasing the dependency on rents, however small.

2.5.3 Petty bourgeois landlords

Kumar (1992) has defined petty bourgeois landlords in terms of role of rents in the household, and the properties held. To subsistence landlords, rents “are essential to the maintenance of the basic use value of dwelling” (1992:22) whereas, for petty bourgeois landlords, “rent is essential, however, if improvements to the dwelling are to be made” (ibid). Both subsistence and petty bourgeois landlords own a single property.

Regarding the financial position of petty bourgeois landlords, Kumar argues that, unlike the subsistence landlords whose financial position puts them below the minimum level of subsistence, petty bourgeois landlords have incomes above the level of subsistence (including rents). Thus what matters is the conditions under which this form of landlordism emerged, as well as the role of rents to petty bourgeois. Again, this form of landlordism emerged under different conditions from those of subsistence landlords, where renting is a survival strategy.

The hypothesis put forward by the research, related to petty bourgeois landlords, states that:

*The State's promotion of landownership creates a group of landlords who voluntarily enter into informal land relations, not as a result of being priced out by the cost of titled plots.*

*Securing a plot through informal land relations is an incentive to landlordism, mobility and capital expansion.*

Petty bourgeois landlords have a dual relation to land. On one level, the land on which the
rented house is constructed may have been purchased with a freehold title. On one level, the plot may not have been purchased, but accessed through subletting, the petty bourgeois being the non-landowner. It may have been possible for the petty bourgeois to have combined both methods of accessing land, formal and informal means.

Kumar (1992) further suggests that it is possible for the petty bourgeois landlord to have started as a subsistence landlord when rents were important to satisfy basic human needs and, as time goes on, rents constitute an extra income, becoming essential if home improvements are to be made or household items purchased. It is also possible for petty bourgeois landlords to have started as petty bourgeois landlords without undergoing transformation.

Petty bourgeois landlords vary their investments in low-cost rental housing according to their relation to land. Where plots are legally owned, investments tend to be higher than when plots have been rented. It is also possible for investments in rental housing not to follow this pattern, such as the legally owned plots characterised by high and low investment. The ability to exercise choice, both in the form of accessing land and the investment in rental housing, puts the petty bourgeois in a better financial position.

The dissolution of petty bourgeois landlordism is influenced by both internal and external factors. The former means factors that are controlled by the individual, such as income, family size and a need for space. The latter refers to factors that are not controlled by low-income householders, such as forms of land tenure. Where the relation to land is one of non-ownership, the termination of informal land relations between landowner and non-landowner, may lead to the dissolution of landlordism, and reverting to the status of non-landlordism. Also, upward and downward mobility may be influenced by the land relations. So will the low-cost forms of rental housing, developed on the affected untitled land. But where land is owned it is less influenced by these land relations, and internal factors, rather than the non-ownership of land, explain the dissolution of landlordism.
2.5.4 Petty capitalist form of landlordism

According to Kumar (1992), petty capitalist landlords differ from the subsistence and petty bourgeois type of landlord according to their motivation for letting space. For petty capitalist landlords, rented accommodation is produced for exchange. Secondly, rents are used for the expansion of capital. Like the subsistence and petty bourgeois landlords, it is possible for petty capitalist landlords to have started as petty bourgeois landlords, where the motive for letting space was a "deliberate attempt to generate additional income" (1992:22). However, as rents may no longer be required to improve homes but become savings for a new plot and the objective of production becomes that of exchange, petty bourgeois landlords would have been transformed to petty capitalist landlords. Downward mobility of petty capitalist landlords is also possible. Again, this is determined by the role of rents. For instance, drastic changes can happen to petty capitalist landlords, whereby rents become "absolutely essential to the maintenance of the basic use value of dwellings" (ibid). A petty capitalist landlord may be forced to sell his/her property. Under these circumstances he/she would have reverted to a status of subsistence landlord. It is also possible for petty capitalist landlords to abandon landlordism, thus becoming non-landlords.

It is hypothesised that the State's promotion of landownership, by granting freehold tenure polarises low-income householders into two distinct levels, distinguished by their relation to land and income. At one level, ownership of land allows the growth of petty capitalist landlordism: petty capitalist landlords respond to the opportunities created by the transformation process by using land as an investment.

Petty capitalist landlordism is of two forms: those whose subsistence level is above the poverty line, and those whose level is below.

Petty capitalist landlords are different from absentee subsistence landlords; the former have invested in plots through purchase, ownership and access to title deeds, and the latter do not own plots. Another difference between the two lies in the manner in which these forms of landlordism have arisen.
Whether petty capitalist landlords operate below or above the subsistence level, their relation to land is that of ownership. However, where a dual relationship to land exists, plots have been purchased and some accessed through informal land relations, the former becomes the dominant means while the latter is regarded as another form of expanding capital.

It is proposed that, under certain conditions, it is possible for petty capitalist landlords to have arisen out of a desire to invest in low-income rented accommodation by purchasing several properties, yet the level of income puts the landlord below the subsistence level. The determining factor is why this form of landlordism has developed and under what conditions the conceptualisation of petty capitalist landlordism can be flexible enough to embrace these diversities. Low-income householders, who previously invested in expanding their capital by purchasing several plots for rental housing construction, may suddenly experience financial problems such as the loss of a job, which may reduce household income. Similarly, changes may take place in low-income households, such as receiving a lump sum from an insurance payout, betting, a disability grant, lobola, and so on. Householders may decide to invest this lump sum on buying property and engage in low-income rental housing construction. The idea of purchasing several plots is aimed neither at consumption nor owner occupation (as the landlord already has access to housing) but is a deliberate attempt to generate income to use in the expansion of low-income rental housing, and increasing wealth by purchasing several additional properties. However, the landlord’s income may continue to remain below the level of subsistence, even though he may have purchased several plots. Thus the ability to have purchased numerous plots does not automatically transform his/her financial position from below the level of subsistence to being above subsistence level. While under the broad definition of the petty capitalist form of landlordism two traits were identifiable, first, the income (including rents) is above the minimum subsistence level and, second, householders convert to the petty capitalist form of landlordism purely for investment purposes and this becomes evident in the purchasing of several plots, it is possible for petty capitalist landlords to have only one of these traits, and purchase and own several plots as a means of investment in the production of rented accommodation. Improvements in household income can also have a significant role in petty capitalist households by transforming them to a level of income above subsistence.
level. Under these circumstances, a petty capitalist landlord would be characterised by both traits, first, having income above the level of subsistence, second, the purpose of production being that of expansion and investing in low-income rented housing production.

Access to rental accommodation may combine a use of informal networks, friends, relatives or even the use of intermediaries, estate agents. Investment motives among petty capitalist landlords is evident in the range of low-cost rental housing produced. They may even provide various types of rental housing such as rented rooms, houses, land, or land and houses. All these are indications of the ability to use land as an investment and maximise rents.

The purpose of this section has been to present a framework through which the development of petty capitalist forms of landlordism can be analysed in South African low-income settlements. It has been argued that the definition of the petty capitalist form of landlordism should be capable of accommodating some variations observed in South African low-income settlements. While petty capitalist landlords, according to Kumar (1992), are defined according to the reasons why the production of rented accommodation is undertaken, the role of rents in households' income and the ability to have more than one plot, signifying an investment motive, it has been shown that it is possible for petty capitalist landlords to have one of these traits, to have purchased several plots with an aim of investing in low-income rental housing, and yet continue having income that is below the level of subsistence.

2.6 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to present a theoretical framework for analysing the development of low-income landlords in South Africa and forms of landlordism. The objective has been to relate landlords to ownership and non-ownership of land. In order to show that concepts observed under the capitalist system are not applicable to freehold tenure settlements in South Africa, the chapter began by discussing two forms of land, non-capitalist and capitalist. Non-capitalist access to land is associated with feudalism. Under
the feudal system, there was a clear distinction between feudal lords and serfs. The former owned land while the latter had no ownership of land but simply worked on it.

The transformation of the feudal mode of production to the capitalist mode is evident in the types of landowner that have emerged under the capitalist system. Land becomes the necessary condition of capitalism. The appropriation of rent is necessary for the perpetuation of capitalism. One other importance of rent as a source of revenue is noted in the division within housing provision, arising between the appropriators of rent in the built environment. The rising numbers of speculative builders, contracting firms, landowners who sell or lease land to developers, who in turn lease and sell houses to landlords, indicate the role of land development in enhancing ground rents as well as the importance of rents as revenue.

In low-income settlements the non-capitalist forms of land can be associated with communal land and untitled plots, and freehold land rights with capitalist forms of land. The transformation of land is significant in two respects. First, it contributes to multiple-plot-ownership. Second, it gave rise to forms of landlordism and the development of informal land relations between landowners and non-landowners. Low-income householders who have invested in plots are different from those who have not made investments by their relation to ownership of land. The former have invested in plots through purchase, and therefore have access to formal title, freehold tenure. The latter’s relation to land is that of non-ownership. The land on which houses have been built is usually not owned, and has no formal title. Multiple-plot-ownership is associated with petty capitalist landlords. The reason for investing in plots is purely economic, to make profits. Plots are purchased not for the purpose of owner occupation, but for the construction of rental housing. The desire to invest in plots and maximise rents is evident in the range of rental housing petty capitalist landlords provide, such as rental housing, rented rooms, renting sites and even a combination of more than one type, such as renting land and houses. Accessing land through informal land relations is regarded as a secondary relation to land. This is viewed as another form of expanding capital, maximising rents and the expansion of rental housing. Low-cost forms of rental housing reflect petty capitalists’ relation to land.
Ownership of land gives landlords freedom to invest in a range of building materials. High and low standards of materials for construction characterise rental housing, as does the investment in services, such as water, sanitation methods, electricity, and so on. This puts landlords in a better position, having been able to command higher rents. Among the petty capitalist landlords are those who live below subsistence level, despite the fact that they have invested in ownership of several plots. There are also those whose income and rents put them above the poverty line. The former have resulted from financial changes, and tragedies such as job losses. Mobility of petty capitalist landlords, from below to above the subsistence level, is possible as financial changes affect their position within the subsistence level. Downward mobility may take place when petty capitalists' relation to land changes from being that of multiple-plot-ownership, either by selling the plots they own, or no longer renting space, and their relation to rents changes. They may revert to subsistence, petty bourgeois landlordism or even to non-landlordism.

One other consequence of the transformation of non-capitalist forms of land is associated with the rise in subsistence landlords. Accessing plots in capitalist land markets creates landlords who are excluded from the capitalist land markets by the cost of the titled plot. In order to have access to land, they enter into informal land relations with landowners. These relations are informal and often not mediated by the officials. The struggle to obtain a piece of plot is evident in the poverty among these households. Subsistence landlords may even enter into multiple informal land relations with the landowners. The absentee subsistence landlord arises from these multiple land relations, while the residential subsistence landlord refers to a landlord who has gained access to a single plot. Mobility within subsistence landlords is possible when a residential subsistence landlord has access to a second plot. Since the subsistence landlords' relation to land is that of non-ownership, downward mobility may be affected by their position to ownership. The termination of informal land relations, may lead to the reduction of plots, for instance, to a single plot. Downward mobility may reduce rental housing, affect rents, and further impoverish these households. However, upward mobility within subsistence forms of landlordism is not an indication of financial improvement within these households. But the mobility between forms of landlordism, such as from subsistence to petty bourgeois, will have an impact on these households. Mobility within subsistence landlords may take place without changing the
form of landlordism. They remain subsistence landlords whether they have access to a single plot or not.

The transformation of non-capitalist forms of land has given rise to petty bourgeois landlords. Located between subsistence and petty capitalist landlords, they are identified by their relation to land. Accessing plots by means of informal land relations established between landowners and non-landowners is a matter of choice. The petty bourgeois can afford a titled plot, yet they choose to enter into informal land relations. These households are not dependent on rents; however, rents are used to purchase household items. Investments made in rental housing vary, reflecting their relation to land. Where the relation to land is that of ownership, investments in building materials for constructing low-cost rental housing, services, and so on, are higher than where the relation to land is that of non-ownership. It is also not uncommon for petty bourgeois landlords whose relation to land is that of ownership to have invested equally in low-cost forms of rental housing, rental housing being characterised by high or low investment. The dissolution of petty bourgeois is influenced by these land relations, and can take place when land relations are terminated. Under these circumstances they may revert to a status of non-landlordism. Upward mobility is also another possibility, should petty bourgeois landlords decide to invest in plots, becoming petty capitalists.

The chapter has demonstrated the impact of capitalist intervention in land markets. It has been shown that there is a link between land regularisation, the promotion of freehold land rights and the development of forms of landlordism. How low-income landlords respond to the introduction of titled plots varies, according to their financial circumstances. To petty capitalist landlords, an introduction to titled plots encourages investment in plots and participating in various forms of low-cost rental housing. To subsistence landlords, secured tenure is another constraint. It means exclusion from the land market, reinforced poverty and forcing them to obtain plots through informal means and continue participating as landlords, as rents are seen as a survival strategy, however small they may be.
CHAPTER 3
APPROACHES TO NON-CONVENTIONAL LAND POLICIES: IMPACT ON LOW-INCOME LANDLORDS

3.1 Introduction

Low-income housing studies that have previously focused on land policies in the developing countries have often failed to link the development of low-income landlords and types of low-income rental housing to land policies. The causes vary and include the following:

- the notion that low-income householders produce housing mainly for owner occupation and informal land tenures prevent the meaningful investment in low-income housing,
- the tendency to focus on settlements that had originated as squatter settlements, formal settlements that had been squatted upon and characterised by conflicts between landowners, landlords and squatters and settlements that had arisen from land invasions. Promoting the ownership of land is seen as a means to investment.

Investigation of these settlements rarely goes beyond the negotiation process and ends when negotiations between squatters and landowners have successfully led to secure tenure for squatters. In cases where studies have gone beyond the provision of secured tenure to squatters, the emphasis has often been on the unintended effects of state intervention leading to the expulsion of the poor. Forcing them to sell their homes and become tenants elsewhere and distinguishing between tenants and homeowners.

This chapter highlights the impact of land policies on low-income landlords. It considers how the various methods used by low-income householders to access land have been transformed. These include the transformation of non-commercial land into commercial land. The various forms in which governments have intervened in land policies, impacts on the development of low-income landlords. It is argued that land policy studies should move away from the portrayal of low-income householders as producers of homes for owner occupation. These studies should link low-income householders to the production of housing for rent as this will unveil forms of landlord whose emergence are an outcome of state intervention in land policies.
3.2 From non commercial to commercial land supply systems

Housing analysts who have written about land supply systems in the developing world have suggested that methods of accessing land without purchase are coming to an end (Baross, 1983; Doebele, 1987; Amis, 1983; Baken & Van der Linden, 1992).

The effects of transformation of land supply systems to low-income householders has also been subjected to various interpretations. Some writers have emphasised the rise in tenancy, the illegal occupation of land, and subdivision, while others have been more concerned about the increased value of land. This section begins by discussing the processes of land supply available to low-income householders, characteristics of these systems and how they have been transformed, the role of the government and the effects on low-income householders.

3.2.1 Characteristics: processes of land supply

Baross (1983) states that there are three forms of land available to low-income householders. These include non-commercial, commercial and administrative form of land. Non-commercial land simply means that householders do not have to pay for land. Land is free. If there is a payment, it is in the form of a tribute or voluntary gifts. Customary land, government land reserves, abandoned properties and marginal land fall into this category. Land may be allocated on a temporary or permanent basis, and is controlled by chiefs.

In Latin American cities, *baldios* and *ejidos* are examples of collective ownership rights to peripheral land (Doebele, 1987).

In some countries the availability of abandoned and unclaimed properties has become a source of non-commercial land supply, as in the case of Lusaka in Zambia after independence:

George was said to be the name of a farmer and the core of George’s compound were the houses of the farm workers. George left the country at independence in 1969 and the settlement grew rapidly, completely out of control of the authorities. In George’s
compound, it did not seem as if anyone has paid rent. Thus, the question of landownership was irrelevant for most of the inhabitants (Baross, 1983:190).

Commercial land differs from non-commercial, as access to the former is determined by ability to pay. Baross identifies three forms, mini-plots, land rentals and substandard divisions. Access to land through the purchase of mini-plots becomes the only accessible form of land supply in cities characterised by land restrictions. The market for mini-plots occurs when the original landowners decide to sell part of their plots. Despite its commercial orientation, Baross maintains that mini-plot development and selling has three advantages for low-income house builders. First, the poor benefit through the sale of the land. Second, the method creates avenues for negotiation to take place between sellers and buyers in respect of plot size, price and the terms of payment. Finally, settlement growth resulting from self-building contributes towards neighbourhood enhancement, and increases householders' bargaining strength, which can be used later to pressurise the government for improved services.

Land rental is another form of commercial land supply where landowners let land to householders. While the sale of mini-plots and land rentals both involve some form of payment by those using land, land rental means the temporary use of land through payment of rent, even though the land rights remain with the owner, and with mini-sales the buyer assumes ownership of land through, for instance, land transfer. Land rental may arise from expectations of high returns if land is to be sold in future or it can be a means of generating income without any intention of selling the land. Land rentals may also mean the participation of landowners in the construction of rental housing. Baross (1983:197) illustrates a case in Maputo, Mozambique:

Before the independence of Mozambique, land tenure and possession of houses could be arranged in two different ways. On the one hand, a landowner possessed a certain area of land, on which he allowed a number of families to build a house of their own. In this way the dwellers paid rent to the landowner for the land, but not for the house, as they had built the house themselves and therefore owned it. On the other hand, the landowner himself arranged the houses to be built, and here the tenant paid rent for the
house to the landowner and did not pay anything for the land. Sometimes minor landowners rented such areas of land from the great landowners, which they in turn leased to tenants for profit.

Substandard land subdivision is characterised by five processes (Baross, 1983). First, plots may be purchased from people with or without legal title to the land. Second, the purchaser is often supplied with "formal documents" such as instalment agreements, receipts or even a promise to register title at the end of payment period. Third, subdivision is often not approved by the local authorities. Fourth, plots are sold without infrastructure. Finally, even houses constructed on substandard subdivisions may have been constructed without official building permits.

According to Baross, administrative forms of land implies government participation in land supply for low-income settlements. This is achieved through projects and rules. "Project implementation" simply refers to housing schemes and projects initiated and designed by the government for low-income settlers. "Rules" refer to government intervention in land markets to facilitate the release of land for low-income housing. Mechanisms used by the State include land ceiling Acts, the nationalisation of land and urban land reforms.

This section was designed to distinguish between two forms in which low-income householders access land, non-commercial and commercial land. Non-commercial land simply means land to which there is access without payment. Whenever payments are made, they are voluntary and in the form of a tribute. Communal land ownership, and land owned by chiefs or tribes are examples of non-commercial land. Access to commercial land requires some form of payment. Commercial land is a broad concept, encompassing how land has been used, money transactions in the form of rents by people without legal ownership of the land, as in the case of the minor landowner who rents sites in order to make a profit.

Some conceptual problems arising from Baross’ usage of concept “commercial land” are worth mentioning. Baross describes various forms of land supply systems but fails to explore the effects of commercial forms of land on low-income householders. Commercial
land is used in explaining land transactions, and the number of actors that have emerged who also use land for profit. While Baross has argued that non commercial forms of land are being transformed to commercial land, he pays little attention to the development of low-income landlords and the relationship between landowner and non landowner. Although there is evidence of landlordism taking place, as in the case of Maputo in Mozambique.

Baross differentiates between a dweller and a tenant. The former owns home built on rented land while the latter does not own home as it is provided by the landowner. The difference between a dweller and a tenant is based on relation to housing tenures, whether homes are owned or rented. According to Baross, dweller means a homeowner. Another distinction is made between the minor and greater landowner. Minor landowners have no legal ownership of plots, which are rented from the greater landowners and later leased to tenants. Baross uses the concept minor landowners interchangeably with tenants. At times tenant refers to householders who are not owning homes but are renting rooms and houses from landowners. In some cases tenants are defined as low-income householders leasing land from minor landowners suggesting that they have built their homes. Also, according to Baross the concept ‘landownership’ could mean ownership of land, as in case of greater landowners and non-ownership of land when making reference to minor landowners.

3.2.2 Why and how have governments intervened in land policies?

Doebele (1987:7) defines land as essential to all human activities, limited in quantity, immobile and permanent. Because of its nature as being for the public good, it is also seen as a commodity that requires public control and management.

Lim (1987) states that failures and imperfections often observed in land markets force policy makers to implement various forms of public intervention. Lim has three categories for the rationale for State intervention in land matters. First, there is the category resulting from land-market failure and imperfections. Second, there are the distributional aspects of ownership and, finally, the severe disequilibria in land markets (1987:24). According to Lim
imperfections in the land market are caused by a number of factors. They include the frequent violation of the conditions for perfect competition in land markets. Because land has special characteristics as a "commodity, durability, immobility and transaction barriers transgress the assumptions of perfectly competitive markets" (p.24). Regarding the distributional aspects of landownership, Lim further argues that land is an important form of asset for households and its value increases faster than the general price indexes. Ownership of land is essential for the production of housing. In developing countries where the largest proportion of low-income households cannot afford the cost of housing, there is a need for public intervention in land policies to ensure equal distribution of land among the lowest income householders. Severe disequilibria in land markets is caused by the rapid urbanisation of the cities of the developing world. In some countries the population growth have doubled during the last two decades. Because the private sector has limited resources, the supply of land lags behind the demand created by sudden urban growth. In order to achieve optimum allocation of land among users with various interests, there is need for the public sector to intervene in land markets.

Lim presents two forms of policy intervention, explicit and implicit. Explicit land policies simply mean policies deliberately designed to achieve certain land-use goals. These include market incentives, regulatory measures and direct public ownership. The aim of using market incentives is either to facilitate or to discourage the behaviour of sellers and buyers in land markets. This strategy ensures efficient transactions and distribution, by applying economic incentives and disincentives where appropriate. Property taxes, housing subsidies, land development subsidies, and land value increment taxes are examples of market incentives. Other levels of intervention may be directed at regulating private agents. Governments establish rules and standards to which private agents are expected to conform, such as subdivision controls, green belts, zoning, rent control, maximum land holding, permit controls and licensing of developers and intermediaries.

The last level of intervention occurs when government doubts the ability of the land markets to promote the desired goals. This leads to direct government participation in the purchase, distribution, developing and disposal of land. Government agencies may be assigned the
responsibility of land acquisition. Examples are nationalisation of land policies, leaseholds, land purchase for a nominal fee, and so on.

Implicit land-use policies are divided into three categories. First, the government may use market incentives to impact on land use, such as investment tax credits as a strategy designed to facilitate private investment, while promoting the expansion of firms in certain areas. These include providing tax incentives for foreign investment. Second, the government may implement regulations not directly affecting land-use control, such as restricting imports for certain groups, free export zones, and so on. Finally, implicit policies relate to direct ownership. Government may assume ownership of land for military bases, as a means to achieve national security.

Lim argues that the successful implementation of land policies will take place only if explicit and implicit land policies are integrated. He warns that governments should consider the purpose, type, number and significance of explicit and implicit policies as ignoring these may create conflict between policies. For instance, an imbalance between large numbers of implicit policies impacting on land use and a small number of explicit policies can affect land-use decisions in several ways. He proposes two concepts to examine the relationship between various land policies, dominance and consistency. It is possible for a particular policy to have dominant power, with specific goals capable of nullifying other policies. However, where implicit and explicit policies are consistent with land-use goals, the possibility of achieving stated goals and land use increases. In contrast, where inconsistencies exist among various land policies, difficulty may be experienced in achieving desired land-use goals.

Kitay’s (1987) view of the role of government in the land market is different from that presented by Lim. He calls for the co-operation of the public and private sector for land and housing delivery to low-income families. By “private sector” he means activities carried out by private persons or firms not linked to the government sector. The term also includes the informal sector. First, he links access to land to low-income housing production. Shelter deficits in developing countries and the number of people unable to afford secured land and shelter are also increasing. According to Kitay, these problems have resulted from inefficient
policy interventions by government. Second, comparing private builders and developers to the public sector, he argues that the private sector is subjected to unfair competition in the field of low-income housing production. Subsidies are another means by which government discourages private competition. Land for low-income housing construction is often inexpensive, as it might have been acquired by the government in earlier times. Third, other expenses associated with land development, such as governmental overheads, supervision of construction, preparation of land plans, recording fees and title registrations are usually not included or recouped in the final purchase of land and houses. Fourth, governments often accept smaller down-payments than the private sector does. Also, because of the large subsidies involved and the sympathetic nature of governments when dealing with non-payers, debt collections, buyers may prefer to purchase from a government agency as opposed to a private builder, when they know they can be lax about repaying their mortgages, with little likelihood of adverse action (Kitay, 1987:32).

Fifth, municipal codes and building standards used in developing countries are imported from Western countries. Besides the cost implications these raise, Kitay argues that, when developers ignore the standards and codes, the resulting housing is illegal, subject to confiscation, fines and other encumbrances (ibid:33). In cases where developers have sold illegal land and houses to prospective buyers, they are faced with defences against payment of mortgage debt based upon the sellers’ breach of the law. Thus private developers can be assailed by the very people that their production intend to benefit (ibid).

Sixth, successful delivery of land for housing depends on government’s ability to provide infrastructure, roads and water supply. Where the government has a record of not fulfilling these needs, this could be a major obstacle in the functioning of the private sector. Finally, low-income housing production exhibits lower rates of return when compared to industrial investment. Such low investments, according to Kitay, is caused by government’s regulations, such as price ceilings, profit margin limits and restrictions, rent control and the amount of property a person may hold. He concludes that a strong requisite for private sector shelter production should be freedom to build and sell under free market conditions (Kitay, 1987:33).
Kitay sees the role of the public sector as capable of removing existing constraints, and increasing interest in private sector housing production. These objectives can be achieved by the reduction of subsidies channelled into public housing, the redrafting of building codes and standards, the introduction of lower legal fees, cheaper title recording, less taxation and the encouragement of credit unions and loan associations.

Gilbert (1984) argues that successful urban planning requires State intervention in the land market. Also, access to land is influenced by the extent and form of State intervention and control. Gilbert, further emphasising the role of the State, argues that land markets cannot be separated from the activities of the government, as the State decides whether land will be distributed according to the rules of the market, whether certain land uses are controlled or whether land should be allocated by the private or the public sector (Gilbert, 1984:225).

Land, according to Gilbert, plays an important part in the relationship between urban growth and socio-economic development. He presents three different interpretations of the role of the State in society. The first interpretation relates to a liberal perspective, which views the State as a referee, arbitrating between various societal groups. The second interpretation is linked to Marxist proponents. Within these perspective there are those who view the State as a powerful instrument acting in favour of the more influential, and doing very little for the poor. Others have adopted the structuralist view, arguing that the State is independent of dominant groups. However, Gilbert suggests geographical and temporal variations of these interpretations and that, under certain conditions, the State may act inconsistently and there seems to be no consistent logic for every form of intervention.

Locating the allocation of land within the role of the State and making reference to the situation in Venezuela, Gilbert argues that the State may use land as a means of accelerating economic growth and capital accumulation. This becomes evident in subsidising companies willing to construct public housing or even offer cheap public land for house construction. Secondly, land may be used by the State to favour particular individuals in a society. For instance, planning permission may be granted to enable certain companies to undertake government contracts. In the same way, planning permission can be used to harm enemies.
Finally, the State may use its powers and act against those groups benefiting from irrational land-allocation processes (Gilbert, 1984:228), such as when land-use patterns increase the cost of allocation and even industrialise cities to rationalise land allocation. Fourthly, the State uses land in favour of the poor. This is evident in programmes designed to increase access to land by the poor, such as land invasion.

Cheema (1987) argues that land supply in developing countries has not kept pace with increasing demands. The structure of land markets indicates decreasing supply by both public and private agencies, who cater for the middle- and high-income earners. Since these only constitute a tiny percentage of the population in developing countries, the poor, who are in the majority, are often excluded and left to fend for themselves. Several matters are attributed to land shortage. First, the urban population increases through migration or natural growth, and what was once considered peripheral rural land is now engulfed by urban land as cities expand. Second, the unequal distribution of income between the poor and the rich has meant that the latter are able to purchase vast properties as investments. While purchasing land for future investment deprives many of those who cannot afford land, it also leads to price increases as land becomes an increasingly scarce resource. Finally, land control through government regulation has not been adequately enforced, and it has created artificial shortages.

Under conventional approaches to low-income housing, there is no separation between land and the provision of housing. Householders are presented with a package, as Turner (1976:82) notes: they are presented with a package which they must take or leave.

The costs of providing serviced land and housing, such as the use of industrialised materials for construction, the emphasis on individual water connections, electricity and so on, has had financial implications for both providers and beneficiaries. For the providers, a large proportion of government’s public funds has been used. To the users, it has meant increased housing expenditure. Turner (1991:57) explains:

The family now live in a vastly improved modern house, equipped with basic modern services and conveniences. However, this “improvement” is endangering the lives of
the family members, and in human and economic terms has led to a dangerous
deterioration of their condition. Incredibly, the family is required to spend 55 percent
of its total income to meet the rent, purchase and utility payments. On top of this, the
working members must pay another 5 percent for public transportation to work a total
of at least 60 per cent of a reduced income on housing services alone. Before the
family was spending 5 percent of a larger income on their housing and journeys to
work combined and they could both eat well and save a proportion of their local
income.

Therefore the State's withdrawal from the provision of housing was viewed as a positive step
towards the reduction of costs. Instead, the role of the State is to facilitate low-income
householders' access to secured tenure, to regularise informal settlements, to mediate between
landowners and squatters, and to increase access to financial institutions as ownership of land
is viewed as an incentive to investment in low-income housing.

The positive role of government towards land is evident from its ability to curb land
speculation and the unequal distribution of land. Land-sharing is a form of public land
acquisition, without government involvement in land purchase, and refers to land occupied by
the squatters, with the landowner lacking the ability to evict them. Land may be public or
privately owned. Squatters are approached by the legal owner and presented with a
development proposal. During the process, land is partitioned into two, that to be used by the
landlord and that for the present slum-dwellers. Squatter families affected by the developments
are encouraged to vacate the portion of land and, in return, are offered benefits by the
landowner. The landowner in return has an additional portion of land at his/her disposal and,
since it can be redeveloped, it increases in value.

Government mediates between conflicting claims from landlords and slum-dwellers, to
establish land rights for the slum-dwellers. Angel and Boonyabancha (1988) maintain that all
parties benefit in the land-sharing process. To squatters, land-sharing resolves land-claim
conflicts between landowners and squatters, with the former claiming certain rights to land,
based on a prolonged stay and their being the legal owners of the land. Land-sharing
eliminates threats of eviction, minimises displacements, maintains community structures and, because occupants are not evicted, they continue to be within the reach of places of employment. Land-sharing provides secured land tenure. These authors further state that land-sharing is a realistic agreement alternative to a protracted struggle, and to pressure from the people, the authorities and the general public (1988:108). It is a cost-saving method. Since squatters are not evicted, involvement in eviction cases, in legal fees, and in compensation payments for both official and non-official staff is no longer necessary, and uncertainty in development schedules is reduced. To the government, land-sharing is a cheap means of accessing land, whereby the poor are housed with limited demand on it. Land-sharing facilitates the neutral role of the government, which is “neither on the side of the landlords nor on the side of slum dwellers, while maintaining order and the rule of the law” (Angel & Boonyabancha, 1988:109). Angel and Boonyabancha (1988) further identify five principles involved in land-sharing. First, for the successful implementation of a land-sharing scheme, community organisation is important. Slum-dwellers are expected to mobilise support, to appoint leaders, and to participate in plot allocation and the demolition of existing structures, as well as in site reconstruction.

Second, land-sharing agreements guaranteeing the partitioning of land between the landowner and occupants, specifying necessary payments and time schedules for implementation, are necessary. The third principle is densification. Re-housing the present occupants may lead to increased densities on the existing sites. However, densities on sites may be reduced by relocating residents. The fourth principle is the reconstruction of housing. This may require householders to improve homes, using permanent building materials. Finally, capital investment is important. For successful reconstruction and home improvements, occupants are expected to have some form of savings, loans, household savings and so on. The authors argue that land-sharing cannot rely on massive government subsidies and suggest cross-subsidisation within land-sharing schemes.

Baken and Van der Linden (1992) warn that, while land-sharing benefits squatters through upgrading, it is not applicable on a large scale. Its success depends on compromises between different parties and this may prove a lengthy process. Kitay (1985) maintains that legal
owners of slum properties may not always be willing to enter into any negotiations with squatters or the authorities for upgrading, fearing that such actions will make their chances of re-entry even more difficult. Angel and Boonyabancha (1988:108) note a case in Hyderabad, India, where authorities refused to assist landlords in evicting squatters after a period of twelve years of continuous occupation had lapsed. As a result landlords were forced to sell their land to the occupants at nominal prices. In another study of redevelopment of *kampung* land in Indonesia, Baken and Van der Linden (1992) highlight the ambiguous role of government whereby *kampung* dwellers were offered compensation after redevelopment far below what the government had obtained when land was resold. This had led to land disputes.

The facilitating role of government in land provision is evident in the implementation of compulsory land acquisition. This may include the nationalisation of land, the abolition of private ownership of land, and the introduction of State-owned land. Limiting land ownership, as a compulsory land acquisition, allows the government to implement land policies that specify the amount of land to be held by individuals, with the excess being handed over to the government for redistribution. Hoek-Smith (1981) argues that the limiting of landownership is sometimes used by governments to promote certain housing tenures and scale down landlordism, and does not always guarantee increased access to land by the poor. Similar views are shared by Moitra and Samajar (1987). Making reference to the Calcutta system of landownership, characterised by three-tier ownership, whereby landowners rent out land to entrepreneurs called *thika* tenants, who then build huts which are rented to occupants. The introduction of the Amendment Tenancy Act, gave government the right to intervene and take over *bustee* lands while retaining the interests of the intermediaries.

### 3.2.3 Implications: State intervention

The previous section reaffirms the role of State intervention in land policies. Doebele (1987) stresses structural change. This includes cadastral systems, which contribute to the high costs of land by prolonging methods of land acquisition. Structural changes also mean the implementation of strategies encouraging participation by the poor in land markets. Land is seen as an investment. He urges the government to move away from restricting plot sizes, but
to adopt land policies encouraging large plots. Since land is viewed as an investment, likely to increase its value over time, low-income householders will be able to sell part of their plots and use the profits as payment of the original price of land. Doebele’s conception of the poor’s access to plots can be criticised on several counts. First, the transformation of non-commercial forms of land means that under commercial land-supply systems, access to land is determined by the ability to pay. Second, various forms of State intervention in non-conventional land policies has decreased the poor’s access to land. Government has to be seen to be providing serviced land, as opposed to allowing illegal subdivision. Thus, land improvements, such as the provision of infrastructure, services, water supply, electricity and taxes become part of the government’s involvement in land matters. The cost of land has an impact on low-income householders. Those with adequate incomes will be able to afford to purchase plots, whereas the poor will be excluded. Third, the introduction of larger plots will impoverish the poor, encouraging access and investment by the slightly better off. Finally, it is through large plots that the poor, excluded from accessing land, are forced to enter into informal land relations with those who have succeeded in purchasing plots. Large plots have significance in further increasing investments among plotholders (Chapter 8).

Doebele’s failure to link land policy to low-income landlords leads to a conclusion that State intervention, by making credit available to low-income householders, enables the construction of extra rooms for rent. Becoming a landlord may take place even if credit facilities are not made available.

Lim (1987) has also emphasised the role of the government in land policies. He differentiates between explicit and implicit government intervention. Explicit intervention means regulatory measures directed at either curbing irregularities in land markets or promoting economic incentives, such as property taxes, land development subsidies and land value investments. Another level of government intervention is the implicit, when land agencies are appointed to administer the leasehold at a nominal fee. All these are designed to increase access to land by the poor. However, explicit and implicit land policies have not been directly linked to the poor’s access to land. Other land uses that may develop in low-income settlements, such as
multiple-plot investments, which may have resulted from the unintended effects of government policy intervention, remain unexplored.

For Cheema, land policies have had an impact on the poor’s access to land. As private sector agencies cater for the needs of the middle and high-income groups, the poor are excluded. This leads to differential investment in properties, with the rich able to purchase vast holdings.

Gilbert relates land to economic growth and capital accumulation. Emphasising the implications of the cost to land, he states that access to land is capable of separating low-income householders. The more affluent occupy the serviced areas while the poor live in the least serviced areas.

Explicit to the role of the government in facilitating access to land, such as in land pooling, is an introduction of higher costs to land and servicing. Prior to negotiations taking place, land usually has squatters, who may either pay rent to the landowners or simply occupy land without any rental payments. During negotiations between the landowners and the government, the value of plots is calculated, as if they were to be sold in the private market. After development, part of the land is sold to recover the costs of servicing. Land improvement requires low-income householders to reconstruct houses using durable materials. This requires householders to seek financial assistance elsewhere in the form of loans, household savings, and so on. During land-pooling, the government plays a mediatory role between landowners and squatters. The aim is to secure land for squatters and to avoid evictions. While there have been some indications of landowner/squatter relations, the role of the State in dissolving these relationships by promoting landownership by squatters prevents any further exploration. Because of such intervention by the State (to provide secured tenure geared towards the attainment of homeownership) and the lack of studies that go beyond the transformation of land tenure but seek to explore the impact of granting landownership, a relationship between homeownership and landownership is often assumed to have developed. Also, the negotiation role of government in land-readjustment and land-pooling systems is important for the transfer of land rights from landowners to squatters. Since the role of

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government leads to an assumption that intervention is linked to the promotion of ownership of land, this again prevents any further investigation.

Government’s intervention in financial land markets have consequences on the poor’s access to land. Third-world governments often lack resources such as credit to develop this access, which has been a major obstacle to most governments in an attempt to “acquire land for housing programmes ... land banking or ... any other public purpose” (Doebele, 1987:15). They are forced to rely on external aid from international donors. In order to improve the levels of services such as roads, water and sewerage, most governments of developing countries have to rely on financial aid. Doebele argues that, after the implementation phase, local governments were to be responsible for maintenance. As maintenance costs increased, governments were forced to search for alternative sources of revenue. Therefore, programmes of property cadastration, property taxes and title registration were more appealing.

The financing of land acquisition has also contributed to the increased cost of land. This includes tax laws and debt financing. Landowners are expected to pay taxes on the profit from the sale of land; in return, government uses taxes to purchase more land. One other method through which government raises funds is by selling bonds to the public. Because most governments lack resources, it is assumed that borrowings from international donors and financing institutions yields high rates of return for the borrower. Since the increase in the value of land is higher than the annual interest, government benefits.

Credit for land may have implications for low-income households. McAuslan (1985) has argued that access to credit influences land tenure, types of house and socio-economic class. Where governments have allowed markets for land, secured land tenure, such as freehold and long lease, will be more favoured by financial institutions as these forms of tenure provide better security for land. Lending agencies may dictate the quality of materials used for construction, housing standards, and so on. As a consequence potential borrowers end up slightly better off.
During government’s promotion of the voluntary sale of land by landowners as a non-compulsory mechanism for government to acquire land, even the mere advertised intentions of government’s to do so can contribute to an escalation in land prices. Kitay (1985) argues that, in developing countries, where economies are characterised by highly inflated currencies, and an absence of alternative investment, land as the major investment is often held for future profit.

Compulsory mechanisms by the State to secure land, such as by nationalising land, implementing decrees that prevent its ownership, the introduction of land quotas, and so on – may create a market for land where it did not exist, and even increase its price. McAuslan (1985) has noted that, in Yugoslavia, land prices rose 20 to 25 per cent per year. Similarly, limiting landownership by the implementation of decrees prohibiting multiple-plot ownership, plot sizes, and so on, leads to urban land shortages and a rise in urban land values (ibid). Limiting landownership can be politically or racially motivated, leading to a scaling-down of landlordism without, in fact, increasing access to land by the poor.

For private landowners, the commercialisation of land has changed attitudes towards letting. While landowners previously let rooms on reasonable terms, they now find letting a lucrative business, and evictions increase as old tenants are replaced by those willing to pay higher rents. Tenants, according to Doebele, are trapped into a situation where land markets have tightened to such a extent that hopes of accessing land are remote and, on one level, to continue having a roof over their heads, tenants should be able to pay commercial rents.

Doebele (1987:12) has argued that land regularisation has given rise to informal transfers and inheritances and, in some cases, as in Indonesia, to multi-layered possessory title. Under these circumstances the role of the State was to create reception areas where the poor could establish themselves:

This new role of the State ... is a response to the emergence of settlers’ movements which demanded fair dealing in land transactions and the provision of services ... These settlers’ movements effectively obliged the State to take up its cards in the colonias
populares self-help housing areas specifically in the form of regularisation and services programmes. The existing colonias thus lose their character of illegality and separation from the regular land market. At the same time, they lose their initial raison d’être – that is, of providing land for self build housing accessible to the working population (Doebele, 1987:12).

Doebele (1987) argues that, as land regularisation takes place, other economic forces emerge. These forces are first explained by the location of sites. When cities expand, peripheral land is incorporated into the city boundaries, further increasing the value of what was once peripheral land. Such increases are also facilitated by land registration and the issuing of title deeds. Doebele maintains that, during this process, the poor have two choices, first, of retaining a property that they undoubtedly know has increased greatly in value and, second, selling to a more affluent class and using the capital to secure alternative housing for themselves (Doebele, 1987:12).

One of the arguments put forward by the research is that government’s promotion of regularised tenure, in the form of freehold land rights, creates divisions within low-income households. These divisions are clearly identified in terms of these householders’ relation to land and income. One division separates householders who can afford to purchase properties, while the other isolates householders who will find the cost of plots beyond them. However, in contrast to Doebele, the latter are forced to enter into informal land relations with the former, in an attempt to satisfy their need for shelter. In terms of this perspective, “selling plots to a more affluent class” becomes less important, because there was no ownership of plots by the poor households, as the cost of land had created the non-ownership of plots by this group.

Angel (1983) enumerates three disadvantages of land-tenure regularisation, saying:

If, as in Karachi, for example, land is considered by some to be a de facto tenure from Government intervention, there will be little interest by the poor in the extra costs and possible taxes that may come from de jure legitimisation. This attitude has been seen in some settlements in Mexico City. In Lusaka, 30% of families offered registered...
Occupancy Licenses disappeared shortly after receiving them, possibly because they were engaged in illegal occupations. Tenure may open doors to takeovers by more affluent classes. If tenure is given too easily, it may encourage further invasions.

On the question of land regularisation, Burgess (1992) argues that the regularisation of tenure which underlies settlement improvement is another attempt by the State to expose low-income householders to capitalist markets. Residents are expected to pay for services and land taxes, and regularisation has further consolidated and integrated capitalist markets with regard to land and property – a goal further served by policies to expand services and infrastructure networks into previously illegal settlements (Burgess, 1992:87).

Ward and Macoloo (1992) disagree with Burgess, but suggest that plots in a low-income settlement in Mombasa, Kenya were exchanged prior to state intervention, so changes in building materials were used. While state intervention may to a certain extent amplify ... the penetration of other interest groups into low-income housing production ... policy initiation and implementation is not usually the first step in this process (Ward & Macoloo, 1992:71).

Again, there is no explicit link between land tenure regularisation and low-income landlords. Macoloo and Ward based their evidence on the changing nature of housing production in Mombassa, where the emphasis had been on diversification in the range of building materials used for self-help housing construction.

It could be concluded that the ways in which governments intervened in land policies had had a direct or indirect impact on the poor’s access to land. Non-conventional approaches to land policies have simply been defined as government’s limited role in providing land. This has been evident in land regularisation, mediation and negotiation, the limiting of plot sizes, multiple-plot ownership, and so on. Because of limited resources, governments are often forced to devise other means of financing land acquisitions. The question we need to ask is: how will the poor respond to the high cost of land and the fact that they are increasingly being excluded from owning it? It is hypothesised, first, that non-conventional land policies have widened the gap between the rich and the poor, those who are able to own properties and those who
cannot. Second, very few poor householders will be able to afford ownership of a plot. The only way they will ever have access to plots is through non-ownership, having entered into informal land relations with the legal plot holders. Finally, because these households are characterised by extreme poverty, and unable to purchase a plot, they will be forced to let space to generate income. It could be argued that state intervention in land policies has been of significance to these households, by reinforcing poverty and a dependence on rents.

Income categories will become significant in the ownership and non-ownership of land, with the lowest income earner experiencing difficulty in terms of access to land, with ownership out of their reach, their having been driven off by the cost of land, with the higher income earners having access to secured tenure, such as freehold land right. Other attributes that have made land expensive such as zoning, improvements, and a lack of previously available communal land-tenure systems will create opportunities among the slightly better off to invest in plots. This will be evident in multiple-plot investment. Even the levels of investment in housing will tend to follow non-ownership or ownership of plots, with higher investment (in the form of services, materials and so on) where plots are owned, and less investment where plots are not owned. The amount invested in plots, as well as the distribution of low-income households according to ownership and non-ownership of land will influence rents, when houses are constructed for rent and even when houses are shared by landlord and the tenant, which denotes that renting was not initially planned. Under these circumstances, owners of land benefit from high rentals, as a result of higher investments in land, services and the quality of housing. These factors will further distinguish them from the poor households. Therefore, apart from owning land, what owners can do on land, in terms of investment, puts them in a better financial position than poor householders who struggle to gain access to plots, and who are forced to enter into informal land relations, rent part of their houses and, above all, who have limited rental income because of smaller investments and continue to live below the poverty line. Non-conventional policies have exacerbated income inequalities between low-income householders, and have further increased financial constraints, a dependency on rents among poor households, while increasing investment and financial independence among the slightly better off.
The distinctions between those who own land and those who have been excluded from ownership become significant in plot size. Because the income of each form of household determines title to a plot, even the size and the number of plots can be explained in terms of affordability. Non-owners of land will have access to small plots, while owners will have large plots. Large plots may further dictate the type of investment and the use to which the plots will be put. For instance, plots can be used as a means of capital expansion, the owners may engage in large-scale investment in rental-housing production, they may even produce various types of rental housing. They may include land rental to tenants for residential purposes, site rental for commercial purposes, or they may even combine investments in rental housing, rooms and land. The impact of these large plots on these households is visible in the choices they exercise, such as how, when, and for what purpose these plots are to be used. Because of the investment already made when the plots were purchased, as well as the rent they are able to command, all of these options make a substantial financial contribution to the households. In short, investments in land further generate income through lettings, and these result in better lifestyles. In the case of the non-owners of land, the lack of income would put them in a slightly different position from that of landowners. First, it is the cost of title that has forced them to secure plots in an informal fashion. The way in which they have accessed plots without ownership, limits any choices of plot size and how they may use these plots. Plots may be very small, permitting the construction of a house for family use. If participation in rental-housing investment does take place, for instance, where these householders let space, it is determined by relations between the owners and the non-owners of the land. If non-owners let space, they do it for reasons different from those of the owners of land. Also, the scale of investment in rental housing is of the lowest level. Renting out of space is seen purely as a survival strategy, with no intention of embarking on large-scale rental housing investment, or the expansion of capital. Non-owners may have to let part of their houses to tenants. It is poverty that drives these households to become landlords, rather than a desire to make profits.

With regard to land improvements, like the provision of services and infrastructure, the effective difference between ownership and non-ownership of land is worth mentioning. Land under title, purchased from the land markets, is subject to zoning and planning laws, and the houses subject to building codes. Therefore those who have invested in plots are more likely
to invest in housing and even improve the level of services. The implication of landownership or non-ownership to these two groups of low-income householders is that non-owners may be forced to consume fewer services. This may be the result of a number of factors. First, entering into informal land relations is not mediated by the official bodies. The nature of these relations is that the non-owner has access to a rented plot. Second, land that has been accessed through informal land relations is not subject to planning laws; for instance, the rented plots are not properly surveyed. Third, houses are not expected to comply with building codes. Finally, differential levels in the consumption of services become possible because of a high correlation between ownership of land and a higher level of services.

Further explaining the impact of state intervention in land policies, it can be argued that non-ownership of land is a reflection of poverty among the poorest households. This has become evident in their inability to purchase title to a plot, or even to have access to a high level of services. The level of housing they consume is more likely to reflect poverty. The poorest householders are less likely to increase their investment in housing. If self-help housing is rented, rents will also reflect the level of investment and the constraints faced by these households. In this case, lower levels of investment will result in lower rents although rents continue to be the source of income to these households. Non-owners of land, not having experienced constraints on land also being favoured by their ownership position are more likely to receive high rents. Land tenure has implications for income, service consumption, quality and investment in rental housing, as well as for rents. Subsistence landlords arise out of these land constraints, while petty capitalist landlords may be regarded as low-income householders who took advantage of the regularisation of tenure and invested in multiple-plot ownership.

It can also be argued that relations between non-owners and owners of land, and informal land relations, may also arise from multiple access to plots. Non-landowners may access plots from several landowners. However, the difference between the two is that non-landowners never invested in those plots, which may be simply rented or have been acquired by any other method that does not involve purchase. Therefore, even the application of the concept of "absentee landlord" has some limitations if used without taking into consideration ownership
and non-ownership of land. While land tenure regularisation has resulted in absentee forms of landlords, a distinction should be made between the subsistence form of absentee landlordism and the petty capitalist form. The former, out of informal relations. There is no indication of land purchase, or the householder having invested in land. Absentee subsistence landlords are not a reflection of such householders for, having escaped poverty, as demonstrated in the previous paragraphs, they are constrained by their level of income from purchasing a plot. Also, land tenure will have implications for these landlords, as it could lead to dissolution of this form of landlordism. For instance, the strength of land tenure, or the non-ownership of land having given rise to this form of landlordism, it is also capable of eliminating absentee landlords, by converting them to the status of residential absentee subsistence landlords or even forcing them to abandon landlordism. While landlordism is a temporary phenomenon, land as an external factor influences the sustainability of landlordism and even rentals. The dissolution of informal land relations will reduce or even prevent any future participation by subsistence landlords in rental housing. This will also have an impact to tenants, who will become subject to eviction. The implications of land tenure confirm the hypothesis developed in the previous chapter about subsistence landlords. Therefore, the evictions that could result from the dissolution of informal land relations affects subsistence landlords and tenants equally. To subsistence landlords it means the loss of income and to tenants the loss of a home. However, in contrast with low-income studies that have associated evictions with increases in the value of land, there is no evidence that subsistence landlords evict tenants in order to replace them with those who are willing to pay higher rents. Evictions should be understood within these land relations and subsistence landlords may be forced to evict as a consequence of downward mobility through the termination of these land relations. Also it is not clear how these evictions can be associated with the increases in the value of land when, first, subsistence landlords do not own land. Second, they consume lower levels of services. Finally, even their participation in rental housing investment reflects land and financial constraints. It should be recalled that rents are affected by the levels of investment, plot sizes, tenure and the quality of rental accommodation. Even if land values were to increase, subsistence landlords’ non-ownership of land and their financial circumstances will prevent them from increasing their investment in rental housing. It is unlikely that the benefits of increased land values will be of value to them.
Petty capitalist landlords have developed from a desire to invest in plots. By being able to invest in plots, they own more than one, and are therefore absentee landlords. Unlike subsistence landlords, they are not forced to enter into informal land relations. Land tenure will have less effect on the petty capitalist than on the subsistence landlord. For instance, the dissolution or downward mobility of petty capitalist landlords is more likely to be influenced by internal factors, such as no longer being interested in landlordism, or a decision to sell the plots, than by informal land relations.

An attempt has been made to highlight some of the impact of land tenure regularisation on low-income householders. It has been argued that the study of low-income landlords should go beyond the regularisation of land and seek to locate the development of landlords within the land tenure systems. The questions that need to be answered are: what happens when land is regularised, and do low-income householders have equal access to plot title? It has been shown that the introduction of land ownership, as well as all the associated costs, including the availability of income to purchase plots, and the manner in which institutions supply credit for buying land, and so on, has made such ownership increasingly inaccessible to the poor. Therefore, contrasting the development of subsistence and petty capitalist landlords illustrates the impact of land-tenure systems on low-income householders.

3.3 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to demonstrate the impact of land policies on low-income households. It has been argued that various forms of state intervention observed during the implementation of non-conventional policies transform non-capitalist approaches to land and contribute to multiple-plot investment. The promotion of landownership creates two groups of householders, those not constrained by income and therefore able to invest in multiple-plot ownership and those who, due to a lack of income enabling them to purchase a portion of a plot, would be forced to enter into informal land relations to satisfy their need for shelter. Multiple-plot investment is linked to the development of petty capitalist landlords, whereas access to land through informal land relations is associated with subsistence landlords.
Approaches to non-conventional land policies have been explained as having been designed by governments to facilitate low-income householders’ access to land, and include both compulsory and non-compulsory measures. Under the former, land could be nationalised, with ownership of plots and houses reduced to one plot or house per household, and the rest ceded to the government for redistribution, accompanied by the confiscation of land and issuing of land quotas limiting the size of plots individuals could hold. Under the latter scenario, government plays a negotiation role, such as during land-sharing and readjustment, land pooling and land regularisation, helping householders to obtain secured land tenure.

Non-conventional land policies have received much support both from governments, policymakers and funding agencies. There are several reasons why non-conventional land policies have received so much attention. The first is related to the reduction in the cost of housing production, which benefits government, which needs to spend less on securing land, and also benefits the users, who will be able to spend less on housing than would have been the case with the conventional approach. Second, a reduction in production costs can be realised when the householders use family labour, and organise the finance and the construction in stages. Finally, secure tenure generates investment from the users, as they are directly responsible for the production of houses.

The implementation of non-conventional land policies increases the cost of land in various ways. From the negotiations that take place between landowners, squatters and government—as during land pooling, the values of plots, were they to be sold in the private market, can be calculated. After development, part of the land is sold to recover the cost of servicing. While the squatters may benefit, having access to services associated with improvements, like roads, electricity and so on, the houses have to be reconstructed of durable materials, and need to accommodate the levels of services. The process exposes them to formal and informal sources of finance. Due to the lack of resources for financing land acquisition, most third-world governments are forced to use external aid, and to adopt measures such as tax laws, property taxes and title deed registration, all of which have an impact on the low-income householder. The financial institutions providing credit for land also base decision on the legality of tenure, freehold, leasehold, the quality of structures, and so on.
The cost of land has implications for low-income householders. It widens the gap between the poor and the slightly more affluent householder. The two are distinguishable according to their financial position and relation to land. The poor householders are excluded from the land market by cost and the manner in which the financial institutions operate. The latter, in a more favourable financial position, can more easily comply with the conditions set by financial institutions and can take advantage of their position. This is evident in their ability to participate in private land markets and invest in plots, leading to multiple-plot ownership. Subsistence landlords will arise from land and financial constraints, while petty capitalist landlords have the ability to own several plots. Furthermore, this leads to increasing non-ownership of land by subsistence landlords, and the adoption of informal land relationships to secure a rented plot.
CHAPTER 4

LAND POLICIES AND PATTERNS OF LANDOWNERSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICA

4.1 Introduction

Land is of significance in the emergence of low-income landlords. Hence, the role of state in land policies becomes important if one has to understand why and how the existing patterns of landownership, forms of landlords and informal land relations in South Africa came about. The aim of this section is twofold. First, it describes the context in which multiple plot ownership, and landlordism in particular, has taken place in South African low-income settlements. Secondly, it aims to discuss the link between non-conventional land policies and the development of forms of landlords. The chapter presents an overview of African landownership, including the mechanisms through which Africans accessed land, a communal land tenure. The transformation of communal land tenure systems into Crown Estates, Missionary land, ownership of land by land companies are also discussed. Land Act of 1913, its subsequent amendments and other mechanisms, such as the Group Areas Act and homeland policies, through which land was made inaccessible while to others it became a source of investment are also considered. Government intervention by means of land policies is an important factor, if one has to answer the question of why landlordism developed in freehold settlements. How different are freehold settlements from other urban settlements? The term, non-conventional land policies refer to various forms of government’s intervention, at a policy level, designed to increase low-income households’ access to land. As the following chapter will illustrate, settlements used as case studies are very old, originating in the early nineteenth century. It is necessary for the historical overview of the development of land policies in South Africa to cover both periods, tracing land policies during the formation of these settlements to the present day.
4.2 Communal land tenure and the location of the reserves

What characterised the reserves? Reserves were created by the British and set aside for Africans well away from white settlements (Hurwitz, 1987:1). Apart from Zwartkop near Pietermaritzburg, Tukela Valley, Drakensberg, Umnnini and Weenen counties, reserves were mainly located in areas rejected by the white settlers because of their unsuitability for the colonial market and their inaccessibility by road.

4.2.1 Access to land in reserves

African access to land in reserves was through the relevant African chiefs. Land belonged to the tribe and was acquired without purchase. Where payment was made for land, it was in the form of tribute. The chief had absolute power over all of the land occupied by the tribe. Thus “land occupied by the tribe is regarded theoretically as the property of the paramount chief; in relation to the tribe he is a trustee holding it for the people, who occupy and use it in subordination to him on communistic principles” (Kerr, 1953:13). The rights granted to the individual included the right to use commonage (ibid).

4.2.2 Land distribution

The chief was acting “through subordinate activities” (Schapera, 1975:42) headmen therefore, in charge of the administration of the tribe. Headmen were often granted portions of land to settle sections of their tribe. However, the subordinate position of headmen is noted by Browles (1883:65), who wrote:

Sub chiefs are granted considerable portions of the territory on which to settle their sections of the tribe ... allocate the land in the same manner as the paramount but all cases of difficulty or appeal are referred to the latter ... An application for land made to the chief would, as, a matter of form, be submitted to the head of the clan where it is proposed to locate people, and from the head of the clan to the subordinates. ...however, the chief may on his own authority and responsibility appoint places of residence to the applicants.
Although communal tenure prevailed, characterised by the rights to use land and commonage, inhabitants had individual plots of arable land. Further acknowledging plots held in common, Kerr (1953), quoting Umvovo & Umvovo (1952:83), states that “individual tenure of land was unknown to Natives before their contact with Europeans. The land they occupied belonged to the chiefs and was occupied communally”.

4.3 Transformation of communal land tenure: Crown lands

Kerr (1953:36) defines Crown lands as “all unalienated land within the Union which is the property of His Majesty in his government of the Union”. Crown lands were less attractive to the Volksraad because of their isolated location. Between 1865 and 1870 Natal experienced a depression. The depression led to an increase in the price of land, and encouraged speculation and overcrowding in the reserves. Martin West, who was the Governor in Natal during this period, granted land to the Volksraad of the Republic of Natal as an incentive for Afrikaners to remain in Natal. Lambert (1995) reports that in 1850 title deeds of 1 773 442 acres of land were granted to the Volksraad, an average of 42 926 acres per household. The land was later sold by the Volksraad to speculators. Thus individuals and companies steadily increased their landholdings, and these constantly became speculators and absentee landowners.

4.3.1 Access to Crown lands: Introduction of individual tenure

The pressure on the reserves and the population growth forced the governors to release Crown lands for Africans. However, land was no longer free as in the reserves, but had to be purchased.

Approximately 4 620 000 acres of Crown land were alienated by the government and sold to Africans. With the exception of land in Newcastle and forest land, crown lands were placed in freehold lots, varying in sizes between 10 acres and 2 000 acres (Lambert, 1995). Lots were auctioned publicly at 10s an acre and payments were made in ten instalments (ibid).
The inhabitants of Crown land were expected to meet two conditions. The condition related to "beneficial" occupation, meaning that occupants were required to build suitable houses and to cultivate not less than one acre in every one hundred acres. The second condition required occupants who had lived in the area for three years to be issued with certificates of "beneficial" occupation, every year. These certificates were issued by the district manager. Title deeds were issued only on the payment of the final instalment (Lambert, 1995).

It should be noted that, prior to the sale of Crown lands to the public, these lands had been occupied by tribes and squatters, to whom the land had been allocated by the governors of the colony, and it was sometimes used as a buffer to separate races. The sale of Crown lands forced chiefs to purchase land that had once belonged to the tribe. This became the common means of accessing land, and the chief's followers were expected to contribute to the annual instalments. Sometimes land was purchased in syndicates and later allocated to the members of the clan. As a result of the depression in 1883 it became difficult for Africans to raise money to purchase land.

In 1883, 523 lots of 485 069 acres of land were sold. Over 25 per cent of sales were for Africans who bought 200 lots, equalling to 123 415 acres at a price of £65 215 2d. Nearly all the land bought by Africans in south-western Natal totalled 66 239 acres – Ixopo, 37 507, Alfred 8 448, Alexandra 5 117, Upper Mkhomazi, Klip River 2 651, and Msinga 2 853 acres (Lambert, 1995).

The deeds of sale of 1884 explicitly stated that sales could be cancelled if purchasers were unable to pay in instalments. The cancellation of sale meant forfeiting the instalments paid so far. In his attempt to ensure that Africans did not forfeit instalments and lose access to land, in 1887 Sutherland made it possible to credit the instalment against the portion of land (Lambert, 1995). While this method prevented dispossessions by guaranteeing that the purchaser was no longer in arrears, it led to the reduction in the sizes of lots.

Lambert (1995) estimates that by 1889 about 812 306 acres of Crown land were sold at a price of £444 025 2s 11d. The average lot sale was estimated at 11s per acre for
whites. Whites purchased 664,338 acres at £366,407 6s 6d. Africans bought 147,198 acres at £77,617 16s 5d, averaging 10s 6d per acre. It is also reported that 80,841 acres of land bought by the Africans were surrendered (54.7%) compared to 139,448 acres (21%) by whites. The inability of Africans to pay for land is also evident from the amount of land they owned between 1881 and 1887 (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1: Land purchases from 1881 to 1887

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Acres</th>
<th>£</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>524,940</td>
<td>275,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>67,077</td>
<td>36,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>592,017</td>
<td>311,993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Lambert, 1995:77)

The position of Natives under the Crown indicates the transformation of indigenous chiefs’ authority and power, as Kerr (1953:14) writes:

[U]pon peaceable annexation of territory where tribes continued in occupation before, or upon which legal tribe or clans were in the early days located as a means of protection to the settlement population from frequent raids and disturbances created by those beyond the frontier, the rights and obligations pertaining to the land passed to or have been assumed by the Crown.

Table 4.2: African-owned land in 1878

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coastal counties</th>
<th>Midland divisions</th>
<th>Inland counties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alfred</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>15 291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandra</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>1 340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
<td>3 782</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4 842</td>
<td>17 366</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Lambert, 1995:73)
As pressure on land in the reserves increased, Africans were allowed to occupy Crown lands as tenants. Because of the drought which followed the depression between 1865 and 1886, farming became impossible. By 1870 more tenants were encouraged to squat. It was noted that rents charged by the Natal Land and Colonisation Company increased from 20s per hut to £3 during this period (Lambert, 1995).

The arrival of Indians in 1860, as indentured labour, impacted on Africans’ access to land. It is estimated that by 1882 there were 24,865 Indians and by 1893 they had increased to 41,208 (Lambert, 1995:66). A high percentage of Indians were self employed. Out of 41,208 Indians in 1893, 3,341 were self employed. Hence they were often preferred as lessees as they were able to pay high rentals.

After the Anglo-Zulu war of 1879 and the Anglo-Boer war of 1881, there was an influx of people fleeing from the wars to Durban and Pietermaritzburg, which increased the pressure on land. Landowners who had tenants on their land began to subdivide their properties into small garden plots. These plots were later leased to Indians and whites (Lambert, 1995). The new “owners” then evicted the tenants and increased rentals. Previously rental has been charged “per hut”, but this had proved to be unprofitable, and rent was later charged according to the number of acres used. By 1879 tenants were paying £10 an acre while in Richmond, Natal, they still paid £10 per hut (Lambert, 1995).

Evictions, therefore, became common on Crown lands. This was the result of the sale and leasing of land to new owners. Tenants found themselves with new owners, and had to satisfy their demands.

Several attempts were made after 1890 to increase African’s access to land through purchase. Lambert (1995) reports that during 1889 the Governor of the Colony increased the period of buying by instalment from 10 years to 20 years. This enabled Africans to purchase land. Between 1889 and 1890 purchase of land by Africans increased 24-fold. The number of acres purchased by Africans increased from 1,519 to 36,284 acres (Lambert, 1995). Africans bought smallholdings of 200 to 500 acres
People who had bought more than one plot were allowed to surrender one, and transfer the amount already paid on it to one or more other properties. Credits could be transferred from one purchase to another. Lambert (1995) observes how a certain Isidumba, who had bought land in Alexandra and paid instalments, was allowed to transfer his credit to a D Mazibuko, who in return gave him a share in the farm at Meadowlands. Between 1878 and 1890 Africans were able to increase their holdings from 83 104 to 210 952 acres (Lambert: 1995:65).

Collecting rentals from tenants commonly enabled landowners to pay for mortgages. Writing about the African landowners, Lambert (1995) cites a case of Stephanus Mini, who had bought 1 250 acres of land and was collecting rental from forty-five huts.

Despite the increase in land purchases by Africans it is noted that a considerable number of Africans had difficulties in meeting repayments, and were often in arrears. African lessees had to surrender their leases and pay £1 per hut for each year that was in arrears. Africans could thus remain as squatters until their debts were cleared (Lambert, 1995).

While the government’s intention to release Crown land was to alleviate land shortages and give Africans access to land, it is noted that, rather than decreasing shortages, it led to evictions, uncertain tenancy and the rise of speculative land companies whose purpose it was to profit from land. While communal land had previously been allocated free of charge by the chiefs to members of their tribes, their powers were slowly being eroded. Under the white settlers chiefs were undermined and their role reduced to that of policemen, and they were required to take orders from the governors of the colony. Indunas and headmen had their roles transformed to that of collecting rent. Those evicted as a result of the sale of Crown land were not provided with alternative land by the government. Land allocated by the chiefs in the reserves belonged to a clan, and therefore clan members had first preference.

In some parts of Natal it was noted that magistrates deliberately did not inform squatters when an auction was due to take place (ibid). The auctioning of Crown land
was often advertised in the *Government Gazette*. As the majority of Africans were unable to read, it meant that few knew about the sales (Lambert, 1995).

Land was sold by the company at an interest rate of 8 per cent (Lambert, 1995). In order to enable Africans to buy land, plots were further reduced to small sizes, ranging from five to 150 acres (ibid).

Evictions did not only arise from land companies leasing land to individuals, or tenants finding themselves with a new landlord with whom they may not have been in good terms, but they also resulted from the purchase of land by chiefs. Those who did not belong to the chiefdom were ordered to leave.

Evictions were also caused by the ways in which land was made accessible, such as auctioning, which increased the value of land. For instance, Chief Ramncana of Duma who had applied for Crown lands in which the Governor had settled his chiefdom, was outbid by Mini and Molefe, and was ordered to remove his people (Lambert, 1995).

The evictees could choose to become labour tenants of the new owners, move to the other Crown land or apply for permission to move out of the colony. The latter option was rarely approved by the government.

The rising price of Crown land prevented Africans from purchasing land. For those who could not keep up with the payments, land reverted to the Crown. Lambert (1995) notes how Mini, who had bought land in 1888, defaulted and the land reverted to the Crown. However, Mini’s encouragement of more tenants to settle on his land, levying an annual charge of 30s for tenants who provided labour, and £3 for those who only paid rent, enabled him to meet his repayments.

By 1890 the Natal Land and Colonisation Company drew about a third of its rents from whites and Indian tenants. Despite the reduction in the amount of land owned by the company from 545 655 acres in 1879 to 384 142 in 1896, rents collected from Africans were estimated at £7 358 13s 2d in 1879. In the following year the rental increased from 20s to 30s a hut, to £2 and £4, and £2 per room for tenants who had
built square houses as opposed to huts. The total rent derived from Africans is estimated to have been £9 346 13s 2d (ibid).

The cost of land often led to poverty. In 1886, the Africans living in Upper Mkhomazi, Natal, became totally impoverished. It was common to settle debts using herds of cattle. For instance, six head of cattle was used as payment of arrears of land (£8 3s 2d) though cattle were valued at £5 per head. Debtors who were unable to secure herds of cattle as a form of payment were often gaolcd and liable to eviction after serving the sentence. As a result of selling off cattle to settle debts, by 1890 few were left in the Midlands.

Africans had no option but to remain tenants. However, their conditions were often unbearable as they had to satisfy the demands of the new owners. For example, Charles Smythe, a landowner in Lions River, Natal, limited the freedom of his tenants by forcing them to first receive his approval before they could be employed as waged labour (Lambert, 1995).

The sale of Crown land fuelled conflicts between chiefs. While the chiefs had the duty to allocate land to their people, the powers vested in them were slowly being eroded. As the amount of land owned by the chiefs had been reduced over the years, they had less land at their disposal.

Government intervention in the drawing of boundaries also led to evictions. Those evicted were often not offered alternative land. The drawing of a boundary at KwaMprumuza, Pietermaritzburg, in 1893 led to the evictions of the Nadi people. About seventeen families were evicted. Eleven out of seventeen who had refused to move had to face two months' imprisonment (Lambert, 1995:130). According to Act 40 of 1896 the government was authorised to compel members affected by the drawing of boundaries to relocate. Overcrowding resulted in clashes between the kingdoms (Lambert, 1995).

While communal land tenure by Africans, formerly easily accessible to the people, was criticised on the grounds that it "bolstered up traditionalism", it led to the Select
Committees of Legislation proposing individual title over the traditional tenures. As they explained:

The proposed tribal tenures will increase the dangers to which the colony is exposed, by perpetuating the organisation of the coloured population, and creating unity of interests, in all probability resulting in unity of action; and “instead of reducing it, would tend still further to build up the power of the chiefs, and increase the distinction of race” (Lambert, 1995:40).

Even the so-called individual tenures were increasingly becoming inaccessible. Land was no longer free. Two major options existed to purchase land or to become a tenant.

4.3.2 Implications of individual tenures

The transformation of communal land tenure into Crown estates, brought changes in the ways in which low-income householders had previously accessed land. Under the communal land tenure system, access to land involved no payments, whereas within Crown estates the ability to pay was the major criteria for having land. Several conditions were to be met by the prospective landowners. First, the ability to outbid other potential landowners, as land was sold on auction. Second, to be able to meet repayments. This was in the form of instalments. Finally, to be literate as auction due to take place was advertised in the Government Gazette. The stringent conditions prospective landowners had to meet meant that only those with adequate income would afford the purchases. As sales were often advertised in the Government Gazette, the majority who could not read were totally excluded.

The cost of land was increased by the interest rates charged at 8 per cent. This meant that even those who would afford the cost of land were later put off by the interest rates. These led to repossessions as the deeds of sale stated that land would be forfeited if the buyers were unable to pay instalments. Changes in the functioning of credit institutions later allowed the portioning of land according to the instalments that had been paid, meaning that arrears would be waived and the householder entitled
access to a piece of plot equivalent to the instalments. Also, the transfer of credits from one purchase to another was permitted. One of the implications arising from the credit for land was that it led to the reduction of plot sizes, as the bigger the plots the more were people expected to pay. Consequently, those who were not constrained by income, therefore able to afford payments, were entitled to larger plots. Therefore, absentee forms of landownership, multiple-plots investments became the norm. Land auctioneering also meant that there were no limits on the number of plots one could purchase, as this was determined by one’s ability to pay. Again multiple-plots and large scale landownership fell into the hands of those who had the means to pay. The role of income in determining ownership of land is evident in even between races. More than half of the land purchased by the Africans had to be surrendered whereas a fifth among the white race. The cost of land led to the purchase of land by syndicates, clans and even the chiefs’ followers expected to contribute to annual instalments. The land was later allocated to the clan members.

Other measures by the government, such as the drawing of boundaries, the granting of land to the Volksraad, contributed in making land a scarce resource and created incentives for using land as an investment. Those evicted were not offered alternative land.

As a result of the cost and scarcity of land, certain relations to land developed. The division between those who owned land and those who did not was distinct. To the owners of land, renting land was viewed as an opportunity resulting from having invested on land. The desire to make profits took different forms, such as moving away from charging rents per house to charging rent according to the acres of land used. Also those who had previously charged rents per house, began to charge tenants per room. Others encouraged more tenants to settle on land and had different rentals for labour tenants and those who were not. To the nonowners of land, only two options were available. To enter into informal land relations with landowners, by either becoming a labour tenant, paying reduced rentals on condition that they continued to supply labour, or simply becoming tenants without having to supply labour. Another group of nonlandowners emerged, who were not so poor, but were often preferred by
the landowners as lessees, capable of paying higher rentals. This was common among
the Indians, who were self employed and therefore in a better financial position.

The transformation of communal land tenure into Crown estates further justifies the
argument that the introduction of individual titled tenures, has further created two
major divisions between low-income households. Those who will be forced to enter
into informal relations and rent land and even contribute labour in an exchange of a
rented site and those who will afford ownership of land, continue to use land as an
investment and maximise rentals.

4.4 Mission land

Mission land was another form of land available to Africans. It resulted from
missionary work that began in the early nineteenth century.

There were two ways in which missionaries acquired land. First, through land grants
offered to missionaries by the government. As the missionaries introduced civilisation,
the building of schools and churches was essential to be able to impart skills to the
villagers. Land owned by the missionaries was exempted from tax. The second method
by which missionaries acquired land involved purchase. Land was bought from the
indigenous tribes. There were also instances whereby missionaries were invited by the
tribes to build schools, hospitals and the like on their land. In such cases, land was
offered free. Missionaries acted as trustees, mediators between the government and the
tribes.

According to Reverend Mason, missions provided “a convenient refuge” for all those
men and women who fell outside the jurisdiction of the chiefs (quoted by Welsh,
1971).

Mission land was available only to converts. There were divisions within missionaries,
while some perceived themselves as the “civilisers”, others were regarded as
segregationalists, and some as intergrationalists, seeing Africans as part of development. It should be noted that missionaries were also subjected to the government's regulations.

Trapido (1978) argues that the economic and political base of the missionaries gave them some bargaining power, and this gave them “increased capacity to put pressure on those [the converts] living on the mission station”. Apart from helping the converts to purchase land, the missionaries had also played an important role in encouraging land speculation. This was achieved by the disposal of land entrusted to them and had sometimes led to the sale of land without consultation with the converts for whom they were supposed to act as trustees. The following extract from the British Native Commission describes missionaries as speculators:

There are numerous mission societies working among Natives, but I cannot say that the latter have been imbued with confidence by the actions of some of these societies in the past ... where the natives lived for over 25 years and built houses, churches, schools upon certain lands which they considered belonging to the society, were ordered to pay £2-£10 per annum per family as rent or leave the ground. Upon enquiry, it was found that the land had been disposed of to a Company, no provision being made for 72 Native families who had for so many years regarded their missionary as their advisor” (Transvaal Administration Reports 1903 B24, as quoted by Trapido, 1978).

A similar case was reported in Mariannhill, Pinetown, where Catholic missionaries entered into an agreement with the government leading to the sale of land in Marianridge, without the knowledge of the residents (Mthethwa, 1984).

Today there is no church policy regarding land. Some churches have subdivided land and sold it to tenants, while others have allowed their tenants to continue using the land (Bislin, 1992). A distinction can be made between the African and European perception of ownership. The former perceives the right to ownership as being the same as actual ownership. Thus, after verbal and mutual agreement, it is assumed that
people will have the right to reside and use land. Those from the West relate ownership to title deeds, land registration, maps and land surveying (Bruiwer, 1992).

4.5 Land companies in Natal

The 2.5 million acres of land in the hands of the Republic of Natalia fell to speculators. Among the land speculators were Cape merchants, members of trekker families, local merchants and individuals. Apart from individual land speculators, the Natal Land and Colonisation Company was the major landowner (Slater, 1975). By 1860, Slater (1975) estimates that approximately 7,000,000 acres of land were in the hands of speculators. The Natal Land and Colonisation Company was formed by colonial landowners in 1860, and was based in London.

The company rented land to tenants. By this time, two-thirds of Natal’s African population lived outside the reserves and Crown lands (ibid).

It is estimated that, between 1838 and 1840, 2.5 million acres of land was registered in favour of 254 people. Out of this total, only 49 were reported to have occupied their holdings (Slater, 1975). The colony of Natal was ruled by governors and each governor implemented different policies on land. Sir Harry Smith, who was the governor of the Cape in 1849, recommended that two million acres of land which was in dispute should be divided amongst 360 claimants, many of whom were the leading speculators (Slater, 1975).

Conflicts mounted between the government and the land companies. During this period, governors were concerned about the “Native question”. The question was how to deal with their influx and to make land accessible to Africans. Another issues pertained to labour. As settlers needed labour, the Natives were a potential source of labour. Landowners were divided at the time. There were absentee landowners who were not so much concerned about the provision of labour as in earning income through rents. On the other hand, there were landowners who were farmers who saw Africans as a threat and as competitors. They wanted more tenants to be released as
farm labourers. Therefore, by renting land to Africans, speculators were perceived as withholding Africans who could have been utilised by them for labour. The sheltering of Africans made them more self-sufficient, and therefore there was no need for them to sell their labour. Land companies were unlikely to support measures designed to reduce the capacity of their tenants to earn an independent income, since the objective of the company was to make profit.

Slater (1975) highlights the mechanisms through which the land company raised profits. These were achieved, firstly, by the company's policy of encouraging immigration and settlers in Natal, and, secondly, of engaging in projects which would increase the value of land, for instance the development of a railway through disguised subsidies (Slater, 1975). It is also noted, that during the company's period of operation, a number of proposals between 1864 and 1866 reflected speculative motives. In 1862, the company created conditions for profits by issuing £150 debentures bearing interest of 6 per cent per annum (Slater, 1975). In 1874, the company formed a subsidiary, the main objective of which was to advertise the company's land for potential immigrants (ibid). Finally, the company formed two subsidiaries – namely the South African Gold Field Exploration Company, which was founded in London in 1868 and the Natal Prospecting company, which was formed in 1880 (Christopher, 1972). The two subsidiary companies were to be involved in the exploration of minerals on company land. Other attempts by the company involved the negotiations with both Mpande and Cetshwayo, the kings of the Zulus, about the possibilities of purchasing a portion of the Zulu kingdom for £3 000 (Slater, 1975). Slater estimates that by 1874 not less than five million acres of land were in the hands of either colonists or speculators. The majority of occupants were Africans paying rent to landowners (ibid). Even land that had been sold to colonists was in fact occupied by Africans who were tenants paying rent to new landlords. In 1874 it is estimated that 657 967 acres of land were rented by Africans, but in 1890 the figure had dropped to 433 343 acres (Slater, 1975).

Rental income formed a major source of income of the land company. In 1880 annual rentals at £1 to £3 per hut totalled an estimated £10 000, and these rentals had increased to about £13 in 1879. The sale of land only amounted to £2 779 (ibid). Hut
rents that were collected from Africans were estimated to total £5 605 a year and had increased from 31 per cent in 1880 to 42 per cent in 1890 (Slater, 1975).

It is estimated that Impendle and Klip River with 83 farms had 260 000 acres occupied by rent-paying tenants. Alexandra had 65 000 acres.

In the Transvaal, a similar picture of land speculators emerged. According to Trapido (1978), the land in the Transvaal was owned by individual speculators, including Patrick O’Sullivan, The Oceana Consolidation Company Limited, the New Belgian Land Company, the Vereeniging Estates and Land Company. It is estimated that large numbers of African families had settled on farms. For instance, Marks & Lewig owned fifteen farms, which were inhabited by 700 children under the age of 12, 276 adults, 140 boys and 183 girls over the age of twelve (Trapido, 1978).

The discovery of mineral wealth in the Transvaal increasingly led to land speculators who claimed rights to the land, in order to have access to mineral rights. Writing about the mineral boom in the Transvaal, Trapido (1978) notes how Natives lost over £1 400 over the bogus sale of the Goed-voor-Alles farm. President Kruger supported the speculators, Erasmus and Viljoen, both of whom wanted to buy mineral rights from Chief Ekalafile. Kruger recommended the following to the chief:

You must let Erasmus prospect your ground. He will only confine himself to the Western portion of your stand. Should gold be found I will send a mining Commissioner and surveyor to survey the land on which gold may be found, which will be fenced with wire and the land outside would still belong to you.

(Trapido, 1975 quoting SNA87/3112/08, Sub-Native Commission, Nylstrom, 1090:2)

In another incident, Sol Plaatjie, a South African analyst recalls how a farm held in trust by General Joubert for Natives had passed into his estate after his death. While Africans claimed to have bought the land, “natives who were originally dispossessed of land were now for the second time dispossessed” (Plaatjie, 1916:15).
Tenants were often disposed of their land as it was sold to companies. Chief Kambi Zulu found that the land on which his people had settled had been sold to a coal company, which took over. The coal company refused to rent the land to tenants, but demanded that 800 men a year to be supplied to work in its mines (Slater, 1975).

4.6 Land tenure implications: mission land and land companies

A number of interventions are said to have led to land speculation, multiple-plot investments as well as landlessness culminating into informal land relations. Some forms of these interventions could be regarded as having had direct or indirect impact on low-income householders. As large proportions of land fell into the hands of missionaries, the churches became landowners. Despite the fact that land was often granted to them by the tribes as a gift, they transformed communal land. Even here, access to land was conditional, restricted to those willing to convert to a particular faith. Land was usually not free, but often sold by the church to converts and, in numerous cases, converts had to pay rent. Such interventions created alien relations to land. At one level, those of a different faith were prohibited from owning land and often forced into non-landowner/landowner relation. At another level these land relations meant that either the church or individuals were landowners therefore capable of promoting these relations. Because of the missionaries’ position as mediators, or trustees, they often abused their position by secretly entering into land agreements which supported land companies by removing the ownership of land from Africans and handing it to speculators. Thus it could be argued that the rise of informal land relations can be of two forms. First, where low-income householders are forced to enter into these relationship because of the inability to purchase a plot. Second, where these relations have been indirectly enforced by the church land policies, by either prohibiting the ownership of land by members of a particular faith, who would have been potential landowners or as a result of secret deals made by the church. It could be argued that the church promoted landownership and landlessness, dependency on informal land relations.
Similar patterns of landownership emerged from company-owned land. Land companies comprised merchants, foreign-based companies, colonists and individual speculators. This confirms a profit-based motive. Other factors confirming the use of land as an investment and further increasing the land values include, the development of infrastructure, such as railway, encouraging immigrants, multiple-plot ownership resulting from the concentration of land in the hands of the few and the company’s encouragement of multiple-purchase of plots, formation of subsidiaries and even extending investing on land by not concentrating on renting land but to purchase land in attempt to explore the potentials of minerals.

Using land as an investment resulted in conflicts between the companies and the government. The role of rents, having increased from 31 to 42 percent meant that the companies were more unlikely to support policies designed to release tenants for waged labour, since almost a third of the income was drawn from rents.

Ownership of land by the companies had effects on low-income householders. This also meant that few Africans would ever become owners of company land. Instead, they rented sites from absentee landowners. Depending on who the landowner was, in some cases other forms of land relations (such as labour tenancy) developed, whereby tenants were expected to supply labour in exchange for access to land. These relations were sometimes extended beyond the normal tenant/landowner relationship, whereby the former became a tenant, but landowners’ powers were often used to restrict tenants’ mobility and even participation in the job market. This had an impact to householders as it reinforced poverty and landlessness among the poor-while creating choices for those able to purchase land. It can be concluded that the ownership of land created options for those who have purchased land, can avail themselves for job market, participate in land rentals whereas those who did not own land were first restricted by their levels of income from purchasing plots, second forced into informal land relations and have to be subjected to restrictions in the job market. So landownership further made a distinction between the poor and the rich, based on land.
The previous sections have illustrated the distribution of land in South Africa, and patterns of landownership for the different races. As early as in the 1840s, land distribution in South Africa had begun to show signs of unequal distribution between the races. This was further aggravated by the mechanisms adopted by the colonial governors to allocate land. Prior to the arrival of the Europeans, communal land was the common form of land tenure. It was allocated free, by the chiefs and indunas, to the members of the clan. As the power of chiefs was slowly being eroded, they were often prohibited from allocating land, and the reserves were becoming overpopulated due to the increasing shortage of land for Africans. Despite overpopulation, the reserves remained free land easily accessible to Africans.

Under the Crown, ownership of land was further removed from the indigenous people. Instead, the land fell into the hands of the Colonialists. Since Crown land was accessed through purchase, financial problems among the Africans meant that few could afford to purchase. Even those who managed to purchase land had difficulty in meeting the payments. As a consequence, plot sizes had to be reduced, and defaulters’ land reverted to the Crown and the former owners were forced into tenancy. As Crown lands were auctioned, land prices increased. Access to land was increasingly determined by the ability to pay. Crown land, therefore, fell into the hands of absentee white and Indian landowners and Africans formed the largest proportion of tenants. Therefore, absentee forms of landownership became the norm, and for Africans the only option was to rent land. Land auctioneering also meant that there were no limits on the number of plots one could purchase, as this was determined by one’s ability to pay. Again, large-scale landownership fell into the hands of those who had the means to pay whites and Indians.
4.7 Land legislations from 1913 to 1952

4.7.1 The Native Land Act of 1913

Natal became part of the newly created Union of South Africa. Three years later, the Native Land Act of 1913 came into effect (SPP, 1983). The Act made provision for the future release of land for Africans. According to this Act, 10.5 million morgen (8.98 million hectares) was reserved for Africans throughout South Africa. Africans could only purchase land in the released or scheduled areas. Land released for Africans amounted to 7 per cent of South Africa's land surface (ibid). Natal was allocated 3 050 000 morgen (2 610 800 ha), 15 per cent of the total area of the province (SPP, 1983). Tatz (1962) suggests that the 1913 Land Act did not show a significant increase in land allocated to Africans, as the scheduled and released areas included land already occupied by Africans, such as freehold land and reserves.

Table 4.3: Land scheduled in Natal in 1913

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheduled land</th>
<th>Acres</th>
<th>Morgen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natal localities</td>
<td>2 267 632</td>
<td>3 061 399 (2 615 366 ha)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission reserves</td>
<td>146 571</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zululand reserves</td>
<td>3 887 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6 301 203</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Surplus People Project, 1983)

The Local Committee was commissioned to review the recommendations of the Beaumont Commission, which had recommended the increase of land to that already scheduled for Africans in 1916, an additional 8 365 774 morgen (7 211 784 ha). However, the Local Committee reduced land to 7 521 273 morgen (6 483 813 ha) (Tatz, 1962).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Type</th>
<th>Morgen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crown forest lands</td>
<td>7238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native individually owned</td>
<td>2392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native tribally owned</td>
<td>871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission-owned</td>
<td>3127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trader-owned</td>
<td>2429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>24222</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Surplus People Project, 1983).

4.7.2 African freehold land

SPP (1983) suggests that less than 9 000 hectares was scheduled for freehold. A fraction, 397 754 hectares, was in African hands in 1910. Although the restrictions on African ownership of land outside the scheduled area was lifted in 1921, very few Africans could afford to buy land (ibid). One major consequence of the 1913 and 1936 Acts was the creation of two classes of African freehold land. The first class had security of tenure and the second’s relationship to land was unclear. The latter type was constantly referred as black spots, which simply meant “Native owned land falling within European areas” and “European owned land falling within African owned land” (SPP, 1983).

4.7.3 The Native Trust and Land Act of 1936

Under this Act, a legal body called the South African Native Trust was created. It was later known as the South African Bantu Trust, and finally as the South African Development Trust (SPP, 1983). The main objective of the Native Trust was to administer settlements occupied by Africans, to legalise land already occupied by Africans, and to buy land which was later sold to Africans – either in groups or as individuals (ibid). About 7.25 million morgen (6.2 million ha) of land was allocated to four provinces, Natal, Transvaal, Cape Province and Orange Free State (ibid). The Act
ensured that no more than 13 per cent of land was in African hands. The quota of land allocated in Natal, 5,028,000 morgen, was lower than the land allocated in the Transvaal and in the Cape, 1,616,000 respectively (ibid). Even land that was to be released for Africans in Natal in 1936 consisted of land which already occupied and bought by Africans (SPP, 1983).

4.7.4 The Group Areas Act

Bundy (1990) states that the Group Areas Act of 1950, as amended in 1952, provided a statutory basis for territorial segregation; it divided South Africa into areas where Africans could not own land. According to this Act, Africans were prohibited from the “purchase, hire or acquisition of land” in areas other than those assigned for African use, the reserves. Prior to 1913, Africans could purchase land in any part of the country – even outside the reserves. When the 1936 Land Act came into effect, it restricted the purchase of land by Africans to those areas that were “released” or “scheduled” for occupation by Africans (Horrel, 1990). The Native Land Act of 1913 and the Group Areas Act had an impact on Africans’ access to land. First, land that had been bought prior to 1936, and was occupied by Africans and surrounded by white landowners, was constantly referred to as black spots and was gradually eliminated (Tables 3.5 to 3.8). Secondly, the racial distribution of land had led to less land being allocated to Africans. While Africans constituted 75% of the population only 13% of South African land was in African hands. By 1968 it is estimated that the total area occupied by Africans was 17,074,342 morgen (56,475 square metres) and 11.98% of the then Republic (Horrel, 1990).

The reduction of quotas allocated to Africans led to the overcrowding of the reserves. Overcrowding in the reserves was, for example, reported by the Tomlinson Commission of Inquiry, which conducted an enquiry into the possibilities for rehabilitating the Native reserves. In 1955 the Commission had recommended that the carrying capacity of the Native reserves was 2.4 million people. During the inquiry, the population was estimated at 3.6 million and in 1981 over 8 million Africans resided in the reserves (Stahl, 1981).
Table 4.5: The extent of African areas (morgen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Scheduled areas</th>
<th>Quota land vested in the Native Trust</th>
<th>Quota of land bought by the Native Trust</th>
<th>Quota of land bought by Africans since 1936</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern areas</td>
<td>1 085 054</td>
<td>1 441 583</td>
<td>1 535 589</td>
<td>271 357</td>
<td>4 333 583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western areas</td>
<td>2 282 338</td>
<td>297 534</td>
<td>1 277 149</td>
<td>154 605</td>
<td>4 011 627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>3 188 799</td>
<td>89 956</td>
<td>423 856</td>
<td>15 893</td>
<td>3 718 504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ciskei</td>
<td>908 421</td>
<td>9 102</td>
<td>110 202</td>
<td>2 257</td>
<td>1 029 982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transkei</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 980 647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7 464 612</td>
<td>1 838 175</td>
<td>3 346 796</td>
<td>444 122</td>
<td>17 074 342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Horrel, 1969)

Table 4.6 The extent of black spots (area in morgen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>Remaining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape</td>
<td>63 471</td>
<td>39 704</td>
<td>23 767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>49 218</td>
<td>9 977</td>
<td>39 241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal</td>
<td>59 740</td>
<td>32 634</td>
<td>27 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>7 548</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>6665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>179 977</td>
<td>83 198</td>
<td>96 779</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Horrel, 1969)

It should be noted that while the policy of the government was to remove Africans on land earmarked for white occupation, this led to an increase in density in urban townships. Woolfson (1991) compares the density of urban townships to white residential areas and suggests that, in Bryanston, the Sandton municipality permits a density of 2.5 to 3.5 units per hectare and a maximum property size of 4 000 square
metres. Alexandra township shares three of its boundaries with Sandton and densities per hectare are estimated at 160 units.

Table 4.7: “Black spot” land that has been purchased or expropriated in recent years, in morgen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Purchased</th>
<th>Expropriated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>6 994</td>
<td>1 051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>11 017</td>
<td>2 859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>5 935</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>4 524</td>
<td>1 328</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Horrel, 1969).

Table 4.8: “Black spots” that still have to be eliminated, in morgen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Area (morgen)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape</td>
<td>138 445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal</td>
<td>82 264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>1 815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>222 981</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Horrel, 1969)

4.7.5 The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951

The Illegal Squatting Act of 1951 facilitated the removal of communities who “without lawful reason remain on or in any land or building without the permission of the owner or the lawful occupier of such land or building whether such land is enclosed or not” (O'Regan, 1990:163). In addition to the removal of squatters, the Act also gave a magistrate the power to make orders “and to demolish any structures in circumstances where he is satisfied that the health and safety of the public generally would be endangered if such removal did not take place” (ibid:163). It gave powers to the
magistrates to remove people without compensation: “every family in a community may be forcibly removed from the place where it has established its home, and its dwelling may be demolished without compensation” (ibid:p171). Where the area in question fell outside the jurisdiction of the local authority, the Act had a special provision (Section 6E) for the establishment of “local communities”, whose responsibilities were to conduct investigations whether or not land was being occupied by persons not employed by the owner. The idea was to remove all those who were not employed. It was only the retired workers and members of the farmworkers’ families who were allowed to stay. The Act had an impact on families who had lived on farms by, first, reducing the number of people allowed to remain as tenants and, secondly, leading to an influx of people from rural farms to urban areas who neither had qualified for accommodation in public-sector housing in urban townships, nor had permits to seek employment in urban areas. For example, Bundy (1990) estimates that between 1960 and 1983, 1 129 000 people were evicted from farms (Table 4.3). While the policies of the government had two major purposes – first, to ensure the supply of cheap labour for the mining industries and, second, to force Africans off the land – the licensing of squatters was meant to relieve a “wasteful system of labour tenancy to one of full time waged paid farm labour in order to create a reserve army of labour for capitalists in? agriculture” (Hartorn & Hutchison, 1990:176).

The Nel Committee of Inquiry into the labour tenant system of 1961 recommended the total abolition of the labour tenant system. Harthorn and Hutchison (1990:197) estimate that between “1960 and 1970, 340,000 labour tenants plus 656,000 squatters and 97,000 others in ‘black spots’ were removed. In addition, 400,000 labour tenants were removed between 1971 and 1974”. The Surplus People Project reports that, out of 3.5 million people that were removed from their homes between 1960 and 1983 as a result of government relocation policies, about 1 129 000 had lived on white-owned farms (SPP, 1983).
Table 4.9: Estimated number of forced removals, 1960-1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farm evictions</td>
<td>1 129 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Black spots” and consolidation</td>
<td>614 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>30 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal settlements</td>
<td>112 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group areas</td>
<td>860 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructural and strategic</td>
<td>103 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3 548 900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source Bundy, 1990:9)

4.7.6 Implications: land tenure legislations

A number of land legislations, implemented by the government in low-income settlements had deliberately created evictions, landlessness and poverty among the poor households. No attempts were made by the government to redress the land shortage among Africans. Legislation passed during 1913, further exacerbated the unequal land distribution between races and low-income households. Africans were the disadvantaged. According to the Land Act of 1913, land allocated for African ownership was further reduced, as the Act introduced provincial quota systems, whereby Africans’ access to land was confined to the specified quota. Any addition to the land quota was vehemently opposed by whites. The Land Act of 1913 should be regarded as having been another tool aimed at concentrating the ownership of land among those who would afford purchases. The scarcity of land was promoted by setting aside land where Africans would purchase. Taking into consideration the overall percentage of land set aside, 13 per cent, compared to the African population, 85 per cent, it was far less than what was required. Also, this land included land already in the hands of Africans, reserves and freehold land.

If one takes into consideration the impact land institutions such as land companies, crown land and missionary land had on the poor’s access to land, it can be argued that
land policies implemented during the late nineteenth century never improved householders’ access to land, but further reinforced divisions between low-income households, increased land values, exacerbated poverty and landlessness within these householders. Under the above mentioned land institutions, avenues of accessing land were determined by the ability to pay. Land available for purchase was reduced while the potentials for low-income householders becoming landowners were also reduced. Under the Group Areas Act, there were no provisions made for those forced to leave. The lack of alternative land and even compensation enabling householders to purchase land elsewhere impacted on poor households who were expected to rebuild houses elsewhere. Those unable to purchase plots were forced to establish informal land relations with those who had continued to be landowners in the resettled settlement.

Under the 1936 Native Trust Land Act, and the Group Areas Act of 1950 and its subsequent amendments, the amount of land allocated for African ownership had been drastically reduced. In urban areas, ownership of land by Africans was outlawed. This led to massive removals and relocation in the effort to clear black spots. Those removed from black spots were often relocated into homelands. Freehold land, located in released and scheduled areas for African purchase, became the only accessible land. As access to land had been reduced over the years, even freehold land was increasingly becoming overpopulated. Other patterns of ownership also developed, whereby land was no longer used for farming, but to generate income. Beinart et al (1986:44-45) explain:

Alternatively, a group of wealthier families would combine resources to purchase land and distribute it as unsurveyed, undivided shares. Whatever the method of purchase, the tendency was for African landowners to let land to tenants and claim rent rather than farm extensive tracts themselves.

The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951, also had an impact on low-income householders’ access to land. Under this Act, poverty among these households is noted when non owners of land are forced to enter informal land relations, labour tenancy, where the non owners of land have access to land on condition that they also work for
the landowner. The termination of these relations, caused by internal or external factors, whereby non landowners no longer contribute labour to the landowners will mean the loss of income as well as access to land. Thus the abolition of these relations further led to the impoverishment of these households who were removed from their homes. As a result of limited options available to them, having been constrained by the lack of adequate income to purchase land elsewhere, let alone the costs of construction, re-establishing informal land relations elsewhere is the only option available for this group. The Act therefore increased a number of low-income households who would neither qualify for credit for land nor can be housed in state owned land. While overcrowding, landlessness were the consequences of the abolition of labor tenant system and affected the poor households, to those who had afforded to purchase land, ownership of land, had created opportunities to continue using land as an investment. A conclusion, arising from the implication of these legislations, to low-income households being that the government intervention in land policies did not lead to an increase in the poor’s access to land. As land became scarce, very few afforded to purchase land. Low-income householders’ relation to land and income differentiated these households according to ownership and non ownership of land. Ownership of land, income, investments in multiple-plot ownership benefitting petty capitalist landlords, while non ownership of land and a lack of income to purchase plots are related to subsistence landlords.

All the laws that prevented Africans from owning land and moving to cities have since been repealed. Bundler (1992) concludes that not all will be able to acquire property in what is still a “racial society”, but there “will be those who have been able to accumulate wealth in the past[who will be] able to acquire fixed property” (Bundler, 1992:2).

4.8 Homeland policy

In 1959, the National Party introduced the Bantu Self-Government Act. This Act laid the basis for the creation of “homelands” or “bantustans”. Creating “bantustans” simply meant the creation of tribal- and ethnic-based residential areas where Africans
would be able to govern themselves. This, briefly, meant the division of South African land into independent homelands. There were nine homelands, each representing ethnic groups in South Africa. Homelands were former reserves, designed to redirect urbanisation from cities to bantustans. Furthermore, the creation of reserves coincided with the government's massive forced-relocation policies.

Hence, the majority were removed from urban areas, because they did not qualify to be in cities; they were classified according to ethnic origin and relocated into the homelands.

Government intervention in reserves had two major consequences. First, it contributed to impoverishment and underdevelopment of the reserves. Wolpe (1972:444) concludes:

The immediate result of the decline in the productive capacity of the pre-capitalist economies was a decrease in the agricultural product of the reserves resulting, therefore, in a decrease of the contribution of the reserves towards the subsistence necessary for the reproduction of the labour force.

The second consequence of government's intervention in homeland policy accelerated the divisions within low-income groups. Moerdijk (1981:150) identified three groups of settlers:

[The] aged, the unfit, widows, women with dependent children and also families who do not qualify under the Bantu (Urban Areas) Act, No 25 of 1945 for family accommodation.

Bantu on European farms who become superfluous as a result of age, disability or the application of Chapter IV of The Bantu Trust and Land Act, No 18 of 1936, or Bantu squatters from mission stations which are being cleared up.
Professional Bantu such as doctors, attorneys, agents, trade industrialists, also those not regarded as essential for the European labour market.

It is hypothesised that the variations in socio-economic groups resettled in homelands, will become evident in the ability to purchase plots. Those who are slightly better off will afford to invest in more than a single plot while to poor households, having been constrained by the lack of income, saving for a piece of plot seem to be remote, and entering into informal land relations would be regarded as the only cheap forms of land accessible to them. Renting of space will be important to supplement household income.

Between 1948 and 1975, 258 632 people, and from 1973 to 1976, 88 000 people were relocated in homelands (ibid). Between 1960 and 1970, Moerdijk (1981) estimates that 340 000 people were removed and 600 000 squatters, who had neither contracts nor title deeds. The majority of those removed had also nowhere to go due to the lack of receptive villages. He further estimates that, as a result of the demolition of Cato Manor, others relocated at Umlazi and KwaMashu, but “scores of thousands of homeless wanderers are a result” (1981:152). About 4 000 tin town sites, planned for settling the relocatees, were reduced to 1 000, further leaving the majority without access to land (Moerdijk, 1981). Others were convicted under influx control laws. Between 1975 and 1976, 380 000 people were deported, and 287 000 between 1976 and 1977 (ibid).

4.9 The incorporation of homelands

The National States Constitution Act 21 of 1971 maintained that black residential areas could be incorporated into independent homelands for the purpose of “establishing legislative assemblies and for the declaration as self governing territories for which legislative assemblies have been established” (Hathom & Hutchison, 1990:215). It gave the State President the power to “modify an area of homeland
jurisdiction”. Under this Act, more than one black residential areas could be incorporated into independent states.

The consolidation of homelands resulted in the reduction of Bophuthatswana from 19 pieces to six, Lebowa from twelve pieces to six, and Venda, KaNgwane and KwaNdebele, from three to two (SPP, 1983). It should be noted that no white towns in the Transvaal were handed over to a bantustan, or a black homeland.

The Cape Times reported that, in 1975, 24 000 hectares of land were excised from the north-western Venda border. This led to the removal of Venda people from the areas of Sinthumele and Kutana, and the creation of a 24 000 hectare buffer zone towards the Zimbambwe border.

One major impact of the incorporation policy was that it often led to the classification of inhabitants according to ethnicity, as well as to the loss of citizenship, to persecutions, deportations and an influx of people into the cities who neither wanted to be incorporated into the homelands nor were provided with suitable accommodation.

4.10 Conclusion

Various factors explain the rise in multiple-plot investments and accessing land by means of informal land relations. The communal land tenure, previously accessed free of charge, by the members of the clan was transformed as a result of the creation of land institutions such as the Crown Estates, Missionaries and land companies. The operation of these institutions in low-income settlements were similar in the sense that they led to the introduction of freehold tenure. Crown estates were not tailored to the needs of the poor. First, land was sold in auction. This means an intense competition among the buyers. Second, there were no restriction, for instance, on the size of plots one could purchase as this was determined by the ability to pay. Third, freehold title buyers were expected to pay in instalments and freehold title deeds issued after the last instalment. Finally, defaulters had either had to forfeit their payments or had the
size of plots reduced. The manner in which land was being sold had implications to low-income householders. It meant no land, small plots for poor householders and large plots, ownership of more than a single plot for the slightly better off. Income, indicated by the ability to afford ownership, large plots.

Under the mission land, no efforts were made to narrow the gap between the poor and the better off, in so far as access to land was concerned. Although, land was not auctioned, the church became the landowner, access to land was through purchase and converting to a particular faith. Again, access to land denoted affordability, whereas non ownership of land was a reflection of poverty, not being able to purchase plots. The informal land relations that developed were of two forms, first, between the church and householders, second, between landowners and low-income householders who were either constrained by income or faith.

Land companies contributed towards the creation of poverty among the poor households. Land companies stand for profit. This was evident in the ways in which they varied investments on land. They did not concentrate on residential and land letting, but they also explored ways through which profits were to be maximised, such as exploring land for potential minerals, changing from charging rent per house to per acre used, subdividing land into rented garden plots and so on. Also, those willing to pay higher land rentals received preference. What this meant to low-income householders? That land has become increasingly inaccessible, that even the informal land relations may serve two types of householders, the poor and those who are not so poor.

It has further been demonstrated that other government legislation, such as the Land Acts of 1913, 1936, the Group Areas Act, Prevention of Illegal squatting and Homeland policies, restricted access to land and did not make any attempts to restore ownership of land to Africans. Low-income householders who had previously been excluded from ownership of land, as a result of the lack of income to purchase plots, continued to be subjected to poverty. Land allocated to Africans became scarce, as a result of land quotas and legislations stipulating who, and where shall the land
purchases take place. Forced removals without the provision of alternative land, compensation, abolition of informal labour tenancy, reinforced poverty among the households who had previously been forced to enter into these land relations and meant that few, if any, of those evicted would ever afford a piece of plot. Taking into consideration that they were expected to rebuild houses.

In conclusion, the transformation of indigenous land tenure systems, having been observed through the government’s promotion of non conventional land policies has widened the income gap between low-income households. Land has become scarce, therefore an important source of investment. To low-income households, at the top, there are those who regard government’s promotion of freehold land rights as a motivation to invest on properties. Since they are not constrained by the cost of plots, they are able to purchase as many plots as they can. In the middle, are low-income householders, who are regarded not that poor, will voluntarily enter into informal land relations, with the landowners in order to have access to land. They also participate in rental housing investments. At the bottom, are low-income householders who have been excluded from the ownership of plots by the lack of income, they are forced to enter into informal land relations. Landowner/non-landowner relationship is important because without it, these householders may not be able to provide shelter for their families. They too, invest in rental housing, rent space and the dependency on rents means that these households will barely survive without rents. The development of petty capitalist landlords is linked with the top level, petty bourgeois in the middle and subsistence landlords at the lowest level.
CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY RELATED TO CASE STUDY

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is concerned with methods of investigating low-income landlords in South Africa. The chapter discusses the objectives of undertaking the case study of low-income landlords. The discussion is considered useful in highlighting the origins of the research and presenting research questions for which the study seeks to offer explanations. It further presents the characteristics of the settlements selected for the research, and how and why they were selected and their relation to the hypothesis being tested.

Research methods that were used during the survey are presented, both qualitative and quantitative methods. The emphasis is on why particular methods have been used. Efforts have also been made to relate the methods of investigation to the aims, objectives, and research questions addressed by the study. Under the qualitative method, group interviews and semi-structured interviews were conducted. While group interviews were directed at the residents of the three settlements, semi-structured interviews were held with government officials, non-governmental organisations and all officials who had a direct or indirect influence in these settlements.

Finally, using the quantitative survey method, the questionnaires were directed at low-income householders. Issues covered by the questionnaire included income, the building and consolidation of low-income houses, the construction of forms of rented accommodation, and the expansion of the rental system and home improvements.
5.2 Objectives

The objectives in undertaking a study of low-income landlords in South Africa were as follows:

- To investigate the different forms of landlordism operating in South African low-income settlements and to explain the causes of and variations in such forms of landlordism.
- To investigate the effects of promoting landownership by the granting of freehold tenure in the development of low-income landlordism.

The study of low-income landlords was designed to find answers to the following research questions:

- What forms of low income landlords operate in South African settlements?
- Which form of landlordism dominates in these settlements?
- What prevents or promotes conversion from one form to another?

In order to examine the effects of promoting freehold tenure, it becomes important to define the hypothesis and the selection of low-income settlements. Also, the settlements selected should be able to reflect varying degrees and patterns of landownership. The choice of methods of investigation has a bearing on what is being investigated. In this case, a comparative method was suitable to assess the impact of freehold tenure on the development of forms of low-income landlordism. As a result, more than one settlement had to be used as a case study.

5.3 Development of hypothesis

The principal hypothesis states that various forms of state intervention, currently observed through the implementation of land policies in low-income settlements transform non-capitalist means of accessing land and contribute to the rise in multiple-plot investment.

There are also a number of sub-hypotheses.
The state's promotion of land ownership, by granting freehold tenure, encourages the polarisation of low-income householders at two distinct levels, distinguished by their relation to the land and their financial circumstances.

At one level, ownership of land allows for the growth of petty capitalist landlordism: petty capitalist landlords respond to the opportunities created by the transformation process by using land as an investment.

At a lower level, freehold tenure creates a group of householders who are restricted by a lack of income from purchasing a titled plot, and are forced to enter into informal land relations with landowners.

Establishing ties with landowners is the only means of satisfying shelter needs. Subsistence forms of landlordism, arising from the landowner/non-landowner relationship is of two forms, residential and absentee landlordism.

Tenure, non-ownership of land and informal land relations reduce investment in rental housing, and reinforce poverty and a dependence on rents.

Between these two extremes are low-income households who voluntarily enter into informal land relations with landowners, but not out of desperation to satisfy shelter needs. Informal land relations serve to promote landlordism, as an incentive to mobility and capital expansion. Petty bourgeois forms of landlordism arise from voluntary informal land relations.

Five variables have been used to define these forms of landlordism, household income, relation to land, ownership or non-ownership of land, and the role of rents and the position of landlords within the poverty line. Petty capitalist landlords are multiple-plot owners who have invested in these plots by means of purchase. Household income plus rents from subletting puts them just below or above the poverty line. The subsistence landlords' relation to land is that of non-ownership. Household income plus rents places them below the poverty line. Access to more than a single plot is also
possible. However, unlike the case of petty capitalist landlords, plots are never purchased and do not have title deeds. Petty bourgeois landlords have been defined as landlords whose relation to land is that of non-ownership. Where ownership of land does exist, they own no more than one plot. Household income and rents are above the poverty line.

5.4 Entering the field: selection of settlements

The next step was to define these settlements. On what basis had the settlements been chosen? How similar or dissimilar were these settlements, in respect of assessing the development of freehold land tenure among low-income landlords?

5.4.1 Defining low-income settlements

The concept “informal settlements” in South African cities covers a broad range of settlement types. The Urban Foundation (1991) relates the concept to backyard shacks in formal townships. Backyard shacks may be divided into two types. Type one consists of shacks and portable zozo huts which may have been constructed by tenants with permission from the site owner, or shacks built by the site owner either for family use or to generate income by renting space to tenants. In both cases shack dwellers share services such as water supply, sanitation and sometimes electricity with the site owner. The second type of “backyard shack” comprises formally extended township houses; they could be rooms or garages, built according to plan, inspected and approved by the local authority. Extended houses can either be used by family members or later converted and let to tenants.

There is a tendency to define settlements with large-scale tenancy as “informal settlements” (Tomlison et al, 1995; Frescura, 1981) and settlements where landownership is in limbo and landowners cannot be traced (Cross & Preston-Whyte, 1989). Tomlison et al (1995) divide informal settlements into four broad categories, based on the financial assistance they receive from the government. They include state-aided settlements under the previous government, settlements established under the Independent Development Trust’s capital subsidy scheme, formally illegal settlements which are not aided by the state and state aided settlements under the housing subsidy policy implemented by the present government.
None of the three low-income settlements selected as case studies originated through land invasion, and they cannot be classified either as formal townships or houses built by the government for public renting. Landowners have acquired land mainly through purchase and are, therefore, legal owners with freehold title deeds. However, informal land arrangements do exist between non-landowners and landowners, whereby the former is allowed to use land on condition that he or she pays rent to the landowner. Secondly, these settlements could not be classified as site-and-services settlements, as no government agencies had ever been involved in the allocation of sites, selection of allottees, or catering for householders who have had to lose their homes as a result of upgrading. Finally, government’s presence is observed in the provision of infrastructure, such as water supply, electricity, schools, clinics, and so on. Because of the nature of these settlements which are neither site-and-services nor formal townships, they are defined as freehold self-help settlements. “Freehold” relates to the form of tenure, “self-help” because the mode of accessing housing has been through self-build (which includes the use of paid and unpaid labour) and the houses are constructed of both temporary and permanent building materials, symbolising their progression from shacks to solid housing.

The country has nine provinces. Due to time and financial constraints it was not possible to have a sample that represented all provinces. Instead, only two provinces were chosen, KwaZulu-Natal and North West Province (Figures 5.1 to 5.5). Two settlements were selected in KwaZulu-Natal, St Wendollins near Pinetown, Durban, and Caluza near Pietermaritzburg. In North West Province, Winterveld was chosen as a third case study.

As the objective of the study was to examine the development of low-income landlords, the ownership of land, multiple-plot ownership and informal means of accessing land, informal land relations were the major criteria used for selecting settlements. These were regarded as being important, to illustrate the outcome of government policies on land. Furthermore, it was thought that settlements with differing origins, such as church settlements, settlements linked to land companies and so on, would allow appropriate investigation of forms of landlordism.
Figure 5.1: Provinces in South Africa
Figure 5.2: Pietermaritzburg within the Province of Natal
Figure 5.3: Caluza- a freehold tenure settlement near Pietermaritzburg
Figure 5.4: St Wendollins, a freehold settlement near Pinetown
Figure 5.5: Winterveld- a freehold settlement in the outskirts of Pretoria
St Wendollins was chosen to represent mission land. It is a missionary settlement which demonstrates the role of the church as a landowner, negotiator and intermediary between residents and government. The settlement was also chosen because of the physical involvement of the church over a large number of years, from the early 19th century to the 1980s. What was hoped would be observed in St Wendollins was the informal land relations that had developed in church settlements, patterns of ownership and whether the physical involvement of the church had influenced the development of landlordism. What was of interest in this settlement was the residential form of landownership, where landowners tended to live in the settlement. Plots were normally shared with tenants. There were very few absentee landlords who lived outside the settlement or who did not share plots with tenants. The presence of landowners in the settlement, or their sharing plots with tenants, was regarded important in explaining the forms of landlordism developing in these settlements, whether their presence facilitated landlordism and investment in rental housing. The settlement's location, between the industrial area of Pinetown and the commercial city of Durban, was also considered, and whether this might also explain the rise in low-income landlordism.

The origin of Winterveld is different from that of St Wendollins. It was chosen to show the effects of government's clearance and homeland policies, and the purchasing of land from speculative land companies. Its location more than 35 kilometres outside Pretoria is evidence of the homeland policies that drove Africans away from the cities and increased their travelling distances. Homeland policies are noticeable not only from the distances from urban areas, but also in the administration of this settlement by the then Bophuthatswana homeland government, although its occupants were non-Tswanas. Clearance policies, on the other hand, led to the removal of Africans from black spots, and to an influx of people who could be accommodated neither by the government nor by the Bophuthatswana administration. The interest of the study lies in the effects of the promotion of freehold land tenure, and the extent to which the development of multiple-plot investment and informal land relations can be explained by the homeland and clearance policies, or by Winterveld's location as a self-help settlement within the public housing domain, where access to land and housing is determined by ethnic origin. In short, the Winterveld study is aimed at observing the kind of informal land relationships that develop where land is scarce, in a
settlement geographically located in Bophuthatswana but where access to land is unregulated. As half the landowners live outside the settlement, while others share plots with tenants or live in another plot in the settlement, this was also of interest when observing how the partial presence of landowners might have influenced the development of forms of landlordism.

Caluza was chosen because of its origin. It had originated as a result of land being made accessible by a speculative company. It represents all the characteristics one would find in speculatively owned land. It is also different from St Wendollins because of the de facto role of the church. Very few landowners have lived in this settlement. With these two distinguishing characteristics, the objective was to observe forms of landlordism and the kinds of informal land relations that developed in this settlement, above all, to examine the influence of multiple-plot investments on low-income landlords and the extent to which this absenteeism might explain variations in subsistence landlords, mobility and the dissolution of landlordism. Landowners have rarely shared plots with tenants. Does, for instance, the absence of a landowner in a settlement reinforce or retard landlordism? Or mobility? The location of the settlement near the city of Pietermaritzburg was regarded as an important factor in observing the influence of settlement location on low-income landlord development, and whether the absence of low-cost forms of land is another incentive for investment in multiple-plot ownership.

There were also differences regarding the composition of tenants and landlords. Winterveld had a high percentage, approximately 90 per cent of tenants, and landlords (and non-landlords) comprised and estimated 10 per cent. The majority of householders in St Wendollins own their homes and very few are tenants. In Caluza half of the plots are occupied by tenants while the remaining half consist of non-tenants.

The provision of services varies. Winterveld has a minimum level of services, compared to Caluza and St Wendollins. Water supply tends to be landowner-driven rather than state-led. There are very few communal standpipes in Winterveld. The majority of householders still fetch water from wells, some purchase water from the landowners who may have boreholes, windmills or have managed to apply for water connections. Pit latrines are the
dominant mode of sanitation. Houses rarely have electricity. Apart from the main road, the streets are not tarred and the houses do not have electricity. Houses are separated by footpaths. There is no regular refusal-removal service, and not even the landowners pay rates. St Wendollins and Caluza symbolise varying degrees of improvement, however, as both have higher level of services than Winterveld. All streets have been tarred and electricity has been provided in St Wendollins. There are bus shelters, community centres, a clinic, day-care centres, a library, a post office, and so on. During the survey householders were in the process of applying for individual water connections. One-third of the houses had electricity. In Caluza, 90 per cent of householders had access to electricity. Most houses had individual standpipes and private sewerage systems. The majority of residents had built permanent structures (concrete blocks and bricks) compared to those in Winterveld and St Wendollins. The characteristics of settlements in terms of services were also considered important in shedding light on either lower or higher levels of investment in rental housing.

Taking the provision of services into consideration, the level of services was important not only for comparative purposes, but also crucial in explaining the extent to which ownership and non-ownership of land explains the variations in rental housing investment.

The three settlements have the following in common: large-scale landownership that has resulted into a two- or three-tier system, where landowners rent land to tenants who, in turn, build rental housing and become landlords by renting space. The unique land-tenure system in these settlements was of interest particularly in investigating the forms of landlordism that one would find in these settlements, mobility from one form of landlordism to another, and the extent to which the land-tenure system influences the sustainability and dissolution of landlordism. There are also similarities in the types of accommodation rented, land rentals, house and room rentals.

Other criteria used to select settlements included the existence of self-help urban settlements with a freehold tenure system and the prevailing political situation, whether it was convenient to undertake the survey, the language, and whether there were established contacts.
5.5 Methods of investigation

The research adopted a multidisciplinary approach, whereby both qualitative and quantitative data-collection methods were used for the investigation. More than one method of collecting data was used. These consisted of semi-structured interviews, group interviews, observation methods, secondary data information and the use of questionnaires.

Semi-structured interviews were directed at officials who had been involved with the freehold tenure settlements, either directly or indirectly. Involvement with these settlements meant working directly with the low income householders or through other organisations that had been present in these settlements. These included government and non-governmental officials, estate agents, volunteers, traditional leaders, research organisations, independent consultants and many others who provided information about the freehold tenure settlements. The list of participants in semi-structured interviews was obtained from various sources such as visits to government offices, land offices, research organisations and referrals by the low income householders living in three freehold settlements.

Observation methods involved taking note of what could be seen at the settlement level. These included the level of services available in these settlements, such as water supply, sanitation methods, availability of electricity, community structures and facilities (schools, the development of roads, post office and so on) materials used for construction, plot sizes and type of houses. The use of observation methods alongside other methods of collecting data such as the use of secondary information (newspapers, ratepayers list, documents) allowed comparisons to be made between the researcher's interpretations of events and those found in documents. Group interviews and the use of questionnaires to gather information were directed at the residents of freehold tenure settlements. They covered landlords and non-landlords. The use of more than one method of collecting data was adopted as a means to enhance the validity of findings.

Comparative methods of investigation have been used to shed light on the understanding of low-income landlords. Writing about the virtues of comparison, Gilbert (1991:82) suggests
that “it reduces the dangers of parochialism, discourages conclusions being made on the basis of experience from one city or country and for the purposes of making general statements, but forces the researcher to think about the underlying processes”. Comparison has the advantage of helping the researcher to think deeply and avoid drawing conclusions from a single settlement. It also helps to identify differences and similarities that might have led to particular forms of landlordism.

5.5.1 Research methods

The primary data was collected by means of a household survey. The aim of the survey was to gather detailed information about low-income landlords, hence landlords form the basis of the study. Non landlords were also interviewed. They served as a control group. Because low income landlords constitute a small percentage, compared with non landlords, local people, informal gatherings served as starting point to identify landlords. Non landlords and tenants were approached and asked to identify their landlords. Some information was obtained from resident landlords who had knowledge of absentee landlords. A list of landlords was compiled. An effort was made to visit all low income landlords Regarding non landlords, about 108 were interviewed. The distribution was as follows, 33 from St Wendollins, 34 in Caluza and 41 in Winterveld. To ensure that all forms of land tenure were represented among non landlords, they were randomly selected. In Caluza, a sample size of 33 non landlords was required. There are 402 sites. Every twelfth house was selected, in St Wendollins every 34th house was selected and every 15th house in Winterveld, based on 600 houses that were sampled. The research is based on multiple research methods, which include qualitative in-depth interviews, group interviews, observations, and quantitative methods using questionnaires and telephone interviews. Burgess (1991) warns that researchers need to use a range of approaches to theoretical problems. Similarly, Wax (1971:10) suggests that

strict and rigid adherence to any method, technique or doctrinaire position may, for the fieldworker, become like a confinement in a cage. If he is lucky or even cautious, a fieldworker may formulate a research problem so that he will found all the answers he needs within his cage. But if he finds himself in a field situation
where he is limited by the a particular method, theory or technique, he will do well to slip through the bars and to try to find what is really going on.

5.5.2 Defining households

The definition of households from which to solicit responses becomes crucial in low-income urban settlements. Who is selected and how one is chosen has an impact on the surveys' results and future policies. The conventional view of defining men as head of households has led to gender-biased analyses (Varley, 1994). Such definitions of households have been criticised for they tend to “circumvent rather than solve the problems which had made the study of family difficult” (Varley, 1994:122). The problem is further compounded by the nature of third-world self-help housing settlements, reflected in multiple ownership, the sharing of plots, and the prevalence of extended families. Varley (1994) suggests the concept be used with care. In this instance, landlords have been defined as any person who derives income through the letting of rooms, houses or land to tenants. The definition does not take into consideration the present status of a landlord or his relationship to the land. For instance, a person renting rooms and houses to tenants is defined as a landlord, irrespective of the fact that he/she may not have owned the piece of land on which rented accommodation was situated. Similarly, a person whose current status was that of a tenant but had also built rooms or houses for tenants, thus deriving income from lettings, is defined as a landlord. The definition includes homeowners who may have been renting rooms, houses, rooms, and so on built on rented land, owned land or a combination of the two.

5.6 Group interviews

Undertaking research in a familiar setting such as in one’s own country, and among one’s own people, has often raised questions of whether the researcher can be objective about situations which are familiar, or whether the native researcher is able to cover all sources of information (Burgess, 1991). Burgess further warns the researchers studying their own societies not to take things for granted and overlook situations that appear at first sight to be similar. In guarding against these problems, my first step was to conduct group interviews, and collect as much information as I could about the settlements, to take note of
detailed information, no matter how insignificant it seemed to be, and to note down situations, whether familiar or unfamiliar.

Group interviews consisted of groups of people carefully drawn from each settlement, and carefully mixed, avoiding combinations of young and old people, and landlords and tenants, which might have created unfamiliar settings, or confrontations, which might have made it impossible to conduct the survey. Groups were selected to represent either landowners or non-landowners. The role of the fieldworkers was to ensure that householders were grouped as tenants, landlords and non landlords and these were selected according to their relation to land. An effort was made not to mix, landowners and non landowners. The majority of landowners were letting space to non landlords, landlords and tenants. Non landlords and landlords were often referred to as ‘tenants’ by the landowners. Therefore, conducting a group interview whose members had conflicting interest was regarded as not feasible. Tenants would not have felt comfortable to discuss issues pertaining to their landlords in front of them. One other aspect considered when selecting group members was the age group. The duty of fieldwork assistants was to ensure that the mixing of old and young people was avoided. For cultural reasons young people usually cannot always freely express themselves in front of the elders and may not criticize them. It should be noted that it was always possible to group people according to age as some groups were self elective. Other devices such as tape recorders, note taking and so on were used during the group interviews. The members of the groups ranged in size from four to eighteen members.

The rationale for undertaking group interviews was as follows:

- to familiarise the researcher with the settlement;
- to be able to identify and compile a list of low-income landlords; and
- to obtain the information about distribution of land tenure, ownership or non-ownership of land.
- to identify the key informants, and to have the opportunity to inform inhabitants about the research, as no other means of communication existed.

The following aspects were covered during group interviews:
• **Social factors** (who were the inhabitants? Where had they come from? How long had they lived in the settlement? when did they arrive in the settlement? why? household sizes, types of employment and so on). Group discussions were aimed at finding out the settlement pattern, whether arrival in settlements had been linked to any government policies on land, and the extent to which location of settlements, types of employment, and irregularity of income could shed light on the origins of landlordism.

• **Tenure** (whether they were landlords, tenants or just non-landlords; how they had accessed land; the problems they had experienced; how easy it was to access land in the settlement; why they had become landlords; how they had started; whether there were any rules regarding landlordism; how long they had been landlords; had they stopped being landlords, and if so, why; what did they use rent monies for; did they have intentions of expanding the lettings; and how they saw the future of landlordism and the relationship between landlords and tenants). The intention was to explore factors that had led to landlordism. Since the objective of the research was to examine the influence of land tenure systems in the development of low-income landlords, it was important to know how landlordism had begun and to explore the future provision of low-income rental accommodation. The general attitude towards landlordism was also important, to develop an overview about these informal land relations, the future production or the reduction of low-income rental housing provision, as this could affect policy proposals, particularly where landlordism had developed on untitled land.

• **Settlement developments** (what services were available in the settlement, such as schools, shops, clinics, roads and building industry; what improvements had been made in the area; and when). Information regarding services available in the settlement was essential to ensure that settlements chosen were fairly comparable and reflected the levels of state intervention in land policies.

• **Finance** (how had they purchased land; how had they financed, the purchase and what were the problems experienced during the site purchase). It should be remembered that one of the research questions was designed to find out about the forms of low-income landlordism operating in South African settlements. Gathering information about the
mobilisation of finance was essential to explain the rise in multiple-plot investment, whether financial problems, or difficulties in purchasing plots could explain the development of informal land relations and the forms of landlordism found in low-income settlements.

- **Household characteristics** (composition of households, number of children, female- and male-headed households, nuclear households, extended households, physical structures on plots). It was felt that discussions about the composition of households would indicate financial differences between households, the need for space, the dependence on rents, and all these would serve as internal factors contributing towards the rise in forms of low-income landlordism and the mobility from one form of landlordism to another.

Group interviews used open-ended questions in which respondents were asked about the issues discussed in the previous paragraph. These questions were not asked in any chronological order but aspects were merely used as guidelines to ensure that all issues were covered during the interviews. In addition to these, respondents were asked to discuss any aspects which were not covered during the discussion and which they felt were important. The responses were noted and divided into two types, namely, the spontaneous (unsolicited) responses and the solicited responses. The spontaneous responses were those issues initiated by the respondents, whereas the solicited responses were those achieved after probing. The spontaneous topics were introduced by respondents, whereas the solicited responses were obtained by asking the respondents questions not covered by the spontaneous responses. Participants were encouraged to talk about their likes and dislikes about being non-landlords, landlords or tenants. In St Wendollins' eight group interviews were conducted. Three groups consisted of landlords, while five consisted of tenants and of owners who were not renting rooms and land to tenants. In Winterveld twelve groups were covered, eight of tenants and four of owners. At KwaCaluza ten groups of people were covered, four of tenants and six of non-landlords. The groups included those letting parts of their houses. Depending on the group composition and the level of participation by group members, group interviews lasted for forty minutes to one hour, and sometimes more. The interviews took place outside houses, under the trees, on verandas or in someone else's house. During the discussions, notes were taken and later compiled at the end of the day to
give a summary of the groups. It should be noted that not all three settlements were covered by group interviews. In some settlements it was fairly easy to conduct group interviews, while in others difficulties were experienced. There were four reasons for the difficulties.

First, although in Caluza it was possible to have groups of tenants and non landlords, bringing landlords into group interviews proved a failure. They preferred to be visited in their homes as individuals. The majority did not live in the settlement and those who did preferred a home visit. Secondly, in Winterveld, group interviews were possible among owners, tenants and a handful of those renting part of their houses. The majority of these landlords were either very old or involved in informal trading activities while others had businesses. Thirdly, because of the large plots owned by landowners, it was not possible to decide on a venue and they were concerned about the distance they had to travel. Finally, relationships prevailed between landlords and tenants in Winterveld. During the research a considerable number of "hidden" landlords emerged who, though letting rooms, did not want to admit that they were doing so in case this led to bad relations between them and the landowners. They would not speak freely about their positions as landlords because they were letting rooms without the permission of the landowner. Faced with such problems, the only solution was to visit landlords in their houses. This meant that fewer landlords would be interviewed. In Winterveld groups represented tenants, non-landlords and those who were letting part of their houses.

5.7 Quantitative survey method

Apart from using group interviews as a method of investigation, the study made use of household interviews. Household interviews were based on scheduled questionnaires. The questionnaires covered closed and open-ended questions. Prior to a field survey, questionnaires were pre-tested in KwaMachibise, a settlement similar to the ones chosen for research. The questionnaires were later modified to suit local conditions.
5.7.1 Representativeness of the sample

The sample consists of landlords and non-landlords. Since the objective of the research is to investigate how the promotion of freehold tenure influenced the development of forms of landlordism, non-landlords were used as a control group. There were three reasons for using non-landlords as a control group:

- First, to understand the contributions of land tenure in the development of landlords, it is important to have non-landlords, to serve as a guide as to whether the components of land tenure, ownership and non-ownership of land, and informal land relations have the capacity to explain the rise in different forms of landlordism.

- Secondly, using non-landlords as a control group allows identification of other possible factors, both internal and external, that may explain the link between informal land relations and the development of landlordism.

- Finally, to ensure that low-income housing policies serve not only the needs of low-income landlords, policy implementers should also be aware of differences between settlements that characterise non-landlords, which might call for specific policies addressing their needs.

There are four constraints that related to undertaking surveys in South African urban low-income settlements, and low-income landlords in particular.

- First, a lack of reliable secondary data.
- Secondly, the lack of studies on low-income landlords has made it impossible to compare data. In cases where information is available it is either outdated or covers the whole city and, therefore, is not desegregated according to settlements.
- The third problem is related to the administration of freehold settlements. Changes in administrative bodies from the Native Administration Department between 1912 and the 1940s, through the Local Health Commissions from 1960-1970, to the Department of Development Aid from the early 1970s until 1992, has meant that the administration of these settlements did not fall within the jurisdiction of the
Pietermaritzburg municipality. Thus information available at the municipal level is often not applicable to these settlements.

- Finally, the lack of local government structures in these urban settlements has aggravated the problem.

It was first assumed that the list of homeowners could be accessed through other means such as the ratepayers roll. However, this created problems. Not all of the settlements studied had a ratepayers roll. In Winterveld, landowners have never paid for rates, hence no such list existed. In St Wendollins, the ratepayers’ list reflected landowners with freehold title deeds. It excluded homeowners who had never purchased land but had been allowed by the church, which was the landowner, to stay. It also exclude those residents who had purchased land but had not been issued with title deeds. When St Wendollins was proclaimed an indian and coloured residential area in the early 1970s, the church pulled out as the administrator of the settlement, and most properties were sold to Indians and coloureds. With the de-proclamation of St Wendollins in 1985, some properties are still registered in the names of Indians and coloureds. Neither the ratepayers’ roll nor the list of owners could offer reliable information for choosing a representative sample of landlords.

Landowners in Winterveld can easily be distinguished from tenants by their houses, which are numbered. Houses are usually built of concrete blocks and some with bricks while tenants’ houses were built of mud. Although landowners of St Wendollins could easily be identified from their large stands and permanent structures, the mere consideration of houses’ physical features was sometimes misleading. A considerable number of householders had houses similar to those of landowners, yet they did not own land. Low-income householders who did not own land in Caluza had built houses with mud, and some had used cement to plaster their houses. However, this was not always the rule. There were cases, though very few, of landowners with mud houses and there were non-landowners who lived in brick houses.

The researcher relied on the list compiled during the group interviews. This was complemented by secondary data on registered landowners, the list of landlords
acquired from the Landowners Association, archival material from Marianhill Mission, the Natal Land Commission, land registration offices, newspapers and information from estate agents and governing bodies involved with particular settlements.

The sample consists of 216 landlords. The distribution of settlements is as follows. Winterveld is the largest settlement of the three. It has a population of 189,000 (Ngomane, 1991), of which 90% are estimated to be tenants (Horn et al, 1992). There are 1,348 registered landowners. Because of the large size of the settlement it was impossible to survey the whole area and only a small section, called Stakaneng, was chosen. This would allow fair comparison with other settlements. Stakaneng was chosen because of its location and manageable size. It is densely populated and the main road separates Stakaneng from Mabopane, a formal public township. Stakeneng’s location was regarded as an important factor in explaining the development of landlordism and informal land relations. The pilot study revealed that there were 85 landlords. An effort was made to visit all landlords. Out of this total only 75 could be interviewed (88%). Landlords who did not live in the settlement and whose whereabouts were unknown were not considered. The survey took place on weekdays, as well as during the weekends and the evenings.

In Caluza, there are 402 sites. Ninety-two landlords were identified. Out of this total 66 (72%) were interviewed. There are 1,126 houses in St Wendollins. The pilot study revealed that there are 82 landlords. Out of this total, 75 landlords were interviewed (92%). All landlords who could be found were interviewed. However, those whose whereabouts were unknown to tenants, lived in another province, lived outside the settlement, had died or could not be found after three visits, were excluded.

5.8 Questions covered

The questionnaire covered three main sections. These include household characteristics, building construction and the consolidation of low-income rental housing. Questionnaires were administered in all three settlements.
5.8.1 Issues addressed by questionnaires

Respondents were asked to describe the present condition of their houses. This included giving a full account of materials used for house construction, such as walls, floors, roof and so on, property sizes, number of rooms and services available in the houses. Allowing respondents to describe physical housing conditions is necessary if we are to assess the influence of land tenure on the quality of low-income housing, to explain variations within settlements and to answer the research question, namely what forms of landlordism exist in these settlements, by relating tenure to the development of landlordism.

5.8.1.1 Household characteristics

This includes a description of sources of income, occupation, type of employment, regularity of income, family size, dependants, age, marital status and family size. The availability of income affects the purchasing of plots, as well as the ownership and even investment in multiple plots. The income available in households also determines the ability of householders to meet other household expenses once construction is completed, such as the satisfaction of consumer needs, food, clothing and so on. Household income becomes relevant in investigating the forms of landlordism operating in low-income settlements, the ability of low-income landlords to move from one form of landlordism to another, petty capitalist landlordism, requirements for an extra plot, and engagement in the production of low-income rental housing. All of these are to a large extent determined by income.

5.8.1.2 Building and investment in rental housing

Due to lack of secondary and primary data related to these settlements it was felt necessary to ask respondents to give an account of how they had accessed land on arrival. The information was going to be used and cross-checked with the existing land-tenure systems and to identify changes that had since taken place in their houses and whether these might have been related to tenure. Because the settlements were very old, and residents had arrived at different times, some could not provide detailed information about the settlement. The information gained is useful since it covers different times at which residents had moved into the settlements.
Understanding the present condition of houses does not explain how the initial houses looked, and how the respondents had invested in their houses. Therefore, respondents were asked to describe the condition of the houses when they arrived in the settlement, the number of rooms, how building materials had been purchased, construction problems, size of the household, the members of household who had been employed in construction, occupation, service charges during construction and the financial position of the households. This information is necessary to understand whether variations in low-cost rental housing can be explained by land tenure, and ownership or non-ownership of land. This is necessary, as rents are also affected by the tenure and quality of housing. All of these are important in determining the contribution of rents to household income and the forms of landlordism.

It is important to understand the relevance of the size of household, financial circumstances, number of rooms and expense of construction towards shaping decisions for householders to become landlords. This information is also linked with forms of land tenure and the length of landlordism, to determine exactly the internal and external factors underlying transition to landlordism.

How big the household was during construction is crucial if we are to link this information with the present household size, and by so doing be able to investigate the extent to which changes in household sizes influence the forms of landlordism. How finance was organised, how many members of household were working, services that the landlords were paying for during the construction and occupation of landlords is useful to understand the financial circumstances of landlords. Reference was made to the old houses. Low-income landlords, therefore, had to recall how the house and settlement looked, and how long it had taken to build houses. The three settlements are very old. The youngest arose in the 1930s, and some houses are occupied by second, third or sometimes fourth generations. Due to memory loss on the part of residents, it was difficult to solicit this information. The questions were open-ended and allowed landlords to cover all aspects related to house construction, without subjecting them to closed questions or forcing them to respond to pre-coded
questions. This information was cross-checked with Section one to see how far the settlement had improved.

In order to establish links between tenure, landlordism and the significance of the quality of low-income rented housing to rents, landlords were asked about the type of rental accommodation they provided, the services provided, their involvement and how rents were charged. Rents not only are incentives to landlordism, but also make a substantial contribution to the landlords' income. Rents are also a potential resource for home improvements and rental-housing expansion. It was important to find out to what extent forms of landlordism were influenced by land tenure and rents, as well as changes in family sizes and financial circumstances. To what extent had land tenure and rents been deterrents to low-income rental housing investments, and mobility between forms of landlordism?

Administration of questionnaires in field surveys has been subjected to several criticism (Moser & Kalton, 1971; Burgess, 1991; Bailey, 1987). The main criticism is that there is an emphasis on counting, as Barley (1983:55) noted: “so I went off every day, armed with my tobacco and notebooks and paced out the fields, calculated the yields, counted the goats in a flurry or irrelevant activity”. Deveraux and Hoddinott (1992) attack the use of questionnaires for failing to go beyond what the numbers suggest.

... collecting only quantitative data is that a number calcifies at each stage – from questionnaire to coding sheet to analysis – until it is one of several hundred numbers contributing to the production of a percentage, in which uncertainty over the accuracy of each individual number is buried forever. Deveroux & Hoddinott (1992:29).

To overcome the problems associated with quantitative surveys, case histories of those who had participated in the survey were used to supplement information obtained from the questionnaires. Case histories were collected at the end of the questionnaire. It was necessary to “tell the story that the numbers suggests”.

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5.9 Conclusion

Chapter five began by discussing the methodology applied during the study of low-income landlords in South Africa. The three settlements are very old, hence they are inhabited by a second, a third or sometimes a fourth generation. The age of the settlement has been shown to have an impact on the accuracy of information. In the absence of secondary data the research relied heavily on the memory of respondents. This, however, created problems. Part of the questionnaire required respondents to recall how their houses had been built, the costs of construction and the organisation of labour. It has been noted that where houses were no longer inhabited by the original owners it was impossible to solicit information. Other problems were related to the fact that respondents could simply not recall what had happened. One major constraint related to the construction of dwellings was that the building of houses often involves more than a single member of the family, who may or may not be related to the landlord. It has been shown that landlords are not always the relevant people from whom to solicit information on house construction and that bringing people who were directly involved during the construction solves the problem.

The aims and objectives of the study were also highlighted. Efforts were made to relate aims, objectives and research questions and hypotheses to methods of investigation. It was shown that, where limited secondary data exists, qualitative interviews could be a valuable tool during pilot study.

Group interviews as part of the qualitative research method were a useful method of accessing information from a number of people within a short period. Respondents are more relaxed when approached as a group in an informal setting than when approached on an individual basis. Group interviews are useful for soliciting information that cannot be covered by the questionnaire and also serve as a reliable source for checking the information collected, later during the survey. It has been shown that the method has also been useful in identifying key informants, landlords and non-landlords, as a source of information and building rapport between the interviewee and the interviewer. It is a useful tool in preparing a survey.
The use of group interviews has revealed that successful and meaningful group participation is determined largely by group size, gender, location and size of acreage, employment and whether landlords are resident or absentee landlords.

Caution should be exercised when arranging groups. The mixing of incompatible groups such as young and old, or landlords and tenants should be avoided. It should be noted that using group interviews during a pilot study is costly, and cannot be successfully implemented without assistants. The method works well in less conflict-laden societies. It cannot be a useful tool in highly segregated societies. The knowledge of local languages, limited mobility within the settlements and the close ties between those residing in the settlements and those outside the settlement all contributed first to the success of the research, and second to the tracing and the identification of absentee landlords.
CHAPTER 6

FREEHOLD LAND RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMAL LAND RELATIONSHIPS

6.1 Introduction

In Chapter 4, the government policy on land, together with the various forms of land tenure systems in which Africans could access land, were explored. It was shown how, over the years, African-owned land had been drastically reduced, leading to overcrowding.

The emphasis of this chapter is on the development of informal land relations at the settlement level. Three settlements are considered and some economic, social and political factors which explain these relations are explored. These include the origin of the settlements, their role as reception areas for migrants and the application of some state land policies which helped to shape informal land relations. How and when landownership developed, the intention for establishing these settlements, and the extent to which they were transformed into urban residential areas where large-scale absentee forms of landlordism developed, are also covered. The significance of absentee forms of landlordism is discussed, including the rising number of multi-plot owners, property sizes, several types of structures that landlords were able to have on their properties, the scale of letting, and the role of these land relationships in enabling low-income householders to expand rented accommodation.

6.2 Caluza and the city of Pietermaritzburg

Caluza is situated in Edendale, at a distance of six kilometres west of the city of Pietermaritzburg. The settlement began as a farm. It was founded in 1851 and was occupied by Christians from 1852 onwards (Meintjes, 1988). Later, in 1861, a legal trust was formed known as the "Edendale Trust", whereby Reverend James Allison of the Wesleyan (Methodist) Mission, in conjunction with the natives, entered into an agreement to acquire the farm, Welverdient, which was 6 123 acres in extent, for the purpose of providing a settlement station for natives. Out of this total, 2 781 acres were used
as a commonage. Other races, such as coloureds, Indians and those of European origin, became the
original landowners (Table 6.1).

Land was accessed through purchase, the most common method being by auction and distribution
among the plot holders. The purchasers were issued with freehold tenure land rights.

Table 6.1: Land distribution in Edendale 1936

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race of owner</th>
<th>Acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European ownership</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian ownership</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native ownership</td>
<td>762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Chief Native Commissioner, 25 September 1973).

When the Group Areas Act of 1950 came into effect, Edendale ceased to be a mixed residential area.
It is today inhabited by Africans. There are a number of settlements which fall under the Edendale
complex such as KwaPata, Machibise, Dambuza, Esiginqini, Moscow, Fishing Road, Esigodini,
Smero, Georgetown, Harewood and KwaCaluza.

6.2.1 Social, economic and political factors

At its inception, Edendale was meant to be a residential area where inhabitants could purchase land
and be able to use it for agricultural purposes. However, a series of incidents led to the
transformation of the settlement in which land was no longer used simply for agricultural produce,
but to generate income.

During the 1860s, the colony of Natal experienced a depression. A large proportion of Edendale’s
landowners left the settlement to establish a network of settlements that were linked to Edendale.
These included a farm in Klipriver, Ladysmith. There was also a decline in the productivity of the land. The average productivity of an acre was five muds, compared to 7.4 in the previous decade.

The economic depression of the 1880s had an impact on the Edendale community. The introduction of pass laws, in accordance with Act 46 of 1884, made the carrying of “pass books” by Africans compulsory. According to this Act, the removal of cattle from one part of the country to another was prohibited, unless the cattle owner had a pass that authorised him to move the cattle. Passes were valid for only 21 days, and contravention of the Act resulted in imprisonment "without the option of a fine" (SNA, 1895). The law had an impact on Edendale traders as it limited mobility.

Africans suffered discrimination as a result of administration and government economic policies. Although they were the major producers of grains (such as mealies, sorghum and fodder) and wool, the quality they produced was inferior to that of the white farmers. Although both Africans and white farmers suffered severely during the economic depression of the 1860s, discriminatory agricultural policies led to improvements in white farmers’ methods of production. Government loans were used to assist white farmers, and unions were given annual grants to carry out experimentation. Meintjes (1988) reports how a railway line was extended into white farming areas to assist in the marketing of commodities. The Natal Witness of 4 August 1888 also described the discrimination against African farmers on the Pietermaritzburg market. High charges levied on the sale of small amounts of mealies, of which Africans were the major producers, affected African small farmers. By 1892, Africans were totally barred from selling in the market stalls (Lambert, 1995).

The government policies made no attempt to create conditions for the incorporation of educated Africans in the employment sector. Professions such as evangelism, ministry in churches, teaching in mission schools and working as shop assistants were dominated by Africans. Educated Africans were rarely employed – even, for instance, as court interpreters (SNA, 1893).

The arrival of British settlers in Natal intensified the competition between Africans and white artisans. This resulted in an outcry from the whites, who accused the government of supporting African
industrial training. In 1895 the government ceased to provide subsidies for industrial education in African schools. Meintjes (1988), quoting the *Inkanyiso YaseNatali*, 18 August 1893, concludes:

> It would appear that natives are to have fewer opportunities of progressing under responsible government than before. Whereas, not long ago, it was feared that our people would never take kindly to manual labour, and missionaries were blamed for not encouraging them more in this direction, now it is thought that, unless a spoke is placed in their wheel, they may become more successful as mechanics than are the Europeans.

African aspirations to become full-time farmers were slowly being shattered. During the 1890s, Africans began to combine farming and full-time employment. Rental income contributed a significant proportion of their household income. Meintjes (1988:45) describes a certain African farmer as follows:

> Enock Msimang was, for example, a wheelwright and a carpenter and employed young assistants in his workshop, teaching them his trade. Yet, Msimang also defined himself as a farmer, and he possessed cattle, sheep and goats which grazed on Edendale commonage.

The economic depression and the government’s discriminatory policies resulted in poverty and indebtedness among Africans. Those Africans who, as a result of agricultural opportunities, had prospered during the previous two decades found it hard to purchase land. Landowners who had owned land found it difficult to keep up with the repayments. The majority who had large tracts of land were forced to mortgage their property. Some found themselves in debt and lost their land. The deed of sale stipulated that, should a prospective buyer fail to pay instalments, the sale would be cancelled and payments already made forfeited. The SNA of May 1902 describes how indebtedness among some landowners led them to forfeit their land:

> Stephen Mini gets money from White men and lends it to all people on interest. In this way all the people get into trouble. The interest charged is very high and this brings about distress.
My own father, Joshua Sive, borrowed 12 pounds from Steven Mini. The rate of interest charged was over 1/- per month. My father again borrowed 13 pounds. The interest amounted to 50 pounds and father had to mortgage his land, 31 acres, to pay his debt. My father then went to Johannesburg, to earn money to pay off the mortgage, and died there and his property has been sold by Mr Clarence under the mortgage bond.

According to the Public Debt Register of the 1880s, 22 people from Edendale registered mortgages in the Public Register. Some were reported to be mortgaging wagons, oxen, stock and crops (Meintjies, 1988).

Between 1891 and 1897, Edendale was struck by three natural disasters. During 1891 locusts destroyed the vegetable gardens. In 1895, the cattle were affected by a lung disease, which resulted in massive losses of stock. Without the cattle, which were often used to draw their wagons and ploughs, farmers were unable to plough the fields. Then, in 1897, Natal was severely struck by rinderpest. It was no longer possible to carry out farming. Natural disasters also had an impact on the diet of the African, leading to low consumption of meat and milk, resulting in malnutrition.

It was through Isibhalo, the forced-labour system, that wages in the Colony were kept down. The lowering of wages had been made possible in 1875, when wages were fixed, commensurate with current wage levels. The general depression had an impact on wages. For example, Isibhalo wages in 1888 increased above the general wages of the Colony. This led to a proletarianisation and an exodus of Africans to cities. For those who were unable to migrate to cities to search for better wages, according to Meintjes (1988:62), the depression created opportunities to combine wages and rents:

Where artisanal and agricultural activity along with trading and transport riding had provided a livelihood for the burgeoning of Edendale until 1890s, by the turn of the century these activities were increasingly being replaced by rent as a source of income. Renting property out to a group of Black tenant class members of the burgeoning working class was a lucrative
supplement to wage work. Edendale with its proximity to Pietermaritzburg, its shops, schools and chapels and the availability of accommodation and communal land for grazing and growing mealies, presented an alternative to backyard dwelling in the town for workers.

6.3 St Wendollins Mission

The St Wendollins Mission, commonly known to locals as KwaSanti, originated in 1882, when two men bought two farms, Zeekoegat (today including Thornwood, Mpola and Tshelimnyama) and Klaarwater (including St Wendollins and Klaarwater links) (Cross et al, 1992). The Marianhill region (of which St Wendollins is part of it) is 176 square kilometres in extent. Twelve settlements fall under these regions, with sizes ranging from 0.5 to 11 square kilometres. St Wendollins is about four square kilometres and lies on the south ridge, overlooking the Umhlatuzana River (ibid). It is located 12 to 15 kilometres from the nearest city, Pinetown, on the main route to the city of Durban.

The objective for missionaries' settling in St Wendollins was to spread religion. The Marianhill Monastery became the original landowner. Land was accessible free of charge only to those who converted to Catholicism. It is not surprising that the settlement is today inhabited mainly by Catholics, (67%), with other denominations constituting only 33 per cent. Later on, the Church introduced the option of purchasing land for to those who were willing to do so. The rest became Church tenants, paying an annual rent of £1. It is estimated that 80 families received freehold title (Cross et al, 1992).

6.3.1 St Wendollins within Pinetown

While the birth of St Wendollins is partly explained by the arrival of missionaries during the 1880s and the establishment of the Marianhill Monastery, the influx of people to Marianhill and Pinetown can also be explained by the growth of Pinetown as an industrial area, the settlement's proximity to the commercial centre of Durban, as well as the constraints imposed on Africans' access to urban land.
At the end of the Second World War, South Africa experienced an economic boom. This was due to freedom and competition from overseas, the controlling of import restrictions, marketing controls and so on, which all made production profitable. In the Pinetown area, local authorities were keen to promote industrial expansion. Pinetown, therefore, grew from a rural outpost in the late nineteenth century into a flourishing industrial area where industries such as metal, textiles, shoes, and made-up textile goods, foods and beverages dominated. The net output – compared to other industrial centres, like the Western Cape province, Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage – was the highest (50%, compared to 14%, 7% and 11%).

The population of settlements forming part of the Pinetown magisterial district increased after 1921 by an average of 6.3 per cent per annum. Between 1946 and 1960 the black population in this district increased from 25 227 to 46 276 persons (Wilkinson, 1963). The total population of this district represented 2.5 per cent of the total population of Natal during this period. The population of Natal between 1946 and 1951 increased by 2.7 per cent, and the Pinetown magisterial district had an population growth of 7.9 per cent per annum during the same period. By 1951, 49 per cent of the total population of the Pinetown magisterial district consisted of persons between the ages of 15 and 64. The potential working population was 26 916 persons (ibid).

6.3.2 St Wendollins and accessible land

If Pinetown was being expanded through the construction of manufacturing industries, as well as rail and road links to the hinterland, what forms of land relations were being established and what were the avenues to accessing land for the black population who constituted the largest proportion of people from whom the potential workforce was drawn? Within the Pinetown magisterial district, there was the Clermont township, a freehold land right settlement established in 1934. Its population had grown from 4 760 in 1955 to 14 024 in 1960. The second township in which Africans could have access to land was in Klaarwater, which had been established by the Pinetown Municipality to accommodate all those employed in the borough of Pinetown in 1960. By 1961 no more than 400 people were housed. However, since land restrictions had been imposed on state-built houses, such as the need to qualify under the Urban Areas Act (Section 10: Rights) and the fact that few Africans
could be accommodated, as well as the restrictions on access to urban land, freehold land-rights settlements became the settlements where the restrictions were lifted. As a consequence, they were overpopulated.

The selling of land to Africans came to an end in 1936, as a result of the Land Act of 1936. While the mission continued to allocate sites to people, freehold title deeds could no longer be issued. As it will be shown in Chapter 6, a considerable number of people remained church tenants, while others were landowners.

The pressure on land, coupled with the desire to search for employment and the scarcity of places where Africans could own land, made Marianhill, a receptive region for migrants. In 1986, the population was 25,260, and by 1990 it had increased to 33,360 (Cross et al, 1992). Much of the population increase was as a result of migration – which accounted for 66 per cent (ibid). The influx of people into this region comprised three groups. First, the influx associated with the expansion of Pinetown as an industrial town in the 1950s. Second, there were the migrants who have arrived in the 1960s and early 1970s, as a result of the expansion of the Frame Group, the blanket mills, cotton and other spinning activities, and so on. Labour was recruited from as far afield as in the Transkei. Finally, there were those who had migrated from rural areas into Marianhill after the repeal of the influx control laws in 1986, which had previously prevented the movement of people to cities. While the laws had been repealed, no extra land had been made available to cater for the influx.

While the Marianhill region became the desirable place to accommodate new arrivals in search of employment, it is appropriate to mention the impact this had on the receiving communities. Africans have a long history of scarcity of land. Land shortages have resulted from the government’s policies of freezing the sale of land to Africans. Where developments took place, land was offered to private developers and housing built for middle-income earners and those qualifying for housing subsidies from their employers. In formal townships, no new sites became available, and those who wanted to be considered for accommodation had to enter their names on a waiting list. This in itself was

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rigorous, and there was no guarantee that sites would ever be made available. Under these conditions, privately owned land was the only form of land easily accessible to low-income householders.

Cross et al (1992) suggested two ways for tenancy to become the mechanism through which migrants could be helped to find a place in Marianhill. The first related to the indigenous tenure systems in remoter areas, whereby outsiders who wished to settle in a community would be expected to find a sponsor, a family prepared to accommodate the newcomers for one to three years, or until they had established themselves in the neighbourhood. At the end of this period, they would be allocated sites either by the sponsor family or by another family, on condition that their stay was approved by the neighbourhood. The second way was associated with the *de facto* tenure system, whereby newcomers would enter the settlement as tenants, brought in by relatives, friends, and sponsors, particularly those with land rights. Tenancy in this respect would not entail membership of the community.

For 27 years St Wendollins was subjected to several threats from the government. Between 1960 and 1980, the settlement was declared an Indian community, and its occupants were subjected to forced removals and the sale of their properties to Indians. In 1979, attempts were made to rezone the area and to relocate the inhabitants. By 1987, decisions were made to incorporate St Wendollins into KwaZulu. It was only in 1989 that the community was allowed to stay and the settlement fell under the jurisdiction of Pinetown.

6.4 Winterveld

Winterveld originated as a farm when, between 1938 and 1945, 1 658 agricultural holdings, varying from 4.3 to 8.6 hectares, were sold to Africans by a speculative company. Land was designated for agricultural use. There were 1 658 freehold properties, ranging from five to 10 morgen. The settlement is located 35 kilometres north-west of Pretoria. It is surrounded by the Mabopane, Garankuwa and Soshanguve townships, which were built by the government for public rental. There are conflicting statements regarding how many people live in this settlement. In 1981, Chief Mangope
of Bophuthatswana estimated that 750 000 lived in this settlement, while the census at the time estimated a population of 105 000 (SPP, 1983). Ngomane (1991) suggests a population of 289 000. Winterveld was under the South African government until Bophuthatswana received its “independence” as a Tswana-speaking homeland in 1977. From 1977 until 1994 it was under Bophuthatswana. Today, it is part of the North West province.

6.4.1 Winterveld within the Pretoria, Witwatersrand and Vereeniging region (PWV)

The discovery of minerals - diamonds in Kimberley and gold on the Reef in 1886, accelerated the demand for cheap labour on mines. Labour was often recruited from the reserves, where recruitment agencies had been set up to supply contract workers. Stahl (1981) estimates that migrant workers increased from 6 000 in 1889 to 305 000 in 1946, and reached 479 000 in 1979.

While Africans living in urban areas were increasing, their status and connection to urban land remained uncertain. Their recognition as temporary workers, who were allowed to enter towns to minister to the needs of whites, influenced government policy on land and further restricted their access to land. In urban townships, the right to occupy property rather than own it was acknowledged. This right remained valid as long as the occupier had the right of occupancy (Section 10 (1) of the Urban Areas Act, had not been unemployed for a continuous period of 30 days, and had not been employed outside the area for a continuous period of 30 days. Where these conditions were violated, the right of occupancy was cancelled after 30 days.

Apart from the restrictions placed on Africans’ ownership of land in cities, which put great pressure on land, rendering settlements with freehold land rights attractive to those who neither qualified under Section 10 nor had proof of employment, resettlement policies and the elimination of black spots further encouraged the development of informal land relations. In Pretoria, no effort was made by the municipalities of Silverton and Pretoria to accommodate Africans. The largest multiracial freehold settlement in the area, Lady Selbourne, which had accommodated 34 000 people, was cleared in terms of the Group Areas Act during the 1950s and 1960s. Other African townships, such as Eastwood, Newlands, and Riverside were also cleared and redeveloped as white residential areas.
Those evicted from the *black spots* were officially relocated by the government. Winterveld was regarded as a transitionary camp, with the intention that those living there were to be removed once appropriate accommodation was made available. The Rand Daily Mail reported:

> The South African and Bophuthatswana Governments are to co-operate in the resettlement of thousands of Blacks ... among the key targets are the squatters in Winterveld and Thabanchu in the Orange Free State (*Rand Daily Mail*, 7/12/1977).

Those who had been resettled by the government in Winterveld had to continue living there, as no alternative housing was ever provided.

The creation of homelands meant the resettling of Africans according to ethnic origin. Ownership of land was increasingly encouraged in the homelands, rather than in the metropolitan areas. Winterveld was officially ceded to Bophuthatswana, despite the fact that its composition reflected non-Tswana speakers. As access to land was increasingly determined by ethnic origin, residents from Winterveld were increasingly excluded from public rented housing.

Other factors that had contributed to an influx of people into Winterveld included increased mechanisation of the agricultural sector, and the restrictions placed on labour tenancy and squatting (SPP, 1983). Winterveld therefore became a refuge for migrants, those removed from *black spots*, from white farms as labour tenants and many others who could not be classified as homeland citizens.

### 6.5 Freehold tenure settlements in the 1990s

The previous sections have highlighted factors explaining the development of informal land relations in freehold tenure settlements. It has been shown that, while the three settlements are similar in terms of having originated as freehold settlements, they differ in terms of indigenous landowners and factors that affected the further development of these relationships, such as influx-control laws, the growth of industrial towns and the need for labour, together with government policies on land,
discrimination towards Africans in the job market, land, and rents becoming an alternative source of income to augment wages.

Figure 6.1: Period of stay by form of household and settlement

Above all, the lack of housing in the formal townships and the rigorous process of scrutiny that applicants had to go through made these settlements (Caluza, St Wendollins, Winterveld) desirable for householders who – while they would have preferred to be near cities or have access to employment, could be housed. Furthermore, the exemption of the freehold settlements from the legislation governing the allocation of land and houses in cities (such as Section 10 rights) became another advantage. The following sections explore some of the developments that took place in the settlements, with an emphasis on informal land relationships.

6.6 Residents of freehold settlements

Occupants of freehold tenure settlements originated from different parts of South Africa. While the arrival of some in the settlements could be associated with a search for jobs, drawing people from afar, others were a product of the government's elimination of "black spots" and its resettlement policies, while some householders' arrival in the settlements can be linked to marriage or a wish to be part of the freehold community.

Even the composition of households reflected the heterogeneity of settlements. Low-income households of Caluza were composed largely of nuclear families (71%), households headed by single men comprised three per cent, and female-headed households 26 per cent. Among households with
female headship, the highest number (65%) were the result of widowhood, and the rest were unmarried female householders.

In St Wendollins, nuclear households were in the majority (64%), followed by female-headed households (25%), and lone-male households (9%). Sixty-three per cent of households were headed by women as a consequence of widowhood, compared to 17 per cent which were headed by unmarried females.

The composition of ethnic groups in Winterveld reflects the multi-ethnic nature of the central PWV region. All ethnic languages are widely spoken in Winterveld, with North Sotho being the most common (43%). The multi-ethnic nature of the settlement further explains why it has attracted so many people, and also why, in the absence of land being accessible to other ethnic groups in the wake of Bophuthatswana’s independence, informal land relations between landowners and non-landowners became the popular route to tenancy for Africans.

In Winterveld 88 per cent of the low-income households consist of nuclear families, nine per cent are headed by females, of which group widowhood accounts for 71 per cent. Households headed by lone men are very rare, there being only one such household.

The number of years low-income householders have been in settlements varies from nuclear household to household. In Caluza, households with single men and women have been a feature for

Figure 6.2: Households sizes by form of household and settlement

In Winterveld 88 per cent of the low-income households consist of nuclear families, nine per cent are headed by females, of which group widowhood accounts for 71 per cent. Households headed by lone men are very rare, there being only one such household.

The number of years low-income householders have been in settlements varies from nuclear household to household. In Caluza, households with single men and women have been a feature for
25 years or less. Widows and widowers' households have been there slightly longer – above 30 years. Of all three settlements, Caluza, St Wendollins and Winterveld, inhabitants have lived in Caluza for the shortest period (Figure 6.1).

Large household sizes characterise all forms of households. Except for Caluza, households headed by single men and women have as many members as the nuclear households have. Households headed by the widows and widowers in Caluza have the smallest average family size, slightly fewer than four, compared to all households headed by widows and widowers, as well as all forms of household (Figure 6.2). The median household sizes reveal no fundamental differences between households. Apart from the median of single-female households being slightly higher than that of other households (7), all forms of households have a median of six household members.

When the analysis is limited to all forms of household, the median stay in Caluza is 27 years, 37 in Winterveld and 39 in St Wendollins.

**Figure 6.3: Distribution of landlords’ age by form of household and settlement**

Low-income landlords can be as young as 23 years or as old as 103 (Table 6.2). Landlords above the age of 50 form the largest proportion, with Winterveld having over 40 per cent older than 60. The median age for landlords in Caluza is 58, in Wendollins 59 and in Winterveld 61.

If one relates the age of the landlord to the form of household, single men and women heading households, in general, have the youngest landlords. For households with landlords under 50 years of age, however, when the three settlements are compared, the householders from St Wendollins constitute the youngest group, averaging less than forty years old. Households headed by
widows and widowers reflect the highest ages for landlords (Figure 6.3).

Table 6.2: Distribution of landlords' age by settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Caluza</th>
<th>St Wendollins</th>
<th>Winterveld</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23-39</td>
<td>4 (6%)</td>
<td>10 (13%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>15 (23%)</td>
<td>12 (16%)</td>
<td>8 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>19 (29%)</td>
<td>13 (17%)</td>
<td>27 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>22 (27%)</td>
<td>28 (37%)</td>
<td>31 (41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-103</td>
<td>6 (9%)</td>
<td>9 (11%)</td>
<td>8 (11%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.6.1 Education

Apart from those landlords whose level of education was not recorded, most landlords were able to read and write, though in varying degrees. When the three settlements are considered, irrespective of form of household, the majority have a higher primary qualification (33%). When each settlement is considered separately, a primary qualification continues to dominate other qualifications, (41% of landlords in Winterveld, 31% in Caluza and 28% in St Wendollins). A secondary education qualification is the second most common, (25% for all settlements, 40% in Winterveld, 32% in Caluza and 28% in St Wendollins). A three-year tertiary qualification is the third highest (13% for all settlements, 39% for Caluza and Winterveld, and 28% for St Wendollins). The fourth-highest educational qualification is a high-school qualification, which is held by eight per cent of all inhabitants. Caluza has the largest number of households at this level, (41%, compared with 29% for St Wendollins and Winterveld). Landlords with junior and post-graduate degrees were found in Caluza and Wendollins, with the majority coming from Caluza. When forms of households are considered, educational levels are fairly distributed within households (Table 6.3).

6.6.2 Dependents

The number of dependants, or family members depending on the income-earner, also varies. Some households were found with only one dependant while others had 10 to 30 dependants. More than
half of all households (57%) had one to five dependants. The largest proportion of these families (90%) lived in Caluza, 70 per cent were from Winterveld and 44 per cent from St Wendollins.

When all three settlements are combined, 23 per cent of households had six to 10 dependants. 43 per cent lived in St Wendollins, 23 per cent in Winterveld, and only five per cent in Caluza. Householders with more than 10 dependants constituted only six per cent of all settlements. None were found in Caluza, only five per cent in Winterveld and 11 per cent in St Wendollins. If the distribution of households' dependants is related to forms of households, Caluza has the smallest number of dependants among all forms of household. A large number of dependants in general characterises all forms of household, and households headed by single men and women may have as many dependants as the nuclear households (Figure 6.4).

Low-income landlords may head households with or without child dependants. Households without child dependants were found in all three settlements (41% in St Wendollins, 21% in Caluza and 16% in Winterveld). For those with one to five children, 77 per cent were from Caluza, 67 per cent from St Wendollins and 41 per cent from Winterveld. One per cent of households in Caluza had 6-10 child dependants, 13 per cent in Winterveld and 17 per cent in St Wendollins. Only St Wendollins had more than 11.4 per cent of its households with child dependants.

When form of household are considered, nuclear households have the lowest level of child dependants. In Caluza and St Wendollins there were on average fewer than three child dependants.
whereas in St Wendollins, the average reached three. Winterveld also has the highest number of children dependant on widows (Figure 6.5).

![Child dependants by form of household and settlement](image)

6.7 Sources of income

What are the main sources of income in these settlements, and to what extent do the settlements vary? Employment, and combinations of employment, pensions and disability grants are the two major sources from which low-income landlords derive their income. In all three settlements 26% of landlords fall into these two categories. The second source of income supplementing rentals is pensions, on which 14 per cent of all landlords in the settlements depend. Other combinations of income include householders’ combining full-time employment and self-employment, operating registered businesses, hawking, relying on rents, part-time jobs or even combining employment, rents and pensions.

6.7.1 Occupation

Most households derive income from pensions (39%), unskilled labourers (18%), professional employment (12%), semi-professional jobs (10%), businesses (8%) and hawking (7%). Some landlords were unemployed at the time or their forms of employment were unregistered.

Occupations among nuclear families are also fairly well distributed within settlements, although variations do occur. Winterveld had the highest proportion of low-income landlords depending on pension (49%), compared to 33 per cent in St Wendollins and 31 per cent in Caluza (Table 6.4 ). Also, there were very few landlords employed as professionals – only six per cent in Winterveld
### Table 6.3: Educational qualification by form of household and settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational qualification</th>
<th>Settlement nuclear households</th>
<th>single men and women households</th>
<th>widows and widowers' households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Wendollins 11(23%)</td>
<td>Wendollins 4(31%)</td>
<td>Wendollins 5 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Winterveld 2(3%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower primary</td>
<td>Wendollins 2 (4%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Caluza 3 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wendollins 3 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>higher primary</td>
<td>Caluza 15 (33%)</td>
<td>4 (67%)</td>
<td>Caluza 3 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>higher primary</td>
<td>Winterveld 27 (41%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Wendollins 3 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Winterveld 2 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secondary</td>
<td>Winterveld 17 (26%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Caluza 3 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Wendollins 1 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Winterveld 4 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high school</td>
<td>Caluza 5 (11%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high school</td>
<td>Wendollins 5 (10%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high school</td>
<td>Winterveld 5 (8%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high school + 1 year's training</td>
<td>Caluza 1(2%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high school + 1 year's training</td>
<td>Wendollins 1 (2%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high school + 2 years' training</td>
<td>Winterveld 2 (3%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high school + 3 years' training</td>
<td>Caluza 6 (13%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Caluza 4 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high school + 3 years' training</td>
<td>Winterveld 9(14%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Wendollins 2 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high school + 3 years' training</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Wendollins 1(8%)</td>
<td>Winterveld 1 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post- grad degree</td>
<td>Caluza 3 (7%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University degree</td>
<td>Wendollins 1 (2%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post- grad diploma</td>
<td>Caluza 2 (4%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

compared to eight per cent in St Wendollins and 24 per cent in Caluza. Owning registered businesses
(11%), rather than hawking (2%), was another common way of deriving income in Winterveld, whereas in Caluza and St Wendollins hawking seemed common (11% and 8% registered businesses, respectively).

Members of households headed by single unmarried women were also employed in various occupations. Some were employed as professionals (20%), some received pensions (20%). Other occupations included unskilled labour, hawking and doing semi-professional jobs.

Other occupations included hawking (4%), semi-professional jobs (4%) and professional jobs (7%). Among the widows, there was a high dependence on pensions (71% in all settlements), with the highest in Winterveld (100%), followed by St Wendollins (92%) and Caluza (36%).

Households headed by single men were found only in St Wendollins. There were six such households. The members were employed as unskilled labourers (33%), in professional jobs (17%), and the rest were not recorded. There were only five households headed by widowers. Most relied on pensions (67%). The rest were labourers and semi-professionals.

Households headed by widows were spread across all three settlements, though there were very few. Five households were found altogether, three in Caluza, one from St Wendollins and Winterveld. Four relied on pensions, others were labourers and semi-professionals.

6.7.2 Employer and government housing subsidies

We need to ask ourselves not only how far informal land relations have developed in these settlements, but also whether the composition of households is an explanatory tool in our endeavour to understand the conversion process. Are nuclear households in a better financial position than other households? And do they therefore have the ability to become petty capitalist landlords? Do these landlords qualify for employers’ or government subsidies? Or do their family members qualify? Only 18 per cent of low-income landlords qualify for government housing subsidies, if all
settlements are considered. They are fairly well distributed among the settlements, with Caluza having 26 per cent qualifying, followed by Winterveld with 19 per cent, and St Wendollins with only 11 per cent. If one considers form of household, 32 per cent of those who qualify for housing subsidies are landlords heading nuclear families. They are from three settlements, Caluza (29%), Winterveld (21%) and St Wendollins (10%).

Only 19 per cent of households headed by single men and women qualified, compared with 17 per cent of those headed by single men and women in Caluza, and 23 per cent in St Wendollins. Among the widows and widowers' households, three households were found to qualify. All live in Caluza. Nuclear households had 15 per cent of “other household members”, rather than landlords, qualifying, with 14 per cent for households headed by single men and women and 16 per cent for widows and widowers' households.

6.7.3 Low-income landlords' income

Does the presence of a second income earner in nuclear households make them financially better off? Are one-parent households worse off? On average, nuclear families had the highest income when rents were excluded (Figure 6.7). Single-men households in Winterveld, and households headed by widows and widowers in St Wendollins are on average the lowest income earners. However, when the analysis is based not only on average landlords' income, and all nuclear households are combined, 41 per cent had an income between R80 and R500, 12 per cent between R501 and R800, 41 per cent between R801 and R5000. St Wendollins had half of its nuclear households earning between R80 and R500, Winterveld had 44 per cent and Caluza only 22 per cent in this category. For households earning between R501 and R800, 11 per cent were from Caluza, 13 per cent from Wendollins and 14 per cent from Winterveld. Of the highest income earners of nuclear households- earning between R1 000 and R5 000 – 39 per cent were found in Caluza, and 21 per cent in both St Wendollins and Winterveld. The median income for all nuclear households was R600. When each settlement is considered, variations were even greater. In St Wendollins, the median was R410, for Winterveld it was R660 and in Caluza it was R1 067.50.
Among the female-headed households income ranged between R410 and R2 500, with 33 per cent earning less than R500. Of this group, 14 per cent were found in St Wendollins and the rest in Caluza. Thirteen per cent earned between R501 and R800. Thirty-three per cent could be regarded as high-income earners, earning between R1 200 and R2 500. Of these, 57 per cent lived in St Wendollins, while the rest were from Caluza.

The median income among female headed households was R500. However, when median income per settlement is considered, St Wendollins had the highest (R1200), Caluza had R455 and Winterveld only R310.

Of households headed by widows, 72 per cent earned between R300 and R500. Within this category, the majority were pensioners (61%). The high dependence on pension is also evenly spread among all the settlements – 80 per cent in Winterveld, 58 per cent in St Wendollins and 55 per cent in Caluza. Very few could be regarded as middle-income earners, only 14 per cent earning between R501 and R900. Eleven per cent had an income of R1 230 to R1 425. The median income for widows’ households was R410. Each of the three settlements had the same median income of R410.

Seventeen per cent of households headed by men earned less than R500, 17 per cent earned between
R500 and R900, and 17 per cent between R1 200 and R1 456. They all lived in St Wendollins. The median income was R200. Widowers' households are found in all three settlements.

There are only four households headed by the widowers. Of these, three depended on a pension of R410 month. One earned above R1 000. The median income for widowers was R410.

6.8 Significance of landlordism

6.8.1 Structures on plots

One other way in which the spread of landlordism had become significant was the extent to which landowners were able to have several structures on plots, resulting in overcrowding, all signifying additional houses for rent. This was common in all three settlements – Caluza, St Wendollins and Winterveld.

Structures found on plots varied in size and building materials used. They ranged from houses built of mud and wattle, to shacks, and to houses built of permanent materials such as brick and concrete blocks.

Landlords who only had single structures on their plots were very few in number. Within nuclear households, only 14 per cent had one structure and, of these, 28 per cent were found in Caluza, 10 per cent in St Wendollins and eight per cent in Winterveld. Having two to nine structures was common in Caluza and St Wendollins, which had 43 per cent and 88 per cent respectively, with only nine per cent in Winterveld. Landlords having more than 11 structures were found in Winterveld.
Table 6.4: Occupation by form of household and settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>% nuclear households</th>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>single men and women households</th>
<th>widows &amp; widowers' households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>3(7%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>3 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labours</td>
<td>13(27%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>6 (46%)</td>
<td>2 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labourers</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>6(13%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td>1(7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labours</td>
<td>10(21%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labours</td>
<td>12(18%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hawks</td>
<td>6(13%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professionals</td>
<td>10 (21%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>1 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professionals</td>
<td>12 (18%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11 (24%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>1 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>business</td>
<td>3(6%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>3 (23%)</td>
<td>2 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>business</td>
<td>5(8%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>business</td>
<td>3(7%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>business</td>
<td>2(4%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>1 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>business</td>
<td>7(11%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>semi-professionals</td>
<td>4 (9%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>semi-professionals</td>
<td>3 (6%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>1 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>semi-professionals</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioners</td>
<td>14 (31%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>5 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioners</td>
<td>16(33%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>12 (86%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioners</td>
<td>32(49%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td>6 (86%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Holders of single and multiple structure were equally spread among households headed by single women (40% each). Those with single structures on plots were mainly found in Caluza and St Wendollins (50% and 43% respectively). Half of the households had two to four structures, and another half 16 to 21 structures. They all lived in St Wendollins and Winterveld. If households headed by single men are considered 67 per cent had two to six structures on plots. The rest were single-structure holders. They all lived in St Wendollins.

In households headed by widows, single structures on plots were very few in number (18%). The majority had two to 10 structures (46%), and 18 per cent had 15 to 28 structures. Among those with two to 10 structures, two structures seemed to be the norm for Caluza and Winterveld residents. However, holders of more than 15 structures were mainly found in Winterveld. Among the widowers, three-quarters had two to 28 structures on plots.

The large properties within the three settlements explain the predominance of multiple structures. A plot of 400 square metres is regarded as the smallest among the nuclear households while 128 000 square metres was extremely large, and could accommodate several structures (Table 6.5). The largest plot sizes were found in Winterveld where 86 per cent owned plots above 42 000 square metres. Among households headed by single women, 48 per cent owned between 800 and 8 700 square metre plots, and only 20 per cent had 85 000 square metre plots. Single men had smaller plots than households headed by women, the largest plot being 8 085 square metres. The largest plot holders (above 42 000 square metres) for households headed by widows and widowers – tended to be concentrated in Winterveld, while the smaller plot holders (below 5 000 square metres), are found in Caluza.

6.8.2 Single- and multiple-plot ownership

How far had informal land relations developed in freehold tenure settlements? And how prevalent was multiple-plot ownership within these three settlements? This section demonstrates the significance of these land relations to both landlords and non-landlords.
While single and multiple ownership of plots were characteristic of freehold land rights settlements, multiple-plot ownership were common. The dominance of multiple-plot holders raises other questions. Did it mean that inhabitants of these settlements were quite well off, to be able to own several plots? Did income alone explain this trend, or did other factors account for the transition from single- to multiple-plot ownership? These questions will be dealt with in Chapter 8.

Multiple-plot ownership cut across all forms of households. Single-plot owners constituted a tiny percentage – only 21 per cent – compared to 73 per cent for multiple-plot owners. When the three settlements are compared, Winterveld had the highest proportion of single-plot owners (53 per cent) compared with 17 per cent in Caluza, and 12 per cent in St Wendollins. It was not uncommon for one nuclear household to own 67 plots while others may have had only two plots (Table 6.6). Most households had access to two to five plots (36%). Larger plot holders, owning more than thirty plots each, were common in Winterveld (15%), with only two per cent of these in St Wendollins. No low-income landlords owning more than 30 plots were found in Caluza.

Ownership of more than a single plot was also common among households headed by single women. Only 20 per cent of this group were single-plot holders. The majority owned two to three plots (33%). Only one householder had more than 30 plots.

In those households headed by single men, single-plot ownership dominated (83%). Few owned more than a single plot, the maximum being two plots. They all lived in St Wendollins.

A very different picture emerges when households headed by widows and widowers are compared. Single-plot ownership was very rare among the widows (only 4%), whereas among widowers' households single-plot ownership was common (half of these households). Ownership of more than one plot was very rare. If it occurred, two was the maximum. Owning two to five plots was common among widows' households, where 61 per cent fell into this category. This group tended to come from Caluza and St Wendollins (41% and 57% respectively). A minute
percentage (2%) came from Winterveld. The larger plot holders, having 12 to 23 plots, were all from Winterveld (17%).

Table 6.5: Distribution of property sizes by form of household and settlement (square metres)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property sizes</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Household form</th>
<th>total (square metres)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>14 (29%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>nuclear</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>9 (14%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>419- 900</td>
<td>8 (17%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900- 1800</td>
<td>6 (13%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-3200</td>
<td>8 (17%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4047- 5000</td>
<td>5 (11%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 (11%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5001- 6500</td>
<td>5 (11%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 (8%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7000- 8200</td>
<td>9 (20%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 (11%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9100- 12 220</td>
<td>5 (11%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 (15%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 300- 45 000</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 (8%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>above 120 000</td>
<td>32 (39%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property size</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>single women</td>
<td>Total (square metres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>5 (71%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>households</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800 - 1 000</td>
<td>3 (50%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 000- 8 900</td>
<td>3 (50%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>above 80 000</td>
<td>1 (14%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property size</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>single men</td>
<td>Total (square metres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>households</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 094</td>
<td>4 (67%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property size</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>widows'</td>
<td>Total (square metres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>5 (42%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>households</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700- 800</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 200- 1 600</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 000- 5 000</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 000- 8 100</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 000- 12 000</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property size</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Settlement</td>
<td>widowers'</td>
<td>Total (square metres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>5 (100%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>households</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 000- 4 200</td>
<td>2 (100%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>above 80 000</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.8.3 Forms of rental accommodation

Low-income landlords provided various forms of low-income rental housing, which might differ in the quality of materials used, the rents charged and the tenants occupying such housing. Some landlords were totally divorced from the production of rental housing, as they simply let sites to tenants who were responsible for building their houses. Only five per cent of low-income landlords let sites. They were found in all three settlements – seven per cent in St Wendellins, six per cent in Caluza and only three per cent in Winterveld. Others let entire houses to individual tenants. Although this was common in all settlements (5%), most landlords were found in Caluza (11%), compared to four per cent and one per cent in Winterveld and St Wendellins, respectively. Another form of rental accommodation was observed where landlords combined land and house rentals, meaning that they can be involved in letting both sites and houses. Thirty-six per cent of landlords rented sites and houses to tenants. It was the most common way of maximising rents in Winterveld, where 83 per cent of landlords provided both land and houses to tenants. In St Wendellins, this applied to 21 per cent of landlords, but to only six per cent in Caluza. Half of the landlords merely let rooms to tenants. Few let rooms in Winterveld (11%), whereas in Caluza and St Wendellins rented rooms are the most common form of rental accommodation (51% in each settlement).

While these forms of rental accommodation cut across all forms of households as well as between single- and multiple-plot owners, the letting of rooms to tenants was common (92% for single-plot holders, and only 26% for multiple-plot holders). Letting land and houses was the most common form of rental accommodation offered by multiple-plot holders (almost two-thirds), followed by room rentals, house rentals and land rentals.

It was also possible for low-income landlords to let particular forms of accommodation continuously, for short and long periods, or they may have even stopped letting space at certain times. Those who had previously let space and reverted to the status of non-landlordism, cited reasons such as an urgent need to renovate the rental housing, non-payment of rents by tenants, a desire to use the rental rooms as household sizes increased and the fact that they were no longer
allowed by the landowners to let the space. Some householders regarded the earning of extra income as voluntary, arising when they were expected to save for educational needs, insurance expenses, and so on. Once the goal was achieved, the letting of space was discontinued.

Table 6.6: Plot distribution by form of household and settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plots</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Household form</th>
<th>Total plots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>8 (17%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>nuclear</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8 (17%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>18 (38%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8 (12%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5</td>
<td>29 (63%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5</td>
<td>24 (50%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-5</td>
<td>4 (6%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>11 (17%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>11 (17%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td></td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20</td>
<td>10 (15%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td></td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-25</td>
<td>5 (8%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td></td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-29</td>
<td>6 (9%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td></td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32-35</td>
<td>5 (8%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td></td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32-35</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-37</td>
<td>5 (8%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td></td>
<td>265</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Plots</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Settlement households</th>
<th>Total plots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>single women</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>single women</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 (14%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>3 (43%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-13</td>
<td>2 (29%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-13</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-23</td>
<td>1 (14%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-83</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td></td>
<td>83</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plots</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<th>Settlement households</th>
<th>Total plots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>3 (21%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>widows</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (9%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>3 (25%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>5 (45%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>8 (67%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-23</td>
<td>4 (80%)</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>widows</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plots</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Settlement households</th>
<th>Total plots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>5 (83%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>single men</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The time after which landlordism was discontinued could also vary; for some it occurred after several years, and for other landlords it seemed to have been a short-term process. In the three low-income settlements studied, landlordism was a continuous process. Only four landlords admitted to have once stopped letting space.

Among those who had been letting space continuously, some were found to have been renting space for a year, and some for even forty years or more. If settlements are compared, Caluza had the largest number of householders who had been landlords for 1-10 years (44%), compared to 15 per cent in St Wendollins and 11 per cent in Winterveld. Periods of 11-20 years predominated (27%) in Caluza, while Winterveld and St Wendollins has 15 per cent and 12 per cent. Landlords in St Wendollins and Winterveld mostly had been letting for more than 20 years. For instance, 33 per cent of landlords in St Wendollins had been renting space for 21-30 years, compared to 25 per cent in Winterveld and 23 per cent in Caluza. Only three per cent of householders in Caluza had been landlords for 31 to 40 years, compared to 27 per cent in St Wendollins and 35 per cent in Winterveld. The 50-plus years of landlordism category was the same for Winterveld and St Wendollins (4% each).

When multiple-plot holders are compared, Caluza had the highest multiple-plot holders who had been landlords for 2-10 years (36%), with only five per cent for St Wendollins and 3 per cent in Winterveld. Also, for those who had been landlords for 11-20 years the figure was 21% for Caluza, compared to 11 per cent in Winterveld and five per cent in St Wendollins. However, as regards low-income landlords who had been renting space for 21-30 years, St Wendollins had 47 per cent, with 30 per cent for both Winterveld and Caluza. Winterveld and St Wendollins led in the category of 31-40 years, with 32 per cent and 39 per cent respectively, and only six per cent for Caluza. Multiple-plot holders who had provided rental accommodation for over 40 years were concentrated in Winterveld (15%), and St Wendollins (8%), with only two per cent in Caluza.

A similar trend was noted in forms of household (Table 6.7).
6.8.4 Contribution of rents to landlords' income

Rental income can contribute anything from 0.5 per cent of a landlord's income to 560 per cent. Although the supplementation of landlords' income by rents is widely spread, and in some cases rents constitute the only source of income, a large concentration (25%) of all settlements' nuclear households had rents contributing 51-100 per cent of their income. St Wendollins and Winterveld had 45 per cent and 40 per cent of their nuclear households falling into this category, but Caluza only 15 per cent. Nuclear households who had rental income contributing between 101 per cent and 560 per cent constituted 19 per cent. None of these households were from Caluza. Winterveld dominated with 87 per cent, and the rest came from St Wendollins.

### Table 6.7: Duration of landlordism by form of household and settlements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of years</th>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>nuclear households</th>
<th>single women households</th>
<th>widows' households</th>
<th>single men households</th>
<th>widowers' households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-10</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>21 (46%)</td>
<td>3 (50%)</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-10 Winslollins</td>
<td>7 (15%)</td>
<td>2 (29%)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-10 Winterveld</td>
<td>8 (12%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-20</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>12 (26%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11-20 Winslollins</td>
<td>5 (10%)</td>
<td>2 (29%)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11-20 Winterveld</td>
<td>10 (15%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-30</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>11 (24%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21-30 Winslollins</td>
<td>18 (38%)</td>
<td>2 (29%)</td>
<td>5 (42%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21-30 Winterveld</td>
<td>15 (23%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td>3 (60%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>13 (27%)</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31-40 Winslollins</td>
<td>5 (10%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31-40 Winterveld</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>2 (40%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>3 (6%)</td>
<td>1 (14%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Differences were also noticed among households headed by single women and men. With the former, the highest percentage of rents' contribution to landlords' income was 185 per cent, and with the latter it was only 157 per cent. More than two-thirds of the single male households have rental incomes contributing between half the income and one hundred per cent of their income, compared to one quarter of single female households.
The largest proportion of households headed by widows had rental income contributing between 50 and 100 per cent of their income. Very few had rents contributing between 300 and 560 per cent (only 7%).

For households headed by widowers, rents' contribution to landlords' incomes ranged from nine per cent to 351 per cent.

When the median percentage of rental income contribution is considered, variations are noticeable within different forms of households. Households headed by single men had the highest median rents' contribution to landlords' income (100%), followed by households headed by widows (50%). Nuclear households had a median of 44 per cent. Households headed by single women and widowers had the lowest percentage of median rental contribution to income – 29 and 21 per cent, respectively.

6.8.5 Tenant households and expansion of rented accommodation

The development of informal land relations between landowners and non-landowners is of major significance, first in waiving the cost of land to householders, the sheltering of tenants and their households and, above all, contributing to the expansion of low-income rented housing. Two case histories of landlords are presented below to illustrate the effect of land relations.

6.8.5.1 Hlatwayo

Nohlabangane is aged 68. She is a retired teacher. When her husband was alive he bought several plots in Caluza and had eight tenant families, renting land. She lives at Imbali, a government state-built public housing plot, which she later purchased. On a three-acre plot situated in Caluza she lets part of her plot to two tenants. The first tenant, Thembile, has build her house and pays R360.00 annually in site rentals of R30.00 a month. On this piece of ground she had built a seven-roomed mud house with limited use of cement, except for the floors and interior walls. The house is partially complete and connected to a standpipe. Thembile lives with her husband who is unemployed, and
three daughters, two of whom are at secondary and one at primary school. The household has five members.

Table 6.8: Percentage of rental contribution to landlords' income by form of household and settlements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of rents</th>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>nuclear households</th>
<th>single women households</th>
<th>single men households</th>
<th>widows' households</th>
<th>widowers' households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5 - 10</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>10 (22%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5 - 10</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>8 (17%)</td>
<td>2 (29%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>2 (17%)</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5 - 10</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>6 (9%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 20</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>7 (15%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1 (9%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 20</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>6 (13%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 20</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 30</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>8 (17%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 30</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>3 (6%)</td>
<td>1 (14%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 30</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 40</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>7 (15%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 40</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>4 (8%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2 (17%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 40</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 50</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>8 (17%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1 (9%)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 50</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>5 (11%)</td>
<td>1 (14%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 50</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>7 (11%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 - 100</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>6 (13%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 - 100</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>18 (38%)</td>
<td>3 (43%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>3 (25%)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 - 100</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>16 (15%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 - 200</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>4 (8%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4 (56%)</td>
<td>2 (17%)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101 - 200</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>12 (18%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2 (40%)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201 - 300</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1 (9%)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201 - 300</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301 - 560</td>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301 - 560</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>6 (9%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although she is also paying rental to the landowner, she also has a tenant who is renting one of her rooms. The tenant lives on her own. The other part of the plot has a two-roomed brick house. It was initially built by the landowner with the intention of occupying it, but the idea was later abandoned, and let to one tenant household. Three people live in this house. In total, eight people have been accommodated by one landowner. In the case of Thembile, she has been responsible for providing
accommodation for one tenant. Under such circumstances it is possible to find different types of land relations on a single plot – a landowner with legal right of tenure, specialising in letting land and housing, a householder without any freehold rights, who is not deriving any income from letting space, and a landlord, also without freehold title but letting a room to a tenant. Finally there is a tenant who has no connection to the landowner, but merely pays rent to her resident landlord.

6.8.5.2 Mthimkhulu

Mrs Mthimkhulu arrived in Caluza in the early 1950s, and started her life as a tenant. She is now a retired teacher. She has five plots in the same settlement. Three of these plots have been purchased and she has freehold title of them, and two are rented from different landowners. Both of the latter live outside the settlement. On her first plot, which is 4 098 square metres, Mrs Mthimkhulu has built three houses. One is an outbuilding, built out of brick, with a flush-toilet and electricity. It is a five-roomed house which is let to four households, with one tenant renting two of the rooms. Ten people live in this house. The second outbuilding, which is also built of brick, has access to water supply and electricity, is let to a tenant who has five family members. The main house, which has twelve bedrooms, belongs to the landlord’s family, and seven people live in it. On the second plot, which is 4 000 square metres, she has built a five-bedroomed house, with bricks walls, flush-toilets, a bathroom and electricity. It is let to six tenants who rent the rooms. A third property of more than 4 000 square metres is still vacant. The landlord intends building rented housing once she has enough savings. She also has two rented houses built on the rented sites.

The first house is a five-roomed mud-and-wattle house. The house is not connected to a pipeline or electrical cables. Rooms are let to tenants. Sixteen people occupy these rooms. The second house is built on another rented stand. Although the house is electrified it is not connected to a pipeline. Rooms are rented to tenants and nineteen people live here, including children. One landlord is therefore able to house 56 people. Through informal land relations established with the landowner, Mrs Mthimkhulu has been able to expand the rental accommodation by almost two-thirds the number of people that can be housed on the properties. Apart from increasing her rental income, she had extended the accessibility of low-income rented housing, and increased options for tenants. These
relations do not only enable her to provide additional rental accommodation, they are also important in waiving the cost of the land, which she did not have to pay. If the “informal land relations” between landowners and non-landowners did not exist in this case, two-thirds of the tenant population would be homeless.

6.9 Conclusion

The objective of Chapter 5 was to discuss the effects of government land policies at the local level. Emphasis was placed on the informal land relations that developed after the establishment of settlements with rights of freehold tenure. The initial purpose for granting freehold land rights was to enable low-income householders to have adequate access to land, where part of it was to be used for agricultural purposes, thus helping to feed the householders and their families. However, the shortage of land accessible to low-income householders was further exacerbated by the government’s pursuance of racially motivated land policies. This meant that fewer Africans could afford to purchase. Indeed, some were even forced to mortgage their land and others remained in constant debt. In response to an influx of people who could not be housed in government-built houses and were not able to purchase land elsewhere, informal land relations, established between landowners and non-landowners became the only hope for those excluded from the formal land markets. While, in Winterveld, the development of informal land relations should be seen as a direct response by landowners to the government’s policy of eliminating black spots and creating homelands based on ethnic group, access to land for occupants of this settlement - because they were not Tswanas - could not be catered for by the newly created homeland of Bophutatswana. In the case of St Wendollins, and Marianhill, segregationist land policies, restrictions placed on the sale of land, the repeal of influx-control laws and the expansion of Pinetown as industrial town, all contributed to a rise in informal land relations.
CHAPTER 7
FREEHOLD TENURE, INFORMAL LAND RELATIONSHIPS AND THE INVESTMENTS ON LOW-INCOME HOUSING

7.1 Introduction

For low-income householders to fully participate in self-help housing, access to land becomes important. As noted in the last chapter, government policies on land not only led to a scarcity of land among Africans, it encouraged the development of informal land relations, whereby landowners who had managed to purchase land became the major providers of accessible land in low-income settlements. Under these circumstances landowners became facilitators of the low-income housing production process.

The production of low-income rental housing can be regarded as a deliberate attempt by the low-income householders to invest in rental housing. At times these householders are forced to generate extra income by letting space. While rental income has a significant contribution to landlords' household income, not all inhabitants of low-income settlements become landlords.

In order to understand the investment low-income householders make on rental housing, it is necessary to examine those who have not invested in rental housing, the non-landlords. Focusing on landlords and non-landlords is important. Firstly, because of the temporary nature of landlordism. Householders who are currently providing rental housing can at any moment revert to a status of non landlordism. Even low-income housing, presently not rented to tenants, could be rented in future. Secondly, investment in low-income rental housing cannot be understood if separated from low-income housing production, because houses produced as self-help which are later let to tenants. Thirdly, non-landlords will be affected by policies designed to promote the production of low-income rental housing. Finally, including non-landlords advances the understanding of the investment of low-income landlords in rental housing, whether or not factors observed within non-landlords can explain variations in landlords' investment in low-income rental housing.
This chapter begins by examining the various ways in which householders have accessed land. These methods range from renting sites from the landowners to having gained access to free land, as a gift.

The significant roles of these relations are discussed in relation to the number of years the various forms of land tenure have been in operation. The investment low-income householders have made in housing, indicated by the types of material used for constructing walls, floors, roofs and services like electricity, water supply, whether or not there are differences between landlords, non-landlords or between the settlements. In further explaining levels of investment; income, occupation, age and forms of household are used as explanatory tools.

7.2 Methods of accessing land

What is the most common method of accessing land in these settlements? Does it differ between landlords and non-landlords, settlements, and forms of household? There are two methods in which new arrivals in these settlements access land, either from a landowner or by purchasing land from a formal land market. Under the first option, land is usually rented, although in some cases landowners may sell land to prospective buyers. While the purchase of land from the capitalist land market is regulated, requiring proof of employment, the appointment of a conveyancer, dealing with financial institutions, and so on, for negotiations with landowners, particularly when the rental of sites is less formal, an informal introduction by an established member of the community is all that is required. Those without links with the settlement often rent rooms to establish their credentials. There are no papers, and there is no lease to sign; it is a mere oral agreement between the landowner and the householder seeking a rented plot. Tenancy may be terminated at any time if the landowner needs his/her land back. Therefore, a low-income householder renting site from a landowner shares a status similar to a tenant renting a room or a house, the only difference being that tenants who rent sites are responsible for the construction of houses suited to their needs, whereas roomers have their accommodation provided by the landlord. The following case of Nokwethemba shows how her established roots in the settlement secured her a rented plot:
Nokwethemba, aged 44, had been born in Caluza. Her parents had always lived in the settlement. When she had married, she had moved out of the settlement in which she had rented a room. In 1989 she came back to Caluza in search of a rented plot on which she could build her house. She was introduced by her parents to a landowner who had three acres of land. The landowner lived outside the settlement, called Moscow. She was expected to pay R100 for isiza – a non-refundable amount – to the landowner. Before commencing with the building process, she had to obtain a letter from the landowner as proof of having been granted permission to build on the property. She was accompanied by the landowner’s son, who would also serve as a witness. The letter was submitted to the KwaVulindlela local authority, which was in charge of building sites, the provision of services, and so on.

As the above case illustrates, access to rented plots requires an initial payment. Even the agreement allowing low-income householders to construct self-help housing on rented sites is mediated by officials.

Procedures for accessing rented plots in Winterveld and St Wendollins are slightly different from those in Caluza. Householders may not be required to pay for isiza, and local authorities may sometimes not be involved. In some cases in St Wendollins – depending on who the landowner is – access to land is sometimes regarded as a gift. When payments are required, they are minimal to cover administration costs, services provided, and so on:

MaDubazane is a widow, aged 103. Before coming to St Wendollins, she had lived in Bergville, a town 300 kilometres from St Wendollins. On the death of her husband she came to Durban as a domestic servant. She was accommodated by her employer. As she was looking for a permanent place, her cousin, who had been in St Wendollins prior to her arrival in Durban, told her about a preacher, Ngidi, who was responsible for the welfare of converts. On arrival, MaDubazane was given a plot more than 600 square metres in size. She was allowed to stay free of charge. A few years later the church introduced an annual fee of £5, which was paid directly to the mission. Another option was then introduced to her, making it possible to purchase a plot. As she was employed
as a domestic servant she could not afford to buy a site, so remained a church tenant.

Access to land may also involve inheritance. Inherited land can be without title – such as a plot that is rented or one with freehold title. Inherited freehold land rights may be singly or jointly owned. It is also not uncommon for a householder’s relationship to the land to exhibit none of these characteristics:

Nosipho is a single woman aged 52. She was born in St Wendollins and had always lived there. Her parents, who had opted to purchase property from the mission, bought five acres of land. They were issued with freehold title deeds. Nosipho occupied one room in a five-roomed mud-and-wattle house that had been a family home. When both parents died, although Nosipho was the oldest in the family, the property was inherited by her younger sister. The younger sister, who later also died, bequeathed the property to her husband rather than to Nosipho. Nosipho’s brother-in-law became the legal owner of the property. Although Nosipho continues living in the house, she does not pay any rent. She is neither a property owner nor a tenant. Her existence on that property is largely determined by the landowner.

The most common method of gaining access to these settlements is through purchase (61%). This method is the most common in Winterveld, where 81% of landlords have purchased land. Over half these landlords bought land in St Wendollins, and 47% are found in Caluza. The second method is land rental, which is highest in Caluza, where almost 35% of low-income landlords rent sites. Non-purchase of land, inheritance, and being offered land as a gift are also found. These methods are all common in St Wendollins, with fewer householders from Caluza and Winterveld using them.
Table 7.1: Distribution of land tenure systems by form of household and settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household form</th>
<th>Land tenure</th>
<th>All settlements</th>
<th>Caluza</th>
<th>Wendollins</th>
<th>Winter veld</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>bought land</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nuclear</td>
<td></td>
<td>105 (66%)</td>
<td>25 (54%)</td>
<td>26 (54%)</td>
<td>54 (82%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>inheritance</td>
<td>20 (13%)</td>
<td>8 (17%)</td>
<td>9 (19%)</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>gift land</td>
<td>8 (5%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>8 (17%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>rented</td>
<td>23 (14%)</td>
<td>12 (26%)</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
<td>9 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>single men and women</td>
<td>bought land</td>
<td>8 (38%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7 (54%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>inheritance</td>
<td>3 (14%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>gift land</td>
<td>3 (14%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3 (23%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>rented</td>
<td>4 (19%)</td>
<td>4 (67%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>widows and widowers</td>
<td>bought land</td>
<td>18 (51%)</td>
<td>6 (43%)</td>
<td>6 (43%)</td>
<td>6 (86%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>inheritance</td>
<td>4 (11%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3 (21%)</td>
<td>1 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>gift land</td>
<td>4 (11%)</td>
<td>1 (7%)</td>
<td>3 (21%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>rented</td>
<td>8 (23%)</td>
<td>7 (50%)</td>
<td>1 (7%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When access to land by form of household is considered, nuclear households form the majority of people who have purchased land – two-thirds of those in all three settlements, with the highest proportion in Winterveld (82%), with Caluza and Winterveld having 54%. Site purchase and site rental are the dominant methods of accessing accommodation, though other forms of tenure also exist (Table 7.1).

When the land tenure system prevailing among non-landlords is compared to that among landlords, a different picture emerges. Two-thirds of non-landlords rent sites from landowners. Site rentals are found in all three settlements in varying degrees; the least common being in St Wendollins where only 18% rent sites, while renters comprise 82% of non-landlords in Caluza and
81% in Winterveld. Having been offered land as a gift is the second method of accessing land and is only applicable in St Wendollins, for more than two-thirds of the non-landlords. Land purchase is very rare – only 10% in all settlements. None of the non-landlords from St Wendollins have purchased land. Access to land through inheritance is the least common method, found in Caluza and St Wendollins. Only 6% of non-landlords inherited land.

Figure 7.1: Landlords, distribution of years in settlement by land tenure and settlements

7.3 Significance of informal land relations

7.3.1 Evictions on rented properties?

Large-scale landownership is often portrayed as an exploitative measures in which tenants always live in fear of insecurity and eviction. The cause of evictions, often cited as landowners' desire to dispose of land for commercial development, and for profit. Such an oversimplification of the landowner/non-landowner relationship has prevented any further investigation of these relationships. This has also led to the diversion of attention from these relationships, their being dismissed on the grounds that, where they exist, they are rare and therefore do not justify any investigation. In the previous section, it was shown how land rentals are an important source of land for both landlords and non-landlords.

Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 have been designed to demonstrate that these informal land relations further enable low-income householders to participate in self-help housing production. It will be shown that, while these land relations have created easily accessible land, they also influence the consolidation process.

Informal land relations, land rentals in particular, continue to be an important source of land for
both landlords and non-landlords. As has been discussed in Chapter 6, all three settlements are very old, originating in the early 19th century. Despite the age of these settlements, evictions are unheard of. On average, non-landlords have been renting land for twenty years. In St Wendollins, non-landlords have been renting land for more than thirty years. If the analysis is limited to land rental among landlords, the average number of years they have been renting is also twenty. In St Wendollins, it is above 30 years (Figure 7.2).

7.3.2 Investment in housing

A range of houses may be found in three low-income settlements. Some are constructed of temporary building materials, mud and wattle, others are permanent structures of brick and block or even a combination of the two, mud and block.

Even the level of services may vary: some householders may have electricity, while others may be without. This section describes investments made by low-income householders, the differences between settlements, forms of tenure and the extent to which land tenure, and in particular informal land relations, influence the investment in housing production.

Low-income landlords on average tend to have larger house sizes than non-landlords. This is evident in all three settlements. While non-landlords' maximum rooms range between 6 and 8 rooms, landlords with houses with more than eight rooms constituted 16% (Table 7.2). The use of temporary materials of construction, mud and wattle, and mud and cement, is more common with non-landlords. Few have, for instance, used concrete blocks (only 10%). While some low-income landlords were also found occupying houses constructed of temporary materials, the use
of bricks and blocks is higher than among non-landlords. Earth floors are found in both landlords and non-landlords' households, though the use of cement dominates. Half of the houses headed by both landlords and non-landlords are connected to electrical cables.

Residents of Winterveld, both landlords and non-landlords, have made the least investment in connecting houses to electrical cables (only 3% of non-landlords and 23% of landlords). Other methods of heating and lighting houses, found in all settlements, include firewood, coal, paraffin, candles, generators, and so on.

Section 7.3.1 has demonstrated that non-landlords have lived in these settlements for a considerable time and even the various forms of land tenure have existed for a long period. It also means that these patterns of landownership, land rentals in particular, have been problem-free, when one takes into consideration the years this tenure has been in operation.

Another conclusion to be drawn from this is that non-ownership of land has also been problem-free, since the status of tenant is clearly temporary. What can therefore be deduced from these findings is that a normal landowner/non-landowner relationship exists. However, another question that needs exploring is that, if low-income householders have lived in these settlements for so long, surely their investment in housing – indicated by the type of housing they occupy and the level of services they consume, such as electricity – should have improved by now? Why have there been so few improvements on housing? Of the non-landlords, 76% still occupy mud houses and a third of the landlords, too, have not improved their houses. The following section examines some of the explanations of the lack of housing investment in these settlements.
Table 7.2: Housing investment, materials for construction, landlords and non-landlords by settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-landlords and landlords</th>
<th>Rooms</th>
<th>All settlements</th>
<th>Caluza</th>
<th>Wendollins</th>
<th>Winterveld</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>16 (15%)</td>
<td>4 (11%)</td>
<td>6 (18%)</td>
<td>6 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>37 (34%)</td>
<td>12 (32%)</td>
<td>10 (30%)</td>
<td>15 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6-8</td>
<td>56 (51%)</td>
<td>22 (58%)</td>
<td>17 (52%)</td>
<td>17 (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>26 (12%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>5 (7%)</td>
<td>19 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>36 (17%)</td>
<td>8 (12%)</td>
<td>22 (29%)</td>
<td>6 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>6-8</td>
<td>97 (45%)</td>
<td>30 (46%)</td>
<td>31 (41%)</td>
<td>36 (48%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>9-12</td>
<td>34 (16%)</td>
<td>8 (11%)</td>
<td>12 (16%)</td>
<td>14 (19%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-landlords landslords</th>
<th>Walls</th>
<th>All settlements</th>
<th>Caluza</th>
<th>Wendollins</th>
<th>Winterveld</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mud and wattle</td>
<td>22 (20%)</td>
<td>15 (40%)</td>
<td>7 (21%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-landlords</td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>59 (54%)</td>
<td>20 (53%)</td>
<td>9 (27%)</td>
<td>30 (79%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-landlords</td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>14 (13%)</td>
<td>3 (8%)</td>
<td>5 (15%)</td>
<td>6 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-landlords</td>
<td>concrete blocks</td>
<td>11 (10%)</td>
<td>9 (27%)</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-landlords</td>
<td>stones and cement</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-landlords</td>
<td>mud, blocks, corrugated iron</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>mud and wattle</td>
<td>19 (9%)</td>
<td>11 (17%)</td>
<td>6 (8%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>55 (26%)</td>
<td>11 (17%)</td>
<td>27 (36%)</td>
<td>17 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>57 (26%)</td>
<td>20 (30%)</td>
<td>14 (19%)</td>
<td>23 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>concrete block</td>
<td>49 (23%)</td>
<td>4 (6%)</td>
<td>15 (20%)</td>
<td>30 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>corrugated iron</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>concrete block, stones</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>stones and cement</td>
<td>4 (2%)</td>
<td>4 (5%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>brick, mud</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-landlords</td>
<td>floors per cent</td>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>Wendo</td>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mud</td>
<td>10 (9%)</td>
<td>7 (18%)</td>
<td>3 (9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-landlords</td>
<td>cement</td>
<td>99 (91%)</td>
<td>31 (82%)</td>
<td>30 (91%)</td>
<td>38 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>mud</td>
<td>9 (4%)</td>
<td>5 (8%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>cement</td>
<td>182 (84%)</td>
<td>42 (64%)</td>
<td>68 (91%)</td>
<td>72 (96%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.4 Income and housing investment

The type of occupation usually determines the income available in households, the lifestyles, and the amount that can be invested in housing, and so on. Therefore, householders who rely on low-
paid jobs or seasonal employment are affected by the irregularity of income, which in turn affects their investment in housing. High and low forms of investment by low-income households cut across all forms of occupation. While some non-landlords in low-paid jobs were found to have invested in permanent building materials – brick and block structures – hawkers, pensioners, unskilled labourers and the like, the same may be true for temporary structures.

Table 7.3: Non-landlords, landlords, investment in housing, roof and sanitation methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-landlords and landlords</th>
<th>Sanitation method</th>
<th>All settlements</th>
<th>Caluza</th>
<th>Wendollins</th>
<th>Winterveld</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-landlords</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-landlords</td>
<td>pit latrines</td>
<td>104 (95%)</td>
<td>37 (97%)</td>
<td>31 (94%)</td>
<td>36 (95%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-landlords</td>
<td>sewerage</td>
<td>5 (5%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>landlords</td>
<td>pit latrines</td>
<td>166 (77%)</td>
<td>28 (42%)</td>
<td>66 (88%)</td>
<td>72 (96%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>landlords</td>
<td>sewerage</td>
<td>25 (12%)</td>
<td>19 (29%)</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-landlords</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corrugated iron</td>
<td></td>
<td>97 (89%)</td>
<td>37 (97%)</td>
<td>22 (67%)</td>
<td>38 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tiles</td>
<td></td>
<td>12 (11%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>11 (33%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tiles</td>
<td>corrugated iron</td>
<td>155 (72%)</td>
<td>37 (56%)</td>
<td>56 (75%)</td>
<td>62 (83%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>asbestos</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>10 (15%)</td>
<td>11 (15%)</td>
<td>11 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>tiles and</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>corrugated iron</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the materials for wall construction are correlated with occupation, the former, a dependent variable, and the latter an independent variable, only a small percentage in the variations in building materials among non-landlords can be explained by occupation, in Caluza only .02%, in St Wendollins .00001%, and in Winterveld .07%.

While low-paid jobs do not prevent landlords from investing in durable building materials, there is a tendency for professionals, business owners, and semi-professionals to build houses of block and brick. Pensioners tend to invest more in houses constructed of brick and block – 55% – than
in mud houses. This is in contrast to non-landlords when all settlements are considered, 87% having made a minor investment in housing, mud seeming to be the most common building

Table 7.4: Housing investment, cooking facilities, landlords and non-landlords

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-landlords and landlords</th>
<th>Cooking facilities</th>
<th>All settlements</th>
<th>Caluza</th>
<th>Wendollins</th>
<th>Winterveld</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>electricity</td>
<td>55 (51%)</td>
<td>25 (66%)</td>
<td>29 (88%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>firewood</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>coal and</td>
<td>11 (10%)</td>
<td>4 (11%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-landlords</td>
<td>paraffin</td>
<td>29 (27%)</td>
<td>3 (8%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>25 (66%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-landlords</td>
<td>paraffin and</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-landlords</td>
<td>firewood gas and</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>solar powered</td>
<td>10 (9%)</td>
<td>4 (11%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>4 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>electricity</td>
<td>111 (51%)</td>
<td>42 (64%)</td>
<td>52 (69%)</td>
<td>17 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>firewood</td>
<td>4 (2%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>coal and</td>
<td>14 (7%)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
<td>10 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>paraffin</td>
<td>11 (5%)</td>
<td>4 (6%)</td>
<td>6 (8%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>gas</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>paraffin and</td>
<td>23 (11%)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>21 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>firewood gas and</td>
<td>18 (8%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>18 (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>firewood gas and</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>electricity</td>
<td>6 (3%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>5 (7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

material used. Another difference between non-landlords and landlords is noticed when housing investments made by unskilled labourers are considered, three-quarters of non-landlords having
invested in mud houses compared with slightly more than a third of the landlords. Also, more unskilled landlords have invested in durable building materials than non-landlords.

Table 7.5: Housing investment, lighting facilities, landlords and non-landlords

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-landlords</th>
<th>Lighting facilities</th>
<th>All settlements</th>
<th>Caluza</th>
<th>Wendollins</th>
<th>Winterveld</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-landlords</td>
<td>electricity</td>
<td>61 (56%)</td>
<td>31 (82%)</td>
<td>29 (88%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>candles</td>
<td>26 (24%)</td>
<td>3 (8%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>21 (55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>paraffin</td>
<td>11 (10%)</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>9 (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>candles and</td>
<td>11 (10%)</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>7 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>paraffin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>electricity</td>
<td>103 (48%)</td>
<td>41 (62%)</td>
<td>50 (67%)</td>
<td>12 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>candles</td>
<td>16 (7%)</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
<td>7 (9%)</td>
<td>6 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>paraffin</td>
<td>22 (10%)</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
<td>8 (10%)</td>
<td>11 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>gas</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>solar powered</td>
<td>4 (2%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>electricity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>candles and</td>
<td>38 (18%)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>36 (48%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>paraffin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>generators</td>
<td>7 (3%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>6 (8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Landlords’ occupations were found not to be an adequate explanation of the variations in housing investment. Low-income landlords who have invested in mud houses, or in brick and block houses, are employed in various occupations. It is possible for landlords relying on irregular incomes such as hawkers to have invested in permanent structures as well as those in unskilled jobs, such as labourers. Even when an analysis of variance was performed, where occupation was used as independent variable and the quality of building materials and walls as dependent variables, no close correlation between the two was revealed. Apart from Winterveld, where only 2% of the variation in building materials can be explained by occupation, chi-square values for Caluza and St Wendollins are well below 1%.
What can be concluded from the analysis of both landlords and non-landlords is that, first, occupation alone is not enough in explaining low-income householders’ variations in housing investment. While there is a growing trend for householders in professional and semi-professional jobs to have invested in durable structures, some may be found to have invested less on housing, merely occupying mud structures. Secondly, even those depending on irregular incomes – such as hawkers, low-paid householders and unskilled labourers, were found to have invested in all types of building materials.

Investment in low-income housing does not always depend on the number of years householders have spent on the settlement. Non-landlords who have invested in brick housing in Winterveld had on average lived in the settlement for fifteen years whereas those occupying mud houses had been in the settlement longer, for more than twenty years (Figure 7.3).

Even among low-income landlords, no link was found between the quality of building materials used for constructing walls and the time spent on settlements. Landlords who had been in St Wendollins for an average of forty years were found to have invested in mud and wattle houses, whereas owners of brick houses had only been
in the settlement for less than thirty years (Figure 7.4). Therefore, for both landlords and non-
landlords, investment in low-income housing is not always explained by the length of time
householders have spent in each settlement. While one can expect the early arrivals to have
accumulated enough savings to invest in home improvements, this is not always the rule.

Early arrivals may choose to invest less on building construction by confining themselves to mud,
and mud and cement dwellings, whereas more recent arrivals may decide to use any form of
building material. Landlords who have lived in the settlement for the same number of years may
invest differently in low-income housing.

7.5 Land tenure and consolidation of housing

7.5.1 Land tenure and income distribution

Before the chapter proceeds to explore the influence of land tenure systems in the consolidation
of low-income housing, this section will highlight the relevance of land tenure in income. Income
is not only important in assessing the ability of householders to improve their houses, but is also
important in examining the distribution of income between settlements, and whether the level of
income within settlements, and between landowners and non-landowners explains the high levels
of home improvements. Income is necessary for purchasing building materials and plots, for
paying labour, and to connect houses to a standpipe.

Average income varies between settlements. When non-landlords are considered, with all forms
of land tenure combined, non-landlords in Caluza has the lowest mean settlement income,
R468.15, while Winterveld has R580.21, and St Wendollins R657.48. In all three settlements, the
majority of non-landlords have incomes below the subsistence level. In Caluza, for instance, 76%
earn below R600, well below the R774 regarded as the minimum income, with only three
households earning between R1200 and R3000. The picture is not promising for St Wendollins,
with only six out of thirty-three households having incomes above the subsistence level, ranging
from R1000 to R2000, with almost 82% below the level of subsistence, with incomes ranging
from R200 and R820. A similar picture is also found in Winterveld, where only five households
earn above the minimum subsistence level with incomes ranging from R800 to R1500. Eighty-
seven per cent fall below the poverty line.

Table 7.6: Non-landlords, access to land by quality of walls and by settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land tenure</th>
<th>All settlements</th>
<th>Walls</th>
<th>Caluza</th>
<th>St Wendollins</th>
<th>Winterveld</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3 (3%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td>11 (10%)</td>
<td>mud</td>
<td>3 (20%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>2 (67%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent land</td>
<td>67 (62%)</td>
<td>mud</td>
<td>12 (80%)</td>
<td>2 (29%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent land</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>19 (90%)</td>
<td>3 (33%)</td>
<td>26 (87%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent land</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>4 (67%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited</td>
<td>6 (6%)</td>
<td>mud</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2 (29%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>stones and cement</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>brick and mud</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gift land</td>
<td>21 (64%)</td>
<td>mud</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2 (29%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gift land</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5 (56%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gift land</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4 (80%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gift land</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>block</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>9 (100%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gift land</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>brick and mud</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

205
Table 7.7: Landlords, access to land by quality of walls and by settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land tenure</th>
<th>All settlements</th>
<th>Walls</th>
<th>Caluza</th>
<th>Wendollins</th>
<th>Winterveld</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>8 (4%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>6 (8%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td>131 (61%)</td>
<td>mud</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3 (50%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>cement</td>
<td>1 (9%)</td>
<td>10 (37%)</td>
<td>8 (47%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>17 (85%)</td>
<td>11 (79%)</td>
<td>21 (91%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>blocks</td>
<td>3 (75%)</td>
<td>8 (53%)</td>
<td>29 (97%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>corrugated</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>iron</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>stones</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>stones and cement</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited</td>
<td>27 (13%)</td>
<td>mud</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited</td>
<td></td>
<td>mud and</td>
<td>1 (9%)</td>
<td>5 (19%)</td>
<td>2 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited</td>
<td></td>
<td>cement</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited</td>
<td></td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>3 (15%)</td>
<td>3 (21%)</td>
<td>2 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited</td>
<td></td>
<td>blocks</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td>4 (27%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gift</td>
<td>15 (7%)</td>
<td>mud</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3 (50%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gift</td>
<td></td>
<td>mud and</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5 (19%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gift</td>
<td></td>
<td>cement</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gift</td>
<td></td>
<td>blocks</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3 (20%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented</td>
<td>35 (16%)</td>
<td>mud</td>
<td>8 (73%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented</td>
<td></td>
<td>mud and</td>
<td>9 (82%)</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>7 (41%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How do non-landlords' incomes compare if land tenure is considered? It will be recalled that ownership of land seems to be less common among non-landlords. The majority tend to rent land from landowners, this having been common in Caluza and Winterveld, whereas in St Wendollins occupation of missionary land, denoting free land, is most common. Land rentals remain the most common method of accessing land, 61 per cent of households in all three settlements rent land. Despite ownership of land being the least common form of tenure among non-landlords, the mean income for landowners was the highest, R779.09, compared to all forms of land tenure. When the mean income of non-landlords who had bought land is compared to non-landlords' mean when
all forms of land tenure are combined, it is 38 per cent higher than the non-landlords’ mean income. Caluza has a mean income 23 per cent higher than that of the three settlements combined, and Winterveld a mean almost a third lower.

When access to land by gift is considered, though this is only applicable to St Wendollins, the mean income is the second-highest after landowners with title deeds – 32 per cent higher than non-landlords’ mean income when all settlements are considered, irrespective of land tenure. Comparing the mean income of non-landlords who have accessed gift land with settlement mean income, it is 13 per cent higher than the settlement mean.

Inheritance of land, much more common in St Wendollins than in Caluza, has the third-largest mean income when compared to the mean income of all tenures. It is 14 per cent higher than the mean income of the three settlements. When analysis is limited to St Wendollins, it is 2 per cent lower than the settlement mean.

Non-landlords who rent sites from landowners have the lowest mean income when the three settlements are combined. However, differences within settlements are noticed. For instance, non-landlords in Caluza have the lowest mean income. Even when the mean settlement income is compared to that of those in the three settlements renting land, it remains 20 per cent below the mean, whereas in Winterveld the mean income for non-landlords renting land is 23 per cent higher than the mean of non-landlords renting land when all three settlements are considered, and one per cent below the settlement mean income.

From the analysis of land tenure and distribution of income within settlements presented so far, it is quite clear that non-landlords are not a homogeneous group. While they all share the status of not deriving income by letting space, the differentiation of non-landlords according to forms of land tenure has revealed mean income differences between those who own land, those who rent land and even those who were offered land as a gift. Generalisations cannot be made even within the same form of land tenure. While non-landlords who have purchased land show the highest mean income, even when compared to non-landlords mean income, all forms of tenure combined, this seems to have been the case with non-landlords of Caluza, but in Winterveld the mean income
is much lower than the mean income of non-landlords who purchased land and even slightly lower than the mean income of all three settlements combined, irrespective of form of land tenure.

One other factor that has emerged from the analysis of income distribution within settlements is that, in general, the mean income for non-landlords in all three settlements is below the minimum level of subsistence. However, when forms of land tenure are considered, non-landlords of Caluza had average incomes well above the subsistence level, whereas those in Winterveld continued to be below the subsistence level. There is no evidence that variations in income explain land tenure system. It is only in Caluza that 15 per cent of the variations in tenure are explained by income. In St Wendollins and Winterveld the correlation is even weaker - .06 and .004 per cent.

Low-income landlords are, on average, earning incomes far above those of non-landlords. The combined mean income of all landlords is 42 per cent higher than that of non-landlords (Tables 7.8 & 7.9). A similar situation was observed with regard to mean settlement income.

When analysis is limited to forms of land tenure, landlords who rent land have the lowest mean income compared to other forms of tenure, although variations are noticed with average settlement income. Low-income landlords from Caluza have the highest mean income in all forms of land tenure. Apart from the landlords who rent land, mean income is above the subsistence level.

When landlords' incomes and rents are considered, the distribution of income further puts them in a better financial position than that of non-landlords. The contribution of rental income to landlords' mean household income (when rent is excluded) is significant as it increases mean income (excluding rents) by more than half (Tables 7.10 & 7.11). Rental income contribution to settlement mean income is also observed. In Winterveld the percentage of rental contribution is 94 per cent, in St Wendollins 37 per cent, and in Caluza 32 per cent. It should be noted that, here, rental contribution to mean settlement income has not taken into consideration the various forms of land tenure. As the rental contribution to forms of land tenure is considered, rents contributed 68 per cent of the mean income of landlords who had purchased land. However, when each settlement is considered, rental contributions were slightly below the overall percentage.
contribution. In St Wendollins, rents increased the mean income by 47 per cent, in Caluza by 40 per cent, and in Winterveld by only 10 per cent. In contrast, when the contribution of rents to landlords’ renting land was considered, some settlements, like Caluza, had a 41 per cent increase and Winterveld 11 per cent, whereas the overall rental income contribution for three settlements was 18 per cent. Therefore, rental income contribution to form of tenure may be lower or higher than the overall settlement mean income. It should be remembered that rents are a reflection of a combination of factors, such as the number of rooms rented, the quality of rented housing, and the type of accommodation (whether land or houses, and so on).

Table 7.8: Non-landlords, income by settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlements</th>
<th>Land tenure</th>
<th>Mean income (Rand)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
<th>Mean difference</th>
<th>95% Confidence interval</th>
<th>No of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>R564.54</td>
<td>460.71</td>
<td>44.13</td>
<td>564.54</td>
<td>477 to 652</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>R468.16</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>82.23</td>
<td>468.16</td>
<td>302 to 635</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>R657.48</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>83.54</td>
<td>657.48</td>
<td>487 to 828</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>R580.21</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>61.95</td>
<td>580.21</td>
<td>455 to 706</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unlike non-landlords, landlords have been able to increase incomes by letting space. The ability to increase income has contributed to an improvement of mean settlement income as well as various forms of land tenure, particularly where income excluding rents happened to be below the level of subsistence. There is also evidence that, although rents have had a significant impact on landlords’ income, landlords who accessed land by renting sites from landowners were unable to increase their income to the subsistence level. From these findings it can be concluded that, while low-income landlords benefit from rents, such benefits are not equally spread within forms of land tenure. Even within the same settlement, variations in rental contribution cannot be ruled out. As Chapter 8 demonstrates, variations in income, rent, low-income housing investment, and so on may be even greater when forms of landlordism are considered, rather than their being treated as
a homogeneous group.

7.5.2 Land tenure, organising labour and financing construction

Does it reflect differences between landlords and landlords? Do certain types of houses require specialised labour? And are there differences in investment? Would we say those renting land have invested less in housing?

Table 7.9: Non-landlords, income by land tenure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlements</th>
<th>Land tenure</th>
<th>Mean (Rand)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
<th>Mean difference</th>
<th>95% level of confidence</th>
<th>No of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>bought land</td>
<td>R779.09</td>
<td>852.32</td>
<td>256.98</td>
<td>779.09</td>
<td>207 to 1352</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>bought land</td>
<td>R961.66</td>
<td>1117.13</td>
<td>456.06</td>
<td>961.67</td>
<td>-213 to 2134</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>bought land</td>
<td>R560.00</td>
<td>382.23</td>
<td>170.96</td>
<td>560.00</td>
<td>85 to 1035</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>rent land</td>
<td>R468.85</td>
<td>304.42</td>
<td>37.19</td>
<td>468.85</td>
<td>395 to 543</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>rent land</td>
<td>R374.51</td>
<td>226.02</td>
<td>40.59</td>
<td>374.52</td>
<td>292 to 457</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendo-llins</td>
<td>rent land</td>
<td>R409.16</td>
<td>257.72</td>
<td>105.21</td>
<td>409.17</td>
<td>139 to 670</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>rent land</td>
<td>R578.27</td>
<td>352.09</td>
<td>64.28</td>
<td>578.27</td>
<td>447 to 710</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>inherited land</td>
<td>R606.66</td>
<td>702.01</td>
<td>286.59</td>
<td>606.67</td>
<td>-130 to 1343</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>inherited land</td>
<td>R410.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-139 to 1343</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendo-llins</td>
<td>inherited land</td>
<td>R646.00</td>
<td>777.45</td>
<td>347.68</td>
<td>646.00</td>
<td>-319 to 5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>gift land</td>
<td>R742.95</td>
<td>449.14</td>
<td>98.01</td>
<td>742.95</td>
<td>539 to 947</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendo-llins</td>
<td>gift land</td>
<td>R742.95</td>
<td>449.14</td>
<td>98.01</td>
<td>742.95</td>
<td>539 to 947</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The organisation and forms of labour used by landlords and non-landlords during the construction phase in three settlements reflect the variation in quality of building materials. A distinction is made between houses constructed of temporary building materials (such as mud, wattle, and earth floors) and those produced with a maximum use of industrialised building materials (such as concrete blocks, bricks, tiled roof structures, corrugated iron sheeting, asbestos and so on).

Low-income landlords and non-landlords are then categorised according to the type of housing they occupy, the services provided, and the forms of labour mostly used for construction. This is not only useful in describing the houses and labour used but will also help in linking forms of labour to quality of housing, highlighting both the levels of improvements and the investments low-income householders have made on housing. By so doing it is possible to present a picture of how far land tenure has influenced investment in low-income housing. It should be noted that the distinction between these two forms of building materials, whether permanent or temporary, is for analytical purposes and does not suggest an absence of industrially produced materials in temporary built structures.

Table 7.10: Landlords, income distribution by settlement (excluding rents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlements</th>
<th>Land tenure</th>
<th>Mean (Rand)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
<th>Mean difference</th>
<th>95% level of confidence</th>
<th>No of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>R801.26</td>
<td>691.02</td>
<td>47.01</td>
<td>801.26</td>
<td>709 to 894</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>R990.07</td>
<td>788.39</td>
<td>97.04</td>
<td>990.08</td>
<td>796 to 1184</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendol-lins</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>R654.41</td>
<td>730.69</td>
<td>84.37</td>
<td>654.41</td>
<td>486 to 823</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter-veld</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>R781.94</td>
<td>503.46</td>
<td>58.13</td>
<td>781.95</td>
<td>666 to 897</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.5.2.1 Constructing temporary structures

The construction of temporary and permanent structures may share some characteristics, as far as the organisation of labour is concerned. Does the use of paid labour in temporary structures mean high investment, and the use of unpaid labour denote lower investment, or are similar investments made in both forms? It will be argued that, while changes in the production of temporary structures are noticed, they remain less expensive to produce.

Prior to the commencement of the construction process, low-income householders of Caluza are required to have house plans. Nokuzola, a resident from Caluza, who had lived in the settlement for 28 years, describes the building process and the extent to which mud houses increasingly typify the industrially produced housing:

"Having been granted a rented site by the landlowner, where I was expected to build my house, the next step was to approach Vulindlela, a local authority office in charge with buildings and sites. On arrival I was given numerous house plans from which I was told to choose one. I paid R10 for a house plan."

House plans clearly state the number of rooms to be constructed by the householder, the location of a house on the plot and the distance of the pit latrine from the house. They also state the need for householders to dig pits for garbage disposal. Although mud and wattle houses similar to those occupied by both landlords and non-landlords in Caluza were found in St Wendollins and Winterveld, the use of house plans for temporary built structures was unheard of.

Temporary built structures may be subjected to inspection prior to occupation. This is common in Caluza but not in Winterveld and St Wendollins. In cases where houses are inspected, this usually is done twice – once at the beginning and once towards the end of the construction phase. House inspection was reported by 63 per cent of non-landlords and 89 per cent landlords.

Builders of temporary structures are usually local residents, known by the prospective occupant or introduced by a friend or relative. The skills are acquired informally. The hiring of umakhi is common both in houses headed by landlords (70 per cent) and those headed by non-landlords (85
per cent). The use of *umakhi* even cuts across all forms of households and there seems to be no

Table 7.11: Landlords, income distribution by land tenure and settlement (excluding rents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlements</th>
<th>Land tenure</th>
<th>Mean (Rands)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
<th>Mean difference</th>
<th>95% confidence level</th>
<th>No of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>bought land</td>
<td>R939.53</td>
<td>760.21</td>
<td>66.42</td>
<td>939.53</td>
<td>808 to 1071</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>bought land</td>
<td>R1253.87</td>
<td>870.82</td>
<td>156.40</td>
<td>1253.87</td>
<td>934 to 1573</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendol-lins</td>
<td>bought land</td>
<td>R803.15</td>
<td>927.49</td>
<td>148.52</td>
<td>803.15</td>
<td>502 to 1104</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter-veld</td>
<td>bought land</td>
<td>R866.98</td>
<td>509.59</td>
<td>65.24</td>
<td>866.98</td>
<td>736 to 997</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>rent land</td>
<td>R519.57</td>
<td>359.78</td>
<td>60.81</td>
<td>519.57</td>
<td>396 to 643</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>rent land</td>
<td>R597.17</td>
<td>402.32</td>
<td>83.89</td>
<td>597.17</td>
<td>423 to 771</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendol-lins</td>
<td>rent land</td>
<td>R490.00</td>
<td>138.56</td>
<td>80.00</td>
<td>490.00</td>
<td>145 to 834</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter-veld</td>
<td>rent land</td>
<td>R331.11</td>
<td>206.42</td>
<td>68.80</td>
<td>331.11</td>
<td>172 to 480</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>inheritance</td>
<td>R783.92</td>
<td>649.00</td>
<td>124.90</td>
<td>783.92</td>
<td>527 to 1041</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>inheritance</td>
<td>R1180.00</td>
<td>954.50</td>
<td>318.16</td>
<td>1180.00</td>
<td>446 to 1914</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendol-lins</td>
<td>inheritance</td>
<td>R597.38</td>
<td>320.07</td>
<td>88.77</td>
<td>597.38</td>
<td>404 to 791</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter-veld</td>
<td>inheritance</td>
<td>R556.00</td>
<td>278.08</td>
<td>124.36</td>
<td>556.00</td>
<td>211 to 901</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>gift land</td>
<td>R585.13</td>
<td>487.18</td>
<td>125.79</td>
<td>585.13</td>
<td>315 to 855</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>gift land</td>
<td>R1300.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendol-lins</td>
<td>gift land</td>
<td>R534.07</td>
<td>462.05</td>
<td>123.48</td>
<td>534.07</td>
<td>267 to 801</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
evidence that households headed by single women are often forced to use paid labour due to lack of males in the households. R-square values indicate weak correlations between forms of household and labour – Caluza (r=.00129), St Wendollins (r=.00014) and Winterveld (r=.00003). Non-landlords have chosen different forms of labour, irrespective of their form of household.

Table 7.12: Landlords, income distribution by settlement (including rents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlements</th>
<th>Land tenure</th>
<th>Mean (Rands)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
<th>Mean difference</th>
<th>95% level of confidence</th>
<th>No of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>R1307.06</td>
<td>985.63</td>
<td>121.32</td>
<td>1307.06</td>
<td>1065 to 1549</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>R1947.10</td>
<td>800.39</td>
<td>92.42</td>
<td>947.11</td>
<td>763 to 1131</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>R1535.05</td>
<td>745.11</td>
<td>86.03</td>
<td>1535.05</td>
<td>1364 to 1706</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the construction phase unskilled labour may be used to undertake tasks such as fetching water, clearing the site, mixing soil, arranging mud within the wattle shuttering ukubhanda, ukuchofa, ukugaxa and ukugandaya. These tasks require the use of unskilled, paid labour at certain stages of house construction. These duties are done mainly by women.

Other forms of labour may include a combination of family labour and hired labour, ilima, building rotating clubs combining ilima and hired skilled labour. With ilima, neighbours, friends and the next of kin are often invited by the prospective homeowner to help in building a house.

The owner of the house may or may not have building skills, in which case skills are expected to be provided by ilima. Duties such as ukugandaya, ukubhanda, ukuchofa and ukugaxa are distributed among ilima, who are all expected to participate in the construction process.
### Table 7.13: Landlords, income distribution by land tenure and settlement (including rents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlements</th>
<th>Land tenure</th>
<th>Mean (Rands)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
<th>Mean difference</th>
<th>95% confidence level</th>
<th>No of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>bought land</td>
<td>R1581.30</td>
<td>897.53</td>
<td>78.42</td>
<td>1581.30</td>
<td>1426 to 1736</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>bought land</td>
<td>R1764.23</td>
<td>1084.58</td>
<td>194.79</td>
<td>1764.23</td>
<td>1366 to 2162</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendol-lins</td>
<td>bought land</td>
<td>R1179.36</td>
<td>987.89</td>
<td>158.19</td>
<td>1179.36</td>
<td>859 to 1500</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter-veld</td>
<td>bought land</td>
<td>R1745.31</td>
<td>624.07</td>
<td>79.91</td>
<td>1745.31</td>
<td>1585 to 1905</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>rent land</td>
<td>R612.00</td>
<td>431.54</td>
<td>72.94</td>
<td>612.00</td>
<td>464 to 760</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>rent land</td>
<td>R732.39</td>
<td>465.75</td>
<td>97.11</td>
<td>732.39</td>
<td>531 to 934</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendol-lins</td>
<td>rent land</td>
<td>R425.00</td>
<td>261.29</td>
<td>150.85</td>
<td>425.00</td>
<td>-224 to 1074</td>
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<tr>
<td>Winter-veld</td>
<td>rent land</td>
<td>R366.67</td>
<td>235.25</td>
<td>78.41</td>
<td>366.67</td>
<td>145 to 547</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>inheritance</td>
<td>R1065.29</td>
<td>695.33</td>
<td>133.82</td>
<td>1065.30</td>
<td>790 to 1340</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>inheritance</td>
<td>R1363.33</td>
<td>985.35</td>
<td>328.45</td>
<td>1363.33</td>
<td>606 to 2120</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendol-lins</td>
<td>inheritance</td>
<td>R856.00</td>
<td>429.30</td>
<td>119.06</td>
<td>856.00</td>
<td>597 to 1115</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter-veld</td>
<td>inheritance</td>
<td>R1073.00</td>
<td>552.87</td>
<td>247.25</td>
<td>1073.00</td>
<td>387 to 1759</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>gift land</td>
<td>R787.13</td>
<td>428.24</td>
<td>110.57</td>
<td>787.13</td>
<td>550 to 1024</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>gift land</td>
<td>R1395.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendol-lins</td>
<td>gift land</td>
<td>R743.71</td>
<td>408.71</td>
<td>109.23</td>
<td>743.71</td>
<td>508 to 980</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.5.2.2 Constructing permanent dwellings

The processes of construction of permanent dwellings in the three settlements share some of those observed for temporary dwellings. First is the use of house plans. These can be purchased or specially drawn by a skilled person to cater for the needs of householders. Unlike in temporary structures, with the exception of those in Caluza, house plans characterise dwellings produced as permanent structures. All householders occupying permanent structures confirmed having used house plans.

Secondly, houses may or may not be inspected prior to occupation. This varies from settlement to settlement. In Caluza, inspection seems to have dominated all houses built of permanent structures, whereas in Winterveld and St Wendollins some houses were subjected to inspection while others were not.

Thirdly, the builders of permanent structures may or may not be known to the householder. The arrangement between the two, the builder and the householder, to provide labour may be informal, without householders being required to sign agreements, and so on. It may also be possible for labour to be entirely divorced from the householder, involving a third party, such as a financial institution. There may be cases where a householder is partially involved in organising the labour.

Fourthly, permanent structures may be single- or double-storey. In the latter, the production process becomes more sophisticated. It may require the reinforcement of houses to support several floors. Therefore, certain skills may be required from builders to manage the construction. Even as far as single-storey buildings are concerned, the construction of permanent structures requires certain skills from the builder, such as the ability to read and use measurements, and an understanding of bricklaying, and the mixing of cement and sand according to specifications. The skills are usually acquired from the formal sector, though in rare cases they may have been acquired informally. It can be argued that building low-income housing, using these two distinct types of building materials, temporary and permanent, has given rise to two distinct forms of labour, each serving a different market. One serves the lower end of the market, the production of less sophisticated mud and wattle houses, and the other specialises in the upper end of the market, in brick and concrete houses.
Fifthly, as in temporary dwellings, a combination of skilled and unskilled labour is possible. During the early stages of housing production the demand for unskilled labour may be higher, it being required to clear sites, dig trenches, pass bricks, mix concrete, and so on. However, the nature of the production itself means that other tasks associated with temporary structures, such as *ukubhanda, ukuxhofa and ukugaxa*, are totally eliminated in permanent structures. In the case of the former, such tasks account for 80 per cent of the production process, with 20 per cent of the tasks related to roofing, *ukugxumeka*, and plastering, usually requiring *umakhiti*, while in the latter the nature of production has reduced opportunities to use unskilled labour. Instead, permanent structures require the services of a bricklayer, who will have to do plastering – whereas with mud houses the need for a skilled person is reduced.

Finally, as in the case of temporary housing, the use of skilled and unskilled labour cuts across all forms of household and all household sizes. The analysis of variance, in which form of household is the dependent variable and labour an independent variable, indicates no close correlation between the two in the three settlements. In Caluza, the r-square value is .00004, in St Wendollins .00375 and in Winterveld .00393. Also, no significant correlation was found between the size of household and labour. Less than one per cent of the variation in labour can be explained by the household size.

### 7.5.2.3 Investments, temporary and permanent structures

Section 7.5.2.1 has shown how the organisation of labour for construction of temporary and permanent structures is increasingly resembling that for permanent structures. This may include the use of corrugated iron sheets, gutters, glass windows, steel doors, cement, and so on. The question we need to answer is whether the similarities between the two indicate equal investment.

Quantifying the expense of producing low-income housing is often difficult. This may depend on the incremental nature of the production, where construction is undertaken in stages. Depending also on the financial circumstances of the householder, the production process may extend over many years and houses may in fact never reach completion, as they may be occupied, although unfinished. The construction may not always be the responsibility of the householder as, during the stages of construction, family members, friends and others may participate, whether in
financing the construction or even in the building process itself. Quite often the investment in housing in self-help settlements takes a different form from investment in houses produced in the developed cities. The cost of land may not always form part of housing investment as land may have been invaded, contain dubious tenures or even be highly subsidised, and therefore not reflect the original price. Labour expenses may also vary within settlements. Factors such as householder's relationship with a hired labourer, whether unpaid labour is used to reduce the price of paid labour, or whether the construction itself is regarded as part-time, or undertaken during the weekends or on daily basis, all influence housing investments. Even the purchasing of material may to a certain extent affect the investments. Some people may use brand-new materials, others may combine second-hand and new materials, or even combine free and purchased materials for construction. As a consequence, similar houses may reflect varying degrees of investment. The inability of householders to keep records on the expenses incurred during the construction process further compounds the problem.

While the construction of both permanent and temporary dwellings entails some level of investment, the degree of investment varies. The former’s level of investment tends to be higher than the latter’s. During the initial stages of mud-and-wattle housing production, sites have to be cleared. This is done by unskilled labourers, family labour or even by the prospective owner. After site-clearing, an umakhisi brought in to insert the wattle poles into the ground and across one another. He may need an assistant, brought by him or arranged by the prospective homeowner, to lift the wattle, and assist in the insertion of window frames. Labour is required to pack the mud inside the wattle. These tasks are done by women and children. The householder can use unpaid family labour, ilima or even togel labour. Once the windows and doors have been inserted and the roof laid, the services of women and children are required for ukubhanda. If the materials required and the labour are available, construction may take one to three months.

The umakhisi uses less sophisticated tools, a hammer and a saw for cutting wattle and nails. The tools belong to him. They are operated manually, therefore no machinery is needed. Mud houses mainly use soil which is gathered locally. Other materials of construction are easily available from a local general dealer. Even the maintenance of mud structures, ukubhanda, simply requires the services of women. It is done annually, sometimes after heavy rains.
The *umakhi* usually has multiple skills. He is responsible for inserting poles in the ground, and installing windows and doors. He is also capable of laying the roof. Only on rare occasions are householders expected to hire a separate person. Under normal circumstances mud construction may require the services of a single *umakhi*. It is only when floors are to be plastered that the skilled builder, the *meselaan*, are used. In cases where there are earth floors none of these skills are necessary, as the *umakhi* simply levels the ground, using mud and cow dung.

Where mud blocks instead of wattle are used, the process stays the same, apart from the fact that mud blocks entail the combination of mud and cement, and the blocks are left to dry before construction begins. While the cost of purchasing wattle is eliminated, the expense is replaced by that of cement. The mixing of mud and cement may also require the services of unpaid or paid labour.

Although the *umakhi* is capable of participating in all stages of house construction, payment for labour is rarely a one-off payment. It is often charged in stages. There are three stages. Stage one relates to the digging of *isiza* and levelling off the ground. Stage two is for inserting poles, window frames, doors, and so on. The final stage is the laying of the roof. Often the expense of laying the roof is separated from the other two stages.

The hiring of more than one labourer to undertake the work cannot be ruled out. Although it increases expenses, it is not always related to different specialities nor does it mean sophistication in the production of mud housing, but is often linked to financial problems low-income householders experience during construction. The following testimony of MaNzama illustrates some of the problems householders have to face when combining employment and the construction of self-help housing.

“When I commenced with the building construction of the house my children were still very young. I did not have an elderly son to oversee the construction process. My husband was working in Durban and I was working as a domestic servant in Pietermaritzburg. We both commuted weekly. By the time the construction phase was completed, I had hired four skilled labours. The first one, who was supposed to do the work, took the deposit
and could not finish. I had to hire the second one who managed to put all the poles into the ground. Due to lack of finance I joined a *stokvel*. Before I could purchase the building materials I sometimes had to wait until it was my turn in *stokvel*. As the construction took place during the rainy season, by the time I was able to continue with the building construction about three-quarters of the timber had to be replaced as it had been destroyed by the rain. A third skilled labourer was hired to redo the work. Finally, the fourth one was hired to lay roof as the third builder had no skills in laying the roof."

Although the investment in mud houses is much lower than brick housing, it cannot be assumed that house construction is a smooth process. As the above case demonstrates, lack of finance remains a problem, prolonging the construction phase.

Permanent housing production implies the use of durable materials, block and brick, which involves purchasing of the materials from the manufacturer, as opposed to locally gathered soil. Such houses are subjected to stringent rules, the builders have to build according to plans, the location of houses on sites is clearly prescribed. Stipulations as to the materials to use, the quantity of cement and sand, and so on, have to be adhered to.

The nature of production itself demands extensive use of industrial materials in the construction of cement floors, glass windows, the digging of trenches, and so on. As the construction of permanent structures is further linked to land ownership, it further distinguishes the levels of investment. The construction of permanent structures means owners’ investments in purchasing plots.

Where contractors are being used, this could mean the user does not participate in the production process, as the contractor does purchasing, provides the labour, and so on. The financing of production in most cases requires the services of intermediaries, financed by financial institutions, such as banks. Under these circumstances banks may manage the financing of the production itself, and may require the householder to appoint the builder with whom the bank should deal. Funds are often paid out in stages. Thus the involvement of financial institutions further facilitates both the use of durable materials and strict adherence to building requirements.
Furthermore, banks require the registration of builders, and the user must appoint a reputable contractor. Among the rules with which builders have to comply, is the stipulation that the structures they build have to carry a guarantee maintenance of five years. The builders appointed should have been registered under the Housing Board and their workmanship approved. These regulations further eliminate the use of locals or simply any builder in whom the user has confidence. Since the production of low-income housing is rarely financed by users’ savings, but requires the assistance of bank, an employer or the like, it is clear that those financing the housing determine the services to accompany the housing, and they also influence the type of builder to be used. In some cases rules – such as, say, a serviced site with water supply – become the criteria used by financial institutions. As will be shown below, it has become expensive to produce permanent built structures.

The builders of permanent structures rarely have multiple skills. Quite often a bricklayer is responsible for laying the bricks and plastering. As the house requires a connection to a standpipe or bathrooms, the services of carpenters, electricians and plumbers are required. Multi-skilled builders are eliminated and the production of permanent housing contrast with the production of mud housing in the machinery and the tools accompanying the production process. Where contractors are used, it is not uncommon for mechanical equipment, such as electrically-powered mixers, to be used. Machinery may even be used for the clearing and levelling of ground. This speeds up the production process.

Even in cases where the householder prefers to use a combination of labour, such as a hired builder, and occasionally supplies unpaid labour for mixing concrete, passing the bricks and so on, or sometimes resorts to hiring a contractor where the user has organised finance and the purchasing of materials, and the contractor provides the labour, it is clear that other forms of labour such as ilima become less appropriate than in the case of construction of temporary structures. The production of permanent structures will require ilima to have construction skills such as bricklaying, plastering, plumbing, carpeting, and so on. Secondly, it will also mean prior selection of ilima members, to coincide with the stages of housing production. For instance, during the early stages the bricklayers will be more appropriate and during the final stages, when laying the roof is undertaken, the ilima will be expected to provide carpenters. This contradicts
the purpose of ilima, which is not based on a preselection of members according to the skills they have, but is purely voluntary. In the case of permanent structures ilima could be relegated to, say, the digging of trenches and mixing of concrete, as their services would otherwise be totally eliminated during construction. Even the nature of the production of permanent structures, encompassing the mixing of concrete, may to a certain extent eliminate the services of women and children, who have previously formed a large proportion of the ilima. The lack of building skills among women would automatically disqualify their services.

The following cases have been carefully selected to show varieties of investment in low-income housing production. The first case demonstrates expenditure incurred in the production of mud and wattle houses, when hired skilled labour and family labour are used. The second case illustrates the production of brick houses, where the services of a contractor and hired skilled labour are used.

**Box 7.1. Thembisile**

She has a five-roomed mud and wattle house. The interior and exterior walls are plastered with mud. The house has a corrugated iron roof.

The construction phase was financed mainly by personal savings. She paid R100 for isiza. Her sister who was working as a domestic servant was able to secure R250 as an advance from her employer. This was used to pay for umakhi. In order to cut down the cost of production and the problems related to builders disappearing without completing construction, she stayed with her parents, who lived in the settlement, and commuted daily to the building site. To reduce the cost of labour, she never hired unskilled labour to perform tasks such as ukugaxa, ukugandaya and ukuchofa. Instead, she used family labour. Sand was collected from the nearby Umsunduzi River. Ukugaxa and ukuchofa were done by her children and herself.

Corrugated iron sheets were bought in instalments. She paid R600 for two dozen 16-ft second-hand corrugated iron sheets. A truck loaded with timber cost an additional R800. Because of financial problems, the builder was unable to finish the construction on time. During this time she heard about a source of free timber in Sinathingi, a nearby settlement. This was available to the public on the condition they provided their own transport. Thembisile hired a truck for R200 to collect timber.

The builder charged R50 per bedroom to cement the floors. The house has four bedrooms. She paid R200 for labour. The cost of cementing the bathroom was R21 and for the passage she paid R35. The total cost of labour was R256. The amount excludes materials and the initial cost of the umakhi, which was R250.
Box 7.2. Madonsela

Madonsela is 49 years of age. He lives with his wife who is 46 and a 15-year-old son. He has a Standard 8 level of education, and his wife has a matric.

They arrived in Caluza in 1965, and were tenants renting rooms in Mbanjwa Road. In 1989, he bought a property of approximately 6475.04 square metres, for R1 200. He bought the property with a five-roomed mud and wattle house. The house had been used by the previous occupant. He did not demolish the house, which was in a state of disrepair. Only two rooms now remain, which are rented to a single tenant.

Madonsela owns a single property. The house is built of bricks, and has a tiled roof and a garage. The house has electricity and running water.

During the construction process he hired a builder as he had no building skills and his wife and he were both in full-time employment. The builder brought along unskilled labour, for whose payment he was responsible. Unskilled labour was used for digging trenches, mixing sand and passing the bricks. Madonsela used his personal savings to purchase building materials and to pay for the skilled labour. Soon after the builder had inserted the doors and window frames Madonsela ran out of money. He needed R45 000 to complete the construction of his house. Fortunately, his employer ran an employees' housing scheme. Madonsela availed himself of a housing loan from his employer, which amounted to R45 000. He hired a contractor who was able to complete the construction. The contractor was responsible for the purchase of building materials and for the hiring of both skilled and unskilled labour.

7.5.3 Land tenure and housing improvements

Seeking financial assistance from formal institutions to finance labour, building materials and construction have to a large extent influenced the variation in home improvements effected by landowners and non-landowners. Access to land through purchase reflects freehold land rights, whereas renting land denotes an informal land arrangements between landowner and non-landowner, where the latter pays rental for a site. Mud, wattle, mud and cement houses have been constructed where land is not owned. Although ownership of land among non-landlords is on a limited scale, a combination of more than one type of material for construction is used.

Whether low-income householders are landlords or non-landlords, the investment in housing production tends to be lower, resembling mud and wattle where land is not owned. This is evident in all three settlements. The use of mud and wattle was equally found in settlements where
landowners lived with non-landowners, sharing plots and even on plots where landowners were virtually outside the settlement, such as in Caluza. Therefore the pattern of landownership, whether present or not, did not change non-landowners' investments in housing.

With low-income landlords, home improvements were more evident where plots were owned rather than rented.

If “home improvements” are not limited to walls, but include services installed by householders, such as connecting a house to a water standpipe, or to electrical cables, leading to the use of electrical appliances, water-borne sewerage, etc, variations between settlements are evident. When non-landlords are considered, there is a tendency for householders not owning land in Winterveld and St Wendollins not to have improved the level of services in housing, even if such services are available in the settlement, and utilised by landowners. In Winterveld, only 10 per cent of temporary structures are connected to an electricity supply, in St Wendollins it is 42 per cent and in Caluza 68 per cent. Land tenure alone does not seem to explain the variations in householders' investment in electricity. Hardly one per cent of these variations can be explained by land tenure. When r-square values are compared where tenure is an independent variable, and electricity a dependent variable, Caluza= .00910, St Wendollins = .00990, and Winterveld = .02047. When land tenure is eliminated and only the quality of the walls is correlated with electricity, where the former is a dependent variable and the latter an independent variable, no link is found between the two. In Caluza only .02% of the variation in investments made in electricity can be explained by the quality of walls, .001 per cent in St Wendollins, and .04 per cent in Winterveld.

The influence of ownership and non-landowners explains some of these variations between settlements. Although access to electricity in Winterveld by occupiers of temporary dwellings accounts for only 10 per cent, only four households were found using solar-powered electricity. Three rent land from the landowners, two of these non-landlords rent land from the same landowner, and the third rents from a different landowner. One has purchased land. All of these non-landlords are related to landowners.
Table 7.14: Non-landlords, land tenure by investment in electricity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land tenure</th>
<th>Walls</th>
<th>Caluza</th>
<th>Wendollins</th>
<th>Winterveld</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td>mud and wattle</td>
<td>1 (13%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>1 (7%)</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>3 (100%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent land</td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>12 (86%)</td>
<td>2 (25%)</td>
<td>3 (75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mud and wattle</td>
<td>7 (87%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited land</td>
<td>mud and wattle</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>1 (7%)</td>
<td>1 (13%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>stones and cement</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gift land</td>
<td>mud and wattle</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>5 (63%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>3 (75%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>blocks</td>
<td>8 (100%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In St Wendollins, very few non-landlords rented land, compared to other forms of tenure. Where land was rented, the landowner usually shared a plot with non-landlords or lived on another plot within the settlement. The connection of houses into electrical cables was common where non-landowners lived outside the settlement, deceased or their whereabouts unknown. None of the residential landowners had electrical connections in their houses, despite the fact that St Wendollins had long been upgraded, with tarred roads, street lights and so on. In cases where land had been inherited it often carried a title deed. “Gift land” denotes, first, access to land without payment being required, and the church being a landowner. Second, it means the transformation of non-landlords at some stage from being non-payers to church tenants. Finally, it implies householders who had opted to purchase land and were not issued with freehold title deeds. This was evident after 1951, when missionaries were allowed to allocate land to Africans, but prevented by the government from issuing freehold land rights. Under these circumstances, some non-landlords continue to describe their relation to the land as being “free”, although some have purchased it. The church pulled out as a landlord in the 1980s and its former tenants were allowed to remain free of charge. These appear much stabler, judging from the investments they have made, than non-landlords who rent sites from residential landowners and continue to use very
basic methods of heating and cooking, such as firewood, paraffin, coal, and so on. A range of materials for construction is found among non-landlords occupying land offered as a gift, while investment in brick and block is common in those households who have purchased land, and mud among former church tenants.

In Caluza, non-landlords' investment in electrical connections to their houses was found among both residential and non-residential landowners. However, it should be noted that the majority of these landowners lived outside the settlement and their properties were managed by intermediaries such as caretakers, estate managers, and so on. Only one non-landlord had a landowner living in the same settlement, but occupying a different site. As in the case of two other settlements, the presence or absence of landowners has not made any difference in investments made in walling. Non-landlords without freehold land rights, particularly those who rent land, have invested in mud houses, either without or with a limited use of cement for walls. Regarding investments in electricity, most non-landlords have electricity. In addition to these, four out of every five households have made further investments by connecting houses to a standpipe. None of the landlords renting sites in St Wendollins and Winterveld have water connections. Earnings do not seem to be related to non-landlords’ homes having either electrical or standpipe connection. For instance, the correlation between income and investments shows no level of significance, the r-square value being even lower, .02040. A similar situation has been found in St Wendollins and Winterveld, with .00532 and 03130. It is not uncommon to come across non-landlords who have resorted to several strategies to reduce the cost of plumbing, by volunteering to dig trenches, by forming credit-rotation clubs, or through group purchases of equipment, and so on.

Informal land relations between landowners and non-landowners in Caluza have a different pattern from that of Winterveld and St Wendollins. While landowners may live outside the settlement or have appointed intermediaries, this does not mean their total absence. Some still come to collect rent, hold annual meetings with tenants, own homes in the settlement and also participate in several functions in the settlement, such as weddings. Therefore to be an absentee landowner of Caluza does not always mean a lack of communication between landowner and non-landowners. It is through such communication that non-landowners have been allowed to improve their houses, apply for electricity, standpipe connection, telephones, and so on. Where previously
officials made ownership of land a prerequisite for home improvement such as connecting the house to a standpipe, or installing electrical cables, the landowner/non-landowner relationship reversed the situation. In Caluza, a high proportion of non-landlords were in the process of purchasing occupied rental sites from landowners. These were not found in St Wendollins and in Winterveld.

The influence of type of tenure and investment in electricity, on the quality of the walls was noted, unlike when the quality of the walls was correlated to land tenure. Where walls have been used as a dependent variable, and land tenure and electricity as independent variables, 31 per cent of the variation in walls is explained by these two variables in Winterveld – a significant improvement in r-square values, which previously stood at .02 per cent when tenure and investment in electricity were correlated. In St Wendollins, the influence of tenure and investment in electricity on walls accounts for 16 per cent of the variation. In Caluza, only 2 per cent of the variation in walls can be explained by these two variables.

However, when non-landlords' investment in sanitation methods is considered in conjunction with the two other independent variables, type of tenure and investment in electricity, 21 per cent of the variation in walls in Caluza can be explained by these variables. In Winterveld, it is much higher, 31 per cent, and in St Wendollins 16 per cent. When regression analysis is performed to examine the strength of independent variables in explaining the quality of walls it is clear that, in the case of Caluza, when land tenure and investments in electricity are eliminated, sanitation methods seem to be more significant when correlated to walls, explaining 19 per cent of the variation in wall improvements with a 2 per cent difference being made by type of tenure and electricity. Conversely, in St Wendollins and Winterveld, land tenure seem to have considerable influence on walls. For instance, when the strength of the three variables related to walls is examined, sanitation methods and electricity are insignificant; when excluded, tenure alone continues to explain 16 per cent of the variation in the investment in walls. Similarly in Winterveld, when tenure, electricity and sanitation methods were used as independent variables, 31 per cent of the variation in walls could be explained by these variables. However, when tenure is maintained, it explains 29 per cent of the variations with sanitation methods and electricity accounting for only 1 per cent.
An inclusion of an additional variable - investment in the roof - in the list of independent variables does not alter the influence these variables may have on the quality of walls. In Winterveld 31 per cent of variations in walls continue to be explained by these four independent variables and tenure explains 29 per cent when sanitation system, roof investments and electricity investments are excluded. In St Wendollins, inclusion of roof investment did not affect the r-value, which stood at .16234; the elimination of all other variables except land tenure resulted in .16086. In Caluza, when roof improvements were added to the three variables - tenure, sanitation systems and investment in electricity - 21 per cent of the variation in walls can be explained by these variables. However, sanitation systems on their own seem to explain 19 per cent of the variation in walls.

Table 7.15: Landlords, land tenure by investment in electricity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land tenure</th>
<th>Walls</th>
<th>Caluza</th>
<th>Wendollins</th>
<th>Winterveld</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mud and wattle</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 (60%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>1 (9%)</td>
<td>9 (47%)</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brick</td>
<td>17 (85%)</td>
<td>5 (63%)</td>
<td>9 (90%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blocks</td>
<td>3 (75%)</td>
<td>6 (46%)</td>
<td>4 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>corrugated iron</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blocks, stones</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stones and cement</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented land</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 (80%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mud and wattle</td>
<td>9 (82%)</td>
<td>2 (11%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited land</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mud and wattle</td>
<td>1 (9%)</td>
<td>3 (16%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>3 (15%)</td>
<td>3 (38%)</td>
<td>1 (10%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brick</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stones and cement</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gift land</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 (40%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mud and wattle</td>
<td>3 (16%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stones and cement</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When landlords are considered, variations between settlements are noticed. Generally, landlords who have invested in brick and block house construction tend to invest in electricity as well. This was the case in all settlements (Table 7.15). However, this does not mean that those who have built temporary dwellings of mud cannot invest in electricity. Landlords occupying houses built
of temporary and permanent materials may or may not choose to invest in electricity. If one considers the high level of landownership among landlords – 81 per cent – one might assume the highest levels of investment in electricity, but this is always not the case. Only 20 per cent have electricity. Some landowners were found to have invested instead in diesel or petrol-powered generators – though only five households. When type of land tenure is considered, all of these are freehold land right holders.

Similarly, few landlords in Winterveld have made any investment in standpipe connections. Some have boreholes, others use wells. Even the ownership of boreholes and wells is associated with landownership. None of the landlords renting sites own boreholes and wells. Access to standpipe connection and electricity seem to be dictated by the landlords' property location. The nearer the property is to the main road, the more likely that landowners will have access to these services, and the further one moves away from the main road the less likely it is that landlords will have access to water and electricity. As a consequence, flushing toilets are limited to those with water supply. Thus, whether landlords own land or not, they may still not have invested in these services. In Caluza access to services, water and electricity is not related to ownership of land, whereas in St Wendollins, investments in electricity characterise all forms of tenure. None of the non-owners of land had connected their houses to a standpipe.

However, the influence of land tenure among landlords is worth mentioning. Only in Winterveld and Caluza, where type of tenure seems to explain 19 and 10 per cent of the variation in walls when type of tenure is used as an independent variable, and walls as a dependent variable. As investment in electricity is used as an independent variable and walls as a dependent variable, when these two are correlated and tenure excluded, the influence of tenure is felt. In Winterveld only 6 per cent of the variations in walls can be explained by the investment in electricity and in Caluza it is even lower, .02 per cent, and in St Wendollins .004. As to the influence of type of tenure and investment in electricity on walls as a dependent variable, the correlation is highly significant in Winterveld at a level of .0000 with 31 per cent of the variation in walls explained by these two variables. In Caluza, it is 16 per cent of the variation and in St Wendollins less than 1 per cent. Addition of the third independent variable, sanitation methods, as an explanation for the variation in the investments made on walls seems not to have an influence in Winterveld.
Instead, land tenure and investment in electricity remain stronger, even when sanitation methods are excluded from the analysis. In Caluza, the influence of sanitation methods is even higher; it explains 55 per cent of the variation in walls at a level of .0000 significance. As the strength of sanitation methods was measured against the other variables – tenure and investment in electricity – sanitation remains strong – .54834 – when all three variables are considered and .54294 when tenure and electricity are excluded.

As to an analysis of variance where investment in the roof is used as the fourth independent variable, in Winterveld it had no influence on walls whatsoever, and in St Wendollins only 8 per cent of the variation can be explained by these variables, whereas in Caluza the correlation between the four independent variables is highly significant, explaining 62 per cent of the variation in walls. However, when the strength of each independent variable is measured against others, 60 per cent of land tenure and investment in the roof in Caluza explains the variation in walls, compared with 62 per cent when all four variables are included.

7.5.4 Land tenure, multiple-plot holders and investments

Non-landlords differ from landlords as they do not let space and therefore have no access to rental income. The majority of non-landlords rent land without title deeds and have rarely invested in a second plot (Table 7.16). However, multiple-plot holders are common among landlords and in all three settlements (Table 7.17). When forms of land tenure are compared, landlords letting sites have invested in no more than five plots, compared to those who purchased land, who may own more than thirty plots. Even the multiple-site renters were concentrated in Caluza, few in St Wendollins and none in Winterveld.

Several factors explain variations in plot investments in settlements. Access to more than a single plot does not always require purchase, or freehold land right. This situation is common in St Wendollins and Caluza. In St Wendollins, access to several rented plots is common where the landowner is deceased, his or her whereabouts unknown and ownership is disputed. The availability of mission land has meant that some landlords could combine more than one method of accessing land, non-purchase, gift and renting. Also, in Caluza combining site rentals and land purchase are common methods of investment. As landowners live outside the settlement, this
Table 7.16: Non-landlords, plots investment by type of tenure and settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land tenure</th>
<th>1 plot</th>
<th>2 plots</th>
<th>3 plots</th>
<th>Caluza</th>
<th>Wendollins</th>
<th>Winterveld</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5 (14%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent land</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>29 (83%)</td>
<td>4 (14%)</td>
<td>30 (88%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent land</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>2 (100%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited land</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>3 (10%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gift land</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>21 (72%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

encourages such combinations. Landlords who do not own land in Winterveld can only have access to a single plot, which is supposed to be occupied by the landlord. The physical presence of landowners within the settlement and the ongoing dialogue between landowners prohibit access to a second plot, let alone non-landowners’ investments through constructing rental accommodation. Analysis of regression, where tenure is an independent variable and investment in plots a dependent variable, reveals that type of tenure explains 18 per cent of the plot investments in Winterveld, 7 per cent in Caluza and 2 per cent in St Wendollins.

Variation in plot investments between landlords further raises a series of questions. If low-income landlords are capable of combining more than one method of accessing land, be it land rental, land purchase, etc, is the investment in plots equally distributed among types of tenure? Do landlords invest more in housing they occupy and less on rental housing? Or is high and low investments in rental accommodation explained by type of tenure? Or do they invest more in properties they occupy and less on those where they are absentee landlords? This will further be explored in Chapter 8, when the influence of tenure on low-income rental housing production and forms of landlords are considered.
### Table 7.17: Landlords, plots investment by tenure and settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land tenure</th>
<th>1 plot Caluza Wendo-lins</th>
<th>2-5 plots Caluza Wendo-lins</th>
<th>6-10 plots</th>
<th>11-20 plots</th>
<th>21-30 plots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td>4 (13%) 11 (28%) —</td>
<td>23 (74%) 20 (50%) 3 (5%)</td>
<td>11 (18%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited land</td>
<td>2 (22%) 1 (8%) —</td>
<td>4 (33%) 12 (92%) 1</td>
<td>10 (71%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>10 (71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gift land</td>
<td>— 10 (71%) —</td>
<td>1 (17%) 4 (11%) —</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent land</td>
<td>5 (22%) 1 (25%) 9 (100%)</td>
<td>11 (48%) 2 (75%) —</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 7.6 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to elaborate on the concepts of landlordism, non-landlordism, investments and informal land relations. This was achieved by giving an overview of the inhabitants of freehold settlements, landlords and non-landlords. The types of housing they occupy, investments made on housing and the relation of landlords and non-landlords to land. Investments observed included materials used for wall construction, roofs, sanitation methods, services provision including electrical cables and standpipe connection and investments in plots.

The use of landlords and non-landlords and how they invested in low-income housing was useful for both comparative purposes and in providing an insight into the distribution of ownership, non ownership of land between landlords and non-landlords and the role of informal land relations. In order to understand the investment of low-income landlords in rental housing (chapter 8), particularly, the effects of informal land relations in lowering investments among
subsistence landlords and increasing dependency on rents, it was necessary to discuss the production of low-income housing. To further prove the subsistence landlords’ hypothesis, it was important to see how subsistence landlords compare with other low-income householders who were not landlords but were also renting sites from landowners.

Ownership of land was found to be the most common method of accessing land among landlords. This can be explained by the predominance of low-income landlords (petty capitalist landlords) who own more than a single plot. Like the subsistence landlords, non-landlords have rarely owned land. Among the non-landlords, two thirds rent sites from landowner and land purchase accounts for only 10% in all settlements. None of the non-landlords from St Wendollins had purchased land. On average non-landlords had fewer rooms (6 to 8), while landlords had larger houses (9 to 12 rooms). The type of housing occupied by non-landlords reflect minor investments in building materials. Three quarter of houses are built of mud and wattle whereas almost three quarters of landlords have invested in brick, block and cement. The majority of non-landlords had income below the subsistence level with only a handful living above the subsistence level. Even when income from non-landlords was related to land tenure, it was found that non-landlords who owned land had the highest mean income compared to other forms of land tenure. Low-income householders renting sites from landowners were found to have the lowest mean income when the three settlements were combined. The mean income for non-landlords was higher when land was owned than when rented from landowners. Landlords were found on average earning incomes far above those of non-landlords. This was observed even when household income, excluding rental income was considered. When rents and landlords’ income were considered they were in a better financial position than non-landlords. However, if forms of land tenure were taken into consideration, landlords who rented land from landowners had the lowest mean income. Drawing from the analysis of landlords and non-landlords, it can be concluded that, non-landlords share the following features with subsistence landlords. With respect to non ownership of land, they both rely on informal land relations. They live in similar types of housing characterised by the lack of investment, using mud and wattle as the materials for construction. Incomes are below the subsistence level even if subsistence landlords are able to generate income by letting part of their houses. The lack of ownership of land among low-income householders has had similar outcomes. Whether they are non-landlords or subsistence landlords, poverty,
low-incomes, lack of investment on housing leads to poorer quality housing despite the fact that subsistence landlords are able to generate income by letting part of their houses. These findings confirm the theoretical propositions put forward by this study about the impact of land policies on low-income householders. It was proposed that state intervention in land policies by granting freehold landrights to low-income householders creates a group of poorer householders who will be priced out by the cost of plot and forced to enter into informal land relations and a group capable of investment in multiple plot ownership. Non ownership of plots is evident among non-landlords and subsistence landlords. Subsistence landlords and non-landlords rely on informal land relations whereas petty capitalists are multiple-plot owners.

It was found that where householders did not own land, but were merely renting sites, materials used for constructing walls were usually mud, wattle, mud and cement. Where land was owned, there was a tendency to built permanent structures, brick and block. This was found in both landlords and non-landlords in all three settlements. Although there was a tendency among those who had invested in permanent structures to occupy houses with improved services, access to water supply and electricity, and flushing toilets, variations between settlements were also noted. Access to these services in Winterveld among landowners was also affected by the location of the site. Where sites were located further away from the main roads, landowners were unlikely to have connected houses to standpipes and electricity, and they continued using boreholes, and firewood and generators as sources of energy. With the non-landowners, most had no access to these services, even if the landowner from whom they rented land, consumed services. Only in exceptional cases where non-landowners were related to landowners were they able to have improved services in their houses. Most non-landowners in Caluza had access to electricity and standpipe water connection. In St Wendollins, service improvements were not found among non-landowners living on the same site as the landowner. However, those who rented land from absentee landowners, and were occupying mission land, were more likely to have invested in homes with electricity. The ability of householders to invest in a second plot was also influenced by tenure and his/her relation to the landowner. While in Caluza and St Wendollins non-ownership of land enabled householders to invest in a second plot – by combining, for instance, more than one form of tenure, land rental and mission land, land rental and site purchasing or even renting more than a single plot – this was not the case in Winterveld. Although non-landowners
were generally found to have invested in less durable materials of construction, variations in relationship between landowners and non-landowners was shown not only to have implications for the quality of the housing produced, but it also affected the ability to invest in a second plot. Where householders are unable to invest in a second plot, rental housing expansion is also affected.
CHAPTER 8
FREEHOLD LAND TENURE, INFORMAL LAND RELATIONSHIPS
AND FORMS OF LANDLORDISM

8.1 Introduction

The previous chapter explored land tenure systems, patterns of landownership, informal land relations established at the local level between landowners and non-landowners, and how these have influenced consolidation and investment in low-income housing. It was shown that, while informal land relations form the basis upon which low-income householders access land, which otherwise would have to be provided by the private sector at a higher cost, it influences the quality of housing, building materials used and the level of services, such as house connections to standpipes, electricity supply, and so on.

This chapter moves a step further. It focuses on low-income landlords, rental accommodation, both being the object of the research. As landlords cannot be properly understood out of the context of the low-income rental housing they produce, as they are an integral part of it, the chapter begins by presenting an overview of landlords found in South Africa. This will serve as a reminder of the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2, their socio-economic background, their distinguishing characteristics, their coverage and the extent to which they have consolidated their housing, the types of accommodation they provide, their investment in housing, the scale of letting and how land tenure has influenced the production of housing, its quality and the rents charged. If the government’s policy interventions are to be meaningful they should acknowledge the role of tenure, not only in influencing developments in forms of landlord, but also in explaining the quality of accommodation provided and the expansion of rental accommodation. Under forms of landlord, the chapter continues to explore the influence of the type of tenure in explaining variations in the conceptualisation of landlords, particularly subsistence and petty capitalists. This becomes the theoretical contribution. As the starting point is land tenure systems and the informal land relations that have developed between landowners and non-
landowners, it will be argued that forms of landlord are better analysed if located within land tenure systems as this approach has the ability to uncover and explain variations in subsistence and petty capitalist landlords.

8.2 Landlords: social and economic background

It should be remembered that the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 stated that three forms of landlords characterise low-income settlements: subsistence, petty bourgeois and petty capitalists. The difference between them is based on the motivation for letting space. Subsistence landlords let space as a survival strategy to earn extra income that can be used for subsistence purposes (to buy households goods, food, and so on). However, the mere letting of space does not automatically make them rich because their levels of income are far below the minimum subsistence level. Therefore, letting is seen merely as a necessity. Even having access to more than a single plot or house does not automatically transform subsistence landlords into petty capitalist landlords, as the reason for letting space is purely for survival. Petty bourgeois landlords have been defined as low-income householders who have chosen to let space to satisfy some immediate financial need, such as using rental income to save for home improvements, education, and so on. What distinguishes the petty bourgeois from the subsistence landlord is, first, the level of income, which is above the level of subsistence. Although income through rents is also important to this form of landlord, they can continue to survive without the rental income. One other distinguishing characteristic of petty bourgeois landlords is that they have access to a single plot. Finally, petty capitalist landlords let space to expand their capital base. This is evident from the way they subdivide plots, let them to several tenants, and purchase several plots and houses, not for owner occupation but to generate rent. Under these circumstances, petty capitalists may provide one or several types of rental accommodation. They may let rooms, houses, or land and even a combination of two types is possible. Having access to several plots may entail one or more land tenure systems. The landlords' income may be above or below the minimum living level. However, the characteristic distinguishing petty capitalists from subsistence landlords is that, while they both let space, subsistence landlords' access to more than one plot
does not place them closer to the petty capitalists’ situation, as with petty capitalists the purchasing of plots is an indication of capital expansion. This will be further explored in Section 8.7.

In order to explain the influence of informal land relations in the development of forms of landlordism, it is important to describe the socio-economic background of landlords briefly, who they are and how these types of landlord are distributed within settlements.

In the three settlements studied, 63 per cent of landlords are petty capitalists – 85 per cent of those in Winterveld, 51 per cent of those in St Wendollins and half of all landlords in Caluza. Petty bourgeois landlords are found only in Caluza and St Wendollins. Of these, 10 per cent, of all landlords from the two settlements, 18 per cent of all landlords in Caluza and 12 per cent in St Wendollins. Subsistence landlords constitute 28 per cent in all settlements – 15 per cent of the landlords in Winterveld, 32 per cent of those in Caluza and 37 per cent of those in St Wendollins. It is clear that, while petty capitalists dominate, petty bourgeois landlords may not be found in all settlements.

8.2.1 Subsistence landlords

Three forms of household characterise subsistence landlords. Nuclear households are fairly common (63 per cent), households headed by widows and widowers comprise 17 per cent, and households headed by single men and women 18 per cent. When settlements are considered, in Winterveld there are only nuclear households, whereas 52 per cent of households in Caluza are nuclear and 57 per cent of those St Wendollins. Other forms of household are equally distributed across the two settlements.

Very few residents are educated to high-school level and those educated beyond high school comprise only 5 per cent. Most have primary-school qualifications (40 per cent), 20 per cent have secondary level education, and 13 per cent lower primary education. The highest proportion consists of pensioners (43 per cent), and only 7 per
cent are doing professional and semi-professional jobs. Others are working as unskilled labourers (17 per cent) and some do not receive any income, being unemployed.

The mean age for subsistence landlords is 56 years, in Caluza it is slightly more (60), it is 55 in Winterveld and 53 in St Wendollins. The average household size in Winterveld and Caluza is 5, and in St Wendollins it is 8. The earnings of subsistence landlords are very low. When rental incomes are excluded, the mean income for Caluza is R370, in Winterveld it is R322 and in St Wendollins R302. Even when rents are included, income remains far below subsistence levels, being R467 in Caluza, R449 in St Wendollins, and even less, R393, in Winterveld.

8.2.2 Petty bourgeois landlords

Nuclear households are the most common among petty bourgeois landlords (76 per cent). Though very few, other forms of household are present. They include households headed by single men and women, and widows and widowers' households. Unlike subsistence landlords, who tend to have a concentration of people with a higher primary education, only 10 per cent of petty bourgeois have. However, most have a secondary qualification (43 per cent), 24 per cent a high-school qualification, and high school, three-year training and university degrees account for 14 per cent. Five per cent have only a lower primary qualification.

The average household size for both settlements, remains 5. Occupations vary slightly within subsistence landlords. 38 per cent are employed as unskilled labourers, those doing professionals and semi professional jobs, pensioners, and registered business owners each constitute 14 per cent. The rest are hawkers. They are younger than subsistence landlords. The mean age for petty bourgeois landlords is 48. Even when settlements are considered, there is no fundamental difference – 48 in Caluza and 47 in Winterveld.

The income of petty bourgeois landlords is much higher than that of subsistence landlords. The mean income for both settlements, excluding rents, is R1 161, much higher in Caluza (R1 464) than in Winterveld (R757). The influence of rents on income

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is noticeable, in that the mean settlement income rises to R1 398. Mean earnings and rents in Winterveld stand at R1 079 and R1 637 in Caluza. It is evident that petty bourgeois landlords are in a better financial position than subsistence landlords. The mean petty bourgeois landlords' income, when rents are excluded, is almost four times that of subsistence landlords.

8.2.3 Petty capitalist landlords

Even among petty capitalist landlords, nuclear households dominate (79 per cent) other forms, with 86 per cent in Winterveld, 79 per cent in Caluza and 66 per cent in St Wendollins. The second most common form of household is headed by widows and widowers (15 per cent). They appear in all settlements. Seven per cent of households are headed by single men or women.

The largest proportion of petty capitalist landlords have a higher primary qualification (one third). 24 per cent have a secondary qualification, 19 per cent a three-year post-matric qualification, 4 per cent have a degree and further qualifications. The rest have either a lower primary or a post-secondary qualification.

As with subsistence landlords, most are pensioners (44 per cent), 21 per cent are professionals and semi-professionals, 11 per cent are unskilled labourers, 10 per cent own businesses and the rest are hawkers. All of these occupations are fairly evenly distributed within settlements. Those in professional jobs are concentrated in Caluza (45 per cent), and 13 per cent live in Winterveld and another 13 per cent in St Wendollins.

The mean age for petty capitalist landlords is 59. In Caluza it is 56 years, in St Wendollins 57, and in Winterveld 61. Average household sizes vary between five and nine members, in Caluza it is five, in Winterveld eight, and in St Wendollins nine.

Income among petty capitalists is generally higher than that of subsistence landlords. The mean earnings for petty capitalist landlords, excluding rents, is R955, three times
the mean income for subsistence landlords, and 18 per cent below that of petty bourgeois landlords. However, when one considers the settlement mean, the distribution of income in Caluza (R1 212) is the highest, it is R890 in St Wendollins, and R861 in Winterveld. When rents are included, R1 603 becomes the average, almost twice the average income excluding rents. Caluza and Winterveld have R1 722 and R1 731 respectively, compared to R1 283 in St Wendollins.

From the analysis of landlords' incomes presented so far, it is evident that rents make a substantial contribution to income. Even among the subsistence landlords with the lowest incomes, rents lead to a significant improvement in their income. However, the average income of petty capitalist landlords should be treated with caution as it assumes homogeneity among them, whereas some are living below the poverty line. This is further explained in section 8.6.1.8.

8.3 Landlords and the consolidation of housing

Low-income landlords occupy houses that may differ in the quality of materials used for constructing walls, floors, roofs, rooms, and in the level of services such as the availability of a water supply, electricity, and so on. However, subsistence landlords rarely use durable building materials, particularly brick and blocks. Among the petty bourgeois and petty capitalist landlords materials used in construction vary in quality, ranging from mud walls and floors to brick and concrete walls (Tables 8.1 & 8.2).

8.4 Landlords and types of rental accommodation

Low-income landlords provide a range of rental accommodation. This may involve themselves letting housing, or non-involvement in housing rental, but only land rental. It is also possible for landlords to combine one or more types of rental accommodation. The most common type is room rental, 51 per cent of accommodation in all three settlements. However, when each settlement is considered, this type of accommodation is most common in Caluza (79 per cent), in St Wendollins it is 68 per cent, and it is least common in Winterveld (11 per cent). Combining land rental and house rental is the second most common type of rental accommodation
provided, 38 per cent in all three settlements, but it is not so common in Caluza (5 per cent of landlords), with 21 per cent in St Wendollins and 83 per cent in Winterveld.

Table 8.1: Housing investments, subsistence landlords

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Walls</th>
<th>Mud</th>
<th>Mud and cement</th>
<th>Brick</th>
<th>Blocks</th>
<th>Corrugated iron</th>
<th>Brick, mud</th>
<th>Brick, mud</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>10 (48%)</td>
<td>4 (19%)</td>
<td>2 (10%)</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Wendollins</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>15 (54%)</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>5 (18%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>9 (82%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roof</th>
<th>Corrugated</th>
<th>tiles</th>
<th>asbestos</th>
<th>tiles and corrugated iron</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Wendollins</td>
<td>22 (79%)</td>
<td>4 (14%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>11 (100%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Floor</th>
<th>Mud</th>
<th>Cement</th>
<th>Stones and mud</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>2 (10%)</td>
<td>15 (71%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Wendollins</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>28 (100%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>11 (100%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooking facilities</th>
<th>Electricity</th>
<th>Firewood</th>
<th>Coal and firewood</th>
<th>Paraffin</th>
<th>Gas</th>
<th>Paraffin and firewood</th>
<th>Gas and firewood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>11 (52%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>4 (19%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Wendollins</td>
<td>18 (64%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>4 (14%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>1 (9%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>9 (82%)</td>
<td>1 (9%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rooms</th>
<th>2-3</th>
<th>4-5</th>
<th>6-7</th>
<th>8-9</th>
<th>10-12</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>2 (10%)</td>
<td>5 (23%)</td>
<td>7 (33%)</td>
<td>3 (14%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Wendollins</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>8 (29%)</td>
<td>7 (25%)</td>
<td>8 (29%)</td>
<td>3 (8%)</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>4 (36%)</td>
<td>4 (36%)</td>
<td>9 (82%)</td>
<td>1 (9%)</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Renting out land to tenants and house rentals, letting an entire house to a single tenant household, is the third most common type of private rental accommodation provided.
by landlords (5 per cent). These types of rental accommodation (house rentals and land rentals) are fairly distributed within settlements.

If one relates the type of private rental accommodation to the form of landlord, the letting of rooms to tenants is common among subsistence landlords (92 per cent). Other types of rental accommodation are also provided. Room lettings are also common among petty bourgeois landlords. Some let houses. With petty capitalist landlords, land and house rentals are the most common (59 per cent), with the degree varying between settlements. It is a dominant type of accommodation in Winterveld, where 94 per cent of landlords provide this type, while 42 per cent of landlords in St Wendollins do so, and only nine per cent in Caluza. The letting of rooms is a second type of accommodation provision (27 per cent). However, this is common in Caluza and St Wendollins (61 and 40 per cent respectively), but only two per cent occurs in Winterveld. Petty capitalist landlords renting out land only and those renting out houses were the third and the last type of accommodation providers. Although distributed equally within settlements, land rental is unpopular in Winterveld, and house rental unpopular in St Wendollins.

It is necessary to describe the types of private rental accommodation provided by landlords in giving an overview of landlords' involvement in the provision of rental accommodation and for laying a foundation for a discussion of investments made. However, the physical characteristics of rental accommodation and the extent to which rental housing has been consolidated in no way confines a particular type of rental accommodation to a form of landlord. Low-income landlords may provide a range of rental accommodation.

8.5 Rental housing distribution and consolidation
It is fairly common in these settlements to find more than one structure, or dwelling, on a plot. A number of factors explain the predominance of more than one dwelling on a single plot. First, plot sizes are very large, allowing for the construction of more than
Table 8.2: Housing investments—petty bourgeois and petty capitalists landlords

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mud walls</th>
<th>Mud and cement</th>
<th>Brick</th>
<th>Blocks</th>
<th>Corrugated iron</th>
<th>Blocks and stones</th>
<th>Stones and cement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>3 (33%)</td>
<td>8 (67%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Wendorlins</td>
<td>3 (25%)</td>
<td>8 (67%)</td>
<td>2 (22%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Roof</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>9 (75%)</td>
<td>3 (25%)</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Wendorlins</td>
<td>7 (78%)</td>
<td>3 (22%)</td>
<td>9 (100%)</td>
<td>8 (89%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Floors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>4 (12%)</td>
<td>10 (30%)</td>
<td>3 (9%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Wendorlins</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>9 (24%)</td>
<td>9 (24%)</td>
<td>9 (24%)</td>
<td>3 (8%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>8 (13%)</td>
<td>23 (36%)</td>
<td>30 (47%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cooking facilities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>19 (58%)</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendorlins</td>
<td>26 (68%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>17 (27%)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>10 (16%)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>rooms</strong></td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>8-9</td>
<td>10-12</td>
<td>mean</td>
<td>standard deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>8 (24%)</td>
<td>7 (21%)</td>
<td>4 (9%)</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendorlins</td>
<td>9 (24%)</td>
<td>13 (34%)</td>
<td>8 (21%)</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>16 (25%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>21 (33%)</td>
<td>6 (9%)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
one dwelling. Secondly, it is common for low-income householders to have commenced the construction phase by building a mud house and, after a number of years, the house is upgraded, with owners building a more solid structure of block or brick. The original house is usually not demolished, but either used by members of the family, or simply let to tenants. Thirdly, the joint ownership of plots has also encouraged multiple dwellings on plots. For instance, it is not uncommon to find various informal land relations operating on a single plot. The layout or large size of these plots has made this possible. For example, a plot may be jointly owned with freehold land right tenure. At the same time each legal owner may have one or more dwellings on a portion of the plot either assigned or belonging to him/her, or which has been constructed by tenants in cases where land is rented. Under these circumstances it is possible to find more than one legal landowner on a single plot, both tenants and non-landlords. Finally, providing more than one type of rental accommodation further increases the number of structures on plots, such as with landlords simultaneously letting houses, land, rooms, and so on.

Therefore, unless stated otherwise, investment and consolidation of rental housing refer to landlords who have participated in rental housing construction rather than those who merely provide tenants with land.

To what extent have landlords invested in low-income rental housing? The initial purpose of housing production among subsistence landlords is for self consumption. However, circumstances can result in such houses being occupied by both owners and tenants. It is common for both house owners and tenants to live under the same roof, the only difference being that the latter pay rent in exchange for the space provided. The social relations between the two may be direct. As the tenant forms part of the household, he/she rents part of the house, and facilities such as the kitchen, bathrooms and toilets are shared with landlord. Tenants may even help with the landlord's domestic chores. During times of financial difficulty, the landlord may require financial assistance from the tenant, or vice versa. This is not an invariable rule, indirect social relations are also possible, where landlord may not share the same house with tenant or may even occupy a different plot. As subsistence landlords tend to share houses with tenants, what they have invested in rental housing is represented by the houses they
occupy, as the house assumes two roles, satisfying the needs of both owner and tenant. In cases where a tenant live in a separate house, the level of investment (indicated by materials of construction and services) may be of inferior quality to those of houses occupied by subsistence landlords.

However, when petty capitalists and petty bourgeois are considered, different levels of investment in rental accommodation are noticeable. As discussed above, the presence of more than one structure on plots also illustrates different levels of investment.

8.5.1 Landlords and rental housing investment
Low-income landlords provide rental accommodation which varies from basic structures with limited services to dwellings constructed of durable materials and with some modest services. Mud structures, with or without the limited use of cement, seem to be the dominant type of accommodation provided in all settlements (Table 8.3 & Pictures 8.1 to 8.3). Houses constructed of brick are found mainly in Caluza whereas, in St Wendollins and Winterveld, few landlords invested in block and brick houses (4-5 per cent). Services provided are slightly better in Caluza, houses usually have kitchen, bathrooms, electricity and individual standpipes. In St Wendollins and Winterveld, however, most rental housing had no water connection or electricity.

8.5.2 Explaining variations in rental housing investment

8.5.2.1 Constructing and financing rental housing
How have landlords acquired rental housing? As is shown by the previous paragraph, low-income rental housing can be of various forms, with varying levels of service. Access to rental housing may not require the landlord to participate in the construction process. It is possible for rental housing to have been purchased, rented, or constructed by persons other than the landlord, such as houses previously built by private investors, or the government, for owner occupation, and so on. Even the labour used for constructing rental accommodation may be purely family labour, or hired labour, or even a combination of one or more methods of accessing rental
Picture 8.1: Low-income rental housing built of brick
Picture 8.2: The production of low-income rental housing in St Wendollins using block
Picture 8.3: Low-income rental housing in St Wendollins built of mud and wattle
housing is possible, such as purchasing and self-build methods. This is common where more than one house is rented.

Table 8.3: Investment – rental accommodation by settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Walls</th>
<th>Mud</th>
<th>Mud and cement</th>
<th>Brick</th>
<th>Blocks</th>
<th>Mud, block, corrugated iron</th>
<th>Mud, cement, corrugated iron</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>14 (23%)</td>
<td>9 (12%)</td>
<td>19 (29%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>33 (44%)</td>
<td>15 (20%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>6 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
<td>52 (69%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>4 (5%)</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Floors</th>
<th>earth</th>
<th>cement</th>
<th>glass windows</th>
<th>wooden windows</th>
<th>wood and glass</th>
<th>none</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>7(10%)</td>
<td>37 (56%)</td>
<td>40 (61%)</td>
<td>4 (6%)</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>5 (7%)</td>
<td>55 (72%)</td>
<td>35 (47%)</td>
<td>7 (9%)</td>
<td>9 (12%)</td>
<td>9 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>5 (7%)</td>
<td>58 (77%)</td>
<td>33 (44%)</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
<td>27 (36%)</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roof</th>
<th>corrugated iron</th>
<th>tiles</th>
<th>asbestos</th>
<th>electricity no electricity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>36 (55%)</td>
<td>8 (12%)</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>34 (52%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>59 (87%)</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
<td>10 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>59 (79%)</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>4 (5%)</td>
<td>4 (5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bathroom</th>
<th>none</th>
<th>available</th>
<th>no kitchen</th>
<th>kitchen available no water connection</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>21 (32%)</td>
<td>23 (35%)</td>
<td>31 (47%)</td>
<td>17 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>59 (79%)</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>58 (77%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>62 (83%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>61 (81%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB: Percentages may not add up to 100% as most have been rounded off. Data exclude landlords sharing houses with tenants.

Rental housing may be financed from a variety of sources. Forms of finance may also cut across all forms of landlordism. Personal savings, involving landlords' income and financing through household finance, where income was derived not only from the householder, but contributions came from other members of the household, were the dominant methods of financing the construction of rental accommodation in all three settlements (Table 8.4). Other methods of financing construction included employers'
loans, grants from employers, bank loans, a combination of methods (such as both savings and loans from employers), *stockvels*, rents, and so on, used equally.

Table 8.4: Investment in, and financing and construction of rental housing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlements</th>
<th>Purchased</th>
<th>Self-built</th>
<th>Contractor built</th>
<th>Hired labour</th>
<th>Family labour</th>
<th>Communal labour</th>
<th>Government built</th>
<th>Rented</th>
<th>Bought and self-built</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7 (78%)</td>
<td>9 (18%)</td>
<td>8 (12%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>15 (100%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(22%)</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
<td>(78%)</td>
<td>(18%)</td>
<td>(12%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Wen-dollins</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>7 (14%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>5 (7%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(17%)</td>
<td>(57%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter-veld</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(61%)</td>
<td>(32%)</td>
<td>(3%)</td>
<td>(67%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(67%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Caluza**

person savings in income  house-hold loans  bank loans  hou sing  sub sidy  rents, savi ngs  employer s'loan  stock vel s  saving vel s and em ploy er savi ngs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlements</th>
<th>Purchased</th>
<th>Self-built</th>
<th>Contractor built</th>
<th>Hired labour</th>
<th>Family labour</th>
<th>Communal labour</th>
<th>Government built</th>
<th>Rented</th>
<th>Bought and self-built</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>4 (6%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(29%)</td>
<td>(18%)</td>
<td>(5%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(54%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Wen-dollins</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td>1 (7%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25%)</td>
<td>(65%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(33%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter-veld</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>4 (100%)</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>5 (38%)</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Financing and constructing low-income rental housing does not follow any fixed pattern. It may take place at any time from a landlord's arrival in a settlement, coinciding with his or her arrival, when a house built for owner occupation is shared with tenants, or long after householders have settled, meaning that some landlords may have begun as non-landlords. Construction may take different forms. Outbuildings formerly used for the owner's occupation may simply be converted into rental housing on completion of the main house's construction. Householders may even embark on large-scale construction of rental housing.

Using personal savings and household funds to finance construction is not influenced by forms of household. For instance, nuclear households with more than one income...
Earners and those headed by single men and women have equally reported using these methods. Neither the formation of a household nor the occupation of landlord can sufficiently provide an explanation to the variation in financing the production of rental housing. When the forms of household are correlated against forms of finance, with the former as an independent variable and the latter a dependent variable, no more than one per cent of the variation can be explained by forms of household. Similarly, occupation is not a significant factor. The use of personal savings, household income, combining rents, savings and stockvels was found to have been used by landlords who would, according to their occupations, have qualified for bank loans. One other reason why there is no link between occupation and financing the construction of rental housing is related to the nature of low-income housing production, including private rental housing. Production is not always separate from designing houses for owner occupation. Householders may have begun the construction process by building a house to satisfy the needs of the owner and may decide to let part of the house, whether complete or not. Even during the construction phase, the occupation of the landlord may be irrelevant, as funds to finance construction may have been generated from a variety of sources. Houses are themselves built incrementally, combining the use of second-hand or newly purchased construction materials. Where the initial purpose is purely for rent, no matter how massive the production may seem, it is often produced at the lowest level, with temporary structures, on untitled land, with limited or no services, and the construction does not comply with standards, and so on. This lowest production level means that these forms of housing cannot qualify for bank loans, even when householders, by virtue of being employed, are able to obtain financial assistance, and personal savings become the dominant form of mobilising funds. Financing rental accommodation may not always be a factor, as landlords may not have been involved, such as those who decide to let sites. Apart from landlords having invested in site purchase, there may have been no further financial expenditure on his/her part, when one considers that the sites being rented are bare pieces of land without any services. In some cases, however, the landlords' relation to the land and rental housing may explain the investment.
It is not surprising that neither age nor the landlords' income can successfully explain variations in the financing of construction and labour. When income was correlated with forms of finance, with income used as an independent variable and finance a dependent variable, and when the age of the landlord was used as an independent variable, less than one per cent of the variation in financial investment in rental housing could be explained by both income and age. The same was true when these two variables were correlated with forms of labour. Income on its own is incapable of explaining various methods of financing the construction phase or the labour used.

8.5.2.2 Land tenure and housing quality
This section highlights the significance of the type of land tenure in the quality of rental housing. While the three settlements offer a range of rental accommodation, the influence of tenure is noticed in the materials used for construction as well as in the level of services accompanying these houses. Landlords who have access to freehold land rights, and have thus purchased land, provide a range of accommodation which may differ regarding the materials for construction and services provided. In St Wendollins and Winterveld there is a growing trend of landlords having invested on temporary structures - mud, and mud and cement. Eighty per cent of rental houses provided by landlords who purchased land are built of mud and cement. In St Wendollins, 41 per cent are pure mud and wattle, and 15 per cent are of mud and cement. In Caluza, 23 per cent of rental housing is mud, 3 per cent mud and cement. When the use durable materials, brick and blocks is considered, over half of those who bought land in Caluza provide such accommodation, whereas in Winterveld and St Wendollins title holders have rarely used brick - 3 per cent in each settlement (Table 8.5).

Where land has been inherited, the distribution of rental accommodation in St Wendollins and Winterveld is of poorer quality -mud, and mud and cement. None of the landlords who inherited land have for instance, provided rental accommodation of brick. In Caluza the use of durable materials was common where plots were owned. This included landlords who had inherited titled land.
Table 8.5: Land tenure and quality of rental housing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tenure</th>
<th>Settlements</th>
<th>Mud walls</th>
<th>Mud and cement walls</th>
<th>Brick walls</th>
<th>Blocks</th>
<th>Mud, block, corrugated iron</th>
<th>Mud, cement, corrugated iron</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purchased land</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>7 (23%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>16 (52%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>16 (41%)</td>
<td>6 (15%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>3 (8%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>6 (15%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>3 (5%)</td>
<td>48 (79%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>4 (7%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inherited land</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>2 (22%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>2 (22%)</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>8 (62%)</td>
<td>3 (21%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>4 (80%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gift land</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>6 (43%)</td>
<td>3 (21%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>1 (7%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rented land</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>6 (26%)</td>
<td>6 (26%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Floors</th>
<th>Settlements</th>
<th>earth floors</th>
<th>cement floors</th>
<th>no bathrooms</th>
<th>bathroom</th>
<th>electricity</th>
<th>no electricity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purchased land</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>23 (74%)</td>
<td>9 (29%)</td>
<td>16 (52%)</td>
<td>20 (65%)</td>
<td>5 (16%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>3 (8%)</td>
<td>30 (77%)</td>
<td>3 (50%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>5 (13%)</td>
<td>28 (72%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>5 (8%)</td>
<td>53 (87%)</td>
<td>57 (93%)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>56 (92%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inherited land</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>3 (33%)</td>
<td>3 (33%)</td>
<td>2 (22%)</td>
<td>2 (22%)</td>
<td>3 (33%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>10 (77%)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>9 (69%)</td>
<td>2 (15%)</td>
<td>9 (69%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winterveld</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>5 (100%)</td>
<td>5 (100%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>5 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rent land</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>3 (13%)</td>
<td>9 (39%)</td>
<td>7 (30%)</td>
<td>5 (22%)</td>
<td>10 (44%)</td>
<td>2 (9%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gift land</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendollins</td>
<td>1 (7%)</td>
<td>9 (64%)</td>
<td>10 (71%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>3 (21%)</td>
<td>7 (50%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, from the materials of construction and the quality of rental accommodation landlords are able to provide, varying degrees of tenure are evident. While it is indisputable that low-income landlords may invest in a range of quality of accommodation, those who have bought land may choose to invest in durable structures, as well as less durable structures, such as mud. Owners of land have a wider choice of investment in materials of construction. They may choose to invest in durable structures as well as in mud structures, while non-owners of land are constrained by the site rentals for housing improvements. There is greater tendency to have invested in mud, and in mud and cement rental accommodation. This trend is extremely high if one considers those landlords who own single houses and share them with tenants.

Land tenure's influence on investment in materials for constructing rental housing was further evident in the regression analysis, where land tenure correlated as an
independent variable and materials for construction as dependent variables, and r-
square values are compared. In St Wendollins, only 3 per cent of the variation in
building materials is explained by land tenure. In Caluza the percentage is slightly
higher – 13 per cent. In Winterveld, tenure and building materials are highly significant
at the .0000 level, with 29 per cent of the variation in materials explained by tenure.

The influence of varying degrees of tenure on the level of services in rental housing,
such as the house’s connection to standpipes, electricity, a bathroom, a kitchen, and so
on, is also noted when settlements are considered. Connecting rental housing to
electrical cables is highly determined by tenure in Winterveld. The level of significance
is at the .0000 level, with 29 per cent of variations explained by tenure. Although in
both St Wendollins and Caluza tenure was found to have influenced the level of
services provided and electrical connections to the houses, tenure influence was much
lower than in Winterveld – 13 per cent of the variation in Caluza, and 4 per cent in St
Wendollins.

The role of tenure in explaining the investment, and the ability to improve rental
housing by connecting it to a water supply system, also shows the varying influence of
tenure within settlements. In Winterveld the relationship between land tenure and
water supply system, where the former is an independent variable, is highly significant,
and able to explain 32 per cent of the variation in improvements. However, in Caluza
and St Wendollins chi-square values were much lower – .00086 in Caluza and .06290
in St Wendollins.

In Winterveld, tenure further influences the quality of materials used for floors,
sanitation methods and the provision of bathrooms. When the regression analysis is
performed further and the chi-square values compared, tenure is of high significance in
Winterveld, determining the improvement in sanitation methods. Sixty-two per cent of
the variation in the quality of sanitation methods provided in rental housing is
explained by tenure – in Caluza, 13 per cent of the variation, and 2 per cent in St
Wendollins. As regards the influence of tenure on the landlords' ability to provide
bathrooms, and use durable materials to improve flooring, r-square values are higher in
Winterveld, 0.68869 and 0.51741, whereas in Caluza r-values stand at 0.02246 and 0.06881, and in St Wendollins 0.04454 and 0.04789. It is clear that, while tenure is an important factor in low-income rental housing production, its influence may vary from settlement to settlement.

8.5.2.3 Tenure and scale of lettings
Plots on which rental accommodation has been constructed vary between settlements and within land tenure systems. When plot sizes are compared, irrespective of tenure, the average plot size in Winterveld is 57 223 square metres, followed by St Wendollins with 9 893, and only 4 934 square metres in Caluza (Table 8.6).

The distribution of plot sizes according to tenure reveals the largest plots among freehold title-deed holders, whereas landlords renting sites from landowners have the smallest average plot sizes. However, when settlements are compared, the average plot size for title-deed holders in Winterveld is the largest. However, plot sizes for those renting land were often unknown. This is also related to the nature of land rental, where the landowner informally provides tenants with rental sites without stating plot sizes. The rental plots are not properly surveyed.

Land tenure was found to influence the plot sizes to a varying degree between settlements. In Winterveld, 46 per cent of the variation in plot size is explained by tenure, 18 per cent in Caluza and 3 per cent in St Wendollins.

8.5.2.4 Property size and dwellings
Plot size determines the number of dwellings, the structures that landlords can have on plots. The relationship between plot size and structure is important when rental housing is to be expanded, as well as for meaningful government policy interventions. What landlords have on plots may vary from shacks to mud structures and permanent dwellings. In some cases landlords may not be directly linked to the provision of these structures, such as where land is rented out to tenants. Even in cases where landlords may not have participated in the physical provision of rental housing, plot sizes are significant when sites are let to tenants. The number of tenant households, allowed to build their houses, also depends on plot sizes (Tables 8.7 to 8.9).
Property sizes in Winterveld were found to have a bearing on the dwellings constructed. Property sizes are able to explain 25 per cent of the variation between dwellings. In Caluza and St Wendollins, property size accounted for less than 5 per cent of the variation.

**Table 8.6: Access to land by property size**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>cases</th>
<th>mean property (square meters)</th>
<th>standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
<th>95% confidence interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>4934</td>
<td>4499</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>3828 to 6040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wendo</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>9893</td>
<td>18546</td>
<td>2141</td>
<td>5626 to 14160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>llins</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>57223</td>
<td>30843</td>
<td>3561</td>
<td>50127 to 64319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>veld</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>cases</th>
<th>tenure</th>
<th>mean property</th>
<th>standard deviation</th>
<th>f value between groups</th>
<th>eta squared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caluza</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>bought land</td>
<td>5802</td>
<td>3036</td>
<td>8.3794</td>
<td>.3546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>inherited land</td>
<td>9327</td>
<td>7838</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>gift land</td>
<td>12141</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>rent land</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>1855</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>bought land</td>
<td>15223</td>
<td>23565</td>
<td>2.0236</td>
<td>.1036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>inherited land</td>
<td>7914</td>
<td>11188</td>
<td>2.0236</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>gift land</td>
<td>1076</td>
<td>2586</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>rented land</td>
<td>2023</td>
<td>3504</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>61</td>
<td>bought land</td>
<td>64784</td>
<td>24046</td>
<td>32.7558</td>
<td>.4764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winter veld</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>inherited land</td>
<td>67988</td>
<td>23274</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>rent land</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Land tenure as independent variable and plot size as a dependent variable. For Winterveld, \( r = .46342 \), Caluza \( .18360 \) and St Wendollins \( .03881 \).*
Table 8.7: Winterveld – dwellings and plot size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable property</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean property (square metres)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structures &gt;= 10</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>64424</td>
<td>24015.10</td>
<td>3049.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures &lt; 10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22880.54</td>
<td>37268.33</td>
<td>10336.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = 41543.49

Levene’s test for equality of variance: F= 9.132 P = .003

T-test for equality of means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>T-value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>2-tail sig</th>
<th>SE of diff</th>
<th>95% CI for difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>8129.523</td>
<td>(25341.38, 57745.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>14.16</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>10776.951</td>
<td>(18453.62, 64633.37)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.8: Caluza – dwellings and plot size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable property</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean property (square metres)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structures &gt;= 2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>6522</td>
<td>5423.31</td>
<td>1084.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures &lt; 2</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3965.26</td>
<td>3564.31</td>
<td>556.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = 2556.45

Levene’s test for equality of variance: F= .386 P = .537

T-test for equality of means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>T-value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>2-tail sig</th>
<th>SE of differences</th>
<th>95% CI for differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>1105.201</td>
<td>(348.556, 4764.343)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>36.78</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>1219.160</td>
<td>(85.689, 5027.210)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

259
Table 8.9: St Wendollins – dwelling and plot size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable property</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structures &gt;=10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4923.45</td>
<td>4461.95</td>
<td>2576.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures &lt; 10</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>10100.24</td>
<td>18889.86</td>
<td>2226.192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean differences = -5176.79

Levene’s test for equality of variance: F = .743 P = .392

T-test for equality of means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>T-value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>2-tail sig</th>
<th>SE of difference</th>
<th>95% CI for difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0.639</td>
<td>10986.04</td>
<td>(-27071.9, 16718.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal</td>
<td>-1.52</td>
<td>6.01</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>3404.743</td>
<td>(-13505.2, 351.578)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.5.2.5 Tenure and number of dwellings

The structures and number of dwellings on plots were also found to be influenced by land tenure systems. Where landlords have access to untitled land, such as being able to rent sites from landowners in Winterveld, the number of dwellings on a single plots has rarely exceeded one. Where properties have been purchased, the average dwellings on plots is more than 17, with an average difference of 16 structures between those renting sites and those with legal ownership (Table 8.10). The difference between landlords who purchase land and those who inherit land is minimal, with a mean difference of a single structure. This can be explained by the trend among landowners in Winterveld to have inherited land with freehold land rights, rather than inheriting a house on a rented site. However, in Caluza and St Wendollins, while tenure exists in a number of structures that landlords may have, its influence is less. The difference between landlords owning land and those renting land in Caluza is not as distinct as in Winterveld. The mean difference in structures is less than one. The same was observed when a comparison were made between landlords who purchased land and those who inherited land. Even in St Wendollins the mean difference in number of dwellings,
when all forms of tenures were compared, was less than three. The variation between Winterveld and the other two settlements, Caluza and Wendollins, is that various methods of accessing land prevail in these settlements, unlike in Winterveld where two methods dominate, land rental and land purchase. In these two settlements, a combination of forms of accessing land is possible, such as land purchase and site rental, renting more than one site, or even combining access to land through gifts and site rental. Under such conditions landlords may be able to increase their acreage without having freehold land rights. As a consequence, land tenure in Winterveld is able to explain 48 per cent of the variation in structures, 5 per cent of that in St Wendollins and 2 per cent in Caluza.

Table 8.10: Winterveld – number of dwellings by land tenure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable structures</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean structures</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>17.70</td>
<td>5.94</td>
<td>.762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited land</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16.40</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>1.691</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = 1.3049

Levene’s test for equality of variance: F=.595  P=.443

T-test for equality of means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>T-value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>2-tail sig</th>
<th>SE of difference</th>
<th>95% CI for difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>.632</td>
<td>2.715</td>
<td>(-4.119, 6.728)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>.509</td>
<td>1.855</td>
<td>(-3.277, 5.887)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variable structures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>17.70</td>
<td>5.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented land</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>.527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = 16.26

Levene’s test for equality of variance: F = 9.365  P = .003

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**T-test for equality of Means**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>T-value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>2-tail sig</th>
<th>SE of difference</th>
<th>95% CI for difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>8.15</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.966</td>
<td>(12.277, 20.244)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal</td>
<td>20.81</td>
<td>65.17</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.782</td>
<td>(14.700, 17.821)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.11: Caluza – dwellings by land tenure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable structures</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean structures</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>.893</td>
<td>.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited land</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>.338</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = -.1864

Levene’s test for equality of variance: F = .126 P= .725

**T-test for equality of means**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>T-value</th>
<th>2-tail sig</th>
<th>SE of difference</th>
<th>95% CI for difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>-.54</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>.596</td>
<td>(-.892, 519)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal</td>
<td>-.50</td>
<td>11.85</td>
<td>.627</td>
<td>(-1.003, .630)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable structures</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>.893</td>
<td>.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented land</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>.9130</td>
<td>.949</td>
<td>.198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = .3450

Levene’s test for equality of variance: F = .624

**T-test for equality of means**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>T-value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>2-tail sig</th>
<th>SE of difference</th>
<th>95% CI for difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>.178</td>
<td>.252</td>
<td>(-.162, 852)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>45.88</td>
<td>.182</td>
<td>.255</td>
<td>(-.168, 858)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8.12: St Wendollins – number of dwellings by land tenure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable structures</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>4.223</td>
<td>.676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented land</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>.577</td>
<td>.333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = 2.8462

Levene’s test for equality of variance: F = 1.964 P = .169

T-test for equality of means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>2-tail sig</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
<th>95% CI for difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>.256</td>
<td>2.467</td>
<td>(-2.141, 7.833)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>27.67</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.754</td>
<td>(1.301, 4.391)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable structures</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>4.223</td>
<td>.676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inherited land</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>1.605</td>
<td>.445</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = 1.5897

Levene’s test for equality of variance: F = 4.176 P = .046

t-test for equality of Means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>2-tail sig</th>
<th>SE of Difference</th>
<th>95% CI of Confidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unequal</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>.193</td>
<td>1.206</td>
<td>(-.832, 4.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>48.96</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.810</td>
<td>(-.037, 3.217)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable structures</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>4.222</td>
<td>.676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gift land</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>.570</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = 2.155

Levene’s Test for equality of variance: F = 3.318 P = .074
### T-test for equality of Means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>2-tail sig</th>
<th>SE of Difference</th>
<th>95% CI for differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>.075</td>
<td>1.184</td>
<td>(-.222, 4.533)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>44.89</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.885</td>
<td>(.374, 3.938)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 8.5.2.6 Plot size, tenure and rental accommodation

The importance of property sizes is evident in Winterveld, when the range of rental accommodation that landlords provide is considered. While landlords may in general provide a variety of accommodation, whether rooms, houses, land or a combination of two types, what is being provided in Winterveld is influenced by both tenure and property size. The common type of rental accommodation provides income by combining site rentals and house rentals. The second common type of involvement by landlords includes specialising in site rental, and few letting rooms. In order to rent out — whether combined with house rental or not — in Winterveld, ownership of land is a prerequisite. This may include landlords who inherited titled land. None of the landlords renting sites from landowners were found to derive rentals by letting sites. Land tenure, and ownership or non-ownership of land, was found to dictate the type of accommodation — in this case letting rooms was common where land was not owned. In Winterveld 45 per cent of the variation in the types of accommodation provided by landlords was explained by tenure — 12 per cent in Caluza and 7 per cent in St Wendollins. Plot sizes were found to have a bearing on the type of accommodation, with 24 per cent of the variation explained by plots size in Winterveld, 19 per cent in Caluza and 8 per cent in St Wendollins. Providing different types of rental accommodation generally demands varying plot sizes. Renting out rooms may require landlords to let part of their houses or separate houses. However, for those letting land, or land and houses, the property size is important, as the larger the plot size, the more tenants they will have and the more likely the combination of types of rental housing provision. Those letting rooms in general have smaller plots. This is also evident in mean plot differences between those providing land and houses, or land, compared with landlords letting rooms to tenants (Table 8.13).
### Table 8.13: Winterveld – property size and type of rental accommodation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable property size</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean (square metres)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rented land and houses</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>64424.03</td>
<td>25217.56</td>
<td>3202.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented rooms</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5311.55</td>
<td>15023.35</td>
<td>5311.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = 59112.479

Levene’s test for equality of variance: F= 15.718 P= .000

T-test for equality of means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>T-value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>2-tail sig</th>
<th>SE of Difference</th>
<th>95% CI for difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>6.46</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>9153.568</td>
<td>(40846.82, 77378.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal</td>
<td>9.53</td>
<td>12.82</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>6202.378</td>
<td>(45693.96, 72530.99)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 8.14: St Wendollins – property size and type of rental accommodation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable property size</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean (square metres)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rented land</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16187.60</td>
<td>14937.94</td>
<td>6680.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented rooms</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5162.68</td>
<td>13228.00</td>
<td>1852.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = 11024.91

Levene’s test for equality of variance: F= .624 P= .433

T-test for equality of means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>T-value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>2-tail sig</th>
<th>SE of difference</th>
<th>95% CI for difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>6261.824</td>
<td>(-1529.29, 23579.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>.177</td>
<td>6932.488</td>
<td>(-7224.17, 29274.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable property</td>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>Mean (square metres)</td>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>SE of mean</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent land and Houses</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23847.81</td>
<td>27387.00</td>
<td>6846.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent rooms</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5162.68</td>
<td>13228.00</td>
<td>1852.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = 18685.15

Levene's test for equality of variance: F= 18.156 P=.000

Table 8.15: Caluza – property size and type of rental accommodation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable property</th>
<th>Numbers of cases</th>
<th>Mean (square metres)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rented land</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12140.70</td>
<td>10959.05</td>
<td>5479.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented rooms</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3870.31</td>
<td>3147.65</td>
<td>445.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = 8270.38

Levene's test for equality of variance: F= 23.656 P=.000

T-test for equality of means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>T-value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>2-tail sig</th>
<th>SE of difference</th>
<th>95% CI for difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>2095.604</td>
<td>(4065.252, 12475.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>.228</td>
<td>5497.580</td>
<td>(-9096.74, 25637.52)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable property</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean (square metres)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rented land and house</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9105.52</td>
<td>5257.077</td>
<td>3035.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented rooms</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3870.31</td>
<td>3147.654</td>
<td>445.146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = 5235.21

Levene's test for equality of variance: F = 1.967 P=.167
If tenure and property size have influenced the scale of letting that variations in type of rental-accommodation landlord will provide, to what extent have property sizes influenced the investment in rental accommodation, in particular the quality of housing? Do large property sizes serve as an incentive for investment in rental accommodation?

The quality of rental housing landlords provide has been found not to be influenced by property size. When the three settlements are considered, no more than 8 per cent of the variation in material for constructing rental accommodation can be explained by property size. In St Wendollins and Winterveld, chi-square values were even lower (.00329 and .05861). Instead, the quality of rental accommodation influenced rents.

8.5.2.7 Rents and materials for construction

Rents charged vary from settlement to settlement, and within settlements. For instance, among landlords letting land in Caluza, some were charging a site rental of R30 per month, others basing rents on the number of years the tenants had been renting sites, and the age of a tenant. It was therefore not uncommon to come across tenants who had been paying annual rentals of R100 since the 1970s. Variations in rental were also found on jointly owned plots, where tenants rented land from different but related landowners. Similarly, when settlements are compared, in Winterveld and St Wendollins site rentals range from R5 to R15 per month. Apart from variations in rent charges, rents received are also dependent on the tenants’ willingness to pay rent. If the analysis is limited to those landlords who constructed rental accommodation, in Caluza 21 per cent of the variation in rent was explained by the type of building material used, as was 8 per cent in St Wendollins and 7 per cent in Winterveld.
Therefore, the range of rental accommodation provided is clearly distinguished by materials of construction, services and rents charged. A rented room in a mud house, with earthen floors, wooden windows, and without standpipe water connection or electricity, would appeal to tenants who might be forced by financial circumstances to live in such a basic rented room, paying R10 to R30, as opposed to a room in a house built of brick, with electricity, water supply, shared facilities such as bathrooms and so on, costing a minimum of R120 (Table 8.16). Rents usually exclude services such water and electricity. Materials of construction influence rents, as evident among landlords who have invested in different types of rental accommodation, as the following cases illustrate.

**Box 8.1 Sinqobile**

Sinqobile has access to five plots. Three have been purchased. She therefore has freehold land rights to these plots while two are rented from different landowners. Of the three plots purchased, one is still vacant. From the two plots that she purchased she has built three rental houses—two on one plot and one on another. All these houses have been constructed of brick. The sites are connected to standpipes and electricity. There are also regular refuse-removal services operating in this settlement. However, two of the houses have no shared bathroom, while the third has one. Where there are no bathroom facilities she charges R45 per room, R5 for water supply, and the electricity is charged separately, being shared among the tenants’ households. In the other house, the rent is R120 per room.

On the plots rented from landowners there are also two houses, one on each plot. Although both have been constructed of mud, they vary, according to the level of investment. The first house is built of mud and wattle, has earthen floors, a shared pit latrine, no electricity or standpipe connection. The rent here is R15 per room. The second house is built of mud and cement, without standpipe connection or electricity. Tenants are paying R30 per room.

**Box 8.2 Thenjiwe**

Thenjiwe lives in a house built of mud and wattle. There is limited use of cement, except for the floors. Interior and exterior walls are of mud. She does not own the land on which the house is built, but rents it from a landowner, paying a yearly site rental of R240. The house is incomplete and has five rooms. It is connected to a water standpipe and electricity. She lets part of her house— one room to a single tenant, whom she charges R30 for a room and R5.00 for water. Altogether, she receives R35 as monthly rental income.
Table 8.16: Caluza – rent, by materials of construction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean (rents)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mud and wattle</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>217.50</td>
<td>225.182</td>
<td>60.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brick</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>707.42</td>
<td>719.632</td>
<td>165.095</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = -489.92

Levene’s test for equality of variance: F = 3.645 P = .065

T-test for equality of means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>T-value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>2-tail sig</th>
<th>SE of difference</th>
<th>95% CI for difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>-2.45</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>199.857</td>
<td>(-897.532, -82.310)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal</td>
<td>-2.79</td>
<td>22.55</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>175.722</td>
<td>(-853.831, 126.011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rental difference is greater between houses constructed of mud and brick than the difference made by the use of cement, when rented rooms of mud are compared to rooms in houses built of mud and cement – a mean rental income difference of -.8333.

8.5.2.8 Rents, plot sizes and tenure

Rents were further influenced by property size, type of accommodation rented, rooms and tenure. In Winterveld, plot sizes have a bearing on rents, and explain 21 per cent of the variation in rent. In St Wendollins and Caluza, plots sizes were found to have less influence on rents – less than 5 per cent of the variation in rent. The significance of plot sizes in Winterveld can further be explained by how landowners make use of the plots. While, undoubtedly, land rental requires landowners to have large plots to enable their participation in this type of rental accommodation, the role of plots is also evident where landowners combine commercial letting and site letting. It is not uncommon for landowners to let a site to a businesses at a monthly rental of R600, compared to the mere R6 to R10 charged if the site is let to a tenant to build his/her house. Under such circumstances, landowners stand a better chance of doubling and even trebling their rents if they do not concentrate on residential letting. On the other hand, non-owners
of land are constrained, first, by type of tenure, which prevents them from letting types of accommodation other than part of their houses, as rooms. Secondly, tenure dictates the scale of letting and the choice they may exercise. While those owning land may provide a range of rental accommodation, such as rental houses, land, and so on, non-landowners have no choice whatsoever. As a consequence, rents are also affected. They tend to be minimal, as tenure influences the type of structure on plots. In this case structures are confined to single dwellings which must be shared with household members and tenants, in the form of rented rooms. While in St Wendollins and Caluza plot size does influence rents, though to a lesser degree, combining residential and commercial letting is forbidden. None of the landowners were found to be deriving rental from combined commercial and residential letting, since once an area is demarcated for residential use it cannot be used for commercial letting. One other explanation of the tendency to combine residential and commercial letting in Winterveld is related to the effects of the previous government’s homeland policy. Winterveld, geographically located in the then "independent" Bophuthatswana homeland, meant that non-Tswana speakers could not own land in Bophuthatswana, as the homeland was for Tswanas alone. Even licences to open businesses could not be extended to non-Tswanas. As Winterveld is comprised mainly of non-Tswana speakers, the lack of land on which people could freely open businesses meant that, apart from residential letting, commercial letting was becoming increasingly important to landowners as a means of deriving rental income. When settlement average rental income is used, without taking into consideration the land tenure system, the influence of tenure on rent is concealed. For instance, the average rental income in Winterveld is R753.04 but, when tenure is considered, the mean rental income for landlords who do not own land but rent sites is a mere R35.00. The difference made by ownership of land is even greater. Even the types of accommodation landlords provide, varying from basic structures to structures with higher levels of services, all these influence rents.
Table 8.17: Winterveld – tenure and rental income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable rental income</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean (rand)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purchased land</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>878.24</td>
<td>472.744</td>
<td>60.529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented land</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35.55</td>
<td>35.555</td>
<td>15.843</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = 842.69

Levene’s test for equality of variance: F= 11.679 P=.000

T-test for equality of means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>T-value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>2-tail sig</th>
<th>SE of difference</th>
<th>95% CI for difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>158.673</td>
<td>(526.064, 1159.317)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal</td>
<td>13.47</td>
<td>66.17</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>62.568</td>
<td>(717.776, 967.605)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.18: Caluza – tenure and rental income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable rental income</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean (rand)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>510.35</td>
<td>625.08</td>
<td>112.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented land</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>135.217</td>
<td>113.27</td>
<td>23.619</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = 375.13

Levene’s test for equality of variance: F= 9.940 P = .003

Table 8.19: St Wendollins – tenure and rental income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable rental income</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean (rand)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>335.43</td>
<td>280.29</td>
<td>44.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gift land</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>164.64</td>
<td>169.39</td>
<td>45.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = 170.79

Levene’s test for equality of variance: F= 3.972 P=.052
Rents in Caluza are influenced by the type of rental accommodation (Table 8.20). Furthermore, what landlords let – houses, rooms, and so on – has as much influence on rents as property size. The influence of tenure on rents is evident in the analysis of variance, where tenure is an independent variable, and rental income a dependent variable, as well as in the mean rental income differences between forms of tenure. Twenty-four per cent of the variations in rent can be explained by the type of accommodation provided. In Winterveld and St Wendollins the extent is less – 11 and 3 per cent, respectively.

Table 8.20: Caluza – rental income and type of rental accommodation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable rental income</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean (rand)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rented land</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>741.25</td>
<td>497.43</td>
<td>248.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented rooms</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>206.00</td>
<td>201.69</td>
<td>28.52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = 535.25
Levene’s test for equality of variance: F= 13.787 P = .001

8.6 Land tenure implications

The previous sections have explored the influence of tenure on rental housing production, the materials of construction, the walls, the level of services, and the scale of letting. How low-income landlords had accessed land, whether by freehold land right or merely renting sites from landowners was found to have influenced the quality of low-income rental housing provided. Landownership extends choice in housing production. For example, landowners have the potential of providing various types of rental accommodation. As the land is owned, they may choose to invest in housing built of brick or block, and providing services such as electricity, house connections to standpipes and so on, or to invest in houses constructed of mud, or mud and cement. Non-landowners, on the other hand, are constrained by their relation to the land, having accessed land through rental from landowners, hence the quality of the rental accommodation they provide, while the material for constructing walls remains mud, with a limited use of cement. Above all, landowners may choose to let sites as this
option, too, is confined to owners of land. Under these circumstances the type of rental accommodation they produce does not stand any chance of improvement. While the use of less durable materials for rental-housing construction by non-landowners is found in all three settlements, the extent to which these non-landowners may improve rental housing – such as by providing standpipe and electricity connections, varies between settlements. In Caluza, landlords who do not own land have connected houses to water connections and electricity, and in St Wendollins rental housing has also been electrified. At one level it may be argued that the absentee form of landownership prevailing in Caluza, the flexibility of landowners in allowing these improvements to take place, and the present status of the non-landowners of St Wendollins (the former church tenants), share similar characteristics with those in Caluza. Here the church, a former landowner, pulled out of the settlement, so as a landowner, it takes an absentee form. In Winterveld, landowners often share sites with tenants and in most cases live on a separate plot within the settlement. At another level it may be argued that, as ownership or non-ownership of land determines improvements in low-income housing, tenant households benefit as a range of low-income rental housing, which may differ in materials of construction, the services provided, and rents charged – is made available. However, non-ownership of land can also affect the continuation and expansion of the production of a range of low-income rental housing, as the status of non-landowners is temporary and can be terminated at any time by the landowners as the need to use land for other purposes arises. Another sharp distinction between owners and non-landowners is evident in the sizes of the property owned. Ownership of land has meant that the former have access to larger plot sizes than the latter. With large plot sizes, landowners are in a position to provide various types of rental accommodation, engage in constructing as many dwellings as they can, and increase rents, while non-landowners are constrained by plot size. This may further affect the expansion of rental-income housing production and the scale on which landlords operate.

8.7 Tenure and forms of landlord
The concept "landlordism" is usually oversimplified, loosely associated with wealth and large-scale ownership of land. Ownership of land is not a prerequisite for
landlordism. Even within the same form of landlordism, a vast difference based on income and access to land is also possible. This section examines poverty among landlords. It takes the different avenues for accessing land as a starting point and will demonstrate that even the conceptualisation of landlords without considering their relation to land is incapable of uncovering variations in subsistence and petty capitalist forms of landlordism. This chapter thus extends not only our understanding of landlordism as a concept, but it provides a meaningful understanding of the development of forms of landlord and moves away from a preoccupation with numbers, plots owned, and houses as a basis for analysing landlords, which hides the poverty among landlords and exaggerates their financial positions. Instead, the argument put forward is that, where the analysis of low-income landlords is located within land-tenure systems, it has the potential of explaining variations in subsistence and petty capitalist forms of landlordism.

8.7.1 Income differences and poverty among landlords

8.7.1.1 Income and occupation

What low-income landlords earn as wages is influenced by the type of employment, its nature, and whether it is seasonal, temporary or full time. Income differences, even within the same occupation, depend on a number of factors such as age, experience, appropriate skills for the job, and so on. Types of employment have been divided into six categories. Labourers include all those employed in unskilled jobs – such as nannies, domestic workers, messengers, and so on; hawkers include all forms of informal sector activities; business owners are another category distinguished from informal sector workers by the legality of the business, often registered and subject to taxation; semi-professional jobs include a wide range of activities for which workers have received minimal training – such as taxi drivers, ticket examiners, and so on; professional employment includes all middle- and high-income jobs, lawyers, nurses, teachers, and so on; while the category of pensioner embraces all those who are either receiving state pensions, pensions from former employers or both.
The lowest average income for three settlements, when forms of employment are compared, is derived from pension, usually a bare R410 per month from the government. The difference in income between landlords earning pensions and those working as unskilled labourers is on average R232.11, the average income from a pension being estimated at R552.31, compared to R784.42 earned by an unskilled labourer. Income differences between labourers and those employed in professional jobs, is almost three times the mean difference between unskilled labourers and pensioners—a mean difference of R602.53. Also, the mean income difference between unskilled labourers and those owning businesses is twice the average income difference observed between unskilled labours and those in professional jobs; here the income difference is R1 338.79, and two-thirds higher when business owners are compared to landlords in professional occupation. However, the income difference between unskilled labourers and those in semi-professional jobs is not as remarkable as that between business owners, an average income difference of R156.30. The lowest average income difference was found between skilled labourers and hawkers, a mere R11.21.

Income differences between occupations can be expected when settlements are considered. In Caluza, the average income difference between unskilled labourers and pensioners is R425.48, 55 per cent higher than when all settlements are combined. In St Wendollins it is almost half of that of the three settlements, R153.83, and in Winterveld it is the lowest, with a difference of only R18.08. Such variations in income within the same occupation may be explained by the differences landlords earn, even those doing the same job. For instance, unskilled labourers in Caluza had the highest average income of R1 019.88 compared to those in the other two settlements—R843.66 in St Wendollins and R548.58 in Winterveld. Income differences between settlements are noted when income from unskilled jobs is compared with that derived from owning businesses, an average income difference of R2 656.33 in St Wendollins, R1137.13 in Winterveld and R836.36 in Caluza. When professional jobs are compared with unskilled jobs, a mean income difference of R719.61 is evident in Caluza, R687.81 in Winterveld and R153.83 in St Wendollins. Only a R10.33 mean income difference was found between unskilled labourers and those in semi-professional jobs,
R204.88 in Caluza and R709.08 in Winterveld. The difference in income between labourers and hawkers in St Wendollins is R243.66, and it is R299.05 in Caluza and R334.75 in Winterveld.

The purpose of highlighting average income differences between occupations is to show how much variation one can expect within the same occupation, and even when settlements are considered individually. What landlords earn cannot be divorced from types of occupation, earnings are not only important for describing variations between occupations and settlements, but they serve as an explanatory tool for feasibly explaining poverty variations within forms of landlordism and variations in subsistence and petty capitalist forms of landlord. It should be remembered that the object of this section is to explore links between tenure and landlordism, and show how land tenure systems have the potential of explaining forms of landlordism, particularly variations between subsistence and petty capitalist forms. If this is the object of the study, what is the position of subsistence landlords in the job market? And how similar or different are their earning capacities when compared to petty capitalist landlords? Subsistence landlords are found in low-paid jobs, working as unskilled labourers or hawkers, or unemployed, and the highest percentage rely on a state pension. If one considers the meagre income derived from the pension, as well as that from low-paid jobs, the poverty among subsistence landlords is even more obvious. This also explains the role of rents among these landlords, none of whom were employed in professional jobs or had businesses. Even if differences between occupations were to be considered, there are few differences between income as the majority remain in low-paid jobs. For instance, an average income difference of R28.00 was found between unskilled labourers and semi-professional jobs. Furthermore, when petty capitalist landlords are considered, the mean difference between them and subsistence landlords is even higher as subsistence landlords continue to earn low wages (Table 8.21).
Table 8.21: Comparison of average income differences between subsistence and petty capitalist landlords

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Subsistence landlords</th>
<th>Average income (rand)</th>
<th>Petty capitalists</th>
<th>Average income (rand)</th>
<th>Average income difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled labourers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>322.00</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>926.06</td>
<td>604.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawkers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>235.00</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>762.00</td>
<td>527.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioners</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>425.00</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>611.56</td>
<td>186.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-professionals</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>350.00</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1072.87</td>
<td>722.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Income differences between subsistence landlords and petty capitalists can further be explained by variations in educational qualifications. Subsistence landlords are rarely educated beyond secondary school level so, even if they are employed in a similar jobs, the slightly higher education among petty capitalists puts them in a better financial position.

Most subsistence landlords are educated up to primary level. As their income is generally low, income differences as a result of educational level tend to be even lower. Also, due to the lack of landlords educated up to a post-high school level, it was often not possible to make such comparisons. For instance, the difference found between those educated to a lower primary and a primary qualification, is R61.45. The average income differences between lower primary and the secondary school level is R99.58. However, if the comparison is extended to petty capitalist landlords, the role of education in income becomes obvious (Table 8.22).
Table 8.22: Petty capitalist landlords – income and educational qualifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable educational qualification</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean (rands)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary level</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>921.20</td>
<td>935.50</td>
<td>139.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1070.90</td>
<td>484.90</td>
<td>146.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower primary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>806.67</td>
<td>687.04</td>
<td>396.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary level</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>921.20</td>
<td>935.50</td>
<td>139.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary level</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>921.20</td>
<td>935.50</td>
<td>139.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary level</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>902.40</td>
<td>506.43</td>
<td>89.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower primary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>806.66</td>
<td>687.04</td>
<td>396.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1070.90</td>
<td>484.81</td>
<td>146.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary level</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>921.20</td>
<td>935.50</td>
<td>139.457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University level (post-graduate level)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2608.33</td>
<td>1445.96</td>
<td>834.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower primary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>806.66</td>
<td>686.04</td>
<td>396.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-graduate level</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2608.33</td>
<td>1445.96</td>
<td>834.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower primary</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>806.66</td>
<td>686.04</td>
<td>396.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school plus three years’ training</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>981.00</td>
<td>442.67</td>
<td>86.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference between primary and high school = 149.71 F = 1.667 P = .202
Mean difference, lower primary and primary = 114.53 F = .128 P = .722
Mean difference, primary and secondary = 18.79 F = 4.546 P = .036
Mean difference, lower primary and high school = 264.24 F = .665 P = .431
Mean difference, primary and post graduate level = 1687.13 F = 4.306 P = .259
Mean difference, lower primary and post graduate level = 1801.66 F = 3.169 P = 150

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Mean difference, lower primary, high school and three year training = 174.33  \( F = 1.303 \)  \( P = .264 \)

8.7.1.2 Income, age and forms of household

Occupations in all forms of landlordism are influenced by age. When petty capitalist landlords are considered, 35 per cent of the variations in occupation are explained by age – 63 per cent for petty bourgeois and 40 per cent for subsistence landlords. However, when age was related to income, the former used as a dependent variable, it is only among subsistence landlords that age and income were found to be highly significant, explaining 39 per cent. Among petty capitalists, earnings could explain 2 per cent of the variations, and among petty bourgeois landlords 1 per cent.

No links were found between levels of income and forms of household. Subsistence landlords' households are composed of nuclear and single-parent households. Sixty-three per cent of households are nuclear, 17 per cent are headed by single men and women and 20 per cent are headed by widows and widowers. Similar forms of household were also found among petty capitalist and petty bourgeois landlords. Nuclear households were the most common form, 80 per cent among petty capitalist landlords and 76 per cent among petty bourgeois households. However, the form of household per se is not enough to explain poverty among subsistence landlords. Household formation assumes a larger income among nuclear families, as these households have more than one income-earner, compared to those headed by single men and women. Poverty among subsistence landlords persists, irrespective of forms of household. There is a tendency to depend on a single income-earner. Even in cases of more than one earner, household income is often very low. The definition of "subsistence landlord" suggests households living below the poverty line. This will be returned to in Section 8.7.1.5 when it will be demonstrated that the letting of space and access to more than a single plot or house, although making a substantial contribution to income, does not change the status of subsistence landlords. Income is influenced by educational level, type of occupation and age (Table 8.23).
Table 8.23: Subsistence landlords – income by age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable earnings</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean (rand)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age &gt;= 60</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>409.33</td>
<td>90.475</td>
<td>16.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age &lt; 60</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>249.33</td>
<td>09.63</td>
<td>38.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = 160.00

Levene’s test for equality of variance: F= 53.737 P = .000

T-test for equality of means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>T-value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>2-tail sig</th>
<th>SE of difference</th>
<th>95% CI for difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>41.686</td>
<td>(76.556, 243.444)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>39.44</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>41.686</td>
<td>(75.712, 244.288)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.7.1. 3 Income and rental housing investment

Plot sizes were found to influence the type of rental housing landlords produce, the rents and the scale of letting. Subsistence landlords are further constrained by plot sizes which are smaller than those owned by petty capitalists (Table 8.24). They are usually not owned, but rented from the landowner. Forty-five per cent rent of subsistence landlords rent plots, 82 per cent in Winterveld, 71 per cent in Caluza and only 11 per cent in St Wendollins. Few have purchased plots – only 13 per cent of all subsistence landlords. Some live in Caluza and others in St Wendollins. None of the subsistence landlords have purchased plots in Winterveld. Other methods of accessing land are inheritance, or having plots offered as gifts. Half of the petty bourgeois landlords have purchased plots. Other methods of accessing land are available, but purchase is the dominant method for accessing land among petty capitalist landlords – 82 per cent. It is common in all settlements, but highest in Winterveld with 95 per cent, 74 per cent in St Wendollins and 67 per cent in Caluza. Although other methods of accessing land were also found, site rental was not found among the petty capitalist landlords of Winterveld

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Site renting influences plot sizes, which are often smaller than when purchased. The influence of tenure on plot size is not only evident when subsistence landlords are compared to petty capitalists; subsistence landlords with freehold titles often have larger plots (Table 8.25).

Table 8.24: Plot size – subsistence and petty capitalist landlords

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable plot sizes</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean (square metres)</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence landlords</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5981.58</td>
<td>16734.72</td>
<td>2160.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty capitalists</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>36 331.66</td>
<td>33909.88</td>
<td>2918.498</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = 30350.07 F= 65.711 P=.000

Since plots sizes among subsistence landlords are very small, they determine the scale at which rental housing can be provided, the dwellings on the plots, and type of letting and rents. While the types of rental accommodation provided by petty capitalists may range from rented rooms to land, land and houses, and houses, subsistence landlords mainly provide rented rooms. House rental was found in cases where more than one house was owned. But this occurred rarely. If one bears in mind the constraint on plot sizes, the renting of rooms does not usually require subsistence landlords to incur the extra expenditure of, for instance, having to build an extra house. This is done by merely converting a single room or more rooms, which are later let to tenants. Letting rooms was also found among those who had purchased land. However, as access to land determines the type of accommodation landlords provide, it is not surprising that subsistence landlords only let rooms. As land is usually rented from a landowner,
therefore, this does not confer any legal title, no one would provide rented land to tenants or combine land and site rentals. Conversely, where land is owned, petty capitalist landlords are more likely to provide rental accommodation in the form of land rental, or simply combine land and house rentals (59 per cent). In cases where land was not owned, room and house rental became common. Again, as petty capitalists are not constrained by plot size and tenure, they are free to participate in any type of rental housing provision. More than half of the petty bourgeois own land, others have inherited land, or rent land or occupy land offered to them as gift. The majority provide rented rooms, few let houses.

8.7.1.4 Rental income and scale of letting
Rental income is determined by several factors. These may include the type of rental accommodation landlords provide. For instance, landlords who combine residential and commercial site lettings have better potential for increasing rents than those letting sites only. Rents were also found to be influenced by tenure and property size. Small plot holders have a limited choice in their attempt to expand lettings. Land tenure may also influence the building materials used for rental housing construction. Where land is not owned, the quality of rental accommodation provided tends to be of a lower standard - being built of mud, or mud and cement with limited services. Even the rents reflect the quality of materials used and services provided.

Rents are also affected by the number of rooms landlords let. This was found in all three settlements. For instance, in Caluza 78 percent of the variation in rents is explained by the number of rooms let, 42 per cent in Winterveld and 36 per cent in St Wendollins.

What is the position of subsistence landlords? Poverty among subsistence landlords is also reflected in their low-scale operation, and few rooms are let. This is also evident when they are compared to petty capitalist landlords (Table 8.26)
Table 8.26: Rented rooms from subsistence and petty capitalist landlords

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable rooms rented</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence landlords</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>3.668</td>
<td>.474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty capitalist landlords</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>15.80</td>
<td>12.559</td>
<td>1.1081</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = 11.5

Levene’s test for equality of variance: $F = 67.450$ $P = .000$

$T$-test for equality of means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>$T$-value</th>
<th>$df$</th>
<th>2-tail sig</th>
<th>SE of difference</th>
<th>95% CI for difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>-6.98</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.654</td>
<td>(-14.803, -8.279)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unequal</td>
<td>-9.78</td>
<td>175.67</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.180</td>
<td>(-13.870, -9.212)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a result of few rooms being rented by subsistence landlords, their rents are the lowest, when compared to petty capitalists and petty bourgeois landlords (Tables 8.27 & 8.28).

Table 8.27: Rental income – subsistence and petty capitalist landlords

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable rental income</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence landlords</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>112.21</td>
<td>106.946</td>
<td>13.807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty capitalists</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>637.35</td>
<td>510.958</td>
<td>43.976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = -525.14

Levene’s test for equality of variance: $F = 44.805$ $P = .000$
Income was found to vary between landlords. This was influenced by occupation and education. Even within the same occupation, variations in income were great. Since rents are influenced by factors such as the type of rental accommodation, materials of construction, property size, tenure and the number of rooms, this further explains why the average percentage contribution by rental income to subsistence landlords' income is very low (42 per cent), when compared to that of petty capitalist landlords (97 per cent) (Table 8.28).

Table 8.28: Rental income contribution – subsistence and petty capitalist landlords

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable rental income</th>
<th>Number of cases</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>SE of mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence landlords</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>112.21</td>
<td>106.946</td>
<td>13.807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty bourgeois</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>216.90</td>
<td>199.940</td>
<td>43.631</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean difference = -124.68
Levene’s test for equality of variance: P = 15.557 P = .000

While rental income is undoubtedly an important source of income to subsistence landlords' households, the low percentage contribution of rental income can also be related to the low-incomes from low-paid unskilled jobs and a lack of higher educational qualifications.
8.7.1.5 Subsistence landlords and multiple plot investments

The above sections have highlighted the plight of subsistence landlords. They are poor landlords, employed in low-paid jobs. Hence their income is below the poverty line. In their attempt to improve rental accommodation, they are further constrained by inadequate income, unstable tenure, property sizes and the quality of rental accommodation they provide. Although rental income make a substantial contribution to these households, they are low. Therefore, subsistence landlords continue to live below the poverty line.

If subsistence landlords have an income below the poverty line, what is the significance of access to more than one plot or house? Would this reflect a change in their financial circumstances? It will be argued, first, that subsistence landlords may have access to more than one house or plot, yet continue living below the poverty line. Secondly, variations in subsistence and capitalist forms of landlordism are best explained when located within land tenure systems. Forms of landlordism were also found to be influenced by income and tenure. In Winterveld, 85 per cent of forms of landlordism are explained by income and tenure, as are 31 per cent in Caluza and 29 per cent in Winterveld.

Subsistence landlord: Nokubonga

Nokubonga Sonjani was born in 1955 at KwaCaluza. She grew up in Caluza and continued living there with her parents. She does not own land but pays a monthly site rental of R30 to a landowner. There are fourteen householders also renting from the same landowner. In 1991 she paid R10 a month for a site. Two years it was increased to R15. In 1996 the site rental stood at R30. She shares the house with her sister, aged 26. Nokubonga also has two children, aged 12 and 14.

When her parents died, she decided to look for a site where she could build her house. In 1991 she managed to find a site through a family friend. She was introduced to a landowner, to whom she had to pay R100 for isiza, and she was later given a site, on which she could build her house, by the landowner.
The plot is approximately 460 square metres. The construction of a dwelling took place while she was working at Dicks, a shoe factory in Pietermaritzburg. She was employed full time, earning R800 a month. During the construction phase she lived with relatives and commuted to the building site to supervise the builders. Since she was in full-time employment, the construction took place in the evenings, after work, and during weekends. She said that although the wages were not satisfactory, she was at least guaranteed a regular income.

She used family labour and hired *umakhi* during the construction. The cost of hiring an *umakhi*, who was responsible for laying the poles and roof, was R500. To ensure that what she had already paid for the *umakhi* was better utilised, she was forced to borrow money from a *stockvel*. With the help of her cousin she was able to open a hire-purchase account to buy sheets of corrugated iron and windows. The cost of the doors and window frames amounted to R4 000. It took her 12 months to pay all her monthly instalments.

A few months after she had begun with the construction process, she lost her job. When she lost her job she was forced to look for an alternative source of income to maintain her household. She still had to pay school fees, and for books, uniforms and daily pocket money.

Because she had friends who were still employed at Dicks, they were able to give her orders of unfinished shoes, to be sewn at home. Through this piece work she was able to earn between R150 and R200 a month.

Because she lost her job, the house is still incomplete. It is built of mud and wattle. The interior and exterior walls of the house are not plastered with cement. The house has six rooms, four bedrooms, a dining room and a kitchen. Although the house has been finished with corrugated iron, some rooms are still without window frames or doors. There is no tap in the yard; water is collected from the communal standpipes. The stand has no waterborne sewerage. She has access to only a pit latrine, located some distance from the house. Although the settlement has a regular municipal refuse-
removal services, the location of a rental site some distance from the main road prevents her from utilising the services. At the back of the house is a pit that is used to dispose of garbage. The house has no electricity and she uses paraffin for cooking and lighting.

She occupies two rooms. One room is shared with her two children and the other is used by four members of her household. When she lost her job she decided to let two rooms. She charges R15 per room and is able to get R30 a month for two rooms. Prior to the commencement of her landlordism she described her financial position as being extreme, due to the loss of employment.

_Nokuzola: absentee form of subsistence landlordism_

Nokuzola arrived at KwaCaluza in 1971. She is now 74 years old. Her household has six members. Three are grandchildren, aged 16, 10 and 6. They all attend school and are financially dependent on her. She lives with her sister, who is 58 and disabled. She also has a nephew aged 41, who is unemployed.

She occupies a mud structure with two rooms. The house is fully constructed, with glass windows, corrugated iron sheets and cement floors. However, the walls have not been plastered with cement. There is no electricity in this house. The owner uses firewood and candles for heating and lighting. There is also no standpipe connection, water being fetched from a communal standpipe. The house construction was financed mainly from personal savings but, occasionally, she received advances from her employer. She also generated income by joining a _stockvel_.

The plot on which the house is situated is rented from the landowner. The plot size is 600 square metres. Nokuzola pays an annual site rental of R70. The landowner lives in Clermont, a freehold township near Pinetown, Durban. Nokuzola is not the only one renting land from the landowner. There are ten families altogether.

Nokuzola is a pensioner, earning R410 per month. She supplements this income by working as a domestic servant once a week. Through domestic work she is able to
earn R30 a day, receiving R120 per month. Within walking distance from where she lives she has another house, which has six rooms. It is also built of mud and wattle, and is in a dilapidated state. The house has earthen floors, and there are wooden windows. There is no water connection or electricity, and there is a shared pit latrine. The land on which this house is built is rented from another landowner at R120 per annum. Nokuzola had previously lived in this house as a tenant, renting a room. It was sold to her by the landowner for R600. However, her son had paid this amount. Four rooms are rented to tenants. Each tenant pays R15 per room. Nokuzola is therefore able to collect R60 per month. Her income, including rents, is R590.

8.7.1.6 Madonsela: petty bourgeois landlord
Madonsela is 49 years old. He lives with his wife who is 46 and a 15-year-old son. He has a Standard 8 level of education, while his wife has matric. He is employed as bus driver and the wife as a clerk. He earns more than R1 300 per month, well above the minimum subsistence level of R771.75.

They arrived in Caluza in 1965 and were tenants renting rooms in Mbanjwa Road. In 1989 he bought a property of approximately 6475.04 square metres for R1 200. He bought it with a five-roomed mud and wattle house. The house had been used by the previous occupant. He did not demolish the house, which was in a state of disrepair. Only two rooms now remain and are let to a single tenant for R15 per room. Madonsela thus gets R30 rent.

He owns a single property. His house is built of brick, has a tiled roof and a garage. The house has electricity and running water.

8.7.1.7 Malatje: petty capitalist landlord
Malatje lives in Winterveld. He is 59 years old. He lives with the rest of his family, consisting of his wife, four daughters and five sons. He also has grandchildren who live with him. The house is built of brick, and has seven rooms. He is a retired businessman. The size of his property is 84 984 square metres. Since the house is situated away from the main road, where there is a piped system, he has no water
connection. However, he has drilled a borehole, which is powered by an engine. His house is also situated away from the electricity pylons, so he uses a generator for lighting the house. He has lived in the settlement for more than 30 years.

When he arrived in Winterveld he first rented a business site. He later purchased the site and build a house. The business site is next to his house. Between 1969 and 1970 he bought the 84 984 square metres of property on which his house is situated. Behind his house he built a six-roomed house, which he let to tenants. The house is constructed of mud and cement. From 1973 he has rented part of his property to two businessmen. Each pays R600 for his site. Malatje gets R1 200 in total. Between 1970 and 1975 he bought three properties, each 42 492 square metres. Through the contacts he had established with lawyers and conveyances, he was able to get first-hand information about the properties on sale. Some of these properties were involved in disputes and repossessions, where owners had failed to keep up payments. Between 1985 and 1990 he bought two properties. These are adjacent plots of 10 morgen each (the 84 984 square metres). He owns more than 200 000 square metres of property. All of his plots are rented out to tenants. In some properties he earns a combination of land and house rentals. He is charging tenants R5 to R10 per plot.

8.7.1.8 Sibiya: petty capitalist landlord living below the poverty line

Sibiya heads a household of eleven members. These include three members belonging to his late sister. None of the eleven dependants are adults, they all attend school. He is married and his wife aged 42. He owns three plots. Two plots are situated in Caluza and one is in Hammersdale, an outside settlement. Hammersdale is his original home, where he has lived since 1975. The house there was formerly built by the government for public rental. With the introduction of the home ownership scheme, it was later purchased. It is now occupied by his wife and four children.

Two plots that he owns in Caluza were also purchased during the 1970s. By that time he was self-employed, owning two minibuses. One plot is two acres in size, while the other is about 1500 square metres. They were purchased from landowners with the purpose of constructing rental housing. On the small plot, there is a six-roomed, mud and wattle house. There is no electricity or water connection. Sibiya lives in that house.
with other members of his household (excluding his wife and some of his children who live in Hammersdale). Two rooms are let to a single household paying R25 per room. Sibiya collects R50 a month. He described the rented rooms as being in a poor condition, leaking, and it was through desperation that the tenant continued renting. On the big plot, there was also another six-roomed, mud and wattle house without services. It was rented out to a single household at R25 per room. Because of the state of this house, which was in disrepair, the amount was reduced to R15 per room, amounting to R90 per month. The owner had hoped to repair the house within a year. However, due to financial problems the house was never repaired and the tenant stopped paying rent. By then he no longer owned minibuses, but occasionally worked as a taxi driver. His earnings varied, depending on the number of trips he had made to town, the roadworthiness of the taxi and whether his services were required. During the interview, he had not worked for eight weeks. As a taxi driver he earns between R400 and R500. While he received rents, Sibiya was able to increase his income to R615. Because of the non-payment of rents, his income was reduced to R525. The rental house was finally demolished, and useful materials for construction, such as doors and the sheets of corrugated iron, were removed to be re-used for future rebuilding. However, Sibiya suggested that the reconstruction of a rental house will take place once his financial circumstances improve.

8.8 Land tenure implications

8.8.1 Ngubane: tenure as a constraint to upward mobility

Ngubane was born in Wartburg, outside Pietermaritzburg. His parents had previously rented a plot in Caluza because they had businesses at Ematsheni and wanted to commute to Pietermaritzburg daily. Ngubane first came into the settlement in 1993. He owns a three-acre plot (12 140.2 square metres) which was purchased by his father and inherited by him. The plot had been left idle for a number of years while his parents occupied a rented site. During this time, the landowner from whom they rented the site lived outside the settlement. The monthly site rental was R30.00.
Ngubane is 44 years old, with three children. He is a licensed hawker renting premises at Ematsheni, Pietermaritzburg, where he sells cooked food and traditionally brewed beer. He also works in partnership with his brother, who owns trucks and buses. They collect timber from the countryside and sell it to prospective home owners and to those who require firewood. He receives at least R2 000 per month, almost R1 228 above the level of subsistence.

In 1993 he built a four-roomed house on his own site. He also applied for a water connection. The house he had built was constructed of concrete blocks. It has no electricity and only a pit latrine is available on the site. During this time he occupied a house built on a rented site. When the house (built of concrete blocks) was completed it was let to tenants. Eight months later Ngubane started the construction of the main house. He hired skilled and unskilled labourers, who were paid weekly. The house has three bedrooms, a kitchen, a dining room and a bathroom. It is constructed of brick and has electricity. The construction phase lasted for eight months. When the construction of the main house was finally completed, he and his family moved into it. By then the landowner had built his house and moved into the settlement. As the owner of the land (on which Ngubane’s house) was situated, disapproved of him renting out the house to the second tenant, the house was demolished and he was forced to vacate the rented site. He continues letting four rooms (an outbuilding in his freehold property) at R30 per room. This amounts to R120. He uses rents as to save towards connecting electricity to the rented rooms. He also intends using part of his vacant property to expand lettings.

8.8.2 MaNdimande: tenure as an incentive to upward mobility

MaNdimande was born at Kwa Mpumuza, a settlement near Pietermaritzburg. She is 60 years old. After her marriage in 1958, she came to live with her husband in St Wendollins. She occupies a six-bedroomed house, which is built of concrete blocks, and with electricity. The walls have been plastered but there is no water connection. She lives with her family, two boys and three grandchildren. Her husband acquired the plot from the mission, through the payment of land rentals. Although the plot was later purchased from the mission, they were never issued with title deeds. MaNdimande
earns her living by selling cold drinks, beers, sweets and vegetables. All these are sold from her home. She previously owned a mobile tuckshop, which was placed alongside the road. In 1973 she rented a piece of a plot from the landowner. The plot had a three-roomed house. Initially the plot was going to be used for storage. A few months later she persuaded the landowner to sell the three-roomed house to her. It is of mud, without electricity or a water connection. In 1974, she bought the house for R600. The landowner lived at Clermont, a settlement outside St Wendolins. She made some improvements to the house, replacing broken windows and cementing the floors, replacing a leaking roof and painting the walls. The walls are still unplastered. Three rooms are let to tenants. Each tenant pays R20, giving her R60 in all. In 1995 she electrified her house. Three rooms are rented to tenants. She charges R55 for one room, and for each of the remaining room she charges R65, giving her R165 per month. Her total rental income therefore amounts to R225. She is able to get between R400 to R600 a month through selling. She also receives a state pension of R410 a month. Her income, including rent, is above R1 035 – slightly above the minimum subsistence level of R915.43.

8.8.3 Nobathembu: tenure as an incentive to capital expansion

Nobathembu is a married woman 69 years of age. She has lived in the settlement since 1954. When she arrived there, she rented two rooms for three years. By then she was employed as a primary school teacher. In 1958 she received a site from a landowner to whom she paid annual land rentals. The plot was more than two acres in size. She built a three-bedroomed house, with a dining room, kitchen and a bathroom. In 1965 she purchased a one-acre property not far from where she lived, but in another, smaller settlement. She paid monthly instalments on it for four years. In 1969, she commissioned one of her relatives with building skills to begin the construction process. The house under construction was also a three-bedroomed house. It was an outbuilding, built of brick, with a flushing toilet, but without electricity. She was hoping that, once the outbuilding was completed, she would be able to save for the main house. In 1973 she and her family moved into the new house. They demolished the old mud house. Two years later she rented a site from the landowner, who lived outside the settlement. She decided to again build a six-bedroomed mud and wattle
house, not for occupation but for rent. The entire house is let to tenants who are paying monthly rents. Two years later she improved the rental house by plastering the exterior walls. She also put in new doors, gutters and a veranda. In 1977 she built a 20-square-metre outbuilding, (separate from the main house) on her plot. She intended to use it as a storeroom. It is built of brick, has glass windows, steel doors and a ceiling. It was let to a tenant. In 1978 she began with the construction of the main house. The construction was completed in 1980. When her family moved into the main house, the five-roomed outbuilding was let to five tenants, each occupying a single room. The outbuilding was electrified three years later. In 1992 Nobathembu bought two properties. One was in her settlement, opposite her house, slightly over one acre in size, and the other was within walking distance from where she lived. During the same year she purchased a house from her cousin. The house is built on a rented site and had existing tenants. She continued renting the site from the landowner and extracting rents from the tenants. In 1994, she hired a contractor to build a house on one of her properties. It is a six-bedroomed house, constructed of brick. It has electricity, waterborne sewerage and is connected to a piped water supply. The house is rented to five tenants who share facilities such as the bathroom, toilet and kitchen. She still has a vacant property on which she intends building another rental house. She charges R20 per room in the mud house and received R100 a month. In one of the brick houses, rooms are let for R120 and R45, excluding water and electricity. From these she receives R870. Total rental income amounts to R970. Rental income alone is above R771.75, the minimum subsistence level. She gets a pension of not less than R2 000 per month. Thus, rentals plus income equal R2 970.

8.8.4 Mphikeleli: dissolution of landlordism

Mphikeleli is aged 44. He is married with three children. He lives at Imbali, a settlement outside Caluza. He was born and bred in Caluza and only moved out of the settlement when he got married in 1980. At Imbali, he bought a site where he constructed a three-bedroomed house, with a kitchen, dining room and bathroom. The house is connected to electricity and a water supply. The construction of the house was financed through bank loans. Mphikeleli is employed as a secondary school teacher.
His links with his birthplace, Caluza, enabled him to secure a rented plot. In 1989 he rented a site from a residential landowner. He had no intention of occupying this site, since he had had another house at Imbali. The rented site was to be used for constructing a rental house. The idea was approved by the landowner. He paid R200 for *isiza* and the site rental was R20 a month or R240 per annum.

He later commissioned his relative to build a two-roomed mud and wattle house. There was no water connection on the site and water was collected from communal standpipes. There was no electricity. When the house was finally completed, it was let to two tenant households, at R20 a room. For the two rooms he received R40. He intended to extend the house once he had enough savings. He received rents for approximately two years.

Later on, he temporarily moved out of town, for professional reasons. His brother became responsible for the rent collection. During Mphikeleli’s absence, the tenants stopped paying rent. As he no longer received money through lettings, he too, was unable to pay for site rentals. After nine months, the landowner demanded her land back. The rented site reverted to the landowner. Mphikeleli was also forced to evict his tenants and demolish the mud and wattle rental house. The corrugated iron sheets, window frames and doors were later removed. While he has reverted to the status of non-landlordism, he intends using these materials to again build a rental house elsewhere, resuming landlordism, if he is able to rent a site from another landowner.

8.9 Conclusion

The chapter has demonstrated the influence of type of tenure on both the production of low-income rental housing and the development of low-income landlords. Low-income landlords provide various types of rental accommodation. These may be rented rooms, houses, land and even a combination of more than one type. The type of accommodation they provide is found to be influenced by property size and land tenure. Where plots are very small, they affect the dwellings and rents. Rents also depend on the quality of materials used for construction and services. Where rental
housing is built of permanent structures, and with higher levels of services, higher rents are charged – higher than houses built of temporary materials.

Poverty among low-income landlords was explored, with an emphasis on subsistence landlords. They were shown to be constrained by low-incomes, and lower levels of education, and were thus concentrated in low-paid jobs. Land tenure was another constraint, dictating the building materials that could be used for rental housing construction, and services. As the rents depended on the scale of letting and plots sizes, subsistence landlords were also affected by plots. As a consequence, the rents derived from letting, though important to these households, were also affected. The landlords continued living in poverty.

Access to a second plot was shown to have been influenced by relations between landowner and non-landowner. However, access to more than a single plot was found in Caluza and St Wendollins. Subsistence landlords who had access to a second plot were found not to be financially better off than those with single plots, but the established land relations between owners and non-owners of land explained this variation among subsistence landlords.

Petty capitalist landlords were also found to live below the subsistence level. It was shown that access to a second plot was often through purchase and the motive for letting space was for capital expansion. However, changes in financial circumstances have also explained income variations and poverty among petty capitalist households. Therefore, for both subsistence and petty capitalist landlords, mere access to several plots, without any exploration of how these plots were acquired, what they are used for and income (including rents) within these forms of landlords may hide poverty in these households. It is therefore, possible to be an absentee landlord, and still be poor.

The informal land relationships between landowners and non-landowners had implications for the sustenance of landlordism. Where land was rented, this created constraints to the upward mobility of landlords. Even among landlords who were able to convert from one form of landlordism to another – such as a move towards
capitalist forms – conflicts between landowners and non-landowners were a cause of dissolution of landlordism. This also led to the reduction of rented stock, as houses had to be demolished. One other advantage of the informal land relationship was that it enabled a transition from those already renting space – from petty bourgeois to petty capitalist – by combining more than one form of access to land, such as rented land and gift land. It was also possible for petty capitalist landlords, already with full ownership of land, to use land rental as a means of expanding capital. Under these circumstances, it can be concluded that informal land relations dictate the conversion to landlordism, transition from one form of landlordism to another and its dissolution. All of these processes may also affect the production and expansion of rental housing since, if landlordism is based on land relationships, so are the rental accommodation they produce.
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUDING REMARKS

9.1 Introduction

The objective of the study was twofold: to explain the circumstances under which low-income landlords have developed in South Africa, and to use freehold land rights as a starting point in exploring the development of informal land relationships and locating forms of landlordism within these relationships.

Selecting freehold land rights settlements from others that originated in communal land tenure, leasehold tenure and without formal tenure, and informal arrangements was prompted by a desire to highlight the uniqueness of South African self-help settlements, some misunderstandings about landownership and landlord-tenant relationship. These have led the proponents of the tenancy school to use the landlord-tenant relationship as the basis for analysing the origins of rental, and to conclude that homeownership would be the solution to the landlord-tenant conflict. The emphasis of this study was on the positive contribution of these relationships to understanding the development of forms of landlordism.

The study of low-income landlords was designed to provide answers to the following research questions;

- What forms of landlordism operate in South African low-income settlements?
- Which form of landlordism dominate in these settlements?
- What prevents/promotes the conversion from one form of landlordism to another?

Apart from having to provide answers to the above-mentioned research questions, a hypothesis linked to the research questions was developed. The principal hypothesis is that State intervention in low-income settlements, observed during the implementation of land policies, transforms non-capitalist forms of access to land and contributes towards multiple-plot investment.
The choice of freehold tenure settlements, as case studies, has been able to prove the subhypothesis that State intervention in land policies, by granting freehold land rights, encourages the development of three forms of landlordism. At the upper level is a group of householders who will take advantage of the State’s promotion of freehold land rights by investing into multiple-plot ownership. At the lowest level are the low-income householders who will be restricted by their income from purchasing a plot with title and who are therefore forced to enter into informal land relationships. In the middle is a group of householders who enter into informal land relations voluntarily, not as a result of being priced out by the cost of plots with title.

The study of low-income landlords has found that there is a link between the promotion of freehold land tenure, the development of informal land relations and forms of landlordism. Three forms of landlordism, defined as subsistence, petty bourgeois and petty capitalist landlordism, were related to the land tenure system. Subsistence landlords were characterised by a lack of ownership of land, the petty capitalists were multiple-plot investors, and the petty bourgeois landlords who might be able to afford to invest in ownership of a plot, but choose to access land through informal land relations.

With regard to the dominant form of landlordism and the ability to convert from one form of landlordism to another, petty capitalist landlords were found to predominate in all the settlements studied. The ability to invest in a second plot (through purchase), changes in financial circumstances and the role of rents would determine conversion from one form of landlordism to another. This could apply to subsistence landlords, or the petty bourgeois who were converting to petty capitalist landlordism. The conversion can take place within the same form of landlordism and may not always be determined by income or the purchase of an additional plot. Conversion from an absentee to a residential subsistence form of landlordism can occur when informal land relations, underpinning access to a second plot (without purchase), come to an end; similarly, establishing ties with a landowner can explain the conversion from residential to absentee subsistence landlordism.
Further conclusions drawn from this study are reviewed under the following headings: low-income housing literature, concepts and relevance in South Africa, the role of Kumar's theoretical framework strengths and weaknesses in South African low-income settlements, land tenure systems, settlements formation and investments in low-income housing, land tenure and investments in low-income rental housing, tenure and forms of landlordism, and policy guidelines and future low-income rental housing studies. Policy guidelines shows how the study has the potential of avoiding inappropriate government policy interventions into low-income landlordism.

9.2 Low-income housing literature: concepts and relevance in South Africa

While the increasing number of studies focusing on informal settlements, site and services projects and upgraded settlements have advanced the understanding of the impact of the state's withdrawal on low-income housing production, other types of settlements have not been researched. Concepts and policies developed from studying these types of settlements have remained unchallenged.

The consumption oriented approaches, discussed in chapter one, associate low-income householders with the production of housing for consumption. Low-income householders are defined as tenants or homeowners paying little or no attention to their role as producers of low-income rental housing.

The concepts tenancy and homeownership have been used in the literature to explain the relation of a low-income householder to housing tenure, whether a home is owned or rented. When the concept tenancy was applied in South African settlements it had several meanings. Residents in freehold settlements can be classified into the following groupings. A landowner who has purchased land with freehold title (including those who may have inherited plots with title), a non-landowner who has no legal ownership of plot where his/her house is constructed, but rents a site from the landowner. A non-landowner can be regarded as a tenant, because he/she pays a monthly or yearly site rental to the landowner in order to use land. It is also up to the
non landowner how he/she uses the rental site for, it may be used for the construction of rented accommodation meaning that some non-landowners let space to tenants. The thesis finds that some householders could rent several sites from landowners and own plots with freehold title within or outside the settlement. When the concept tenancy is used to explain the householders’ relation to housing tenure (whether owned or rented) a distinction between tenants and homeowners does not always exist. In housing literature it means non-ownership of homes whereas in South Africa it means ownership of homes but not land. This means that a tenant and a homeowner could be the same person. When the concept was applied to low-income landlords, it became even more confusing. Low-income householders were found renting sites from landowners in order to built low-income rental housing. Some analytical problems are worth mentioning. To continue classifying low-income householders as either tenants or homeowners conceals a range of affordable low-income rental housing produced by these householders. Above all, tenants who are renting rooms can also be treated as non-existent. Another concept, widely used by tenancy studies is that of a sharer, who is defined as neither tenant nor homeowner. The cost of land has forced some families to share homes. A sharer is different from a tenant because he/she does not pay rent but simply shares space with relatives, next of kin and so on. However, sharers are expected to contribute to the household by buying food, paying bills and so on. The application of this concept in freehold settlements raised some conceptual problems. It was possible for some householders to share plots with landowners without being part of the landowner’s household. This situation has often arisen when the landowner allows or invites householders who may not always be related to him/her to share his property. The ‘ sharers ’ build their houses. Some let part of their homes to tenants, while others remained as low landlords. Chapter seven (section 7.2) illustrates how some householders have become sharers of plots.

Absentee landlords in the housing literature are associated with the ownership of several plots. The study of low-income landlords did not find any links between ownership of plots and the absentee form of landlordism. Subsistence, petty bourgeois and petty capitalist are three forms of landlord operating in freehold
settlements. Subsistence landlords do not own land but rent sites from landowners. Land tenure systems operating in these settlements have made it possible for subsistence landlords to rent more than one plot from the landowners. Others were found to have inherited houses on rented sites making them multiple owners of houses and not of land. Subsistence landlords are defined as low-income householders who have been priced out by the cost of land. Treating subsistence landlords as multiple-plot owners, would have implications for policies designed to promote and expand the production of low-income rental housing if such policies base their evidence on the number of plots held by subsistence landlords than on their relation to land, which is non-ownership.

The literature further associates multiple-plot ownership with wealth. Petty capitalist landlords are defined as low-income landlords who have a desire to expand capital, and have invested in several plots. Within petty capitalist landlords are those whose household income plus rental income put them below the poverty line, while others are heading households living above the poverty line. The study of low-income landlords has found that unless plots owned by petty capitalist landlords are used to explain petty capitalists’ position within the poverty line, plots on their own may indicate wealth within petty capitalists and non-static nature of this form of landlordism. It was found that tragedies such as job losses affected the financial position of petty capitalist landlords, reducing household incomes and forcing landlords to head households living below the poverty line despite the fact that they had invested in plots.

The structures and dwellings on plots are often used to describe the scale of letting and to categorise landlords. It is common among the residents in freehold settlements to have more than one structure on plots, such as a mud house and concrete built house. This symbolised the improvements of dwellings, a progression from temporary to permanent structures. Multiple structures on plots were observed among the low-landlords. Also, several structures on plots were common among low-income landlords who were either letting sites to householders or houses and sites.
Structures on plots did not always belong to landlords as householders who rent land from the landowners are expected to build their own houses.

Mobility, as defined by the consumption approaches means tenant eviction, mobility between two housing tenures, homeownership and tenancy. Rent paid by tenants to landlords in order to use space is regarded as the source of conflict between landlords and tenants. This leads to eviction and mobility of tenants. The study of landlords has found that there is no relation between the mobility of landlords and housing tenures. Mobility from residential to absentee subsistence landlord took place when a landlord was able to rent a second or a third plot from the landowner. Mobility led to the expansion of rental housing without actually changing the status of subsistence landlords, they continued living below the poverty line and their relation to land remained being that of non-ownership. Also, mobility within capitalist form of landlordism could be upward or downward. Downward mobility takes place when petty capitalists have income below the poverty line and upward mobility happens when the situation improves. Ownership of plots by petty capitalist landlords is not affected as they continue to operate as landlords, what is of more importance here is changes of income in relation to the poverty line than the relation of landlords to housing tenures. In freehold tenure settlements the researcher came across downward mobile landlords, who no longer had businesses while others had lost their jobs and so on. The dissolution of landlordism leading to the removal of rental housing was caused by the termination of informal land relations between the landlord and the landowner. Low-income rental housing constructed on land not owned by landlords ceased to exist when the landowner demanded his/her land back. The demolition of low-income rental housing contributed to tenants losing their homes. Evictions were caused by the removal of rental housing from the housing market and not by rents and conflicts between tenants and landlords. Dissolution of landlordism and the removal of low-income rental housing should all be seen within the context of the nature of landlordism which is a temporary phenomenon.

Consumption oriented approaches further link poverty with rents arguing that high rents charged by landlords force tenants into poverty. The study of low-income
landlords in South Africa has found no links between poverty and payment of rent. Poverty cut across low-income householders who were paying rent and those who were not. Some non-landlords owned land while others rented sites from landowners. Within this group, non-owners and owners of land were found heading households living below the poverty line. If the payment of rent is related to forms of landlord, poverty characterised petty capitalist households. It should be remembered that petty capitalist landlords are defined as landlords who have invested in plots and are therefore called multiple-owners. Some petty capitalist landlords were found heading households living below the poverty line even though they were not paying rent. Within the petty capitalist landlords are landlords who have purchased plots and also rent sites from landowners. If the analysis is limited to the payment of rent, on the grounds that landlords do not own sites, these landlords were found living above the poverty line despite the fact that they were rent-payers. Similarly, petty bourgeois landlords are landlords who chose to enter into informal land relations with landowners and pay rent, even if they can afford to own plots, they were all found living above the poverty line. Also, subsistence landlords who were not paying rent but sharing plots with landowners were found living below the poverty line. Poverty in South African settlements was not always explained by the fact that householders paid rent.

One of the values of undertaking a study of low-income landlords and their relation to land is that it minimises inappropriate government strategies on low-income landlords. Poverty characterised subsistence and petty capitalist landlords’ households. Therefore ownership of plots without relation to the household income can be misleading as it assumes homogeneity between petty capitalist landlords. Multiple plot ownership may be treated as similar to access to multiple plots. Subsistence landlords who have access to several plots may be treated as petty capitalist landlords. Petty capitalist landlords may be bypassed by strategies aimed at promoting the production of rental housing on the grounds that they own several plots. Some of the findings of this study are detailed in the following sections.
9.3 The role of Kumar's theoretical framework: strengths and weaknesses in South African low-income settlements

The study of low-income landlords, Kumar (1996) was the first to make low-income landlords the starting point. This study did not only focus on low-income landlords but presented a theoretical framework that can be used to analyse the development of low-income landlords. The strength of the theoretical framework is indicated, first, by its ability to distinguish between three forms of landlord. Kumar states that low-income landlords can be divided into three forms, subsistence, petty bourgeois and petty capitalists. Subsistence and petty bourgeois landlords are defined as landlords who own single plots whereas petty capitalist landlords own more than one plot. The consumption oriented approaches (chapter 1), distinguish between small and big landlords and the distinction between the two is based on the number of buildings, houses, and whether land on which houses have been built is inherited and so on. A second strength is the introduction of poverty line as a yardstick to highlight poverty and heterogeneity within low-income landlords. It should be remembered that under the consumption oriented approaches, landlordism suggests that low-income landlords were slightly better off than tenants and landlords viewed as a homogeneous group. Kumar's framework point out at the importance of the poverty line. As the minimum living level varies from country to country and even within the cities of the same country, Kumar argues that it is only when the income of low-income landlords is linked to the poverty line that we are able to show the heterogeneity between forms of landlord and the fact that it is possible for landlords to head households living below the poverty line. According to Kumar, subsistence landlords live below the poverty line while petty bourgeois and petty capitalists are living above the poverty line. Third, consumption oriented approaches regard rental income as the source of conflict between landlords and tenants. The mobility within tenant households is caused by rent increases. Rent is also defined as either high or low to reflect the rent as paid by the tenants. Kumar uses rental income to highlight its contribution and role to low-income landlords' households. Rental income is added to household income. It is possible that before rental income is added to the landlords' income, household income falls below the poverty line and when rental income is added, it has a
significant contribution to household income. Rental income and the landlord's income are the two factors determining the position of landlords within the poverty line. According to this perspective, rental income on its own is insignificant unless related to household income. To low-income landlords, rental income has a significant role despite the fact that some landlords are living below the poverty line. To petty bourgeois landlords, rental income is an important source of income used to purchase household items. To petty capitalist landlords, rental income is important as a means for capital expansion. Fourth, Kumar's perspective states that landlordism is a temporary phenomenon. Mobility between forms of landlord can either be downward or upward, sometimes leading to the dissolution of landlordism. Finally, because the perspective insists on using per capita income, rental income plus household income to define forms of landlord the perspective has been useful when applied in South Africa to detect heterogeneity even within the same form of landlordism, petty capitalist landlords.

Despite the strengths of this theoretical framework, it had limitations when applied to South African freehold tenure settlements. In South Africa it was possible for subsistence and petty capitalist landlords to live below the poverty line, whereas Kumar has defined petty capitalist landlords as low-income landlords whose rental income plus household income put them above the poverty line. According to Kumar, subsistence landlords own single plots. In South Africa, subsistence landlords do not own plots but it was possible for subsistence landlords to have access to more than one plot. Mobility, according to Kumar, takes place between forms of landlord, it can be an upward or downward, whereas in South African settlements mobility can take place between forms of landlord and within the same form of landlordism.

The inability of the perspective to explain the rise of petty capitalist landlords living below the poverty line and subsistence landlords with more than one plot can be explained by the following factors. First, Kumar's perspective was developed from an investigation of three types of settlement, an unimproved settlement on public land, an upgraded settlement and a site and service project. Second, the ways in which low-income householders access land in Madras are different from freehold
settlements in South Africa. The presence of missionary land, freehold land rights, residential and absentee landowners have made it possible for householders to use more than one method of accessing land. Land may be acquired through informal land relations, purchased from the formal land markets, landowners, and non-purchase including gift land. Several plots could be rented from different landowners. Third, ownership of a second plot in Madras involved purchase whereas in South Africa this was not always the case. There are restricted plot sizes in site and services projects preventing the development of informal land relations as noted in Madras. In Mogappair East, Madras, plot sizes ranged between 36 and 44 square metres whereas in South Africa, plot sizes ranged between 400 and 85,000 square metres in Winterveld. Because of large plots in freehold settlements, it was common to find different forms of land relations in a single plot. Some plots were occupied by the landowners; some families rented sites from the landowner, on which they had built their houses; some householders occupied houses built by the landowner, and paid rent; some families owned a joint plot with the landowner. Some of these householders were non-landlords while others were landlords. Fourth, in order to explain why some low-income householders produce housing for rent while others do not, Kumar used three categories: tenants, landlords and low landlords. The research undertaken in South Africa focused on the relation of low-income householders to land, whether owned or not. The three settlements selected as case studies are freehold tenure settlements. St Wendolins is a missionary settlement which demonstrates the physical involvement of the church for a number of years, as a landowner, negotiator and an intermediary between residents and government. Winterveld demonstrates the effects of government’s clearance and homeland policies and the purchasing of land from the speculative companies. Caluza had originated as a result of land being made accessible by a speculative market. The objective was to explain how land policies in South Africa had been responsible for the development of informal land relationships, forms of landlord and a three tier system where landowners may let sites to low-income householders who built rental housing which is let to individual or tenant households. The category of tenant, discussed in the previous section, was found to be inappropriate in South African situation because it concealed the development of informal land relations. The usage of the concept of tenancy in these settlements
would have had implications for the study of low-income landlords leading to less recognition of low-income householders as providers of low-income rental housing.

When this perspective was applied in South African freehold settlements it was incapable of distinguishing between multiple-plot ownership and access to multiple plots. Access to multiple plots can take place without householders owning plots. Fifth, mobility according to Kumar takes place between different forms of landlord. In South Africa, mobility was possible even within the same form of landlordism. Sixth, the usage of the concept absentee form of landlordism applies to petty capitalist landlords since they own more than one plot. The absentee form of landlordism was found among subsistence landlords. It can also be argued that petty bourgeois landlords have the potential of becoming absentee landlords, if one takes into consideration the fact that petty bourgeois have voluntarily entered into informal land relations. Nothing could prevent a petty bourgeois landlord from having access to multiple plots and even purchasing a single plot while renting other plots from landowners. Finally, the perspective was unable to explain the persistence of poverty and heterogeneity among petty capitalists landlords.

Some policy implications arising from Kumar’s perspective when applied to South African freehold tenure settlements are worth mentioning. Because this perspective failed to recognise the changing nature of petty capitalist landlords some of whom may live below the poverty line, strategies aimed at promoting the expansion of rental housing, by petty capitalist landlords that do not distinguish between two forms of petty capitalist landlords may have a negative effect on petty capitalists living below the poverty line. There are differences between land tenure systems. For instance, the expansion of rental housing in Madras requires landlords to undertake vertical expansion whereas in South Africa, landlords do not always construct rental housing as they may let sites to low-income householders. Strategies promoting large plot sizes would enable landlords to expand rental housing by, for instance, providing various types of rented accommodation, land rentals, letting rooms, letting land and houses and encouraging informal land relations; such strategies would be more appropriate in
South Africa than in Madras. This shows some implications of Kumar’s perspective when developed from studying site and service schemes in South Africa.

The study of low-income landlords in South Africa aimed at explaining the development of landlords by using land tenure as the starting point. Household income plus rental income were used to define forms of landlord and their relation to the poverty line. The categories of subsistence, petty bourgeois and petty capitalist landlords were adhered to, as developed by Kumar. In order to differentiate between low-income landlords who had acquired plots for the purpose of expanding capital from those who did not invest in plots, two concepts were adopted, investment and non-investment in plots. Investment here means the purchase of plots with freehold title, while non-investment means access to several plots without purchase. Access to multiple-plots is similar to non-investment because the mode of accessing plots have involved non-purchase whereas multiple plot ownership is linked with investment in plots. Subsistence landlords were defined as landlords who have not invested in plots since the method of accessing plots is usually non-purchase, including renting sites from landowners whereas petty capitalists have actually invested in plots with the intention of constructing rental housing. It was therefore possible to differentiate between subsistence and petty capitalist landlords living below the poverty line. Residential and absentee forms of landlordism applied to subsistence and petty capitalist landlords. Residential subsistence landlords were found either sharing houses with tenants or living without tenants. Absentee subsistence landlords had access to more than one plot, with the second and third plot occupied by tenants. Similar findings were observed among petty capitalist landlords. Some petty capitalists landlords were found to have invested in plots and rent sites from landowners in order to construct rented accommodation. Mobility from residential to absentee subsistence landlordism happened when the landlord had access to a second plot without purchasing it. Finding a landowner willing to let a second site to a subsistence landlord was detrimental to mobility. Downward mobility, and even the dissolution of subsistence form of landlordism was influenced by the informal land relations between the landowner and the non-landowner. Unlike the subsistence landlords, dissolution of petty capitalist landlords were not always explained by the land relations. Petty
capitalist landlords who have built rental housing on rented plots can be required to demolish rental housing when the informal land relations established between the petty capitalists and the landowners are terminated. Because petty capitalists also own plots, this may lead to the reduction of rental housing stock and rental income without affecting this form of landlordism. They may continue operating as petty capitalist landlords.

Despite the differences between Madras, where the perspective was developed and South Africa, where a recent study of low-income landlords has been undertaken, these two studies complement each other. Both studies have focused on low-income landlords and have made significant contributions to the literature on low-income housing, definitions and the conceptualisation of landlords. These studies insist that housing literature should refrain from using buildings, houses to describe landlords. In South Africa, it was also found that even the number of plots held by landlords was not a reflection of wealth because even landlords who had several plots lived below the poverty line.

The number of plots held, no account being taken of whether or not they had been purchased, was found to be an inadequate tool to define landlords. Subsistence landlords had access to several plots but were poor, plots were not owned but rented from landowners. What has been learned from the study of landlords in South Africa is that multiple-plot ownership is not a reflection of wealth and exploitation of poorer households. Poverty is found among multiple plot owners (petty capitalist landlords). Low-income rental housing policies should take into consideration the changing nature of low-income landlords, for instance, today’s petty capitalist living below the poverty line could be the future petty capitalist living above the poverty line and vice versa. Strategies aimed at promoting the production of low-income rental housing should be flexible enough to acknowledge diversities within the same form of landlordism. Another contribution made by this study is to the concept of mobility, the non-static and temporary nature of landlordism. State intervention in land policies, by regulating the number of plots individuals may own, impact on low-income landlords. While this leads to the reduction of rental housing and eviction of tenants, the effects
may vary from one form of landlordism to another. Subsistence landlords would be
denied rental income, the most important source of income to these households.

The promotion of homeownership and landownership is often stated as the objective
for state intervention in land policies. One of the contributions made by the study of
low-income landlords on housing literature has been on the impact of state
intervention in land policies. It was found that state intervention in low-income
settlements by granting freehold landrights to low-income householders did not lead
to the universal ownership of land by low-income householders. Instead, ownership
of land has become unattainable to some householders leading to the development of
informal land relations between landowners and non-landowners as poorer
householders are priced out by the cost of land. Informal land tenures, previously
associated with the lack of investment in low-income housing, has become the
easily accessible form of land among the poorer householders in freehold settlements.
In South African freehold settlements ownership of land is increasingly separated
from ownership of housing as some householders are forced to built houses on land
that is not legally owned.

9.4 Land-tenure systems, settlement formation and investment in low-income
housing

There are various ways in which low-income householders access land in the three
settlements studied. These include land purchased from the land markets, whereby the
purchaser has full ownership of land, having been granted a freehold title deed. Land
can also be purchased from landowners selling unused land, a portion of their land or
land previously occupied by tenants. The purchaser acquires freehold title. Access to
land may involve non-purchase, having been offered as a gift. This method was
common in the St Wendollins settlement, where 36 per cent did not pay for land but
had been allowed by the Church, the former landowner, to continue using the land.
Non-purchase of land was not confined to land offered as gift, it was possible for
householders to inherit freehold title. Renting sites from landowners was found to be
the common method of accessing land by landlords and non-landlords. Of low-income-
landlord householders 16 per cent had used this method – 66 per cent in Caluza, 25 per
cent in Winterveld and nine per cent in St Wendollins. When non-landlords are
considered, the figure is 62 per cent in the three settlements – 46 per cent in Caluza, 45
per cent in Winterveld, and nine per cent in St Wendollins. A combination of methods
of accessing land was possible, such as among individuals who had purchased land on
which their houses had been constructed, and who at the same time rented sites from
single or several landowners. Combinations of accessing land through non-purchase,
receiving it as a gift, and site rental were also found.

A review of literature on low-income housing production and self-help housing
emphasises the role of land-tenure regularisation in home improvements, including
houses constructed in site-and-services schemes and upgrading of existing houses. It
has been said that low-income householders are likely to invest more in housing if
tenure is secure (Kool et al, 1989; Martin, 1983). Settlement improvements include
state provision of services such as water supply, access to electrical cables, and
infrastructure that cannot be provided by the householders.

A number of factors explained the variations in low-income housing investments, the
formation of settlement and the distribution of services. It was found that the granting
of freehold land rights to householders had the potential of leading to unequal
provision of services such as water supply, improved methods of sanitation, refuse
removal and the connection of houses to electrical cables, and that the ability to access
improved services, and invest in low-income housing will vary between and within
settlements. These variations will depend on the number of factors, such as
government policies on land, the relationship between owners and non-owners of land,
and changes in investment will reflect attitudinal changes among landowners and non-
landowners. The distribution of landownership within three settlements show that 61
per cent of all landlords are freehold title-deed holders – in Caluza 24 per cent, 30 per
cent in St Wendollins and 46 per cent in Winterveld. In respect of non-landlords, 55
per cent in Caluza, 45 per cent in Winterveld and in 64 per cent in St Wendollins have
been offered land as a gift. These include church tenants and those who might have
purchased land, but without title deeds. The distribution of access to water supply
services among title-deed holders, indicated by improved toilet facilities, shows that more than half (52 per cent) have flushing toilets in Caluza, whereas in both St Wendollins and Winterveld only 3 per cent have them. The variations in access to services observed between settlements can be explained by the conflicting administrative policies adopted by the government regarding these settlements. In certain parts of Caluza, self-initiated septic tanks, some privately and others publicly maintained, had been the norm. This had led to a high percentage of householders having access to this facility. In St Wendollins and Winterveld, this had never been the case, as it had been regulated by the then municipality assigned the duty of administering these settlements. Also, access to improved toilet facilities should be understood, and is determined by householders’ access to a standpipe connection. Flushing toilets cannot exist without a standpipe water connection on plots. In Caluza, prior to the commencement of house construction, connecting a plot to a standpipe was a prerequisite for owners of the land. In Winterveld and St Wendollins, connecting plots to a water connection was never a prerequisite. With the former it characterised householders located at the periphery of a formal township, where pipeline connection was in fact possible. The same was found with respect to access to electricity. In Winterveld 74 per cent of landowners had no access to electricity; services used included generators, while the majority used paraffin, firewood and coal. Access to these services were determined by the location of plots within the pipeline systems, and electrical cables. The further away the sites were from the main road, the less likely it was that landowners would have access to the services, despite the services having being made available in the settlement. Therefore, houses had no waterborne sewerage. Instead, pit latrines, wells and boreholes are still prevalent. In Winterveld, 94 per cent of landowners used pit latrines, despite being freehold title deed holders. Also, if home improvements like a water-supply system is considered, few had a water-supply connection. However, it is argued that, where access to these facilities is improved, such as by the government’s initiative to make them available settlement-wide, the relationship between ownership of land and access to improved services will be clear in Winterveld and St Wendollins, but less evident in Caluza, where informal land relations play a major role. During the research, it was observed that, in St Wendollins, where the option of connecting houses to standpipes and to electrical cables had recently been
made available to low-income householders, only the owners of land had seized the opportunity to have it done. This confirms the argument made earlier on that ownership of land has the potential of leading to unequal access to resources. The point is further expanded upon in Section 9.5, where the quality of rental housing is considered.

State intervention in low-income housing production and confining its activities to providing infrastructural services has been subjected to various interpretations. It is often argued that land regularization leads to an increase in land values. Land regularization goes hand-in-hand with settlement improvements such as the introduction of garbage-removal services, improved transportation systems, the recognition of residents as ratepayers through incorporation into the municipal rate-payment system, and so on. The study found that land regularization by granting freehold land rights to individual households could take place without citizens actually enjoying the benefits of improvements. Again, this should be understood within the historical developmental framework and the rules governing the administration of these settlements. In Winterveld neither the introduction of a garbage-collection system nor the incorporation of residents into rate-paying systems has taken place, despite the age and legal status of the settlement. It was found that in Caluza and St Wendollins landowners were paying rates and the residents even enjoying some benefits from settlement upgrading, with regular refuse-removal services. Houses in Winterveld were still separated by footpaths, and there were no proper roads. From the discussion presented so far, it can be concluded that freehold land rights may mean unequal access to services, dictated by the historical development of settlements, and the distribution and location of sites. These further explains some variations in house improvements.

Income, occupation, forms of household and age were found not to be adequate enough to explain investment made in housing. Low-income householders occupy a range of houses that differ in the quality of materials used for constructing walls, as well as in the services provided, such as electricity, running water, flushing toilets, bathrooms, and so on. The physical appearance of these houses further denotes variations in the investments made by the householders. During the production
process, the forms of labour, whether paid or unpaid, or a combination of the two, and
the type of materials used also denote some form of investment made by the
householders. No relationship was found between income of the householder and the
investment in low-income housing production. This is explained by the complexity of
the production itself. The production of low-income housing is often undertaken in
stages. It may take years for the construction process to be completed. Sometimes
houses may be occupied prior to the completion of the construction. Other houses
never reach completion. The income considered is that of the householder and
excludes the contributions of other members, who might have contributed in cash, or
otherwise, during the construction. It was found that self-help housing production can
involve members of the extended family. Financing the construction can also mean
borrowing from employers, friends, moneylenders, and so on. In some cases income
may not always reflect involvement in the construction process, as the dwelling may
have been inherited. Low-income earners were found to have invested in durable
materials for constructing walls. A similar situation was also found for high-income
earners. Householders earning similar incomes were also found to have invested in
different types of materials for constructing the walls.

There was no relationship between the types of occupation and the investments made
in housing. Inhabitants of the three settlements studied were employed in a variety of
occupations characterised by irregular incomes, such as hawking, seasonal
employment, all forms of informal activities and activities ranging from semi-
professional to professional jobs. Investments in housing, indicated by the use of
temporary materials such as mud, as well as permanent materials, brick and concrete
blocks, cut across all types of occupation. Landlords relying on an irregular income,
such as hawkers, were found to have invested in durable materials. When the three
settlements are considered, only two per cent of the variations in building materials
was explained by occupation in Winterveld, and less than one per cent in both St
Wendollins and Caluza. Similar findings were observed among non-landlords.

Three forms of household were found in freehold settlements. These are nuclear
households, those headed by single men and women, and those headed by widows and

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widowers. Nuclear households predominated in the three settlements, whether they were households headed by landlords or non-landlords. In Caluza, 71 per cent of households headed by landlords or non-landlords were nuclear households, with 64 per cent in St Wendollins, and 88 per cent in Winterveld. Forms of household did not influence the investment made in housing. Nuclear households, households headed by single men and women, and widows and widowers were all found to have invested in permanent structures.

The study found that housing investment is not related to the age of the householder. The youngest landlord found in these settlement was aged 23 and the oldest 103. The median age for landlords in the three settlements is 58 years in Caluza, 59 in St Wendollins and 61 in Winterveld. There is evidence in both the literature and the findings of the study that self-help housing production is a long process, requiring householders to build in stages and even occupy makeshift structures. South African settlements were no exception, with 25 per cent of the landlords in Winterveld and St Wendollins admitting to having occupied shacks during the construction process. To others, the process had lasted for years, since the purchasing of building materials, hiring of labour was tied to household income. Although the occupation of shacks indicated some improvements in housing production, from shack to semi-permanent and permanent structures, the progression was not related to the age of the landlord. For instance, there was no relationship between the age of the landlord and the quality of materials used for constructing walls. It was not uncommon to come across householders who had reached retirement age – 60 years and above – but who were still living in unimproved houses constructed of mud and wattle, without a connection to electricity or a water standpipe, and using pit latrines. It was found that investment in housing is not explained by the age of the householder, as both young and old householders may choose to invest in similar or different forms of material for construction. Age could explain less than one per cent of the variations in housing investments in all three settlements. A similar situation was found with the number of years householders had spent in the settlement. There was no evidence that those who had lived longer in the settlement had used more durable building materials for construction. Non-landlords who had lived in the settlement for 10 to 20 years were
found to have used brick for house construction whereas those who had lived there for 25 to 40 years still occupied houses built of mud and wattle. Similar findings were observed among landlords. These variations were best explained by the origin of the settlement, government policies towards the settlements, and not merely by the granting of freehold land rights.

The relationship between landowners and non-landowners was found to have the potential of influencing the investment in low-income housing production (Chapter 7). To both landlords and non-landlords it meant access to land is neither mediated by formal institutions, nor directly governed by capitalist land markets. The most common method of securing a plot in these settlements required an introduction of a prospective plot seeker to the landowner by a well-established resident of the settlement. Access to a plot was determined by the ability of the individual householder to pay site rental. There were no formal land agreements; access to a rented plot was a temporary phenomenon that could be terminated any time when the landowner needed land for other purposes. These land arrangements were characterised by two forms of landownership, absentee landownership, involving living on the same settlement but on a different plot from those occupied by tenants, those living outside the settlement and resident landowners sharing plots with tenants. Home improvements were influenced by whether the landowner lived in the settlement or not, and the relationship between landowner and non-landowners. In the three settlements studied, the use of permanent building materials for constructing walls by non-landowners was rare, unless the non-landowners were related to the landowners who occupied jointly owned plots, or who had inherited a house built on legally owned plots. The investment made in houses by connecting them to electricity was found to be higher among non-landowners in Caluza (68 per cent), than in St Wendollins (42 per cent) and Winterveld (only 10 per cent). House connection to electricity by owners of temporary structures in Winterveld only took place when the non-landowner was related to the landowner. In Caluza and in St Wendollins it took place on sites where landowners lived outside the settlement, and their whereabouts were unknown, and among the former church tenants of St Wendollins. In this case, the church, formerly the landowner, has allowed householders to stay free. When the connection of houses to standpipes is considered, four out of five householders in Caluza have standpipe connections. No non-landowners were
found to have standpipes in their yards in Winterveld and St Wendollins. This was the preserve of landowners. Home improvements in Caluza were also found to be influenced by the communication between landowners and the non-landowners, albeit the former in an absentee form. Although most Caluza landowners lived outside the settlement and their properties were managed by intermediaries like caretakers, lawyers and so on, constant dialogue between landowners and non-landowners and the fact that most landowners continued to maintain ties with the settlement, hold regular meetings with non-landowners, and participate in social activities, helped to create a conducive climate for negotiations to take place, which also led to improvements in the houses. Apart from these relations leading to home improvements, a considerable number of non-landowners were in a process of purchasing sites on which their houses had been constructed from the landowners.

The ability of low-income householders to improve their homes should be understood beyond the provision of services and freehold title. Services may be available in the settlement, but not under-utilised by residents. This was explained by land tenure relationships, location of sites, established contacts between landowners and non-landowners and the absentee form of landownership. Differences between settlements existed. In Winterveld, ownership of land was a strong determinant for the lack of improvement. In Caluza and St Wendollins, where landowners lived outside the settlement, there had been a significant improvement in houses. The conclusions drawn by this study so far is that it is clear that there no single policy strategy could be applicable to the three settlements. Whatever the strategies adopted by government, they should seek to understand the causes of differential investment and home improvements, and acknowledge the role of these land relationships. In Winterveld, strategies geared towards the spreading of services to all parts of the settlement will mean that both landowners and non-landowners have access to water supply although, in Winterveld, it is only landowners who would be able to connect houses to standpipes, and to electricity. Ownership of land in Winterveld could be another appropriate strategy leading to home improvement. Most people who have not upgraded their houses rent the land. Therefore, land relationships and the role of landowners cannot be ignored. Some strategies that will encourage negotiation
between the landowners and non-landowners could be another option for trying to improve low-income housing within the existing land-tenure systems. However, these should be treated with caution because official intervention in sensitive issues like land, could create conflict between landowners and non-landowners and may be interpreted by others as a strategy designed by the government to transfer land from landowners to non-landowners. This could be met with resistance by the landowners.

9.5 Land tenure and investments in low-income rental housing

The study found that ownership of land by landlords does not always imply high investment in rental housing, leading to high quality. Landlords who had purchased land in Winterveld and St Wendollins were found to have invested less in the production of rental housing, despite the fact that land was legally owned. 80 per cent of rental housing provided by landlords owning land were built of temporary materials, mud and wattle. In St Wendollins, 41 per cent of houses are build of mud and wattle, 15 per cent are mud and cement houses. In Caluza, 23 per cent of rental housing is constructed of mud and wattle and 3 per cent mud and cement. If the use of durable materials is considered, over half of landowners in Caluza provide rental accommodation built of brick and blocks, whereas in Winterveld and St Wendollins, title deed holders rarely use brick, only 3 per cent of houses fall under this category. It cannot always be generalised that freehold title deed will lead to the production of quality rental housing, increasing rents and leading to the eviction of tenants. Instead, landowners were found to have provided a range of rental accommodation varying in quality and rents. For instance, landowners were found providing rented sites, not taking part in the construction of houses because tenants are expected to build their houses. 8 per cent of landowners rent sites. 40 per cent in Caluza, 50 per cent in Winterveld and 10 per cent in Winterveld. It was also common for a landowner to rent sites, houses to individual tenant households and rooms. For instance 59 per cent rented land and houses. Rented houses were found to vary with materials used for constructing walls and in services, like water supply, sanitation methods, electricity and facilities such as kitchen, bathrooms, garages and so on. So what landownership does
is to increase the choice among tenant households by varying the types of rental accommodation provided, the quality of such housing and the rents charged.

The influence of land tenure on the quality of rental housing varied with settlements. For instance, the variations in the quality of walls, services provided like water and sanitation, electricity were explained by tenure in Winterveld. Land tenure explains 29 per cent variations in materials used for constructing walls for rental housing, 13 per cent in Caluza and 3 per cent in St Wendollins. When access to services is considered, such as the ability to provide improved services to rental housing, water connection, electricity, land tenure had more influence in Winterveld than in the other two settlements. 62 per cent of improved sanitation methods in Winterveld were explained by tenure, 13 per cent in Caluza and 2 per cent St Wendollins. Land tenure was also important in Winterveld determining the improvement in houses resulting from water connection. Tenure explained 32 per cent of the variations. In St Wendollins and Caluza, tenure had least influence. The causes of great influence of tenure in the quality of rental housing is related to the origins on landlordism in this settlement. Landlordism in Winterveld is very much influenced by the ownership of land whereas, in Caluza, landlords did not have to own land in order to electrify homes and have water connection. This was determined by the relationship between landowner and non-landowner and whether the latter lived in the settlement or not. Also, other methods of accessing land in St Wendollins, such as non-purchase of land, the presence of Church land, which was accessible with or without purchase has meant that a significant number of householders may have no title deeds, yet they regard themselves as 'landowners' either because they have been allowed to stay free or they have purchased land but were not issued with freehold title deeds. It meant several means of accessing land than in Winterveld, where a clear cut exist between landowners and non-landowners, the former with the title deed and the latter renting sites.

Plot sizes were found to be another factor influencing the production of low-income rental housing. Plot sizes determine dwellings that could be constructed for rent and the extent in which landlords can vary types of accommodation provided. Small plots holders are limited by the size of plots and can only provide rented rooms whereas
large plot holders were found proving rented land, houses and rooms to tenants. Plot sizes therefore, have significance in rental housing expansion and tenant households benefiting. Plot sizes are influenced by tenure. Large plot owners are title deed owners. Dwellings on plots increased with ownership of land and decreased with non-landownership. This was found to be the case in all three settlements, where land is rented, though with varying degrees. Where land is rented from the landowner in Winterveld, dwellings on plots rarely exceeded one. Where properties have been purchased, the average dwellings on plots was higher than 17, average difference of 16 between those owning and renting plots. In Caluza, the mean difference in dwellings between landowners and non-landowners is less than one. Even when the comparison is limited to the purchasers and inheritors of land. In St Wendollins, the mean difference of dwellings when all forms of land tenure are considered is 3. The strongest influence of land tenure in Winterveld is explained by the largest plots compared to the two settlements. The smallest plot in Winterveld, owned by 51 per cent of landowners, is a 43 000 square metre plot. The rest owning between 85 000 to 127 000 square metre plots. 82 per cent of landowners in Caluza, owned not more than 8 140 square metre plots, the rest owning no more than 12 141 square metre plots each. A third owned between 10 000 and 86 000 square metre plot, only 8 per cent had plots above 43 000 square metres. Multiple plot ownership in Winterveld further increased the acreage. Site renting to tenants was the common method of deriving rents in Winterveld 94 per cent rent land and houses, while 2 per cent rent sites only. One third of landowners of St Wendollins rent land and houses, 7 per cent in Caluza, and 10 per cent rent sites only. Other avenues of accessing land found in St Wendollins and Caluza, such as the tendency of non-landowners to combine more than one method of accessing land like renting plots and non-purchase of land, gift, renting plots from different landowners, inheriting untitled plots have made it possible for non-landowners to have increased the number of dwellings without legal ownership of land. Unlike in Winterveld where householders renting sites are allowed to have one plot and a construction of a dwelling utilised by the householder, in Caluza and St Wendollins, the construction of more than one dwelling on a rented plot was permissible. The implication of tenure to rental housing expansion has also meant that in order to increase rental housing supply in Caluza and St Wendollins householders may not
always require ownership of land as they are able to increase dwellings by combining more than one method of accessing land. It can also mean that strategies for promoting rental housing expansion in Winterveld may be unlike those in Caluza and St Wendollins. Strategies promoting ownership of land in Winterveld could prove to be more successful. Land tenure explains 48 per cent of the variations in dwellings, with five per cent in St Wendollins and three per cent in Caluza.

Ownership of land, government intervention at all levels in housing provision, and particularly, securing unsecured tenure is often associated with the negative impact these aspects have on consumers of low-income rental housing and the positive impact on producers of rental housing. The former are expelled, rents increase, and the producers seize the opportunity of increasing the number of dwellings constructed for rent. The findings confirm that freehold land right title alone, without any consideration of other methods of accessing land that may have developed within freehold tenure in the settlement, is incapable of explaining why, for instance, non-owners of land have been able to increase dwelling construction. The role of tenure in explaining dwellings varied, even within freehold land right settlements, and was strongest in Winterveld. Also, dwellings were found to be related to plot size. Large plots allowed the construction of more than one dwelling, with tenure explaining such variation. Freehold title holders had larger plots than those renting sites. So what could be constructed on plots was a function of land tenure and plot size.

Land tenure was found to dictate the type of rental accommodation. Renting land to tenants required landlords to have large plots. Of the types of rental accommodation, 24 per cent in Winterveld were explained by plot size, and 19 per cent in St Wendollins and Caluza. Where land was not owned, rental accommodation in the form of rented rooms was provided. The influence of tenure on types of rental accommodation also varied with settlements, with the strongest being in Winterveld (45 per cent), with 12 per cent in Caluza and 7 per cent in St Wendollins. The average plot-size difference between those providing rental land and houses to those who let rooms in Winterveld is 59 112.50 square metres. In St Wendollins, the mean difference in square metres between those renting land to tenants and those renting rooms is 11 025, and between
those renting land and houses compared to landlords’ renting rooms is 19 000. Caluza has a mean difference of 8 270 square metres between those renting rooms and those combining land and house rentals. Property size was found to have no influence on the quality of rental housing.

9.6 Land tenure and forms of landlordism

Freehold title is not a prerequisite for the development of landlordism. In line with low-income rental housing studies that have found low-income landlords operating in squatter settlements (Amis, 1984; Gilbert et al., 1997) and government-owned land (Watson, 1991), ownership of land is not a requirement to become a landlord in South African settlements. In the three freehold tenure settlements studied, 61 per cent of the landlords own land, 16 per cent rented land from landowners and others were found who neither owned nor rented land, yet were landlords.

A number of low-income rental studies emphasise the role of rents in the conversion process. Low-income householders become landlords with the incentive of deriving rents from renting space. There are two ways in which these studies have arrived at an explanation of relating rent to the number of tenants – the time it has taken landlords to make profits based on the equivalence of rents to the minimum salary, and the percentage of rent to landlords' income. Gilbert and Varley (1991) explain:

Two landlords, with sixteen and thirty tenants, respectively, receive the equivalent of seven times the minimum salary, although the average for those with between ten and thirty tenants was around four times the minimum salary.

The study of low-income landlords in three settlements found that, unless the contribution of rents is related to the production process, the quality of housing and per capita income, it does little to further our understanding of the conversion of low-income householders into different forms of landlordism. Rents are influenced by the investment low-income householders have made in housing production. These three
settlements are characterised by various types of low-cost housing. Each type is
differentiated by the materials used for construction and labour. Some houses were
built of temporary materials (mud and wattle, or mud and cement), and others of
permanent materials (brick and blocks). The builders of temporary structures are often
multipurpose builders, skills acquired informally. Other tasks, like ukugaxa,
ukubhanda, and ukugandyaya imply the extensive use of unpaid labour, involving
women, children and other voluntary unpaid labour, or ilima. Under these conditions,
temporary structures became less expensive to produce in comparison to permanent
ones, for which specialised labour was required (builders, carpenters, plumbers and
electricians). Builders are required to build according to specification, with the house
being inspected as to its ability to withstand fire and water hazards. Therefore, in terms
of labour and finance, the construction of these forms of houses illustrates differential
investment, permanent structures being more expensive to produce.

Investment in a particular type of material for constructing walls was found to be
explained by land-tenure systems. There was a tendency to invest more in housing if
land was owned than when it was rented. This was of significance to landlords who
had used a variety of methods of accessing land, such as combining site rental and land
purchase. This pattern of investment not only influenced the quality of rental housing
but affected services provided to rented housing and rents. The use of permanent
structures was often, but not always, associated with a high level of service. Landlords
were more likely to provide high-quality rental accommodation, with services such as
bathrooms, flushing toilets, shared kitchens, garages, electrically heated water, and so
on, for permanent structures than for temporary structures. Rents charged varied with
materials used for construction as well as the services provided. So, the higher the
quality of materials and services, the higher the rents tenants would have to pay.
Landlords were also found to adopt various strategies of charging rents, including the
age of tenant, room sizes and what was being rented – for instance, whether it was
land. This was found to be the case even on jointly owned plots. Rents varied even
within settlements. In Winterveld, landowners renting sites were charging between R5
and R15 per month, and those who were renting commercial sites R600. In Caluza,
some landowners were charging site rentals of R60 to R240 per annum, and R25 to
R30 a month. The influence of rents on landlords' incomes was also affected by whether tenants were paying rent or not. A significant number of landlords were no longer receiving rents. This cut across all settlements, and applied particularly to landlords renting land, whether residential or absentee landlords.

Rents are also influenced by plot size, which explains 21 per cent of the variations in rents in Winterveld and to varying degrees those in Caluza and St Wendollins. As previously noted, plot size dictated the type of rental accommodation. Large plots allowed landlords to derive rents by combining various types of rental accommodation, renting rooms, houses, land, and land and houses. It was found that basing our conclusions solely on average rental income, without taking into consideration the land tenure system, concealed rental-income differences which could be explained by tenure. In Winterveld, for instance, the average rental income when all forms of landlordism are considered, was R753.04. When tenure is considered, low-income landlords disaggregated according to land tenure systems. The average rental income of landlords who did not own land, but simply rented it from the landowner, was R35, a difference of R618 being made by tenure. Therefore, rents cannot be explained by type of tenant. Rental income was found to be a function of several factors – land tenure, plot size, and type and quality of rental accommodation provided.

The contribution of rents to landlords' incomes, based on a percentage, was found inadequate to explain conversion to landlordism. Income is influenced by occupation and regularity of income, whether full-time, part-time or seasonal. Income is also influenced by the type of occupation, age, education and the skills required by the job. Even within the same occupation, income may vary widely, determined by these factors. The average settlement income difference between unskilled labourers and business owners is R2656.33 in Caluza, R1137.13 in St Wendollins, and R836.60 in Winterveld. The difference in income of landlords in professional jobs and unskilled labourers was R719.89 in Caluza, R687.81 in Winterveld and R153.83 in St Wendollins. Even within the same form of landlordism, income was influenced by education. When the average income of petty capitalist landlords with a primary-school
education and those educated to a postgraduate level were compared, a difference of R1 582 was found.

In line with the previous study of low-income landlords (Kumar, 1992; 1996), it was found that when rents are related to per capita income we are able to differentiate between forms of landlordism – landlords heading poverty-stricken households and those living above the poverty line. Three forms of landlordism operate in freehold tenure settlements – subsistence, petty bourgeois and petty capitalist landlords, with 28 per cent being subsistence landlords. Poverty within these households was evident according to educational level. Few had post-secondary school education (only 5 per cent) and the majority had primary-school levels of education. Over 40 per cent were pensioners with very low incomes, with an average settlement income of only R370 in Caluza, R322 in St Wendollins and R202 in Winterveld. The significance of poverty was noted when related to ways in which they had accessed plots. Few had purchased plots, renting sites from landowner. Petty bourgeois landlords were found in Caluza and Winterveld, and were leading a better life than the subsistence landlords. A large percentage were educated to secondary-school level (43 per cent) and 14 per cent had university qualifications. Because of their educational level, their income (excluding rents) was higher: R1 464 was the average income in Caluza and R757 in Winterveld. Income (excluding rents) was four times that of the subsistence landlords. The form of household was not adequate enough to explain poverty among subsistence households. Nuclear households cut across all forms of landlordism – 79 per cent of petty capitalist landlords’ families, 76 per cent of the petty bourgeois and 63 per cent of the subsistence landlords’ families.

It was also found that forms of landlordism were best explained when related to income (including rents and land tenure), the manner in which second plots were acquired and the use they were to be put to. Absentee landlords have often been described in the literature according to a scale of letting, namely the plots held. Gilbert and Varley (1991:134) referred to them as those owning more than one plot. This was also noted by Basset and Short (1980), while Pennant (1990) refers to ownership of more than two buildings. Another common yardstick for defining absentee landlordism

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has been exploitation, large profits and the eviction of tenants (Amis, 1984). If the explanation is restricted to access to more than one plot and buildings, as portrayed in the literature, this should be revealed by the findings of the study.

It was found that low-income landlords could have access to several plots and buildings and yet be poor. Absentee landlords were found among subsistence and petty capitalist landlords, 25 per cent being subsistence landlords. In Caluza and St Wendollins 32 per cent were subsistence landlords, and in St Wendollins and Caluza 29 per cent. Petty capitalist landlords comprised 63 per cent, and were predominant in all three settlements – 85 per cent in Winterveld, 51 per cent in St Wendollins, and 50% in Caluza). Seventeen per cent of petty capitalist landlords lived below the poverty line – 39 per cent in St Wendollins, 12 per cent in Caluza and nine per cent in Winterveld.

The distribution of plots revealed 75 per cent own three plots, one-third of those in St Wendollins owned three plots, and the rest owned between five and 13 plots. In Winterveld, the number of plots owned ranged from 10 to 83. Among subsistence landlords, three plots were the maximum. Access to a second plot by subsistence landlords had not involved purchase, it was rented from the landowners. Petty capitalist landlords had purchased their plots with a purpose of building rental accommodation. This was evident in the manner in which they had saved their income for investment in rental housing, by purchasing plots. They operated on a larger scale, with plot sizes ranging from 42 000 to 85 000 square metres; two-thirds owned 45 000 square metre plots, a third had 85 000 square metre plots. In St Wendollins, a third owned 10 000 to 43 000 square metre plots and the rest had plots of less than 8 200 square metres. In Caluza, three-quarters owned 4 000 to 8 000 square metre plots and a quarter had 800 square metre plots. Plot sizes among subsistence landlords ranged from 900 square metres to 5 000 square metres, but in most cases plot sizes were unknown. Multiple structures were found on the plots of both forms of subsistence landlords – absentee and residential. Houses were shared with tenants, in the cases of both residential and absentee plots. The same applied to the two forms of petty capitalist landlords, living both below and above the poverty line. Multiple structures are explained by the varied types of rental accommodation they provide. Petty capitalist landlords living below the poverty line were found to be letting rooms, or
houses, to individual tenant households, as well as land, and land and houses. Of those living in Caluza 25 per cent rent land to tenants – 20 per cent in St Wendollins, 100% of all rented land and houses in Winterveld, and 27 per cent in Caluza. For landlords renting land to tenants, the number of dwellings does not reflect their ownership by landlords, because tenants build their houses, and not landlords. The dwellings may vary, depending on plot size and the tenant households renting land.

The absentee form of subsistence landlordism was found in Caluza and St Wendollins. Land-tenure systems operating in these settlements explain why absentee subsistence landlords could not be found in Winterveld. Absentee landownership in Caluza means that landlords have easy access to more than one plot without purchase. The relationship between landowners and non-landowners has encouraged access to multiple plots, because landowners do not always expect non-landowners to occupy rental sites, unlike in Winterveld, where constant dialogue between landowners prevents this from happening. In St Wendollins absentee landownership and land where ownership is unclear either because of disputes or the origin of this settlement as a missionary settlement, make it possible for householders to combine more than one form of accessing land without actually being involved in land purchase. Absentee landlords were found to have either combined two methods of accessing land, namely land offered as a gift or church land, and simultaneously renting a site from the landowner or simply renting sites from similar or different landowners.

Poverty among petty capitalist landlords was explained by financial changes in these households. Misfortunes – such as a job loss, reduction of earnings resulting from retirement and businesses going insolvent – meant that landlords who had previously enjoyed a better lifestyle, or purchased plots and built rental accommodation, could no longer maintain their standard of living and were now faced with poverty. The fact that they had been able to purchase plots in the past did not make them rich because they were now living below the poverty line. In this instance, the production of rental accommodation through plot purchasing was designed to expand capital. However, misfortunes had obliged these landlords to continue living below the poverty line, despite having embarked on large-scale rental housing production by purchasing
several plots. Plots held by subsistence and petty capitalist landlords, unless related to the production of rental housing, income and the ways plots had been accessed, were found to mask poverty in these households, and this could lead to the exclusion of these landlords by support strategies on the grounds that they seemed better off, having been able to access several plots.

The absence of landowners in Caluza and St Wendollins, and other forms of land tenure were significant in explaining the expansion of capital and rental housing among the petty capitalist landlords living above the poverty line. Petty capitalists had seized this opportunity by renting sites from different landowners as a means of expanding their capital, despite the fact that they had previously purchased plots. In Winterveld, absentee landownership was an incentive for the development of subsistence landlords. Subsistence landlords were found on sites where landowners had deceased in number, their whereabouts were unknown and in cases of disputed land.

The literature explains the continuation and dissolution of landlordism by relating it to rents. Gilbert and Varley (1991:152) suggest that older settlements would seem to be equally disillusioned with rentals and would get out. They further state that renting was considered a poor business mainly because rents were low (Gilbert & Varley 1991:147-148). A recent study on low-income landlords found that landlordism is influenced by both external and internal factors (Kumar, 1996). Landlords continue to rent space, even if rents make a minimum contribution to their households. Landlordism, being a temporary phenomenon, means that dissolution, or upward and downward mobility, is possible within any form of landlordism. The study found that downward mobility and the dissolution of landlordism were explained more by land-tenure systems than by rents. Landlordism that developed from non-ownership of land was easily terminated by the landowner if he/she disapproved of the renting of space, needed his/her land for some other use, or when conflict has arisen between the landowner and the non-landowner. This has either led to the dissolution of landlordism or downward mobility within forms of landlordism.
Following the discussion of some of the limitations of literature on low-income rental housing, and the concluding remarks this study has arrived at, particularly the theoretical contributions, the following section suggests appropriate policy guidelines in support of low-income landlords.

9.7 Policy guidelines

The study found that, despite similarities in the forms of tenure, freehold land rights and land relationships that had developed in these settlements, differences were observed in home improvements, access to services and the role of land tenure. These relations have had varied impacts on householders living in these settlements, particularly the non-landowners. Strategies adopted by government to improve access to services may not be the same everywhere, as they are informed by the landowner/non-landowner relationship and the distribution of services. In Winterveld, the influence of land on home improvements was stronger than in the other two settlements. Water and electricity supply is determined by land tenure and is accessible only to landowners. The distribution of these services within the settlements serves those living near the main road. Improvements to service consumption and access will require government intervention to ensure that piped water supply and electrical cables are evenly distributed within the settlement. Negotiations with landowners become essential as the non-landowners' access to these services and even their ability to improve their homes is determined by the negotiations between government officials, landowners and non-landowners. This should be implemented with caution, and policy intervention should guard against creating the conflict between landowner and non-landowners.

One other alternative for Winterveld is for the government to distribute water-supply systems, and improve the distribution of resources within the settlement, to ensure landowners have access to them. Non-landowners could have access to communal standpipes, and landowners who have a water connection to their sites could continue to provide water to their tenants' households at an agreed-upon tariff. This is not
something new in Winterveld, where landowners who have wells, motor-driven water-pumps, and boreholes have extended access to their tenants, through the payment of a minimum fee.

Meaningful government intervention to promote low-income rental housing production will require a drastic change of attitude on the part of academics and policymakers. As regards low-income housing studies, a change in attitude towards absentee landlordism will avoid inappropriate strategies for low-income rental housing expansion. Johnson (1983:183) recommends that

> a programme of encouraging the construction of rental units should be established concurrently with the upgrading process ... To qualify for such a loan, the room(s) should have access to water and sanitary facilities, and must meet minimum structural standards. To avoid absentee landlordship, and the chance for abuse of the system as a result, a system of incremental equity transfer could be devised.

South Africa's lack of studies on landlordism and the production of rental housing is no exception. This is evident in government housing policy. Government's present policy on housing is to promote homeownership. A number of programmes confirm these, such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme. The government acquires land at a low cost, services it by providing infrastructure, and subsidised sites are sold to first-time homeowners. So government subsidies can be accessed by first-time homeowners. Landlords wanting to construct rental housing are excluded, as the policy guidelines do not make such provision. Formal housing finance is only accessible to capitalist landlords building flats for rental.

The appropriate strategies to encourage the production of rental housing will require the incorporation of rental housing production into government land and housing policy. Low-income landlords are divided into three forms - subsistence, petty bourgeois and petty capitalist. Each form calls for specific types of intervention, and these will vary from settlement to settlement. Subsistence landlords may be best served
by strategies designed to alleviate poverty within these households, and by employment strategies. The majority are in low-paid jobs, or are pensioners, unemployed or in seasonal jobs. This means that they do not have access to financial institutions and, without financial assistance they cannot purchase a plot, houses cannot be improved, and both landlords and tenants who consume such housing are affected. In Winterveld, strategies promoting landownership among subsistence landlords' households would be another step towards improved rental housing production, as tenure here was a strong determinant of form of landlordism and the quality of rental housing. Rents depended on the quality of rental housing and the scale of letting. Subsistence landlords were constrained by land tenure, income, and low-scale operation. Even among petty capitalist landlords, some were living below the poverty line, and strategies promoting income-generating activities and rental housing expansion may be different from those living above the level of subsistence.

The benefits of the landowner–non-landowner land relationship were noted. To non-landlords it has led to access to low-cost land, and the construction of houses for owner occupation, while landlords have been able to build houses for rent, and expand rental housing. Land-tenure systems were also responsible for upward and downward mobility and even the dissolution of landlordism. It is suggested that these land relations should be encouraged. The government may play an important role in incorporating rental housing production within the existing housing policy. Large tracts of land may be set aside for those willing to participate in the production of low-income rental housing. Small plots such as those in site-and-services schemes discourage these relationships.

The study of low-income landlords in freehold self-help settlements is not representative of all kinds of settlement and land-tenure systems one would find in South African cities. The enquiry into low-income landlords has excluded leasehold settlements, houses built by the government for public rental, informal settlements, communal land and even freehold land right settlements which could not be classified as self-help because of the inhabitants’ lack of involvement in the construction phase.
The policy guidelines presented are applicable to the freehold self-help settlements studied, and may be of limited use to other settlements. With the variety of settlements and land-tenure systems not covered by the study it is suggested that, for the successful formulation of rental housing policy at national level, there is a need for research to focus on settlements characterised by other forms of land tenure. This will be valuable information to assist in understanding the forms of landlordism developing in these settlements and ensure the appropriate policy intervention in support of the development of low-income landlords and rental housing production in South Africa.
APPENDIX 1
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

1.1 Group interviews

1.1.1 Methodological problems

Group interviews can be effectively undertaken only if more than one person conducts the interviews. As householders arrive on the scene at different times, assistants are required first to inform participants about group interviews and second, to organise groups. If group interviews are not properly planned chaos could ensue and some people pull out before the discussion starts.

It is not always possible to limit the size of groups as people come as they wish. The size of the group had an effect on the discussion and the level of participation. Small groups of about four to eight people were more manageable than groups of fifteen. It was observed that in larger groups of sixteen or more there was a tendency for individual conversations to start up, leading to distraction.

Not all people participate during group interviews; some become listeners. It was noticed that the larger the group, the more likely it was that a few people would dominate the discussion, and the smaller the group the more likely that all would participate. Lack of participation by all in the group means that only a few’s views would be considered.

Because of the nature of the topic being studied, careful selection of group members becomes important. A study of landlords and tenants covers sensitive issues, and can easily stimulate fears and hatred. To avoid conflicts and suspicion, landlords were approached first, and they were informed about the objectives of group interviews.

The more densely populated the settlement was, the easier it was to organise people into groups. In densely populated parts of Winterveld, Caluza and St Wendoliins, it was fairly easy to form groups compared to those parts of settlements where houses were scattered. Respondents were very reluctant to travel long distances.
Age and sex of the respondent were the determinants of group participation. The groups which were dominated by women falling within the same age group tended to be more active than mixed groups, such as old and young women. Older residents tended to be authoritative, diverting the discussion to those issues that suited them. These included pensions, welfare and family problems. In such groups intolerance was voiced by the younger generation.

The composition of groups had an impact on the level of responses. Where women were in the majority, they dominated the discussion.

Group interviews were more effective where the majority of landlords lived in the particular settlement and were not scattered than in settlements with absentee landlords. In St Wendollins most of the landlords were resident landlords, but in Caluza most lived in neighbouring settlements. Because of the vast acreage owned by the landlords, especially in Winterveld, organising groups was often not successful.

Because of the sensitive nature of the topic being discussed, while most had welcomed the research, it was not possible to have mixed groups of landlords and tenants. This was due to the hostile relationships existing between landlords and tenants. The differentiation of groups according to tenure created a platform from which tenants, owners and landlords were able to air their views.

There is a limit to what could be discussed during the group discussions. During the research, discussion was centred around issues discussed previously. Aspects such as income and education were not dealt with, as these were to be covered by the quantitative interviews. Despite the methodological problems arising from using the group interview as a tool for investigation, it proved to be an efficient method of gathering information within a short space of time. Combining group interviews with quantitative methods provided the information which could not be accessed by the questionnaires. In this instance, it served as a benchmark against which responses to the questionnaires could be compared.
1.2 Qualitative interviews: key informants

Under the qualitative method, group interviews and semi-structured interviews were conducted. While group interviews were directed at the residents of the three settlements, semi-structured interviews were held with the government officials, non-governmental organisations and all officials who had direct or indirect influence in these settlements.

Kumar (1989:1) argues that key informants' interviews involve interviewing a select group of individuals who are likely to provide needed information, ideas and insights on a particular subject. Interviews were also extended to key people such as those who had worked in these settlements, were still involved with the settlements and were influential in the administration of settlements. Development organisations, non-governmental organisations, including the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), the Natal Land Commission, deeds administration offices, Marianhill Coventry, Town and Regional Planners, built environment support groups, and Pinetown City Council were approached. The focus was on semi-structured interviews.

Representatives of these organisations were asked about government policy on land in these settlements, such as the legislation that promoted access to land, government's attitude towards multiple-plot ownership, the subdivision of plots and the development of landlordism. Representatives of these organisations were also asked to give an account of the administration of settlements, and details about their roles in land policies. By focusing on the administrative role of these sectors, qualitative interviews aimed at establishing the degree of their involvement and the extent to which they may have influenced the rise in multiple-plot investment, and the development of informal land relations and forms of landlordism.

Also knowledge about government on land and multiple-plot ownership could shed some light on whether land tenure systems prevailing in these settlements had influenced development of forms of landlordism. Finally, extending interviews to
representatives of government, semi-government and non-governmental organisations was important in establishing dates about government’s involvement in the settlement and to cross-check results with the information gathered from residents.

In addition to semi-structured interviews, local people, associations of landlords and informal gatherings served as a starting point to identify key informants in the area. Existing networks were identified. Residents were approached and asked to identify their landlords and give information about former landlords. Houses known to be occupied by tenants were visited and the name of the landlord noted. In Winterveld, where landlords are known to each other, vast information was obtained from resident landlords who had knowledge of absentee landlords, those in the settlement, how often they came home and when was rent most likely to be collected. Using this information, houses of landlords living in the settlement were identified and absentee landlords targeted on the days they were most likely to be available.

1.3 Analysis of data

Other methods of collecting data and the issues addressed by the questionnaire were discussed. The section gives an overview of how data was analysed and the list of variables considered during the analysis. The Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) was used to analyse the data.

As the aim of the research is to examine the effects of land-tenure systems on the forms of low-income landlordism, data was, desegregated first according to settlements to illustrate how the origins of settlements may have influenced forms of landlordism and, second, according to ownership or non-ownership of land. Land tenure is therefore used as an independent variable influencing forms of landlordism. Data was also analysed according to forms of landlordism. This was necessary in linking forms of landlordism to forms of tenure.
In order to prove or disprove this hypothesis, the analysis focused on five related aspects – household characteristics, the physical condition of houses, the production of low-income housing, land tenure and the economics of landlordism.

1.3.1 Household characteristics

Under the composition of households, family size, number of dependants (financially dependent on the householder), sex of the respondent, age, marital status and forms of household were used as indicators of distribution of household size within settlements.

The size of households, whether composed of a considerable number of children or adults, the high- and low-dependency rates, education and gender have an effect on income differences and will affect household spending and the use of space.

Income was another variable observed during the analysis. It included sources of income, employment (part time or full time), regularity of income, occupation, income earners in households and variations between settlements.

Again, the availability of income in households would affect the ownership of land, participation in different forms of landlordism, purchasing of building materials, financing of labour, access to land, property sizes, quality of low-income rental and the ability of householders to meet other household expenditures.

1.3.2 Physical characteristics of houses

Indicators of rental housing investment include the sizes of houses (rooms), average number of rooms per household, family sizes, building materials used for constructing walls, roof, floors, as well as plot sizes and dwellings on plots. Services included types of sanitation, telephones, electricity and water-supply connections.

To observe the role of tenure in housing production, the following variables were considered:

- methods of accessing housing (purchase, inheritance, self-build, and so on);
• methods of accessing land (purchase, inheritance, rental, downpayments, gifts, and so on);
• forms of building material used (mud, cement, mud and cement, concrete block, brick, corrugated iron, and so on);
• mode of accessing building materials (purchase, second-hand, brand-new);
• forms of labour (family, paid and unpaid labour, contractors, and so on);
• sources of finance for construction (personal savings, loans, employers, insurance, informal credits, and so on);
• methods of purchasing building material (cash, hire-purchase, in stages, and so on);
• house construction (use of house plans, house inspection, tools);
• construction problems;
• occupation during construction of the dwelling; and
• expenses (service payment, rates, rent, electricity).

On of the research question seeks to explain what prevents/promotes the transition from one form of landlordism to another. A distinction is made between internal and external factors. Internal factors are linked to household characteristics, while external factors include all those that are beyond the control of individual households – such as tenure, access to land, finance, building materials, infrastructure, and so on. In an attempt to answer the research question, the analysis of data concentrated on household characteristics, land tenure, elements of rental housing production and the economics of landlordism.

1.3.3 Economics of landlordism

In order to assess the extent of landlordism in three settlements, the following variables were used as indicators of the scale letting:

• Types of rental accommodation provided
• Scale of letting
• Plot sizes
• Number of plots held
• Dwellings on plots
• Quality of dwellings
• Rental income and its contribution to non-rental income.

1.4 Problems: quantitative survey

The questionnaire was designed to cover all aspects of houses. Some questions required the interviewees to recall events which had happened more than thirty years previously. Landlords were asked to describe the physical conditions of houses, the level of services, and provide a description of houses occupied by tenants, how the houses had been built, the problems experienced during construction and what had been spent on them. Some houses are no longer occupied by the original owners but by second, third and fourth generations. Forty per cent of the respondents are above the age of 60. Due to their deteriorating memories, it was not always possible to obtain such information. As the settlements are very old, most houses had been built more than forty years ago. Hence interviewees had problems in remembering, for instance, the costs of building the house, how long it had taken to build, the size of the household and how much they earned. There was also a tendency among respondents to recall dates by attaching them to historical events. It was, for instance, normal for people, when asked how long they had lived in the area, not to be specific but simply say “ever since I was married”, “when I had my first child”, or “during the floods”. To overcome this problem, other members of the household were asked to provide detailed information when a householder could not remember. In some cases household members were brought in by respondents who felt that themselves unable to recount the details. In such cases dates were estimated.

The concept “home” in the South African context does not necessarily mean that only the head of the household is involved in organising the construction – such as the purchasing of building material, hiring of labour and providing the finance. Building a house may involve family members as well as members of the extended family, who all contribute to the building process, whether with labour, finance or otherwise. It is traditional for sons, daughters, cousins and so on, when they start working, to build and extend the houses for their parents. In some cases more than one person was
interviewed, when it was felt that additional input was relevant in soliciting information on various aspects of the questionnaire that were unknown to the landlord or non-landlords, because of their being less involved.

The second problem relates to income. Asking the respondents how much they earned created problems, particularly among households whose income was derived from various sources, such as from respondents without a regular income, those who were paid on commission, and respondents who declared themselves to be unemployed yet received income from daughters and sons, whether in cash or otherwise. It was also common for interviewees not to know the earnings of other members of the household. This is because, in most households, family members are not expected to disclose their earnings and, secondly, household members often contribute towards the buying of groceries, education, transport, and the payment of bills or they may allocate a certain percentage of their income to the head of household. The majority of informal sector workers, such as hawkers, cobblers, and so on do not keep records of how much they bring home daily or weekly. Records relating to expenditure often do not exist. This is because income is consumed immediately, to buy household goods. In response to these problems tables were drawn and left with the respondents who did not know their earnings. The aim was to enable respondents to record all money received from family members, no matter how small it was. They were encouraged to record the amounts of money they received each day. Those who received income from their children had to record how much was received. Another table was used to record how much the other household members contributed to the upkeep of the house. Although I had assured respondents of confidentiality of the information and anonymity of the interviewees, by avoiding asking respondents' clan names, using these tables meant that some households had to be visited more than once to check whether they were filling out the tables, and to take their names so that the information on income could be matched with the relevant questionnaire. Respondents were promised that, once the tables had been collected and the information entered into the questionnaire, their names would be removed from the questionnaires. These tables were collected after two months. All those who had previously reported that they did not receive income had in fact recorded income from various sources.
The definition of landlords as householders who derive income from renting land, rooms and houses to tenants was of great concern to some respondents. While the inhabitants from these settlements distinguish between umthengi and umqashi. This distinction does not distinguish landlords and tenants according to their relation to land. All settlements are characterised by multiple-plot ownership. There were several cases where a single plot that once belonged to a family had been inherited by sons or daughters who might or might not have been landlords. In cases where parents were still alive I was always referred to either of them as the head of the house and the spokesperson, even if the sons or daughters had their own families and were the landlords. Similarly, in households where the householder had died and sons had inherited the land, I was often referred to the eldest son, although he had no tenants and the other brothers were the landlords. A similar experience was recorded by (Varley, 1994) who suggests that secondary groupings in a household may sometimes refuse to see themselves as a separate grouping.

A considerable number of landlords in Caluza are absentee landlords. They use lawyers to manage their estates and to collect rents from the tenants. These landowners were contacted via intermediaries and some were interviewed by telephone. Due to the length of a questionnaire, it was divided into three parts, which meant that one person was interviewed three times over the telephone. Only six had to be interviewed by telephone. They included landlords who lived outside the settlement, business and professional people who, as a result of the nature of their work, preferred to allocate time that suited them, rather than having to go through the questionnaire at once.

1.5 Opportunities

The topic covered by the research, housing, development issues in generally and landlordism in particular generated a lot of response and enthusiasm among the respondents. The study coincided with the South African government’s commitment to upgrading and developing urban and rural settlements through its Reconstruction and
Development Programme (RDP). I was often mistaken as an RDP official or a social worker.

In Winterveld, the study coincided with a march staged by landlords who had approached the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) to intervene in a hostile landlord and tenant stand-off, which had led to the non-payment of rents. To landlords, the study brought hope for resolving their problems, and to tenants it seemed to mean improvement in services and living conditions.

As a native speaker of different ethnic languages, I was considered an “insider” studying her communities. My familiarity with cultures and customs gives strength to the research (Bozolli, 1991). The common characteristics which I shared with the interviewees enabled me to grasp and understand the underlying cultural significance of explanations (Robertson, 1984). Working in a familiar setting has many advantages. Land, landlords and tenants are sensitive issues. This sensitivity has sometimes led to inhabitants denying participation in landlordism. The fact that I had formerly lived in one of the settlements helped to allay fears normally experienced by the “outsiders” studying unfamiliar societies. Being a resident in the settlement I was not going “to sell them out”. As one women in Caluza remarked: “We are telling you things we would never have told strangers”. This view is supported by Nukunya (1969:19) who confirms that “because I was one of them and not a foreign intruder, the fear and suspicion which always lurk in the minds of the subjects and informants during the research in general were almost absent”. Researching the familiar has an advantage as it enabled me to understand gestures, the tone of their voices and their reaction to certain aspects.

Gender is often portrayed as a major constraint for researchers undertaking field work. Abu-Lughod (1988:149-50) illustrates:

> By accompanying me, my father had shown those with whom I would be living and those on whose good opinion and generosity my life and work would depend, that I was a daughter of a good family whose male kin were concerned about her and
wanted to protect her, even when pursuit of education forced her into a potentially comprising position.

Others have argued that single women are in a better position than lone men (Ellen, 1984:5). These studies reflect the experiences of foreigners studying indigenous people and the adjustments they have had to make when confronted with a "culture shock". Further, the focus is on sex-segregated societies (Razavi, 1992; Altorki, 1988; Abu-Lughold, 1988) and aliens researching non-segregated societies (Cohen & Odhiambo, 1989). My experience as a researcher and a woman does not conform with these views.

Female researchers are not a new phenomenon in South Africa's urban settlements. Social workers, midwives and students have often been seen conducting field surveys and working with the people on the ground. The restrictions imposed by culture (Robertsons, 1984), language (Marshall, 1970), sex, age, marital status, religion, travelling during certain hours, and which members of the public to interview or not to interview (Ahmed-Ghosh, 1991; Palriwala, 1991; Sesaiah, 1979) were not experienced during the research. The sample consisted of male and female respondents.
APPENDIX 2

HOUSEHOLD INTERVIEWS
SECTION I DESCRIPTION OF HOUSES OCCUPIED BY LANDLORDS AND NON LANDLORDS

Township.___________________________________
Settlement.__________________________________
City________________________________________
Nearest town ________________________________

1. Type of dwelling owned by the respondent
   four-room[] extended four-room[] self-built structure[] flat[] employers' house[]

2. How many rooms are in this house?[] and what are they?
   bedroom[] kitchen[] dining room[] sitting room[] bathroom[] garage[] store room
   [ ] other, specify______________________________________________________________

3. What is the building materials used for building the house?
   (a) walls __________________________ (b) roof.____________________________________
   (c) floor ______________________________________________________________________

4. What system do you use to dispose excreta?
   pit[] vip[] bucket[] waterborne sewerage[]
   other, specify[] ______________________________________________________________________

5. What are the main sources of energy used for cooking and lighting?____________________
   ________________________________________________________________________________

6. Does the householder has access to telephone?
   yes[ ] no[ ]

7. How many structures are in this plot including that of the householder? none[ ] one[ ] two[ ]
   three[ ] four[ ] other, specify[ ] ______________________________________________________________________

8. How would you describe the type of structures in your plot (other than the main house)?
   shacks[ ] how many[ ] number of rooms[ ]
   zozo huts[ ] how many[ ] number of rooms[ ]
   converted garage[ ] how many[ ] number of rooms[ ]
   backrooms[ ] how many[ ] number of rooms[ ]
   house[ ] how many[ ] number of rooms[ ]

9. What is your home language S Sotho[ ] N Sotho[ ]
   Tswana[ ] Zulu[ ] Tsonga[ ] Swazi[ ] Venda[ ]
   Xhosa[ ] Ndebele[ ]

10. What is your religion?_____________________________________________________

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11. What is the size of your property acres [ ] square metres [ ] other, specify [ ] ________________________________

Biographical Information

12. When did you arrive in this settlement? ________________________________
13. Are you a homeowner [ ] homeowner with tenants [ ] homeowner without tenants [ ]
14. Sex of the respondent  male [ ] female [ ]
15. Marital status married [ ] single [ ] divorced [ ] widowed [ ] separated [ ] other, specify [ ] ________________________________
16. How many members of your household live here (including yourself)? ____________________
   age number of people occupation education
   ______________________________________________________________________________________
   ______________________________________________________________________________________
   ______________________________________________________________________________________
   ______________________________________________________________________________________
   ______________________________________________________________________________________
   ______________________________________________________________________________________
   ______________________________________________________________________________________

17. Where do you work? place ____________________ (b) employer __________________________
   (c) full time [ ] part time [ ]

18(a). Do you qualify for a housing subsidy? yes [ ] no [ ]
(b) How many members of your family qualify for subsidy [ ]

Income

19. What are the main sources of income?
   employment [ ] hawking [ ] spaza shop [ ] business [ ] pension [ ] disability grant [ ]
   other, specify [ ] ________________________________
20. (a) How much do you earn? monthly [ ] fortnightly [ ] weekly. [ ] daily [ ] other, specify [ ]
(b) How much does your spouse earn? monthly [ ] weekly [ ] daily [ ] other, specify [ ]
(c) How much does other members of your family earn? ________________________________

SECTION II LANDLORDS
Conditions of houses at the initial stage

21. What were the conditions of this settlement regarding infrastructure (roads, water supply, electricity, building construction industry) when you first moved in?
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________

22. How did you gain access to this house?
bought [ ] self built [ ] partially built [ ] rented [ ] family house [ ] company house [ ]
other, specify [ ]

23 (a) Describe the conditions of your house (building materials used, the level of services including sanitation, ventilation, sources of energy and number of rooms) when you first moved into this settlement?
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________

(b) Describe how you built your house (use of labour, building plans, technical support, guidance, inspection and supervision)?
_____________________________________________________________________________
24(a) How would you describe the tools used during construction? 

(b) How long did you take to complete your house? 

25. How did you purchase the building materials? 

26. What problems did you encounter during the construction? 

27. How did you finance the building construction? 

28 (a) What was the size of your house? 

(b) What was the size of your household at the initial stage? 

(c) How many members of your household were working? 

(d) What was your occupation? 

29. What services were you paying for when you first moved into this settlement? 

30. How much is your house worth today? 

31 (a). How many plots of land do you own including this one? [ ] 
(b) How many plots of land are leased? [ ] 
(c) In how many plots of land you have tenants? [ ] 

32. (a) How did you access land? bought [ ] inherited [ ] gift [ ] mission land [ ] company land [ ]
(b) How much did you pay for land?

(c) What forms of financial assistance did you receive towards purchasing land?

(d) How long took you to pay off your land?

33 (a) What motivated you to become a landlord?

(b) How did you start renting accommodation?

(c) What was the financial position of your household when you became a landlord?

(d) How big was your household when you became a landlord?

34. What was the condition of your house when you became a landlord?

35. What improvements have you made to your house since you became a landlord?

36 (a) How long have you lived in this settlement?

(b) How long have you been a landlord? weeks [ ] months [ ] years [ ].

37 (a) How often have you stopped being a landlord?

(b) Why

38 (a) Do you have tenants living in the same plot, same settlement, outside the settlement in another town?

(b) How would you describe the parcels rented out to tenants?

renting land [ ] renting houses [ ] renting land & houses[ ] renting part of the house [ ] renting flats [ ] renting rooms [ ] renting shacks [ ] renting zozo huts [ ] other, specify [ ]
(c) If you are renting any of the following to tenants, how many?
rented plots [ ] rented houses [ ] rented flats [ ] rented rooms [ ] rented shacks [ ] zozo huts [ ] other, specify [ ]

39. What is the size of your property?
acres [ ] square metres [ ] other, specify [ ]

(b) What is the size of the property rented out to tenants?
acres [ ] square metres [ ] other, specify [ ]

(c) How many vacant plots do you have not rented out to tenants?

(d) What are the sizes of vacant properties?

40 (a) If the respondent has more than one property, how did you acquire land where you have tenants?
bought [ ] inherited [ ] govt land [ ] rented [ ] tribal land [ ] mission land [ ] company land [ ] employees land [ ] other, specify [ ]

(b) How did you expand your lettings?

(c) When did you expand your lettings?

(d) Why have you expanded your lettings?

41. (a) How much did you pay for properties?

(b) If you are renting the property how much are you paying?
monthly [ ] quarterly [ ] yearly [ ]

(c) How are your properties operated?
employ caretaker [ ] family member [ ] lawyers [ ]
agents [ ] other, specify [ ]

42 (a) How did you build the rented accommodation?
bought [ ] self build [ ] contractor built [ ]
hired skilled labour [ ] incrementally build [ ]
family labour [ ] communal labour [ ] govt built [ ]
employer built [ ] missionary built [ ] tenant built [ ]
other, specify [ ]

(b) How did you finance the building construction of rented accommodation?
personal savings [ ] household income [ ] bank loans [ ]
housing subsidies [ ] rental income [ ] employers loan [ ]
stokvels [ ] other, specify [ ]

(c) How much do you pay for water supply [ ] electricity [ ] rates [ ] rent [ ] services [ ] bank loans [ ] other specify [ ]

349
43. How many houses do you own which are not used as rented accommodation? none [ ] one [ ]
two [ ] three [ ] other, specify [ ] ________________________________

Housing standards (if you have tenants not living with you)

44. What building materials have been used for constructing rented accommodation?
mud [ ] mud & wattle [ ] mud blocks [ ] mud and cement [ ]
tobolo [ ] bricks [ ] concrete blocks [ ] stones [ ]
timber [ ] corrugated iron [ ] other, specify [ ] ________________________________

roof
corrugated iron [ ] asbestos [ ] tiles [ ] stones [ ]
stones & corrugated iron [ ] thatch [ ] other, specify [ ]

Floor
mud [ ] cement [ ] tiles [ ]

Windows
glass [ ] wood [ ] none [ ]

44. Facilities
Water supply
individual standpipe [ ] communal standpipes [ ] iterant tankers [ ] well [ ] borehole [ ]
streams/rivers [ ]
other, specify [ ] ________________________________

Sanitation
pit (individual) [ ] communal pit [ ] vip individual [ ]
vip communal [ ] bucket (individual) [ ] bucket (communal)
[ ] waterborne (individual) [ ] waterborne (communal) [ ]
other, specify [ ] ________________________________

Refuse removal
none [ ] available [ ]

Electricity
available in house yes [ ] no [ ]

Kitchen
individually owned [ ] communal [ ] none [ ]

Bathroom
individually owned [ ] shared [ ] none [ ]

350
Rent

45. How do you charge rent?
   according to services provided [ ]
   according to bldg construction materials [ ]
   profession/status of tenants [ ]
   other, specify [ ]

46 (a) How often is rent paid?
   weekly [ ]
   fortnightly [ ]
   monthly [ ]
   quarterly [ ]
   yearly [ ]
   other, specify [ ]

(b) How much do you collect on rentals per month?

(c) Do tenants pay a deposit?
   yes [ ]
   no [ ]

(d) What is the rent collection procedure?
   paid at owners place [ ]
   collected by landlord [ ]
   paid in person [ ]
   paid in cash [ ]
   paid in cheque [ ]
   other, specify [ ]

47 (a) Are you planning to expand your lettings in future?
   yes [ ]
   no [ ]

(b) If not, why are you not expanding your lettings?

48. What major changes have your household experienced when you became a landlord?
   children finishing school [ ]
   job promotion [ ]
   receiving pension [ ]
   disability grant [ ]
   insurance funds [ ]
   lobola [ ]
   death [ ]
   subsidy [ ]
   other, specify [ ]

49. How important is rental income to your households?
   very important [ ]
   important [ ]
   not important [ ]
   don't know [ ]
   other, specify [ ]

50. How do you use rental income?

SECTION 111 FOR LANDLORDS AND NON LANDLORDS

51. How many plots of land do you own including this one?
   one [ ]
   two [ ]
   three [ ]
   other, specify [ ]

(a) What do you intend doing with the plots in future?
   rent [ ]
   to live in future [ ]
   to sell [ ]
   other, specify [ ]

52. Where are your plots?
in settlement [ ] another settlement [ ] another town [ ]
other, specify [ ] ________________________________

(a) What are the size of plots?
plot 1  acres [ ] square metres [ ] other specify [ ] ________________________________
plot 2  acres [ ] square metres [ ] other specify [ ] plot 3  acres [ ] square metres [ ]
other specify [ ] plot 4  acres [ ] square metres [ ] other specify [ ]

53 How would you describe the land you have occupied?
rented [ ] government [ ] communal [ ] mission [ ]
company [ ] employees [ ] other, specify [ ] ________________________________

54 How did you acquire land?
bought [ ] rented [ ] inherited [ ] gift [ ]
other specify [ ] ____________________

55 How much did you pay for land?______________________________

56 What forms of financial assistance did you receive?______________________________

57 How long have you lived in this settlement?______________________________

58 How long have you been a homeowner?______________________________

59 hat were the conditions of your house when you first moved into this settlement?______________________________

(a) building materials used ________________________________
(b) services ________________________________
(c) size of rooms ________________________________
(d) size of household ________________________________
(e) What was the occupation of other members of the family? ________________________________

60. How would you describe the conditions of this settlement when you first moved in?
(infrastructure, roads, water supply, garbage collection, services, electricity, ngo's, technical support)

61. How did you built your house? (use of labour, tools, plans, guidance, inspection and supervision)

62. How long it took to complete construction?

63. What was the cost of building the house? ________________________________
64 (a) How many houses do you own including this one? _______________________
(b) Where are the houses?
   in this settlement [ ] another settlement [ ] another town [ ] other, specify [ ]
   _______________________
(c) What do you intend using the houses for in future?
   rent [ ] to live in [ ] as home [ ] other, specify [ ]
   _______________________
65. What major changes have your household experienced when you became homeowner?
   children finish school [ ] job promotion [ ] receiving pension [ ] disability grants [ ]
   insurance funds [ ] lobola [ ] received housing subsidy [ ] other, specify [ ]
   _______________________
66. What financial problems did you experience regarding the house construction?
   _______________________

67 (a) Have you ever rented accommodation to tenants?
   yes [ ] no [ ]
(b) If the answer is yes, how long have you been a landlord?
   _______________________
(c) Why did you stop renting accommodation?
   _______________________
(d) If you have never been a landlord state reasons why?
   _______________________
(e) Would you like to become a landlord in future?
   _______________________

353
## HOUSEHOLD INCOME

Recordings of contributions of members of households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family member</th>
<th>weekly</th>
<th>fortnightly</th>
<th>monthly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daughter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Son</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grandchild</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, specify</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## INCOME FROM INFORMAL SECTOR WORKERS

Name of household : 
Adress : 

Week ending : Week starting:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income (money received)</th>
<th>Where from</th>
<th>How much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Monday</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MINIMUM LIVING LEVEL FOR THREE SETTLEMENT

The minimum living level (mll) or the minimum subsistence level used for householders living in Caluza and Winterveld was R771.75 adapted from South African Labour and Development Research Unit. In St Wendollins- R943.45 was used as a minimum subsistence level based on the Durban Functional Region during the research.
APPENDIX 3
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMAL LAND RELATIONS IN OTHER CITIES

3.1 Informal land relations, landlordism, tenancy in other cities

In South African cities uncertainty still exists today regarding the number of people who live in privately rented housing, as well as the number of landlords. Privately rented housing usually takes the form of outbuildings or backyard shacks in the formal townships. Watson (1994), making reference to six metropolitan cities - Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban, Springs and Welkom - estimates that 40 per cent of the population live in backyard shacks. These may be sharers or renters. In Gugulethu, a formal township of Cape Town, 100 per cent of the properties are sublet (ibid). Informal land relationships that have developed in these townships include the granting of space to tenants by landlords. A tenant is expected to erect a shack, or a portable zozo hut, which can be dismantled and re-erected elsewhere, in case the landlord needs the space. In some cases the landlord may rent rooms to tenants. The amount of space in formal townships determines the number of tenants who can rent space, as the landlord himself lives on his property. Sites in townships range between 300 and 350 square metres, except for corner sites, which can be as large as 400 square metres. The landlord himself is usually a tenant – either owning or renting his house from the local town or city council. The land tenure system characterising urban townships comprises only a 99-year leasehold. Therefore, while residents provide others with rental accommodation, they themselves do not have freehold land rights. As Sections (6.8.1 to 6.8.5) in chapter six have demonstrated, forms of landlords developing within freehold tenure settlements are distinguishable from those operating in former government built houses.

In Hillbrow, in the inner city of Johannesburg, tenants rent flats. In 1955 about 800 to 10,000 people lived in servants' quarters located on the roofs of mid-city flats in Johannesburg (Mather, 1987). This was the only form of accommodation available to urban Africans. As Africans were forbidden to own property in cities, landlords were often of European origin. The relationship established between landlords and tenants was not always that of employer-employee, where employment governed access to
accommodation. Some people were reported to be working elsewhere but paying rent, undertaking certain duties in exchange for accommodation.

The government's land policies also had an effect on the composition of inner-city tenants and landlords. Before 1970, apart from the domestic servants' quarters, inner-city apartments were reserved for whites. Enormous pressure on land became noticeable when the government instructed the Department of Community Development not to construction additional low-income housing after 1977. An influx of people to the inner city after the 1976 Soweto uprisings – particularly of blacks, Indians and coloureds – to occupy the abundance of rental accommodation that had been vacated by an exodus of whites to the suburbs, as well as the lifting of rent control on buildings constructed after 31 December 1954, meant that landlords were no longer bound by the rules governing tenancy. As landlords were now entitled to increase the rentals, legal tenants who had previously enjoyed low rents were being phased out. By 1978, Anglo American Property Services, the biggest of the landlords, announced that there were five times as many empty flats in Hillbrow as compared with a year ago (Morris, 1994).

What kind of relationship was being established between landlords and tenants in inner-city apartment blocks, where blacks, coloureds and Indians were transgressing the Group Areas Act? Two types of tenant developed. First, there was the legal tenant who, by virtue of being white, was allowed to rent an apartment. Second, there was the “illegal” tenant, who was not allowed to own a home in the city. Access to apartments by “illegal” tenants was often through a white nominee.

The government policy on land has been significant – and not only in peripheral townships, where council tenants began subletting plots. The policy also contributed to an influx of people from the townships in response to the high cost of transport from distant townships into town, a lack of space to build houses, and job opportunities (which made living in the inner city desirable). Also, the governments’ intervention in lifting rent control created the opportunity for landlords to increase rents and replace the protected tenants with “illegal” tenants who, because they were desperate for accommodation, were less likely to challenge rent increases. Morris (1994) notes that
in 1980, after a two-year period during which rent increases had been pegged at 10 per cent, rapid rent increases followed, and the surplus of vacant inner-city apartments evaporated.
### APPENDIX 4
FREEHOLD TENURE, INFORMAL LAND RELATIONSHIPS AND THE INVESTMENTS IN LOW INCOME HOUSING

Table 4.1: Non-landlords, housing investment, occupation, by type of walls and by settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>All settlements</th>
<th>Walls</th>
<th>Caluza</th>
<th>St Wendollins</th>
<th>Winterveld</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>13 (12%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5 (13%)</td>
<td>3 (9%)</td>
<td>5 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled labourers</td>
<td>29 (27%)</td>
<td>mud</td>
<td>3 (20%)</td>
<td>1 (14%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled labourers</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>8 (40%)</td>
<td>3 (30%)</td>
<td>8 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2 (40%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled labourers</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>blocks</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2 (22%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawkers</td>
<td>13 (12%)</td>
<td>mud</td>
<td>2 (13%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawkers</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>2 (67%)</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawkers</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>blocks</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>5 (5%)</td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (10%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>blocks</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3 (33%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-professionals</td>
<td>11 (10%)</td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td>1 (20%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>blocks</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioners</td>
<td>38 (36%)</td>
<td>mud</td>
<td>8 (53%)</td>
<td>5 (71%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
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<td>Pensioners</td>
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<td>4 (44%)</td>
<td>8 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>blocks</td>
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<td>3 (33%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioners</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>brick and mud</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.2: Landlords, housing investment, occupation by type of walls and by settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>All settlements</th>
<th>Walls</th>
<th>Caluza</th>
<th>St Wendollins</th>
<th>Winterveld</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>31 (14%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>7 (11%)</td>
<td>21 (28%)</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>33 (15%)</td>
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<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
</tr>
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<td>labours</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>1 (9%)</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>7 (41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labours</td>
<td></td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>4 (29%)</td>
<td>3 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td>blocks</td>
<td>1 (25%)</td>
<td>1 (7%)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>corrugated iron</td>
<td>1 (11%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>labours</td>
<td></td>
<td>stones and cement</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2 (50%)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawkers</td>
<td>14 (7%)</td>
<td>mud</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
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<td>---</td>
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<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
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<td>brick</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>1 (7%)</td>
<td>2 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawkers</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>blocks</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>1 (7%)</td>
<td>4 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>25 (12%)</td>
<td>mud</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>8 (40%)</td>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>blocks</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3 (20%)</td>
<td>3 (10%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business owners</td>
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<td>mud and cement</td>
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<td>2 (12%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Semi-professionals</td>
<td>11 (5%)</td>
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<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td>1 (7%)</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
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<td>blocks</td>
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<td>1 (7%)</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Pensioners</td>
<td>87 (42%)</td>
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<td>5 (45%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>4 (36%)</td>
<td>12 (44%)</td>
<td>7 (41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>6 (30%)</td>
<td>3 (21%)</td>
<td>13 (57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td>blocks</td>
<td>2 (50%)</td>
<td>4 (27%)</td>
<td>17 (57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td>stones and cement</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2 (50%)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensioners</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>brick and mud</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
<td>1 (7%)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.3: Landlords, housing investment by form of household and by settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household form</th>
<th>All settlements</th>
<th>Building material</th>
<th>Caluza</th>
<th>Wendo llins</th>
<th>Winter veld</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>160 (74%)</td>
<td>mud</td>
<td>6 (13%)</td>
<td>4 (8%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>12 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>7 (15%)</td>
<td>14 (29%)</td>
<td>16 (24%)</td>
<td>37 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>16 (35%)</td>
<td>11 (23%)</td>
<td>17 (26%)</td>
<td>44 (28%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>blocks</td>
<td>4 (9%)</td>
<td>8 (17%)</td>
<td>29 (44%)</td>
<td>41 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>corrugated iron</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>blocks and stones</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>stones and cement</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4 (8%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single men and women</td>
<td>21 (10%)</td>
<td>mud</td>
<td>3 (50%)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>7 (54%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>8 (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2 (15%)</td>
<td>2 (100%)</td>
<td>4 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>blocks</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3 (23%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widows and widowers</td>
<td>35 (16%)</td>
<td>mud</td>
<td>2 (15%)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>mud and cement</td>
<td>3 (23%)</td>
<td>5 (39%)</td>
<td>1 (17%)</td>
<td>9 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>brick</td>
<td>4 (31%)</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>4 (43%)</td>
<td>6 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>blocks</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4 (31%)</td>
<td>1 (14%)</td>
<td>5 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>corrugated iron</td>
<td>1 (7%)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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