A Commentary on Solon's Poems

A Thesis submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation is a Commentary on Solon's Poems (elegiacs and tetrameters; the iambic trimeters, though taken into consideration for the examination of the rest of the poems, are not given a detailed commentary). Solon's poetry is studied mainly from a literary point of view; it is compared with the language and vocabulary of his predecessors Homer, Hesiod, and the other lyric poets of his age. The study attests the influence of Solon's language, content, motives, and ethical/political ideas on his lyric successors, on Aristophanes and the tragedians (above all Euripides who specifically appears to share the ideology of the polis and the heightened consciousness about civic affairs which emerged in the Athenian community under Solon) as well as the coincidence between Solon's ethical statements and the topoi of the language of the inscriptions.

This is not a historical Commentary; the connections of Solon's poetry with his Laws as well as with the historical situation of his time and the reforms he sponsored are taken into consideration only when they are useful and rewarding in the answers they provide for the interpretation of the Solonian poetry.

The emphasis of this work is on Solon's poetry as a work of Literature and on Solon's poetic achievements. The close examination of his poems reveals his creativity, his artistry together with his view of the process of poetic composition as technical making and his focus on his craftsmanship as a tool for his profession as a politician and as a statesman.
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Preface

This dissertation on Solon's poetry is heavily indebted to a range of people: I am particularly grateful to my supervisor Prof. H.G.T. Maehler for his wise counsel and constant encouragement, his unfailing patience in reading and improving successive drafts of this Commentary, and, above all, for the sense of perspective he has provided me during the course of research and writing. I would like to thank Prof. S. Hornblower for his kind help and advice as well as for the criticism he generously provided which saved me from many errors.

I have also been exceptionally fortunate in receiving the constructive criticisms and perceptive analyses of Prof. M. Fantuzzi while I was at the University of Florence as an Erasmus-student, and also afterwards in the later stages of my research. My work has also greatly profited from the comments and suggestions of Dr. E. Magnelli. Finally, I wish to thank my family whose love and support have meant a great deal to me.

The Commentary is based on the text of Solon in Teubner Poetae elegiaci by B. Gentili and C. Prato, with some deviations. The editions of the ancient authors which have been followed are the standard ones, in most cases, (unless otherwise stated), the ones listed in L. Berkowitz and K.A. Squitier, Canon of Greek Authors and Works (but for the ancient elegiac authors Gentili-Prato's edition is followed). Most of the abbreviations used for ancient authors and collections of fragments or for the reference bibliography are the conventional ones, which can be found, for example, in the Oxford Classical Dictionary. The abbreviations of the titles of journals are as in L'Année philologique.
Introduction

It has been more than forty years since A. Masaracchia's book on Solon has appeared and eighty since I.M. Linforth's. Only one third of each book was devoted to a discussion of the Solonian poems: in spite of the wide range of material provided by Masaracchia and the generally good judgement shown by Linforth in relation to problems of interpretation arising out of Solon's poems, both books do not indeed focus enough on the literary features of Solon's text.

Much more recently, the studies by O. Vox (1984) and by E. Katz Anhalt (1993) offered more careful literary interpretations of some of Solon's fragments. Vox and Anhalt approach Solon's poetry with great sensitivity: far from considering Solon's language conventional, they well demonstrate how often Solon innovated within the archaic tradition to a remarkable degree, or resorted to refined forms of allusion to Homer or Hesiod. However, the good points of their contributions are overshadowed mainly by their limitations in structuring the material, as the selection and arrangement of it sometimes produces a sequential commentary on a single poem and sometimes a handling of a series of topics inside it. Neither are they interested in considering the specific context of each fragment or problems of their textual transmission.

There is still a need, therefore, for a commentary on Solon's poems and for a fuller re-examination of their literary features. In fact, these often tended to be overshadowed by the other aspects of Solon's admittedly remarkable personality (Solon the wise man, Solon the traveller, Solon the legislator, Solon the statesman, Solon the political thinker). However, a close examination of the main body of his poetry (elegiacs and tetrameters) will reveal his creativity and artistry in as much as his own view of poetic composition as technical making and the strong interconnection between his 'profession' as a politician motivated by the concept of the community and his 'profession' as a poet, intending his poetry often, yet not only, as a more appealing form of advertisement and expression of his ethical or political thoughts. Indeed, Solon sought to create and use poetry for the needs of the polis as a whole, including all the members of it (rather than to exclude or to speak in favour of a faction, as in the poetry of Theognis or Alcaeus, for instance) and all the aspects of their life, considering as well the dimension of pleasures. It is precisely this non-exclusive function of his poetic σοφία and his consciousness about civic affairs which will be later appreciated by authors like Aristophanes or Euripides, imbued with the omnicomprehensive ideology of the polis. This Commentary does not specifically or systematically examine Solon's reception in late antiquity, but the fairly abounding fifth century parallels provide good instances of the reception and fortune of Solon's language and thought at an earlier age.
Solon's poems often appear vague or cryptic and this is certainly the case when one tries to find there detailed explanations or specific clarifications of his political career or reads them as an application of the historical situation and the crisis of his time as described by our principal, yet chronologically later, reconstructions of Aristotle's *Athenaion Politeia* and Plutarch's *Solon*. In this Commentary the connections of the poems with Solon's Laws and the historical background of Athens in his time are taken into consideration, especially when they are helpful to the interpretation — and no-one ought to side-step (at least intentionally) the thorny historic topics involved in them. However, this Commentary does not consider the poems as clues to political history, not only because this perspective has been prevailing in the only line-by-line modern commentary to Solon, namely that by Linforth, but even more because, on the present evidence, we have to admit that much has to remain disputable. For instance, the very words *σέλονθελα* and *ἐκτήμορα*, which are a leitmotif of Aristotle's and Plutarch's explanations of Solon's political activity, are not found in the transmitted Solonian poems and, as a matter of fact, we do not have any reliable evidence for any reference to debt by Solon in connection with his reforms which is the hard-core of the most traditional (but still prevailing, though with exceptions) historical interpretations. From Solon's poems we can glimpse a picture of the social system of his time but we can only speculate on the specific economic relations between the mighty and the low inside that system. This certainly is not enough for a historical reading of Solon, but fairly fits the concern of a close reading and literary analysis of Solon's text, which this Commentary claims to be.

The transmitted textual transcriptions of Solon's songs, even if sadly reduced in number and mainly one-sided, do reveal Solon's self-awareness as a poet. With *Salamis* (fr. 2 G.-P.2=1-3 W.2), for instance, Solon acknowledges the distinction between song and prose, attested here for the first time, and deliberately chooses poetry to convey his message to the Athenians because he can avail himself of the status of an *δοιοδός* (both prestigious and free of political constraints), and likewise of the divine power of his singing in comparison to a simple prose speech he could have delivered; at the same time, he apparently wants to exploit in a political context the emotional impact of his poetry and thus its efficiency on the audience. But in so doing, he expresses, in an unexpected way, a new attitude towards poetry which shows the emergence of the poet as a skilled craftsman and not as the traditional *δοιοδός* qua inspired servant of the Muses, and the art of 'singing' becomes for him 'making'/'composing', in the very same way of other lyric poets (Alcaeus, Pindar).

Besides, other fragments, such as 18 G.-P.2=24 W.2, 24 G.-P.2=26 W.2, reveal in several ways how Solon has worked inside the poetic tradition of erotic poetry, how he fits into, and differentiates from this larger framework. Other poems, more
expressly, record a literary polemic with the idea of life which can be found in Mimnermus and Alcaeus, and later Alcman, Anacreon, Simonides, who divided human life in the positive phase of the bloom of physical and sexual powers of youth, as opposed to the pure negativity of their decline in old age. Solon's presentation of the maturity and old age as the years of the progressive acquisition of the νόος in the Ages (23 G.-P.²=27 W.²) or as a period of continuing ability for learning in fr. 28 G.-P.²=18 W.², effectively challenges and militates precisely against the standard erotic lyric presentation of the theme. Solon's poetic dialogue with Mimnermus (the tradition informs us about his keen interest also for Sappho's songs), and above all his 'reply' to Mimnermus in fr. 26 G.-P.²=20 W.² reveals Solon's dialectic with older and contemporary poets and, quite unexpectedly, the agonistic tone of his own poetic intentions.

No poet in antiquity could ever write without engaging with Homer at some level. The first step to appreciate Solon's reliance on tradition as well as his departure from it is to consider his explicit acknowledgement of literary indebtedness while endeavouring to express new ideas — it is obvious that Solon had to innovate in order to deal with concepts or objects unattested in the Homeric or the Hesiodic poems; it is also self-evident that Solon could deal with the dawning repertory of the elegiac formulas, no less than with the hexametric tradition (as showed by Riedy 1903, 51f., Solon's use of epic formulas in hexameters is a good half less frequent than in the pentameters; see Giannini 1973 and Gentili 1968, 69ff., for an attempt at defining the specific formulas of archaic elegy). Nevertheless, close examination of the style of the fragments will show how Solon takes the option of not adopting what was offered by the formulaic diction even when he is allowed to keep it, but of substituting it with something often quite untraditional, and how he invests the Homeric formulas and concepts with a new syntax and a new meaning much more often than so far suspected. This is equally true for his metaphors, which while inserting and integrating elements borrowed from Homeric pictures and similes, thus sending back the listener to a familiar larger context, become semantically different and unusually striking because what Solon has to say is often genuinely unparalleled.

At times, one clearly remarks in his language the almost absolute absence of Homeric references, epithets and words, together with the frequent use for the first time of new words (some of them absolute hapaxes) or of expressions that are known to us only from Athenian comedy or that we suppose to be derived from everyday expressions or proverbs. At other times we notice a keen taste for mimic descriptions of the human reactions (and for mimetically ridiculing his opponents, above all in the poems in tetrameters) which are very uncommon features of the epic tradition. These elements of idiosyncratic innovations — that do not depend on the novelty of this or that idea in comparison with the epic vocabulary and ideas — together with the fact
that Solon, and similarly Archilochus, were two poets of the archaic age who used, besides elegiacs, other types of available metre, should suggest a higher degree of vividness and originality in his poetic activity than is usually acknowledged.

In my opinion Homeric allusion itself in archaic lyric cannot be reduced to the re-use of a ready-made thesaurus of suitable formulas for the dactylic rhythm (in elegiac poetry) or to a standard intention of the archaic poets to evoke the atmosphere or the tone of epic in a general way. Such an approach would wrongly underestimate Solon's self-consciousness in resorting to the so-called 'traditional referentiality': in the following pages the reader can find plenty of instances where the evocation of the Homeric context(s) through a formally more or less evident allusion to a Homeric line appears to be exploited by Solon to gain a powerful intensification of the meaning.

Indeed, the analysis of fr. 11 G.-P.²=19 W.² for instance, points in this direction: a piece of eulogistic poetry intended to pay a high literary homage, it reveals more than other poems how densely Solon could play with the Homeric heritage. In fragment 23 G.-P.²=27 W.², the frequent epicisms have the effect of elevating quite common events of human life to the level of 'heroic' events. Instead, fragments 12 G.-P.²=9 W.² and 13 G.-P.²=12 W.², though simply looking like reshaping of Homeric images, show the subtlety of Solon's thought, where the exploitation of the popularity of the meteorological speculations and skilled use of the naturalistic knowledge would invite the listener to take up a thought association between natural laws and human politics.

From the notes in this Commentary Solon's relation to Homer and Hesiod can look at times as rich and sophisticated as that of the Hellenistic poets, but I am not too much alarmed at a similarity that might seem unhistorical. Some kind of intertextuality can reasonably be presupposed any time poets and hearers/readers share a strong familiarity with one (or more) pre-existing authoritative poetic work(s), both steadily fixed in the memory of the authors and of the audience of an oral culture or fixed by writing. By the way, apart from the doubtful testimony of Dieuchidas of Megara, FGrH 485F6, according to whom Solon himself τά τε Ὅμηρον ἐξ ὑπερβολῆς γέγραψε ῥαφιδεῖσθαι ... μᾶλλον ὁ δὲ Ὅμηρον ἐφώτισεν ἦ Πεισίστρατος, and apart from the reliability of the better attested "Peisistratean" redaction of the Homeric poems (see Davison 1955 and 1959), most of the modern views on the transmission of Homer agree that around Solon's time the poems of the Iliad and the Odyssey had already been (see e.g. Janko 1992, 29-32) or were going to be transcribed to (written) text (on the "Peisistratean redaction" see lastly Seaford 1994, 148-53). The 'textuality' of the Homeric poems was a fact or a need which Solon would simply have, respectively, reflected or anticipated.
When one attempts to outline the structure of this elegy, one is confronted by a multitude of interpretations which vary at times either only in nuances, or are poles apart.

The main problem is the different perspective of a first part, where the idea of divine justice prevails, and appears to rule human actions, and a second part, where the result of the human actions is mainly conditioned by the unforeseen, if not capricious, powers of fortune. Ll. 67-70, in particular, appear to reverse the faith in a divine justice, which is stated several times elsewhere in the poem.

The poem was considered a mere patchwork, expanding on the first lines, the only original ones — the first ten lines, which are imitated by Crates (Perrotta 1924), or the first 14 lines (Puccioni 1957). Several scholars did not share this analytical approach, but simply acknowledged that these two parts are disconnected, and considered the poem as a discursive series of considerations succeeding each other in an almost free order (e.g. lastly Greene, Campbell, Gerber, West). Lattimore 1947, and van Groningen 1958 tried a formalistic analysis of single micro-textual themes, showing a logic at work, which is not at all the one we would expect — an archaic logic (as first described by Fränkel 1924=1960, 70-1), which seems repetitive to our taste and which could not express all at once and straightforwardly the most important truths, but had to present them from different points of view. Lattimore 1947, 162 argues that the elegy is a "progression of thought, each subsequent stage being an expansion, or revision, or illustration of a previous stage. It is, thus, a self-generating series of connected ideas". This approach views the poem as developing with an internal logic which may be perceptible without the necessity of recourse to an externally imposed thematic structure. Van Groningen 1958, 94-7 agrees with Lattimore but he finds a latent structure of the poem as well. He believes that the poem is an example of the type of archaic composition termed as "entrelacement". This structure results when the poet is presented simultaneously with a number of inseparable ideas whose equal importance and complexity renders hard the treatment of each one of them in depth before moving on to the next. Van Groningen, then, points to four ideas which are the dominant and main ones: a. I desire wealth, b. Just acquisition results in abiding wealth, a gift from the gods, c. Man's fortune is variable and unpredictable, d. Moira determines human fortune and punishment always attends, and x. the parts of the elegy with no direct relation to the movement of the ideas (ll. 1-2, 3-6, 14-15, 69-70), so we get this chain (x) ab (x) abdbcd (x) cdcaadde (x) abd which shows that the four ideas are functional, repetitive and always present in the poem.
Some other scholars tried to find a main idea connecting the whole poem and justifying the different perspectives of its two parts: the idea of the wisdom (Allen 1949) or of the correct and incorrect pursuit of wealth (Wilamowitz 1913, 257-68, Büchner 1959, Spira 1981), or the idea of divine justice leading to both the punishment of the unrighteous men and the re-distribution of their wealth, commonly misunderstood as the caprice of fate (Jaeger); δύναμις as divine principle operating on the unrighteous men, in the first part, and δίκη operating against the bad ἔρροψιν in ll. 71-6, after the description of the human professions in the central section (Römisch).

The last decades saw a renewal of the interest in the problem of the unity of the elegy which has been characterised by a similar attempt at justifying the lack of coherence between the two parts rather than at finding out a single, strong idea common to both: Müller 1956, Dalfen 1974, Maurach 1983, Eisenberger 1984, Christes 1986, Pötscher 1987. They attempted to find more and more logical (logical in the modern sense of the word) connections between the two parts, almost all of them trying to emphasise the pervasive relevance of the idea of divine justice, for instance ascribing the human suffering and failure of ll. 67-70 to the late operations of the divine punishment, the main thought developed in the first part (see above all l. 35) — though in fact Solon drops completely the theme of divine punishment in the second part, in order to develop in detail the unpredictability of human actions and the limits of human knowledge; on this matter, more successfully than his predecessors, Manuwald 1989, suggested that the unpunished success of the wrongdoers of ll. 29-32 is simply 'restated in positive terms' in ll. 69-70. But ll. 67-70 cannot be understood in moralistic terms, as convincingly shown by Römisch already in the 1930’s; and, in any case, there is still a relevant difference between the passive delay of the divine vengeance presented in ll. 29-32 and the active allowance of success for the wrongdoers of ll. 69f.

Lastly, and most convincingly, Nesselrath 1992, solved the incongruity between the first and second part in terms of different perspectives, the divine one and the human one. He believes that Solon himself subscribes to both of them, and they would somehow be progressive results of his own thought. He remarked that the starting prayer to the Muses for such general human conditions (as prosperity and good reputation), allows Solon to consider all kinds of limitations of the human fortunes as well as to reflect on human guilt and divine justice: this prayer would, somehow, be the start of a speculative chain and the reflection by Solon on the problem which he presents at the start, and is always in progress till the end. The element which allowed the evolution of Solon’s ideas in a changed perspective from l. 33 onwards must have been the fact that men do not feel the strokes of destiny as the punishment for their guilt or the guilt of their predecessors but as an unexpected and obscure pain. From l. 17 onwards reference concerned the 'over natural perspective'
of Zeus as ruler of the world and the connection between god and men had been dealt with from this perspective. In ll. 33-6 Solon with the use of the first plural person-θηςιτοι comes back to the 'natural human plan' and his concern is about cruelly deluded illusions which men alone form for themselves. In all, ll. 33-62 describe the several ways men form their positions and exploit their possibilities in an illusion about happiness and knowledge, and the superhuman forces which unexpectedly hinder them: both the fate and the 'rule of equilibrium' that stops people who have missed the invisible τέρμα which rules the acquisition of wealth.

Nesselrath's interpretation appears to me to be more convincing than the other ones simply because it admits, and justifies the change in perspective between the divine and the human part of the poem, instead of cancelling it for the sake of a single thematic principle. This means that the very issue of searching for a unifying principle has had to acknowledge the unavoidability of an 'anthropological' approach like Fränkel's, which antedates the beginning of the research for a unifying motive for Solon's elegy (and in my opinion undermines its legitimacy): in Solon's logic "the single, valid form of one single relevant truth has to be shown from two or three points of view".

1. Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου ἄγλα τέκνα: The first line is reused by the author of a late hymnodic inscription from Amorgos (IG XII.7, 95), and the first two by Crates, SH 359 in an amusing cynical abasement of the elegy which explicitly also involves ll. 5-10 (cp. above all χρήματα δ' οὐκ ἔθελω συνάγειν and Sol. I. 7; (πλούτον) εὐθείαν, εὐκτητον, τίμιον εἰς ἀρετήν and Sol. II. 2f., 7, 10). Eumelus, PEG 16 Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου ἕνεκα κοίματο was a parallel already known to Clement of Alexandria (Strom. 6.11.1): either Eumelus was really the model of Solon, or, more probably, both Solon and Eumelus testify that a prayer-formula of this kind pre-existed to Solon, cf. also Hymn. Orph. 76.1 Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζηνὸς ἐργαδότου θυγάτρες.

Mnemosyne (and/or Zeus) as parents of the Muses are found also in Hes. Theog. 52-4, 915-7, Hom.Hymn Herm. 429-30, Alcm. PMG 8.9-10 and PMG 28, adesp. PMG 941=Terp. 8Gos., Pind. Isthm. 6.75, Nem. 7.15, fr. 52f.55-6, and 52h.15-17, Arist. PMG 842.19-20, Scol. PMG 917c (quoted below), Callim. fr. 735, Apollod. Bibl. 1.3.1, Hymn.Orph. Proem. 17, Hymn.Orph. 77.1f. (quoted above). In a tradition independent of Hesiod, followed by few poets (cf. Diod.Sic. 4.7.1), and attested to us only by Alcman (PMG 5 fr. 2.28-30; cf. also 67) and by Mimnemnus (fr. 22), the Muses are daughters of Gaia and of Uranus, who in the Hesiodic version are the parents of Mnemosyne.
While following Hesiod’s account of the Muses’ parentage (and birthplace, cf. below), Solon certainly highlights his version of their lineage in a direct, unsubtle way, by making Μνημοσύνη the first word of his poem (Anhalt 1993, 13), or at least by sharing the traditional formula with Μνημοσύνης at the beginning (see above) and therefore moving κλώτε from its beginning position which is invariable in Homer (cf. below). Solon’s emphasis is most probably intentional, and may well be a signal of his variance with the other two lyric poets, and most especially with Mimnermus, from whom he likes to differentiate himself more than once (see ad fr. 23 and 26).

Μνημοσύνη ‘Memory’ occupies a prominent place in early Greek theology. She is included among the Titans, the first generation of the theogony of Gaia and Uranus (Hes. Theog. 135). For the oral poet, who is a mnemotechnician, she is the means by which he creates, especially if his theme was extensive, as in Homer’s case, or his subject factually complex, as with the genealogies of Hesiod’s Theogony. Poetic craftsmanship and inspiration were closely connected with memory, as Memory also transmitted traditional knowledge from one generation to the next (cf. Notopoulos 1938, Vernant 1965, ch. 2, Yates 1966, West’s note on Theog. 54, and Finnegan 1977, 52ff.). As late as the early 3rd cent., Mnemosyne still kept a traditional role in the proemial invocations of the improvising poetry, and Solon’s proemial emphasis on Mnemosyne has a close parallel in a sympotic poem, PMG 917c, which is entitled ΜΝΗΜΟΣΥΝΗ, and starts with the invocation Ὅ Μνήμη’ ἄγανωμάτε μάτερ, συνεπίσπεισε σὺν τέκνων ... ἁρπὶ βρόοσαν ἄοιδαν πρωτοπαγεῖ σοφίᾳ διαποίκιλον ἐκφέρομεν (text according to Ferrari 1988, 226).

Ζηνός Ὑολομπίου: Hom. II. 15.131, Od. 1.27, 2.68, 4.74; Hom. Hymn 17.2; Hes. Theog. 529, 884, Op. 87, 245, fr. 1.15, and 211.8.

ἀγλαά τέκνα: The most expected Homeric combination of epithet+neuter plural name for ‘children’ is νήπια τέκνα (11x in the Iliad and 3x in the Odyssey). ‘Ἀγλαά τέκνα is relatively less frequent in Homer (3x in the Iliad 2.871, 18.337, 23.23, 3x in the Odyssey 11.249 and 285, 14.223, and 4x in the Hymns: Ap. 14, Ven. 127, 33.2; cf. also the [Hom.] Epigr. 4.8 Markwald, where the Muses are called κοῦραι Διός ἀγλαά τέκνα). On the other hand, Hesiod nowhere has νήπια τέκνα, and he only exploits the formula which Solon adopts. I do not rule out that Solon’s use of the Hesiodic phrase is another hint at the Hesiodic choice made by Solon about the lineage of the Muses. Hesiod’s Theog. 644 Γαῖς τε καὶ Ὑφανοῦ ἀγλαά τέκνα is also the closest passage which is certainly before Solon’s time (cf. also Theog. 366, fr. 31.2 and 4).

G.-R.: (13 W3)

KXeiouaai, ... Δὶ' ἐννέπετε ..., Hymn.Orph. 76.1ff. cit. Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζηνός ἑργασίαν τὸν Ὀλυμπίαν ἔργασις Ἐορδάς, Μοῦσαι Πιερίδες ... ἀλλὰ μόλις, Bacchyl. 1.1-3, Sapph. PLF 103.8 ... ἄγνοια Χάριτες Πιερίδες[ς τε] Μο[ι圣地, Crates, SH 359.2 Μοῦσαι Πιερίδες, κλύτε μοι εὐχαριστή, adesp. SH 938.1-8 etc. The association of the Muses specifically with Πιερία (region in the north-east of Olympus) as their birthplace is non-Homeric, and appears to start with Hes. Theog. 53-4 (cf. also Eur. Bacch. 409 Πιερία, μοῦσαι ἑδρα; Paus. 9.29.3-4 connects the Muses with some Macedonian Pierus ... τρόπον φασὶ Πῖερον Μακεδόνα ... ἔλθοντά ἐστὶ Θεσπίους ἐννέα ... Μοῦσας καταστήσασθαι καί τὰ ὀνόματα τὰ νῦν μεταβέβαια φίλις). However, Solon as well as Hesiod, do not ignore the epic adjective 'Olympian' Muses (see below in l. 51) — an adjective which is more generic, as it refers to the common seat of all the gods, and, therefore, it is not at all incoherent with the specific one Πιερίδες.

Solon's invocation to the Muses in the elaborate preem of his "most personal elegy" (Solmsen 1949, 107) gives the beginning of the poem the appearance of a formal-deferential prayer to the gods (cf. below). This invocation is understandable if we think of Solon simply as a poet who is beginning his poem, and we can find plenty of lyric passages where the Muses are invoked as more or less responsible either for the content or the form of the song — above all if we suppose that Solon wanted to enhance the value of his ethical-paraenetic considerations presenting them as originated from the mouth of the Muses (cf. Jacoby 1931, 103 n. 1). But other reasons, too, may have driven Solon to emphasise the role of the Muses.

In Homer what is requested from the Muses is information on events of the distant past concerning human exploits and stories of the gods of which the poet could have had no first hand knowledge (ll. 2.484-93, 11.218ff, 14.508ff, 16.112ff, 2.761ff). Solon may derive from this Homeric, and later wide-spread tradition, by emphasizing Μνημοσύνη, because she provides the remembrance of the past, and therefore allows to draw the causal connections between past actions and their unavoidable future outcomes, which is useful for the welfare of the city and for Solon's role as a politician (cf. Anhalt 1989, 19). As was already stressed by Masaracchia 1956, 94-5, in this evaluation of the Muses, Solon would be also relying specifically on Hes. Theog. 80-97, where the importance of the Muses had been expressed not only for the poets but also in helping the ruling activity of the βασιλεῖς; in ll. 94-5 the singers are from the Muses (and Solon is a poet) but these goddesses bestow also to the king they protect things that Solon wants for himself as a politician: eloquence (δύναται τιμήσωσι Διὸς κοῦρα μεγάλου γεινόμενον τε ἰδωσι διοτρεφέων βασιλῆων, τῷ μὲν ἐπὶ γλώσσῃ γλυκερῆ ποίησιν ἔφεσιν), respect and admiration by the people (οἱ δὲ νυ λαοὶ πάντες ἐς αὐτὸν ὄρασι κτλ., αἰδοὶ μελεῖς), just decisions...
(διακρίνοντα θέμιστας ἰδείησι δικησιν), persuasive power (μαλακοίσι παραφάμενοι ἑπέεσσαν); therefore the one whom the Muses φιλωνται becomes ὀλβος (II. 94f.): cp. Solon's request for ὀλβος in the following I. 3. On Muses and politics see Livrea 1992=1993, and Agosti 1997.

κλοτε, μοι εὐχομένω: Besides the direct imitation of Crates, SH 359.2 κλοτε μοι εὐχομένω, cf. Thgn. IEG 4 μοι κλοθ, 13 εὐχομένω μοι κλοθ, adesp. PMG 1018b.3 εὐχομένων ἐπακούσατε(σ), Rhian. CA 56 κλοθε μοι εὐχάων. The formal-deferential tone of this initial invocation (the dative instead of the more common genitive, which Valckenaer wanted to substitute for the dat. of codd., is probably a result of this tone, cf. below) is confirmed by the parallels which can be found in the pseudo-orphic poems: cf. Hymn.Orph. 28.11 κλοθε μου εὐχομένου =32.15, 34.10, 49.4, 56.1 (also 59.2 κλοτε μοι εὐχομένου), and [Orph.] Lith. 171 (δόφρα σευ εὐχομένου κλοθε θεός).

For the sequence κλοτε ... δότε, cf. [Hom.] Epigr. 11.1 Markwald κλοθε μοι εὐχομένω, Κουροτρόφε, δος δε γυναίκα, [Hom.] Epigr. 6.1-3 Markwald κλοθε Ποσειδάων ... δος δ' οὐρον ... καὶ νόστων κτλ.

In Homer κλοθε and the other imperative forms of κλείν (such as the reduplicated κέκλουθο or κλοτε) are invariably at the beginning of the (first line of a) prayer (II. 11x, Od. 20x, cf. Braswell 1988, 79), followed by the vocative of the invoked person. This fixed position depends on the pragmatic function of these verbal forms, which aim at attracting the attention of the apostrophised person to the following request, and is also more or less analogous in function to the longer phrases with verba dicendi which fill the line preceding a direct speech. In the lyric poets — where also the use of the introductory verba dicendi is much less regular, cf. Führer 1967 — the imperative forms of κλείν appear not to have a fixed position, but they are still very frequent at the start of the speech (they are at the start in Anac. PMG 418, adesp. PMG 978b, Archil. IEG 108.1, Pind. Pyth. 1.90 and 4.13, fr. 78; they are not in Thgn. IEG 4, Pind. Ol. 14.5, fr. 52f.58). I would not rule out that Solon intentionally moved κλοτε from the beginning to the second half of the distich in order to emphasise the role of Mnemosyne.

Κλωμ regularly takes the genitive of the person heard, and the accusative of the thing heard. However, the dative (μοι) is attested by most of the MSS at least in Hom. Il. 24.335, Od. 4.767, Hom.Hymn Ap. 334, Hes. Theog. 474 and [Hes.] Sc. 68, Thgn. IEG 13, [Hom.] Epigr. 11.1 Markwald, and by an ancient pap. in Od. 15.172; in other passages μοι may have been overwhelmed by μευ in the tradition of the text, since the latter was the reading preferred by Didymus (cf. schol. Il. 1.37, Od. 6.239, and Ludwich 1884, 1.176). This μοι can be interpreted as a form with double function as genitive and as dative, which appears to be an archaic heritage (cf. Wackernagel
1928, 2, 77f. and Chantraine, Gramm.hom. 2,70 §8); a different linguistic interpretation of the dative with the verbs of hearing, as a dative of interest, is also possible, and is maintained e.g. by Haldane 1972, 45. The use of the genitive μευ with κλειν would be an innovation. Since many of the Homeric passages where μοι is best attested are a formulaic celebrative and archaising prayer-invocation (cf. Meier-Brügger 1986), we are perfectly entitled to suppose that also in Solon the dative is a signal of the formal-deferential tone of the prayer.

3-4. The same combination of wealth and reputation (with a different form of limitation) can also be found in Democr. VS 68B77 δόξα καὶ πλοῦτος ἀνευ ξυνέσιος οὐκ ἄσφαλεα κτήματα, which may be hinting at the Solonian precedent. Prosperity was considered a prerequisite of good opinion: cf. Hes. Op. 313 πλοῦτῳ δ' ἀρετή καὶ κόδος οὐμηδεί (cf. already Hom. Od. 11.358-61 καὶ κεῖν πολὺ κέρδιον εἰς, πλεονέρη σὺν χειρὶ φίλην ἕς πατρίδ' ἱκέσθαι καὶ κ' αἴδοιότερος ... ἀνδράσιν εἰπὼν πᾶσιν κτλ.).

Solon's line 4 is closely paralleled by CEG 396 δός δὲ ἐν ἀνθρώποις δόξαν ἔχειν α' γιαθων (6 B.C.: it is impossible to understand if it was a coincidence in using a traditional phraseology or an imitation of Solon; see also ad l. 8). For the combination of δίδωμι + final infin. ἔχειν + object, cf. Hom. Od. 2.335-6 οἴκια ... μητέρι δοῦμεν ἔχειν, Mimm. 1.1-2 Τιθωμὶ μὲν ἔδωκεν ἔχειν κακῶν ἄφθουν <ὁ> Ζεὺς γῆρας, and Anac. Anth.Pal. 6.346.3-4=196 G. δός δὲ μιν ... ναλέων αἰώνος μοῖραν ἔχοντ' ἀγαθὴν. For the phrase δόξαν ἔχειν, Thgn. IEG 572 δόξαν ἔχουσ' ἀγαθῶν (=1104b), Eur. TGF 659.10 δόξαν ἐδωκόλμην ἄν εὐκλείας ἔχειν.

The word ὀλβος has a range of uses, including 'happiness', 'good fortune', 'material wealth', 'prosperity', cf. Masaracchia 1958, 204f., and Doyle 1970. Here Solon appears at a first reading to be specifically thinking of economic prosperity, wealth or money, as the following πλοῦτος l. 7 and χρήματα l. 9 (at the beginning of the line, as well as ὀλβος) show; cf. also frr. 8.3 and 29b.2, where the accompanying adjective πολὺς stresses the material meaning of the word. See also Hom.Hymn Dem. 486-9 μέγ' ὀλβος ὃν τιν' ἔκειναι πρωφρονέως φιλοιται ... αὑφα δὲ οἱ πέμπουσιν ἐφέστιοι ἐς μέγα δόμα πλούτου, ὃς ἀνθρώποις ἄφενος θυτοῦσι δίδωσιν. In his imitation of Solon's elegy Crates, SH 359 also emphasises the material meaning of ὀλβος: χόρτον ἐμὴν συνεχὺς δότε γαστέρι, ἥ τε μοι αἰεί χώρις δουλοσύνης λυτὸν ἔθηκε βῶν. Nevertheless the reservation of ll. 7-13 is intended to specify that god-given wealth, as wealth combined with justice (cf. l. 3, where ὀλβος is particularised as πρὸς θεῶν, as well as πλοῦτος l. 9 is by ὃν μὲν
δῶσι θεοί), is different from πλούτος (cf., above all, l. 71 for its negative value) and χρήματα in general — after all Solon explicitly contrasts material wealth with ἄρετή in fr. 6, and possibly his ideology of the ὀλβος is less different than it may appear from the Pindaric ὀλβος 'happiness' of Isthm. 4.76ff., Pyth. 1.46ff. and 2.26ff.

In Homer either the gods in general (Od. 3.208, 18.19 quoted above) or specifically Zeus (Od. 4.207-8, 6.188 quoted above, 18.273) are considered to be responsible for the allotment of ὀλβος. See the occasional requests to different gods for virtue and financial prosperity in the explicit of some Homeric Hymns: 15.9 χαίρε ἄναξ Δίος υἱέ (scil. Heracles) δίδου δ’ ἄρετήν τε καὶ ὀλβον, 20.8 ἄλλ’ ἤλθ’ Ἡφαιστε: δίδου δ’ ἄρετήν τε καὶ ὀλβον. However the association of ὀλβος with the Muses has already a parallel in the Hesiodic passage on the Muses as helpers of poets and kings, already considered ad l. 2: Theog. 96-7 ὁ ὀλβος, ὑπτινα Μοῦσαι φιλωνται=Hom.Hymn 25.4-5. I do not agree with Eisenberger 1984, 10, according to whom the specification πρὸς θεῶν is intended to remind the audience that wealth comes from the Olympians, and that he is asking the Muses above all for the δόξα: in this interpretation we would be compelled to presuppose a hard zeugmatic variance in the sense of πρὸς, that would mean 'from' as far as the gods are concerned, and 'at the hand of' as for the men (on the meanings of πρὸς, see below): I prefer to believe, with Römisch 1933, 45, that the Muses have to mediate Solon's gaining of both wealth from gods and reputation from men.

πρὸς θεῶν μακάρων ... καὶ πρὸς ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων: An instance of the flexibility of the formulaic system, being an expansion of the single line formula, Hom. II. 1.339 πρὸς τε θεῶν μακάρων πρὸς τε θυτῶν ἀνθρώπων, Od. 9.521 οὔτε θεῶν μακάρων οὔτε θυτῶν ἀνθρώπων=Hes. fr. 204.117=Hom.Hymn Herm. 144 and Hom.Hymn Aphr. 35, Hes. fr. 25.31=fr. 229.11 ἐκ τε θεῶν μακάρων ἐκ τε θυτῶν ἀνθρώπων; Phoron. PEG 5.2: πάντας γὰρ μάκαρας τε θεὸς θυτοῦς τ’ ἀνθρώπους. Πρὸς +gen. is used of effects proceeding from whatever cause, in the meaning of 'from', 'at the hand of', with verbs of having and receiving (e.g. Hom. II. 1.160, 16.85, Od. 11.302, Alc. PLF 5.7, Pind. Ol. 7.90 and Nem. 9.45).

dόξαν ἀγαθήν: The good opinion which others have of one, estimation, repute, first in Solon. The phrase appears to be the 'political' equivalent — the replacement — of the 'heroic' κλέος ἑσθλὸν of Homer (e.g. II. 10.212-3, Od. 1.95, 19.333-4, Hom.Hymn Ap. 174-5). To be πάντας ... κατ’ ἀνθρώπους ὀνομαστός (Thgn. IEG 23), or πολλοῖς τε θ[αυ]μασθείς βροτῶν (Bacchyl. 1.152), or ἑσθλὸν ἄνδρα πολλῶν ὕπ’ ἄνθρωπῶν πολυζήλωτον εἶμεν (Bacchyl. 10.48-9), or περίβλεπτος, δακτυλόδεκτος (Aesch. Ag. 1332), ἐπίζηλος (Aesch. Ag. 939), περίβλεπτος βροτός ὀνομαστὰ πράσσων (Eur. HF 508-9), περιβόητος, would
be especially useful to someone who, like Solon, was aiming at political consensus. For the opposition between the wish for great wealth and the one for good opinion, cf. Critias, *TRGF* 43F17.7-10 oí δ' αἰσχρὰ κέρδη πρόσθε τοῦ καλοῦ βροτῶν ζητοῦσιν . . . ἐγὼ δὲ τοῦτον οὐδενὸς χρῆζω τυχεῖν, δύκαν δὲ βουλομένη ἂν εὐκλεῖας ἔχειν.

Homer has the word δόξη only twice, in the expression οὔδ' ἀπὸ δόξης 'and not otherwise than one expects'. This phrase is once co-ordinated to ἀπὸ σκοποῦ (*Od.* 11.344), and once (*Il.* 10.324, a line which probably derives from *Od.* 11.344, cf. Shewan 1911, 119, and Laser 1958, 408f.) is attributive of σκοπός: σοι δ' ἕγω οὐχ ἄλος σκοπός ἐσσομαι οὔδ' ἀπὸ δόξης. In both passages, as the ancient scholia acknowledged, δόξα emphasises the subjective character of the expectation, and is therefore still quite far from the meaning of 'reputation', namely positive public opinion, which the term already appears to express in Tyrt. 9.9 — another author mostly concerned with the elaboration of values and concepts of the ideology of the *polis* —, though it was above all developed from the Presocratics onwards (cf. Greindl 1940, 221). On the other hand, in l. 34 the meaning of δόξα is closer to the Homeric one of personal 'expectation'. The same ambivalence of the term is to be found in Theognis, *IEG* 571f. quoted above and 639, where δόξα means 'expectation', and 665-6, where δόξα is synonymous with the contextual τιμή (cf. Anhalt 1989, 29).

The specification of the δόξα as proceeding πρὸς ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων has to be remarked, since it suits Solon's aim to operate for the well-being of all the citizens: Solon does not want to be esteemed by his friends or a single faction of the Athenians, but by everyone.

5-6. The presentation of the results inherent in the conditions of life Solon was praying for in the second distich, happiness and good reputation. They are somehow the 'public version' of the simple private happiness described in Sol. fr. 17.


For the oxymoron γλυκύς/πικρός, cf. Thgn. IEG 301 and Soph. Aj. 966, and for the idea of generosity towards one's friends preferred to excessive wealth, cf. Pind. Nem. 1.31ff. (and Pyth. 1ff., quoted below ad 1.12, where πλοῦτος combined with ἀρετά is spoken of by the poet as a πολύφιλον ἐπέταν).

αἰδώλον ... δεινὸν ἵδειν: Hom. Il. 3.172 αἰδώλος τὲ μοὶ ἔσσο ... δεινὸς τε, 18.394 ἢ ρά υἱὸς τε καὶ αἰδώλη τε βόσ τον, Od. 8.21-2 φίλος ... γένοιτο δεινός τ’ αἰδώλος τε, 14.234 δεινός τ’ αἰδώλος τε μετὰ Κρήτεσσι τετύμην; cf. also Il. 15.657-8 ἵσχε γὰρ αἰδώς καὶ δέος, and Hom.Hymn Dem. 190 τὴν δ’ αἰδώς τε σέβας τε ἴδε χλωρόν δέος εἶλεν. For δεινὸν ἵδειν, Hom. Od. 22.405 δεινός δ’ εἰς ὑπὰ ἵδεσθαι.

Homer uses the two adjectives as positive parallels to describe an individual, and the two notions seem sometimes to overlap. δεινὸς reinforces αἰδώλος 'revered' without implying anything more frightening ('provoking reverence and therefore fear' LfgR E s.v.; see also Kirk ad Il. 3.172). Cf. Cypr. PEG 18.2 ἵνα γὰρ δέος, ἐνθα καὶ αἰδώς, Epich. CGF 221K. ἐνθα δέος, ἐνταῦθα καὶ ἀδώς and Pl. Euthphr. 12b where αἰδώς appears to overlap with just a part of the meaning of δέος. But most often δεινὸς had also the narrower meaning of 'fearful' in Homer, and at Resp. 5.465ab Plato treats reverence and fear as distinct and co-ordinate (the distinction between the two concepts is stressed as being original by Erffa 1937, 29f.). By contrasting αἰδώλος with δεινὸς Solon is certainly exploiting some difference in meaning between δεινὸς and αἰδώλος, and therefore possibly differentiates himself from the endyadic use of the phrase δεινὸς τ’ αἰδώλος in Homer. Solon's wish is not to harm his enemies, as in several of the similar dichotomies quoted ad I. 5, but to be 'respected' by them — a wise caution for a politician who liked to present himself in equilibrium between the political factions of his time, as remarked by Alt 1979, 393; cf. also Vox 1983a, 517-9.

7-8. χρήματα δ’ ἵμειρω ... οὐκ ἐθέλω: transformed in the parody of Crates, SH 359.6-9 χρήματα δ’ οὐκ ἐθέλω συνάγειν κλυτὰ, ... ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνης μετέχειν καὶ πλοῦτον ἀγείρειν εὐφορον, εὐκτητόν, τίμιον εἰς ἀρετήν. The
verb πέπαμαι appears here for the first time, and still in Theognis it appears to be specialised for the 'possession' of wealth, see 146 cit. below and 663; see later Pind. Pyth. 8.73 and the tragedians (where it is felt as a specifically Doric word with the alpha impurum, cf. Björck 1950, 130f.).

For the distinction between right and unrighteous wealth, cf. Hes. Op. 320-6 χρήματα δ’ οὖν ἄρπακτά: θεόδοστα πολλὸν ἁμείνω κτλ., Thgn. IEG 29-30 μηθ’ αἰσχροίζειν ἐπ’ ἔργασαι μηθ’ ἀδίκοισιν τιμᾶς μηθ’ ἁρετὰς ἐλκεο μηθ’ ἀθενος, 145-6 θεόλε δ’ εὐσεβέων ὀλγάς σὺν χρήμασιν οἰκεῖν ἢ πλουτεῖν ἀδίκως χρήματα πασάμενος, 199-202 εἰ δ’ ἀδίκως παρὰ καρᾶν ἀνήρ φίλοκερδέι θημων κτήσεται, εἰθ’ ὀρκψ πάρ τὸ δίκαιον ἐλων, αὐτικα μὲν τι φέρειν κέρδος δοκεί, ἐς δὲ τελευτὴν αὕθες ἐγεντο κακόν, θεὼν δ’ ὑπερέσχε νόος, 466 μηδὲ σε μυκᾶτω κέρδος ὃ τ’ αἰσχρόν ἔη, 753 ταῦτα μαθῶν φιλ’ ἑταῖρε δικαίως χρήματα πολού, Pind. Pyth. 3.110-1 εἰ δὲ μοι πλουτον θεὸς ἄβρον ὀρέξαι, ἐλπὶδ’ ἔχω κλέος εὐφέσθαι κεν ψήλῳν πρόσω (also Ol. 2.53 ὃ μᾶν πλοῦτος ἁρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος, Nem. 9.46 ἁμα κτεάνοις πολλοῖς ἐπίδοξον ... ἀρηταί κύδος), Democ. VS 68B77 δὸξα καὶ πλουτος ἀνευ ξυκέσθος οὐκ ἀσφαλέα κτήματα, Scol. PMG 890.3 τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδίκως, [Phoc.] 5 Derron μὴ πλουτεῖν ἀδίκως, αλλ’ εξ ὀσίων βιοτεύειν; also Xen. An. 2.6.18. In the fifth century will also appear the doctrine that prosperity in itself never lasts, for which see West’s note on Eur. Or. 340.  

πάντως ὑστερον ἡλθε δίκη: The closest parallel is Inscr. Graecae metr. 63 Pr. (ap. Polyb. 4.33 and Paus. 4.22.7) πάντως ὁ χρόνος εὑρε δίκην, κτλ., considered by Callisthenes (FGrH 124F23) to be the tombstone of Aristocrates, the Arcadian king who betrayed the Messenians during the first Messenian war (7th cent. B.C.), but was certainly later (cf. Walbank ad Polyb. cit.). For the thought, cf. also below, II. 28ff., and Sol. 3.16 (Δίκη) τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πάντως ἡλθ’ ἀποτελεσμένη, Simon. IEG 11.12 ἡ θείας ἀρμά καθιλε δίκης, Men. fr. 510.2 K.-Th. τὸ μὴ δικαίως εὐτυχεῖν ἐχει φόβον. The word δίκη appears in the Iliad seven times with the meaning 'settlement', namely ruling, legal process which may be proposed and made between two parties in dispute, as opposed to violent or illegal action; this sense accords with the derivation of the word from the root of the verb δείκνυμι 'to show', 'to indicate' (the different sense 'right, custom' or 'characteristic behaviour', 'mark' of a specific category of people or gods first occurs in the Odyssey, with the genitive or a limiting clause). Homeric society, being primarily composed of warriors, could not rely upon δίκη (peaceful litigation of disputes) without force (βίη) or violence (οβρίς) — this is the new meaning which Hesiod emphasises in Works and Days, though he also develops the meaning of the word towards a more abstract notion of legal process, law, and towards the idea of punishment for the violation of this process (Op.
219-24, 238-9). In several of these cases Hesiod clearly personifies and deifies Δίκη (above all in Theog. 901-2, where she is a daughter of Zeus andThemis, sister of Eirene and Eunomia; cf. also Op. 213, 275, 283), and thus increases its importance; besides he often makes reference to the role of Zeus in supervising the functions of Δίκη, thus implying that a violation of it is in some sense an offence against the god (Op. 36, 225-9, 239, 242, 253, 256, 259, 276, 281). At any rate in Hesiod the word does not yet seem to have the meaning of (personal) morality or (public) justice in general, which only Plato appears to exploit fully (as stressed by Havelock 1978; for a different point of view, cf. Solmsen 1949, 87-96 who follows Jaeger in believing in a "religious and moral doctrine of Justice and Injustice" in Hesiod). In Hesiod Δίκη still oversees only one activity, the peaceful settlement of disputes: cp. Op. 327-34, a section which refers to deeds which are traditionally wrong, but the punishment for these ἄδικα έργα has nothing to do with Δίκη, since there is no question of harming any legal process, and since Δίκη does not mean 'justice' or 'retribution' in general, a meaning (=later δικαιοσύνη) which first occurs in Theognis, and is connected with the increasing association of Δίκη with the idea of balance, attested from Solon fr. 13 and the Presocratics onwards (cf. Anaximand. VS 12B1, Heraclit. VS 22B 94, Parm. VS 28B1.14 and 8.14).


While being strongly influenced by Hesiod, Solon turns his attention above all to the economic and political results of the violation of Δίκη, namely uncertainty of wealth, destruction of the whole city (cf. fr. 3), and in this line Δίκη (or, better, Δίκης) is something in between the Hesiodic personification and the Theognidean abstraction. Indeed, it means 'punishment against the unlawful acquisition of prosperity' in an economic context, as well as in Thgn. IEG 207 ἄλλον δ' οὐ κατέμαρφε δίκη, where we find both the violation of Δίκη by the ἄδικοι and the failure of the system to punish these ἄδικοι (cf. II. 743-52, where his indignation about the prosperity of the ἄδικοι and the sufferings of the δίκαιοι is obvious). But at the same time Solon's Δίκη also appears to be close to a personified deity as found in Hes. Op. 220ff., where she comes into the city and brings evil to those who drove her out, and finally, I. 259-60 αὐτίκα πάρ Δίπατρι καθεξομένη Κρονίων γηρύτει' ἀνθρώπων ἄδικον νόον. In Solon, too, the coming of Δίκη is presented in strict connection with the action of Zeus, described from I. 17 onwards. After all the same gnomic aorist ἡλθε, and the same adverb πάντως are exploited by Solon for the surely personified Δίκη of fr. 3.14ff. quoted below.
The gnomic aorist ἧλθε expressing a general truth, reflects exactly Solon’s confidence in the final retaliation of δίκη, a confidence shared piously by Hesiod, Op. 217-8 δίκη δ’ ὑπὲρ ὑβριος ἵσχει ες τέλος ἔξελθοισα. However, different from Hesiod is in Solon the certainty of the statement, stressed by the adverb πάντως (see also ll. 28 and 31): as remarked by Raaflaub 1996, 1060ff., the acknowledgement of firmly established laws in the social-political sphere (see ll. 11ff.) allows Solon to replace with certainty the previous faith/belief in justice.

9-13. The perspective in which Solon emphasises the opposition between right and unrighteous wealth is, above all, the perspective of duration of each of them, which may have already appeared in aieί l. 4, cf. Römisch 1933, 5. For the thought, see above all Pind. Pyth. 5.1-4 ὁ πλοῦτος εὐρυσκευής, ὅταν τις ἀρετά κεκραμένον καθαρὰ βροτήσιος ἀνήρ πότμου παραδύντος αὐτὸν ἀνάγη πολύφιλον ἔπέταν, who states that the wealth combined with ἀρετά and sent by πότμος is the only εὐρυσκευής πλοῦτος; besides Eur. El. 943-4 ὁ δ’ ὅλβος ὅδικως καὶ μετὰ σκαιῶν ξυνῶν ἔξεπτατʼ οίκων, σμικρὸν ἀνθήσας χρόνον, Ion 378-80 ἀν γὰρ βία σπεύδωμεν ἀκόντων θεῶν, ἀνύνητα κεκτήμενα τὰ γάθ’, ὦ γύναι, ἃ δ’ ἀν διδόντε ἐκόντες, ὦφελουμέθα, TGF 362.11-3 ἀδίκως δὲ μὴ κτῷ χρῆματ’, ἢν βουλὴ πολὺν χρόνον μελάρθος ἐμέμενεν’ τὰ γὰρ κακὸς οἰκοὺς ἐσελάθοντ’ οὐκ ἔξει σωτηρίαν, TGF 419 βία ... ἔλκετε ... κακοὶ τιμᾶς βροτοὶ, ... κτάσθε πλοῦτον πάντοθεν θηρώμενοι, ... ἐπειτ’ ἀμάθε ὑπὸνε δύστηνοι θέρος, TGF 459 κέρδη τουαῦτα χρή τινα κτάσθαι βροτῶν, ἐφ’ οἷς μέλει μῆποθ’ ύπερον στένειν. For the connection of wealth and ὑβρις (see l. 11), cf. e.g. Eur. TGF 437 ὤρῳ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖσιν ἀνθρώπῳ ἐγὼ τίκτουσαν ὕβριν τὴν πάροθ’ εὐπραξίαν, TGF 438 ὑβριν τε τίκτει πλοῦτος.

The idea of the uncertainty of the material goods, especially of those improperly and unrighteously acquired, is frequent in later authors, cf. Thgn. IEG 197-208, Eur. El. 941 ἢ γὰρ φύσεις βέβαιοι, ὡς τὰ χρηματα, HF 511-2 ὁ δ’ ὅλβος ὁ μέγας ... οὐκ ὀδί’ ὅτι βέβαιος ἐστι, Phoen. 558 ὁ δ’ ὅλβος ὁ βέβαιος ἀλλ’ ἐφήμερος, TGF 354.2-3 οὕτε γὰρ πλοῦτος ποτε βέβαιος ἀδίκως, TGF 362.11-3 ἀδίκως δὲ μὴ κτῷ χρῆματ’, ἢν βουλὴ πολὺν χρόνον μελάρθος ἐμέμενεν’ τὰ γὰρ κακὸς οἰκοὺς ἐσελάθοντ’ οὐκ ἔξει σωτηρίαν, and Men. Dys. 797 περ’ χρημάτων λαλείς, ἀβεβαιοῦ πράγματος.

On the firmness of wealth sent by gods: Hes. Op. 320-6 χρηματα δ’ οὐχ ἀρπακτὰ’ θεόσοδοτα πολλὸν ἀμείνω. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ χερσί βίη μέγαν ὅλβον ἔληται, ... ἀνέρι τῷ, παῦρον δὲ τ’ ἐπὶ χρόνον ὅλβος ὀπηδεῖ, Thgn. IEG 197-8 χρῆμα δ’ ὁ μὲν Διὸθεν καὶ σὺν δίκη ἀνδρὶ γένεται καὶ καθαρῶς, aieί
1. μετά του πεδίου... πεδίον τὸν θεόν, Pind. Pyth. 3.103-6 χρῆ πρὸς μακάρων τυγχάνοντ' εὖ πασχέμεν. ὧν δήσος δὲν ὡς μακρόν ἀνδρῶν ἐρχεται σάσος, πολύς εὖτ' ἀν ἐπιβρίσασα ἔπηται, καὶ Ἑμ. 8.17 σὺν θεῷ γὰρ τοι φυτεύεις ὀλβος ἀνθρώποισι παρμοιώτερος.

9. παραγίγνεται: the verb appears once in a material sense in Hom. Od. 17.173. With reference to an abstract subject in Thgn. IEG 139 οὔθε τῷ ἀνδρώτων παραγίγνεται ὅσα ἐθέλησιν (also e.g. in Pl. Men. 86d, 99e, Leg. 5.732d, Xen. Cyr. 4.1.14).

δῶσι: Subjunctive with gnomic value.

ἐμπεδός: From the literary meaning of 'standing firmly on the ground', already in the epic ἐμπεδός developed, on the one hand, to 'unchanged', 'undisturbed', on the other, to (metaph.) 'firm', 'reliable', sometimes with a temporary connotation 'continuous' (LfgrE s.v.); both metaphorical senses of the word, which Homer exploits almost only in the Odyssey, occur in Solon.

10. ἐκ νεάτου πλαμένος ἐς κορυφήν: For totality described in a 'vertical' sense, see Rhian. CA 71.9-10 τοῖν σέλας διμασιν αἴθει κοῦρος, κάς νεάτος ἐκ κορυφῆς δύναχας. For the word's substantival use cf. Callim. Del. 33 ἐκ νεάτων from the foundations'.

11. οὖν δ' ἄνδρες τιμῶσιν ὕψι ύβριος: There lies a clearly marked contrast between 1.9 (the πλοῦτον) οὖν μὲν δῶσι θεοί and I. 11 (ὁ πλοῦτος) οὖν δ' ἄνδρες τιμῶσιν, further emphasised by the phrases ὑψι ύβριος and οὐ κατὰ κόσμον. We need a word which will harmonise with this situation, what τιμῶσιν certainly does, in my opinion. Most adopt Ahrens' emendation μετύσιν (some similar attempts were θηρῶσιν van Herwerden, ἀνάγαμον von Leutsch, coll. Pind. Pyth. 5. 3; συλώσιν Linder and Schmidt, coll. Thgn. 345, μασώται Linforth, φιμῶσι Masaracchia). However, as Masaracchia 1958, 212 points out, πλοῦτος cannot 'follow' (ἐρχεται) one who pursues it. Björck 1942 attempts to justify τιμῶσιν placing the comma after it instead of after ύβριος, comparing Pl. Resp. 2.364a (πονηροῖς πλουσίων καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἑκούσις εὐδαμονίζειν καὶ τιμᾶν ... τοῖς δ' ἀτιμάζειν καὶ ὑπερραῖν, οἱ ἃν πη ὀσθενεῖς τε καὶ πένητες ὅσιν) but then no satisfactory contrast is provided to the previous distich, and Björck's assumption that in II. 11f. Solon would be repeating II. 9f. appears to be a petito principii. The expression πλοῦτων τιμῶσιν (reading of the MSS) receives support from Thgn. IEG 189 χρήματα ... τιμῶσι, 523 οὖ σὲ ... ὁ Πλοῦτε βροτῶ τιμῶσι μάλιστα, Eur. TGF
354 τὰς οὐκίας ... τιμᾶν, Ar. Plut. 587, Pl. Resp. 8.551a1, 553d5, 555c7, Ep. 2.312e5, Arist. Top. 117a, Aesop. Prov. 58.3, Aristid. Or. 13.145.9. As for ύψι ὑβρίς, it appears to me to be perfectly understandable as denoting "an intentional, anti-social, element in men's pursuit and overvaluation of new wealth; the presence of hybris makes the acts of acquisition unjust", cf. Fisher 1992, 69, and see Sol. 3.6 χρήματα πειθόμενοι, said of the citizens whose foolishness is going to destroy their city. Therefore the distich soundly complements the previous one, if we simply accept Hermann's comma after ὑβρις.


12-3. (πλοῦτος) ἐρχεται ... ἐπεται: The wealth is here almost personified as in the close parallel of Pind. Pyth. 3.105-6 quoted above ad ll. 9-13 ὄλβος {δ'} οὐκ ἐς μακρὸν ἀναρών ἐρχεται σάος, πολὺς εὖτ' ἂν ἐπιβρίσας ἐπηητα. On wealth as "companion", besides Sol. 8.3-4, cf. Bacchyl. 1.160 πλοῦτος δὲ καὶ δειλόσιν ἀνδρώπων ὁμαλεί, and Pind. Pyth. 5.1ff. ὁ πλοῦτος εὐφυθενής, ὅταν τις ... ἀνήρ ... αὐτὸν ἀνάγη πολύφυλον ἐπέταν.


13. οὐκ ἔθελων: For a similar personification of an abstract concept, in a similar context (Dike subdued by unrighteous rulers), cf. Hes. Op. 220-3 τῆς δὲ Δίκης ῥόδος ἐλκομένης ἦ κ' ἄνδρες ἄγωσιν δωροφάγοι, σκολῆς δὲ Δίκης κρίσις θέμιστας. ἦ δ' ἐπεται κλαίοσα ... κακὸν ἄνθρωποι φέρουσα.

ταχέως δ' ἀναμίσγεται ἄτη: Ταχεός only once in Homer (II. 23.365) who almost always has τάχα, apparently a poetic word, much more common in the tragedians, but rarely attested in prose and comedy, which prefer ταχέως (cf.

ἀτη dative (lastly accepted by West), though attested by best MSS, is worse than the nominative, because ἀτη is more easily understood as the subject of the following ll. 14-6, — but not because of the argument raised against the dative by Linforth 1919, 231, who states that ἀναμίσγεσθαι is properly used only of joining a group (cf. the opposite instances of Hom. Od. 10.235-6 σῦτῳ φάρμακα, Callim. Del. 217 φάβω μύθος, fr. 24.3 Pf. γέλως λύπη).

The primary meaning of ἀτη appears to have been 'blindness', a state of mind in which a person lacks rational control over his decision and deeds, mostly inflicted by the gods (and this is found at least in Hom. II. 3.1.100—according to Zenodotus: δρυχή codd.—6.356, 9.114-20, 24.28, (cf. 3.164, 19.86-8), Od. 4.261); more frequently in Hesiod the word signifies the material consequences or the destruction. Only in Hesiod (Op. 213-6) appears the connection between ἀτη and ὄβρις, while neither in Homer nor in Hesiod is there any sign of the idea of ἀτη as punishment for the ὄβρις (on the contrary, in Hes. Op. 213-6, after one has already encountered ἀτη he is weighed down with ὄβρις), or of the well-known scheme ὀλβος-κόρος-ὄβρις-ἀτη. Instead, both ideas seem to be implied by Solon (see also frs. 3.8-11 and 8): cf. Dodds 1951, Iff., Greene 1963, 36-8, Doyle 1984, Roisman 1984, Havelock 1978, 258.

14. δρυχῆς δ’ ἐξ ὄλγης γίγνεται: Solon compares the beginning of ἀτη with the image of fire which grows big from small beginning. We should prefer the correction by West 1966, 152, δρυχῆς δ’ ἐξ ὄλγης, rather than δρυχή κτλ. MSS, which does not give a satisfactory combination with the verb τελευτᾷ (see Wilamowitz 1913, 259). Arnott’s reading δρυχῆν δ’ ἐξ ὄλγου is also plausible but the parallels quoted by West, Solon I. 59 πολλάκι δ’ ἐξ ὄλγης ὀδόνης μέγα γίγνεται ὄλγος, and Hes. fr. 43(a)61 ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὄλγης are most persuasive. I would add Bacchyl. 11.64-6 νεῖκος ... ἀμαμάκετον βληχρᾶς ἀνέπαλτο ... ἀπ’ ἀρχᾶς.

ὡστε πυρός: a brief simile which ends the verse, typical of the elegiac poetry. For a parallel picture cf. Pind. Pyth. 3.37 πολλάκι δ’ {ἐν} ὀρεὶ πῦρ ἐν ὄνος σπέρματος ἐνθόρον ἀδίστωσεν ὑλαν, and cp. Ar. Ach. 916-25.


tὸ πρῶτον: Cf. Hom. II. 4.267, 23.324.
16. οὖ ... δὴν: 'not for a long while', δὴ is the reading of S, δὴν is Gesner's correction and is also found in the late ms. Paris. 1985. οὖ γὰρ δὴν is found in Hom. Od. 2.163-4, 20.155 (ὀν δὴν 16x in Hom.).

οὐβρος ἐργα: Similar phrases with ἐργα in Sol. 1.41 πενίης ... ἐργα, Sol. 3.37 ἐργα διχοστασίας; Hom. ll. 9.228 δαυτος ... ἐργα, Hes. Op. 146 (according to the reading of Πίθρ), Minn. 8.12 πενίης ... ἐργ(α), Xenoph. 2.18 ρώμης ... ἐργ(α).


18-25. ὡστ' ... τέσις: Solon expands a short phrase of comparison (ὡστ' ἀνευμος ... διεσκέδασεν) by adding — in the manner of the extended Homeric simile — an enjambing relative clause which is preceded by the runover adjective ἦμυνος, ὡς πάντου κτλ., and develops a picture which extends for six verses. At the end of the simile the correlative τοιαῦτη to the introductory adverb marks (in ring form) the return to the narrative. The length of this simile, unusual for archaic elegy, which prefers to condense the Homeric models into one or two words (as noted by Hudson-
Williams 1926, 123), is a clue to the emphasis Solon wants to give to his treatment of the idea of ὀλίγη. The points stressed are the swiftness of the spring-storm, its destructive violence, and the complete calm it finally brings, since the earth is as free from the works of ὑβρίς, as heaven from the winter clouds. The implicit point of comparison is that "as the storm comes in its destructive violence only at the end of winter, so Zeus is concerned not with each deed but with the end" (Allen 1949, 53); cf. also Fränkel 1924=1960, 70 n.1, who points out that ἕρμος — which is given importance by its emphatic position — must be given full weight in interpretation: the storm comes in spring, after the clouds of the long winter, and the αἰθήρη following it will be a persistent one (cf. ll. 23f.). The idea introduced in the simile anticipates its appearance in the narrative (ll. 25-8 repeat explicitly what the simile has already implied, and ll. 29-32 repeat the idea again in more precise detail), so that the simile plays an essential part in the sense.

Storm-simile passages are found in epic (Il. 13.795-801, 16.384-93; Hes. Theog. 873-80), and the storm of Il. 16.384-93 was already a punishment inflicted by Zeus on unrighteous men, but Solon's simile formally comes from Il. 16.297-302 ὡς δ᾽ ὁτ᾽ ἄρχηται ... κυνήθη πυκνήν νεφέλην ... Ζεῦς, ... ἔκ τ᾽ ἐφανεν ... σκοπαί καὶ πρώονες ἄκροι καὶ νάπαι, οὐρανόθεν ... ὑπεράγη ἁστετος αἰθήρ, ὡς Δαναώι νηρῶν ... ἀπωσάμενοι ... πῦρ τυπθὼν ἀνέπνευσαν (cf. also Il. 5.525-6 ζαχρείων ἄνεμων, οἷς τε νέφεα σκιάευτα πνοήσειν λιγυρῆς διασκαδάσαι δέντεσ). In the Iliad-passage the active role of Zeus in moving the cloud hints that his plan caused this shift — in Solon ἄνεμος ἕρμος=Zeus; in Homer the simile is related from the Greeks' viewpoint and embodies their emotions, and the sudden gleam of new hope for them is compared to a sudden improvement of weather when light bursts through the clouds — in Solon αἰθήρη ἐκθευκεν ... λάμπει δ᾽ ἡμέλλοι μένος καλὸν for the final serenity of Zeus' justice. By the way, that the focus of Solon's attention is more on the restoration of justice than on the effects of the punishment is proved also, as was remarked by Ziegler 1963, 654, by the length of the description of the good weather coming back, which takes three and a half lines whereas the picture of the effect of divine punishment occupies two and a half lines. Later parallels for the tempest=punishment by gods are Aesch. Sept. 758-61 κακῶν δ᾽ ὀσπερ θάλασσα κύμα ἀγεῖ τὸ μὲν πίτουν, ἄλλο δ᾽ ἀείρει τρίχαλον, δὲ καὶ περὶ πρύμναν πόλεως καχαλίζει, and Soph. Ant. 584-92 οἷς γὰρ ἐν σεισθὴ θεόθεν δόμος, ἄτας οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει ... ὡσε ποιήσας ἀλῶς οἶδα, δυσπνοῖς ὦταν Θρήσκομιν ἐρέβος ὕφαλον ἐπιδράματι πνοίας, κυλίνδει βυσσόθεν κελαινάν θῖνα καὶ δυσάνεμοι στόνῳ βρέμουσιν ἀντιπλῆγες ἀκταί (on which cf. Easterling 1978, 145).
18. ἀνεμος νεφέλας ... διεσκέδασεν: A similar picture in Hom. II. 17.649-
50 αὐτικα δ' ἥρα μὲν σκέδασεν, καὶ ἀπώσεν ὀμίχλην, ἱέλιος δ' ἐπέλαμψε, and
Hes. Theog. 873-9 αἱ δὲ τοι πτίπουσα ἐσ ἱεροειδέα πόντον, πῆμα μέγα
θυμωσί, κακὴ θύωσιν ἀέλη ἄλλοτε δ' ἄλλαι ᾠει διακινδύνασι το νῆας
ναύτας τε φθείρουσι ... αἱ δ' αὖ καὶ κατὰ γαῖαν ἀπείρωτον ἀνθρώπων ἔργο'
ἐρατά φθείρουσι χαμαιγενέων ἀνθρώπων; (cp. Sol. l. 21 (ἀνεμος) δηώσας καλά
ἐργα).

19. ἤρινός: The form is new, being a typical Attic contraction, for the
Homer/ Hesiodic εἰ/ἡαρινός; for the phrase, cf. above all II. 8.307 νοτίσσι τε
eιαρινήσιν. For the separation of the adjective from its name ἀνεμος, see ad l. 45.
πόντον πολυκύμονος ἀτρυγέτοιο: The combination πόντον ἀτρυγέτοιο is found in Hom. II. 15.27 (in accusative), Od. 2.370, 5.84, 140, 158,
7.79, 17.289 (in prepositional accusative), Hes. Theog. 241 (in dative), 808, 737,
(also cf. 131 accompanying the word πέλαγος, 413, and 728 with θαλάσσης).
Πολυκύμων is first found in Solon. The only other instance is Emp. VS 31B38.3
gαϊα τε καὶ πόντος πολυκύμων ἥδ' ἵγρος ἀὖρ, but Suda p 1982 A. πολυκύμονος
θαλάσσης (the epithet explained with its name, according to a well known
lexicographic principle, for which cf. Degani 1977-8, 143-6) proves that the diffusion
of this pattern had to be larger. Homer had expressed the same idea through the
phrases πόντον ... κυμαίνοντα: II. 14.229, Od. 4.425 and 570, 5.352, 11.253.

20. πυθμένα κινήσας: Hom. II. 4.422-3 ... κύμα θαλάσσης ὄρινυτ' ... Ζεφύρου
ὑπο κινήσαντος, Hom.Hymn 28.11 ἐκινήθη ... πόντος. For πυθμήν 'sea-bottom'
cf. Hes. Theog. 932, Thgn. IEG 1035.

γῆν κατὰ πυροφόρον: πυροφόρος='wheat bearing' is not a fixed formulaic
adjective in Homer: in the Iliad once with πεδίῳ (II. 21.602), once with ἀροῦρης
(II. 12.314) and in the nominative plural with ἄρουραι (II. 14.123) while in the
Odyssey (3.495) the form πυρηφόρος replaces πυροφόρος to suit the metrical
requirements (also in the Hom.Hymn Ap. 228). πυροφόρος is twice in Hesiod for
ἄηρ (Op. 549) and for Ἀσίς ἔδος (fr. 180.3), and of the soil in Sol. 18.2=Thgn.
IEG 720 γῆ πυροφόρον πεδία, Thgn. IEG 988 πυροφόρω πεδίῳ, Stesich. PMG
222 II 7 χθόνα πυροφόρον; see also Pind. Isthm. 3/4.72. We cannot rule out that in
this context Solon contrasted it deliberately with ἀτρυγέτοιο of the preceding line:
ἀκαρπος was one of the two/three meanings which the ancients ascribed to
ἀτρύγετος, the Homeric epithet of the sea, whose significance was much debated: cf.
Eur. Phoen. 210 ὑπὲρ ἀκαρπίστων πεδίων, which glosses the Homeric formulas
with ἀπρόχιτος and πώντος/άλς, as was already remarked by schol. II. 15.27 (cf. also Guida 1994, 24 n. 3).

21. δηώσας καλά ἐργα: 'Destroy' is a new meaning of δηώ, first attested here, and later frequent in Ionic-Attic authors (starting from Hdt. 5.89.2). In Homer the verb means above all 'cruelly' to kill' persons, tearing them to pieces; only a few times it is used for the arms of the enemies in the meaning 'to tear in pieces' (ἀσπίδες II. 5.452 and 12.425; τεύχεα II. 18.82). Therefore the idea which is here conveyed may be that Zeus destroys the human works with the martial fury with which the Homeric heroes destroy the defences of the enemies. The prosody of καλά, with the first syllable short, is not Homeric, but usual in Attic (and also in other elegiac poets).

ἐργα:  'cultivated fields and crops', destroyed by the rain sent by Zeus in II. 5.92 πολλὰ δ᾽ ἐπὶ αὐτοῦ ἐργα κατήρισε κάλ' αἰζήσω, by overflowing in II. 16.392 μισθεί δὲ τε ἐργ' ἀνθρώπων, by winds in Hes. Theog. 879 ἐργ' ἐρατὰ φθείρουσι χαμαιγενέων ἀνθρώπων.

21-2. θεῶν ἔδος αἰτήσυν ikανε 5ορανόν: See Pind. fr. 162 οὔφρανόν ἐς αἰτήσυν, Bacchyl. 3.33f. [ἐς αἰ]τήσυν αἰθέρα (told of someone rising his arms to the sky to pray to gods), Soph. Aj. 845 τὸν αἰτήσυν οὔφρανόν; Hom. II. 5.367 ἰκαντο θεῶν ἔδος, αἰτήσυν ὁλυμπον, II. 5.868 ἰκανε θεῶν ἔδος, αἰτίνυ ὁλυμπον, Hom. Hymn Ap. 109 ἰκανε θεῶν ἔδος αἰτίνυ ὁλυμπον, [Hes.] Sc. 203 θεῶν ἔδος ἀγνός ὁλυμπος. In Homer the sky is often called εὐρός, and αἰτίς is said of mountains, but the double indication of the seat of the gods as Olympus and as the sky (the former possibly being the older: cf. Sale 1984, 23-28) already led to some overlapping of the two places even in the Homeric poems (see above all II. 8.19-26, where ἐξ οὔφρανόθεν: II. 19 and 21-περὶ δύον Οὐλιμπόλοι: I. 25). Above all, according to the schol. ad II. 3.364 and 15.192, Zenodotus read οὔφρανόν αἰτίνυ in these passages, where the vulgata has οὔρ. εὐρόν. Aristarchus objected that the sky is εὐρός, while αἰτίς is better said of a mountain, as he carefully differentiated the epithets suitable for Olympus, a mountain, and those for the sky (see also schol. ad II. 13.317), in order to distinguish between what he believed to be the Homeric usage and the later identification of Olympus and the sky (or, better, the allegorical explanation of the Homeric Olympus as the sky: cf. Lehrs 1865, 164-171, Schmidt 1976, 85f.). Against Nickau 1977, 207 n. 60, Janko 1992, ad 15.189-93 maintains that Zenodotus altered the text to further the view that Olympus was in the sky. In my opinion the antiquity and the strongly homerizing tone of Solon's passage (which is unexploited so far in connection with the Homeric variants of II. 3.364 and 15.192) hint, instead, at the
possibility that some ancient texts of Homer had already αἰτίων οὐρανόν either in II. 3.364 or in 15.192 or in both cases which Zenodotus accepted.

αἰθρήν δ' αὖτις ἐθήκεν ἰδέιν: αἰθρή is the Ionic-Attic equivalent of the epic αἰθρη—'clear sky', first in Solon. Solon rephrases Hom. II. 17.645 Ζεῦ πάτερ ... ποίησον δ' αἰθρήν, δῶς δ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδέσθαι (where αἰθρήν was not the object of ἰδέσθαι) while adapting to the pentameter the common Odyssey-formula θήκεν ἰδέσθαι (8.20, 18.195, 24.369, 374), which had been always and only said of miraculous alterations of the human reality by Athena. For ἐθήκεν='caused', 'made' see Od. 9.235 ὅρμαγδον, Soph. OC 542 φόνον, Eur. HF 590 στάσιν, Or. 1510 κραυγήν. For other examples of 'timeless' aorists used in similies, see West 1989, 136-7.


κατὰ πίονα γαῖαν: Πίον in Homer is said metaphorically of rich soil (with ἀγρός, δῆμος etc.), and it is used with masculine/neutral nouns (cf. also Tyrt. 6.3, Phoc. 7.1), while the feminine πείρα frequently accompanies ἀρουρα, and once γαῖαν (Od. 19.173). If we accept the reading of the majority of the MSS, κατὰ πίονα, Solon would use the masculine form for the feminine, as [Hes.] Ἀχ. 407-8 ἀγροτήρης ἐλάφιον πίονος or Aesch. Ag. 820 πίονας πλούτου πινοᾶς (for the interpretation of Od. 2.56=17.535 πίονας αἰγας as feminine, see Kühner-Blass I, 543 and Schwyzer I, 543). Metrical reasons prevented Solon from using here the Homeric traditional feminine form which the poet adopted in 29φ8 πείρας χθονός πατρίδος. The relevance for Solon of this idea of the fertility of the earth (cf. above 1. 20 and 18.2) allows us to adopt the non-Homeric lectio difficilior κατὰ πίονα γαῖαν instead of the reading κατ' ἀπείρονα supplied by the manuscript B2, κατ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν which would simply repeat the epic formulas ἐπ'/κατ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν/ of Homer (8x) and Hesiod (6x).

25. τοιαύτη Ζηνὸς πέλεται τίσι: Cf. Alcm. PMG 1.36 ἦστι τις σιῶν τίσι:

Gagarin 1974, 190 believes that Solon does not elaborate on the nature of the punishment which follows unlawful behaviour in acquisition of wealth, but stresses the timing of that punishment and the uncertainty of economic future; however, τοιαύτη refers back to the whole simile—the vengeance τίσι is like the violent storm in spring which destroys ἔργα in its wake but eventually clears the sky, so that the sun can shine on the rich earth again: all this is not just the simile but also metaphor.
for the manner in which Zeus punishes those who acquire wealth ύφ' ὑβρισ', a metaphor through which Solon emphasises more the positive effects of Zeus' vengeance, as was already remarked ad ll. 18-25. We can contrast the forms of the divine punishment in Homer's and Hesiod's detailed accounts about famine and plague: storm and floods in Hom. II. 16.388-92, hunger, plague, sterility of women, military defeat in Hes. Op. 243-7 (for an opposite picture of the richness of land and sea in presence of δίκη, Hom. Od. 19.111-4 and Hes. Op. 232-7).

At any rate, Hesiod (Homer only in the much-discussed passage of II. 16.387-8, which Leaf cuts out) is concerned above all with corrupted or right justice in trials, and though Hesiod cut a distinction between just and unjust possessions (Op. 321ff.), which Solon may have echoed, Solon much more definitely than Hesiod identifies ἕβρισ with the unjust desire for wealth (cf. Solmsen 1949, 109).

25-6. οὔθ' ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ ὃσπερ θυντός ἀνήρ γίνεται ὄξυχολος: A mortal man gets angry at every single incident but Zeus is not prone to anger at each thing done. The thought is new, so is the word ὄξυχολος. For a parallel, see Pallas, Anth.Pal. 10.94 εἶναι νομίζω γίγνεσθαι τὸν ἐθνικὸν λάθοσμίαν τὸν εὐθὺς οὗ θυμιάμενον, χρῶν δ' ἐπαυξάνουσα τὰς τιμωρίας τὰς τῶν πονηρῶν καὶ ταλαιπώρων βροτῶν. Even a proverb existed, quoted by Sext.Emp. In gramm. 287 ὁφεὶ θεῶν ἀλέουσι μύλοι, ἀλέουσι δὲ λεπταί.

As for Solon's emphasis on the timing and thoughtful procedure of divine punishment, it suits the same positive presentation of Zeus' punishment described above ad 18-25. Cp. above all Hom. II. 16.386, where the description of Zeus' vengeance is introduced by a phrase ὃτε δὴ ἀνδρεσσαί κοτεσσάμενος χαλεπὴν, which Solon's 1. 26 may seem to criticise, Hes. Op. 47, 53, 138, Theog. 558, 561, 568, where Zeus reacts to human lack of respect promptly and χωλωσάμενος/χωλούμενος or ὁχθήσας. Zeus' superior sublimity is stressed by Solon also by the fact that his action is not as a direct one, but it is mediated through the intervention of Ate (ll. 13-6 and 75-6): cp. Op. 238-47 quoted above, where, instead, the punishment which falls upon the individual who had offended Dike still came through a spontaneous act of Zeus, who personally reacts by stirring up a war or destroying the ships of unjust men on the sea etc.


θυντός ἀνήρ: the same phrase occurs several times in Homer and Hesiod in the context of an opposition to gods (e.g. ll. 20.41 and 265-6, 24.259, Od. 10.306, 16.196, Hom.Hymn 19.33) and in Hesiod (Theog. 967).
27. αἰεὶ δ’ οὗ ἐλέηθε διαμπερές: οὗ ... ἐλέηθε: 'litotes' which makes it
equivalent to 'bear in mind'. Parallels for the 'litotes' are e.g. Hom. Il. 23.323 αἰεὶ
tέρμι' ὀράων στρέφει ἐγγύθει, οὐδὲ ἐλήθει, Hes. Op. 268 καί νυ τάδ’ αἳ κ’
adēληπτο' ἐπιδήκεται, οὐδὲ ἐλήθει, and, for the concept, e.g. Pind. Ol. 1.64 εἰ δὲ
θεόν ἀνήρ τις ἐξεταί τι λαθέμεν ἔρδων, ἀμαρτάνει, Eur. Phoen. 872 ἄ
συγκαλύφαι ... χρήζουσ'τε, ὡς δὴ θεός ὑπεκδιαμοιῶμεν, ἰμαρτον ἀμαθῶς,
TGF 853 δότες δὲ θυτῶν ἵδεσται τοὺς ἱμέρας κακῶν τι πράσσων τοῖς θεοῖς
λεληθέναι, δοκεῖ πονηρά καὶ δοκῶν ἀλήσκεται, ὅταν σχολὴν ἰγουσα τυγχάνη
Δίκη, Lucian, Anth.Pal. 10.27 ἀνθρώπους μὲν ἵσως λήσεις ἀτοπόν τι ποιήσας,
οὐ λήσεις δὲ θεοῖς οὐδὲ λογιζόμενος. For the confusion of the MSS between οὗ
(F)κ and οὔτε or οὔτι, also in Il. 24.214 (cf. schol. ad loc.) a variant οὔτι existed for
οὔ ἐ', defended by Aristarchus. The connection of αἰεὶ and διαμπερές, in the same
metrical position, was already in Hom. Il. 15.70 and Hom.Hymn Ap. 485. For the

28. πάντως δ’ ἔς τέλος ἐξεφάνη: Zeus, in the end, brings to light, reveals
the rogue. In πάντως we see the theme of the unavoidability of punishment, repeated
again later in the poem: 31ff., 55f.

For the idea, and for ἔς τέλος+verb in the last three dactylos of the hexameter, see
Hes. Op. 217-8 δίκη δ’ υπὲρ ὑβρίσος ἵσχει ἐς τέλος ἐξελθοῦσα (besides 333-4 ἐς
dὲ τελευτὴν ἔργων ἀντ’ ἀδίκων χαλεπῆν ἐπέθηκεν ἀμοιβῆν; ἐς τέλος+verb in
the same position also in Hom.Hymn Herm. 462). For the thought, see also ad 3.16.

29-32. Solon admits here that sinners might personally seem to get away
unpunished, but corrects himself in Il. 31-2 with the idea of the inherited punishment
which will later become the heart of Attic tragedy.

Postponement of divine punishment is fully envisaged in Hom. Il. 4.160-1 εἰ
περ γὰρ τε καὶ αὐτίκ’ Ὀλυμπιος οὐκ ἐπέλεσσεν, ἐκ τε καὶ οὐκε τελεί, σῦν τε
μεγάλῳ ἀπέτεισαν, σῦν σφήνα εἰς καλῆς γνωστές ἐκαί εἰς καὶ τεκέσσαν, where it is
already strongly connected with the idea that the pursuing punishment will catch up
with the innocent children of the wrongdoers, or their seed after them — a typically
archaic way of thought (paralleled e.g. in the Old Testament, Exodus, 20.5 and
Numeri 14.18), that can be well understood in the light of the belief in family
solidarity prevalent in Archaic Greece, because of which the son's life was felt a
prolongation of his father's (cf. Glotz 1904, 560-83, Dodds 1951, 33, and Dover
1974, 260). Hesiod writes in the same spirit about how a man's sin carries with it the
ruin of his óκος (Op. 244) and the extinction of his γένος (Op. 282-5, 321-6). The
idea will be fully expressed in Thgn. IEG 199-204 εἰ δ’ ἀδίκως ... ἀνήρ ...
30. Theōν μοιρ’ ἐπιοὐσα κί χι: here μοῖρα is substantially equivalent to ἀσα of fr. 3.1-2 (see ad loc.), and in both cases the Homeric diction is re-used with a different meaning, because here the gods' doom is not concerned with death, as in its Homeric (and lyric) instances for which see notes at Sol. 23.18 and 26.4. See Soph. OT 883-91 εἰ δὲ τις ... πορεύεται, Δίκαις ἀφόβητος, οὐδὲ δαμόνων ἔδη σέβων, κακά νῦν ἔλοιπο μοῖρα, ... εἰ μὴ τὸ κέρδος κερδανεὶ δικαίως ... ἢ τῶν ἀθίκτων θέτεται ματάξων for an analogous use of ἔλοιπο μοῖρα.

31. ἀναίτιοι: Thgn. IEG 731-6 provides the first known criticism of the idea of inherited guilt (and divine punishment) from the new perspective of the individual responsibility: Ζεῦ πάτερ, εἰθε γένοιτο θεοῖς ... μετὰ φρεσὶ δ’ ὅστις ἥδηνης ἔργαζοτο, θεῶν μηδὲν ὑπόζμενος, αὐτῶν ἐπείτα πάλιν τείσαι κακά, μηδ’ ἐτ’ ὑπίσσω πατρὸς ἀτασθαλία παιοῦ γένοιτο κακόν, but I do not rule out that Solon's ἀναίτιοι may already imply an analogous mode (for other connections between Sol. fr. 1 and the whole sequence of Thgn. IEG 731-52, see Alt 1979, 396 n. 32).

32. παῖδες τούτων ἢ γένος ἐξοπίσω: In Solon's passage the effects of the unjust deeds of the ancestors are extended to the successive generation, and not the glorious ones as it was in Solon's possible formal models: Hom. II. 20.308 καὶ παῖδων παῖδες, τοί κεν μετόπισθε γένωται or Tyrt. 9.30 καὶ παῖδων παῖδες καὶ γένους ἐξοπίσω, concerned with the positive value of the survival of the κλῆς (as remarked by Anhalt 1993, 31 "Solon has put the line in a new negative context").
Similar phrasing in Tyrt. 6.12 γίγνεται ... οὔδ' ὀπίσω γένεος. Ἐξοπίσω is used of time and place in Homer (Od. 13.144).

33-6. The closest precedent is Hom. Od. 18.132-7, where after stating that οὐδὲν ἀκιδνύτερον γαία τρέφει ἀνθρώπου (l. 130), Odysseus explains: οὔ μὲν γάρ ποτὲ φησι κακὸν πεισεῖσθαι ὁπίσω, ὡδρ' ἀρετὴν παρέχουσι θεοὶ καὶ γούνατ' ὀρώρη: ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ καὶ λυγρὰ θεοὶ μάκαρες τελέσωσι, καὶ τὰ φέρει ἀκεκαζόμενος τετλητότι θυμῷ. ... τοῖς γὰρ νόσοι ἐστίν ἑπιχοθονῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἶνον ἐπὶ ἴμαρ ἄγησι πατήρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε. Solon's perspective is different. Both passages deal with the instability of human condition (ll. 32-5) and, therefore, of human thought (l. 136f.): Odysseus sees both wholly dependent on the circumstances decided by the gods, while Solon seems to speak here only of the limits of the human nature and particularly of those of human δόξα, because his perspective at this point of the poem is more concerned with human motivations than with divine control over the human world, though in l. 17 he had stated, as does Odysseus, that the τέλος of all things is always foreseen by Zeus. Closer to Solon's thought are Simon. IEG 20.6 (young people) κοῦθον ἔχων θυμὸν πολλ' ἀτέλεστα νοεί' οὔτε γὰρ ἔλπιδ' ἔχει γηροσέμεν οὔτε θανείσθαι, οὔδ', ὑγίης ὅταν ἢ, φροντίδ' ἔχει καμάτου. νῆπιοι, κτλ., Thgn. IEG 133-6 (stating that no man is αὐτὸς responsible for the good or bad outcome of his actions, but gods are δῶτορες of both ἄτε and κερδὸς, and men cannot foresee the good or bad τέλος), and above all Thgn. IEG 639-40 πολλάκι πάρ δόξαν τε καὶ ἐλπίδα γίνεται εὖ ῥεῖν ἐργ' ἀνδρῶν, βουλαῖς δ' οὐκ ἐπέγεντο τέλος, from which Schneidewin's emendation of l. 34 originated.

The enunciative perspective of l. 33 (νοεθεμεν'), which involves also the author in a general and inclusive statement, tones in more with the one of l. 36 (τερπόμεθα) than with the perspective of the previous lines, which is objective, neutral at the beginning of the poem and is suspended with l. 32: on the contrast, in this poem, between the "neutral/objective" perspective, where the author "ne se montre pas comme acteur dans le texte" and the passages (ll. 33, 36, 51-2, 72), where "le locuteur abandonne explicitement cette perspective pour assumer le point de vue des acteurs du texte", cf. Loeffler 1993.

ὁμοίας ἁγαθός τε κακός τε: Hom. II. 9.319 ... ἦμεν κακὸς ἤδε καὶ ἐσθλὸς, II. 17.631-2 τῶν μὲν γὰρ πάντων βέλε' ἀπτέται, ... , ἢ κακὸς ἢ ἁγαθός, Od. 6.188 Ζεὺς ... νέμει οἶλ' οὖν ... ἀνθρώπους, ἐσθλοῖς ἤδε κακοίσιν, Od. 8.552-3 οὐ ... τις πάμπαν ἀνώνυμος ἑστ' ἀνθρώπων, οὐ κακὸς οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλὸς, Od. 22.414-5=23.65-6 οὐ τινα γὰρ τίσκον ἑπιχοθονῶν ἀνθρώπων, οὐ κακὸν οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλόν, Hes. Op. 669 ὁμοίας ἁγαθῶν τε κακῶν τε, Thgn. IEG 369
μομεντα δε με πολλοι, ομως κακοι ἤδε και ἑσθοι (Theognis contrasts the two adjectives even more in 189, 190, 431, 577, 661, 875, 1112). An ethical meaning of this polar expression is certainly left in this opposition after the previous lines about divine punishment of the unrighteous, but the interpretation 'skilful men and incompetents' would better chime with νοεθεν (not only the stupid believe, etc.):

cf. e.g. Wilamowitz 1913, 263 and lastly Donlan 1968, 110f.; it would also suitably set the stage for the following long section about the human skills and professions.


The emendation of Büchner and Theiler, accepted by West, is based on Theognis 639-40 but ἐρευν works better in Theognis' context, with ἔργα ἀνδρῶν, than with Solon's δοξα. Di Benedetto's paper deserves much more attention. Indeed, his text is the closest to the MSS, among all of the proposed corrections, though I would not favour its insertion in the text. Besides, it stressed once again (and most convincingly) that the point of ll. 33f. is the deceitfulness of human expectations in connection with

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what was remarked in ll. 27-32 (in these lines Solon spoke about the punishment that is unforeseen, in ll. 33f. he would be passing to a more general consideration of the unreliability of the human expectations), much more than with the idea of the illusions and the limits inherent to human professional efforts, which are only emphasised from l. 53 onwards (cf. already above all, Eisenberger 1984, 14, who states that the παθεῖν of l. 35 "is the effect of the δώκη and the τίσις of the first part of the poem").

δόξαν ἐκαστὸς ἔχει: For δόξαν ἔχειν, cf. Thgn. IEG 572, Pind. Ol. 6.82. For the same metrical position of the phrase ἐκαστὸς ἔχει, see Thgn. IEG 214, 312, 898. δόξα has here the Homeric meaning of 'expectation', at variance with the one Solon exploits in l. 4, cf. ad loc.

πρὸν τι παθεῖν’ ... ὀδύρεται: 'before he suffers; then he mourns'. Solon is aligned with a thought that had become a proverb in Plato's age (Symp. 222b7 κατὰ τὴν παρομίαν ὡσπερ νῆπιον παθόντα γνώναι); see Hom. ll. 17.32=ll. 20.198 πρὸν τι κακῶν παθεῖν’ ῥέχθεν δὲ τε νῆπιος ἔγνω (cf. also ll. 23.487 [να γνώις ἀποστινων]), Hes. Op. 89 ὅτε δὴ κακῶν εἶχ’ ἐνόησεν, 218 παθῶν δὲ τε νῆπιος ἔγνω (cf. also Pl. Symp. 222b7 quoted). Solon, quite pessimistically, extends these conditions to all human beings, who, according to him, do not appear to learn a lesson out of their suffering: cp. the very different, and later view of the πάθει μάθος, for which see, for instance, Aesch. Ag. 177, Eum. 276, Soph. Ant. 619 quoted below; cf. Dörrie 1956.

36. χάσκοντες κούφαις ἐλπίσιν τερπόμεθα: The verb χάσκω is new in the meaning 'gape in eager expectation', whose obvious mimic effects are often exploited by the comic authors, above all in the context of the proverb λύκος ἔχανεν or λύκος μάτην χανών, concerning both the rapacity and the stupid self-illusions about the prey (οἱ γὰρ λύκοι ἀδηρίᾳ περιπεσόντες χαίνουσι διερχόμενοι: Diogenianus, Paroemiogr. I, 273.20); see Aesop. 417 Perry; Ar. Lys. 629 and PCG 350; Euphr. PCG 1.30f.; Eub. PCG 14.11; Men. Asp. 372; Plaut. Stich. 605 and Trin. 169, Luc. Gall. 11, Aristaenet. 2.20.35; Hsch. λ 1396 L.; Suda λ 816 A.; cf. Tosi 1991, 411 no. 873). Solon likes to emphasise mimetically human faults, as is often shown, above all, in his tetrameters to Phocus. For 'gaping' as a more generic symptom of being stupidly ensnared, cf. Anac. PMG 358.8 πρός δ’ ἀλλην τινα χάσκει, Semon. IEG 7.110 κεχενφῶς γὰρ ἀνδρός.

κούφαις ἐλπίσιν: Cf. Thuc. 2.51.6, Hor. Epist. 1.5.8 leves spes, Hdn. 2.8.4 and 2.9.1. See also Bacchyl. 1.178-80 ὄντινα κούφοταται θυμον δονέυσι μέριμναι (~‘ambitions’) ὡςον ἄν ζωὴ ἵχρονον, κτλ., and Eur. TGF 271 πτηνὰς ... ἐλπίδας. The negative sense of ἐλπίς (on which see Schrijen 1965, 68-81) had
already appeared before Solon in Hes. Op. 498-91 πολλὰ δ’ ἀεργὸς ἄνηρ, κενεῖν ἐπὶ ἐλπίδα μίμων, χρησίων βιότοιο, κακὰ προσελέξατο θυμῷ. ἐλπὶς δ’ οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένον ἀνδρὰ κομίζειν ἢμεν ἐν λέση, where, however, 'hope' is more a cause of inactivity. Solon's view of (false) hopes as a negative motor of human actions, as opposed to rational consideration, appears to be entirely new (cf. Solmsen 1949, 110), and is often resumed; Semon. PMG 542.21-2 τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δύνατον διζήμενος κενεῖν ἐς ἔπακτον ἐλπίδα μιᾶν αἰῶνος βαλέω, Pind. Nem. 8.45 κενεῖν δ’ ἐλπίδων χαίνον τέλος, Nem. 11.43-6 τὸ δ’ ἐκ Δίως ἀνθρώποις σαφὲς οὐχ ἔπεται τέκμαρ: ἄλλ’ ἐμπαν μεγαλορίας ἐμβαίνομεν, ἐργα τὸ πολλὰ μενονωτες: δέδεται γὰρ ἀναιδεί ἐλπίδια γυνία, προμαθείας δ’ ἀπόκειντα ροι, Soph. Ant. 615-9 ἀ γὰρ δὴ πολύπλαγκτος ἐλπὶς πολλοὶς μὲν ὑμνησι ἄνθρωπι, πολλοὶς δ’ ἀπάτα κοφινωμένοι ἐρώτων εἴδοτι δ’ οὐδὲν ἔρπει, πρὸν πυρὶ θερμῷ πόδα τις προσαύη; Eur. Supp. 479-80 ἐλπίς ... ἐστ’ ἐπιστον, ἣ πολλὰ πόλεις συνήψ’ ἀγούσα θυμὸν εἰς ὑπερβολάς, Heracl. 433-4 τὶ δὴ τ’ έπερφας ὡ τάλαινα με ἐλπὶς τὸτ’, οὐ μέλλουσα διατελεῖν χάριν, IT 413 φίλα ... ἐλπὶς ἥγεντ’ ἐπὶ πήμασι βροτῶν ἄπληστος ἀνθρώπους, TGF 650 πόλ’ ἐλπίδες φεδοῦσι καὶ λόγοι βροτοὺς; Thuc. 2.62.5, 3.45.4-6, 4.108.4, 5.103.1. For a full list and some discussion of the texts, cf. van Menxel 1983, 51ff.

This distich of Solon, together with Solon's instance of the seafarer (43-46), beginning with σπείρει ... , possibly were the model of Serapio, Anth.Pal. 7.400 Τούτ’ ὁστέων φωτὸς πολυεργός. ἢ τὰς ήσθα ἐμπορὸς ἢ τυφλοῦ κύματος ἰχθυβόλος; - ἓ Ἀγγελόν θυτοῦσιν, ὃτι σπείρεστε ἐς ἄλλας ἐλπίδας ἐς τοῖν ἐλπίδα λυόμεθα.'

37-42. All or some of these lines have been suspected by various scholars (all of them were athetized by Immisch; II. 37-40 by Bernhardy, Nestle 1942; II. 39f. by Bergk, Wilamowitz 1913, 260, E. Fraenkel 1927, Römisch 1933, 12f.), but there are no good reasons for doubting them: the first strong defence of their authenticity is by Masaracchia 1956, 120; see also Alt 1979, 399 and Erbse 1995, 251f. The grammatical remarks by Wilamowitz on the non-Solonian character of καλὸς with long alpha and of the Homeric-aeolic ἔμεμειναι do not hold true: ἔμεμειναι is justified as an unchanged re-use of a Homeric hemistich (cf. ad loc.); as for the alpha of καλὸς in thesis, it is measured long less frequently than in arsis, but it is not exceptional at all neither in archaic epic (cf. LgrE s.v.) nor in elegy: cf. at least Tyrt. 7.30 and Thgn. IEG 257, 1336, 1369. As for the difference in tenses of the verbs of II. 37f. and 41f., which are futures, and the one of II. 39f., being a present, both temporal perspectives
are compatible with the waver ing character of the human hopes, as shown by Friedländer 1929, 381f.

I would add that all of Solon's three distichs are paralleled in the gnomic tradition on the human goods, cf. Scol. PMG 890 ἡγαίονειν μὲν ἄριστον ἄνδρι θυμῷ, δεύτερον δὲ καλὸν φιλῶν γενέσθαι, τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλούτειν ἀδόλους, καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἥβαν μετὰ τῶν φιλῶν, which is quoted (without the fourth wish, which has a specifically symposiastic character) by Pl. Grg. 451e and Leg. 661a. Besides, this three-fold list would be paralleled by other three-fold lists in a near and related context. After exemplifying in general terms, by three instances, how human beings delude themselves, the section of II. 43-62 brings forward a specific nuance of ideas (hinted at both in II. 33-6 and II. 41-2): man devotes himself in professions with the expectation that effort will command gain and success (cf. κέρδος ἄγειν I. 45-κτήσασθαι πάντως χρήματα πολλὰ δοκεῖ I. 42) but these all are empty, vain hopes since the mortal fails or succeeds according to his portion, and what the gods send cannot be avoided. Also this concept of the 'applied' self-deluding hopes is exemplified by two groups, which would numerically parallel the three instances of II. 37-42 the craftsmen (merchant, farmer, carpenter) and the intellectuals (poet, seer, physician). This structure, the 'mirror' correspondence of II. 43-64 to II. 37-42, is a strong argument for the authenticity of II. 37-42.

37. νοῦσοιςιν ὑπ' ἄργαλενη: again in I. 61. A standing epic combination — Hom. II. 13.667, Hes. Op. 92, fr. 195.43, [Hes.] Sc. 43, Aymyt. SH 43.2, GVI 860.6 (3 A.D.), Greg. Naz. Anth.Pal. 8.94.3 — which only in the imperial age is shared by prose as well (Philo, deus immut. 66.5, 98.1, mut. nom. 150.5, Jos. 77.3, In Flacc. 183; Aelian. NA 8.9.8; Euseb. Vit. Const. 3.5.1). See also Hom. II. 1.10 νοῦσον ... κακήν, Hes. Theog. 527 κακήν ἀ' ἀπὸ νοῦσον.

38. τοῦτο κατεφράσατο:κατεφράσατο is a rare word, with the meaning 'think upon thoroughly', as the preposition κατά emphasises (cf. Schwyzer 2, 475f.); not in Homer (cf. II. 14.3 φράξεσθαι ... ὃς ἔσται τάδε ἔργα) but once in Hes. Op. 248; see later Hippon. IEG 79.13 (=Degani) and Hdt. 4.76.5. Thgn. IEG 430, 706 has ἐπεφράσατο. The past tense has here a gnomic value.

39-40. δελός ... ἀγαθὸς ... καλὸς μορφῆν οὐ χαρίεσσαν ἔχων: the first couple of terms, δελός ... ἀγαθὸς, has the same meaning as in Homer ('coward' and 'brave'; cf. also the ἀγαθὸς ἄνηρ of Tyrt. 6.2 and 9.10, 20). Fränkel 1975, 233 n. 33 and Christes 1986, 10 are probably correct in noting that the ideal of καλακαγαθία is here implicit. This interpretation of II. 39-40 would allow us to
consider the distich as a single instance of the self-illusion concerning the psychophysical conditions — and keep for the three distichs 37-42 a three-fold pattern.

39. δοκεί ἐμεναι άνήρ: Hom. Il. 23.470 δοκεῖ δε μοι ἐμεναι άνήρ (ἐμεναι ἄνδρων also Il. 6.488 and Od. 6.200).


πενήνθες ἐργα βιάται: For the periphrasis see above, on l. 16. Thgn. IEG 177 πενήνθες δεδημένοις. For the form of the verb, Thgn. IEG 503-4 καὶ με βιάται οίνοις. The epic had used βιάω only for future and aorist, and for the present only in diectasis (βιάζω in the other forms of the present).


43-62. L. 43 introduces the typological description of the diverse forms of human activity and variety of professions, in an extensive list, which has its precedent in Od. 17.382ff. τίς γὰρ δὴ ἐξείνον καλεῖ ἄλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν ἄλοιος γ', εἰ μὴ τῶν οὗ δημοσργὰ ἑαυτί, μάντιν ἢ ἱηθὴρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτουν δούρων, ἢ καὶ θεσπῖν ἄοδόν, ἢ κεν τέρπησιν δείδων, where the introductory phrase ἄλοθεν ... ἄλοια γ' may also have formally suggested the ἄλοθεν ἄλοιος ... ἄλοιος ... ἄλοιος ... ἄλοιος ... ἄλοιος ... ἄλοιος polyptoton in Solon's lines (on which see Krause 1976, 75-81): cf. Race 1982, 65-67, Schmid 1964, 72.

The mention of profit (l. 44 κέρδος) relates to the last example (Il. 42f.) of the previous group of cases, that deals with the illusions of the poor, following a thought pattern which is exemplified also in Thgn. IEG 179-80 χρή ... ὁμώς ἐπὶ γῆν τε καὶ εὐρέα νῦνα θαλασσίς διζησθαί χαλεπῆς ... λύσων πενίθες, whereas with the mention of diseases and the uncertainty of their cure (l. 62) we have returned, in a ring form indicated by the repetition of νοῦσος ἀργαλέη, to the example with which the first series began (l. 37).

In all, Solon lists six classes of professions: the merchant, the seer, the physician, the farmer, the craftsman, and the poet, who have only one couplet each. For the craftsman, the poet, the seer and the physician, Solon mentions the traditional divine patron, but he does not do so for the merchant and the farmer, who also in the
Homeric-Hesiodic tradition do not appear to have had any specific patron god. There is a clear progression from the material profession of the merchant, the farmer, and craftsman, who intend to produce a personal, tangible κέρδος/βιότος and appear therefore to be controlled by motives of profit, towards the last three 'intellectual' and 'social' professions, for which Solon is concerned with the effectiveness of the result (τέλος) more than of any κέρδος; the separation between the first and the second group is marked by the opposition χειρόν 1. 50/σοφίς μέτρον 1. 52. Common to all of them is the uncertainty of the κέρδος or of the effectiveness, though some emphasis is also on the human knowledge in the professions which are assisted by divine patrons: see δαεῖς, δίδαξθεῖς, ἐπιστάμενος, ἔγνω. For other lists of human activities/professions in poetry, cf. Hom. II. 13.730-4, Pind. Isthm. 1.47f., fr. 221, Bacchyl. 10.39-48, Cleanth. CA 1.26-31.

ἀλλοθεν ἄλλος: in the same position in the line, Hom. II. 2.75, 9.671, Od. 12.392.

43-5. κατὰ πόντον ... ἰχθυόεντ': a formulaic phrase, 15x in Homer, and often in passages which mention (dangers) winds during navigation: Il. 19.378, Od. 3.177, 4.516, 5.420, 9.82-3; Hom.Hymn Dem. 34, Hom.Hymn 27.9, Thgn. IEG 248, GVI 741.1 (3 A.D), Nonnus, Dion. 1.268, [Orph.] Arg. 1039. The formularity of the phrase in connection with travels, and the Hesiodic parallels for a mercantile meaning of l. 44 ὀἰκάδε κέρδος ἀγείν (see ad loc.) suggest that ἰχθυόεντ ' does not hint at the profession of the fisherman (as was proposed by Leutsch 1872, 162). However this last possibility was also included in the evident, though so far unnoticed, imitation by Serapio, Anth.Pal. 7.400 (quoted ad l. 36), which seems both an allusion and a 'philological' interpretation of the ambiguity of Solon's passage.

The 'separation' of the adjective ἰχθυόεντα from πόντον by a whole line was considered by Wilamowitz 1913, 261 to be a proof of Solon's lack of skill in re-using traditional epic language. The contiguous combination of the two words certainly was one of the most formulaic phrases of the Homeric-Hesiodic diction (15x), but precisely this is a good reason to suppose that Solon wanted to revive with the 'separation' such a standard epithetum ornans: cf. Treu 1955, 270f. At any rate, there is no substantial reason to suspect the adjective, as does Tucker (and more cautiously Linforth), who proposed to replace it with ἐνθα καὶ ἐνθα. A good explanation of the emphasis that it has at the beginning of the line (it would be "quite unworthy of the important place it occupies, unless it is intended to suggest the dangers to which sailors are exposed from man-eating fish" according to Linforth) was provided by Römisch 1933, 70f.: the first distich l. 43f. would include the three basic ideas, specifying the place (sea), the means of transport (ship), and the aim (profit).
second distich would expand the first, qualifying more the same three ideas in the same order. The traditional formula, divided into the two distichs, would hint at the continuity between them. For the technique of Solon, consisting in suspending the second part of a phrase or of an idea in order to emphasise it, cf. Massa-Positano 1947, 33.

43. ἀλάται: Hom. Od. 2.370 πῶντον ἐπ’ ἀτρύγετον ... ἀλάλησθαι, Od. 5.377 οὔτω νῦν κακὰ πολλὰ παθῶν ἀλῶ κατὰ πῶντον. The verb is also used of pirates: Od. 3.73-4, 9.254, Hom.Hymn Ap. 454.


105.2-3, Diod.Sic. 12.62.2.6, Joseph. AI 13.199.4 etc.; Carm. pop. PMG 856.5 μη φείδομενο τας ζωᾶς, Anth.Pal. 7.534.1=Alex.Aet.(?) 25.1 Magn. ζωῆς περιφείδεο. Diod.Sic. 14.52.1.6 provides another instance of the Solonian periphrasis ἐπηγείροντο τας ψυχὰς, οὐδεμιὰν φείδω τοῦ ζῆν ποιοῦμεν.

ψυχή is the standard word in various martial phrases implying the idea of risking or defending one's life e.g. ll. 9.322, Od. 1.5, 9.423, 22.245. At sea Od. 3.73-4=Od. 9.254-5=Hom.Hymn Ap. 454-5 ὑπεὶρ ἀλα... ἀλῶνται ψυχᾶς παρθέμενοι, Hes. Op. 686-7 χρήματα γὰρ ψυχή πέλεται δειλάσι βροτοῖν. δεινὸν δ᾽ ἐστὶ θανεῖν μετὰ κύμασιν, Archil. IEG 213 ψυχὰς ἑχοντες κυμάτων ἐν ἀγκάλαις, and other passages in West ad Hes. Op. 686.

47. γῆν τέμνων πολυδένδρεον: First here in the meaning 'cut lengthwise', 'plough the earth', which remains rare: cf. Aesch. TrGF 196.4 τέμνει δίκελλ' ἀρουραν, Ap.Rhod. 1.628 πυροφόρους τε διατήμασθαι ἀρουρας, GVI 720.1 (2 Α.Δ) οὕτως ο γῆς τέμνων. In Hdt. and in Thuc. the phrase γῆν τέμνων means 'destroy/devastate the enemy's land'. Solon's metaphorical use of the verb in connection with agriculture may have been derived from the Odyssey's dis legomenon for travelling through the sea, πέλαγος (θάλασσαν) or κύματα τέμνειν (Od. 3.174-5, 13.88; see later Arion, PMG 939.16-7, Pind. Pyth. 3.68, Bacchyl. 17.4, Soph. TrGF 271.5). This poetic rephrasing — from cutting the surface of the sea to cutting the surface of the soil — would be paralleled by the post-Homeric re-use of the Odyssey-expression for travelling in the sky (Hom.Hymn Dem. 383 βαθὺν ἑρα τέμνων ἱόντες, Ibyc. PMGF S223(a) ii 7 βαθ[υ]ν α[έ]ρα τάμνων, Bacchyl. 5.16-7 βαθὺν δ᾽ αἰθέρα ... τάμνων; on the intertextual connections between these three passages, see Richardson ad Hom.Hymn Dem. 383, pp. 279f.), and may have been suggested to Solon by the mention of the seafarer, which immediately precedes in our poem. The analogy is shown in the passage of Nonnus, Dion. 1.105-9 γλαυκά διασχίζει βοεῖ βοδὶ νῦτα θαλάσσῃς, καὶ σὺ βυθοὶ μετὰ κύμα, Ποσειδάων, μετανάστης γαῖς δύσια νῦτα μετέρχεο πεζὸς ἀρστρεφ, νῆθαλάσσαῃ Δημήτρεος αὐλάκα τέμνων, χερσαίου ἀνέμου βατὸν πλοῦν ἐν χθοιν τεύχων.

In the epithet of γῆ van Effenterre 1977, 126-7 sees a reference to land-cultivation of olive trees introduced in Solonian Athens, but the epithet accompanies earth also in the epic, Hom. Od. 4.737 κῆπουν ... πολυδένδρεον, Od. 23.139 ἀγρόν ... πολυδένδρεον, Od. 23.359 πολυδένδρεον ἀγρόν ἄπειμι.

eἰς ἐνιαυτὸν: a common epic verse-end (ll. 21.444, Od. 4.526, 595, 11.356, 14.196; Hom.Hymn Dem. 399 m² in the ms. M), which is the shorter doublet of τελεσφόρον eἰς ἐνιαυτὸν (ll. 19.32, Od. 4.86, 10.467, 14.292, 15.230;
Hom. Hymn Ap. 343, and 20.6). The closest parallels for the content are ll. 21.444-5
θητεύσαμεν εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν μισθῷ ἐπὶ ῥήτῳ, and its imitation Panyas. PEG 3.3
θητεύσαμεν εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν; in both passages Poseidon and Apollo are in Laomedon's
"service" under harsh conditions for a whole year; cp. also Rhian. CA 9°10 θητεύσαι
μέγαν εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν (said of Apollo's service to Admetus). At any rate, in Solon the
ἐνιαυτὸς is most probably not the civil calendar year, but the "agricultural year circle"
which begun when the stores were full, as in the Hesiodic τετελεσμένον εἰς
ἐνιαυτὸν of Op. 561 (~Homer τετελεσφόρον εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν): for the farmer it takes a
whole year before the results of his toils come back. The use of εἰς facilitates the
interpretation of ἐνιαυτὸς here as the time on which the year-circle is
completed~τετελεσφόρον or τετελεσμένον εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν; cf. West 1965, 156 n. 27,
Beekes 1969, 142.

48. λατρεύει: The verb is new, cf. Hsch. λ 403 L. λατρεύει: ἐλεύθερος ὄν
dουλεύει, to be understood in the light of Arist. Ath. Pol. 2.2 ἐδούλευον σὶ πένητες
tοῖς πλουσίοις ... καὶ ἐκαλοῦντο πελάται καὶ ἐκτήμοροι, and Poll. 3.82 πελάται
dὲ καὶ ὅητες ἐλευθέρων ἐστὶν ὁνόματα διὰ πενιαν ἐπ' ἀργυρῷ δουλεύσων.
On the lexicographical basis Wilamowitz inferred that Solon's elegy preceded Solon's
reforms on debt-slavery, and Ferrara 1956, 66-71 suggested that Solon would be
referring either to debt-slaves, or to people who did not own the land they worked on.
But Hesychius' source may also simply overinterpret the meaning, thinking of the
very legislative action against debt-slavery, which was topically connected with Solon.
Solon's λατρεύειν may mean nothing more than working as a labourer for hire or
pay, as λάτρεις means in Thgn. IEG 302, 486, Eur. Ion 4 and HF 823: cf. Büchner
1959, 175.

fr. 33 K. κερκία καμπυλόχοια, where κερκίδες =ἀροτρα; see Hsch. κ 616 L.,
Mosch. 2.81, and [Orph.] fr. 280.3 K. εὐκαμπύλες ἀροτρον. The attribute was
formulaic for the bow (10x) and for the chariot (2x) in Homer. The starting point of
Solon's expression may be found in Hes. Op. 427 πόλλ' ἐπικαμπύλα κάλα, a
hemistich which follows the precepts on the straight timbers useful to be cut for the
farmer (ll. 420-6), and immediately precedes the instructions on how to arrange the
γύνης of the plough.

Basically, the plough must have two elements, one horizontal which is drawn
through the soil (ἐλυμα) and the other curving upwards and forwards from it, to take
the pull of the oxen (γύνης). This curved shape of the plough-beam (the γύνης) creates
the overall impression that the whole plough is curved, and this is the reason why in
Latin poetry it is the standing epithet for the plough (curvi arati, cf. Ov. Her. 1.55, Lucr. 5.933 (~6.1253), Verg. G. 1.170, 1.494, 2.513); besides, the γύς is the most important part of the whole implement, and could in itself form a plough (in Hes. Op. 433 the plough formed by a plough-stock only, αὐτόγυνον ἄροτρον, is opposed to the plough composed by various parts, πηκτὸν ἄροτρον).

49-50. Ἀθηναίης ... καὶ Ἡφαίστου ... ἔργα δαείς ... ξυλλέγεται βίοτον: Athena ἔργανη was the goddess of any technical activity as early as Homer, and she is invoked as the goddess of all handicraft celebrated by the artisans in the streets of Athens at the popular festival of Chalkeia during which a sacrifice was offered to her (see Deubner 1932, 35-6, Parke 1977, 92-3, Burkert 1985, 168, and cf. Soph. TrGF 844). Hephaestus χαλκείς (ll. 15.309-10) was the armourer (e.g. of Achilles' armour ll. 18.466ff., of Diomedes' corselet ll. 8.195 and of Heracles' greaves [Hes.] Sc. 122-3), the goldsmith (e.g. of Zeus' sceptre II. 2.100-8, of Pandora's headband Hes. Theog. 579). Both Hephaestus and Athena were divinities of the τέχνη and of craftsmanship (e.g. from Hom. Od. 6.232-5 to Arr. Cyn. 35), and patron deities of artisans in Athens, and as such were worshipped in a common cult (see Farnell 1896-1909, 1, 409 n.98). The association of the two gods is also proved by the fact that Athena's statue was set up in the temple of Hephaestus next to that of the god (see Paus. 1.14.6), and had the epithet Ἡφαιστία (see Hsch. s.v.), while another name for the Chalkeia, a feast chiefly for Hephaestus, was 'Ἀθηναία (see Harpocration, Erym.Magn. and Suda s.v.), and Hephaestus had collaborated to the birth of the goddess (Pind. Ol. 7.735f.). See Frontisi-Ducroux 1975, 62-3, Loraux 1981, 134-6, Nilsson 1964, 12, Parke 1977, 92.

The association of man's acquisition of skill with his hands from Athena and Hephaestus is especially frequent to emphasise the specific excellence of the single craftsmen, from Homer onwards: cf. Od. 6.232-4=23.159-61 ἄνηρ ἰδρις, ὅν Ἡφαιστος δέδαν καὶ Πάτας Ἦφασιν τέχνην παντοὶ, χαρίσματα δὲ ἔργα τελείει, Od. 20.72 ἔργα δ' Ἀθηναία δέδακε κλυτὰ ἐργαζέσθαι, Hom.Hymn Aphr. 12-5 (Ἀθηνή) προτί τεκτονός ἄνδρας ἐπιχθονίως ἐδίδαξε ποιήσαι σατίνας καὶ ἀρματα ... χαλκῷ ... παρθενικάς ... ἀγλαὰ ἐργ' ἐδίδαξεν ἐπί φρεσκία θεία έκάστη, Hom.Hymn 20.1-3 Ἡφαιστον κλύτομητων ... ὡς μετ' Ἀθηναίης ... ἔργα ἀνθρώπως ἐδίδαξεν, 20.5 νῦν δὲ 'Ἡφαιστον κλύτοτεχνήν ἔργα δαέντες, Hes. Op. 430 Ἀθηναίης δημός (i.e. τέκτων), Hes. fr. 43(a)71 ἄργα διδάξατο Πάτας Ἦφασιν, all of them including the root δα- which is also present in Solon (see later e.g. GV I 1528.4 (3/4 A.D.) ἔργα δ' Ἀθηναίης τῆς ἔργα δ' Ἐρατούς ἰδανὶς and Quint.Symm. 12.83 δέδαν δὲ μὲν ἔργου Ἀθηνής). Besides ll. 5.59ff., 9.390, Od. 7.109ff. See Karusos 1941-1972, 106f.
Solon often seems deliberately to avoid the obvious Homeric expression or vary the Homeric epithets: here πολύτεχνης replaces the traditional κλωττοτέχνης (ll. 1.571, 18.143 and 391, ᪐. 8.286; besides Ḥom. Ḥymn 20.5, Hes. fr. 141.4).

50. ξυλλέγεται βίοτον: Here βίοτος with its secondary meaning 'livelihood', cf. Ḥom. ᪐. 11.490, Ḥtg. ḤEG 624 etc. The phrasing is parallel to a Homeric one, cf. ᪐. 3.301 πολίν βίοτον καὶ χρυσὸν ἀγείρων, 4.90 πολίν βίοτον συναγείρων, and cp. Eur. Ḥl. 81 βίον ... ξυλλέγειν.

51. The poet is here described as the one who knows, by the help of the Muses, the γνωμοσύνης ἀφανὲς μέτρον which Solon defines χαλεπώτατον νοῆσαι in fr. 20.1-2, cf. Müller 1956, 14 n. 1.

The syntax is hardly plain, as no main verb is expressed. Implying that ξυλλέγεται βίοτον is an ἀπο κοίνου verb both for the artisan and the poet (as was last suggested by Masaracchia 1958, 235), would not fit the superior dimension that Solon appears to ascribe to poetry, divination and medicine (as remarked by Gladigow 1965, 16). In my opinion it is not necessary at all to suppose that a distich dropped out after l. 52 (so, first, Rohde and Bergk); instead, we rather have here a 'brachylogy' for ἐπιστάμενος (ἐστί)-ἐπισταταί, as in Ḥom. ᪐. 4.231-2 ἵπτρος δὲ ἐκαστὸς ἐπιστάμενος περὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων, a passage which can, even more, be paralleled to Solon's, because it was concerned with a profession.

51. Ὅλυμπιάδων Μουσέων πάρα δῶρα διδαχθεῖς: Ḥom. ᪐. 8.481 οὕμας Μῶσα ἐδίδαξε, ᪐. 8.488 σε γε Μῶσα ἐδίδαξε, Ḥes. Ḥθεόγ. 22 αἱ νῦ ποι' Ἡσίόδον καλὴν ἐδίδαξαν ἄοιδήν, Archil. ḤEG 1.2 καὶ Μουσέων ἔρατον δῶρον ἐπιστάμενος; Alcm. PMG 59(b)1-2 τοῦτο Φαδείαν ἐδείξε Μωσάν δῶρον, Bacchyl. 10.39 Χαρίτων τιμὰν λελογχώς, including here the artistic handicrafts under the Χάριτες, 19.3-4 ὅς ἄν παρα Πιερίδων λάχησι δῶρα Μουσάν. On Μουσέων δῶρα cf. also Ḥtg. ḤEG 250, Ḥanac. PMG 346 fr. 11.7-9, Ḥanac. ḤEG eleg. 2.3=56.3 G., Pind. Ḥl. 7.7, Bacchyl. fr. dub. 55.2.

For the epithet, Ḥom. II. 2.491 (and 2.484, 11.218, 14.508, 16.112), Ḥom. Ḥymn Herm. 450, Ḥes. Ḥθεόγ. 25, 52, (75, 114), 966, 1022 (=fr. 1.2).

52. σοφίς μέτρον ἐπιστάμενος: Sol. 20.2 γνωμοσύνης ... μέτρον; Archil. ḤEG 1.2 καὶ Μουσέων ἔρατον δῶρον ἐπιστάμενος.
Métron means here 'full measure', something like 'a definite amount', not an incomplete or imperfect thing, but a really mature whole; for its 'noetic' value, cf. ad 20.2. In this meaning ancient epic has only the phrase ἔχων ἔρμον ἰκέσθαι or ἔχειν II. 11.225, Od. 4.668, 11.317, 18.217, 19.532, Hom.Hymn Dem. 166–221, Hes. Op. 132 and 438, fr. 205.2 (the same phrase later appears in Thgn. IEG 1119 ἔχων ἔρμον). The expression "to possess σοφίας μέτρον", namely the full measure of (poetic) skill, appears to be idiomatic, cf. Thgn. IEG 876 μέτρον ἔχων σοφιᾶς (see also 790, 1074), Pigres IEG 1.2 Μοῦσα, σὺ γὰρ πάσης πείρατ' ἔχεις σοφίας, CEG 82.3 (450-425?) σοφίας μέτρο[ν ἐπ']στάμενος, and the epitaph of Hesiod ascribed to Pindar, FGE 583 μέτρον ἔχων σοφιᾶς; also two of the tabulae Iliacae (the Capitolian one and the one of the Metropolitan Mus., N.Y.: cf. Sadurska 1964, 29 and 39) invite the reader to consider the structure of the Iliad and of other cyclic poems ὅφρα δαίεις πάσης μέτρον ἔχεις σοφίας.

Σοφία is used of manual skill, precisely in carpentry, in II. 15.412, the only example of the word in Homer. Solon is one of the first authors who testify the broadening of the term from practical to intellectual knowledge, both as wisdom and sound judgment in common life (what σοφία means in Sol. 23.16), and as poetical-musical competence — the latter meaning appears to be first attested in our passage and in Hom.Hymn Herm. 483 τέχνη καὶ σοφία δεδαμένος and 511 ἐτέρης σοφίας ἐκμάσαστο τέχνην (both concerned with the musician's art): cf. Maehler 1963, 66f. and Gladigow 1965, 18-20 (Hes. fr. 306 called Linus the citharist, son of the Muse Urania, παντοίης σοφίς δεδαμένα; but we do not know in what context his knowledge was praised, and Linus was not only a musician, but also the teacher-tutor of Heracles). Later archaic instances of σοφία=poetic competence are Thgn. IEG 770, 995 and Pind. Ol. 1.116, 9.38, Pyth. 1.12, 4.248, 6.49, Nem. 7.23, Isthm. 7.18; see also Ibyc. PMG 282(a)23 Μοῖσας σεσοφι[σι]έναι, Bacchyl. 10.39 ἦ γὰρ σ[ο]φὸς ἦ Χαρίτων τιμᾶν λεογχῶς ἔλπιδο χρυσέαι τέθαλεν and Pa. fr. 5.1 ἐτερος ἐξ ἐτέρου σοφός (about how poets learn from the previous ons: cf. Maehler ad Bacchyl. locc.citt; for a review of the fifth cent. instances, cf. Snell 1924, 8-12).

53. μάντιν ἐθηκεν...Ἀπόλλων: Hom. Od. 15.252-3 ... μάντιν Ἀπόλλων θῆκε, Callim. Lav.Pall. 121 μάντιν ἐπεί θηρῶν δοῦλων ἐσομένους.

ἀναξ ἐκάργος Ἀπόλλων: The formula occurs three times in Homer (II. 15.253, 21.461, Od. 8.323) always as a nominative, and six times in the Hymns; cf. besides Hes. fr. 235.1 ἀναξ ... Ἀπόλλων, Tyr. 14.1 ἀναξ ἐκάργος Ἀπόλλων. The Homeric formula containing this distinctive epithet of the god is always found at the end of the line, and has been considered the prototype of ἀναξ Διὸς ψύχ..
'Απόλλων (Hom. Od. 8.334). 'Working (or prohibiting) from afar' (ἐκάσ+ἐργάζομαι or εὑρεῖοι) is how the epithet was understood by epic poets (see also the cognate epithets of the god ἐκατηβόλος, ἐκπεδός 'striking from afar', and the inscriptive evidence quoted by Frisk, Gr.etym.Wörterb. s.v. ἐκπεδός). I would not rule out that the ability of the god to 'operate from afar' is opposed to the limits of his human representative, the seer, who knows but cannot prohibit the κακόν τηλόθεν ἐρχόμενον. For the formula in connection with the gift of the prophetic skill, Stesich. PMGF 222(b) 209 μαντοσύνας δὲ τεᾶς, ἀναξ, ἐκάργας 'Απόλλων.

54. ἔγνω δὲ ἄνδρι κακὸν ... ἐρχόμενον: Hom. Od. 20.367-8 νοεῖ κακὸν ὑμῖν ἐρχόμενον, Hom.Hymn Dem. 256-7 ... ἀφράδμονες οὔτ' ἀγαθῶς αἴσαν ἐπερχομένου προγνώμενα οὔτε κακοῖο.

55. ξυνομαρτήσωσι: new, but the simple form of the verb is used in the meaning 'to accompany' by Hom. ll. 24.438 and Od. 13.87. The relative is commonly interpreted as referring to μάντις, two lines above, (e.g. Adrados, Defradas, West: if the seer is favoured by the gods he sees disaster coming from afar). The verb certainly has most often a positive meaning, and the preposition may seem to hint at a positive meaning as well, but I am tempted to connect the relative clause to κακὸν of the previous line: besides, if the unavoidable κακὸν is the one that comes 'with the assistance of the gods', then also τηλόθεν would profit in significance, because this adverb would be hinting at its being originated outside the human world. After all, Solon has already mentioned Apollo, the specific protector god who endowes the seer with his powers: why to repeat the idea that the assistance of the gods generically is necessary for the seer, in order to foresee the disaster? I think, instead, that Solon stresses that the κακὸν which the seer acknowledges but cannot prevent is the one sent by the fate (μόρφωμον) and/or by punishing-prosecuting gods, in terms not different from l. 63, where good and bad things are said to be decided by the Moira, and l. 64, where it is stated that what the gods send cannot be avoided.

55-6. See Hom. ll. 2.831-4 ὑὲ δῶτο Μέροπος Περσωσίου, ὥς περὶ πάντων ἤδει μαντοσύνας, οὔδε οὕς πάιδας ἔσασκε στείχειν ἐς πόλεμον φιλοήμορα· τῷ δὲ οἱ οὐ τι πειθόντω· κῆρες γὰρ ἀγνὸν μέλαιον βανάτοιο, and 2.858-61 ... "Εννομος οἰωνοτής· ἄλλ' οὐκ οἰωνοτήν ἐφρύσατο κῆρα μέλαιαν, ἄλλ' ἐδάμιν, where ρύσωμαι has the uncommon meaning 'keep off, ward off' (also found in ll. 5.538, Od. 23.244, 24.524, Pind. Isth. 8.53). See later Ap.Rhod. 4.1503f. (Mopsos) ὁδευκέα δ' οὐ φύγειν αἴσαν μαντοσύναις· οὐ γὰρ τις ἀπότροπηθανάτοιο. Prophesying
from bird-flight (οἰωνός) or from the behaviour of the victims in the ἱερά 'sacrifices' were two of the most common forms of divination.

The whole concept expressed by Solon is found again e.g. in Pind. Pyth. 12.30 τὸ δὲ μόρσιμον οὐ παρφυκτόν, Pa. fr. 6.92 ff. νέφεσσι δ’ ἐν χρυσέως Ὀλύμπου καὶ κορυφᾷσιν ίζων μόρσιμ’ ἀναλήψειν Ζεὺς ο θεῶν σκοτός οὐ τολμᾷ, fr. 232 τὸ πεπρωμένον οὐ πύρ, οὐ σιδάρεσσι σχίσει τεῖχος, Bacchyl. 24.7-10 οὐ γὰρ τις ἀνθρώπῳ, τὸν ἀν εὐθύδακι Μοῖραι ... φατίξωσιν φόξις, κτλ., Aesch. Sept. 281 οὐ γὰρ τὶ μάλλον μὴ φύγησ τὸ μόρσιμον, TrGF 362.3-4 οὔτε ... φεύγει τὶ μάλλον τὸν πεπρωμένον μόρον, Eur. Heracl. 615 μόρσιμα δ’ οὔπι φυγεῖν θέμις, οὐ σοφίᾳ τις ἀπώπεται.

57-8. Cf. Hom. Il. 16.28 τοῖς μὲν τ’ ἵτροις πολυφάρμακοι ἀμφιπένονται. Παἰήνων appears in the Iliad as the physician of the gods, at 5.401=5.900 τῷ δ’ ἐπὶ Παἰήνων δυσνήφατα φάρμακα πάσσων; and is the one ὃς ἄπαντων φάρμακα οἶδεν, according to Hes. fr. 307.2. In Od. 4.231-2 every Egyptian is said to be ἰτρὸς ... ἐπιστάμενος περὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων ἢ γὰρ Παἰήνων εἰσὶ γενέθλησι.

The participle cluster may be taken as an apposition to ἀλλοτριος, but in the context of Solon's elegy it is better understood as an anticipated apposition to the specific ἰτροι who are good at their profession since they continue their patron's craftsmanship, as well as the artisan, the poet and the seer mentioned above, were the good artisan, poet and seer who respectively had learnt their craft from Athena and Hephaestus, the Muses and Apollo — not 'others, who practice Paieon's work, are physicians', but 'others are physicians who practice Paieon's work'. As in the case of the seer, also in the case of the physician, to point out the professional worth of the unsuccessful professionals would put more emphasis on the irresistible strength of fate.

58. ἰτροί: Other lists of professions that mention the physician, besides Hom. Od. 17.384ff. (quoted ad 43-62) are in a fragment of Emp. VS 31B146 and in Aesch. PV 478-99.

καὶ τοῖς οὖθεν ἐπέστι τέλος: 'even though/and also they achieve nothing'. Cf. Hom.Hymn Dem. 150 οἷον ἐπέστι ... κράτος; also Hom. Od. 17.496 εἰ γὰρ ἐπ’ ἄρθιν τέλος ἥμετέρησι γένοιτο, Thgn. IEG 164 τέλος δ’ ἐργαζόμεν οὐχ ἐπετει, 640 βουλαίς δ’ οὐκ ἐπέγεντο τέλος, 660 θεοί ... οἷον ἐπέστι τέλος.

The physicians have no power or efficacy on the outcome, because they are subject to favourable as well as unfavourable surprises. I disagree not only with Lattimore 1947, 168, but also with Cordes 1994, 22 that Solon's text necessarily implies that the τέλος which the physicians cannot control lies in the hands of Zeus.
The idea that gods' help is vital in every human profession becomes a common theme of the Greek popular morality (cf. its survival till the Roman period in Arr. Cyn. 35 οδὸν ἄνευ θεῶν γιγνόμενον ἀνθρώποις ἐς ἀγαθῶν ἀποτελευτά). However in Solon's text, the τέλος with which Zeus is concerned (I. 17) appears to be the fortunes of the wicked men (II. 27-8), namely he is concerned with the general control of righteous and unrighteous deeds, as his τίμως for wrongdoing appears in the long run (I. 28). But this is certainly not the case for the physician who confronts an unexpected aggravation of disease (II. 59-60) or an unexpected recovery (II. 61-2): see below.

60. ἥπια φάρμακα δούς: an adaptation to the pentameter of the Iliad-formula for the second hemistich (ἡπια) φάρμακα πάσσων (or πάσσειν): 11.515 and 830, (~5.401 and 900); cf. also ἥπια φάρμακα εἰδώς/πάσσε II. 4.218.

61. νοῦσοι ... ἀργαλείας: as above, I. 37.

κυκώμενον: Cp. Archil. IEG 128.1 θυμέ, θύμ' ἀμηχάνοις κήθεσιν κυκώμενε (of soul disquietness).


The phrase ἀπεσθαλ χειροῖν is neither referring to a cure by hypnosis, magnetic treatment by rubbing and laying on of hands, namely the physician's touch with mesmeric effects, connected with Egyptian or Eastern influences in medicine (as was maintained by Headlam-Knox on Herodas 4.18), nor to the divine-magical curation by the hands which the medical god Asklepios/Paian would have passed to his pupils (as maintained by Weinreich 1909, 35), nor to the magical practices often found in antiquity (cures through incantation or invocations of the daimons out of the body of the ill person). As was already correctly remarked by Cordes 1994, 22, magical practices were expensive, and needed a lot of apparatus, and therefore they do not fit Solon's description of a swift cure. I would add that the Greek texts attribute only to Ἀσκληπιός or to Πατήν the magical effect of the touch and never to a human representative of the god's art (despite Weinreich, quoted above). Since Solon appears to be only concerned with the human aspects and limits in the professions, even from a methodological point of view it appears to be improbable that Solon refers to the magical touch of the physician which sometimes fails to cure. In my opinion, Solon is speaking of the healing touch of the physician which later becomes idiomatic in the phrase πασών χείρ (Aesch. Supp. 1066, Soph. Phil. 1345-6, Ar. Ach. 1223,

The mention of the adverb αἰσθα in Solon's lines is not a hint to magic either. Hippocrates often uses a formula 'doing these things (the sick) was suddenly cured' (*Int.*, chs 20, 21, 23, 33, 35, 37, 42, 54; the verb is always accompanied by the same kind of adverbs (τάχιστα, ἐν τάξει, εὐθὺς) which give emphasis to the swiftness of cure. Solon is anticipating these formulas — or possibly resuming old primitive formulas, confirmed by Egyptian and assyro-babylonian medical texts, which Hippocrates would have resumed (Di Benedetto 1986, 151f.).

**63-4.** In Homer, Moira normally operates in the singular as a goddess of fate, death and evil (interchangeable with the singular Αἰσθα), and the personified plural is found only once in Homer, *Il.* 24.49. Hesiod officially incorporates the Moirai in his system as daughters of Zeus and Themis and gives them their names. However, archaic poets waver between plural and singular, sometimes even within one poem (Callin. fr. 1.9 and 15).

Solon's starting points for this distich are the ideas expressed by Hes. *Theog.* 904-6 Μόιρας θ', ἦς πείστη τιμή πόρε μητίετα Ζεὺς, ... αἱ τε δίδοναι θηρτοῖς αὐθρῶποις ἔχειν ἀγαθὸν τε κακὸν τε, or in the Homeric passages *Il.* 24.527f. (where Zeus apportions to man his lot from the two πίθοι, one containing κακά, the other ἐδά) and *Od.* 4.236f. (ἅταρ θεὸς ἄλλο τε ἄλλῳ Ζεὺς ἀγαθὸν τε κακὸν τε δίδοι). However, Solon does not explicitly involve Zeus, and deliberately chooses the almost abstract concepts of Μοῖρα (l. 63) and the almost impersonal plural θεοὶ (l. 64) — cp. ἐκ θεῶν μοίρα παγκρατίθης ... κατένευσε in the third *dith.* of Bacchylides (17.24: ἐκ θεῶν is better connected with the verb, cf. Maehler ad loc.) — to introduce the profane idea of risk entailed in human action, which is going to be mentioned in the following line.

The view maintained here by Solon regarding the profession of the physician is not very different from the one which we see refuted in the Hippocratic treatise *de Arte* (ch. 4-6 with the conclusion at the beginning of ch. 7): without completely denying the interferences of τύχη, the writer is dealing with the criteria which prove that there is such a thing as an art of medicine which is seen as the knowledge of the causes of the sicknesses, ch. 5.16, ch. 6.15. Solon does not simply set the stage for the poetic and sophistic discussions of the effectiveness of the τέχνη and the power of the τύχη, as
Cordes 1994, 22 asserts, but, actually, Solon is the first to speak in an archaic context about the dichotomy between medical profession/effectiveness of Μοῖρα=Τύχη, which was going to become a most debated question of the Athenian culture of the fifth century (some poetic parallels: Eur. Alc. 785-6, IT 89, Agatho, TrGF 39F6, and 39F8).


64. δῶρα δ' ἄφικτα θεῶν γίγνεται δθανάτων: Hom. II. 3.65 οὗ τοι ἀπόβλητ' ἐστι θεῶν .... δῶρα, Thgn. IEG 446 δῶρ' δθανάτων, 1033 θεῶν .... εἰμαρμένα δῶρα .... οὐκ ἂν .... θυτὴς .... προσφύγοι, Rhian. CA 1.2 φέρομεν .... θεῶν ἑτερόρροπα δῶρα. On the human necessity to suffer the divine δῶρα, cf. also Od. 18.142 and Hom.Hymn Dem. 147-8—216-7, Soph. TrGF 964 θεού τὸ δῶρον τοῦτον χρὴ δ' ὅσα ἕν θεοὶ διδῶσι, φεύγειν μηδέν, ὧ τέκνον, ποτέ (see also TrGF 585).

ἄφικτος: new. In the epithet ἄφικτα recurs Solon's idea that Μοῖρα=Fate is always threatening with a sanction, a theme repeated also in πάντως, II. 8, 28, 31. Cp. Simon. PMG 520.4 ἄφικτος .... θάνατος, and adesp. PMG 1018a (probably coming from Eur. Peleus), κλύτε, Μοῖραι, Δίος αἱ τε παρὰ θρόνον ἀγχοτάτω θεῶν ἐξέχυμαι περιώσι' ἄφικτα τε μῆδα παυτοδαπάν βουλάν ἀδαμαντίναις ἐφαίνετε κερκίσιν. For the unavoidability of Moira's actions, cp. also Phanocl. CA 2 ἀλλὰ τὸ Μοιράων νῆμ' ἄλλων, οὐδὲ τῷ ἔστιν ἐκφυγεῖν, ὡς καὶ γῆν ἐπιφερομέθεια (according to the ancient testimony concerning human death).


65-70. A version of these lines occurs in Thgn. IEG 585-90 (also quoted by Stobaeus in the chapter περὶ τῶν παρ' ἐλπίδα: 4.47.16), with variants whose relevance indicates that the passage underwent an autonomous symposiastic reworking. The lines of the Theognidean corpus were the work of a minor moralist poet who μεταποιεῖ Solon's text in order to express the idea of the dangers of an
imprudent ambition and to cancel Solon’s pessimism with a more conventionally pious faith in the benefits from virtue and skill (the most relevant variations in meaning are: I. 587 εὐδοκίμειν πειρώμενοι instead of εὖ ἐρδεῖν πειρώμενοι, and I. 589 τῷ δὲ κακῶς ἐρδοῦτι instead of τῷ δὲ καλῶς ποιεῖντι): as is well shown by Ferrari 1989, 25-7, the changes made by ‘Theognis’ to serve this moralistic purpose ruin the chiastic symmetry of Solon’s text in lines 67-70, with the beginning verse 65 having no longer any significance at all now that there lies no danger for the well-doer, and make the word ἀφροσύνης look incongruous, since it does not apply any more to the one who acts well.

65. πᾶσι ... κίνδυνος ἐπ’ ἐργασίαν: see Thgn. IEG 401-2 μηδὲν ἀγαν σπεῦδειν καιρὸς δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀριστος ἐργασίαν ἀνθρώπων, and 449 for the phrase πᾶσιν ἐπ’ ἐργασίαν; Thgn. IEG 637f. ἔλπις καὶ κίνδυνος ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὀμοίαν ὀὕτω γὰρ χαλεποὶ δαίμονες ἀμφότεροι for the thought. The latter passage appears to synthesise two thoughts which are articulated in two subsequent sections of Solon’s poems, namely the hope as a stimulus of human actions > hereafter the list of the professions) > the danger entailed in every action. Also Bacchylides concludes the list of professions in 10.38-45, which appears to have been modelled on Solon (see Maehler 1997, 189), with the statement (II. 45f.) τὸ μέλλον δ’ ἀκρίτους τίκτει τελευτάς, πᾶ τόχα βρίσει.

The word κίνδυνος, attested here for the first time (Mette 1952, 409), brings forward another idea that adds to the unavoidability of Μοῖρα. The element of risk, danger, provided by the unexpected and the unforeseen which every human action entails, is somehow the same concept as Μοῖρα=Τύχη (cf. above ad l. 63), but considered from the human point of view, and not as a divine entity — note how the parallelism of the Μοῖρα distich and of the κίνδυνος distich is outlined by the same introductory τοῖ, which has to be interpreted as the τοῖ emphasising a proverbial or gnomic sentence (cf. Denniston, Greek Part. 542f.).

Μοῖρα=Τύχη is the reason why sometimes things turn out good, sometimes bad, not in proportion to our merit or right. In this way, for the first time, the physician is understood as a model for the whole human situation (so Cordes 1994, 23 paraphrasing Wilamowitz 1913, 266) — but a model that is hardly connected with the right and wrongful actions supervised by the justice of Zeus.

65-6. οὐδὲ τις οἶδεν ... χρήματος ἀρχομένοι: Parallels for the thought: Thgn. IEG 135-8 οὐδὲ τις ἀνθρώπων ἐργάζεται ἐν φρεσίν εἰδὼς ἐστέλος εἴτ’ ἀγαθὸν γίνεται εἴτε κακὸν. πολλάκι γὰρ δοκέων θήσειν κακὸν ἔσθλον ἔθηκεν, καὶ τε δοκῶν θήσειν ἔσθλον ἔθηκε κακὸν, 141-2 ἀνθρώποι δὲ μάταια
νομίζομεν, εἰδότες οὖν ἔτι δὲ κατὰ σφέτερον πάντα τελοῦσαι νόμον, 159-60
οὖν γὰρ οὖν ἔτι ἄνθρωπον ὧν οὐδὲν χίμέρα ἄνδρι τελεί, 1075-6 πρήγματος
ἀπρίκτου χαλεπωτατόν ἐστὶ τελευτὴν γνώσει, Semon. IEG 1.4-5 (ἄνθρωπον)
οὖν εἰδότες ὡς ἐκαστὸν ἐκτελεύτησε θεὸς, Simon. PMG 521 ἄνθρωπος
ἐώς μὴ ποτὲ φάσῃς ὃ τι γίνεται αὐριον, ... ἀκείνη γὰρ οὖν ἄνθρωπος ταὐτοπερφύγου
μῆλις γι δέ μετάτασιν, Pind. Ol. 7.24-6 ἀμφί δ' ἄνθρωπον φασιν ἀμπλακάιον
ἀναρίθμηται κρέμανυ τούτο δ' ἀμάχανον εὑρεῖν, ὅτι νῦν ἔν καὶ
tελευτὰ φέρτατον ἄνδρι τυχεῖν, Ol. 12.7-9 σύμβολον δ' οὖ πώ τις ἐπιχθονίων
πιστῶν ἀμφὶ πράξεως ἐσωμεναῖν εὑρεῖν τεθεῖν, τῶν δὲ μελλόντων
tετούφλωται φραδαί. The lack of certainty in human life and the instability of it will
become a cliché in tragedy: cf. e.g. Soph. Trach. 1270 τὰ μὲν οὖν μέλλοντ' οὖν ἔτις
ἔφορή, TrGF 590 θητήν δὲ φύσιν χρῆ θυητά φρονεῖν, τούτο κατειδότας ὡς
οὐκ ἔστιν πλὴν Δίος οὖν ἔτις τῶν μελλόντων ταμίας ὃ τι χρῆ τετελέσθαι, Eur.
TGF 391 οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν φωρίς ἄνθρωπος θεων σπουδαζόμενε δὲ πόλιν ὑπ' ἐλπίδων,
μᾶτιν πόνους ἐχοντες, οὖν ἔτις εἰδότες σαφές (besides Soph. Aj. 1418-20,
Eur. TGF 262, TGF 301, TGF 304); see also adesp. Anth.Pal. 11.56.1-2 τι γὰρ
αὐριον, ἥ τι τὸ μέλλον, οὖν ἐτεικεί.

66. τὴ μέλλει σχήσειν: ἦν is the reading of cod. S and Stob. 3.9.23 (περὶ
δικαιοσύνης). Τὴν is that of Thgn. cod. A, τὸι of Thgn. codd. OXI and of Stob.
4.47.16 cit. Homer and Hesiod do not have the Attic τὸι (cf. Apollon.Soph. 131.8)
and use τὴν only with relative value (coordinated to τῇ), or demonstrative (=τῆ ἦν), while
they write τὴν or ὅπιτι to denote movement in a certain direction; cf. also Hdt. 1.32.9
σκοπεῖν δὲ χρῆ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτὴν κῇ ἀποβήσεται. Thus most
probably the best reading is τὴν, later replaced in the tradition by τὸι and ἦν.

Solon’s periphrasis with μέλλειν replaces, as well as Hesiod’s (fr. 204.113) the
traditional, Homeric τὰ ἐσομένα , and expresses a dynamic idea of time. The use of
the periphrasis will be furthered in the fifth century: cf. Basset 1979, 129. The verb
ἐχεῖν in Homer can mean to hold a ship or a chariot in a certain direction, Od. 11.70;
for the intransitive use, cf. e.g. ll. 16.378 of Patroclus driving his chariot, and of
ships coming ashore, and Ar. Ran. 188 τὸι σχήσειν δοκεῖσιν.

67-70. Also in 1. 32 the polar expression κακός and ἄγαθος synthesises all human
beings in opposition to divine forces — here more certainly than there skill (ἐὖ) or
incompetence (κακός ἐρδεῖν) are relevant, in a technical sense.

In these lines Solon prospects the negative version of the optimistic perspective to
be found for instance in Soph TrGF 831 ἐργού δὲ παντὸς ἦν τις ἀρχηγαὶ καλώς,
For the thought that the gods (or Tyche) can always reverse human fortunes, cf. Hes. Op. 5-7, and see e.g. Archil. IEG 130, Eur. Or. 340-7, TGF 100, TGF 554, TGF 684, Lyr. adesp. CA 34.4-7. That the treatment of men's fortunes is random, irrational, and sometimes unfair to what human action would deserve, cf. e.g. Thgn. IEG 660-6 θεοί γὰρ τὸ νεμεσιόν, οὕτως ἐπεστὶ τέλος. ... πενεχρὸς ἀνήρ ... ἐπιλύσατο, ... καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κακῶς ὃν ἔλαχεν, Eur. Hec. 956-60 οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν πιστὸν, ... οὕτως οὕτως πράσσοντα μὴ πράξειν κακῶς, φύρουσα δ' αὐτὰ θεοὶ πάλιν τε καὶ πρόσω παραγμὸν ἐντιθέντες, ὡς ἀγνωσία σέβωμεν αὐτοὺς. Eur. Hel. 711-5, TGF 901 πολλάκια μοι πρατίδων διήλθε φοινίς, εἰτε τόχα τιος· εἰτε δαίμων τὰ βρότεια κραίνει, παρὰ τ' ἐλπίδα καὶ παρὰ δίκαιον τοὺς μὲν ἀπ' οἶκων δ' ἐνακόπτοντας ἄταρ θεοῦ, τοὺς δ' εὐτυχοῦντας ἄγει, adesp. TrGF 323b=*717.2-3 πάντα ... τὰ τοῦ βίου ... διὰ τούχην δὲ γίνεται, Agatho, TrGF 39F9 τάχ' ἂν τις εἰκὸς αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι λέγοι, βροτοῦσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν οὐκ εἰκότα. Cf. also the general comment of Men. fr. 417 K.-Th.: πάσασθε νοῦν ἔχοντες· οὐδὲν γὰρ πλέον ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὁ τῆς τούχης — εἰτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο πνεῦμα θείον, εἰτε νος — τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ κυβερνὸν ἄπαντα καὶ στρέφων καὶ σώζων, ἥ πρόνοια δ' ἡ θυτὴ κατινὸς καὶ φλάραφος. πεισθείτε, κοι μέμψεσθε με· πάντως ὡσ νοοῦμεν ἡ λέγομεν ἡ πράττομεν, τούχη 'στίν, ἡμεῖς δ' ἐσμὲν ἐπιγεγραμμένοι.


69-70. Solon says that things sometimes turn out not in proportion to one's merit/right, and therefore one can succeed even though going about it the wrong way and vice versa (ll. 67-8); cp. the example of the physician. Therefore, in my opinion, ἀφροτυνή has to be understood as the opposite of σοφή (and not of σωφροσύνη) and to be translated as 'ignorance', and would parallel ἐγὼ ἔρδειν πειράμενος and οὐ προνοήσας in connection above all to the presence or absence of practical skill in the planning of one's actions; contra Fill 1972, 163-5, who sees in the διπλασίας σπείροντας of l. 73 a hint at the unrighteous wealth followed by ἡβρίσ of ll. 9-15, and therefore states the ethical implication of ἐγὼ and κακῶς — but the difference
between the emphasis on divine justice of the first part of fr. 1 against the focus on the human perspective in the second part appears to me to be one of the best results of the modern analyses of the structure of the elegy.

The singular θεός found here is equivalent with the plural θεῶν ἀθανάτων used in l. 64, and the two words hint at an impersonal Fate no less than Μοῖρα. See François 1957, 59-62, 86, and Büchner 1959, 165.

70. συντυχίην ἀγαθὴν, ἐκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης: συντυχίη is not found in Homer. For ἐκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης, cf., in the same hemistich of the pentameter, Thgn. IEG 556-1178b πρὸς τε θεῶν οίτειν ἐκλυσιν ἀθανάτων. The term ἀφροσύνη was already in Il. 7.110 (in plural Od. 16.278, 24.457). For other instances of the same connection of λύειν with ἀφροσύνη, see Pl. Resp. 515c5 λύσιν τε καὶ ἱασιν τῶν τε δεσμῶν καὶ τῆς ἀφροσύνης and [Plut.] Cons. ad Apoll. 108C ἐως ὁ θεός αὐτὸς ἀπολύσῃ ἡμᾶς. καὶ σοῦῳ μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλαττόμενοι τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἀφροσύνης.

The closest parallel to Solon’s line is Ar. Av. 544-5 σὺ δὲ μοι κατὰ δαίμονα καὶ τινῳ συντυχίαιν ἄγαθὴν ἥκεισ ἐμοὶ σωτήρ, which may help to understand the syntactical connection of the two accusatives. In the common interpretation συντυχίην ἄγαθὴν is the object, and ἐκλυσιν ἀφροσύνης the apposition, but the Aristophanic passage shows the idiomatic character of συντυχίην ἄγαθὴν, and such an idiomatic and general use is what we would expect much more in an apposition (an anticipated apposition of a kind of which there other instances in Solon, cf. fr. 2.2), because the apposition intends to explain, while the explanandum is more specific and restricted in meaning. The ἀφροσύνη would therefore cause the failure (see Hes. Op. 89 ὅτε δὴ κακὸν εἶχ’ ἐνόρησεν, and 218 παθῶν δὲ τε νήπιος ἐγινώ, after Hom. Il. 17.32 ἰσχιθὲν δὲ τε νήπιος ἐγινώ), but the θεός would sometimes provide the ἀφρων with the liberation from the ἀφροσύνη, leading him therefore unexpectedly to success: cf. Römisch 1933, 21-2 (and Büchner 1959, 167, Maddalena 1943, 9-10 for an unsuccessful attempt at refuting the interpretation by Römisch).

71-6. Thgn. IEG 227-32 has a version of these lines, with variants.

Scholars usually interpreted these lines above all as a return to the thoughts on wealth of the first part. Certainly the πλοῦτου which is programmatically at the start of l. 71 hints at the πλοῦτος which is in the same position in l. 9, and the final lines resume the criticism of the pursuit for unrighteous wealth of Il. 9-25, together with the idea of divine justice and of ἀτιη. But the final lines also develop from another perspective the outline of the human σπεῦδειν presented in Il. 43ff. The logic
underlying the transition between the ways of ἀγαν σπείρειν and the πλούτος may be explained through the Theognidean principle of μὴ δὲν ἀγαν σπείρειν, on which, cf. above all, II. 401-4 μὴ δὲν ἀγαν σπείρειν καμάρος δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀριστος ἐργασαι ἀνθρώπων. πολλάκι δ’ εἰς ἀρετῆν (v.l. ἀάτην) σπείρει αὖ ἄρη κέρδος διξῆμενος, δυτικα δαίμων πρόφρων εἰς μεγάλην ἀμπλακήν παράγει (cp. Sol. II. 65-70).

The nuances of the different approaches to the theme of the wealth in the first and the last part of the poem have been fully appreciated first by Nesselrath 1992. In I. 9 Solon only wanted to distinguish between the good wealth and the wealth gained by men in unlawful ways; I. 71 is concerned with wealth for which οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον (namely, also in case that a τέρμα exists, all the same, it is not understandable by the man). The system presented in II. 9-32 implied that human actions and efforts, all of them being more or less motivated by the wish for well-being, can be divided into good or bad (namely the ones which are in accordance with the gods and those against the order established by them, which are doomed to be pursued by ἄτη). The second part of the poem presents a new perspective which shows that the division of human actions and efforts between good and bad does not match, and that both depend on the superior power of chance; besides, ἄτη is not any more only the punishment of the ἰδρις in contrast with divine law, but also affects men who simply surpassed the invisible τέρμα in gaining the κέρδεα which had been provided to them by gods, and may somehow seem close to a profane principle of equilibrium, though it is managed by the "gods".

In II. 9-25 the criticism of the wealth had been more specifically ethical, as it had opposed there good and bad means to gain it; here the criticism concerns another inherent danger of this pursuit, namely its boundlessness. For the idea that unbridled growth leads to ἄτη, cf. also Sol. 8.3; it leads to great instability also according to Bacchyl. 15.57-60 ἀ δ’ αἰώνοις κέρδεσοι καὶ ἀφρούναις ἐξαισίοις θάλουσά ἀδαμβής ῥήμασι, ἐ πλούτοι δύναμιν τε θωδός ἄλλωτρον ωπάσεν, αὕτης δ’ ἐς βαθὺν πέμπει φθόρον, which is a relevant parallel also for the following lines of Solon; for Democr. VS 68B.219 χρημάτων ὄρεξις, ἢ μὴ ὀρίζηται κόρῳ, πεινής ἐσχάτης πολλοῦ χαλεπωτέρη μέξονες γὰρ ὄρεξις μέξονας ἐνδείᾳς ποιεῖτον. Cf. also, more generally, Men. fr. 786 K.-Th. ἀρχὴ μεγίστῃ τῶν ἐν αὐθρώπωι κακῶν τάγαθα, τὰ λίαν ἄγαθα.

71. πλούτος δ’ οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον: As the participle both of φαίνω and of φημί, πεφασμένος had two different meanings, 'evident' and 'shown forth' by words (see Suda π 1416 A. and Hsch. π 2099 S.). In Hom. πεφασμένος of II. 14.127 was attributive of μῆθος, and therefore may have the second meaning (cf.
Hom. Od. 8.499 φαίνει δ’ αδιδήν]. Solon's πεφασμένος means 'evident', after II. 2.122 τέλος δ’ οὗ πώς τι πέφανται, as in Soph. OC 1122, and, possibly, in one of Solon's laws: Lysias, in Theomn. (10.16), making reference to the "ancient laws of Solon", namely the axones or the Athenian law code of 403 B.C. which were still rich in archaisms (cf. Hillgruber 1988, 65), quotes the law whose beginning was ἰδιαί δὲ πεφασμένως πωλοῦνται', and glosses τὸ μὲν πεφασμένως ἐστὶ φανερῶς (19; cf. also Harp. a 198 K. ἀποπεφασμένον' αὐτὶ τοῦ ἀποδεδειγμένον καὶ πεφανερωμένον).

Τέρμα='end' had already been used metaphorically by Tyrt. 12. On the phrase, cf. Sol. 20 γνωμοσύνης δ’ ἀφανές ... μέτρον.

For the thought, Thgn. IEG 596 πλην πλούτου παντὸς χρήματος ἐστὶ κόρος, 1158 οὕτε γὰρ ἐν πλούτου θυμὸν ὑπερκορέσας, Find. Nem. 11.47-8 κερδέων δὲ χρὴ μέτρον θηρευέμεν· ἀπροσκίτων δ’ ἐρώτων ὀξύτεραι μανία, Bacchyl. 1.172-4 ἵσον ο’ τ’ ἀφθος ἦμερει μεγάλων ο’ τε μείων παυροτέρων, Ar. Plut. 193-97 σοῦ δ’ ἐγένετʼ οὐδεὶς μεστὸς οὐδεπώποτε. ... ἢν τάλαντα τις λάβῃ ... πολὺ μάλλον ἐπιθυμεῖ λαβεῖν ... βούλεται, ἢ φησιν εἰν’ ἀβίωτον αὐτῷ τὸν βίον, fr.lyr.adesp. CA 37.20 μέτρα τὶς ἀν πλούτου, τὶς ἀνέφρατο μέτρα πενίας,, 'Sotad'. CA 8.6-7 ὡς πένης θέλει σχείν, καὶ πλούσιος πλέον σχείν, ἵσον ἔχουσιν αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ τὸ μεριμνᾶν.


72. βίος=βήστωσ is new, and will later be typical of prose. The less well attested adverbial neuter is preferable, since the replacement of the epithet by the adverb is easier than the opposite way round.

For σπείδειν 'to strive eagerly or anxiously' denoting at the same time emulation and rivalry in an apparently analogous context, cf. Hes. Op. 23-4 ζηλοῖ δὲ τε γείτονα γείτων εἰς ἄφενος σπείδουσι· ἀγαθῆ δ’ 'Ερίς ἦδε βροτοίας, Thgn. IEG 402-3 πολλακί  δ’ εἰς ἀρετὴν σπείδει ἀνὴρ κέρδος διζήμενον. But both in Hesiod and Theognis the σπείδειν to equalise other people's wealth is considered a
positive fact; on the contrary Solon's perspective is pretty negative (other passages criticizing the greed and those who always want more when they already have enough are frr. 3.7-10, 5.3-4).


74. κέρδεα τοι ... ὅπως ἀναφαίνεται: Hom.Hymn Dem. 220 ὅπως ἀναφαίνεται ἰστράτου (beginning of the line); cf. Hom. Od. 18.19 ἀλβον δὲ θεοὶ ... ὀπάζειν, Thgn. IEG 321 εἴ ... θεοὶ κακῷ ἀνδρὶ βίον καὶ πλοῦτον ὑπάσης, Rhian. CA 1.9-10 θεοὶ δ᾽ εἶπι ἀλβον ὀπάζῃ καὶ πολυκοραίνην. The verb ὀπάζειν is often told of divine gifts: e.g. II. 6.156-7, Od. 8.498, Hes. Theogn. 420, Hom.Hymn 24.5, 30.18, 31.17, Bacchyl. 17.130, of bad ones, Semon. IEG 7.72.

75. ἄτη ... ἀναφαίνεται: Cf. above l. 28 (Ζηνὸς τίσις) ἐξεφάνῃ. Hom. Il. 11.174-17.244 ἡμῖν δ᾽ άντ᾽ ἀναφαίνεται αἰτίως ὀλεθρος; cf. also Soph. OC 1222 μοῦρ(α) ... ἀναπέφηνε.

ἐξ αὐτῶν: Hardly from the θυνητῶν, as first maintained by Wehrli 1931, 12, see later West 1974, 181: either from the κέρδεα (Ziegler 1922, 204, Römisch 1933, 25, cp. Sol. 8.3 τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὑβρίν), or from the θεοὶ (Hamilton 1977 the gods would be presented as givers of both κέρδεα "gains" I. 73 and ἄτη, as also in Thgn. IEG 133f. — but in this case I would expect some kind of conjunction 'also' between κέρδεα and ἄτη). Thgn. IEG 227-32, who resumes Solon's Il. 71-76, cuts out any mention of the gods as responsible for human κέρδεα, and lets ἄτη derive from the χρήματα when they become ἀφροσύνη (instead of Sol. l. 74, he has χρήματά τοι θυνητῶν γίνεται ἀφροσύνη: cf. Hasler 1959, 83).

76. ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔξει: Sol. 6.4 χρήματα δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔξει/, Thgn. IEG 232, 318 ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔξει/. Hiatus is admitted with polyptota of ἄλλος (though in most cases a particle, usually τ᾽, or a preposition has intruded in some or all manuscripts): see Od. 4.236-7 (analogous context: θεοὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλῳ Ζεὺς ἀγαθὸν τε κακῶν τε θεῶν), Hom.Hymn Herm. 558, Hes. Op. 713, Archil. IEG 13.7 ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔξει, specifically of the κακά sent by gods (on the points of contacts with Solon, cf. Krause 1976, 79): indeed, I believe that Solon, too, resumes here from l. 29 the idea of the unpredictability of the punishment, and I would rule out that
he is implying that Ate does not punish the specific individuals, but one or the other member of the community, namely that her concern is to punish the whole *polis*, as Hasler 1959, 84 maintains. See later Thgn. *IEG* 157, 992. Phoc. 16.1, Ap.Rhod. 1.881, Opp. *H.* 2.268, 566, 4.290.

The object of ἔχει is most probably ἃν, *apo koinou* with πέμψει, and the parallel of fr. 6.4 is not enough to justify the syntactically hard connection of ἔχει with κερδά, proposed by Ziegler 1922, 204 and accepted by Allen 1949, 60, Fränkel 1975, 236 n. 41, Müller 1956, 11.

Τεισομένη: Ate is the executor of Zeus' vengeance, as stated in ll. 14-7. For the "vengeance" of Dike, Sol. 3.15-6. Theognis, who differently from Solon did not emphasise her role in dealing with the idea of divine punishment, meaningfully replaced τεισομένη (*Ἀτη*) with τειρομένοις (θνητοῖς) in l. 232 of his passage reproducing Solon's ll. 71-6.
The natural position of the island of Salamis, forming a barrier towards Nisaea, the
harbour town of Megara on the Saronic Gulf, and stretching out towards Piraeus
would have made it necessary for either of the two nearest mainland cities, Megara and
Athens, to want to hold it for reasons of defence. Especially after the annexation of
Eleusis to Athens (at the end of the 8th or the beginning of the 7th century, cf. Hopper
1961, 211 n. 204), the acquisition of the island can safely be said to have become even
more desirable for the Athenians. Important economic reasons can be added:
possessing or neutralising the island implied seizing or safeguarding the sea-route
to the isthmus of Corinth (see French 1957, 238-40, Waters 1960). Such
considerations could be expected from Megara as well, given the city's colonising
activity over a longer period in the seventh century and its powerful position in the
north-east trading sphere as well as from Athens who had considerable naval interests
(as shown by its struggle against Mytilene for Sigeum in the Troad: Hdt. 5.94-5,
Diog. Laert. 1.74).

At Cleisthenes' time Ajax from Salamis was considered to be 'ally' of the Attic
heroes (Hdt. 5.66), and two lines were apparently added in the Homeric Catalogue of
Ships, where the forces of the Salaminian Ajax follow the Athenians in terms that
imply the subordination of Salamis to Athens (ll. 2.557f.). The two lines were hardly
original, since nowhere else in Iliad Ajax is strongly connected to Athens; therefore
they were athetized by Aristarchus, and sometimes considered to be a 'late addition' by
Homer (Vita Herod. Homeri 390-3, p. 210 A.) but more often a forgery by Solon (cf.
19.251, 478b Dilts; see also Strab. 9.394: by Solon or by Peisistratus) — it is
significant that also the Megarians tried a similar interpolation in order to connect Ajax
with troops from the Megarian towns of Tripodes and Nisea: cf. Strab. quoted.
Closely connected with Athenian claims to Salamis was the legend of the giving of the
island to Athens by Philaios and Eurysakes, the sons of Ajax (Plut. Sol. 10) or by one
of them (Paus. 1.35.2), in exchange for the Athenian citizenship. According to
Plutarch, Sol. loc.cit., Athenian accounts recorded that Solon exploited this legend
about the sons of Ajax during a public trial between Athens and Megara on the
historical ties with Salamis, where the judges, five Spartans, decided in favour of
Athens (also the Delphic oracle would have been helpful, calling Salamis 'ionic'); on
the same occasion, Plutarch says that Solon read in public the two lines of the Homeric
catalogue about Ajax and the Athenian troops (cf. also Arist. Rh. 1375b30).

The war for Salamis is obscure in the extreme and the evidence for it is late and
meagre (see above all Hopper 1961, 208-217, and Piccirilli 1978). An apparently long
and difficult struggle, some phases of which certainly belong to the latter part of the
seventh century as it can be identified by the Megarian support of Cylon's unsuccessful *coup d' état* in Athens (Thuc. 1.126.5) ended by the arbitration of Sparta in favour of Athens mentioned above. In spite of some isolated defences of Plutarch's chronology (Busolt, Meyer), the Spartan arbitration is most often considered to be more or less later than Solon's times, and dated to the 560's or early 550's (Legon 1981, 138f., Andrewes 1982, 373), to 519/18 B.C. (Piccirilli 1973, 52f.), or between 510 B.C. and 508/7 B.C. (Beloch).

Daimachus (*FGH* 65F7=Plut. *Comp. Sol. et Publ. 4.1*) was the only voice in antiquity to deny that Solon acted as a general in the war against Megara, and Solon's figure is most present in the testimonies about the Athenian conquest of Salamis. However, at some point Peisistratus' name, too, appeared in the story in a quite confusing way. Apart from the fact that Solon obviously took a stand on the Salamis issue as his celebrated poem guarantees, his share in the *final* conquest of the island remains debated in Plutarch, whose narration is the fullest we have: in chs 8f. he presents two versions of the capture of Salamis (for the chronology according to Plutarch, see Manfredini-Piccirilli ad *Sol. 8.4*) and his account is also contradictory regarding the end of the war, because at the start of ch. 10 it is stated that the war continued (!) till the arbitration of Sparta.

With this obviously confused account one has to fit together Herodotus' narration (1.59.4) which records the capture of Nisaea by Peisistratus before his tyranny, but says nothing of Salamis or Solon, and Aristotle, who in *Ath.Pol.* 14.1 accepts Peisistratus' participation in the war together with Solon (also prospected by Plut. *Sol.* 3-4), while he denies it in 17.2 as a chronological mistake. The story of the murderous cross-dressing by which the final capture of the island was accomplished appears in Plut. *Sol.* 8.4f. as a *strategema* engineered by both men, but is ascribed only to Peisistratus by Aen.Tact. 4.8-11 and Just. *Epit.* 2.7f. while others (Polyaenus 1.20.1-2 and Aelianus, *VH* 7.19) consider only Solon to be the responsible.

We should not forget in the ancient biographies of literary men the efforts to tie literary history in with fixed points in political history and the temptation to claim, defying sensible chronological facts, that close events were absolutely simultaneous or the strong attempt to elaborate legends around them (see e.g. Podlecki 1987, 9-10), and it is natural to suppose that probably Athens gained and lost Salamis more than once, and that the war urged by Solon was not the one in which Peisistratus was a general (see Rhodes ad* Ath.Pol. 17.2*) or that, after an early but insecure capture of the island (before Solon's archonship) Peisistratus' success improved Athens' bargaining position in the war (see Legon 1981, 137, and Andrewes 1982, 373).

Solon's poem *Salamis* and the circumstances under which it was composed and cited are reported in a number of sources containing elements of doubtful historicity. Plutarch, *Sol.* 8f., reports in detail that Solon had to prevent a newly established law
forbidding to propose in public to resume the war for Salamis, and so he pretended to be out of his mind (ἐσκήψατο μὲν ἔκστασιν τῶν λογισμῶν), sallied out into the market place with a cap upon his head (ἐξεπηδήσεν εὶς τὴν ἄγοραν ὄψιν, πιλίδιον περιθέμενος), and got upon the herald's stone (ἀναβὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τοῦ κήρυκος θησ) to perform his poem; according to Diog.Laert. 1.46, who confirms the detail of Solon's pretence to be mad, Solon would have gone to the market place ἐστεφανωσάμενος, and would have had the poem read by a herald. An allusion to Solon's cap as a πιλίδιον occurs as early as Dem. 19.255 οὐκ οἶει δίκην δώσειν ... κἂν πιλίδιον λαβὼν περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν περινοστῆς καὶ ἐμοὶ λοιδορῇ (where the "even if" proposition seems already to hint at some kind of peculiarity of the cap most probably as a device intended to gain impunity), and the tradition of some queer Solonian disguise is already in the Pseudo-Aristotelic Homeric Problems, on ll. 2.183 (Arist. fr. 143 Rose=368 Gigon). The story of the feigned madness is also found in Cic. Off. 1.30.108, Philod. mus. 20.18, Polyaeon. Strat. 1.20, and Just. Epit. 2.7.9.

Different interpretations have been proposed about the context of the performance, and Solon's disguise. Apart from this poem by Solon, the agora is nowhere mentioned by ancient testimonies as a performance-place of elegiac poetry, as remarked by Bartol 1993, 54. Some scholars trust the testimonies and believe that this poem was exceptionally delivered in the market-place, and not, as usually, at the symposium (cf. West 1974, 12, Henderson 1982, 29, Tedeschi 1982, 42-4), but the mention of the agora might have been a reconstruction of theirs by an inference based on the misunderstanding of δύτες 1.2 (cf. e.g. Lefkowitz 1981, 40, and Bowie 1986, 19-20). More recently, Bartol 1993, 54f. interpreted the first distich in a metaphorical sense: Solon would play a herald by presenting himself as a herald, though being at the symposium (what is plausible; Bartol most unlikely intends the second line, too, from the same perspective: δῦτος ἄγορης would mean "instead of the agora", or "not in the agora", and i.2 "I shall speak not in the agora, so I shall use poetry", but this interpretation of i.2 not only is very hard (and Solon would be presupposing a too implicit reference to the sympotic context, to allow such an interpretation of δῦτος), but also belittles the meaning of the emphatic self-reference of the message as a poem (better understandable as functional to an opposition between poetry-prose).

As for Solon's πιλίδιον, mentioned by Plutarch and Demosthenes, it was interpreted by Weil 1883, 348 n. 13 as the traveller's hat, which would indirectly fit the image of the herald of the first verse — but the heralds had their own hats (see below). Most recently, Mastrocinque 1984, remarked that πιλίδιον was also the hat of the strangers or of the liberated slaves: the fact that the Athenian Solon spoke in public with his head covered in such a way might be attributed by the Athenians to madness, fitting perfectly Solon's own intentions — however this interpretation only connects
the testimony about the hat and the testimony about the madness, but offers no clue to Solon's very lines. I agree with the proposal of Freeman 1926, 171 n. 2, followed e.g. by Flacelière 1947, 247, according to whom the πιλίδιουv of Plutarch's story was the πίλος of the herald, but the legendary evolution misunderstood it before Demosthenes' time for a πιλίδιουv, namely a sign of weakness or inferiority which would have prevented the Athenians from being hard in applying the law against him. Indeed, this πιλίδιουv would have been over-interpreted as the sick man's πιλίδιουv of Pl. Resp. 406d, or the πιλίδιουv which Dicaeopolis adopts in Ar. Ach. 439, in keeping with his role as a foolish beggar who while starting a 'long speech' to the chorus wants to avoid any serious judgement or any harm — αὕτη (the speech) δὲ θάνατον, ἦν κακῶς λέξιω, φέρετι (see ll. 416f.). In other words, through his hat Solon was originally enacting a herald because he wanted to appear holy and untouchable as heralds were (see e.g. schol. bT II. 1.334 καὶ νόμος δὲ νόμος μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι κηρυκα; the inviolability of the heralds belonged according to Hdt. 7.136.2 to τὰ πάντων ἄνθρωπων νόμων), but his performance was later interpreted as that of a madman — untouchable again, because of this status (see Tedeschi 1982).

Either with a hat or without it, certainly Solon's own text, 1. 1, presented the poet as a κηρυκεῖος. The meaning of this auto-presentation is far from being clear. According to Bowie 1986, 19 it would not have implied any kind of real disguise or madness, but would be one of the many possible ways ancient lyric poets presented their own 'I' — Archilochus, fr. 1 could introduce himself as a servant of the Muses, Theognis 257 as a mare, Solon would have presented himself as a traveller just coming from Salamis, in the same way the 'I' of Theognis 783-8 presented himself as a traveller who had been in Sicily — after all the multi-formity of the auto-presentations of the ancient lyric poets may be considered an early parallel of the equation between the "rhapsode"/poet and the "actor", which is later found in Pl. Ion 532d6-7, 536a1, Resp. 373b7, 395a8, Alcid.Soph. 14 Avezzù, and in Arist. Rh. 1403b22 and Poet. 1462a6).

However, we have to cut some distinction between the conventions of the fictional 'I', and to differentiate between the ones because of which the poet may 'hand over' to a persona loquens completely different from his own self (and so, for instance, the 'I' that speaks may be a mare) and the less radical fictional way with which Solon (and Archil. fr. 1 quoted above) express the 'I' of their own selves. Solon's (or Archilochus') auto-presentations do not hand over to a different self, but simply emphasise at different levels metaphorical or metonymic aspects of the author's real self. Archilochus, as a singer inspired by the Muses, over-stresses his dependence on the Muses and, therefore, states that he is their "servant", Solon, as a politician who is going to speak about Salamis, says that he brings news from Salamis. The problem is that the metonymy with which Solon presented his own self in order to gain a strong
illocutionary effect of exhortation upon his audience (cf. Slings 1990, 17f.) certainly implied at least one un-realistic feature, and at least in one point he tried to seem someone different from who he was. He wanted to look like a herald from Salamis — this is the minimum level of unrealistic 'staging' that I. 1 makes sure: no Athenian could in reality be a herald from Salamis, since Salamis was Megarian/not Athenian by that time.

Apart from this 'anomalous' self-presentation, did he more explicitly feign to be mad — e.g. in the disguise, that the Homeric problems of Pseudo-Aristotle appear to imply? Nothing in the remaining eight out of the original one hundred lines (so Plutarch) of the poem hints at Solon's madness (though behaving like a madman kept being attributed to him during his lifetime, cf. fr. 14), but both Solon's pretended madness and his disguise — which would result in a fully pre-tragic staging (see Else 1965, 40f.) — would have been easily understandable in archaic Greece as a στρατήγημα. The gods used to appear to humans in disguise (e.g. Athena in Od. 1.105f. or Demeter in Hom.Hymn Dem. 119-44), and disguise was also a common device to operate in dangerous situations: Odysseus again was disguised as a deserter at Troy to gain information from the Trojans in Od. 4.244-58 (cp. the Persian Zopyrus of Hdt. 3.154, who feigned to be a deserter to enable Darius to conquer Babylon), or as a beggar on his return to Ithaca (Od. 14.192-359). Furthermore, Odysseus had been considered very successful in 'setting the stage' for his hortatory speeches in II. 2.183-97: when he throws off of his cloak before speaking to the leaders and the troops in order to stop their flight from Troy, the ἀπειρέσις gesture of τὴν χαλάναν ἀποβαλόντα μονοχίτωνθεῖν appeared to the pseudo-Aristotelian Homeric problems loc.cit. as a device to θουμαζεῖν 'astonish' the people (a device that already [Aristotle] had compared with Solon's), and the schol. ad ll. 2.183b considered it a way to ἐπιστρέφειν τῇ παραβόδηθιθέῳ τοὺς πολλούς, ἢ ἣν ταπεινός ὑπηρέτης δικῇ εἶναι τῶν βασιλικῶν δογμάτων. Furthermore, Odysseus also resorted to some kind of oratory strategy which more closely resembles the device ascribed to Solon by the testimonies: while standing to speak in the assembly, according to the description of Antenor (II. 3.219-23), Odysseus ἀστέλλετες έχοσκεν, ἀδδρεὶς φωτὶ ἐκκύκλως· φαίνως κε ζάκοτον τέ τιν' ἐμμεναι ἄφρονα τ' αὕτως but as soon as ὅπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στόθεν ἐη καὶ ἐπεα ... οὐκ αὖ ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσσής γ' ἐρίσασε βροτὸς ἄλλος (for a full analysis of the analogy between Solon's and Odysseus' deceiving strategies, cf. Vox, 1984, 17-49). Solon would have exploited the ἀποσωδόκητον-effect provoked by the gap between his mad look and the sharpness of his words, more or less like Odysseus did, according to Antenor's description of his oratory.

As for the information presented by the testimonies (by Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Justinus, Polyaeus, Aelius Aristides; implicitly by Demosthenes), that
Solon feigned madness in order to avoid the punishment of the law which forbade any kind of discussion about Salamis, it is certainly open to doubt. For instance, Raaflaub 1996, 1037 says that the idea of a law prohibiting discussions on a delicate political question was familiar in the late fifth and in the fourth centuries (cf. e.g. Thuc. 2.24.1, 7.15.1), but seems to be rather improbable in the first decades of the sixth; if so, the whole anecdote would have developed to explain the puzzling imagery of the first couplet and an original performance by Solon as 'inspired' κήρυξ (or as simulating to be so), elaborating also on the reference to his μανία which Solon himself makes in fr. 14 (so for instance Lefkowitz 1981, 40 and Bowie 1986, 19). I personally believe that the testimonies about Solon's feigned madness may simply have re-interpreted Solon's 'Odyssean' behaviour in an age when political oratory had got its own fixed and peculiar rules, and the histrionic style of rhetoric could not be understood any more, while the high consideration of Solon's cleverness led to the need of explaining the device of the feigned madness. So, for instance, Phanias probably used Solon's statements to be in the middle between poor and rich (e.g. fr. 30.15ff.) and elsewhere his defence for having done what he had promised (fr. 29b.4ff.) in order to state that Solon used apate in order to become archon, promising to both sides (rich and poor) to act in favour of them, lying for the benefit of his city (fr. 20 Wehrli, ap. Plut. Sol. 14.2).

1. Αὐτὸς κήρυξ ἠλθον: Eur. Supp. 589 αὐτὸς τε κήρυξ, Hdt. 1.79.2 αὐτὸς ἀγγελος Κροῖσῳ ἐξιδοθες; Soph. OC 1511 αὐτοὶ θεοι κήρυκες ἀγγέλουσι μοι. Αὐτοκήρυξ may also be a single word: Aesch. TrGF 420a=Phot. Lex. a 3226 Theod.-Phryn. PS 5.17 de Borries (ὁ μη δι᾽ ἐτέρων ἀλλὰ δι᾽ αὐτοῦ κηρυκεῖων).

Stressing αὐτὸς, Solon possibly opposed his personal self-performance to the practice of the "canto affidato", namely the sending of the song to be performed in absence of the composer, which was also exploited by archaic poets: see Vetta 1981, 485f.

άφι ἱμερητής Σαλαμῖνος: Sol. 2.8. The adjective was used in Homer of one's native land, e.g. Il. 2.751 ἀμφ' ἱμερτόν Τιταρησόν, Od. 11.275 ἐν Θήβῃ πολυπάτῳ: Archil. IEG 22 (Θάσος) οὐ ... καλὸς χῶρος οὐδ' ἐφίμερος οὐδ' ἐρατός, Tyrt. 1b.4=14.14 Σπάρτης ἱμερόσσα πόλις, Minn. 3.2 ἱμερητήν 'Ασίνην, Alcm. PMG 55 Κύρρου ἱμερτάν, Bacchyl. 1.123 Κυσάου ἱμερτάν [πόλις]. This erotically charged presentation of one's love for one's own fatherland is therefore quite widespread in archaic poetry: Solon uses it here in a very pointed way, because Salamis was not of course the homeland of the Athenians, but it was, nonetheless, something very worthy of loving and fighting for, see Robertson 1997, 149-50. The repetition in l. 8 gives more strength to the idea; if we consider it the last line, then Solon's poem would be cleverly constructed to form skilfully a propagandistic ring.
2. κόσμον ἑπέων: All the Homeric instances of the word κόσμος point to a notion of order, arrangement (ll. 10.472, 11.48, 12.85, 225, 24.622), often in a moral/social way (ll. 5.759, 8.12, 17.205, Od. 14.363). When it refers to a speech, κόσμος means a sequence that contains everything necessary and does not leave out anything, this being a proof of its truthfulness (see Maehler 1963, 19 and LfgrE s.v.): cf. Hom.Hymn Herm. 433, 479, and above all Od. 8.489-91, where the phrase λίν κατὰ κόσμον 'all quite according to the order of things' refers to the content of the bard's song and to its good internal structure as an accurate, articulated and well-ordered sequence of the themes concerning the fate and the venture of the Achaeans.


Solon's κόσμος most probably keeps the Homeric meaning and therefore does not denote anything more than an ordered sequence of ἑπεων metrically defined, that is, disposed according to an order that is different from that of prose. In Homer ἑπεων is exchangeable with μῦθος in the meaning of "statement" (in the schol.min. it is usually glossed with λόγος), and the sense of "poetry", which is possible in Od. 8.91 and 17.519, is no more than incidental (LfgrE s.v.); in Solon the word appears once more in no connection with poetry, ἐσ γὰρ γλώσσαν ὅρατε καὶ ἐσ ἐπη αἰμύλου ἄνδρος, ἐσ ἔργων δ' οὐδὲν γιγνόμενον βλέπετε (fr. 15.7).

However the phrase κόσμος ἑπέων cannot simply be interpreted as 'an adornment of words', using one of the Homeric meanings of κόσμος 'decoration' or 'ornament' (ll. 4.145), because such an emphasis on poetry as instrument of aesthetic pleasure would fit a later author (as for instance Thuc. 3.67.28 λόγοι ἑπεων κομμηθέντες), but hardly Solon. In my opinion, Solon's phrase refers to the fascinating linguistic structure of the song, ψήν, which through its alluring
Illocutionary power could potentially, and eventually did drive his audience against its previous orientation. Solon's ωδή, as Gentili 1984, 67-8 nicely puts it (similarly, Walsh 1984, 135 n. 8), constitutes a linguistic universe (κόσμος ἐπέων) carefully worked out, fitted together and governed by the rules of metre and rhythm.

From a syntactical point of view the phrase is an anticipated apposition to the word ωδήυ —despite Westman 1974, 190, who considers ωδήυ a superfluous gloss on κόσμος ἐπέων, which would have replaced an expression qualifying the herald's proclamation (possibly the adjective λιγέων). Westman's main point is that it would be strange from a purely syntactical point of view that ωδήυ is a postponed apposition to κόσμος ἐπέων. In fact, this use of an anticipated apposition by Solon can be seen as an extension of or variation on Homeric patterns like ἀναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων and it seems to be a linguistic feature that suits Solon, since his extant verses supply us with two other examples of the same sort: 1.21 θεών ἔδος αἰτίμων ἰκάνει ωφανόν, and 1.57 ἄλλοι Παιωνίων πολυφαρμάκου ἔργων ἔχοντες ἱητρώλ. In this way, Westman's objections to the MSS text can be dismissed; there is also no need to add τ' after ἐπέων, which Hartung had proposed and Bergk introduced in the text.

The distinction between song and simple prose speech, here for the first time —the Homeric poems know only poetry and poetic speech — had to be made because a poem was not expected on such an occasion, and Solon could have spoken in prose. Prose was the means he had himself used for his own Laws: as Solon himself states in fr. 30.18-20, θεσμοὺς δ' ὁμοίως τῷ κακῷ τῇ κάγαθῳ ... ἐγραφα, where the difference between γράφειν and ωδήν θέσθαι has to be noted: as recently remarked by Dover 1997, 183-4, classical Greek denoted the composition of poetry by ποιεῖν, while written composition in prose was denoted by γράφειν (usually in compound forms); therefore Solon's phrasing seems to obey this special terminology.

Solon is aware of the distinction and deliberately chooses poetry: in so doing he apparently shares the dominant archaic belief which sees the poet or the wise-man as the 'teacher of the truth' (see the 'classic' Detienne 1973), and wants to be able to avail himself of the prestige and independence of an ἄοιδος and likewise of the divine power and the emotional impact which his singing, ωδή, is endowed with, contrary to a simple speech which would not have it. Two passages from authors as different as Plutarch and Dio Chrysostomus show that the choice of poetry was a common and accepted practice in ancient politics: according to Plutarch (Lyc. 4.2ff.), Lycurgus, the Spartan lawgiver, was believed to have called the lyric poet and lawgiver Thales to Sparta in order to soften the hard customs of his fellow-citizens through the powers of Thales' poetic art. In a similar way, many centuries later, Dio Chrysostomus (Or. 32.20.9), while delivering a lengthy discourse to the people of Alexandria in their great theatre, will complain of not being able to deliver his thoughts in verse.
φῶθιν ἄντι ἄγορής θέμενος: a variation on the Homeric formula καὶ τότ’ ἐγὼν ἄγορὴν θέμενος μετὰ πᾶσιν ἐειπον (Od. 9.171=10.188–12.319) which Odysseus uses as a wise commander of his companions to brief them boldly on his plan to investigate the land of the Cyclops and the island of Circe or, later on, to suggest to them a strategic behaviour concerning Helios' cattle on his island. The similarity in context is obvious: a potentially dangerous situation, the lost or unguided crowd, the clever wisdom of the one who solves the crisis. However, Solon invests this formula with a new value, through the shift in the meaning of ἄγορά, which in Od. 9.171 etc. meant 'assembly'.

In Solon's context it is impossible to have the word ἄγορά in its most common meaning (ἄντι cannot mean 'in front' of the assembly; for the other implausible interpretation 'instead of being in the market place', by Bartol, see Introd.). This was clearly acknowledged by the ancients: see Phot. Lex. a 221 Theod. ἄγορά· τόπου ὄνομα. καὶ τὰ ἄγοραζόμενα. Θεσσαλοὶ δὲ καὶ τῶν λιμένα ἄγοραν καλοῦσι. Κρήτες τὴν ἐκκλησίαν. παρ' Ὀμήρῳ πάς ἄθροισμός. Σόλων δὲ ἄγοράν καλεὶ τῷ πεζῷ λόγῳ ἄγορεῖν. καὶ ὁ τόπος παρ' Ὀμήρῳ ἢ ἡ ἐκκλησία ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον. Solon's ἄγορά means 'public speech', 'discourse', as sometimes in Homer (II. 2.275, 788, 4.1, 400, 9.441, 12.211, 18.106, Od. 4.818), though 'place of assembly' is the original (from ἄγειρω) and prevailing meaning of the word already in Homer (e.g. II. 18.497, Od. 1.90, 16.361). On the meanings of ἄγορά, cf. [Apion] Gloss. Hom. 212.2 Ludwig ἄγορή ε τῶν τόπον τῆς ἐκκλησίας, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ τὴν βουλὴν, καὶ τὴν δύναμιν, καὶ τὴν δημηγορίαν, καὶ τὸς τόπους τῶν ὠνόμων τὰς ἄγοράς, Ap.Soph. 4.15 ἡ ἐκκλησία, τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ ὁ τόπος, καὶ τὸ συνάθροισμα ~ Etym. Magn. 12.44 which adds καὶ ὁ λόγος; see Martin 1951, 157, contra Ford 1981, 162 and 278, n. 43.

As for θέμενος, Solon's expression is the first in a long line of phrases presenting the production of poetic or prose speech as the work of a craftsman — an idea that survives all through Greek Literature in the vocabulary of ancient poetics: cf. e.g. Alc. PLF 204.6 ἄι θέσεις (et. Etym. Magn. 319.30ff. ἐθηκε ... ἡ ἐποίησεν. ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ θέσεις ἡ ποίησις, παρὰ Ἀλκαίῳ, Pind. Ol. 3.8 βοῦν αὐλῶν ἐπέσει τε θέσιν ... συμμείξαι (schol. ad loc.: τὴν ποίησιν ἐπέσει θέσιν ἐπεσεν), Ar. Ran. 1052 λόγον ... ξυνεθῆκα, Isoc. 10.11 οἱ δὲ κοινοὶ καὶ πιστοὶ καὶ τούτος ὁμοιοὶ ... χαλεπώτεραν ἔχοσιν τὴν σύνθεσιν, etc.)

This shift to a new concept where the art of 'singing' of what the Muses inspire becomes 'making'/composing' will continue with Theognis, showing the emergence of the poet as a skilled craftsman with a more analytical/rational view towards the process of poetic composition as technical making. Indeed, through this verb, Solon stresses his craftsmanship as an artist in the very same way that the later poets will use
the verb ποιεῖν — after all, it is in Sol. fr. 26.3 that we find the first use of this very verb ποιεῖν for the activity of the poet in his address to Mimnermus: μεταποίησαν, Λυγυριστάδη, ὥστε δ' ἄειδε, see notes ad loc.

3. εἶθν δὴ τότε έγώ: Hom. Od. 9.561 δὴ τότε έγών, 10.100 δὴ τότε έγών (for the use of the particle δὴ preceding temporal adverbs, see Denniston, Greek Part. 228 §2).

Φολέγανδρος ἢ Σικινίτης: Folegandros and Sikinos, being islands of the Sporades, are mentioned in a number of sources —and are sometimes accompanied with adjectives or comments that hint at their desolation and roughness. Cf. above all Aratus, SH 109.1-2 με σιδηρεία Φολέγανδρος, δειλὴ ἢ Γυδρῷ παρελεύσεαι αὐτίχ’ ὁμοίην (cp. Strab. 10.5.1(484) Φολέγανδρος, ἢν "Αρατος σιδηρεῖν ὀνομάζει διὰ τὴν τραχύτητα καὶ καταλαβεῖν ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι τῶν καὶ ναῦσιν τελείως, ἀρχαίν ὃς, ἐρείπωσιν ἄγλαίτην; Hsch. φ 726 S. Φολέγανδρος. νῆσος ἐρήμη.

The inhabitants of the Aegean islands were commonly spoken of with contempt as inferior to the ἤπειρώται, presumably because islands would be poorer in resources than mainland kingdoms and because of the lonely life the νησιώται would lead, outside any participation in a community: see Eur. Andr. 14 τῷ νησιώτῃ Νεοπτολέμῳ δορὸς γέρας, 210 τὴν δὲ Σκύρον οὐδαμοῦ τίθης, Heracl. 84 οὐ νησιώτην, ὃ ξένων, τρίβων βλέων, ὥστε μικρὸν σφάγη ἐξελεύσετο, ὅτι τὴν δυναμὸν παρασκευάσασθαι παρακεντήσωσι, καὶ 23.211 πώς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν Αἰγαίος μὲν τούτους, νῆσος οἰκουνόμος οὕτω μικρὰν καὶ οὐδενὲς ἔχοντας ἐφ’ ὑ μέγα χρῆ φρονεῖν αὐτοὺς; see lastly Aeschin. 2.72 where Athens' hegemony of Hellas is compared to and contrasted with the little island of Myonnesus, and the pirates there. For other small islands that became proverbially unimportant places see, on Belbina, a rocky island in the Saronic Gulf, Hdt. 8.125, Teles fr. 3 Hense (ap. Stob. 3.40.8) ὁνειδίζομεν μὲν ὧν Κυθήνωις ἢ τισιν ἀλλοις τοιούτοις οὐκοι συνήδειν ὑμῖν, ἔλαττον φρουεῖν συνεβούλευον ἀν’ ἐπειδὴ δι’ ἐστὶ Ἀθηναίοι, τὸ τὴν δυναμὸν παρασκευάσασθαι παρακεντήσωσι, καὶ 23.211 πώς γὰρ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν Αἰγαίος μὲν τούτους, νῆσος οἰκουνόμος οὕτω μικρὰν καὶ οὐδέν έχων τας ἐφ’ ὑ μέγα χρῆ φρουεῖν αὐτοὺς; see Phot. Lex. p. 151 Ν. Σέριφον (codex Σέρειφου) τὴν Λακεδαίμονα Σέρειφον (cp. Phot. Lex. p. 151 N. Σέριφον (codex Σέρειφου) τὴν Λακεδαίμονα, διὰ τὸ σκληρῶς ζῆν καὶ χρῆσαι αὐτοῖς ἐξέπεσεν), Pl. Resp. 330a, Plut. Them. 18, Juv. 10.170.
For the paradoxical wish expressed by Solon, cf. Odysseus' wishes in ll. 2.259-64 μηκέτ': ἐπεὶ τʹ ὁδυσσην ὃμωσιν ἐπείτη, μὴ Ἦ τῇ Τηλεμάχῳ πατὴρ κεκλημένος εἶν, εἰ μὴ ἑγὼ σε ... δόσω, κτλ. and in Od. 2.230-4=5.8-12 μή τις ἔτι πρόφρων ἄγανὸς καὶ ἢπιος ἐστὶν σκηπτοῦχος βασιλεύς, μηδὲ φρεσίν ἀείματα εἶδως, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ χαλέπις τ' εἶν καὶ αἴσια ρέξιν, ώς ὁ τις μέμηται ὁδύσσης θείῳ λαῷν σίαν ἄνασσε, πατὴρ δ' ὦς ἢπιος ἦν; besides Hes. Op. 270-2 νῦν δὴ ἑγὼ μήτ' αὐτὸς ἐν ἀνθρώπου δίκαιος εἰν μήτ' ἐμὸς ὑός, ἐπεὶ κακὸν ἄνδρα δίκαιον ἐμεναι, Soph. OT 830-3 μὴ δήτα μὴ δήτ', ... ἐδοξεῖν ταύτην ἡμέραν, ἀλλ' ἐκ βροτῶν βαίνην ἄφαντος πρόσθεν ἤ τοιαῦθ' ἱδεῖν κῆλδ' ἐμαυτῷ συμφορᾶς ἀφαγμένην.

Σικινήτης: For the form, cf. Σικινήται IG P.71.90, 287.16; SIG3 147b127.

4. ἀντί γ' Ἀθηναίοι: The participle γε gives force to Solon's epexegetis introduced with the participial clause, as noted by Denniston, Greek Part. 138 §12.ii.

πατρίδ' ἀμειβαμένος: The verb is used again in 23.6. Solon's idea was not going to be shared by Socrates, who before facing the death penalty is indignant with his fellow citizens just like Solon is, but in Pl. Ap. 37d ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ, declines the perspective which Solon seemingly "threatens" to adopt. In reality, Sol. 30.8 shows how much Athens meant to him.

5-6. Solon is trying to evoke the feeling of shame to his audience, and prospects that the fear of ridicule or contempt — a dominant feature in the 'shame-culture' of the Homeric time (cf. Dodds 1951, 17-8) — would not only be applicable to him individually, in case that he had not dared reminding the Athenians of the need to (re)conquer Salamis, but collectively to all Athenians for their behaviour, since they apparently refuse to deal with the matter. The closest Homeric parallel to Solon's gesture is Od. 21.322-6 οὐ τί σε τοῦτ' ἀξέσθαι ἄμομθε': ... ἀλλ' αἰσχυνόμενοι φαίνων ἄνδρων ἢδε γυναικῶν, μὴ ποτὲ τις εἰπησα κακότερος ἄλλος 'Ἀχαϊῶν' ἡ πολὺ χείρονες ἄνδρες ἀμύωμοις ἄνδρας ἀκούσαν μικρόν, ... διὰ δ' ἢκε σίδηρον'. At the same time, he marks some kind of σφαγίς for his exhortation to the war and for his poem — though this σφαγίς really is the reversal of the usual ones (see e.g. Thgn. IEG 22f. ὁδε δὲ πάς τις ἐρέι: 'Θεύγνως ... Μεγαρέως', Epich. fr. 86.12f. Austin, Erathosth. CA 35.17f., and cf. Vox 1984, 32f.), because Solon cannot 'present' himself and his native city, until the shame of Salamis in enemy hands is not averted from the Athenians.
5. αἴφα γάρ ἀν φάτις ... γένοιτο: besides Od. 21.323-6 quoted above, possible formal models are Hom. Od. 23.362 αἰτίκα γάρ φάτις εἶσιν, and Od. 6.29 ἐκ γάρ τοι τούτων φάτις ἀνθρώπους ἀναβαίνει.

μετ’ ἀνθρώποισι γένοιτο: Hom. Od. 18.225 αἰσχος λόβη τε μετ’ ἀνθρώποισι πέλοιτο in context similar to Solon’s tone —cf. also Hom. II. 3.287-460 (τιμήν) ἢ τε καὶ ἐσσομένοισι μετ’ ἀνθρώποισι πέληται and Od. 8.160 μετ’ ἀνθρώποισι πέλοιται.

6. Ἀττικὸς οὗτος ἀνήρ: See Hom. Od. 1.406 ὅπποθεν οὗτος ἀνήρ, II. 3.167 ὅ’ ἐστιν Ἀχαῖος ἀνήρ, 14.471 οὐχ οὗτος ἀνήρ Προδοτήρος αὐτὶ πεφάσθαι ἀξίος, 18.257 οὗτος ἀνήρ Ἀγαμέμνον μήπε δίω, Τυτ. 9.20 οὗτος ἀνήρ ἀγαθός, but above all the formlary phrase before the identification of the Greek heroes by Helen to Priam in II. 3.178 οὗτος γ’ Ἀτρεΐδης, εὑρὶ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνον, 3.200 οὗτος δ’ αὐ Λαερτιάδης πολύμητις Ὀδυσσέως, 3.229 οὗτος δ’ Ἀλε ἐστὶ πελώριος, ἐρκος Ἀχαίων. Cf. also Simon. IEG 19.1 Χίος ... ἀνήρ, Bacchyl. 5.191 Βαιωτώς ἀνήρ, Timoc. PMG 732 Σικελός ... ἀνήρ.

τῶν Σαλαμιναφετῶν: The word, coined by Solon and found only here, is something like the correspondent of the demotic: he is Attic, of the tribe of the people who abandoned Salamis. Through this ‘demotic’ Solon avoids the presence of the names 'Athens' or 'Athenian', as if the name of the city was somehow destined to a damnatio nominis because of her coward inhabitants — both by Solon himself and by the future generations.

From this rebuke by Solon it is not clear if the Athenians had held and then lost Salamis or they have just given up the attempt to (re)gain it. Plutarch, in Sol. 8.1 implies with the adverb αὕτως the second version whereas in 12.5 the first one.

7. ἵομεν ... μαχησόμενοι περὶ νῆσον: Hom. II. 2.801 ἔρχονται πεδίῳ μαχησόμενοι προτὶ ἀστυ, II. 12.216 μὴ ἵομεν ... μαχησόμενοι περὶ νῆσων. For ἵομεν 'short-vowel' subjunctive, see Schwyzer, 1, 674.

This elegy has survived through some MSS of Dem. 19 (De Falsa Legatione), which was delivered in 343-2 B.C. to prosecute Aeschines for his alleged misconduct and bribery in the second embassy to Philip. The text we have is preserved by several inferior manuscripts, which give the 39 verses without any indication of a lacuna (but at least one hexameter is missing after l. 10 and l. 11, and one pentameter after l. 25). However S and L, two of the best manuscripts of Demosthenes, do not have the poem while A and T only include ll. 1f. and 5f., and only in the scholia. This varying way of transmission, and the fact that poetical quotations by the orators are usually short, suggested to Wilamowitz 1893, 2.306 and Jaeger 1926=1966, 78-9 that the preservation of the poem as a whole may be due to some ancient grammarian who added a fuller quotation to Demosthenes' mention of some initial lines, and maintained that ll. 17-29 (where the destruction of the whole city is described) could not suit Demosthenes' speech which states the permanent protection of Athens and the Athenians by the gods. These doubts on the transmission of the poem do not hold good, because, as Jaeger himself admitted, there are at least two other quotations from poetry in the orators that are long as well (55 lines from Euripides' Erechtheus and 32 lines from Tyrtaeus fr. 6 in Lycurgus' Against Leocrates); besides the analysis by Rowe 1972 showed that several other points of Solon's poem, not only the starting lines on the divine protection of Athens, were plainly acceptable and even useful for Demosthenes' concern.

Poetry was used in the orators' speeches of fourth century Athens, and six of them, held in political trials, include more or less extensive quotations from poetry: each of the three speeches of Aeschines, Lycurgus, Against Leocrates, Demosthenes, De corona and De Falsa Legatione. This kind of quotations reflects not only the general taste of the period and the preferences of the audience acquired both in school and in course of general attendance at performances but also the literary education of the orators themselves. They are, at the same time, essential to the orators' methods since they are used not only for refutation of the opponent's arguments (cp. Dem. 19.243-7, where the quotations from Hesiod and Euripides are aimed at Aeschines, or Aeschin. 2.158, where the quotation from Hesiod is his counter-thrust to Demosthenes' quotations from Solon), but could also fill the lack of any concrete evidence by witness to prove the opponent's guilt, or even were the only reference points in cases ambiguously in between law and ethics: as is stated by Lycurg. Leoc. 102, οἱ μὲν γὰρ νόμοι δὲ ἡ τὴν συντομίαν οὐ διδάσκοντο, ἀλλ' ἐπιτάττοσιν ἃ δέι ποιεῖν, οἵ δὲ ποιηταὶ μεμούνειν τῶν ἀνθρώπων βιῶν, τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἑργῶν ἐκλεξάμενοι, μετὰ λόγου καὶ ἀποδεῖξις τῶν ἀνθρώπων σωματεῖθαι. Quotations from poetry in oratory were also appreciated by Aristotle (Rh. 1375-1376) who considered them to be a repertory of

Demosthenes makes reference to Solon as a paradigm of modesty, to be contrasted with the briberies of Aeschines. After showing the difference between Aeschines' behaviour and the way in which Solon had been represented in a statue at Salamis — "You ought not to speak with your hands within the folds of your robe (as Solon had been represented), no, but to go on an embassy with your hands within. But you there (in Macedonia), holding forth and holding under your hands", namely receiving bribes, etc.: 19.255 — Demosthenes asks Aeschines how he could think of escaping δίκην δώσεων τηλικούτων καὶ τοσούτων ἀδικημάτων, even if he πιλίδιον λαβὼν περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν περινοστῆς καὶ ἐμὸι λαοδικῆς. This pathetic question is immediately followed by the quotation of Solon's lines, which are not expressly presented as a quotation from Solon (the audience could guess the authorship only through the reference to Solon's famous πιλίδιον in the performance of Salamis), but are introduced by the short λέγε ἄυ which usually was the order to the γραμφέως to read the laws. In such a way, since many of the laws which the Attic orators quote in their speeches were ascribed to Solon, these verses of Solon, too, might sound to Demosthenes' audience as elevated to the authoritative level of laws, and had even more the effect of leaving the impression of having been written precisely to condemn Aeschines.

The structure of the poem is less problematic than that of fr. 1, and there is a general consensus about the main sections, with few differences in details (see Maharam 1993, 320-57). The first four lines are a unity, delimited between the inceptive δέ and the δέ of l. 5, and show confidence in the divine help to Athens, just in order to emphasise the guilt of the mischievous citizens who are going to ruin a city that would be otherwise destined to a safe future. The rest of the poem is a depiction of the present dysnomia of Athens (ll. 5-29); after a first person statement by Solon on his duty to warn his fellow citizens (30-1), follows the prevision of the effects of a possible eunomia (ll. 32-9). In the central part of the poem (devoted to the opposite situation of dysnomia), ll. 5-6 state the guilt of all the citizens, ll. 7-14 the guilt of the leaders. After the statement of the guilt, the presentation of the consequences follows; the mention of the violations of Dike (l. 14) introduces the statement of Solon's certainty about her τίας. The description of the actual situation (ll. 17-29) both in its length and in its structural centrality strongly parallels Hesiod's admonition about the consequences of the violation of Dike, that is the heart of the moral part of Works and Days (248-85). In particular, we note the precise correspondence between ἐρχεται l. 17, which introduces the ruin for the polis, and ἐρχεται l. 26 which introduces the final destruction of the private fortunes. Solon's first person warning in ll. 30-1 sets the stage for the abstract definition of the κακὰ just described, namely the personified Dysnomia — as if by naming them Solon could gain.
some kind of control, at least conceptual, over the situation. However, as if it was evoked in a polar way by the mention of Dysnomia, Eunomia (l. 32) and her effects are the theme of the last part of the poem — in such a way Solon effectively leaves the impression that his own personal 'voice' is more strongly connected with the optimistic prevision of the possibility of Eunomia, than with the observation of the Dysnomia; the message implied is that Solon as a politician would provide Athens with this *eunomia*, whereas the present ruling class was driving Athens to the deepest ruin. This section (ll. 32-9) has a hymnodic tone, and, by means of some kind of ring composition, reintroduces the hopes about the future which had surfaced in the first four lines about the divine protection, but had been submerged by the statement of the present misery and the future dangers of the city. Also to be noted is the series of punctual repetitions that resume concepts from the first lines (or the first part) of the poem, ἀδίκος (33)/ἄδικος νός (7); κόροιν, ὑβρις (34)/ὕβρις (8) and κόρον (9); δίκαια σκολαί (36)/Δίκης θέμεθα (14); ὑπερήφανα ἐργα (36) and τοῖς ἀδίκοις (33)/ἄδικος ἐργασί (11); ἐργα διχοστασίς (37)/στάσιν (19); ἀργαλέης ἐρίδος (38)/πόλεμον (19); κατ’ ἀνθρώπος (39)/κατά Δίος αἴσαν (1); ἀρτια καὶ πινυτά (39)/ἀφαδήμεν (5). This kind of ring composition is most probably intended to show that "all the previously uttered apprehensions are unfounded in a well-ordered state" (so Halberstadt 1954-55, 202).

The relations of this poem with the elegy to the Muses are self-evident. Fr. 1 expresses Solon's opinions and warnings in the field of morals, fr. 3 in the field of politics. In both cases excessive greed for wealth appears to be the main cause that stirs up human mischief (1.7-13, 71-6; 3.6, 11-4). Both poems start with a pious request for help from some gods (a direct apostrophe in fr. 1, an indirect one in fr. 3), and in both Solon ascribes to a divine principle the responsibility of ensuring the fulfilment of the moral or political order that he favours, and of punishing human contravention of the established norm, called in both poems acts of *hybris* (cf. 1.11; 3.7); the divine validation that Solon is maintaining for his opinions involves in both poems a marked emphasis on the forms of the divine punishments: in fr. 1 it is Zeus' *tísiς* (cf. l. 25), in fr. 3 it is Dike's *tísiς* (cf. ll. 15-6). As a consequence, deviation from the norm is much more stressed than the norm itself. No wonder: the statesman Solon could materialise the positive map of his (=Zeus' or Dike's) norms in his laws, and the poetic messages had simply to smooth the way for them, inducing the Athenians to the fear of their absence.

1-2. Ἡμετέρα δὲ πόλις: Cf. Hom. *Od.* 6.191 ἡμετέρην τε πόλιν, Thgn. *IEG* 782 ἡμετέρην τίρικε ... πόλιν. We cannot rule out that Solon sets his own view against another opinion or that a statement existed in the previous (lost) lines of the kind "other cities have perished because their gods were unwilling to protect them, but our city ..." (so lastly Adkins 1985, 111; Manuwald 1989, 3 and n. 19) or "Athena's wrath against..."
Paris brought Troy to destruction, when Zeus eventually stopped to help it, but in case of our city ..." (so Nestle 1942, 135). However, it is more economical to suppose — as was lastly remarked by Siegmann 1975, 271 — that this line is the beginning of Solon's poem, with inceptiveδέ. This start would give emphasis to Solon's words and mark the song as something deserving special attention; besides, introducing at the very start the city as the dearest thing to him and to his fellow-citizens would fit well a poem where the community of interests between author and audience is often stressed.

Some further examples of inceptiveδέ are: Hes. Op. 286, Mimm. 7.1, Heraclit. VS 22B1 τοῦ δὲ λόγου τοῦτοι έδοντος, Ion Chius VS 36B1 ἀρχη δέ μοι τοῦ λόγου (where the emendation by Lobeck in κντδέ would introduce an attractive Hecatean and Herodotean incipit), Philol. VS 44B1 ἀ φύσις δ' ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἀμφότητι, the beginning of the Athenian Constitution by the 'Old Oligarch' etc. (for more instances of the inceptiveδέ, or of the quasi-continuative one, cf. Denniston, Greek Part. 172-3; the most natural explanation seems to be that inceptiveδέ is a weak form of ἀρχη, cf. de Falco 1949, Leumann 1949, Verdenius 1955, 17, Chantraine, Dict. étym. 1.255.

κατὰ ... Δίὸς αίσαν: combines the epic abstract formulas κατ' αίσαν and Δίὸς αίση, ἐκ Δίὸς αῖσης, ὑπὲρ Δίὸς αἴσαν. Already in Homer, Zeus is said to be a dispenser of αίσα e.g. at Il. 9.608 Δίος αἵση, 17.321 ὑπὲρ Δίος αἴσαν, Od. 9.52-3 κακὴ Δίος αίσα ... ἄλγεα πολλὰ πάθωμεν (see below, l. 8 ἄλγεα πολλὰ παθεῖν). Here, as well as in the two Iliad-passages, the term means especially what is allotted to individuals or people inside the established order within which either Zeus or an abstract δαιμόων (Od. 11.61, Hom.Hymn Dem. 300)θεός (Eur. Andr. 1203) expect human beings to act, and actively intervene to see it fulfilled (Bianchi 1953, 14-7, Yamagata 1994, 116-9). Αἰσα appears nowhere connected with a god different from Zeus or δαιμόωνθεός (cf. note ad Sol. 1.69); hence, most probably, Solon's distinction between the αἴσα of Zeus and the φίλειν of the other gods. A distinction between θεόν βουλαί and Δίος θεμότερες was already in Od. 16.402-3; see also Hom. Od. 5.7=8.306 Ζεῦ πάτερ ἥ' ἄλλοι μάκαρες θεοὶ αἴνε ἐόντες.

οὖποτ' ὀλείται: Epic ending of the formulaic line which states the immortality of the glory ... κλέος οὗ ποτ' ὀλείται/ (Hom. Il. 2.325, 7.91, Od. 24.196, Hom.Hymn Ap. 156, Hes. fr. 70.7). In spite of the negative situation, Solon's prevision is a strong statement of his trust in divine protection, and shows that the poet ranges with the 'party' of the gods favourable to Athens against the party of the mischievous citizens who want its destruction. This stance of surety counterbalances the emphasis on the concrete fear of the danger, which Solon presupposes for his audience, as if he were pretending to present his poem as the answer to the preoccupation of the audience on the future of Athens.
Δίὸς ... καὶ μακάρων θεών φρένας ἀθανάτων: Hom. II. 3.298 Ζεῦ ... καὶ ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ ἄλλοι—II. 3.308, Od. 5.7 Ζεῦ πάτερ ἥδ' ἄλλοι μάκαρες θεοὶ αἰὲν ἐόντες—8.306, Thgn. IEG 757-9 Ζεὺς ... ἄλλοι τ' ἀθάνατοι μάκαρες θεοὶ (see also II. 4.127-8 θεοὶ μάκαρες ... ἀθάνατοι, Thgn. IEG 834 ἀθανάτων ... θεῶν μακάρων). For θεῶν φρένας ἀθανάτων, cf. Hom. II. 15.194 Δίὸς ... φρεσίν, Thgn. IEG 330 σὺν ... θεῶν δίκη ἀθανάτων (second half of a pentameter, as here).

3. Precedents for the whole line are Hom. II. 4.390 τοῖς οί εὐπροθεσμοῖς ἦν Ἀθηνή, and Od. 4.826-8 τοῖς γὰρ οἱ ποιμνίς ἄμα ἐρχεται, ... Παλλᾶς Ἀθηναίη (see later, at least, Callim. Del. 27). Athena is here the instance of the θεοὶ favourable to Athens, not only because of her strong connection to Zeus, I. 1 (she is remembered as the daughter of Zeus in Homer, and ὀβριμπότρη also reminds us of this parentage), but also because she appears to be in particular the eponymous champion of Athens who assures the city's prosperity under the Olympian regime, together with Zeus. In the absence of earlier Athenian literature we cannot be certain that this idea of Athena which tactfully reconciles the panhellenic and the local goddess with political overtones and features was Solon's own invention, but this seems quite possible (Herington 1963, 63). This new Athenian image of the goddess ('Ἀθηνά Παλλᾶ) is always present in Athenian politics throughout the period from Solon to Pericles, and, as in Solon, is often joined to Zeus: see e.g. Scol. PMG 884 Παλλᾶς Τριτογένει' ἄνασσ' 'Ἀθηνά, ὅρθον τήνες πόλιν τε καὶ πολίτας ἀτερ ἄλγεων [τε] καὶ στάσεων καὶ ἄθανατων ἀώρων, σὺ τε καὶ πατήρ, Aesch. Eum. 997-1002 χαίρετ', ἀστικὸς λεώς, ἱκτερ ἠµενι Δίος, παρθένου φίλας φίλοι σωφρονύντες ἐν χρόνως. Παλλάδος δ' ὑπὸ πτεροῦς οὕτας ἄχεται πατήρ, 1044-6 σπουδαὶ δ' ἤτε τὸ πᾶν ἐνδαιδέσ αὐξωνὶ Παλλάδος ἄστοις. Ζεὺς παντόττασας οὖτω Μοῖρα τε συγκατέβα. The close personal connection of Athena with Athens is also clearly shown by the frequent tragic idioms Athens=Παλλάδος πόλις (or πόλισμα, or ἄστοι), cf. Aesch. Pers. 347, Eum. 79, 772, 1045, Eur. Med. 771, Hec. 466, HF 1323, Ion 8-9, and the attributes that Solon ascribes to Athena (victorious prowess in war, intelligence, love of the arts) are more or less the same that were ascribed to the Athenian people by Pericles in the Funeral Speech, according to the report of Thuc. 2.35ff.: cf. Herington 1955, 56.

Indeed, Athena's epithets for the goddess fit Athens' functions: μεγάθυμος is used in the Homeric epic of warriors (Diomedes: II. 6.145, Achilles: II. 20.498 etc.) and soldiers (Ἀχαιῶι II. 1.123, Od. 24.57), and for Athena herself, a warrior goddess, twice in the Odyssey (8.520, 13.121); cp. also Bacchyl. 13.195 μεγάθυμος Ἀθάνα. Επίσκοπος in Homer was said of the scout Dolon (II. 10.38 and 342), of traders 'attentive' to their merchandise (Od. 8.163) or of the shepherd as 'guardians' of the μῆλα

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(Hes. fr. 217.3), or of the gods as overseers and watchers over human compacts (II. 22.255), but the passage closest to the Solonian idea of protection comes from Andromache's prophecy in II. 24.728-30 for Troy: πόλις ἤδε κατ' ἀκρις πέρεσται· ἦ γὰρ ὅλωλας ἐπισκόπος, ὃς τέ μιν αὐτὴν ὑπόκευε. Solon may have referred to this passage specifically because he wanted to imply that differently from Hector's Troy, his city, Athens, has an immortal ἐπίσκοπος, but in spite of this its internal enemies are doing their best to destroy it (cf. already Anhalt 1993, 78). Of tutelary gods the epithet only occurs in passages later than the Solonian one: e.g. Pl. Leg. 872e δίκη, Pind. Ol. 14.4 Χάριτες. The epithet ὀβρυμοπάτη connects Athena intimately with Zeus and his might. It is already used of Athena in the epic (Hom. II. 5.747, 8.391, Od. 1.101, 3.135, 24.540, and Hes. Theog. 587); see later at least Bacchyl. 16.20. Also Παλλάς 'Ἀθηναίη is frequently found in Hom. (II. 10.275, 11.438, 15.614, Od. 4.828, 16.298, Hom. Hymn 28.1, 16) but the combination of all the four adjectives accompanying the goddess's name is Solonian.

4. χείρας ὑπερθεν ἔχει: ἕπερθεν χείρα: a form of ἔχειν is a phrase said several times for divine protection: Hom. II. 4.249 αἳ κ' ὑμῖν ὑπέραξα χείρα Κρονίων, II. 5.433 οἰ αὐτός ὑπείρεχε χείρας 'Απόλλων, II. 9.419-20=9.686-7 Ζεὺς χείρα ἐγὼ ὑπερέσχε — the last two instances are the comment of Achilles on Zeus' permanent protection of Troy, which might seem to prevent the Greeks from conquering Troy for ever, but eventually it did not: inferring from these two passages that Solon implies "Athens' protection cannot be counted upon to prevent the destruction of Athens" (Anhalt 1993, 78) is in my opinion a bit too far fetched —, Thgn. IEG 757 Ζεὺς μὲν τήδε πόλις ὑπειρέχοι ... αἰεὶ δεξιτερῆν χείρ(a), Eur. IA 915-6 ἦν δὲ τολμήσῃ σύ μου χείρ' ὑπερτείναι, σεσώμεθ(a), Theodorid. Anth.Pal. 6.155.6 χείρας ὑπερθεν ἔχειν, Epigr.Gr. 831.10 (2 B.C.) χείρα θ' ὑπερθεν ἔχεις, Lucian, Tim. 10 ὑπερέσχε γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὴν χείρα. Cf. also the epithets ἐπιρροθός 'bringing help' said of Athena in connection with Diomedes (II. 4.390, 5.808-828, 23.770) and ἐρυσίπτολος 'protecting the city' (II. 6.305, Hom. Hymn 11.1).

5-8. Here, as well as in fr. 15.1-3 εἰ δὲ πεπώθατε λυγρὰ ..., μὴ θεοίσιν τούτων μοῖραν ἑπαμφέρετε: αὐτοὶ ... ἑξῆσατε κτλ. (consider also the parallelism between 1.
4 διὰ ταύτα κακὴν ἔσχετε δουλοσύνην, and II. 23-5 of the present fragment), Solon may have in mind Zeus' programmatic statement in Hom. Od. 1.33-4 ἐκ ἢμεῶν γὰρ ἀνωμέναι, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ αφῆσιν ἀτασθαλίησιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἀλγε' ἐχουσιν: mentioning Aegisthus' case, the supreme god affirms that mortals bring their downfall upon themselves by their foolish and wicked deeds, and gods are wrongly blamed as responsible (a similar opposition of human and divine perspectives will be also expressed in Aesch. PV 1071-9 ἀλλ' ὀν ἐμμενήθη ἀγὼ προλέγω, μηδὲ πρὸς ἄτης ἥραθείται μὲμβησθε τύχην, μηδὲ ποτ' εἶπηθ' ὡς Ζεὺς ὑμᾶς εἰς ἀπρόσπτον πήμ', εἰσέβαλεν μὴ δητ', αὐτά δ' ὑμᾶς αὐτάς· εἰδοίᾳ γὰρ κοῦκ ἐξαίφνησ' οὐδὲ λαθραίως εἰς ἀπέραντον δίκτυον ἄτης ἐμπλεξήσεσθ' ὑπ' ἀνοίας). Other similar passages in the epic concern the end of the suitors and that of Odysseus' companions who too had perished due to their own ἀτασθαλία (Od. 1.7, 10.27, 22.317 =416, 23.67, 24.458), or the destiny of the men of the Hesiodic silver race, who were not able to survive outside the arms of their hyperprotective parents, and παυρίδων ζώσκον ἐπὶ χρόνον, ἀλγε' ἔχοντες ἀφραδίης· ὑβριν γὰρ ἀτάσθαλον οὐκ ἐδούαντο ἄλληλων ἀτέχειν, κτλ. (Op. 133-5). However, in the same first book of the Odyssey (II. 48ff.), Odysseus' distress for missing the return to Ithaca is expressly ascribed by Zeus himself to Poseidon's anger, and it was a most common practice in the epic and in classical poetry as well to attribute to a god the full responsibility for any misfortune for which there was no obvious cause (see II. 3.164-5, 19.86-8, Od. 1.347-9, 11.558-60, 12.371-2 with the parody of Eur. Cyc. 285, and Eur. Supp. 734-6), or at least some share in it (for instance, Agamemnon apologises for his ἄτη in II. 19.86-7 also blaming Zeus, Moira and Erinys, or he regarded the gods as μεταίτιον with himself in the capture of Troy in Aesch. Ag. 811, and at Cho. 910 Μοῖρα is considered partly responsible, παρατία, for Clytemnestra's crime), or to be in doubt about human or divine responsibility for human misfortunes (cf. e.g. Bacchyl. 11.34-6). Even for the very example of Aegisthus quoted above, Nestor's 'human' point of view is that Clytaemnestra yields to Aegisthus' seduction by μοῖρα θεῶν (Od. 3.269). See further, at least Dodds 1951, Fraenkel on Aesch. Ag. 811, Yamagata 1994.

The result on the audience of this allusion to the 'divine' perspective' of Odyssey 1.33-4 would be that Solon takes over the function of the prophetic warners which in Odyssey 1, or later in Aeschylus' Prometheus, is carried out either by Zeus or by Hermes, the messenger of the gods (as lastly remarked by Jaeger 1926=1966, 86-7). Solon adopts an analogous voice of a warners also in fr. 14, but there he will have a more personal and defensive stance. See for a similar idea Thgn. IEG 833-6 οὐδὲ τις ἢμιν αἴτιος ἀθανάτων Κύρης θεῶν μακάρων, ἀλλ' ἀνδρῶν τε βη καὶ κέρβεα δειλὰ καὶ ὑβρις πολλῶν ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἐς κακότητι ἐβαλεν, and 855-6 πολλάκις ἢ πόλεις ἢ δι' ἤγεμόνων κακότητα ὡσπερ κεκλιμένη νὰς παρὰ γῆν ἐδραμεν, Bacchyl. 15.51-2
It is better to interpret αὐτοὶ ... ἀντίκειται ἀλλὰ ὡς μέσῳ κεῖται κείμεν ... ἀνθρώπωσις Δίκαιον κτλ.

It is better to interpret αὐτοὶ ... ἀντίκειται 'the whole of the citizens', δῆμος, and χρήματι πειθόμενοι as 'pursuing (someone else's) wealth' (as in Thgn. IEG 194 χρήματι πειθόμενος, told of a noble who marries a rich but base-born woman), than to suppose that ἀντίκειται means a part of the citizens, the rich, who are 'trusting in (their own) wealth', though the latter meaning can be underlying as well, see Thgn. IEG 191-2, where ἀντίκειται-ἀγαθοί. As stressed by Adkins 1985, 226, "the effect of the rhetoric depends not on ἀντίκειται clearly denoting the prominent citizens but on the possibility of doing so". In this interpretation Solon would imply that a new immorality was spreading in between the δῆμος, which originated from the greed of the rich, cf. Stahl 1992, 388. Indeed the 'citizens' are here principally opposed to the gods of II. 1f.; however, as the gods and the leading upper-ruling class of the city are mentioned, Solon may also underline the personal responsibility of the whole body of the citizens in relation with both the gods and the leading class. In this case, here as well as in frs. 12.3-4 ἐς ... δῆμος ἀνδρεῖ̃η δουλοσύνην ἐπεσεν, and 15.1 already quoted, Solon would anticipate the 5th century theories of the two opposite social classes, stating the political failure of each of the two (rich-poor), and he would imply what he fully maintains in fr. 8 (see ad ll. 3-4), namely that not only rich or powerful people may be affected with ἱβρίς, but also the demos as soon as it reaches conditions of particular ὀλίσκου.

Solon's view is shared by Theognis, who, at any rate, emphasises much more than Solon the specific responsibility of the leaders of the demos, cf. IEG 41-5 ἀντίκειται μὲν γάρ ἐθ' οἴδε σαόφρονες, ἤγεμόνες δὲ τετράθαται πολλὴν εἰς κακότητα πεσεύν. οὐδὲμίαν τινὶ Ἐκρύν' ἀγαθοὶ πόλιν ὠλεσαν ἀνδρεῖς· ἀλλ' ὅταν ὦβριζειν τοὺς κακοσπερί τῆς δην ὑφίσταται. As stressed by Adkins 1985, 226, "the effect of the rhetoric depends not on ἀντίκειται clearly denoting the prominent citizens but on the possibility of doing so". In this interpretation Solon would imply that a new immorality was spreading in between the δῆμος, which originated from the greed of the rich, cf. Stahl 1992, 388. Indeed the 'citizens' are here principally opposed to the gods of II. 1f.; however, as the gods and the leading upper-ruling class of the city are mentioned, Solon may also underline the personal responsibility of the whole body of the citizens in relation with both the gods and the leading class. In this case, here as well as in frs. 12.3-4 ἐς ... δῆμος ἀνδρεῖ̃η δουλοσύνην ἐπεσεν, and 15.1 already quoted, Solon would anticipate the 5th century theories of the two opposite social classes, stating the political failure of each of the two (rich-poor), and he would imply what he fully maintains in fr. 8 (see ad ll. 3-4), namely that not only rich or powerful people may be affected with ἱβρίς, but also the demos as soon as it reaches conditions of particular ὀλίσκου.

5. Besides the passages quoted above, cf. also Hom. II. 5.648-9 ἔτει κεῖνος ἀπώλεσεν Ἡλεων ... ἀνέρος ἀφραδήθην ἀγανοῦ Λαομέδουντος, said of a different destruction of a city, that of Troy, by Heracles for Laomedon's cheating. μεγάλην πόλιν: Pind. Pyth. 7.1 ᾧ μεγαλοπόλεις Ἀθῆναι, Nem. 2.7 ταῖς μεγάλαις Ἀθαναίς (cf. also Pyth. 2.1 with reference to Syracuse).

6. φθείρειν βούλονται: instead of a less emphatic μέλλουσιν or similar, Solon underscores the intention with which, pursuing their own profit, the citizens intent on destroying the community. For the sentiment, cf. Pl. Menex. 243d δόξαν γάρ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἡ πόλις ἔσχεν μὴ ποτ' ἀν καταπολεμηθήναι μηδ' ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων — καὶ ἀληθῆ ἔδοξεν — τῇ δὲ ἡμετέρᾳ αὐτῶν διαφορὰ ἐκρατήθημεν, οὐχ ὑπὸ τῶν.
Solon expressly links wealth and ἀδίκος ἔργα below in 1.11 πλουτοῦσιν δὲ ἀδίκοις ἔργα μακρὰ πειθόμενοι; cp. his view on πλοῦτος which οὐ κατὰ κόσμον ἔρχεται, ἀλλ' ἀδίκοις ἔργα μακρὰ πειθόμενοι in fr. 1.11ff.

Euripides, Supp. 236-7 includes lust for gain in the list of the selfish motives in the city that put in danger the public interest and the common good ἄλλος δὲ κέρδος οὐνεκ’, οὐκ ἀποσκοπῶν τὸ πλῆθος εἰ τι βλάπτεται πάσχον τὸδε. Regarding the self-interested citizen, cp. also Eur. Heracl. 3-5 ὁ δ’ ἐὰς τὸ κέρδος λημ’ ἔχων ἀνειμένον πόλει τ’ ἀχρηστοῖς καὶ συναλλάσσειν βαρῶς, αὐτῷ δ’ ἄριστος, and see the remarks by Nestle 1901, 191ff., 336.

6-9. ἀδίκος νόος ... ὑβρις ἕκ μεγάλης ... κόρον: a similar sequential relation between injustice > ὑβρίς and satiety can be found in the hexameter-oracle quoted by Hdt. 8.77.1 διά Δίκη σβέσσει κρατερῶν Κόρον, ᾗ ὑβρις υίόν, and in Pind. Ol. 13.10 ὃ ἤμνυ, Κόρον ματέρα θαρσύμυθον. On the late (most probably Solonian) chain ὁλᾶς-κόρος-ὑβρὶς-ἀτή, well known to us from Herodotus (e.g. 3.80.3 ἐγγίνεται μὲν γὰρ οἱ ὑβρὶς ύπὸ τῶν παρεόντων ἀγαθῶν, φθόνοις δὲ ἀρρήθεν ἐμφύεται ἀνθρώπῳ. δύο δ’ ἔχων ταύτα ἔχει πάσαν κακότητα· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑβρὶ κεκορημένος ἔρει πολλὰ καὶ ἀτάσθαλα, τὰ δὲ φθόνῳ) and the Attic tragedy, see ad 1.13.

7-10. Solon’s thought and his emphasis on the injustice by the members of the upper class are paralleled by the warnings to Perses which follow the αἴνος of the nightingale (Op. 202-24; cp. above all ll. 213 σοῦ δ’ ἄκουε Δίκης, μηδ’ ὑβριν ὄμολας and 217-8 δικὴ δ’ ὑπὲρ ὑβρισί ισχεῖ ἐς τέλος ἐξελθοῦσα) and are mainly concerned with the violations of justice by the ἐσθλοῖ, including the βασιλεῖς of l. 202 and judges of l. 221. At any rate, the scope of Solon’s perspective is much larger, because he hints at several forms of civic injustice in the following lines, while Hesiod appears to be mainly concerned with the injustice in the trials.

7. δῆμον ... ἡγεμόνων: all the members of the upper-ruling class, more probably than the "leaders of the mass" (the same term, but in a different, less negative perspective, can be found in fr. 8.1), cf. Nagy 1985, 43, and see below ad l. 19. Δῆμος means here "the free inhabitants of a community, excluding the immediate leadership", juxtaposed to its rulers much more neatly than it is found in the Homeric poems, in Hes. Op. 261-4 and in Tyrt. ο14, cf. Forti Messina 1956, 233ff., and Donlan 1970.

8. ἀλγεῖα πολλὰ παθεῖν: Hom. Od. 9.53 quoted ad ll.1-2, Od. 1.4 πολλὰ ... πάθεν ἀλγεῖα, Od. 13.90 πολλὰ πάθ᾽ ἀλγεῖα, 310 πάσχειν ἀλγεῖα πολλὰ, Od. 16.189 πάσχεις ἀλγεῖα πολλὰ; see also Tyrt. 9.38 πολλὰ δὲ τερπνὰ παθών ἐρχεται εἰς Ἕλιον (the phrase ἀλγεῖα πάσχειν/παθεῖν is very common in epic: Homer 19x).

9-10. The ordered drinking-party had already been in Homer a metaphor/instance of a stable community of a polis ruled by εὔνοµία and εὐφροσύνη, on the assumption that knowing how to control the drinking-parties and their pleasures is of the same nature as the art of controlling/governing a city: see Od. 9.6-8 εὐφροσύνη μὲν ἐχὴ κατὰ δῆµον ἀπαντα, δαιτυµῶνες δ᾽ ἀνὰ δύσµατ᾽ ἀκοµαζώνται δοµῶν ἤµενοι ἐξεῖς, παρὰ δὲ πλῆθων τράπεζαι (dealing with the utopic Phaeacian society); Xenoph. 1, where the κρατήρ ... µεστὸς εὐφροσύνης (1. 4) is, inter alia, the visible sign of a party (and of a society) which hates gigantomachies and avoids the στάσεις σφεδαναί. For more passages connecting drunkenness and ἕβρις, well-ruled drinking and peace, cf. Slater 1981; on the strong connection between ἕβρις and excess in eating and luxury, which can be found in authors of fifth century Athens, cf. MacDowell 1976. On the symposium as the expression of the aristocratic archaic life and the illustration of the relations favouring civic collectivity which are established while eating and drinking together, see Murray 1983b, Levine 1985, Nagy 1988 (Engl. reworking in Nagy 1990, 269-75), Schmitt-Pantel 1992, 53-113, Fisher 1992, 203-7.

However, in this fragment of Solon, the connection between ordered city and ordered apportionment of food and drink in the feast may be something more than a metaphor by analogy, as is commonly assumed (see e.g. Gerber 1970, 132 "men who show no restraint in their greed for wealth and power are compared to men who place no curb to their appetites"). Indeed, Solon's metaphor fitted very well a symposiastic meeting, possibly the real occasion on which the poem was performed (cf. Tedeschi 1982), but it also, and more pointedly, called into question the symposium as the most important occasion of the aristocratic groups for meeting, being, therefore, also the unofficial venue for many political decisions that were made beyond the institutional and really public arrangements of the polis — these lines may therefore anticipate the image fully presented in ll. 21f. For the ties between symposiastic occasions and archaic ἐταρεία, see lastly Vetta 1980, xxxi-xxvii and Rösler 1980, 37-41; for the opposition between (most) aristocratic drinking groups and democracy in the fifth century Athens,
cf. Murray 1990, Rhodes ad Arist. Ath. Pol. 34.3, Bowie 1997, 3. Besides, Solon's warning against the catastrophic symposium of these lines may have included a hint at the idea that the statesman was possibly going to actualise (or had already actualised) in one of his laws, which was going to be the forerunner of the Athenian law on *hybris* we find quoted by Dem. 21.47 and Aeschin. 1.16. As shown by Murray 1987, Solon may really have passed a law forbidding the acts of *hybris* by the rich in the *kómpoi* after their banquets, because these revels often ended in offences against other people's *τιμή*, and were, at any rate, instances of social disorder.

In this perspective of reading, Solon's choice of the word δαις to mean the feast seems hardly casual, since its etymology, from δαιμαί, hinted at the 'distribution' of the portions — δαις was a technical term for the religious banquet where meat was equally apportioned to the different gods (cf. Nagy 1988, 203), and Vetra 1997, 208 even supposes that a religious feast with a banquet for the gods may have been the real occasion of the performance of this poem which suggested the connection to Solon. However, this direct pragmatic reference to the occasion is not necessary for understanding Solon's emphasis on the opportune aspect of the δαις. In fact, "from Homer to Plutarch ... the egalitarian meal, via sacrifices and public banquets, functions as an institutional practice conjoined with the social relationships that underlie the *isonomia* figure of the city" (cf. Detienne-Svenbro 1979=1989, 153): cp. above all the most explicit (pre-)history of the human eating outlined by Ath. 1.12c-d: the first men were rapacious and violent because they neither knew yet the Homeric idea of δαις ἐσος, nor had food in abundance, so they all threw themselves upon it together, seized it by force, and took it away from those who had it: hence ἀκοσμία and murders also started, and the 'wickedness' was called ἀτασθαλία, "because it was amid festivity (ἐν ταῖς θαλαίαις) that men first sinned against one another". It is impossible to ascertain how old was the ideology of the equal distribution between the members of the society underlying this metaphor. At any rate, from a strictly linguistic point of view, the acquaintance with the Homeric diction unavoidably led anyone hearing of δαις to think of the very common formula δαιτὸς ἐσος — and ἵσος δαιμός might (at least might) have already been in Solon's time a material image for the ideal of *isonomia*, as it certainly was in Theognis, *IEG* 677-8 χρήματα δ' ἀρπάξουσι βίη, κόσμος δ' ἀπόλωλεν, δασμός δ' ὀυκέτ' ἵσος γίνεται ἐς τὸ μέσον, for which cf. Cerri 1969, Figueira 1985, 149ff., and in general Schmitt Pantel, 1992, 45-52.

9. οὗ γὰρ ἐπίστανται κατέχειν κόρον: Both Homer and Hesiod use the verb κορέννυμι and the noun κόρος in a positive sense to describe a condition of satisfaction and satiety (e.g. Hom. Il. 8.379, 11.562, 13.831, 22.427, Hes. Op. 33, 368, 593), whereas only the adjective ἀκόρητος (e.g. Hom. Il. 7.117, 14.479, [Hes.]) Sc. 346,
433, 459) indicates the negative value of insatiability, the inability to stop wanting more of something. Solon’s usage of the noun is different, and the term always takes on the negative, dangerous sense of insatiability, excessiveness, incessant greed for more: cf. Sol. 5.2-5 and 8.3-4. Thus, while for Homer and Hesiod the component of restraint is inherent in the condition of κόρος itself, for Solon the condition is one which requires restraint if cessation is to occur: cf. Anhalt 1993, 85-7, who explains: "if the pursuit of koros has a terminus for Homer and not for Solon, this may largely reflect the fact that epic poetry is praise poetry of a certain type and gives relatively little emphasis to faults which stem from heroic excess".

The phrase κατέχειν κόρον has been reconstructed in Sapph. PLF 68a.8 κόρον οὗ κατίσχε (where the verb makes clear that κόρος has already a negative meaning), and is found in Pind. Isth. 3.2 quoted below; see besides for the verb Thgn. IEG 322 ἀφραίνων κακίνην οὗ δύναται κατέχειν. Like Solon, Theognis and Bacchylides, and more often Pindar, will proclaim the necessity and the difficulty of restraining the κόρος of the rich several times: cf. Thgn. IEG 749-51 ὁππότ’ ἄνιρ… ὑβρίζῃ πλοῦτῳ κεκορμιμένος, Bacchyl. 15.57-8 ἀ δ’ αἰδόλους κέρδεσσι καὶ ἀφραίνων ἔξαισίσοις θάλλους’ ἁθαμβῆς"Τῆμις, and Pind. Ol. 1.55ff. ἀλλὰ γὰρ καταπέφαι μέγαν ὅλβον οὐκ ἐδυνάσθη, κόρω δ’ ἔλεν ἄταν ὑπέροπλον, Ol. 13.10 "Τῆμις, Κόρου ματέρα θραυσύμβουλον, Isthm. 3.1-3 εἰ τίς ἄνδρων … σθενέι πλούτου κατέχει φρασίν αἰανή κόρον, ἄξιος εὐλογίαις ἄστῶν μεμίχθαι. The closest parallel to Solon for the connection between the κόρος of the rich, their hybris and the violation of Dike is Aesch. Ag. 381-4 οὗ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐπαλέξει πλούτου πρὸς Κόρον ἄνδρε λακτίσαντι μέγαν Δίκας βιωμὸν εἰς ἀφάνειαν.

10. ἐφφοροῦν “merriment” is a specialised term for the pleasures of the lavish banqueting: besides Hom. Od. 9.6-7 and Xenoph. fr. 1, quoted ad ll. 9-10, see Anac. IEG el.fr. 2 οὗ φιλεῖ, ὅς κρήτηρι παρὰ πλέω ὀίνοποιτάζων … ἀλλ’ ὄστις … ἔρατης μυϊσκεται ἐφφοροῦν, Panyas. PEG 16.17-9 τῷ ἐν χρή παρὰ δαιτὶ δεδεγμένου εὐφρονι θυμῷ πίνειν, μηβε βορῆς κεκορμιμένων ἦπε γύπα ἦσθαι πλημύρουντα, λειπομένων εὐφροσυνῶν (cp. also Hom.Hymn Herm. 480-2 where the lyre has to be εὐφροσύνη νυκτός τε καὶ ἡματος for the δαιάς θάλεια and the κώμος, and later e.g. Aristid. Rom.enc. 224.31 ὅπερ πανηγυρίζουσα πάσα ἡ οἰκουμένη … εἰς δὲ κόσμων καὶ πάσας εὐφροσύνας τέτραπται σὺν ἔξουσίᾳ).

ktl. The incipit of Pind. *Pyth.* 8 is a hymnodic invocation to the personified Ἡσυχία, the daughter of Δίκη, who is μεγιστόπολις and knows how to annihilate the ὄβρις of whoever ἀνέθληκεν καρδία κότον ἐνελάσῃ; in *Pyth.* 11.55-6 envy may be aroused εἰ τις ἄκρον ἑλὼν Ἡσυχίᾳ τε νεμόμενος αὐνάν ὄβριν ἀπέφυγεν; see besides Pind. fr. 109 τὸ κοινὸν τις ἀστών ἐν εὐθίᾳ τιθεὶς ἐρευνασάτω μεγαλάνορος Ἡσυχίας τὸ φαίδρον φῶς, στάσιν ἀπὸ πραπίδος ἐπίκοτον ἀνελῶν, πενίας δότειραν, ἐχθρὰν κουροτρόφον. For κοσμεῖν "organise in orderly and methodical fashion", cf. *Od.* 7.13 ὄρπον ἐκόσμη; *Hes. Op.* 306σοι δ' ἔργα φιλ' ἐστὶ μέτρα κοσμεῖν, and above all Hippon. *IEG* 128.1-2 (=126 Degani) ... Εὖρημενοτάδε ... τὴν ἐν γαστρὶ μάχαιραν, δς ἐσθίει οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, resumed by Lucian, *Anth.Pal.* 9.367.9 γαστρὶ χαριζόμενος πᾶσαν χάριν οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, where the connection between excess in food and lack in kosmos is emphasised (cf. Degani 1984, 197).

10-2. A hexameter is missing both before and after l. 11, or l. 11 has to be removed, or l. 11 is a corrupted hexameter. If we share the first idea, either a new period is starting with l. 11 ("where indeed unrighteous men ...": so West), or there is no syntactical pause before l. 11, and after l. 10 something like 1.7 followed, while after l. 11 there was a line like that of 8.3 — the insertion of these two other Solonian lines in the text of fr. 3 had been quite common in pre-Bergk editions, but is no more methodologically acceptable. Also the deletion of l. 11 (proposed by Voemel in his 1862 ed. of Demosthenes 18 and 19) appears to be too arbitrary. Since there is no need of any filling for the sense, I share the last perspective, which also appears to be favoured by Diehl and Gentili-Prato; the original hexameter might be something like πλουτοῦσιν δ' ἄδικοις(ν ἐπ') ἔργασιν θημὸν ἔχοντες; cf. Sitzler 1879, 668f.


12-13. οὖθ' ἱερῶν κτεάνων οὔτε τι δημοσίων φειδόμενοι κλέπτουσιν: Homer has only the adjective φιλοκτέανος and the dative κτέάτεσσα, but the word κτέανα was already in *Hes. Op.* 315 and Thgn. *IEG* 1149, and the whole Solonian phrase reappears in Xenoph. 2.8 δημοσίων κτεάνων; δημόσιος is here attested for the first time.
On the existence of a distinction between sacred, public property, cf. Sel. of Greek Hist.Inscr. 13.1-3 Meiggs-Lewis, a τεμόνιον concerning the ἀνδαυθόν πλακός Ἀδαμᾶς καὶ Λισκαρίας καὶ τῶν ἀποτόμων καὶ τῶν δαμοσίων of a Locrian colony around (?) 525-500 B.C.: according to the editors (p. 25) τῶν ἀποτόμων is to be interpreted as sacred precincts (cf. τέμνειον from the same root), opposed to public property; see also Rihll 1991, 110 and n. 68.

I would not rule out that Solon is here recalling to the minds of the Athenians a recent, specific episode (if we trust in the commonly accepted chronology which dates Cylon's putsch between 640 and 623). Cylon with the help of an ἑταιρεία of supporters attempted to make himself tyrant of Athens, and according to schol. Ar. Eq. 445 committed a sacrilege in plundering the temple of Athena: he managed to escape, but his followers were killed (stoned) though they had sought for protection at the gods' altars, and those responsible for their execution (the supporters of the Alcmeonid archon Megakles, according to Herodotus and Aristotle) were therefore themselves considered ἐναγείς or ἀδεβεῖς (the sources are Hdt. 5.71, Thuc. 1.126, Arist. Ath.Pol. 1, Plut. Sol. 12, and schol. Ar. Eq. 445 quoted). According to Plut. Sol. 12.3-4, Solon had to perform the task of settling the strife between the Cylonians and the supporters of their executes (τὸς στάσεως ἀκμῆν λαβούσης μάλιστα, καὶ τῶν δήμου διαστάτως), and he persuaded the Alcmeonids to enter the trial where they were found guilty of sacrilege, and exiled. Both the sacrilege perpetrated by the Cylonians on that occasion (according to Hdt. 5.71 Cylon would have relied on a ἑταιρημή τῶν ἡλικιωτέων), and the sacrilege which the supporters of the aristocratic family of the Alcmeonids were considered to have committed was possibly for Solon exemplary instances of the consequences provoked by the contrasts involving aristocratic clans.

At any rate, such sacrileges were not uncommon (cf. Diod.Sic. 16.56.6 on Delphi), and guards were employed against domestic temple-robbing still in the classical age (cf. Sokolowski 1969, 60), though robbers were heavily punished: at Athens, still in the classical age, the temple-rober, like the traitor, was denied burial in his native land, and many Greek states chose methods of execution apparently intended to prevent any form of burial, and orators, like Demosthenes, commonly accused their opponents of sacrileges of any kind and such offences became an ideal device for political manipulation (see Dem. 22.69f., 24.111f., 120, 129, 137, 49.65). Disrespect for sacred money was considered a sign of a tyrant's behaviour in Xen. Hier. 4.11, and in Diod.Sic. 14.67.4, of barbarians in Hdt. 1.105.2 etc. Temple-sacking or exploitation of sacred property provided accusations which led into the first, third and fourth sacred wars (possibly also into the second) — as for the first (ca. 600-590), the holy alliance of Thessaly, Athens and Sicyon against Cirra/Krisa exploited the main themes of "impiety" and of "Greek states coming to the god's aid", and according to the accounts of Aeschin. 3.108, Plut.
Sol. 11, Paus. 10.37.4-8 it was Solon who in the Amphictiony proposed this crusade: on the first sacred war, and the problems it presents, see Davies 1994, with references; more generally, cf. Parker 1983, 170ff. Temple robbery is mentioned in Ar. Plut. 30 etc.

Van Effenterre 1977, 114 n.72 argued that the reference to the sacred properties fits very well the region of Eleusis and the ὅργασ there (cf. Harp. ο 27 Κ. τὰ λοχμώδη καὶ ὀρεινὰ χωρία καὶ οὐκ ἐπεργαζόμενα, ὅθεν καὶ Ἡ Μεγαρική ὅργασ προσωνομάσθη τοιαύτη τις οὔσα, περὶ ἤς ἐπολέμησαν Ἀθηναίοι Μεγαρεύσαν), in order to maintain — with no really substantial evidence — the general idea of his that all the agrarian problems Solon was concerned with did not refer to Attica, but to this recently conquered land (his hypothesis was furthered by L’ Homme-Wéry 1996).

On the insatiability of human desire in the pursuit of wealth, see also Sol. 1.71-3. On the politicians who ‘steal’ (most used is the very verb κλέπτειν) the common goods of the city see Ar. Vesp. 663f., Eccl. 608, Plut. 565-9, and Xen. An. 4.6.16 ἀλλὰ μὲντοι ... κάγω ἵματις τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἀκόου ἰδεῖνος εἶναι κλέπτειν τὰ δημόσια, καὶ μᾶλα ὅτις ἰδεῖνοι κινδύνου τῷ κλέπτοντι, καὶ τοὺς ἀκριβῶς μὲντοι μᾶλλον, εἴποι ἵματι οἱ κράτιστοι ἄρχειν ἀξιοῦνται.

13. κλέπτουσιν ἐφ’ ἀρπαγῇ: the two words are found side by side in other passages which describe rapacious behaviour: Aesch. Ag. 534 ἀρπαγῆς τε καὶ κλοπῆς δίκην, Soph. Phil. 644 κλέφαι τὰ χαρπάσα, Ar. Plut. 372 ὃυ κέκλοφας ἀλλ’ ἠρπακας.

ἐφ’ ἀρπαγῇ: ἀφαρπαγῆ or ἀφαρπαγῇ is the reading of some MSS of Demosthenes, accepted by West and Gentili-Prato, while some other more recent ones have ἐφ’ ἀρπαγῇ. The compound ἀφαρπαγῇ may be lectio difficilior, namely a new Solonian formation from ἀφαρπάζω (so already LSJ s.v.), but the parallel of Sol. 29ε.1 ἐφ’ ἀρπαγαῖσιν, and the possibility that ἀφαρπαγῇ is simply a mistake (ἐφ’ α- > ἁ-φα-) favours the reading of the recentiores — being not always deteriores.

ἀλλοθεν ἀλλος: epic phrase=Sol. 1.43 (see ad loc.); cf. also Sol. 1.76 and 6.4 ἄλλοτε ἀλλος ἑχει.

14. οὐδὲ φυλάσσονται σεμνὰ Δίκης θέμεθλα: Cp. Heraclit. VS 22B23 Δίκης οὖν οὐκ ἄν ἠδεσαν. θέμεθλα/θεμείλα is never attested in a metaphorical meaning before Solon. Masaracchia 1958, 263, and Defradas 1962, 49 link θέμεθλα to θέμις, which both as an abstract principle, and as the corresponding personification, were close and often connected to Δίκη; cp. first of all the Hesiodic description of the consequences on Δίκη of the misrepresentation of the θέμιστος by the corrupt judges, τῆς δὲ Δίκης ἑλκομενῆς ἢ κ’ ἄνδρες ἀγωνιῶν διωροφάγοι, σκολιῆς δὲ Δίκης κρίνωσι θέμιστας (Op. 220-1), in the context of a passage that Solon had certainly in mind (see
ad l. 8), Parmenides, VS 28B1.28 ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. On the linking of the two, taken up later by Pind. Ol. 13.6-8, Bacchyl. fr. 15.53-6 etc., see Stafford 1997, 159-60.

This idea of Masaracchia and Defradas is fascinating, but, at any rate, Solon leaves it to the imagination of his audience, and the prevailing sense of the θέμεθλα must here be the root of τίθημι: "what Dike is set in", the basics of Dike, as a metaphor of the common idea of the βάθρον or πυθμήν of Dike, which can be found, above all, in Pindar and in Aeschylus: cf. Pind. Ol. 13.5-6 ἐν τὰ γὰρ Ἑυνομία ναίει κασιγνήτα τε, βάθρον πολίων ἀσφαλές, Δίκα, Aesch. Cho. 646-7 Δίκας ... πυθμήν, Soph. Ant. 854 ἰψηλὸν ἐσ Δίκας βάθρον. Aeschylus, Eum. 539-42 βωμὸν αἰδέσαι Δίκας, μηδὲ νῦν κέρδος ἰδὼν ἀθέω ποδὶ λάξ ἀτίσησ: ποινὰ γὰρ ἐπέσται is also a very close passage to Solon, since we find there the same connection between lust for money, violation of Dike's altar and punishment (there are several passages of the Eumenides which may have adopted Solon's Eunomia as their model, cf. Ameduri 1970-71, 18); for other literary references to altars of Dike cp. also Aesch. Ag. 381-4 ... μέγαν Δίκας βωμὸν, [Dem.] 25.35 καὶ δίκης γε καὶ Ἑυνομίας καὶ αἰδοὺς εἰσὶ πάσιν ἀνθρώποις βωμοῖ, and see Shapiro, LIMC 3.1. 389. The thought follows also formally the steps of Hes. Op. 222-4 (when Dike is violated in the bad sentences by the corrupt judges) ἐπεται κλαίουσα πόλιν καὶ ἠθεα λαών, ἡερὰ ἐσπασμένη, κακῶν ἀνθρώποις φέρουσα, αἰ τέ μιν ἐξελάουσαι καὶ οὐχ ἰθειαν ἑνειμαν, and 238-41 οἷς δ' ὀβρίς τε μέμηλε κακῇ καὶ σχέτια ἑργα, τοῖς δὲ δίκην Κρονίδης τεκμαίρεται εὐρύστα Ζεῦς. πολλάκι καὶ ξύμπασα πόλις κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπήρα, ὡσὶς ἀλταίανει κτλ. See ad l. 8. At any rate, there are relevant differences between Hesiod's and Solon's Dike: above all, differently from the Hesiodic picture, who appears quite sceptical about the end of injustice, Solon strongly connects the situation in Athens to the precise historical factors described in ll. 5-14, and in the end prospects the possibility of a final triumph of justice (the best treatment of the differences between the presentations of Dike by Hesiod and Solon is Manuwald 1989, 5-9).

Similar thoughts reflecting the pious belief that Dike is ever a watchful avenger of the bad and the unjust are a topos in the Tragedians: besides the close parallel of Eur. TGF 979 προσελθοῦτοι ἡ Δίκη ... σιγὰ καὶ βραδεῖ ποδὶ στείχουσα μάρφει τοῖς κακοῖς, cf. Aesch. Cho. 61-5 ὡστὰ δ' ἐπισκοπεῖ Δίκας ταχεία τοὺς μὲν ἐν φάει, τὰ δ' ... μένει χρονίζοντας ... τοῖς δ' ... ἐχει νῦξ, Soph. TyrGF 12 τὰς Δίκας δέδορκεν ὅμα, τῶν δ' ἄδικον ἀμείβεται, Eur. Bacch. 882-90, El. 771 Δίκη τε πάνθ' ὀρῶσ', ἵθες ποτε, Rhes. 876 ἡ Δίκη δ' ἐπίσταται, TGF 151 τὴν τοι Δίκην λέγουσι παϊδ' εἶναι Δίως ἐγγύς τε ναίειν τῆς βροτῶν ἀμαρτίας, TGF 255 δοκεῖς ... τὴν Δίκην ποι μάκρ' ἀπογκρίθαι βροτῶν; ἡ δ' ἐγγύς ἔστιν, οὐχ ὀρμεμένη δ' ὀρῆ δὲν χρή κολάζεται τ' οἴδεν· ἀλλ' οὐκ οἴσθα σὺ ὅποταν ἀφὶνω μολοῦσα διοιέσθη κακούς, TGF
555 οὗ διήκται πως κύνες οἱ θεοί (quoted by Callim. SH 239.5) ἀλλ' ἡ Δίκη γὰρ καὶ διὰ σκότου βλέπει (but see also Antigone's denial of this belief in Phoen. 1726-7 οὐχ ὁρᾷ Δίκαι κακοὺς οὐδ' ἀμείβεται βροτῶν ἄσυνεος). Besides Dionys. TrGF 76F5 ὁ τῆς Δίκης ὀφθαλμὸς ὡς δὲ ἡ ἡσύχων λεύσων προσώπου πάνθ' ὁμοῖς αὐτ' βλέπει, adesp. TrGF 421 ἐκτίνη Δίκης ὀφθαλμός, ὡς τὰ πάνθ' ὁρᾷ, adesp. TrGF 486.3 ἀλλ' ἡμέρας ἤ νυκτὸς ἡ Δίκη ποτὲ τῷ ὄντος ὑπερβούντι σιγ' ἔχοντα' ἐνήλιατο, adesp. TrGF 493 ὁρᾶς Δίκην ἀναδονού σωματικῇ εὐδοκίτι καὶ στείχοντι καὶ καθημένη, adesp. TrGF 655.19-20 ἢ τοι πάροξον θεῶν ὄρμων κεκτημένη Δίκη δέδορκεν ὄξυ, κἂν ἀπὸ μακρὰν; some later instances: Cerc. CA 4.18-9=1.12 Λιβρεά μὴ ποτ' οὖν ὁ τὰς Δίκας ὀφθαλμὸς ἀπεσταλάκτωτα, Hymn. Orph. 62.1-4: ὁμμα Δίκης ... πανδέρκεος ... τοῖς ἀδικοῖς τιμῶρος ἐπιβράδυσα δικαία, Nonn. 40.1: Δίκην ... πανόμφου, Leo, Anth. Pal. 9.362.24 Δίκην ... πανδέρκεα, Synes. Ep. 44.164 τὸ μὲν ἀλθὲς εἰδέ τέ καὶ οἶδεν ἡ Δίκη.


On the personification of Dike in archaic poetry, see above ad Sol. 1.8. The representations of Δίκη in art of the archaic period (on the Vienna amphora and the Cahn fragment) exemplify her actions as avenging the misdeeds, since she is sometimes portrayed as a beautiful woman beating with a hammer an ugly 'Αδικία, whose body is covered by dotted circles like tattoos, of a type that appears in the vase representations of barbarian women, see Shapiro 1993, 39-44.

15. τὰ γυγνόμενα πρὸ τ’ ἐόντα: such phrases summarising omniscient knowledge are usually said with reference to the knowledge of priests-prophets, cf. Hom. Il. 1.70 ὡς ἥδη τὰ τ’ ἐόντα τὰ τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρὸ τ’ ἐόντα for Calchas, Eur. Hel. 13-4 τὰ θεία γὰρ τὰ τ’ ἐόντα καὶ μέλλοντα πάντ’ ἡμίστατο for Theonoe and Ion 7 τὰ τ’ ἐόντα καὶ μέλλοντα θεσπίζων αἵ for Apollo (Apollo is also probably the theme of Hes. fr. 204.113 ἔστιν καὶ ὀπτόσα μέλλει ἑσσόθαι); for poets or the Muses, cf. Hes. Theog. 32 θέσπιν, ἵνα κλείσαι τὰ τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρὸ τ’ ἐόντα, 38 εἰροῦσαι τὰ τ’ ἐόντα τὰ τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρὸ τ’ ἐόντα, Certamen p. 229.97 Α. Μοῦε’ ἀγε μοι τὰ τ’ ἐόντα τὰ τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρὸ τ’ ἐόντα. To these we could also add the orac. ap. Diog. Laert. 1.33=Thal. VS 11A1 τὰ τ’ ἐόντα τὰ τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρὸ τ’ ἐόντα, Anaxim. VS 13A7 ἀέρα ... ἐξ οὗ τὰ γυγνόμενα καὶ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα, Emp. PStrasb.gr.Inv. 1665-6 α(ι)8 πάντ’ ὄσ’ τ’ ἦν ὡσα τ’ ἐστ’ ὡσα τ’ ἐσσετ’ ὑπόσσω.
As often remarked (see lastly Treu 1955, 276f.), Solon replaces Homer's and Hesiod's permanent mentions of τὰ ἔσοψενα with τὰ γυγνόμενα, for the sake of his more pragmatic view of the dimensions of the human time, which is to be found here for the first time, and anticipates the perspective of the historiographers. A simpler interpretation for the omission of the future perspective is plausible as well: Solon’s Δίκη is aware of what is happening now and what has gone before — if there was, or is, injustice, Δίκη will bear it in mind and punish it; unlike the prophets, she does not need to know the future.

16. τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πάντως ἡλθ' ἀποτείσιμένη: 'with time', cf. also Sol. 1.8 πάντως ὑστερον ἠλθε δίκη, and cp. Pind. Pyth. 8.15 ἐν χρόνῳ, Bacchyl. 18.45 πάντ' ἐν τῷ δολιχῷ χρόνῳ τελείται concerning the destruction of the proud and the unjust man respectively. Similar associations between paying the penalty of one's bad actions sooner or later occur in tragedy: see e.g. Aesch. Ag. 58, 126, 463, Cho. 383, where the adjective ὑστερόποινος is applied to punishment (cf. also Ag. 462f., 700ff.); Cho. 61ff., where the fact that one never knows when justice will be achieved is stressed; Cho. 935 ἐμολε ... Δίκα ... χρόνῳ, Supp. 732-3 χρόνῳ τοι κυρίῳ τ' ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ... τις βροτῶν δώσει δίκην, Eum. 498 μετάθεις ἐν χρόνῳ, Soph. Ant. 303 χρόνῳ ποτ' ... δίκην, Phil. 1041 τείσασθε τείσασθ', ... τῷ χρόνῳ ποτέ, Eur. Heracl. 941 εἶλε σε' ἡ Δίκη χρόνῳ, TGF 223 Δίκα τοι Δίκα χρόνος, ἀλλ' ὁμος ὑποπεσοῦν' ἔλαβεν, ὅταν ἔχξι τιν' ἀσεβῆ βροτῶν, TGF *1131.5 χρόνῳ ... δώσει δίκην, Antiope GLP. 10.55 Page δίκα τοι δίκα χρόνος ἀλλ' ὁμος ἔλαβεν ὅταν ἅ[δ]η [τ]ὐν' ἀσεβῆ βροτῶν, TGF 624.5 χρόνῳ γὰρ οὕτος ὑστερον δώσει δίκην; cf. also the epithet θραδύπος said of her in Greg.Naz. Anth.Pal. 8.246.2, 247.1.

On the gnomic aorist ᾧλθε, see ad Sol. 1.8; as remarked by Henderson 1982, 27, it "indicates a timelessness which, together with the present participle σύγωσα, the verb σύνῳδε and the adverb πάντως, presents before the listener a graphic, ever-present view of Justice". Furthermore, the abundance of the present tenses in the following lines change the abstract character of Dike into an imminent moral principle whose actions are cast graphically in the present. This gnomic and general presentation of Dike marks the start of a section of the poem where it is hardly possible to ascertain whether Solon is thinking specifically of Athens or of the polis in general — and certainly general is the last part on Eunomia.

In his confidence in the final retaliation of δίκη, Solon is at variance with the Homeric epic, where gods' moral functions do not meet much of human expectations and beliefs about the divine reward of righteous and pious men and the punishment of the bad ones (on which, cf. Yamagata 1994, passim), and also with the Hesiodic perspective (see above ad l. 15-7).
The presentation in ll. 17ff., and of the opposite consequences of the Eunomia in ll. 32ff., all of them concerning social/political aspects, appears to be very different from the material, traditional presentation of the harsh disasters or of the blessings respectively affecting the Unjust or the Just City of Hesiod's *Works & Days* (failure of crops, famine, plague etc., ll. 238-47; good harvest, excellent children, glorious festivals etc., ll. 225-37; see also later, e.g. Callim. *Dian.* 130ff.). Though Solon's Dike is still a personified goddess, she is somehow in between Hesiod and the principles ruling the human experience that we can find in some Presocratics, for instance the δική-τίτις because of which, according to Anaximander, *VS* 12B1, everything that comes to be has compensated with death the 'injustice' of their birth in accordance with the ordering of time (κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν): cf. Jaeger 1926=1966, 92f.

17. τοῦτ’ ... ἐλκός ἀφυκτον more probably resumes the anti-social behaviour of some citizens described in ll. 12-4, and presents it as already affecting (ἡδὴ ἐρχεται) the whole political body (πᾶσῃ πόλει) as an inescapable polluting wound. ἐλκός ἀφυκτον may also refer to the punishment by Dike (as Jaeger 1926=1966, 91 believes, and West 1993, appears to propose in his translation of the poem), but it is hardly possible that Solon defines in such a grim way the effect of the intervening divine Justice (cp. the luminous and positive simile which describes the intervention of Zeus' τίτις in fr. 1.17-25), and the Hesiodic description of the effects of justice and injustice (Op. 225-47 mentioned above) provides a good parallel for the former interpretation (already emphasised by Manuwald 1989, 6-7). On ἀφυκτός see fr. 1.64.

The closest parallel to Solon's metaphorical ἐλκός, in a context where the same juxtaposition of public and individual evils is introduced as in Solon (see ll. 26ff.), appears to be Aesch. *Ag.* 640-2 πόλει μὲν ἐλκός ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τυχεῖν, πολλοὺς δὲ πολλῶν ἔξαγισθέντας δόμων ἄνδρας διπλὴ μάστιγι, κτλ. See also Thgn. *IEG* 1134, Pind. *Pyth.* 2.91, Soph. *Ant.* 652. According to Hammond 1961, 89, the metaphor of this major disease in the state would hint at the image of the ὀρν., the marks of the enslavement of the land which Solon removed in order to free the land from its bondage. As for the metaphor itself of the ἐλκός, the connection between medical disease (νόσος) and failure of the ἰσονομία of the δυνάμεις of the body (namely their σύμμετρος κράσις) and the idea that this failure leads to the ὑπερβολή or μοναρχία of the single class of the rich (probably the danger of the tyranny is not yet envisaged here: see below ad l. 18) can also be found in the philosopher and physician of the late 5th century, Alcmaeon, *VS* 24B4: cf. Vlastos 1947, 156-58, Kudlien 1967, 51ff. and 60, Cambiano 1982 (especially important on the overlapping between political and medical metaphors in the 5th century). Solon's Eunomia was certainly not the same as the ἰσονομία, but, so to
say, was the step before it (see below, ad l. 32). After all, Solon himself may have shared these metaphors with the beginnings of medical speculation: cf. Introd. to frs. 29-29b.

18. ἐς δὲ κακὴν ... ἦλθε δουλοσύνην: The word δουλοσύνη is found once in the epic, Hom. Od. 22.423 καὶ δουλοσύνην (v.l. -ης) ἀνέχεσθαι (v.l. ἄπι-), and after Solon only from Pindar and Herodotus onwards.

The meaning of the word in the Homeric passage has been debated. The reading with the accusative, which is usually accepted by the editors, would be said of the διωμαί of Odysseus who were educated to spin the wool and "to fulfil their status as slaves", but yielded to the suitors and became their concubines. The variant δουλοσύνης has been recently defended: it would mean the "sexual bondage" that the slaves would have been educated to "contrast" or "cope with" (see Beringer 1960, followed by Fernández-Galiano ad loc. (Engl. ed. 1992), who also accepts the papyrus variant ἀνέχεσθαι, which more explicitly that ἀνέχεσθαι has the sense of "to resist to"). Also in case that this strained interpretation is correct (but I do not think so) we are not necessarily driven to believe that the meaning of "sexual bondage" is the original meaning of the word δουλοσύνη. Indeed, even if we assume it to be present in Od. 22.423, (for the behaviour of some of Odysseus' female slaves), we cannot maintain that the same implication is a part of the meaning of the Homeric δούλη, though the context often implies some kind of sexual submission of the female slaves to their owner: cf. Gschnitzer 1976, 10f.

Therefore, through the term — in a meaning not different from the Homeric one — Solon may anticipate the idea of chattel slavery to which II. 23-5 refer, but also possibly something more. The word could denote, at different metaphorical degrees, the state and the conditions of those who had been literally sold into slavery overseas (as in II. 23-5 and in fr. 30.8-9), or of the hectemoroi "sixth-parter" serfs (Arist. Ath.Pol. 2.2, Plut. Sol. 13) — namely the various forms of total subordination or lack in political freedom, which Solon had to cope with according to Aristotle, Pol. 1274a15 Ἑκτεμορί Σόλων γε ἐοίκε τήν ἀναγκαστάτην ἀποδίδοναι τῷ δῆμῳ δόναμιν, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν (μηδὲ γὰρ τοῦτον κύριος ὦν ὁ δῆμος δοῦλος ἂν εἶ οὐ καὶ πολέμιος.

The relevance of debt-slavery in the political thought of Solon has been much debated and perhaps overstated. The aim of Solon's reforms appears to have been that the poor should no longer be rigidly tied clients or serfs to the rich, and could become mobile workers with looser ties to their patrons: one of the effects of the old system may have been the creation of factions in the political body by constraint rather than choice, and the nobles could exploit their groups in their rivalry for offices and for the defence of the private interest of their own or of their clan (cf. Lintott 1982, 46-7). Such a kind of social dependence, an almost δουλοσύνη could be presented by Solon in the following line as the potential starter of inner wars between opposite aristocratic families.
Stahl 1992, 392f., is perhaps a bit too confident in seeing here a mere reference to the danger of the tyranny. We do not know a lot about the chronology of Solon's poems, but this fragment most probably precedes frs. 12 and 15, where the perspective or the actuality of the tyranny is called δουλοσύνη. Therefore, we cannot be sure that Solon was already implying in this fragment that the tyranny, namely the δουλοσύνη of the whole demos (including the rich) to a tyrant, was the inherent danger of the enmity among the aristocratic factions — a danger which was materialised after Solon's departure from Athens after the nomothesia, with the anarchy that did not allow the election of the archon, and drove Peisistratus to seize absolute power.

19. Cf. Alc. PLF 70.11 ἐμφύλω ... μάχας; and Thgn. IEG 51 έκ τῶν γὰρ στάσισες τε καὶ ἐμφυλοὶ φόνοι ἀνδρῶν; see also Scol. PMG 884.3 quoted above ad 1.3, and Hdt. 8.3.1; Democr. VS 68B249, Aesch. Eum. 862f. and Soph. Ant. 1263-4. The word στάσις also occurs in the famous allegory of the ship by Alc. PLF 326 ἀσυννέτημι μι τῶν ἀνέμων στάσιν, where it may have primarily meant the 'direction' of the winds, but most probably also metaphorically included the idea of 'strife'. In my opinion πόλεμος is the open conflict consequent to the enmity between the factions (στάσις), and it is not necessary to suppose that it had already in Solon the meaning of 'external' war (ἀλλότριος καὶ ὀθνείος), which it certainly has in opposition to στάσις as a civil strife (οἶκειος καὶ συγγενής) in Pl. Resp. 5.470b (for a different opinion cf. Ferrara 1964, 74).

The relative pronoun is usually interpreted as dependent on δουλοσύνην. The attempt of Weil 1883 to connect it with Dike is hardly defensible; more interesting is the possibility, recently re-proposed by Adkins 1985, 118-9, that it is connected with πόλις: 'the city which stirs up stasis ... swiftly comes to slavery' under a tyrant. It is true that Athens really suffered this fate in Solon's lifetime, when Peisistratus' success rode on the political and social dissatisfaction of the poor, but apart from the difficult syntax presupposed by Adkins' interpretation, we do not know whether Solon is foreseeing the tyranny here or not (see ad l. 18), and besides the polis appears in these lines to receive (and not to cause, as Adkins proposes) all the bad events of ll. 17, 18, 21f., cf. Manuwald 1989, 5 n. 26.

The metaphor of the awakening of the fight (φύλοις, μάχη) is not uncommon in Homer (cp. also Ἀρνᾶ ἐγείρειν: ll. 2.440, 4.352 etc), but πόλεμον ἐγείρειν appears to be an hapax of ll. 20.31, πόλεμον δ' ἀλλαστόν ἐγείρε (cp. later Thgn. IEG 549 πόλεμον ... ἐγείρει, Hdt. 8.142.2 ἡγείρατε ... πόλεμον), which Solon resumed most probably intentionally, since this line marks out the start of the Theomachy, namely the moment of the Iliad when the gods fought their internal war, openly against each other in two opposite ranks, οἵ μὲν θεοὶ ἄντα θεῶν ἱσαν (l. 75) — an internal hostility already
exists, as ll. 12f. had suggested: the δουλοσύνη simply allows it to be exploded in the hardest form (that of a civil war). At any rate, Solon contaminated the Iliadic hemistich with the other Homeric formula ὑπνώοντας ἐγείρει (ll. 24.344=Od. 5.48 and 24.4), in order to produce the image of the 'sleep' of the war which is not attested before him.

20. ἐρατήν ὠλεσεν ἥλικην: an epitaphic expression, belonging to the conventional language both for the ἀνδροῖ, and more specifically for the young fallen in war, which justifies the presence of the past tense (possibly re-interpreted by Solon as a gnomic one): cf. [Simon.] Anth.Plan. 26=FGE 690 οὐκ ἄδικως, ἐρατήν γὰρ ἀπωλέσαμεν νεότητα, [Simon.] Anth.Pal. 7.258=FGE 878 ἀγλαὸν ὠλεσαν ἤβην, [Simon.] Anth.Pal. 7.515=FGE 987 ἐρατή νεότητι, [Simon.] Anth.Pal. 7.254=FGE 890 ὠλέσαθι ἤβην, GVI 1226.3 (6 B.C.) and 305.3 (5 B.C.) νεαρῶν ἥβεων ὠλέσαντα, GVI 18.1 (440/39 B.C.) ἀπόλεσαν ἀγλαῶν ἥβεων, CEG 732.5 (4 B.C.) ὠλέσας ἥλικιαν (in the end of the pentam.), GVI 1913.1 (beginning 3 B.C.) ὠλέσας ἥλικιαν, GVI 771.4 (1 A.D.) ἐρατὰν ὠλεσεν ἥλικιαν; besides Tyr. 9.23 ἐν προμάχοις πεσὼν φίλοι ὠλεσε θυμόν, after Hom. ll. 11.342=20.412 φίλον ὠλεσε θυμόν).

21. πολυπράτων ἄστυ: See Bacchyl. 19.9-10 πολυπράτως ... Ἀθάνατος, Ar. Nub. 300-1 εὐανήδουν γὰν Κέκροπος ... πολυπράτων; also Hom. Od. 11.275 ἐν Θήβῃ πολυπράτῳ, Hdt. 4.159.3 ἐς Λιβύην πολυπράτων, Ael.Phleg. Parad.Gr. 3.7 p. 190 Giann. Θρινακίης ἕρας πολυπρατοῦ, Orac.Sibyll. 5.289 Geffcken πολυπράτει Τράλλας.

δυσμενέων: certainly the internal enemies of the communal welfare, not the external enemies, pace Adkins 1985, 119 who resumes the 19th century interpretation of the ἐν συνόδοις (see at the following line) in the meaning of 'hostile meeting of armies', and considers δυσμενέων of our line as external enemies.

22. τρύχεται ἐν συνόδοις: The verb sometimes denotes physical distress or hardship in the epic (see Hom. Od. 10.177, 17.387 and Hes. Op. 305), and it is said of Odysseus' οἶκος (for the suitors eat his goods in his absence): Od. 1.248=16.125=19.133: I believe that Adkins 1985, 119 is correct in proposing that Solon could here imply some equivalence between behaviour of his ill-natured fellow-citizens and the Homeric suitors; cf. also Mimn. 8.12 οἶκος τρυχοῦται (because one has to support a big family).

This is the earliest extant occurrence of the word συνόδος with the meaning of 'associations'/'clubs' or of the actual meetings of these clubs (cf. later Ar. Eq. 477, Thuc. 3.82.6, Pl. Tht. 173d, Isoc. 3.54, Andoc. 1.47). Solon's preoccupation about the
danger for the community of these clubs is confirmed by Gaius, Dig. 47.22.4 (F76a Ruschenbusch), who quotes a Solonian law that gave legal validity to the regulations of these societies, provided they were not contrary to the state laws: Sodales sunt, qui eiusdem collegii sunt quam Graeci ETAIPEIAN vocant. his autem potestatem facit lex pactionem quam velit sibi ferre, dum ne quid ex publica lege corrumpant. sed haec lex videtur ex lege Solonis tralata esse. nam illa est est eañ dè δήμος ή φρατόρες ή όργεώνες ή γεννήται ή σύσσιτοι ή ομόταφοι ή θιασώται ή επί λείαν οιχόμενοι ή εἱς εἰμπορίαιν, ὅτι ἂν τούτων διαθώται πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κύριον ἐἶναι, ἓν μὴ ἀπαγορεύσῃ δημόσια γράμματα.

There is not sufficient information on these societies of Athenian politics (ἐταιρείαι is their more common designation; see already Phoc. 5), their composition, organisation, activities even for periods better documented than the archaic age. Certainly the word seems already to have here a sinister ring, and Solon may be hinting at the subversive aristocratic clubs which Mazzarino 1943, 41f. called the ἐταιρείαι ἐπὶ τυραννίδα, relying on Hdt. 5.71 ἐπὶ τυραννίδα ἐκόμισε, προσσημάμενος δὲ ἐταιρημήν τῶν ἥλικωτέων καταλαβέει τὴν ἀκρόπολιν ἐπειρήση (about Cylon), and on Arist. Pol. 1311b27 (who described Megakles, the author of the putsch against the Penthelidai as operating μετὰ τῶν φίλων). It would be tempting to see an analogous instance of the word in Alc. PLF 130: the poet remembers to have been driven into exile far from the property he and his ancestors had in Mytilene, πεδὰ τωνδέων τῶν [ἀ]λλακόκων πολίταν (II. 21-2); but he has decided to get rid of strife, στάσιν γὰρ πρὸς κρ.[...] ὀὐκ ἀμείνον ὀννέλην (II. 26-7) and to live keeping his feet clear of the κακά in a sanctuary where Lesbian women hold their beauty competitions: II. 30-1 χλι.[.] [.]. [.]. ἵναις συνόδοις ἑαυτὰς ὑπημακήμενοι κ[ἀ]κων ἐκτος ἔχων πόδας. The syntactical connection of συνόδοις ἑαυτὰς with what remains of I. 29 and with I. 30 is not clear, and a political meaning of σύνοδοι I. 29 cannot be ruled out. Indeed, it is maintained by Rodriguez Somolinos 1992, 145, 165, 185, and by De Martino-Vox 1996, 3.1259, but most modern scholars appear to agree in interpreting σύνοδοι as the meetings of the women in the sanctuary. See further Calhoun 1913, Sartori 1957, Talamo 1961, 302-3, Ghinatti 1970.

τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι φίλαις: the hemistich has been variously dealt with. Most MSS have φίλοις, which is unacceptable; φίλους of F, also kept by West, would be the object of τοῖς ἀδικοῦσι, a dative of the agent: 'by people who injure the φίλοι'. In that case φίλοι has been sometimes intended in the meaning of '(political) friends' of Solon, namely the class that Solon favours while opposing the rich δυσμενεῖς, but it is hardly possible to believe that any reader would recognise who the φίλοι are and whose friends they are (Linforth 1919, 203), above all in a distich where the main theme had been the
political clubs, whose members could also be called φίλοι (cp. Thuc. 1.126.5 and Arist. Pol. 1311b27 quoted, and cf. Ghinatti 1970, 16). If we try to keep the MSS text, it would be better to consider φίλοι-ἀστατοί: the (members of the) clubs would "injure their fellow-citizens (friends and relatives)". The word ἀστάτος is mentioned in the previous line by Solon, and for this equivalence in meaning see Lévy 1985, 55-6; as a matter of fact, civil strife usually involved the devastation of the land of fellow-citizens, φίλοι: cp. Pl. Resp. 5.471b, see also 5.470d. The idea would be attractive but syntactically a dative of the agent is normally found only with passive perfect and pluperfect (otherwise it is ὑπὸ+genitive). Another possibility would be to intend this hemistich as describing the cause, not the consequence of the civil strife, as West 1993, 75 appears to interpret: "for if men injure their own people, they soon find their lovely city scarred and faction-torn"; but this interpretation is syntactically difficult, and above all our hemistich would be overlapping with ἐκ δυσμενέων 1.21 (both are supposed to mean the same persons: the translation cit. by West meaningfully suppresses ἐκ δυσμενέων).

For these reasons, Bergk's emendation of φίλος in φίλαις qualifying συνόδοις, accepted by Gentili-Prato, is preferable (for a full review of the emendations proposed, Maharam 1993, 290-2).

23. ἐν δήμῳ: usually interpreted as 'at home', opposing the pains that the poor citizens have to suffer when sold as slaves abroad.

Demos is better interpreted (with Halberstadt 1954-55, 201 n. 16) in the meaning of 'inside the whole body of citizenship', which is recurrent in Solon (see ad l. 7), and the phrase would therefore mean more or less 'at a public level': the city in its entirety is reached by the evil so that no single individual can escape, and the evil roams through the public. In the line(s) which Demosthenes left out between the first and the second passage, Solon may have provided further details on the other calamities which were affecting the πενήχροι or, beyond the πενήχροι, other classes of the Athenian citizens.

The μεν-δε opposition between δήμος and the πενήχροι sold abroad would be between the general distress of the former, and the extreme consequences of this situation for the latter.

στρέφεται κακά: στρέφομαι was already in Homer with the meaning "to go round", "to circulate". Sol. 30.27 ως ἐν κυσίν ... ἐστράφην λύκος.

24-5. Cp. Sol. 30.8-15 πολλοῖς δ' Ἀθήνας, πατρίδ' εὐθέκτοιν, αἵνηγαγον πραθέντας, ἄλλων ἐκδίκους, ἄλλων δικαίως, τούς τ' ἀναγκαῖς ὑπὸ χρεοίς φυγόντας, ... ως ἰδν πολλαχῇ πλανωμένους, τούς δ' ἐνθάδ' αὐτοῦ δουλίνη ἑικέα ἔχοντας, ἡβη δεσποτῶν τρομευμένους, ἐλευθέρους ἑθηκα.
In Homer fetters are "painful"/"strong" (άργαλέα, δυσηλεγή, κρατερά, χαλεπά etc.), but already in Hes. fr. 37.4 the δεσμός is ethically qualified as δεικές—Aesch. PV 97, 525. Solon calls the fetters "degrading" because in his view it is shameful (a shame for Athens) if free citizens are enslaved. By preventing the enslavement of the Athenians with his Laws, Solon created a legal boundary distinction between free (Athenian citizens) and slave (non-citizens): on the implications and the importance of such a boundary see Finley 1981, Brook Manville 1990, 132ff. Demosthenes 59.88 attests that the Athenian citizenship was considered something very valuable, καλὸν καὶ σεμνὸν. Generally, the Greeks were strongly opposed to the enslavement of their own fellow-citizens, cf. Callicratidas' statement at the siege of Methymna in 406 that no Greek would be enslaved (Xen. Hell. 1.6.14), and the general compassion for the Greeks enslaved by Philip at Olynthus in 348 (Aeschin. 2.156, Diod.Sic. 16.53.3). Enslavement was excluded for full citizens in classical Athens, where the only penalties applicable were fines, political disqualification (ἀτυμία), imprisonment, exile and death.

Solon speaks here about the selling abroad of the citizens lower-down the economic scale in a context that points more to social inequality than to anything else, and certainly does not mention the idea of debt, cf. Harris 1997, 105-6). The entire passage (17-26) is valuable for revealing the close connection in Solon's poetry between stasis (discord) and doulosyne (slavery): it does not describe the economic exploitation of dependent labour in some kind of quasi-feudal system, and the enslavement of the poor is not linked to any failure of the hectemoroi to make payments to their lords or to the foreclosure of mortgages on land held by poor farmers, but comes about from a breakdown of law and order described in ll. 5-22. This breakdown of law and order (l. 31 Dysnomia) has produced the kind of raids for plunder and slaves found throughout the Odyssey and Iliad (e.g. ll. 9.328-36, 664-8, 11.623-6, 21.40-1, Od. 7.7-11, 9.40-2). As a matter of fact, in Solon's poems the reference to debt is not explicit, at least in the ones transmitted to us. It is only a logical inference to suppose that the 'slavery' Solon is speaking was a debt slavery — a condition which, as we know from later sources, took place in later Athens: see a collection of sources in Rhodes ad Ath.Pol. 6.1. The practice of self-enslavement for debt continued to exist in Gortyn in Crete and in other places, cf. Lenger 1966, no. 22, 42-5, Lintott 1982, 27; it is also found in the Hellenistic period at least at Delphi, in Egypt, and in the Peloponese. Cf. Ar. Plut. 147-8 διὰ μικρὸν ἄργυρίδιον δοῦλος γεγένημαι; also Lys. 12.98, Isoc. 14.48. At any rate, export markets existed for the debtor slaves in other Greek cities in later times, see Westermann 1955, 3, Garlan 1988, 53.

As for fr. 30.11 quoted above, the London pap. has (ἀναγκαῖς ὑπὸ) χρέους, the Berlin pap. has (ἀναγκαῖς ὑπὸ) χρέων. Most of the modern historians who support the indebtedness-theory read ἀναγκαῖς ὑπὸ χρέους, interpreting the latter as the genitive
of τὸ χρεῖον 'debt' and ἀναγκαία as the common epic substantive=ἀνάγκη, 'through the necessity of debt': cf. Hammond 1961, 89f., Chambers 1967, 56. However, this assumption does not appear to be solid at all. All the recent editors of Solon — none excluded — print χρείος perispomenon, and imply that ἀναγκαίας is an adjective dependant on it, some of them quoting the relevant parallel of χρεῖον ἀναγκαία Ἰομ. II. 8.57f. (Gentili-Prato add Ap.Rhod. Argon. 3.998: ικάνω χρεῖον ἀναγκαία γονονόμενος ; the syntagm appears in many more instances so far as I have checked).

Faced by the linguistic evidence, χρείος, in concordance with ἀναγκαίας, has to be considered the better reading, and I do not see how and why we would have to stretch χρείος to be=χρεῖος and to mean 'debt', as Defradas 1962, 63 tries to do out of the few passages where χρέος means 'need' (not only Ar. Ach. 454f., quoted by Defradas, but also Hom. Od. 11.479 and Bion fr. 5.2), and is therefore equivalent to χρεῖον. Nowhere, as far as I could check, is the reverse true, that is χρεῖον meaning 'debt'. As for the reading of the Berlin pap. it can be considered, safely I think, as a gloss on Solon's ἀναγκαίας ὑπὸ χρείος which later entered into the text. Therefore, we do not have any reliable evidence on any Solonian mention of 'debt' (slavery) in connection with Solon's reforms.

24. γαῖαν ἐς ἀλλοδαπῆν: Cf. Sol. 30.8ff. For the phrase see Hom. Od. 9.36 γαῖη ἐν ἀλλοδαπῇ, GVI 1043.3 (2 A.D.) γαῖη ἐν ἀλλοδαπ[η], 2029.14 (2/3 A.D.) γαῖαν ἐς ἀλλοδαπῆν.

26. δημόσιον κακὸν ἐρχεται οἶκαδ' ἐκάστῳ: The lacuna of at least one pentameter after l. 25 was most probably not long, and l. 26 resumes and more vividly personifies ἐν δήμῳ κακά of l. 23 (the pentameter preserved by the single ms. Matrit. 4562, apart from unmetrical ζη-, is too oddly repetitive, and may be a forgery by the humanist Constantinus Laskaris, cf. West).

The phrase δημόσιον κακὸν also appears in the cenotaph of the Corcyraean proxenos Menekrates, 625-600 B.C., CEG 143.4 δαμόσιον δὲ κακὸν ῥό[ι]ν, where το[ὐ] πάντας ἤκανε[ν] and το[ὐ] πάντας ἄφικε[ι] were proposed by Hoffmann and Peek to fill the end of the line. Cf. Hom. Od. 20.367-8 κακὸν ῥῆμαν ἐρχόμενον, Od. 2.45 ὅ μοι κακὸν ἐμπεσεν οἰκῷ, Thgn. IEG 50 κέρδεα δημοσίῳ σὺν κακῷ ἐρχόμενον.

οἶκαδ' ἐκάστῳ: Hom.Hymn Dem. 302 οἶκαδ' ἐκαστος. Contrast δημόσιον with ἐκάστῳ: "public" disease affects the individual. The "visionary" strength of the image of the public disease entering everyone's house is probably intended as a warning that the final effect of the excessive greed for one's own house-wealth could involve everyone's house, room after room.
27. αὐλεῖοι ... θύραι: they are the doors of the gate of the court-yard into the street, cf. Harp. a 263 K. αὐλεῖος ... ἄπο τῆς ὁδοῦ πρώτη θύρα τῆς οἰκίας. The phrase ἐπὶ αὐλεῖοι θύρησιν is a common epic hexameter-ending, cf. Od. 18.239, 23.49, Hom.Hymn Herm. 26, see later Pind. Nem. 1.19, Hdt. 6.69, Theoc. 29.39.

οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν: with the meaning οὐ δύνανται, possibly already in Homer — see e.g. ll. 9.353 or 21.366, where the schol. ad loc. (Aristonicus) interpreted οὐδὲ ἔθελε προφέειν, ἀλλ’ ἵσχεω αὐτὶ τοῦ οὐκ ἤδύνατο —, but certainly in this passage and often in Attic: cf. LfgE s.v. ἔθελο (3).

28. ψηλὸν ... ὑπὲρ ἐρκος ὑπέρθορος: The verb ὑπέρθροσκω is used four times in the Iliad, in three references to horses leaping or fearing to leap over the Greek ditch (8.179, 12.53, 16.380) and once by Phoenix in his discourse to Achilles at 9.476 (ὑπέρθροσ ἐρκίον αὐλής) in relation to his leaping over the courtyard wall when he fled his home to take refuge with Achilles' father, Peleus, after having quarrelled with his father. Solon may have combined this relevant precedent for the diction with the image of the Homeric similes in which lions attack domestic animals in the fold (cf. e.g. ll. 5.136-42), which had been lastly suggested by Adkins 1985, 118.

We have scanty information on the domestic architecture of archaic and classical Greece (we know something more about that of the fourth century, from the excavations at Olynthus). From the Homeric epics we can draw a picture of the Homeric house, where indeed the αὐλή is surrounded by a perimeter wall called either ἐρκίον αὐλής (ll. 9.476) or ἐρκος αὐλής (Od. 22.442, 459); see also ll. 24.452-5. The general description of the palace in Od. 17 mentions some θύραι ... εὐερκέες (l. 267), and the same adjective is usually grouped with αὐλή in the meaning "well-enclosed" in ll. 9.472, Od. 21.389, 22.449; see also Hes. Op. 732-τοίχον ... εὐερκεός αὐλής, and Archil. IEG 37 τοίχων γὰρ αὐλήν ἐρκος ἀμφιδέρομεν. In the Olynthian houses also the main entrance to the house regularly opened, where possible, directly into the court, and whenever the court was contiguous to the street the court was enclosed with a wall.

The emphasis on the 'barriers' of the αὐλε, the θύραι and the ἐρκος, was most probably intentional: the δημόσιον κακόν also invades the sphere of the private property of the house: cp. the commonly joined cult of Zeus Herkeios and Zeus Ktesios, on which see Sjövall 1931, 41-8, 55 and RE 15, 1978, 1049-51 s.v. Compare the similar — but comically excessive — emphasis on the barriers and the borders of the house in the Wasps of Aristophanes (above all, ll. 126-55), where Bdelycleon copes with the huge danger represented for his household by the insane passion for trials and tribunals of the father Philocleon (though in Aristophanes' case Philocleon is a danger if he manages to go out of the house, not if he enters, as Solon's δημόσιον κακόν): cf. Crane 1997, 218f.
The emphatic contrast of l. 26 between δημόσιον and ἐκάστῳ — "public" disease affects every individual — favours in my opinion the conservation of the reading of a part of the MSS (v.l. πάντως) against the correction πάντως of the recentiores.

29. Degani-Burzacchini 1977, 111 note the rare omission of ἄν, and compare Callin. 1.12f. οὐ γὰρ κως θάνατον γε φυγεῖν εἰμαρμένον ἐστίν ἄνδρ', οὐδ' εἰ προγόνων ἦ γένος ἀθανάτων.

ἐν μυχῇ ὡς θαλάμου: ηθαλάμῳ MSS. Schneidewin's emendation is right, because μυχος θαλάμου is an almost idiomatic phrase of the poetic language — Hom. II. 17.36 μυχῇ θαλάμῳ, Od. 16.285 ἐς μυχον ὣφηλοΰ θαλάμου, 22.180 θαλάμῳ μυχον κάτα, 23.41=Hom.Hymn Dem. 143 μυχῳ θαλάμουν εὐπήκτων; Pind. Nem. 1.42 ἐς θαλάμῳ μυχον εὑρόν (cf. also Simias, CA fr. 26.17 ἐν κόλπῳ θαλαμῶν μυχοιστάτῳ) —, but nowhere do they appear juxtaposed as synonyms (Hsch. θ 21 L. θάλαμοςἐ... μυχός, and schol. Aesch. Ag. 96 μυχόθεν ἦγουν ἐκ τῶν μυχῶν, τουτέστι τῶν θαλάμων can be better considered as instances of the typical use of the lexicographers to explain a member of a syntagm with another one).

The word θαλάμος signifies in the epic any of the private rooms of the house (the sleeping room and the store-room) as opposed to the megaron (see, above all, Od. 22.143): cf. Pesando 1989, 39. The megaron, with its central hearth, was the common space of the house for dining and entertaining guests, and was connected with the most typical male activity of the symposium, while θαλαμος is usually mentioned in connection with female life and activities (see e.g. the opposition between battlefield and θαλαμος regarding the coward Paris of II. 3.382ff.). Solon's expression describes the most natural thing the ill-natured citizens, whom Solon had just described as intemperately enjoying the symposiastic pleasures (II. 9ff.), would do as a reaction to the spreading of the punishing δημόσιον κακόν consequent to their guilt: also in the Odyssey, after the first spears thrown by Odysseus, Telemachus and Eumaeus, the suitors feasting in the megaron vainly try to retreat to the inner part of the megaron itself: ἀνεχώρησαν μεγάρῳ μυχόντε (22.270).

30. ταῦτα διδάξαι θυμός ... κελεύει: The verb διδάξαι points to a didactic stance, and also suggests that Solon himself saw this poem as a lecture in verse. Solon is not speaking to a younger brother, as Hesiod was in Works and Days, so the Athenian statesman devises a strategy of presentation which understates the position of superiority which he is keeping. Κελεύω is often used to describe inner motivation in relation to the θυμός (or to κραδίηθυμός τε in the parallel constructed phrase κραδίηθυμός τε κελεύει); κέλομαι also appears with θυμός as its subject, cf. Hom. II. 7.68, 349, 369,
8.6, *Od.* 7.187, 8.27, 17.469, 18.352, 21.276, *Hes.* *Theog.* 645 etc. The choice of the word is meaningful: as is clear from the formula κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν, the θυμός was considered to be mainly the seat of the emotions (cf. Caswell 1990): that implies, as remarked by Stahl 1992, 396, that "the warnings of Solon are not only a matter of understanding, but also have their roots in the depth of the soul".

32-9. The mention of the personified Dysnomia leads to the mention of Eunomia. Solon's final short hymn to Εὐνομία was most probably conceived after the model of Hesiod's Hymn to Zeus in the beginning of the *Works & Days* (3-9). The resemblance is striking in size, in style (the *asynedeton*, which is a common feature of prayers — see for instance the beginning of *Hom. Hymn* 8 or *Hom. Hymn* 19, and cf. Fraenkel ad *Ag.* 163, Jaeger 1926=1966, 97-9 —, but in Hesiod and in Solon it is exceptionally persistent; besides the polar antitheses, the anaphora of παθεῖ and the rhymes of αἰαίνει-λειαίνει (cp. above all the repetition of ἔρα in Hesiod) and the tone (both passages are theodicies of the divine justice administered by the god Zeus in Hesiod, of human justice ruled by the personified abstract principle of Eunomia in Solon).

The word Εὐνομία appears first in the *Od.* 17.487, "a passage strongly reminiscent of Hes. *Op.* 249-55" (so West ad Hes. *Theog.* 902) where gods in concealed identity visit certain mortals to test their hospitality and to discover their ἔθρες or εὐνομία. In Hesiod, Dysnomia is sister of Ate and daughter of Eris (*Theog.* 226-30), while in *Theog.* 902 Εὐνομία is one of the three Horai, daughter of Themis and Zeus, and sister of Dike and Eirene. This Hesiodic genealogy had a lasting influence on the poetry up to the fifth century, cf. adesp. *PMG* 1018b6-7, *Pind. Ol.* 9.15f. and 13.6-9, *Bacchyl.* 15.54f., but Alcm. *PMG* 64 offers an alternative genealogy where Τύχη is called Εὐνομίας κτε καὶ Πειθώς ἄδελφα καὶ Προμαθής θυγάτηρ.

As noted by Jaeger 1926=1966, 89, Solon's fr. 3 has two clearly distinct components that recall Hesiod's contrast of the just and the unjust city: the negative part (II.1-32) where what is brought to the city by injustice is described, and the positive part (II. 33-39), where the blessings of *eunomia* are exalted. However, the more 'modern' level of abstraction of Solon's *eunomia* and διονομία has to be underscored, comparing the mythological presentation of the two goddesses in Hes. *Theog.* 226-30 and 903 referred to above, which had included the traditional genealogy, cf. Manuwald 1989, 8f. (Adkins 1985, 124 overstates in my opinion the divine status and features of Solon's *eunomia*). As was well put by Meier 1980, 79f., Solon's eunomia is the fruit of a "religious realism", that transforms the conscience of the need for a solution of the disorder and of the aristocratic *hybris* and the optimism about the possibility of this solution into a divine principle of renewal and in the faith in divine assistance.
Already the Hesiodic Eirene-Dike-Eunomia are clearly personifications that hint at "social virtues which cannot be usefully practised by the individual in isolation, but if widespread make possible the collective life of the city" (so Andrewes 1938, 89), but the political value of the eunomia is explicit at least, in the archaic age, in Hom. Hymn 30.11 αὐτοὶ δὲ εὐνομίησι πόλιν κατὰ καλλιγύναια, Xenoph. 2.19 (where athletic achievements are said to add to the εὐνομία of the polis), Pind. Ol. 13.6 Εὐνομία ... βάδρον πολίων ἀσφαλές, Bacchyl. 13.186-9 Εὐνομία τε σαφρὼν, ὑθαλίας τε λέογχεν ἀστεά τ' εὐσέβεων ἀνδρῶν εὐ εἰρήνηα φιλάσφει, adesp. PMG 1018b 5-9 πέμπτε(ε) ... Εὐνομίαιν ... τ' ἀδελφάς Δίκαια καὶ ... Εἰράναν, πόλιν τε τάνδε βαθυφρόνων λελάθουσε συντυχιαν. Eunomia is also the title that according to Arist. Pol. 1307a1 and Str. 8.4.10(362) was given to the elegiac poem by Tyrtaeus, whose subject was obedience to the existing law and the loyalty to the Spartan kings, who are presented by Tyrtaeus as Sparta's guarantee to her claims on the land, since their authority would have sprung from Zeus' award to the sons of Heracles, and as the best reference point in a period of social discontent and fear for disorder in Spartan history (see on the poem Andrewes 1938, 95-102, and Wade-Gery 1944). Solon's ideal of Eunomia is not concerned with the city's past nor has the sense of a divine act as the one which established the Spartan order, and is certainly not equal to the idea of πειθαρχία, which probably had a strong relevance in Tyrtaeus' defence of the established order (cp. Soph. Ant. 672-6 ἀναρχικεῖς δὲ μείζον ὡς ἐστιν κακῶν. αὐτὴ πόλεις ἄλληςιν, ἢ ἰον ἀναστάτους οἱκος τίθησιν, ἢδε συμμάχου δορὸς τροπάς καταρρήγνυητο τῶν δ' ὀρθομεέων σύζει τά πολλά συμβαθῇ ἡ πειθαρχία). The term in later times was more often connected with the Spartan political and educational system (Hdt. 1.65.2 etc.), but there is evidence for a worship of Εὐνομία together with Εὐκλεία in Athens, which goes back at least to 400 B.C. (a temple of Εὐκλεία was one of the many Marathon dedications according to Paus. 1.14.5). For her depictions on vases see Shapiro 1993, 80-5.

As a political ideal, Solon's εὐνομία is still distinct from the principle of egalitarianism, the ἰσονομία (see above all fr. 29b.9, where Solon denies to have wanted the ἰσονομία of the land between poor and rich), though it anticipates some of its features (see above all ὑβριν ἄμαρτα, ἀναίνει ἠτῆς ἄνθεα): according to Meier 1970, 15ff. and 1980, 278-88 Solon's idea of eunomia is the premise to the idea of isonomia, and the latter the premise to the concept of demokratia.

32. εὐκοσμα καὶ ἄρτια πάντι ἀποφαίνει: for the combination of the two adjectives, see Hom. Od. 8, where after Odysseus' speech against Euryalus who had not spoken κατὰ κόσμον about his athletic virtue (179), Alkinoos apologises saying that nobody would really blame him, ὃς τις ἐπίστατο ἤσι φρεσὶν ἄρτια βάζειν (240).
Solon's line was imitated in Cleanthes' _Hymn to Zeus_ (CA fr. 1), ll. 18-9 σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσα ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θεῖναι, καὶ κοσμεῖν τάκοσμα.

ἄρτια: The adjective, from the root of the verb ἄφρεσκο (see Calame 1977, 216-8) is a favourite word and concept for Solon, see also l. 39 and fr. 5.5 and 8.4 which perfectly synthesises the political ideal of Solon as being in the middle between rich and poor, and trying to "fit" both classes (see fr. 31.9). See later Thgn. _IEG_ 946 ἄρτια πάντα νοεῖν, where, at any rate, the meaning appears to be simpler, virtually the same as δίκαιος, cf. van Groningen 1966, ad loc. As remarked by Treu 1955, 274-5, this adjective expresses an ideal of 'conformity' which is strongly opposed to the Homeric ideal of ἅπεροχον ἐμμεναι ἄλλων. Therefore, the phrases ἔσκοσμα καὶ ἄρτια l. 32 and ἄρτια καὶ πιεῦτα l. 39 themselves are emphasised by the ring composition that forms the frame of the hymn to Eunomia, and in both pairs ἄρτιος is the constant element expressing the idea of "conformity" to the same principle of an "ordered wisdom".

33. τοῖς δύκοις ἀμφιτίθισιν πέδας: πέδη is used only once in Homer, of the foot-hobbling of the horses in ll. 13.36 ἀμφι δὲ ποσι πέδας ἔβαλε χρυσείας; later usually with reference to men: e.g. Thgn. _IEG_ 539 οὖτος ἀνὴρ φίλε Κύρνη πέδας χαλκεύεται αὐτῷ. For the combination of πέδη to the verb, see Semon. _IEG_ 7.116 καὶ δεσμὸν ἀμφέθηκεν ἄρρηκτον πέδην, and Lycoph. _Alex._ 1344 τραχήλῳ ζεύγλαυν ἀμφιθείς πέδας.

34. τραχέα λειαύνει: presents the lowering of the over-powerful / over-rich people affected by κόρος to the level of the other citizens through the image of the flattening of the raggedness of a landscape. Cp. Pl. _Ti._ 66c λειαύνῃ ... τὰ τραχύθεντα.

παύει κόρον: Cf. besides l. 9 above, Sol. fr. 8 and note there. Greg.Naz. _Carm._ de se ipso 1319.1 γαστρὶ μὲν ὄβρυν ἐπαυσά κόρον. Anhalt 1993, 93 notes that Eunomia stops the insolence which in ll. 9f. was described as a threat for the banquet, and that such an association of Eunomia with festivity is taken up by Pind. fr. 52a.9ff., and Bacchyl. 13.186-9.

similar constructions cf., for instance, Asclep. Anth.Pal. 12.163.4 πειθοῦς ἀνθέα καὶ φιλής and Sol. 27.6 ad loc.


37. ἔργα διχοστασίας: a common periphrasis, see Sol. 1.16 and note there.

διχοστασίας: The same political use of the term in connection with civil strife is found in Thgn. IEG 78 ἄξιος ἐν χαλεπῇ Κύρνη διχοστασία, adesp.el. IEG *12 ἐν δὲ διχοστασία καὶ ὁ πάγκακος ἐλλαχε τιμῆς, Eur. TGF 173 ῥεῖος ἀνθρώπου γίγνεσθαι φιλεὶ πόλεμος ἐν ἀστάς, ἥν διχοστατῇ πόλις.


39. ἄρτια καὶ πινυτά: For the phrase see above, l. 32. πινυτος is an Odyssey-word, said of Penelope.
According to the testimony, Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 5.1, this fragment was the *incipit* of a political elegy where Solon would have stated his position as a μέσος πολιτισ between the opposite needs of the classes of the rich and of the poor who were δουλεύοντες τὰς ὀλίγοις, and therefore rebelled against οἱ γυνώμοι: after criticising both parties, he would have recommended them to stop with a common agreement the present φιλονικία (for the problem inherent in Aristotle's presentation, see Introd. to fr. 5). Sploesteter 1911, 18-34, has good remarks on the features of this elegy and its possible analogies with the thoughts of fr. 3, but his attempt to reconstruct a single poem including frs. 4+5.1+3+ 5.2-5 does not seem persuasive, because Solon likes to repeat the main ideas of his political program (see ad fr. 6).

1-3. γιγνώσκω καὶ ... ἐσορῶν γαίαν .. κλίνομενήν: γιγνώσκω+a nom. participle of ὁρῶ followed by an object (+acc. predicative participle) is quite common in epic, in the meaning of 'to identify at sight something/someone (as this or that)': e.g. *Iliad* 7.189 γνῶ δὲ κλίρου σήμα ἔδων; *Od.* 15.532 ἐγών γάρ μιν ἐσάντα ἴδον οἶων ἐόντα; see also *Hom. Hymn Dem.* 94f. οὐδὲ τις ἀνδρῶν εἰσορῶν γιγνώσκε (but I think we cannot assume, with Vox 1984, 51-6, that this last passage is the model of Solon, who would be paralleling his personal observations with the impossibility to recognise goddess Demeter disguised as an old woman: the evidence for an allusion is really too scanty).

γιγνώσκω means intellectual, objective acknowledgement, and here it is strongly connected with the visual element of ἐσορῶν (cp. *Iliad* 8.52=11.82 εἰσορῶν Τρώων τε πόλιν καὶ νήσως Ἀχαϊῶν) and with the subjective feeling expressed in the parenthetical second hemistich of 1. 1. The juxtaposition of the two perspectives is not only reinforced through the "slight anacolouthon" (so Linforth 1919, 178) which focuses on the first person of the *persona loquens*, instead of connecting the participle ὁρῶ with μοι as would be more natural, but also through the *apo koinou* construction of γαίαν, which is the object both of γιγνώσκω and of ἐσορῶν (I do not believe that the isolated γιγνώσκω was going to be completed, and its object expressed, somewhere else in the following lines, as Masaracchia 1958, 273 prefers to intend). The resulting implication is that 'it is enough to see (the city reclining, lying down) to realise and to feel pain'.

1. φρενός ἐνδοθεν ἄλγεα κεῖται: the final phrase adapts the common epic formula ἄλγεα+a form of πάσχειν at the end of a hexameter, but follows for the content the model above all of Hom. *Od.* 24.423 ἐνι φρέσι πένθος ἐκεῖτο and possibly of *Iliad* 24.522-3 ἄλγεα δ' ἐμπής ἐν θυμῷ κατακείσθαι ἐάσομεν (where the verb may mean
"to rest"). These Homeric passages could be something more than a formal model for Solon, because they both deal with paternal pains for the children, and Solon could exploit this connotation here, to imply that the depression he feels for his fatherland ranges among the close and intimate father-son feelings (so already Vox 1984, 53f.). As for φρένας ἐνδοθεν, it is paralleled by several epic lines where the adverbs ἐνδοθεν, ἐνδοθεν occur near a term for an organ (which syntactically is independent of the adverb) — see above all φρένας ἐνδοθεν, 4x in Od.

There are several passages of lyric poets that mention φρένας being affected by outside objects and emotions, and at least twice besides Solon φρήν is the location of negative, painful feeling (Mimn. 7.7, Thgn. IEG 387; cp. also Thgn. IEG 593, 657); cf. Sullivan 1988, 59f. For more general discussions of the identification of the φρήν, see Onians 1951, 23ff., Ireland-Steel 1975, 184.

2. πρεσβυτάτην ... γαίαν [']λαονίας In Hom. ll. 13.689 the Ionians mentioned at 1. 685 are equated with the Athenians, Bacchyl. 17.3 κούρως 'Ιάονιονην, 18.1-2 βασιλεύ τάν ... 'Αθηνάν, τών ἀβραβίων ἄναξ 'Ιώνων (cp. also ll. 15), Aesch. Pers. 178 Ιαῶνων γῆν ἀχεται πέρσαι θέλων (564 διὰ ... 'Ιαῶνων χέρας), Ar. Ach. 104 'Ιαονιᾶ, 106 'Ιαονίας (the only uses of the term for Athenians in Aristophanes, see Sommerstein ad loc).

We seem to have here for the first time the tradition that Asia Minor had been colonised from Athens (by Neleus the son of the Athenian king Codrus according to Hdt. 9.97, cf. 1.146f.): the idea that 'Ιαονίας is a specifying genitive, and not a partitive one (cautiously prospected by Vox 1984, 50), or even the correction of 'Ιαονίας in 'Ιαονίαν (Richards 1893, 210) cannot be taken in consideration, since there is no reason in the context for calling Athens 'Ιονία' rather than 'the oldest land of Ιονία'.

πρεσβυτάτην may be ambiguous in meaning: both "the oldest" and "the most important" — the latter being a linguistically possible nuance that Solon would let surface, as a propagandistic evaluation, though from an objective perspective Athens could hardly be considered the most important Ionic city at the beginning of the 6th century.

For Athens' role as mother city of Ιονία, cp. Hdt. 5.97.2 (on the Ionic revolt of 499) and Thuc. 1.6, 1.12.4, 1.95.1-2. The claim seems to have a kernel of truth but it was inflated later, in the time of the Delian League for the Athenian propaganda purposes: cp. above all Pherecydes the Athenian and Panyassis, who respectively maintained that the Athenian colonisation of Asia Minor had started from Ephesus or from Miletus. Cf. Sakellariou 1958, 27, Barron 1962, 6 and n. 40, Barron 1964, 46-48, Mazzarino 1966, 1, 92, Alty 1982, 12 n. 8, 9 n. 46, Parker 1987, 205-7, Hornblower ad Thuc. 1.95.1.
No matter how the term was interpreted, as already remarked by Maharam 1993, 365f., its role was essential, because the antiquity of Athens was the objective reason why every Athenian, not only Solon, had to regret about the present situation of Athens.

3. κλινομένην: Blass 1892, 572 (approved by Richards 1893, Kenyon in the Berlin ed. of Ath. Pol. of 1903 and O.C.T. 1920, Mathieu in the Paris ed. of 1922, Rhodes 1985, 123 and Chambers 1990, 162) read καλωμένην in the papyrus, but the reading of Wilcken 1895, 620f., κλινομένη, which Kenyon considered not impossible, has been accepted in all the modern editions of the text after Linforth. Indeed καινομένη would introduce too hard a metaphor, since καίνω is never said of a land anywhere else.

Almost the same problem applies to the easy emendation in καλωμένην 'being burnt', 'in flames' (printed in the text by Hudson-Williams), that would seem to be paralleled by Hes. Theog. 693f. ἀμφὶ δὲ γαία φερέωτος ἐσμαράγδε καλομένη (where however καὶςθαί is a first degree metaphor, since the earth is really burning because of Zeus' thunder), and above all by Lys. 33.7 (ap. Dion. Hal. Lys. 30): τίν ποτὲ γνώμη χρώμενοι (scil. the Spartans) καινομένη τῇ 'Ελλάδα περιορῶν. Lysias' passage is certainly crucial, because it may involve an allusion to Solon's (cp. περιορώσων and Solon's ἔσπορων), but even in Lysias the hyperbole looked excessive to the editors: Dobree had emended καινομένη in καλωμένη, and as soon as the papyrus of the Ath. Pol. was published, Kem 1918, proposed to correct Lysias' καινομένη in κλινομένη. Nowhere else Solon presents the consequences of the strife so fiery as to justify the image of the land being 'burned' and, objectively, the internal rivalries of the aristocratic families or the social contrast of Solon's time could hardly drive the Attic land to look like a burned territory.

The most economic solution is to opt for κλινομένην: the metaphor "to lie down"="to be oppressed/depressed" (parallel to the technical expression of boxing εἰς γόνυ πεσείν: see 'Simon'. Anth. Plan. 24) is a more moderate image (cf. Maharam 1993, 362), and better fits the real conditions of Athens. The same verb is also attested at least in Aesch. Pers. 929-30 'Ασία δὲ χθόν ... ἐπὶ γόνυ κέκλειται, and in Thgn. IEG 856 ὧσπερ κεκλιμένη ναῦς παρά γῆν ἐδραμεν (where the meaning 'to go off course', 'to loose one's own balance' seems more probable than 'to be inclined': cf. Masaracchia 1958, 274). Other parallels (unexplored so far for Solon) for this kind of metaphor about a city are Hdt. 6.27 ἢ ναυμαχίη ὑπολαβοῦσα ἐς γόνυ τῇ πόλιν ἐβαλε (for the equivalence of εἰς γόνυ πεσείν and κλινοσθαί εἰς τὴν γῆν, cf. Phryn. Praep. soph. 71.11ff.), Euph. CA 18=Etym. Magn. 687.33 ὁ δὲ Εὐφρίων οὐκ ὁρθῶς λέγει περὶ τοῦ Διονύσου, ὥστε ταῖς γνακέιαις τάξεισιν ἐγκελεστάναι ἐπὶ τὴν Εὐρυμέδοντος πόλιν, τούτεστι τὸ "Αργος (cp. SH 418.41 πρήμιξε δορυσσοῦ;)
Nonn. 47.668 Ἅργος ἑπερσε καὶ ἐπρήμαξε Μυκήνας (for the equivalence of πρημαχήναι and εἰς γόνυ κλιθῆναι, cf. Zonar. 1585 T.).
5 G.-P.² (4b-c W.²)

Ll. 2-5 of this fragment are quoted by Aristotle, Ath. Pol. 5.3 as evidence of Solon's μεσότης, just after the quotation of fr. 4 (cf. also Pol. 4.1296a18-20). Aristotle continues to say that Solon blamed Athens' situation on the rich, καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτίαν τῆς στάσεως ἀνάπτει τοῖς πλουσίοις; διὸ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐλεγείας δεδοκέναι φησὶ 'τινὶ τε φιλ[οπλο]υτίαν τινὶ θ' ὑπερβαίναν', ὥς δὲ ταύτα τῆς ἐξής ἐνεπτύωσις (Ath. Pol. 5.3.12). However, the surviving quotation fails to prove the point of Solon's μεσότης. This may be a hint that the source of the Ath. Pol. gave at this point other poems of Solon which might have proved his μεσότης, but Aristotle cut the number of the instances (Rhodes, Ath. Pol. ad loc). Indeed, we are promised ποιήματα: the best attested and oldest meaning for ποιήμα is (short) composition embodying poetic features and above all the μέτρον (cf. Arist. Rh. 1408b30), often opposed in the Hellenistic and Roman period to ποίημα which is the large poem with a σύστασις τῶν πραγμάτων (Arist. Poet. 1447a7f.); cf. Dahlmann 1953 and Greenberg 1961. As for our passage, Arist. Ath. Pol. 5.3, we can assume that the later attested meaning of ποιήματα=distichs was already in use in the fourth century (following Ardizzoni 1953, 47 n. 9, who quotes Varro, Parm. 398 Bücheler distichon epigrammation vocant poema), or, preferably, we can share Rhodes' suggestion that Aristotle would take the word without alternating it from his source, though, in abbreviating, he quoted only one of the 'small poems' he found in it.

The other testimony, Plutarch, Sol. 14.2, would seem to solve the problem of Solon's μεσότης. Referring to the situation before his election to archonship, Plutarch says that he feared the φιλοχρηματίαν of the poor, the ὑπερβαίναν of the rich. According to Manfredini-Piccirilli 1977, 179 Plutarch would do a lapsus memoriae in attributing one fault to the poor the other to the rich, because, they state, in Aristotle the rich are most probably charged with both faults. However, the text of Aristotle, as we saw, speaks about Solon's favouring the μεσότης, and therefore might be understood also by later ancient authors as implying a charge against the poor for their φιλοχρηματία: either Plutarch is mislead by Aristotle or, similarly to Aristotle (according to Rhodes' interpretation), he cuts out of his quotation the relevant poems for the point of μεσότης.

On the basis of the surviving evidence, Solon's views in our fragment coincide with what he had identified in other elegies as the source of the disastrous situation of the polis (at least before his archonship): the comparison of fr. 3.7-10 δὴμον θ' ἤγεμονων ἀδίκος ὕδως, ὀσίν ἐτόιμον ὦβροι ἐκ μεγάλης ἀλγείᾳ πολλὰ παθεῖν· οὗ γὰρ ἐπίστανται κατέχειν κόρον οὐδὲ παρούσας εὐφροσύνας κοσμεῖν δαίτος ἐν ἀρχῇ, and of fr. 8.3-4 τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὦβριν, ὅταν πολὺς ὀλβὸς ἐπηται

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with the ll. 2-3 of the present fragment ἴμεῖς δ’ ἡσυχάσαστες εἰς ἄρει παράντος ἤτορ, οἱ πολλοὶ ἄγαθοὶ ἐς κόρον ἧμᾶς ἤσσατε, suggests that in all these lines the common denominator is the relation between the κόρος of people who are already rich and its consequence (ὑβρίς) in a civic context. Already Linforth 1919, 179 correctly remarked that Solon had in mind the quality of μεγαλοφροσύνη which characterises those rich citizens who can combine the qualities of μέγαν νόον and καρπερον ἤτορ: admirable in instances of restrained conduct but deemed dangerous if exercised with no restraint over their pursuits, and above all when not keeping their appetites under control.

1. τὴν φιλοχρηματίαν τὴν ἑπερηφανίαν: τὴν τε φι[...] [...] πιαν is the papyrus reading of the first of the words, which were recognised as a Solonian pentameter by Jackson and Mayor 1891, 107. The reconstruction is based upon Plut. Sol. 14.2 δεδουκὼς τῶν μὲν τὴν φιλοχρηματίαν, τῶν δὲ τὴν ὑπερηφανίαν; cp. also Diod. 7.12.5, of the oracle given to Lucurgus, ἀ φιλοχρηματία Σπάρταν ἀλεί, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδέν. Other proposals for the papyrus lacuna include φιλαργυρίαν (Kenyon), φιλοπλουτίαν (Blass, Chambers 1965, 34: φιλοπλουτίαν does not fit the metre, and if it is the correct reading, this might suggest that possibly Aristotle was quoting from memory here). Solon, 30.21 uses φιλοκτήμων in a negative context: on the compounds with φιλο-, see the discussion by Cozzo 1991, 29-30, 91-2, 94-6.

From the context in Aristotle and Plutarch we can safely infer that the two accusatives would have been introduced in Solon's text by a perfect tense of a verb of fear, pointing to the firmness of Solon's persuasion.

ὑπερηφανίαν: new. Cp. 3.36-7 (Ἑμοῖα) ὑπερήφανα τ’ ἔργα πράτων. The wealthy are censured in Ar. Plut. 559-64, among other things, for arrogance. The two vices are distinguished by Plato, Resp. 391c5 ὡστ’ ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ νοσήματε δύο ἐναντίω ἄλληλοι, ἀνελευθερίαν μετὰ φιλοχρηματίας καὶ αὖ ὑπερηφανίαν θεῶν τε καὶ αὐθρόπων.


Solon's ἰσουχία represents the restraint of spirit in the face of success, an idea that can be already found in Odyssey 18.142 where Odysseus advises Amphinomus that one
should hold the gifts of the gods silently, συγγρη, and not to do ἀτάσθαλα as the suitors, and in Hesiod, Op. 119 where the golden race is enjoying many goods ἡσυχιος in contrast with the men of the silver race who suffered ills, as they could not keep from wanton ὑβρίς (cf. Dickie 1984, 84-5).

ἐνὶ φρεσί φαρτερόν ἦτορ: A — possibly Solonian — fusion of various epic expressions, as Hom. Il. 17.111 ἐν φρεσίν ἄλκιμον ἦτορ, Hom. Od. 15.486 ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θυμὸν ὄρνας, Od. 20.38 θυμὸ스 ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμηρίζει, Od. 21.87 θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσιν ὄριετον; cp. Thgn. IEG 646 κείμενος ἐν μεγάλη θυμὸν ἀμηχανίη, Panyas. PEG 17.13 ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θυμὸν ἀέρησι. For ἐνὶ φρεσὶ as a local dative, Aesch. Supp. 606 with Johansen and Whittle ad loc; for phrases mentioning φρένες in a positional relationship to another organ, as seen in Hom. Il. 8.202 ἐν φρεσὶ θυμὸς, Tyrt. 7.17 ἄλκιμον ἐν φρεσὶ θυμὸν, Thgn. IEG 122 δόλον δ’ ἐν φρεσὶν ἦτορ, Aesch. Cho. 831-2 ἐν φρεσίν καρδίαν, see Ireland-Steel 1975, 190.

The adjective καρτερός included both positive and negative qualities (for the latter see above all, Hom. Il. 5.757 where the term chastises the deeds of Ares as an ἄφρων who ὅς οὐ τινα οἶδε θέμιστα, or 5.872 for Diomedes' violent act that Zeus is asked to deplore, οὖ νεμεσίζῃ ὄρων τάδε καρτερά ἐργα; besides e.g. Aesch. Supp. 612, PV 212), but in the Homeric poems it almost always synthesised the positive values of heroic 'strength' and 'courage'. Here, in combination with the verb ἡσυχάζω, Solon makes it clear that he is thinking only of its negative connotations: another instance of the reshaping of the epic values by the means of Homeric expressions, for which see, for instance, ad 1.3-4, 3.9, 7.5.

3. ἀγαθῶν ἐς κόρον [vetica]: Cf. Tyrt. 8.10 ἀμφοτέρων δ’ ἐς κόρον ἠλάσσατε, Hdt. 2.124.3 ἐς πᾶσαν κακότητα ἠλάσσαι, and for the phrase ἀγαθῶν ... κόρον, Aesch. Ag. 381f. (fully quoted above ad 3.9) οὗ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐπαλξίς πλοῦτου πρὸς κόρον — if πλοῦτου is connected with κόρον, as some recent scholars (Fraenkel, Bollack) agree, and not with ἐπαλξίς. Besides Fraenkel ad loc., cf. Dopchie 1968.

4. ἐν μέτριοισι: In Solon as in other early archaic poets (cf. Sol. 14.2, Thgn. IEG 335, Phoc. 12, Pind. Pyth. 11.52) μέτριος and its related concept μέσος express the notion of moderation, reflective attitude in a political content, which will produce in fourth century sources a concept of the polis as a community of οἱ μέσοι, the middle class (e.g. Eur. Supp. 244-5: ... ἱ ἐς ἐσῶ σὺζει πόλεις, κόσμον φυλάσσουσι' ὁντιν' ἄν τᾶξιν πόλις; see further Morris 1996).

μεγαν νόοιν: this very combination of words is usually attested for the mind of gods: see Hom. Hymn Dem. 37 τόφρα οἱ (Demeter) ἐλπὶς ἐθέλε γε μέγαν νόον ἀχυμένης περ, Hes. Theog. 36-7 ταῖ Δι πατρὶ ... τέρπουσι μέγαν νόον ἐντὸς
'Ολύμπου, Πίνδ. Πυθ. 5.122 Δίος τοι νόσι μέγας κυβερνά δαίμον' ἀνδρῶν φίλων, Theoc. Ἡδ. 30.30 θέσις ὡς καὶ Δίος ἐσφάλε μέγαν νόσι; differently (but still with a very positive value) only in Πίνδ. Νεμ. 6.5 ἀλλά τι προσφέρομεν ἐμπαν ἡ μέγαν νόσι ἡμαρ φύσιν ἀδελφάτοις.

However, in parallel with the case of καρτέραν (see ad 1.2), we can guess that Solon's use of the expression possibly balanced this highly positive connotation of the phrase (or of the similar idiomatic expressions μέγα/μεγάλα φρονέιν or μεγαλοφρονέω, which most often in epic and in later Greek positively describe the greatness of mind of the heroes) against the negative meaning of 'arrogance' which the μεγαφρον- expressions are sometimes attested to have had in the Greek prose writers at least from the fifth century onwards, and which most probably already surfaces both here and in fr. 12.3: cf. Bissinger 1966, 307.

5. πεισόμεθα(α): The first person plural was thought by nineteenth century scholars to be proof of Solon's being a προστάτης τοῦ δήμου. However, as Masaracchia 1958, 276 lastly pointed out, far from being so, Solon rather uses some kind of powerful rhetoric in his attempt to check the greedy rich: the plural would better convey the idea of isolation the rich are going to face in relation to all the other Athenians.

οὖθ' ύμιν ἄρτια ... ἔσεται: the arrogant rich are driving Athens to an instability that might lead to tyranny (not mentioned in the text) and that certainly cannot be 'suitable' to their interests. By using the key-term of his euνομία in its basic sense (ἄρτια from ἀφρόσκω), Solon manages to imply that also the 'future' interests of the ruling class he tries to rebuke coincide with his own project for 'conformity' and kosmos inside the polis (see ad 3.32, 39, and ad 7).
The whole fragment with small changes is found in the Theognidean corpus, II. 315-8. It appears to be a variation of the ideas of Solon's fr. 1 (see above all, II. 3f., 7-10, 67-70) describing the destruction which derives from human wealth as well as the instability of it (note also the same *polyptoton* in frs. 1.76 and 6.4).

However, Solon's criticism of the wealthy is in the strongest terms here, because, unlike fr. 1, which, somehow, 'offered' to the audience a theory of ethics, this fragment does not have such an 'ambition', but looks more connected to the specific and urgent events of Athens.

1. *πολλοὶ ... πλουτοῦσι κακοὶ, ἄγαθοὶ ... πένυνται*: it is difficult to ascertain the meaning of the distinction ἄγαθοι and κακοὶ. One possibility is that it points here expressly to the 'technical' opposition between nobles and non-nobles (as a consequence of the developments taking place in pre-democratic Athens of Solon's age, many of the nobles, who traditionally in the aristocratic society of archaic Greece had also been the wealthier class, had become poor, and many *non-agathoi* rich, see e.g. Mitchell 1997, 143-4): in this case, as is clear from II. 2f., Solon would number himself among the nobles who were poor and would be rejecting the new wealth of the non-ἄγαθοι in favour of aristocratic *arete*. It is much better to believe that the opposition points at the ethical distinction between, on one side, people who because of their merits and qualities would deserve to be rich (the 'men of account') but are not, and, on the other, the unworthy, evil people who, nonetheless, gain fortunes (a less historically plausible paradox provoked by the unforeseen characteristics of the destiny). I agree with Donlan 1968, 112f. that the latter possibility is better, because, after all, in the other poetic fragments preceding the reforms, Solon prefers to avoid the use for the ruling aristocrats of the term ἄγαθοι which, though being technical, could still imply the original positive value, and hints at the distinction between the powerful and leading class on one side, and the rest of the *demos* on the other side, in terms of possessing or not power and wealth (wealth which usually has negative connotations): frs. 3.7ff., 7.3, 8, 5.2-3; also fr. 12.3 ἄνδρῶν ... μεγάλων, fr. 31.4 μείζονς καὶ βιαν ἀμείνονές; see Donlan 1973, 366-7, n. 4. On the meaning of ἄγαθοι/κακοὶ in the poems following the reforms, where the dichotomy appears more technically to apply to the aristocratic (and usually rich) class and to the non-nobles, cf. Introd. to frs. 29-29h.

What is more important, in my opinion, is that in this fragment Solon surely 'turns around' the social values underlying this terminology (rich-ruling-aristocratic class=virtuous people) and presents himself as an 'anomalous' *agathos*, namely a non-rich one, and at the same time dramatically disjoins his own new idea of ἀρετή from...
wealth: contrast Solon’s attitude to Hesiod, Op. 313 πλούτῳ δ’ ἀρετῆ καὶ κύδος ὄπισε (cf. Fränkel 1975, 232). Theognis appears to have gone far beyond in this direction, since he registers the economical emergency of the new (namely not aristocratic) rich as an ‘unnatural’ possession of wealth by evil people: 57-8 οἱ δὲ πρὶν ἐσθαλῷ νῦν δειλῶ, 683 πολλοὶ πλούτου ἔχουσιν αἰδριεῖς: οἱ δὲ τὰ καλὰ ἁγιώτατα χαλεπῇ τείρομενοι πενήθι (321 ... κακῷ ἀνδρὶ βλῶν καὶ πλούτον ὁπάσσῃ, 749-52 ὀππότ’ ἀνήρ δόκις καὶ ἀτάσθαλος, ... ὑβρίζῃ πλούτῳ κεκορμημένος, οἱ δὲ δίκαιοι τρίχονται χαλεπῇ τείρομενοι πενήθι: 1061-2 οἱ μὲν γὰρ κακότητα κατακρύβαντες ἔχουσιν πλοῦτῳ, ταῦ δ’ ἀρετῆν οὐλομένη πενηθί (see Cerri 1968, and Lahr 1992, 19-23). See later Bacchyl. 1.160 πλοῦτος δὲ καὶ δειλάσθαι ἀνθρώπων ὀμηλεί, 10.49-51 οἶδα καὶ πλοῦτον μεγάλαν δύνασθαι, ὁ καὶ τί[ῶν ἄχρεον τίθησαι] χρηστον, Eur. TGF 247 τί δ’ οὐκ ἂν εἶ ἁρμονίας ὀλβίος γεγοσ.; TGF 641 πλουτεῖς, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα μὴ δόκει ξυνείναι· ἐν τῷ γὰρ ὀλβίῳ φαυλότης ἐνέστη τις, πενία δὲ σοφάν έλαχε διὰ τὸ συγγενεῖς, Ar. Plut. 502-4 πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὄντες πλούτουσι πονηροί, ἀδίκως αὐτὰ ξυλεξάμενοι· πολλοὶ δ’ ὄνετες πάνω χρήσις πράττομε κακῶς καὶ πεπίσαν, Men. Kol. 43 οὐθεῖς ἐπλύτασαν ταχέως δίκαιος ὄν, fr. 84 K.-Th. πλοῦτος δὲ πολλῶν ἐπικάλυμμ’ ἐστίν κακῶς, Crates, PGC 48 spoke of the man who had become rich through wrong-doing, ἀδικοχρήματος. Compare also the type of class/status expressions in Eur. TGF 326 ἄρ’ οἴσθ’ οὐδένεχ’ οἱ μὲν ἐγνείες βροτῶν πένητες ὄντες οὐδέν ἀλφάνους’ ἐτί, οἱ δ’ οὐδέν ἦσαν πρόσθεν, ὀλβίοι δὲ νῦν, δόξαν φέρονται τοῦ νομίσματος χάριν καὶ συμπλεκόντες σπέρμα καὶ γάμους τέκνων; δούναι δὲ πᾶς τις μᾶλλον ὀλβίῳ κακῷ πρόθυμός ἐστιν ἡ πένητα κάγαθῳ. κακὸς δ’ ὁ μὴ ἔχων, οἱ δ’ ἔχοντες ὀλβίοι. Cercid. fr. 1.1-11 Livrea=1.41-50 Lomiento (with the note ad loc.)

πέ νονταί: With the meaning ‘to toil’ in Homer, here for the first time ‘to be poor or needy’; see later Aesch. Ag. 962, Eur. Hec. 1220, etc.

2-3. οὐ διαμεισφόμεθα τῆς ἀρετῆς τῶν πλούτων: The plural of the first person is here most probably a mere variety for the singular of fr. 1 — the inclusion of the audience as subject of this choice would not find any sure parallel in Solon’s fragments. For the medium form, cf. Sol. 7.2, 23.6 and Tyrt. 19.6.

ἀρετή (probably still in a martial sense) and richness are two prerequisites for happiness commonly considered to be joined — concretely combined e.g. in Homeric Hymns: 15.9-20.8 οἶδον δ’ ἀρετῆν τε καὶ ὀλβίον. For the idea, cp. Solon’s statement at 1.7-8, Sapph. PLF 148 ὁ πλούτος ἄνευ τ’ ἀρέτας οὐκ ἀσίνης πάροικος ἄ δ’ ἀμφοτέρων κράσις ἐδιαμοιάζει έξει τό ἄκρον, adesp. PMG 961 οὐ μήν ποτε τᾶν ἀρέταν ἀλλάξομαι ἄντ’ ἀδίκου κέρδους, Thgn. IEG 149-50 χρήματα μέν δαίμων καὶ παγκάκω ἀνδρὶ δίδωσιν Κύρν’ ἀρετῆς δ’ ὀλίγους ἀνδράσι μοιρ’
επεται, Callim. Jov. 95-6 οὐτ' ἀρετής ἀτερ ὄλβος ἐπίσταται ἄνδρας ἀέξειν οὐτ' ἀρετή ἄφενοι· ὀλδον δ' ἀρετήν τε καὶ ὄλβων, with McLennan ad loc.

The reading of Plutarch, αὐτοῖς, has been more often accepted than τοῦτος of the codd. of Theognis and Stobaeus. Certainly, when a list of items precedes, οὗτος commonly resumes the last of them (what in our case would be absurd). If, however, we consider that the polemical target on which Solon focuses are the bad-rich of the first hemistich of 1.1 (here as several times elsewhere in Solon), and suppose that ἄγαθοι δὲ πένωνται consequently has a semi-parenthetic marginal relevance, the reading τοῦτος (accepted by West) may not be desperate at all. It would have the emphatic connotation of contempt that οὗτος often has, in order to refer to the bad-rich who are the real enemies of Solon (cp. the use of οὗτος with reference to the opponent or the hostile party in Attic juridical or political prose).

3-4. The idea of virtue as the safest possession is often paralleled in the fifth century: cf. Bacchyl. 3.90-1 ἀρετᾶς γε μὲν οὐ μινῦθει βροτῶν ἀμα σφύματι φέγγος (most probably opposed not only to youth but also to εὐφροσύνα δ’ οὐ χρυσός 1.87 as a non-permanent possession: see Maehler ad loc.), and 13.176 Ἀρετᾶ ... ἐμπεδον ... στρωφάται, Soph. TGF 201d ἀρετῆς βέβαιαι δ’ εἶσιν αἱ κτήσεις μόνης, Eur. El. 939-44 ηὐχείς τις εἶναι τοῖς χρήμασι σθένων· τὰ δ’ οὖδέν εἰ μή βραχὺν ὀμιλῆσαι χρόνον. ἢ γάρ φύσις βέβαιος, οὐ τὰ χρήματα. ἢ μὲν γὰρ αἰεὶ παραμένουσα αἱρεί κακά· ὁ δ’ ὄλβος ἁδίκως καὶ μετὰ σκαίων ξυνῶν ἐξέπτατ’ οἴκων, συμκρόν ἀνθήσας χρόνον, TGF 53 οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐν κακοῖσιν εὐγένεια, παρ’ ἄγαθοι δ’ ἄνδρῶν, TGF 542 οὔτοι νόμισμα λευκὸς ἄργυρος μόνον καὶ χρυσὸς ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ κάρετὴ βροτοῖς νόμισμα κεῖται πάσην, ἢ χρῆσθαι χρεῶν, TGF 734 ἀρετῇ δὲ καὶ θάνη τις οὐκ ἀπόλλυται, ζῇ δ’ οὐκέτ’ οὗτος σώματος· κακοῖς δὲ ἄπαντα φροῦδα συνθαλόνθ’ ὑπὸ χθόνος, TGF 1030 ἀρετὴν μέγιστον τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπων καλῶν, TGF 1029 οὖκ ἐστὶν ἀρετῆς κτήμα τιμώτερον· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε δούλων οὔτε χρημάτων οὔτ’ εὐγενείας οὔτε θωπείας ὅχλου. ἀρετὴ δ’ οὖσιν περ μᾶλλον ἂν χρῆσαι θέλησι, τοσοῦτοι μείζων αὐξεῖται τελουμένη, TGF 1066 ἢ τοῖς ἐν οὐκ χρηματὶς λεικυμέθα, ἢ δ’ εὐγενεία καὶ τὸ γενναῖον μένει; besides Lucian, Anth.Pal. 10.41.1-2 πλούτος ο τῆς ψυχῆς πλούτος μόνος ἐστὶν ἀληθῆς· τάλα δ’ ἐχει λύπην πλεῖστα τῶν κτεάνων.

Solon's statement is not a banality to be taken for granted, because the opposite notion that wealth guarantees and maintains one's social standing — otherwise reduced as a result of lack of it is also widely expressed. Cf. Alc. PLF 360.2 χρήματ’ ἄνηπ, πεύχρος δ’ οὖδ’ εἰς πέλετ’ ἔσλος οὖδε τίμιος (Solon may have been in a polemical strain with the perspective of the persona loquens in Alcaeus' fragment, some Aristodamus: he says that a man is one's richness; Solon maintains that richness and the
man are well distinguished), Scol. PMG 910 οὐδὲν ἦν ἀρα τάλα πλήν ὁ χρυσός, Thgn. IEG 621 πᾶς τις πλοῦσιον ἄνδρα τίει, άτειε δὲ πεντχρόν, Bachyl. 10.49 (quoted ad l. 1), Soph. TrGF 354.6-7 έμοι δ’ οὐδεῖς δοκεῖ εἶναι πένης ὄν ἄνοσος, άλλ’ άει νοεῖν, Eur. El. 37-8 χρημάτων δὲ δὴ πένητες, ένθεν πηγένει’ ἀπόλλυται, Phoen. 442 πένης γάρ οὐδέν εὐγενῆς ἄνηρ, TGF 95 άλλ’ οὐδέν ηὔγενεια πρὸς τὰ χρήματα, τὸν γὰρ κάκατον πλοῦτος εἰς πρωτόνς ἀγεῖ, and also later, Crantor Sol. SH 345 οὐκ ἐστὶ πενίας οὐδέν ἀθώτερον ἐν τῷ βίῳ σύμπτωμα, καὶ γὰρ ἄν φύσει σπουδαίος ἦς, πένης δὲ, κατάγελως ἔσθι.

3. έμπεδον α’ εἰ: at the beginning of the line also in Hom. Il. 16.107 (in a different position also in 15.683), and Thgn. IEG 1084 ἐμπεδον αἶεν.

4. χρήματα δ’ ἄνθρωπων ἄλλοτε ... ἔχει: Thgn. IEG 918 χρήματα δ’ ἄνθρωπων (in the preceding hemistich of the pentameter).

For the gnomic notion of the instability of wealth, cf. Hes. Op. 326 παύρων δέ τ’ ἐπὶ χρόνον ὀξός ὅπηδει, Thgn. IEG 157-8 Ζεύς γάρ τοι τὸ τάλαυτον ἐπιρρέπει ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, ἄλλοτε μὲν πλουτεῖν, ἄλλοτε μηδὲν ἐχεῖν, Pind. Pyth. 3.106 ὀξός {δ’} οὐκ ἐς μάκρον ἄνθρωπον ἔρχεται κτλ., Men. fr. 116.1 K.-Th. περὶ χρημάτων λαλεῖς, ἀββαίαν πράγματος, fr.ep.ad. CA 4.9-15 ἄλλοτε γὰρ ἄλλοις ὀξοὺ λάχος ἄνθρώπως· οἷς τοι πεσοῦσὶ δίκη, τοιῆς καὶ ὀξοὺ πεσοῦσι ἀμείβομενος ποτὲ μὲν τοῖς, ἄλλοτε τοῖσιν εἰς ἀγαθὸν πίπτει καὶ ἀφενῶν αὕτα τίθησεν πρόσθεν ἀναλβεῖον, εὐθειενέστα α’ ἀναλβεῖον τοῖς δυνάτης περιστρέφεται πτερύγεσσιν ὀξός ἐπ’ ἄνθρωπως, ἄλλον δ’ ἔξ’ ἄλλου ὑφέλει. That wealth — not only the unrighteous one — is short-lived is a common-place in tragedy, cf. Soph. TrGF 646.4 ἐν γὰρ βραχεὶ καθεῖλε κωλίγῳ χρόνῳ πάμπλουτον ὀξόν δαιμονος κακοῦ δώσις, ὀταν μετατη καὶ θεοὶ δοκή τάδε, Eur. Phoen. 558 ὀ δ’ ὀξός οὐ βέβαιος ἀλ’ ἐφήμερος, HF 511-2 ὀ δ’ ὀξός ὁ μέγας ... οὐκ οἶδ’ ὁτι βέβαιος ἐστι, El. 943 ὁ δ’ ὀξός ... ἐξέπτατ’ οῖκων, σμικρόν ἄνθρωπος χρόνων, TGF 618 τὸν ὀξόν οὐδὲν οὐδαμοῦ κρίνω βροτοῖς, ὑν γ’ ἐξαλείφει ρύοι ἢ γραφὴν θεὸς. As for its fast passing from one to another, cf. Eur. TGF 420.4 where vanishing wealth is called ὑπόπτερος, and TGF 518.2 τοῦ μὲν (πλοῦτο) ἰκεῖα πτέρυξ.

ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἐ’ χεῖ: Cf. Sol. 1.76 and note there.
The picture we draw from this poem can hardly be reconciled with the interpretations which have either celebrated Solon as a revolutionary leader championing the cause of the poor or criticised him for showing a paternalistic attitude towards demos. His objective was a more just, though still a stratified, society which sought to retain the co-operation of its élite: cf. Hornblower 1992, 228-9. As Solon puts it here, he gave as much as was sufficient to each of the groups in seventh- and sixth-century Athens (cf. Arist. Pol. 2.1274a15-18, who says that Solon only gave to the demos the very minimum of power), as his intentions were to preserve order and not to change the social position of either side.

1. δήμω ... ἐδωκα τόσον γέρας ... δόσον ἀπαρκεῖ: For the thought, cf. Eur. TGF 626.1 δήμω δὲ μήτη πἀν ἀναρτήσῃς κράτος μήτ' ἀδικώσῃς.

Literally γέρας means every kind of privilege, which someone has as an inherent feature of one's situation (old people, deceased or gods; in this case verbs of 'bestowing' are nowhere attested) or which someone is bestowed with because of one's social status; in this second case it either concerns the privileges of the kings, or of the military leaders, above all, the special share bestowed by the soldiers to the military leaders in the distribution of the booty or in similar cases (the most common verb of bestowing used is δίδωμι, as in Solon, both in the Iliadic occasions of division of the prey, cf. 1.123, 135, 138, 163, 276; 9.334, 367, and in the acknowledgement of Arete's kingship by the people in Od. 7.150). In this second meaning, which clearly better fits Solon's passage, γέρας always implies a kind of relationship in which the recipient (the leader of a group) is in a position of marked superiority to the donor (usually the group-members) — apart from the sarcastic parody of the equal gift-giving from beggar to beggar in Od. 20.297. For the etymology of the word, (probably Mycenaean in origin) see Chadwick-Baumbach 1963, 180, and Scheid-Tissinier 1994, 234-4. For the acquisitive heroic society, where γέρας is the material prize/rightful privilege from the standpoint of τιμή 'honour', which confers moral consideration to the one who possesses, see Riedinger 1976, and Bottin 1979.

Solon is inverting the Homeric organisation of sharing/redistribution by offering a geras not to a basileus 'king' or to an outstanding warrior or to a person of exceptional social standing, but to demos: as remarked by Anhalt 1989, 10 through this inversion of the donor and the recipient, Solon underscores his intention to distinguish the demos as an actor in the political process. I would also add a relevant detail of Solon's use of the Homeric cultural model, which Anhalt appears to have missed.
In by far the most numerous instances, the bestowing of the γέρας concerns the typical scene of the distribution of the booty, reflecting the 'tribal' use to put in common and afterwards dividing the spoils (cf. Borecki 1965, 12-4). But the premise of this distribution, and therefore of the bestowing of the γέρας, is obviously that something 'in common' exists to be distributed, as Achilles pointed out in II. 1.123-4 πῶς γάρ τοι δώσουσι γέρας μεγάθμοι Ἀχαιοί; οὕτε τί που ἴδιμεν ξινήσα κείμενα πολλά. Therefore, in this line Solon was also most probably implying (in order to cope with the dissatisfaction of the demos) that not only he had given the suitable γέρας to the demos (and not the leaders) but also that he, Solon, had put in common political rights, and started the distribution.

δόσσον ἀπαρκεῖ: For ἀπαρκεῖ, preferred by West, cp. Soph. El. 354 ἐπαρκοῦντος expressing also a sense of sufficiency, or Ant. 612 ἐπαρκέσει νόμος which is the only instance of the verb without an object as in Solon, but ἐπαρκέσει has the different meaning of 'will hold good' or 'endure'.

Besides, ἀπαρκεῖ (which was already conjectured by Koraes before the discovery of the Athenaion Politeia) is by far the most idiomatic verb in this meaning: cf. Aesch. Ag. 379 (see the substantial note by Fraenkel ad loc.), Pers. 474, Soph. OC 1769, Eur. TGF 892.4, Ar. PCG 474. Ziegler 1963, 656 (after Bergk) argues for a consecutive infinitive, rather than an indicative but I do not see the need for this.

2. ἐπορεύδαμεν = Hom. II. 5.335, where the participle is said of Diomedes 'leaning out to'. Lloyd-Jones (in Rhodes 1981, 172) interpreted 'not reaching out for it' (Solon would not be 'exposing himself' too much). However, here the recipient of the participle has to be the demos as it is understood from its opposition to ἀφελῶν with which it is connected by the οὔτε ... οὔτε: cf. also Vox 1984, 58. It is better to interpret, as Hudson-Williams 1926, 19 translates 'not handing out more than their due', in the sense which the verb has in the active voice and in tmesis in Hom. II. 5.224f. εἶ πέρ ἂν αὐτὲ Ζεῦς ἐπὶ Τυδείδη Διομήδει κόδος ὀρέξῃ.

3. χρήμασιν ... ἀγητοῖ: First in Solon with the instrumental or causal dative (aliter Theoc. 1.126 ἲν καὶ μακάρεσσιν ἀγητοῦ, where the dative is an indirect object). It is worth noting that Solon characterises the 'respectability' of the group opposed to demos (which was traditionally labelled by the technical term ἀγαθοῖ, see ad 6.1) purely in materialistic terms.

4. καὶ τοῖς ἐφρασάμην ... ἔχειν: For the use of the article as demonstrative in elegiac and lyric poetry, see e.g. Sol. 1.6, 1.58, Tyrt. 6.7, Thgn. IEG 33-4, 395, 871,
Pind. Ol. 6.75. For the syntax φράζω+infinitive, cf. Hom. Il. 9.347 in the sense of "to plan".


For the pattern, cf. Hom. Il. 19.133 ἐργον ἀεικές ἔχουσα; Hdt. 3.15.2 ἔχων οὐδὲν βίαν.


5. ἀμφιβαλῶν κρατερόν σάκος ἀμφιτέροισι: Compare Sol. 30.26-7 τῶν οὕνεκ' ἀλκήν πάντοθεν ποιούμενος ὡς ἐν κυσίν πολλάσιν ἐστράφην λύκος, and Sol. 31.8-9 ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων ὦσπερ ἐν μεταχειμῳ ὅριος κατέστην.

Though being formally dependent also on Hom. Il. 17.742 κρατερόν μένος ἀμφιβαλόντες, the shield-image was more probably reminiscent of Hom. Il. 3.334 (Paris)=16.135 (Patroclus) ἀμφὶ δὲ ἀρ' ὀμοίων βαλετο ἐξίφος ... ἐπείτα σάκος μέγα τε στιβαρῶν τε (pace van Effenterre 1977, 115-6, who maintains that σάκος alludes specifically to Ajax in the Iliad, whose σάκος is never called ἀσπίς). Jaeger observed that the use of the Homeric language shows that Solon felt he was a Homeric heroic warrior of his times, a protector of his people (most probably against internal political disaster and not against outsiders, as was proposed by Linforth 1919, 180). Furthermore, Solon's version of the Homeric image is surprisingly original as Solon covers with the shield not his shoulders but the two opposing factions, ἀμφιτέροισι, protecting one from the other. Solon's image constitutes a paradox also when compared to the Hoplite-tactics of his own time: ἔστιν evokes the image of the phalanx, (see Tyrt. 8.28-38, Ar. Vesp. 1081-3) but on this battlefield Solon stands alone: Loraux 1984, esp. 206, has many good points on the metaphor, see also Anhalt 1989, 129. I would add the remarkable absence of the mention of the sword, which was present in both the armouring scenes quoted above: Solon is armed to protect both existing parties, and not to kill any opponent.

Vian 1960, 275 proposes to read ἔστιν ἀντέστην, 'I opposed both parties, posing myself between them', and therefore 'covering myself with the shield'. However, Solon's line shows that his aim was not self defence (pace Rhodes 1981, 172-3) but, as the following line confirms, not to allow either of the two conflicting parties to prevail (cf. Masaracchia 1958, 284).

6. οὐδὲτέρους: Hom. Il. 14.18 has οὐδετέρως, οὐδέτερος is first found in Hes. Theog. 638, and [Sc.] 171. Cp. for the thought, Sol. 30.22-5 εἴ γὰρ ἤθελον ἃ τοῖς ἐναντίοισιν ἥμανεν τότε, αὕτης δ' ἃ τοῖσιν οὔτεροι φρασάιατο, πολλῶν ἀν
άνδρών ἦδ' ἔχρωθη πόλις, and see Eur. TGF 21 δοκεῖτ' ἂν οἰκεῖν γαῖαν, εἰ πένης ἀπας λαὸς πολιτεύοιτο πλουσίων ἀτερ; οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο χωρὶς ἐσθλὰ καὶ κακά, ἀλλ' ἐστι τις σύγκρασις, ὥστ' ἔχειν καλῶς. ἂ μὴ γὰρ ἐστι τῷ πένητι πλοῦσιος δίδωσιν ὃ δ' οἱ πλουτοῦντες οὐ κεκτήμεθα, τοῖσιν πένησι χρώμενοι τιμώμεθα.
With the opposition between demos, the whole body of the citizens (cf. Fortimessina 1956, quoted ad 3.7) and their chiefs, Solon had dealt with also in fr. 3.7. However the perspective from which Solon considers the leadership of Athens in this fragment is different from fr. 3. In fr. 3 the demos was stupidly being allured by wealth, and the leadership, which appeared to be rapacious and deliberately unrighteous, was the most negative pole of the opposition. Instead, in this fragment the leadership is not expressly told to be the worse element of the opposition, and though the conclusion that the citizens ought to follow their leadership is not drawn, it seems to be implied. A plausible explanation of this difference would be that fr. 8 belongs to a stage of Solon’s political action later than Eunomia and Solon’s archonship (cf. Ferrara 1954), or however a time when Solon was considering the dangers from an unruly demos no less than from an unruly noble-ruling class.

In Homer and in Hesiod hybris and aie are almost always connected with powerful and rich characters — for the variance of Solon with Hesiod in the sequence of the two factors, cf. ad fr. 1.12. In this fragment it is not sure at all that Solon is simply only concerned with the hybris of the leaders (pace Masaracchia 1958, 276, 286, and Ferrara 1964, 138). I agree with Santoni 1981, that Solon is most probably warning both classes, the demos and the leaders, not to exploit too much the situation and to lose the qualities of conformity/order (expressed with artios). Solon would first attest here the possibility that persons of the demos may be affected by hybris, when acquiring positions of olbos; taking evidently into consideration the increasing importance of the "new" mercantile wealth of Athens of his age, Aristotle, who was convinced that hybris, the exhibition of superiority, affects above all young and rich people (Rh. 2.1378b28), is very correct, when he 'glosses' the maxim first attested in Solon in connection, above all, with the "new rich" (Protr. fr. B4 During tiktet gat, wif pho ti pariwmia, koro mouv ubrin, apaitheusia de met' eixousias anoian, ktl., and Rh. 1391a14ff. diapherei de tois neosti kektimeneois kai tois palai tia heta tiv apanta mallon kai faulotera ta kakà echein tois neoploutous (wosper gat apaitheusia ploutou esti to neoplouton einai), ktl.

1-2. δήμος μήτε ... ανέθεις μήτε βιαζόμενος: The lines most probably were the model of Aesch. Eum. 526-8 μήτε ἀναρκτὸν βίον μήτε δεσποτούμενον αἰνήσεις, and 696-7 τὸ μήτ’ ἀναρχον μήτε δεσποτούμενον ἀστοῖς περιστέλλουσι βουλεύω σέβειν (where respectively the chorus and Athena warn against the danger of anarchy); cf. also Eur. TGF 626.1 δήμω δὲ μήτε πάν ἀναρτήσῃς κράτος μήτ’ αὖ κακώσῃς.
For ἄνεθείς, see Plut. Per. 11.4 μάλιστα τῷ δήμῳ τάς ἴνις ἄνεθι ὁ Περικλῆς ἐπολιτεύετο πρὸς χάριν.

σὺν ἴγεμόνεσσιν ἔποιτο: Hom. II. 12.87 and 13.801 ἃμ' ἴγεμόνεσσιν ἔποιτο.

2. ἄνεθείς: for a similar use of the verb, cf. above all Hdt. 2.129.3 τὸν λεών τετριμένον ἐς τὸ ἔσχατον κακοῦ ἄνεϊναι, and Eur. Andr. 727 ἄνειμένον τι χρῆμα πρεσβυτῶν γένος.

3-4. Cf. Sol. 3.5-10, 3.34 where the idea is expressed in a more general/absolute way. On the causal chain olbos-koros-hybris-ate, see 1.12-4 and 3.6-9, with notes ad locc. The kinship κόρος-ὑβρίς is stated in Thgn. IEG 153-4 τίκτει τοι κόρος ὑβρίν, ὅταν κακῷ ὀλβῷ ἐπιται ἀνθρώπῳ καί ῶτι μὴ νόσος ἀρτιος ἃ which reproduces Solon's passage with some changes and, in a different order, also in the oracle quoted by Hdt. 8.77 κρατεῖν Κόρον, "Ὑβριος ἵλον, and Pind. Ol. 13.10 cit. ad 3.6-8.

ὅταν ... ὀλβὸς ἐπιται ἀνθρώποις ὀπόσοις μὴ νόσος ἀρτιος ἃ: Cf. Αξιορ. CA 5.2-3 χῶρος οἰκία τυραννίς πλοῦτος ἵσχυς καλλονὰ ἀφρονος ἀνθρώπου τυχόντα καταγέλαστα γίνεται. For πόλις ὀλβὸς, cf. Sol. 29th2.
The testimony, Plut. Sol. 25.6, quotes this line while making a personal comment on Solon's decision to leave Athens for a long trip soon after completing his reforms, in order not to have to cope with the opposite complaints against his legislation provoked by the different needs of the various classes. However, we do not have to assume that this line necessarily reflects Solon's personal experience after the reforms, and comments on the different dissatisfied responses he had got from the Athenians.

In fact, in this line Solon may have also simply pointed out (programmatically) how difficult it was for him to be in the middle between rich and poor, and to try to satisfy both: see fr. 7 and the testimony of Arist. Ath. Pol. 5.1-2, who says that in the elegy beginning with fr. 4 and including fr. 5 Solon would have presented himself as a ruler who πρὸς ἐκατέρως (=rich and poor) ὑπὲρ ἐκατέρων μάχεται καὶ διαμφισβητεῖ. Solon was not interested in taking sides and acquiring personal friendships and political partnerships (which would also involve enmity towards the enemies of the side he would have chosen or particularly favoured, see e.g. Hom. II. 9.613-5 οὐδὲ τι σε χρῆ τὸν φιλέειν, ἵνα μὴ μοι ἀπέχθησαι φιλεοῦντι. καλὸν τοι σὺν ἐμοὶ τὸν κήδειν ὡς κ’ ἐμὲ κήδη).

ἐργασίαν ἐγὼ μεγάλοις: Hom. II. 10.282, Hdt. 1.14.4 μέγα ... ἔργον. ἐργα is not used by Homer but occurs in Hesiod (2x) and the Hymns.

πᾶσιν ἄδειν χαλεπῶν: A traditional characteristic of the archaic society is the importance of being positively considered among one's fellow citizens: apart from Solon's prayer in the beginning of the Elegy to the Muses, also Archil. IEG 133 warned that οὕτως αἰδοῖος μετ' ἄστων οὐδὲ περίφημοι θανῶν γίνεται. χάριν δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ χοῦ διώκομεν ὥν ζοοί, while Pind. Nem. 8.38 wished for himself to die ἄστοις ἀδῶν (for a fuller collection of passages see Lévy 1985, 58).

Solon's concession that the difficulty to please everyone arises out of ἐργασίαν ἐγὼ μεγάλοις gives place in Theognis to a trend of general and more negative thinking on common opinions and likings, cf. II. 23-4 πάντας δὲ κατ’ ἀνθρώπους ὄνομαστος· ἄστασιν δ’ οὕτω πᾶσιν ἄδειν δύναμαι. II. 25-6 οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς ... πάντεσσαν ἀνδάνει ..., II. 367-8-1184 α-β ... νόον ἄστων ὄστιν ἐχονουν· οὕτε γὰρ εὖ ἔρως ἀνδάνῳ οὕτε κακῶς. II. 801-4 οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων οὕτ’ ἔσσεται οὕτε πέφυκεν ὡς ἄστες πᾶσιν ἀδῶν δύσπετα εἰς Αἵδεως οὐδὲ γὰρ ὐς θυτοῖς καὶ ἀθανάτους ἀνάσσει. Ζεὺς Κρονίδης, θυτοῖς πᾶσιν ἄδειν δύναται; see also e.g. Bacchyl. 13.202-3 βροτῶν δὲ μύμος πάντεσσα μὲν ἐστὶν ἐπ’ ἔργοις, adesp. Anth. Plan. 84 παντὶ δ’ ἐπ’ ἔργῳ μύμος.
The tradition on Solon's trip to Egypt most probably derived from this short fragment or the poem it comes from. Plut. Sol. 26.1 connected this trip with Solon's ἀποδήμια after his legislation. The chronology of this trip is much debated. Hdt. 1.29 says that Solon travelled to Egypt, and was a guest of Amasis during his ἀποδήμια, the ten years he spent travelling abroad after the archonship — ostensibly for θεωρία, the pleasure of getting in touch with different peoples and cultures, but in reality to safeguard himself from the risk of being asked to change his Laws. But the same Herodotus — inconsistently with himself — presents Solon at 2.177 as including in his legislation the so-called νόμος ἀργίας which had been passed by Amasis (F 78a Ruschenbusch). The chronology of Amasis' reign (from 570 or 569 to 526) is also inconsistent with the date of Solon's ἀποδήμια, which is said to have taken place more or less soon after Solon's legislation during his archonship (the canonical date for the archonship is 594-3; Arist. Ath. Pol. 13.1 dates Solon's nomothesia to 592-1: cf. Hammond 1940, 71-83; the attempts of Hignett 1952, and Miller 1959, id. 1963, id. 1968, id. 1969, to question the reliability of the ancient archons' list and to move the date of Solon's archonship down to the '70 of the 6th century did not find favour).

We do not have enough evidence to solve Herodotus' inconsistencies. It is possible that the reference to Amasis as the pharaoh at the time of Solon's trip is an invention induced by the fact that this pharaoh was the first and most important interfering with Greek archaic history, and even got the title of φιλέλλην (cf. Hammond 1955, 396 n. 1). Nonetheless, it is also possible that the whole story of Solon's ἀποδήμια after the archonship was fictitious, made up by Hecataeus or by Herodotus: the trips of Solon might therefore have taken place in different periods of his life (cf. Podlecki 1976, and Wallace 1983, 88f.). After all, Plutarch, relying on Hermippus (fr. 7 Wehrli), speaks of a series of trips of the young Solon (unknown, or at least never mentioned by Herodotus and Aristotle), and it is plausible that also Herodotus' report about the law on the idleness as being inspired by the Egyptians and inserted in Solon's laws, reflected a tradition about juvenile trips of Solon, and specifically about his stay in Egypt (on this cf. Alessandri 1989, esp. 191-215). In any case, the absence of any historical context does not allow to decide whether fr. 11 belongs to Solon's youth, or to the period after the nomothesia.

Also the problem of what town Solon's topographical allusion refers to cannot be solved in a definitive way. The town most often considered the best candidate is Naucratis. Naucratis was a trading town which lay according to Strabo on the east bank of the Canopic branch of the Nile some fifty miles from the open sea and the later Hellenistic capital Alexandria; archaeological evidence indicates that Naucratis was
founded before Amasis' reign and that the Greek settlement on the site dates back to 630-10: Bissing 1951; Braun 1982, 37-8, Boardman 1980, 121; Cook 1937. Therefore this town may well have been the city Solon is referring to here, as is maintained by von Bissing cit., 48 and Boardman cit., 132.

Another possibility should be discussed. In Plato's *Timaeus* (21c ff.), while reporting the λόγος 'Ατλαντικός — the story of Atlantis which Solon would have brought back to Greece from Aegypt (cf. also *Critias* 108d ff.), and started to sing in verses (cf. also Plut. *Sol.* 26.1) — *Critias* precisely starts with a description of the delta of the Nile, which culminates in a reference to the νομός Σαϊτικός and the city of Σάις: 'Εστι τις κατ' Αίγυπτον, ... ἐν τῷ δέλτα, περὶ δ' κατὰ κορυφὴν σχίζεται τὸ τοῦ Νείλου ἤμια, Σαϊτικός ἐπικαλομένος νομός. Sais fits the geographical specifics presupposed by Solon's fragment (though it is a bit more distant than Naucratis from the Canopic Nile), and Plato's phrase might be a reworking of Solon's line — one might even dare to conjecture that our fragment was the beginning of Solon's started but never concluded poem on Atlantis. However, Plato's testimony cannot lead to any certain conclusion, because Plato's report on Solon and Atlantis may have been fiction (cf. Weber 1927, 270-4) — in this case the philosopher, while attributing to Solon the tale of Atlantis, may have found it very profitable to exploit an 'Egyptian' line of Solon on an originally different subject for his own fictional reconstruction. On Solon and Atlantis, see further Griffiths 1991.


The Nile is named first in Hes. *Theog.* 338 (Hom. *Od.* 4.477 has Αἰγύπτοιο, δυσπετέος ποταμοίο). The reference here is to the Nile Delta: cp. Aesch. *PV* 846-8 ἐστὶν πόλις Κάνωβος, ... Νείλου πρὸς αὐτῇ στόματι καὶ προσχώματι, a passage which may have been influenced by Solon's description.

Κανωβίδος ἀκτῆς: The Canopic branch of the Nile; the homonymous city, said to have been founded by Menelaus in memory of his pilot who died there of snake-bite (Tac. *Ann.* 2.60) on the furthest north-west edge of the land of Egypt, is mentioned in Aesch. *PV* 846-8 (quoted above) and likewise in *Supp.* 311, Hdt. 2.15.1 etc.
Solon departing from Cyprus bids farewell to the king and the citizens of Soloi in Cyprus. The chronology of Solon's journeys has been variously debated (cf. Alessandri 1977/80, and Id. 1989; Reeker 1971; Markianos 1974; Podlecki 1976), but it falls completely outside the concern of the interpretation of Solon's poems. However, there is a general agreement about the date of Solon's stay in Cyprus after his nomothesia, sometime between 569 and 560, and not in the period of his travelling as a young man (cf. Plut. Sol. 2.1-2, after Hermippus) — the latter chronology appears to be solely favoured by Alessandri.

Post-Hellenistic sources inform us that Solon was connected with the foundation, or the re-foundation of Soloi by a king named Cypranor or Philocyprus (the latter name being confirmed by Hdt. 5.113). According to Ach.Tat. Vita Arat. in schol. Arat. p. 7.14ff. Martin, the town was called Soloi after Solon because of his advice to the king Cypranor during the foundation; in another source, Plut. Sol. 26.3-4, Soloi was the new name that king Philocyprus gave to the pre-existing town of Aipeia, again to honour the Athenian statesman who had advised him to re-locate the previous, ugly settlement in a fertile plain, and Solon himself planned what Plutarch calls the συνοικισμός of the town. For a suggestion about the location of Soloi, see Karageorghis 1973, and for Philocyprus' dates, Hammond 1955, 396 n. 2.

Linguistic history disproves beyond any doubt that the name Soloi was really connected with Solon, as the place-name is an Aramaic word already attested in Assyrian texts one century before Solon, cf. RE 3A, 938f. Besides, the antiquity of the tradition — as well as of the other (false) tradition regarding the foundation by Solon of an homonymous Soloi in Cilicia, which in fact was a Rhodian colony (both stories can be found flanked in PÔxy. 680 of the second half of the 3rd cent. A.D., cf. Gallo 1975) — has to be assessed taking into consideration that Hdt. 5.113, while mentioning the stay of Solon in Soloi, did not hint at any eponymic connection of the statesman with the town. As a fact, the traditions about the eponyms of both towns are not attested before the Hellenistic age, a period when many legends concerning the foundation of poleis arose as the result of the Hellenistic taste for aetiology.

Taking into consideration this doubtful evidence, Sykutris 1928, thought that the story of Solon being eponymous of Cyprian Soloi was a late fiction derived from the tradition of Solon being eponymous of the Cilician Soloi, and that the third distich of our fragment (which by the way is omitted by Ach.Tat. Vit. Arat. cit.) was a spurious addition introduced to record this story — indeed he took for granted that οἰκισμός 1. 5 alluded to Solon's role as a synoikistes.
The authenticity of the whole fragment has been reaffirmed by Wilamowitz 1929, 459f. on the grounds of a reappraisal of the possible historicity of some kind of re-foundation (οἰκίσμος) resettlement of Soloi by Philocyprus (cp. Gelon's συνοικίσμος of the inhabitants of Camarina and of Megara into Syracuse: see Hdt. 7.156); cf. also Reeker 1971, 103 and n. 27. Above all, it has also been observed that Solon's word οἰκίσμος need not necessarily be intended as implying any reference to the story of Solon's participation in the foundation of the town (cf. Masaracchia 1958, 83-7, 288); quite on the contrary, the ambiguity of this and other expressions of fr. 11 may have started, as part of a 'political mythology', some fanciful reconstruction by a later scholar, for instance either an Attidographer (as we learn from Plut. Sol. 26.10-1 and Str. 14.683, Athenian propaganda singled out the Athenian Demophon son of Theseus, or Phaleros and Akamas, brother of Demophon, as κτισταί of Aipeia or of Soloi, respectively), or one of the Peripatetic biographers dealing with Solon's life, like Phainias or Hermippus, who appears to have been the first to treat Solon's journeys extensively (cf. Gallo 1975, cit. 189 n. 20, and Id. 1976). Furthermore, the absence of the last distich in Vita Arati proved to be a very weak argumentum ex silentio against its authenticity; as remarked by Alessandri 1977/80, cit., 172f., the interest of Achilles Tatius was on the name of the citizens of Soloi, being both Σόλλοι and Σόλεῖς; therefore he may have cut out lines of the poem which were not relevant to him.

This fragment is one of the most 'literary' of Solon, in the sense that the re-use of the Homeric models is most frequent and emphatic, consequently to the 'aulic' function it had as a farewell to a king. The poem would have been recognised in late antiquity as a (self-generated) propemptikon of equal to equal, according to Menander Rhetor's distinction between the sorts of the genre (Men. Rhet. 395.4-32). The equal standing of both is stressed by the way Solon employs the personal pronouns (ll. 1, 3), prominently in the starting positions of consecutive distichs and how he pairs the wishes for the king and himself in the clausula: the first couplet offered to his host is succeeded by the second containing a prayer and invocation of Aphrodite for his own protection and a good voyage; then the last couplet is equally divided between the good wishes for his addressee and the reiteration of the asking for divine help for the journey.

Some compliments and praise (being typical of the propemptikon from inferior to superior according to Men. Rhet.) appear to be implied in the first three lines, with Solon's wish about the king's long reign in Soloi and the mention of the island as κλείστη νῆσος. At any rate, even this very deferential reference to the island is also revealed in the following line as functional to the introduction of the idea of Solon's sea-voyage to Athens (and the dangers it implies).

Besides, the mention of Aphrodite is two-folded in this elegy, as was already remarked by Masaracchia 1958, 289. To say that it is explained by the regular association
of Aphrodite with Cyprus is to point out the obvious: she was traditionally Κυπρογένεια and here appears with her name Κύπρις (possibly intentionally adopted by Solon, as this name is rare in archaic Greek epic, see ad l. 4). Solon's mention of Aphrodite also points to her function as a marine goddess, protector of navigation and of the merchants: on Aphrodite's connection with the sea, cf. first of all Sappho's prayer to Κύπρις (PLF 5) for granting her brother Χάραξος a safe passage home from Egypt, the possible reflection of the paretymology of her name from ἄφρος 'sea-foam' and ὄδητης 'wanderer' in the Hesiodic story of the birth of the goddess, Theog. 188-206 (for which see Kretschmer 1895, 267-68, and Boeckeker 1974, 8 and 14-7), and her cult titles as Εύπλοια, Λυμενία, Πολύδεσμα, Καλλιπλέα, Εινάλη, Θαλασσαίη, Ἰστοπόδος (on which cf. Pirenne-Delforge 1994, 433-437). This association of Aphrodite both with Cyprus and with Solon's return journey is fully exploited in the third distich. It not only resets the tone of general good wishes of the ἱπτομικά for the king of Soloi (this ring-composition was emphasised by Fränkel 1960, 71), but also in my opinion gives a very prominent final position to the author's νοῦτος towards his native city.

It is difficult to escape the temptation of seeing in the use of the word νοῦτος a hint at Odysseus' attitude which would fit Solon perfectly here. The possibilities and the implications of this analogy are evident. Philocyprus is a wonderful host, and Cyprus is a wonderful island (Calypso was in deep love with Odysseus, and promised immortality to him, Od. 5.209 / Alkinoos was so fond of Odysseus, that he promised Nausicaa in marriage to him, Od. 7.311-5; besides, Calypso's island was so beautiful that "even a deathless god who came upon that place would gaze in wonder, heart entranced with pleasure", Od. 5.73f. / Phaeacian Scheria is another paradise on earth, Od. 7.86-132 — Cyprus could still appear as a locus amoenus to the Athenians of 4th cent. Athens, cf. Eur. Bacch. 402-16); even so, I, Solon, have the duty to continue my journey back (νοῦτος) to my fatherland (πατρίς), like Odysseus who told Calypso that he wanted to ὀκαδέ τ' ἐλθεμέναι καὶ νόστιμον ἰμαρ ἰδέσθαι (Od. 5.220) / Odysseus had told Alkinoos that he had to go back to his πατρίς, Od. 7.332; nevertheless, I, Solon, am aware of the danger of the sea trip (on Odysseus' fear about the sea trip before leaving Calypso, see above all Od. 5.221-4 / even after listening to Alkinoos' guarantee that Odysseus would experience that the Phaeacian ships and sailors are the best, Odysseus prays to Zeus to fulfil this last promise of Alkinoos, Od. 7.329-32). Again, in accordance with the twofold structure of fr. 11, this kind of implications would not only please Philocyprus, but also reinforce the meaning of Solon's final invocation to the goddess, who would have to ward off from Solon the shipwreck which, instead, Odysseus had actually suffered after he left Calypso's island. After all, also from a formal point of view, the last distich appears to adapt the combination of the requests that we find in the phrase with which Odysseus expresses his intention to leave from Scheria (except that
Solon prays for the king's prestige and not for fame: Ζεῦ πάτερ, αἴθ' ὡσα ἔηπε τελευτήσειν ἄπαντα Ἀλκίνοος· τοῦ μὲν κεν ἐπὶ ζείδωρον ἄρουραν ἀσβεστον κλέος εἴη, ἐγὼ δὲ κε πατρίδ' ἰκόιμην, Od. 7.331-3.

1. πολῖν χρόνον ἕνθάδ' ἀνάσωμ: a combination of epic formulas for the second hemistich: Hom. II. 2.343 πολῖν χρόνον ἕνθάδ' (ἐόντες), Od. 4.594 πολῖν χρόνον ἕνθάδ' (ἐρυξεί), 15.68 πολῖν χρόνον ἕνθάδ' (ἐρυξεί), 15.545 πολῖν χρόνον ἕνθάδε (μέμνειος) with several expressions where ἀνάσωμ, at the end of the hexameter (the typical position of almost all the various forms of this verb), is preceded by the name of the persons who command authority.


3-4. To Solon's wish compare the one made by Sapph. PLF 5 for the return of her brother.

ξῦν νηί θοῇ: Hom. II. 1.389-90 σῶν νηί θοῇ, II. 16.123 νηί θοῇ, Od. 3.61 θοῇ σῶν νηί μελανη (=10.332), Hes. fr. 43(a)67 νηί θοῇ.

4. ἄσκηθῆ πέμπει: together with the logically connected specification πατρίδ' ἐς ὑμετέρην of I. 6, this phrase resumes in an allusive way an Odyssey-phrase of book 5.26=144 ὦς κε μᾶλ' ἄσκηθῆς ἢν πατρίδα γαῖαν ἴκηται (~168), and book 9.79 καὶ νῦ κεν ἄσκηθῆς ἰκόμην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν (differently II. 16.247 ἄσκηθῆς μοι ἐπειτα θοᾶς ἐπί νῆς ἐκοτο), and varieties it through two other epic expressions, Od. 5.263 πέμπτ' ἀπὸ νῆσου διὰ Καλυφώ and 15.65 μ' ἀπόσεσθε φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν. As remarked by Alessandri 1977/80, 190-1, the use of ἄσκηθῆς in the Homeric model Od. 5.26, 144-168 was more 'logical' than in Solon — one arrives 'safe', does not leave 'safe': by using the adjective as 'proleptic', Solon means "so that I am safe" (on arrival), and the word hints at the sentimental focus of his on that very moment.

Κύπρις ἰςτέφανος: The goddess' name Κύπρις is found five times in the Iliad, all in book 5, once in the Hymns, and once in the Hesiodic fragments, never receiving an epithet. Its limited use as well as the lack of epithet systems, suggest that it was not a traditional part of Aphrodite's names in archaic epic, cf. Boedeker 1974, 18-22 and Frenne-Delforge 1994, 310-318.

Apart from the ἰςτέφανον τ' Ἀφροδίτης (Od. 8.267), or ἰςτέφανος Κυθέρεια (Od. 8.288, 18.193), the equimetrical variant ἰςτέφανος is only posthomeri}

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5-6. The distich addresses Philocyprus and what Solon intends is that, besides this (re)foundation (which the goddess has already permitted), she should also give future prestige (to the new city and to the king) and safe return (to Solon). The parallelism established by Solon can be found again in Pind. Pyth. 1.33-5 ναυσιφόρητος δ᾽ ἀνδράσι πρῶτα χάρις ἐς πλόον ἀρχομένοις πομπαίοιν ἐλθεῖν οἴρουν ἐοικόται γάρ καὶ τελευτά βερτέρου νόστου τυχεῖν. ὃ δὲ λόγος ταύτας ἐπὶ συντυχίαις δόξαν φέρει λοιπὸν ἐσοσθαι στεφάνοις μὲν ἵπποις τε κλυτάν καὶ σιν εὐφώνοις θαλάσσαι ὀνυμαστάν. The striking similarity, and the fact that Pindar's passage is also thematically close to Solon in celebrating a new-founded city, Etna, in connection with its founder Hieron (see below, ad 1.5), suggest that these lines of Pindar may have been directly influenced by Solon, where the combination of the two wishes reflected, however, the pragmatic situation of the poet and of the propemptikon-nature of the poem.

κῦδος ... ἐσθλόν: Solon exploits again the practice of bold conflation of Homeric formulas, which we saw operating in other lines of this 'aulic' poem. Indeed, the obvious Homeric models for χάριν καὶ κῦδος ὀπάζοι (see ad 1.5) appear to be varied through the reminiscence of the widespread formula κλέος ἐσθλόν, possibly provoked by Od. 7.331-3, a passage of relevance for the poetic ideology of Solon's poem (see Introd.).

The meaning of ἐπὶ+dat.='on the basis of' (Solon: 'given that you have founded this city, may the goddess' etc.), with the "dative of the motive" is certainly less frequent than the final value of ἐπὶ+dat., but it is well attested from Homer onwards: see e.g. ll. 2.270 ἐπὶ αὐτῷ ἢδώ γέλασσαν and 9.492 ἐπὶ σοι μάλα πόλλα ἐπαθοῦν (cf. Gonda 1957, 7). One might also accept here for ἐπὶ+dat. the meaning 'in addition to', 'besides' (LSJ s.v.); for the verb ὀπάζω with this secondary meaning 'give besides something else, add', Hom.Hymn Herm. 120, Hom.Hymn 24.5, Pind. Isthm. 6/5.67, see LSJ s.v. II.2), cp. also the much later attested ἐποπάζω 'bestow besides' (LSJ s.v.).

5. οἰκίσμῳ: Casevitz 1985, 100 paraphrasing Plut. Sol. 26.4, connects oikismos with Soloi and its population (οἰκετοί), and adds that the simple oikismos=operation of the foundation (of a new city) is the poetic equivalent of synoikismos. The most ancient
instance of the word after Solon is Plato's *Leg.* 4.708d, where πόλεων οἰκισμοί refers to the (historic) operations of foundations of cities. *Oikismos* cannot mean anything other than foundation=re-foundation / resettlement with the inclusion of new citizens, taking into consideration what Plutarch says. However, as already stated by Masaracchia 1958, 288, this does not imply any direct connection of Solon with the arrangements of the re-foundation of Soloi and the consequent eponymity with Solon (see Introd.). I would add that the mention of the foundation is justified on its own, without implying an involvement of Solon in the foundation, because references to the more or less recent episode of the foundation of a city is a very common feature in eulogistic poetry about cities and rulers of the choral poetry of the late sixth and fifth centuries, for which a real "poetics of colonisation" (see Dougherty 1993) may have existed: cf. above all Pind. *Pyth.* 1.59-63 (Etna), 5.55-61, 72-81 and 89-95 (Cyrene), *Ol.* 7.27-33 (Rhodes); Bacchyl. 11.64-72 (Tiryns). In the opinion of the author of the *Vita Aeschyli* 9 (TrGF III p. 34), Aeschylus, too, in his tragedy celebrating the foundation of Etna, εἰς Σικελίαν ἱέρωνος τότε τὴν Αἴτνην κτίζοντος ἐπεδείξατο τὰς Αἴτνας οἰωνιζόμενος βίον ἀγαθὸν τοῖς συνοικίζουσι τὴν πόλιν — exactly the motivation which appears to have underlain this short poem by Solon.


Solon's request for κύδος "strength", "power," "prestige" refers to the king, (cp. Alc. *PLF* 70.13 Φιττάκῳ δὲ δίδοσι κύδος ἐπί[φατ[ιον]), and in this way, κύδος takes up πολὺν χρόνον ἄνασσων (l. 1) in ring composition.

6. πατρίδ᾽ ἐς ἡμετέρην: Cf. Thgn. *IEG* 1044 πατρίδος ἡμετέρης; Sol. 3.1 ἡμετέρα δὲ πόλις.
The wishful statement expressed at the beginning of fr. 3 is about to be overtaken by the worsening of the situation, and because of the actual ruin of the *polis* by the aristocratic ruling class (the ἄνδρες μεγάλοι of 1.3, more derogatorily called μείζονες καὶ βίαν ἀμέσως in fr. 31.4), the δῆμος, the whole body of the citizens who did not trust any more these traditional ἡγεμόνες of theirs, are on the point of resorting to give the full autocratic power over the *polis* to a μόναρχος.

The μόναρχος Solon speaks about must still be identified, if not with Peisistratus, with a tyrant like Peisistratus, whose access to absolute power would really be a consequence of the political disaster which Solon charges against the irresponsibility of the δῆμος ἡγεμόνες in fr. 3 and here, first of all, against the μεγάλοι ἄνδρες of 1.3: it is hardly possible to prove that Solon is not referring to the same people (see further ad 1.3). Therefore, I think that the point of frr. 3 and 12 has to be the same, namely a prospective fear, and I do not believe that Solon's fragments (12, 14, 15) dealing with the autocratic danger may be the retrospective reflection, product of Solon's youth on the extraordinary office given to Drakon for his law-giving, as was suggested by Rihl 1989.

Plut. *Sol.* 3.23-9 reports the initial distich of this fragment, together with fr. 13, in order to show Solon's "simple and old-fashioned" knowledge ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς, in contrast with his keen interest in, and love of the ethic-politic thought (φιλοσοφίας δὲ τοῦ ἡμικοῦ μάλιστα τὸ πολιτικόν, ... ἡγάπησεν). Plutarch considered this passage as a versification by Solon of 'naive' principles of coming-into-being, since he most probably shared the picture maintained by Dicaearchus (fr. 30, 31 Wehrli=T 106 and 112 Martina; cf. Manfredini-Piccirilli 1977, 122f.), according to whom the Seven Sages would have been concerned with the θεωρητικὸς βίος, and therefore would have been mainly συμετοι̊ καὶ νομοθετικοί. This perspective led Plutarch to misunderstand the thoughtful and skilful use of the meteorological images by Solon.

We cannot see here either a simple re-use of Homeric imagery. Masaracchia 1958, 298-99, tried to connect Solon's meteorological allegory with Zeus, since in the epic Zeus oversees the meteorological phenomena — e.g. *II.* 2.146, 10.154, 13.796 —, and Solon himself in fr. 1 had explicitly compared Zeus' punishment with the spring-wind. However, at least here, in my opinion, Solon's approach to the physical aetiology of the natural phenomena is evidently profane, since Solon does not connect them at all with Zeus, and to see Zeus behind the allegory is over-stressed: as was already remarked by Fränkel 1975, 228 it is not Zeus who sends tyranny, and the calamities of the actual situation are human faults: cp. Solon's remarks and ideas on responsibility for the situation in Athens in fr. 15. In fact, Masaracchia, somehow, contradicts his remarks, when he points to *II.* 15.170 as the main model of Solon's l. 1 (see below), where, in
contrast with the other Homeric passages he had quoted before, there is no mention of Zeus.

Certainly Solon uses here the meteorological images first of all to "bring out the elemental power of the process described but also to reveal the iron law of causality that governs political and social life corresponding to the absolute necessity of nature", as remarked by Jaeger 1926-1966, 93 (see also Müller 1975, 135), and Solon's allegory itself belongs to a tradition well established in archaic poetry which explains in terms of meteorological phenomena negative ideas (war, civil disorder, discord, e.g. Archil. IEG 105, Alc. PLF 326; see Edmunds 1987, 9 for later instances and bibliography). At any rate, in my opinion, far from simply touching on the subject of nature in a simplistic way, Solon skilfully exploits the popularity of the meteorological speculations among the Ionian philosophers, and a correct appreciation of Solon's implications reveals a competence the subtlety of which has not so far been noticed.

At first sight the two meteorological phenomena in il. 11. If. appear to be co-ordinated to each other at the same level — from the clouds come the snow and the hail, just as from the lightning comes the thunder —, and as a consequence the responsibility of the ἄνδρες μεγάλοι in ruining the city and the ignorance of the δῆμος, resulting in empowering a μοναρχός, would also seem independently co-ordinated facts. Instead, Solon was most probably referring to the contemporary theories of nature which had stated that the lightning and the thunder were a product of the clouds, no less than, more obviously, the snow and hail (for which cf. e.g. Anaximenes. VS 13A.7.7 and Anaxag. VS 59A.85). Indeed, we know that at least a younger contemporary of Solon, Anaximander, had acknowledged that the thunder, lightning, thunderbolts, and hurricanes are all produced by the interaction of winds and clouds: according to the testimony of Aetius (~Sen. QNat. 2.18:VS 12A23) περὶ βροντῶν ἀστραπῶν κεραυνῶν ... Α. ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος ταυτὶ πάντα συμβαίνειν ὅταν γὰρ περιληθέν νέφει παχεὶ βεσάμενον ἕκτεσθι τῇ λεπτομερείᾳ καὶ κουφότητι, τόθ' ἢ μὲν ῥῆξις τὸν ψόφον, ἢ δὲ διαστολὴ παρὰ τὴν μελανίαι τοῦ νέφους τὸν διανυσμόν ἀποτελεῖ. The point was destined to be reaffirmed by other naturalistic philosophers: after Anaximenes. VS 13A.17 see Heraclitus. VS 22A.14 βροντὴν μὲν κατὰ συστροφάς ἀνέμων καὶ νεφῶν καὶ ἐμπτώσεις πνευμάτων εἰς τὰ νέφη, ἀστραπάς δὲ κατὰ τὰς ὑθυμωμένας ἐξάψεις, and Anaxag. VS 59A.1.9 βροντὰς σύγκρουσιν νεφῶν ἀστραπάς ἐκτριφίων νεφῶν (cf. also A42.11).

Therefore, if Solon shared this naturalistic interpretation — which is possible in terms of chronology — he would have meant that, as the νέφελαι are responsible not only for the snow and the hail, but also for the thunderbolt and the thunder, so the ἄνδρες μεγάλοι, the Athenian élite, were explicitly responsible for the ruin of the polis, but implicitly also the main cause of the despair (cf. 3.21-5) which was going to lead the
δήμος, because of its ἀληθεία, to look for a tyrant (pace Masaracchia 1958, 298 who thinks that Solon is blaming the faults of both classes).

1. χίόνως μένως ... χαλάζης: See Sol. 1.23 ἡκίσκος μένως. Of natural/inanimate forces already in Homer, where μένως is a metaphor from the vitality of a human being or animal: Hom. Il. 15.170 ὡς δ' ἄνευ εἰς νεφεῖν πτηταὶ νυφᾶς ἢ χάλαζα is particularly close to the Solonian imagery. For hail and snow combined in the same passage, see Il. 10.6-7, 15.170-1 (quoted), 22.151-2.

2. ἀνδρῶν ... ἐκ μεγάλων πόλες δαλυται: note the use of ἐκ, which is not the preposition we would expect ἀλλοθεία (ὑπὸ is more common), but contributes to stress the parallelism with I. If. (cf. Römisch 1972, 166f.). With μεγάλοι ἄνδρες Solon means the aristocratic ruling class which in fr. 31.4 is referred to as μείζονος καὶ βίων ἄμεινοι, and in fr. 3.7 as δῆμον ἠγεμόνες. Theognis, IEG 43-52, in a similar context, will exclusively blame the κακοὶ ἄνδρες for the plight of the city and the δημος, ἐκ τῶν γὰρ στάσισις τε καί ... φόνοι ἄνδρῶν μοῦναρχοι τε πόλει μῆποτε τῇ δὲ ἁδι. For the negative implications of μεγάλοι, cf. ad 5.4.

3-4. The verbs δαλυταί, ἐπεσέν (a gnomic aorist, as was already remarked by Mühl 1956, 317 n. 3), and ἐστὶ refer to statements of universal applications while ἡ ἁμη χρή (I. 6) points to the unavoidable consequence of the parallelism for the actual state of affairs in Athens: see Linforth 1919 ad loc., and Masaracchia 1958, 299.


On the favour and support of the δῆμος towards the tyrant, besides Sol. fr. 15, cf. the contemporary Alc. PLF 348. Aristotle, Pol. 5.1310b14-16, 29-31 considers the early tyrants demagogues, meaning that they enjoyed popular=non-elite support. He also states that the tyrants acted as champions of the people against the rich (πλοῦσίοι), and that they
were trusted by the people because they attacked the γνώριμοι (Pol. 5.1305a, 1310b12-16); see also Pl. Resp. 8.568e ἐκ τῶν πατρῴων θρέφεται αὐτῶς τε καὶ οἱ συμπόται τε καὶ ἑταίροι καί ἑταῖραι .... ὁ δήμος ὁ γεννήσας τὸν τυραννόν θρέφει αὐτῶν τε καὶ ἑταῖρους. On the tyrants as orientated by the aim of putting an end to the arbitrary rule and privileges of the aristocrats, see Salmon 1997, 62-4; on the dialectic relations between aristocracy and tyranny, see generally Stahl 1987.

ἄδρείη: often in epic with the extension genitive νόοι (e.g. Hom. Od. 11.272 ἄδρείης νόοι, Hes. Op. 685 ἄδρείης νόοι), but also twice alone, Od. 10.231 and 12.41-ἀπειρία (which is the usual explanation of the word: Apoll. Soph 17.3, Hsch. α 1794 L., Suda α 677 A.). Solon may have intended to allude specifically to the two Odyssey-passages, because in both of them Odysseus’ companions by their ἄδρείη (ignorance, stupidity) are bewitched by Circe or lured to their doom by the song of the Sirens: Circe θύρας ἀυξεθα φαελώσα καὶ κάλει, the companions ἄδρείην ἐπονοεῖ; as for the Sirens, ὃς τις ἄδρείη πελάσῃ καὶ φθόγγον ἀκούσῃ does not escape death (Römisch 1972, 166f. had already pointed out the latter passage, but missed the similar relevance of the former). Such an allusion by Solon is all the more probable, because of the image of entrancing fascination also implied in fr. 15.7f.

The formation of the name, from ἀδρίης, is far from being sure: ἄδριη (with lengthening of ι in ει, by analogy to the formations from the themes in σ-: Lfgre s.v.), or ἄδριη (from the weak vocalism of the root and contraction: West ad Op. 685), or ἄδρεια (from the full vocalism: Solmsen 1909, 250). No choice is, therefore, possible between the two different readings of the MSS.

δοῦλοσύνην: Solon is fond of using the term, for the meaning of which, see fr. 15.4 and the remarks at fr. 3.18. Here the ἄδρείη of the δῆμος consists in believing that the tyrant leads them to freedom from the μεγάλων ἀνδρῶν, whereas a tyrant leads everyone — rich and poor — to slavery.

ἐπεσεν: probably a gnomic aorist (cf. Masaracchia 1958, 299, and Maharam 1993, 395), hinting at the certainty of the features of a tyrannic rule, which the δῆμος ignored.

5. λιαν δ' ἐξάραντες λείης δ' ἐξεραντα, which makes no sense. Bergk corrected in λεῖως δ' ἐξάραντα which he translated ‘si quem plane extuleris’, comparing Phot. Lex. p.383 N. τὸ γὰρ λεῖως ἐστὶ τελέως. However, apart from Archil. IEG 226 λεῖως γὰρ οὐδὲν ἐφφόνευκε, and a series of testimonies in the lexicographers (see West ad Archil. fr.cit.), λεῖως is only found in compounds (e.g. λεφρογός).

Most recent editors of Solon adopt Schneidewin’s correction λιαν δ’ ἐξάραντες ‘si quem nimis extuleris’ which better conveys the idea of supreme power a tyrant was vested in: cp. Sol. 15.3 αὐτῶν τούτων ηὐξήσατε.
κατάσχειν: Here said of the demos who is going to be powerless in stopping the emerging tyranny. In frr. 30.22 ὁ ἄν κατέσχε δῆμον, 31.6 ὁ ἄν κατέσχε δῆμον the verb is, instead, seen from the perspective of the one towards the many.

6. <περί>: νοεῖ means 'to acknowledge', more than 'to consider well' in order to devise. When this latter meaning is needed, which clearly best fits Solon's context, it is usually emphasised by coupling the verb with a co-ordinated or a participial form of φράζομαι or complementing it with ὁ μόνος (see the instances in LfgrE s.v.): in Solon we would expect something like πεπυμένην πάντα νοῆσαι (Hom. Od. 18.230). To avoid this lack in emphasis on the devising strength of the verb, one could accept West's <καλά> πάντα νοεῖν, or Dindorf's <περί> πάντα νοεῖν. I favour the latter, because it does not present the structural problems noted by Gentili-Prato, namely that the pattern monosyll.+bisyll.+bisyll.-bisyll. is never found in Solon. For πεπυμένη, cf. schol. Tzetz. in Ar. Ran. 958 πεπυμένη: πανουργότατα καὶ βαθέως πάντα νοεῖν.
Regarding the choice of the metaphor, Solon is clearly near to Alcaeus who singled out the winds as the beginning cause of the allegorical storm at sea against the ship of State: 

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PLF 326.1-4 ἀσυννετήμι τῶν ἀνέμων στάσιν, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐνθεν κῦμα κυλίνδεται, τὸ δὲ ἐνθεν, ἀμμες δὲ ἄν τὸ μέσον ναὶ φορίμμεθα σὺν μελαίᾳ. However, in the case of Alcaeus, we cannot say anything else about the context. In the case of Solon we can, because of fr. 12. Indeed, the naturalistic colouring and overtones of this fragment have to be understood allegorically, as it is clearly shown by the formal correspondences between ἐκ νεφέλης πελεται χύνος μένος ἴδε χαλάζης of fr. 12 and ἐξ ἀνέμων δὲ θάλασσα ταράτσεται of fr. 13 (both the clouds and the winds hint at the irresponsible ruling aristocrats), as well as by the instances of other parallels which take up Solon’s implicit (or, at any rate, not-reported to us here) reference to the Athenian demos as sea: cf. fr. iamb. adesp. 29 D.3 δῆμος ἀστατον κακῶν καὶ θαλάσση πάνθ’ ὀμιλον υπ’ ἀνέμου μπίζεται, καὶ γαληνὸς ἢν τόχθ πως, πνεύμα βραχύς κορύσσεται, Hdt. 7.16 τά σα καὶ ἀμφότερα περιήκοντα ἀνθρώπων κακῶν ὀμίλια σφάλλουσι, κατὰ περ τήν πάντων χρησιμοτάτην ἀνθρώπους θάλασσαν πνεύματά φασι ἀνέμων ἐμπίπτοντα οὐ περιορῶν φύσι τῇ ἐνυτῆς χράσθαι, Dionys. Hal. Ant.Rom. 17.12 παραπλήσιον τι πάσχουσιν αἱ δημοκρατούμεναι πόλεις τῶν πελάγειν· ἐκεῖνα τε γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων ταράττεται φύσιν ἔχουσα ἤρεμεις, αὕται δὲ ύπὸ τῶν δημαγωγῶν κυκώνται μηδὲν ἐν αὐταῖς ἔχουσαι κακῶν (where the uncommon verb κυκώα for humans, cp. Sol. 1.61, may reinforce the possibility of a reminiscence of Solon), Polyb. 11.29.9 ὅθεν αἰεὶ τὸ παραπλήσιον πάθος συμβαίνει περὶ τε τῶν ὀχλοὺς καὶ τὴν θάλατταν, καθάπερ γὰρ κάκεινής ἢ μὲν ὁδια φύσις ἐστὶν ἀβλαβῆς τοῖς χρωμένοις καὶ στάσιμος, ὅταν δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν ἐμπέθη τὰ πνεύματα βία, τοιαύτη φαίνεται τοῖς χρωμένοις οἷοὶ τινὲς ἄν ὅσιν οἱ κυκλοῦντες αὐτὴν ἄνεμοι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ πλῆθος αἰεὶ καὶ φαίνεται καὶ γίνεται πρὸς τοὺς χρωμένους οἷος ἀν ἔχῃ προστάτας καὶ συμβούλους, Liban. 25.44.3 ἢν δὲ κυμαῖς ὁ δῆμος γένηται κτλ. (on which see Lomiento 1987); also Liv. 28.27.11 sed multitudo omnis sicut natura maris per se immobiles est, [et] venti et aurae ciant; ita aut tranquillum aut procellae in vobis sunt; et causa aequo origo omnis furoris penes auctores est, vos contagione insanitis, 38.10.5 qui volgata similidute, mari tranquillo, quod ventis concitaretur, aequeperando multitudinem Aetolorum, usus, cum in fide Romanae societatis mansissent, insita gentis tranquilitate quiesse eos aiebat, Cic. Clu. 49 ex quo intellegi potuit, id quod saepe dictum est, ut mare quod sua natura tranquillum sit ventorum vi agitari atque turbari, sic populum Romanum sua sponte esse placatum, hominum seditionis vocibus ut violentissimis tempestatibus concitari.
Masaracchia 1958, 300 notes the Homeric influence of the wave-similes in *Il. 2.144-6, 394-7, 4.422-8*, where the noise of the crowd of the Achaeans is compared with the surge and noise of the waves, but the Homeric examples account for a single detail of Solon's imagery, which at least in its main idea of natural 'justice' could not have derived from Homer, but was probably conditioned by the thought of the naturalistic philosophy and the theories on nature (cf. Müller 1975, 135f.).

According to the testimony schol. Nic. Alex. 172, Heraclitus (VS 22A 14a) would have said that the sea is *δούλος* of the winds. Besides, certainly Nicander, and possibly also Heraclitus, said that the sea, only as a consequence of the intervention of the ἐχθροὶ winds on it, becomes a *δεσπότης* φιλοργίης of the sea-men (καὶ ῥ’ ἢ μὲν ἀκοσμήσοσα, φιλοργίης δεσπόζει νηών τε καὶ ἐμφθορέων αἰζήμων). If Solon was already aware of this kind of imagery, and his distich belonged to a longer poem where the comparison of *demos* to the sea was furthered, the following context of the fragment might have been articulated in analogous terms to fr. 12, and the evolution of Solon's thought may have run somehow like this: "it is because of the winds (the troublesome leaders), that the sea (the *demos*) is now in the storm (the tyranny of a μόναρχος — the *demos* alone would not have, otherwise, resorted to a tyrant)."

Besides, the opinion that the sea, when it is not stirred by the winds, is "naturally smooth", may have had its beginnings in the concern of the naturalistic philosophers for the definition of the qualities of the elements: see the much later Anon. *Introd. ad Arat. schol.* p. 92.20-23 Maass ... καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ γίνεται· τὸ γὰρ ὕδωρ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων κυνούμενον ἀνώμαλον δείκνυσι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν ποτὲ μὲν κυρτομέμφων κυμάτων διὰ τὴν τοῦ πνεῦματος οφθαλμότητα, εἰθ’ ὑπὸ τῆς φυσικῆς ἀνάγκης εἰς λειτότητα διαχεομένων. At any rate, it was certainly a standard point of popular thought: see Aesop. *fab.* 178 Hausrath, where a shipwrecked complains with the sea being calm after the storm, ὅτι γε δελεὰζουσα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τῇ πραύτητι τῆς ὁδείως, ἥρκα ἂν αὐτοῖς προσδέξῃται, ἀπαγρομένη διαφθείρει, καὶ θάλασσα, personified as a woman, answers with the specification: μὴ ἐμὲ μέμφου, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀνέμους ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιάντη εἱμί, ὡσποδ’ καὶ νῦν με ὁδᾶς· οἱ δὲ αἰνιγίδον μοι ἐμπίπτουτες κυματοῦσα καὶ ἑξαγριώνουσιν (cf. Jedrkiewicz 1989, 327); Varro, *ling. Lat.* 7.23, p. 259 Traglia *Mare aequor appellatur quod aequatum cum commotum vento non est*; Cic. *Acad.* 2 (fr. 3) *quid tam planum videtur quam mare? e quo etiam aequor illud poetae vocant*; Serv. ad Verg. *G.* 1.50 *terrarm ... ab aequalitate dictam ... unde et maria aequor adicuntur.*

The naturalistic philosophy certainly provides a key to understand Solon's identification of the "stability" of the sea, namely the absence of the disturbing winds, as a state of δίκτη, whereas when winds appear, the sea loses its natural balance and the result is injustice (the winds are something like the sickness that makes κυκώμενος the
patient whom the ἰητρός tries to heal in fr. 1.61: cf. Vlastos 1946, 68-70). The whole imagery would parallel the fact that, in a political/social context, δίκη is the healthy absence of those turbulent factors which disturb the demos and the city, and are expressly mentioned in fr. 12. To call 'justice' the absence of perturbing factors in the realm of nature may strike us (cf. Masaracchia 1958, 302) but such a response only reveals our distance from Solon's time (cf. Vlastos 1947, 156). To assume that it is simply a literary metaphor, an example of interaction between the 'tenor' and the 'vehicle' of an image (cf. for the terminology Silk 1974, 79), would presuppose a radical difference between the world of nature (where justice is not really found) and the world of humans (where it actually is): the two worlds would be distinct one from the other, they would operate according to different rules, and consequently, social, moral, evaluative language would apply only in the human world.

This interpretation is somehow inappropriate for the pre-Socratic philosophers who place humans squarely in the natural world, and for Solon who is contemporary with the oldest of them: cf. Gentili 1975, and Edmunds 1987, 11. For Solon the alteration that the winds operate to the sea by changing its natural state is of the same kind as that which the bad powerful citizens commit to the demos and the polis, and δικαιότατος (and its implied opposite) describes and evaluates all kind of acts, regardless of the nature of the agent. Not very differently from Solon, his contemporary Anaximander maintained the notion that natural elements may be "unrighteous" in the cosmological process, and that justice is maintained only when the rival principles alternately prevail over one another in a uniform, impersonal and inevitable manner: cf. above all VS 12B1 διδόναι γάρ αὐτά δίκην καὶ τίς ἀλλήλοις τῆς δίκης κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν (αὐτά most probably are the opposed world-masses of the opposite elements: cf. Kirk 1955, 33 and Kahn 1960, 178ff.). In Solon as well as in Anaximander, ἀδικία is the temporary prevalence of one element on its opposite (see Kahn 1960, 178-83); besides, the coincidence between the idea of some δίκη being given κατὰ τῆς τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν in Anaximander and Solon's ἐν δίκῃ χρόνου, fr. 30.3 should be noticed (cf. Jaeger 1947, 207 n. 60). Compare the analogous way of thinking in Parmenides, VS 28B1.14, who maintains that Δίκη πολύποινος ἔχει κληρίδας ἀμοιβῶν of the "doors" of Day and Night. On the natural state as the "just" one, examples from medicine are collected by Vlastos 1946, 66 n. 19 (cp. in primis Alcmaeon's ἀισθομία, for which see above, and ad 3.17).

1. θάλασσα ταράσσεται. For the use of the verb with reference to the stirring up of bodies of water, Hom. Od. 5.291 ἐτάραξε δὲ πόντου, 304 ἐτάραξε δὲ πόντου, Archil. IEG 105 ταράσσεται πόντος, Pind. Ol. 2.63, Aesch. PV 1088 etc. The
opposite state, that of a non-disturbed sea, will provide the most prominent metaphor for

For a survey of the semantics of παράττειν in its earliest occurrences as well as in
the fifth century literature where it characterises the negative behaviour of the
demagogues, see Edmunds 1987, 5-16.

2-3. ἃν ... τις αὐτήν μὴ κινή: Cp. Sol. 1.19-20 ἀνέμος ... ὁς πόντου
πολυκύμονος ... πυθμένα κινήσας. In our fragment the point of the image is on the
one, τίς, who is able not to move the sea, namely not to be a wind. I agree with
Maharam 1993, 413-5 that this 'one' must be identified with Solon himself, who would,
in this way, present once again his political action in favour of Athens but opposite to the
solution of a μόναρχος.

2. πάντων ἐστὶ δίκαιοτάτη: Thgn. IEG 314 πάντων ἀνθρώπων εἰμὶ
dίκαιοτάτος, 'Cleobulina' IEG 2.2 (in the end of the pentam.) τοῦτο δίκαιοτάτον. One
may expect δίκαιοτάτον as Minn. 2.2 ἄληθεία ... πάντων χρήμα δίκαιοτάτον, but for
the construction πάντων (everything)+fem. superlative, Arist. Eth.Nic. 1097b16 and
Protr. 62.2 Düring.

δίκαιοτάτη: cp. the opposition between μαίνεσθαι and being δίκαιος in Thgn.
IEG 313f., and Xen. Mem. 4.4.5 ἵππων καὶ βοῶν ... δικαιούς ποιήσασθαι. Of the
summer-sea which stands quiet and therefore is harmless, Hes. Op. 670 τῆς ὥστε
εὐκρινεῖς τ' αὖραι καὶ πόντος ἄπτημος, and Semon. IEG 37-9 θάλασσα πολλάκις
μὲν ἄτρεμῆς ἐστηκ', ἄπτημον, χάρμα ναύτησαι μέγα, θέρεσι ἐν ὤρη.

For the fortune of δίκαιος said of the sea (possibly after this very fragment of
Solon), see Ar. Nub. 1290-2 —τὴν θαλατταν ἐσοθ' ὅτι πλείονα ὑπὶ νομίζεις ἢ πρὸ
tοῦ; — μὰ Δί' ἄλλ' ἵστημι. οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον πλείον ἐίναι (where δίκαιον is banalised
by schol. ad loc.: οὐ γὰρ λυσιτελές οὐδὲ συμφέρει τῆς γῆς πλείονα ἐίναι τὴν
θαλατταν).
The source for this fragment, Diog. Laert. 1.49, presents it performed in the assembly (ecclesia) by Solon, shortly before the events that led Peisistratus to seize the absolute power, as his response to the accusations made against him by the boule—the Peisistratean supporters. The truth of this late testimony cannot be accepted unquestioningly (see Introd. to fr. 15), and it has more the characteristics of an 'enriched' anecdotal reconstruction rather than of a historically reliable information—the details on Solon's dressing the arms recall the testimonies, at least partially fictional, on Solon's dress while performing Salamis. Besides, Diogenes Laertius' reference to a bouleī uttering comments on Solon's actions may be thought to have been influenced by the practice of the Roman senatus, whose duties had really included some kind of evaluation of the actions of the various magistrates in the republican age, and afterwards the consecratio or the damnatio memoriae of the dead emperor in the early imperial age (about the Solonian boule we know scarcely anything and, on the sources we have, it is not possible to say whether it is a historical fact or myth: some scholars have been so sceptical as to deny its existence; on the historical improbability of the four hundred bouleī which Arist. Ath. Pol. 8.4 and Plut. Sol. 19.1.2 ascribe to Solon, cf. lastly Ruzé 1997, 350-68; on Solon's boule, see further, Cloché 1924, Hignett 1952, 92-64, Rhodes 1972, 208 n.2, with bibliography). I would add that Solon's reference to his audience by the term ἀστοῖς hardly makes any sense if the occasion was a public speech, as the narration by Diog. Laert. explicitly states (μαίνεσθαι ἔλεγον αὐτῶν· ἐδει εἴπε ταυτί). Indeed, in such a context, the ἀστοῖ were most probably going to be the audience itself, and we would rather expect something like the personal pronoun ὑμῖν.

Regarding the metaphorical image of the truth coming to the centre, the centre is obviously for Solon the place of the greatest visibility and control, which is common for everyone (cf. Cerri 1969, 102f.) — the place where everyone can see and hear you, as in Hom. Od. 8.262 κ' ἐς μέσου (of Demodocus who prepares to start singing) or in Plut. Agis 9 εἰς μέσου προελθών (of Agis who goes to speak in public); see also Hdt. 4.97 ἐς μέσον φέρω ('to make public'). 4.161 ἐς μέσον τῷ δήμῳ ἠθηκε ('to make public'), 6.129 λέγειν ἐς τὸ μέσον ('to say in public'), or the place where, when something is there, everyone can control it, as in Il. 23.704 γυναῖκ' ἐς μέσον ἠθηκε (of a prize in the games) and 23.574 ἐς μέσον ἀμφοτέρωσι δικάσσατε, or everyone can share it, as in the symposiastic imagery of Lykop. TrGF 100F3 ὃς ἐκ βραχείας δαιτός ἢ βαλά κύλεις αὐτῶς κυκλεῖται πρὸς μέτρον, τράγυμα δὲ ὁ σωφροσύνης πάσῳ ἐν μέσω λόγως, and Plut. Conv. sept. sap. 156d αἱ Μοῦσαι καθάπερ κρατήρα νηφάλιον ἐν μέσῳ προθέμεναι τῶν λόγων. However, the formally closest and most idiomatic precedents for Solon's phrase are also the Iliadic expressions meaning the spatial,
physical 'middle' of the battlefield, where Hector goes twice to incite his soldiers and to
to a duel, cf. II. 3.77 ες μέσον ἰῶν=II. 7.55, or where the warriors go when they
want to start the duel: cf. II. 6.120 ες μέσον ἀμφότερων συνίτην μεμαωτε
μάχεσθαι=20.159-23.814, 18.263-4 Τρώες καὶ Ἀχαιῶι ἐν μέσῳ ἀμφότεροι μένος
'Αρησ δατέωνται (see later e.g. Soph. Trach. 514 ίσαν ες μέσον, and Theoc. Id.
22.183 ἀ δ' εις μέσου ἥλυθε Λυγκεύς). I would not rule out the possibility that the
pacific Truth which Solon wanted (or at least advertised) to be shared by every party of
the community is here deliberately balanced against the martial-exhortatory meson, place
of the Homeric leaders, or the starting point of the fight between opposite armies, and
enhances Solon’s usual self-image as a politician and a ruler who redefines and intends
the idea of the centre as the place of the peaceful resolution of the contrasts, instead of a
place for fight. After all, this second level of meaning, though more implicit, is closely
parallel to the one presupposed by the use of μεταίχμιον (a post-Homeric technical term
of the military language with exactly the same meaning as το μέσον of the Iliadic
expressions quoted above) in fr. 31.18 εγὼ δε τούτων ὠσπερ ἐν μεταίχμιῳ ὄρος
κατέστην. Solon goes where the general or the warriors go in order either to urge to
fight or to start fighting, but he goes there to prevent the strife between the two opposing
factions: see also ad 7.5-6.

The relevance of the metaphor ες μέσον as an item of the imagery of politics was
already pointed out by Cerri quoted, in connection with Theognis 678, but there is space
for remarking that Solon is at the origin of this metaphor, which is exceptionally
functional to Solon’s self-image as politician. The "centre" between the opposite social
factions (the powerful privileged rich and the demos) is the position which Solon
‘invented’ to place his action for social unity; therefore, Solon’s metaphor also implies
that the personified Truth will eventually reach and join Solon in his own political stance,
after being ‘hidden’ for a long time where no-one could profit from her.

1. The emphatic δὴ, without a verb of saying, thinking etc., often denotes words that are
not to be taken at their face value, objectively, but express something merely believed, or
ironically supposed to be true (cf. Denniston, Greek Part. 214 §8f., 234 §6). Therefore,
Solon might be correcting his opponents’ statement by giving to it the effect of inverted
commas, ‘my so-called madness’.

Indeed, the idea expressed in the fragment is rather close to the one of the long trimeter
poem (fr. 30), though in the latter Solon appears to have lost every concrete support, and
to be resigned emotionally only to the criterion of Time for the defence of his political
actions: cf. 30.3ff. συμμαρτυροῖτα ταῦτα ἄν ἐν δίκῃ χρόνου μὴ περ μεγίστη κτλ. In
fr. 14 the epanaphora of the verb at the beginning of the lines still shows Solon’s
certainty, and emphasises his voice as a “warmer” (on the difference between Solon’s
stance here and in fr. 3, see ad fr. 3.5-8). On the verb, besides Sol. 1.8 and note there, cp. also the impersonal use of 
\[ \text{dei}{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon}{\iota}{\eta}{\iota}{\sigma} \] 'reveal' in Ar. Vesp. 994, Ran. 1261, and Dem. 2.20 δοκεῖ δ' ἐμοῦ ... δείξειν οὐκ εἰς μακράν.

Other poets and philosophers of the sixth century B.C. besides Solon offer semi-personifications of Time as being endowed with the power to vindicate the exact truth: Thales, VS 11A1 (=Diog.Laert. 1.35) σοφῶτατον χρόνον· ἀνευρίσκει γὰρ πάντα, Thgn. IEG 967 τοιῶν δ' ἐκφαίνει πάντως χρόνον ἢθος ἑκάστου, fr.eleg.adesp. IEG 22 οὖκ ἔστι μείζων βάσανος χρόνου οὐδενὸς ἔργου, ὡς καὶ ὑπὸ στέρνος ἀνδρὸς ἐδείξεν νῦν; see later Pind. Ol. 10.53-5 ὁ τ' ἐξελέγχων μόνον ἀλάθειαν ἐτήσιμον Χρόνου (also Ol. 1.33-4 ἀμέρας δ' ἐπίλουσι μάρτυρες σοφώτατοι), fr. 159 ἀνδρῶν δικαίων Χρόνος σωτήρ ἀριστος, Bacchyl. 13.204-7 ὁ δ' ἀλάθεια φίλει νικάν, ὁ τε πανθ[α]μάτωρ χρόνος τὸ κάλως ἐργαμένοι αἰεὶ ἀ[δείζει. Opposite considerations of oblivion, the other result of time, are more occasionally presented: Pind. Ol. 2.15-7 τῶν δὲ πεπραγμένων ἐν δίκα τε καὶ παρὰ δίκαια ἀποίητον οὐδ' ἄν Χρόνος ὁ πάντων πατήρ δύνατο θέμεν ἔργων τέλος, Paron VS 26 οἱ μὲν σοφώτατον ἐλέγχων (scil. τὸν χρόνον), ὁ δὲ Πυθαγόρειος Πάρως ἀμαβέστατον, ὁτι καὶ ἐπιλαυθάνουσα ἐν τούτῳ, λέγων ὀρθότερον, Simpl. in Arist. Ph. 4.13.222b 17 ... λέγων ἐν Ὀλυμπίᾳ Σιμωνίδου τὸν χρόνον ἑπαινοῦτος ὡς σοφώτατοι, εἴτε ἐν αὕτη αἱ μαθήσεις γίνονται καὶ αἱ ἀναμνήσεις, παρόντα τινὰ τῶν σοφῶν εἰπέν τ' ὑε, ὁ Σιμωνίδης, οὖκ ἐπιλαυθάνομεθα μέντοι ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ;' (cf. Simon. PMG 645).

The same cultural orientation can be found in tragedy, where oblivion is seldom emphasised, while usually Time and revelation of the truth are explicitly connected (this is shown by the verbs that are used, hinting at the idea of 'discovery': besides δεικνύοιν we find ἀναπτύσσοιν, ἔκκαλύπτοιν, ἀνευρίσκοιν, εἰς φῶς ἀγείν, ἐφευρίσκοιν).
The discoveries concern small details in Aeschylus (cf. Supp. 993, Ag. 727), but in Sophocles and Euripides time eventually shows up the good and the evil: cf. Soph. OT 614 χρόνος δίκαιον ἀνδρὰ δείκνυσιν μόνος (see also 1213), TrGF 62 ἀλλ' οὐδέν ἔρπει πειθός εἰς γῆρας χρόνου, and TrGF 301.1f. ὡς ὁ πάνθ' ὄρῳ καὶ πάντ' ἀκοίων πάντ' ἀναπτύσσοις χρόνους, TrGF 918 πάντ' ἐκκαλύπτου τὸν χρόνον εἰς <τὸ> φῶς ἀγεί, Eur. Hipp. 428-30 κακῶς δὲ θυητῶν ἐξέφην' ὅταν τύχη, προβείς κάτοπτρον ... χρόνον, 1051 μηνυτῆς χρόνων, HF 805 λαμπρὰ δ' ἐδείξε, ὁ χρόνος τῶν Ἡρακλείων ἀλκάν, Antiope, Greek Literary Papyri 101-2 Page ἑπὶ μηνυτῆς χρόνος πειθές μὲν ἡμῖς, TGF 60 χρόνος δὲ δείξει <α' τ' ὡς τεκμηρίῳ μαθῶν ἢ χρηστῶν ὡτια γνώσιμαι σ' ἢ κακῶν, TGF 112 ὁ χρόνος ἀπαντά τοίνυν ὑστερον φάραει, λάλος ἐστιν οὕτως, οὖκ ἐρωτῶσι λέγει, TGF 222 τήν τοι Δίκην λέγουσι παῖδ' εἶναι χρόνου, δείκνυσι δ' ἡμῶν ὡτίς ἢστι μὴ κακός, TGF 303.3-4 ὁ γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἐκφύς χρόνος δικαίως ἐπάγων κανόνας δείκνυσιν ἀνθρώπων κακότητας.

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βαιός: Homer has only the compound ἧβαίος, but already in Hes. Op. 418 βαιόν='for a short time'; the phrase βαιός χρόνος is again found in Soph. Trach. 44 χρόνον γὰρ οὐχὶ βαιόν, and OC 397 βαιόν κούχι μυρίον χρόνου.

2. ἀληθείας ἐς μέσον ἐρχομένης: On the granted results of the affirmation of truth, cf. e.g. Pind. fr. 205 ἄριστα μεγάλας ἀρετάς ὄνασσ᾽ 'Αλάθεια and Bacchyl. 8.21-2 σὺν ἀλαθείᾳ δὲ πάν λάμπει χρέος.

As most often in archaic Greek (cf. above all Krischer 1965, 161-4, Maehler ad Bacchyl. 3.96), ἀλήθεια has to be understood in its etymological meaning as absence of the 'oblivion' veiling the reality of things — it is more the opposite of 'defect in recording' than of 'falsehood'. Therefore, we do not have to imply that this distich had to be followed by some kind of self-defence and explanation of Solon's true intentions. In my opinion, Solon neither displays here (yet) the auto-apologetic attitude that he certainly displays in the tetrameters nor explicitly charges his citizens of being not true, namely 'false' in saying that he is mad: he still has hopes in the future, and in the plain visibility of the meaning of his actions which will be achieved by means of the unveiling operations of χρόνος.
Though the ancient testimonies associate these lines with the context of Solon's reaction to Peisistratus after his seizure of tyranny (Solon tried to oppose it according to some sources but the exact scenario of his reactions to Peisistratus' coup varies considerably: see Podlecki 1987, 9), the prevailing tendency among modern scholars is to refuse to follow these sources: Wilamowitz 1893, II, 312 insisted that there is no reason to believe such an association, as the reference in 1.3 (τοῦτος) is made to plural tyrants. Linforth 1919, 207, added that since ῥῶματα δῶρες, which Diodorus and Plutarch understood as the body-guard granted to Peisistratus by the Athenians, is in plural, it must refer to something more than the body-guard alone. Masaracchia 1958, 292-3 attempted to reconcile ancient interpretations and modern objections, suggesting that the plural τοῦτος could be referring to Peisistratus and his faction. More recently, Podlecki 1987, 9 denied that there is anything in Solon's verses themselves that shows his warnings pointed specifically at Peisistratus and attributed the whole episode to the fiction which grew up to heighten the contrast between the two men; he added that similarly monitory statements can be found at frs. 3.7f. and 5, directed against the 'leaders of the people', whoever these may have been. Rihll 1989, 279-80 also gave several reasons against the association of the lines with Peisistratus and even argued for their association with Drakon (for which see the criticism in the Introd. to fr. 12). Lastly, West 1993 believes that since Solon speaks of plural tyrants we may have here reference to some earlier junta of which we know nothing.

Apart from the too speculative identification of the αἵμωλος ἀνήρ of this fragment with Drakon, Rihll 1989, 280 has well pointed out that there is no obvious reason that this fragment should be considered as an example of anti-tyrannical rhetoric (aiming at Peisistratus). Instead, Solon's criticism would be aimed once again at the choices of the people who put themselves in harsh conditions by superficially putting their trust in men they should not. Fr. 15 could be seen as the last, culminating piece of the sequence started with Eunomia and followed by fr. 12: the fact that the Athenians did not manage eventually to avoid the tyranny shows that Solon's aim of awakening his people was not achieved: the Athenians remained superficial and possibly they may have once again ridiculed Solon's concern and fears (fr. 14). A co-examination of the three poems will clarify better the issues at hand.

Here, as in Eunomia, Solon speaks of the Athenians' responsibility: after charging the leaders because of their rapacious behaviour in fr. 3, in our fragment Solon would concentrate on the responsibility of the demos, both from a past and a present perspective — the difference in perspective is made clear by the shift in the verbal tenses, which is crucial for my own interpretation. After his first statement, which strongly parallels fr.
3.1-2, Solon presents the historical mistake of the *demos*, namely to have kept in power the aristocratic leaders (*τούτως*) and allowed them his support (*ῥύματα δώτες*); consequently, they had lived in a condition of *δουλοσύνη* (which had been mentioned in fr. 3.18, 24-5). The plural *τούτως* would mean the *ἀνδρὲς μεγάλοι* of fr. 12.3, and *δήμου ἡγεμόνες* of frr. 3.7 and 8. Although the *demos* had tasted bitterness and hardness in the past because of their stupidity (the past tenses have to be acknowledged), even now the Athenian people do not change their way of dealing with the welfare of the state (II. 5-6: present tenses) and now again (the last distich has verbs in present tenses) they are wrong in committing themselves to some leader of theirs: the last distich (II. 7-8), which points to a singular *ἀνὴρ*, would either be a generalising statement of the Athenians' readiness to be seduced by demagogues, or a more specific allusion to the danger of a tyranny (like that of Peisistratus? the specific reference to him is unsure).


δ' ὑμετέραν κακότητα: the closest parallel both in form and in content is Hom. Od. 24.455-7 ὑμετέρῃ κακότητι, φίλοι, τάδε ἔργα γένοντο· οὖ γὰρ ἐριν πείθεσθ', οὐ Μέντορι ποιμένι λαών, ὑμετέρους παῖδας καταπαυέμεν ἄφροσινών, where the seer Halitherses charges the responsibility of the murder of the suitors to the ἱθακήσοι as a whole, who had not paid attention to his warnings and had not restrained the young suitors, their children, from their arrogance: I believe that Solon implicitly keeps the role of Halitherses, who ὅσος ὁρὰ πρόσω καὶ ὁπίσω (I. 452), and had warned the Athenians not to go on protecting their leaders, but they did not pay attention. See also Il. 13.108 ἠγεμώνοις κακότητι μεθημοσύνησι τε λαῶ, Thgn. IEG 855 δι' ἠγεμώνων κακότητα.

2. The *Odyssey's* opening speech of Zeus (1.32ff.) has been correctly considered the model for Solon's *Eunomia* (II. 5-8), where we find the antithetical pair *θεοὶ/ι(αὐτοί) βροτοί*: see ad 3.5 for the other parallels and a discussion of the relevant differences
between Homer's and Solon's stance on the problem of human/divine responsibility. The same antithesis is also operative here, and responsibility lies again with human action.

\[\text{For later uses of the verb in relation to god or supreme power, cf. Them. paraphr. in Arist. de anima paraphr. 5.3.103.10.}\]

\[\text{For the apocope and assimilation, cf. Minn. 5.2: ἁμπαυώς.}\]

\[\text{thoútwv moîran: Thgn. IEG 356 thóutwv moîr(a) (in the same metrical position). Linforth ad loc, gives some examples of the appositional genitive: 23.18 moîran thánatou, Thgn. IEG 356 already quoted, 592 ἀμφιτέρων τὸ λάχος.}\]

3. αὐτὸι ... ἰδιεῖσατε: Sol. 23.5 has ἀεξομένων. The verb had been used in epic only twice and always about divine 'magnification' of humans: cf. Hom. Od. 13.359-60 αἰ κεν ἐὰ ... με ... ἀγελείη αὐτόν τε ζῷεν καὶ μοι φίλον υἱόν ἀδέξῃ and Hes. Op. 6 (Zeus) μεία δ᾽ ἀρίζηλον μινύθει καὶ ἀδήλον ἀδέξει; see also Pind. Ol. 8.88: (Zeus) αὐτοῦ τ᾽ ἀδέξοι καὶ πόλιν. This is very relevant to the interpretation, in a context where the problem of human responsibility for the events has just been stated: Solon may somehow imply that the Athenians are doing with their leader(s) what usually the gods do; he will be resumed by Thgn. IEG 823 μητ᾽ των ἀδέξα τυραννον ἐπ᾽ ἐλπίδι, κέρδεσαν εἰκῶν κτλ. See also Eur. TGF 420.1 τυράννους διὰ μακρῶν ἤξηξιόντως, Pl. Ly. 206a ἐπειδὰν τις αὐτοῦς (scil. τοὺς καλοὺς) ἐπαινή καὶ αὔξῃ.


The line was commonly taken to refer to the body-guard given to Peisistratus, a typical feature of the archaic tyrant: cp. Ar. Eq. 852ff. where the sausage-seller in his
attempt to connect Cleon with the charge of tyranny (see Edmunds 1987, 15-6) warns Demos of the young men Cleon has around him, implying a tyrant's body-guard; besides Hdt. 1.59.5, Thuc. 6.56.2, 57.1. Both this interpretation and the word itself ῥύματα have been doubted. Rihll 1989, 279 wrongly overlapped the two meanings which ῥύμα has: both 'defence' (from the middle ῥύσαμα) and 'what is drawn', therefore arrow or spear (from the active ἐρώω), and considered a problem the fact that in the ancient tradition (Hdt. 1.59.5, Ar. Ath.Pol. 14.1) the body-guard Peisistratus had been voted was composed not of archers, but of 'club-bearers', κορυφηφόροι. This argument can be fairly dismissed, because the Solonian word has undoubtedly the meaning 'defence', as the Hesiodic ἔρυμα quoted above. Linforth 1919, 207 prefers the reading of Diog.Laert. ῥύσια δόντες 'giving pledges or hostages', namely putting yourselves in the power of the οὖτος: Solon would have had in mind the hectemoroi system which he himself had abolished; he would have employed the figure to describe exactly what the Athenian people must have done in their relations with Peisistratus in analogy to how they were acting in the previous system of the self-enslavement for debt. But Linforth's interpretation assumes references which are not sure: on the problem of the debt-slavery see ad 3.18. For my different interpretation, see Introd.

An economic choice is to believe that in the second distich Solon is reflecting on the situation he had depicted in Eunomia: after the criticism of the leaders, in our fragment Solon would concentrate on the responsibility of the demos, who had driven these leaders to power: the expression ῥύματα δόντες would simply point to the protection or support offered to the upper ruling class of citizens, and δουλοσύνη as the 'almost slavery' of the complete lack in political freedom that the demos has been ready to suffer: cf. ad 3.18 and 24-5.

4. ἐσχέτε δουλοσύνην: Sol. 3.18 ἧλυθε δουλοσύνην.

5-6. Solon pointedly contrasts the Athenian resourceful way of behaving in private to their totally opposite public attitude: cf. Eur. TGF 886 μετὸ πολέτην ὅσις ωφελεῖν πάτραν βραδύς φανεῖται, μεγάλα δὲ βλάπτειν ταχύς, καὶ πόρμουν αὐτῷ, τῇ πόλει δ' ἀμήχανον.

5. ἀλώπεκος ἰχνείς βαίνει: 'walks with a fox-tread' — possibly from observations of the characteristics of the fox when hunting?: cf. Schol. In Aristid. 160.5.1-2 (ὡσπερ ἰχνῶν εἴχετο τῶν ἔργων τοῦ πατρός): ἰχνῶν, ἀντὶ τοῦ βημάτων. ἔστι δὲ ἀπὸ μεταφορᾶς τῶν θηρευτικῶν κυκών. Solon's line was imitated by Cratinus, PCG 135 ὑμῶν εἰς μὲν ἑκαστος ἀλώπης διουροδεκέται.
Masaracchia 1958, 293, and Jedrkiewicz 1989, 327 see here an allusion to the Aesopic myth of the old lion and the fox (147 Hausrath), the lion being Peisistratus, the fox the Athenian people: such a reference seems much too vague to my mind, and unconvincing firstly because in the fable the lion is too old and unable to feed himself and this image would not fit a newly-established and totally powerful tyrant; most importantly, such a parallelism would clearly weaken Solon's message because the fox is not deceived in the fable. Solon's point of reference is rather to the animal's celebrated astuteness and shrewdness in the way of e.g. Archil. IEG 185.5-6 ἀλώπηξ κερδαλῆ... πυκνὸν ἔχουσα νόον; it had become proverbial already in the sixth century, model for the type of behaviour of Pittacus (see Alc. PLF 69), and for other unscrupulous politicians: see Ar. Vesp. 1241f., where Philocleon quotes the skolion: οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλωπεκίζειν, οὐδ' ἀμφοτέροις γίγνεσθαι φιλον, to point to the perjurer Theoros as a traitor of the ἄγαθοί whom he pretends to join, while he holds the right hand of Cleon and the κακοί (on the problem whether the skolion which Philocleon quotes pre-existed to Aristophanes or was an invention of his, cf. Vetta 1983, 129). For ἀλωπεκίζειν 'to deceive in an alluring way' see Bafr. 95.64 and Hsch. a 3369 L. ἀλωπεκίζειν ἀπατάν. On the cunning intelligence (metis) of the fox, see further Detienne-Vemant 1974, 41-5.

ἐνεστὶ βαίνει: For the dative, see Strattis PCG 71.2-3 πεντήκοντα τοιοῦ ἐνεστὶ βαίνετ(ε); more generally for the expression, Hom. Od. 2.406=3.30=5.193=7.38 ἤ δ' ἐπείτα μετ' ἐνεστὶ βαίνε θεοί, Meleag. Anth. Pal. 12.84.5 βαίνω δ' ἕνος ἐπ' ἐνεστὶ; later, e.g. Philo, gigant. 39.2, migr. Abrah. 128.4, fuga et invent. 130.1-2, Nonnus, Dion. 34.2.

6. For χαίνος, cf. Sol. 29.4 and note there; χαίνος νόος is the opposite of the Homeric πυκναί φρένες; cf. Pind. Pyth. 2.61 χαίνα πρατιδί παλαιμονεὶ κενεὰ and Nem. 8.45 κενεὰν δ' ἐλπίδων χαίνον τέλος, Eur. Supp. 412-3 ἐκχαίνων λόγοις, Andr. 931 τοῦδε' ἐκαύωσαν λόγους. Frequent in Aristophanic comedy, it creates metaphors politically allusive of how gullible and uncritical the Athenians are, such as that of the χαίνοπολίτης in Ar. Ach. 635, who swallows open-mouthed all that is told him (cf. also Eq. 1263 ἡ Κεχραίων πόλις, scil. Athens, Nub. 875, Vesp. 721): see Taillardat 1965, 264-7.

The pattern adjective+verb+νόος is a structural formula of the second hemistich of the pentameter in Theognis (IEG 74, 88, 142, 196, 498, 580, 622, 698, 792, 1082d; see also Marc.Arg. Anth.Pal. 5.116.2.), and ἐνεστὶ νόος will become a common phrase in Euripides (e.g. Andr. 667, Hipp. 920, TGF 212.1).

Phoen. 596 ἐς χέρας λεύσεις ἐμάς (a preposition was apparently regular in such expressions, cp. Soph. El. 972 πρὸς τὰ χρηστὰ πᾶς ὤραν, Eur. El. 377 πρὸς λόγχην βλέπων, and see Page ad Med. 247).

The metonymy 'to look at the glossa of someone' instead of 'to pay attention to someone' not only mimetically hints at the orientation of the eyes of the Athenians while listening to a speech, but also introduces the ἄνηρ by whom they are attracted as a mere talker (having a mouth, and giving a series of wily speeches), but nothing else — indeed it anticipates and reinforces the consideration of 1. 8.

The antithesis between ἐπος and ἔργον became conventional in sophistic rhetoric but is already present in Homer in pairs with ἐπος, βουλαί, μύθοι: cf. e.g. Il. 1.395, 5.879, 9.374, 11.703, 15.234, Od. 2.272, 3.99, 4.329, 15.375, Hom.Hymn Dem. 117, 199, Hom.Hymn Ap. 540, Hom.Hymn Herm. 46 etc. In the Homeric aristocratic society, the pair represented the fundamental qualities a man of value should possess — cf. Il. 9.443 μύθον τε ὑπηρ’ ἐμεναι προκτηρά τε ἔργων, with reference to Achilles' education (instances in the Iliad of being good at fighting and in council: Achilles and Agamemnon at 1.258, Agamemnon at 3.179, Diomedes at 9.53f.). See later Democ. VS 68882 κόβδηλοι καὶ ἀγαθοφανεῖς οἱ λόγῳ μὲν ἀπαντᾷ, ἔργῳ δὲ οὐδὲν ἔρδοντες, Soph. TrGF 201a ὡς γλώσσα', ἐν οἷς ἄνθρωποι τιμήρ ἔχεις, ὅπου λόγοι σθένουσα τῶν ἔργων πλέον, Dem. 9.15 ἀλλ' ἔστιν ... ὡς ... ἐκ τῶν ὀνομάτων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πραγμάτων τὸν ἄγοντ' εἰρήνην ἢ πολεμοῦνθ’ ἐαυτῷ σκέφατ’ ἄν; See also the notes ad Sol. 29b.3.


7. αἰμύλον ἀνδρός: Hsch. a 1969 L. αἰμύλος- ἐξῆς ἐν τῷ λέγειν, Sud. ai 212 A. Αἰμύλα. καὶ Αἰμύλος, κόλαξ, ἀπατεών, Etym.Magn. 35.30 ποικίλον, πυκνόν, πανοργόν, δολέρον. In favour of the v.l. αἴλόν (scil. ἐπος) would be passages with derogatory uses of the adjective as Hes. Theog. 511 ποικίλον αἰλόμοσιν, ἀμαρτινοῦν τ’ ἔπιστρεφεί, Pind. Nem. 8.25 μέγιστον δ’ αἴλόν ψεύδει χέρας ἀντέταται, Aesch. PV 661-2 αἰλοστόμους χρησμοὺς, but the word seems to point more to shifty wiles rather than to a charm of eloquence and persuasion which is needed here — and demagogues/Peisistratus (?) were most probably considered to be clever in speaking rather than quickly changing their statements. Besides, ἀνδρός would be left very vague without a qualifying epithet.

Contrast the praise for the εὐθύγλωσσος ἄνηρ in Pind. Pyth. 2.86-8 ἐν πάντα δὲ νόμον εὐθύγλωσσος ἄνηρ προφέρει, παρὰ τυραννίδα, χώποταν ὁ λάβρος στρατός,
χῶταν πόλιν οἱ σοφοὶ τηρέωντι (also Ὀλυμπ. 1.86 ἀφευδεῖ δὲ πρὸς ἄκμοιν χάλκευς γλώσσαν), and compare Soph. TrGF 683 οὗ γὰρ ποτ' ἄν γένοιτ' ἀσφαλῆς πόλις ἐν ἤ τὰ μὲν δίκαια καὶ τὰ σώφρονα λάγδην πατεῖται, κατάλοιπος δ' ἀνήρ λαβὼν πανούργα χεραί κέντρα κηδεύει πόλιν, Eur. Or. 907-13 ὅταν ... ἡδύς τις λόγοις φρονών κακῶς πείθη τὸ πλήθος, τῇ πόλει κακὸν μέγα, Supp. 412-5 ... ὡστε ἐκχωνῖν λόγους πρὸς κέρδος ἱδιον ἄλλοτ' ἄλλοσε στρέψει, τὸ δ' αὐτίχ' ἡδύς καὶ διδοὺς πολλὴν χάριν ἐσαύθις ἐβλαψε(ε), Supp. 423-5 ὥ ὅ δὲ νοσώδες τοῦτο τοῖς ἀμείνοσιν, ὅταν πονηρὸς ἄξιωμ' ἀνήρ ἔχῃ γλώσσῃ κατασχών δῆμον, οὐδὲν ὑπὸ τὸ πρῶν, and Hec. 132 ἡδυλόγος δημοχαριστής (of Odysseus seen unfavourably as a manipulator of the unsophisticated), 254-5 ἀχάριστον ὑμῶν στέρμ', ὅσοι δημιουργοὺς ζηλοῦτε τιμᾶς; for the description of Peisistratus' charms in speaking (which, however, we cannot be sure that Solon is alluding to here), Simon. PMG 607 ἐπόθησεν σειρῆα τὸν Πεισίστρατον, Plut. Sol. 29.3 αἰμὸλον τι καὶ προσφιλές εἶχεν ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι, and Per. 7.1-2 where a comparison is drawn between the two men).
A much too short fragment containing an explicit reference to male homosexuality (μηρών ἰμεροῦν) and contemporary with the earliest depictions of homosexual courtship on Attic black-figure vases (ca. 560-475): see Dover 1978, 98, 195, Shapiro 1981, 135f., Bremmer 1990, 142. Other poetic references to homosexuality more or less contemporary with Solon are Mimn. 7.9 (where the old man is said to become ἐχθρός ... παιοῦν), and Alcaeus PLF 430 (Alcaeus would have sung of a boy) and (possibly) PLF 431. See further Vetta 1980, xxxvii-xliv (a very neat assessment of the ancient testimonies and the present evidence of paederotic themes in archaic elegy and lyric), and Percy 1996, 176-81 (with an examination of the laws attributed to Solon on the love of the youths).

Plut. Amat. 751e ascribes fr. 16 to a young Solon (νέος ἄν ἐτη καὶ 'απέρματος πολλοῦ μεστοῦ' ως ο Πλάτων φησί), and considers fr. 24 the result of a more mature age (ὡςτε ἐκ ᾐλῆς καὶ χειμῶν τῶν παιδικῶν ἐρωτῶν ἐν τινι γαλήνῃ τῇ περί γάμου καὶ φιλοσοφίαν θείμενος τὸν βίον). Indeed, the two fragments deal with two different aspects of the sensual sphere, δῶρα 'Αφροδίτης and ἔργα 'Αφροδίτης: according to Calame 1992, 16, since Aphrodite’s gifts, the ἐρατὰ ἄνθη (beauty, charm, sexual strength) are granted for a short span of time in the bloom of youth, the passing of time fades them and therefore the (also aesthetic) δῶρα 'Αφροδίτης are eventually reduced to the more exclusively sexual dimension of the ἔργα 'Αφροδίτης. However, in fr. 16 Solon appears not to speak about himself, therefore to believe that fr. 16 is by a young Solon, and fr. 24 by a mature/old Solon would mean to follow the usual biographical fallacia of the ancient readers.

1. ἐςθ': the conjunction ἐςτε is not attested in Homer, but it is already in Hes. Theog. 754; cf. later Thgn. IEG 959, and Xenoph. 5.4. Also the use of temporal conjunctions with the subjunctive without ἄν is not Homeric, but it is not rare in Attic poetic language (cf. Kühner-Blass 2, 449f. n. 4; Soph. Aj. 1183 is an instance with ἐςτε), and there is no reason to emend παλαφιής codd. in -ςεις (Brunck, Gaisford) or -ςει (Boissonade) — in fact, the future ind. can be found after these conjunctions in Homer, but always with ἄν (cf. Kühner-Blass 2, 447 n. 2).

ἡμης ἐρατοίσυν ἄν ἄνθεις: The metaphor of the "flower" of the youth refers in Homer to the full martial strength of a young soldier: see II. 13.484; later on, Hom. Hymn Herm. 375, Pind. Pyth. 4.158, Aesch. Supp. 663, (Ag. 197-8, Pers. 59, 252, PV 420), but here, as usually from Hesiod onwards (cf. LfgrE s.v. 3a-b), it means the full bloom of the youth (with sexual or aesthetic connotations), as in Hom. Hymn Dem. 108 κουρίδον ἄνθος, Hes. Theog. 988 τέρνεν ἄνθος ἐχοῦτ’ ἐρμυθοῦς ἡμης, Tyrt. 7.28 δφρ’ ἐρατῆς ἡμης ἄγλαον ἄνθος ἐχη, Mimn. 7.3.4 κρυπταδὴ φιλότης
The floral metaphor stands for the boys' beauty. I agree with Roth 1993, that the meaning of the preposition επί with reference to the erastes is certainly not temporal. Indeed, differently from the eromenos-youth who will always be reminded that the charms of ἵβη are granted temporarily (cf. e.g. Thgn. IEG 1303-4 οὐκετί δηρῶν ἤξεις Κυπρογενοῦς δώρων ισοτετάνου, 1305-6 παιδείας πολυπράτου ἄνδρος ὑκύτερον σταδίου, Xen. Symp. 8.14 τῷ μὲν τῆς ὀρας ἄνδρος ταχὺ δῆπου παρακμάξει, Strat. Anth.Pal. 12.234 εἰ κάλλει καινχά, γίνωσχ', ὅτι καὶ ρόδων ἄνθετε ἀλλὰ μαρανθέν ἄφιω σὺν κοπρίως ἐρήμη. ἄνδρος γὰρ καὶ κάλλος ἵσον χρόνον ἐστὶ λαχώτατα ταῦτα δ' ὀμὴ φθονέων ἐξεμάρανε χρόνος), the erastes must be older than the eromenos (he cannot be very young, a pais) in the etiquette of Greek paederotic love. A causal-local meaning for επί is appropriate, for the erastes loves alighting on the single boys-in-bloom, like the bees who πέτονται ἐπὶ ἄνθεσιν εἰαρνοῖσιν of Homer Il. 2.89. For the etiquette governing the erastes, see Pl. Symp. 180c-185c, and Cantarella 1992, 18.


2. μηρῶν ἡ μείρων: Though the celebration of the beloved does not often dwell on characteristic and individualised features of his figure, any references of this kind usually deal with the eyes (e.g. Pind. fr. 123, Mel. Anth.Pal. 12.109, 110, 113, adesp. Anth.Pal. 12.130, Strat. Anth.Pal. 12.196; Arist. fr. 96 Rose=43 Gigon) or the μηρόι (Anac. PMG 407 ἀλλὰ πρόπινε ῥαδινοῦς ὃ φιλε μηροῦς, Aesch. TrGF 135 σέβας δὲ μηρῶν ἀγνῶν ὧν ἐπηρήσω, ὃ δισχάριστε τῶν πυκνῶν φιλημάτων (Achilles for Patroclus), TrGF **136 μηρῶν τε τῶν σῶν εὐσεβῆς ὀμιλία τκαλλιώ† (Achilles for Patroclus), Soph. TrGF 345 μηροῖς ἕπαιδων τὴν Διὸς τυραννίδα (of Ganymedes), cf. Buffière 1980, 307, and Dover 1978, 70.

γλυκεροῦ στόματος: The pattern appears here for the first time; γλυκερός in Homer (Il. 13.637, Od. 23.145) and Hesiod (Theog. 83-4, 97 γλυκερῆ οἷς ἀπὸ
This is the fragment where Solon's aristocratic ideals, consequent upon his birth, surface in the most evident way. Paederastic love was a well known component of the aristocratic way of life (cf. fr. 16). As to horses, the connection of horsemanship and rich classes is another fact: as remarked by Arist. Pol. 1289b35-8, one of the criteria providing distinction in wealth among the γυνάκια was ἱπποτροφία, since τοῦτο γὰρ οὗ ῥάδιον μὴ πλουτοῦντας ποιεῖν διότι ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων χρόνων ἄσας πόλεσιν ἐν τοῖς ἱπποῖς ἡ δύναμις ἤν, ὀλιγαρχία παρὰ τούτοις ἦσαν (see also 1321a5-11; besides Thuc. 6.12.2; Xen. Hipparch. 1.9-12, Isae. 5.43, Isoc. 6.55 and 16.33); the family of Philaidai, claiming to descend from Ajax, were given the epithet τετραποτρόφος (cf. Hdt. 6.35.1), and the names of many Athenian aristocrats included the root ἰππ- (cf. Ar. Nub. 60-7). The second richest class of Solon's system, the ἱππεῖς, were so called because they were expected to serve as cavalry in the army and be able to equip themselves with horses, and the highest class, the pentakosiomedimnoi, had to serve also in the same corps (cf. Spence 1993, 180f.). After all, later, in order to reduce the military relevance of the landowners and to limit the power of the aristocrats, both Hippias and the post-Peisistratean democracy adopted at different levels the device of restricting the role of the Athenian cavalry in war actions (cf. Anderson 1961, 128-130); Regarding the passion for hunting with dogs and horses it was a typical sport of well-off people, see e.g. Pl. Ly. 205c, 211d-e, and cf. Méautis 1972, 37-9, Lilja 1976, 42, Stupperich 1977, 177.

The themes of the fragment are very traditional, yet the personal mark of Solon's ideology can be seen through a comparison with a close parallel to Solon's fragment: Hom.Hymn Dem. 486-9 μέγ' ὀλίβος ὧν τιν' ἐκεῖναι (Persephone and Demeter) προφρονεῖς φιλίωντα ... ἀίφα δὲ οἱ πέμπουσιν ἐφέστων ές μέγα δῶμα Πλοῦτον, ὃς ἀναφέρατος ἀφετοί ρητοῖοι δίδωσιν, a text on the blessed condition of the initiated, whose terminology is also paralleled in fr. 18 (see Introd.). Although the frequency of the topos of the makarismos (see ad l. 1) does not allow any confidence in a concrete intertextual connection, and in the Hymn the agrarian dimension of life is obviously stressed, the parallelism illustrates well how much Solon favours a rather more modern view of wealth than the agrarian surplus of corn with which the author of the Hymn and, more generally, the archaic Greek culture were concerned — cp. the common genealogy of Ploutos as the son of Demeter and Iasion, and the passages quoted by Richardson ad Dem. 489 and by West ad Theog. 969. The result would be to refuse the concept of richness as accumulation of food-stuff or generally of surplus (the idea of the 'house full of ἔθολα' of Hom. Hymn 30.10, which Solon appears to understate while speaking of περιόστα σχηματα in fr. 18.7f.), and to favour a more 'mobile' idea of
wealth, which includes in itself the moment of the enjoyment of it in the social dimension stressed by the references to the παιδείς and the ξένος.


παιδεις ... φιλοι: The phrase παιδεις φιλοι is Homeric (Od. 19.455= 'dear sons'), but I do not believe that the meaning here can be the Homeric one ("happy the man who has dear children"), as was maintained by Harrison 1902, 111, Linforth 1919, 176f., and Fränkel 1975, 230. In favour of an erotic interpretation of the distich (see at least Bowra 1938, 74 and de Heer 1969, 33) is the possibility that Solon's παιδεις ... φιλοι=παιδεις καλοι, amasii (cf. at least Anac. PMG 378.2 οὐ γαρ ἐμοὶ παῖς ἐθέλει συμβαῖν (with Porson's integrations) and Thgn. IEG 1369 παιδος ἐρως καλος μὲν ἐχειν (where παῖς alone=παῖς καλὸς), and above all Solon's verb παιδοφιλεῖν of fr. 16.1. Besides, Hermias ad Pl. Phdr. 231e seems to have understood the fragment in an erotic sense (καλοῦ τοῦ ἐραν μνημονευει λέγων (Σόλων) and the variant νέοι of Theognis' text point to this direction as well.

φιλοι can be taken (with e.g. Hudson-Williams) as an attribute to παιδεις ("happy is who has beloved boys...), as Lucian's quotation certainly implies, or as a predicative to it ("happy is who likes boys...), as Plato's quotation most probably implies (φιλοι would be=φιλοι εἰσί, to be connected not only with παιδες, but also with the other subjects ἵπποι and κύκεσ: cf. Landfester 1966, 41 n.4, and Skiadas 1966). I favour the former interpretation, though the latter seems to be supported by "Thgn." IEG 1255-6 ὡστις μη παιδας τε φιλει και μωνιχας ἵππους και κύκας, οὕποτε οἱ θημος ἐν εὐφροσύνη, but the Theognidean distich more probably operated a stretching inside the μεταποίησις of Solon's poem which the Theognidean author made after having quoted it (1253-4): Theognis' ll. 1255-6 would therefore be a good instance of the symposiastic repartee technique, and the Theognidean author of this distich may be 'answering' the makarismos of Solon ("happy is who ...") with a more emphatic exclusive statement ("the only happy man is who ..."): cf. Vetta 1980, 58f.
μῶνυχες ἑποιοῖ: a common epic formula, see e.g. Hom. II. 5.236, 9.127, 11.708, Od. 15.46, Hes. fr. 30.4 μ[ῶν]υχας ἱπποις (always at the end of the hexameter).

2. ἄρευνται: the word is used for the first time for dogs, but cf. θηρευταί κόνες in Hom. II. 11.325 and 12.41.

ξένος ἀλλοδαπός: Cf. Hom. Od. 17.485 ξένοιασιν ... ἀλλοδαποῖα. Beyond the sense of 'foreign', ξένος already in Homer had acquired the second meaning 'friend of a foreign land/city' (Hsch. ξ 29 L. ξεινος ὁ ἀπὸ ξενῆς φίλος), to define the ties of hospitality which made friends of strangers (e.g. II. 17.582ff., Od. 19.191ff., 24.262ff.), or celebrated an existing formal bond inherited through one's father (e.g. II. 6.215ff., Od. 1.175ff.), in a society where strangers were not always welcomed (e.g. the episode with the Cyclops, Od. 9.175f., or Od. 21.27 where Heracles kills his host). See further Kakridis 1963, 86-105, Donlan 1981/82, 148-51. Solon's emphasis on the foreign status of the ξένος is probably a hint at the mobility of Attic aristocracy, and the aristocratic 'networks' between individuals beyond a city's boundaries, created by marriage alliances, guest-friendship: cf. Lewis 1996, 27-9.
The structure of the poem is simple. Solon's starting axiomatic statement introduces the two comparable case-examples of traditional "goods", wealth/gastronomic and erotic pleasures, so as to maintain that they are equal πλούτος (ἴσον τοι πλουτιώδους) — an utterly unconventional stretching in the meaning of the word, which, somehow, parallels Solon's use of the term ἄγαθοι in fr. 6 (see ad loc.). Though wealth and physical pleasures look like equalised at the beginning, the different length of their descriptions anticipates which of the two Solon really favours (material possessions which conventionally characterise abundance in wealth occupy two lines of the poem; the enjoyment of food, physical pleasures the next four lines). Then comes Solon's further statement, given in a typically apophthegmatic, nominal phrase in the first hemistich of l. 7: only the latter goods are real ἀφενός.

The inescapability as well as universality of death simply proves the futility of material possessions — but also, one could think, of the pleasures: in Hades you can neither take your money with you, nor enjoy food or love: cp. e.g. Thgn. IEG 973-88, Asclep. Anth.Pal. 5.85, Strat. Anth.Pal. 11.19. Solon's way to avoid the impression that the last statement about death would invalidate his own option of the pleasures is to stress from the beginning of the poem the contrast between excess of wealth and simplicity in one's acquisitions: the former carries in itself the connotations of effort and endless toil being stressed by Solon elsewhere, cp. frr. 1.43ff., 1.71-3 etc., and, possibly, also implies the idea that such an amount of wealth is not directly enjoyable, differently from the physical pleasures; the latter descends from the ideas of moderation and measure, so dear to him, cp. fr. 5.4-5, and implies the idea of an easier life.

The best parallel for Solon's text is provided by an archaic but not Greek text, the epitaph of Sardanapalus, which according to a testimony would have been translated in Greek verses by some Choerilus, most probably the one of Iasos: SH 335.1-5 εὗ εἴδως ὃτι θυττός ἔφυς σὸν θυμὸν ἄξιε τερπόμενος θαλίσσι· θανόντι τοι οὔτις ὄνησις. καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ σποδός εἰμι, Νίνου μεγάλης βασιλεύσας. ταύτ' ἔχω ὅσα' ἐφαγον καὶ ἐφύβρισα καὶ μετ' ἔρωτος τέρπν' ἐπαθον· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλίβα κείνα λέλειπται; all three much shorter prose versions of the same epitaph, which are recorded by Ath. 12.530ab-Strab. 14.5.9(672)-Arr. Anab. 2.5.2-4=FGrH 139F9 included the invitation: ἔσθηε, πῦνε, παῖζε, ὡς τὰλλα τοῦτο οὐκ ἄξια or ... ὡς τὰλλα τὰ ἀνθρώπινα οὐκ ὀντα τοῦτο άξια (the poetic version of Sardanapalus' epitaph was credited with the relevance of a real manifesto, and provoked the 'correction' by Chrysippus, SH 338.4-5 εὗ εἴδως ὃτι θυττός ἔφυς σὸν θυμὸν ἄξιε, τερπόμενος μιθοπεῖ. θαγόντι σοι οὔτις ὄνησις ... ταύτ' ἔχω, ὅσα' ἐμαθον καὶ ἐφφύνισα καὶ μετὰ τοῦτων ἐσθλ' ἐπαθον· τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ καὶ ἱδέα πάντα λέλειπται). Parallels to the message of
Sardanapalus are also real epigraphic epitaphs of the imperial age: GVI 2015 (2/3 cent. A.D.) εὐφροσύνη, πόθος, οἶνος, ὑπνο[σ ταύτ' ἐστὶ βροτοῖσι] πλούτος - ἀνευράντων Ταντάλ[ου ἐστὶ βιόσ], 1978.17-22 (2/3 A.D.) τούτ' ... παραιών τῇ ψυχῇ μετάδοσ καλῶν ... καὶ τοῦ βιῶν τροφή παρηγόρησον εἰδός, ἢν καταβῆς ἐς πώμα Λήβης, οὐδὲν τῶν ἐπάνω κάτω ποτ' ὁξει ὑποψὶ ... ἀποπταθείσης, 1905.14ff. (3 A.D.) μηδείς δ' ἐν πλούτῳ τυφωθεὶς [γαύ]ρα φρονεῖτω, πάσι γὰρ εἰς "Ἄδης καὶ τέλος ἐστὶν ἱσον. ἐστιν τις μέγας ὃν ἐν κτίμασιν - οὐ πλέον οὕτως, ταύτῳ μέτοικος πρὸς τάφον ἐκδέχεται. σπεύδετε, τὴν ψυχήν εὐφραίνειτε πάντοτε, θνη[τοί], ὥς ἄδης βίοτος καὶ μέτρων ἐστὶ ζωῆς. ταύτα, φίλοι, μετὰ ταύτα τί γὰρ πλέον; οὐκέτι ταύτα. στήλη ταύτα λαλεῖ καὶ λίθος- οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ.

Considered in itself, with its references to (homosexual-heterosexual) love, to the enjoyment of what lies ready to hand, this poem would seem to produce a kind of carpe diem philosophy — the carefree attitude towards life which can be found in Mimn. 7 and becomes a topos later, see e.g. Anacreon. 36.1-16 ὁ Πλούτος εἰ γε χρυσοῦ τὸ ζῆν παρείχε θυτοῖς, ἑκατέρων φυλάττων, ἵν' ἔσοβηνει ἐπέλθη (ἀν Θάνατος ἐπέλθη; Wakker) λάβῃ τι καὶ παρέλθῃ. εἰ δ' οὖν μή το πρίασθαι τὸ ζῆν ἐνεστὶ θυτοῖς, τι καὶ μάτην στεγάζω; (τί καὶ γόος προσέπω;) θανεῖν γὰρ εἰ πέρπωται, τί χρυσός ωφελεῖ με; ἐμοί γένοστο πίνειν, πιόντι δ' οὖν ἢδην ἔμοις φίλοις συνείναι, ἐν δ' ἀπαλαίσα κοίταις τελείν τὰν 'Ἀφροδίταν, CEG 482 (5 cent. B.C.; cf. Sassi 1981) πολλὰ μεθ' ἥλικιας ὁμοίλους ἡδέα πάσας ἐκ γαίας βλαστῶν γαῖα πάλιν γένονα: εἰμὶ δὲ 'Ἀριστοκλῆς Πειραιεύς, παῖς δὲ Μένινος, Eur. Supp. 953-4 σμικρὸν τὸ χρήμα τοῦ βίου- τούτων δὲ χρῆ ὡς ράστα καὶ μὴ σὺν πόνους διεκπεράν.

However, to believe that the poem simply is 'an affirmation — even an arrogant one — of the individual, an almost cynical hedonism' (Marzullo 1965, 126) is extremely wrong. Nor have we to read it as a manifesto ante litteram of the Hellenistic ideal of the αὐτάρκεια — for which see e.g. Alph. Anth.Pal. 9.110 οὐ στέργω βαθυλήνους ἀρώφας, οὐκ ὁδὸν ποιόρκουν οἷα Γύγης- αὐτάρκους ἔραμαι βίου, Μακρίνε· τὸ 'μηθέν' γὰρ ἀγαν' ἀγαν με τέρπει, or Crates' Hymn to Eutelia, SH 361.

In fact, the poem has to be read in the broader context of Solon's constant criticism of the traditional over-evaluation of wealth that was synthesised e.g. in Alc. PLF 360.2 χρήματ' ἄνηρ, πένιχρος δ' οὐδ' εἰς πέλετ' ἐσλός οὐδὲ τίμιος (see ad 6.3-4 for later instances). In this perspective, frs. 6 and 18 will rather appear to be a pair of attacks on the idea of material wealth, the former focusing on the social idea of ἀρετῆ, the latter from the individualistic point of view of personal well-being.

Textual clues of this intention can be detected. Solon uses the verb πλουτοῦσαι and the substantive ἀφενος to define his new "goods" in the first hemistichs of l. 1 and
of 1. 7, and this combination might resume the traditional epic use of this couple of synonyms which define the most blessed human 'happiness': besides Hom. II. 1.171 ἀφενος καὶ πλοῦτον ἀφύξειν, see above all Hes. Theog. 969-74 Δημήτηρ μὲν Πλοῦτον ἐγείνατο ... ἐσφλόν, ... τῷ δὲ τυχόντι καὶ οὐ κ’ ἐς χεῖρας ἦκηται τὸν δὴ ἀφενιὼν ἔθηκε, πολὺν δὲ οἱ ὀπόσαειν ὀλβον, and Hom. Hymn Dem. 486-9 μέγ’ ὀβύς ὄν τιν’ ἐκεῖναι (Persephone and Demeter) φιλονται ... αἴφαι δὲ οἱ πέμπουσιν ἐφέστιον ἔς μέγα δώμα Πλοῦτον, ὦ ἀνθρώπους ἀφενος θυγτοῖ σδίωσιν. The concept of ἀφενος/πλοῦτος as life's unsurpassed ideal, which surfaces in all these epic passages, is exactly the one that Solon seriously challenges while proposing to call ἀφενος the enjoyment of pleasures: Solon's disapproval for the excess in wealth appears so sharp in this poem, that it could be understood by Stob. 4.33.7 as an instance of σύγκρισις πενίας καὶ πλοῦτον. Stobaeus' interpretation is certainly wrong, since Solon himself in other fragments is clearly not indifferent to and does not ignore wealth: see e.g. 1.7-8; furthermore, the key word for our understanding of this poem, the adjective περιόσια, exactly points out that Solon's emphasis is once more upon his condemnation of excess and his belief in moderation and simplicity. Solon most probably presents the same belief and aim which can be found in Hes. Op. 40-1, where the exclamation νήπιοι, οὐδὲ ἵσασιν, ὧσ πλέον ἠμισον παιντός, οὐδ’ ὧσον ἐν μαλάχη τε καὶ ἀσφόθέλω μέγ’ δινειαρ is part of an attack against the avidity of the bribed judges.

The poem looks specifically designed for a symposiastic performance. That is obvious from the eulogy of the physical pleasures, but also the warning context about the impartiality of death would easily be much more effective on the audience when compared with the actual warmth or the sensuality of a symposium: indeed, the two situations are often compared, from Alc. PLF 38 to Thgn. IEG 973-88 cit., from anon. PMG 1009 to Asclep. Anth.Pal. 5.85 cit. and 12.50, Strat. Anth.Pal. 11.19 quoted.

1. ἵσον τοι πλοῦτοῦσιν: cf. Hom. Od. 15.72-3 ἵσον τοι κακῶν ἐσθ’, ὡς τ’ οὐκ ἐθέλοντα νέασαι ... καὶ ὡς ... κατερίκει, see also Bacchyl. 1.172f. and Eur. Supp. 862f. For the frequent use of τοι in gnomic writings where it forces the general truth upon the consciousness of the individual addressee in the sense of 'do not forget, please', cf. Denniston Greek Part., 543.

1-2. ἀργυρός ... καὶ χρυσός: Silver and gold are often mentioned together as precious components of luxury ornaments or of the most remarkable goods (see e.g. Hom. II. 10.438, 17.52, 18.475, Od. 10.35, 45, Hom. Hymn Herm. 249), and in Thgn. IEG 77, 119, adesp. PMG 988 they are contrasted with different ethical values. They are also deprecated when moralists praise the simple life: Musonius fr. 20 p. 111.1 ff. Hense
ék keraiméwv poteríwv parón, à to te dífos aíbei léa paratpounwv pèfuke toûs xrusodwç, kai toû égræómewv aútowq aînov ou lýmaíntetai, ómòq dé ye ëbû toû xrusodwç parèxetai kai toû árwywv, Philo, somn. 2.61 tî dé árwywv kai xrusodwç k利用icoi àfthoon plèthos katasekanèzabai, eî mi diâ toû xraîntómeon megâla tûwv kai thn 'èp' aíôras forouméntn kehûn dòxanv; ps.-Lucian, Cyn. 9 tî dé xrusorôphov oikîwv ouûsèn tî málloû sketpoucov, tîn dé èktrapôtwv toûs árwywv oîk ëfeloûntwv toû pótôn ouû ëfê toû xrusodwç.

2. γîs purophôro pédîa: Sol. 1.20 γîn kàtâ purophôro. The adjective is common in Homer with âróûrê: Il. 12.314 or with pêdîov: II. 21.602, Od. 3.495, Hom.Hymn Ap. 228; see also Thgn. IEG 988 purophôro ... pêdîov, Stesich. PMG 222.ii.7 ðhôna purophôro, Simon. PMG 591 âróûrai purophôro, Eur. Bacch. 706 pêdon ... γîs, Phoen. 644 pêdia ... purophôra, Eur. Hel. 1327 pêdia gâs, 1485 pêdia karptophôra ... gâs, Eur. HF 620 γîs ... pêdon, Supp. 260 γîn thn te purophôron ðeàv, 829 kàtâ ... pêdon gâs.


méva taûta pâresti: Hor. Epist. 1.12.4 pauper enim non est, cui rerum suppedit usius.

Despite Hudson-Williams' approval, tà ðeûnta of the MSS of Theognis looks like a banalisation of the méva taûta.

4-5. Eating, drinking and having sex are cited side by side as natural pleasures by Arist. Eth.Nic. 1118b8-12 and 147b23-8, and the pleasures of the table are also central in Epicurus's thought about natural and necessary pleasures, which excluded sex as a natural but not necessary pleasure: fr. 456 Usener. Solon's reference to the πλευραὶ kai ποσαί concerns the clothes and the shoes: cp. the parallel of Epicurus, who included dressing among the natural-necessary pleasures.

Solon's lines are usually considered to be the source of Hor. Epist. 1.12.5-6 si ventri bene, si lateriest pedibusque tuis, nil divitiae poterunt regales addere maius.

4. àbrà pàthoven: 'to luxuriate' in eating, drinking, etc:=Thgn. IEG 474; see also Archestr. fr. 61.1 àbròdai ti trapeçî. The idea is similar to pòlla ... ìdeâ pàsis of CEG 482 quoted or to têrpov' èpathan 1.5 of the epitaph of Sardanapalus, ësðl' èpathan
of SH 338.5 quoted above. For the meaning of the adjective, first attested in Hes. incert. fr. 339 ἀβρὴ παθεῖν, see also Verdenius 1962, and Kurke 1992, 93.

Lombardo 1983, 1085-7 remarked that as the concept of the aristocratic luxurious life-style is applied in Solon to simple every-day comforts, it becomes available to a wider range of citizens.

5. παίδος τ᾽ ἡδε γυναικὸς depends on ἄβρα παθεῖν and the whole has to be considered as a periphrastic verb of enjoyment: compare Thgn. IEG 1009 τῶν ... κτεάνῳ εὖ πασχέμεν. Solon puts on the same level homosexual and heterosexual love (like e.g. Mimn. 7.9, Ar. Nub. 1073).

5-6. ἐπὶ ηὴ κατὰ ταύτ᾽ ἀφικηται ὤρη· σὺν δ᾽ ἡβη γίγνεται ἀρμόδια: The emendation of καὶ ταύτ᾽ in κατὰ ταύτ᾽, first proposed in Bergk's 4th ed. (1915), and later maintained by Hudson-Williams (1926), seems preferable to the text of the two most recent editions by West and Gentili-Prato, who keep the text of Plutarch's MSS, since I cannot find any satisfactory interpretation for καὶ. For κατὰ with the connotation of "moving to", see e.g. Hom. ll. 1.424 ἡβη κατὰ δαίτα, and Sol. 23.17 κατὰ μέτρον ἕκοιτο. The text which certainly appears the easiest, but is also most probably a banalisation, is the one of the MSS of Theognis (and of Stob.) ὅταν δὲ κε τῶν(δ').

Indeed, ὤρη often means the fitting time for something, which is indicated by a gen. (e.g. Od. 3.334, 11.379, 15.126 etc.); τῶν would be recalling παίδος and γυναικὸς.

For 1. 6 I accept ὄρη· σὺν ἡβη (dat.), because ἡβη is the specific term to denote the strength and vigour of youth (van Groningen ad Thgn. 724; LSJ s.v. b), namely the ὄρη whose full bloom has strong sexual implications: see ad 16.1, or Aesch. Pers. 543-4, where sex is called ἡβης ἀρχαῖας. The pentameter, then, intends to complement Solon's previous line, and his thought moves from the general term ὄρη to the more specific ἡβη. As for the text of Plutarch's MSS, ἡβη· σὺν δ᾽ ὄρη(ι), as far as I could ascertain, σὺν ὄρη (Gentili-Prato) 'combined with charm' appears only in the prose of the imperial period — see Aristid. Panath. 23 (p. 16 Lenz), Philostr. VS 1.510.8 —, and might therefore be a later banalisation.

6. ἀρμόδια suggests both that there is something desirable to be enjoyed and that if time is wasted the pleasure will be lost. Furthermore, since the basic idea underlying ἡβη is ripeness (see e.g. Hom. Od. 5.69), and ripeness may become over-ripeness (cf. Verdenius 1962), Solon completes his idea with a form of the carpe diem motif, the warning about the appropriate time for love: 'when one is young, neither too young, nor too old' (the latter idea being alluded in the later mention of death and physical decay: cp. above all Mimn. 9.1 τὸ πρὶν ἐὼν κάλλιστος (qua young), ἐπὶ παραμεῖβεται ὄρη,
7.8. The lines present a very common topos: Pind. Nem. 7.19-20 ἀφενές {τέ} πενεχρός τε θανάτου παρά σάμη νέονται, and 30-2 κοινόν γὰρ ἐρχεται κύμι' 'Αἴδα, πέσε δ' ἀδόκητον ἐν καὶ δοκέουτα' τιμὰ δὲ γίνεται ὅν θεὸς ἀβρόν αὐξεῖ λόγον τεθαυκῶν (where immortality—through athletic victory and celebratory song—is described as a value more worthy than wealth), Aesch. Pers. 842 τοῖς θαναύσι πλοῦτος οὐδὲν ὑφελεί, [Phoc.] 109-10 Δέρρον πλούτων μὴ φείδου μέμησι' ὁτι θυριοῦ ὑπάρχεις οὐκ ἐν ἐις 'Αἰδήν ὀλβον καὶ χρήματ' ἀγεονθα, GVI 1655.3 (3 B.C.) [εἴ] δ' ἦν ἄργυρον καὶ χρυσίου αὐτῷ πρέασθα, [οὐδὲ] αἰς πλοῦτων εἰς 'Αἴδου κατέβη, Phoen.Col. CA 1.22 ἑγὼ δ' ἐς 'Αἰδήν οὔτε χρυσόν οὔθ' ἵππον οὔτ' ἄργυρην ἀμαξαν ψχήμαν ἐλκων, Leon. Anth.Pal. 7.740 ο πρὶν καὶ Γύγη παρισεῳμένου ὀλβον, το πρὶν βουτάμων, το πρὶν πλοῦσιος αἰτολίος, το πρὶν - τι, πλεῖω μυθείμ' ἐτε; πάσι μακαρτός, φεῦ, γαῖς ὄσσες ὅσσον ἔχει μόριον, Crates, SH 355 ταῦτ' ἔχον, ὅσο' ἔμαθον καὶ ἐφόρνυτα καὶ μετὰ Μούσων σὲμ' ἐδήν· τα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ὄλβα τύφος ἐμαρμέρει, fr.lyr.desp. CA 37.32f. ὀλβος ὅν ὁ Μίδας ... ἀλλὰ τίς εἰς 'Αἴδα ὀβολοῦ πλεόν ἠλθεν ἔχουν, GVI 1245.8-10 (2/3 cent. A.D.) ποῦ στολαί, ποῦ χρυσία, κοσμήθησα ὑπὸ πατρὸς; οἰκτρὸν μὲν τὸ θανεῖν, πᾶσιν δὲ βροτοῖς ἐπεκλώθη τοῦτο, φυγεῖν δ' οὐδεῖς θυριοῦ εἰς δύναται, Pall. Anth.Pal. 10.60.1-2 πλούτεις, καὶ τι τὸ λοιπὸν; ἀπερχόμενος μετὰ σαυτοῦ τὸν πλοῦτον σύρεις εἰς σορὸν ἐλκόμενος; See also Hor. Carm. 2.14.21-4, Prop. 3.5.13, Ov. Tr. 5.14.12, Mart. 8.44.9, Sil. 5.265-7, and Lucian Dial. mort. 20(10).1.

7. ταῦτ' ἀφενός θυτηοὶς: For other parallels where the importance of the presence of sensuous joys in one's life is emphatically stressed, see e.g. Mimn. 7 τεθικὴν ὅτε μοι μηκέτι ταῦτα μέλει (scil. ἱδοναί), Pind. Isthm. 7.40-3 ὅτι τερτινὸν ἐφάμερον
διώκων ἐκαλος ἐπειμί γῆρας ἐς τε τὸν μόρομον αἰώνα. θυσκομεν γὰρ ὅμως ἀπαντες· δαίμων δ' ἀυίος, Pind. fr. 126 μηδ' ἀμαρόν τέρφημ ἐν βίω· πολὺ τοι φέριστον ἀνδρὶ τερπίσα αἰών, Antiph. PGC 318 τις φησί τοις ἐρώτας οὐχὶ νοῦν ἐχειν; ... εἰ γάρ ἄφελοι τις τοῦ βίου τὰς ἡδονὰς, καταλείπετ' οὐδὲν ἐτερον ἢ τεθηκέναι, and more generally Simon. PMG 584 τις γὰρ ἀδοράς ἂτερ θανατω βίος ποθεινός ἢ ποία τυραννίς; τάσδ' ἂτερ οὐδὲ θεῶν ξηλωτὸς αἰών, Soph. Ant. 1168-71 πλούτει τε γάρ κατ' οἶκον, εἰ βούλῃ, μέγα, καὶ ζῆ τύραννον σχήμ' ἔχων, εἰς 8' ἀπ' τούτων τὸ χάρειν, τἀλλ' ἐγώ καπνὸν σκιάς οὐκ ἄν πριαίμην ἀνδρὶ πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν.

8. ἐρχεται εἰς 'Αίδεω Od. 10.512 εἰς 'Αίδεω ἴέναι δόμον, 23.322 εἰς 'Αίδεω δόμον ἴσινεν, Hom.Hymn Herm. 572 εἰς 'Αίδην, Tyrt. 9.38 ἐρχεται εἰς 'Αίδην, Mimm. 8.14 ἐρχεται εἰς 'Αίδην, Thgn. IEG 802 δύσεται εἰς 'Αίδεω. GVI 1508.16 (ca. 201) ἱκεο ... εἰς 'Αίδεω.

9-10. The gods of the underworld are conventionally inexorable: Hom. Il. 9.158 'Αίδης τοι ἁμείλιχος ἰδ' ἀδάμαστος, Thgn. IEG 1187 οὕτις ἀποινα διδοῖς θάνατον φύγαι οὐδὲ βαρεῖαν δυστυχὴν, Aesch. TrGF 161 μόνος θεῖον γάρ Θάνατος οὐ δόρων ἐρᾷ, οὐδ' ἀν τι θῶοι οὐδ' ἐπιστέφουν ἄνοις, οὐδ' ἐστὶ βομβὸς οὐδὲ παιωνίζεται· μόνον δὲ Πειθώ δαιμόνων ἀποστατεῖ, Hymn.Orph. 87.9 (το Θάνατος) οὐτε γὰρ εὐχαίδεν πείθη μόνος οὔτε λιταίσιν.

θάνατον ... βαρείας νούσους ... κακὸν γῆρας: For other examples of the triad: Mimm. 8, Semon. IEG 1.11-4, Simon. IEG 20.7-8, Pind. fr. 143.9.


θάνατον φύγοι: Hom. Il. 16.98 θάνατον φύγοι (in the same position)-Od. 4.789 and 15.300, Callin. 1.12-3 οὐ γάρ κως θάνατον γε φυγείν εἰμαρμένον ἐστίν ἄνδρα, Simon. 139.2 D. θανάτῳ πάντες οὐκέλομεθα, Simon. PMG 520.4-6 ὁ δ' ἀθροκτος οὕς ἐπικρέματα θάνατος· κείνου γάρ ἱσον λάχον μέρος οἱ τ' ἀγαθοὶ ὄστις τε κακός and 524 ὁ δ' αὐθ' θανατος κίχε καὶ τὸν πυγόμαχον, Bacchyl. 20.7 φυγών θανάτον τέλος, Pind. Nem. 10.83 θάνατον τε φυγών καὶ γῆρας ἀπεξεύμενον, Eur. Ion 1229 οὐκ ἐστὶν θανάτου παρατρόπη.

10. κακὸν γῆρας ἐπερχόμενον: For γῆρας with ἐρχεσθαι, see Thgn. IEG 1132 ἀργαλέου γήρας ἐπερχόμενοι.
On Solon’s more positive attitude towards old age in a different context, see frr. 26.4, 28, where physical decay is somehow overshadowed by the positive element of the increase in wisdom. Here, however, Solon is considering old age as a problem of physical decay (l. 9), in a perspective which, therefore, is not so far from the one he sanctioned by law that the children had to take care of the parents in their old age (βρέπτρα ἀποδόναι): Test. 454-6 Martina and Gal. Protr. 8.2 Wenkeback (cf. Ruschenbusch F104b). As a fact, Galen Protr. 8.2f., just after referring to what seems to be a detail of Solon’s law about the matter (ἐπαινέσειε δ’ ἀν τις καὶ τὸν Ἀθήνης νομοθέτην, ὃς τοῦ μη διδάσκαντα τέχνην ἔκώλυ πρὸς τοῖς παιῶν τρέφεσθαι), remembers a definition of old age by Solon which sounds no less gloomy than the one expressed here: πείθεσθαι δὲ καὶ Σόλων τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἐνδεικνυμένω, μεμαθηκότας ἐν τοῖς βίους τέλει γῆρας καθάπερ χαλεπῶν ἐφεδρεύον[τα] χειμώνα, δεδεμένοις οὐχ ὑποδηματῶν μόνον καὶ ἐσθήτος ἀλλὰ καὶ οἰκήσεως ἐπιτηθείας καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων, παρασκευάζεσθαι πρὸς αὐτὸ καθάπερ ἄγαθον κυβερνήτην ἐκ πολλοῦ πρὸς χειμώνα (that this testimony cannot be considered as a clue to another poetic fragment, but to a passage of Solon’s laws, Barigazzi 1978, 215-8).

The same attribute for old age can be found e.g. in Minn. 1.1-2, Thgn. IEG 728, 1011, and Archil. IEG 188.2 (Byl 1976, and Allen 1993, ad 1.1 provide lists of the negative adjectives that accompany γήρας in the works of Homer, Hesiod and the other early elegists). On the disadvantages of old age, see also Soph. OC 1237-8 γήρας ἄφιλον, ἵνα πρόπαντα κακὰ κακῶν ξυνοικεῖ, Aj. 473-4 αἰσχρόν γὰρ ἄνδρα τοῦ μακροῦ χρῆσιν βιοῦ, κακοῖσιν ὅστις μηδὲν ἐξαλάσσεται, TrGF 556 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλγος οἷον ἡ πολλὴ ζώῃ, and TrGF 949 πάντ’ ἐμπέφυκε τῷ μακρῷ γῆρα κακά, νοῦς φροῦδος, ἐργ’ ἀχρεία, φροντίδες κεναί, Eur. TGF 575 ὅστις δὲ θυτῆσαι βούλεται δυσώιμον εἰς γῆρας ἐλθεῖν, οὐ λογίζεται καλῶς μακρὸς γὰρ αἰῶν μυρίους τίκτει πόνους, TGF 637 φεῦ ϕεῖ, τὸ γῆρας ὡς ἔχει πολλὰς νόσους, TGF 805 ὦ γῆρας, οἷον τοῖς ἐχουσιν εἰ κακῶν, Antiph. PCG 250 πρὸς γὰρ τὸ γῆρας ὡσπερ ἐργαστήριον ἀπαντά ταῦθωτά προσφοιτα ἑκάτα; Lys. 24.8 γῆρας καὶ νοῦσοι καὶ τὰ τοῦτος ἐπόμενα κακὰ προσγίγνεται μοι, Men. fr. 644 K.-Th. ὁχληρὸν ὁ χρόνος ὁ πολύς. ὦ γῆρας χαρᾶ, ὡς οὐδὲν ἄγαθον, δυσχερῆ δὲ πόλλ’ ἔχεις τοῖς ζῷσι καὶ λυπηρά. πάντες εἰς σὲ δὲ ἐλθεῖν ὃμος εὐχόμεθα καὶ σπουδάζομεν.
The fragment presents the common *topos* of the laborious unhappiness of the human life (for which, cf. already Hom. II. 17.446-7 οὐ μὲν γὰρ τί ποῦ ἔστιν δεξιωτέρον ἀνθρώπος πάντων ὄσσα τε γαῖαν ἐπὶ πιθεῖει τε καὶ ἐρπεῖ (cf. βροτός, θνητοί) the bliss and lack in troubles of the gods (for which e.g. Pind. *Pyth.* 10.21 θεὸς εἴη ἀπήμων κέαρ, and Aesch. Ag. 553-4 τίς δὲ πλὴν θεῶν ἀπαντὰ ἀπήμων τὸν δὲ αἰῶνος χρόνον;): cp. Eur. *TGF* 1075 θυντός γὰρ ὥν καὶ θυντὰ πείσεσθαι δόκει: ἕρθε θεὸς βιόν ζήν αἰξίος ἀνθρώπος ὁ. The poem from where this fragment comes was most probably the starting point of the Herodotean *logos* of Solon and Croesus (1.29ff.).

On the *topos*: no mortal is (really) happy in the archaic age, see e.g. Thgn. *IEG* 441 οὐδεὶς γὰρ πάντ᾽ ἐστὶν πανόλβιος, Bacchyl. 5.53-5 οὐ γὰρ τις ἐπιχοδονίων πάντα γεὐδαίμων ἐφι; Pind. *Nem.* 7.55-6 τυχεῖν δ᾽ ἐν' ἀδύναμοι εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπανταν ἀνελομένου. On the *topos* 'humans are bound to suffering', Mimn. 8.15-6 οὐδὲ τις ἐστιν ἀνθρώπους, ὃς Ζεὺς μὴ κακὰ πολλὰ δεδοί, Semon. *IEG* 1.20-2 οὕτω κακῶν ἀν᾽ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ μιρία βροτοί κῆρες κανέπιφραστοί δόσα καὶ πήματ' ἐστίν, Thgn. *IEG* 167-8 ἀλλ᾽ ἀλλῳ κακὸν ἐστί, τὸ δ᾽ ἀτρεκὲς ὅβιος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων ὀπόσως ἥλιος καθῶδε.


1. μάκαρ: For μάκαρ, cf. Hippon. *IEG* 43 (=5 Degani) and *117.6 (=°196 Degani), Mimn. 5.1 with Gentili's note. In this form the attribute has strong religious implications,
and remains mainly connected with the gods, who by antonomasia are the μάκαρες, till
the tragedians, whereas for men μακάριος is more often used: cf. de Heer 1969, 52ff.

πονηροὶ: with the meaning "miserable, full of labour", first in Hes. frs. 248.1, 249
(of Heracles), (Hom.) Ἐπιγρ. 13.20 Markwald=Hes. fr. 302.20 (of ἔργα). Cp. above all
Simon. PMG 526.3 ἀπήμαντον ἂν οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡμᾶς (ῥοτοῖς), Simon. PMG
520.1-4 ἀνθρώπων ὀλίγοι μὲν κάρτος, ἀπρακτικὰ δὲ μεληδόνες, αἰώνὶ δὲ ἐν παύρῳ
πόνος ἀμφὶ πόνῳ, Bacchyl. fr. 13 θνατοῖς δαίμον ἐπέταξε πόνος ἄλλοισιν ἄλλοισιν.

2. ὁσοῦς θνητοῦς ἥλιος καθορᾶ: the complete correspondence of toil with the
whole span of human life is made more effective by means of the image of the sun,
which marks the beginning of life (for which, cf. e.g. Bacchyl. 5.160-2 θανατοῦσι μὴ
φυναι φερστον μὴ ἀθλον προσδεῖν φεγγος). The picture gets even more bitter,
because it also implies that a troublesome life is destined to be followed by the absence of
There is one single measure for everything, by which limits and features inherent to everything are established. It is very difficult to grasp the measure of prudence since it is not evident (the measure of human life, fr. 23.17, can be grasped because there are inherent physiological limits: a start, evolution and end of life for all human beings). The measure of prudence is a direct reflection of the *noos* itself, and Solon reiterated this idea in fr. 5 ἐν μετρίασι τίθεσθε μέγα νόον, by implying that "*noos* works best within measures", cf. Prier 1976, 165.

Solon’s specific concern for the extreme difficulty (though not impossibility) of the intellectual perception, understanding and appreciation of μέτρον γνωμοσύνης can be understood since it is essential to a sensible guide to conduct, and thus can be of benefit to the individual no less than to the polis: if limits are recognised, injustice will be avoided, retribution averted, social cohesion promoted as the communal civic bonds are harmonious (ep. the hymn to Eunomia); more specifically, this μέτρον γνωμοσύνης is also the solution to the problem of insatiable, unrestrained and indiscriminate human acquisitiveness and its regulation: Solon states this view a number of times (1.71, 5.4, 8.3-4).

If we acknowledge that γνωμοσύνη of this fragment and σοφία of fr. 1.51-2 are very close concepts, we may possibly be driven to suppose that 1.51-2 is somehow integrated with the thought of this fragment, and therefore that in the elegy to the *Muses* Solon was hinting at the revelation of the Muses-Gods as the necessary guide to understand the invisible μέτρον σοφίας/γνωμοσύνης. Theognis echoes Solon in II. 1171-2 where he says that the gods give to mortals ἀρίστην γνώμην (πρῶτον εἴρημένον) which has πείρατα παυτός.

1-2. γνωμοσύνης ... μέτρον: for similar patterns of μέτρον + genitive, cf. ad 1.52. γνωμοσύνη is an absolute *hapax* in the whole of the surviving literature. Its opposite ἀγνωμοσύνη, with the meaning 'want of sense', 'foolishness', is found in Thgn. *IEG* 895-6 γνώμης δ’ οὐδὲν ἁμένου ... οὐδ’ ἀγνωμοσύνης ... ὀδυνηρότερον , *Democr. VS* 68B175 διὰ νοῦ τυφλότητα καὶ ἀγνωμοσύνην, *Hdt. 9.41.4* ἐγινετο ... γνώμη ... Μαρδονίου δὲ ἑσχυροτέρῃ τε καὶ ἀγνωμονεστήρῃ καὶ οὐδαμῶς συγγινωσκομένη ; with the meaning 'ignorance' in *Antiph. VS* 80B104 ἀνεπιστημοσύνη, ἀγνοία, ἀγνωσία, ἀντ. δ’ ἐπὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἀγνωμοσύνην λέγει, *Pl. Thht. 199d2* πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τυχοῦ ἐξουτα ἐπιστήμην τούτο αὐτὸ ἁγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀγνωμοσύνη ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμη.
1. *αφανές*: Solon uses the same adjective for the gods' mind (fr. 21).

χαλεπώτατόν ἐστι νοήσαι: Hes. fr. 324 χαλεπόν δὲ νοήσαι.

2. πάντων πείρατα μοῦνον ἔχει: The word πείρατα entails here the meaning 'boundary, end, limits' which define and determine the coming-into-being or the fullness of each thing, and this is consistent with the use of the word in the epic (e.g. *Il. 6.143 ὀλέθρου πείραθ’ ἰκην, 7.102 νίκης πείρατ’ ἔχονται ἐν ἄθανάτοις θεοῖς*). For πείρατα+παντός/πάντων ἔχειν, cf. Hom. *Od. 23.248 πάντων ἐπὶ πείρατ’ ἀέθλων, Thgn. *IEG 1172 πείρατα παντὸς ἔχει, 'Pigres' *IEG 1.2 πάσης πείρατ’ ἔχεις σοφίης.*

Solon attributes the control of ends and outcomes to Zeus and the gods in fr. 1 (1.17 in a general consideration, *Il. 63-6 in opposition to men's minds) but here — at least in the text transmitted — he tactfully diverges from the Homeric pattern of *Il. 7.102* (quoted) or of Archil. *IEG 111 νίκης δ’ ἐν θεοῖς πείρατα, because the contrast between divine nature (which should determine the πείρατα since it possesses completely the γνωσθεῖς) and the human one (which has to struggle to perceive it) remains implicit (and suggestive): cf. already Bergren 1975, 135-9, 168. In fact, the testimony of Clem. *Strom. 5.81.1* that Solon *γέγρασαν ταῦτα περὶ θεοῦ* may be misleading, since the distich seems much more appropriately said with reference to the ability of the human mind to catch this measure. Clement notoriously quotes from anthologies (without context), so his remark περὶ θεοῦ may well be his own invention. However, in the absence of context nothing certain can be stated, but certainly the other testimony, Theodoretus, *Graec. affect. cur. 1.73.3* does not imply here any reference to the powerful wisdom of the gods.
A well-established axiom: Hom. Od. 23.81-2 χαλεπόν σε θεῶν αἰειγενετάων δήνεα εἰρυθαι, μάλα περ πολύεδρων κάοσαν; Hes. Op. 483-4 ἀλλοτε δ' ἀλλοίως Ζηνός νόος αἰγιόχοιο, ἀργαλέος δ' ἀνάφησι καταβουτοῖς νοήσαι, fr. 16.7 ἀλλὰ Διός κρυπτός πέλεται νόος, οὐδὲ τις ἀνδρῶν φάσσασθαι δύ[ναται, 43(α) 52 ᾄ]λλ' οὐ πῶς ἤδει Ζηνός νόον αἰγιόχοιο, fr. 303 μάντις δ' οὕτως εἰς ἐστίν ἔπιξποιῶν ἀνθρώπων ὡς ὁ εἰδεῖ Ζηνός νόον αἰγιόχοιο, Pind. fr. 61.3-4 οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' ὡς τὰ θεῶν βουλεύματ' ἐρευνάσαι βροτέα φρενί, Xenoph. VS 21B34 καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφές οὕτως ἀνὴρ ἰδεῖν οὐδὲ τις ἐστίν εἰδώς ἀμφί θεῶν τε καὶ ἀσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων· εἰ γὰρ ... τίχοι τετελεσμένων εἴποι, αὐτὸς ὁμώς οὐκ οἶδε· δόκοις ... τέτυκται; Aesch. Supp. 1048-9 Διὸς οὖν παρβατός ἐστιν μεγάλα φήμη ἀπέρατος, 1057-8 τί δὲ μέλλω φρένα Διαν καθορᾶν, ὅπιν ἀβυσσόν; Eur. IT 475-6 πάντα γὰρ τὰ τῶν θεῶν ἐς ἀφανεῖς ἔρπει κοῦδὴν οἷς οὐδείς ἥκακώτι, HF 62 ὡς οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπωσι τῶν θεῶν σαφές, TGF 947 ἡ πολλὰ καὶ δύσγνωστα βουλεύει θεός, adesp. TrGF 168 θεός οὐχι ληπτός· εἰ δὲ ληπτός, οὐ θεός etc.
This distich is preserved by two contradictory testimonies, so that there is no way in which to tell if the lines are praiseworthy, condemnatory, or neutral for the Critias mentioned.

Proclus (in Pl. Ti. 20e), who elaborates on the positive testimonies of Plato regarding the family of Critias (Ti. 20e, Chrm. 157e), which was related to Solon (see ad l. 1), gives us the reading εἰπέμεναι Κριτία ξανθότριχι κτλ. From his testimony, one would assume that the distich was part of a longer elegy where Solon would have spoken in detail about his γένος (Masaracchia 1958, 322), showing that it combined mind-qualities as well as physical beauty: in this context, a word such as ξανθότριχι would stress Critias' beauty. Indeed, ξανθός was a colour admired in hair (e.g. Long.Soph. 1.17.3 τότε πρώτον καὶ τὴν κόμην αὐτῆς ἑξαίμασεν ὅτι ξανθῆ κτλ.; schol. Hom. II. 4.141c.2 θαυμάζεται δὲ παρὰ Λάκωνι λευκός χρῶς καὶ ξανθή κόμη; Hsch. ξ 7 L. ξανθίζονται: *κοσμεῖσθαι τὰς τρίχας ἢ βάπτεσθαι αὐτάς; Eust. ad Hom. II. 1.680.5 ἐπαινοῦ δὲ κόμης παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς τὸ ξανθόν. διὸ καὶ ἡλιόδης κόμη καὶ ἡλιόσα ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ χρυσάνθες δέ, καὶ ὁ ταύτῃ ἐξων χρυσεοκόμας), and even produced artificially (as it can be seen from the numerous vegetal prescriptions which can be found in the medical writers on how to make the hair blond).

This interpretative context for the elegy is not supported by Aristotle, Rh. 1375b31, who quotes only the first line as εἰπεῖν μοι Κριτία πυρρότριχι κτλ. among the examples of the use in court of the authority of the poets or other distinguished authorities (on which see the introduction to fr. 3). Solon's verse would have been exploited in the public action brought by Cleophon against Critias Καλλαίσχρον, later one of the Thirty Tyrants, as evidence of the ἀσελγεία of this Critias, which Cleophon traced back to his homonym ancestor, Critias Δρωπίδου. For the background of the prosecution we are virtually ignorant; however, since Xenophon (Hell. 2.3.15 and 36, Mem. 1.2.24), and later Philostratus (VS 1.16.502) mention Critias' exile in Thessaly, most likely after the battle of Notium, and during the Trial of the Ten Generals in 406 B.C., modern scholars have supposed that he was banished on the prosecution by Cleophon (Németh 1988, 175, Avery 1963, 166-7, Wade-Gery 1945, 25, 33 and n. 1, Krentz ad Xen. Hell. 2.3.15, and 2.3.36, Underhill ad Xen. Hell. 2.3.15).

The charge of ἀσελγεία belonged to the repertoire of the orators (e.g. Dem. 4.9.2, 9.35.5, 10.2.1, 21.1.1, Isae. 8.43.1, Lys. 24.15.1). It was connected with licentious (cf. Hsch. ά 39 L. ἄσελγής· ἀκόλαστος, ἀκάθαρτος) and brutal behaviour (Synag. lex.chres., in Anecd.Gr. I 451 Bekker ἀσελγέσ, πᾶν τὸ σφοδρόν καὶ βιασών. καὶ ἀσέλγεια ἢ μετ' ἐπηρεασμοῦ καὶ θρασύτητος βία), usually that of a tyrant (Dem. 22.52.2, Plut. Marc. 2.5.5, Plut. Sull. 13.1.8, Plut. Arat. 51.4.4, Plut. De mul. vir.

πυρρόθριξ would fit better than ξανθόθριξ the context of such an accusation, since red hair and complexion in men and animals could imply a licentious disposition: [Arist.] *Phgn.* 812a.16 οἱ ξανθοὶ ἐὔψυχοι: ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τοὺς λεοντάς. οἱ πυρροὶ ἁγαν πανούργοι: ἀναφέρεται ἐπὶ τὰς ἀλώπεκας, *Ael. NA* 15.14.12 κύνας γενναίους, ὑπὲρ ὅν ἦν μοι λέλεκται, καὶ πυθῆκος λευκοῖς καὶ μετανάτους ἄλλους· τοὺς γὰρ τοι πυρροὺς ὡς γυναιμανεῖς ἐς τὰς πόλεις οὐκ ἄγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποθὲν ἐπιπηδήσαντες ἀναροῦσιν, ὡς μοιχοῖς μεμισθήκτες, *Long.Soph.* 1.16.5 οὕτως δὲ καὶ πυρρὸς ὡς ἀλώπης καὶ προγεύειος ὡς τράγος καὶ λευκὸς ὡς ἔξ ἀστεος γυνῆ, Adam. *Phgn.* 2.33 πυρρὸν δὲ τὸ σώμα πάν δολεροῦ καὶ πολυτρόπου ἂνδρός ἐστι δείγμα, 2.37 μέλαινα κόμη δείλαν καὶ πολυκέρδειαν ἀγγέλει, ἢ δὲ ἄγαν ξανθὴ καὶ ὑπόλευκος, ὅποια Σκυθῶν καὶ Κελτῶν, ἀμαθίαν καὶ σκαιότητα καὶ ἀγριότητα ... πυρρότης δὲ ἄκρατος κατὰ τὸ τῆς ροιάς ἄνθος οὐκ ἄγαθον, ὡς ἐπὶ πλείστον γὰρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν τὰ ἤσθη θηριώδη καὶ ἀναίσχυντα καὶ φιλοκερδῆ, Anon. *Phgn.* 25.7 ἀνθρωπὸς πυρρός, ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνῆ, ὀργίλος καὶ φονικὸς καὶ μετεωρόλεσχης ἐστὶν.

However, according to the confusing paraphrasis of Anon. in Arist. *Rh.* (=Comm. in Arist. *Græca* xxi 81.15ff. Rabe), Cleophon's point would have been Critias' alleged effeminacy (cp. Aeschines' accusation against Timarchus that he had misused his body for shameful purposes and activities, see Harris 1995, 102-4 and n. 51). Effeminacy is a plausible implication, though not the prevailing one, of the semantics of ἄσελγης (cf. above all schol. anon. rec. Ar. *Nub.* 678 πάλιν σκώπτει ὁ ποιητής ἐνταῦθα ... διότι δὲ ἣν ἀσελγής, θηλυκός ὑποφέρει τὸ ὄνομα ... Σωστράτην τινὰ κατακόρος κωμιδεῖ ώς πάλιν τὴν τρυπτετῆ ὄντα, and schol. rec. Ar. *Nub.* 684), but never a connotation of ξανθόθριξ, as far as I have been able to check; rather, instead, it is part of the semantics of ξανθόθριξ.

In modern editions of Solon, πυρρότριξ is usually kept in the text by those editors who consider it lectio difficilior (after all it is not in the epic, as lastly remarked by Masaracchia 1958, 321), while ξανθότριξ would be its gloss. Nevertheless, on the basis of what survives, we cannot deny that either word might have been used by Solon and both words would have been new. In the epic, ξανθός is mostly used of hair (Hom. *Od.* 13.399 ξανθῶς τρίχας, *Hes. fr.* 25.5 ξανθοκόμης), and a word such as ξανθότριξ would match Solon's tendency to coin new words out of pre-existing ones (cf. also *IL.* 19.125 φρένα βαθείαν — Sol. 29.1 βαθύφρων). On the other hand, πυρρότριξ might have been one more example of Solon's new words (the word is not found earlier than Bacchyl. 18.51 πυρσοχαίτης (of Theseus), and Eur. *IA* 225 πυρσότριξ (said of
horses), but the idea of hair-colour of the fire is possibly as early as Sapph. PLF 98a6f. ἔνθατερας ἐχεῖν ταίς κόμας δώδος; see later Xenoph. fr. 18, Hdt 4.108, Ar. Ran. 730, Eur. Cret. fr. 4.14-5 Cantarella; this hair-colour was possibly not very common in Greece, and is often connected with foreign people (see Maehler ad Bacchyl. loc.cit.). Besides, the lines do seem to be addressed to a boy or a very young man as admonition, and πυρόκριξ could have been used by Solon as a mark of age, since it characterises the colour of the first beard (cf. e.g. Eur. Phoen. 32, Theoc. Id. 6.3, 15.130, Parmen.Byz. (?)) CA fr. 8).

At any rate, the choice between the two readings becomes even harder — but at the same time also less relevant and useful for the interpretation — if we consider that ἔνθαθος and πυρός appear to have been close in meaning, since ἔνθαθος denotes yellow of various shades, frequently with a tinge of red, according to LSJ s.v.: cf. Pl. Ti. 68b, 68c πυρόν ἔνθαθοι τε καὶ φαιον κράπατε γίγνεται, Arist. Metaph. 1054b13, Mete. 375a11, [Color.] 797b9, Gal. 9.599 ἐγγυνάτω τὴν φύσιν ἐστὶ τὸ πυρὸν χρῶμα τῷ ἔνθαθῳ διαφέρει δ’ ἀλλήλων τῷ τὸ μὲν λευκότερον εἶναι τὸ δὲ στιλπνότερον; besides Hsch. ξ 9 L. ἔνθαθον πυρόν. καλὸν. εὖ εἰργασμένον. χλωρόν. π 1310.16 S. πυρσαῖς γένυσι: ταῖς ἔνθαθαις θριξί, Suda ξ 10 A. ἔνθαθος δὲ ὁ πυρός.

1. εἰπέμεναι Κρίτικ: ... ἄκουειν: The infinitive with the value of an imperative: Hom. Il. 7.373, 14.501-2 εἰπέμεναι μοι, Τρώες ... πατρὶ ... γοημέναι. Aristotle has εἰπεῖν μοι, which may have been mistaken for εἰπέμεναι: I suspect that the kind of text given by Aristotle, where μοι would serve as an introduction of the name of Solon, would be of more value for Cleophon’s purposes who could, thus, further remark on the worth of Solon as a moral figure in complete contrast with the old and (by analogy to) with the younger Critias: this was a quite usual argumentative point of the orators, cp. e.g. Aeschin. 3.257.4 αὔτη παρατατακτέμενος πρὸς τὴν τοῦτον δάσκαλον τοῦς τῆς πόλεως ευρέγετας, Σόλωνα μὲ τὸν καλλήστας νόμους κοσμήσαντα τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἄνδρα φιλοσοφοῦ καὶ νυμοθέτην ἱγάθον, σωφρόνως, ὡς προσήκον αὐτῷ κτλ. Furthermore, Cleophon could also have used Solon as the image of a democrat and anti-tyrannical leader (e.g. Ar. Nub. 1187 refers to Solon as demophilos; see further Hansen 1989, 88 and n. 73) to be juxtaposed to the oligarch Critias, who became one of the “Thirty Tyrants”.

Κρίτικ: The stemma of the main line of male descent from Dropides I, archon in 645/4 (Cadoux 1948, 90) to Critias IV, the tyrant, would be according to Davies 1971, 322-9 like this:
Dropides I

↓

Critias I

↓

Dropides II

↓

Critias II

↓

Leaides

↓

Critias III

↓

Glaukon

↓

Callaischros

↓

Critias IV

Dropides II, friend and contemporary of Solon according to Pl. Ti. 20e (later authors made the two men brothers), was archon μετὰ Σόλωνα (Philostr. VS 1.16.2), seven years after the archonship of (his brother) Critias I. Assuming a sequence of thirty-year generations, Critias II may have been born “by 590 or by 580 in any case, for him to deserve a rebuke for head-strongness before 560” (Davies 1971, 326), which was the year of Solon’s death according to Plut. Sol. 32.3, Ael. VH 8.16 etc. Leaides is totally unknown, but his son, Critias III, was a candidate for ostracism in the 480s, and Anacreon’s lover (cf. schol. Aesch. PV 128a (Ἀνακρέων) ἐπεδήμησε γὰρ τῇ Ἀττικῇ Κριτίου ἔρων; Plato, Chrm. 157e also reports that ἦ ... πατρὼ μεν οἰκία, ἢ Κριτίου τοῦ Δρωπίδου, καὶ ὑπὸ Ἀνακρέοντος καὶ ὑπὸ Σόλωνος ... ἐγκεκριμενένη παραδεδοται ... ὡς διαφέρουσα κάλλιε τε καὶ ἀρετῇ καὶ ... εὐθαμονία.). However, as remarked by Rosenmeyer 1949, 408, the juxtaposition of the names shows that in Plato’s eyes the Critias who was loved by Anacreon was the son of Dropides who was a friend of Solon. In other words, Plato telescoped the happenings of the sixth century; Solon, for his purposes, lived just before Anacreon, and Anacreon in turn was active in the early fifth century.


2. οὐ γὰρ ἀμαρτινώ: litotes, intended both to emphasise Dropides’ qualities, and to hint at Critias’ limits. On the adjective, see Hom. Od. 7.292 οὐ τὶ νοήματος ἡμβροτεν ἐσθλοῦ, Hes. Theog. 511 ἀμαρτίνων τ’ Ἐπιμηθέα, Aesch. Supp. 542-4 φεύγει ἀμαρτίνος πολλὰ βροτῶν διαμειβωμένα φύλα, Rhian. CA 1.1-2 πάντες ἀμαρτίνοι πελόμεσθα ἀνθρῶποι.
πείσεται ἥγεμόνι: Τυπ. 10.19 πεισόμεθ᾽ ἥγεμον, at the end of a pentameter.
The testimonies of the elegy — Philo, *Opif. Mundi* 104, Clem.Al. *Strom.* 6.144.3, and Anatolius, Πέπι δεκάδος, p. 37 Heiberg, also often quoted in Censorinus, *DN* (see above all ch. 14) — are good evidence of the antiquarian interest that the elegy had excited among its ancient readers. Despite some doubts about the authenticity of the poem raised by 19th century scholars (Porson, Gaisford, Ahrens, Usener), a very early reflection of one thought expressed by Solon in this poem hardly allows suspicions: Hdt. 1.32.2 ascribes to Solon, in his conversation with Croesus, the phrase: "I set the boundary of human life at seventy years" (cf. also Diog.Laert. 1.55). Herodotus, as well as Diogenes Laertius, could not refer to fr. 26, where Solon expresses the wish personally to die at the age of eighty (in opposition to Mimn. 11, who had wished to die at sixty), and, therefore, they had to acknowledge Solon's statement of seventy years as the "mature" age to die in fr. 23.18. Besides, Aristotle's reference to the "poets" μετρούντες ταῖς ἐβδομάδαις τὴν ἥλικαν (*Pol.* 1335b32ff.: see ad 1. 13) certainly involves Solon (and might even be a generalising plural for Solon's poem).

The structure of the poem is very careful. Every *hebdomas* gets a distich, with the exception of the seventh and the eighth, concentrated in two lines. This very regular and linear structure of the poem, as correctly remarked by Steinhagen 1966=1972, 276-7, is intended to be the formal mirror of Solon's idea of life as a regular succession of stages, functional to each other and ruled by an internal μέτρον, the principle of order and unity expressly evoked at l. 17.

The *hebdomades* 1-4 are concerned with the physical growth. The 5th *hebdomas* deals with a passage-event, the marriage, that has both physical (sexual) and social relevance. The 6th *hebdomas* meaningfully emphasises the full maturity of human νόος "in every aspect", a culmination furthered on in the seventh and the eighth *hebdomas*. This structure implies in all probability some literary polemic with the lyric perspective about life, and above all complements Solon's 'reply' to Mimnermus in fr. 26. As was already emphasised by Romisch 1933, 67-9, and Steinhagen cit., 269ff., the idea of life divided in the positive phase of the bloom of physical and sexual powers in youth, as opposed to the pure negativity of their decline in old age, which can be found in Mimnermus, Alcman, Alcaeus, Anacreon, Simonides, is effectively challenged by Solon's presentation of the maturity and old age as the years of the progressive acquisition of the νόος, something like a new start after the progressive acquisition of full physical maturity in the first four *hebdomades* (see also Siegmann 1970).

However, the intentions of the poem were not limited to the dimension of contemporary controversy. After all, as was well shown by Schadewaldt 1933=1960, the complaint about the perspective or the coming of physical decline was typical of the lyric
poetry: the Homeric poems had not acknowledged anything like this fear, but considered
the faults of youth (lack in intellectual ability) no less than the lack in strength as a feature
of old age, and old Nestor (II. 4.310-25) could be proud of his skills in decision-making
and eloquence (βουλὴ and μῦθοι) as merits of his age, in a way that does not appear to be
very far from Solon's consideration in ll. 11-3. Was Solon simply looking back to the
epic considerations of some balance between faults and merits of every age?

I agree with Falkner 1995, that the poem's numerical approach of the human life with
its chronological quantification is embedded in a set of social and political values. At the
same time, Solon's idea is possibly to propose to his audience a piece of didactic poetry
that is by far shorter and less ambitious, but somehow parallel to the periodic division of
the year in function of the agricultural activities by Hesiod in the Works & Days.

In this perspective the emphasis on the νόος may have not only been intended to
point to a biological parameter that would make old age more tolerable than it was for
Mimnermus (and for other lyric poets, not to mention Solon himself, in a different
context: fr. 18.10). The growth of the νόος was also most important in order to define
the prime of the citizens' ability to decide well in the political assemblies, or the idea of
personal responsibility in family law and in criminal law.

Certainly, as already noted by Falkner 1995, 166, Solon's transitional years do not
coincide with those of political or military life, nor are they usually described in terms of
these institutional structures ("military training begins somewhere in the third hebdomas,
which is described simply as a time of physical growth, eligibility for political office
begins in the fifth hebdomas, which is defined here as a time for marriage"): avoiding
specific social allusions makes the periodicity of man's life more generic and so more
persuasive than focusing only on man's dimension as individual citizen. However, the
very definition of νόος in ll. 11-2 provides, in my opinion, a most probable internal
indication for the civic-political function of Solon's poem.

The maturity of "thinking", which culminates Solon's description of human maturity,
is specified as the stage when someone is no longer willing (οὔδέν ... θελέτι) to do
ἀπάλαιμα ἐργα. Differently from the Homeric and Hesiodic meaning 'shiftless' or
'helpless' (ll. 5.597, Op. 20; later e.g. Alc. PLF 360 ὡς γὰρ δῆποτ' Ἀριστόδαμον
φαίσα' οὐκ ἀπάλαιμον ἐν Σπάρτα λόγον εἰπὼν, χρήματι ἀνήρ, πένιχρος δ' οὐδ' εἰς
πέλετ' ἐσοδο ὀδεί τίμιον, Simon. PMG 542.33-6 [ἐμοίγε ἐξαρκεῖ ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὸς
ἴ] μηθ' ἄγαν ἀπάλαιμος εἰδώς γ' ὄνησιπολίν δίκαιον, ἧγης ἄνηρ, Pind. Ol. 1.59
ἐχεῖ (Tantalus) δ' ἀπάλαιμον βίων τούτων ἐμπεδόμοιχον), in several of its archaic
and classical occurrences ἀπάλαιμος appears to define wicked or inconsiderately foolish
actions, which people do either because they are morally δειλοὶ (cf. Thgn. IEG 279-84
εἰκὸς τὸν κακὸν ἀνήρ κακὸς τὰ δίκαια νομίζειν, ... δειλῶ γὰρ τ' ἀπάλαιμα
βροτῷ πάρα πόλλ' ἀνελέοθαι πάρ ποδός; Pind. Ol. 2.57-9 θανόντων μὲν ἑνθάδ'
The organisation in *hebdomades* is an abstract model to divide into periods the human life, and most probably Solon uses it to avoid the traditional terms of νέος, παῖς, κούρος etc., and the fluctuation in meaning which was inherent in their traditional use (it is significant that as early as the 3rd cent. B.C. Aristophanes of Byzantium felt the need to publish a collection of the *kçeig* denoting the various stages of life in men and animals: *Peri ómορμασίας ἡλικίων*). Solon never uses any of them in this poem, with the exception of ἀνήρ, II. 8, 9, 11, which, at any rate, does not have a technical meaning. Cp. the comparatively lower need for abstraction in the *Περὶ Ἑβδομάδων* (5 West=VIII p. 636 Littré): even though he keeps the division in *hebdomades*, and most probably after Solon's model (see below), the Hippocratic author refrains from getting rid of traditional terms, and divides the life of man into seven ages each with its name παῖδιον, παῖς, μειράκιον, νεάνισκος, ἀνήρ, πρεσβύτης, γέρων (that these terms were traditional can be inferred from the presence of a more or less equivalent denomination in a seven-fold division of human life in the schol. vet. in Aesch. *Sept.* 665α βρέφος, παῖς, μειράκιον, νεανίσκος, ἀνήρ, γηραιός, πρεσβύτης).

The abstract and exact quantitative model may have suited Solon's taste for numerical quantification, which can be inferred from several laws of his and was most probably intended to limit the abuses typical of the discretionary power of the judges (cf. Falkrær 1995, 157-9). Looking through the list of Solon's laws in Plutarch (*Sol.* 20-4), we notice an overwhelming preference for the number "three", wherever numerical details are specified, which does not reflect objective market values and does not involve different and practical needs: the husband of an heiress has to make love to his wife at least three times a month; the bride could not have more than three dowry dresses; slandering was punished with the fine of three drachmas to be paid to the defamed; women were not allowed to walk outside wearing more than three clothes, and the deceased could not be buried with more than three dresses; a dog that bites has to be put on a leash three cubits long.

"Three" is a well known 'magical' number for the Greeks, no less than "seven" (C. e.g. Usener 1903). In the laws as well as in fr. 23, Solon would have profited from the conventionality deriving from the cultural relevance of the numbers: the mentality that...
leads Solon to prescribe "a three cubits leash" instead of "a leash not too long" is consistent with Solon's division of human life in periods founded on two numbers seven and ten, which had also a no less anthropological value as 'magic' numbers, and most probably had been anthropologically connected with transitional moments of human life already before Solon. Cp. for instance the Athenian practice of giving the name to the new-borns on the seventh or tenth day after their birth, a rite that merged into the ὅμοιομήθης ἡμαράμφιδράμια, namely the rite of taking new-born children round the family hearth on the seventh or the tenth day after birth (Arist. Hist.an. 588a7f., schol. Ar. Lys. 757a, Harp. ε 2 K. ἐβδομευομένου, Hsch. a 3995 and δ 2400 L.). The division of life into ten phases, destined to a wide fortune in the modern world, does not appear to be attested in the ancient world until late, in a poem anthologised in the 6th cent. A.D. (PoetaeLat. min. IV.217, p. 257f. Baehrns), cf. Zacher 1891.

In the case of fr. 23, at any rate, it is certain that Solon exploited also the wide-spread beliefs that this or that number would have been dominating all things — a belief that was the premise of the theory (mainly Pythagorian) that numbers are the principles of intelligibility of all things: cf. Philol. VS 44B4, Arist. Metaph. 987b11f. and b28f., Aristox. fr. 23 Wehrli. The magical properties of number "seven" are found from early times (see lastly Vogel 1966, 173ff.): the seventh was for instance mentioned as Apollo's day in Hes. Op. 771 (Plut. Quaest. conv. 717d attests a title ἐβδομαγεψής, cf. also Aesch. Sept. 800-1 ἐβδομαγήτας ἀναξ Ἀπόλλων; Apolline festivals were most often celebrated on the seventh: see West ad Hes. Op. 770), and the seventh is one of the three days of the month that Hesiod calls "holy" (Op. 770). The Pythagorians stressed the relevance of both numbers seven and ten: for the former, see at least Hippon VS 38A16 and Philolaus VS 44A12 (a Hellenistic or post-Hellenistic treatise Περὶ ἐβδομάδος was also ascribed to the Pythagorian Prorus of Cyrene: VS 44A6); for the Pythagorian seven and the τετρακτύς, besides Arist. Metaph. 986a8ff., see above all Philolaus VS 44A13 and 16, B11, and Archytas, to whom a treatise Περὶ τῆς δεκάδος was ascribed (VS 47B5).

The numerology of the physicians provides the best parallels to Solon's framework of the human life. The theory of the "seven" was very popular in the analysis of the critical days (e.g. for the author of the Προγιαστικῶν), but the main medical writers who contributed to the idea of the "seven" as ruling the whole human life, from the embryo to the growth of the body, are the "Hippocratic" authors of Περὶ σαρκῶν (dated to the end of the 5th cent. according to Deichgräber 1935, 27 n.4, 30, 54, Diller 1936, 377: in ch. 19 also "ten" takes part in the calculation of the critical days, and it has to do with tens of hebdomades), and of Περὶ ἐβδομαδῶν, the long tract which in the twelve initial chapters establishes an analogy between human physiology and the patterns of the whole universe based on arithmology of the "seven" (re-edited with a comm. by West
An important point of contact between Solon and these "Hippocratic" tracts most probably was, in the 6th cent., the Pythagorian physician Alcmaeon, who coincides with Solon in saying that the production of the sperm starts \( \epsilon \nu \tau_\mathrm{0}i \, \epsilon \tau_\mathrm{e} \tau_\mathrm{o}i \, \tau_\mathrm{o}i \, \delta_\mathrm{i} \_ \epsilon \tau_\mathrm{t}_\tau \tau_\epsilon \tau_\epsilon \tau_\epsilon \sigma \epsilon \rho_\epsilon \nu \epsilon \nu \epsilon \nu \epsilon \nu \epsilon \nu \) (\( \psi \) 24A15), cp. Solon's i.4 ζήτης ... σήματα γνωσμένης in the boys who are fourteen years old (for another possible point of contact between Alcmaeon and Solon, cf. ad fr. 3.17). For the Pythagorian Hippon (second half of the 5th cent.) the child is mature to be born when it is seven months old, and, as well as for Solon, the child looses his first teeth when he is seven years old, whereas puberty starts at the age of fourteen (\( \psi \) 38A16). Post-"Hippocratic" hebdomadal divisions of the human life, which also include the ten-fold framework of Solon, were accomplished by Diocles (5th cent. B.C.) and Straton (4th cent B.C.), whose theories are known to us thanks to Macrobius (ad Cic. Somn. 1.6.65-76) and to the Theologumena arithmeticae by Nicomachus of Gerasa, partially known to us in the pseudo-iamblichean tract with the same title (pp. 64-6 De Falco): the human embryo is mature after seven months, the seventh hour after birth is crucial for death or survival of the new-born, and their eyes are able to follow the light after 7x2 days, etc.; they have their milk teeth after seven months etc.; children are beginning to get their permanent teeth when they are seven years old, etc.; puberty and sexual maturity starts at 7x2 years, the first traces of beard and the fulfilment of the growth take place during the third hebdomas, etc.; at 7x5 years the humans reach the maximum of the physical strength, and decline starts during the eighth hebdomas; full intellectual maturity and perfection coincides with the age of 49; the span of human life is completed at the end of the tenth hebdomas: \( \text{cum vero decas, qui et perfectissimus numerus est, perfecto numero, id est \( \epsilon \tau_\mathrm{p}_\tau \tau_\epsilon \) } \), iungitur ut aut decies septeni aut septies deni computetur anni, haec a physicis creditur meta vivendi (Macr. 1.6.76). For a more detailed synopsis of the post-"Hippocratic" hebdomadal framework of the human life, cf. Mansfeld 1971, 156ff.; see also Vincentelli 1990. More generally on the divisions of human life, Boll 1913=1950, 171-224, Eyben 1973, 150-90.

1. \( \pi_\alpha_\zeta_\mu \epsilon \nu \, \alpha_\nu_\theta_\beta_\sigma_\zeta \, \epsilon_\omega_\nu \, \epsilon _\tau_\nu \chi_\eta_\eta_\rho_\omega_\zeta \); \( \alpha_\nu_\theta_\beta_\sigma_\zeta \) new, not in Homer and Hesiod.

The traditional epic phrase is \( \pi_\alpha_\zeta_\mu \nu_\chi_\eta_\eta_\rho_\omega_\zeta \) (cf. Hom. Il. 22.484=24.726 \( \pi_\alpha_\zeta_\delta_\iota \, \epsilon_\tau_\nu \chi_\eta_\eta_\rho_\omega_\zeta \), Od. 19.530 \( \pi_\alpha_\zeta_\mu \, \epsilon_\nu_\nu_\epsilon_\tau_\nu \chi_\eta_\eta_\rho_\omega_\zeta \), 21.95 \( \pi_\alpha_\zeta_\delta_\iota \, \epsilon_\tau_\nu \chi_\eta_\eta_\rho_\omega_\zeta \, \chi_\eta_\eta_\rho_\omega_\zeta \) \( \chi_\zeta \) ), where \( \nu_\chi_\eta_\eta_\rho_\omega_\zeta \) refers to the intellectual immaturity of the \( \pi_\alpha_\zeta_\mu \) (cf. Hom. Hymn Herm. 163f.; the opposition between being \( \nu_\chi_\eta_\eta_\rho_\omega_\zeta \) and \( \nu_\nu_\epsilon_\tau_\nu \) or being \( \chi_\zeta \delta_\omega_\zeta \) was already common in Homer and Hesiod: cf. e.g. Il. 9.440, Od. 9.442, Op. 40, 456). Solon adds \( \alpha_\nu_\theta_\beta_\sigma_\zeta \) to specify the physical immaturity (cf. Römisch 1933, 65), and to stress the pure negativity of the age of childhood as the age of the "not yet". However, \( \alpha_\nu_\theta_\beta_\sigma_\zeta \) might also be for
Solon a modern legal term, as we can infer from its presence in the Gortyna law inscription (early 5th cent.): *Inscr.Cret.* 4.72 col. XI.19 Guarducci: the law prescribes that a woman or a person below the age of puberty cannot adopt — probably implying that adoption was allowed before the adopter was adult, but after the age of puberty: cf. Guarducci ad loc., and Willetts 1967, 79. The word also appears in a later fragmentary inscription from *Axos, Inscr.Cret.* 2.V 25.A.7 Guarducci which may have had a legal concern as well (see Guarducci ad loc.).

1-2. ἐρκος ἀδόντων ἐκβᾶλλει: The connection of the verb with "teeth" was probably idiomatic (cf. *Hippoc. Hebd.* 5.3 West ἀδόντων ἐκβολής, *Eur. Cyc.* 644 καὶ τοὺς ἀδόντας ἐκβαλεῖν), and ἐρκος ἀδόντων was a very common Homeric formula for the end of the line: *Il.* 4.350, 9.409, 14.83, *Od.* 1.64, 3.230, 5.22, 10.328, 19.492, 21.168, 23.70. The use of such an epic traditional phrase may seem to be disproportionate for a physiological event destined to happen in the life of every human, but several other hints in the first lines of the poem (cf. ad ll. 3 and 4) lead us to believe that resorting to typical Homeric phrases is the way Solon transforms the landmarks of human life into heroic events checked by the divine control.

In the Athenian society the age of seven years was certainly an important event, as well as the loss of the first teeth which used to be the sign of that age: cf. *Ar. Ran.* 422 ὑν ἐπτέτης ὕν ὅπρ ἐφυσε φράτερας, where "members of the phratria", as remarked by the schol., is a pun παρὰ προσδοκίαν for φραστήρας "the signal-teeth" of the age of seven, when an Athenian child, if entitled by his parentage to full citizenship, was enrolled in one of the ancient Athenian tribal divisions, the phratriai (on the much debated details of presentation of children to phratries and the procedures of admission see Labarbe 1953, Roussel 1976, Cole 1984, Golden 1985; generally on the phratries, Guarducci 1973).


δὴ τῇ τελεσθῇ θεός ἐπτε ἐνιαυτοὺς: the idea that gods watch over the accomplishment of a span of time is a specific instance of the broader concept that gods or Zeus or, seldom, a more abstract θεός, are the ultimate inspectors of the τέλος of every event (see ad 1.17). The latter concept was very common in Homer — see e.g. *Hom. Il.* 18.8 (gods), 74-5 (Zeus), 116–22.366 (Zeus and the gods), and *Od.* 8.570 τὰ δὲ κεν θεός ἔ τελεσει, ἣ κ’ ἀτέλεστ’ εἰ. On the other hand, the former idea is only paralleled in Homer by the formula τρίτον ἢμαρ ... τέλεσ’ Ἡώς: *Od.*
5.390-9.76=10.144, where, by the way, the subject is, obviously, the god 'professionally' in charge of starting the day.

Looking for divine control as a validation for the hebdomadal landmarks described by Solon as the framework of human life is consistent with the more explicit seeking for divine validation that can be found at the beginning of both the other poems of Solon which are most concerned with paraenetic/didactic points of view (see Introd. to fr. 3). For the more general intention of Solon to raise his age landmarks to the sublime level which divine intervention and epic language can provide, see ad l. 2 and l. 4.

4. ἐκφαίνει σήματα: A common Homeric expression: II. 2.308 ἐφάνη μέγα σήμα; see also 2.353 σήματα φαίνων-4.381, 9.236, Od. 21.413, Hymn. Hom. 7.46. In Homer, at any rate, the expression was specialised for the portentous σήματα sent by gods to humans, as was acknowledged by the ancients (cf. schol. ad II. 2.308), and the same specialisation is kept by Hes. fr. 141.25-8 σήματα φαίνων Ζεὺς ἀφίηται μήδεα εἴδος ... Διὸ ἔνει τέρας ἦν. Solon probably used such a phrase intentionally to stress again the divine control on the landmarks of his framework of the human life and to elevate them into the level of 'heroic' events.

ἡβής γιγνομένης: Among the main signs mentioned by the physicians on the coming of puberty there was the development of the genital organs: Hippoc. V p. 312 L., Heraclit. VS 22A18, Arist. Hist. anim. 5.544b23-25 and 7.581a25-27 etc. Cp. Archil. lE G 196a.50 ἡβής ἐπίλυσιν (the meaning is debated: arrival of puberty, Slings ad loc.; "bewitching, spell, charm" of youth, Burzacchini 1973-74; approaching of the youthful "sexual strength=penis, Casanova 1976, 20).

Labarbe 1957, 67 says that since the adolescence was a bit different among certain individuals, Greeks had to keep a limit superior to fourteen years, when determining at what age a young Athenian could be considered to have reached this stage. Such an age-class exists in the laws of Gortyn, where the adolescent who has just completed his sixteeen years is called ἡβήων. This idea of ἡβή as legal puberty can be met with again in classical Athens, where it starts at the sixteenth completed year: the orators (Isae. 8.31, 10.12, Dem. 46.20, 24) often mention a law-regulation according to which one should necessarily be an adolescent for two years "ἐπὶ διετές ἡβήων" before being able to enjoy one's family rights.

5. ἀξιωτάτων ... γυνῶν: Hes. Theog. 492-3 μένος καὶ φαίδημα γυνὰ ηὔξητο (of the new-born Zeus). For the third hebdomas as the age of the full growth, see Hippoc. Hebd. 5.5-6 West νερήσκος δὲ ἀξιωτάτων ὁλείου τοῦ σώματος ἐς τὰ τετράκες ἐπτά.

χρωΐς ἄνθος ἀμείβομένης: the expression is ambiguous. The verbs ἀμείβειν or ἀλλάττειν with χρώμας as object usually mean to "change" the colour of the "skin": see e.g. Aesch. Pers. 316-7, Eur. Med. 1168, Men. Epit. 887. Is this change positively considered by Solon as an "acquisition" of the beard, metaphorically called ἄνθος (so DGE 2.187 s.v. ἀμείβω; cp. Lucr. 5.888-9 tum demum puerili aevi florente iuventas occipit et molli vestit lanugine malas), or is it described negatively as a loss? The latter interpretation seems preferable, taking into consideration that this is the meaning implied in two parallels of Solon's χρωΐς ἄνθος, Aesch. PV 22-3 σταθεῦσος δ' ἡλίου φοίβη φλογὶ χρωΐς ἀμείβεις ἄνθος (cp. adesp. TrGF 161 χρόαν δὲ τὴν σὴν ἡλίῳ λάμπων φλογὶ αἰγυπτιώσει: see West 1979, 134), and adesp. Anth.Pal. 12.39 ἐσβέσθη Νικηνόρος, ἀπέπτατο πάν ἀπὸ χρωΐς ἄνθος, καὶ χαρίτων λοιπὸν ἑτ' ὀοῦ ὀμομ. The metaphor "flower" of the skin-beard is not common at all in early literature (the only instance I know before Solon is Hom. Od. 11.320 πυκᾶσαι τε γένος εὐανθήλα χάρνῃ quoted above — later see Callim. Hec. fr. 45 Hollis, Herod. 1.52, Antip. (Thess.) Anth.Pal. 6.29.11.), whereas ἄνθος is a very common metaphor for the bloom of the beauty in early youth, and in this latter meaning it is often exploited in contexts where its end is considered (in a negative, nostalgic way), as a value that is lost: besides Sol. 16.1 ἠβήσες ἐρατοῖον ἐτ' ἄνθεσι, cf. the passages quoted ad loc.

After all, remarking the coincidence of the start of the beard and end of the bloom of youth would be consistent with Solon's statement in fr. 18.5-6 on ἠβή as the opportune time for love, and with Solon's personal concern with paederastic love, since the arrival of the beard/growth of hair were commonly considered to mark the end of a boy's attraction for the erastes (cf. Thgn. IEG 1327-8 ὁ παῖ, ἐως ἄν ἐχθὶς λείαν γέννων, οὕσποτε σ' αἰνών παύσωμαι, and Vetta 1980, ad loc; Straton's passage quoted above is somehow a hyperbole): see the rich collection of passages in Halperin 1990, 88, 90, 181, and nn. 4, 5, 6, Tarán 1985). "Ἀνθος χρωΐς might mean, or hint at the "softness" of the skin, and ἀμείβομένης be a euphemism for "to loose" — the beard makes the cheeks prickly, and deprives them of their previous smoothness.

εν ἕβδομάδ’ ἐστὶν ἀριστος: this is the text proposed by Sylburg with a small intervention on the ἕβδομάδε(σ)αυν ἕβδομασιν ἀριστοσ which is found in three of four testimonies. This reading is evidently wrong (see the singular τῇ δὲ τετάρτῃ at the beginning of the line), but most probably it arose from an original text like the one reconstructed by Sylburg (ἔβδομαδ’ ἐστιν ἀριστος > ἕβδομαδε(σ)αυν ἀριστος is a quite easy corruption), and certainly not from an original text with μέγ’: the text of Clement’s single cod., ἕβδομαδι μέγ’ ἀριστος, accepted both by West and Gentili-Prato, may rather be an ancient attempt to restore the concordance with the singular τῇ δὲ τετάρτῃ relying on the text of I. 13 — as is shown by the variant of the second hemistich of I. 16, Clement of Alexandria appears to depend on a different branch of the transmission than the other three testimonies. Sylburg’s restoration also appears to me to be preferable, because it avoids the lengthening of the -i of ἕβδομαδι before μ, which is plausible as a Homerism (as remarked by Gentili-Prato ad loc.), but would be very rarely attested in elegiac poetry.

7-8. For the extension accusative, see e.g. Hom. *Od.* 8.116=11.469, 24.17 ἀριστοσ ... εἰδος τε δέμας τε.

8. σήματ’ ἔχουσ’ ἀρέτης: for the shape of the line, cf. Thgn. *IEG* 1178 πείραν ἔχοις ἀρετῆς, *GVI* 335.2 (4 cent. A.D.) πάσαν ἔχουσα ἀρετῆς. However, in Theognis the verb has the common meaning "to have", while in Solon it means "to consider", which in accordance with Solon’s emphasis on the intellectual aspects of the human ages shows his scepticism on the common view (ἀνδρες) that the physical strength of maturity is really the ἀρετή. For the plural σήματα ("poetic" plural for singular) predicative of singular ἔσχεν, ἥν κτλ., see parallels in [Hes.] *Sc.* 312-3 and Eur. *Hipp.* 11.

9. The line probably has its formal model in *Hes.* 616 τότ’ ἔπειτ’ ἄρτον μεμημένος εἶναι ὡραίοι, 641 ἔργων μεμημένος εἶναι ὡραίων πάντων. For the idea of ‘right time’ for marriage see e.g. Hom. *Od.* 15.126 ἐς γάμου ὠρῆν, Hdt. 6.61.5 γαμέει δὲ [ὁ] μιν ἐς γάμου ὠρῆν ἀπικομένην, Aesch. *TrGF* 55 ὡραίον γάμου, Eur. *Hel.* 12 ἐς ἡβῆν ἡδεῖν ὡραίαν γάμων, *TGF* 804.2 οὐκέθ’ ὡραῖος γαμεῖ, Hdt. 1.196.3-4 ὡς ἀν αἱ παρθέναι γινοῖστο γάμων ὡραία. For the specific idea that around thirty was the right age for a man to marry, cf. e.g. *Hes.* *Op.* 695-7 ὡραίος δὲ γυναίκα τεϊν ποτὶ οἶκον ἄγεοθαι, μήτε τριηκόντων ἐτέων μάλα πόλλ’ ἀποκλητῶν...
μήτ' ἐπιθεὶς μάλα πολλά· γάμος δὲ τοι ὦριος οὗτος, Pl. Resp. 460e, Leg. 721b-d, 772c, 785b etc.

Ὤριον: in the right time, to be interpreted as a nominal verb = ὦριον ἐστὶ (pace Römisch 1933, 62, who maintained that ὦριον would be better connected with ἄνδρα, and the distich has to be interpreted as an imperative infinitive: "in the fifth period, a mature man must think of marriage"). The form of the adjective is the same as in Hom. Od. 9.131 ὦρια πάντα; Theognis says ὦραῖος (1199, 1275, 1289).

10. παῖδων ζητεῖν εἰσοπίσω γενέῃν: The closest parallel is Hom. Hymn Aphr. 104 ποιεῖ δ’ εἰσοπίσω θαλέρων γόνων (the prayer of Anchises to Aphrodite, asking for military glory and flourishing progeny). In Sol. 1.32 ἢ παιδεῖ τούτῳ ἢ γένος ἐξοπίσω, ἐξοπίσω is used for the generations following one’s children, as well as in other archaic parallels with analogous adverbs: Hom. Il. 20.308 καὶ παιδών παιδεῖς, τοι κεν μετοπίσθε γένουται, Tyrt. 9.30 καὶ παιδών παιδεῖς καὶ γένος ἐξοπίσω (see also Soph. Phil. 1104). Aristotle, Pol. 1335b25-40 about the age limits within which a man should beget children, says that they would have to coincide with the διανοίας ἀκμῆ, and comments that αὐτή δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς πλείστους ἤμερα τῶν ποιητῶν τινω εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετρούντες ταῖς ἐβδομάσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τὸν χρόνον τῶν τῶν πεντήκοντα ἐτῶν.

On the generally spread belief in antiquity that the purpose of marriage was procreation see Brown 1984, 40-1, and n. 16.


καταρτύεται: The word occurs here for the first time. The simple ἄρτῳ was commonly referred to mental activities (βουλῆ, δόλος, ψεύδεα) already in Homer (see LfgrE s.v.), but the use of the composite, an almost terminus technicus for breaking and taming horses (cf. also κατάρτυσις, and see Soph. Ant. 477-8, Plut. Mor. 38d and Plut. Them. 2.7), or metaphorically of human beings (Eur. TGF 821.5, Philostr. VA 5.33, 7.23; cf. also Aesch. Eum. 473 for Orestes), anticipates the specific aspect of 'steadiness' that Solon ascribes to the maturity of the νόος: see l. 12. For the same figurative meaning implied in Solon, cf. Pl. Leg. 808d5 ὃ δὲ παῖς ... ἔχει πηγήν τοῦ φρονεῖν μήπω καταρτυμένην.
12. οὖθ' ... ὀμῶς ... ἐθέλει: people of the sixth hebdomas are no more 'ready' (cf. ad 3.27) to do the 'inconsiderate' things of the young people, 'analogously' to the acquisition of the 'discipline' of the νόος (the v.l. ὀμῶς 'nevertheless' states some kind of evidently absurd opposition between l. 11 and 12).

ἔρθειν ... ἔργα: Hom. Od. 2.236 ἔρθειν ἔργα βίας κακορραφήσει νόοι, Tyr. 8.27 ἔρθων دارةμα ἔργα διδασκόμεθος πολεμίζειν (these parallels leave no doubt about rejecting Clement's reading οὖθ' ἐσίδειν).

The scholia in Ar. Ach. 330 say that the verb begins with aspiration, and many Homeric MSS do write ἔρθ-. Theognis has aspiration at 178, 1086, 1096 (τοῦθ' ἔρθειν), and 1180 (μηθ' ἔρθειν); therefore van Groningen ad Thgn. 105 suggests writing ἔρθ- consistently, even though Chantraine, Gramm.hom. 1.187f. argues that the aspiration owes its existence to the Alexandrians' wish to distinguish ἔρξα (from ἔρθειν) from ἔφξα (from ἔφειν). Contrast Sol. 1.67, 69, 29b.7.

ἀνάλαμν(α): See Introd. On the use of the word in archaic lyric see also Gentili 1984, 89f.

13. μέγ' ἄριστος: The adverbial μέγα commonly qualifies an epithet, from Homer (μέγ' ἄριστος 9x) to the tragedy: see Bissinger 1966, 256f. and Johansen-Whittle ad Aesch. Supp. 141.

νοῦν καὶ γλώσσαν: Hes. fr. 239.3 γλώσσαν τε νόον τε, 150.14 τῶν μέν τε νόος [γλ]ώσσης καθ[ὑπ]έρθεν. Maturity in reasoning and in eloquence counterbalances as a symptom of intellectual maturity the ἰσχύς as symptom of physical maturity in l. 8: the parallelism of two ἄκμα ἰσ is emphasised by the repetition of the verse-ending (ll. 7 and 13) and of the word ἀρετή (ll. 8 and 16: but see ad l. 16).

While quoting the poets μετρούντες ταῖς ἐβδομασίᾳ τὴν ἡμικίαν Aristotle, Pol. 1335b32f. cit., agrees with them that τῆς διανοίας ἄκμη is reached περὶ τῶν χρόνων τῶν πεντήκοντα ἑτῶν.


μαλακώτερα: "too soft for". The word is not found in this sense in Homeric or early elegiac poetry; but a parallel in the sense of being 'soft', not energetic, is furnished by Thuc. 2.18.3 δοκῶν καὶ ἐν τῇ ξυναγωγῇ τοῦ πολέμου μαλακῶς εἶναι καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιτήδειος, οὐ παρακινών προθύμως πολεμεῖν.

16. πρὸς μεγάλην ἄρετήν γλώσσα τε καὶ σοφία: μεγάλη ἄρετή is attested elsewhere in archaic Greek, with the meaning of moral-intellectual virtue (e.g. Hom. Od. 24.193, Thgn. IEG 1074), and almost all modern interpreters appear to interpret πρὸς μεγ. ἀρ. as "in respect to the great virtue-deeds" tout court. Differently, at least,
Schadewaldt 1933–1960, 41: "weaker in comparison with the full virtue, great achievement".

Certainly πρὸς limitative, 'in respect to', can an be connected with μαλακός (cf. e.g. Xen. Mem. 1.2.2 πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν μαλακός), but I prefer the comparative value already proposed by Schadewaldt (see on it Kühner-Gerth, 1, 520f.). Indeed in my opinion πρὸς μεγάλην ἄρετὴν resumes in a nominal form the adjectival μέγ’ ἄριστος of l. 13, as well as γλώσσα τε καὶ σοφία resume νοῦς καὶ γλώσσαν. The meaning would be: "in comparison to the full virtue/great achievement" (πρὸς μεγάλην ἄρετὴν) reached in the sixth hebdomas and kept in full in the seventh and the eighth, the eloquence and wisdom (γλώσσα τε καὶ σοφία) of the ninth are weaker — the ninth and tenth hebdomas are the age of the "no more enough σοφία", as the first had been the age of the "not-yet-enough νοῦς and ἔσχης".

γλώσσα τε καὶ σοφία is usually and correctly preferred by the modern editors to the variant of Clement, σῶμα τε καὶ δύναμις — physical strength can hardly be relevant for the ninth hebdomas, above all since Solon stopped making reference to it from the fourth hebdomas onwards. As for the synonymy νοῦς/σοφία, it is clearly not at all a full equalisation, and Solon distinguishes the wisdom reached through experience (σοφία) from the natural gift of 'intelligence' (νοῦς).

Analogously ἄρετὴ l. 8 was the more traditional physical "strength", which had most often been identified in ancient epic with martial value; in l. 16 the word is used in its broader meaning, to include the civic virtues of eloquence and wisdom, and the martial meaning seems forgotten, since Solon takes care to remark the fainting of the intellectual powers, but is silent (or seems uninterested in) about the expiration of the physical strength; in a similar way, he uses the word ἱῆς from the very first line, but he never mentions the word γῆς — a word for which Solon showed no less hatred than other lyric contemporaries of his in the different, symposiastic context of fr. 18.10 (cf. Preisshofen 1977, 84f.). Cp. Diocles and Straton, who by contrast, specified the start of the decline of the physical strength between the sixth and the seventh hebdomas: see Introd.

17. τελέσας κατὰ μέτρον ἢκοτο: The typical Solonian thought — that the end of life is also its full accomplishment according to its natural measure (see Introd., and ad fr. 20), also reflected in Macrobius (quoted above): meta vivendi ... vitae humanae perfectum spatium terminatur — is expressed through a pretty traditional language. Cf. Soph. Ant. 1114 τῶν βίων τελεῖν, GVI 441.1 (2/3 cent. A.D.) τέρμα βίου τελέσας, and, on the last phrase, Hom. II. 11.225 ἱῆς ... ἢκετο μέτρον (-Od. 4.668, 11.317, 18.217, 19.532, Hom.Hymn Dem. 166), Hes. Op. 132 ἱῆς μέτρον ἢκοτο, 438 ἱῆς μέτρον ἢκοτο, 720 κατὰ μέτρον ιοῦσας, fr. 205.2 ἱῆς ... ἢκετο μέτρον.
18. ἀνορός appears only once in Hom. Od. 12.89 πόδες ἀνοροῖ. Soon later it becomes a technical term for the deceased before their natural time: Hdt. 2.79.3, Scol. PMG 884.4; CEG 154.2 (5th cent.), being the first instance of a long series of epitaphs, for which see Griessmair 1966 and Vérilhac 1978-82.

μοιράν ἔχων θανάτου: Sol. 26.4 μοῖρα κίχων θανάτου, and note there, GVI 414.3 (2/3 cent. A.D. [μ]οίραν ἔχων θανάτ[ου]). Cf. Hom. Il. 13.602 μοῖρα κακῆ θανάτου (second hemistich), Od. 2.100=3.238=24.135 μοῖρ’ ἀλλ’ καθέλησα ... θανάτου, 17.326 μοῖρα λάβεν ... θανάτου, Hom.Hymn Aphr. 269 μοῖρα παρεστήκη θανάτου, Hes. fr. 35.4 θανάτου ... λάβε μοῖρα, Thgn. IEG 820 μοῖρα λάβοι θανάτου, second half of pentameter, as in [Arist.] Pepl. 29.2 Bergk4 μοιραν ἔχον θανάτου.

Death is mentioned with an expression that tries to make this event smoother, and stressing its natural necessity invites to a conscious acceptance of it: see lastly Burzacchini 1995, 77.
A positive presentation of elements of the sympotic pleasure, whose etiquette Sol. in fr. 3.9f. had been defending. Plutarch clearly misunderstands the context of the lines in one of his three quotations of the fragment (Amat. 5.571e): see on this Masaracchia 1958, 327-8, and the notes of the Introd. to fr. 16. A close parallel to Solon’s fragment is Anac. IEG 2 κρητήμα παρά πλέω οίνοποτάξων ... Μουσέων τε καὶ ἀγλαὰ δῶρ’ Ἀφροδίτης συμμίσγων ἐρατής μνήσκεται εὐφροσύνης.


The motif coupling wine with love has a long history (see, generally, Privitera 1970, 91ff., and Giangrande 1968, 127ff.: see also e.g. Anac. PMG 357, Panyassis, PEG 17.3 (who states that the second round of drinks was dedicated to Aphrodite and Dionysus), Eur. Cyc. 69-72, Pl. Symp. 177e, Anacreont. 5.12-5, 6, 38.2-6, 44, Hymn.Orph. 42, 55.7, 57.3-4: see Dodds ad Eur. Bacch. 402-16 for iconography and cult. For the association of Dionysus with the Muses e.g. Anacreont. 50, Nicaen. Anth.Pal. 13.29, Hedy. ap. Athen. 11.472f and 11.473a (=Hell.Fr. 1853-56, 1857-62 Gow-Page), Antip. Sid. Anth.Pal. 7.27.9f., 'Diog.Laert.' Anth.Pal. 7.104; For Dionysus-Mousagētēs in Naxos, see Nilsson 1906, 306, n. 2.


For the form Διονύσου with omicron, Od. 11.325 is the only example in Homer, who elsewhere has Διώνυσος, but it occurs x4 in the Hymns.


For the goddess’ epithet Κυπρογενής (in its various forms) see e.g. Hom.Hymn 10.1, Hes. Theog. 199, Sapph. PLF 22.16, 134, Alc. PLF 296b.1 and 380, Stesich. PMGF S104.6, Thgn. IEG 1323, 1386, Pind. Ol. 10.105, Pyth. 4.216, Panyas. PEG 17.3, adesp. PMG 949, etc.

2. ἀ τίθησα ... εὐφροσύνας: Accompaniment of the feasting and drinking in Homer (Latacz 1966, 163f.), the purely pleasant sympotic εὐφροσύνη, is the
embodiment of the aristocratic life-style and of the symposiastic ideals of good order, on
which cf. Sol. 3.9-10 and note there; see Oranje 1984, 105.
The fragment does not fit any incipit of the metres used by Solon. Modern editors usually consider it to be the last part of a hexameter, and this presentation is certainly correct, but the fact that the fragment itself is a 'paroemiac' must not be understated. The presence of the phrase, complete in itself in this form, may suggest that Solon acknowledged it as the "quotation" of a pre-existing proverb, since, beyond the name, this metrical structure was a very common shape of Greek proverbs, and both Pl. Just. 374a and its scholiast (our only testimony for Solon’s authorship) state that Solon was quoting the proverb. This fact should not, in my opinion, let us doubt the authenticity of the fragment as Solon’s: Solon will have inserted the proverb in a hexameter of his in a way analogous to Hesiod’s, who appears to have inserted previous proverbs with their original metre in the most sapient-gnomic section of Works & Days (383-828), in order to gain a 'gnomic' aura, as has been acknowledged by various modern scholars: cf. Porter 1951, 31-2, Hoekstra 1957, 212ff., Sbardella 1995.

Solon’s resorting to the Hesiodic practice of marking off gnomic-proverbial phrases by conserving their original paroemiac form may also be intended as an allusion to Hesiod as the precedent for the selection of the poetic themes Solon would be dealing with in this fragment (and in his poetry). Hesiod was concerned with "thoughtful" and didactic themes of poetry, and had stated that the Muses ἱδμεν ψεύδεα πολλά λέγειν ἑτύμουσιν ὁμοία, ἱδμεν δ’ εὕτ’ ἑθέλωμεν ἀληθεία γνωσάσθαι (Theog. 27-8) "they say" (namely inspire) both "truth" (wise theological or ethical subjects, as the ones Hesiod chose to treat) and "lies" (the fictional myths that have no connection with the past or present ‘realities’ about gods or social principles, the pertinent subjects for the devoted to the truth author of Theogony and Works & Days); after all, as Kannicht 1996, 204-6 emphasised about the Elegy to the Muses, Solon avoids to ask them for inspiration about the themes Homer and the Homeric ἄοιδοι had been asking for, but invokes their help for some guide about ethical themes of Hesiodic flavour, such as "righteous wealth", good δόξα and so on.

In my opinion, Solon sets himself in the wake of Hesiod who had previously rejected the 'fictional' poetry unrelated to the present, and would allude to his being in his wake also by using a form of direct reference to the paroemiographic tradition, as Hesiod himself had used as a vehicle for a markedly gnomic content of a section of the Works & Days.

Although the nature of Solon’s criticism cannot be established with certainty because of the very scanty information we have, his statement that the poets speak many falsehoods can be understood from the agonistic context of early poetry, which produced multiple accounts of a single story, alternative versions of myth and demanded reworking
on one's predecessors, improvement, and explicit comparison with one's rivals. Cp. how the poet of the *Hymn to Dionysus* claims as false the other accounts of Dionysus' birth, in ll. 1-6 οἷς μὲν ..., οἷς δὲ ..., ψευδόμενοι (see Vetta 1983, xlvii; on the competitive context of early poetry, see Gentili 1984, 204-5 and n. 5, Griffith 1990; for evidence of early poetic competitions: Hom. II. 2.594-600, Hes. Op. 26, 650-7, Certamen p. 228.64ff. A., *Hom. Hymn Aphr*. 19-20 etc. Already the *Odyssey* may be seen as suggesting a relationship between the poet and the liar by the affinity of the figure of the narrating Odysseus with the poet-bard (see further on this Pratt 1993, 55-94). For other critiques of the traditional poetry which will culminate in the fifth century philosophy, see Ford 1981, 351-68, and Pratt 1993, 131-56.

In such a context the ability to deceive and lie, namely to invent and shape fiction, becomes particularly desirable and essential, and is entailed in the artist's own *techne*, *sophia*. Such view of poetry as a product of the human intellect and imagination would be coherent with the idea of poetry that Solon expresses in *Salamis* (I. 2) and in his poetic address to Mimnermus (see the Introd. to fr. 26).

Solon's interest for poetry as a 'critic' is depicted by Plutarch's anecdote (*Sol*. 29.7) about his attending Thespis' performance and complaining afterwards about the 'lies' performed, like a good Platonist *ante litteram* (cp. Plato's opinions on drama in the third book of the *Republic*) — cf. also Diog. Laert. 1.59 Θέσπιν έκώλυσε τραγῳδίας διδάσκειν, ώς ὄνοφελῆ τὴν ψευδολογίαν. We cannot decide on the historicity of the tradition of Solon's controversy with Thespis (there is a serious but not inhibiting chronological difficulty: cf. Patzer 1962, 25 and Kolleritsch 1968 4 n. 14), but Plutarch links it closely with Peisistratus' histrionics in the market place, and therefore the main purpose of the anecdote seems to illustrate vividly Peisistratus' own tricks: in this case Plutarch's Solon would be criticising the mimetic form of the presentation, more than its contents (cf. Manfredini-Piccirilli 1977, 272f.) — much too modern a perspective for the real Solon.

*Ψευδόνται*: The verb denotes only the objective falsity of what is said, and in Greek there is no word-difference for unintentional *pseudea* ('fiction' or 'partial information') and intentional ones ('lies'), cf. e.g. Pl. *Hp.mi*. 370e ἄ μὲν γὰρ ὁ 'Αχilléως ψεύδεται, οὐκ ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς φαίνεται ψευδόμενος ἄλλ' ἁκῶν, διὰ τὴν συμφορὰν τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ἀναγκασθεῖς καταμείναι καὶ βοηθήσας. ὃ δὲ ὁ 'Οδυσσεύς, ἐκὼν τε καὶ ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς, Plut. *Quom. aud. poet* 2.16a-d where poets are said to produce both unintentional and intentional *pseudea* (τὰ μὲν ἐκόντες, τὰ δὲ ἀκόντες); see Pratt 1993, 56, with bibliography ad loc. For early examples of unintentional saying what is not objectively true, see Hom. II. 10.534—*Od*. 4.140.
This fragment presents itself expressly as a correction of Mimnermus' fr. 11, inside what the testimony of Diog.Laert. 1.60 calls a "critical reply" to Mimnermus' thought and poetry about the shortness of the life-span and the bitterness of old age. Solon's fr. 27 (according to the testimonies), possibly fr. 28 and, in a less direct way, fr. 23 may also be part of Solon's criticism. This wide range of Solon's concern with Mimnermus' thought makes it unnecessary to consider any biographical conjecture on a concrete meeting and a specific occasion for this fragment — for instance, according to Szá deczky–Kardoss 1942, 80f., and Steffen 1955=1973, Solon would have written these lines during his visit to Ionia, in the imminence of the sixtieth birthday of Mimnermus, and would have advised him to avert the bad omen.

Solon asks (or, better, imagines to ask) Mimnermus (or, better, someone who had recited some lines of Mimnermus) to bring about a μεταποίησις, namely one of the "alterations" which in the 'tit for tat' repartees of the symposia (a practice well documented to us by the Theognidean corpus and Aristophanes' Wasps: cf. Vetta 1980, XXIX f., and Bowie 1997) was customarily brought about by a X speaker on the utterance of a previous Y speaker. More precisely, instead of doing a μεταποίησις himself of the text by another, in the way we know from the Theognidean corpus, Solon asks Mimnermus (namely the real author of the lines, or a reciter of them, see ad 1.1) to bring about a παλινψία, and such an inclusion of the interlocutor in the text makes clear the agonistic character of Solon's intentions, though his poetry does not yet involve the practice of the agonistic couplets that features in the Theognidean corpus (see ad 17.1).

1. εἰ μοι ... πεῖσει: Cf. Hom. II. 1.207 αἱ κε πίθαι, 7.28 εἰ μοί τι πίθοιο, Od. 20.381 ἀλλ' εἰ μοί τι πίθοιο, Semon. IEG 1.22 εἰ δ' ἐμοί πιθοῖστο. The conditional emphasises the good will that Mimnermus has to show in order to allow Solon's criticism to be fruitful, as is well posed by Tuomi 1986, 10. Πεῖσει is better for the sense to be taken as subjunctive aorist rather than indicative future. On short-vowel subjunctives, see Chantraine, Gramm. hom. 1.454ff. with examples from Homer (e.g. Od. 1.270, 13.336).

καν νῦν εἰ: "if (perhaps, ἄν) now still" — "even if eventually now (after previously refusing)", proposed by Hermann ap. Vigerus 1834, 922, or "were it only for this once", by Hudson-Williams (cf. Kühner-Gerth 1, 245). It is, however, also possible that Solon meant to be ironical or sarcastic towards Mimnermus who was almost certainly dead when Solon wrote this, so the meaning of the line is 'if you could, please, even now that you are dead, change this...'.

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If, on the contrary, we accept καὶ νῦν, (the reading proposed by Thiersch, and lastly accepted by West and Tuomi 1986, 20-5) and πείσεσαι as a future indicative we have to assume that Solon had already asked Mimnermus for other changes in the past.

εξελε τοῦτο: on the verb, see Pl. Resp. 3.394b μᾶθανε ... ὅτι ταύτης αὖ ἐναντία γίγνεται, ὅταν τις τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν δῆσεων ἐξαιρῶν τὰ ἀμοιβαία καταλέιπῃ. The neuter (implying either ἔπος: cf. West 1974, 181f., or the single word ἔξηκονταέτη: cf. Tuomi 1986, 19) is better than the masculine τοῦτον, implying στίχον.

2. μηδὲ με' γαιρεν: Hom. Od. 3.55 κλόθε ... μηδὲ μεγήρης (the verbal form is at the end of the line 8 of 9x in Homer and the Hymns).

ὅτι σεῦ λῶν ἐπεφρασάμην: λῶν adverb (Florens Christianus (Chrestien), Boissonade) is much better than λῶν' (στίχον) Ziegler, since Homer and Hesiod use only the neuter λῶν; one could also accept the neuter here with τοῦτο (ἔπος). The reading of the MSS, σεῦ τοῖον (σ' εὖ τοῖον Allen 1934, 238) cannot be accepted, in spite of the defence of Tuomi 1986, 14-9. According to Tuomi τοῖον is a pronoun which anticipates the epithet of 1.3, and the whole line would be a parenthetical invitation to Mimnermus not "to envy me=Solon because I found out such a name for you", but we would expect that Solon's invitation would concern the change in Mimnermus' verse, not the new name, and at any rate the syntax would be exceptionally hard, with καὶ μεταποίησον resuming the main thought of the fragment and being something like a parenthesis inside the parenthesis.

ἐπεφρασάμην: cf. Thgn. IEG 430 and 706 τοῦτο γ' ἐπεφράσατο. The verb is always middle in Homer and Hesiod.

3. μεταποίησον: new. Cf. Sol. 2.2 ὕδην ... θέμενος (=ποιοῦμενος). μεταποιοῦμαι in the sense of 'change', 'alter substituting one word with another' appears sometimes in contexts of creative adaptations ([Plut.] Cons. ad Apoll. 110B8) but much more frequently to define grammatical interventions on other people's texts (e.g. Gal. De diff. resp. 7.834.10 and In epidem. comm. 17b.93.11; the term also was technical in the scholiastic tradition: see Erbse's ed. of the schol. to Iliad, vol. 6, p. 406f.).

The archaic poet's vocation and art were conventionally thought to stem from the gods and to be sustained by the gods. It is in Solon that we find the first use of the very verb πολεῖν for the activity of the poets in this address to Mimnermus (as stressed by Ford 1981, 300ff., πολεῖν in Homer and Hesiod is always applied to technical arts in the sense of "fabricate" but never to poetry because poetry has had the status of a religious function, it was a matter of divine inspiration not τέχνη; see also Dover 1997, 184-5):
the new use of the word implies a new profane evaluation of poetry, where the art of 'singing' becomes more or less human 'making'/'composing', and shows the emergence of the poet as a skilled craftsman with a more analytical/rational view towards the process of poetic composition as technical making (see Gentili 1971, 60ff., and 1984, 67 and notes, and also above, ad fr. 2.2). It is most probably not a matter of chance, if this new profane approach surfaces in this context, because Solon's request to Mimnermus to 'change' what he had written would be otherwise more or less blasphemous, if Solon had reaffirmed here the principle of the divine provenance of poetry — compare the different attitude that Solon has in other poems, like the proemium of fr. 1, where he traditionally involves the Muses and places his message under divine approval and protection, and later on, II. 51-2, speaks of the profession of the poet piously in connection with the Olympian Muses.

Λιγυφαστάδης: (υ)α(υ)γιαστάδης(-δι) codd., emended by Bergk to Λιγυφαστάδη and by Diels 1902, 481-2 to Λιγυφάστάδη, with reference to the entry of Suda (μ. 1077) on Mimnermus, which, after stating that Mimnermus was son of some Λιγυφιτάδης adds: ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ καὶ Λιγυφαστάδης διὰ τὸ ἐμμελὲς καὶ λυγύ. The name of the father as reported by Suda has a foreign, Anatolian flavour (compare the Asiatic names Hýρτιος son of Gýrios and Hýrrákos of Homer, already quoted by Allen ad Mimn., p. 16 n. 31), and Solon's seeming patronymic might involve a joke between the adjective λυγύς and the name of the father, as if Solon were mocking the obscure (not Hellenic?) origin of Mimnermus (on such mocking polysyllabic words with patronymic endings see Diels 1902, 482, who compares Ar. Ran. 841).

As to λυγύς, it was often used in archaic poetry with reference to a pleasant singing voice or to the sound of an instrument (see Kaimio 1977, 42ff.); for testimonies of Mimnermus' aulos-playing which recalls the strong association of the early elegy with musical accompaniment, see Allen cit., pp. 16-17, and cp. also the qualification used by Corinna for the poetess Myrtis, PMG 664.2 λυγοφράν Μουρτίδ(α). In the light of this evidence, I am quite sceptical about the negative interpretation of the adjective, advanced by Tuomi 1986, 12-4, according to whom Solon would criticise the excessive musicality of Mimnermus' style, or his excessive relying on the musical accompaniment.

ωδέ δ’ ἀείδει: Hom. Od. 8.83, 367, 521 ταύτ’ ἄρ’ ... ἀείδει. In early poetry ἀείδειν was the basic verb to denote the performance of the epic poet, and was also used by poets of all genres as an 'ennobled' term for their activity: cf. e.g. Archil. IEG 117, Alcm. PMG 14a, 28, Sapph. PLF 160, Thgn. IEG 4, 533, 943, Corinn. PMG 655.1.2).

4. Solon's reference line was Mimn. 11.2 εἴηκοντατή μοῖρα κίχοι θανάτου.
The adjectival formation is paralleled in epitaphic inscriptions: *CEG* 176 (5th cent. B.C.) ἀντεκαίεισέντις (first half of a pentameter)—*GVI* 1233.6 (2/1 B.C.).


Some of Solon's laws aimed at limiting funerary ostentation and the luxury of the funeral rites, which according to Dem.Phal. 135 Wehrli would have become more and more expensive by Solon's time. Cf. Ampolo 1984, 93, Engels 1998.

In one of his laws, according to Plut. Sol. 21.6, Solon ἀμυχὰς δὲ κοπτομένων καὶ τὸ θρηνεῖν πεποιημένα καὶ τὸ κωκύειν ἄλλον ἐν ταφαῖς ἔτέρων ἄφειλεν. Our fragment may have hinted at what the κωκυτός during the πρόθεσις ought to be in the opinion of Solon the lawgiver: it had to be limited to the φίλοι of the dead.

Solon's position appears to mediate between the praxis of the epic heroes and of the Greeks of his time to mourn the deceased in scenic and immoderate ways at the funerals, often hiring mourners (according with the primitive belief that the spirits of the dead demand mourning as their due) and the opposite wish not to be mourned and lamented.

As for the first attitude, resorting to professional mourners (the Carian women were the most famous) remained a common practice throughout the centuries: see Ar. Ran. 1302-3 Pl. Leg. 7.800d-e (besides Hsch. κ 824 L. s.v. Καρίνας, Phot. Lex. p. 314 N., s.v. Καρικῆ μούση), and the presence of non-kin at the lamentation for a deceased is attested as early as ll. 18.339, where Trojan women were compelled to mourn for Patroclus, or in ll. 24.720f., where professional ὁδῳδοί intervene in Hector's funeral; cf. Alexiou 1974, 10-4.

As for the second attitude, instances are Archil. IEG 13.9-10 ἀλλὰ τάξιστα τῇ της, γυναικεῖον πένθος ἀπωσάμενοι, Semon. IEG 2 τοῦ μὲν θανόντος οὐκ ἀν ἐνθυμομέθα, εἰ τι προνοίμην, πλεῖον ἰμέρης μῆς, Bacchyl. fr. 12 τι γὰρ ἐλαφρὸν ἐτ’ ἐστίν ἀπρακτ’ ὀδυρόμενον δοείν καρδίαιν; Pl. Resp. 386-8, Philet. CA 11 ἐκ θυμοῦ κλαίσαι με τὰ μέτρα, καὶ τι πρόσημως εἰπεῖν, μεμνηματί τ’ οὐκέτ’ ἐόντος ὁμός, Posidipp. SH 705.21 ἡμὲ τὶς οὐν χεῖναι δάκρυν (on which, cf. Lloyd-Jones 1963=1990, 184-5), Euph. CA 21 τῷ καὶ μέτρια μὲν τὶς ἐπὶ φθιμένῳ ἀκάχολτο, μέτρια καὶ κλαύσειν· ἐπεὶ καὶ πάμπαν ἄδακρυν Μοῖραι ἐσκοτύησατο (if one retains, as proposed by van Groningen ἐσκοτύησατο given by Stobaeus' cod. S, then this would appear to be another case of almost complete denial of mourning), [Plut.] Cons. ad Apoll. 102d and de Hom. 2.189. An instance of complete denial of the opportunity of mourning is provided by Sapph. PLF 150 οὐ γὰρ θέμις ἐν μοισοπόλων τοίκια θρήνον ἐμμεν· οὖ κ’ ἀμμὶ τάδε πρέποι (according to the testimony the advice was addressed by Sappho to her daughter —compare the φίλοι for whose lamentation Solon wishes after his death); see also Enn. fr. var. 17 Vahlen (which Cic. Tusc. 1.117 and Cato maior 20.73 preferred to Solon's position) nemo me lacrimis decoret nec funera fletu Faxit. Cur? volito vivos per ora virum, where denial of funerary honours and trust
in the immortality of the glory are closely connected — possibly in the path of Sappho, if Sappho's strong denial was really as rare in antiquity as our evidence allows us to believe.

Therefore several parallels exist for Solon's wish for moderation (and Sappho's possibly pre-existed to him), but Solon's personal contribution may be detected in the mention of the φίλοι. In my opinion, this fragment possibly furthers the challenge which Solon sets, in a positive qua social perspective, against the anti-social and negative views on the end of human life maintained by Mimnermus, according to whom old age unavoidably makes everyone isolated and despised even by one's children: οὐδὲ πατήρ παιὸν τίμων οὔτε φίλος, fr. 9.2; see also fr. 1.6. Cp. the law of Solon on the assistance offered to the parents by the son, for which see ad 18.10.

The distress, the grief of the friends is not only the context for lamenting his death. It is also a formal affirmation of the aristocratic ideology of philotes that binds the φίλοι ἑταῖροι together, already present in the Homeric tradition of the mourning for the dead heroes (II. 18.232ff., 19.4ff.), and, in a larger sense, too, in lyric (Callim. 1.18-9, Tyrt. 9.27-8). Here in Solon this social function of grief is applied to civic death and to the ideology of the politis, and the attempt by Stupperich 1977, 200-5 to date back to Solon's laws the beginning of the Athenian use of the ἐπιτάφιος λόγος for the fallen in the war is perhaps a bit too speculative, but appears to me to be not improbable at all. As a fact, Solon is said to have authorised a common festival of the dead, the Genesia, which transformed the formerly private matter of reverence for deceased family members into a public concern, see Jacoby 1944, and Brook Manville 1990, 148-9. Solon would also have received the first public burial in Athenian history, according to Plut. Sol. 32, Ael. VH 8.16.

1. μηδὲ ... θάνατος μόλοι: For verbal similarities, cf. Aesch. TrGF 255.1 ὅ θάνατε παῖν, μή μ' ἄμιμασις μολεῖν, Soph. Aj. 854 ὅ θάνατε βάνατε, νῦν μ' ἐπίσκεψαι μολῶν, Phil. 797 ὅ θάνατε θάνατε, ... οὐ δύνη μολεῖν ποτε, adesp. TrGF 369α ὅ θάνατε παιᾶν, «---» λατρός μόλος.

ἀκλαυτός: ἀκλαυτός codd. which appears to be a late form, never certain before Alc. Mess. Anth.Pal. 7.247 (though it is attested in the Louvre papyrus of Alcman fr. 1.39; see also Soph. TrGF ** 1133, 56.1 ἄκλαυτος[ ]).

The lack of lamentation (e.g. Aesch. Cho. 433 ἄνοιμωκτον, Eum. 565 ἀλετ' ἀκλαυτός ἀντός) was almost as bad as the lack of proper burial, and the two things are often linked together: see e.g. Hom. Il. 22.386 κεῖται ... ἀκλαυτός ἄθαπτος, Od. 11.72 μή μ' ἀκλαυτον ἄθαπτον ... καταλείπειν, Soph. Ant. 29 ἐὰν δ' ἀκλαυτον, ἄταφον (see also Ant. 847 φίλων ἀκλαυτός), El. 867 οὔτε τοῦ τάφου ἀντιάσας οὔτε γόων, OC 1708 οὔτε πένθος ἐλπὶ ἀκλαυτον, Eur. Andr. 1159-60 κομίζομέν νίν σοι
κατοικώξαν γόοις κλαύσαι τε, ... γῆς τε κοσμήσαι τάφῳ, Hec. 30 ἀκλαυτος ἀταφος, GVI 715.5 (1/2 A.D.) οὐκ ἀκλαυτον ἔχων τάφου; for the dishonour done to Agamemnon regarding his funerary rights Aesch. Ag. 1541-50, Cho. 8. 511.

1-2. φιλοισί καλλείπομι ... ἁλγεα καὶ στοναχάς: the closest parallel is Aesch. Pers. 674 ὁ πολύκλαυτε φιλοισί θανών; cf. also Hom. II. 2.39 θήσειν ... ἁλγεά τε στοναχάς τε, II. 5.156-7 πατέρι δὲ γόον καὶ κήδεα λυγρά λειπ(ε), Od. 1.242-4 οἶχετ' ... ἐμοὶ δ' ὁδόνας τε γόοις τε κάλλιπεν' οὐδ' ἔτι κείνον ὀδύρμενον στεναχίζω κτλ., Od. 5.83=157 δάκρυσι καὶ στοναχήσι καὶ ἁλγεσι θυμὸν ἐρέχθων, Od. 11.279 τῷ δ' ἁλγεα κάλλιπ' ὀπίσθω, Od. 14.39 ἁλγεᾶ τε στοναχάς τε, Stesich. PMG 232.3 κήδεα δὲ στοναχάς τ' Ἀίδας ἐλαξε, Soph. Aj. 972-3 ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ λιπὼν ἀνίας καὶ γόος διοίχεται, GVI 77.1-2 (5 cent. B.C.) ὁς μάλα πολλαὶς ἀστοῖς καὶ ξείνοις θόκε θανῶν ἀνίαν, 762.5 (1 B.C.) στοναχάς καὶ δάκρυα λείπει, 1121.4 (2/1 B.C.?) ἐλημπον δάκρυα καὶ στοναχάς, 1122.1 (first half of first cent. B.C.) πένθεα καὶ στοναχάς λείπω, 1913.5-6 (beginning of 3rd cent. B.C.) πολλὰ δὲ δοῦσα [ἀ]λγεα κ[αί] στεναχάς θυνήσκεις μελέοισι γουεῦσιν.
Solon develops a positive attitude towards the process of human ageing regarding it as a period of continuing ability for learning: cp. fr. 23.15-6, where he acknowledged both the weakness and the abilities of the ninth hebdomad. In fact, the qualification κακὸν γῆρας of fr. 18.10 is in contrast with this view, but this contrast is due to the realistic acknowledgement of the proximity of old age and death and of the 'social problem of old age' in fr. 18 (see there ad l. 10), and besides to the different generic context (the concern of fr. 18 is mostly erotic, and the idea of physical decay unavoidably matters much more in it; on Solon's manipulation of the ideas of γῆρας and ἤβη according to different contexts, see the brilliant analysis of Falkner 1995, 163f., 168 and n.43).

The association of prudence and wisdom with old people was a commonplace already in Homer (for instance the most senior were privileged by their years to intervene in moments of perplexity as wise counsellors: besides the Iliadic Nestor, see e.g. Od. 2.15 Aegyptius, 2.157 Halitherses, 7.155, 11.342 Echeneus, 24.52 Nestor again, Hes. Theog. 233 Nereus). However, Solon is more specifically engaged in representing old age as a worthy part of the human life against the background of erotic lyric poets who denigrate γῆρας, Mimnermus in particular, who had also said that mental powers fail in old age: see 1.4-7 τὸ δ’ ἀργαλέον ... γῆρας ... βλάπτει δ’ ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ νόον ἀμφιχθεῖν.

The debate was not going to finish in the age of the lyrics: the fame of Solon's line was to become great later (see parallels ad l. 1, and in Tosi 1991, 175, n. 385), but the opposite opinion on the wisdom of old age surfaces no less often: cf. e.g. Hdt. 3.134.3-4 αὐξομένῳ γὰρ τῷ σώματι συναύξονται καὶ αἱ φρένες, γηράσκοντι δὲ συγγηράσκουσι καὶ ἐς τὰ πρήγματα πάντα ἀπαμβλύνονται, Soph. Ant. 681-2 ἡμῖν μὲν, εἰ μὴ τῷ χρόνῳ κεκλείμεθα, λέγειν φρονοῦντως ὡν λέγεις δοκεῖς πέρι, TrGF 949 πάντ’ ἐμπέφυκε τῷ μακρῷ γῆρα κακά, νοῦς φροῦδος, ἔργ’ ἀρχεία, φροντίδες κεναί, Eur. TGF 25.2-4 γέροντες οὐδὲν ἐσμεν ἀλλο πλῆς ψόφος καὶ σχήμ’, ὀνείρων δ’ ἐρπομεν μιμήματα νοὺς δ’ οὐκ ἐνεστιν, οἴομεσθα δ’ εὖ φρούειν, TGF 509 τί δ’ ἄλλο; φωνη καὶ σκιὰ γέρων ἀνήρ. Pl. Resp. 7.536d expressly quotes Solon, stating that his view was mistaken: τόλων γὰρ οὐ πειστέον ὡς γηράσκων τις πολλὰ δυνατὸς μανθάνειν, ἀλλ’ ἦττον ἦ τρέχειν, νέων δὲ πάντες οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι, and Pl. Euthd. 272c will ridicule the γεροντοδίδασκαλος (cf. also Lach. 201a-c, Ar. Nub. 129-30, 854-5, and Theophrastus’ ὀφυμαθής).

γηράσκω ... αἰεὶ ... διδασκόμενος: Aesch. PV 981 ἀλλ’ ἐκδιδάσκει πάνθ’ ὡς γηράσκων χρόνος, (a possible reworking of Solon's line), Ag. 1621-2 τὸ γῆρας ...
διδάσκειν, Soph. OC 7-8 χρόνος ξυνών μακρός διδάσκει, TrGF 260.1-2 ἄλλα τῇ γήρᾳ φιλεὶ χῶ νυσὶ όμαρείν καὶ τῷ βουλεύειν ἂ δεῖ, TrGF 664 γῆρας διδάσκει πάντα καὶ χρόνου τριβή (whereas when you are young TrGF *694 νέος πέφικας· πολλά καὶ μαθεῖν σε δεῖ καὶ πόλλ' ἀκοῦσαι καὶ διδάσκεσθαι μακρά), Eur. Phoen. 528-30 οὐχ ἀπαντά τῷ γήρᾳ κακά, ... πρόσεστίν· ἀλλ' ἡμπειρία ἔχει τι λέξαι τῶν νέων σοφώτερον, Hipp. 252 πολλὰ διδάσκει μ' ὁ πολὺς βίωτος, Supp. 419 ὁ γὰρ χρόνος μάθησιν αὐτὶ τῶν τάχους κρέασι δίδωσι, TGF 291.2-3 γνώμαι δ' ἀμείνους εἰς τῶν γεραιτέρων· ὁ γὰρ χρόνος δίδαγμα ποικιλώτατον, TGF 508.2 βουλαὶ δ' ἔχουσι τῶν γεραιτέρων κράτος, TGF 619 τῷ γῆρᾳ ... τῶν νεωτέρων φρενών σοφώτερον πέφικε κάσφαλέστερον, ἐμπειρία τε τῆς ἀπειρίας κρατεῖ, Men. Georg. fr. 3.3-4 K.-Th. ὁ δὲ χρόνος τὶ μ' εἰδέναι ποιεῖ πλέον.
In contrast to the early poems written before the archonship (in elegiacs), which are more concerned with attacking the greed of the rich, Solon's later poems, in tetrameters (addressed to an unknown Phocus) and in iambics are mostly written in justification of his reforms, and, in the case of the tetrameters to Phocus, against the complaints of the party which had favoured Solon's political rise, but, after the reforms when he did not accept the autocracy of a tyrannis in Athens, thought that he did not go far enough to further its interests.

Indeed, according to Plutarch, Sol. 14.6 Solon had the possibility of becoming a tyrant in Athens, and even a Delphic oracle had guaranteed him success in this attempt: ἰπο μέσην κατὰ νῆα, κυβερνητήριον ἔργον εὐθύνων πολλοὶ τοι 'Αθηναίων ἐπίκουροι (cf. Thgn. IEG 39-40, where εὐθυντήρ unambiguously refers to an autocratic seizure of power).

The modern meaning of tyranny, and the best established modern views about this idea may lead us to believe that the apology of Solon about his refusal had too much of an obvious concern. First of all, in Solon's time the term did not have the connotations of power imposed with force through an unlawful putsch, which the term was going to have in Athens after the Peisistratid experience (see ad 11.2-3), and the list of the 'Seven Sages' included two tyrants: Periander of Corinth and Thrasibulus of Miletus. Besides, the idea that tyranny is something desirable, because of the wealth and the power it implies, appears to be by far the common opinion in the 6th century. According to Plut. Sol. 14.8 Solon himself, while speaking to his φίλοι (=his supporters before the legislation?), would have admitted καλὸν μὲν ἐίναι τὴν τυραννίδα χωρίαν, οὐκ ἔχειν δ' ἀπόβασιν. Analogously the son of the tyrant Periander is told by the father in Hdt. 3.53.4 that τυραννὶς χρὴμα σφαλερόν, πολλοί δὲ αὐτῆς ἑρασταί ἐίσοι, and the carpenter Charon, the persona loquens of Archil. IEG 19 (quoted below ad 1.4-5) has to defend his critical stance against what appears to be the common positive valuation of tyranny — a positive valuation which occurs in a straight form in Archil. IEG 23.19-21 νῇν εἶλες αἴχυμι κα[i. μέγ' ἐ]ξήρ(ω) κ[λέος. κεῖνης ἀνάσσε καὶ γ]τ[υραν]νίην ἐχε[−] π[ό]λις[ι[ Θ]η[ν]ὶ] ζη[λῳ]τὸς δ[ι]θρ[ῶ]πο[ι]ν ἐς[κ[ε]] (Archilochus' fragment is an especially interesting passage, because the invitation to seize the power as a tyrant may have included more or less the same reasons maintained by Solon's critics, and rejected by Solon in our fragment; for an attempt at identification of the two characters, cf. Strauss Clay 1986).

Only the later Athenian ideology of the 5th and 4th centuries still stresses sometimes the inherent pleasures (cf. Soph. Ant. 1168-9 and OT 380, Eur. Alc. 286, TGF 332.7), but more often the dangers of autocracy, or its anomaly and variance with a legitimate
rule: see e.g. Pind. Pyth. 11.52f. τῶν γὰρ ἀνὰ πόλειν εὐρίσκων τὰ μέσα μακροτέρω {οίνιν} ὀλβῷ τεθαλάστα, μέμφου’ αίσιν τυραννίσων, evidently very important in connection with Solon’s own concern, Eur. TGF 172 οὔτε εἰκὸς ἀρχεῖν οὔτε χρῆν εἶναι νόμον τύραννον εἶναι: μωρία δὲ καὶ θέλειν ὃς τῶν ὁμοίων βούλεται κρατεῖν μόνος, TGF 605 τὸ δ’ ἐσχατὸν δὴ τούτο θαυμαστὸν βροτοῖς τυραννίς, οὔχ εὐρίσκειν ἀν ἀθλιώτερον. φίλους τε πορθεῖν καὶ κατακτανείν χρεῶν, πλέοστος φόβος πρόσεσι μὴ δράσωσι τι, incert. TGF 850 ὡς τύραννις πάντοθεν τοξεύεται δεινοῖς ἐρωσιν, ἴση φιλακτέον πέρι, Xen. Hier. 1.9-12, 7.11, Isoc. Ep. 6.12; instead the life of a private citizen is commonly preferable (e.g. Eur. Ion 625-8), and the feeling that the lot of the ordinary persons is more secure and less precarious than that of the one with an extraordinary power gains prevalence in Greek tragedy (e.g. Eur. Med. 122f.).

As for the identity of the ex-supporters/present opponents Solon was facing after his reforms, according to the Aristotelic interpretation (Ath. Pol. 12.3), followed by most modern scholars (see above all Masaracchia 1958, 342, Adkins 1972a, 12-21 or Rhodes ad Ath. Pol. 12.3), the kakoί of fr. 29*9 were the poor, in whose favour Solon would have been supposed to pass the land-ισομορία, namely the redistribution of the land of the ἐσθλοῖ, the noble-rich class. This reconstruction has been recently challenged. On the improbability of a project of distribution of the lands of the rich class in favour of the poor in the age of the archaic tyrannies, see Brandt 1989, Rosivach 1992. The supporters of Solon who had the expectation of ἔκαστος αὐτῶν ὅλον εὐρίσειν πολῶν, fr. 29*2, may not be/or only be the poor class (in this case Solon’s expression would certainly overstate their expectation: cf. Ferrara 1964, 120; Rosivach 1992, and compare Bacchyl. 1.172-4 ἰσον ὃ τ’ ἀφενός ἰμείρει μεγάλων ὃ τ’ μείναι παυροτέρων), but also a part of the nobles (the Alcmeonids, for instance) who relied on the temporary alliance of the poor to become more powerful (on the tyrannoι being the product of internal aristocratic stasis, and the expressions of the interests of a single aristocratic faction against another, often exploiting the support of the middle-low classes of farmers and traders, see, above all, Ellis-Stanton 1968, Stinton 1976, Stahl 1987, 77-106, Cawkwell 1995), or a group of non-aristocrats (κακοί) who had become wealthy, and wanted to get from Solon χθονὸς πατρίδος ἵσομορίην with the aristocrats (ἐσθλοί) (II. 8-9) in order to make sure of a fuller participation in political power (on the effect of Solon’s political reforms that shifted the qualification for public office from the criteria of birth plus wealth to the single criterion of wealth, but the social categories were still defined in terms of agricultural produce, cf. Rosivach 1992, 156).

Solon, and similarly Archilochus, were two poets of the archaic age who used, besides elegiacs, other types of available metre, namely trochaic tetrameter, iambic trimeter, epodes (for Solon’s composing of epodes we have the testimony of Diog. Laert.
1.61, West 1982, 43 n.38). However, Archilochus' and Solon's use of the tetrameters is different.

Dover 1964, examines the form, contents and ethos of Archilochus' elegiacs and iambics, and concludes that there are no grounds for believing that Archilochus regarded them as different genres: in fact, Archilochus may have used the word *iambos* with reference to all forms of poetry which he composed, their common characteristic being not their metre or language, but the type of occasion for which they were composed, their social context. Similarly, Maas 1962, 54f. maintains that the rhythm seems to have been neutral in respect of ethos in the poetry of Archilochus, the Lesbians, and later of Pindar and Bacchylides: a similar metre is used in poems of entirely different character and vice versa.

Solon appears to cut some distinction, namely to use the elegiacs for themes with didactic (either ethical or political-programmatic) purposes, while his extant tetrameter verses are closely tied to his position as an individual looking back on the past. The similarities in the subject-matter of the three fragments addressed to Phocus seem to indicate that they belonged to the same poem or the same kind of poetry, and their tone is different from that of the elegiacs. Scholars have already noticed that the self-referential quality of Solon's narration with the predominance of first person singular verbs in past tenses (features also found in the long trimeter poem) focuses on Solon's past actions (as was stressed for instance by Havelock 1978, 252) and, consequently, on his own present isolation inside Athens. I would add the almost absolute absence of Homeric references, epithets and words, together with the frequent use for the first time of new words (*βαθύφων*, *ἰσομοιρία*, and *βουλητεύς*, being an absolute *hapax*) or, at any rate, of expressions that are known to us only from Athenian comedy (*άσκος* ... *δεδάρθαι*, *ἐπιστρέφθαι*); it would be too mechanical to suppose that this un-Homeric tone is simply due to the unsuitability of Homeric phrases to the different metre. Indeed, all these features may be clues to a less high and official level for Solon's tetrameters than the public — political or ethical — programs sung in the elegiacs.

I do not think that Solon used the tetrameters for a 'serious' political self-propaganda (West 1974, 32), as he had used the elegiacs. In the tetrameters as well as in the long trimeter poem regarding his legislation he does not convey precise programmatic information as he would have had if to substantiate any kind of political self-support (Tsagarakis 1977, 51). Solon's almost complete isolation may imply a new critical and detached attitude. Even though our knowledge of his work is one-sided, the fragments to Phocus show that Solon by displaying traditional terms of praise and blame, and other devices common in blame poetry, such as playing with the *persona loquens* (on which see already Anhalt 1993, 105) aims at ridiculing his critics, more than at self-justifying or self-defending.
As a matter of fact (lastly noticed by Stoessl 1987, 122) Solon is the first, known to us, who imported the trochaic and the iambic metre in Athens from the Ionia of Archilochus. In my opinion, Solon may have anticipated the trend of fifth century drama to exploit the ethos of the different metres to convey different connotations. Aristotle in his Poet. 1449a21, 1459b37, Rh. 1408b36 (and later on, Dion.Hal. Comp. 17.5) called the tetrameter the most satiric and suitable metre for dance, the 'lowest' one even in comparison with the iambic trimeter which was more suited to speech (1448b31, 1459a12); on the other side, hexameter, the most solemn and less colloquial metre, was the most elevated (1459b31-60a1). Solon would be intending to invert the hostility of his old supporters no less than of his old enemies into his own self-praise by discrediting his old supporters-new opponents and by revealing their corruptness (Will 1958, 303, Anhalt 1993, 105). Solon’s use of the tetrameters could be explained in these terms. Tetrameters should be ideal for his satiric attack, in a symposiastic context, against his opponents, as distinguished from elegiacs, reserved for the highest didactic-political themes (it is well known that the ancients, till late antiquity, appear not to have a clearly-cut distinction between hexametric and elegiac poetry, both being defined as ἐπιτη); also the references to food in the iambic frs. 32-4 may indicate another similar but even more disengaged trend.

West usefully hinted at possible echoes of Solon’s words from the tetrametra in several passages of Plutarch’s Solon, but I think that in most cases the thoughts and phrasing more probably are Plutarch’s reconstructions: for prudence that is required, see Martina 1972, on the attempt by den Boer 1966, to extract a Solonian fragment from Plutarch, Sol. 14.8. However, I am inclined to believe that at least Sol. 15.1=test. 59 G.-P.=fr. 33a W., after Bekker’s reconstruction: συγχέας ἀπαντάπασι καὶ ταράξας τὴν πόλιν ἀθενεστέρος γένηται — vel γένωμει — τοῦ καταστήματι πάλιν may allow us to think of the structure of a verse; furthermore, the content would fit Solon’s trend to use medical language for describing the conditions of the state as a sick body: cf. ad 3.17.

29 G.-P.² (33 W.²)

1-2. γῆς ... πατρίδος: a formulaic phrase which frequently occurs in Homer and Hesiod, but always in the different word order πατρίς γαῖα, with the only exception of the anastrophe γαῖας ἀπὸ πατρίδος (II. 13.696, 15.335, Od. 10.49). The use is furthered by Ap.Rhod. who has ἀπὸ πατρίδα γαῖαν 3.1136, but γαῖης ἀπὸ πατρίδος 1.535, and the only parallels for the word order γαῖα πατρίς come from later language: Eur. Supp. 1037 ἐς γῆν πατρίδα, HF 620 γῆς πατρίδος (also Alc. 169 ἐν γῆ πατρίᾳ, El. 1315, IT 1066 etc.). Solon resumes the distinct word order of the epic tradition, but in doing so he manages to juxtapose the two words emphatically to
And express the two ideas that are polar opposites for him: (public interests of) fatherland and (private interests of a party, satisfied by) tyranny.

However, besides the patriotic feelings (for which cf. also fr. 4), Solon had a strong concern for the pragmatic 'economical' values of γῆ (πατρίς), which for him is equivalent to life itself since it can provide the means of living — the land is called twice πυροφόρος by Solon, and see Hes. Op. 31f.

The relationship between acceptance of tyranny and saving the land is explained in 29.7-9 (for the formal similarity connecting the two passages, see ad loc.).

2-3. τυραννίδος: the term τυραννίς is first found in Archil. IEG 19 (in whose age the word τυραννος was thought to have been first introduced into Greece: cf. Hippias Eleus VS 86B9), τυραννος in Semon. IEG 7.69, Alc. PLF 348, τυραννίτη in Archil. IEG 23.20, and Xenoph. 3.2, mainly in connection with eastern monarchs; besides, a later tradition considered Gyges to be the first tyrannos (from Euph. 177 van Gron. to Etym.Magn. 771.54 G.). At any rate, at least Alcaeus' passage, concerned with Pittacus' seizure of power, proves that as early as the beginning of the 6th century, the term was exploited in Greece also for some kind of supreme rulers inside the city-states (of the kind described by Archil. IEG 115; cf. Gallavotti 1949). Besides, other passages both in Herodotus and in the tragedians of the 5th century show that the terms tyrannos and basileus were almost interchangeable, and with no sure derogatory implication for tyrannos (as is particularly stressed by Hegy 1965, and Parker 1998). Only in 5th century Athens, presumably in the early years of the century, when ostracism was introduced, tyranny ceased to be a feasible constitutional option, and the term more and more became a metaphor for the political abuse of the bad autocrat as opposed to the good basileus (see for instance Xen. Mem. 4.6.12) — in Aristotle (Pol. 1285a) we even see an attempt at distinguishing between the Greek tyranny of Pittacus, being lawful, temporary, and elective, and the barbarian tyrannies of the Asiatic despotism (cf. Romer 1982; more broadly Lanza 1977).

τυραννίδος καὶ βίας ἀμελέτους: Solon's passages (here and in 29.7) are the first to connect tyrannis with βία, but we cannot be at all sure whether any derogatory connotation affected Solon's use of the term, or not. More probably Solon refused to enter this office not because he believed it to be itself a form of rule intrinsically abusive and violent (in that case τυραννίς and βία would be something like an eniadias — this interpretation is most common yet anachronistic) — but because his being the tyrannos of one of the two political sides would have provoked his own use of βία as well as the βία of the side he would have favoured against the other (cf. Andrewes 1982, 390f., Raafflaub 1993, 73, Salmon 1997, 68f., who also adds as a reason the specific Athenian experience of Cylon's attempt and its aftermath).
3. οὗ καθηψάμην μιάνας καὶ κατασχύνας κλέος: In Homer καθάπτομαι is used of the effort made to engage someone in speech for an important reason—cf. II. 1.582, 15.127, Od. 2.240, 3.345, 10.70, and see Kirk ad II. 1.582. Here for the first time with the meaning 'lay hold of', as also later with reference to material objects. In my opinion Solon focuses on the tyranny as an object in order to stress that the physical contact with it provokes *miasia*.

μιάνας καὶ κατασχύνας κλέος: The usual association of κατασχύνω with γένος from Homer (e.g. Od. 24.508) to Aristophanes (Av. 1451) was a fundamental aristocratic belief (see also the simple αισχύνω: II. 6.209, Tyrtr. 6.9). Solon substitutes γένος with a word, κλέος, which refers to his personal self (it is remarkable that the word γένος never appears in the extant verses of Solon in any connection with Solon himself). Later parallels for Solon's phrase are Eur. Hel. 845 τὸ Τρωίδον γὰρ οὗ κατασχύνω κλέος, 999-1000 καὶ κλέος τοῦμον πατρὸς οὐκ ἂν μιᾶναμι(1), Joseph, BJ 6.187.4 μὴ κατασχύναι τὸ σφέτερον κλέος, Plut. De gen. 582e4 οὗ κατασχύνω τὸ μέγα Πυθαγόρου κλέος, Opp. H. 2.641 οὗτ' ἤχυναν ἕνω κλέος οὐδὲ θανόντες.

According to several scholars of our century, from Wilamowitz onwards (see lastly Pellizer 1981, Vox 1983b, 310, Vox 1984, 73 and 76f.), Solon believes that he has disgraced his κλέος by not becoming a tyrant, but this association is not paralleled, and would be justifiable only if it was reflecting the thought and the criticism of the opponents— as, indeed, it often happens in the tetrametra to Phocus. However, this cannot be the case here, since the passage reflects Solon's perspective (see ἐφευσάμην and βίος ἀμελλίχου). I interpret the syntax in a different way: no pause has to be implied after the verb καθηψάμην, and no comma ought to be printed after it (as in West's edition), and the negative οὗ should be connected not only with the verb that follows it, but also with the participles (as is fairly possible: cf. Shorey 1911). The meaning of the lines is, that by avoiding to seize the power Solon avoided to pollute his κλέος, and gained the universal favour (1. 4f.), so fulfilling his wish to πρὸς ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων αἰεὶ δόξαν ἔχειν ἀγαθήν (fr. 1.3-4). Indeed, the verb μιάνω, whose original meaning in epic was material pollution (Hom. II. 16.795-96, 23.732), evoked afterwards more or less clearly a stain of blood (Aesch. Ag. 209, Eum. 281, Soph. OC 1373-74, Eur. Hipp. 317) or a contamination connected with the hands that have accomplished the 'dirty' action (e.g. Eur. El. 322, HF 1324, Or. 517, 1563, IT 946, 1047, 1226f., Antiph. caed.Her. 82.3), and the connection of the participle of such a verb with οὗ καθάπτομαι would be effective: Solon would have felt the pollution of his reputation and the disgrace of his name if he had become tyrant, if he had dared to ἀπεσθαμί τυραννίδος, and not because he did not. Cf. on this Catenacci 1996, 183ff., who compares Solon's attitude with
Theognis 894 regarding the Cypselidae and notes that Solon anticipates Pind. *Pyth.* 11.56f. where he who has refrained himself from the *hybris* of a *tyrannis* leading a moderate life, dies γυρικατά γενικα ευώνυμον κτείνων κρατίσταν χάριν πορών (also 244 n. 10 with full bibliography on the legislation against tyranny).

4. οὐδὲν αἰσθήματι: Cairns 1993, 166-67, makes two interesting points on the usage of the verb by Solon. The verb is used here for the first time with a conditional clause related to past conduct, but also with a reference to the present and future, because Solon confidently expects a greater glory to come exactly because of this behaviour of his and despite the present criticism. Such an attitude by Solon, which opposes conventional conceptions of the honourable and relies on his personal alternative sense, is never found in the characters of the Homeric epic.

4-5. νυκήσειν δοκέω ... πάντας ἀνθρώπους: For verbal similarities cf. Pl. *Symp.* 179a οἱ τοιοῦτοι νυκήσεν ἣν ... πάντας ἀνθρώπους, 213e νυκώντα ... πάντας ἀνθρώπους.

The βία of the *tyrannos* (l. 2) against the defeated party reflects the behaviour of the winner in the Homeric duels, who has the life or even the body of the antagonist at his own complete mercy. Solon’s phrase of ll. 4-5 remoulds boasts of Homeric duellers before the fight (cf. e.g. *Il.* 7.192 δοκέω νυκήσεμεν ’Εκτορα διὸν: Ajax on the outcome of his duel with Hector), and the switch in the meaning of the verb (here 'to win the favour of') possibly implies some answer by Solon to the discontent of his ex-supporters, who would have blamed his softness towards the opposite, defeated but not oppressed party: in fact he did not intend to win a duel, but to 'win' the favour of everyone. Compare Solon’s wish to conquer everyone’s approval with the conquest of everybody’s ζήλος, which was the result traditionally connected with the seizure of autocratic power, as reflected in Archil. *IEG* 23.19-21 cit. ad ll. 2-3.

Loraux 1988, 119 hypothesised that this line would be opposing poetic-agonistic victories as the one of Hesiod, *Op.* 657 ὑμιᾷ νυκήσαντα φέρειν τρίποδ’ ὑτώντα, but I do not see any hint in this direction.

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29* G.-P. 2 (33 W. 2)

1955, 37 observed that Solon’s expression anticipates the ideas of Heraclitus about the 'depth' of the human mind.

βουλήτης: hapax.

2. ἐσθλαί: For ἐσθλαί 'good things, gifts', cf. e.g. Hes. Op. 116, 119, Hom.Hymn Dem. 225 θεόι δὲ τοῖς ἐσθλάι πόροιεν, Thgn. IEG 4. Here the reference is to the tyranny itself, according to Frankel 1960, 67 and n.3 who quotes Hdt. 3.53.4 μὴ δῶς τὰ σεωτου ἄγαθα ἄλλοις (scil. the tyrannis which Periander possessed). On the thought that to accept the smaller share when the situation allows a position of force is "unmanly" or "mean": Eur. Phoen. 504-10 and 524-5, Pl. Grg. 483a-c and Resp. 344a-c can be added.


I would not rule out that the expression implies also a reference to the Delphic oracle quoted by Plutarch, promising Solon success in gaining supreme power over the parties (cf. Introd.). The acceptance of the gift by Solon would have created a bond of obligation, since reciprocity lies in the ethos of the gift-giving and receiving. Solon would not have been able to repay such a gift and the unwise acceptance of it would have been the prime factor for his destruction (cf. Hes. Op. 83-9 about Epimetheus’ unwise acceptance of Pandora as a gift from the gods, though Prometheus had warned him μή ποτε δῶρον δέξασθαι τὰρ Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου, ἄλλ’ ἀποπέμπειν, but Epimetheus δεξάμενος, ὅτε δὴ κακὸν ἐξὶ, ἐνόησεν; see also Pl. Resp. 619b-c where tyranny appeals to the one who makes his choice of life ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης τε καὶ λαμαργίας).

3. περιβαλῶν δ’ ἀγαραν: Hdt. 1.141.2 λαβεῖν ἀμφίβληστρων καὶ περιβαλεῖν τε πλῆθος πολλῶν τῶν ἱχθῶν καὶ ἐξειρύσσαν, and later Arr. Ind. 29.11.6 τούτους (scil. the fish) περιβαλλοῦντες τὰ δίκτυα αἱρέουσαν. A description that illustrates the technical procedure of the kind of fishing alluded to by Solon is in Philo, De agric. 24.1 καθάπερ γὰρ οἱ ἀλιευόμενοι δίκτυα καθιάσαν ἐστὶν ὅτε μήκιστα πολλὰ ἐν κύκλῳ περιβαλλόμενον θάλασσαν, ἵν’ ὡς πλείστους ἐντὸς ληφθέντας ἄρκων δὰ τειχήρεις γεγονότας ἱχθύας συλλάβωσιν.

ἀγαθεῖς: Cf. Hsch. a 345 L. ἀγαθεῖς· θαμασθεῖς. Instead of ἀγαθεῖς codd. Lobeck ad Soph. Aj. 309 and Ziegler (addenda et corrigenda in his edition of Plut. Vit. 4.2, p.9) proposed ἀσθεῖς (=ἀτυχθεῖς Reiske). But for ἀγαθεῖς absolutum, cf. Hom. Od. 18.71 ὑπερβαλῶς ἀγάσαντο. As for the meaning in Homer the verb always implies a 'shock' in front of something that exceeds the boundaries of the normal or usual (cf. Lfgre s.v., B), and specifically in the Odyssey, the use of the verb connects
admiration and fear (see ad 18.71: the suitors in front of a bold speech of Iros) or fear and respect: in front of his extraordinary catch Solon does not know how to deal with it, as well as Odysseus in front of Nausicaa (6.168-9): ως σε, γυναι, ἀγαμαί τε τέθητα τε δείδια τ’ αἰνώς γούνων ἀφασθαί: χαλεπὸν δὲ με πένθος ἵκανει.

3-4. οὖκ ἐπέσασεν ... μέγα δίκτυον: The closest parallel is Theoc. 1.40 μέγα δίκτυον ... ἐλκεί where the old fisherman gets tired by the effort he makes to drag a μέγα net. It is possible that this very idea of weight is aimed at Solon by his opponents: the net and its catch were too much for him and thus he fails to 'net' the catch. ἔπισπάω is new in the meaning of 'dragging the nets'. In this context we find more commonly verbs as ἀναπάω (which Xylander proposed for Solon's text), the simple σπάω (cf. schol. in Ar. Vesp. 175 ἀλλ' οὖκ ἐσπασέν: παρά τὴν παρομίαν εἰρήκε τὸ οὖκ ἐσπασέν αντὶ τοῦ οὖκ ἐπέτυχεν ... ἀγκιστρον μετὰ σχοίνου καὶ μή ἐπισπυγχάνοντων ἵχνους τινὸς) οὐ ελκω. However, ἐπέσασεν is given in SC and A (supra scriptum), and should be kept, both as a lectio difficilior, and above all as an adaptation of the technical term to fit better Solon's context: Solon would have had, in his critics' word, to pull the net not ἀνά "upwards" (the obvious gesture for a fisherman), but ἐπί "towards", namely "in favour" of his own profit (and of the profit of his supporters).

There are other passages from Greek Literature where tyrannis is likened to a net and the tyrant to a fisherman, closest in time to Solon is Hdt. 1.62, cf. Catenacci 1996, 201f., and Vox 1984, 97 who correctly believes that this fishing metaphor for tyrannis was a well established item of the ancient political jargon. On the links between the ideas of freedom and democracy with fish in classical Athens, see lastly Davidson 1997, esp. 278-308.

4. ἀμαρτή: Cf. Hsch. a 3456 L. ἀμαρτή· ὀμοῖ. For the form of this Homeric adverb, ἀμαρτή was soleley supported by Aristachus (see Schol. b² II. 5.656, II 89.20 E. ὅ μὲν Ἀρίσταρχος τὸ ἀμαρτή χωρίς τοῦ τ γράφει καὶ ὅξυνε), but it has to be considered an archaic trait in comparison with ἀμαρτή or ἀμαρτή of the Hom. MSS, which were favoured by several other ancient grammarians: cf. Wackernagel 1922=1955, 132 n. 1.

ἀφενῶν ἀ ποσφαλεῖς: Aesch. PV 472 ἀποσφαλεῖς ἀφενῶν. The verb is always absolute before Solon, but its use in connection with the genitive will become common in ionico-attic: cf. Hdt. 6.5.1, Aesch. Pers. 392, Pl. Leg. 950b etc.

5-6. ἡθελον γαρ κεν κρατήσας .... πλούτον .... λαβῶν ... τυραννεύσας: The MSS have ἡθελε(ν): the imperfect with κεν constitutes an hypothetical period where
the first part is implied from the preceding verses. I think that both readings can keep the
irony of the text and give the same result — the opponents get discredited in either way;
however there is a difference: with ἴθελε(ν), the speech of the opponents ends at l. 4
(Solon would appropriate the feelings of his critics and the ironic sense of the lines would
run like this 'if he had not lost his nerve and common sense he would have been willing
to become tyrannos even for one day and to be flayed to make a wineskin afterwards');
with ἴθελον the end is at l. 7; the context of Plutarch strongly suggests the second
(ταύτα ... λέγοντας). Another strong argument in favour of ἴθελον is γάρ, which links
ll. 5-7 very closely to the preceding sentence. That makes it very unlikely that the
"quotation" ended with l. 4.

The verb τυραννεύω is first used here and in Alc. PLF 75.13 (see O' Neil 1986).
The linking of wealth and tyranny is traditional, both in Solon's critical-derogatory
perspective and in a positive view: something like this last topos that regards autocratic
power and supreme wealth as desirable goods (cf. the passages in the Introd.) is rejected
here by Solon's connection of one day's tyranny with painful death and extinction of
one's family — it is as if ll. 5-6 were 'quoting' the words and the 'topic' perspective
expressed by the ex-supporters of Solon; l. 7 would provide Solon's real thought and
answer to them.

The negative view on the tyrant's life (and wealth) is first attested by Archil. IEG 19
οὐ μοι τά Γύγεω τοῦ πολυχρύσου μέλει, οὐδ' εἶλε πῶ με ξήλος, οὐδ' ἀγαίομαι ...
μεγάλης δ' οὐκ ἑρέω τυραννίδος κτλ.

A parallel formally very close to Solon is the adesp. epigram Anth.Pal. 11.3, where
the supposedly positive wish for the wealth and power of a tyrant is later changed to a
denial of the idea of becoming a tyrant: 'Ἡθελον οὖν πλούτειν, ὡς πλούσιος ἴθν ποτε
Κροίσος, καὶ βασιλεῖς εἶναι τῆς μεγάλης Ἀσίης- ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐμβλέψω Νικάνωρα
tῶν σωστιγγῶν καὶ γιῶ, πρὸς τί ποιεῖ ταύτα τὰ γλυκασόκομα, ἀκτήν ποιό δόσασκε
καὶ ταῖς κοτάλαις ὑποβρέξας τὴν Ἀσίην πωλῶ πρὸς μύρα καὶ στεφάνους.
Cataudella 1928, 252 thinks that this epigram reproduces the tone and the expression of
Archil. 19W., but in my opinion it is much more evidently connected with that of Solon,
where the seeming wish for tyranny is, subsequently, pointedly refused and can be a
precious testimony of the diffusion of Solon's poetry in a sympotic context even in late
antiquity (cf. also Maced. Anth.Pal. 11.58 Ἡθελον οὖν χρυσόν τε καὶ ἀστεα μυρία
gαϊς οὐδ', ὡσα τὰς Θῆβας ἐλπεν 'Ομηρος ἐχειν, κτλ.).

For the accumulation of participles, which creates a powerful stylistic effect in the
argumentation of the enemies, and seemingly reverses the values of 29.3 for a while (cf.
above), see Sol. 1.44-6, 30.8-15, Hom. II. 22.68, Tyrt. 7.21-6; Römisch 1933, 47f.,
6. μοῦνον ἡμέραν μίαν: the Pythagorean philosophers were thought to be favourable of the idea of being "tyrant even for one day" rather than living a long subdued life in Iambi. VP 260.6 τυραννίδος ὀρέγεσθαι παρακαλοῦντας κρέιττον εἶναι φάσκειν γενέσθαι μίαν ἡμέραν ταύρον ἤ πάντα τὸν αἰῶνα βοῦν (but the topos — in this form? — will be one of the traditional charges against the Pythagorean view of life, for which see e.g. Arist. frs. 190-205 Rose=155-77 Gigon. As a fact, the political concerns of Pythagoras and of the Pythagoreans in Croton were certainly often interpreted as aiming to seize a tyranny: cf. Theopomp. FGrH 115F73 and Posidon. fr. 253.113f. Kidd ap. Ath. 5.213e, Diog.Laert. 8.46 (also 8.39), App. Mith. 28; see Burkert 1972, 118f. Regarding the topos of asking the fate for one single day more, cf. Lucian Catapl. 8.11 οὗ πολὺν χρόνον, ὃ Μοῖρα, αἰτῶ· μίαν μὲ ἔασον μεῖναι τήνδε ἡμέραν, ἀγριόν τι ἐπισκόπησι τῇ γυναικὶ περὶ τῶν χρημάτων κτλ.

7. ἀσκός ὄστερον δεδάρθαι: Cf. Diogenian. 1.84=Paroemiogr. 2.14.1f. ἀσκόν δαίρεις: ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνόητως σφόδρα τι ποιοῦσιν· ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπερβολικῶς αἰκίζομενων παύεις. It is not possible to ascertain whether the proverb with this meaning derived from this passage of Solon or pre-existent, but its old proverbial aura is confirmed by its history as a common jest in classical Athens: Ar. Nub. 442 ῥγών ἀσκόν δείρειν, Eq. 370 δερῶ σε θύλακον κλοπῆς, Pl. Euthd. 285cδ ἐτομός εἰμι παρέχειν ἐμαυτὸν τοῦς δένοις, καὶ ἔαν βούλωσίντας δερεῖν ἐτί μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν δέρουσιν, εἶ μοι ἢ δορὰ μὴ εἰς ἀσκόν τελευτήσει, ὡσπερ ἢ τοῦ Μαρσύου, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς δέρην. I do not rule out that the passage could imply a hint at a specific kind of punishment envisaged by Solon for himself: see Hdt. 7.26.3 ὁ τοῦ Σιληνοῦ Μαρσύου ἀσκός (being the punishment of Marsyas), and especially Alc. PLF 296a8 μᾶλλόν] κ᾽ ἄξιος Ἀντιλέοντος [ος] ἦσ ἀποδέρθην (with Maas' integrations); for this passage of Alcaeus, see Maas 1956, 200; for its connection with Solon, Lloyd-Jones 1975=1990, 55.

καὶ πιτερίφθαι γένος: The phrase alludes to ancient laws, which for several crimes condemned the guilty person as well as his family (see e.g. IG 11.1296.6-8 ἐξώλῃ εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ γένος καὶ αἰκίαν τὴν ἐκείνου, Andoc. Myst. 98, Antiph. caed.Her. 11, Aeschin. In Cies. 111). See above all, Isoc. Phil.108 εὑρομεν ἄν οὐ μόνον αὐτοῦς διεθαρμένους ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ γένος αὐτῶν εἴ ἄνθρωπων ἡφαιστείου, which may imply a belief in something like a prosecution of the tyrants' families. At any rate, we have a certain testimony (Arist. Ath.Pol. 16.10) about a law applying the ἀτιμία for both the individual who would have attempted to become tyrant and his family — a number of scholars ascribed this law to Solon himself: F37a Ruschenbusch. See for the whole matter Bourriot 1976, 2, 309-326.

Ἐπιτρίβω is another Aristophanic word, that reinforces the mocking tone of the line; also the perfect tense of δεδάρθαι and ἐπιτετρίφθαι, which describes an eternal and
absolute state (cf. Linforth 1919, ad loc.), makes more paradoxical the readiness of the
speaker to die in such a way after a single day of tyranny.

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29\textsuperscript{b} G.\textsuperscript{2} P.\textsuperscript{2} (34 W.\textsuperscript{2})

1. οἱ δ’ ἐφ’ ἄρπαγῆσιν ἥλθον· ἐλπίδ’ κτλ.: οἱ δὲ most probably should have
introduced the intention of the ex-supporters of Solon as opposed to the (previously
expressed) pacific plans of Solon himself, as we see in ll. 4 and 6f.

The closest parallel is Eur. \textit{HF} 588-91 πολλοὺς πένητας, ὀδίβως δὲ τῷ λόγῳ
δοκοῦντας εἶναι συμμάχους ἀναξ ἔχει, οἱ στάσιν ἐθηκαν καὶ διώλεαν πόλιν ἐφ’
ἄρπαγαίσι τῶν πέλασ, a passage that appears to have had Solon as its model, as it
describes an autocratic power supported by "poor" in a situation where some nobles
became poor, and may be read as the one described in fr. 6.1 (though the meaning of the
fragment may have been different, cf. ad loc.). See also Pl. Resp. 344a, according to
whom ἔστιν δὲ τούτῳ τυραννίς, ἢ οὐ κατὰ σμικρὸν τάλλοτρα καὶ λάθρα καὶ βία
ἄφαιρεται, καὶ ἱερὰ καὶ ὀσια καὶ ἱδία καὶ δημόσια, ἀλλὰ συλλήβδην.

Modern scholars usually compare this line of Solon with fr. 3.13, but it is not sure
that our line refers to the same rapacious people. However ἐφ’ ἄρπαγῇ of 3.13-ἐφ’
ἄρπαγῆσιν certainly points to this direction. In fr. 3.13 Solon was speaking of the
arrogant and rapacious behaviour of the aristocratic faction(s); is he here alluding to the
(aristocratic ?) faction from which he had gained some support, but which after the
legislation had showed its real intentions? In this case the verbal allusion would imply
Solon’s bitter awareness that his ex-supporters were no less lacking in interest for the
good of the state than the other aristocratic factions which he had been blaming in fr. 3. If
so, the ex-supporters who were in favour of Solon’s tyranny appear to share the features
of selfish greed and indifference for the good of the people, which were sometimes
referred by Homer and Hesiod to the king (for the δημοβόρος βασιλεὺς see \textit{Il}. 1.231,
and Hes. \textit{Op}. 260-4), and later ascribed to the \textit{tyrannos} at least by Alc. PLF 70 (see
Fileni 1983).

It is difficult to decide between the two possible interpretations of the beginning
monosyllable: demonstrative, οἱ δ’ (Richards 1893, 212, and West), or relative, οἱ
δ’=τοῦτοι οἱ (Gentili-Prato), but I think that the first is preferable, since it creates an
\textit{asynedeton explicatum}.

There are good reasons to doubt about the reading ἐφ’ ἄρπαγαίσιν ἥλθον. Indeed,
the ending -αισι is never consistently or surely attested by the Homeric MSS, apart from
\textit{Hom.Hymn Dem}. 368 θυσίαισι, where it may be considered an aeolic feature: cf.
the Attic poetry of the 5th century, the ending is common in passages of choral lyric, but it cannot be considered an Atticism, because the Attic common endings are αοιν(ν), ησι(ν), or sometimes οιν(ν), ησι(ν), while -αοι never appears in the inscriptions until the end of the century, though it became later a frequent poetical trait (cf. Threatte 1996, 2, 98-100). I do not find plausible the presence of this single (homerizing) aeolism in the language of Solon, in front of -ησι in frs. 1.37, 3.5 and 10, and I think that an original ἄρπαγησιν (so West) was later banalized in ἄρπαγαίσιν (lastly accepted by Gentili-Prato). I still have some doubt about the presence of this very dative, because both ἐφ' ἄρπαγάς is idiomatic (see e.g. Dindorf, Stephanus, TLG s.v.), and ἐπι(α)+accus. would better fit the movement verb ἔρχεσθαι, and the emendation of ἐφ' ἄρπαγαίς ἴλθον in ἐφ' ἄρπαγῆ συνήλθον, proposed by Richards 1893 cit. and independently by Ziegler 1928, 507 does not clear up my doubt. If a more radical intervention than West's is needed, in my opinion that ought to be ἐφ' ἄρπαγαίς συνήλθον (cp. fr. 30.1-2 ξυμηγαγον δῆμον).

3. Thought of Solon’s ex-supporters, who had interpreted Solon’s sweetness as a deceptive tool of the bad ruler who at the end was going to impose his (and his partisans’) τραχύτης, as really does the αἰμύλος αὐὴ in Solon 15.7, whose γλώσσα and ἐπι diverge from his real practice-aims (τὸ γιγνόμενον): cf. the note ad loc. The opponents were stupid (see l. 4), because they had not understood that Solon’s aim as a lawgiver was to impersonate the role of euonomia of fr. 3.31f., that is to say, permanently τραχέα λειαίνει (3.34).

κωτίλλοντα λείως: κωτίλλω, a non-Homeric word, is first attested in Hes. Op. 373-4 μηδὲ γυνὴ σε νόσον πυγοστόλος ἐξαπατάτω αἰμύλα κωτίλλουσα, where the verb has already the derogatory meaning of chattering with insincere pleasantry that appears in Solon and in Thgn. IEG 363 εὖ κωτίλλε τὸν ἐχθρὸν, 851 ὡς τὸν ἐταίρου μαλθακά κωτίλλων ἐξαπατάν ἐθέλει — the verb can also simply mean chattering, as first in Phoc. 14.2 ἱδέα κωτίλλοντα καθήμενον οἰνοποτάζειν, and in Thgn. IEG 488, 816; see later GVI 1512.1 (first half of 2 cent. B.C.) αἰμύλα κωτίλλουσα τεοῖς γενέτας ἀτίτάλες.

ἐκφανεῖν νόσον: Thgn. IEG 967 ἐκφανεῖ ἱθὸς.

4. χαῦνα ... ἐφράσαντο: the adjective is not attested before Solon, and Alc. PLF 359 ἐκ δὲ παιδῶν χαῦνως (χαῦνοσ cod. A) φρένας. Its later frequent occurrences in Attic writers allow us to suppose that it became a colloquialism. Cf. Sol. 15.6 σύμπασιν δ' υμιν χαῦνος ἐνεστι νόσος and note there.
5. λοξὸν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὀρῶσι: λοξὸς is another non-Homeric word which became common for angry or hostile glances, as a synonym of the Homeric ὑπόδρα ὀδόν: besides the isolated phrasing of Tyrt. 8.2 οὐπω Zeus αὐχένα λοξὸν ἐχει and Thgn. IEG S35f. δουλεία κεφαλῆ ... καυχέναι λοξὸν ἐχει (that may mean a less markedly hostile glance: cf. Prato ad loc), see Anac. PMG 417.2 λοξὸν ὃμμας βλέπουσα, [Theoc.] Id. 20.13 ὃμμασι λοξὰ βλέπουσα, Callim. Aet. fr. 1.37-8 ἰδον ὃθματα ... μὴ λοξῷ, and Hec. fr. 72 Hollis ἐδὲ πελεδυνθείσα καὶ ὃμμασι λοξὸν ὑποδράξ ὀσομένη, Ap.Rhod. 2.664-5 ὃμματα δὲ σφιν λοξὰ παραστρωφώνταi and 4.475-6 λοξῷ ἵδεν ὦιόν ἐρεξὰν ὃμματι ... ἐργον Ἐρινώς, Damag. Anth.Plan. 95.3-4 ὃμμα βαλόντες λοξῶν, Antip.Thess. Anth.Pal. 7.531.6 δερκομένα λοξαῖς ... κόραις, adesp. Anth.Pal. 7.546.4=FGE 1255 λοξαῖς ὃμμασι etc.: see the rich collection of late instances by Massimilla on Callim. Aet. fr. 1.38 (with the additions by Magnelli 1997, 451).


πάντες ὠστε δῆλον: For the use of ὡς τε, ὡς εἶ τε in Homer and elsewhere in lyric poets, see Denniston, Greek Part. 522. Vox 1984, 150-1 contrasts Solon's status here to Odysseus' who in the Od. 10.38-9 is πάσιν φίλος ... ἀνθρώποις.

6. εἰ πα: a statement of political coherence, which, in my opinion, 1. 3 (see ad loc.) intended to strengthen.

οὐ χρεών: an absolute accusative, adverbial and parenthetical, as e.g. in Thuc. 3.40.4 ὑπεῖς ήν οὐ χρεών ἀρχοιτε. As Vox 1984, 149 well remarks, Solon is here opposing —as being not compulsory— the principle of personal friendship and political partnership with someone as being quite exclusive and involving the enmity against the enemies of this someone (for which see Introd. to fr. 9). He is also opposing the general code of reciprocating one's enemies (as well as one's friends, see fr. 1.5).

σὺν θεοῖσιν: it will become a stereotyped expression in order to avoid human hybris and, consequently, divine punishment for boasting of one's success (e.g. Pind. Isthm. 4.4, Aesch. Ag. 961f., Eur. Med. 915, Tro. 867, Ar. Ran. 1199), but here the phrase still opposes the 'declared' plans whose coherence with the willingness of the gods had been a strong point of Solon's self-presentation in his programmatic poems (see Introd. to fr. 3) and the "other" possible results which were not 'declared' in the programmatic poems and were not enjoying divine favour. A strikingly close parallel for the opposition divinely supported (useful)/μάψ (harmful) is Hes. Theog. 871-2 οἰ γε μὲν ἐκ θεόφιν γενεύην, θυτοίς μέγ' ὤνειαρ. αἱ δ' ἄλλα μᾶς αὖρα ἐπιπενεύσα τὸλασσαν ... πήμα μέγα θυτοίσι, where the winds created by the gods are opposed to "the other" unruly-occasional winds, which do a lot of damages to men.
7-8. οὐδὲ μοι τυραννίδος ἀνδάνει βία: Archil. IEG 19.3 ... οὐκ ἔρεω τυραννίδος, Pind. Pyth. 11.52-3 μέμφομ' αἶσαν τυραννίδων. Richards 1891, 178 emends to ἵνδανεν in accordance with ἔρηδον which is correct from a syntactic point of view. However, as Masaracchia 1958, 344 notes, the present form ἀνδάνει would emphasise the permanent character of Solon's rejection of tyranny.

Note the ring composition of the opposition between the ideas of tyranny/βία and of fatherland that connects these line to 29°.


8. βία τι [ρέζ]ειν 'Cleobulina' IEG 2.2 βία ρέξαι.

8-9. πιείρας χθωνός: the phrase is not found before [Orph.] Lith. 702 καὶ χθόνα πιέιραν, πάντως τροφὸν κτλ., but cf. the Homeric πιείρα ἄρουρα and πίνοις ἄγροι. Notice the enjambment with πατρίδος which can be found in fr. 29.1-2 (see ad loc). Earth was always a propagandistic reference-point dear to a prospective tyrant, see the instances gathered by Catenacci 1996, 227 n. 158.

9. κακοὶσιν ἐσθλοῦς: On the identity of the two factions of the ἐσθλοῦ and of the κακοῖ, see Introd.

ἱσομοιρίαν: new, but see Hom. Il. 15.209 ἱσόμορον. The term appears again in Emp. VS 31A72 and in the Pythagorean philosophy (cf. Diog.Laert. 8.26), as well as in philosophers and medical writers: cf. e.g. Arist. [Mund.] 396b35 and Gal. temper. 1.527.2 564.4 and 573.9, alim. facult. 698.10. On Alcmaeon's analogous idea of ἱσονομία between the opposite elements as necessary for the health of the body, see ad 3.17; on the difference between Solon's eunomia and the ideal of isonomia, see ad 3.32-9. On the fortune of the political and medical-philosophical idea of ἱσονομία and ἱσομοιρία, cf. Mau-Schmidt 1964, and Triebel-Schubert 1984.
The invocation to Zeus was a common theme of the archaic προοίμια, from Terpander (PMG 698 Ζεύ πάντων ἀρχά, πάντων ἀγήτωρ, Ζεύ σοι πέμπω ταύταν ἠμίν ἀρχάν) to Alcman (PMG 29 ἐγὼν δ' ἀείσομαι ἐκ Διὸς ἄρχομένα) to Pindar (Nem. 2.1-3 οδεν περ καὶ Ὀμηρίδαι ραπτίων ἐπέων τὰ πόλλα ὀδοί ἄρχουται, Διὸς ἐκ προομίου, καὶ ὅδε ἀνήρ, κτλ., Nem. 5.25f. αἱ δὲ (=the Muses) πρώτηστον μὲν ἠμίν Διὸς ἄρχομενα ... Θέτιν, κτλ.). In the proem of the Works and Days, the poet begins the poem by inviting the Muses to celebrate their father Zeus (ll. 1-2), and thereafter the Muses celebrate Zeus' power in a short hymn (ll. 3-8), so the reference to the addressee and the real beginning of the work must wait until ll. 9-10. In Theogony the song the Muses (ll. 43-51) mentioned the gods born from Earth and Heaven first, and secondly Zeus and his superiority among the gods, while l. 48 reaffirmed as a general truth that the Muses sing of Zeus first and last (ἀρχόμεναι θ' ἴμιδεί τεαίτ λήγουσαι τ' ἀοιδῆς). In an analogous way, in the 'Homeric' Hymn to Dionysus (i) a reference to Zeus led the author (or an interpolator) to insert a full farewell to Zeus (ll. 17-9 οἱ δὲ σ' ὀσίδοι δῶσουν ἄρχομενοι λήγουσές τ', οὔδε πη ἔστι σεί' ἐπιθέουσαι ιερῆς μεμνήσθαι ἀοιδής), which is curiously in contrast with the pertinent farewell to Dionysus which immediately follows (20f.): see Fantuzzi, Theocritus and the Demythologising of Poetry, forthcoming in the proceedings of the conference Matrices of Genre Authors, Canons, and Society (Center for Hellenic Studies, Washington 13-18/8/1996).

1. εὐχόμεσθα Διὶ ... βασιλῆ: For the verb, Hom. II. 7.194 εὐχέσθη Διὶ Κρονίων ἄνακτι, II. 7.200 οἱ δ' εὐχόντο Διὶ Κρονίων ἄνακτι, Theb. PEG 3.3 εὐκτὸ Διὶ βασιλῆς, Hes. Op. 465 εὐχέσθαι δὲ Διὶ. For the second hemistich, see Hes. Op. 69 Διὶ Κρονίων ἄνακτι (at the end of the hexameter).

The epithet βασιλεύς is never used of Zeus in Homer either attributively or predicatively, and is typically Hesiodic. Besides Theog. 886 Ζεὺς δὲ θεῶν βασιλεύς where "the phrase resembles a formulaic title, but is not used as such; there is a strong predicative sense Zeus, now that he was king of the gods" (West ad loc.), Hesiod often uses βασιλεύς for the kingship in heaven (Theog. 486, 897, 923, Op. 668, fr. 308); on Zeus basileus in Homer and Hesiod, cf. Drews 1983, 104-107, and further, Wackernagel 1916, 210; for the epigraphic evidence Cook 1914-40, (Index I, s.v. Zeus' Epithets). Other instances of the epithet together with the name of Zeus are Hom. Hymn Dem. 358, Cypr. PEG 9.3, Theb. PEG 3.3, Alc. PLF 296.3=387, 308.3-4; later, Thgn. IEG 1120 (also 285-6, 376, 1346), Emp. VS 31B128.2, Pind. Nem. 5.35, Isthm. 8.18, Ol. 7.34, Corinn. PMG 654, col.iii.13, Aesch. Pers. 532=Ag. 355, where Fraenkel ad loc.

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The verbal form might be simply considered a first person emphatic plural for singular, but here more probably includes the audience in the poet's self-reference, as well as in the proem of Odyssey, where after ἄνδρα μοι ἐννυέτε in l. 1 we find l. 10 εἰπὲ καὶ ἠμῖν, see S. West, ad loc. (Engl. ed. 1988). The subjunctive to express resolve has some kind of proemial specialisation, and can be found in Hes. Theog. 1, 36, Hom. Hymn Ap. 1, Hom. Hymn 25.1 (see further Aratus, Phaen. 1 and Theoc. 17.1-2).

2. θεσμοῖς τούσδε ... ὀπάσασι: Cf. Sol. 30.18 θεσμοῖς δ' ὁμοίως τῷ κακῷ τε κάγαθῳ ... ἔγραψα.
    τούχη ... καὶ κύδος ὀπάσασι: Besides Sol. 11.5 χάριν καὶ κύδος ὀπάζοι, cf. above all fr. 1.2-4.

Scholars seem to have missed that this line about the success of Solon's laws appears to ask in the same terms and in the same order for what Solon himself had prayed in the proem of his longest elegy (ὁλός = τούχη ἄγαθη, δόξα ἄγαθη-κύδος). If we also take into consideration the strong tradition of the phrase κύδος ὀπάζειν, along with the fact that traditionally, too, the provider of this κύδος had always been Zeus (cf. e.g. Hom. Il. 8.141, 12.255, 15.327, 16.730, 17.251, 17.566, 21.570, Od. 15.320, 19.161, Hes. Theog. 438; Ar. Eq. 200 etc.), and compare it with the thoughtful unconventionality of the invocation to the Muses in fr. 1 (see note to fr. 1.2), we may suppose that this line is more probably a patchwork imitation of Solon's text, than a variation by Solon himself.

Around the second half of the seventh century public writing recorded laws in prose (the earlier ones on stone found so far, dated roughly to 650-600 B.C. — Sel. of Greek Hist. Inscr. 2 Meiggs-Lewis — come from Dreros, Crete), and Solon certainly left an extensive prose-written code for Athens ca. 600. Plut. Sol. 3.5 testifies that Solon had used the hexametric-epic style poetry for his θεσμοί, before passing to prose. The information is not at all secure. Plutarch himself has doubts about it (ἐνιοτὸν δὲ ἁσιν κτλ.), and seems to follow a source which did not have Solon's poems but had found the verses that Plutarch cites in other sources (as Solon's poems were recited by memory still in Plato's time, Plutarch would hardly have presented the fragment in such a suspicious way, if he could read other lines of text in his source, cf. Manfredini-Piccirilli ad loc.). Hermippus, who in the sixth book of his Περὶ Νομοθετῶν (in Ath. 13.619b=fr. 88 Wehrli) ascribed to Charondas a similar habit of writing laws in verse, may have been Plutarch's source.

Loraux 1988, 116-117, seems to believe in the authenticity of these lines ascribed to Solon and finds a parallel with what Tyrteaus had done for the non-written rhetra of
Lycurgus. According to her, Solon used the epic language of Homer and Hesiod to gain for his legislation the superior authority of the inspired epic poetry.

It is true that on archaic laws in verse there existed a conspicuous tradition; besides Hermippus, also Diodorus testifies that Charondas’ Laws were written in hexameters and sung in the symposia, and Thales too was considered to have put in verse the Constitution of Lycurgus (on the relation between verse and laws, see Thomas 1995, 63-4, and n.15, Piccirilli 1981, and, more generally on the *topoi* connected with the archaic lawgivers, Szegedy-Maszak 1978). But this very tradition might have facilitated the apocryphal attribution of these lines to Solon, and both the relevant topic elements, and the imitative character of 1. 2 do not favour the assumption of their authenticity.
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