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IMMUNITY

Reddy, K; Schularick, M; Skreta, V; (2020) IMMUNITY. International Economic Review , 61 (2) pp. 531-564. 10.1111/iere.12433.

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Abstract

Legal provisions that protect elected politicians from prosecution have been common throughout history and still exist in most democracies. We provide the first systematic measurement of immunity and study, theoretically and empirically, its relation to corruption. Theory predicts that immunity is a double‐edged sword. To test whether immunity is a vice or a virtue, we quantify immunity enjoyed by heads of government, ministers, and legislators in 90 countries. Controlling for standard determinants of corruption, we find that stronger immunity is associated with greater corruption. Instrumental variable estimations using immunity at the first democratic constitution suggest the effect could be causal.

Type: Article
Title: IMMUNITY
DOI: 10.1111/iere.12433
Publisher version: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12433
Language: English
Additional information: This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.
Keywords: Social Sciences, Economics, Business & Economics, PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY, CORRUPTION, ACCOUNTABILITY, CONFIDENCE, DEMOCRACY, CHECKS, PRESS, VOTE
UCL classification: UCL
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10097985
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