



# UCL



## **MASIP evaluation final report**

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## Glossary

CBA	Cost-benefit analysis
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
CRS	Crime recording system
EMMIE	An evaluation framework consisting of the dimensions of <u>E</u> ffect, <u>M</u> oderators, <u>M</u> echanisms, <u>I</u> mplementation and <u>E</u> conomics
IASU	Integrated Anti-Stalking Unit (Cheshire)
LAP	Local Area Partnership
MARAC	Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference
MOPAC	Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPS	Metropolitan Police Service
NHS	National Health Service
NPS	National Probation Service
PCC	Police and Crime Commissioner
SASH	Screening Assessment for Stalking and Harassment
SRP	Stalking Risk Profile
STAC	Stalking Threat Assessment Centre (London)
VA	Victim Advocate
VAWG	Violence against women and girls

## Acknowledgements

We would like to thank all of the people from the MASIP who participated in this research, for providing data, for giving us their valuable time for being interviewed and for answering our (many) questions. We are particularly grateful to Vicky Lowry who re-ran some analysis for us during the COVID-19 crisis, when we were unable to access our secure data lab.

The methods in this evaluation were guided by our wider project team, Professor Kate Bowers, Professor Nick Tilley, Dr Ella Cockbain and Dr Paul Gill. Our Advisory Board, including Andy Myhill, Sara Kirkpatrick, David James and Sylvia Walby all provided invaluable advice on some of the thorny measurement issues.

Lastly, we would like to thank Katy who raised our awareness of intersectionality and how this interacted with how stalking was viewed and managed in the community.

## Executive summary

The Multi-Agency Stalking Interventions Programme (MASIP) is a proof of concept project which aims to reduce the risk to, and impact of stalking, on victims by developing a multi-agency intervention model. This model simultaneously coordinates activity around the victim and perpetrator<sup>1, 2</sup> and incorporates an essential pathway which seeks to address the fixation and obsession in perpetrators that might be contributing to stalking offending. This is funded by the Home Office Police Transformation Fund, through the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) in London across three Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) forces, and managed by the Suzy Lamplugh Trust. MASIP seeks to draw expertise and intelligence across the multi-agency spectrum to inform the risk management process associated with managing stalking cases, and to offer interventions with perpetrators, a subset of which are clinical when appropriate.

This final evaluation report presents evidence that speaks to the question: Does the MASIP work? Clearly, 'working' can refer to several different outcomes that can be considered indicators of success of a multi-agency initiative of this kind. We therefore test a number of hypotheses that were outlined in our interim report<sup>3</sup>. These hypotheses were designed to test the **Effect** of the MASIP, by testing specific **Mechanisms** proposed earlier, as well as testing various **Moderator** and **Implementation** conditions that might supposedly have an impact on the Effect. We finally add a new hypothesis to test the **Economics** dimension to analyse whether the cost-benefit analysis favours the intervention by offering savings to the state and the victim.

The key findings of the evaluation can be summarised as:

- The outcomes for the police force data reflect favourably on the three LAPs; each of them had a greater proportion of cases that resulted in a charge. Proportionately fewer resulted in a caution in Cheshire and Hampshire forces, which are considered an inappropriate outcome for stalking cases, and these were dropping in London in the final six months of the data period. It is worth saying that the data period for the police force analysis does not cover the full effects of MASIP, and therefore is likely to underestimate the effects that the three LAPs had on positive police outcomes. This is

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<sup>1</sup> We acknowledge that the terms 'victim' and 'perpetrator' are presumptive and imply that guilt has been found in a court of law. However, we use these terms throughout the report for simplicity.

<sup>2</sup> To conserve words footnotes are presented once - with cross-references made, when appropriate, later in the report.

<sup>3</sup> See Belur, Tompson and Jerath (2019). MASIP evaluation interim report. Available at: <https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10078857/>

because it takes time for police outcomes (e.g., charges) to come to fruition, and the data period finished before MASIP itself concluded.

- It was simply too early in the project to conclusively determine if specific health interventions reduced re-offending, however the signs from Cheshire and Hampshire indicate that it is promising. Due to how the data were set-up in London, and the small numbers of health interventions provided to perpetrators, we are unable to make any provisional conclusions about this LAP.
  - Cheshire had the most developed data collection processes, and we are confident that they were able to pick up on most, if not all, re-offending (even if this did not result in a charge or conviction). **The rate of re-offending for perpetrators who had completed a health intervention in Cheshire was 17.6%**, which is at the lower end of the range reported in research studies where a psychological intervention has been used with stalkers. **This suggests that Cheshire's health interventions were successful.**
  - Both Hampshire and London did not have formal mechanisms within their partnership data for monitoring and recording re-offending. We were able to extract out qualitative information on re-offending in Hampshire but believe that this was inconsistently recorded and therefore underestimates the rate of re-offending. Nevertheless, the **re-offending rate within six months of the case being monitored in Hampshire was 6.4%**, which is lower than similar figures reported in research.
  - Analysis of force level data in London revealed that the **re-offending rate that relates to the six-month period after STAC was operational (3.2%)** is lower than the previous period (4.4%), but this difference is not statistically significant. It is also the case that this analysis likely underestimates the re-offending rate, since there are no unique identifiers on the crime recording system in London for perpetrators or victims which makes the analysis challenging.
- Interviews with stakeholders and perpetrators indicated a high level of satisfaction with the bespoke intervention provided and there was a degree of confidence in the perpetrators that they had the tools necessary to address their obsession and fixation in the future. The small sample size of perpetrators interviewed does however encourage caution about this finding.
- Victims were not always satisfied with the sentences given to perpetrators, as they did not think that the sentences were reflective of the gravity of the offence. Despite satisfaction with the Victim Advocacy (VA) services being high, this did not necessarily translate to the rest of the criminal justice system (i.e., the courts).

- Victims were overall satisfied with the support provided to them by the VAs. In particular, the VAs kept victims informed and empowered them to manage their own safety and support the investigation.
- Findings of the cost benefit ratio conducted indicated that when institutional costs (such as prison and secure hospital) are excluded there is always a cost-beneficial finding for the state, across all LAPs. Institutional costs are not directly related to MASIP, and although necessary, they may be indirectly related to the LAPs' work. The other notable finding is that MASIP intervention is not always cost-beneficial for victim/s. This is primarily because the initial experience of victimisation has a high cost for the victim, in terms of the impact on their own mental and physical well-being and those of their family and friends. This cost often has already been borne prior to any MASIP intervention. In many cases, these costs are extremely high and appear unavoidable for victims when victimisation first occurs. While some of these costs cannot be prevented, MASIP could be considered to prevent those costs escalating into worst-case scenarios, which often involve both continued ill effects of constant stalking, and in some cases can have serious or fatal outcomes for the victim. Thus, the risk of persistence and risk of escalated violence are both possibilities in the absence of MASIP intervention. Given the high risk associated with some types of stalkers the cost savings to victim/s and their families, as a result of intervention by MASIP, could potentially be substantial.

Additional observations indicated that:

- The importance of the multi-agency aspect of the unit was the driving force behind the project with the three LAPs embodying three different models. IASU in Cheshire provided the most mature example of an integrated inter-agency unit with in-depth involvement in those cases where they felt the unit would add most value to; RECOLO in Hampshire was an example of how a number of agencies can work well together in delivering a substantial number of health interventions; and STAC in London demonstrated the challenges of setting up a large multi-agency unit while dealing with a large volume of referrals across a capital city and relying on numerous external stakeholders.
- Stakeholders perceived that a multi-agency approach did improve the response to stalking as a crime type. This was in terms of better and more efficient investigation and appropriate charging of cases, and that information sharing was extremely useful for risk assessment and risk management in stalking cases.
- Stakeholders indicated that victims required further support from victim advocacy which is resource intensive, and there was a need for more mental health provision to help them cope with the aftereffects of being victimised.

- Data collection and data management needs of interventions such as MASIP, require dedicated resources with the appropriate skills in order to monitor progress and manage caseloads. The importance and role of project management in a venture of this nature was highlighted throughout the pilot project.

Recommendations emanating from this evaluation can be summarised as:

- Adequate and sustained resourcing is crucial for the success of projects such as the ones reported here. People in post must have appropriate skills and motivation to work with victims and perpetrators in a multi-agency environment. Buy-in from key stakeholders is also important. Project stability for three to five years is essential if the effects are to be properly observed.
- There is limited evidence to suggest the superiority of any one model, since only Cheshire had robust data collection procedures for re-offending. Instead, partnership models should be designed specifically to suit local context and conditions and requirements of the area to be served by these partnerships.
- The importance of collecting appropriate data and setting up frameworks to collect detailed data at the start of any project cannot be stressed enough. Partnerships require someone with good data management skills and should invest in training to ensure that person can work efficiently and effectively. That person also ideally requires access to both police and health databases.
- In a similar vein, project management should be a vital role within a partnership, and not just an add-on to operational requirements. Project managers can oversee information sharing agreements, help set up processes and procedures in new units and ensure that requests from funders about impact are managed appropriately.
- To ensure that service provision is truly inclusive and accessible to all, equality considerations need to be designed into the service from the beginning. This may include working with local third sector organisations to build sensitivity to marginalised groups.

## 1. Introduction

The Multi-Agency Stalking Interventions Programme (MASIP) is a proof of concept project which aims to reduce the risk to, and impact of stalking, on victims by developing a multi-agency intervention model. This model simultaneously coordinates activity around the victim and perpetrator<sup>1</sup> and incorporates an essential pathway which seeks to address the fixation and obsession in perpetrators that might be contributing to stalking offending. This is funded by the Home Office Police Transformation Fund, through the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) in London across three Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) forces and managed by the Suzy Lamplugh Trust. MASIP seeks to draw expertise and intelligence across the multi-agency spectrum to inform the risk management process associated with managing stalking cases, and to offer interventions with perpetrators, a subset of which are clinical when appropriate.

Stalking is recognised as a “widespread problem with serious economic, social, medical and psychiatric consequences”<sup>4</sup>. Stalking is widely considered to be a gender-based violent crime, since stalking perpetrators are predominantly men and victims are predominantly women. It therefore falls squarely within the Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG) agenda and is intertwined with domestic abuse. Indeed, research indicates that an overwhelming majority (over 90%) of victims of intimate partner violence report stalking as one of the many kinds of violence perpetrated by partners<sup>5</sup>. A large proportion of stalking incidents are not reported to police<sup>6</sup>, despite the Crime Survey for England and Wales estimating that there are over one million victims each year. And of those stalking offences that are reported to the police, only 12.7% result in a conviction at court (and many of these are not prosecuted at the appropriate severity level). The impetus for this project came from research, published by the Suzy Lamplugh Trust, which found that 43.4% of people who have reported stalking to the police did not find the police response helpful. In addition, feedback from clients using the national stalking helpline informed the Suzy Lamplugh Trust that legal sanctions in and of themselves do not address the fixation and obsession of the perpetrator, which is also suggested by leading experts in stalking<sup>7</sup>.

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4 Owens, J. G. (2016). Why Definitions Matter: Stalking Victimization in the United States. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 31(12), 2196 -2226

5 Basile, K. C., & Hall, J. E. (2011). Intimate partner violence perpetration by court-ordered men: Distinctions and intersections among physical violence, sexual violence, psychological abuse, and stalking. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 26(2), 230-253.

6 As evidenced here - <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/apr/18/stalking-cases-recorded-police-data-lilly-allen-charity>

<sup>7</sup> See Mullen, P. E., Pathé, M., & Purcell, R. (2000). *Stalkers and their victims*. Cambridge University Press.

Responses to stalking by public agencies have to address the complexity of the phenomena, and ensure that perpetrators are, firstly, being correctly identified, and secondly, that the response is appropriate for the situation so that harm to the victim and re-offending by offenders are minimised. This requires distinct expertise, since stalking is a unique crime type which can have deep psychological drivers. Such expertise is not commonplace, and in England and Wales had only really become established in Cheshire and Hampshire prior to the MASIP, with other police force areas keen to develop their capacity in this area.

Following a process of competitive tendering, a research team at University College London (UCL) was commissioned to evaluate the MASIP project. This evaluation uses a multi-method approach to support the EMMIE evaluation framework<sup>8</sup>. This framework is concerned with drawing out not just whether an initiative works, but how, for whom, and under what conditions. The EMMIE framework has been designed to capture information (and interactions) between the **E**ffect of an intervention, the **M**echanisms causing the effect, the **M**oderating (i.e. contextual) conditions, crucial information on **I**mplementation and data on **E**conomics<sup>9</sup>.

This final evaluation report focuses predominantly on the *effects* and *economics* of the MASIP, with the *mechanisms*, *moderators* and *implementation* largely having been covered in the interim report<sup>3</sup>. These reports are therefore complementary to a full understanding of the MASIP and should be read in conjunction with one another. The interim report documented findings on the set-up and early implementation of the MASIP. This included the theories of change each Local Area Partnership (LAP) was operating with, the related operational processes, and drew out barriers to and facilitators of success. In summary, the findings of the interim evaluation revealed that although notionally the outputs and outcomes in the three LAP areas were largely similar, and whilst each area strove towards the provision of all aspects of the partnership work - the activities in each area were focused on slightly different aspects, which often were a product of the maturity of the partnership and the number of cases they were dealing with. The data analysed in this report reflects slightly different foci across the three LAPs; the Integrated Anti-Stalking Unit (IASU) in Cheshire primarily focuses on risk management, the Recolo Project in Hampshire focuses predominantly on the diagnosis and appropriate treatment of perpetrators and the Stalking Threat Assessment Centre (STAC) in London is a new unit that is concerned with the correct classification of stalking and the

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<sup>8</sup> Originally devised to support the UK 'What Works Centre for Crime Reduction'.

<sup>9</sup> Johnson, S. D., Tilley, N., & Bowers, K. J. (2015). Introducing EMMIE: An evidence rating scale to encourage mixed-method crime prevention synthesis reviews. *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, 11(3), 459-473.

provision of expert advice to relevant agencies over a pan-London area<sup>10</sup>. This is not to say that the other aspects of partnership working were neglected by any of the LAPs.

Crucially, hypotheses were outlined in the interim report that we looked to test in the evaluation reported here. So, the final report aims to answer the following questions:

- Does the intervention (MASIP) work, i.e. does it achieve its intended aims?
- How does it work? Through which mechanisms?
- What is the impact of moderating conditions? This focuses on interventions chosen for particular cases and caseloads.
- What are the lessons learned from the implementation of the pilot project to guide the setting up of similar partnerships in the future?
- Is the intervention cost effective?

To answer these questions quantitative and qualitative data was collected and analysed. The structure of this report is as follows:

- Following this introduction, section 2 describes the quantitative analysis which uses police force level data and partnership data. Briefly, police force level data from the three LAPs is compared to similar forces, to understand case outcomes with regards to charges and cautions. This is followed by quantitative analysis of partnership data from the three LAPs, which assesses referrals and re-offending statistics.
- Section 3 focuses on the analysis of interviews data from perpetrators and victims.
- Section 4 considers the experiential learning from stakeholders involved in the project, with regards to multi-agency working and the benefits this brought to case management.
- Section 5 provides the findings of the cost-benefit analysis in the form of six case studies: two from each LAP.
- Section 6 discusses the collective findings in relation to the intended aims of the MASIP and the reflections of the evaluation team
- Section 7 offers some recommendations for the development of future practice in this space.

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<sup>10</sup> The STAC is modelled on the London-based Fixated Threat Assessment Centre (FTAC) which was established in 2005 to assess and manage the risk of those who harass, stalk or threaten celebrities, politicians and the royal family.

## 2. Quantitative analysis of police force level and partnership data

### Police data on formal actions taken

As outlined in the interim report, due to the innovative and unique work being done by the three MASIP pilot sites, there are no appropriate control areas that can be used in this evaluation with regards to bench-marking re-offending rates against. Instead, we selected police forces to serve as comparators regarding formal actions taken by police (i.e., stalking offences that result in a charge, caution or community resolution).

We are required to keep the forces selected anonymous for data protection reasons. Forces were selected as comparators based on their similarity to the three MASIP pilot sites on the following criteria:

1. Most similar forces (produced by the Home Office)
2. Reported stalking offences trend trajectory
3. Police and Crime Commissioner funded services (i.e., where stalking was mentioned as a priority in the PCC's strategy, but usually subsumed within domestic abuse).

MOUs<sup>11</sup> were signed with the three anonymised forces identified as being the closest comparators to the three LAPs and force level data on stalking offences was obtained from them, and the three LAP force areas. It should be noted that the data periods analysed were dependent on when the comparison forces were able to make data available to us. The data periods were:

- For Cheshire and the comparator force: August 2016 – December 2019, inclusive.
- For Hampshire and the comparator force: March 2016 – August 2019, inclusive.
- For London and the comparator force: August 2016 – July 2019, inclusive.

They therefore do not capture the full MASIP period and consequently underestimate the effects of MASIP.

For brevity, the similarities and differences between the LAP forces and the comparison forces are provided in Appendix 1. Here we provide a summary of the police outcomes associated with the forces analysed. It is important to say at the outset that we just present the statistical trends in the data; we are not aware of the local recording practices or circumstances that might explain these trends. Since the analysis provides a snapshot of results without a detailed understanding of the processes underpinning the resulting data (as this was beyond the scope of the evaluation), we feel that it raises more questions than provides answers. As a result, only the headline findings are presented here (detailed analysis can be found in

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<sup>11</sup> Information sharing agreements were not required for these data, since they did not contain sensitive or personal information such as victim or perpetrator characteristics or information regarding crime location.

Appendix 2) but with a strong proviso that these are not indicative of definitive findings about whether the partnership forces are performing better or worse than the comparator forces. Future research might be able to shed a light on the trends presented.

***Trends in case outcome***

The proportion of stalking cases that ended in a charge or a summons was greater in all of the MASIP LAP forces compared to their comparator force (see Table 1). Whilst these differences are not dramatic, given the difficulty in bringing a charge to any case, they are also non-trivial.

A different pattern was also observed for cases that resulted in a caution. In line with the now national advice for police warnings, cautions for stalking are not advisable<sup>12</sup>. We see from table 1 that cautions are proportionately less used in Cheshire and Hampshire forces than their comparators. London has proportionately more cautions used; however this had dropped to three per quarter in the final months in 2019 which suggests that the advice given by STAC was permeating through the MPS.

	<b>Cheshire</b>	<b>Cheshire comparator</b>	<b>Hampshire</b>	<b>Hampshire comparator</b>	<b>London</b>	<b>London comparator</b>
Charges / summons	17.7%	14.6%	21.1%	16.6%	17.5%	13.8%
Cautions	0.3%	2.3%	1.9%	12.4%	2.0%	0.6%

*Table 1 – Charges and cautions for the three LAP forces, and their comparator forces.*

Breaking these statistics down further revealed that:

- Cheshire charged for less serious forms of stalking, as defined by sentencing policies (known as 2A offences, with the Home Office code of 195/12) more often, and more serious forms of stalking (4A offences, with codes 008/65 and 008/66) less often than their comparator force. In addition, offences in Cheshire were far less likely to encounter evidential difficulties but did have a higher proportion of victims not supporting the investigation than the comparison force for Cheshire. There appeared to be no clear reason for why this might be the case and it may reflect local recording practices.

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<sup>12</sup> It has been advised to exercise care when considering the use of cautions as a police action in practice advice for the police from 2005 (Practice advice on investigating harassment, NCPE 2005). However, it is often the CPS’s decision to advise that a suspect be cautioned, and their advice has, since 2009, increasingly erred towards encouraging cautions to be used sparingly. Cautioning stalkers is inappropriate for several reasons, least not that they deny the victim recourse to a restraining order.

- In Hampshire cases which were closed because of evidential difficulties were more prevalent in Hampshire than the comparison force. Conversely, Hampshire were less likely to have cases closed because the victim was unsupportive of the investigation than the comparison force. Again, we do not know why these differences exist, and caution should be exercised when drawing conclusions from these trends.
- In London police charges were brought against proportionately more stalking cases across all the stalking crime types, compared to the comparator force. Cases with evidential difficulties cited as the disposal code were proportionately less in London (21.6%) compared to the comparison force for London (41.5%).

It is worth bearing in mind that charges take a considerable amount of time to come to pass – on average three to four months (see Appendix 2). The data period for this analysis only captures a small proportion of the time after the MASIP resources were introduced in September 2018 and therefore the true effects of MASIP have not manifested in the data analysed herein<sup>13</sup>.

### **Partnership data**

Information sharing agreements were signed with the LAP police forces and the data generated by the partnerships were obtained. We focus on two core themes in this subsection: referrals and re-offending. Re-offending in the context of stalking is challenging to define, as due to the ongoing nature of it additional offending is sometimes recorded in a new crime report, and at other times recorded as an update to an original crime report. This is likely to be dissimilar across police forces with different understandings of stalking and associated recording practices. In this research we defined re-offending as additional stalking behaviour within six months of the original offence coming to the attention of the LAPs. There is an assumption that once a case has come to the attention of one of the LAPs some sort of intervention is done (even if that is modest, such as providing investigative advice to the officer in charge).

This six-month period accords with research<sup>14</sup> that suggests that ongoing stalking behaviour be considered as ‘persistence’ (an ongoing offence to the same victim), whereas if there is a break in stalking for six months and then it resumes it is known as ‘recurrence’ (which counts as a new offence to the same or another victim). These clinical classifications of stalking are not reflected in criminal justice system processes.

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<sup>13</sup> However, when we analysed the proportion of charges by month, there was no evidence of an improvement over time.

<sup>14</sup> For example, see McEwan, T. E., Mullen, P. E., & MacKenzie, R. (2009). A study of the predictors of persistence in stalking situations. *Law and human behavior*, 33(2), 149.

Where similarities in data recording permit, we present analysis for the LAPs together. Otherwise we present analysis that is distinctive to the data in each area. Because it is not central to the evaluation, victim and perpetrator profile analyses are included in Appendix 3. This confirms that in the partnership data stalking is a highly gendered offence type, overwhelmingly committed by men and directed to women.

### Referrals

Referral data for Cheshire were obtained through the Home Office quarterly returns for the period September 2018 – November 2019. 562 cases were referred into IASU in this time period. As can be seen in Figure 1, the volume of referrals does not indicate an obvious trend over time.




Figure 1 - Referral patterns in Cheshire over time

Of the 562 cases that were referred into the Cheshire IASU in the period September 2018 – November 2019, 173 cases were discussed at their clinic meeting and were recorded in more detail in the partnership data generated by the team. Otherwise put, after reviewing all the referrals, around 30% of cases were taken on by IASU. These cases were where IASU felt they could add value to the case.

Another eight cases were added to the partnership data in December 2019, bringing the total up to 181. Of these 181 cases, 69 cases were deemed not to be stalking<sup>15</sup>, and eight cases were deemed not applicable to stalking<sup>16</sup>. This left 103 cases remaining for further analysis.




Figure 2 - Hampshire’s referral numbers, including those that were later triaged by the team, and were subsequently heard at clinic, either in full or in brief

Referral data for Hampshire were provided by the Force Stalking Co-ordinator, and these documented the referrals, the numbers that were triaged at the next stage, and then out of those triaged which ones were subsequently mentioned or discussed at the clinic meeting. As seen in Figure 2, Hampshire has seen an increase in referrals to its stalking unit since the beginning of 2018, which pre-dates MASIP. The trend in referral numbers does not alter noticeably after the start of the MASIP funding in September 2018 and no obvious seasonal patterns to referrals are evident. Dips in referrals are perceptible in the months when the Force Stalking Co-ordinator took annual leave (e.g., August 2018, October 2019). However, this did not appear to have an impact on the cases discussed in clinic, which are reasonably stable due to the partnership’s capacity to discuss cases in detail.

Referral data for London were obtained through the Home Office quarterly returns for the period September 2018 – November 2019. 2,750 cases were referred into STAC in this time

<sup>15</sup> Determined by the consultation of three data fields: 1) stalking conduct consensus and 2) Discharge reason for Perpetrator and Aggrieved Person.

<sup>16</sup> Not applicable was recorded when a case was mentioned (but not discussed in full) at clinic. This usually related to domestic abuse cases that were being monitored in case the victim ended the relationship and was then vulnerable to being stalked. In one case the perpetrator died prior to the clinic.

period<sup>17</sup>, 160 of which were referred by Probation. As can be seen in Figure 3, at the beginning of the period, most referrals were deemed by the STAC team as not relating to stalking, and this proportion dropped noticeably from June 2019<sup>18</sup> onwards. There does not appear to be a linear (i.e., increasing or decreasing) or seasonal trend in the cases confirmed as stalking over time.




Figure 3 - Referral patterns in London over time

It was unclear how many cases were referred into the STAC in the evaluation period from the 2,750 cases recorded in the STAC data<sup>19</sup>. Using the final two digits of the crime reference number, it could be determined that 2,242 cases had been recorded in the years 2018 and 2019. Of these, 1,332 cases had been recorded with a date the stalking event had occurred (the recording of which was the usual referral mechanism into the STAC). 861 of these were classified by STAC as being stalking, which meant that they had been discussed at the morning partnership meeting (which is more akin to triage than a clinic meeting). 64 of these cases had been identified as stalking by STAC, since they had been recorded on the CRS as another crime type.

<sup>17</sup> The cases heard 'at clinic' were equal to the total of referrals, so these are not presented.

<sup>18</sup> The data for June 2019 suggests that either referral practices changed, or data recording changed, since the number of confirmed cases rose significantly, and the proportion of referrals deemed not stalking decreased considerably.

<sup>19</sup> This was due to data recording inconsistencies. For example, 1,625 cases had no date information. For this reason, these numbers are incompatible with other aggregated data (e.g., in the Home Office returns).

Based on risk levels, and other information, STAC use a ‘tier’ system to address need appropriately. Ten of the 861 were deemed tier 4, which is where a resource-intensive multi-agency response is provided to a case, 46 were recorded as tier 3, whereby considerable work was undertaken with professionals external to the STAC (e.g., police, probation, health). 369 were classified as tier 2, 326 were classified as tier 1, and 110 cases had no tier recorded – presumably because they pre-dated the introduction of this need management system.

The referring agency was usually the police in all three LAPs (see table 2). Hampshire saw a greater proportion of referrals coming from Probation and Health, whereas Cheshire saw 33 cases referred by IASU<sup>20</sup> which we have included in the ‘other’ category in table 2 (the ‘other’ three referrals were from MARAC). The other category in Hampshire referred to one referral apiece from the Armed Forces and Social Services and in London, those cases without referral agency data were presented as ‘other’. There was no trend over time in Cheshire, but in Hampshire it appeared that referrals from Probation and Health increased in frequency over time, which potentially relates to the growing visibility of the Recolo service, which focused on providing bespoke therapeutic interventions for perpetrators. In London, referrals from Probation were not accurately recorded in the partnership data shown in table 2. Using the data from the Home Office returns, there was evidence of an increase in referrals from Probation in London from February 2019 onwards (averaging 14 a month).

The data from Cheshire and London permitted an assessment of whether incorrect referrals (i.e., that were not classed as stalking) had increased over time. No evidence was found for this for Cheshire, whereas in London incorrect referrals were common in the early stages of the STAC but fell from June 2019<sup>15</sup> (see Figure 3).

Agency	Cheshire		Hampshire		London	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Police	135	74.6	180	77.2	857	99.5
Probation	4	2.2	35	15.0	1	0.1
Health	2	1.1	16	6.9		
Advocacy services	4	2.2				
Other	36	19.9	2	0.9	3	0.3
Total	181	100	233	100	861	100

*Table 2 - referral agency for the three LAPs*

N.B. in London there were 160 referrals by Probation that were not captured in these data

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<sup>20</sup> This is where the case was being monitored by IASU (but had not been discussed at clinic before) due to the potential for a domestic abuse situation to escalate into stalking, and a new incident had occurred and therefore it was brought into clinic to be officially discussed.

## Re-offending in Cheshire

IASU record evidence of stalking behaviour continuing or resuming, by quarter, which enabled analysis of both persistence and recurrence, both of which we report here. Of the 71 cases where there had been six months or more elapsed since IASU began monitoring the case, there was evidence<sup>21</sup> that 30 stalkers, not all of whom received a health intervention, continued their behaviour, which equated to **42.3% of the sample persisting in their offending**. Whilst this sounds high, it is within the range reported in the only study of persistence following a psychological intervention in the research literature (50% for persistence past 12 weeks and 27.1% for persistence past 52 weeks – although this sample did not include ex-intimates or measure re-offending in precisely the same way - see James et al. 2010 in appendix 4). It is also worth stating that re-offending is optimally calculated from when the health intervention concludes. **Monitoring re-offending from the referral date, as Cheshire have done, has likely inflated the true re-offending rate.**

The relatively high re-offending rate may further be influenced by the very high proportion of rejected stalkers, who may not be open to treatment or dissuaded by legal interventions, as research has found that ex-intimates are more likely than other stalker types to persist in their offending and to use violence<sup>22</sup>. It may also be the case that this figure is as high as it is because victims have confidence in reporting re-offending to the police and/or their advocate. Cheshire had the most robust estimates of re-offending since it took victim reports into consideration, which do not necessarily translate into a subsequent charge or conviction.

The full breakdown of re-offending can be seen in Table 3. This was generated by considering quarterly reports of re-offending, so that if *any* re-offending had been recorded in each period in Table 3 (when that period had elapsed) it was counted once only. In other words, if re-offending had (say) been recorded within the first and third quarters it would only count as one instance in Table 3. Visual inspection of this shows that re-offending had occurred in 20.4% of stalkers by three months; 42.3% by six months; 47.7% by nine months and 58.3% by twelve months<sup>23</sup>.

	< 3 months		< 6 months		< 9 months		< 12 months	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
Not reached time threshold	10		32		59		79	

<sup>21</sup> This could be reported by victims to the police, by probation or could come to IASU's attention via other means.

<sup>22</sup> For example, see Björklund, K., Häkkänen-Nyholm, H., Sheridan, L., & Roberts, K. (2010). The prevalence of stalking among Finnish university students. *Journal of interpersonal violence*, 25(4), 684-698; Sheridan, L. and Davies, G. 2001. Violence and the prior victim-stalker relationship. *Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health*. 11, p.102-116.

<sup>23</sup> We had planned to provide more context to those who had re-offended in the final version of this report, but unfortunately our secure data lab had to be closed because of COVID-19 and this analysis remains incomplete.

No	74	79.6	41	57.7	23	52.3	10	41.7
Yes	19	20.4	30	42.3	21	47.7	14	58.3
Total	103		103		103		103	

Table 3 - breakdown of re-offending at periodic data collection points in Cheshire

Of the 44 cases where nine months or more had passed since IASU had been monitoring the case, there was evidence that **stalking behaviour had recurred to the same victim in 4.5% of cases** (n=2). This is lower than the range that is reported in research that has studied recurrence following a psychological intervention (9.5% - 40%, see appendix 4), and these two cases did not receive a health intervention from IASU. This suggests that the interventions directed towards the victims may have indirectly decreased their chances of re-victimisation.

With regards to the stalker type, one out of two of all incompetent suitors, none out of seven intimacy seekers, 26 out of 61 rejected and one out of two of resentful stalkers re-offended.

Table 4 provides a breakdown of the 71 cases where enough time had elapsed to judge re-offending, by the intervention type that was used in the case. These are not mutually exclusive categories. Of those perpetrators who **received a direct health intervention 17.6% re-offended**. This is at the low end of the range when compared to re-offending rates in research studies where the perpetrators have received a health intervention (which range from 0% - 52.9%) **and suggests that the health interventions delivered in Cheshire are highly successful**. Of the three perpetrators who re-offended after receiving a direct health intervention, one re-offended within three months; one re-offended within six months and one re-offended within nine months. Thus, two of the three can be considered as persistence, and one as recurrence.

Intervention type	Re-offending		
	Yes	No	Total
Comprehensive risk assessment	4	6	10
Perpetrator direct intervention	3	14	17
Perpetrator health signposting	4	1	5
Perpetrator 3 <sup>rd</sup> party consultation	21	26	47
Victim direct intervention	10	11	21
Victim target hardening	2	5	7
Victim 3 <sup>rd</sup> party consultation	24	29	53
Victim safeguarding <sup>24</sup>	2	2	4

<sup>24</sup> These figures are misleading since these were recorded when the case was heard at clinic – or in other words, right at the beginning of IASU involvement. The IDVA subsequently performed safeguarding for each of the 103 cases.

*Table 4 - Intervention type by whether there was any evidence of re-offending (persistence)<sup>25</sup>*

Further analysis was undertaken to test the relationship between individual characteristics of victims and perpetrators, and programme characteristics, with re-offending at six months. Bivariate analysis was produced for each of the following variables, and a chi-square test was performed. To summarise the results, a statistically significant relationship was found between re-offending at six months and a) a stalking charge being the impetus for a referral into IASU ( $p=0.04$ ) and b) the perpetrator being involved (currently or in the past) with mental health services ( $p=0.01$ ). This means that cases that had been referred to IASU based on a stalking charge, and perpetrators who were involved with mental health services were more likely to re-offend.

Several factors relating to the perpetrator, such as age, gender, previous offending history and vulnerability were found to be non-significant<sup>26</sup>. Similarly, all partnership actions considered by IASU as interventions, such as safeguarding the victim/perpetrator, signposting of the victim/perpetrator to other health services, and consultation with third party agencies regarding the victim/perpetrator were not statistically significantly related to re-offending<sup>27</sup>. Finally, neither the gender dynamic of the victim-perpetrator relationship nor the stalker type was statistically significantly related to re-offending<sup>28</sup>. These results were not appreciably different for a subset of the data which focused on perpetrators who had completed a health intervention.

### ***Re-offending in Hampshire***

The data field capturing re-offending in the form of recurrence was only filled in for 20 cases<sup>29</sup>, which was deemed to be insufficient for the evaluation. Notes made in the referral meetings

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<sup>25</sup> We have since been informed by IASU that these figures from their data may not be correct. For example, the Victim Advocate uses target hardening tactics in all cases and provided a direct intervention in 34 cases.

<sup>26</sup> The perpetrator's gender ( $p$ -value=0.94); the perpetrator's age group ( $p$ -value=0.51); the perpetrator being known previously for stalking behaviour ( $p$ -value=0.48); the perpetrator having an antisocial lifestyle ( $p$ -value=0.54); and the perpetrator being involved with Probation ( $p$ -value=0.62).

<sup>27</sup> If a perpetrator had received a direct health intervention ( $p$ -value=0.12); if a perpetrator had been signposted to other health services ( $p$ -value=0.20); if safeguarding had been done for a perpetrator ( $p$ -value=0.46); if consultation with third party agencies had been done regarding a perpetrator ( $p$ -value=0.79); if a comprehensive stalking risk assessment had been done for a perpetrator ( $p$ -value=0.82); if the victim had received direct support from a VA ( $p$ -value=0.42); if a victim had been signposted to other health services ( $p$ -value=0.21); if safeguarding had been done for a victim ( $p$ -value=0.75); if situational target hardening measures had been put in place with the victim ( $p$ -value=0.70); and if consultation with third party agencies had been done regarding a victim ( $p$ -value=0.07).

<sup>28</sup> The gender dynamic of the perpetrator-victim relationship ( $p$ -value=0.46) and the stalker type ( $p$ -value=0.85).

<sup>29</sup> Of which, two cases recorded recurrence having occurred (one of these was captured in our measure of persistence).

and clinics were thus manually coded to provide an estimate of re-offending persistence (i.e., stalking that persists after a legal intervention such as police involvement). One researcher generated a shortlist of cases where there was potentially evidence of re-offending whilst the case was being monitored by the Hampshire unit, which was then discussed with the research team to collectively agree which cases could be considered to have re-offending present. This does not include cases where victims were reporting some type of re-offending (like the breach of a restraining order) prior to it being monitored by the Hampshire unit.

**Persistence was found to be present in 15 cases, which equates to 6.4% of cases.** This is much lower than the same figures reported in an academic study that studied re-offending after a psychological intervention (50% for persistence past 12 weeks and 27.1% for persistence past 52 weeks - see appendix 4), which suggests that either Hampshire have been particularly successful at reducing re-offending through the service provided by their stalking unit or that the mechanisms for recording persistence were underdeveloped.

When looking at the interventions applied to the cases, some interesting patterns emerged with regards to re-offending. As is shown in Table 5, almost half of those who re-offended (n=7) had received direct intervention and consultation (as defined by the practitioners). Out of those who did not re-offend, only 11% (n=24) received a direct intervention and consultation.

Lack of data on who completed treatment and who dropped out might explain these figures further. For example, research shows that perpetrators who drop out of treatment are more likely to re-offend than those who complete treatment programmes. We do know from the data provided as part of the quarterly returns to the Home Office during the course of this project that 23 perpetrators completed direct health interventions, but we have no way of matching these to the case-level information to understand what happened to this sample of perpetrators. Overall, the cases where re-offending was present appeared to have (mostly) been treated as high risk and discussed at the Stalking Clinic.

Intervention type	Re-offending		
	Yes	No	Total
Consultation Only	3	11	14
Direct Intervention & Consultation	7	24	31
Monitor		21	21
No input		8	8
Signpost & Liaison	1	27	28
Stalking Clinic	2	34	36
Stalking Clinic & Consultation	1	1	2
Stalking Clinic & Liaison		3	3
Unable to meet due to Project End		1	1
Blank	1	88	89
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>218</b>	<b>233</b>

*Table 5 - Interventions by whether there was any evidence of re-offending (persistence)*

Further analysis revealed that the cases in which the stalker persisted after legal intervention (i.e., police involvement) were:

- More likely to have the perpetrator involved in MAPPA (13.3% (n=2) versus 4.6% (n=10) of other stalkers).
- More likely that the perpetrator had an existing record on the NHS system (RiO) in the service area (53.3% (n=8) versus 34.9% (n=76) of other stalkers. The proportion of stalkers who had persisted that had engaged with mental health services in the past was 40% (n=6), compared to 33.9% (n=74) of other stalkers.
- Less likely to have previous victims (none compared to 18.3% (n=40) of other stalkers).

Four stalkers who re-offended within the evaluation period were female, and 11 were male. This equates to 21% of all female stalkers compared to 5.1% of all male stalkers in the Hampshire sample. Offenders who persisted in their stalking were not markedly different in age than the general profile for stalkers (minimum age: 27.7; mean age: 35.6; maximum age: 48.8).

With regards to the stalker type, 8% (n=2) of all incompetent suitors, 10% (n=1) of all intimacy seekers, 7% (n=11) of rejected and 9% (n=1) of resentful stalkers re-offended.

### ***Re-offending in London***

The data field relating to whether a referral into the STAC was new or not can be used as an indication of repeat referrals. Out of the 861 cases, 11 (1.3%) were repeat referrals, however another 101 cases were recorded as 'unknown' for this data field, meaning that this number could be higher (as much as 13% of cases).

Another way of estimating re-offending is through MPS crime reports. If an investigation into stalking is open, then new reports of ongoing stalking behaviour are supposed to be added to the existing crime report<sup>30</sup>. Therefore, new crime reports relating to the same suspect seemingly relate to a new stalking episode.

An MPS crime analyst extracted crime reports relating to stalking and breaches of over a two-year period. A unique identifier for suspects was created and then used to determine how many stalking offences had occurred within six months of a period in which the original

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<sup>30</sup> However, this does not always happen in practice (personal communication with STAC officer). In cases where a new crime report is created after a report of ongoing stalking behaviour, the Crime Management Unit should identify this and make the new crime report a 'No Crime', and it is closed with reference to the original crime report.

offence had occurred. For example, reports from March-August 2019 were checked against reports from September 2019 – February 2019. Table 6 presents the results of this analysis for three six-month time periods<sup>31</sup> and shows that re-offending rates estimated in this way are relatively stable. **The re-offending rate that relates to the six-month period after STAC was operational (3.2%)** is lower than the previous period (4.4%), but this difference is not statistically significant<sup>32</sup>.

Original offence period	Re-offending period	% re-offending
Sep-17 - Feb-18	Mar-18 – Aug-18	4.6
Mar-18 – Aug-18	Sep-18 – Feb 19	4.4
Sep-18 – Feb-19	Mar-19 – Aug-19	3.2

*Table 6 - Re-offending by the same suspect, within six-months of an original stalking offence, in London*

In Table 7 we see that breaches of restraining orders are the most common stalking offence for re-offending. In the most recent period, which runs for the first six-months the STAC was operating, we see that breaches of restraining orders are lower, and incidents of section 4As, which are the most serious types of stalking, are higher. Whilst the numbers are too small to make any reliable statements of effect, the numbers are pointing in a promising direction (such that re-offending, when it happens, may be being charged at an appropriately serious level).

Re-offending period	Section 2A	Section 4A	Breach of restraining order
Mar-18 – Aug-18	5	2	38
Sep-18 – Feb 19	6	4	36
Mar-19 – Aug-19	4	8	22

*Table 7 - Reoffending by the same suspect, by stalking offence type, in London*

There are several limitations regarding these estimates of re-offending. Foremost are how the data periods were defined. Due to challenges in the data structure (i.e., there being no unique reference for suspects), the analyst sensibly chose six-month periods to compare. This means that a stalking case reported in, say, March 2018 would have re-offending estimated over an 11-month period, whereas a stalking case reported in August 2018 would only be checked for six months. For this reason, these estimates of re-offending are very general.

<sup>31</sup> As six months had not passed after August 2019 at the time of analysis, we could not analyse the most recent period.

<sup>32</sup> Chi square test, p-value = 0.18.

Another limitation is that these figures are likely an underestimate of re-offending. This is because cases without details about the suspect cannot be identified as re-offending (even if the victim is the same, due to no unique identifier for the victim). What's more, stalking episodes that persist after police involvement are not necessarily captured in new crime reports, as outlined previously, meaning that persistence is not being measured here.

A final limitation to this analysis is that we could not directly link the re-offending data to the STAC data, because the overlap between the MPS data and the STAC data was smaller than expected. Put differently, there were 2,072 stalking crime reports recorded by MPS as having occurred between September 2018 and August 2019. The same number in the STAC data (with the offence confirmed by STAC as being stalking) was 998, meaning that there was a discrepancy of 1,074 crime reports. This means it was not possible to analyse the case information for the cases where re-offending had occurred.

### **Summary and conclusion**

The outcomes for the police data reflect favourably on the three LAPs; each of them had a greater proportion of cases that resulted in a charge. Proportionately fewer resulted in a caution in Cheshire and Hampshire forces, which are considered an inappropriate outcome for stalking cases, and these were dropping in London in the final six months of the data period. It is worth reiterating that the data period for the police data analysis does not cover the full effects of MASIP, and therefore is likely to underestimate the effects that the three LAPs had on positive police outcomes.

Neither Cheshire nor Hampshire demonstrated an obvious upward trend in referrals over the time of the project, whereas London experienced an initial increase in referrals. Both Cheshire and Hampshire had an anti-stalking unit in operation pre-MASIP, so it is difficult to determine whether the units' activity before the MASIP started was influencing referral trends. Both saw fluctuations in referrals which *may* relate to greater awareness as a result of an awareness-raising event, but this is not conclusive. What was evident from the data was that in Hampshire there was a small but steady increase in the referrals from Health and Probation over the course of the project, suggesting that the visibility of the unit was growing outside of the police. What's more, in Cheshire's partnership data we were able to determine that there was not an increase in 'false negatives' over time, which means resources were not wasted and that training messages appeared effective. Conversely, in London there was evidence that incorrect referrals had increased in the period following the operational start of the STAC.

Before summarising the findings on re-offending, it is worth stating that the persistence rates reported in research where no psychological intervention has been made range from 10-60% and the same range for persistence is 10-27% (see appendix 4). In Cheshire the re-offending rates for persistence and recurrence were 42.3% and 4.5% respectively, and the persistence rate for perpetrators who had completed a direct health intervention was 20% (see footnote

22). These are all lower than rates that are reported in research that has studied these forms of re-offending after a psychological intervention (although not a comparable intervention, see appendix 4), which suggests that IASU are outperforming similar initiatives elsewhere in the world. It is also likely that, due to the excellent communication between the victim advocate and the victims that most, if not all, instances of the stalking behaviour continuing are identified.

In Hampshire the re-offending rate for persistence was 6.4% which is a great deal lower than that reported in the research literature and suggests that this was underestimated since the data collection for re-offending was under-developed. In London, re-offending rates were low – between three and four per cent, and these measures are closer to recurrence than persistence. However, for reasons discussed above, these are likely to be underestimated.

It is important to stress that re-offending was estimated differently across each of the three LAPs, and it is therefore inappropriate to compare them. Cheshire had highly organised and consistent data collection procedures and therefore we have the most confidence in the data reported for IASU. It is highly likely that re-offending has been considerably underestimated in Hampshire and London because they did not have data collection processes set up to collect this. The data collection in all three LAPs precluded an examination of whether the frequency or severity of stalking reduced.

Across both Cheshire and Hampshire, perpetrators who re-offended (defined variously) were more likely to have received a direct health intervention than those who did not re-offend. Although at first glance this may seem as if the health interventions were not successful, it must be noted that re-offending figures are particularly high within stalker populations (see Appendix 4), and this remains so even after intervention. Hence another interpretation of this might be that the health practitioners were successful in judging who was at a high risk, and successfully treated a proportion of these. (The caveat here is that Hampshire's data recording practices were not set up to capture re-offending, and therefore we believe their numbers to be underestimated). It is also worth stressing that stalkers are not a homogeneous group; each of them will have a specific combination of personal and environmental influences on their behaviour, which cannot be treated uniformly.

The broader context of this means that we cannot say, in a pilot project operating for only 17 months, that the direct intervention work with perpetrators has reduced re-offending to the extent that people might hope. It is simply too early to tell, and the uncertainty caused by the funding situation (see section 7) prompted ethical concerns of not being able to finish treatment, which may well have meant that the health interventions were not able to be delivered optimally. It is worth stressing that not every offender is willing to engage in treatment. It is also true that we were unable to quantify if harm to the victim had reduced (either through a reduction in frequency or risk level, or through the victim being more empowered through the support of their advocate), even if re-offending was present in a

case. The qualitative analysis reveals that there is reason to believe that the interventions delivered by the LAPs certainly benefitted some participants in the programme.

### **3. Interviews with perpetrators and victims**

The second part of the evaluation focuses on the qualitative aspects of evidencing the impact of the MASIP. Interviews were conducted with perpetrators and victims to elicit their perceptions and experience of engaging with the programme.

#### **Method**

In an ideal world we would have liked to have interviewed matched pairs of victims and perpetrators involved in several randomly selected cases. However, there were ethical concerns and data protection issues with conducting interviews with victims and perpetrators. Given the sensitive nature of the research and the vulnerability of the participants, it was decided at the outset that key stakeholders working closely with victims (i.e. victim advocates) and perpetrators (health practitioners) would be the appropriate authority to decide whether a participant was in an appropriate and stable frame of mind to be able to participate in the evaluation research with the intention of a reduced risk of negative consequences. These practitioners made the initial contact with the participants and obtained an agreement in principle to be contacted by the research team. Those that were willing to be contacted were then given an information sheet with the necessary information about the research. These provided them with information about the purpose of the evaluation, interview process and their rights to withdraw. They were asked to read and provide written and/or verbal consent to participate and be audio-recorded before the beginning of the interview. Some interviews were carried out on university premises, however six took place in other settings such as the local police stations, where victims felt safer and where it was convenient for them. Our available sample pool was small, as only those participants for whom the intervention was already complete, or was nearing completion; who were judged to be in a stable frame of mind to participate in the research; and who were willing to participate in the research were suitable.

After obtaining informed consent a total of 17 in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with ten victims and seven with perpetrators (see tables 22 and 23 in Appendix 5) between April and December 2019. When possible, two researchers conducted the interviews. Of these, 15 interviews were conducted in person (nine with victims and six with perpetrators) and a total of two interviews were conducted on the phone in cases where the interviewee was reluctant to meet face to face. Interviews lasted between 20 to 40 minutes and were taped with the permission of the participant. These interviews were anonymised, professionally transcribed and were coded and analysed using qualitative software NVIVO. Thematic analysis of the interviews revealed several interesting insights.

#### ***Limitations***

This part of the evaluation has several limitations:

- The number of interviews conducted is very small, and not representative of the various stalking typologies or dyads of relationships<sup>33</sup>. However, given the sensitive nature of the topic, we are grateful to the participants who did agree to talk about some very traumatic aspects of their life.
- Given how the sample had to be chosen and recruited, we acknowledge that the sample could be biased (by the choice of the practitioners) and consist of a self-selected group of individuals who were willing to engage with the research.
- Finally, we acknowledge that these interviews were sensitive and we, as the researchers, only had limited time to establish trust with the participants, and therefore we cannot discount the possibility that the interviewees might not have been totally forthcoming or as introspective as might be desirable; resulting in us only eliciting what interviewees considered socially desirable.

Nevertheless, the interviews revealed many insights into how individuals perceived the impact of MASIP and are a valuable source of evidence in this evaluation. In what follows, we present the findings of the perpetrator interviews and then the victim interviews. Two main themes are presented: impact of intervention; and prevention of reoffending. We focus on these themes as they provide an evidence base for some of our recommendations for future good practice.

### **Impact of MASIP intervention on perpetrators**

The characteristics of the interviewees can be found in table 22 in Appendix 5. All interviewees had engaged with the therapeutic component of the programme after being referred into the service through their probation offers, post sentencing. The interventions offered by the MASIP included regular psychological therapy sessions delivered weekly or fortnightly. The interventions offered included combinations of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, Interpersonal Therapy and Emotion-Focused therapy and Occupational Therapy (in one LAP area). It was interesting to note that all individuals interviewed had realised that they had been provided with bespoke interventions that were tailored to their specific needs and situation. A significant proportion of the interviewees had pre-existing mental health conditions and were previously under treatment, but they were grateful that the therapists involved in the MASIP project had understood their underlying conditions and provided appropriate support. More importantly, interviewees said that the therapy had helped them realise the pernicious impact and consequences of their previous behaviour on the victim, and on themselves insofar as they had been organising their lives and their routines around their stalking behaviours.

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<sup>33</sup> We were unable to interview perpetrators who were classified as indicative of other typologies or females stalking males or other females, nor males stalking other males.

*“I would be late for work because I would be going to see if she was at home. I’d shoot off early to try and see where she was or try and ring her. I would literally drop everything to do something, like phone her, text her, something like that, and I was also physically getting worse in myself...” – [P5]*

The therapy provided the interviewees with the space to reflect on their own motivations and behaviours and identify where the obsession was stemming from, as one interviewee explained,

*“I didn’t understand why I got so angry, so emotional, so upset. Everything was always the maximum. It was never normal or anywhere close to middle... I have started to understand a lot more than I did.” – [P6]*

For others, the interventions provided clarity around the legality of their behaviours and what was inappropriate as the label of stalking was one which they were particularly uncomfortable with.

*“When I read [Victims]’s statement she was saying things like she had to stop working and she had lost friends and she really built it up, so then I could understand this is why the police had to take action because ignoring this, they wouldn’t be responsible policemen had they ignored her side of it, what impact it had on her...See, I had no idea that what I was doing was...criminal.” – [P7]*

The engagement with MASIP interventions served several purposes recognised by perpetrators:

- Providing an understanding of impact of their behaviours on their own lives and the victim’s. (P4 and P6)
- Why certain actions constituted stalking and criminal behaviour. [P2]
- A space to reflect on their own behaviours. [P3, P5 and P7]
- Recognizing underlying causes and risk-management plans to prevent re-offending (which involved accounting for mitigating factors such as unemployment, housing, medication, etc). [P1-7]

Interviewees also recognised that engagement with therapy had provided them with the tools to appropriately deal with the underlying fixation and obsession that motivated their stalking.

*“I felt like I was able to understand why I did what I did, accept that what I did was not right and realised that I had a lot of underlying issues that I hadn’t thought about that were causing my behaviour in that way and it’s been really helpful to recognise that and be able to talk it through with somebody.” – [P4]*

The MASIP intervention also provided the interviewees with the skills and awareness needed to monitor their own behaviour and manage their own risk of reoffending. This was evident by way of scenario-based activities which interviewees said compelled them to formulate the appropriate reaction to a tempting or provocative situation which may arise in the future. The

psychological sessions provided perpetrators with a variety of options to think through and consider if there any future risks to reoffending behaviour. As a result, most of the interviewees were confident in their ability to refrain from reoffending.

*“If it happens again, I have to put my phone away or say, ‘If you want to be friends, be friends. If you don’t want to be friends, enjoy the rest of your life.’ If you don’t, I will just be back here again. That is what will happen. I might not be back here. I might be even in prison if I start harassing and ringing people again.” – [P3]*

In acknowledgement of how the therapy had helped the interviewee manage his own risk, one interviewee said,

*“What [psychologist] has taught me is there are options, there are other ways to deal with stuff, ... I think I am about 85 per cent of where I need to be. I don’t think she is going to do the 15 per cent... because all it (MASIP) has done is put the fire out — dragged me away from the fire and now I am going to have to patch up my own burns, but at least I have got enough to work with.— [P6]*

### ***Harnessing preventative factors to not reoffend***

A key theme explored in the perpetrator interviews were the motivators driving them to engage with the MASIP intervention and active ownership of their own risk management plans. Along with a universal desire to avoid imprisonment<sup>34</sup>, interviewees were motivated to engage with the treatment and to resist re-offending by a varied range of factors, depending upon how they were placed in their lives. For example, for ex-intimates who had children with their victim, limited contact with their children was an adequate threat, as some of them expressed the concern around access and rights to see their children. Interviewees were made aware that if they were in prison or deemed to be unfit due to criminal behaviour, the time spent with their children could be supervised and/or limited due to involvement of social care. Some perpetrators revealed that they did not want their children’s wellbeing to be affected further by the stalking episodes involving their mother. There was a recognition that the distress caused to their victim, could inadvertently harm their children and they wanted to refrain from engaging in further misdemeanours to avoid such a situation.

*“At the end of the day, I don’t want my son’s mother to be...worried and frightened. He will sense it. Because he senses it, there is that little worry in a little body growing up, all because of his... No. I don’t want that. I want him to feel totally happy and at ease.” – [P6]*

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<sup>34</sup> Although it should be noted that engagement with the MASIP was not an alternative to a custodial sentence.

A couple of the interviewees were particularly distraught by being labelled as a stalker, or a criminal, and faced with the possibility of serving prison time decided to engage to evade any future likelihood of being classed into stigmatised categories.

*“When you get classed as a stalker... Stalker is the main word. Harassing. People know what you say when... ‘I was harassing her,’ but when you become classed as a stalker... That is why I want the [therapist] to help because I don’t want it to happen again.” – [P3]*

Another prominent motivation to engage with MASIP and refrain from reoffending, seemed to be the desire to lead a healthy and crime-free lifestyle. Stalking behaviours can be time-consuming and mentally draining. The ability to engage with a service which would provide them with appropriate guidance on how and where to divert their energy to be productive members of society, was particularly appealing to some interviewees. Many of the perpetrators had criminal histories or unaddressed mental health issues and were generally fed up of their chaotic lives. Others were on a similar pathway and wanting to avoid contact with the CJS. They all sought the MASIP interventions to get on to a different life pathway.

*“In all honesty, I was tired of feeling the way that I was feeling and I wanted to... And I’ve never ever been in trouble with the police or the law before and, with all due respect, I never want to be again...just want to be able to address those issues and move forward in a healthy way.” – [P4]*

## **Conclusion**

Interviews with perpetrators clearly indicated the benefits of engaging in the therapeutic component of the suite of interventions provided by the MASIP. Although almost all the interviewees had been referred to the MASIP by probation, they nevertheless realised the benefits of engaging with the therapeutic team were diverse:

- Because it helped them work out what their motivations were for engaging in stalking. Sometimes this was anchored in their childhood experiences, and for others it was due to a mental health condition or other traumatic events such as addictions or unemployment which spiralled into obsession and fixation.
- It helped them recognise that their behaviour was not harassment but stalking, with seriously negative consequences for not only the victim but also on their mental and physical well-being.
- It enabled them to determine for themselves why they needed to work on addressing their problem behaviours to prevent future reoffending.
- It provided them with the tools to avoid regressing back to obsessive, fixated behaviours and to find ways to deal with situations that might let them slide back into reoffending.

- Finally, interviewees recognized that they had been provided with bespoke interventions tailored to address their individual needs and this made them appreciate that the therapy, unlike the generic treatment they had received in their previous encounters with state mental health providers, was adapted to suit their unique circumstances. Not all of them were aware of MASIP but acknowledged the bespoke nature of the therapeutic component that was provided by the health workers within the partnership.

### **Impact of MASIP intervention on victims**

This evaluation looked at the victims' experiences with the police, victim advocates and the consequent case outcomes in the context of engagement with the MASIP service. Victims were asked about their stalking experiences and contact with every criminal justice agency and MASIP as a programme. In what we report here, we focus exclusively on the victims' experiences of the service provided by the MASIP. This is not to trivialise the profound debilitating effect the stalking had on victims. All interviewees expressed that they had suffered from depression, fear, anxiety and hypervigilance as a direct result of being stalked. The financial impact to victims of stalking was similarly substantial. The characteristics of the interviewees can be found in Table 23 in Appendix 5.

### ***Engagement with the Criminal Justice System (Police and Courts)***

Victim experiences with the criminal justice system mainly focused on the response they got from the police and the way they felt they were treated by the courts. Although most of the victims we spoke to had directly contacted the police and continued to engage with the police, often subsequent contacts were influenced by inputs from the LAPs in the three areas, whether or not victims were aware of it. Victims said that they tended to ignore or minimise the stalking behaviour initially, in the hope that it would go away. They contacted the police when the stalking had reached unacceptable levels or when they feared for their safety, as most of them genuinely feared that the behaviours would escalate to more extreme forms of violence.

*"...it just starting ramping up to 90 missed calls one day from a withheld number, 60 the next. Loads of horrible messages, emails especially... ...he'd damaged my front door, smashed the handle in and smashed the letterbox and scratched it and ...I thought I don't know how long he is going to be there." - [V6]*

Most victims had expressed their involvement with the police to be positive. In terms of the response level, victims seemed to be reassured that when they were feeling threatened and fearful, the police responded immediately and were supportive.

*"I had the number now for the Safeguarding unit, I phoned them directly. I was hyperventilating, and they said 'Get off the phone to us and call 999.' So, I did, and told*

*the police and they said 'We'll be round soon.' In the meantime, Safeguarding had told the detective on the case, he texted me saying 'We're sending guys round now, at least we know we're going to press for stalking, not harassment. I'm really sorry about this but don't worry, we're looking after you.' And the police came around." - [V7]*

Others felt that there was not enough information or support provided to them in cases where the stalking was more indirect, especially when it involved social media. One participant who was being cyber-stalked for over a year did not have his case classified as stalking until the evidence landed in the hands of a specialist officer. He was referred in to the MASIP unit but described the communication with the police service as challenging due to the nature of online stalking and the limited understanding around it. Another participant faced a similar issue with the police saying they were unable to act due to the online communication lacking serious grounds for arrest and the unhelpful attitude of the police officer.

*"I would show them all this and then they would say, 'No, it is just messages, just malicious communications... I realised that the police officer wasn't into computers. It is a guy in his 50s and he knows how to send emails, but that is basically it. Because the case is mostly digital, I thought, oh crap. What is going to happen? It turns out the guy has no idea what he is doing so it really impacts on what is going on." - [V8]*

It was clear that in some of these cases the local police either lacked the training to identify stalking or the ability to provide helpful advice to the victim that would aid evidence gathering and the subsequent investigation. However, in those cases where LAP input was clear and direct, victims felt they got an informed and helpful response.

Following investigation, the second point of the victim's engagement with the criminal justice system was in the courts. In most cases, the interviewees had expected longer or harsher sentences considering the serious impact stalkers had on their lives, and were therefore dissatisfied with the court responses as they felt that they did not consider the possibility of reoffending or consider of the severity of the offences while sentencing.

*"There were charges made in regards to me ...It was charges of stalking but then when it went to court it got downgraded."- [V2]*

Other participants had grievances about how administrative errors and lack of important information from the courts had added to their anxieties around the possibility of revictimization. For example, two participants (V3 and V4) stated that they were not informed when their perpetrator had been released from custody. The police had accidentally provided a stalker with his victim's contact details on his bail conditions. This may be common for bail documents which highlight restrictions and areas that the offender should not go to, however this should not have been overlooked, considering that the nature of the offence was stalking. There seemed to be a great degree of dissatisfaction amongst stalking victims with the courts service in general.

### ***Experience of victim advocacy***

Any victim whose case had been classified as stalking by the police in each LAP was assigned a victim advocate (VA) - except in London, where only a small proportion of victims were provided with extensive advocacy support due to large volumes. The role of VAs was to help with the management of cases, safeguarding plans and provide overall support. A significant number of participants within this study had been assigned a VA who they had been dealing with since the start of their case. The level of contact in the three LAPs varied, as some offered face-to-face sessions with victims while the others provided communication via phone and emails. The length and quality of communication was dependant on each LAPs workload, structure and nature of cases.

Most participants emphasised positive aspects of this Victim Advocacy service, claiming it assisted with their frustrations with case management, protection plans and mental wellbeing. Some participants stated that they felt completely lost until a VA, who was well acquainted with the criminal justice processes, were available to them for advice and support.

*“If you’d met me last year, I was half of what I am now. I was an absolute mess. I genuinely couldn’t have done what I’ve done or got where I am without the help of the stalking clinic. Because I’ve not got that family support on the outside so it was just... I rely on [victim advocate] for all my support.” – [V2]*

While many victims struggled to seek psychological therapy to deal with their anxieties due to lack of funds, they indicated that the VA acted as a substitute. The VA provided an understanding of the victim’s circumstances in a way that was absent elsewhere in their lives, and they felt being heard gave them a sense of relief. This feeling of being supported was intensified for the victims as they recognised the important role of the VAs in helping them manage their own risk. One interviewee said,

*“It’s teaching me to take control. Even not take control but because we’ve been talking about how going home different ways, different things to do, just to keep my anxiety down if it does happen again, just to try and get out of that situation instead of sheer panic.” – [V1]*

Another interviewee credited the sessions with the VA for enabling her to deal with her feelings of anxiety and feeling encouraged to take control of her own safety. Advice on the types of security measures that could be placed in the home, planning routes to work and back or placing certain alerts on restraining orders were some of the recommendations that were appreciated by victims.

*“I have not felt safe until fairly recently when I have reviewed my safety plan with (VA2) and I am venturing out more now.” – [V10]*

The interviewees frequently highlighted that the VA service filled in some crucial gaps that the criminal justice system had failed to address, such as informing the victim about the

progress of the case, or even providing supplementary support with regards to housing and child protection services. VAs also helped by providing supplementary information and requests for specific clauses in restraining orders which allowed courts to physically limit access between the perpetrators and victims.

*“I ring her all the time, because, as I said, who else would I seek help from? The police didn’t help me whatsoever. She (VA) was the only person who did. So there probably wouldn’t be a restraining order if [female] didn’t go.” – [V4]*

Above all, interviewees appreciated the fact that the VA was a central conduit to relay important information back to victims from relevant agencies. Through this process, most victims felt at ease and were very appreciative of having this type of contact because it meant that they did not have to worry about chasing up information from several different agencies. However, where resources and knowledge around cyberstalking was limited, this seemed to affect a victim’s experience of support with the service negatively. Given that in most areas of the country, stalking victims are only provided with advocacy support from IDVAs if they have previously been in a relationship with the perpetrator, the VAs provide a support service that fills an important gap in service provision for victims.

### **Conclusion**

The psychological, physical and financial damage to victims is substantial and victims felt unsupported by the system at various points. Interviewees were particularly disappointed because it appeared as if the courts did not account for the seriousness of the impact of stalking or the possibility of reoffending when sentencing. However, victims acknowledged that their engagement with victim advocacy services was of considerable value for a variety of reasons:

- The MASIP victim advocates use specialist risk assessment and screening tools to develop individualised safety and support plans for clients. The formation of the plan involves the exploration of practical and emotional support options available to increase clients’ sense of physical and psychological safety and decrease their sense of isolation.
- Overall, the interviewees who had been physically stalked seemed to be very satisfied with the advocacy service as it was understood to enhance their experiences with the criminal justice system.
- Victims perceived a difference in the response to online and offline stalking cases. In cases predominantly characterised by cyberstalking and in cases where the perpetrator was unknown victims felt that the police response was less than satisfactory and sometimes uninformed and unhelpful.

## 4. Interviews with stakeholders

Following on from the interim report<sup>3</sup>, which was process focused and based primarily on interviews with stakeholders and observations of MASIP meetings, this final report builds on the earlier learning by interviewing stakeholders near the end of the project to capture their learning from the project over its lifetime. Specifically, this chapter focuses on three questions:

- What was stakeholders' experience of being involved in MASIP? This included:
  - Their experience of multi-agency working.
  - How the project evolved and matured over the 18-month period.
  - Identifying what they considered as success of the project.
  - Personal and professional growth and learning (if any).
  - Challenges that they faced along the way.
- What was the stakeholders' perception of the impact of MASIP on perpetrators and victims?
- If stakeholders had to do it all again, what would they do differently?

The aim of these interviews was to capture experiential evidence of the learning and experience of the stakeholders over the MASIP project to make recommendations for good practice professionals

We also interviewed:

- Senior leaders across the LAPs to understand the amount and nature of buy-in from each agency.
- Professionals outside of the LAPs who had received advice from the units, to capture the indirect impact of MASIP.

### Method

After obtaining informed consent, a total of 21 follow-up semi-structured interviews were conducted with probation, health, police, and victim advocacy in each LAP, between January and February 2020. Of these, 13 interviews were conducted in person and eight interviews were conducted on the phone in cases where the interviewee was unable to meet face to face.

Senior leaders (from the PCC's office and Health Leads<sup>35</sup>) from each LAP were contacted for interviews, out of which two PCCs responded to be interviewed over the phone, after obtaining consent, in February 2020. Five NPS probation officers in London were contacted<sup>36</sup> and two were interviewed on the phone after obtaining consent. Two police officers in London were contacted, but a convenient time to interview could not be arranged.

Interviews lasted between 10 and 30 minutes and were recorded with the permission of the participant. These interviews were anonymised, professionally transcribed and were coded and analysed using qualitative software NVIVO.

## **Stakeholder experience of involvement in MASIP**

### ***Multi-agency working***

Most stakeholders believed their involvement with MASIP to be a positive one and appreciated the benefits of multi-agency working. This was expressed by various stakeholders as,

*"We all have pieces and when you bring them together, we have much more of a positive income than if we didn't do that" - [SH5]*

One key aspect which was highlighted as a valuable aspect of multi-agency work was how efficient processes had become due to the ease of contact between agencies,

*"Rather than having to battle to get information or assistance, having multiple agencies on your doorstep has been a massive assistance." - [SH13]*

*"We've worked as a team rather than separate organisations. It just happens that we can log into different systems and have different knowledge and skillsets." - [SH3]*

The benefit of having agencies work together to provide each other with different perspective seems to have facilitated discussion and contributed to the understanding of case-management in a holistic way,

*"I would advise to embrace being part of a multi-agency team because ...there is so much knowledge that you gain from all these other different professionals..." - [SH15]*

Another stakeholder commented that,

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<sup>35</sup> These two agencies were common across all LAPs, whereas probation was not, and the victim advocates were employed by different agencies.

<sup>36</sup> We were provided with more probation professionals' contact details but the interviews conducted suggested that we had reached saturation quickly and that there would be little value in doing further interviews.

*“We've got our own agencies there to determine what we need to do within our agencies and we're all happy to listen as a unit to what other agency experts say we need to do, and that's been from the beginning and carried on.” - [SH14]*

Interviewees said they had enjoyed the experience of working as a team and being able to focus exclusively on stalking as a crime type.

*“So, one of the huge benefits from our perspective is having all these people joining and having that capacity around one particular crime type is hugely beneficial. I know there are other forces doing it now ... so it's definitely picking up in regards to recognising that it is a crime type that needs some attention specifically on it.” - [SH9]*

Overall, stakeholders admitted that while there were hurdles, stakeholders managed to overcome them and work better as a team, over the course of the project.

*“I think there have been some challenges with it and we have different cultures. But I think we've all learned from each other and taken on each other's points of view much more.”- [SH14]*

### **Project development and maturity**

Almost all stakeholders said that the project had changed over the time period, to varied degrees, in each LAP area. Development in one of the more established units was minor,

*“We've got a model, but there is flexibility within that model and I think the way we drafted our process on day one isn't drastically different from how it appears now.” - [SH4]*

In the others, the processes and partnerships evolved over time, as stakeholders told us,

*“When we first started, we were having I think triage meetings two-weekly, and the layout was very different to how we would do it now. And we've just continually evolved that on a week by week basis” - [SH9]*

*“I think at the beginning we had much more time, so we could sit down and talk about each case. Obviously we've had to develop, the numbers have been enormous ...I think we just have to keep evolving and that will keep changing as numbers change.” - [SH14]*

Even though the three LAP areas remained more or less faithful to their original models (see Belur et al 2019) the way they conducted their day to day working became more efficient over time, as acknowledged by this stakeholder,

*“The meetings were very much changed. It [the process] has become much more structured, concise and precise in what we're doing so that we're getting through cases quicker and we'll be much more effective in our outcomes” - [SH5]*

It was our observation that all three LAPs worked well together, and all of them demonstrated elements of good practice – however, the longest standing of these units, IASU, provided the best example of interagency working. We identified a number of factors that assisted this process: a clear understanding of what services the unit was best placed to provide and focusing resources on refining this service; co-location of the team ensuring channels of communication were always open; sufficient longevity of the unit to ensure that trust and information sharing protocols were set well; and finally, dedicated personnel who were totally focused on the shared objective. Although the other two units displayed many of these features, it was the combination of factors and personnel that made the unit at Cheshire a unique showcase for interagency working.

### ***Perceived success of the project***

When asked what they considered was the success of the project, stakeholders asserted that success was more than just the effect on reoffending, but comprised of a number of intangible benefits such as positive impact on victims' experiences as well as improving understanding of stalking in the criminal justice community. One successful outcome was the upskilling of staff with knowledge and training around stalking offences, to inform practitioner decisions around the treatment and management of cases.

*"We did lots of training at the beginning which people have found really positive and now we're doing all these consultations, both for pre-sentence report writers and offender managers which I think they find really helpful... I feel like we're able to really support people with particularly complex cases." - [SH14]*

Another stakeholder thought the success of the project for their organisation would be in raising awareness and recognition of the multi-agency stalking services provided,

*"... success would be around the making sure that the stalking service continues to be a well-established service; that's the most successful outcome, and that comes from the multi-agency aspect that is reflected in the way that we move the stalking service forward, and that that's recognised, not just by the organisation, which it is, but by everyone" - [SH10]*

Continuing in the same vein, another interviewee felt that success of the project was self-evident in the fact that they had received follow-on funding:

*"Well, I guess we've had certain elements of success in the fact that funding's been now extended. It would be more of a success if it was longer than a year; I think we'd all prefer three or five, but we'll take the year to start with." - [SH9]*

Receiving follow on funding was considered the ultimate accolade in terms of recognising the value of the MASIP partnerships. A great deal of effort was expended to ensure that each of the stakeholder agencies were brought on board to continue supporting the partnership. Our observations indicated that the final few months of the project were overshadowed by the pursuit of further funding to continue partnership work. This had a negative impact not only

on the numbers of victims and perpetrators the units felt comfortable to start intensive engagement with given their uncertain future, but also had a substantive effect on the morale of team personnel. There was near universal agreement among stakeholders that funding for 18 months was never going to be sufficient for demonstrating the impact of a complex project such as this.

### ***Personal and professional growth***

Stakeholders reported that being part of MASIP was beneficial for them from a personal and professional point of view because of the opportunity for growth and learning that it provided. The kinds of skills development mentioned below include improved understanding of the risks of stalking, greater confidence in voicing their professional opinion, establishing strong working relationships, and being able to incorporate views from various agencies in decision-making, as these stakeholders said,

*“Being the one for victims’ voices and everybody for the offender, sometimes you can feel that perhaps your voice was probably not as loud...I’ve had to choose my words, develop skills in how to get my information over more effectively, be more concise. And that’s been a real positive for me. It’s been a good development skill” – [SH5]*

*“I’ve learnt a lot, and I think we’ve all learnt a lot, and it’s been very exciting being part of something so worthwhile.” – [SH6]*

According to another stakeholder, much of this professional enhancement contributed to the management of stalking in a meaningful way.

*“From a professional point of view, it’s been incredibly rewarding because I’ve had the opportunity of integrating different ways of working, of understanding behaviour, and identifying risks with an associated behaviour from a psychological perspective, and to begin to think about risks associated with individual cases in a very sophisticated, scientific way.” - [SH1]*

### ***Challenges encountered***

Most stakeholders felt that their agencies had supported them well during MASIP and recognized the value in the project.

*“In all honesty, I think everything that we’ve heard is that they’ve always been very behind us, they recognise what we’re doing is very valuable, that it’s worthwhile.”- [SH3]*

*“I think it’s been quite good. To have a unit like this, within the Met, that has taken the time to carve out six or eight police officers to do what we do and effectively support us in doing it,” – [SH12]*

The support from the police is evidenced by one representative from the PCC's office who thought that,

*"I think it's just one of the most wonderful examples of operational partnerships that we've seen in a long time...I've been on the steering group locally and nationally so I'm not an expert in terms of stalking so I can't do much in terms of the operational stuff but what I have been able to do, is support the case for continuing funding." [SH16]*

Another PCC office representative stated that their role was to implement an appropriate governance structure, and the financial investment in the project was indicative of the faith in the project to deliver successful outcomes,

*"We have in a say in that the money comes through us, I'd like to ensure that the partnerships are strengthened and get more out of the health element from this... I'm hoping they'll raise the profile of stalking and its links to mental health and domestic abuse...they'll be able to assist their colleagues in terms of what signs to look for in a stalking case because they're not very skilled at it. I think we've been quite clear with our police colleagues about the importance of this service." [SH21]*

However, some other LAP stakeholders expressed negative experiences with their agency support, rooted in the failure of their supervisory team in giving due recognition to their contributions to the project. One stakeholder said,

*"The truth is, I don't really feel valued or respected in everything that I have done." - [SH15]*

It appeared as if most of the challenges in receiving the full support or recognition from their parent agency were related to the Health sector.

*"I don't feel like the Health Trust has been as supportive or as invested as it potentially could or should have been". - [SH7]*

*"Verbally, they're totally, 100% behind it, but that apathy in high-level support, strategic support from the health service, has been quite damaging I think." – [SH4]*

The lack of support was attributed to frequent changes in management, and the focus being on managing their internal requirements, in preference to helping the project to succeed.

Another stakeholder attributed Health's lack of support because in their opinion the project aims did not really fit in with their outcomes of interest,

*"I think that they've found it a little bit more challenging to appreciate what we're trying to do, because it doesn't really fit within their traditional funding model. So, from a Health perspective, it's been much more challenging to demonstrating outcomes that directly impact upon the mental health of the people that we're working with." - [SH1]*

While all stakeholders felt that their experiences were meaningful ones, many expressed particular challenges along their journey and involvement; mainly around management expectations and adapting to new processes of documentation and insufficient resource capacity.

*“The biggest challenges around the whole project itself has been the project management, and that’s been to do with... the structure of it has meant that actually we’ve been required to attend and respond to more meetings than we were expecting to, we’ve been given information and requirements to do things very late” – [SH10]*

There is a distinction between project management, which all LAPs appreciated was essential to their functioning, and programme management. The latter was necessary for the governance structures across the three pilot sites, and numerous organisations involved in the MASIP. MOPAC provided strategic programme management and the Suzy Lamplugh Trust provided operational programme management. Given the multi-layered nature of the governance structures (Home Office, MOPAC and the Suzy Lamplugh Trust), sometimes the stakeholders may have been misdirecting their frustrations regarding data reporting requirements.

A few stakeholders pointed out that starting the project without any data collection structures in place was a struggle, as they were completely responsible to think and model different ways to do so.

*“So how best to capture different information and document things, that for me has been a challenge.” - [SH5]*

### ***Impact of MASIP on perpetrators and victims***

Health practitioners interviewed said they realised that there were no ‘off the shelf’ perpetrator interventions. Each case was unique, and the needs of every perpetrator were different, thus practitioners had to learn to adapt and deliver bespoke treatments that addressed particular issues for every individual. Thus, having practitioners who were able to refine and develop their skills in dealing exclusively with stalking perpetrators was an immensely positive outcome of the project.

*“We’ve been doing the work with the perpetrators, what will work for one person might not work for another, and we have to really tailor that kind of intervention for their individual needs and what’s indicated. So it’s been really positive, I think, on the whole.” - [SH3]*

Similarly, stakeholders reported that given the serious impact stalking had on victims’ physical and mental wellbeing, they needed care and bespoke support for them to deal with the effect(s) of stalking and to take some control around their own risk management. One stakeholder said that it was rewarding to know that many victims who engaged with the services felt empowered,

*“The fact that even though the behaviours have either continued or just finished or whatever they feel stronger, they feel able to know what to do...they’ve got more knowledge of what’s happening to them, what they’re experiencing, they know there’s somebody specific they can phone and be in contact with”. - [SH5]*

Some interviewees highlighted the importance of specialising in a service which recognizes needs of victims and perpetrators correctly, in order provide bespoke interventions,

*“We have a much clearer understanding of stalking, solutions, tactics, investigations, legal issues, what success looks like in terms of the right people to target and make interventions with” – [SH4]*

This is substantiated by a probation officer, who expressed the value that specialist knowledge added to their ability to manage risk within their own caseloads,

*“They’ve been most helpful to what has been identified as risk factors, as protective factors and how to manage risk in the community. I think is the most part my job. And they’ve kind of assessed the case through having specialist knowledge,” [SH22]*

This holistic approach was believed to inform decisions more strongly and success in this light meant to improve the quality of service to both parties involved in a stalking case,

*“That we have undoubtedly changed people’s lives for the better, victims and perpetrators, 100%.” – [SH4]*

Furthermore, closer integration with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) was identified by stakeholders as one area for more partnership work in the future. Most stakeholders expressed the importance of CPS in managing the prosecution, as well as victim expectations. Whereas IASU had good rapport with their local CPS representatives and the RECOLO project was able to consult with their CPS point of contact in most cases – the absence of any regular CPS involvement in STAC was felt keenly. Overall, stakeholders felt that the inclusion of CPS as a full partner in MASIP would go a long way in improving the evidential robustness of the prosecution and help with managing victim expectations throughout their journey through the court processes.

An interesting observation made by health practitioners was the importance of addressing basic needs for the perpetrator which would indirectly help with treatment and, subsequently, re-offending potential. This was attributed to the understanding that many stalkers have not secured housing or employment after their criminal justice sanction and assistance with meeting such needs facilitated a trusting relationship between the practitioner and perpetrator, thus easing the process of implementing successful psychological treatment. As one stakeholder mentioned,

*“...the perpetrator and victim both have basic needs and it’s unfair to just cater to the victim and not the perpetrator, because you’re not protecting the victim doing that, you’re just making things the same.” - [SH4]*

## Lessons for the future

### **Resourcing**

We asked stakeholders what they would do differently with the benefit of hindsight. In recognition of the resourcing issue, some LAPs identified areas where their partnership and the services offered would benefit from the involvement of more specialised health professionals and greater involvement of probation and the CPS in areas where this was currently not integrated into the unit. There was a desire to hire such staff as they were believed to add value to understanding stalking behaviour and overall intervention processes.

*“There is a clinical reason why I’m saying an OT [occupational therapist], which I’m sure you know, basically to break that cycle of fixation on obsession through doing something, so an OT definitely would be useful.” - [SH1]*

*“I think we could probably make more of the probation service, so NPS. But two very dedicated NPS offender managers who, when they could turn up, would, and they would bring value, undoubtedly.” – [SH9]*

In London, given the sheer volume of cases being handled, the current provision of VA services was struggling to cope with the demands. Going forward stakeholders identified more resourcing was needed in this area.

There was also a recognition that despite the positive outcomes for the victims that resulted from the services provided by VA, there was a distinct need for more support for VAs and clinical supervision to be able to deal with the impact of managing victims, especially therapy and counselling, where this was absent.

*“I would definitely have had more advocates and I would put a provision in for clinical supervision, because that’s not something I’ve had, which I think has been quite crucial... that I’m doing all my own self-CPD ” – [SH5]*

### **Project management and data collection**

The role of programme and project management in the MASIP project evoked mixed reactions, with some stakeholders resenting what they saw as the demands of the current programme management.

*“I think at times it has been incredibly stressful ..., but there have been a lot of other layers and things to wade through, and a lot of reporting, especially with very high turnaround, that has added a lot of pressure and taken up a lot of time, so the amount of extra hours I’ve worked is crazy.” - [SH6]*

There was acknowledgement that project management at the level of each individual LAP was important, however. Thinking about what they would do differently going forwards, one stakeholder said,

*“We would have asked for more staff, more partners in here. We would have had a full-time, dedicated project manager.” - [SH4]*

On reflection, stakeholders felt that the requirements for data and information from the programme management team for reporting and accountability purposes, and from us as evaluators, were very resource intensive. Some stakeholders felt that going forward they would need to have a dedicated staff for data collection.

*“I would look at the supporting staff for analytics and research and for the internal projects that we do.” - [SH12]*

It was interesting to note that although all three LAPs felt that the programme management of the pilot project was less than ideal, they nevertheless realised the importance of project management more broadly.

There was also recognition from the stakeholders that the kind of data they could collect going forward would be more geared towards evidencing the intangible benefits of the project to the victims and measuring the costs involved in the intervention.

### **Conclusion**

Interviews with stakeholders clearly indicated ample benefits of engaging in a multi-agency approach to tackle stalking management and victimisation. Individually, the experience of working in a collaborative set up, created great opportunity for stakeholders to learn from each other and build on specialist knowledge to better identify and manage stalking cases. The MASIP was targeted to safeguard both perpetrators and victims. Treatment of both seem to contribute to the idea that reoffending could be contained if the bespoke needs of both parties were catered to. Overall our observation of meetings over the lifetime of the project and interviews with stakeholders indicated that although their processes and speed and sophistication of case disposals in meetings evolved and improved, the LAPs remained largely faithful to their original model and the programme Theory of Change that is described in the interim report (Belur et al 2019).

## 5. Cost benefit analysis

We undertook cost benefit analysis (CBA) of the MASIP to assess whether the benefits accruing from the outcomes were greater than the costs of implementing it. Conducting a CBA involves comparing the (monetised) impacts of an intervention with the (monetised) costs of the intervention itself. Assessing the economic costs involved and the costs avoided (the benefits) is crucial when informing decisions on how to allocate scarce public resources.

CBA is usually done by calculating the cost and benefit for an average unit (in this case, each case managed by a LAP) and aggregating over the total units for the intervention as a whole. However, interviews with stakeholders and our observations of clinic meetings in the three LAPs revealed that a 'typical' or 'average' case does not exist. Instead each case and the circumstances involved are unique. The main contribution of the MASIP, as the victim and perpetrator interviews reveal, is that a bespoke service and (sometimes) treatment are tailored to these unique cases. This led us to conclude that calculating an 'average' cost of the MASIP programme would be an exercise in futility. This is due to the context and costs in the three areas being different, but also the level of engagement and service provided by each LAP depended upon their theory of change model and the contextual requirements of the case itself. What's more, calculating the cost incurred and the benefits derived (by estimating the most likely outcomes in the absence of the MASIP) required detailed information about each case, which was beyond the resources of the project.

It was therefore decided that instead of trying to conduct a misleading CBA at the programme or LAP level, we would instead take an in-depth focus on two case studies in each LAP. For these cases, we aimed to obtain all the costs based on detailed information about the actions taken by the LAP partners and other agencies, both statutory and non-statutory, that provided services to the victims and perpetrators involved in the case.

### Method

We invited each of the LAPs to identify suitable cases for the CBA and conducted focus groups, where possible, with all stakeholder agencies involved in the case. These representatives came prepared with the details of the case and the actions taken during the case management. Detailed information was obtained on who was involved in each action (e.g., referrals meeting) and how much time was spent (e.g., preparation time, travel time, duration of meeting, follow-up time).

The CBA cases would have ideally been randomly selected from the closed cases on each LAP, stratified by stalker type. However, data maintained by the three LAPs did not contain consistent information about the status of the case, which challenged our preferred approach. Since the stakeholder practitioners had to provide detailed information relating to each case, we requested that they select cases according to the following criteria:

1. The case should be notionally closed – i.e. at least 3 months since the cessation of active MASIP engagement with the victim and perpetrator<sup>37</sup>.
2. One of the cases should involve ex-intimate partners (due to this stalker type being most prevalent across the three LAPs – see the quantitative analysis section). There was no specification of stalker type for the other case.
3. The case could be complex or simple.
4. The outcome could be satisfactory or not.

Importantly, to fully monetise the costs, it was vital that stakeholders had all the relevant information relating to the involvement of their agency in a case, and knowledge of the extent of involvement of external agencies. For instance, police and probation know about the court proceedings. A total of six focus groups were held with representatives of all the agencies involved to discuss the chosen case in great detail. The focus groups were conducted between November and December 2019 and at least two researchers were present to lead these. Five of the six cases were discussed in person, and one case was discussed with the health practitioner on the phone<sup>38</sup>. Extensive notes were made during the focus groups and any information that was later found to be critical to the CBA was followed up with the relevant practitioner. All efforts were made to keep the cases anonymised during the focus groups. Each focus group lasted between 45 - 70 minutes.

As is recommended in CBA literature<sup>39</sup> we strived to calculate both direct and indirect costs *and also* the tangible and intangible costs to appropriate individuals and organisations. This means that, uniquely, we have costed for the emotional and physical harm that victims suffer for crimes, including stalking. This is important given the overwhelming evidence that documents the acute suffering of stalking victims.

Costs for each item in the following analysis were sourced from various academic, government and other sources (see Appendix 6). An unusual aspect of our CBA is not only do we calculate the benefit-cost ratio for the state, but also for the victim/s. What's more, to provide a range of estimates, we calculate the benefit-cost ratio for these two entities in projected best-case and worst-case scenarios over the medium term (six months), focusing on what might be the most favourable and least favourable outcomes that might possibly occur in each case in the absence of MASIP intervention. These projected scenarios were constructed in accordance with the risk assessment scores and practitioner input based on their experience and knowledge of the case. We acknowledge that these are, at best,

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<sup>37</sup> LAPs were left to define what they thought a closed case should be according to their individual criteria.

<sup>38</sup> This was Hampshire's second case

<sup>39</sup> For example, see Manning, M., Johnson, S. D., Tilley, N., Wong, G. T., & Vorsina, M. (2016). *Economic analysis and efficiency in policing, criminal justice and crime reduction: What works?*. Springer.

informed guesses about how the situation would have progressed in each case if there had been no MASIP intervention. It is worth saying that a benefit-cost ratio of 2 can be interpreted as: for every £1 spent (say, by the state), £2 of savings are made. Ratio values under 1 are therefore not cost-beneficial as the intervention costs outweigh the counterfactual costs.

The six case study narratives are presented below. A detailed breakdown of how the costs were calculated and the sources of costs can be found in Appendix 6. It must be emphasised that we have anonymised the narratives of these cases to protect the identity of victims and perpetrators.

### ***Limitations***

We acknowledge a few limitations with the method adopted. Instead of attempting to do what might be called a 'shallow' CBA of the entire MASIP, the approach we took involved doing a 'deep' CBA of a handful of cases, which is unconventional but well suited to the distinctive nature of the MASIP.

The main limitation of this approach is that the cases selected by the practitioners for analysis were not representative of the rest of their caseload. Despite the inclusion criteria we provided for this selection, all three LAPs selected cases that were high risk, and demanding of resources. They also tended to select cases that were unusual or particularly memorable<sup>40</sup>, but were not always the most successful ones. The upshot of this is that the CBA presented here is not typical of all cases, which likely have fewer costs for both the state and victim/s. This selection bias is not wholly problematic however, since it provides an understanding of the costs (and benefits) associated with complex and high-risk cases. Even if an area only has these types of cases arise rarely, the consequences of one of the worst-case scenarios playing out is unthinkable from a social perspective and excessively demanding from a public sector resource perspective.

This naturally leads onto the second limitation of this approach. The construction of best- and worst-case scenarios was done in consultation with the health practitioners involved in the case and based on careful consideration of the risk assessment profiles for each perpetrator. Crucially however, we cannot say with any certainty whether these scenarios would have played out without intervention from the LAPs. Risk assessment tools are dynamic, and risk can escalate and de-escalate for many reasons. The reason for providing two different counterfactual scenarios for the CBA was to protect against bias of assuming that only one outcome was possible.

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<sup>40</sup> For example, choosing a case with a female perpetrator or with a complex mental health issue, which is uncommon and can inadvertently reinforce inappropriate stereotypes.

Two more minor limitations of the approach we took to CBA was that it depended on the practitioners' memories, which may have under- or over-estimated the time and resources spent on each case (our observation was that the former was more common, although this was partially mitigated through prompts and probing questions). We also did not consider the opportunity costs associated with the MASIP, which refers to what outcomes could have been achieved had something other than the MASIP been funded.

## Cheshire case 1

### Stalker type: Rejected

Risk assessment dimension	Risk assessment rating
Risk of serious/significant violence	High risk but occurrence of violence is not currently imminent
Risk of persistence	Moderate (later downgraded to low and changed to moderate risk of recurrence)
Risk of recurrence	Low (later changed to moderate)
Risk of psycho-social damage to the perpetrator	Moderate

### **Background**

The victim (V) and perpetrator (P) were in a marriage involving coercive control and domestic violence by the P. The P had a history of domestic abuse in his first marriage, as well. Following an alleged sexual assault by the P on the V, he was asked to leave the marital home. The P thereafter stalked the V over a few months, culminating in a serious violent incident. Although there was evidence of stalking, the P received a substantial determinate prison sentence. Whilst the P was in prison, there was intelligence to suggest he tried to contact the V in the early period, which left the V terrified. Concerns were held by professionals approaching the P's release from prison about the perceived high risk of violence associated with managing the P in the community and a MAPPa process was initiated. This was the time when IASU was invited to be involved in the case.

### **MASIP involvement (period of 14 months)**

Probation referred the case to IASU. IASU supported the MAPPa process by interviewing the P in prison several times to produce a comprehensive risk assessment, based on an extensively researched timeline of events. The evidence from this suggested that the P had not sought out the V or engaged in any violence whilst on day release, however the risk of recurrence with another victim was moderate. From the interviews, IASU experts deemed that there was high risk of violence, but this was not imminent (under the current circumstances). However, they deemed that there was a moderate risk of recurrence of stalking behaviour and a moderate risk of psycho-social harm to himself. IASU worked with the P's probation officer to develop her thinking about understanding the risk and managing it appropriately while interacting constructively with the P. Meanwhile, the victim advocate worked extensively with the V in terms of practical support and safety planning. Thus, IASU's contribution to the case was in appropriate risk assessment for probation to follow up, and vital support for the victim to manage her own fears and risks.

The total costs for what happened with IASU's involvement over 14 months amounted to £7,182.54 for the state and the victim incurred costs of £20,579.74 for the same period (see

table below). The costs that were plausibly avoided have been estimated in a best- and worst-case scenario, which was devised based on the risk assessment ratings, and in consultation with the practitioners involved in the case.

<b>What happened (costs)</b>	
Infrastructure costs (per referral) <sup>1</sup>	£ 151.13
Referral <sup>2</sup>	£ 552.14
Initial risk assessment <sup>3</sup>	£ 4,435.79
Safeguarding for V <sup>4</sup>	£ 1,892.09
Post-conviction follow-up <sup>5</sup>	£ 151.88
In/direct costs to V <sup>6</sup>	£ 20,579.74
TOTAL COSTS TO STATE	£ 7,182.54
TOTAL COSTS TO VICTIM	£ 20,579.74
TOTAL COSTS	£ 27,762.28

***Plausible scenarios in the absence of IASU involvement (period of 6 months)***

**Best-case scenario in terms of outcomes:** MAPPA would not have an accurate risk assessment and take a very generic view to the risk management and would consider this case very high risk because of the previous severity of violence. Probation would be unlikely to recognise and classify the behaviour as stalking. The P would have become increasingly antagonised by this approach and feel that he wasn't being heard. He would blame the V for the impact on his life and would contact the V again and viciously attack her. The V and her family would experience severe trauma.

<b>What could have happened (costs avoided)</b>		<b>Benefit/cost ratio</b>
Indirect costs to the victim <sup>10</sup>	£ 71,438.41	
Costs to the state for violence with injury <sup>11</sup>	£ 20,179.26	
TOTAL COSTS TO STATE	£ 20,179.26	2.8
TOTAL COSTS TO VICTIM	£ 71,438.41	3.5

**Worst-case scenario in terms of outcomes:** Initially the P would not be motivated to contact the V, however frustrations regarding his prospects of resuming work would destabilise him a couple of months after his release. Whilst unemployed he would get into a relationship with a vulnerable woman and the patterns of conflict and abuse that characterised the P's previous relationships would begin. The relationship would swiftly break down. He would blame the V for this and start ruminating about their relationship. He would not engage with mental health services, would become increasingly estranged from his family, further increasing his sense of resentment and frustration. This would lead him to take his own life (he had a previous history of suicidal ideation). The original V would be distressed throughout this period as would the new V (partner) following P's ill treatment of her.

<b>What could have happened (costs avoided)</b>	<b>Benefit/cost ratio</b>
Indirect costs for V <sup>7</sup>	£ 2,682.45
Harm to new V for violence without injury <sup>8</sup>	£ 23,636.47
Costs to state for violence without injury <sup>8</sup>	£ 7,718.67
Costs to society for P's suicide* <sup>9</sup>	£ 2,254,500.00
<b>TOTAL COSTS</b>	<b>£ 2,288,537.59</b>
	<b>82.4</b>

\* This estimate combines the intangible costs (loss of life to the individual and the pain and suffering of relatives), as well as lost output (both waged and unwaged), police time and funerals. For this reason, it is not possible to calculate the costs in the counterfactual scenario to the state and victim. The benefit-cost ratio has been calculated using the total costs in the what happened scenario.

## Cheshire case 2

### Stalker Type: Intimacy Seeker

Risk assessment dimension	Risk assessment rating
Risk of serious/significant violence	Moderate risk of general violence, low risk of imminent serious/significant violence
Risk of persistence	High
Risk of recurrence	-
Risk of psycho-social damage to the perpetrator	High

#### **Background**

The perpetrator (P), who has a chronic history of drug and alcohol abuse with intermittent periods of being of no fixed abode was a client of the victim (V), for a brief time, two years prior to the stalking. The P began stalking the V by making increasingly sexually graphic and threatening phone calls to the V at work. Police were alerted, P was arrested and spent time in prison. The stalking, whilst brief, had a significant impact on the victim and her professional identity.

#### **IASU involvement (period of 12 months)**

P was referred to the IASU on arrest. IASU assisted with investigative support to the police and completed a comprehensive risk assessment prior to the P being released on bail. The risk assessment revealed that while there was no indication of risk of immediate or significant violence, there was a high risk of persistence, and given the Ps complex needs, a high risk of psycho-social harm to himself. The recommendation was for the P to be remanded to a secure psychiatric hospital when he was rearrested for breaching his bail conditions. IASU liaised with a neighbouring police force to coordinate the response to the P breaching his bail conditions.

The V's workplace was not sympathetic and were not willing to make changes to her work conditions to ensure her safety. It had a serious impact on her mental well-being, and she went off sick from work when P breached his bail conditions. The Victim Advocate met with administrators at V's work and helped the V to resolve some of the grievances related to her work and a safety plan has now been devised for the workplace. IASU's training for the workplace staff resulted in a change in attitude towards accepting their own responsibility towards V's risk management in the workplace. The Victim Advocate continues to provide support to the V regularly.

The total costs for what happened with IASU's involvement over 12 months amounted to £81,382.09 for the state (of which £3,189.40 was attributable to the costs of IASU) and the victim incurred costs of approximately £34,791.68 for the same period (see table below). The costs that were plausibly avoided have been estimated in a best- and worst-case scenario,

which was devised based on the risk assessment ratings, and in consultation with the practitioners involved in the case.

What happened (costs)	
Infrastructure costs (per referral) <sup>1</sup>	£ 151.13
Referral <sup>2</sup>	£ 445.74
Initial risk assessment <sup>3</sup>	£ 2,019.67
Police costs for P's breach of bail <sup>4</sup>	£ 311.19
Prison costs for P <sup>5</sup>	£ 7,281.82
Secure Hospital costs for P <sup>6</sup>	£ 68,020.73
Safeguarding for V <sup>7</sup>	£ 628.94
Post-conviction follow-up <sup>8</sup>	£ 2,522.87
In/direct costs to V <sup>9</sup>	£ 34,791.68
TOTAL COSTS TO STATE	£ 81,382.09
TOTAL COSTS TO VICTIM	£ 34,791.68

**Plausible scenarios in the absence of IASU intervention (6 months)**

**Best-case scenario in terms of outcomes:** On release from prison the P would continue to abuse drugs and alcohol and have a poor lifestyle, whilst being socially isolated, and would display delusional behaviour. He would continue to access NHS services frequently, but with little long-term relief. The V would experience trauma legacy but would eventually return to work.

What could have happened (costs avoided)		Benefit/cost ratio
Indirect costs to V <sup>10</sup>	£ 11,913.45	
NHS costs for P <sup>11</sup>	£ 6,921.91	
Samaritans cost <sup>12</sup>	£ 108.00	
TOTAL COSTS TO STATE	£ 6,921.91	0.09*
TOTAL COSTS TO VICTIM	£ 11,913.45	0.34 <sup>x</sup>

\* Not including institutional costs ratio = 1.11

<sup>x</sup> Not including safety dog ratio = 1.36

**Worst-case scenario in terms of outcomes:** On release from prison the P would continue to abuse drugs and alcohol leading to a severe deterioration in his health, whilst being socially isolated, and would display delusional behaviour. The P would visit the V's home address. Making good on previous threats, the P would sexually assault the V. The V would be further traumatised and not be able to return to work; lose her house as a result, and eventually rely on benefits. The P would be arrested and prosecuted for sexual assault, but his underlying mental health condition would remain undiagnosed. Whilst on bail he would become homeless and be assaulted.

<b>What could have happened (costs avoided)</b>		<b>Benefit/cost ratio</b>
Indirect costs to V <sup>13</sup>	£ 20,163.65	
1 year of benefits for V <sup>14</sup>	£ 10,515.44	
State costs for sexual assault to V <sup>15</sup>	£ 1,228.77	
State costs for assault to P <sup>16</sup>	£ 2,201.10	
NHS costs for P <sup>11</sup>	£ 6,921.91	
Samaritans cost <sup>12</sup>	£ 108.00	
<b>TOTAL COSTS TO STATE</b>	<b>£ 20,867.23</b>	<b>0.26*</b>
<b>TOTAL COSTS TO VICTIM</b>	<b>£ 20,163.65</b>	<b>0.58<sup>x</sup></b>

\* Not including institutional costs ratio = 3.35

<sup>x</sup> Not including safety dog ratio = 2.29

## Hampshire case 1

### Stalker type: Intimacy Seeker

Risk assessment dimension	Risk assessment rating
Risk of serious/significant violence	Medium risk
Risk of persistence	High risk
Risk of recurrence	High risk
Risk of psycho-social damage to the perpetrator	High risk

### **Background**

The perpetrator (P) and victim (V) were in a patient- health worker relationship. The P started stalking the victim in October; two years after the (mental health related) treatment was provided. Stalking behaviour included repeated emails, photographing the V's car, and attempting to obtain V's address. P had already harassed someone else at an address believed to be the V's. P also made countless calls to V's workplace complaining of unfair treatment and 40+ calls to police. P's behaviour had not been recognised as stalking but was treated by the police as malicious communication and harassment. The P's mental health issues had previously been diagnosed as personality disorder and she had been discharged from services.

### **MASIP involvement (period of 12 months)**

The V self-referred herself into victim advocacy service and the case was discussed by the Recolo team. Their main contribution was in supporting the V, and the investigation of the case. The V was very distressed and had been off work with stress for over a year. However, during the trial, following a psychiatric assessment, the Judge deemed the P as unfit to stand trial. Recolo was further involved in diagnosing the P and highlighting the obsessive and fixated behaviour which had previously been undiagnosed. As a result, the P was detained in a secure hospital under the Mental Health Act. Victim Advocacy has been closely involved in supporting the V and putting in a safety and support plan in place to help her.

<b>What happened (costs)</b>	
Infrastructure costs (per referral) <sup>1</sup>	£ 59.92
Partnership meeting <sup>2</sup>	£ 837.51
Initial risk assessment <sup>3</sup>	£ 1,817.37
Safeguarding for V <sup>4</sup>	£ 1,164.65
Post-conviction follow-up <sup>5</sup>	£ 932.77
NHS cost (secure hospital stay) <sup>6</sup>	£ 80,185.11
In/direct costs to V <sup>7</sup>	£ 17,939.72
<b>TOTAL COSTS TO STATE</b>	<b>£ 84,969.55</b>
<b>TOTAL COSTS TO VICTIM</b>	<b>£ 17,939.72</b>

***Plausible scenarios in the absence of Recolo involvement (period of 6 months from background information)***

**Best-case scenario in terms of outcomes:** P’s behaviour would not be recognised as stalking. Due to the P’s mental health condition the persistence would have continued but, when unable to contact the V, the P would harass the V’s work colleagues instead. The V’s anxiety levels would have stayed high, impacting on her health and ability to work. She eventually would change her car and job, at a cost to herself, and would have to rely on state provided counselling with her depleted finances.

<b>What could have happened (costs avoided)</b>		<b>Benefit/cost ratio</b>
In/direct costs to original V <sup>8</sup>	£ 14,965.42	
Costs to V’s workplace <sup>9</sup>	£ 732.66	
Costs to state for victim’s lost productivity <sup>10</sup>	£ 6,851.76	
<b>TOTAL COSTS TO STATE</b>	<b>£ 8,942.23</b>	<b>0.1*</b>
<b>TOTAL COSTS TO VICTIM</b>	<b>£ 14,965.42</b>	<b>0.8</b>

\* benefit-cost ratio excluding institutional costs = 1.9

**Worst-case scenario in terms of outcomes:** P’s behaviour would not be recognised as stalking. Due to the P’s mental health condition the persistence would have continued to the point of finding out the V’s whereabouts and resuming contact with the V multiple times daily. The P would have continued to call V’s workplace and would have been charged with malicious communication, rather than stalking, and given a caution. The V’s anxiety levels would have stayed high, impacting on her health and ability to work. She eventually would change her car and job, at a cost to herself, and would have to rely on state provided counselling with her depleted finances.

Two more people would have been subject to harassment when the P erroneously confronted them assuming that it was V’s address. The P would have at least two further care contacts with mental health specialist teams and eventually be sectioned, but without professionals having a full understanding of her obsessive and fixated behaviour. The P would be released and go on to stalk another victim.

What could have happened (costs avoided)		Benefit/cost ratio
In/direct costs to original V <sup>8</sup>	£ 14,965.42	
Costs to V's workplace <sup>9</sup>	£ 732.66	
Costs to state for victim's lost productivity <sup>10</sup>	£ 6,851.76	
Harm to 2x harassment Vs <sup>11</sup>	£ 6,004.00	
Costs to state for 2x harassment <sup>11</sup>	£6,432.36	
CJS costs <sup>12</sup>	£ 1,673.30	
NHS MH service costs <sup>13</sup>	£ 471.18	
NHS cost (secure hospital stay) <sup>14</sup>	£ 33,938.81	
Harm to new stalking V <sup>15</sup>	£ 22,894.89	
Costs to state for new stalking V <sup>15</sup>	£ 8,105.12	
TOTAL COSTS TO STATE	£ 59,563.01	0.7
TOTAL COSTS TO VICTIM	£ 43,865.27	2.4

\* benefit-cost ratio excluding institutional costs (for both scenarios) = 2.7

## Hampshire case 2

### Stalker type: Rejected

Risk assessment dimension	Risk assessment rating
Risk of serious/significant violence	Low
Risk of persistence	Medium
Risk of psycho-social damage to the perpetrator	Medium

### **Background**

The perpetrator (P) and victim (V) had been in an intimate relationship for a few years before it ended. The main reason for this was the controlling behaviour of the P, which was exacerbated by his mental health condition. For the duration of this period, the P's mental health was being managed by the Community Mental Health team. Following the breakup, the P stalked the V for over a year; his behaviours included loitering around her home, following her, tracking the V's phone and sending unwanted messages. The P was reported to the police for stalking in late 2018 and convicted a few months after.

### **MASIP involvement (period of ~8 months)**

The criminal justice and liaison service referred the P to the Recolo Project following his conviction. Following psychological assessment by the health practitioner, they received therapeutic treatment. The stalking behaviour has ceased. A subsequent risk assessment by the clinic (6 months later) has judged risk levels on all three dimensions (violence, persistence and psycho-social damage to self) as low.

<b>What happened (costs)</b>	
Infrastructure costs (per referral) <sup>1</sup>	£ 59.92
Referral <sup>2</sup>	£ 42.59
Initial risk assessment <sup>3</sup>	£ 100.11
Therapeutic treatment <sup>4</sup>	£ 2,397.24
Indirect costs to the V <sup>5</sup>	£ 6,482.71
<b>TOTAL COSTS TO STATE</b>	<b>£ 2,592.87</b>
<b>TOTAL COSTS TO VICTIM</b>	<b>£ 6,482.71</b>

### **Plausible scenarios in the absence of Recolo involvement (period of 6 months from background information)**

**Best-case scenario in terms of outcomes:** The P would continue to try and contact the V post-release and feel increasingly frustrated with her non-engagement. His mental health would deteriorate, and he would be referred back to the community mental health unit but his underlying obsessive and fixated behaviour would remain undiagnosed and untreated in the medium term. The P's contact with his children would remain limited and this would increase

his frustration causing him to become more threatening in his attempted contacts with the V. The V would suffer from some trauma and anxiety and self-refer to get therapeutic counselling from the NHS. She would continue to call the police to report P's attempts to contact her directly or through her friends and family.

What could have happened (costs avoided)		Benefit-cost ratio
Indirect costs to V <sup>6</sup>	£ 4,862.03	
CJS costs <sup>7</sup>	£ 524.70	
NHS MH treatment for V <sup>8</sup>	£ 2,651.29	
NHS MH treatment for P <sup>9</sup>	£ 387.76	
TOTAL COSTS TO STATE	£ 3,563.75	1.4
TOTAL COSTS TO VICTIM	£ 4,862.03	0.8

**Worst-case scenario in terms of outcomes:** The stalking would continue after P's conviction and would escalate into threats being made to the V. Following his release, the P would loiter outside their children's school in an attempt to make contact with the V. The V would again report this behaviour to the police, calling three times in one week because of the level of concern. Their eldest child would be affected by the situation and experience anxiety and depression necessitating treatment by Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS). A multi-agency intervention (MARAC) would be convened following assessment of risk of harm to the children. *(Since the victim has not engaged with victim advocacy services, the following developments are considered likely from the academic literature on the impact of stalking on victims).* These developments would affect the V's mental wellbeing, causing her to experience depression and post-traumatic stress disorder due to the ongoing trauma of being stalked. The V would have alarms fitted in her house in an initial attempt to feel safe. Her mental health would deteriorate, and she would be signed off work on long term sick, and eventually leave that job and become reliant on benefits to support the family. The P's mental health would also deteriorate and at least two care contacts would be required. The subsequent therapeutic treatment would not be tailored to deal with the fixation and obsession, and the stalking would continue. To get away from the P the V would move to a new house.

What could have happened (costs avoided)		Benefit-cost ratio
In/direct costs to the V <sup>10</sup>	£ 14,248.89	
CJS costs <sup>7</sup>	£ 524.70	
NHS MH treatment for V <sup>8</sup>	£ 2,877.30	
MARAC convened <sup>11</sup>	£ 709.83	
CAMHS treatment for V's child <sup>12</sup>	£ 4,280.21	
V is signed off on long term sick <sup>13</sup>	£ 7,226.00	
V becomes reliant on benefits <sup>14</sup>	£ 13,804.18	
TOTAL COSTS TO STATE	£ 29,422.21	11.3
TOTAL COSTS TO VICTIM	£ 14,248.89	2.2

## STAC case 1

### Stalker type: Intimacy Seeker

Risk assessment dimension	Risk assessment rating
Risk of serious/significant violence	Low
Risk of persistence	High
Risk of psycho-social damage to the perpetrator	High

#### **Background**

The victim (V) and perpetrator (P) met through friends several years ago but there was never a relationship between them. The stalking behaviour began in 2015 and has been exclusively online as the P was not aware of the V's current whereabouts since she moved out of the area. The obsession escalated and the messages sent via social media became increasingly threatening. The V reported this to her local Police Force (which was outside London) and the P was prosecuted for malicious communication. The court initiated a restraining order and gave the P a suspended sentence. This was breached and the P was arrested and sentenced to prison. The P continued contacting the V whilst in prison. The V was extremely distressed by the prolonged stalking behaviour and had been off work with stress.

#### **STAC Intervention (6 months)**

NPS referred the case to STAC in 2019. The local police were treating the V's further reports of contact from the P as malicious communications until STAC stepped in. STAC and the Victim Advocate helped the V to draft a personal statement and encouraged the court to request a psychiatric report on the P in prison, which ultimately resulted in a swift sentence for the P. STAC's primary contribution was in correctly classifying the offence, initiating a psychiatric assessment of the P and providing support to the V so that she supported the investigation (the V was receiving Advocate support in her local area).

The total costs for what happened with STAC's involvement over 6 months amounted to £7,136.36 for the state while the victim incurred costs of approximately £19,936 for the same period (see table below). The costs that were plausibly avoided have been estimated in a best- and worst-case scenario, which was devised based on the risk assessment rating, and in consultation with the practitioners involved in the case.

<b>What happened (costs)</b>	
Infrastructure costs (per referral) <sup>1</sup>	£ 65.29
Ad hoc STAC meetings <sup>2</sup>	£ 243.95
Initial risk assessment <sup>3</sup>	£ 751.39
Initial consultation with NPS <sup>4</sup>	£ 696.54
Court preparation for the V <sup>5</sup>	£ 2,238.54
Court preparation for the P <sup>6</sup>	£ 2,853.43
Post-conviction follow-up <sup>7</sup>	£ 287.22
Indirect costs to V <sup>8</sup>	£ 19,936.00
<b>TOTAL COSTS TO STATE</b>	<b>£ 7,136.36</b>
<b>TOTAL TO VICTIM</b>	<b>£ 19,936.00</b>

***Plausible scenarios in the absence of STAC intervention (6 months)***

**Best-case scenario in terms of outcomes:** The local police would continue to treat the P's behaviour as malicious communication. The P would become depressed and increasingly isolated as he was unemployed and his support network non-existent. He would feel increasingly resentful of the V and keep sending her threatening messages, as his risk of persistence was high. The P would direct his obsession towards another victim and begin contacting her online. The original V would continue to experience anxiety and suffer productivity losses at work. She would access mental health treatment on the NHS after exhausting the support from her employer.

<b>What could have happened (costs avoided)</b>		<b>Benefit/cost ratio</b>
In/Direct costs to V <sup>9</sup>	£ 4,862.03	
NHS MH treatment for V <sup>10</sup>	£ 1,357.82	
V lost wages/productivity <sup>11</sup>	£ 6,851.76	
Harm to new stalking V <sup>12</sup>	£ 29,746.65	
Costs to state for new stalking offence <sup>13</sup>	£ 1,263.81	
Police costs for mal comms <sup>14</sup>	£ 249.30	
<b>TOTAL COSTS TO STATE</b>	<b>£ 9,722.69</b>	<b>1.4</b>
<b>TOTAL TO VICTIM/S</b>	<b>£ 34,608.68</b>	<b>1.7</b>

**Worst-case scenario in terms of outcomes:** The local police would continue to treat the P's behaviour as malicious communication. NPS would remain ignorant of the seriousness of the behaviour to treat it as stalking and as a result, be unable to manage the P appropriately. The P's risk of violence would increase, and he would become angry with his probation officer. As he would be unable to physically access the V he would concentrate on harassing her family as he had previously threatened, (he knew they lived locally to him). Two family members would become secondary stalking victims and the P would go on to assault one (without injury) as the risk of violence would have escalated. The family would not have faith in the CJS to deal with it and would make private security arrangements. The V would become increasingly isolated from her family, never visiting them, and would have been discharged

from her job on medical grounds, relying on benefits and NHS mental health treatment before getting another, lower paid job. The P's risk of psycho-social harm was deemed to be high so his substance abuse behaviour would lead to deteriorating health and would have presented to a primary care health centre as a victim himself, thus accessing services.

<b>What could have happened (benefits)</b>		<b>Benefit/cost ratio</b>
Indirect costs to V <sup>9</sup>	£ 4,862.03	
NHS MH treatment for V <sup>10</sup>	£ 1,357.82	
V lost wages/productivity <sup>11</sup>	£ 6,851.76	
6 months on benefits for V <sup>15</sup>	£ 5,257.72	
Harm to 2x stalking Vs <sup>16</sup>	£ 56,493.30	
Costs to state for 2x stalking offences <sup>17</sup>	£ 2,527.63	
Harm to V for assault <sup>18</sup>	£ 30,697.12	
Costs to state for assault <sup>19</sup>	£ 1,890.50	
Private security for new V's <sup>20</sup>	£2,000.00	
NHS MH treatment for P <sup>21</sup>	£ 2,868.96	
Police costs for mal comms <sup>14</sup>	£ 249.30	
<b>TOTAL COSTS TO STATE</b>	<b>£ 14,151.93</b>	<b>2.0</b>
<b>TOTAL TO VICTIM/S</b>	<b>£ 99,486.07</b>	<b>5.0</b>

## **STAC case 2**

**Stalker type: Rejected**

**SASH assessment: high concern**

### ***Background***

The victim (V) was in an abusive relationship with the perpetrator (P). Police were contacted on several occasions, but the V always withdrew the allegation. The P had a history of drug and alcohol problems and had a previous conviction for stalking and violence. The V fell pregnant but terminated the pregnancy because of concerns about the relationship. The P subjected her to further emotional and psychological abuse and harassed her family. The P was arrested for drug offences and sent to prison. On his release from prison, the P stole some property belonging to the V and her friend. This was reported to the police. The V then went on holiday outside of the UK and the P turned up. The V reported this from the country she was in and was fearful to return to the UK.

### ***STAC involvement (15 months)***

The case was referred to STAC by NPS when the P was due to be released from prison. The V started to engage with STAC. The V subsequently resumed the relationship with the P under duress and stopped engaging with victim advocacy services. The police officer in charge stayed in contact with STAC as the investigation was ongoing. Five months later the V was still living with him but contacted police and showed them 300 pages of evidence that the coercive control had continued. The P was arrested and remanded. The STAC victim advocate arranged for the V and her family to be rehoused pre-trial so the V would give a statement – they spent 4 weeks in a refuge. The V's sister was heavily involved in supporting the investigation and relocated at a loss too. With the help of the V's statement, the P was given a custodial sentence. He continued to message the V from prison. STAC did a consultation with the pre-sentence report writer and he got 3 years in prison and will be managed by the NPS on release. The V feels safer living in a place unknown to the P. She is now employed full-time work. She continues to report contact from the perpetrator which feeds into the risk management process.

The total costs for what happened with STAC's involvement over 15 months amounted to £46,006.24 for the state (£8,922.42 of this was attributed directly to STAC's running costs, much of which was spent on Victim Advocate support) and the victim incurred costs of approximately £40,122.39 for the same period (see table below). The costs that were plausibly avoided have been estimated in a best- and worst-case scenario, which was devised based on the risk assessment rating, and in consultation with the practitioners involved in the case.

<b>What happened (costs)</b>	
Infrastructure costs (per referral) <sup>1</sup>	£ 65.29
Initial risk assessment <sup>2</sup>	£ 445.13
Initial consultation with OiC <sup>3</sup>	£ 504.39
Court preparation for the V/s <sup>4</sup>	£ 6,942.70
Post-conviction follow-up <sup>5</sup>	£ 1,100.22
CJS costs (prison) <sup>6</sup>	£ 36,948.52
In/direct costs to V/s <sup>7</sup>	£ 40,122.39
<b>TOTAL COSTS TO STATE</b>	<b>£ 46,006.24</b>
<b>TOTAL TO VICTIM/S</b>	<b>£ 40,122.39</b>

***Plausible scenarios in the absence of STAC intervention (6 months after the V going to the police with evidence of coercive control)***

**Best-case scenario in terms of outcomes:** The police would charge the P with harassment as there would be insufficient evidence to establishing coercive control or stalking without the V supporting the investigation. The P is released after a short sentence in prison and is not deterred by this due to his numerous convictions for harassment and previous arrests for stalking. He resumes his attempts to contact the V, thus breaching his restraining order, but the V would not report through lack of confidence. As the risk was assessed as being of high concern, he would most likely try to contact the V by threatening friends and family members, causing these secondary victims stress and anxiety. In the meanwhile, the victim and her family would relocate, but continue to experience trauma and anxiety. The victim would find a low paid job but would need to access mental health services.

<b>What could have happened (benefits)</b>		<b>Benefit/cost ratio</b>
Indirect costs to V <sup>8</sup>	£ 28,498.50	
Indirect costs to secondary Vs <sup>9</sup>	£ 47,272.94	
Costs to state for assault & harassment <sup>10</sup>	£ 23,156.01	
Mental health treatment for V on NHS <sup>11</sup>	£ 1,357.82	
Mild anxiety for 3 family/friends <sup>12</sup>	£ 164.50	
Relocation costs for family <sup>13</sup>	£ 25,000.00	
<b>COSTS TO STATE</b>	<b>£ 24,513.83</b>	<b>0.5*</b>
<b>COSTS TO VICTIMS</b>	<b>£ 100,935.94</b>	<b>2.5</b>

\* Excluding institutional costs this ratio is 2.7

**Worst-case scenario in terms of outcomes:** The case against the P would have been dropped due to lack of evidence and lack of V support for the investigation. No risk management would be done in relation to the V. The P's behaviour would escalate, and his behaviour towards the victim and her family would become increasingly threatening until he would eventually physically assault the V. The V would report the assault to the police and move into a refuge.

The P would grow desperate and follow family members or intimidate them into revealing her whereabouts and would follow the V when she is out and about. He would ultimately kill her as the risk of violence was assessed to be very high, given the P had made many threats and had committed serious violence in the past leaving his victim with life-changing injuries.

What could have happened (benefits)		Benefit/cost ratio
Indirect costs to V <sup>14</sup>	£ 9,724.06	
Harm associated with assault <sup>15</sup>	£ 78,868.31	
Refuge for V <sup>16</sup>	£ 422.00	
Harm associated with femicide <sup>17</sup>	£ 2,329,847.71	
Costs to state of violence with injury <sup>18</sup>	£ 5,347.71	
Costs to state of homicide <sup>19</sup>	£ 679,901.00	
COSTS TO STATE	£ 685,248.71	14.9
COSTS TO VICTIM	£ 2,086,578.03	52.0

## Conclusion

Notwithstanding the limitations described above – and in the absence of any other evidence on costs relating to managing risk in stalking cases – the results of the CBA are presented in table 8 below. Here the benefit-cost ratio ranges are summarised with ranges over the two cases in each LAP and the best- and worst-case scenarios. Benefit-cost ratios under 1 indicate that more has been spent than saved; benefit-cost ratios over 1 indicate that savings have been made by the intervention.

It is important to note that the ranges in table 8 include institutional (such as prison and secure hospital) costs, and when these are excluded there is always a cost-beneficial finding for the state, across all LAPs. Institutional costs are not directly related to MASIP, although the fact that they are necessary may be indirectly related to the LAPs' work. It should be considered though that institutional costs are entirely appropriate in some cases and the aim should not be to avoid them.

The other notable finding in table 8 is that the MASIP is not always cost-beneficial for victim/s. This is not related to the actions taken by the MASIP but is more to do with the extremely high costs to victims in relation to their victimisation. For example, in Cheshire one of the victims paid for a safety dog, which had a very high cost that was not recouped in the counterfactual scenarios. Another victim in Hampshire paid for private mental health treatment and lost a significant amount in wages. The MASIP or similar programmes cannot do anything about the costs already incurred by victims, but they can prevent those costs escalating into worse-case scenarios, which often involve the victim being re-traumatised, or seriously injured and even killed. Given the high risk associated with some types of stalkers (e.g., it is well documented that ex-intimate stalkers pose a high risk of violence to their

victims<sup>41</sup>), the cost savings to victim/s and their families of intervention by units such as those in the MASIP cannot be underestimated.

LAP	CB ratio range for the state	CB ratio range for victim/s	Conclusion
Cheshire	0.09-82.4	0.34-3.5	Cost-beneficial for the state and victims in best and worst cases when institutional costs are excluded. Cost-beneficial for victim/s when atypical victim costs are excluded.
Hampshire	0.1 – 11.3	0.8 - 2.4	Cost-beneficial for the state in best and worst cases when institutional costs are excluded. Cost-beneficial for victim/s in worst case scenario only (however, skewed by indirect costs to victim in the real scenario).
London	0.5-14.9	1.7-52	Cost-beneficial for the state and victims in best and worst cases when institutional costs are excluded.

Table 8 - a summary of the benefit-cost ratios generated by LAP

The conclusion we take from these findings is that intervening in high-risk cases is always cost-beneficial to the state (even if it incurs some institutional costs borne by the criminal justice system or health), and in most cases is cost-beneficial to the victims. To accurately determine which cases are high-risk necessitates the underpinning infrastructure of the units operating within the MASIP. If just one of these worst-case scenarios is prevented by the actions of a multi-agency unit to address risk of stalking then the savings to the state, society and victims are substantial.

Finally, although cost effectiveness is useful and a worthwhile goal to pursue, often the quality of life difference that MASIP provided to individuals, whether victims or perpetrators, can often be immeasurable and even if a few lives were saved as a result, the programme can be considered cost effective and worthwhile.

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<sup>41</sup> See McEwan, T. E., Harder, L., Brandt, C., & de Vogel, V. (2019). Risk Factors for Stalking Recidivism in a Dutch Community Forensic Mental Health Sample. *International Journal of Forensic Mental Health*, 1-15.

## 6. Discussion

This final evaluation report presents evidence that speaks to the question: Does MASIP work? Clearly, 'working' can refer to several different outcomes that can be considered indicators of success of a multi-agency initiative of this kind. Here we intend to present findings with reference to the myriad intended outcomes of the project. To recap, the MASIP pilot project had six main aims that it intended to achieve over a period of 17 months from September 2018 – February 2019. These aims, as mentioned in their proposal document are to:

- Reduce re-offending and improve public safety by improving management of stalking perpetrators and, where appropriate, providing specific mental health support.
- Increase early intervention, thereby reducing the overall incidence of stalking and levels of fixation and obsession.
- Improve the response to victims of stalking, ensuring they receive consistently high-quality service and improving victims' satisfaction with police and across the Criminal Justice System.
- Reduce risk by improving the capabilities of police and partner agencies to manage risk in cases of stalking.
- Enhance communication and relationships between the police and other local services to respond effectively to the risk, harm and vulnerability posed by stalking cases; and
- Capture, analyse and share data on the results of different perpetrator intervention strategies, which will inform strategies (and be applied if successful) across all 43 force areas.

### Our approach

This evaluation was designed on realist principles, following the EMMIE framework. Thus, our approach to the evaluation required us to work closely and collaboratively with the practitioners involved in the programme. It had the distinct advantage of being involved in the design of the programme theory and explicitly considering the contextual conditions. However, a potential disadvantage of this collaborative approach to evaluation is that it might result in a loss of independence and objectivity. For this reason, to maintain the academic rigour of this evaluation, we set out hypotheses at the end of the interim report (Belur et al 2019) that we intended to test in this final report. Our aim in specifying the hypotheses in advance of our quantitative analysis was so that we could specify the types of data trends we might expect to see if the proposed mechanisms were working as expected. Furthermore, our intention in specifying the hypotheses we intended to test was also to guard against subjective selection of data that can bias the findings of the evaluation.

These hypotheses were designed to test the **Effect** of the MASIP, by testing specific **Mechanisms** proposed earlier, as well as testing various **Moderator** and **Implementation**

conditions that might supposedly have an impact on the Effect. We finally add a new hypothesis to test the **Economics** dimension to analyse whether the cost-benefit analysis favours the intervention by offering savings to the state and the victim.

Thus, in this discussion section we consolidate our findings presented in the preceding quantitative and qualitative analysis sections considering these hypotheses. We conclude by examining whether the aims of the programme were indeed achieved, as well as a number of other miscellaneous findings of relevance.

### **Mechanism hypotheses and data trends**

1. *Greater awareness of the stalking expertise available at the three LAPs, due to the training provided by the LAPs to external practitioners, will result in an increase in referrals over time to each LAP.*

Our evidence indicated no discernible increase in referrals in police across the three LAPs analysed, but Hampshire saw a small increase in the number of cases referred to by other agencies such as Probation and Health and London experienced a greater number of referrals from Probation from February 2019 onwards. This could be attributed to the training and awareness raising activities of the MASIP teams. There was also little evidence of increases in false negatives in Cheshire, leading to the assumption that the training message was delivered effectively and landed appropriately among wider practitioners. False negatives in London appeared to decrease over time, suggesting that the awareness-raising activities were percolating through the sizable MPS.

2. *Investigative support provided by LAPs will result in better criminal justice outcomes, such as an increase in arrests, restraining orders, and charges and prosecutions for stalking at an appropriate level of severity<sup>42</sup>.*

The data partially supports this hypothesis insofar as in all three LAPs a higher proportion of cases ended up with a criminal justice charge as compared to the comparator forces. However, the number of stalking cases charged under section 2A (less serious) as compared to 4A (more serious) was higher in Cheshire than the comparator force. An opposite trend was seen in London, where there were more 4A charges than the comparator force. We were unable to test for patterns for arrests, restraining orders and prosecutions with the available data.

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<sup>42</sup> For example, charges as 4A instead of 2A.

- 3. An increase in criminal justice outcomes will, at least temporarily, reduce the likelihood of stalking re-offending.*

The expected outcomes involved in this hypothesis are long-term and not feasibly tested within the 17-month duration of this project. However, there is embryonic evidence from Cheshire that perpetrators referred into IASU having been charged with stalking are at a high risk of re-offending<sup>43</sup>. This might be early evidence that criminal justice outcomes are not enough to encourage desistance from stalking, but that other interventions are necessary.

- 4. An increase in criminal justice outcomes will lead to an increase in victim satisfaction with criminal justice agencies.*

Interviews with victims indicated that there was some dissatisfaction with the criminal justice outcomes as in some cases victims thought that the sentences were not reflective of the gravity of the offence. However, the number of interviews conducted is too small to derive any conclusions about overall victim satisfaction with the criminal justice system.

- 5. Bespoke needs-based interventions (health and otherwise) will lead to a change in perpetrator behaviour which will subsequently lead to a reduction in stalking re-offending.*

The data to robustly test this hypothesis was only available from Cheshire. Here we saw that re-offending by those who completed a direct health intervention was 17.6% which, when compared to research findings, suggests that the health interventions delivered in Cheshire are highly successful. Similar trends might have been seen across Hampshire and London, had there been appropriate data collected.

To complement this, interviews with stakeholders and perpetrators indicated a high level of satisfaction with the bespoke intervention provided and there was a degree of confidence in the perpetrators that they had the tools necessary to address their obsession and fixation in the future. The small sample size of perpetrators interviewed does however encourage caution about this finding.

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<sup>43</sup> We wanted to check the data again to ascertain whether perpetrators referred into IASU on a stalking charge received a direct health intervention, but as described in footnote 22 were unable to.

6. *Victims feel supported by Victim Advocates (VAs) and consequently feel empowered to support investigation of stalking cases and/or collect evidence in support of the prosecution, resulting in an increase in charges and prosecution.*

There was no evidence to support this hypothesis, although the timescales involved do not permit the measurement of this factor adequately at the time the report was written. However, interviews with victims and stakeholders indicated that, overall, victims were satisfied with the support provided to them by the VAs. In particular, the VAs kept victims informed and, when appropriate, helped them draft a statement to be presented in court that had an impact on the sentencing. Victims also said that the support provided by the VAs empowered them to support the investigation and to collect evidence to support the prosecution.

7. *Victims feel supported by VAs which results in an increase in victim satisfaction with criminal justice response.*

As in the case of hypothesis 4 and 6 above, there is inadequate data to underpin the quantitative analysis that would support this hypothesis. However, the qualitative data indicated that in some cases although the victims felt supported by the VAs it did not lead to overall satisfaction with the criminal justice response – often feeling that they did not receive appropriate support from the police or the courts.

8. *Reductions in stalking re-offending (as a consequence of one the above mechanisms) will lead to an increase in victim satisfaction.*

There was inadequate data in the short project timescales to support this hypothesis.

### **Moderator hypotheses and data trends**

9. *Intervention actions taken by LAPs will work better for certain stalker types than others.*

The number of stalkers receiving interventions was too low to adequately test the effect on different stalker types in the project timescales. So, this hypothesis remains inconclusive.

10. *Increased caseloads (per LAP staffing) will be associated with fewer reductions in re-offending rates.*

Caseloads were calculated by referrals per full time staff equivalent. London had the highest caseload, and Cheshire had the smallest caseload, with Hampshire between the two. Since re-offending rates have only been robustly collected for Cheshire, we are unable to compare the three LAPs with reference to their caseloads.

## Implementation hypotheses

11. *Co-located teams will lead to greater reduction in re-offending rates for perpetrators, and a greater increase in victim satisfaction, than non-co-located teams.*

The available quantitative data does not support this hypothesis and there were problems with the data to test this adequately. However, interviews with stakeholders from the two co-located teams indicated that they thought co-location brought several benefits to their working, in terms of easy access to information and opportunity to consult and discuss partners. However, stakeholders from the one non-co-located unit (Hampshire) did not perceive it to be critical to how they operated. Additionally, nothing in our fieldwork (observations and interviews) suggested that Hampshire were impeded by their non-co-location. Thus, we conclude that co-location might be a desirable but not a necessary condition for the success of the programme.

## Economics hypotheses

Although we had not proposed a specific hypothesis for testing the economic efficiency of the programme earlier in the interim report, the assumption underlying the programme was that it would save resources and costs to the state.

Thus, an additional hypothesis would be:

12. *MASIP interventions result in cost savings to the state as a result of:*
  - *Savings generated by multi-agency working; and/or*
  - *Savings to the criminal justice system as a result of more efficient and effective investigations; and/or*
  - *Better outcomes for the victim and perpetrator*

Findings of the cost benefit ratio conducted indicated that when institutional costs (such as prison and secure hospital) are excluded there is always a cost-beneficial finding for the state, across all LAPs. Institutional costs are not directly related to MASIP, and although necessary, they may be indirectly related to the LAPs' work. The other notable finding is that MASIP intervention is not always cost-beneficial for victim/s. This is primarily due to the fact that the initial experience of victimisation has a high cost for the victim, in terms of the impact on their own mental and physical well-being and those of their family and friends. This cost often has already been borne prior to any MASIP intervention. In many cases, these costs are extremely high and appear unavoidable for victims when victimisation first occurs. While some of these costs cannot be prevented, MASIP could be considered to prevent those costs escalating into worse-case scenarios, which often involve both continued ill effects of constant stalking, and in some cases can have serious or fatal outcomes for the victim. Thus, the risk of persistence and risk of escalated violence are both possibilities in the absence of MASIP intervention.

Given the high risk associated with some types of stalkers the cost savings to victim/s and their families, as a result of intervention by MASIP, could potentially be substantial.

### ***Overall conclusion***

We now present our overall conclusion about the effectiveness of the pilot project as mapped against the original aims of the project. Referring to the Theory of Change developed in the interim report<sup>3</sup>, the evaluation has been able to report findings with respect to the outputs of the project and partially on some of the intended outcomes. This was mainly due to two factors:

1. The time period over which the intervention was evaluated was too short to be able to test whether any of the long-term impact and many of the medium-term outcomes were realised.
2. Data collected was insufficient to test many of the hypothesis that underpinned the project. Therefore, while the evaluation can report that many of the intended activities were completed, the impact of these activities on the intended audiences could only partially be tested in some cases, and not at all in others. Consequently, we can say that:
  - The LAPs were active in training and dissemination activities intended to improve communication between the police and other agencies and knowledge levels and skills of wider practitioners in stakeholder agencies and beyond. It was not clear whether the intended outcomes of improved investigation and better criminal justice outcomes were achieved.
  - The LAPs provided bespoke interventions to perpetrators which enabled them to understand the causes of their obsession and fixation and they were given relevant tools to deal with these behaviours in the future. However, there is inadequate evidence to indicate whether this had resulted in the intended reduction in re-offending behaviour.
  - The LAPs provided bespoke support to victims to support the investigation and prosecution of cases and to manage their own risk going forward. There is some evidence to indicate victim satisfaction with advocacy services, but not with the criminal justice response as a whole.
  - There is no evidence to support that the intended long-term outcomes of improving public safety and reducing overall incidence of stalking and levels of fixation and obsession were achieved. This is not to say that the programme is not effective, but that the time period is insufficient to be able to arrive at any conclusions.

Additionally, we draw several conclusions from the data that speak to some of the broader aspects of the evaluation.

- Stakeholders perceived that a multi-agency approach did improve the response to stalking as a crime type. This was in terms of better and more efficient investigation and appropriate charging of cases, and that information sharing was extremely useful for risk assessment and risk management in stalking cases.
- Stakeholders indicated that victims required further support from victim advocacy which is resource intensive, and there was a need for more mental health provision to help them cope with the aftereffects of being victimised.
- Based on the interviews and observations we conclude that the three LAPs remained largely faithful to the overall programmatic Theory of Change, whilst retaining their individual focus on the different aspects of the process [Risk management for Cheshire; Perpetrator intervention for Hampshire; and Improving awareness and correct classification as well as triaging for perpetrator interventions in London] that were identified by the interim report (Belur et al 2019, p. 34). The STAC in London did though refine their working practices through introducing a 'tiered' system which helped them to manage the demand of cases on the unit.
- It is difficult to comment, based on the limited evidence available, whether any particular model works better than the other, especially since the models were are very different stages of maturity. However, we observed several advantages of having a small integrated unit which focused exclusively on owning the case and seeing it through completion and/or in the follow up period, as well as the many challenges of having a unit that helps a large force upskill and get better at recognising, classifying and investigating stalking cases as well as signposting perpetrators towards appropriate mental health services in the community. At this point there is no conclusive answer as to which model is better but only that the context in which these units work, and the resources required to support them, are at entirely different scales.
- Data collection and data management needs of interventions such as MASIP, require dedicated resources with the appropriate skills in order to monitor progress and manage caseloads.
- Short term funding for projects of this kind which require a long lead in period, and where outcomes are more medium- or long-term can be the source of great anxiety and stress for practitioners involved. A significant amount of their energies were directed towards finding further funding in the latter months of the project to keep the intervention alive. This had a negative effect on the morale of the team and affected their capacity and ability to take on new cases in the final months of the project.

- Finally, although stakeholders in the three LAPs asserted that they worked very well as a team and had built good relations with the agencies involved, it was our observation that the more mature and established the LAP the more their approach showed evidence of an integrated interagency rather than a multi-agency approach. This supports finding in the wider literature about the time required for such initiatives to become effective.

## 7. Recommendations

- It is important to ensure that the multi-agency partnership is adequately resourced in terms of buy in from key stakeholders and posts are occupied by people with appropriate levels of skills and motivation to work with victims and perpetrators. There also needs to be some security of tenure to the stakeholders in these units as they develop and specialise in providing bespoke interventions, in order to harvest the benefit of their experience and skills.
- Stakeholders expressed that in the future the involvement of CPS as a full partner would be a welcome addition to the MASIP given the important role played by the CPS in the prosecution and management of stalking cases.
- The data does not suggest the superiority of any one model over the others or demonstrate unequivocally that there is indeed an ideal, one-size-fits-all template for multi-agency working in stalking. Instead, partnership models should be amended specifically to suit local context and conditions and requirements of the area to be served by these partnerships.

For example, at the regional level or for larger police force areas – a large unit like STAC would help in awareness raising and triaging cases at the referral stage as an umbrella unit within which smaller more integrated units can work intensively with perpetrators and victims and provide the bespoke interventions that are suitable for individual cases. The Hampshire and Cheshire models did show promising signs of success at this local level.

- The importance of collecting appropriate data and setting up frameworks to collect detailed data cannot be stressed enough at the start of any project. The evaluation work revealed that practitioners, who throughout the duration of the project were more focused on the procedural and service delivery aspects of multi-agency working, felt let down that the evaluation was not able to demonstrate the massive contribution of the unit. This was mainly because the importance of data collection was not really understood until the end when stakeholders realised that the data was inadequate to show demonstrable impact. This also highlighted that adequate resources and skill sets are required for data to be collected and updated routinely and systematically throughout the life of the project.

Having comprehensive data collection, designed from the start to capture information that is anticipatory of partner and funder objectives, enables self-monitoring. This is important understanding the demands on the service provision and for managing resources. Building in data collection processes that enable the identification of minority groups can help to reveal if there are underrepresented groups. This can indicate that there are barriers to accessing the service. Importantly, this data can be

used to understand if trends in reporting, investigation, interventions and outcomes differ for different demographics of victims and perpetrators.

- Project management for a multi-agency partnership of this kind plays a very important role – to oversee information sharing agreements and ensure MOUs between partner agencies are in place, to help set up processes and procedures in new units, and to ensure appropriate data collection and data management processes within the unit. This includes administering and gathering user (victims and perpetrators) satisfaction surveys to self-monitor success. Although units may be tempted to nominate a lead agency stakeholder as the manager and single point of contact, often the project management role can become subsidiary to the operational demands of the unit and therefore be less effective.
- Setting up multi agency partnerships, developing trust between partners and setting up data and information sharing protocols takes time and given the nature of stalking as an offence, its detection, investigation and provision of intervention further consumes time. Thus, projects such as these should have stability and funding for at least the medium term – 3 to 5 years – before the effects can be properly observed. It is difficult to evidence the impact of investing in resource intensive units for short periods of time.
- When designing the service, it is good practice to consider the most marginalised people (across all the protected identity characteristics). This may include working with local third sector organisations to build sensitivity to marginalised groups. In doing this, the service can be truly inclusive and accessible to all.

## 8. Appendices

### Appendix 1 - Comparison force analysis trends

#### *Patterns of reported stalking offences by stalking type*

983 offences were reported as stalking between August 2016 and December 2019, inclusive, across Cheshire Constabulary. Figure 4 shows that the reporting of stalking has escalated since the summer months of 2019. Cheshire sees a roughly equal share of the three main types of stalking, as recorded in Home Office codes.




Figure 4 - Stalking reporting patterns over time in Cheshire Constabulary




Figure 5 - Stalking reporting patterns over time in the comparison force for Cheshire

724 offences were reported as stalking in the same period across for the comparison force for Cheshire. Visual inspection of Figure 5 reveals that although stalking offences started to be reported more frequently at the beginning of 2018, the volumes of offences noticeably increased in 2019. One interesting observation is that, for this force, the proportion of 'course of conduct' offences dominate the stalking types recorded, equating to 80% of all offences.




Figure 6- Stalking reporting patterns over time in Hampshire Constabulary

1,007 offences were reported as stalking between March 2016 and August 2019, inclusive, for Hampshire Constabulary. Figure 6 displays the three main types of stalking offences over time. This shows that an increase in reporting seen in the summer of 2018 pre-dates the beginning of MASIP and may relate to the activities of the unit that was in place pre-MASIP. Other than a December/January dip each year there do not appear to be any seasonal trends in reporting. It is noteworthy that 62.9% of the reported offences in Hampshire Constabulary relate to 'course of conduct' stalking.




Figure 7- Stalking reporting patterns over time in the comparison force for Hampshire

1,003 offences were reported as stalking between March 2016 and August 2019, inclusive, for the comparison force for Hampshire. The frequency of reported stalking offences over time is plotted in Figure 7. This shows that offences started to rise in 2017, with a peak in June of that year. Stalking offences fell thereafter but increased again in the final months of 2018 and persisted into 2019. Around 44% of offences were recorded as Course of conduct, with a further 34% recorded as stalking involving serious alarm/distress. This latter stalking type appears to account for the most recent increase in stalking offences overall, whereas the former type appeared to be recorded more commonly in 2017.




Figure 8 - Stalking reporting patterns over time in the Metropolitan Police Service

3,463 stalking offences were reported in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) between August 2016 and July 2019, inclusive. In Figure 8 we see the trends over time for the various stalking offence types. From this it is clear that there has been a steady increase over the reported period, and the increases are proportionate across all three stalking offence types. The reporting of offences appears to have steadied in the first months of the STAC being in operation.




Figure 9 - Stalking reporting patterns over time in the comparison force for London

1,829 offences were reported as stalking for the comparison force for London. Figure 9 presents the frequencies of these by the month in which the different types of stalking were reported. As this shows, reporting started to increase throughout the calendar year of 2017, with 2018 recording even more stalking offences. From Spring 2019 there appears to be a slight decline in reporting from the peak experienced in 2018. It appears from Figure 9 that the three stalking offences are reported with approximately similar proportions over the time period shown.

Stalking type	Cheshire			Hampshire		
	n	Mean	Max	n	Mean	Max
Involving fear of violence	179	82.6	1,745	126	202.7	4,237
Involving serious alarm/distress	435	266.3	11,464	247	178.6	4,388
Pursue a course of conduct	369	229.9	26,298	634	171.9	7,868
Total	983	219.2	26,298	1,007	177.4	7,868

Table 9 - Duration of stalking offences reported to Cheshire and Hampshire Police<sup>44</sup>

Stalking type	Cheshire comp			Hampshire comp			London comp		
	n	Mean	Max	n	Mean	Max	n	Mean	Max
Involving fear of violence	76	167.7	2,558	223	138.4	6,209	629	122.7	4,280
Involving serious alarm/distress	66	262.3	4,383	342	207.2	11,892	596	208.5	5,450
Pursue a course of conduct	582	214.0	11,687	443	136.9	5,722	604	167.8	11,261
Total	724	213.6	11,687	1,008	155.8	11,892	1,829	166.3	11,261

Table 10 - Duration of stalking offences reported to the comparison forces

The duration of the stalking offences was calculated by taking the days between the start and end times, reported by the victim. These are shown in tables 9 and 10. The minimum values of the duration were commonly zero, when the stalking had been reported as having occurred on one day (despite there being an underlying assumption that to be classed as stalking two or more incidents must have occurred). The mean values varied across the different stalking types with no consistent trends across the three areas. The most striking trend, though, is that the maximum value is high for all, indicating that some victims are experiencing the negative impact of stalking over many years before they report this to the police.

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<sup>44</sup> The data we received from the MPS did not have reported start and end times to enable a duration to be calculated.

### ***Multiple and repeat victimisation/offending***

The comparison forces for Cheshire and London<sup>45</sup> provided unique reference numbers for victims and offenders, which facilitated analysis on multiple victimisation and offending<sup>46</sup>. In Table 11 in the Cheshire comparator, 12 incidents involved two victims, and these were distributed as might be expected over the stalking types. For the London comparator we see in Table 10 that 17 stalking offences had two victims, and one offence had four victims recorded. Plausibly, these additional victims refer to ‘secondary victims’, whereby a person close to the primary victim also experiences some of the stalking behaviour (e.g., a partner or family member).

Similarly, 12 offences in Table 11 involved two suspects for the Cheshire comparator, and 30 and six offences in the London comparator had two and three suspects respectively. Whilst stalking is not typified by co-offending, since the fixation is usually individual rather than collective<sup>47</sup>, co-offending is possible via ‘stalking by proxy’. Otherwise put, if the primary suspect/offender instructs someone else to contact the victim then this person is similarly culpable for the course of conduct.

	<b>Cheshire comparator</b>		<b>London comparator</b>			
	<i>2 victims</i>	<i>2 suspects</i>	<i>2 victims</i>	<i>4 victims</i>	<i>2 suspects</i>	<i>3 suspects</i>
Involving fear of violence	2	2	6		10	2
Involving serious alarm/distress	1		8		14	2
Course of conduct	9	10	3	1	6	2
<b>Total</b>	12	12	17	1	30	6

Table 11 - multiple victimisation and offending evident in the comparison forces for Cheshire and London

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45 The complication with the comparison force for Hampshire is that their crime recording system (CRS) was changed in April 2018, and only offences after this time had unique reference numbers for suspects/offenders and victims. This means that analysis on repeat offending and repeat victimisation could only be undertaken over a period of 16 months, which likely explains why no repeat victims or repeat suspects were found in these data (i.e., the timeframe is not long enough to detect repeat victimisation/offending).

46 This was not requested for Cheshire and Hampshire Forces due to the partnership data containing information on victimisation and offending. London (MPS) data does not have unique reference numbers in it.

47 Although see Sheridan, L. P., & James, D. V. (2015). Complaints of group-stalking ('gang-stalking'): an exploratory study of their nature and impact on complainants. *The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology*, 26(5), 601-623.

It was also possible to examine repeat victimisation within the comparison force for Cheshire. This refers to people who have reported multiple instances of stalking involving the same suspect. These figures do though need to be interpreted with caution as there is not enough information in the data to ascertain if these constituted separate offences (i.e., known as ‘recurrence’) or made up one ongoing offence (i.e., known as ‘persistence’)<sup>48</sup>. Table 12 shows the breakdown of the number of cases where there were the same victims and offenders involved. From this we can see that three victims reported three stalking offences in the comparator to Cheshire and twenty-nine victims reported two offences.

<b>N offences</b>	<b>Cheshire comp</b>	
	N victims	Total offences
<b>3</b>	3	9
<b>2</b>	29	58
<b>1</b>	657	657
<b>Total</b>	689	724

*Table 12 - Breakdown of repeat cases with the same victims and perpetrators*

Tables 13 and 14 provide a breakdown of the disposal codes (the codes assigned to a crime report when it is ‘closed’ or disposed of on the police crime recording system), and the minimum, mean and maximum number of days from when the stalking offence was reported until it was disposed<sup>49</sup>. Offences with no disposal code do not appear these tables.

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<sup>48</sup> In the academic literature ‘recurrence’ is defined by stalking behaviour resuming after at least a six-month break, which can be to the same or a different victim. Persistence refers to stalking behaviour that continues.

<sup>49</sup> A change in the crime recording system in the comparison force for Hampshire complicated the analysis of the disposal codes, which was recorded differently across the two systems. The disposal codes were harmonised; however, it is possible that this does not produce perfectly matched codes across the two systems.

**Appendix 2 – Police outcomes for LAPs and comparator forces**

Disposal code	Cheshire				Hampshire				London (MPS)			
	N	Min	Mean	Max	N	Min	Mean	Max	N	Min	Mean	Max
1: Charged/Summoned/Postal Requisition	155	30	71.9	421	213	0	111.0	947	575	0	102.7	627
3: Caution/ conditional caution	3	0	35.4	76	19	15	112.7	374	65	1	86.8	335
5: Offender deceased					1	249	249.0	249	2	10	78.5	147
8: Community resolution	1	323	323.5	323	8	4	55.6	205	8	3	90.1	195
9: CPS - prosecution not in public interest	2	144	290.4	437	3	142	175.9	219				
10: Police - formal action not in public interest	2	30	47.4	64	15	18	157.7	455				
12: Named suspect too ill to prosecute	1	159	159.4	159					3	40	71.7	114
14: Victim declines/unable to support action to identify offender	14	4	90.9	527	6	45	131.1	302	168	0	51.1	405
15: Suspect no further action: evidential difficulties	184	0	90.4	893	432	0	127.4	945	1308	1	81.2	899
16: Victim declines/withdraws support - named suspect identified	472	0	50.7	490	224	0	105.9	568	709	0	66.3	603
17: Suspect identified but prosecution time limit expired	1	236	236.4	236	10	60	361.1	1096	3	202	276.0	363
18: Investigation complete no suspect identified	36	3	84.0	389	36	1	111.6	823	436	0	55.8	664
20: Other body/agency has investigation primacy	1	23	23.0	23	2	154	323.3	493	2	18	89.0	160
21: Police - named suspect, investigation not in the public interest	4	14	46.6	78	1	155	155.0	155	2	44	73.5	103
<b>Total</b>	<b>876</b>				<b>1,007</b>				<b>3,281</b>			

Table 13 - Time in days from reporting date to disposal date on the police system, by disposal (outcome) code for the police forces in Cheshire, Hampshire and London

Disposal code	Cheshire comparator				Hampshire comparator				London comparator			
	N	Min	Mean	Max	N	Min	Mean	Max	N	Min	Mean	Max
1: Charged/Summoned/Postal Requisition	72	2	98.1	389	113	2	110.1	737	142	0.4	151.5	574.9
1a: Alternate offence charged/ summonsed/postal requisition	24	7	99.2	279	37	11	150.2	599	86	0.7	113.1	443.9
3: Caution/ conditional caution	6	4	37.8	87	45	2	73.6	394	4	5.2	88.4	178.9
3a: Alternate offence caution/conditional caution	9	16	38.4	88	67	1	62.1	265	6	83.6	255.8	439.9
5: Offender deceased					1	37	37.0	37				
8: Community resolution	1	27	27.0	27	3	68	131.3	253	7	2.4	96.4	366.9
9: CPS - prosecution not in public interest					1	48	48.0	48	1	321.0	321.0	321.0
10: Police - formal action not in public interest									1	30.6	30.6	30.6
12: Named suspect too ill to prosecute									5	40.6	94.3	250.1
14: Victim declines/unable to support action to identify offender	20	2	33.3	145	16	6	122.1	513	3	8.1	19.8	33.3
15: Suspect no further action: evidential difficulties	201	1	73.3	590	226	1	134.6	798	692	0.9	108.8	905.9
16: Victim declines/withdraws support - named suspect identified	280	0	40.6	770	367	1	81.3	476	687	0.2	60.6	777.9
17: Suspect identified but prosecution time limit expired	7	8	256.4	720	4	187	235.8	270	3	251.0	256.0	265.5
18: Investigation complete no suspect identified	32	2	41.0	186	21	13	65.2	175	13	1.8	36.3	158.8
20: Other body/agency has investigation primacy	1	54	54.0	54					1	11.3	11.3	11.3
21: Police - named suspect, investigation not in the public interest	4	17	61.5	116	1	240	240.0	240	6	15.9	47.6	78.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>657</b>				<b>902</b>				<b>1,657</b>			

Table 14 - Time in days from reporting date to disposal date on the police system, by disposal (outcome) code for the comparison forces

Disposal code	Cheshire Police						Hampshire Police						London (MPS)					
	008/65		008/66		195/12		008/65		008/66		195/12		008/65		008/66		195/12	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
1: Charged/Summoned	39	24.7	68	17.7	48	14.4	32	26.4	73	30.5	108	17.7	89	19.8	148	15.0	224	12.3
1A: Alternate offence charged /summoned													19	4.2	41	4.2	35	1.9
3: Caution/conditional caution	1	0.6	2	0.5			1	0.8	4	1.7	14	2.3	5	1.1	13	1.3	25	1.4
3A: Alternate offence caution														9	0.9	13	0.7	
5: Offender deceased							1	0.8										
8: Community resolution					1	0.3					8	1.3	2	0.4			6	0.3
9: CPS - prosecution not in public interest			1	0.3	1	0.3	1	0.8	1	0.4	1	0.2						
10: Police - formal action not in public interest	1	0.6			1	0.3	1	0.8	6	2.5	8	1.3						
12: Named suspect too ill to prosecute					1	0.3									1	0.1	2	0.1
14: Victim declines/unable to support	4	2.5	6	1.6	4	1.2					6	1.0	10	2.2	52	5.3	105	5.8
15: Suspect NFA: evidential difficulties	37	23.4	87	22.6	60	18.0	56	46.3	96	40.2	280	45.9	165	36.7	395	40.0	742	40.9
16: Victim declines/ withdraws support	73	46.2	203	52.7	196	58.9	26	21.5	48	20.1	150	24.6	116	25.8	194	19.7	398	21.9
17: Prosecution time limit expired					1	0.3			3	1.3	7	1.1	1	0.2	1	0.1	1	0.1
18: Investigation complete no suspect identified	3	1.9	15	3.9	18	5.4	2	1.7	7	2.9	27	4.4	41	9.1	133	13.5	262	14.4
20: Other body/agency has investigation primacy			1	0.3			1	0.8	1	0.4							2	0.1
21: Police - investigation not in the public interest			2	0.5	2	0.6					1	0.2	1	0.2			1	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>385</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>333</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>239</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>610</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>449</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>987</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,816</b>	<b>100</b>

Table 15 - Criminal justice outcome (disposal code) for reported stalking in the three LAP forces. NB: 008/65 refers to Stalking involving fear of violence, 008/66 refers to Stalking involving serious alarm/distress and 195/12 to Pursue a course of conduct in breach of S1 (1) which amounts to stalking.

Disposal code	Cheshire comparator						Hampshire comparator						London comparator					
	008/65		008/66		195/12		008/65		008/66		195/12		008/65		008/66		195/12	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
1: Charged/Summoned	14	21.5	18	29.0	40	7.5	36	19.0	27	10.2	50	12.6	34	6.0	49	9.3	59	10.5
1A: Alternate offence charged/summoned	6	9.2	1	1.6	17	3.2	12	6.3	13	4.9	12	3.0	37	6.5	34	6.4	15	2.7
3: Caution/conditional caution	1	1.5			5	0.9	10	5.3	9	3.4	26	6.5	1	0.2		0.0	3	0.5
3A: Alternate offence caution			2	3.2	7	1.3	7	3.7	5	1.9	5	1.3	1	0.2	3	0.6	2	0.4
5: Offender deceased									1	0.4								
8: Community resolution	1	1.5							1	0.4	2	0.5	4	0.7	2	0.4	1	0.2
12: Named suspect too ill to prosecute													2	0.4	2	0.4	1	0.2
14: Victim declines/unable to support	1	1.5	1	1.6	18	3.4	1	0.5	6	2.3	9	2.3	1	0.2	1	0.2	1	0.2
15: Suspect NFA: evidential difficulties	18	27.7	16	25.8	167	31.5	59	31.2	86	32.3	81	20.4	263	46.3	228	43.2	201	35.8
16: Victim declines/ withdraws support	20	30.8	19	30.6	241	45.5	58	30.7	109	41.0	200	50.4	215	37.9	200	37.9	272	48.5
17: Prosecution time limit expired	1	1.5	2	3.2	4	0.8	1	0.5			3	0.8	1	0.2	2	0.4		0.0
18: Investigation complete no suspect identified	3	4.6	3	4.8	26	4.9	4	2.1	8	3.0	9	2.3	6	1.1	5	0.9	2	0.4
20: Other body/agency has investigation primacy					1	0.2											1	0.2
21: Police - investigation not in the public interest					4	0.8	1	0.5	1	0.4			1	0.2	2	0.4	3	0.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>530</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>189</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>266</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>397</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>566</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>528</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>561</b>	<b>100</b>

Table 16 - Criminal justice outcome (disposal code) for reported stalking in the comparison forces (see table 14 for Home Office code explanations)

To summarise tables 13 and 14:

- With regards to stalking incidents reported to police that result in a charge or summons (codes 1 and 1a) – the proportion of stalking offences that were resolved in this way equated to:
  - 17.7% in Cheshire, compared to 14.6% for the comparison force for Cheshire. The mean days taken to achieve this outcome was 71.9 in Cheshire and 98.1 in the comparison force for Cheshire.
  - 21.1% in Hampshire compared to 16.6% in the comparison force for Hampshire. The mean days taken to achieve this outcome was similar across Hampshire and its comparison force (111/110).
  - 17.5% in London compared to 13.8% in the comparison force for London. The mean days taken to achieve this outcome was greater in the comparison force (115.5) than the MPS (102.7).
- Cautions (codes 3 and 3a) made up proportionately fewer of offences than stalking, with:
  - 0.3% in Cheshire compared to 2.3% for the comparison force for Cheshire.
  - 1.9% in Hampshire compared to 12.4% for the comparison force for Hampshire.
  - 2.0% in London compared to 0.6% for the comparison force for London.
- The number of offences where the investigation was dropped due to evidential difficulties was cited as the disposal code (code 15) equates to:
  - 21% in Cheshire compared to 30.6% for the comparison force for Cheshire.
  - 42.9% in Hampshire compared to 25.1% for the comparison force for Hampshire.
  - 39.9% in London compared to 41.8% for the comparison force for London.
- The victim declined or withdrew their support (code 16) in:
  - 53.9% in Cheshire compared to 42.6% in the comparison force for Cheshire.
  - 22.2% in Hampshire compared to 40.7% in the comparison force for Hampshire.
  - 21.6% in London compared to 41.5% in the comparison force for London.
- The mean number of days for disposal code 16 ranged from 40.6 to 105.9 days across the LAPs and their comparator forces, which suggests that efforts were made

to encourage victims to work in collaboration with police. It is worth saying that the police can still pursue an investigation without the support of the victim, when it is deemed appropriate from a risk-reduction lens.

Some interesting trends were apparent from analysing the disposal codes broken down by the type of stalking offence in Tables 15 and 16. From these it can be summarised:

- Less serious forms of stalking (195/12) result in an outcome of a police charge (code 1 and 1a) in:
  - 14.4% of offences in Cheshire, compared to 7.5% for the comparison force for Cheshire. For stalking involving serious alarm/distress an opposite trend was seen, with the same proportions 17.7% and 29% respectively. The trends were similar for stalking involving fear of violence across Cheshire and its comparator.
  - 17.7% of offences in Hampshire, compared to 15.6% for the comparison force for Hampshire. For stalking involving serious alarm/distress the same proportions were 30.5% and 15.1% respectively and they were similar for stalking involving fear of violence.
  - 14.3% of offences in London, compared to 13.2% for the comparison force for London. For stalking involving serious alarm/distress the same proportions were 19.1% and 15.7% respectively. For stalking involving fear of violence London also had a higher proportion (24.1%) of charges than the comparison force for London (12.5%).
- In Cheshire Police evidential difficulties were more likely to be experienced for the more serious forms of stalking whereas the opposite was true in the comparison force for Cheshire. In the comparison forces for Hampshire and London evidential difficulties were more likely for more serious forms of stalking, whereas in the police forces for Hampshire and London there seemed to be no difference between more and less serious forms of stalking
- Interestingly, victims declining or withdrawing their support for an investigation seemed to be recorded more frequently for less serious cases of stalking compared to more serious cases. This was true for both Cheshire (58.9%) and Hampshire Police (24.6%) and the comparison forces (45.5%, 50.4% and 48.6% of offences, for the comparison forces for Cheshire, Hampshire and London, respectively). In London there was no clear trend.

### Appendix 3 - Victim and perpetrator profiles within the partnership data

The victim and perpetrator demographic profiles confirms that stalking is a highly gendered offence type (see table 17). That is, in Cheshire 94.1% of cases (n=97) involved a male perpetrator and a female victim. The same proportion in London was 44.6% (n=384), although when missing data are excluded this rises to 87.9%. 92% of stalking cases in Hampshire are perpetrated by males.

	Victims				Perpetrators			
	M	%	F	%	M	%	F	%
Cheshire	4	3.9	99	96.1	97	94.1	6	2.6
Hampshire					214	91.8	19	8.2
London	95	11.0	762	88.9	394	90.2	43	9.8

Table 17 - Victim and perpetrator demographics (where known) for the three LAPs

Due to the Recolo team's focus being exclusively on the perpetrator, the Recolo data did not have much information on the victim. Instead, most data collected related to the perpetrator and the treatment conditions that the team judged to be most appropriate for the case.

In table 18 we see that that perpetrators are commonly aged between 25 and 54 years. Only a small proportion of cases were perpetrated by youths (aged under 25 years)<sup>50</sup>.

Age	Cheshire		Hampshire		London	
	n	% of known	n	% of known	n	% of known
Under 25 years	12	11.6	13	6.1	3	17.6
25 - 34 years	39	37.9	72	33.8	5	29.4
35 - 44 years	26	25.2	48	22.5	5	29.4
45 - 54 years	20	19.4	48	22.5	1	5.9
55 - 64 years	3	2.9	26	12.2	2	11.8
65 years and over	3	2.9	6	2.8	1	5.9
No details			20		844	
Total	103	99.9	233	100	861	100

Table 18 - Perpetrator age profile across the LAPs

<sup>50</sup> Although it is worth saying that IASU only works with perpetrators over the age of 18, and this may be true in Hampshire and STAC too.




Figure 10 - Cheshire victim age and gender

Figures 10 and 11 show that female victims in Cheshire and London are predominantly under 35 years old (63.1%, n=65 for Cheshire and 64.8%, n=232 for London) and the few male victims tended to be over 35 years.




Figure 11 - London victim age and gender

Figure 12 illustrates the breakdown of stalker types across the three LAPs. From this it is clear that the dominant stalker type in both areas are rejected (ex-intimates), although this was more pronounced for Cheshire. The breakdown of the other types differed across the LAPs. In Cheshire 7% of perpetrators were intimacy seekers, 2% were incompetent suitors, 2% were resentful and none were considered predatory. In Hampshire the second most common stalking type was incompetent suitors, with 11%. Intimacy seekers, predatory and resentful stalkers together made up 14% of stalkers. Three cases had secondary, as well as primary, victims and thus were recorded as rejected and resentful. The second most common stalker type in London was intimacy seeker (13%), with incompetent suitors and resentful stalkers comprising 4% each.




Figure 12 - Perpetrator stalking type profile across the three LAPs

Further analysis of the information known about victims and perpetrators in Cheshire revealed:

- Twice as many perpetrators (n=6) as victims (n=3) were involved with mental health services at the time IASU began monitoring their case. More than twice as many perpetrators (n=38) as victims (n=15) had been involved with mental health services in the past.
- Where it was known, no victims were currently, or had previously been involved with Probation. This was in stark contrast to perpetrators, where 28.1% (n=29) were currently involved with Probation and a further 11.6% had been in the past.
- Three perpetrators and one victim were considered to have an antisocial lifestyle (as defined by IASU).
- 75.7% (n=78) of victims were previously known to report some form of stalking behaviour or domestic abuse to the police.

- 53.3% (n=55) of perpetrators had previously been reported to the police for some form of stalking behaviour.

Whilst the Hampshire Recolo data did not collect demographic details on the victim, it did record whether there were secondary victims, other targeted victims and prior victims. Of the 139 cases where there was enough information to infer whether there were secondary victims, in 75 cases there were one or more secondary victims. One and two secondary victims were most often recorded (equating to 42 and 14 cases respectively), with greater victims associated with fewer cases. However, in three cases over five secondary victims were recorded as being affected. No further information was provided to ascertain more about the circumstances in which so many secondary victims are involved.

In the 149 cases where there was enough information to discern whether other victims were being targeted (as well as the victim in the case recorded), 34 cases (22.8%) had one other victim, 9 cases (6%) had two other victims and one case (0.6%) had three other victims. It is assumed that other targeted victims are different than previous victims, which was recorded separately. Here, out of the 119 cases where this was known, 23 cases (19.3%) had one previous victim, 7 (5.9%) had two previous victims and 6 cases (5%) had three or more previous victims.

Analysis on victims and perpetrators in London produced the following findings:

- 78 (9%) perpetrators and two victims (0.2%) were already known to the NHS when STAC did background checks.
- 57 (6.6%) perpetrators and eight (0.9%) victims were already known to the NPS when STAC did background checks.
- 30.2% (n=260) of victims were previously known to report domestic abuse to the police.
- 110 (12.8%) perpetrators had been charged with stalking previously; 51 of which were against the same victim as the stalking offence which formed the referral into STAC, and 19 of which were to a different victim. For 40 perpetrators it was unknown whether the victim was the same or different (because there is no unique identifier for victims on the MPS CRS).

The SASH (Screening Assessment for Stalking and Harassment) is commonly undertaken at the triage stage in Hampshire and London. This performs a preliminary risk assessment using the information available. This data is presented in Table 19 for the cases assessed in the evaluation period.

From this we see that it is not necessarily the case that male perpetrators are a higher risk in Hampshire – 57.8% of females scored high or moderate/high on this risk assessment tool,

compared to 53.7% of males. It was different in London, whereby 15.4% of male perpetrators and only 2% of females scored high.

SASH rating	Hampshire		London	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
High	10	94	1	61
Moderate/High	1	21		
Moderate	4	44	7	41
Low	1		3	14
Not Completed	3	55	32	278
<b>Total</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>394</b>

*Table 19 - SASH ratings in Hampshire and London by perpetrator gender*

Due to the volume of stalking cases being processed by London’s STAC, a need management system has been developed. When cases are triaged, they are given a tier from one to four which correspond to the risk posed by the individual and their level of need. Briefly, tier 1 cases prompt checks on the individuals involved and the Police/Probation officer is provided with advice and guidance. Cases regarded as tier 2 are when STAC staff work with specific professions (e.g., Health, Probation, Police) to provide information and to assist with risk assessment and guidance for care, sentencing or investigation planning. Tier 3 cases involve significant work in relation to the perpetrator and can include professional consultation and attendance at multi-agency meetings and sometimes involve direct interview and assessment of the perpetrator. Tier 4 cases are the most resource intensive and involve direct assessment or action by the STAC. This might be in the form of formulation-led care, a direct health intervention, sentence or safety planning or a full police investigation.

Tier level	Female	Male	Unknown	Total
Blank	7	56	47	110
Tier 1	21	197	108	326
Tier 2	15	127	227	369
Tier 3		13	33	46
Tier 4		1	9	10
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>394</b>	<b>424</b>	<b>861</b>

*Table 20 – Tier model by perpetrator gender in London*

As Table 20 shows, in the cases where the perpetrator’s gender is recorded, males dominate the tier 3s and 4s, which are considered the cases of highest risk and/or need.

#### Appendix 4 - Summary of re-offending prevalence reported in research studies

Study	Study country	Sample size	How measured	Re-offending rate	Re-offending type
Eke et al. 2011	North America	78	(Sub-sample of Mohandie et al. 2006). Police contacts after threat assessment and legal intervention.	56% (n=44)	Recidivism
Foellmi et al. 2016	North America	89	Evidence of post-assessment stalking behaviour or harassment after psychological intervention from self-reports and criminal records.	35% (n=31)	Recidivism
Hehemann et al. 2017	The Netherlands	115	Report of stalking made to police within six months of index offence.	40% (n=46)	Persistence
	England	222		44.1% (n=98)	Persistence
James et al. 2010	Australia	140	When a subject re-contacted their target (no ex-intimates in sample). No timeframe in English sample who received a legal warning. Australian sample received a psychological intervention.	50% (n=70)	Persistence over 12 weeks
				27.1% (n=38)	Persistence over 52 weeks
Malsch et al. 2011	The Netherlands	709	New convictions for people already convicted of stalking, over 4 years or more.	11% (n missing)	Recidivism (stalking)
				24% (n missing)	Recidivism (stalking related)
McEwan et al. 2009	Australia	200	Prior stalking, to the same or other victim, disclosed during assessment with mental health clinician during a psychological intervention.	33% (n=65)	Recidivism
				9.5% (n=19)	Recurrence
McEwan et al. 2017	Australia	157	Stalking prior to index offence was taken from criminal records and clinician reports.	10% (n=16)	Persistence/ Recurrence (same victim)
				27% (n=43)	Recurrence (different victim)

McEwan et al. 2018	Australia	235	Stalking charge or restraining order (or similar), to the same or other victim, after psychological treatment. Over an average follow up time of 4 years. 8 offenders stalked both.	14.9% (n=35)	Recurrence - same victim
				13.6% (n=32)	Recurrence - new victim
				26.4% (n=62)	Recidivism
McEwan et al. 2019	The Netherlands	70	Police reports by the same or other victim, over an average follow up time of 2.63 years from referral to psychological intervention. 6 offenders stalked both.	40% (n=28)	Recurrence – same victim
				21.4% (n=15)	Recurrence – new victim
				52.9% (n=37)	Recidivism
Mohandie et al. (2006)	North America	730	When a subject re-contacted their target, subsequent to threat assessment and legal intervention.	60% (n=434)	Persistence
Rosenfeld (2003)	North America	189	Evidence of a second arrest or re-contact of target (based on victim or Probation reports or indicated in clinical interview).	49% (n=93)	Recidivism in whole sample
Rosenfeld et al. 2007	North America	29	Police and/or probation reports for 20 months after a psychological intervention.	0% (n=0/14)	Recidivism for treated stalkers
				26.7% (n=4/15)	Recidivism for treatment dropouts
Shea 2015	Australia	148	Police charges for stalking or indicative stalking post index offence and post psychological intervention. Sample is cases not offenders.	20.3% (n=30)	Recidivism (stalking charge)
				30.4% (n=45)	Recidivism (indicative stalking charge)
Shea et al. 2018	Australia	146	Stalking post index offence and post psychological intervention was taken from criminal records and self-reports.	33.6% (n=49)	Recurrence

Table 21 – Summary of re-offending statistics from academic research, with type of re-offending measure

Ranges summary:

- Recidivism: 9-56% (0%-52.9% in studies where there had been a psychological intervention)
- Persistence: 10-60% (50% in study where there had been a psychological intervention)
- Recurrence: 3-27% (9.5% - 40% in studies where there had been a psychological intervention)

## Appendix 5 - Summary of perpetrator and victim interviewees

Identifier	Relationship to Victim	Known for	Charge	Sentence	Previous Offending
P1	Former Partner/ Mother of Child	12 yrs	2A Stalking	Custodial sentence, restraining order and community order	Restraining Order issued by an ex-partner
P2	Former Partner/ Mother of Child	6 yrs	Breaching restraining order	Suspended custodial sentence, compulsory rehabilitation requirement	Domestic Violence
P3	Old Acquaintance	8 yrs	S.2 Harassment	Suspended custodial sentence, Community order, restraining order, rehabilitation requirement	Drunk & Disorderly
P4	Former Partner/ Mother of Children	10 yrs	Stalking 2A	Community Order, probation order, compulsory rehabilitation requirement	None
P5	Online Acquaintance	2 yrs	S.2 Harassment, Prohibited Weapon, Common Assault	Suspended custodial sentence, restraining order, compulsory rehabilitation requirement, hospital order	Previous stalking
P6	Former Partner/ Mother of Child	8 yrs	Stalking 2A	Suspended custodial sentence, probation order, restraining order, fine	Robbery, Assault, Fraud, Domestic violence
P7	Former Friend	7 yrs	S.2 Harassment	Community order, compulsory rehabilitation requirement	None

Table 22 - Summary of Perpetrator Interviewees

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>Relationship to Victim</b>	<b>Known for</b>	<b>Together for</b>	<b>Charge</b>	<b>Criminal Justice Outcome</b>
V1	Former Partner	15 years	9 years	S.18 GBH	Custodial sentence
V2	Former Partner	6 months	6 months	S.2 Harassment	Custodial sentence restraining order
V3	Former Partner	12 years	6 months	Stalking 2A, Criminal Damage, Battery	Custodial sentence
V4	Old Acquaintance	12 years	N/A	S.2 Harassment	Community Order, Restraining Order, financial fine
V5	Acquaintance	2 days	N/A	Stalking 2A	Custodial sentence – transferred to mental health institution
V6	Former Partner	8 months	7 months	Ongoing	Ongoing
V7	Former Partner	3 months	3 months	Stalking 2A	Suspended custodial sentence, community order
V8	Unknown/Stranger	N/A	N/A	Ongoing	Ongoing
V9	Friend/Acquaintance	3 years	N/A	Stalking 2A	Community order, community order, rehabilitation requirement, restraining order.
V10	Former Partner	10 years	1 year	Stalking 2A	Custodial sentence, restraining order

Table 23 - Summary of Victim interviewees

## Appendix 6 - Assumptions and costs for cost-benefit analysis

### *Assumptions and sources of costs for Cheshire case 1*

<sup>1</sup> Calculated by dividing all non-salary operating costs by the number of referrals received by the unit in the first year of operation.

<sup>2</sup> Calculated by multiplying the partnership staff hourly rates (based on salary + employer costs) by the (varied) time spent on the referral (includes preparation time for a timeline to clarify misinformation). Also includes:

- 2x hours of Police (officer in charge) time - Costs calculated from <https://www.polfed.org/pay/constable-pay-scales/> and cross-referenced to Hampshire Police for PC. Uplifted for employer costs.
- 2x hours for probation officer - hourly rate taken from Hampshire's budget (which is only a few pence higher than national estimates of median probation hourly rate by the Office of National Statistics). Uplifted for employer costs.
- 2x hours for Adult Social Care professional - hourly rate taken from Office of National Statistics occupation data for welfare professional (HO costs of MARACs made same assumption) - uplifted for employer costs.

<sup>3</sup> Same assumptions and sources as for point <sup>2</sup> for partnership staff and probation costs but also includes:

- 1x hour of Prison Nurse time – NHS prison nurse starts on band 5 – hourly rate calculated from midpoint of this band at <https://www.healthcareers.nhs.uk/working-health/working-nhs/nhs-pay-and-benefits/agenda-change-pay-rates> and uplifted for employer costs.
- 6x hours of Housing Officer time - cost taken from Office of National Statistics occupational data, for welfare and housing associate professional, and uplifted for employer costs.

<sup>4</sup> Same assumptions and sources as for point <sup>2</sup> for partnership staff costs and point <sup>3</sup> for housing officer costs, and also includes:

- 12x hours of Victim Liaison Officer time – same assumptions as for probation officer in point <sup>2</sup>.
- 2.5 hours of V's colleagues' time - assumed to be 1x senior law professional and 1x security professional (from Office of National Statistics occupation salary costs) with uplift for employer costs.

<sup>5</sup> Same assumptions and sources as for point <sup>2</sup> for partnership staff, police (officer in charge) and probation costs.

<sup>6</sup> In/direct costs to victim include:

- £ 11,344.74 for 14 months of Quality-Adjusted Life Year (duration of IASU involvement, although this can invariably be estimated for longer) taken from p. 47

of Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs for moderate anxiety \* UK Government's estimate of the cost of a life in full health (2016/17, inflation applied).

- £8,855 estimated from average cost of moving in UK - <https://www.barclays.co.uk/mortgages/guides/real-cost-of-moving/>
- £150 for security door estimated from <https://www.lathamssteeldoors.co.uk/security-front-doors/>. £200 for 4x bars on windows in house (source: Ebay).

<sup>7</sup> 20 months of Quality-Adjusted Life Year taken from p. 47 of Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse for moderate anxiety, 17 months for mild anxiety, 3 months of moderate anxiety \* Government's estimate of the cost of a life in full health (2016/17, inflation applied).

<sup>8</sup> Cost taken from p. 54 of Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse, for violence without injury (2016/17, inflation applied).

<sup>9</sup> Cost taken from Knapp, M., McDaid, D., & Parsonage, M. (2011). Mental health promotion and mental illness prevention: The economic case. (2009, inflation applied).

<sup>10</sup> Same costs for point <sup>6</sup> for moderate anxiety, but for 18 months plus £200 for changing daily routine travel – cost taken from VICE [https://www.vice.com/en\\_us/article/mbyvy8/cost-of-domestic-abuse-stalking-money](https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mbyvy8/cost-of-domestic-abuse-stalking-money)

<sup>11</sup> Cost taken from p. 54 of Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs for violence with injury, costs for state = £16,150 + £,3170 (2016/17, inflation applied).

### ***Assumptions and sources of costs for Cheshire case 2***

<sup>1</sup> Calculated by dividing all non-salary operating costs by the number of referrals received by the unit in the first year of operation.

<sup>2</sup> Calculated by multiplying the partnership staff hourly rates (based on salary + employer costs) by the (varied) time spent on the referral. Also includes:

- 1 hour for probation officer - hourly rate taken from Hampshire's budget (which is only a few pence higher than national estimates of median probation hourly rate by the Office of National Statistics). Uplifted for employer costs.
- 1 hour for Adult Social Care professional - hourly rate taken from Office of National Statistics occupation data for welfare professional (Home Office costs of MARACs made same assumption) - uplifted for employer costs.

<sup>3</sup> Same assumptions and sources as for point <sup>2</sup> for partnership staff and probation costs but also includes:

- 1x hour of Prison Nurse time –NHS prison nurse starts on band 5 – hourly rate calculated from midpoint of this band at <https://www.healthcareers.nhs.uk/working->

[health/working-nhs/nhs-pay-and-benefits/agenda-change-pay-rates](https://www.healthcareers.nhs.uk/working-nhs/nhs-pay-and-benefits/agenda-change-pay-rates) and uplifted for employer costs.

- 1x hour of Housing Officer time - cost taken from Office of National Statistics occupational data, for welfare and housing associate professional, and uplifted for employer costs.

<sup>4</sup> Neighbouring police costs to respond to P's breach of bail estimated by DC at Cheshire. Including:

- 9x hours for Sergeant - costs calculated from <https://www.polfed.org/pay/constable-pay-scales/> and cross-referenced to Hampshire Police for Sergeant.
- 2x police officer and 4x PCSO visits to the victim – same as above assumption for PC and source for PCSO <https://www.jobtrain.co.uk/merseysidepolice/displayjob.aspx?jobid=5221>.

<sup>5</sup> Calculated as 108 days (from mid May 2019 - end August 2019) using costs taken from the median value provided to survey by Care Quality Commission, (2017/18, inflation applied).

<sup>6</sup> Includes:

- £67,877.63 for 6 months stay in a secure forensic hospital - costs taken from the median value provided to survey by Care Quality Commission, (2017/18, inflation applied).
- £143.10 of 2.5 hours of staff time for Hospital Staff – estimated salary for Senior Psychologist from <https://www.indeed.co.uk/cmp/Nhs-Professionals/salaries/Senior-Psychologist> Estimated Consultant Psychiatrist salary from band 8c from <https://www.healthcareers.nhs.uk/working-health/working-nhs/nhs-pay-and-benefits/agenda-change-pay-rates>.

<sup>7</sup> Same assumptions and sources as for point <sup>2</sup> for partnership staff costs, but also includes:

- 2.5 hours of Chief Nurse (Band 8d) and Security Officer (Band 2) from <https://www.healthcareers.nhs.uk/working-health/working-nhs/nhs-pay-and-benefits/agenda-change-pay-rate>. Uplifted for employer costs.

<sup>8</sup> Same assumptions and sources as for point <sup>2</sup> for partnership and probation staff costs, but also includes:

- £2,268 for Cheshire police's response to breach of bail – source: IASU's Sustainability report

<sup>9</sup> In/direct costs include:

- £2,431.02 in Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) for 3 months taken from p. 47 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs for moderate anxiety multiplied by the UK Government's estimate of the cost of a life in full health (2016/17, inflation applied).
- £26,000 for a trained safety dog (Victim disclosed cost range was £12,000-£40,000 but did not want to give precise cost so median cost was estimated).

- £6,360.67 for lost wages – estimated salary at Band 5 with 5-6 years' experience from <https://www.healthcareers.nhs.uk/working-health/working-nhs/nhs-pay-and-benefits/agenda-change-pay-rate>.

<sup>10</sup> 18 months of Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) taken from p. 47 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse, 15 months of moderate anxiety and 3 months for mild anxiety\* Government's estimate of the cost of a life in full health (2016/17, inflation applied).

<sup>11</sup> Includes:

- £315 for Street triage - costs provided by NWBH Business Intelligence Officer
- £810 for 2x Ambulance call outs - costs provided by NWBH Business Intelligence Officer
- £1,890 for 2x Criminal Justice Liaison team - costs provided by NWBH Business Intelligence Officer
- £640 for 4x attendance at A&E - costs provided by NWBH Business Intelligence Officer
- £3,266.91 for 2x inpatient at hospital - costs estimated from p.5 <https://improvement.nhs.uk/documents/1972/1 - Reference costs 201718.pdf> (2017/18, adjusted for inflation).

<sup>12</sup> 3x hours of Samaritan charity time - costs provided by NWBH Business Intelligence Officer

<sup>13</sup> In/direct costs include:

- £14,586.09 in Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) for 18 months taken from p. 47 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs for moderate anxiety multiplied by the UK Government's estimate of the cost of a life in full health (2016/17, inflation applied).
- £5,577.56 for physical and emotional harm for sexual assault - cost taken from 'other sexual offences' consequence costs from p.7 of Home Office estimates of crime costs report (2015/16, adjusted for inflation).

<sup>14</sup> Costs estimated for 1 year for a single person with no dependents who had not claimed benefits previously - from <https://www.entitledto.co.uk/benefits-calculator/Results/ComprehensiveCalc?cid=f52ba101-3aa5-4b60-832f-88fbce28fc23&paymentPeriod=Weekly&calcScenario=UniversalCredit>

<sup>15</sup> Cost taken from 'other sexual offences' response costs from p.7 Home Office estimates of crime costs report (2015/16, adjusted for inflation)

<sup>16</sup> Cost taken from 'violence with injury' response costs from p.7 Home Office estimates of crime costs report (2015/16, adjusted for inflation).

### ***Assumptions and sources of costs for Hampshire case 1***

<sup>1</sup> Calculated by dividing all non-salary operating costs by the number of referrals received by the unit in the first year of operation.

<sup>2</sup> Calculated by multiplying the partnership staff hourly rates (based on salary + employer costs) by the (varied) time spent on the assessment. Including:

- 3 hours of a Care Coordinator's time – hourly rate provided by Clinical lead in Hampshire and uplifted for employer costs.
- 3 hours of a Doctor's time - estimated from average GP's salary at <https://www.indeed.co.uk/salaries/general-practitioner-Salaries> and uplifted for employer costs.

<sup>3</sup> Same assumptions and sources as for point <sup>2</sup> for partnership staff costs but also includes:

- 1 hour of administrator time – hourly rate approximated by benchmarking against partnership administrator (£18 p/hr) and uplifted for employer costs.
- 3 hours for 2x Band 6 Psychologists - cost taken from <https://www.healthcareers.nhs.uk/working-health/working-nhs/nhs-pay-and-benefits/agenda-change-pay-rates> and uplifted for employer costs.
- 1 hour of police sergeant, 5 hours of police constable and 3 hours of Detective Chief Inspector -- costs taken from Hampshire Police Officer salary document (online) and uplifted for employer costs.
- 30 hours of Crown Prosecution Staff time - Assumed to be legal professional from Office of National Statistics data and uplifted for employer costs.

<sup>4</sup> Same assumptions and sources as for point <sup>2</sup> for Victim Advocate costs and 2 hours of a Care Coordinator's time, but also includes, for a 2-hour safety planning meeting at the V's workplace:

- 2x NHS workers, 1 senior, 1 administrative (salaries taken from <https://www.healthcareers.nhs.uk/working-health/working-nhs/nhs-pay-and-benefits/agenda-change-pay-rates> and uplifted for employer costs.

<sup>5</sup> Same assumptions and sources as for point <sup>2</sup> for partnership costs.

<sup>6</sup> Costs for 215 days (from section date to date of analysis) taken from median value provided to survey by Care Quality Commission, 2018 – inflation applied.

<sup>7</sup> Indirect and direct costs to victim include:

- £8,913.72 in Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) for 22 months taken from p. 47 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs for moderate anxiety multiplied by the UK Government's estimate of the cost of a life in full health (2016/17, inflation applied).
- £1,800 in private mental health treatment sessions (Victim interview).
- £7,226 for lost wages (Victim interview).

<sup>8</sup> In/direct costs to victim include:

- £12,965.42 in Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) for 16 months taken from p. 47 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs for moderate anxiety multiplied by the UK Government's estimate of the cost of a life in full health (2016/17, inflation applied).
- £6,851.76 in lost productivity for victim - cost taken from p. 53 of Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs (2016/17, inflation applied).
- £1,500 for having to change jobs - cost taken from VICE [https://www.vice.com/en\\_us/article/mbyvy8/cost-of-domestic-abuse-stalking-money](https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mbyvy8/cost-of-domestic-abuse-stalking-money)
- £500 for having to change cars – no source, just estimated.

<sup>9</sup> 16 hours of lost productivity at Victim's workplace: assumed to be 2x NHS workers; 1 senior, 1 administrative (salary taken from <https://www.healthcareers.nhs.uk/working-health/working-nhs/nhs-pay-and-benefits/agenda-change-pay-rates>) and uplifted for employer costs.

<sup>10</sup> Cost taken from p. 53 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs (2016/17, inflation applied).

<sup>11</sup> Costs taken from p. 15 of Home Office costs of crime - estimate for violence without injury (2015/16, adjusted for inflation).

<sup>12</sup> Costs for 40x incident logs (£1,424) calculated from p 29 of Charging for Police Services. Costs for charging P with malicious communications (£249.30) taken from pp. 29-30 of Charging for Police Services, including taking a crime report, interview with a police officer and issuing a caution.

<sup>13</sup> Care contact with Forensic community, adult and elderly (£256.31) and Care contact with Criminal justice liaison services (£214.87) taken from 2014/15 NHS reference costs for mental health services, inflation applied.

<sup>14</sup> Three month stay - costs taken from median value provided to survey by Care Quality Commission (2017/18, inflation applied).

<sup>15</sup> Costs taken from p. 42 of Home Office costs of Domestic Abuse (2016/17, adjusted for inflation).

### ***Assumptions and sources of costs for Hampshire case 2***

<sup>1</sup> Calculated by dividing all non-salary operating costs by the number of referrals received by the unit in the first year of operation.

<sup>2</sup> Calculated by multiplying the partnership staff hourly rates (based on salary + employer costs) by the time spent on the assessment.

<sup>3</sup> Same assumptions and sources as for point <sup>2</sup> for partnership staff costs.

<sup>4</sup> Same assumptions and sources as for point <sup>2</sup> for partnership staff costs, but also includes:

- 3 hours of a Community Mental Health Team, assumed to be one mental health nurse (band 6) and one nurse consultant (band 8a) - salaries taken from <https://www.prospects.ac.uk/job-profiles/mental-health-nurse> and <https://www.healthcareers.nhs.uk/working-health/working-nhs/nhs-pay-and-benefits/agenda-change-pay-rates> and uplifted for employer costs.

<sup>5</sup> Eight months of QALY taken from p. 47 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs for moderate anxiety multiplied by the UK Government's estimate of the cost of a life in full health, (2016/17, inflation applied).

<sup>6</sup> Same as point <sup>5</sup> but for six months.

<sup>7</sup> Costs for 3x incident logs, 1x crime reports, DV report, interview with Police Officer, statement written by police officer, calculated from p. 29 of Charging for Police Services.

<sup>8</sup> Average service cost for treating depression - taken from [https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/default/files/Paying-the-Price-the-cost-of-mental-health-care-England-2026-McCrone-Dhanasiri-Patel-Knapp-Lawton-Smith-Kings-Fund-May-2008\\_0.pdf](https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/default/files/Paying-the-Price-the-cost-of-mental-health-care-England-2026-McCrone-Dhanasiri-Patel-Knapp-Lawton-Smith-Kings-Fund-May-2008_0.pdf) (2007, inflation applied).

<sup>9</sup> Average service cost for treating personality disorder - taken from [https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/default/files/Paying-the-Price-the-cost-of-mental-health-care-England-2026-McCrone-Dhanasiri-Patel-Knapp-Lawton-Smith-Kings-Fund-May-2008\\_0.pdf](https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/default/files/Paying-the-Price-the-cost-of-mental-health-care-England-2026-McCrone-Dhanasiri-Patel-Knapp-Lawton-Smith-Kings-Fund-May-2008_0.pdf) (2005/06, inflation applied).

<sup>10</sup> Indirect and direct costs to victim include:

- £ 4,862.03 for Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) for six months taken from p. 47 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs for moderate anxiety multiplied by the UK Government's estimate of the cost of a life in full health (2016/17, inflation applied).
- £501.86 for alarms – taken from Women’s Aid, Change that Lasts, Yasmin’s story. No source, cost assumed to be 2014 (as other data), inflation applied.
- £8,885 for moving to a new house - estimated from average cost of moving in UK - <https://www.barclays.co.uk/mortgages/guides/real-cost-of-moving/>

<sup>11</sup> Costs calculated from p.41 of Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs – x5 to account for the fact that the case may have been heard multiple times (2011, inflation applied).

<sup>12</sup> Cost taken from average cost per case per team [https://www.pssru.ac.uk/pub/uc/uc2010/uc2010\\_s12.pdf](https://www.pssru.ac.uk/pub/uc/uc2010/uc2010_s12.pdf) (2010, inflation applied)

<sup>13</sup> Estimate provided by Hampshire Health Practitioner - from NHS website for a part-time nurse

<sup>14</sup> Estimates provided by <https://www.entitledto.co.uk/> for someone with 4 children and new to claiming benefits for 6 months.

### ***Assumptions and sources of costs for London case 1***

<sup>1</sup> Calculated by dividing all non-salary operating costs by the number of referrals received by the unit in the first year of operation.

<sup>2</sup> Calculated by multiplying STAC staff hourly rates (based on salary + employer costs) by the (varied) time spent on the assessment.

<sup>3</sup> Same assumptions and sources as for point <sup>2</sup> for STAC costs but also includes:

- 3.5 hours of 2x probation staff time – salaries taken from <https://www.indeed.co.uk/salaries/probation-officer-Salaries,-London-ENG> and uplifted for employer costs.

<sup>4</sup> Same assumptions and sources as for point <sup>2</sup> for STAC costs but also includes 1.5 hours of 2x probation staff time (same assumptions as point <sup>3</sup>).

<sup>5</sup> Same assumptions and sources as for point <sup>2</sup> for STAC costs but also includes:

- 1 hour of staff time for Prison Psychologist and Lead Prison Practice Nurse. Costs estimated from midpoint of salary scale for prison psychologist <https://www.prospects.ac.uk/job-profiles/forensic-psychologist> and band 5 from <https://www.healthcareers.nhs.uk/working-health/working-nhs/nhs-pay-and-benefits/agenda-change-pay-rates> and uplifted for employer costs.

<sup>6</sup> Same assumptions and sources as for point <sup>2</sup> for STAC costs and 1 hour of Prison Psychologist time (same assumptions as point <sup>5</sup>).

<sup>7</sup> Same assumptions and sources as for point <sup>2</sup> for STAC costs, and 1.5 hours of prison in-reach team (same assumptions as point <sup>5</sup>) and 1.5 hours for 2x probation staff (same assumptions as point <sup>3</sup>).

<sup>8</sup> Indirect and direct costs to victim include:

- £19,886 in Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) for four years taken from p. 47 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs for mild anxiety (x2 years) and moderate anxiety (x2 years) multiplied by the UK Government's estimate of the cost of a life in full health (2016/17, inflation applied)
- Medication – over the counter sleeping tablets = £50 (no source, just estimated).

<sup>9</sup> Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) for 6 months taken from p. 47 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs for moderate anxiety multiplied by the UK Government's estimate of the cost of a life in full health (2016/17, inflation applied).

<sup>10</sup> Cost taken from p. 51 the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs (2016/17, inflation applied).

<sup>11</sup> Cost taken from p. 53 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs (2016/17, inflation applied).

<sup>12</sup> Cost taken from p. 42 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs - only emotional and physical costs to victim (2016/17, inflation applied).

<sup>13</sup> Costs to health services taken from p42 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs (2016/17, inflation applied).

<sup>14</sup> Costs taken from pp. 29-30 of Charging for Police Services. Includes taking a crime report, interview with a police officer and issuing a caution.

<sup>15</sup> Benefits costed for 6 months for approximately the V's circumstances via <https://www.entitledto.co.uk/benefits-calculator/Results/ComprehensiveCalc?cid=f52ba101-3aa5-4b60-832f-88fbce28fc23&paymentPeriod=Weekly&calcScenario=UniversalCredit>

<sup>16</sup> Same as the costs in point <sup>12</sup> but for two victims.

<sup>17</sup> Same as the costs in point <sup>13</sup> but for two victims.

<sup>18</sup> Cost taken from HO estimates of DA costs - estimate for violence without injury - only costs to victim (2016/17, inflation applied).

<sup>19</sup> Cost taken from HO estimates of DA costs - estimate for violence without injury - costs to health and police, pp. 36 and 42 (2016/17, inflation applied).

<sup>20</sup> Private security costs estimated from other victim accounts.

<sup>21</sup> Cost taken from p. 22 [https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/default/files/Paying-the-Price-the-cost-of-mental-health-care-England-2026-McCrone-Dhanasiri-Patel-Knapp-Lawton-Smith-Kings-Fund-May-2008\\_0.pdf](https://www.kingsfund.org.uk/sites/default/files/Paying-the-Price-the-cost-of-mental-health-care-England-2026-McCrone-Dhanasiri-Patel-Knapp-Lawton-Smith-Kings-Fund-May-2008_0.pdf) (2007, inflation applied).

### ***Assumptions and sources of costs for London case 2***

<sup>1</sup> Calculated by dividing all non-salary operating costs by the number of referrals received by the unit in the first year of operation.

<sup>2</sup> Calculated by multiplying STAC staff hourly rates (based on salary + employer costs) by the (varied) time spent on the assessment. Including:

- 1 hour of 2x probation staff time – salaries taken from <https://www.indeed.co.uk/salaries/probation-officer-Salaries,-London-ENG> and uplifted for employer costs.
- 6 hours of a Detective Constable and 5 hours of a PC (OiC) – salary estimated from <http://www.metpolicecareers.co.uk/newconstable/being-a-pc.php> and uplifted for employer costs.

<sup>3</sup> Same assumptions and sources as for point <sup>2</sup> for STAC costs but for 2 hours of the OiC's time.

<sup>4</sup> Same assumptions and sources as for point <sup>2</sup> for STAC costs but for 62 hours of the OiC's time (and 318 hours of the Victim Advocate's time).

<sup>5</sup> Same assumptions and sources as for point <sup>2</sup> for STAC costs but for 20 hours of the OiC's time and 6 hours of a Probation Officer. Includes £50 of security provided to victim's family (no source, just estimated).

<sup>6</sup> Perpetrator received a 3-year sentence so could be assumed to serve half of that in prison. Annual average cost taken from MoJ report on costs of prison (2017/18, inflation applied).

<sup>7</sup> Indirect and direct costs to victim and victim's family include:

- £8,103.39 in Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) for 10 months taken from p. 47 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs for moderate anxiety multiplied by the UK Government's estimate of the cost of a life in full health (2016/17, inflation applied)
- Victim rehousing costs not included as a mutual housing exchange was used.
- Victim's sister sold her £500k property at a loss for a quick sale – 5% estimated as loss = £25k.
- Victim loss of earnings (part-time job) and online adverts cost for victim whilst dog was missing = £175 (no source, just estimated).
- Private mental health treatment: £150 per session for 20 sessions = £3k.
- Victim changes jobs twice, £1,500 each time – source [https://www.vice.com/en\\_us/article/mbyvy8/cost-of-domestic-abuse-stalking-money](https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/mbyvy8/cost-of-domestic-abuse-stalking-money)).
- Refuge cost for 4 weeks – source <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/nov/26/womens-refuges-funding-changes-what-they-could-mean>.

<sup>8</sup> Includes:

- £4,862.03 for Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) for 6 months taken from p. 47 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs for moderate anxiety multiplied by the UK Government's estimate of the cost of a life in full health (2016/17, inflation applied).
- £23,636.47 emotional and physical harm for violence without injury, cost taken from p. 54 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse, (2016/17, inflation applied).

<sup>9</sup> Same as point <sup>10</sup>, but for two victims.

<sup>10</sup> Cost taken from p. 54 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse for three victims for violence without injury, lost output and health costs (2016/17, inflation applied).

<sup>11</sup> Cost taken from p. 51 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse (2016/17, inflation applied).

<sup>12</sup> Quality-Adjusted Life Year (QALY) for 6 months taken from p. 47 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs for mild anxiety multiplied by the UK Government's estimate of the cost of a life in full health (2016/17, inflation applied).

<sup>13</sup> See point <sup>7</sup> for relocation costs.

<sup>14</sup> See point <sup>8</sup> for moderate anxiety costs.

<sup>15</sup> Cost taken from p. 25 & 29 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse for violence with injury, (2016/17, inflation applied).

<sup>16</sup> See point <sup>7</sup> for refuge costs for 2 weeks.

<sup>17</sup> Cost taken from p. 42 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse (2016/17, inflation applied).

<sup>18</sup> Cost taken from p. 25 & 29 of the Home Office estimates of Domestic Abuse costs for violence with injury, costs for state = £3,170 + £1,950 (2016/17, inflation applied).

<sup>19</sup> Cost taken from p. 42 of HO estimates of DA costs, costs for state = £1,120 + £830 + £649,000 (2016/17, inflation applied)

