Technopolitics, Development and the Colonial-Postcolonial Nexus:

Revisiting Settlements Development Aid from Israel to Africa

Introduction

This article critically discusses the affinity between colonial development in Israel and the export of knowledge to Africa. At the heart of the Israeli aid to Africa, we argue, stands the global technopolitics of the Cold War era – the application of technological devices and practices to achieve definite political goals. The technopolitics of development refer to modernisation schemes permeated by colonial knowledge and practices accrued under European imperialism. We propose to revisit this claim by examining Israeli aid to African countries during the Cold War era across a broad range of diplomatic and spatial contexts and tracing the myriad connections between foreign policy, technopolitics and practices of racialisation. Our analysis addressing the intersection of geopolitics, planning and global politics, and thus advancing our understanding of the geographic and multiscalar dynamics of the relationship between Israel and Africa during the cold war era.

From the 1950s until today, development policies of international bodies have been the subject of an occasionally acrimonious debate, review of which exceeds the scope of the present article. We will, however, strive to briefly delineate the main points of contention relevant to our concerns. James Ferguson, for instance, contrasted two central approaches to development. The liberal approach, on the one hand, understands development as sincere attempts to alleviate poverty and therefore tends to underscore their moral underpinnings and accumulative consequences; while the neo-Marxist approach, on the other, sees international development organs as essential to the maintaining of imperial power as instruments indispensable to the sustainment of colonial and class-based structures of domination and exploitation. Post-colonial approaches elaborated the argument of domination and exploitation, pointing to a massive and yet unacknowledged transmission of colonial models to development and modernisation itineraries, and exposing the ethno-centrism inherent to ‘development science,’ illustrated by a pervasive belief in the supremacy of Western cultural.

The technopolitics of development stood at the core of the relationship between Israel and Africa, and has had the effect of reinvigorating Israeli discourses of modernity and nationalism. The technopolitics of development in Israel have been directly marked by
dominant beliefs in several interrelated ways. First, they were rooted in orientalist discourses in which the ‘backward native’ becomes a consumer of modern technologies migrating from territories where such knowledge is produced to territories where its products are consumed, with knowledge exported by Israel contributing to a reproduction of notions differentiating the ‘West’ (the Western Israeli benefactors) from the ‘East’ (African indigent beneficiaries).

Second, the Israeli gaze on Africa was mediated by a wider epistemological framework in which orientalism was turned ‘inwards’ as well, onto the Mizrahi Jewish population on the one hand, and the Palestinian population, on the other. Despite differences in the treatment each group received by the Israeli authorities, both had simultaneously undergone processes of racialisation.

In this article, we examine not only Hecht's claims regarding Israeli-African relations, or the colonial hues of Israeli developmentalism in general, as might be evident from Israeli actions in the West Bank since its occupation during the 1967 war. We strive to expand the analysis of Zionism beyond the confines of a particularised national history, and seek to locate it within broader discourses of global imperialism.

Despite the considerable volume of Israeli projects in Africa and the broad spectrum of spatial, agricultural and social development schemes exported to the continent, existing literature on the subject, has by and large cast the Israeli ‘Periphery Doctrine’ as the principal animating factor in the Israeli-African relations during the 1960s and 1970s. Without downplaying the validity of this explanation, we wish to raise an additional account according to which development projects of various Israeli settlements in Africa, such as the founding of Nahal settlements and Gadna bases, illustrate the role of Africa as a laboratory in which colonial spatial practices were experimented with and from where new notions of social engineering and spatial planning emerged.

One intimation for this could be found in remarks made by Ra'anan Weitz, a weighty figure in settlement and development schemes during the first decades of the State of Israel:

I've found that there were similarities between the patriarchal society of the immigrants form Oriental countries and the societies in many of the developing countries and I saw how the experience we've gained here in Israel may be useful for African and Asian nations …
In light of these similarities, Ra’an an Weitz recommended to ‘export’ to Africa the model of the ‘new settlement’ which were planned mainly for the immigrants from north Africa, and not the models of the cooperative farms designed for the veterans (the Kibbutz or the Moshav). He explained that these new settlements, which he also named as ‘guided village cooperatives’, are more suitable for ‘people with no technical or managerial capacity and with no background of cooperative economic activities’. It is this system, in which the authorities and its instructors are in charge of managing all the aspects of the village and imposed it on the members, sometimes against their will, that he recommended to transferred to developing countries (1971).

Apart from the issue of the affinity between Israel and the Africa in regards to the ethos of pioneering and manual labour, and the way it exposes colonial schemata in Zionist thought, Ra’an an Weitz’s statements raise attention to the salience of aid programs in the contexts of settlement and agriculture, and the fact that the model selected for exportation was that of regional planning, with its discernably centralised agricultural and colonisation arrangements. The Nahal and Gadna were the main vehicles of Israeli aid in a number of African States during the 1960s, and, through them, knowledge of development and agriculture was transmitted. The exchange invoked enthusiasm among both Israelis and Africans, as both sides entertained hopes for the potential of these exports to affect subsequent development schemes in emergent post-colonial Africa.

The fact that Weitz, an individual heavily involved in settlement projects for immigrants throughout the 1950s, began dealing with exportation of Israeli settlement models to developing countries is not coincidental. It is, we argue, broadly characteristic of the period of de-colonisation throughout the world, during which Western experts, many of whom had previously worked in the colonies, needed to find a way to turn their professional knowledge into a commodity that could prove applicable to various contexts.

**Technopolitics and Diplomacy**

Israel's principal motive in forming close ties with African States was geostrategic, hoping to drive a wedge between Arab States and nascent Africa States which had recently
gained their national independence. This policy stipulated the need for alliances with Muslim states in the periphery of the Middle East. A number of events allowed this process to gain momentum from 1956 onwards: first, African countries began gaining their independence in an accelerating process of decolonisation from 1957 onwards – paving the way for the creation of diplomatic ties. Second, following the Arab diplomacy pressure Israel was isolated regionally: It was driven out of the first Asian-African conference held in Bandung in April 1955, in which representatives of the independent States of Asia and Africa had met for the first time (Peters, 1992), reflecting its status as an anomaly among post-colonial nations. Israel was also excluded from the Second International Socialist Conference in New Delhi in 1956, and branded as a bridgehead of Western colonialism. Apart of being isolated from its own subregion in Asia, Israel was also a target of condemnations by the Soviet bloc countries. Another factor was the outcome of the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis, which lent Israel a reputation as a powerful regional force and consolidated both its military standing and its recognition in the international arena.

Ronen Bergman noted that the upsurge and consolidation of Israeli involvement in Africa was overseen primarily by military bodies such as the Mossad and the IDF. The Foreign Ministry became increasingly sidelined by the Defense Ministry, a process connoting the increasing militarisation of Israel's foreign policy (Kleimann, 1999). Following its expulsion from the Bandung Conference, with its aspiration to gain international standing unabashed, Israeli leadership exploited the military and intelligence agencies as diplomatic backchannels through which to forge ties with African States. These backchannels also had the benefit of strengthening ties with the US, as intelligence collected by Israeli Intelligence agencies in Africa was passed to the Americans who made use of it in the clashes forming the geopolitical lineaments of the Cold War. The US, in return, financed (albeit secretly) the Israeli involvement in Africa.

Apart from providing military knowledge, arms, as well as training and guidance to national armed forces Israel also provided consultation and initiated joint agricultural and business ventures. Such ‘civilian’ projects were, inevitably, secondary and undetachable from the main context of military aid. Shlomo Hanegbi, who was commissioned as an agricultural instructor in the Ivory Coast, described it thus:

We were invited to the Foreign Ministry for a meeting with the Ambassador [of the Ivory Coast in Israel]. He described what is required of us. We set forth
as a Military delegation – that's what the Africans liked, they found the Israeli Military captivating. We thus arrived at the Ivory Coast as five professionals and a commander

Professor Naomi Hazan who as a young researcher was commissioned to produce a written assessment of the Israeli agents in Africa, remarked in a similar vein:

One of the most palpable symbols of sovereignty is the army. The reference in Africa was to the developmental aspect, the Africans saw in Israel a post-colonial state that had successfully undergone rapid development. This image was very important … one objective was recruiting youth [to the army] as a means to propagate nationalism. An additional objective was to streamline bodies loyal to the regime itself… the national challenge came first […] these military bodies, the Gadna for instance, served the new regime

The above remarks illustrate the bond between the military and civil society at the basis of the Israeli development project in Africa and epitomised by the export of the notion of Nahal and Gadna settlements to the African States.

By the early 1960s, Israel had already held formal ties with Ethiopia, Liberia, Congo, Nigeria, Tanganyika and the Ivory Coast; by 1966, some ten African States were receiving some form of direct military assistance from Israel. Rumors about the mushrooming Israeli aid travelled among the governments of the nascent African States, aided by the fact that Israeli military arrangements became associated with not only the straightforward supplying of weapons and ammunition, but with the notion that Israeli military arrangements allowed the government to put the army to use in peacetime as a taskforce capable of promoting a variety of civilian objectives.

In 1964, the rate of Israeli experts in Africa per capita, including agricultural advisors and military experts, was nearly twice as high as the overall rate of the member states of the OECD. Between the years 1958 and 1963, the amount of training courses given to Africans in Israel had almost tripled whereas the number of African students and apprentices in Israel multiplied fifteenfold, from 137 in 1958 to 2100 five years later.

This rise in Israeli initiatives is also a result of the founding of Mashav in 1958, an Israeli Agency for International Development Cooperation within the Foreign Ministry.
agency quickly grew, offering a variety of training and technical instruction courses primarily in Africa, promoting ambitious initiatives in agriculture, irrigation, regional planning, community development, public health and, as we shall discuss soon, the training of youth as cadets in the future national security sector.\textsuperscript{24}

**Nahal and Gadna: Development, Pioneering and Frontier**

The foundation of the Nahal in 1948/49 resulted from a state-led attempt to preserve the ethos of Zionist 'realisation' ("Hagshama") from the pre-state Yishuv era, which construed the collective agricultural settlements as the culmination of Zionism. The decision stemmed from a historical moment in which, despite arduous colonisation efforts in Israel, the founding of new agricultural settlements waned, even in the most sensitive boarder regions, lagging behind Israel's ambitious colonisation schemes in the first few years after the 1948 war. The Nahal settlement model is unique due to the fact that it merged agricultural work and active military activity, making such settlements particularly useful as strategic outposts in frontier areas, later becoming civilian Kibbutzim. Youngsters who had volunteered in the Nahal were expected to carry on in the tradition of frontier pioneering and personify the Zionist ideal of the young, tanned, virile settler-warrior.\textsuperscript{25}

The Nahal filled two purposes: one military, since draftees recruited through this channel received a comprehensive military training; and the other civilian, since these youth groups were used to found new settlements which promoted security blueprints (as in placing them in areas near the borders), demographic strategies (areas with a majority of non-Jews) or territorial exigencies (areas less adapted to agricultural settlements due to lack of water or unfertile soil).

Despite Nahal cadets' status as active soldiers in the IDF, marked by their obligation to wear army fatigues, their training stage in the Kibbutzim was intended to acclimatise them to life as both soldiers and settlers simultaneously in preparation for founding their own Kibbutz in the future. After the year-long training in the Kibbutzim was over, men were commonly sent to complete their military training, later to rejoin the women and found a new Kibbutz or join a recently established one. Upon their completion of mandatory military service, the Nahal operatives were allowed to decide whether to remain in the Kibbutz or leave.

The Gadna was established in 1940 by the 'Hagana', a Jewish paramilitary organisation operated during the British Mandate period. The aim of the Gadna was to prepare teenagers for future service in the Hagana and run, in the meanwhile, secondary errands and missions.
Youngsters recruited to the Gadna underwent military instruction programs which emphasised the individual's commitment to Zionism. After the foundation of the State, the Gadna continued to be an educational organ designed to prepare teenagers for military training and promote commitment to the fulfillment of Zionism's goals. Unlike the pre-state youth movements and Nahal, however, Gadna cadets were not necessarily called upon to take part in agricultural settlement.

Two main reasons explain why the Ganda program was continued even after the establishment of the State. First is the precarious security situation after 1948, which justified robust physical and psychological training of Israeli teenagers in preparation for their military service. The second reason was the absorption efforts of the 'mass immigration' after 1948, and the Israeli government's intention to imprint upon the young generation of immigrants, mainly Mizrahi, the Zionist ideals as these were understood by the veteran Jewish Yishuv.

It therefore becomes increasingly evident why the models of the Gadna and the Nahal seemed appealing to Africans, since these were touted as powerful tools to simultaneously mobilise unemployed youngsters into educational, productive systems and produce a national body which would lead the building of scores of new settlements, fulfilling an important role in national territorialisation. However, due to the same thinking that led to population dispersal policies in Israel in the 1950s, governments in Africa saw small settlements based on modern agriculture as the primary means by which to combat mass immigration from the impoverished countryside to the rapidly expanding cities.

The Gadna and the Nahal, infusing military and civilian aspects and constituting a state-controlled means by which to mold the first post-independence generations, infuse it with values of patriotism, unity and a sense of national responsibility while also training it in modern agricultural work and invigorating frontier regions. The benefits such models promised them, as well as for their Israeli hosts, were both internal and external: internally, the presentation of the Nahal and the Gadna programs as important to promoting a national civil society and externally, the chance to receive grants and support from international aid foundations, just as Israel had done, raising substantial international funding to projects in territories it has conquered by force in 1948.

Exporting the Nahal and Gadna programs to Africa
(Figure 1 about here)
The thoughts of exporting Israeli models initially pertained to the Kibbutz and the Corporative Moshav, Israel's most celebrated achievements. However, it quickly became evident that it was the innovative schemes of regional planning and the appending centralised agricultural settlement systems developed in Israel that best met the needs of most post-colonial countries. Such Israeli projects were exported to Burma, Greece and even, to a limited extent, Morocco. Eitan Bar-Yoseph points to Ghana's request to Israel to assist founding a 'builder's brigade' modeled after the Nahal as early as June 1957 as a herald of the blossoming Israeli aid industry in Africa throughout the following decade. Ghanaian representatives who toured Israel reported to their governments that such settlements could prove an ideal means by which to incorporate the youth in the project of national liberation and slash unemployment rates. In 1960, Israeli Nahal officers in Ghana orchestrated the founding of a national youth movement, based on the Israeli Gadna program. Additional African States solicited Nahal-based programs, and representatives of various countries participated in an international seminar of the leaders of the international union of socialist youth held in Israel in 1959.

The expansive curricula and schedules of Nahal training programs testify to the intensity of the aspiration to transfer knowledge and values developed in the Nahal:

As soon as the program begins strict discipline is to be imposed, and individual responsibilities are be placed on each trainee […] since in the majority of African countries no strong ideological inclinations exist, trainees possessive of natural leadership skills should be ferreted out in the opening stages of the course.

Highlights of such programs included educational tours to celebrated pioneering sites in Israel, such as the Kibbutz. The presentation of the achievements of pioneering Israel to African trainees focused not only on development knowledge but also on reforming identity and morality of the trainees, teaching them to emulate pioneering values into their own lives. Therefore, the trainees were evaluated and graded by their Israeli instructors on their social, intellectual and physical abilities.

Following the initial enthusiasm caused by the exportation of the Nahal to Ghana, additional states applied for Israeli programs. In April 1962 an Israeli Nahal delegation departed for Ivory Coast, where they were placed as overseers of a new national civil service.
program affiliated with the national army. Nahal settlements in the various places retained their Hebrew name and were referred to as ‘Nahal Settlements’, such as settlement in Mwanza (Tanganyika) established in 1962. Additional examples of such settlements included the foundation of the communal settlements of Apscow and Zambacro in the Ivory Coast and Kafulaftu and Kafubu in Zambia.

Periodic reports on the progress of Israeli aid reveal the scope of activity, the successes as well as the failures and unforeseen challenges which arose during the transplantation of the programs. A report from 1970 details the various ongoing projects in the Ivory Coast, detailing meetings with key figures in the Ivory Coast, as well as the structure and content of training programs given by the Israelis, their relations with the locals, and makes suggestions which would 'further elevate the ideological level of the participants'. Other reports written by Israeli representatives recount their warm welcome receptions in the various countries due to, among other things, the enthrallment of the locals with the successful national project of Israel. Since the late 1950s until the severing of diplomatic ties between Israel and most sub-Saharan African States in 1973, settlements drawing on the models of the Nahal and the Gadna had been established in as many as twenty African States.

(Map 1 about here)

What are the Nahal and Gadna in Africa?

Due to the pro-establishment bias pervading most of the scholarship produced on Israeli involvement in Africa until the last decade, there has yet to be a comprehensive effort to tackle key questions regarding the contending definitions of Nahal and Gadna in Africa. We argue that it was particularly the field-operatives, the agents of knowledge and professional practice, who raised numerous questions in this regard. Failure to examine the validity of the terminology used to describe Israeli involvement in Africa had led critical scholars, too, to accept a certain bias regarding the Nahal in Africa, admitting definitions which falsely imply that the Nahal in Africa was fundamentally about the foundation of new agricultural pioneer settlements. It soon becomes evident, however, that it is not only the terminology that is unclear, but also that the loosely defined objectives of these projects allowed for a broad range of different outcomes.

Foreign Office correspondences between the late 1950s and the 1960s reveal that the concepts of Gadna and Nahal often appear in quotation marks, suggesting that even the high officials and army personnel were uneasy with using these definitions to describe the African context. Documents speak of a resemblance to the Israeli models or mere inspiration, not on
an actual reproduction of the Israeli model as is and that: ‘Our operations in Dahomey take place on two levels, one similar to the Nahal and the other, similar to the Gadna’. Later on, they present the basic premise of the Israeli team's operations in the country, concluding that: ‘the report was authored by the head of the delegation …. The author, similarly to the other IDF officers serving in the delegation, uses the concept Nahal without quotation marks. The informed reader shall be able to surmise, however, that the subject of discussion is a local, Nahal-like organisation’. 39

A similar state is implied in an appreciative inquiry commissioned by government ministries. In some countries, projects titled ‘Nahal’ or ‘Gadna’ served as cover to other projects, whose objectives were more pronouncedly political (such as forming a cadre directly loyal to the governing party) or military (training a special army unit personally loyal to the President).

"Relatively Primitive": Revisiting Institutional Research

Several publications summarising appreciative inquiry projects which looked into the exportation of Israeli agricultural and communitarian knowledge had appeared as early as the high-period of the exportation of the Gadna and Nahal. Rivi Gillis identifies two characteristics of such inquiries: First, they were prepared in strict adherence to frameworks set by institutional historiography in Israel during the 1960's and 1970's, as some of the authors had themselves participated in instructing and directing the various Israeli development projects. Secondly, they unanimously and uncritically accepted the notion of development as central to an unavoidable universal process taking place between developed and developing countries.

It is in light of this context that we will discuss the findings of two main appreciative inquiries: that of Michael Kreinin, a former Israeli expert on international trade and finance and that of Rina Shapria, a Sociologist of Education from Tel-Aviv University, who was commissioned by the Ministry of Defense to survey, together with a group of students, Gadna camps in Malawi, Togo and the Ivory Coast. Mordechai Kreinin's book was published with the support of the American Ford Foundation, while Rina Shapira's study originally appeared in a Defense Ministry publication and remained obscure for many years.

Mordechai Kreinin hails the success of the Israeli development projects in Africa, musing that Israeli efforts were successful due to their lack of colonial motivations, a factor, he claims, that provided Israeli experts with the mandate to modernise African states without
triggering resistance. One of the issues that appealed to African trainees in the Israeli training programs, he explains, was the non-dogmatic instillation of socialistic values, believing that Israel found the middle road between private and public capital and as a result was able to quickly develop its economy. Another similarity Africans supposedly found in Israel was the fact that Israel achieved growth despite basing it on ‘relatively primitive people’, i.e. immigrants from Asian and African countries borne from patriarchal societies. The experience of introducing modern techniques into traditional societies proved highly relevant to Africa. Another characteristic of Israel was its conferring of social prestige to manual labor, particularly agricultural work, as opposed to Africa where social prestige was accorded to bureaucratic office workers.

Central to Mordechai Kreinin's book are the agricultural cooperatives founded by Israeli experts in Africa, while the Gadna and Nahal were categorised as ‘community development’ projects. To him, a central issue in contemporary Africa were the challenges presented by high unemployment rates leading villagers to migrate to the city. National Youth Movements were founded in Israel in order to tackle similar challenges. Many of them were affiliated to political parties, but only two were non-partisan and national: the army-sponsored Gadna and Nahal programs, both of which evoked much interest among African government officials, who sought to emulate their examples.

The appreciative inquiry carried out by Rina Shapira was co-commissioned by the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Ministry, focusing particularly on Gadna-style movements in three African countries. Shapira recounts the objectives of the young pioneers' Youth Movements in Africa: the instillation of values such as patriotism, unity, discipline, sense of national responsibility and the nurturing of leadership and the promotion of technical capabilities, similar to the Gadna in Israel. The connections between Israel and Africa were a central theme throughout the interview with Shapira, who stated: ‘I was a teacher in the Ma'abarot and I've founded a youth movement for the [Mizrahi] Immigrants… we were pioneers, we wanted to help others, as well’.

Compared to Mordechai Kreinin, Rina Shapira is more critical, pointing out various problems that plagued the Israeli programs and remained inadequately addressed. Thus, for example, she describes the problem of Nahal graduates, most of whom returned to their villages of origin but find themselves individually powerless to enact any reform. Their role was to ‘project’ their acquired working methods onto the entire village, to set a personal example, but since they did not receive a personal parcel of land upon their return but continued to cultivate the joint family
land instead, their motivation to increase production and evolve production methods soon plummeted. They operate, moreover, within a traditional society that does not look kindly on difference: ‘when the entire village wakes up for work in 9AM, it is hard for the lone graduate to rise earlier, and he quickly reverts back to the cycle of indifference’.\(^{47}\) Such statements resemble complaints voiced against Mizrahi immigrants, an issue that was discussed in detail with Shapira\(^{48}\), who reports cases in which cadets failed to cultivate the entire plot allocated to them in the Nahal Settlements and consequentially faced expulsion, but adamantly refused to return to the village where there was no employment at hand. Following the cadet's resistance, the police would intervene and forcibly remove them from the settlement, in a description reminiscent of scenes in Israeli immigrant's Moshavim\(^{49}\).

Contemporary researchers had routinely overlooked several aspects which today seem inextricable from the political and international context of the period. For instance, the complete omission of the Palestinian issue and its relevence to the creation of the Israeli models of the Nahal, Gadna and the models settlements in general, as a method of colonisation. The Israeli-Arab conflict is mentioned only in the expositions of the wider context which led to the Israeli attempt to gain allies and influence in territories on the far side of their immediate Middle Eastern neighbors. Other studies\(^{50}\) pay no regard at all to the Palestinian context. Despite his empirical rigor, augmenting straightforward written material with numerous interviews with top ranking officials and diplomats, Israeli accomplishments in agriculture are often discussed without any recourse whatsoever to the results of the 1948 war, that were the basis for transferring agricultural land to Jewish settlers that were founded on Palestinian abandoned villages that their inhabitants were either expelled or left.

Similarly, hegemonic Israeli cognitive constructs dominate these scholar's treatment of Mizrahi Jews. Thus, for instance, no reference is made to the debasing selection procedures immigrants from North Africa were subjected to, nor to the condescension on behalf of the Israeli establishment which they encountered upon arrival, most poignantly manifest in their forced settlement in the peripheries of Israel. Neither do the more critical of the appreciative inquiries refer to the early failures of these models in Israel which were later triumphantly exported to Africa: the Lakhish model, the Nahal model itself, and the model of Immigrant Moshavim as a means of nation building and providing border security.
Nahal and the Gadna to Chad

The episode of the Nahal in Chad is illustrative of broad characteristics of Israeli operations in Africa: the importance of the local national government's support of Israel; the relations between Israel and France in light of the intensive involvement of both in a country only recently emerging from under French Colonial rule; the relations between Israeli bodies operating in Africa and international aid institutions led by the US and the UN; and the lack of coordination between the various Israeli and Zionist bodies operating in Africa.51

Analysing Israeli involvement in Chad points to a merging of development and political considerations equally shaped by the Cold War, the Israeli effort to forge alliances in Africa as a means to combat Israel's diplomatic isolation on the international scene and the Israeli nation building effort. This case displays the importance of focusing on a particular field with its political, social and economic particularities and analysing how these lead to unanticipated dynamics and results, requiring flexibility and compromise.

Correspondences testify that the ambiguousness of the Israeli policy of regarding the objectives of the youth movement in Chad permeated the Israeli operatives as well, leading to misunderstandings and complaints. This policy also led to meandering Israeli responses in light of suspicions and speculations regarding the true nature of the Israeli presence raised by UN delegations and representatives.52 Despite many distinguishing factors of the exportation of Nahal programs in Chad, there are many similarities between it and other projects in the continent, first and foremost the common attempt to find a solution to the alarming unemployment rates among youngsters who immigrated from the countryside to the city in droves.53

The Kondoul Farm's opening ceremony took place in the summer of 1966. Ambassador Eliezer Armon testified how after only 9 months, the farm already had an 'Israeli appearance' in terms of construction style, field cultivation, but most pronouncedly in the high degree of order and planning. In a more detailed memorandum the ambassador explains that Israeli-sponsored agricultural activity in Chad is limited to the founding and management of only one Farming compound, in the village of Kondoul, operated by the Chadian Youth Movement, the M.J.T. The Farm would be an agricultural experimental compound and also ‘camouflage special security operations’. The ambassador explains that the farm's usefulness is not predicated on agricultural productivity and therefore questions of its profitability are of little consequence. The problem he outlines next, however, would persist over the next several years:
Not all the Chadian government officials and public know of all the motives, classified or otherwise, which led to the Farm's foundation. The educational activities are not known in full to all [...] At present we Israelis are the only ones explaining the sensitive experimental and educational nature of our activities in the Farm... 54

In a letter, Lieutenant Colonel Naeim Morad, from the Unit of Foreign Relations and Aid in the Ministry of Defense, explains that two focuses stand out in the President's speech which consist the basic credo of the Israeli activity in Chad: the cultivatable human being as the principal resource of every country; the necessity to unite the Chadian people and transcend tribal affiliations; the traits of discipline and responsibility as central to the education to good citizenship, concluding that ‘the Youth Movement is the agent which is called upon to take up the burden of forging this new Chadian architype’. These emphases echo similar patterns of thinking and political slogans used in Israel during the 1950s.

Discussions ensued over the course of several months, with the first training program beginning in July 1967 and ending in September that same year. Such unofficial ties between the President of Chad and the IDF delegation point to the various means by which the leaders of post-colonial countries take advantage of development projects to advance their interests.

While the taskforce was secretly being trained, correspondences regarding the Kondoul Farm testified to the problematics involved by using an agricultural farming compound to camouflage secret military training. Thus a classified document sent from the Foreign Ministry to the Embassy reports that in a meeting held by the Mashav director, ‘The opinion presented by Lieutenant Colonel Naeim Mourad, that the farm should continue to be used only as a front for the training of Youth militias and for the President's Guard and that any expansion into agricultural activity should be avoided… in light of this, the Ministry of Agriculture has been commissioned to design a reasonable work plan that would allow the farm to continue providing the Youth Movement with as much food and work-days as possible’. Naeim Mourad himself provides a detailed account of this policy decision in a letter to his two superiors in Chad, Ambassador Armon and the Commander of the IDF delegation to Chad, Azzi Rigai:

I apologise that the designation of the Kondoul Farm as a cover for training programs of the Movement's militia forces was misunderstood [...] Camouflage and disguise are embedded into the very structure and
foundations of the [Youth] Movement. In order to avoid identification of the Youth Movement's activity with militarisation, the Movement was structured similarly to any other such movement in the African States [...] The camouflage is predicated on the structure of the Movement and its internal organisation, not in the activities carried out in the Farm compound the farm should appear as any other farm, but does not have to accomplish all its objectives it would have otherwise pursued elsewhere.\textsuperscript{55}

Azzi Rigai responded to this letter claiming that the Chadian's demands had, in fact, changed: having invested considerable amounts of money, the authorities were demanding that cadets gain experience in advanced forms of agriculture. Therefore, it would be impossible to maintain the current durations of training programs, only one or two months long, and begin offering longer programs that would include agricultural training.

In November 1967, the President of Chad tasked the IDF delegation with assisting in founding another compound, where, too, the youth movement would hold military training. In his letter, Azzi Rigai hints at ethnic tensions in Chad: the new camp was to be located in Mongo, some 560KM east of Fort Lamy, in the heart of a region populated entirely by Arabic Muslims where a massacre had recently occurred, which is why Rigai objects to dispatching Israeli officers there. Rigai explains that training in Dweiba leads to maintenance problems of 150 Mongoians in the center of the South, whereas the Kondoul compound accords an important advantage to exercise oversight over the Israeli Officers, since ‘It has lately been brought to our attention that despite two monthly visits, the Israeli officers stationed there need to be kept within sight’. This would raise another problem, however: ‘Insisting on training them in Kondoul would amount to an admittance that the Farm is a cover for military training, something we've been trying to hide’.\textsuperscript{56}

During 1968, the majority of correspondences pertain to various agricultural problems in Kondoul, what might hint that military activities had migrated elsewhere, such as in Dweiba. Azzi Rigai concluded the training in this camp: ‘A. The cadets who completed their training are not the movement's operatives but nomads and vagabonds from the North. B. In the early stages of the program a mutiny broke in which some 30 cadets took part, who were promptly dismissed. C. I think there has been some good work done to transform these nomads from an assortment of tribes to orderly regiments who march proudly and in high morale. The program
had met its goals and, what's more, it taught former enemies who despised each other to live together: to break bread, sing, and work together.¹⁵⁷

In 1969 Youth Movement in Chad reached an all-time low. Cadets in Kondoul went on strike in June, and embarked on a march to Fort Lamy to protest the worsening conditions in the Farm and the debasing treatment they received from the Movement's leader. The head of the Israeli delegation, Lieutenant Colonel Oron Reuben, detailed realities in the Kondoul compound in a classified memorandum: some 160 cadets are employed there, most of them for their third or fourth consecutive year, some married. He makes efforts to find them employment opportunities outside the Movement, but only few found positions in the Army or the Police and the vast majority remained unemployed. The annual budget of the Youth Movement had been cut by 50 percent, the leader was a drunkard, corrupt and regularly exploited the movement's personnel for his own private gains. Oron Reuben claimed there to be international involvement aimed against Israeli involvement, promulgated by ‘propaganda officers from the Soviet Bloc’. Some communist propaganda leaflets were indeed found amongst the cadets. Reuben also accused French and American representatives in involvement in various episodes in the Farm.

In examination of the Israeli development project as part of the imperialist project and not as a stand-alone case, one could read the resistance of the cadets as congruent with resistance patterns observed elsewhere against the institutions of the Eurocentrist, in this case, the representatives of the Israeli development project. This challenge fosters a third, hybrid space which fractures the White Man's actions and those of the institution he serves and represents.⁵⁸

To conclude we will revert back to Itzhak Tsarfati's remarks we began with. Itzhak Tsarfati claimed that he is unaware of the reasons for the change in the designation of the Kondoul Farm, whether this was due to a laxing demand for Security personnel, budgetary inhibitions on behalf of the government of Chad or some other reason. At any rate, more than a few ministers ‘expressed their dissatisfaction with the current situation and believe we've
entangled them in an ill-advised financial and political escapade’. The American ambassador, too, whose country donated to the Farm expensive agricultural equipment, applies pressure and demands the equipment be put to use. Thus, a farm originally intended to train youth to the Security Services became an institution which fails to complete its cadets training and hoards expensive, potentially highly productive equipment, ‘virtually unused’.

In the meanwhile, the President of Chad stopped following the turmoil besetting the Youth Movement closely, ‘and he is preoccupied with is to have something positive to show his ministers and foreigners’. To Israel, it is argued, is bound ‘due to prestige as well as political considerations’ to bringing the Farm in Kondoul to a state of profitable productiveness, an effort which would require much additional investment, which is why Tsarfati requested the Ministry of Agriculture to take up the mantle.59

Recounting the correspondences and appending documents related to this episodes constitutes placing a mirror to the Developmentalist Israeli discourses: various documents detailing the objectives of the Youth Movement in Chad are highly evocative of dominant discourses from the Israeli State-building era. These include the general outlines of the Nahal and Gadna projects as we mentioned earlier as well as account for their adaptation to African contexts and to the governments importing Israeli knowledge: educating the youth and encouraging pioneering undertakings of agriculture and construction, fostering a nationalistic attachment in order to secure the State and the stability of the regime and to unite the tribes and regions to a cohesive nation-state.60

An additional contribution for the study on Chad is exposing the processes of racialisation which Israeli operatives have undergone in the states recently unshackled from French Colonialism. One should point out that due to the necessity of knowledge of the French language, service in these countries became available to operatives from North-African descent. Rivi Gillis61 suggests that many of them spent time in Kibbutzim. Eitan Bar-Yoseph62 suggests further that service in Africa had the effect of obscuring ethnic difference within Israeli society and ‘Whitened’ the Mizrahi operative, given that he had already been subjected to resocialisation in the Kibbutz. Our study contests this argument and brings into question the possibility of North African immigrants in Israel to undergo complete whitening. Nevertheless, our research entertains the argument that Mizrahi identity has ‘broad margins’ in its encounter with the Ashkenazi, ‘Israeli’ identity63, or, in our case – with the racialised African identity, which places the Mizrahi subject between the Ashkenazi and the African, rendering a complete whitening impossible.
Many letters relate to disciplinary infractions of operatives in Chad and their allegedly low cultural level, a finding hinting to their Mizrahi backgrounds. Thus, for instance, a ‘Report on Social, Moral and Educational Problems in the IDF delegations in Africa’ was attached to one of the letters, detailing multiple complaints on ‘extremely’ aversive findings related to some operatives. The report contends that many of the operatives' wives are ‘of low intelligence, or of little education’, and one of his suggestions is to enact a more stringent process of ‘selection’[sic.] of State representatives abroad. Tadmor goes on to explain that ‘one must not only consider the professional capability of the officer, but also his cultural and social qualities and proficiencies,’ adding that, ‘the selection should also inquire as to the officers' wives’.64 A clause from another document relates to selection processes of candidates to be operatives in Chad, lamenting the ‘harsh picture’ of the current state of affairs. This document hints at the mobilisation channel forged in the Israeli army to operatives sent to Africa – a promotion from the rank of Sergeant to the more ceremonial Captain – claiming that ‘the sergeant was a sergeant, and will continue to behave like one’. We should emphasise that criticism focused not only on behavior but also on physicality: ‘it is impossible not to notice a 165cm tall Captain’.65

**Conclusion**

In this article we have sought to broaden the discussion on the technopolitics of the exportation of the Nahal and Gadna models to Africa by promoting an introspective analysis of Israel itself. There is a deliberate blurring of the distinction between military and civil, nation-building and its incorporation into forging a new ‘Israeli’/’African’ identity, imbued by certain values, and what the regime in the state in question happens to choose to call ‘Security Requirements’. Both in the Israeli and in the African case, such ‘security requirements’ emerge to be undetachable from the specific power ploys led the party in power, often promoted at the discretion of the government or political leadership without public transparency. In Israel, one can speak of the twin projects of Judaisation of territories occupied during the 1948 war, which were originally designated as part of the Arabic State according to the UN partition plan. Most of the Nahal settlements were erected on these lands, particularly on private Palestinian land which was summarily expropriated and nationalised. Nahal settlements also featured prominently in land-grabbing maneuvers some two decades later, this time on land conquered during the 1967 war.
In some of the African States Israeli aid programs were used to disguise illicit training programs of para-military militias as well as elite army units loyal to the regime, masquerading political/military sectarian objectives as part of nation building or educational policies. We emphasise, however, that the last two ingredients actually were a part of the Israeli aid programs, which were comprised of both military and civilian facets.

To a large extent, one can see in the exportation of Israeli settlement models in Africa an extension of the Israeli spatial and social engineering projects of the 1950s, not only in the use of Nahal settlements but also in the proliferation of immigrant Moshavim. While the establishment discourses maintain that Israel's experience in immigrant absorption and modernising premodern populations was an important and relevant precursor to Africa, we argue that these shared apparatuses are examples of orientalist perceptions which have had, to a large degree, shaped society in Israel. This continuation is expressed in several aspects: in the culturising practices themselves: the attempt to re-educate immigrants from both Africa and Asia in Israel, as well as the Africans in sub-Saharan Africa by instructions in modern agriculture, including an emphasis on values and qualities of rationality, productivity, efficiency; in the unique focus of the projects in both Israel and Africa on youth, based on the assumption that these would be more amenable to re-education and re-socialisation than the older generation.

The youth in both contexts was educated exclusively in agricultural or vocational education programs, meaning that particular youngsters were directed to vocational trades and given technical skills whereas the elites in Israel and Africa were given unimpeded access to higher education and white-collar jobs; in the analysis of the instructing team and their social make-up: both in the immigrant Moshavim in Israel and in Africa a group disproportionately consisting of Kibbutz and veteran Moshav members, men serving in professional roles while their wives are given semi-official roles of instructing local women. Moreover, part of the planning and application teams in projects of development were sent themselves to Africa, meaning that the continuation between Israel in the 1950s and Africa in the 1960s materialised in the actual presence of the very same people. It seems that one reason for this is an influx of people who dealt with immigrant absorption in Israel in the 1950s in various disciplines and were dispatchable to third-world countries.

One can, therefore, point to a continuation of the colonial pattern of the Nahal as a merger of civil and military activity whose purpose was primarily military (laying stakes to expropriated Palestinian land in Israel; training squadrons loyal to the regime in a part of the
African States), testifying to the extent that the internal colonial project in Israel of reeducating Mizrahi immigrants was deeply entangled in global orientalist discourses.

An additional comparative aspect illustrates the multifaceted nature of Israeli colonial practice as well as the extent of continuity and mutual influence of attitudes towards different subjects on the ‘native’s side’. This is connected, for example, to the conquest of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 and their subjection to Israeli rule. As described by Neve Gordon, during the first decade of its rule in the territories, Israel attempted to manage Palestinian's lives by encouraging prosperity. A number of actions have been taken to increase economic activity in accordance to both Israeli economic interests, and as a way to increase the standard of living in the territories, hoping that economic growth would stifle political aspirations and normalise the occupation. One can compare these motivations to development projects in Africa where, too, governments who commissioned Israeli experts attempted to bring about technological advancements as a means to increase standards of living without having to deal with issues of social and political justice.

Until 1976 Israel provided development loans in order to allow farmers to acquire tractors and other agricultural equipment, leading to a gradual increase in agricultural productivity until 1980. Alongside developing the agricultural sector, Israel inhibited the development of industry in the occupied territories, leading to the increased dependence on agriculture. Concurrently, however, Israel expropriated vast tracts of land and curtailed access to water for irrigation. It is important to mention that the agricultural development, too, was first and foremost intended to provide for the needs of the Israeli market.

The connection between Israeli technopolitics in Africa and the West Bank, and on the military-civil infusion we discussed earlier are attested by Igal Tzur, who was sent in 1970 on behalf of the Mossad to East Africa and a year later to Gambia as a Mashav operative: ‘What I've learned in Judea and Samaria on traditional [Palestinian] farmers was important. It was a precursor to my work in Africa’.

It seems that despite the decades that passed since the technopolitics of development in relation of agriculture through Nahal and Gadna programs were exported, the notion still echoes occasionally in the media and political conversation in both Israel and Africa. Schler describes how, during her last visit to Zambia, where she travelled to investigate what had remained from those agricultural settlements devised by Israeli operatives, the local population received her ‘in an unexpected stupor of excitement and anticipation from the moment they heard I was Israeli. Again and again they asked, "So, you're coming back?", even though that
I've learned from interviewing them that Zambians who've remained where they were after the expulsion in 1973 have had to overcome with harsh conditions.70

In Israel, the notion makes irregular appearances, sometimes in surprising contexts. Yaron Zelicha, a former prominent Finance Ministry official and presently a business school professor, lately suggested ‘to initiate the foundation of agricultural farms in fields in which the business and scientific sector in Israel is most proficient. All this would be partially funded with Foreign Aid money… these projects will train many hundreds of families of African infiltrators and we will offer interested African countries an entire project, in which knowledge, equipment and personnel trained in Israel fosters collaborative working relations with’71. Although Yaron Zelicha’s suggestion to send to African asylum seekers and refugees (preferring the contemptible term ‘African infiltrators’) residing in Israel back to Africa as agricultural instructors sounds somewhat bizarre and off-centered in the current context of Israeli politics which regards refugees as a problem, not an opportunity, it turns out that the idea had made an earlier appearance in even more surprising circumstances.72

Anwar Suleiman-Arbab, one of the founding members and Deputy Director of the Foundation to Aid the Sudanese Refugees in Israel, recounts: ‘As early as 2014, in discussions we've held in the foundation on suggestions to promote absorption of Sudanese refugees residing in Israel into the European Union, one of the ideas the community discussed, at its own initiative, was to offer the state [of Israel] agricultural initiatives which would allow training and education in Africa’73. The very fact that ideas to export knowledge and training programs, agricultural or otherwise, from Israel to Africa, continue to be periodically evoked and spark the imagination, is testimony to the vitality of the historical experiment and the relevance of bringing it to discussion in present-day critical contexts.

2 Ibid


6 Israel State Archives (hereinafter: ISA), HZ 20/951. ‘Economic Cooperation with Developing Countries’. No Date.


8 Nahal acronym of ‘*Noar Halutzi Lohem*’, ('Fighting Pioneer') refers to an Israeli paramilitary program that combines military service in the Israel Defense Forces and the establishment of agricultural settlements.

9 Gadna acronym of ‘*Gdudei Noar*’ ('Youth Regiments') is an Israeli military program that prepares young people for military service in the Israel Defense Forces.


13 Oded, 2011


17 Bergman, 2007

18 Ibid: 428-429

19 IDF Archives (Hereinafter: IDF), 22/92/1671. ‘IDF and Defense Ministry Aid to foreign countries – a platform for General Staff discussion’. 27 October.

20 Interview, 15 March 2016

21 Interview, 10 February 2


24 Schler, 2016
25 Shapira, R. (1970). Israeli Aid to African Nations: Activity amongst the Youth. A Study on the Activities in Malawi, Togo and the Ivory Coast. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University. [In Hebrew].
26 Ibid, 1970
28 Bar-Yosef, E. (2013). *The Villa in the Jungle: Africa in Israeli Culture*. Tel Aviv and Jerusalem: Kibbutz HaMeuchad and Van Leer Institute. [In Hebrew]

32 IDF, 1665/92/912 ‘Appendix to report Nahal Course – Tanzania, Cadet Assessement’.


39 Ibid.
40 Shapira, 1970: 316
41 Gillis, 2017
43 Shapira, 1970
44 Kreinin, 1964
45 Ma’abarot are temporary refugee absorption camps. Established in order to accomodate Jewish migrants in the 1950s. The ma'abarot were largely transformed into Development Towns.
46 Interview, 17 April 2016.
48 Interview, 17 April 2016
50 Decalo, 1986

51 These issues are raised by Itzhak Tsarfati, the supervisor of the Special Aid Fund and the Director of the Francophone Department: 27 November 1969, sent by Itzhak Tsarfati (supervisor of the Special Aid Fund and
the Director of the Francophone Department) in tour in Chad to Colonel Itzhak Bar On, Director of the Foreign Relations and Aid Unit, Department of Defense and to Mr. Shimon Amir, Director of Mashav. Tsarfati concludes his assessment on the youth movement M.J.T. ISA, HZ – 2/1517.

52 Cited in the concluding report of IDF delegation to Chad, 5 August 1968. ‘Every time we were called upon to explain the movement's objectives became an unpleasant ordeal of evasion and sidestepping in order not to divulge any clear piece of information’, Ibid.


54 Armon to Mashav Directors, 02 December 1966. GM, HZ – 1517/3.

55 Naeim Morad to Ambassador Armon and Azzi Rigai. 18 July 1967.

56 Azzi Rigai to Naeim Morad, Mashav. 5 November 1967.

57 Azzi Rigai to Mashav. 24 March 1968.

58 (Lavi and Sweidenberg, 1996).

59 27 November 1969. By Itzhak Tsarfati (supervisor of the Special Aid Fund and the Director of the Francophone Department) who was on tour in Chad to Colonel Itzhak Bar-On, Director of the Foreign Relations and Aid Unit in the Defense Ministry and Mr. Shimon Amir, Director of Mashav. Itzhak Tsarfati concludes his assessment on the youth movement M.J.T. GM, HZ – 1517/2.


61 Gillis, 2017

62 Bar Yosef, 2013


66 Weisz, S. (1979). "Training of Students from Developing Countries in Israel", M.A. Thesis, Tel Aviv University. [In Hebrew].


68 Ibid

69 Interview with Igal Tzur, Jerusalem, 29 July 2016

70 Schler, 2016: 11


72 Ibid

73 Telephone Interview, 16 July 2017