Tyer, Samuel Charles;
(2020)
Anscombe on intentional action: Towards an understanding of practical knowledge.
Masters thesis (M.Phil.Stud), UCL (University College London).
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Abstract
Anscombe's notion of practical knowledge has often been misunderstood. My central aim is to rectify this misunderstanding through clarifying Anscombe's method and tying together three core aspects of Intention: (i) INTENTION as a formal concept; (ii) practical reason; and (iii) practical knowledge. First, I show that Anscombe thinks that there is a particular form of representation that is internal to the employment of the concept INTENTION. Second, I show that the order contained within this form of representation is one and the same as the order present in the structure of intentional actions. Third, I show that this identity obtains only by virtue of practical reasoning. Finally, I show that, given practical reasoning's role in securing this identity, we can then properly understand Anscombe's notion of practical knowledge.
Type: | Thesis (Masters) |
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Qualification: | M.Phil.Stud |
Title: | Anscombe on intentional action: Towards an understanding of practical knowledge |
Event: | UCL |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | Copyright © The Author 2020. Original content in this thesis is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) Licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Any third-party copyright material present remains the property of its respective owner(s) and is licensed under its existing terms. Access may initially be restricted at the author’s request. |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10092998 |
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