UCL Discovery
UCL home » Library Services » Electronic resources » UCL Discovery

On the Supposed Incoherence of Obligations to Oneself

Schaab, JD; (2021) On the Supposed Incoherence of Obligations to Oneself. Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 99 (1) pp. 175-189. 10.1080/00048402.2020.1714677. Green open access

[thumbnail of Schaab_Obligations to Oneself (unpublished manuscript3.pdf]
Preview
Text
Schaab_Obligations to Oneself (unpublished manuscript3.pdf - Accepted Version

Download (237kB) | Preview

Abstract

An influential argument against the possibility of obligations to oneself states that the very notion of such obligations is incoherent: If there were such obligations, we could release ourselves from them; yet releasing oneself from an obligation is impossible. I challenge this argument by arguing against the premise that it is impossible to release oneself from an obligation. I point out that this premise assumes that if it were possible to release oneself from an obligation, it would be impossible to violate that obligation. I note that there are two interpretations of this assumption, one conceptual and one psychological. I argue that, on both interpretations, the assumption is false—at least according to independently plausible accounts of obligations to oneself and of what it means to waive an obligation. My arguments paint a picture of obligations to oneself that not only challenges the argument against their incoherence, but also illuminates these obligations’ relationship to other parts of the moral domain.

Type: Article
Title: On the Supposed Incoherence of Obligations to Oneself
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2020.1714677
Publisher version: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2020.1714677
Language: English
Additional information: This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.
Keywords: obligations to oneself, moral obligation, ethics, metaethics, practical reason, second person
UCL classification: UCL
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10092323
Downloads since deposit
45Downloads
Download activity - last month
Download activity - last 12 months
Downloads by country - last 12 months

Archive Staff Only

View Item View Item