内容提要

《中国城市科学》是一本专门从事城市科学理论与应用研究的高端学术读物。本书定位于：凝聚学术资源、精研学术问题，扶持学术创新，推动学科建设，关注城市发展，引领时代潮流。目标是办成中国城市发展的重要理论创新高地与全球都市化进程研究的成果交流平台。主要内容有“特稿”、“都市化进程研究”、“都市文化理论与政策”、“城市发展战略与管理”、“城市资源与文化产业”、“中国城市群与区域战略”、“城市空间与阶层研究”、“世界城市研究”、“都市精神与形象”、“城市文化叙事”、“城市文化史”、“都市茶话”、“城市学术资讯”等。本书适合相关专业人士阅读。

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Beyond Space

— The Ideas of Henri Lefebvre in Relation to Architecture and Cities

Iain Borden

Abstract: Born in France in 1901, Henri Lefebvre’s 90 year life as communist, philosopher, sociologist, academic and writer spawned over 70 books on an extensive range of subjects. Since his death, he has become one of the most debated and discussed figures in academia. Most attention has been paid to his writings on the urban, everyday life and, in particular, the production of space, especially following the publication of the English translation of La production de l’espace as The Production of Space in 1991. As a result, urban geographers, anthropologists, art historians, cultural theorists, sociologists and feminist theorists have all responded to his work.


2 Henri Lefebvre, La production de l’espace (Paris: Anthropos, 1974), hereafter P E; and P S.

3 See, for example, Rosalyn Deutsche, “Men In Space,” Strategies (UCLA), n. 3 (1990), pp. 130 - 137; Derek Gregory, Geographical Imaginations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989); Doreen Massey, Space, Place and Gender (Cambridge: Polity, 1994); and Steve Pile, The Body and the City (London: Routledge, 1996).
Surprisingly, however, despite the appropriateness of Lefebvre’s concerns for architecture, few such attempts have been made in architectural history or theory beyond those projects which the author has himself been partly responsible for instigating: the Strangely Familiar programme of events, for example, contained notions of the everyday, social production of space and public space both directly and indirectly drawn from Lefebvre. The Unknown City similarly draws heavily on Lefebvre’s thought for its structuring principles, while Skateboarding, Space and the City utilises Lefebvre’s ideas for a historical interpretation of its subject. This paper therefore seeks to lay bare some of the principle features of Lefebvre’s thinking, with a particular focus on those areas which are most pertinent to those based in architecture. As a précis of Lefebvre’s thought, it concentrates largely on Lefebvre’s writings which are translated into English, in order to maximise the opportunity for interested readers to look at Lefebvre’s ideas in more detail as they might require. Despite this summary format, there is also implicit in here a profound rethinking of architecture, away from a particular kind of design activity or representational system and towards its integration with revolutionary and human activity of all kinds.

**Key words:** Henri Lefebvre, Space, Architecture, Cities

**Method**

Although a form of marxism, Lefebvre’s thought is not a Stalinist statism and dogmatism, but a developing process conceiving of marxism as containing many different forms at once insufficient yet

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2. Iain Borden, Joe Kerr, Jane Rendell with Alicia Pivaro (eds.), The Unknown City; Contesting Architecture and Social Space (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 2001).
indispensable to our understanding of the world. Marx, for Lefebvre, is not a completed system, but a guide. His dialectic, therefore, is not so much composed of oppositional thesis and antithesis with resultant thesis within a temporal sequencing, as trialectical, a deconstruction continually seeking a third or Other term unlocatable within the binary logic of the original pair.

This applies at all levels of Lefebvre work. For the book, for example, texts do not cancel out previous ones but are successive “approximations” proceeding dialectically. In terms of internal argument, Lefebvre’s thought is an open dialectic allowing for the “analysis of becoming,” a “total” rather than “pure” history incorporating disciplines from history and sociology to philosophy and planning. Textually, Lefebvre’s books are conceived not as procedural arguments but as music “to be a cry, a song, a sigh, and simply to be read as a theoretical and discursive statement.” They are attempts to speak as much as write.

And in terms of its temporality, Lefebvre’s thought is directed as much toward the future as the present and the past, toward the utopian glimpse of the new as to the already achieved.

To understand the past we cannot see it exclusively in terms of the

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1 S M, p. 188; and Henri Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World (New Brunswick; Transaction, 1984), p. 70, hereafter E L M W.
3 Soja, Thirdspace, pp. 60 - 70; and Shields, Lefebvre, Love and Struggle, pp. 109 - 126.
5 W C, pp. 185 - 186 and 197.
6 T L CP, p. 86.
7 S M, pp. 17 - 18.
8 W C, pp. 95 - 96.
9 I M, p. 4.
10 I M, p. 4; and Soja, Thirdspace, pp. 53 - 60.
11 P S, pp. 65 - 66 and 408 - 409; E L M W, p. 191; S M, p. xiii; and I M, p. 128.
12 P S, p. 60; and E L M W, p. 75.
past, we must also see it in terms of the future.  

Man is nothing unless he can make a reality of what he has glimpsed in his youth and this is impossible. Nowadays dreams, imagination and utopianism are exploring the dialectic between the possible and the impossible.  

This is a “transduction” elaborating a possible object in which the horizon opens up and calls for actualisation. The human subject, therefore, is not a pre-given but a “developing thing;”  

He constitutes, creates, produces himself in the domain of praxis. There is nothing in him that is not a product of interaction among individuals, groups, classes, societies.  

Lefebvre consequently offers no specific programme, rules, or ultimate beliefs. What follows here, then, is set of openings, an orientation rather than prescriptive course of action.  

Politics  

This does not mean Lefebvrian thinking is without politics. Ultimately, Lefebvre is concerned with enacting Marx’s “total revolution” and the end of the state, nation, art, labour,
family, politics, history, the everyday, philosophy and so forth—a complete revolution involving new forms of education, industrial production, self-management, property, and, most importantly, human beings themselves as an “appropriation of the world, of life and its desires, of space and time, the mastery by man of his own nature and life.” The resultant “total man” consists of the unity of physical, physiological, psychological, historical, economic and social characteristics.

These goals, however, will not come about inevitably, immediately, or programmatically. Instead, the revolutionary process must be gradually reformist, spontaneous and based on particular historical conditions and conscious thought, and itself subject to new processes and actions. Revolution, like love, must be reinvented.

It must be a “permanent cultural revolution,” not of violence but of an unceasing struggle tactics introducing discontinuities into the overall socio-historical process.

Lefebvre’s project, then, is neither of the right nor classically marxist, but a “third reality.” Specific targets and actions are equally diverse, reaching beyond production, general strikes and working

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5. T E, pp. 84 - 86, 126 - 127 and 137 - 139; S C, pp. 120 - 124; and S M, p. 7.
9. T E, p. 69; and I M, pp. 82 - 83.
13. S M, pp. 52 and 171.
classes to the relations of production, the everyday, the aleatory, space, leisure, dwellings, aesthetics, ethics and so forth. Furthermore, only radical change starting from the bottom of society is decisive, as this alone erases obsolete forms.

Particularly important here is a general concern to reassert use values over exchange values, and thus urban dwellers over urban managers and technocrats:

Use value, subordinated for centuries to exchange value, can now come first again. How? By and in urban society, from this reality which still resists and preserves for us use value, the city an urban reality for “users” and not for capitalist speculators, builders and technicians.

Other important areas for Lefebvre are: a notion of culture as itself a “means of production,” consumption, pleasure, the pursuit of desires, happiness and loves; and the resurrection of the whole body, removing barriers between thought, desire, action and physicality, between the eye and the senses.

More than anything, utopian politics for Lefebvre are something lived, not just thought or represented, as “the image of what is possible transferred into reality.” Ultimately, human freedom must be defined on the social, not political, plane. Revolution involves

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1 S.C., pp. 7 and 95–97.
2 S.C., p. 7; and E L M W., p. 197.
3 I M., pp. 202–205 and 381.
4 S.C., p. 7.
5 W.C., p. 187.
6 I M., p. 200.
7 S.M., p. 54.
8 W.C., pp. 167–168.
9 E L M W., p. 31.
10 E L M W., p. 32.
11 I M., pp. 99 and 261.
12 I M., p. 91.
13 S.M., p. 182.
the death of politics itself. ①

The Urban and Architecture

If the revolution must always be an interrogation of the present in relation to the future, Lefebvre identifies the urban as the site of this process.

Utopianism is testing itself out; it is living itself; imagination is becoming alived experience, something experimental, it is no longer a question of one leap into the distant future over the head of the present and the nearfuture, but of exploring the possible using the present as a starting point. And that is why I attach so much importance to new towns and their problems. ②

It is in the architecture and planning of the modern city, and not in first nature, the medieval town, the industrialised city of the nineteenth century, distant imagination or future space-time that this revolution will be carried out.

This does not mean, however, simply an “architectural” revolution or building programme. ③ Lefebvre’s studies of such places as Nanterre④ and Lacq-Mourenx new town⑤ are not so much architectural studies as attempts to locate the revolution in a generic architectural space.

Spatially, this takes two important forms. Firstly, the urban is

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① P.S. p. 392.
② I.M. p. 357.
④ T.E. pp. 104−105.
not confined to the spatial scale of the city but encompasses the whole, multi-scalar landscape produced by human activity. The urban is the extensivity of space, from the micro to the macro, and cannot be reduced to the form of the town or city.

Second, the urban is not a set of objects and drawings, nor the product of planners and architects. Dismissing the apolitisation of Jane Jacobs, planning as a “science of space,” and the fetishism of communication in Robert Goodman and advocacy planning, Lefebvre also attacks architects for their privileging of the eye, and theorists like Sigfried Giedion, Bruno Zevi, Christopher Alexander and Christian Norberg Schulz for their conception of an a priori space (architecture’s “geometric formant”) — “talented men” who “believe themselves to be at the centre of knowledge and experience whereas they remain at the centre of systems of writing, projections on paper, visualizations.”

Imbued with masculinist violence and Phallic power (its “Phallic formant”), architecture may, as monuments, express significance in the city, but it will simultaneously “mask the will to power and arbitrariness of power beneath signs and surfaces which claim to express collective will and collective thought,” conjuring away social possibilities. Architecture, for Lefebvre too easily becomes, as with Le Corbusier, a “moral discourse on straight lines, on right angles and straightness in general, combining a figurative appeal to nature

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2 R P S, p. 30; and W C, pp. 188–191.
3 P S, p. 364.
4 R P S, p. 30.
8 P S, p. 285.
9 W C, p. 117.
10 S C, pp. 88–89.
11 P S, pp. 286–287.
12 P S, pp. 143–144.
(water, air, sunshine) with the worst kind of abstraction (plane geometry, modules, etc.)”¹ Such architectural space ignores the space of the body, reduces experience to intellect,² and renders users passive⁴ (architecture’s “optical” or “visual formant”⁵).

We build on the basis of papers and plans. We buy on the basis of images. Sight and seeing, which in the Western tradition once epitomized intelligibility, have turned into a trap: the means whereby, in social space, diversity may be stimulated and a travesty of enlightenment and intelligibility ensconced under the sign of transparency.⁶

Experiencers of architecture consequently tend to view it through metonymy, where the small space of a high-rise apartment signals their small role in their relationship with the social whole, or through metaphorisation, where their bodies are caught up in parcelled space and projected through the eye into images of themselves as prettified, happy and posed.⁷

Architects’ designs are simply representations within a wider urban production which also encompasses spatial practices and spaces of representations. Architecture is “a specific, partial and specialised practice which has close links with the everyday,”⁸ not a thing but a continual reproduction of space and politics — a way of life.

The right to the city cannot be conceived of as a simple visiting right or as a return to traditional cities. It can only be formulated as a transformed and renewed right to urban life. It does not matter

¹ P S, pp. 297 – 298 and 361.
² P S, pp. 200 – 201.
³ P S, p. 362.
⁴ P S, p. 285.
⁵ P S, pp. 75 – 76.
⁶ P S, p. 98.
⁷ S C, p. 88.
whether the urban fabric encloses the countryside and what survives of 
peasant life, as long as the “urban,” place of encounter, priority of 
use value, inscription in space of a time promoted to the rank of a 
supreme resource among all resources, finds its morphological base and 
its practico-material realization.①

It is not then the form of the city or its social accessibility which 
matter politically, but its operative social qualities as a place of uses, 
desires and emotions.

Modernist urbanism for Lefebvre is characterised by the zero 
degree architecture of the new town: dominated spaces of worker 
housing with strict temporal routines,② spatial instructions,③ 
programmed everyday life,④ restricted age cultures,⑤ monofunctional 
centres of decision-making⑥ and aesthetics of dehumanised 
rationality.⑦

As yet there are not many traffic lights in Mourenx. But in a sense 
the place is already nothing but traffic lights; do this, don't do that. 
Everything is clear and intelligible. Everything is trivial. Everything is 
closure and materialized system. The text of the town is totally 
legible, as impoverished as it is clear, despite the architects' efforts to 
vary the lines. Surprise? Possibilities? From this place, which should 
have been the home of all that is possible, they have vanished without 
trace.⑧

Despite this, city dwellers, particularly outside new towns and 
suburbs, enjoy the benefits of monuments, chance encounters and 
distractions of the everyday city experience; they have the potential

① W C, p. 158.
② E M W, pp. 122 and 151.
③ I M, p. 119.
④ E M W, pp. 64 - 65.
⑤ I M, p. 384.
⑦ I M, p. 119; and C E L, p. 243.
⑧ I M, p. 119.
for the adaptation of time and space. Given this opportunity, the city must cease to be understood as an object, and become a “possibilities’ machine,” a place of artistic production in its widest sense, where the “texture” of the city is its creation of time-spaces through the appropriative activities of its inhabitants, a place of non-labour, joy and the fulfilment of desires overtioil, of qualities, difference, relations in time and space, contradictory uses and encounters.

Urban life suggests meetings, the confrontation of differences, reciprocal knowledge and acknowledgement (including ideological and political confrontation), ways of living, “patterns” which co-exist in the city.

The city should bring together the “micro” architectural and “macro” planning scales, the everyday realm and the urban, inside and outside, work and non-work, the durable and ephemeral, and so forth. It must be situated between the perceived and the lived.

Epistemologically, the city and the urban can never be understood in their entirety for the “city historically constructed is no longer lived and is no longer understood practically.” Still less can it be reduced to purely semiological analysis, rendering space into signs. Instead, thinking of the city is to try and preserve its complexity and its sense of becoming:

1 E L M W, p. 123.
2 S C, p. 16.
4 P S, pp. 222 and 235.
5 S C, p. 16.
6 R P S, p. 34.
7 W C, p. 131.
8 W C, p. 75.
9 P S, p. 64. See also W C, pp. 193 - 194.
10 P S, p. 65.
To think about the city is to hold and maintain its conflictual aspects: constraints and possibilities, peacefulness and violence, meetings and solitude, gatherings and separation, the trivial and the poetic, brutal functionalism and surprising improvisation. Thinking the city moves towards thinking the world (thought as a relationship to the world) ... globality as totality, the universe, space-time, energies, information, but without valuing one rather than another.①

Space

The urban and architecture are Lefebvre's initial considerations of space during the 1950s and 1960s. But with his spatial turn of the late 1960s and early 1970s, principally the publication of La production de l'espace, this concept comes to the fore.

Again, this is part of the revolutionary project, for all space is part of capitalism,② a "product literally filled with ideologies,"③ and as such:

To change life, we must first change space.④

Lefebvre sees space as becoming increasingly important in "modern" societies, operating from micro to global scales and beyond.⑤ Space is not a setting but a social production, at once mental and material,⑥ a "concrete abstraction,"⑦ work and product,⑧ such that social relations have no real existence except in and

② P S, p. 347.
③ R P S, p. 31.
④ P S, p. 190.
⑤ P S, p. 412.
⑥ P S, p. 402.
through space.\(^1\)

(Social) space is not a thing among other things, nor a product among other products; rather, it subsumes things produced, and encompasses their interrelationships in their coexistence and simultaneity. At the same time there is nothing imagined, unreal or "ideal" about it as compared, for example, with science, representations, ideas or dreams. Itself the outcome of past actions, social space is what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others.\(^2\)

It is also a place of diffused power,\(^3\) fully implicated in the capitalist state’s operations. Socially-produced space is thus simultaneously product, part of the forces of production, lived, a representation, and contains the seeds of future forms of living.\(^4\)

Epistemologically, Lefebvre rejects the “true space” (espace vrai) of philosophy and dogma, reducing real space to the abstract, and instead focuses on a “truth of space” (vérité de l’espace) tying space to social practice.\(^5\) Lefebvre’s main procedure here is the triadic formulation of spatial practices, representations of space and spaces of representation — a triad which forms the cornerstone of his spatial theory.

The first of these three kinds of space, spatial practice (la pratique spatiale\(^6\)), concerns the production and reproduction of material life. It includes both everyday life and urban activities, resulting in the various functional spaces ranging from single rooms and buildings to large urban sites which form part of the material production of space. Spatial practice is thus roughly equivalent to the

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2. P S, p. 73.
material base, producing the spatial forms and practices appropriate to
different productive and reproductive activities. This is space as
“perceived” as apparent, functional space before considering concepts
and experiences. This is space as empirically observed.

The second kind of space, representations of space (les
répresentations de l’espace), concerns the conscious, codified
conceptions of space typified by abstract understandings of space such
those of planning, science, mathematics and artists of a “scientific
bent.” Representations of space are a form of knowledge, necessary
for spatial practices to take place. They thus tend toward intellectually
constructed systems of verbal signs. This is space as conceived, as
“the concept without life.”

The third and last kind of space, spaces of representation (les
espaces de représentation), concerns those spaces subconsciously
experienced as symbols and images, or the space of “inhabitants” and
“users.” In part, the spaces of representation are the effect that
conceptions of reality have in conditioning possibilities for action. In
addition, however, they are also liberatory, for it is here that
resistance to dominant social orders can take place. Spaces of
representation are where space can be invented and imagined. They
are thus both the space of the experienced and the space of the
imagination, that is space as passively or actively “lived.” Spaces of
representation tend toward systems of non-verbal symbols and signs.
(Some interpret the space of representation as the trialectical third

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1 P S, pp. 33, 38 and 288. See also Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity, pp. 218–221.
2 P S, pp. 413 – 414.
3 P E, pp. 43 and 48.
4 P S, pp. 33 and 38 – 39. See also Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity, pp. 218–221.
6 Translated in P S by Donald Nicholson-Smith as “representational spaces.”
7 P E, pp. 43 and 49.
8 Terms Lefebvre later rejects for inferring marginality and underprivilege, proposing
instead “subjects.” P S, pp. 362 and 381.
9 P S, pp. 33 and 39. See also Harvey, Condition of Postmodernity, pp. 218–221.
term of the triad — what Soja, for example, calls a “Thirdspace” — preserving within itself the perceived and the conceived as well as the lived. Lefebvre’s more explicit definitions of the spaces of representation reject this, as with his description of spaces of representation as “life without concepts.”

We thus have a sophisticated conceptualisation which situates mental conceptions of space in an overall conception of spatiality. Representations of space as explicit knowledge of space are the forms of spatial knowledge necessary for social being, which Lefebvre describes as being “shot through with a knowledge (savoir) — i.e. a mixture of understanding (connaissance) and ideology.” Spaces of representation are similarly passively experienced space, or actively imagined space necessary for innovation and thus for dynamic life. Taken together, representations of space and spaces of representation provide the conceptions and imaging necessary for spatial practice to operate. Mental space is thus rescued from the realm of the abstract, erroneous and immaterial and reconstrued as a necessary part of both spatiality and, a fortiori, of social being itself.

Furthermore, these kinds of space (as with time, space and energy) are not exclusive but only analytic categories. Spatial practices, representations of space and spaces of representation therefore necessarily incorporate each other in their concrete historicalgeographical combinations, and the “long history of space” must account “for both representational spaces and representations of space, but above all for their interrelationships and their links with social practice.” Lefebvre makes this point consistently, asserting that codes of space must be seen as the interaction between “subjects”

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and their surroundings, and also, more fundamentally, that such interrelationships form the object of study of life.

Knowledge falls into a trap when it makes representations of space the basis for the study of "life," for in doing so it reduces lived experience. The object of knowledge is, precisely, the fragmented and uncertain connection between elaborated representations of space on the one hand and representational spaces (along with their underpinnings) on the other; and this "object" implies (and explains) a subject — that subject in whom lived, perceived and conceived (known) come together within a spatial practice.

Lefebvre emphasises this point with reference to the human body, distinguishing between the use of the body as a social and spatial practice, the representations of the body as contained in science and in the context of nature, and its various cultural symbolisms.

That the lived, conceived and perceived realms should be interconnected, so that the "subject," the individual member of a given social group, may move from one to another without confusion — so much is a logical necessity.

Real space and spatiality is then not situated at any one kind of spatial practice, representation of space or space of representation, nor composed of some additive combination of them, but is constructed in and through some configuration of their spatial and historical specificity.

Beside the triad of spatial practices, representations of space and spaces of representation, there are three other considerations of space in Lefebvre's thought which should be raised here. Firstly, Lefebvre's

② P S. p. 230.
③ P S. p. 40. See also p. 288.
posits a four-part historical development of space broadly following a marxist understanding of the development of the productive bases of western civilisation. Each mode epoch produces its own understanding of space and experiences it accordingly. ①

Every society — and hence every mode of production — produces a space, its own space. ②

Thus natural or physical space (a pre-existent natural phenomenon over which activities range — the space of pre-history) ③ gives way first to absolute space (fragments of natural space rendered sacred, the space of rites, death and the underworld — the space of slavery), ④ then historical space (the early towns of the West — the space of feudalism), ⑤ and finally abstract space (space as commodity, at once concrete and abstract — the space of capitalism). ⑥ Each space contains within it both traces of its predecessors and the seeds of the next, creating a complex historical geography of different social spaces. ⑦

Most important for the twentieth century is abstract space, where space as treated as an abstract commodity, a medium of exchange tending to absorb use. Abstract space is not only used but bought and sold to make further profits. It is also, qua commodity, simultaneously homogenous and universally applicable to any function, and, consequently, infinitely fragmented into units of equal kinds. ⑧ Although infused with latent violence, ⑨ abstract space more than any prior space depends on consensus for its continual reproduction. ⑩ Socially, this is the space of the new town, abstraction and passive

① P S, pp. 34 and 46.
② P S, p. 31.
③ P S, pp. 11 - 14.
④ P S, pp. 48 and 234 - 254.
⑤ P S, pp. 48 - 50.
⑦ P S, p. 86.
⑨ P S, pp. 280 - 281.
⑩ P S, p. 57.
users, instruction and message, prescriptions and proscriptions, where statements take precedence over bodily action and very little is said, still less “lived.”

Second, Lefebvre’s postulates a differential space, a space yet to come. “Social space” is in fact many social spaces, such that the global does not abolish the local, different spaces are interconnected, and old spaces are preserved in new ones. In the rigid fragmentations of abstract space, then, there are already present the seeds of its successor, which Lefebvre suggests is a more mixed, inter-penetrative space where differences are respected rather than buried under a homogeneity. This is “differential space.”

[Differential space] will put an end to those localizations which shatter the integrity of the individual body, the social body, the corpus of human needs, and the corpus of knowledge. By contrast, it will distinguish what abstract space tends to identify — for example, social reproduction and genitality, gratification and biological fertility, social relationships and family relationships.

Differential space is thus the spatial concomitant of the total revolution and total man, not as a universal entity but as the socialist “space of differences.”

Third, a psychoanalytic undercurrent runs through much of Lefebvre’s writing on space. Although devoid of detailed references to Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva and Sigmund Freud, Freudian concerns with repression and sexual and social prohibition, together with the Lacanian concepts of the Real, Symbolic and the Imaginary, all

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2. P. S., pp. 48-50, 52, 60 and 409.
3. P. S., p. 86.
5. P. S., p. 52.
6. Ibid.
underlie Lefebvre’s notion of social relations. Hence we find references to the Phallus and Phallic architecture, repressed sexual relations, “symbolic castration,” prohibition, Ego and mirror, and even a “psychoanalysis of space.” Lefebvre did not undertake such a psychoanalysis of space, and often simply appropriated its terms, but these brief examples disclose a latent and otherwise oft ignored component of his formulations.

**Time**

Although many commentators see Lefebvre’s work as a move away from time to space, in fact this remained very much at the heart of his formulations.

Space is a use value, but even more so is time to which it is ultimately linked because time is our life, our fundamental use value.

This is integral to Lefebvre’s notion of revolutionary politics and the study of the past with a view to present and future, for this was ultimately a project of becoming, of unfolding events in time. The dialectic for Lefebvre is not purely ideational, spatial or formal, but,
following Stendhal,① Hegel and Marx and not Kant,② an historical process.③ Lefebvre thus, having heard Einstein on the subject, was concerned less with the Bergsonian distinction of time as quality and space as quantity, as with the intimate relation of time and space.④

The link between time and space remains a fundamental problem, both theoretically and practically. It consists of the use of time in relation to space, the division of space in relation to time, and the measurement of time and space, which are relative in relation to one another.⑤

Before me, around me, I have space-time.⑥

Thus time and space are not independent constructions but inter-productions, at once separate but necessarily inter-related processes.

Time is distinguishable but not separable from space.⑦

Following Heraclitus, time is not an absolute entity, but is self-actualised in space.⑧

Space is the envelope of time. When space is split, time is distanced — but it resists reduction. Within and through space, a certain social time is produced and reproduced; but real social time is forever re-emerging complete with its own characteristics and determinants: repetitions, rhythms, cycles, activities.⑨

But this was not an easy formulation, and Lefebvre wrote no

① I M, pp. 263 – 265.
③ T L CP, p. 86.
④ I H L, p. 33; and P S, p. 73.
⑤ I H L, p. 34.
⑥ I M, p. 130.
⑦ P S, p. 175.
⑧ P S, p. 130.
⑨ P S, p. 339.
extended treatise on time or its relation to space. ①

The standing of time as it relates to space is problematic, and has yet to be defined. ②

Nonetheless, Lefebvre offers important insights that help transcend the reductive periodised macro-time of Postmodern Geographies.

Lefebvre recognises that abstract space reduces time to constraints on the employment of spaces — to distances, pathways, itineraries, and to a general dominance of time by economic space. ③ Time here is a matter of clocks and labour, ④ celebrated not as lived experience but as novelty. ⑤ However, time can resist such reductions, “reemerging instead as the supreme form of wealth, as locus and medium of use, and hence of enjoyment.” ⑥

Abstract space fails in the end to lure time into the realm of externality, of signs and images, of dispersion. Time comes back into its own as privacy, inner life, subjectivity. Also as cycles closely bound up with nature and with use (sleep, hunger, etc.). Within time, the investment of affect, of energy, of “creativity” opposes a mere passive apprehension of signs and signifiers. Such an investment, the desire to “do” something, and hence to “create,” can only occur in a space — and through the production of a space. ⑦

There are important things to note here, principally that time is a potential resistance to abstract space, that it is a realm of enjoyment,

② P S. p. 408.
③ P S. pp. 370 – 371 and 393.
④ P S. pp. 95 – 96.
⑤ I M. p. 185.
⑥ P S. p. 393.
⑦ Ibid.
wealth and use, that it requires effort and hence is a production, and, lastly, that it is therefore also a production of space.

This is more complex than Marx's notion of time as measure of social labour\(^1\) and measure of space for the distribution and sale of goods. \(^2\) Lefebvre did sketch a periodisation of space, from prehistory (time not part of consciousness), to historic and industrialised societies (history acknowledged, homogenous time at centre of consciousness), to a transitional period starting around 1970 (contradictions between homogeneity and difference become more apparent), to an eventual post-history or transhistory (unitary history finally abandoned, disorder), \(^3\) but time for him was more than a developmental history. Looking back in part to medieval society, Lefebvre seeks to reassert "this greatest good of all goods"\(^4\) as diversified time of different social constructions\(^5\) punctuated by festivals and celebrated in space, which, as in Joyce's Ulysses, is at once linear (the time of progress) and cyclical (the time of nature, of repetitions, death and life). \(^6\)

Time in the city and by the city will be independent of natural cycles but not submitted to the linear divisions of rationalized duration; it will be the time of unexpectedness, not a time without place but a time that dominates the place in which it occurs and through which it emerges. This will be the place and time of desire, above and beyond need. \(^7\)

This is a Nietzschean concept of time, maintaining the significance of space within a problematic of becoming. \(^8\)

\(^1\) P S, p. 324.
\(^2\) P S, p. 278.
\(^4\) P S, p. 95.
\(^5\) P S, pp. 267 - 268.
\(^6\) E L M W, pp. 3 - 6.
\(^7\) E L M W, p. 190.
\(^8\) P S, p. 22.
For Lefebvre, time had been “murdered by society,” and its restoration had to start with the spaces of representation, followed by a reunion with representations of space. The spaces of representation are, after all, lived experience, the most immediately active and hence the most temporal of Lefebvre’s three kinds of space.

Representational space is alive: it speaks. It embraces the loci of passion, of action and of lived situations, and thus immediately implies time. Consequently it may be qualified in various ways: it may be directional, situational or relational, because it is essentially qualitative, fluid and dynamic.

It is by facing the constraints of time imposed within contemporary society that people master their own times, and so make it “fully productive in the widest sense, of art, of knowledge, of the lived.”

Furthermore, it is in the modern city that one must consider the different uses, productions and inscriptions of time. Rethinking the city necessarily involves the consideration of the temporal.

[T]he city will only be rethought and reconstructed on its current ruins when we have properly understood that the city is the deployment of time.

Architecture as the “structure of houses and towns, monuments, the meanderings of a road from the gates of a town to its centre” is not

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1. P S, p. 96.
2. P S, p. 175.
just spatial, but temporal.  If the new town does not allow the reading of time, and only of its functions, then it is precisely here that the temporal should be restored.

**Everyday Life**

The inter-production of time and space was, for Lefebvre, intimately related to everyday life. In modernity, everyday life (la vie quotidienne), permeated by myths and values, is infiltrated by the everyday (le quotidien or la quotidienne) — that is by the homogenous, repetitive, fragmentary, programmed, mediated and routinised.

The quotidian is what is humble and solid, what is taken for granted and that of which all the parts follow each other in such a regular, unvarying succession that those concerned have not call to question their sequence.

The everyday is Hegel’s “prose of the world,” the insignificant and banal. Time thus appears here as “constrained” or “compulsed” (as in the practice of commuting), as repetitions, while “terroristic” everyday life appears to erase time altogether in a pure, formal space.

The everyday is also, necessarily spatial, and particularly infiltrates the spaces of representation where the imagination is

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1. ELMW, p. 156.
2. IM, pp. 119 - 120.
3. TLP, pp. 78 - 79; and CEL, pp. xxvi - xxvii.
5. TLP, p. 78.
8. ELMW, p. 179.
dominated and rendered passive.  

[T]he social control of space weighs heavy indeed upon all those consumers who fail to reject the familiarity of everyday space.  

But, as stated above, spaces of representation can also be the spaces of imagination and resistance, and it is therefore here that the pervasive power of the everyday can be turned back on itself through everyday knowledge, appropriating and re-appropriation.  

Doing so involves confronting the reduction of language to advertising objects and desires, the fetishistic translation of relations into things, radio and television, retrenchment in private life and attendant bureaucratisation, the ideology of technocracy, privileging of writing over speech, programming through advertising and publicity ("the poetry of modernity"), the substitution of eroticism for sexual pleasure, leisure, spectatorial sport, planned obsolescence, dominant sub-systems like tourism, fashion and the motor car, and other such pervasive constituents of the "Bureaucratic Society of Controlled Consumption."  

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8. C E L, pp. 41–42.  
15. C E L, p. 36.  
Ultimately, as with Simmel's concern with "finding in each of life's details the totality of its meaning," the everyday can reveal the meaning and complexity of human life.

The most extraordinary things are also the most everyday; the strangest of things are often the most trivial.

To do so, active man must be reasserted against the consumer as possessor of happiness and rationality. This means the restoration of the everyday life which still lies within the everyday, and in particular of the ancient Greek and medieval Festival — at once spontaneity, play, seriousness, patience, pain and pleasure, food, laughter, games, marriages, sex, birth and death, scuffles, intimate social relations, co-operation with nature, joy and mystery. By this means, everyday life will become "a place where creative energy is stored in readiness for new creations," a form of critique as well as source of thought. Only here will the revolution be fulfilled.

Everyday life is the supreme court where wisdom, knowledge and power are brought to judgement.

Furthermore, it is in the new town, the site of modern architecture, where such a restoration must take place.

Our task now is to construct everyday life, to produce it,

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2. C. E. L., p. 57.
10. C. E. L., pp. 87 - 89.
consciously to create it. Here, in the new town, boredom is pregnant with desires, frustrated frenzies, unrealized possibilities. A magnificent life is waiting just around the corner, and far, far away.\(^1\)

The new town cannot answer the problem of everyday life, but it does hold a way towards everyday life as an “art of living” composed of “the joy that man gives to himself.”\(^2\)

The Human Subject

Lefebvre opposes the structuralist and semiological elimination of the subject,\(^3\) and the Husserlian Ego which reduces space to epistemology and mentality, eradicating the living, and social “I.”\(^4\) For without the human subject, the production of space cannot be understood.

The question is what intervenes, what occupies the interstices between representations of space and representational spaces. A culture perhaps? Certainly — but the word has less content than it seems to have. The work of artistic creation? No doubt — but that leaves unanswered the queries “By whom?” and “How?” Imagination? Perhaps — but why? and for whom?\(^5\)

Central here is the human body, not just as site of cultural endeavour\(^6\) but of selfappropriation and adaptation. The body is particularly useful for thinking about the triad of perceived, conceived and lived: spatial practices (perceived) presuppose the use of body, hands, sensory organs and gestures — the practical basis of the

\(^1\) I M, p. 124.
\(^2\) C E L, p. 193; and I M, p. 126.
\(^3\) P S, p. 61; and E L M W, pp. 163 – 165. See also Ross, Fast Cars, Clean Bodies, pp. 176 – 179.
\(^4\) P S, p. 61.
\(^5\) P S, p. 43.
\(^6\) T L CP, pp. 81 – 82.
perception of the outside world; representations of space (conceived) include representations of the body, derived from scientific and anatomical knowledge, and relations with nature; and spaces of representation (lived experience) include bodies imbued with culture and symbolisms. It is thus the body which helps render the triad concrete, not abstract. It is the body which unites cyclical and linear time, need and desire; it is the body which preserves difference within repetition and is therefore, the source of innovation. This is a recovery of the body from its abandonment within western philosophy, a living body now at once subject and object.

The body, then, is the "most extraordinary" contradiction of space, that which counters abstract space.

It will not allow itself to be dismembered without a protest, or to be divided into fragments, deprived of its rhythms, reduced to its catalogued needs, to images and specialisations. The body, at the very heart of space and of the discourse of Power, is irreducible and subversive. It rejects the reproduction of relations which deprive it and crush it.

The body is vulnerable, but cannot be destroyed without destroying society itself. It is therefore a necessary and fruitful site for political action.

Any revolutionary "project" today, whether utopian or realistic, must, if it is to avoid hopeless banality, make the reappropriation of the body, in association with the reappropriation of space, into a non-negotiable part of its agenda.

So how is the body constituted? This is a "practical and fleshy

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1 P S., pp. 39 - 40.
2 P S., pp. 203 and 372 - 373.
3 P S., p. 407.
4 S C., p. 89.
5 Ibid.
6 P S., pp. 166 - 167.
body conceived of as a totality complete with spatial qualities (symmetries, asymmetries) and energetic properties (discharges, economies, waste)," one which rejects the spectacularisation and decorporalisation ("scotomization") of Judaeo-Christian traditions and Taylorist-capitalist division of labour, and which follows instead Marx's call in the 1844 Manuscripts for the senses to become theoreticians in their own right—what Lefebvre memorably calls an "intelligence of the body." Considering space with the whole body, not just the eyes and intellect, allows more awareness of conflicts and so of a space that is Other. This is body of tastes and smells, left-right and front-back orientations, hearing and touch. It resists the tendency of abstract space and its attendant domination of the visual to replace sex with the representation of sex, pulverise the body into images, erase history, reduce volume to surface, and flatten and fragment the experience of space.

Through such processes the body produces space outward from itself, engaging with architecture to bring the latter within itself. This is a "spatial body," both constituted by and constitutive of the space it occupies.

[T]he spatial body's material character derives from space, from the energy that is deployed and put to use there.

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1. P.S. p. 61.
2. P.S. p. 166.
4. P.S. pp. 399 - 400.
12. P.S. p. 137.
It is also a body of desires beyond defined needs, and which so causes difference, stopping needs from stagnating. More than basic survival, this is a reassertion of the “sensuous enjoyment of the object;” the rehabilitation of the world of senses as practical-sensuous, manifested as the immediate sensing of art, cities, buildings, objects of common use, landscapes and relationships.

A psychoanalytic concern is apparent here. However, for Lefebvre, psychoanalysis yields only a mechanistic and homogenising explanation for different societies and spaces. Similarly, Lacanian thought on the body presupposes a neutral, a priori space. Consequently, although Lefebvre speaks of the Lacanian Phallic and the masculine use of vertical towers, metal, glass, straight lines, right angles and strict perspective to dominate space (Picasso’s “dictatorship of the eye” and of the bull, machismo and Mediterranean male), this is a metaphorical rather than essentialist use of psychoanalytic terms, as with his identification of feminine spaces not as literally uterine in form but as lived experience and recognition of the Other. The aim is to replace an architecture of the dominated, masculine space of objects with the appropriated, female space of “pleasure and joy, of community in the use of the gifts of the earth.” Appropriation, rather than domination, is the authentic marxist tactic.

The subject-body is additionally a preservation and production of time, through various rhythms of breathing, eating, sleeping, through

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2 S C, pp. 38 – 41.
3 P S, pp. 248 – 249; S C, p. 31; E L M W, p. 117.
4 P S, pp. 35 – 36.
6 P S, p. 305.
7 P S, p. 302.
10 P S, pp. 165 – 166; and I M, pp. 192.

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activities of walking, looking and sensing, and through cycles of birth, reproduction and death.

No camera, no image or sequence of images can show these rhythms. One needs equally attentive eyes and ears, a head, a memory, a heart.®

This is part of Lefebvre’s project of rhythmanalysis — which he considered might replace psychoanalysis as “more concrete, more effective, and closer to a pedagogy of appropriation (the appropriation of the body, as of spatial practice)”™ — where the inter-relation of the subject-body with itself and the external world is dealt with at various spatial and temporal scales and experiences, ranging from breathing, hunger and sleep, to sexuality, social life and thought.® Through such processes, buildings cease to be objects and become places of epistemological and social negotiation conducted through the figure of the subject. It is here that the body’s importance for the subject “in whom lived, perceived and conceived (known) come together within a spatial practice”® is most explicit. Space-time must always involve (although not be reduced to®) a production through, and of, the subject as body and mind, thought and action.

For it is by means of the body that space is perceived, lived — and produced.®

The subject, then, is not just a body. Lefebvre refers to different forms of social construction as central to the production of space —

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1 W.C., p. 227.
2 P.S., p. 205.
4 P.S., p. 230.
5 P.S., p. 212.
6 P.S., p. 162.
principally class, but, as a “latent postmodernist,” he also sees that modernity requires consideration of gender, ethnicity, sexuality, family relations, age, and “outsiders” of all kinds. Once again, abstract space tends to erase precisely these characteristics, the restoration of which, therefore, the revolutionary project must be directed toward. It is these social constructions which differential space preserves and emphasises, such that the right to the city is not the right to buildings or public space, but the right to be different and not classified into categories enforced by the homogenising powers. Against Gilles Deleuze, Lefebvre formulates difference as something not based on originality, individualism and particularity but which emerges from struggle, the conceptual and the lived.

Activity

Lefebvre rejects the terms “users” and “inhabitants” for inferring marginality and underprivilege. “Subjects,” however, suggests an entity of social construction, which does something. This is the last attribute of Lefebvre’s thought to be revealed here: the idea of activity.

It is not a question of localizing in pre-existing space a need or a function, but on the contrary, of spatializing a social activity, linked

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2 Dear, “Postmodern Bloodlines,” p. 55.
4 P S, p. 55; W C, p. 140; C E L, p. 193; and S C, pp. 115–116.
6 P S, pp. 49–50; and E L M W, pp. 148–149.
8 S C, p. 23.
9 P S, p. 49.
10 S C, p. 35; and W C, p. 157.
12 P S, pp. 362 and 381.
to the whole by producing an appropriate space. ①

The notion of activity is largely unrecognised by Lefebvrian critics and commentators — probably because Lefebvre’s consideration of spatial practices, after the first section of Production of Space, mostly disappears. Nonetheless, it is preserved within the notion of the body with its “capacity for action, and its various energies,”② as a site of gestures, desires, needs, senses and imaginative processes. Space, after all, is not an intellectual projection but is enacted.③

What, then, is the “activity” of the human subject in its inter-production of the self with time and space? To simply list “functions” would be to reduce activity to tasks, so other directions must be pursued.

For revolutionary politics, a new cultural project should encompass democracy, sociability, adaptations of time and space and the body, life beyond the commodity, and the slow transformation of everyday life — “a project for society that is at the same time cultural, social, and political.” It is then no longer Heidegger’s question of what does it mean to think, but of “what remains to be thought now?”④

Human activity must therefore be directed at new forms of content, seeking not just to symbolise but transform life as a kind of generalised artistic practice.⑤

The highest mission of art is not simply to express, even less to reflect, the real, not to substitute fictions for it. The highest mission of art is to metamorphose the real. Practical actions, including techniques, modify the everyday; artwork transfigures it.⑥

① W C, p. 188.
② P S, p. 170.
③ P S, p. 200.
④ T L C P, pp. 86 - 87.
⑤ I M, p. 175.
⑥ T L CP, pp. 82 - 83.
Let everyday life become a work of art! ①

Here, the city and architecture become not just aesthetic objects but dynamic, practical realisations of art, ② unique and irreplaceable “works” and not reproducible products ③— polychromatic compositions of linear and cyclical times and different social spaces, born from multitudinous differing labours. ④ This is art not as the prettifying of urban spaces, but of making time-spaces into works of art. ⑤

Leaving aside representation, ornamentation and decoration, art can become praxis and poesis on a social scale; the art of living in the city as work of art. ⑥

Such a work of art involves: a new culture of the body — the freedom and jouissance in the everyday which starts with the body; ⑦ the finding of new places of festival, such as the struggles over time, space and cleanliness at the beach; ⑧ new moments and situations — fleeting but decisive sensations and points of rupture, revelatory of possibilities contained in everyday existence; ⑨ exploration of the textures as well as meanings of space; ⑩ production of creativity of all kinds, including play (ludo), ⑪ and not just “products;” ⑫ the

① E L M W, p. 204.
② T L CP, p. 83; and I M, p. 279.
③ P S, p. 70.
④ W C, pp. 222–223.
⑤ W C, p. 173.
⑥ Ibid.
⑦ T L CP, p. 82.
⑧ I H L, p. 36.
⑩ P S, pp. 117–118 and 132.
⑪ W C, p. 171.
combination of academic knowledge with everyday experience —
"earthbound and concrete" thought; the "rule of option" — choosing
what fascinates, not what is presented as the most important;
development of a totalising Romanticist lifestyle emphasising conflict,
emotions, rejection of hierarchies, originality, spontaneity; the fight
for the right to be different; and pleasure, delight and joy — a kind
of "architecture" which rejects the criteria and constraints of the
purely necessary and quantitative.

Above all, the inter-production of time, space and social being
should be about use values ("the only real wealth") and not exchange
values in the city.

Use value, subordinated for centuries to exchange value, can now
come first again. How? By and in urban society, from this reality
which still resists and preserves for us use value, the city.

It should be about appropriation not ownership, production as
creativity in the widest sense. It means representing and thinking,
but also doing, being active, transforming everything — thought,
politics, work, the self — in the process.

Thus, having stressed throughout The Production of Space the
inter-relation of representations of space and spaces of representation,
Lefebvre at the end returns to the necessity of spatial practices — the

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1. P. S., pp. 316 and 415.
3. I M., p. 47.
5. P. S., pp. 64 and 396 - 397.
11. ELM W., p. 204; and I M., p. 93.
12. T. E., p. 120.
things people do, and the patterns and physicality they create — for disrupting abstract space. It is the "potential energies" of groups which act to transform and create new social spaces.

The city is not only a language, but also a practice.

Experience and representation are here returned to action, to new activities in which they are embedded. And in political terms, this marks the move from critical thought to contesting practice, from writing to more active speech, at which point the subjective becomes an objective intervention. Activity concretises the life-world (as Benno Werlen notes), both as the negative critique which undermines the illusory rationality of the political state and social hierarchy.

Events reactivate the movement of both thought and practice. They pull thinkers out of their comfortable seats and plunge them headlong into a wave of contradictions. Those who are obsessed with stability lose their smiling confidence and good humor, and as that which keeps different social space-times together.

Only an act can hold — and hold together — such fragments in a homogeneous totality. Only action can prevent dispersion, like a fist clenched around sand.

In this way we become true subjects in time and space, not simply

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1 P S, p. 365.
2 P S, p. 391.
3 W C, p. 143.
4 P S, pp. 138 - 139; and E L M W, pp. 177 and 182 - 183.
5 T E, p. 110.
7 T E, p. 68; and C E L, p. 72.
8 T E, p. 8.
9 P S, p. 320.
users or experiencers of, but produced by, and productive of, the architecture around us.

For the historian, a simple yet profound lesson emerges. Activities as particular rhythms of time and space are not universal constructs, but are constructed in specific conditions.

A rhythm invests places, but is not itself a place; it is not a thing, nor an aggregation of things, nor yet a simple flow. It embodies its own law, its own regularity, which it derives from space — from its own space — and from a relationship between space and time.①

To understand human history, in our considerations of the conceived and the lived, representations and experience, we therefore have to be explicit also about what activities are being undertaken — what are the energies deployed, patterns created, objects produced? In short, what productive work is being studied?

超越空间

——亨利・勒弗菲尔的建筑与城市的思想

[英] 尹・鲍登”

[摘 要] 亨利・勒弗菲尔 1901 年出生于法国,在其 90 年的生涯中，共撰写 70 余

① P S, p. 206.
** 尹・鲍登：英国伦敦大学 UCL 巴特莱特建筑学院建筑系教授，前任系主任，博士生导师，英国皇家建筑学会名誉委员，欧洲著名的“建筑与城市文化”、“建筑历史与理论”专家和建筑教育家。研究方向：建筑历史、建筑教育、建筑的现代主义与现代性、当代建筑理论与实践、建筑与电影、城市空间、身体与空间、空间体验、研究方法、评论、勒弗菲尔等，已经出版《未知城市》、《轮滑者：空间与城市》等 10 多部专著。
部著作。作为一名共产主义者、哲学家、社会学家、学者、作家，他的著作涉及面广，题材广泛。他死后成为学术界颇受争议和广为讨论的人物。他在城市和日常生活方面的著作，特别是在空间生产方面的著作受到了人们的普遍关注。在 1991 年 La production de l'espace（空间生产）的英译版问世后，这种关注达到了高潮，城市地理学家、人类学家、文化理论学家、社会学家、女性理论家都把目光投向了他的著作。

准确地说，勒弗菲尔是研究建筑的。然而有些奇怪的是，目前关于他的建筑理论方面的研究很少。作者曾（部分）负责关于这方面的理论研究：例如，“事件的奇特而又熟悉的安排”包含的日常生活的提法、空间和公共空间的社会性产生，都或多或少来自勒弗菲尔的思想。同样的，《未知的城市》是基于勒弗菲尔的构造原则的思想，而《滑板：空间与城市》则是运用勒弗菲尔的思想来解读它的案例。因此，本文关于勒弗菲尔的思想摘要，将关注勒弗菲尔思想的主要方面，特别是他的那些来源于建筑的思想。限于篇幅，本文将主要参考那些已有英译版的勒弗菲尔的著作，使方便有兴趣的读者可以自己查阅。本文也试图对建筑进行重新思考，即离开特殊的设计活动或代表性的系统来谈建筑，让建筑融入到人类的精彩层的活动和变革中去。

【关键词】 亨利·勒弗菲尔 空间 建筑 城市