‘Brothers in arms’? A police-paramilitary partnership in Karachi

Policing and Society

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This paper explores the relationship between two state institutions, a civilian police and a paramilitary force, jointly tasked with maintaining law and order in Karachi. I describe this system of pluralised policing as a ‘competitive-network model’, in which unstructured cooperation between police and paramilitary officers coincides with competition and inter-agency conflict. Based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Karachi between 2015 and 2019, I analyse the impact of the competitive-network model on the civilian police. I argue that this relationship model causes institutional disruptions within the civilian police, reinforces the belief that militarisation of routine police work is necessary, and creates a crisis of self-legitimacy for civilian police officers who identify their institution as the ‘younger brother’ in such relational dynamics. This is the first study to investigate the partnership between two public policing providers in Pakistan. In doing so, it makes an empirical contribution to an expanding scholarship on the pluralisation of policing that currently lacks an understanding of partnerships between state officials and entities jointly tasked with public policing. It therefore raises important questions about the effects of police pluralisation, and prompts in-depth ethnographic research that assesses the impacts of pluralised policing on civilian police officers, particularly from contexts where the diversification of security actors may be politically motivated and detrimental to the professionalisation of civilian institutions.

Keywords: Pluralisation, Militarisation, Self-Legitimacy, Pakistan
Introduction

Karachi, an ethnically diverse megacity, has long suffered not just from ethno-political and criminal violence (Gayer 2014), but also police abuse (Ata-Ullah and Ijaz 2016), corruption (Ahmad 2019), and incompetence. This has resulted in a lack of trust in the civilian police and a steady reliance on a paramilitary force, the Sindh Rangers, that has been a regular fixture in Karachi since 1989, engaging directly with the Karachi Police (Shigri 2016). However, the dynamics between the Karachi Police and the Sindh Rangers, and the resulting pluralisation of public policing, remain unexplored, even though these two state institutions jointly police a shared jurisdiction, with differing political agendas and oversight mechanisms. This institutional relationship is complicated by Pakistan’s complex history of civil-military relations in which the Army (the patron of the Rangers) has frequently injected itself into domestic politics, undercutting the authority of civilian institutions, including the police.¹


However, the pluralisation of public security institutions has received limited attention and empirical investigations into the multiplication of police providers and its impact on police officers remain scarce. This is despite the fact that the diversification of state-sponsored entities tasked with policing citizens is an increasingly common phenomenon in developing and underdeveloped countries, where military and paramilitary forces are routinely deployed internally to assist civilian police departments, should the police lack in capability or confidence (Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017, Lamb 2019, Harig, 2019). South Asian countries, for instance, have witnessed an increasing reliance on paramilitaries since 2001 (Ashraf 2019).
But scholars of pluralised policing must ask: What happens when military and paramilitary forces engage in routine policing and when this practice becomes normalised, no longer limited to ‘exceptional circumstances’? And how does this affect civilian police organisations and officers? Scholars have studied pluralised policing in contexts where the police are a ‘dominant player in multi-agency criminal justice partnerships’ (Skinns 2008). However, what happens when, in post-colonial states, the civilian police are routinely challenged by the military’s expanding control over domestic security?

In this paper, I consider the impact of pluralised policing on the institutional dynamics of the Karachi Police. In Karachi, the police refer to the Rangers as an ‘elder brother’. This is a bitter oral recognition of the paramilitary’s authority and perceived superiority. The ‘elder brother’ reference suppresses police resentment for the Rangers’ increasing legitimacy and autonomy, which is the product of a strained marriage between civil and military state structures in Pakistan. In this relationship, the police accept a secondary status and no longer have a perceived monopoly over public policing. This has deep institutional repercussions that provide important insights into the political economy of plural policing. The sarcastic reference to paramilitary officers as ‘brother’ is distinct from the idea of the ‘police extended family’, which refers to individuals or groups working under police supervision (Johnston 2005). Such metaphorical description better compares with how Civil and Military Police in Brazil publicly refer to each other as ‘sister organisations’ to mask their shared antagonism (Sapori 2018).

To conceptualise this relationship, I draw upon the configurations of plural policing applied to Anglo-American and European contexts (Dupont 2004, Crawford 2008, Maillard and Zagrodzki 2015, Eikenaar 2019) but find that existing models do not adequately capture the relational dynamics between public policing providers in Karachi. I therefore frame the relationship between the police and the paramilitary as a ‘competitive-network model’ that illustrates an unstructured alliance between institutions. In the absence of formal contractual arrangements, the two state institutions are locked in competition and inter-agency conflict, but the demands of state elites and mutual interdependence also facilitate limited and loose networking. I argue that a competitive-network model of pluralised public policing can lead to a crisis of ‘self-legitimacy’ (Tankebe 2019) within the ranks of civilian police officers, normalising the ‘militarisation of policing’ (Mummolo 2018), and creating institutional disruptions in police work and practices. Thus, this model of pluralised public policing can have detrimental effects on the structure and culture of civilian police organisations,
especially when civilian officers begin perceiving themselves as subordinate to their competitor. By considering these effects, this research contributes to the emerging agendas of ‘southern policing’ (Jardine 2019) and ‘southern criminology’ (Carrington et al. 2016) that advocate for localised interpretations of policing and security mechanisms given their distinct developments in the global South.

To explain this relationship and its consequences, this paper first conceptualises the competitive-network model. The case of Karachi is then discussed in relation to its underlying civil-military dynamics to contextualise how public policing has evolved and situate the paramilitary’s participation in it. Thereafter, I demonstrate how the competitive-network model works and analyse its implications for civilian policing. In conclusion, I suggest that to prevent such partnerships from adversely affecting civilian police officers, independent regulatory mechanisms must be established.

Conceptualisation

Pluralisation of policing

The pluralisation of policing is understood as efforts by public and private, governmental and non-governmental entities to enforce law, maintain public order, and control crime (Bayley and Shearing 1996, Jones and Newburn 2006). In this paper, ‘plural policing’ is not limited to a reductive public-private dichotomy. Taking cue from Brodeur (2010) who recognised the ‘internal diversity of public police forces’, I hold that plural policing can comprise of public institutions tasked with routine policing, within the ‘web’ of public policing. The increasing number of institutions tasked with policing and providing security has also developed the idea of ‘security networks’, defined as ‘organisational forms involving public, private and hybrid actors or nodes that work together to pursue security-related objectives’ (Whelan 2017).

information flows and coordination are present but weak, often because of conflicting aims and agendas. Crawford conceptualised this model as one that leads to loose cooperation between equally placed security providers. But how do loose connections affect the provision of public policing, where two state security providers compete within the same environment but are located differently within hierarchy of state institutions?

The police-paramilitary partnership under consideration here may also resonate with Dupont’s (2004) categorisation of an ‘institutional security network’, where two institutions in a decentralised policing system collaborate for resources, information, or issue-specific reasons (such as counterterrorism). Dupont suggested that issue-specific collaborations overcome unproductive competition if both institutions are self-sufficient. However, in certain partnerships it may be the lack of self-sufficiency that generates the pluralisation. Moreover, partnerships can transpire out of issue-specific policies but outgrow time, space and policy limitations. In such cases, institutional security networks can corrupt partnerships because the political capital previously held by the police is undercut by that of the competing institution (in this case, by the institution affiliated with the military).

This, therefore, generates what I call the ‘competitive-network model’, which builds on ‘network models’ and ‘institutional security networks’ since the two institutions under consideration are not on a level-playing field and the network-development compromises the authority of the original public policing provider. Under this model, competition cannot be overcome and the network is vulnerable to exploitation by competing political interests and nodes of security governance, undermining the adequate provision of public security. The element of competition thus warrants further acknowledgement in plural policing literature.

Similarly, the element of conflict needs further exploration. In certain contexts, scholars accept that the pluralisation of policing and the creation of security networks encourage good practices within the police (Rice 2019). For instance, Crawford and L’Hoiry’s (2017) discussion on inter-organisational relations between public organisations in the United Kingdom suggests that although networked relationships are vulnerable to power contestations, they also provide opportunities for organisational learning. This may be the case in police partnerships with organisations detached from policing or law enforcement, and thus can create possibilities for collaboration. Police pluralisation may not always increase reflexivity or foster organisational learning when it lacks the necessary elements listed by Crawford and L’Hoiry: shared commitment, trust, balanced exchange of
information, mutual respect, and open communication, that are frequently missing from relationships between competing organisations.

In certain contexts, therefore, we must question how, if at all, processes of pluralisation are bettering public policing, especially if measures to diversify policing providers prioritise the interests of the state and state elite above citizens. In Brazil for instance, the pluralisation of public policing resulted in ‘chronic conflict and breakdowns in coordination’ between the civil and military police officers (Sapori 2018). This paper thus takes a critical approach to the normalisation of plural policing and networked security in which military and paramilitary organisations encroach upon the space of the civilian police, complicating the policing landscape by following differing political agendas.

Due to the inapplicability of existing security network and plural policing models to this case study, I argue that the relationship model between the paramilitary and the police is best described as a ‘competitive-network model’, in which state security providers tasked with public policing in overlapping jurisdictions, will necessarily compete with each other not just for material resources, territory and knowledge, but also, as Eikenaar (2019) suggests, for professional status and recognition. Where these institutions are loosely networked (and where networking is often personalised, not institutionalised), cooperation will be unstructured, irregular, and often driven by interpersonal rather than inter-institutional interests, in the event of joint operations or ‘coordinated but separate interventions’ (Maillard and Zagrodzki 2017). Thus, competition and contestation underscore an insecure partnership, and cooperation is not just limited but also unequal, irregular, and contingent upon the interpersonal relations between those in office and their political patrons (in this case, the military and civilian governments). This means, that competition and conflict limit cooperation, and networking manifests in the form of selective collaborations and periodic joint interventions. In a competitive-network model, the partner that perceives itself as ‘junior’ is vulnerable to losing confidence in its own authority and will adopt the practices of the ‘senior partner’. To this effect, we must consider the implications of the competitive-network model. I demonstrate that, over time, pluralisation that generates the competitive-network model exacerbates the militarisation of civilian policing and compromises the self-legitimacy of civilian officers, disrupting the internal cohesion of the civilian police.

_Militarisation of policing_
The militarisation of policing refers to the influence and infiltration of military ethos, philosophy, training, and resources on civilian police departments, which transforms domestic policing through the rhetoric of ‘war’ and ‘defence’ (Kraska 2007, Kappeler and Kraska 2015, Mummolo 2018). But militarised policing is not a new phenomenon in former colonies such as Pakistan, where the divide between civilian and military policing was never clear to begin with, and police services were modelled on constabularies to protect the interests of the empire, not the ‘natives’ (Das and Verma 1998, Jauregui 2010). Whilst I acknowledge the militarised roots of Pakistan’s police departments, most of which are still governed under colonial laws, I differentiate between their militarised legacy and the militarisation of civilian policing that has been taking place in Karachi over the last three decades because of the competitive-network model that frames the police-paramilitary partnership.

Within the competitive-network model, the police strive to perform at par with their paramilitary counterpart, believing they too are ‘frontline soldiers at war’, that their sacrifices amount to ‘martyrdom’, and that they too should be able to ‘get away with shit’ (P-141, April 2019), a metaphor for extra-legal practices exhibited by both civilian and paramilitary officers, as shown below. This glorification of militarised policing does little to improve the self-legitimacy of civilian police officers and enables routine police work, practices and processes to be interfered with. As scholars have shown, the militarisation of policing hurts police legitimacy, impairs public safety (Mummolo 2018), and undermines demilitarisation efforts (Lamb 2018). The repercussions, therefore, of the paramilitary’s influence on the militarisation of civilian police in Karachi is a critical area of inquiry in terms of the impacts of the competitive-network model, and contributes to scholarship interested in the effects of a diversifying security landscape and police partnerships on police culture (O’Neill and McCarthy 2012).

**Self-legitimacy of police officers**

Loosely defined as officers’ confidence in their own authority and how they identify with their organisation (Bradford and Quinton 2014), the concept of ‘self-legitimacy’ is a recent addition in scholarship. While police legitimacy is outward-facing, evaluated by officers’
relations with the public and other audiences (state institutions, media, external observers; or ‘audience legitimacy’), self-legitimacy looks inward to assess the relationship between a police officer and his agency and the officers’ ‘recognition of their individual entitlement to power’ (Tankebe 2019). Tankebe (2019) offers two factors that can sustain or weaken the self-legitimacy of police officers: how effectively the police maintain order and curb crime, and the extent to which officers believe that their supervisors, peers, and other ‘clientele’ (citizens, prosecutors, etc.) recognise their authority.

Through my findings, I show that the overlapping mandates between the police and paramilitary erode police perception of having monopoly over public policing and compromise their authority. The competitive-network model thus challenges the status of not just the police but also its officers for whom the paramilitary becomes a ‘client’ that observes, criticises, and challenges the identity and loyalty of civilian police officers and, by extension, their self-legitimacy. I further show that because civilian officers internalise the idea that the paramilitary (by its association to the Army and limited accountability to civilian authorities) is a superior force (a superiority the police should strive towards), this furthers the militarisation of policing as civilian officers compete with their paramilitary counterparts to match the latter’s independence and capabilities. Moreover, with their loyalty and identification with the police compromised, some officers choose to work alongside or directly under the command of their paramilitary counterparts, a practice that risks the internal cohesion of the civilian police and creates institutional disruptions.

Thus, in assessing the effects of the competitive-network model, I not only connect with and contribute to debates on pluralised policing, but also police practice, procedures and legitimacy, and introduce a new way of thinking about police partnerships.

**Methodology**

Like the Pakistan Army, the Sindh Rangers restricts access to its data, operations and governance, making it a difficult institution for civilians to study. Although access to the civilian police was less restricted, it was routinely negotiated due to a lack of research conducted on law enforcement in Karachi. Access to both institutions was also limited due to socio-cultural reasons; policing is still a male-dominated, conservative and under-studied profession in Pakistan and establishing trust with practitioners as a female researcher was
challenging. Nevertheless, I carried out 14 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Karachi between 2014 and 2019, conducting semi-structured interviews with 80 participants, including serving and retired police and paramilitary officers, journalists, lawyers, and members of the civil society. Interviewees were selected based on their affiliation or relations with the police, the paramilitary, or both, since the 1990s. I then translated, transcribed, anonymised, coded and analysed all interviews.iii Participant observation was carried out between 2015 and 2017, at police stations, police and paramilitary offices, on patrol, and during the policing of public events in which police and paramilitary officials jointly participated. This was to observe how police and paramilitary officials communicate with and about each other in public and private spaces, and to understand the differences in their practices and procedures. Furthermore, newspaper archives were consulted in Karachi and London to understand how the relationship has evolved and to corroborate interviewees’ accounts.

**Plural policing in Karachi**

Since the 1980s, Karachi has suffered from violence between various political parties, including the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) (Verkaaiik 2004, Gayer 2014). On its part, the Karachi Police has grappled with corruption, politicisation, and a lack of resources for addressing emerging challenges. In 1989, due to extreme political discord, an auxiliary of the Army, the Mehran Force, was deployed into Sindh. In 1990, the Army itself was called in due to police incompetence, resulting in the first post-independence demonstration of the ‘police-isation of the military’ (Dunlap 1999) in peacetime Karachi. This event set precedence for the Army to physically assert itself onto Karachi’s security architecture, complementing the military’s ongoing efforts to assert itself on provincial and local political landscapes, and strengthen its position within Pakistan’s civil-military dynamics (Rizvi 1998, Shah 2014). Such assertion has frequently brought military and civilian establishments into direct confrontations that would later be mirrored in the interactions between police and paramilitary officers. As reports from the 1990s demonstrated, the paramilitary’s expanding mandate was interpreted by local police officers as the ‘Army running the show through the Rangers’ (Abbas 1995).
In 1992, the Army launched ‘Operation Clean-up’, primarily targeting the MQM (Gayer 2014, Frotscher 2008). When it withdrew in 1994, the Mehran Force converted into the Sindh Rangers, which would remain under the dual command of the Army and the Ministry of Interior (Table 01). In 1995, the Rangers assisted the Karachi Police in a second operation that left a number of police officers and MQM activists dead, with torture and extrajudicial killings reported on both sides (Frotscher 2008). In subsequent years, MQM-affiliated militants assassinated dozens of police officials. The inability of civilian and military governments to reform civilian policing increased reliance upon military personnel, and the Rangers began asserting itself, becoming, for all intents and purposes, ‘the political arm of the Army’ (P-75, December 2016) that would indefinitely monitor and interfere in local and provincial politics, with the support of the military, relegating civilian policing to a ‘subordinate role’ (Petzschman 2010).

In 2013, the Rangers’ growing authority was evidenced further with the launch of the ‘Karachi Operation’ for which command was given to the Rangers, with the police assisting the former, contrary to legal provisions (e.g. Pakistan Rangers Ordinance 1959) that mandated the Rangers to assist the police. As a result, police officers refer to the paramilitaries’ involvement in Karachi, and the pluralisation of public policing, as a product of Pakistan’s broader civil-military dynamics, which contextualises the relationship between the police (a provincial, civilian subject) and the paramilitary (a federal, military institution). As Scarpello (2017) wrote in the case of Indonesia, ‘the policing landscape is… an important site for [political and military] struggles.’

The Rangers’ officers are deputed from the Army, replicate the military in structure, training, and equipment, and are generally better resourced than their civilian counterparts. They do not just operate on the orders of the federal and provincial governments, but also Pakistan Army’s headquarters in Karachi (Corps V), and therefore fall within the regular command-and-control channel of the military. They thus have an intermediary status between the police and military, but remain institutionally closer to the latter. In the words of a senior paramilitary officer, ‘We are not here to serve the people; we are here to serve the Army. We are loyal to this institution’ (R-95, November 2015), an attitude that resonates across the officer-ranked cadre of the paramilitary.

Table 01: Providers of Public Policing

10
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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Karachi Police</th>
<th>Sindh Rangers</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>Paramilitary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affiliation</td>
<td>Sindh Police</td>
<td>Pakistan Rangers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>Inspector General, Sindh Police; Additional Inspector General, Karachi Police</td>
<td>Director General, Sindh Rangers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Police Services of Pakistan</td>
<td>Pakistan Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversight</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior; Government of Sindh</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior; Pakistan Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction</td>
<td>All districts</td>
<td>All districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength (est.)</td>
<td>27,000-30,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Powers</td>
<td>- arrest&lt;br&gt;- maintenance of public order&lt;br&gt;- intelligence collection&lt;br&gt;- crime prevention&lt;br&gt;- registration of FIRs&lt;br&gt;- criminal investigation&lt;br&gt;- patrol&lt;br&gt;- stop-and-search&lt;br&gt;- counter-terrorism&lt;br&gt;- administration of police stations and check-posts</td>
<td>- arrest&lt;br&gt;- maintenance of public order&lt;br&gt;- intelligence collection&lt;br&gt;- crime prevention&lt;br&gt;- protection of property/persons&lt;br&gt;- patrol&lt;br&gt;- stop-and-search&lt;br&gt;- counter-terrorism&lt;br&gt;- assist armed and civil armed forces&lt;br&gt;- border security&lt;br&gt;- administration of check-posts</td>
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The Rangers are deployed under Article 147 of the constitution that allows provincial governments to transfer policing powers to federal officers. In 1995, through an amendment in the Criminal Procedure Code 1898, the Rangers were granted policing powers to detain suspects and seize property. In 2009, their powers were extended to allow them to patrol, establish pickets, provide security and assist the police during public events. Through this extension, the government also formally allowed the Rangers to conduct intelligence-based operations independently, limiting their role as ‘assisting’ civilian agencies and granting them institutional autonomy. In 2014, an amendment in the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997 empowered the Rangers to detain individuals suspected of ‘terrorism’ for ninety days without charge.

The Rangers’ institutional autonomy has also made it a stakeholder Karachi’s economy, enabling it to rely upon ‘extra-professional’ ways of benefitting from it (Gayer 2010), much like the entrepreneurial over-reaches by the Army (Siddiq 2016). For instance, the paramilitary has encroached upon public property, including the Radio Pakistan Building. In 2015, paramilitary officers established bases in this building after receiving temporary permission by the government to carry out surveillance during a religious procession. ‘But they are not going to leave’, opined a police officer. ‘That’s how they occupy such spaces. They get temporary permission, and stay as long as they like’ (P-41, October 2015). Such
encroachments are solidified over time and interpreted by the police as ‘the Rangers [getting] away with illegitimate practices through the construction of security narratives’ (P-72, November 2016). Thus, although deployed to assist the police due to its own incompetence, the paramilitary’s expanding official and unofficial powers have created a mechanism of pluralised public policing that suffers from competition and limits cooperation.

The competitive-network model in effect

A House of Cards? Selective networking

The cooperation between the Karachi Police and the Sindh Rangers is selective and personality-driven, as it is contingent upon interpersonal relations between police and paramilitary officers. One of the most publicised examples of such partnership was between a former Additional Inspector General (AIG) of Police and a former Director General (DG) Rangers in 2013 at the beginning of the Karachi Operation. Through joint press conferences, the police and paramilitary chiefs strived to demonstrate ‘civil-military solidarity’, but the alliance eventually fell apart due to opposition from political parties most affected by the paramilitary’s crackdown (Khan 2015). Although hailed as a successful policing partnership, it did not translate into greater cooperation between police and paramilitary cadres. As explained by a senior police officer, ‘the senior Rangers officers respect the police to an extent. It depends on officer-to-officer dynamics. Some are typical [Army] officers who look down on anyone who is not a [soldier]’ (P-141). Such personalised dynamics, therefore, keep the relationship unstructured and always at risk of rupture.

In addition to crowd control duties during public order events, paramilitary and police officials collaborate for raids, arrests, and during armed encounters with suspected criminals and terrorists. Occasionally, such collaboration reveals not just the militarised practices of both organisations, but also their ability to collaborate in operating outside the law. The Karachi Police is infamous for engaging in a practice known as staged ‘encounter killings’ or extrajudicial killings in which select police officials shoot and kill persons in custody (Waseem 2019, Belur 2010), because of the little confidence they have in Pakistan’s overworked and under-resourced prosecution and judiciary. In select cases, paramilitary officers (operating on the guidance of intelligence agencies) enable trusted civilian officers to
carry out ‘encounters’. As a police officer who has previously worked alongside paramilitary and intelligence officers told me,

I was called by the Rangers. They wanted to hand over militants to me to “take care of” in fake encounter killings. I showed up… with a number of my policemen. While handing over the militants, one of the paramilitary officers took a photograph of the handover. I refused to go through with it. Tomorrow, if something happens, that photograph could be used to implicate me. (P-51, December 2015)

A similar collaboration was observed when I witnessed the aftermath of a police ‘shootout’ with suspected ‘terrorists’ in 2015. While the then district police chief addressed the media, paramilitary officers investigated the site of the shootout. ‘There is nothing unusual about this’, explained a news reporter. ‘The suspects are frequently in the Rangers’ custody, or the custody of intelligence agencies, before they are handed over to the police’ (J-153, October 2015). This anecdote indicates that not only do paramilitary and police officers cooperate for public events such as processions, they are frequently ‘uneasy partners in crime’, to borrow from Puck’s (2017) assessment of the relationship between the police and private security companies in Mexico. In other words, not only is this cooperation limited and selective, it is also based on careful calculations about which officers can be trusted and for what legal or extra-legal purposes.

This is not just privy to select police officers, but also the paramilitary. ‘Rangers can pick and choose when they want to cooperate with the police’, explained a senior police officer, referring to the so-called ‘Lyari Operation’ carried out by the police in 2012 against gang members in one of Karachi’s most turbulent neighbourhoods (Nabi 2012).

When the Lyari Operation began, the Rangers told the cop leading it that they would not join. They told the police to conduct it independently. They wanted to show everyone that, “look: the police cannot operate without us!” In the process, a number of people, including a police inspector, were killed and the operation collapsed. (P-147, April 2019)

Because cooperation between police and paramilitary officers is irregular and forms an unstructured security network, it is prone to disputes and confrontations that are seldom reported in the media.

_Sibling Rivalry? Inter-institutional competition_

In the 1990s, stop-and-search powers were allotted to the paramilitary, alongside static pickets across Karachi to control sporadic disturbances. Concerns were raised about the
Rangers’ high-handedness and about granting them policing powers; they were called ‘substitutes for the Army’, encroaching upon the duties of the police (Leader 1995), laying the ground for future competition over territory and knowledge. Disputes between police and paramilitary officials were common (The News 1995), trickling down to junior officers, and by the mid-1990s, there were reports about the police registering cases against the Rangers for ‘acting outside the law’. Although both provincial and federal governments urged the two institutions to correspond better, the relationship remained turbulent.

In the 1995 police-led operation, with the Rangers assisting the police, inter-institutional tensions remained high, partially because by now the Rangers had been granted policing powers to make arrests and was no longer acting on the orders of its civilian counterpart. Police and paramilitary officers downplayed their tussles but these ‘jurisdictional clashes’ (Jha 2000) manifested themselves in everyday police work, for instance in claims over resources and territory. For example, when the Rangers’ acquired property provided to the police for registering complaints, a series of confrontations between police and paramilitary officers ensued, as recounted by a police officer involved.

When I heard the Rangers wanted to take over that space, I resisted. Why should they take over? Because they are superior and we are inferior? When the paramilitary arrived, I told my officers to sit tight… I encouraged passive resistance. Ultimately, the paramilitary officers called their seniors. A brigadier phoned and said this property is owned by a housing authority that belongs to the Army. I told him to get an official order… not come at us with arms. I said, “give us some face-saving”. They eventually got the order and the property. But the delay was possible because we resisted. (P-72)

Similar competition has been seen following responses against militants and criminals, following which police officers complain that paramilitary officers ‘highlight our failures, but do not give credit where due’ (Ibid). In June 2014, armed militants attacked the Karachi International Airport. The police (led by their own militarised auxiliary unit, Special Security Unit) arrived after the Airport Security Force, followed by paramilitary officers and thereafter the Army. ‘When the operation ended, the Army drew up their timelines to show who responded and how’, recounted a police officer present at the meeting.

In an internal meeting between civilian and military authorities, the Army officers saluted the police and their sacrifice. After the meeting, they went outside to address the media… and the role of the police went unacknowledged. It’s clear that neither the Army nor the paramilitary want to publicly project our successes. (P-147)

Such incidents of inter-agency competition and conflict have created deep mis-trust between the two institutions. Paramilitary officers admit to limiting cooperation with police officers and confirm that ‘information-sharing with the police is kept to a minimum’ (R-95),
demonstrating competition over knowledge or information. On their part, police officers resent the Rangers’ lack of accountability. ‘They are like an elder brother who gets away with shit. When the elder brother gets away with shit, the younger brother has to suck it up’ (P-141).

Furthermore, police officers highlight the discrepancies between the autonomy afforded to them versus the paramilitary. The most publicised example of this discrepancy-in-autonomy came in the aftermath of the extrajudicial killing of a civilian, Sarfaraz Shah, by paramilitary officials in 2011. The superior judiciary ordered the removal of both police and paramilitary chiefs to enable fair and impartial investigations. Three months later, the paramilitary chief was reinstated, while the police chief was unceremoniously replaced even though the police was not associated with the incident. Discrepancies such as these fuel the competition and conflict over resources and recognition that underscores the competitive-network model, and, as discussed below, effects the civilian police in three ways.

The effects of the competitive-network model

Institutional disruptions

Organisational change in police departments can take place due to external factors, such as evolving social, political or economic environments (Marks 2000). The normalised presence of paramilitary officers is similarly an external factor that has triggered organisational changes within the police in the form of institutional disruptions created by interferences in routine police procedures. I have briefly touched upon this in my discussion of select police officers independently collaborating with paramilitary officers. Connected to the above-quoted officer’s contention that the ‘younger brother has to suck it up’, the unofficial practices of the paramilitary may result in the police ‘cleaning up the brother’s mess’. ‘When the Rangers detain a suspect, take his remand, and interrogate him, they eventually have to hand him over to the police’, explained an interviewee.vii

When they hand the suspect over to the police, the police have to file a First Information Report (FIR). Nowhere in that do they mention that the suspect was in paramilitary custody. The reason the Rangers give the suspect to the police is basically to release him after interrogating him for information. Sometimes, the way to do that is to get the police to frame him for some small crime, like the possession of an unlicensed weapon. (J-143)
In this way, not only do the Rangers benefit from existing illegal police practices (non-registration or incorrect registration of FIRs), as a police ‘client’ they actively encourage the police to continue operating outside legally and procedurally defined rules, knowing that the police will ‘comply due to their inferiority complex’ (P-133). The informal practice of exchanging suspects without adequate record-keeping interferes with institutional workings and makes it difficult to prosecute suspects.

The paramilitary is complicit in enabling such institutional disruptions in the police partly due to its unmet demands for separate police stations and permanent policing powers for carrying out independent investigations (Sahoutara 2016). While researching at a police station in 2015, I observed a dozen paramilitary officers bring six men and transfer them into police custody. The police officers present informed me that the men were affiliated with a banned militant organisation and accused of murder. Based on my conversations with these detainees, prior to their arrival at the station, they were kept in paramilitary custody for three months. Echoing the sentiments of the families of other suspects detained by the Rangers for their affiliation with the MQM (whom I had interviewed earlier that year), these detainees confirmed that paramilitary officers were free to interrogate and torture select prisoners in Central Jail (Karachi’s largest maximum-security prison). These are not, however, details featured in police reports but have gradually made the police a participant in the extra-legal practices of their primary competitor, a product of the personalised ‘networking’ between both institutions.

Part of the reason why police procedure is compromised by the paramilitary is because, in the words of a senior police officer, ‘many police officers do not challenge the Rangers’ (P-141). This hesitance to challenge paramilitary officers from interfering in police work is because police officers have witnessed their civilian colleagues being undermined by the Rangers when the latter felt their ‘primacy’ or superiority was being challenged.

The Rangers want to have primacy over policing and security…. When they feel the police is cracking a lot of cases, they adopt a mean streak…. [A police officer] recently arrested militants linked to a radical outfit. [The Rangers] were so stung, that they took the guys from the cop by force. They did so because for a year the police had been performing well. (P-141)

This anecdote reflects how the asymmetric inter-agency competition between police and paramilitary officers encouraged the Rangers to create institutional disruptions within the civilian police. This competitive-network dynamic teaches some officers that good individual relations with the military and paramilitary will yield professional benefits (which
impacts the self-legitimacy of police officers, as discussed below) and poor relations can result in professional achievements being undermined or compromised.

**Militarised policing**

Through this competitive-network model of pluralised policing, the police internalise that the paramilitary is both ‘able to get away with shit’ and can use its association with the Army to its advantage. This association benefits the paramilitary by shielding it from transparency, democratic scrutiny, public criticism and accountability. Paramilitary officers, like Army officers, are not subjected to civilian scrutiny in Pakistan, particularly with regards to ‘extraprofessional’ activities or corruption (Gayer 2010). The police interpret this advantage as one that hurts their own means of corruption. ‘They are far more corrupt than us’, responded a senior police officer when questioned about the corrupt practices of police and paramilitary officers. ‘We eat in lakhs, but they eat in crores’ (P-42, October 2015).

Measuring each institution’s corruption is beyond the scope of this article, but the officer’s response indicates a perception that police officers have towards the protection afforded to the paramilitary on account of the Army’s patronage.

This perception impacts how the police interpret interactions between paramilitary officers and Karachi’s business community. In 2012, the paramilitary registered their private security company (Rangers Security Guards Ltd.) to provide private guards to educational institutions, businesses and commercial areas. This endeavour has strengthened their relations with Karachi’s business community, a prominent stakeholder in the city that routinely calls upon the paramilitary’s deployment to be extended. Furthermore, similar to the practice of bribing police officers, factory owners and traders have come to realise that the paramilitary too can be paid for security, a service the paramilitary is perceived as providing better than the police. Previously, such ‘protection money’ was paid by to the police and mafia groups patronised by political parties (B-91, B-92 March 2017). According to an influential businessperson,

Factory owners pay the Rangers for check-posts and patrolling. It’s protection money. They pay because they want to maintain relations with the Army. They believe the Army can best maintain order in the city, through the Rangers, unlike the Sindh government. There is no legal basis for such private arrangements. (B-91)
The police resent the closeness between the paramilitary and businessmen given that this relationship hurts the financial arrangements in place between the police and the business community. ‘There is a “silent partnership” between businessmen and police officers. Businessmen want contacts in the police. In return, police officers get shares in businesses through which they make extra money’ (P-40, October 2015).

With this ‘silent partnership’ compromised, police officers internalise that the paramilitary’s corruption makes it a competitor over illegitimate sources of income that were previously reserved for the police and that, given the proximity between the Rangers and the Army, the paramilitaries’ corruption will go unquestioned, unlike that of the police. These dynamics lead police officers to believe that ‘the Rangers are not answerable to anyone. They can loot, torture, and kill but they cannot be touched’ (P-77, December 2016).

This lack of accountability is also witnessed through the practice of ‘encounter killings’, a militarised procedure that evades reliance upon the rule of law or democratic procedures, and in which both police and paramilitary officers are known to participate, but the latter has an added advantage.

If the Rangers kill someone in an encounter and the police kill someone in an encounter, there is a huge difference between both. The media cannot write against the paramilitary. They issue a standard press release through their spokesperson, unlike the police that is more accessible. (J-143, April 2019)

Press releases from civilian police officers are frequently signed off by a police officer under his own name; in contrast, paramilitary officers issue press releases from their spokespersons who, although potentially known to reporters and journalists, remain anonymous.

Furthermore, in contrast to civilian police officers, paramilitary officers are not required to display their identities on their uniform nametags. This creates a discrepancy between the amount of transparency and accountability both institutions are subject to, strengthening perceptions of the police that the standards that apply to paramilitary officers do not apply to the police, even if both institutions have overlapping mandates and jurisdictions.

Such practices convey to the police that the military superiority of paramilitary officers within this plural policing mechanism gives them an advantage that enables them to bypass legal procedures whilst avoiding public criticism. When asked about the extra-legal activities and practices of paramilitary officers, one Rangers officer claimed,

The legal system is too idealistic. It does not commiserate with ground realities. Internal security operations are taking place under the Anti-Terrorism Act. We need to engage in
informal practice. We cannot present a suspect within 24-48 hours as advised. We do not get warrants. Waiting for warrants would mean letting criminals go. (R-95, November 2015)

As a result, police officers romanticise the military strength of the paramilitary, that is better trained and resourced, but less accountable and transparent (partly due to how military and defence sectors have expanded in Pakistan through the construction of ‘security threats’ (Ahmed 1974)). For instance, police officers ‘look up to’ paramilitary officers who are able to police the MQM, whose activists were behind the assassinations of police officers in the aftermath of the two operations in the 1990s (Khan 2010).

Some cops like the Rangers because of the work the Rangers have done against the MQM. For some cops, it is personal. The Rangers “arrest” MQM militants who were responsible for killings cops. On paper, they are there to assist the police, but off-the-record they operate independently, as the political arm of the Army. (P-75, December 2016)

This perception of the paramilitary’s superiority has been translated by some police officers as a source of insecurity, but also as a standard that civilian officers need to meet, thus further militarising the police in terms of shaping the ideological affiliation of some officers towards the military, at the cost of their professional relationship and loyalty with the civilian police.

A crisis of self-legitimacy

As a result of the competitive-network model, the civilian police have gotten accustomed to comparing their own performances to the paramilitary’s. During a security brief ahead of a joint police-paramilitary deployment, the chief of police addressed his subordinates to motivate them do ‘good police work’. The standard for good policing, however, was to be met by that of the Rangers.

When I ask paramilitary soldiers why they are deployed at a particular location, they know why they are there. When I ask my police “soldiers” why they are at a particular location, they do not know. They say, “Sir, we are standing here because [a superintendent] has told us to stand here”. (P-39, October 2015)

An emerging area of scholarship looks at how police officers perceive of their own legitimacy and how ‘the position of the police within broader sets of power relations’ shape their ‘self-legitimacy’ (Bradford and Quinton 2014) and their trust within their organisation (Wolfe and Nix 2017). My findings suggest that the presence of the paramilitary and the resulting competitive-network model, has significant effects on police officers’ self-legitimacy, which is connected to how police officers view militarised policing and how they correspond with their own organisation and with the paramilitary.
This is partly a result of how police officers are recognised by police clientele, what Tankebe (2019) refers to as ‘clientele recognition’, which can come from citizens but also, in this case, from the paramilitary, since paramilitary officers can choose when and where to credit the police (J-148), for example during closed-door meetings between civil and military authorities. As discussed earlier, the paramilitary has been striving to make in-roads towards its own clientele recognition by building trust with the business community. In a private meeting with this community in 2016, a former DG Rangers reassured businessmen by stating that the Rangers would remain in Karachi because businessmen were factored into the paramilitaries’ priority. In an interview, an industrialist recounted how the community had ‘come out in the media, lobbying for the Rangers’ when the provincial government threatened to take away the paramilitary’s policing powers (B-92).

The police are privy to these exchanges and interpret them as events that create ‘negative publicity’ for the civilian police (Nix and Wolfe 2017). Commenting on these interactions, the paramilitary’s increasing role in community policing, and the industrialists’ financial support for paramilitary troops, a police officer remarked that the paramilitary’s increasing presence has been ‘demoralising for the police’ (P-147, April 2019). ‘Of course, they undermine our legitimacy. Their shop does well when ours doesn’t.’

In an interview, a journalist recounted how the paramilitary speaks about the police in private meetings with the media. ‘When I ask the police if they can handle the situation in Karachi if the Rangers left, many police officers claim they would have some difficulty initially but eventually they would manage’. The paramilitary, on the other hand, are more sceptical of the civilian police. ‘They say the police are incapable and they don’t trust the police. The Rangers, frankly, do not want to leave, and the Army does not want them to either.’ (J-148, April 2019)

This sentiment is connected to the perceptions of both military and paramilitary officers, who expressed that ‘There are no police in Karachi; these are workers of political parties in police uniforms’ (R-101, September 2015). This resonates with the perceptions of paramilitary officers: ‘I try and praise the police in front of my juniors to get them to respect their civilian counterparts. They laugh at me and say, “Sir, are you joking?”’ (R-95, November 2015). These insights tie together with the civil-military dynamics discussed above, in which Pakistan’s military has traditionally viewed itself as ‘superior’ to civilian institutions, and, as an extension, the paramilitary perceives of itself as ‘superior’ to the
police, particularly due to the fact that its deployment in Karachi has been predicated on police incompetence.

The police officers are aware of the perceptions the military and paramilitary officers have about civilian police departments. Their self-legitimacy is further compromised because in select cases, paramilitary officers have been able to influence the transfer of police officers which adversely affects both ‘supervisor recognition’ and ‘peer recognition’ within the civilian police.

Senior police officers are in direct contact with Rangers’ officers. They know they need to obey the Rangers. When they don’t, there is possibility that they might get transferred. It depends of course on police leadership, too. But this is what police subordinates learn – that their institution may not always protect them. (J-143)

Thus, a police officer, transferred because of differences with paramilitary officers, and his subordinates, both have their self-legitimacy connected to the recognition by his supervisor compromised. This erodes the trust that police officers have in their own institution, its leaders and its civilian management, encouraging police officers to gravitate away from the Sindh government. ‘Some police officers are good with the Rangers, and some are good with the Sindh government. The Rangers are trying to depoliticise the police’ (P-147), or, in other words, reduce the influence that the civilian government and political parties have over local and provincial police departments. Behind this admission is the recognition that policing in Karachi is deeply influenced by Pakistan’s civil and military struggles, as discussed above. The knowledge that the Rangers are trying to ‘depoliticise the police’, or reduce the influence of the civilian government, teaches police officers that their job security is contingent upon their loyalty towards the military, even if this loyalty costs them their association with their own organisation.

Similarly, individual cooperation between police and paramilitary forces undermine the self-legitimacy of other police officers, especially when select police officers support the paramilitary in replicating aspects of civilian policing, such as community policing initiatives. The Rangers routinely organise public events, such as sporting events and concerts, to draw local residents into community policing initiatives, such as providing information directly to paramilitary officers through WhatsApp messaging service and helplines. One such initiative was organised by the Rangers in December 2016, a month marked by its officers as the ‘month of Quaid’, to commemorate the founder of Pakistan. As part of this initiative, a peace walk was held in an affluent residential area, where gifts were distributed to the sponsors and co-organisers. The then DG Rangers invited a serving Deputy
Inspector General (DIG) to the stage to be presented with a gift. In the aftermath of this exchange, which was widely publicised as another demonstration of positive civil-military partnership, police officers expressed disdain towards the DIG, calling his acceptance of the Rangers’ gift ‘an embarrassment’ for the police. The ‘embarrassment’ resulted from long-standing grievances held by civilian police officers towards colleagues working alongside the paramilitary, in spite of optics that demonstrated a hierarchy in which the paramilitary officers could independently run community events, an aspect the civilian police traditionally had monopoly over.

The statements made by paramilitary officers towards their civilian counterparts, their influence over postings and transfers within the Karachi Police, and their involvement within the social fabric is therefore interpreted by police officers as efforts to undercut police authority, collectively resulting in a self-legitimacy crisis within the police.

Conclusion

This paper argued that a plural public policing model that consists of unstructured, personality-driven cooperation, competition and inter-agency conflict, shaped by a country’s political economy and civil-military dynamics, can adversely affect the civilian police and its officers. The effects of the competitive-network model are essentially intertwined and capable of reinforcing each other. The militarisation of routine policing, exacerbated by the presence of a ‘superior’ force, can trigger institutional disruptions within the civilian police. These disruptions negatively affect how police officers identify with their own institution, thus compromising their self-legitimacy. A compromised self-legitimacy strengthens officers’ perception that the police is ‘inferior’ to the paramilitary and that the latter’s procedural flexibilities should be emulated or its authority respected and affiliated with, regardless of the philosophy of civilian policing, thus furthering police militarisation. Thus, in certain contexts, we must critically assess the power relations underlying the multiplication of security providers that generate inter-institutional competition (Crawford 2008, Lister and Jones 2016, Scarpello 2017).

Overtime, pluralised policing has become the norm in the city of Karachi. The partnership between the Karachi Police and the Sindh Rangers is a product of the policies designed by civilian and military administrators. The policing powers periodically granted to
the paramilitary by successive governments entrenched pluralisation without strengthening the partnership. The result is that these two institutions have been locked in a competitive relationship that has disrupted the internal cohesion of the police, reoriented the loyalties of individual officers away from their institution and towards their counterparts in the paramilitary force, and facilitated the militarisation of police practices.

The relations between paramilitary and police officers are likely to remain in a state of flux as long as both institutions struggle to find independent ways of policing their shared turf. This study therefore has important consequences for future research exploring relations between plural policing providers and their impact on routine policing and public security. I suggest, therefore, that we need to acknowledge the trends of pluralised policing in countries undergoing democratic transitions, where different policing entities may be serving the interests of competing state institutions, often at the expense of institutional accountability, internal security, and public safety. In order for multiple security providers to co-police and ensure adequate maintenance of order and public safety, an independent regulatory mechanism needs to be put in place to monitor the expansion of security networks. This suggestion furthers recommendations by scholars who have advised that police partnerships be regulated by independent commissions (Loader 2000, Skinns 2008). This paper thus adds a critical perspective to the pluralisation of public policing and the risks it poses (Crawford and Lister 2006), addresses the empirical gaps identified in literature (Boels and Verhage 2016), and provides insights into the consequences of pluralised public policing (in the case of civilian and military partnerships).

1 To learn more about Pakistan’s law enforcement infrastructure, see Abbas (2011).
2 Dupont defined ‘political capital’ as the capital that ‘derives from proximity of actors to the machinery of government and their capacity to influence or direct this machinery toward their own objectives’ (2004, 85).
3 To protect the anonymity of my participants, I have numbered all interviews and assigned participants letters based on their affiliation: P=police officers, R=paramilitary officers, J=journalists, B=businessmen and industrialists, respectively.
4 A detailed exploration of Karachi’s politics and its connections with Pakistan’s broader civil-military relations is beyond the scope of this paper. For further analysis, see Verkaaik (2004), Frotscher (2008), and Gayer (2014) on Karachi’s ethno-political trajectory and Rizvi (1998), Shah (2014), and Jaffrelot (2015) for a history of civil-military relations in Pakistan. On the military’s involvement in Pakistan’s economy, see Siddiqa (2016).
5 Ordinance XXXV of 1995, section 131A.
7 The Rangers do not transfer all suspects to the police and may release some directly. In relatively few reported incidents, suspects have died in custody (Ali 2016). Official data on suspects held in paramilitary custody were inaccessible.
References


Leader, 1995. The Rangers should be retrained. Leader, 03 September.


