A genealogy of the whole child

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PhD Thesis

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Declaration

I, Bronwen Jones, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

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Abstract

This research is an investigation into how the essentially ‘progressive’ pedagogical construct of the whole child became a neoliberal policy subject. In short, it is a presentation of the production/ or productions of the whole child in the neoliberal policy process. Specifically, it is focused on policies of well-being and character from the time of New Labour to the 2014 Conservative government. During the course of the research, three different yet thoroughly connected productions of the whole child have emerged: the whole child constituted in policy document definitions through psy-scientific discourses; the whole child constituted through the processes and practices of a neoliberal education system and the whole child constituted through classroom practices of well-being and character programmes. They occur at different stages of the policy process and in different sites yet are inseparable. Together they constitute a kind of anatomy of the whole child in neoliberal education policy. I have found it helpful to employ Foucault’s concept of the dispositif to both explore and connect the notion of the whole child and neoliberalism. I have understood those three articulations from the perspective of his constructs of bio power, governmentality and technologies of the self. My research then suggests that this ‘whole child’ of education policy represents and facilitates an increasingly systematic extension of neoliberal governance into/through the emotional and moral ‘life’ of the child. The whole child functions as a bio political or etho political subject that is a critical and developing constituent part of the neoliberal dispositif.
Reflections on research

None of it does more than mark time. Repetitive and disconnected, it advances nowhere. Since indeed it never ceases to say the same thing, it perhaps says nothing. It is tangled up into an indecipherable, disorganized muddle. In a nutshell, it is inconclusive (Foucault, 1980a, p.78).

Impact Statement

I hope that this research generates a degree of unease about what is happening in schools in the name of educating the ‘whole child’, and that this discomfort leads to greater scrutiny and critique of policies and practices of the ‘whole child’.
Acknowledgements

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## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTENTS</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOTIVATION AND RATIONALE</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCEPTUALISING AND SITUATING THE RESEARCH</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conceptualising the research- Foucault</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situating the research- neoliberalism</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practicalities</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROBLEMATISING THE WHOLE CHILD</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, SOCIETAL CHANGE AND EDUCATIONALISATION</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW HUMAN SCIENCES</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychology</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The child study movement</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The romantic child- Locke, Rousseau, Pestalozzi and Froebel</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dewey- psychological philosophy</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Education Fellowship</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE HADOW REPORTS</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WELFARISM 1944-1988</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Plowden report and comprehensivisation.................................71

CONCLUSION ..................................................................................73

SECTION ONE: PSY-SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSES AND
THE ARTICULATION OF THE WHOLE CHILD IN
POLICIES OF WELL-BEING AND CHARACTER: A
BIO/ETHO POLITICAL SUBJECT ...............................................75

BIO POWER ..................................................................................76

Bio politics and neoliberal governmentality ..................................79

NEW LABOUR AND THE WELL-BEING OF THE WHOLE CHILD.......81

The rise of well-being ...................................................................82
The articulation and evolution of well-being in policy .................84
The influence of psy-scientific discourses- therapeutic education? 89

COALITION AND CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENTS AND CHARACTER
EDUCATION ..................................................................................92

Defining character? ......................................................................96
Demos ............................................................................................98
Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues .....................................101
APPG on Social Mobility ...............................................................105

THE PRODUCTION OF THE WHOLE CHILD AS A FORM OF BIO POWER
........................................................................................................106

Psy-scientific discourses and the somatic and molecular self ........108
The whole child as a bio/etho political subject .............................110

SECTION TWO: THE DISCOURSES AND
ARCHITECTURE OF NEOLIBERAL EDUCATION
POLICY: AN EXPANDING NEOLIBERAL DISPOSITIF
AND GOVERNMENTALITY .........................................................117

GOVERNMENTALITY ....................................................................119

Liberalism and neoliberalism as governmentalities .....................121
Liberalism as a governmentality- social realities naturalised .......122
My Character by the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues ................................................................. 214

Research methodology, virtue ethics and positive psychology ...... 215
Discourse analysis ........................................................................................................................................... 219

My neoliberal Character ............................................................................................................................... 228

Technologies of the Self and the Production of the Whole Child as a Neoliberal Subjectivity .......................... 229

The Neoliberal Whole Child- A Cuckoo in the Nest .................................................................................. 231

Appendix A: Critical Discourse Analysis ..... 237

Appendix B: Handouts Supporting Boniwell and Ryan’s Personal Well-Being Lessons for Secondary Schools: Positive Psychology in Action for 11-14 Year Olds. .................................................. 246

Appendix C: Organisations ......................................................................................................................... 250

References ..................................................................................................................................................... 251
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ad-ICM</td>
<td>Adolescent Intermediate Outcome Measure</td>
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<td>APPGSM</td>
<td>All Party Parliamentary Group on Social Mobility</td>
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<td>CASEL</td>
<td>Collaborative for Academic, Social and Emotional Learning</td>
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<td>DCSF</td>
<td>Department for Children, Families and Schools</td>
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<td>DfE</td>
<td>Department for Education</td>
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<td>DfEE</td>
<td>Department for Education and Employment</td>
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<td>DfES</td>
<td>Department for Education and Skills</td>
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<td>DoH</td>
<td>Department of Health</td>
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<td>DHSC</td>
<td>Department for Health and Social Care</td>
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<td>ECM</td>
<td>Every Child Matters</td>
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<td>ERA</td>
<td>Education Reform Act</td>
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<td>EHWB</td>
<td>Emotional Health and Well-Being</td>
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<td>KIPP</td>
<td>Knowledge is Power Programme</td>
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<td>HCEC</td>
<td>House of Commons Education Committee</td>
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<td>ICM</td>
<td>Intermediate Concept Measure</td>
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<td>IPEN</td>
<td>International Positive Education Network</td>
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<td>JCCV</td>
<td>Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues</td>
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<td>MCS</td>
<td>Millennium Cohort Study</td>
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<td>NEF</td>
<td>New Education Fellowship</td>
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<td>NHS</td>
<td>National Health Service</td>
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<td>NHSP</td>
<td>National Healthy School Programme</td>
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<td>NHSS</td>
<td>National Healthy School Status</td>
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<td>Ofsted</td>
<td>Office for Standards in Education</td>
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<td>PBI</td>
<td>Personal Brand Identity</td>
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<td>PSE</td>
<td>Personal and Social Education</td>
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<td>PSHE</td>
<td>Personal, Social and Health Education</td>
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<td>RCT</td>
<td>Randomised Control Trial</td>
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<td>SEAL</td>
<td>Social and Emotional Aspects of Learning</td>
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<td>SEL</td>
<td>Social and Emotional Learning</td>
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<td>SDQ</td>
<td>Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire</td>
</tr>
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<td>SRE</td>
<td>Sex and Relationship Education</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIA</td>
<td>Values In Action youth survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# List of Figures

1.1 The JCCV’s Neo-Aristotelian Model of Moral Development 104

2.1 JCCV- Chart comparing student character strengths 151

2.2 JCCV- Graph tracking development of student character 151

2.3 JCCV-Table showing comparison of character strength averages 152

2.4 Mirfield Grammar School website 163

2.5 True Colours website 164

2.6 Commando Joe’s website 166

2.7 Commando Joe’s website 167

2.8 Character Counts PowerPoint slide 173

3.1 Front cover of textbook Boniwell and Ryan, 2012 188

3.2 Contents page of textbook, Boniwell and Ryan, 2012 189

3.3 My Character units 215

3.4 List of figures and themes in *My Character* unit of study 222
For Mum and Dad
Introduction

Motivation and rationale

As a student, parent and teacher, it seems to me evident that compulsory schooling can be damaging to many of those involved. Boredom, bullying, academic failure or simply the relentless, rigid and all encompassing regime of institutional life and overbearing performativity can erode the confidence and enthusiasm of adult and child alike. Interaction between children and adults in schools is often heavily circumscribed by narrow understandings of the role of the pupil and teacher and by what it might mean to be educated. Some contend that the emphasis on academic standards measured largely by examination performance has produced a rather lopsided schooling experience that can be negative for many students. (Gillborn and Youdell, 2000, Youdell, 2004, Pring, 2012, Winter, 2017). In addition, the pressure to survive and succeed in this system limits the time, energy and opportunity for teachers and students to develop more personal and meaningful relationships with each other (Cooper, 2004, Gewirtz, 1997). The media have reiterated this feeling by routinely flagging up the pressures of our current educational regime on teachers and students alike from early years to higher education. Indeed, it can be persuasively argued that such a system of education, based on a factory model is an odd place to put young people when they are at their most vulnerable, energetic and receptive (Robinson, 2008). Even odder, if we are told that the intention of the education system is to educate and develop the whole child. Witness recent Secretaries of State for Education conviction that the intention of the education system should be to educate and develop the whole child:

This is not just about academic attainment, the Every Child Matters agenda is about developing the whole child, fostering new experiences and learning new skills (Alan Johnson, Secretary of State for Education, in Linden, 2006).

You won’t get good grades in schools unless you are happy and fulfilled and unless the whole child is looked after’ (Michael
Gove, Secretary of State for Education, in Dimbleby and Vincent, 2013, p.20).

A strong academic core is the start, but it’s just that: a start. It’s not enough. We need to address the whole child. We send our children to school to learn, yes, but also to grow as people. To mature and gain confidence. To learn valuable life lessons, in the classroom and on the playground’ (Nicky Morgan, Secretary of State for Education, 2015).

You and I know that education is about more than just academic achievement, important though that is. It’s about more than what happens in the classroom. So how can we ensure that what young people become is the very best version of themselves they can be? How do we instil virtues? How do we build character? (Damian Hinds, Secretary of State for Education, 2019)

Of course, such observations about schools are not new and there have been a number of attempts since the advent of compulsory mass schooling to address concerns about the impact of such ‘factory schooling’. Plowden and child-centered pedagogy and indeed alternative forms of schooling and educational provision, such as Summerhill, home education and Education Otherwise are all evidence of attempts to take a more holistic approach to educating the child.¹ The advent of the internet has certainly aided an increasing home education movement with organisations such as Net School and Cambridge Home School offering internet teaching with virtual and interactive online classrooms. Indeed, it would appear that the increase in homeschooling has been substantial with a study conducted by the BBC revealing that there was a 40% rise in children being homeschooled from 2014-2017 (BBC, 2018). Whilst not necessarily solely motivated by concerns about the development of the whole child, Paula Rothermel’s research indicates that home educating families valued the ‘space to develop non academic intelligences’ (Rothermel, 2002) and ‘had a strong commitment to a ‘child-centred’ approach to teaching’ (Rothermel, 2003 p.83). Parents who home school certainly expressed conviction that the consequent discussion, spontaneity and shared experience with their children, ‘contributed to the children’s education in a way that school could not’ (Rothermel, 2002). Within mainstream schooling also, a glance at my

¹ Education Otherwise is a charitable organisation supporting home educators. http://www.educationotherwise.net.
own children’s current curriculum confirms government gestures towards developing an education system that attends to the development of the whole child; programmes of personal and social education (PSE), citizenship studies, positive psychology programmes, resilience training, personalised learning, character education etc. Furthermore, the increasing tendency to ‘outsource’ some of these programmes, detailed and discussed in subsequent sections, bears witness to a developing cottage industry of organisations dedicated to the development of the whole child. It would seem that more than ever, the education of the whole child is big business.

It was this apparent paradox that initially perturbed me. I was convinced many schools were places where children were too often not related to as individuals, where educational experience failed to engage or respond to the whole child. Yet I had to concede that aspects of current curricula appeared to challenge this view and suggested that great care was taken to ensure that a range of aspects of a child’s development were tended to. I wanted to understand how there could be an educational system that placed so much ostensible emphasis on the development of the whole child yet was apparently and simultaneously so alienating in practice. I have Michael Gove to thank for highlighting this paradox and helping me to explain it more clearly. As quoted above:

You won’t get good grades in schools unless you are happy and fulfilled and unless the whole child is looked after (Michael Gove, Secretary of State for Education, in Dimbleby and Vincent, 2013).

I had been surprised by this quote because it had seemed, probably reflecting a degree of prejudice on my part, an unlikely sentiment to hear from Mr. Gove given his trademark emphasis on a rigorous academic curriculum (Gove, 2014). However, once I had realised that far from advocating child focused, whole child teaching, Mr. Gove was in fact referencing the diet of school children in the ‘School food plan’, all was clear (Dimbleby and Vincent, 2013). Mr. Gove and I did not mean the same thing when we talked about educating the whole child. The misunderstanding was important because it indicated that the whole child
was being produced and understood in different ways, in different discourses and with different audiences. This begged the questions; how is educating the whole child understood? What is the ‘whole child’?

For me, these questions were posed and reflected upon in the context of a neoliberal education system that I felt did not tend to the education of the whole child or did, but in a paradoxical way. It was important to substantiate that feeling and gauge whether and in what way modern schooling might be disaffecting and failing to engage a child’s personal self. Initially, I chose to focus on the nature of the relationship between teacher and student, as it seemed to represent the most obvious opportunity for the child to be engaged and appreciated as a whole person. Certainly, this was the experience of my own children who could enthusiastically recall those teachers who they felt were interested in ‘them’. Further, my own experience of teaching suggested that this was an aspect of school life that had been significantly and detrimentally impacted by changes in the system over the past thirty years.

The neoliberalisation of the education system, which I discuss in detail below, has brought about widespread change to teachers, pupils and their relationships. A key area of academic research into neoliberal education has identified concerns about the impoverished, arguably colonised, relationship between students and teachers that result from neoliberal policy and practice (Gewirtz, 1997, Jeffrey and Woods, 1998, Ball, 2003, Cooper, 2004). Teacher stress, generated by work overload resulting from the pressure to perform, has allowed little space in the day for teachers to develop relationships with students or indeed to care for them in a way that many teachers feel they wish to (Gewirtz, 2002). In addition, the increased focus on administration with new emphasis on the use of databases and tracking software has distanced the person of the teacher from the person of the child and further objectified the child. Such change has made it increasingly difficult to maintain personal relationships. Cooper vividly summarises what this looks like:

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2 For example, Different Class an online pupil tracking software designed to monitor pupil performance. http://www.different-class.com/dcpro
Empathic teachers exhaust themselves finding pockets of profound empathy for needy children in corridors and in the entrances and exits to lessons, but it is never enough (2004, p.20).

Concern about this loss or transformation of personal, social, moral and emotional dimensions of the teaching relationship is often expressed in the language of the whole child. Witness the quotes from Woods and Jeffrey’s 2002 interviews with teachers:

We're not saying that the education system didn't need a review because I'm sure it did, but it has meant that children have become slots in a machine who have to come up with the right numbers and we're the ones that have got to make them come up with the right numbers whereas before you were dealing with the whole child. You were dealing with its emotions, you were dealing with its social life, you were dealing with its grandma, you were dealing with today (Cloe).

My teaching is about the whole child, whether they're in the classroom, walking along the corridor, in assembly. It's the interactions that go on all the time that helps to bring that child ‘together’. But my immediate reaction to the Ofsted inspector’s questioning of the children was that it seemed like attack, attack, attack as they quizzed them on specific pieces of knowledge (Shula) (Woods and Jeffrey, 2002, p.94).

The complication is that this language of the whole child is also employed to justify and explain multiple curriculum initiatives and practices such as healthy eating and sex education. These programmes and their concerns reference a different kind of concern for the whole child to those expressed by the teachers above or in the work of academics such as John Smyth (2007). Therefore, it seems to me that the terminology of the whole child is employed to address different, though not necessarily unrelated, concerns. The upshot is that there is no common understanding or conceptualisation of what the whole child is. The following quotes from the ex-Master of Wellington College-Anthony Seldon, the UK’s leading Green politician-Caroline Lucas, and well-known, perhaps notorious, journalist and former Director of the New Schools Network-Toby Young, demonstrate further the diversity of interpretation and dichotomy of opinion that surrounds the education of the whole child. It is clear that the education of the whole child
is a lauded goal. It is however far from clear what this means:

Schools have major responsibilities for developing the whole person, not just their intellect. The traditional model of large, de-personalised and exam-focused schools is appropriate neither for the academic, cultural, moral, spiritual, physical and emotional development of young people, nor for preparing them for a fruitful life (Seldon, 2010, p.2).

The importance of ensuring every child has access to education around sex, health and relationships - as well as teaching on everything from life-saving CPR to how to be responsible with money - can barely be overstated. PSHE is about more than sex ed. - it's about relationships, respect and responsibilities. It's about age-appropriate, fit-for-purpose, whole person education and it's more important than ever (Lucas, 2015).

The character traits that Tristram Hunt, Michael Gove, Paul Tough and others want children to be taught in schools are largely innate. That is, they are hard-wired into children's DNA. In light of this, it looks as though Anthony Seldon and other public school headmasters who stress the importance of educating the "whole child" are congratulating themselves for teaching characteristics that children at their schools already possess in abundance (Young, 2014).

It seems that there is considerable divergence on how to understand the whole child and further that the figure of the whole child is allied to various and differing policy agendas. This was born out by the initial exploratory research (Appendix A) that I undertook to clarify and hone my research question.

In this preliminary research, I used critical discourse analysis to examine the mission, vision and pastoral education statements and policies of both faith and secular schools. I wanted to explore how these shaped the schools’ understanding of the whole child. My research revealed two dominant, though not incompatible, discourses through which the whole child is commonly defined; one of values and ethos and the other of psychology and child development- which I refer to as psy-scientific discourse. I think it is helpful to take some time to comment briefly on the terminology I employ from now on.
In considering the increasing influence of psychological approaches on conceptualisations of the whole child, it is clear that different disciplines exhibit different methodologies. However, unsurprisingly given the designation of psychology as a science, a scientific epistemological framework underpins and coheres these psy-scientific approaches. In order to try and convey this simultaneous variety and similarity, I have leant on Rose’s references to ‘psy-disciplines’, ‘psy-discourses’ ‘psy-sciences’-collective terms for psychiatry, psychology, psycho analysis and other psycho therapies. I have adopted the term psy-scientific discourses in this research to reference not only the multiplicity of psy-approaches used and the importance of their work as discourse but also to draw attention to the significance of their scientific epistemological frameworks. These points of emphasis are critical to the genealogical analysis I am undertaking and signal the direction the research will take. I want to examine how such discourses operate as discourses of truth that produce and constitute the whole child in what Foucault refers to as an act of violence (Foucault, 1981, p.67). More specifically, I want to address the ‘coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse’ on the way in which the whole child is spoken and formed (Foucault, 1980a, p.85). What Foucault references is of course an act of power, and the interrogation of this relationship between psy-scientific knowledge, power, government and the formation of the subject of the whole child lies at the heart of this thesis.

To return to my initial research: Whilst it would be fair to say that a values discourse dominated in the faith schools and psy-scientific discourse in the secular schools, I found that they were by no means mutually exclusive and both discourses were evident in varying degrees in both kinds of school. However, both were characterised by considerable ambiguity and vagueness. In addition to identifying these distinct discourses, both with long histories in relation to philosophy, pedagogy and psychology, it was also clear that from the school through to government that the whole child was being incorporated into a field of policy. The influence and prevalence of both a values discourse and a psy-scientific discourse was clearly evident in policy:
Our success comes from fulfilling our mission, which is so much more than what Ofsted or the Government says what a school must do,” she said. “When I was a teacher, I remembered that I was not just seeing a child, but was seeing God in that child, and that creates expectations in teachers. We are charged with developing the whole child (Oona Standard, Director of the Catholic Education Service, in Marley, 2014).

Healthy Schools London uses a whole school approach to improve health and wellbeing. It supports and recognises school achievements in pupil health and wellbeing. Healthy Schools London focuses on the whole child and gives schools a framework for their activity with pupils, staff and the wider community (Mayor of London/London Assembly, press release, Oct 2014).

Many schools are already doing excellent work in providing support to their pupils but we know there is more to do to ensure schools enrich the whole child. This is why we are setting the first in a series of actions as part of a fresh focus on mental health (Gyimah, S. Childcare and Education Minister, 2014).

The result of this initial research then was to suggest that the whole child is a constructed, malleable and arguably inconsistent ideal that operates as and perhaps benefits from being seen as an intuitive and common sense educational truth. It seems so obvious that schools should educate the whole child that this self-evidence obfuscates what that means, what different meanings it may have or indeed whether it is in fact meaningful.

The construction of the whole child in terminology that is slippery, vague, and ambiguous, whether it is moral or psy-scientific, makes it beguiling but dangerous. Such language enables the whole child to function as a classic ‘empty’ or ‘floating’ signifier and so helps to elide and confuse issues that are connected solely by their focus on the non-academic development of the child. As such, it is a fatuous conceit/construct, a ‘facile gesture’ that merits critique (Foucault, 1990a, p.155). As a multi faceted, perhaps Janus faced construct, it seems to facilitate and frame disingenuous debate as meanings are blurred and displaced. It appears to obscure different agendas and as a consequence it seems that something is slipping through a net of research and policy, but it is difficult to articulate what. A concern to educate the whole child might indicate the provision of a caring and supportive
environment or the delivery of a substantial and varied extra curricular programme. In practice, it often references both without distinction or clarification. It seems clear that the term ‘whole child’, and what it might refer to, is open to the working of truth and power and as such offers itself up to a Foucauldian analysis.

The real question is whether that matters and I contend that it does. The education of the whole child justifies a range of ever increasing diverse practices that extend the remit and scope of public schooling into the personal realm of the self. By promoting particular practices, certain values, skills, morals, character traits are privileged and this has the potential to legitimate, or not, the development of a certain kind of person. This in turn has implications for the exclusion of certain models of the whole child and the normalisation of others. Indeed, the very notion of the whole child includes within it a sense of the superlative, since presumably a whole child is an improvement on half a child, however that might be calculated. In the end, this raises serious and difficult questions about the relationship between government, the school and the child.

My research focus thus became: to raise and address questions about what is understood by the whole child and the education of the whole child and, perhaps more importantly, to scrutinise what is happening when the education of the whole child is invoked and prioritised in government education policy. In order to address this, I decided to delve more deeply into the history of the ‘whole child’; to consider how particular ways of understanding the education of the whole child have become dominant at a certain level of policy and practice; to trace the trajectory of the whole child through recent education policy. It was apparent to me that this was an historical exploration in which language was critical and where the topic of investigation was problematically vague. In my reading and research, I struggled to conceptualise and articulate the whole child; as a psychological construct, a pedagogical approach, a sociological role, a rhetorical device, a philosophical conviction, or a motivational ideal? These concerns pointed toward the particular style of historical, philosophical and
linguistic approach of genealogy. The focus of a genealogical history is likely to be a taken for granted and obvious truth which would appear at first sight to have no history and merit no investigation. The education of the whole child seems just such a truth.

**Conceptualising and situating the research**

**Conceptualising the research- Foucault**

Broadly speaking, I have approached, understood and present my research as a particular genealogy of the whole child. This means that in order to conceptualise and direct my explorations, I have adopted Foucault’s analytical approach to forms of experience as fashioned along the three axes of knowledge, power and the subject. However, whilst such an approach has proved an invaluable guide and heuristic, it presents some difficulties when the time arrives to order and present a thesis that is cogent and accessible.

One of the difficulties in setting out/writing up this research is that the research is based on a philosophical and methodological approach that does not lend itself to a linear or progressive presentation. Indeed the process of the research has been a series of iterative excavations, or perhaps productions, of numerous, interconnected perspectives which have slowly aligned to offer an interpretation that might qualify as this ‘thesis’. This process of research has also been a way to get to know Foucault and it would be hard to say whether his approach clarified or constituted the explorations and analyses. His conceptual apparatus has become so thoroughly knitted into the research that it is painful and difficult to try and unpick it. Should I start with the ‘research’ or the ‘methodology’ and how would I distinguish one from the other given that each has informed a route through the other?

At each stage of research, it has been necessary to re-engage with his work in some new way to make sense of the material in front of me and that material has in turn pushed and pulled at the explanatory limits of Foucault’s much referenced tool kit. Consequently, the presentation of this
work is perhaps best described as layered, the building of a methodological approach alongside and in relation to empirical material in a cumulative fashion. In many ways, it feels as though there are two pieces of work here—one on the whole child and one on Foucault and yet neither would exist without the other. And so, in order to attempt to acknowledge both their dependence and independence, and I hope for the purposes of clarity, I have chosen to introduce each of the three key sections of my research with an introductory elaboration of those Foucauldian concepts used in the subsequent analysis. Each aspect of what I think of as an anatomy of the whole child is fully imbricated with a Foucauldian strategy and vice versa. And so, each explication of a particular production of the whole child is accompanied by an introduction that offers a perspective on that production. I have chosen to mark these introductions in blue italics to identify them as distinct theoretical discussions.

It is of course also useful to establish at the outset, some of the epistemological parameters that are implicit and explicit in Foucault’s approach. It serves to orient the reader and indeed the research. It operates as a kind of methodological scene setting that hopefully gives the reader a sense of context. Below I set out three key fundamental aspects of a Foucauldian approach that set the groundwork and framework for the generation and production of this thesis: discourse, genealogy and the dispositif.

**Discourse**

The formulation of my research question as a possible genealogy was encouraged by an initial textual analysis (see above and appendix A) of the way the whole child is constructed in different discourses in schools. This critical discourse analysis was an extension of Foucault’s apprehension of discourse and language to the level of textual analysis. It successfully raised questions about the way the whole child was constructed by and employed in diverse discourses. In doing so, the analysis undermined the intuitive idea that the meaning of the whole child was constant and obvious. It seemed to me that this textual analysis of current discourses represented the beginnings
of a critique from which a genealogy might begin. It is important though to understand what a genealogical approach brings to the research question and this means exploring and considering Foucault’s epistemological approach to language and discourse. This is fundamental to an appreciation of where genealogy begins and how my own research focus had been forged.

Foucault rejects the notion that language is representative of a pre-existing reality, that discourse is an attempt to describe or convey some underlying prediscursive truth or essence. To believe that it does, means failing to acknowledge the metaphysical assumptions built into the fabric of language and hence to be deceived into thinking that ‘at the very basis of experience...there were prior significations-in a sense, already said-wandering around in the world, arranging it all around us, opening it up from the outset to a sort of primitive recognition’ as though ‘Things are already murmuring meanings which our language has only to pick up’ (Foucault, 1981, p.65). This directs Foucault’s attention away from meaning and signification towards the way in which language produces and maintains, rather than reflects, our realities. He emphasises the productiveness of discourse and its effects, the idea that language is constitutive (De Saussure, 2006). He aims to show not only how discourses are created, constrained and disseminated but also how they in turn create and constrain through the propagation of certain truths, particularly truths about the human subject. Foucault defines discourse as ‘practices that form the object of which they speak’ (2002, p.54) and this crucially points to his emphasis on the materiality of discourse. This productive yet simultaneously restrictive aspect of discourse is inextricably linked to institutions and social structures. These are the ‘material conditions of possibility’ (Hook, 2001, p.526) in which discourse operates to enact power relations and instantiate truth claims on bodies. The capacity to fix and stabilise certain truths as obvious and natural, such that they become the way in which we apprehend the world and ourselves, is a covert facet of discourse that configures power relations in practice. Fundamental to this process is the maintenance of the illusion of a representative connection between reality and language. This illusion gives legitimacy to the truths of
discourse because they are simply truths that correspond to a pre-existing reality. But if one were to claim and indeed demonstrate that discourses are not actually generated and controlled by attempts to reveal and mirror such a pre-existent reality but by other forces, this would prove a powerful critique of the status quo. It would also raise the question as to what forces were at work in securing certain discourses as valid and others as invalid.

This question lies at the heart of his inaugural lecture, at the College de France Dec 2 1970, *The Order of Discourse or The Discourse on Language*. In this, Foucault considers the restrictions, or principles of rarefaction that determine and govern the production and dissemination of discourse in society. In order to attend to these restrictions and remain alert to the metaphysical traps of discourse, Foucault commends four investigative principles of discourse analysis. These principles or methodological correctives ensure that we maintain an appropriately suspicious attitude when considering the claims of discourse to reflect reality.

The principle of *reversal* is the dominant principle that underpins the three other regulating principles. It is an attempt to shake up the way that we analyse the truths discourse maintains. Foucault exhorts us to reverse our traditional way of understanding discourse, so rather than imagining that discourse is the way it is due to, for example authorial intent, we challenge such traditional explanations. This may mean a straightforward reversal of conventional categories of analysis, or simply a rejection of them as fully explanatory. It is a principle of suspicion and challenge and is enacted through the other three subsidiary principles.

The principle of *discontinuity* is a reversal of the continuity of progress and development that we tend to look for and find in discourse. Foucault cautions us to resist any temptation to construct or accept continuous ‘tidy’ narratives that offer explanations and grand theories. Discourse is more effectively understood as ‘discontinuous practices’, that may interact or clash or simply exist unknowingly side-by-side, not as part of a chain of meaning. This principle is a valuable caution in researching the history of child centred education. This is often presented as a process in which
successive generations of educationalists and politicians have become increasingly enlightened in their attitudes to the child. The principle of discontinuity would mean also pursuing the way that some forms of holistic education were marginalised and discredited perhaps with reference to political and economic factors.

The principle of specificity is a reversal of the belief that behind discourse there are underlying or ‘pre-existing significations’. There is no one submerged reality of which different discourses are alternative representations. Specificity encourages us to approach discourses as stand alone and self-referential rather than as examples or editions of fundamentally identical ideas or forms. This then opens up space to appreciate the role of chance and mishap in the formation and preeminence of certain discourses. This is a vital principle in considering the discourses that have constructed and manifested the whole child. There is a marked tendency to see moral, religious, character, personal, social, health etc. education as variations of the same educational concerns. Specificity places its emphasis rather on understanding the particular conditions in which certain programmes emerge in order to fully appreciate their significance. As an example, it may well be limiting to consider current attempts at character education as return to Victorian moral concerns and values.

The principle of exteriority reverses the idea that analysis should attempt to burrow down and reveal a true, hidden meaning or essence lying behind the surface. The focus should rather be on the external conditions that made an event possible and comprehensible. This means, amongst other things, considering the ways in which certain people may obtain the right to talk and how certain statements can be formulated, promoted and secured. Inevitably, this involves a consideration of the power relations, of social, economic and political practices that form the context of events. The aim is to focus on the way those practices operate to create a field in which certain truths can take hold. In respect of this work, it would seem that there are certain truths about the whole child, for example aspects of Froebel’s approach, that failed to take hold in mass schooling whilst others such as the
kindergarten flourished. Exteriorty directs us towards the socio economic and political circumstances that allowed this and to the power relations that secured and maintained it.

**Genealogy**

These interconnected principles of discourse analysis form a mode of interrogating and destabilising the truth claims of discourse and are part of a distinctive approach to historical investigation known as genealogy. This genealogical approach is distinguished from traditional history in the refusal to accept the metaphysical assumptions of discourse. Indeed, Foucault is scathing about the tendency of traditional history to fall prey to the delusions of discourse and sets out a genealogical approach that challenges discourse’s claims.

Genealogy is a way of doing history that operates fundamentally as a form of critique of the present and begins with an attitude of profound skepticism. Indeed, Hook describes it as ‘a methodology of suspicion and critique, an array of de-familiarising procedures and reconceptualisations’ (2005, p.4). Its skepticism is directed to the present, in particular to those truths, ideas, ‘constants’ that appear to have or present themselves as having no history. It is by investigating and revealing their history with an emphasis on junctures and accidents, that the influence of factors such as luck, chance, accident and power are revealed. It clears a space to reveal the play of power in history and so reveals the contingency of the present. Such a history is for Foucault an ‘effective history’, not because it reveals ‘what really happened’ but because it shows that things are not as necessary as all that and may well have been, and critically therefore could be, different. The genealogical method employs and reiterates the same fundamental epistemological concerns of Foucault’s discourse analysis. However, it holds a certain shape and direction that is worth considering.
**Descent**

The metaphor of genealogy itself suggests a different style and approach to historical investigation. Deriving from the German ‘herkunft’, genealogical descent involves looking back through an ever-increasing spread of potential multiple influences, a ramshackle avalanche of events that owe much to chance and accident. Tracing back through such a complex series of events allows the genealogist

> to maintain passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute diversions—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us (Foucault, 1991a, p. 81).

The genealogist must resist the temptation to knit events together in a unifying conceptual framework. Theories of this kind are bullies that ensure that certain knowledges and truths are promoted whilst others are ‘out of the truth’ and it is precisely this that genealogy hopes to avoid and expose. The history of humankind is not a linear journey of progress, a continuous and smooth process of enlightenment based on a growing understanding of the reality of our existence, meaning and truth. These are illusionary grand narratives that are no more than the erroneous imposition and violence of discourse itself. This kind of history is deceitful lending an air of inevitability to the present that is false. Rather, Foucault states

> the search for descent is not the erecting of foundations; on the contrary it disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself (Foucault, 1991, p.82).

**Emergence**

Analysing the emergence of an event, idea or subjectivity requires attention to the field in which it surfaces. Throughout history, certain ideas or truths may emerge, take hold or may disappear. For the genealogist this subjugation and disappearance of knowledge is not due to a lack of veracity but rather, to the play of forces. Foucault sees the process of subjugation as
the result of power relations and power struggle and genealogy is an account of that struggle; it is ‘a painstaking rediscovery of struggles together with the rude memory of their conflicts’ (1980a, p.83).

The purpose of this rediscovery is not to reveal a greater, better truth, but to expose the fragility of existing dominant truths and to expose the operation of power in establishing them. Part of Foucault’s genealogical approach is to revisit such ‘subjugated knowledges’ and restore their place in the historical process. In part, and perhaps also inadvertently, in tracing the dominance of psy-scientific knowledge in framing the whole child, this research has highlighted the ‘buried knowledges’, ‘disqualified knowledges’ (ibid, p.82) of alternative ways of conceptualising the whole child. In examining and exploring the dominance of the psy-scientific account of the whole child, it has highlighted ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated; naïve knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of scientificity’ (ibid, p.82). It is important though to be quite clear that there is no intention to challenge the ‘contents, methods or concepts of a science’ (ibid, p.84). Rather, ‘it is really against the effects of the power of a discourse that is considered to be scientific that the genealogy must wage its struggle’ (ibid, p.84). It is the attempt to explicate the power of psy-scientific discourse that drives much of this analysis of the whole child.

The dispositif

The dispositif illustrates for me the impossibility of distinguishing between the methodological approach and research area and also the conundrum of whether to first adumbrate the concept or the concrete instantiation. Although not paramount in my mind at the start of the research process, the dispositif has increasingly come to the fore as a way of understanding and expressing the formation and production of experience. I have come to think of this research as exploring a number of overlapping dispositifs or maybe more accurately as proposing understanding aspects of the area of research
as dispositifs. I think it would help to elaborate a little of the way Foucault employs the term and the way others have adapted it.

As with most of Foucault’s concepts, the dispositif is complicated. It helps to begin by thinking of the concrete and in many ways, the detailed and concrete is where Foucault’s analyses begin. Foucault, in the interview/conversation *The Confession of the Flesh* attempts to explain his understanding of the dispositif as a

thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid (1980b, p.194).

A truly critical aspect of this ensemble it that it includes both the discursive and the non-discursive and as such allows Foucault to address the materiality of power. However, as disparate as this ensemble is, there remains an evident coherence and schema that binds an ensemble together and it is this, that is the dispositif. When discussing the dispositif of sexuality, he refers to his realisation that the heterogeneous elements of ‘the body, the sexual organs, pleasures, kinship relations, interpersonal relations and so forth’ were ‘overlaid by the apparatus of sexuality’ (ibid, p.210). It is the set of relations, a net of meaning that holds together such a motley selection of discourses, practices, buildings, gestures, signs etc. that is the dispositif. ‘The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements’ (ibid, p.194). It goes without saying that these relations involve a play of power that is from a Foucauldian point of view, inevitably and inextricably bound up with knowledge in/as the dispositif:

[T]he apparatus is essentially of a strategic nature, which means assuming that it is a matter of a certain manipulation of relations of forces either developing them in a particular direction, blocking them, stabilizing them, utilizing them etc. The apparatus thus always is inscribed in a play of power, but it is always linked to certain coordinates of knowledge which issue from it but to an equal degree, condition it. This is what the apparatus consists in: strategies of
relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge (ibid, p.196).

As such, employing the concept of the dispositif means focusing on the power relations that are established between the disparate items. In a sense, to quote Bussolini, ‘the dispositive is a tool for analysing or understanding a multiplicity of forces in movement and contest…it seems first and foremost a tool to think about power in the perpetually dynamic social field’ (2010, p.90). At an extreme, following Agamben, a dispositif may be very loosely defined: ‘I shall call an apparatus literally anything that in someway has the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control or secure the gestures, behaviours, opinions, or discourses of living beings’ (2009, p.14).

Foucault points out the fluidity and flexibility of these relations. Whilst they may be connected by strategic objectives, they are also subject to ‘strategic elaboration’ in ways that may be unforeseen, contradictory or both. Such is the particular make up and formation of the dispositif that it has the potential to evolve and dissolve at points where it overlaps and intersects. Deleuze captures this with his description of the dispositif as a composition of lines that do not surround or encapsulate meaning but rather ‘follow directions, trace balances which are always off balance, now drawing together and then distancing themselves from one another. Each line is broken and subject to changes in direction, bifurcating and forked, and subject to drifting’ (1992, p.159).

The dispositif is porous and is based on or generated by constituents that are multivalent. They have their own genealogies and potential trajectories that may concur or contradict any overall strategic direction of a dispositif and in doing so alter it. Foucault talks of and distinguishes between local tactics and overall strategies whilst reflecting on the mutuality of them both. It may be a stable configuration but it evolves in a feedback loop with its constituent parts. The key is to identify that web of relations that cohere to generate, exert and manifest power.

The underlying continuity with the epistemological and ontological principles of the genealogy and discourse are evident and in a sense explain
why Foucault does not develop his more abstract and vague explanation of the dispositif further. In order to understand the dispositif, the reader needs to consider the particular dispositifs that Foucault analyses/proposes e.g. sexuality or discipline. Each dispositif has its own particular and unique configuration. The ‘heterogeneous ensemble’ is different and the relations that cohere it also. The borders, truths, lines, power relations, subjectivities etc. of each dispositif is varied and it is this particularity that must be examined.

In addition, the fluidity and flexibility may also account for what is seen by some as the dispositif’s capacity to transcend the macro/micro divide. The dispositif is an analytical concept that takes very seriously the materiality of thought, of power and knowledge. In doing this, the dispositif as a methodological tool sets its teeth into some very grounded and minute detailed practices. It also thus admits and accommodates the unpredictability and capriciousness of human behaviour and enactment as part of the constitution of a dispositif. I am not sure if this means a macro/micro divide is bridged, so much as never created in the first place. It is also important to appreciate that whilst Foucault talks of a heterogeneous ensemble connected by a strategic imperative, there is no sense of replication in the way that the dispositif works. The particular, evolving and distinct histories and identities of various discourses, practices, institutions, regulations etc. of a dispositif are such that the relations connecting the parts are varied and partial. Foucault clarifies:

There is no discontinuity between them, as if one were dealing with two different levels (one microscopic and the other macroscopic); but neither is there homogeneity (as if the one were only the enlarged projection or the miniaturization of the other); rather, one must conceive of the double conditioning of a strategy by the specificity of possible tactics, and of tactics by the strategic envelope that makes them work (1998, p.99-100).

The value of using this idea of a dispositif is that it captures the uneven, varied and dynamic network of regimes of knowledge that comprise our social reality. It looks to highlight the relations of power that lend coherence to this network and traces them across material and discursive and macro
and micro levels of enactment. It understands the generation and securement of what is seen and heard to be truthful and sensible within a given field as an historical and ongoing process. The dispositif- its knowledge, truths, power and subjectivities- are both tangible and transient. At one and the same time, it sets itself to the concreteness and ephemerality of reality. To examine or propose a dispositif is to identify a particular web of meaning, a theme, a concept and to understand and analyse its existence as a formation that encompasses multiple forms. The dispositif, like genealogy, is an epistemological and ontological statement of intent. In tracing an anatomy of the whole child, it has been necessary to span and follow disparate and multiple levels of meaning and practice. Attempting to make sense of the connectedness of instances of classroom practice, policy fields, organisational structures, texts, individuals, etc. in terms of a whole child is difficult. The dispositif facilitates this breadth of focus and prioritises the strategic objectives and elaborations of power that intersect and produce the whole child.

**Situating the research- neoliberalism**

It is impossible to discuss the current world of education policy in England and Wales without addressing the seismic changes that have taken place in the education system over the past thirty years. It is also impossible to discuss these without engaging with the term, ideology, philosophy, and ‘thing’ that is neoliberalism. The term neoliberalism carries much baggage, and much of that baggage centers on how to understand it. It is fair to say there is a broad agreement over the fundamental ideas that characterise neoliberalism, but considerable debate and confusion over what form and function it takes and subsequently what affect it creates.

Though taking serious account of the heritage of the whole child, a particular focus of this research has been policy and practice from the period of New Labour onwards. I understand an analysis of this time period as one in which ‘neoliberalism’ has brought great changes to the education ‘system’ in England and Wales. Below, I set out a series of analyses of the
neoliberal influence on education, identifying key processes and practices that seem peculiarly pertinent to the way in which whole child policies have developed. It is not an exhaustive account of neoliberalism, the neoliberal education system or investigations and research into it. It provides a scholarly context, as this research is of course a continuation and development of these analyses. Indeed in part, my research is a study of how ‘neoliberalisation’ has been both the context for and integral to the nature of the way whole child education has developed. Equally, it is fair to say, that the research has also become an ongoing process of developing a way of conceptualising neoliberalism itself- particularly the way in which it inhabits education. This, I think, is also a methodological issue and I shall address this after.

What is neoliberalism?

Neoliberalism is clearly a term that has enabled insightful and meaningful analysis of many of the economic, political, social and cultural changes that have occurred in the Western world in particular over the past fifty years. However, it seems to me that it is rather difficult to explain exactly what is meant by neoliberalism. In some respects, it appears to have assumed the status of a political theory, without many of the requisite defining characteristics. Yet, the ambiguity and uncertainty that surrounds its definition and employment does not seem to impact its regular invocation and employment. It has become both omnipresent and nebulous and this merits a degree of care and caution. It is unfeasible to conduct a detailed account of neoliberalism and I largely intend to focus on the way in which neoliberalism has evidenced itself through the education system. However, initially it is necessary to provide some orientation to that discussion. I begin with the much-quoted definition of David Harvey in his A Brief Introduction to Neoliberalism:

Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property
rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices (2005, p.2).

In the UK, the influence of neoliberalism is often identified as beginning with the politics and policies of ‘the new Right’ and the election of Margaret Thatcher (Ball, 1990). Indeed, some commentators argue that the politics of the New Right are so inextricably bound up with the philosophical and economic doctrines of neoliberalism, that in practice, they are effectively the same thing (Olssen, Codd and O’Neill, 2004, p.134). However, it is not so politically clear-cut; policies of New Labour and the Coalition and Conservative governments proved neoliberalism to be a cross party affair.

In practical terms, neoliberalism is seen in practices of privatisation, deregulation, reform of welfare and the extension of the practices of the marketplace into the arena of social life. However, this practical realisation of the shift from Welfare state to competition state (Jessop, 2002) exerts a far more profound and extensive change. Commentators have pointed up the emergence of ‘new’ understanding of social life and human nature dominated by an economic model of the market. The multiple relations of competition that structure our everyday life act to transform our relations with others and ourselves. This internalisation of the market form effects an epistemological and ontological reformation. ‘We are made up as neoliberal subjects’ (Ball, 2017a, p.218). This is key to neoliberal governance and much of the focus/concern of this research has been to explore how policies of the whole child contribute to an intensification of this process. However, the notion of intensification should not belie the capacity of neoliberalism to shape shift, evolve and dissipate. It develops, changes and progresses to exert both a widespread global influence and a deep and persuasive grip on how we as individuals perceive the world and our place in it:

For it (New Labour) is an evolving economic and political project that has already passed through several stages, that can be adjusted as its effects unfold in different fields and on different scales, and that has to be adapted to changing economic, political, and social circumstances (Jessop, n.d, p.7).
During the course of this research, I have found it increasingly helpful to conceptualise and model neoliberalism as a dispositif. One of the attractions of this is that it appears to offer an insight that might elucidate this breadth and depth. A great deal hinges on the rootedness of the dispositif in practice. This accentuation on the materiality of thought/power/reality opens up an understanding of exactly how neoliberalism has appeared to mutate and move, to explain the capacity of neoliberal dispositif to travel and develop and even transcend its own borders. The emphasis on the malleability and particularity of different manifestations of neoliberalism is key. In this respect, a consideration of the political instantiation of neoliberal ideas—deregulation, privatisation and devolvement—in the education system is illuminating. The neoliberal dispositif creates the structures that effect its transmission; it creates structures that themselves are working models of its principles. It fixes its principles into the fabric of its existence, which then in turn ensure the depth of its spread by engineering the contexts, and environments in which individual subjectivities emerge and develop. I think that it is this that has been so critical in what Peck and Tickell refer to as a form of ‘deep neoliberalism’ embedding its values and practices in local sites (2002, p.398). The content and structure of a dispositif are mutually reinforcing and this is apparent in the processes, practices, culture and organisation that characterise our neoliberal education ‘system’. I think it is preferable to try and expand on this through a consideration of some key features of such a system as identified by academic research.

**Neoliberal education policy**

The transformation of the practice of education in England over the past thirty years has been breathtaking. An extensive body of literature and research has situated this change as part of a wider neoliberal agenda focused on public services reform; a dismantling of welfare provision by the state by placing great emphasis on individualism and applying the logic of the market to all areas of society. Whilst this process arguably began with Callaghan’s Ruskin speech in 1976 (Ball, 1990, Ranson, 2003), perhaps it is
most clearly seen in the 1988 Education Reform Act (ERA), of which Ball remarks:

At the heart of the Act is an attempt to establish the basis of an education market. The key provisions of the Act (ERA) replace the principle of equal access to education for all with the principle of differentiation in the market place (1990, p.60-61).

The Education Reform Act introduced the organisational structure of the market into education through the ‘deregulation’ and privatisation of education that began with the local management of schools provisions of ERA (Bowe, Ball, and Gold, 1992, p.24). Since then, there has been a steady intensification of the extension and application of the market form to education that has manifested itself in a number of ways. The reorganisation of the education system along the principles of the market modifies not only structures but also the fundamental understanding of education and its purpose. The discourses of the market offer a range of metaphors through which education is articulated, understood and produced differently. New actors, new relationships, new values, new processes and practices, new knowledges characterise the instigation and development of this ‘quasi market’.

Researchers and academics have investigated, charted and analysed the consequences of such dramatic change in a variety of ways. The discourses and practices of marketisation, managerialism, commercialisation and entrepreneurship have been identified. The implementation of a National Curriculum, standardised testing, league tables, Ofsted, have been understood as processes, or perhaps technologies, of performativity and accountability. Beyond this, more recently, the increased intensification of deregulation and privatisation and the emergence of edu businesses and influx of new providers has been situated/interpreted as constituting new modes of network governance. The divide between private and public has become unclear if not arguably non-existent and this process has been seen as the dismantling of state education.

Ball is quite explicit in how he sees these new times of ‘heterarchical
network governance’. ‘This is not a ‘hollowing out’ of the state; rather, it is a new modality of state power, agency and social action— a form of meta-governance (Jessop cited in Ball, 2017a, p.221). In other words, far from being a process through which the state has stepped back, the system of education that exists today is one in which state power is reconfigured, simultaneously dissipated and intensified operating through new sites, actors and relationships. ‘The state is governing in new ways!’ (Ball, 2017a, p.218)

Of particular relevance for this research, is the relationship between this new style of governance and the reconfiguration of the personal, social and ethical landscape of education. It is the way that changes in the organisation, structure and practices of the education system have reoriented selves, relationship and values such that they become forms of self-governance. To quote again from Ball:

This is a system of education that at each level, from the national to the student, is modeled on the firm, an investment model that requires students, teachers and schools to make decisions about how they invest their time, resources and energy in relation to likely returns— as qualifications and labour market opportunities, as performance improvement, as social advantage (ibid, p.217).

Of course, this investment may well benefit the individuals involved but it is also investment that benefits the state and the economy.

Below I have identified what I see as the most important characteristics and effects of neoliberalism in the world of education in respect of the way it reorders and restructures selves, social relationships, values and governance. They are critical to understanding how the whole child is produced. 

Commodification, marketisation and instrumentalism

The 1988 ERA was the first step in reconfiguring the world of education as a competitive market. The commercialisation, marketisation and commodification of education have been identified as consequences of the development (Branceleone and O’Brien, 2011). Put simply, the requirement
for schools to compete in this ‘quasi market’ effectively meant that the education they offered became marketed as a commodity or service to be bought and sold (Gewirtz et al, 1995, chapter 5). Bowe, Ball and Gold (1992) document the increasing use of public relations strategies and marketing tools by schools.

The market positioned schools, students and parents as producers and consumers of education (Gewirtz et al, 1995, Vincent and Ball, 2006, Wilkins, 2010). Structural changes to the allocation of school places emphasised parental choice as a means of improving schools performance. The necessity to inform choice by facilitating comparison between schools ensured the necessity/practice of defining and measuring the commodity ‘education’. This was gauged in terms of exam results. The importance of these processes was accentuated by an increasingly workplace oriented perspective of the purpose of education. Education served the individual by ensuring a good job and served the country by securing success in a globally competitive market. These approaches and assumptions had a number of effects as the pressure for schools to compete and ‘drum up trade’ increased.

Of particular interest, is the way in which the commodification of education as a product to be marketed and chosen has spawned other commodification, most notably the commodification of the child. It has been well documented that the commodification of education as a private good in a competitive market meant the academic performance of a school as recorded and published in league tables took on critical commercial importance (Ball, 2004). Such tables and exam results were the way in which the quality of the product being offered by a school could be judged. Good exams results equate to a good education that in turn equates to a good job. These conflations led to practices that can be understood as gaming the system, the construction of the admissions strategies, exclusion policies, direction of teacher attention of schools. Research swiftly suggested that schools sought students who would, with minimum input and therefore at minimum cost, perform well in public examinations (Ball and Gewirtz, 1997, Kenway and Bullen, 2001, Gewirtz, 2002). Similarly in the
classroom, research has shown how teachers have focused on students on grade boundaries in order to maintain percentage pass rates (Gillborn and Youdell, 2000, Youdell, 2004). These strategies made clear that children were valued, or not, as producers of academic performance, and approached as commodities. The commodification of education that necessitated the marketisation of education led to the commodification of students:

Thus, schools and teachers are effectively encouraged to value students according to what these children can offer the school financially and in terms of exam performance and image. In this way, students have become objects of the education system, to be attracted, excluded, displayed and processed, according to their commercial and semiotic worth, rather than subjects with needs, desires and potentials (Gewirtz, 2002, p.124).

Ball refers to this as an economy of student worth:

The demands of competition, the ‘information’ provided by League Tables, pressures from the state for performance improvement and target-achievement and per-capita funding, in a period of spending constraints, work together to create local ‘economies of student worth’ (2004, p.10).

In effect, the commodification of education in the context of a competitive market leads to the commodification of the child as a bearer of potential and realised academic performance. The effect of this is powerful. The academic performance of the child becomes highly significant to the teacher and school as an indicator of their own professional value. This is ethically highly problematic as it charges those relationships with an ethic of self-interested instrumentality; a built in imperative to see and treat others as a means to an end, more specifically your own end. The child’s results constitute the very product being offered. This is a clear example of the way that the reorganisation of an aspect of the system of schooling on neoliberal lines has produced new subjectivities and relationships that bring instrumental values to the fore.

**Datafication and performativity**

Commodification entails measurement and both are fundamental to the competitive environment of a neoliberal education system in which schools,
teachers, and children are constantly assessed and compared (Power, 1997, Ozga, 2009). Although it should be noted that an emphasis on formal assessment, premised on a correlation of academic performance with aptitude and ability, has a long history way beyond neoliberalism. However, what has been witnessed over the past thirty years is an explosion of standardised tests, universal national targets, assessments, performance indicators, Ofsted inspections and league tables. Beckmann and Cooper explain that ‘what has changed is the intensification of centrally prescribed performance targets controlling the framework of educational activities’ (2005, p.476). A system that demands relentless assessment is inevitably characterised by a privileging and disproportionate emphasis and employment of numerical knowledge (Ozga, 2009). It is an integral aspect of the restructuring of education as a market. To reference Ball again, ‘neoliberal governing is characterised by a privileging of forms of knowledge such that the economy and its associated concepts become the lens through which all aspects of life are understood’ (2017a, p.218). Such epistemological dominance extends beyond league tables and Ofsted, and arguably begins before it because it frames policy formulation through a privileging of quantitative methodologies and policy agendas that are ‘research based’ (Ozga, 2009). The education policy field has become dominated by and preoccupied with the production of data, that is numerical data (Bradbury and Roberts-Holmes, 2018). These numerically based knowledges hold an epistemological grip on the way that education is understood, articulated and practiced. They represent the reduction of complex personal, social and moral realities for the purposes of assessment, comparison and competition; a process neatly described by Rose as ‘a rhetorical technique for black boxing’ (1999, p.208). In other words, the hegemony of the ‘number’ through technical, mathematical, statistical, scientific discourses serves to obfuscate the complexity and fragility of the processes, relationships and commitments that lie behind and beyond the production of a number. Ozga considers this a fundamental strategy in governance since the production of techno-scientific data at once constitutes that which it claims to represent whilst portraying itself as a neutral and purely representative form of knowledge. It hides not only the complexity of
real life processes but also its own value-driven perspective (Ozga, 2009 p.269). The dominance of such numerical knowledges both at the stage of research and in practice in schools is also a key element in the production of the whole child. More than this, data also facilitates comparison that ‘is itself a mode of governance’ (Ozga, 2009). The way this process plays out has been explored and articulated by Ball. The hegemony of numerical knowledge is integral to the relentless and never ending array of attempts to drive up standards through increased and improved ways of measuring outcome and performance. This has resulted in what Ball critiques as a ‘culture of performativity’ (Ball, 2003). He elaborates, ‘Performativity is a technology, a culture and a mode of regulation that employs judgements, comparisons and displays as means of incentive, control, attrition and change based on rewards and sanctions (both material and symbolic)’ (ibid, p.216). Its emphasis is on the performances of individuals and organisations as ‘measures of productivity or output, or displays of ‘quality’, or ‘moments’ of promotion or inspection’ (ibid, p.216). Performativity clearly contributes to the commodification of the child, or indeed as Ball states ‘the commodification of everything’, but it is the significance attached to performance that give rise to the ‘terrors’ Ball recounts. The performative culture uses performances to judge, measure, punish or reward. It places performance within a system of accountability that not only spotlights the individual, but positions each individual in a relation of competition with each other. It produces winners and losers, averages, norms and trends-numerical data- that in turn work to regulate and control those it measures and have so produced. Such are the terrors for students, teachers, schools and educational organisations alike, that it works to produce self-regulating subjects. Performativity is an astonishingly effective union of the purportedly neutral and numerical with the emotional and judgmental. It promotes a highly structured relationship to the self, based around the values and judgments of the markets. And in structuring the relationship, it also produces a particular kind of individual. ‘Market principles of competition therefore underpin our way of understanding the world, our relations with others and ourselves- our mentality of government and self-government. We are made up as neoliberal subjects’ (Ball, 2017a, p.218).
Allied and integral to many of these processes and practices that characterise neoliberal education is an understanding of the self as a form of human capital. Gary Becker’s (1964) notion of human capital exemplifies the accusation of neoliberalism as a colonising perspective that restructures our apprehension of life in terms of economic rationality. Foucault discusses Becker’s notion of human capital as signifying a shift in the way human behaviour is reconfigured by market rationality and as a basis for an entrepreneurial self, a *homo oeconomicus*. Fundamentally, the neoliberal practices and structures of market competition in education position the child, and indeed schools and teachers, as sites of investment, a project demanding work and improvement in order to succeed. The child themselves is educated to understand themselves as a site of investment, to approach their own development as a means to an end. This creates a divided self, a kind of self-commodification and a relationship of instrumentality towards yourself. The homo oeconomicus or entrepreneurial self is in a sense the human being implied as the successful inhabitant of the neoliberal world, the competitive market. They are an adaptable and malleable individual, willing to work on themselves in order to succeed; a subject in a state of constant competition with others, who is exhorted to ‘turn themselves into a project’ in order to best compete. They are characterised by autonomy, self-interest and logic in their decision-making (Olssen et al, 2004, p.171). They are motivated by self-interest and further those interests are calculated as a cost benefit analysis reflecting an understanding of the human subject as human capital. Their success is their responsibility and their failure likewise.

The colonisation of the educational world by the entrepreneurial self alters profoundly the social relations of teaching. Both the teacher and the student are exhorted to be entrepreneurs of themselves and the moral implications of this are clear. ‘Every social transaction is conceptualised as entrepreneurial, to be carried out purely for personal gain’ (ibid, p.137). Indeed, this self interested ethic of instrumentality demonstrates an ability to infiltrate even those areas of the curriculum that might have been intended
to offer an authentic opportunity to engage students. As an example, Thomson and Gunter comment on the appropriation of ‘pupil voice’:

Within the education portfolio, there is a marked tendency for senior policy makers to bring ‘pupil voice’ into the policy conversation as a means of achieving school improvement and higher standards of attainment, rather than as a matter of the UN convention, citizenship and rights (2006, p.840).

The initial research I had conducted of school mission and vision statements (see appendix A) suggested that this perhaps underpinned what was happening on the websites of schools promoting an education of the whole child. ‘Selling’ an idea of education that went beyond academic results arguably gave such schools a competitive edge. More than highly qualified, schools aim to produce well rounded, ambitious, kind, resilient children. Now, in all fairness, it is impossible to say whether these visions were rooted in educational philosophy or commercial nous but it seemed that these images could be presented as unique selling points of schools competing in a diverse market.

**Heterarchical network governance**

Conceptualising neoliberalism as a dispositif means understanding content and structure as displaying a reinforcing affinity and this is peculiarly apparent in the shift to heterarchical governance that characterises many Western educations systems. The changes that the ‘system’ of education in England and Wales has undergone over the past thirty years have been convincingly located as part of wider changes to the form and nature of the state and its mode of operation. The shift towards a ‘polycentric state’ is understood as a move from hierarchical government to **heterarchical governance** (Jessop, 1998, p.32). Heterarchical governance transforms the role of the state; put simply, new forms and sites of devolved governance replace more traditional, bureaucratic centralised government. In the current context, heterarchical governance is related to the increasing dominance, some might say monopoly, of neoliberal thinking of successive political governments. In this sense, current heterarchies embody and reflect the
principles and values of neoliberalism. Heterarchical structure instantiates many of the defining values of neoliberalism, for example, competition, choice, devolved and fragmented power bases. This means that there are multiple, and competing sites of influence, at different times in various sites.

To talk about neoliberal heterarchical governance, is to focus attention on the way in which neoliberalism is disseminated through complex, uneven and unstable relations between actors and organisations. The old structures of the ‘state’ do not disappear but are necessarily reconfigured alongside new players as part of this new system of governance. This ‘diffusion of authority’ (Ball and Junemann, 2012, p.136) through the complex, shifting and uneven ‘system’ blurs the boundaries of and between public and private and voluntary sectors and generates overlapping multiple networks of relations between new actors and organisations. Yet, it is not a purely haphazard and chaotic arrangement. There is a strong coherence between diverse bodies and structuring the nature of dominant networks. That coherence is found in the principles and values of neoliberalism; the competitive market is the metaphor through which everything is understood and legitimated, it is a site of veridiction (Foucault, 2010, p.31). In the world of education, the shift to heterarchical governance has been characterised by involvement of the private and voluntary sector in educational provision. This is seen in the influx and proliferation of new agents, private and voluntary organisations, Free schools, academies, academy chains, education consultants and consultancies, policy advisors, edu businesses, charitable institutions, public private partnerships. This in turn has generated new tactical relationships, networks of power and alliance that straddle across policy areas and private-public divides. Think tanks and advisors offer their services across multiple arenas of social life. New sites of knowledge production evolve and new expertise emerge shaped by and shaping distinctively neoliberal agendas of choice, innovation and entrepreneurialism. These new sites operate/govern through a network of alliances and relations structured by the principles of the market that enabled them. Heterarchical governance is itself constituent of new relations of power as well as a conduit through which they flow. It
contributes to the creation, promotion and instantiation of new knowledge, new truths, and new subjectivities.

Any examination of the role and impact of educational policy needs to understand policy as part of today’s neoliberal heterarchical governance. This shapes the context in which policy emerges, travels and is enacted. It is the structure within which it is generated, through which it operates and which in turn it responds to. The distinctive basis in network governance provides avenues of circulation and feedback that make visible and influential, arenas of policy enactment that were previously hidden. This has been particularly evident in the way in which the development of character education, which I explore as a recent articulation of the whole child, has played out. The emergence and development of a character education network and the identification of best practice in schools through national character awards evidence an influx of new policy influencers that stimulate the generation and trajectories of policy.

Practicalities

It would be satisfying to recount a process of research that proceeded either chronologically from past to present or as a journey of progressive, consecutive discovery. However, this is not what happened. Genealogy is certainly an historical investigation, ‘grey, meticulous and patiently documentary’ (Foucault, 1991a, p.76) but it is not chronological or consecutive in either its research process or analysis. That said, I will try to explain details of the method and presentation as clearly as possible.

Simply put, my interest is in the way the whole child exists in a context of neoliberal education policy. I identified the period from New Labour onwards as significant in terms of the extent to which the whole child began to re-surface in policy. This is not to say that the Conservative government prior to New Labour had no interest in educating the whole child, just that it did not feature prominently as a policy concern. Having identified policies of well-being and policies of character as key articulations of the whole child, my research began with the examination of multiple documents and
publications; policy research reports, White papers, the 2004 Children Act, the 2006 Education Act, government advice, guidelines, committee reports, and press releases, think tank publications, Hansard, local authority guidelines, Ofsted guidelines, school and company websites and promotional material. This examination or excavation generated a complex picture of how the anatomy of the whole child evolved through government policy. So intimately and densely connected was this production that the attempt to separate and explicate for presentation purposes was untidy, unsatisfactory and frankly uncomfortable. Nevertheless, a shape emerged that as discussed earlier, owed much to the Foucauldian approach taken.

Section One of the analysis developed as an exploration and emphasis of the significance of psy-scientific discourse in defining and articulating the whole child in both research and policy. Leaning on Rose’s terminology of the psy-scientific stresses the importance of the scientific epistemological framework of the whole child. This formed the basis of an exploration of the whole child as a manifestation and production of bio or etho power.

Section Two evolved as an attempt to prioritise the structures and modalities of neoliberal governance in considering the way the whole child is manifest. It explores the pre-existing neoliberal policy field and the way in which that has inflected conceptions of both well-being and character.

Section Three looks more closely at the detail and characteristics of an emerging neoliberal whole child. It represents a slightly different approach, employing a discourse analysis of two programmes of study, positive psychology and character education. It tries to flesh out as it were, the bio/etho political subjectivity that I contend the whole child has become.

At some point during this excavation work, though it is hard to say exactly when, it became clear that this current day production of the whole child could be better understood by an appreciation of its previous incarnations and appearances in educational circles and government policy. This was the part of the thesis most concerned with a ‘reactivation’ of subjugated knowledge as part of a process of critique (Foucault, 1980a, p.82). This was a problematic endeavour because it represented the work of multiple theses or multiple genealogies. Yet not to situate today’s whole child within an
understanding of Plowden, or the 1944 Butler Act, or comprehensivisation or indeed Dewey or Froebel seemed churlish. Indeed, sketching out a broader genealogy of the whole child was necessary in order to more fully understand the way it is produced and understood today. The purpose of this account is to point to the particularity of today’s presentation of the whole child, to show that it has not always been understood in the way it is now, and that it has been promoted in government policy in different ways over time. It shows how the whole child has been incorporated into wider policy moves and has ‘form’ as a politically contested construct. It has served as an opportunity to view alternative stances on the whole child that have often helped me to see the neoliberal whole child with a clearer perspective. Where feasible, I sought out primary sources but I concede that this was not always possible.

In this introduction, I have tried to offer a sense of the context and approach of my research. I have outlined the epistemological principles of this Foucauldian genealogical interrogation of accepted truths about the whole child. I have recounted the key aspects of a shift in the structures and culture of education over the past thirty years as a process of neoliberalisation. I have suggested the value of analysing the particular social, political and moral world of education that has emerged as part of a neoliberal dispositif. The purpose of this has been to lend theoretical and academic detail to my contention that such a context problematises the whole child. Further, this elaboration orients the reader towards the way in which the thesis explores current productions of the whole child as a form of governance characteristic of neoliberalism. In order to better understand the nature of this problematisation, the following section explores some of those subjugated knowledges that have been historically significant in the development of understandings of the whole child.
Problematising the whole child

As referenced previously, my initial research (appendix A) identified what appear to be two major discourses that contribute to our understanding of what it means to educate the whole child: psy-scientific and moral. Looking at how these discourses have come to frame our understandings of the whole child entails explicating how philosophical and psychological accounts of the child have been appropriated by and adapted to social and political agendas and government education policy. In this account then, I am offering a necessarily truncated and selective genealogy of the ways in which particular discourses of the whole child have been privileged in the policy and practice of state funded mass education. Inevitably, it is also an examination of those subjugated knowledges that have at times been critical in framing the whole child and yet have failed to gain a real foothold in policy. Identifying and tracing the prioritisation and also subjugation of certain discourses sheds light on the ways in which new human sciences such as psychology and statistics have cohered with the development of mass compulsory schooling to produce and privilege a psy-scientific whole child.

As an endeavour, such a genealogy is problematic and difficult because the whole child does not exist in a discrete and identifiable doctrine or discourse. It arguably belongs to progressive education, but this term itself is contentious and encompasses a broad church of theories and approaches (Howlett, 2013). It belongs to a tradition of the psychology of education, child psychology and developmental psychology and these too are disciplines that have undergone extensive and significant development and reform. It most definitely can find roots deep in religious and spiritual traditions both formal and informal. Indeed, from a Foucauldian perspective, these roots were critical to the problematization, shaping and guiding of the morality/soul of the child, and by extension future society, that have long been a feature of educational practice (Hunter, 1994). In addition to this, part of the problem when investigating the history of the development of educational concepts is the very nature of the history of
education as a discipline. As Trohler (2004) points out, the history of education and educational ideas was developed primarily as part of teacher training. It was therefore packaged in a way that emphasised a development in understanding the child and the educative process and made it accessible and coherent to young teachers. To illustrate his point, Trohler identifies the uncritical way in which teacher trainers in England and Wales adopted a partisan account of Rousseau’s place in educational history. He contends that the version of Rousseau that was promulgated in teacher training courses, and continues to be, was not an accurate reflection of his views and that much that was controversial was omitted. Trohler’s note of caution echoes Foucault in drawing attention to the dangers of traditional histories with their tendency to portray a process of improvement and progress towards modern states of enlightenment. I hope to show, through use of a genealogical approach, that there has been no great unfolding of understanding about how to educate the whole child. I am not tracing a history of how human understanding of educating the whole child has evolved and progressed through philosophical and psychological reflection and development. Rather, I am presenting a somewhat haphazard and capricious manifestation of a whole child that shows how historical, political and social developments and agendas positioned Froebel’s, Rousseau’s, Dewey’s or Piaget’s accounts as ‘in the truth’ or otherwise. I have aimed to produce an account that is accessible yet not misleading. I have chosen to present them as ostensibly chronological for the sake of easy reading but really they should be understood as snapshots. In no way does such chronological ordering suggest a linear development of thinking about either education or the whole child that could be understood as the march of educational progress. Nor do these chronological sections help to expound thoroughgoing accounts of particular educational philosophies and pedagogies that are critical to this account. The purpose of the examination is to demonstrate the contingency and fluidity of the way that government policy regarding the education of the whole child is determined. This is a ‘historical knowledge of struggles’ (Foucault, 1986, p.83) over how to understand the whole child.
The nineteenth century, societal change and educationalisation

The approach that I take begins with an understanding of the establishment of mass schooling as part of a re-situation of social problems in an educational context, a process of the educationalisation of social problems (Smeyers and Depaepe, 2008). Indeed, the history of education and schooling in England and Wales makes some sense when understood as a series of responses by government to changes, sometimes perceived crises, in the social, economic and political realm. As Hunter succinctly suggests, ‘The picture that emerges is thus not one of the schools appearance as the partial manifestation of an underlying principle, but of its improvised assemblage as a device to meet the contingencies of a particular history’ (1994, p.xvii). The conviction that education is a way of solving such problems is based on and reveals assumptions made about the nature of the child. These assumptions are implicit in the social and political discourses that validated the development of mass schooling and inform the role of education in society. Futurist and adultist conceptions of the child as incomplete, or ‘not yets’ (Peters and Johansson, 2012) allows them to be positioned as full of potential and capable of direction such that the child can become an agent of societal improvement. Constructing ‘younger human beings as the “other”’ (Cannella, 1999, p.38) and in need of rescue legitimises the regulation of their lives through the institution of education. Indeed, Dean takes this further, drawing on Valverde’s argument that when it comes to subjects of minority legal status, notions of liberty and freedom do not apply. Dean suggests and points to a kind of ‘ethical and moral despotism’ that sits at the heart of liberal government. Children are compelled to behave in certain ways and ‘despotic means’ are justified in their training if they lead to their improvement (Dean, 2010, p.157). These tropes have proved remarkably resilient and though their articulation and enactment may have proven significantly different, it is hard not to be struck by their recurrence. To produce a subject that is incomplete and therefore merits intervention and regulation is a potent combination that ensures ‘The
“nature” of the child thus constituted a shifting political site’ (Baker, 1998, p.165).

This notion of educationalisation contradicts the idea that the provision of mass schooling is based on and has developed as a consequence of philosophical considerations regarding the nature of education and/or the child. However, this does not mean that such reflections have not taken place and that they have not at times exerted influence and effected government policy. However, it does mean that such influence has been mediated by social, economic and political concerns and agendas as will be clear.

The nineteenth century heralded the beginning of a period of tumultuous societal and economic change in England and Wales. The rapid growth of industrialisation and concomitant urbanisation generated new social classes and actors (Ball, 2017a, p.64-66). New political philosophies and the extension of the franchise evidences a period of significant political and social transformation. Furthermore, there was concern over the state of Britain in ‘international’ arenas, from the military to the economic (Perry, 1901, Hendrick, 2007, p.751). Alongside this development of the ‘industrial state’ (Hendrick, 1997, p.35) came a moral unease about the urban poor, notably the urban poor child or ‘factory child’ as witnessed in the increasing lobbying and indeed legislation, focused on the status of the child as a worker (ibid, p.40-42). In addition, such philanthropic concern was coupled with broader concern about the future of the nation. Hendrick refers to a shift of emphasis from the mid-nineteenth century concern with rescue, reform and reclamation, mainly through philanthropic and Poor Law interventions, to the involvement of children in a consciously designed pursuit of the national interest, which included the post-Boer war movement for ‘national efficiency’, education, racial hygiene, responsible parenthood, social purity and preventive medicine (ibid, p.49).

The improvement and extension of education, which at that time lagged behind systems in Europe and America, was considered a solution to these
many social, political and economic problems (ibid, p.45, Wright, 2012, p.156).

As it stood, at the end of the nineteenth century, schooling in Britain was incapable of addressing these concerns. It was ad hoc, localised and unsystematic. The Church dominated as a major provider of schooling, but also significant were the activities of interested groups in establishing their own schools e.g. professional bodies founding schools such as Epsom for the sons of Drs., Wellington for the sons of army officers, or Dorothea Beale and Frances Buss founding Cheltenham Ladies and North London Collegiate School for girls respectively (Aldrich, 1982, p.110, 1996, p.11, Gates, 2005, Ball, 2017a, p.67). It had become clear that existing arrangements of voluntary schooling by largely religious bodies was woefully inadequate for the development of a national system of education which was in turn essential to ensure economic competitiveness. The three Royal Commissions, the Newcastle Commission 1858-1861, the Clarendon Commission 1861-1864 and the Taunton Commission 1864-1867, were intended to address this situation. Simplistically, the Commissions formed the basis of a system of three separate schools based on class lines; elementary for the working classes, secondary for the aspiring middle classes and private schools for the ruling elite (Ball, 2017a, p.69). It is important not to overstate the impact of the Commissions since issues of administration, fees and compulsory attendance were varied and contentious and progress was piecemeal and diverse (ibid, p.70-71). Indeed, whatever the Commissions achieved, they most certainly did not bring about an entirely streamlined system of education, but they did initiate the beginnings of mass schooling in England and Wales. The 1870 Forster Education Act heralded the beginning of such mass elementary schooling.

This is the context in which the development and extension of mass schooling in England and Wales must be understood. The incorporation and production of the child in government education policy takes place as a response to significant social, economic and cultural upheaval and the moral and political concern this elicited. A fundamental aspect of that concern was
the future of the nation and the education of the child was critical to this. Trohler at al refer to the ‘the intersection between the rise of schooling and the formation of the nation state’ proposing an understanding of the development of mass schooling as ‘a set of cultural and institutional practices concerned with the making of society by making the child as a future citizen’ (2011, p.1).

**New human sciences**

Allied to these social and economic changes, was the development of new ‘social sciences of man’ that offered up society and its members as objects of study. The growth of human sciences such as sociology, psychology and statistics, were critical to the development of education. Specifically, they focused attention on the ‘population’ as an apprehensible and measurable social fact and on the individual, in the case of education, the child, as an object of study. In doing so, they made visible the emergence of new demographic groups such as the middle class and the urban poor. This provided a target for the fears that rapid and extensive social change had brought and a rationale and focus for action (Hendrick, 2003). These human sciences were critical in directing those fears, concerns and aspirations towards a solution in the provision and expansion of mass education. This solution was dependent upon the normalisation of the concept of childhood: a concept that prior to the nineteenth century had arguably gained mastery only among the elites of Western societies and then only for sons and on a voluntary basis (Schnell, 1979, Hendrick, 1997). This conception of the child was developed in a number of sites and organisations, philosophies, pedagogies and theories and these are the focus of the next section.

Although it is in some ways pre-emptive, it also seems important to note the significance of such new social sciences of man for understanding changes in the modality of government power. Foucault’s explication of governmentality, which is discussed in detail at the beginning of section three of the analysis, centers the role of disciplines, such as statistics, their discourses and experts, to strategies and practices of modern government
power. Equally, his analysis of bio power as integral to a neoliberal governmentality identifies disciplines such as psychology as critical in the formation of neoliberal subjectivities that are correlatives and mechanisms of such a neoliberal governmentality. I think that what we see in this particular period of the establishment of mass schooling is the forging of a link between education and psy-scientific disciplines as ‘effective alliances’ (Danziger, 1990, p.181) that form a key strand of neoliberal bio power. The two strands cohere to promote a particular articulation of the child as a bio political subject, an object of professional care that eases and accelerates the involvement of the modern state in the ‘life’ of the individual (Ball, 2013, p.15). Whilst many different constructions of the child circulated (Hendrick, 1997), it will become clear that the psy-scientific child gains traction and becomes privileged as others are ‘disqualified as inadequate to their task’ (Foucault, 1986, p.82).

**Psychology**

The emerging discipline of psychology was fundamental to the production and framing of the child and childhood in the nineteenth and twentieth century and later. The child within this system of thought is an object of scientific knowledge and determining the ‘whole child’ is a scientific and empirical endeavor. Further the importance of psychology to the developing discipline of educational studies and of educational thinking would be hard to overstate. Arguably, in many ways, this was a mutually beneficial relationship.

One of the obvious but significant consequences of the introduction of mass elementary schooling was the proliferation of schools. The school offered an accessible and controlled environment in which to study the child as an individual and children as a population. In return, psychology offered education a degree of scientific legitimation and kudos. In addition, the necessity for an increase in the number of teachers brought with it an increase in the number of teacher training colleges. Their curriculum featured psychological re-articulations of ways of understanding the child
and educative process that helped to promote and legitimise education as a discipline.

This dominance of psychological discourse in educational thinking is critical. G. Cannella’s study points to the influence of child development discourse on educational theory. She notes education’s uncritical acceptance of a scientific discourse, developed through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in medicine and psychology which purports to have revealed ‘what younger human beings are like, what we can expect from them at various ages, and how we should differentiate our treatment of them in educational settings’ (Cannella, 1999, p.37). The subsequent generation of knowledge and experts who have rights to define the child and the presentation of such knowledge as ‘true and obvious’ marks the beginning of remarkably intransigent and influential psy-scientific production of the child. We will consider its implications later.

Whilst it seems impossible to overstate the importance of the developing discipline of psychology to the production of the schooled child, it is equally important to note that we are not talking of a fully formed professional organisation or body of knowledge. Rather much of the early work associated with psychology and education, certainly in England and Wales involved a number of organisations that were distinctly composite-professional and amateur. The child study movement exemplifies this.

**The child study movement**

The child study movement, most active from the 1880 to 1910, is a ‘key site for understanding how childhood became divided and normalised, especially through new fields of knowledge like psychology’ (Baker, 1998, p.163). The child study movement is considered to have begun with the work of G. Stanley Hall (1844-1924), an American psychologist at the end of the nineteenth century. It sought to employ the new found ‘scientific’ methods of the human sciences to investigate how best to educate the child. In the UK, the British Child Study Association was founded in 1898 and the journal for the dissemination of its ideas, Paidologist journal, was
established in 1899. The child study movement was in many ways initially an eclectic, amateur and diverse organisation. It included teachers, parents, nursery assistants, Froebelians and was a forerunner for what would become educational psychology (Brehony, 2009). It also considered that the curriculum should begin with and be centred on the needs of the child. However, it was not the same as Rousseau’s child centredness or Froebel’s philosophy and indeed G. Stanley Hall was in many ways seen as in opposition to Froebel. The child study movement followed the theory of recapitulation and as such saw education as developing the child away from its natural ‘savage’ state. Indeed, much of its work centred on the collection of data and statistics on physical and mental growth of children (Brehony, 2009).

The child study group was part of and contributed to a milieu in which the child and childhood was visible and able to be defined or redefined within a whole new repertoire of interpretive schema developed in the new human sciences. Such an approach fostered an understanding of children as ‘ontologically different from adults’ (McDonald, 2009, p.244); a difference couched in terms of children being unfinished adults. Whilst the apprehension of the poor urban or rural child, the mentally retarded child, their social and psychological development and perceived absence of childhood was of great concern, it was also one of great opportunity.

**Character**

Concern over the welfare of poor, urban children is evident in the wealth of legislation relating to the child and in the greater extension of government through education (Hendrick, 1997, p.571). In particular, the middle classes, who had embraced the notion of a universal childhood, and perhaps stood to gain the greatest from the social mobility promised by a new social and economic milieu, pressed home their anxieties. ‘Middle class reformers found it intolerable that large numbers of children were without a childhood and that such children would pose a danger to those who had’ (Schnell,
Saving the poor urban child was not just a matter of charitable action; it was essential for the safety and development of the nation.

Schooling became a mechanism through which the child was utilised in a grand programme of reform. This move was justified explicitly through a reconfiguration of the child as the potential salvation of the nation. As Wright notes, ‘With the expansion of elementary education in the late nineteenth century, contemporaries put their faith in the school as the institution that would civilise the poor urban child, and, through the child, bring order to the home’ (2012, p.156). The end of the nineteenth century/beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the development of a new kind of relationship between the state and the citizen in which the child is pivotal. From a Foucauldian perspective, this has been understood as the rise of a pastoral art/modality of government in which the state assumes the role of pastor to the flock of the population (Foucault, 1982). Education was and remains integral to this relationship. The future-oriented notion of childhood that underpins the education system allows the child to be utilised as a mechanism of social change and/or control. What is interesting to consider is the way that this grand programme of reform and societal improvement was articulated. The policy, philosophy and politics of the day reveal a dominant and consistent approach to the education of the child in terms of their ‘character’. Indeed, one of the primary motivations for the extension of schooling appears to be the development of character in order to lead to the betterment of the nation. It is worth considering in greater detail the way in which character was articulated through education policy and practice during this period. It reflects the shifting of wider discourses dominating education and provides, in certain respects, interesting content to contemplate in the light of recent manifestation of character education.

This concern with character exemplifies the belief in the social importance of moral rectitude and has a long and distinguished history in religious and philosophical discourse. It was highly influential during the nineteenth century, to quote J. S. Mill from his inaugural address as the Rector of St. Andrew’s, ‘Men are men before they are lawyers’ (1868). It formed the
bedrock of the elite ‘great public schools’ whose purpose was without doubt, to prepare young men of a certain class for high office. ‘These schools have been the chief nurseries of our statesmen….and they have had perhaps the largest share in moulding the character of an English gentleman’ (Maclure cited Aldrich, 1982, p.106). However, it is interesting to note that this process was not without criticism. The Clarendon report expressed concern that some institutions appeared to produce ‘a large proportion of men of idle habits and empty and uncultivated minds’ (Clarendon Report, 1864, p.55). Nevertheless, the state’s emphasis on the development of character neatly encapsulated the conviction and tradition that knowledge and education should make cultivated human beings who would in turn improve society. Indeed, its importance increasingly extended beyond formal schooling with the development between the wars of movements such as the Boy Scouts, Outward Bound and founding of schools such as Gordonstoun, promoting the notion of character building through physical exercise and outdoor pursuits (Cook, 1999). The pastoral role of the state is emphasized as the development and improvement of the child’s character is connected to the ‘worldy’ salvation of society (Foucault, 1982, p.215):

Sophie Bryant, headmistress of the North London Collegiate School, spoke of how, through character, ‘ideal personality and the good of the community converged’. The individual became imbued with a sense of responsibility to the community and was able to function as an influential example to others, ‘an organ of moralisation in the organic community’. As she argued elsewhere in 1894, ‘the backbone of character is the sine qua non of virtue’ and without it, it was impossible for man to ‘do his duty . . . the virtuous man grows towards perfection by devoting himself to objects outside himself . . . working for purposes to be fulfilled in the world (Roberts, 2004, p.178).

This emphasis on character, harnessed to an implicit conception of the child as potential, situated the child as an agent of social improvement through personal development. The assumption appears to be that a child, as an unfinished adult, can be educated to develop certain character traits. This potentiality to bring about social change was of course dangerous and needed to be carefully guided. It is not surprising that given the importance
of character as the foundation of such an ambitious and critical social project, an explication of what character was and how best to improve it then became an issue of focus and debate. ‘Throughout the 1890s and 1900s the principal English pedagogical publication, the Journal of Education, repeatedly asserted that the training of character was ‘the great object of education’ (ibid, p.179-180). The prominence of the notion of character clearly owed much to the influence of the Church and liberal educational philosophy. However, increasingly the human sciences such as psychology and the study of eugenics entered into educational debate. It was not long before the consideration of character in the educational milieu began to break free from its religious footings. As Roberts points out, whilst ‘expertise in ‘character’ was seen as an important prerequisite for classroom practice and students were expected to provide an account of character that was based not on moral treatises or Bible studies but on contemporary psychological theories’ (ibid, p.177). He illustrates this influence of psychology on understanding character by quoting from teacher training exam papers:

Give an analysis of the notion of character, bringing out (a) the psychologically distinct factors in it, (b) the more general and important phases through which the formation of character proceeds.

In what does character consist? How would you cultivate it?

Character has been described as ‘a completely fashioned will’. What does this mean? (Ibid, p.177)

This shift in an understanding of character is perhaps first most evident in the work of Galton. Galton’s statistical analysis on the nature and distribution of character drew on the theory of evolution as a framework of understanding. This facilitated a significant shift in the conceptualisation of character, emphasising its genetic rather than acquired quality.

Clearly one of the attractions of eugenics in this context was the consolidation and vindication it offered the class system. The notion of character lent itself to an interpretation that reiterated class divisions as beneficial for the good of the nation. That some are born with leadership
qualities and some are born to follow is a belief system that had its attractions. However, it posed considerable problems for those approaching education as an engine of moral and social progress. Roberts again:

[I]n its emphasis on the play of inherited qualities, the evolutionism that lay behind the Galtonian method provoked serious questions about the capacity of education to bring about the kinds of moral and intellectual transformations in pupils that the character-building project involved (ibid, p.182).

Problematic though Galton’s studies were, they signaled the start of a conversation between education and the new sciences of man, notably psychology, which proved to be highly significant. Danziger argues, drawing on experience in the US, that this relationship can be understood as part of psychology’s attempt to promote itself as an academic discipline with practical application. As systems of mass schooling developed, the call of ‘professional educational administrators’ was for scientific research that could form the ‘basis for a rationalized education system’ (Danziger, 1990, p.103). This led to the adoption of Galtonian statistical methodology that ‘greatly facilitated the artificial creation of new groups whose defining characteristic was based on performance on some psychological instrument, most commonly an intelligence test’ (ibid, p.112). The reconfiguration of ‘character’ then, with its emphasis on the scientific study of inherited psychological characteristics, soon began to give way to the notions of ability and IQ. By 1904, the Revised Elementary code outlines the purpose of education ‘to form and strengthen the character and to develop the intelligence of children entrusted to it’ (cited in Moorish, 2007, p.26). As the next major development in British education is set to occur, a new way of orienting education and positioning the child emerged. Character and its constituent parts, and ability as measured through IQ, were dominant ways of understanding the child and shaping policy. Running parallel to this, and what we shall consider next, were the developments in educational philosophy and pedagogy that were also evident in the teacher training colleges and were also beginning to exert an influence on the way in which mass schooling and education policy developed.
Educational philosophy

The romantic child- Locke, Rousseau, Pestalozzi and Froebel

The development of state educational provision briefly mentioned above, and the motivation behind it, was worlds away from the kind of educational philosophy and practice that dominated the education of the wealthy European elite but has gone on to be presented as the heritage of child centred education to this day. I will look briefly at the history of educational ideas and thinking that are generally considered to constitute and inform progressive child centred educational philosophy and pedagogy. This is a very different endeavour to looking at the history of mass schooling and one might argue that this is a history of what a wealthy European elite were doing with their children whilst Lancaster and Bell, church schools and Dame schools predominated amongst the masses. Nevertheless, it proved extraordinarily popular and influential within this rather restricted, though powerful, circuit. In fact, a great deal of the writing and philosophical commentary on the education of the child that proved so popular amongst this ‘class’ retains a remarkably ‘modern’ flavour.

John Locke’s *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* first published in 1693 and published multiple times and translated into numerous languages is widely considered to be the first influential philosophical treatise on education in England. Explicitly intended for the education of a son, his emphasis on the importance of experience and attention to the nature of the individual child appear remarkably ‘modern’. His work and influence is evident throughout the eighteenth century on various individuals and societies concerned with the education of the child. Notably in England a group known as the Lunar circle and the work of Richard Lovell Edgeworth and his daughter Maria Edgeworth. Together they wrote a treatise *Practical Education* applauded at the time and bringing together Locke’s ideas of the importance of experience and discovery in the child’s learning with an emphasis on science and invention. Perhaps, more commonly cited as pivotal, the publication of *Emile* by Rousseau (1712-1778) in Europe in the
18th century is noted as the beginning of the formal interest in child centred education. Rousseau is seen as ‘unquestionably the most brilliant…early exponents’ (Darling, 1994, p.6) of child centred education positing the novel notion that the child was not inherently sinful and proposing a form of natural education based on bringing out and guiding a child through natural stages of development and emphasising their moral development and character. In Rousseau’s view, the child needed to be kept away from civilisation as long as possible for it was corrupting. Rousseau’s *Emile* (1762) was a controversial and also highly influential text, notably through the work of the Swiss clergyman turned educator Pestalozzi (1746-1827) and the German teacher Friedrich Froebel (1782-1852). Pestalozzi’s schools and philosophy of education emphasised the importance of student self-activity, sensory experience and the development of all aspects of the child, ‘Learning by head, hand and heart’. Froebel was a student of Pestalozzi and influenced by his ideas. The importance of recognising the child as inherently ‘good’ and placing self-directed, practical and sensory learning encouraged by Froebel’s gifts, lay at the heart of the Kindergarten system Froebel is so famous for founding.

The ideas and practices of Rousseau, Pestalozzi and Froebel exerted an influence on educational thinking and pedagogy across Europe. However, the scope and extent of this influence was limited to a wealthy elite and a burgeoning middle class and this was a whole child produced through philosophical discourses and not allied to large institutions. These were tracts and treatises designed for an education that took place away from many of the more formal sites of schooling that developed in the 1800s and 1900s. As well as ‘classed’ it should be noted, though it is not possible to explore this further here, that this was also a ‘gendered’ whole, male, white child.

Loosely speaking, these ideas and developments in educational thinking, beginning with the innocent child, the tabula rasa, whose whole person must be guided through experience to a developed state, have been situated within the Enlightenment tradition of philosophy. Brehony (2009) refers to
this period and approach as a ‘romantic’ stage and distinguishes them from the scientific and psychological approaches that followed with Dewey in particular. Brehony refers to the development of child and developmental psychology that is often associated with Dewey as an epistemological break with the romantic tradition of Froebel etc. This is not necessarily so clear, as Howlett suggests (2013, p.193) it may be more accurate to acknowledge a degree of overlap in these approaches. Certainly, as we are going to consider the gradual influence that this thinking began to have on government policy, it is probably wise to be broad shouldered in an understanding of what such ‘new’ educational thinking comprised. This blurring of distinctions is, I think, clear with Dewey himself and is particularly evident in the eclectic work and constitution of the New Education Fellowship in England and Wales.

**Dewey- psychological philosophy**

John Dewey was a philosopher and a psychologist, writing at the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century when psychology was a branch of philosophy and struggling to define itself as a separate discipline. Dewey himself embodies the blurring that existed between psychology and philosophy, holding the position of President of both the American Philosophical Association and the American Psychological Association. Including an account of him in this section on education philosophy evidences the difficulty in separating the philosophical and psychological traditions and discourses surrounding the child during this period. I might well have referenced him under psychology, as indeed I might the following New Education Fellowship, but have chosen not to. The rationale for this is frankly intuitive and rooted in a perceived emphasis on the child as an individual rather than an object of study. I am not convinced that this would withstand great scrutiny but it helps to organise a period in which new disciplines and discourses jostled to define their parameters.

Many would see Dewey’s various treatises on education emphasising the importance of the child ‘learning by doing’ as forming the basis of progressive education. He shared with Rousseau the importance of
experiential learning but his distinctive contribution lies in his understanding of the child as a social animal. His child centred-ness took place within an understanding of education in terms of its social function. The child is developed and grows through an interaction with their social environment but they are without doubt the centre of that interaction. Likening the changes in education that were occurring as a consequence of ‘progressive education’ to a Copernican revolution Dewey states, ‘the child becomes the sun about which the appliances of education revolve; he is the centre about which they are organized’ (1915, p.35).

However, Dewey’s approach of psychological philosophy brought a distinctively scientific flavour to educational studies and heralded the beginnings of child study as an empirical scientific discipline. As an academic, Dewey’s approach to the education of a child brought academic credibility to educational theory and he exerted considerable influence on educational practice in America. This influence was less marked initially in the UK but is evident in the work of the New Education Fellowship.

**New Education Fellowship**

The New Education Fellowship (NEF) was probably one of the most influential groups in promoting child centred education in the early twentieth century. This was a group founded in 1921 by a group of progressive educational thinkers and liberal thinkers associated with the theosophical society. They embraced a variety of ideals with great pains not to be exclusive but particularly emphasised child centred education, social reform and world peace.

The title the New Education Fellowship is one that suggests a unity that it simply did not have. It is often, and is here, used as an umbrella term to refer to a general milieu and miscellaneous group of educational thinkers and organisations in the early twentieth century. It is really impossible and not terribly helpful to try and divorce it from the work of Montessori, Dewey or Isaaks, whose ideas, schools, organisations, theories at various times were included and/or endorsed by the NEF (Howlett, 2013, p.143).
is however important to observe that it points to a time of enormous diversity and fluidity of thinking and debate both in terms of the child centred pedagogy that was promoted but also the social and political ideologies concerned with equality and reform.

Beatrice Ensor could be accurately described as being at the centre of this and presided over global conferences that brought together a multitude of prominent thinkers. However global though the conferences were, the NEF epitomises the small world that education was. The conferences of the NEF included guest speakers such as Jung and Adler and A.S. Neill and Piaget and Montessori, the latter credited with developing ‘scientific pedagogy’. In fact, the second conference was titled ‘The new psychology and the curriculum’ (Darling, 1994, p.35). It is hard to see that such a group of radicals, despite their proselyting energy and vibrancy, could exert great influence on educational practice beyond those small, privately funded independent schools. However, it was part of a changing intellectual and political milieu at the turn of the century and the very existence of such alternative thinking and provision was significant. In fact partly due to the somewhat sketchy and piecemeal provision of teacher training for a newly expanding mass schooling system, the message of New Education was slowly disseminated. Froebel especially had proved popular and by the end of the nineteenth century hundreds of teachers had trained and were working in kindergartens and the national Froebel Union Certificate was recognised by the Education Department (Doddington and Hilton, 2007, p.22). Charlotte Mason trained at the Home and Colonial training college in 1860 that put forward and promoted the educational ideas of Pestalozzi (infed, 2000). In 1892, the Froebel teacher training college was established in Roehampton. Further, the NEF had in fact attempted to exert some influence on government policy, giving oral evidence to the Hadow committee responsible for the Hadow reports (Darling, 1994, p.38). This is seen best in the 1931 Hadow report and will be considered in the following section.
The Hadow Reports

The Hadow Reports were a series of six reports published over a period of ten years from 1923-1933 concerning a variety of issues at all stages of schooling, from structure to curriculum. They are often cited as an example of the increasing influence and acceptance of more liberal and child centred approaches to education. Certainly, by the 1931 Hadow report, three Froebelians were on the advisory committee and some would contend that the ‘progressive’ tone of many sections of Hadow bear witness to the influence of this tradition. There are unquestionably endorsements of child centred education in this report and many of the comments, for example pertaining to the organisation of the curriculum are far more progressive than might be expected for government thinking at this time. The introduction outlines that for a good primary school, ‘Its primary aim must be to aid children, while they are children, to be healthy and, so far as possible, happy children, vigorous in body and lively in mind’ (Consultative Committee, Board of Education, 1931).

It is also clear from the Hadow Report that the discipline of psychology is coming to the fore as a way of understanding and articulating children’s development. Professor Cyril Burt whilst not a member of the Hadow committee contributed advice and information particularly for the 1924 report *Psychological Tests of Educable Capacity and their Possible Use in the Public System of Education* which specifically raised the question of the potential use of psychological testing in a public education system (Gillard, 2007).

The Hadow reports represent a significant moment in the relationship between both the nascent discipline of psychology and the progressive ideas of new educators with government policy. Nevertheless, the economic depression that characterised the 1930s meant that such new thinking exerted little tangible influence. It was thirty years before their approach to the education of the child and the models of the child they conveyed would become dominant.
Welfarism 1944-1988

The 1944 Butler Act, which brought free education up to the age of fifteen to all, is widely seen as one of the most significant pieces of educational legislation in English history. It drew on a series of reports, the Hadow reports (five from 1923-1933), the Spens report (1938) and the Norwood Report (1943) and stands at the threshold of a post war Welfare society. It is situated within a political context of reconstruction after the World Wars. Fundamental to this reconstruction was the commitment to welfare and increased equality epitomised perhaps by founding of the NHS. The Butler Act confirms education as part of the process of the reconstruction of post war Britain. The preceding 1943 White Paper, Educational Reconstruction, makes clear that it aimed to ‘fit the schemes for educational reform into the general picture of social reconstruction’ (Grosvenor and Lawn, 2004, p.382). Education was again positioned as part of a wider social project but this period also witnessed a significant degree of inconsistency and conflict in approaches to education. Competing discourses jostled for dominance, and nowhere is this more apparent than in the way the child is conceptualised.

The increasing influence of the scientific discourses of the child, such as the psychology of education, is apparent. Consequently, the mind and intelligence, and the concept of IQ as a means of assessing and measuring such mental faculties began to dominate as categories of importance in understanding the child. Whilst the notion of character remains, and is quite prominent in the Norwood report, (Veevers and Allison, 2011) the psychological developments in the analysis of character had effectively paved the way for new ways of categorising children. This had of course taken place within the context of the tripartite system of education instigated by the 1944 Act.

The Norwood committee, arguably appointed to supplant the Spens report which had not provided strong enough support for the tripartite system, argued that there exist different ‘types’ of students with different ‘types’ of
mind, which merited similarly different types of school; namely grammar, secondary modern and technical. This organisation of education categorised and segregated at eleven on the basis of ability as determined by IQ. There seems little question that this maintained the significance of class in structuring existing educational provision. In effect, it promoted an education system ‘clearly modeled on a class-divided vision of education, albeit a more porous one than previously’ (Ball, 2008, p.66). Perhaps even more significantly, the impact of the tripartite system and the eleven plus on primary schools meant a ‘straitjacket of training and grooming children for the eleven plus’ that would overshadow any developments made towards more child centred approaches. (Doddington and Hilton, 2007, p.39).

The shift from character to ability and IQ marks a significant shift in the way the purpose of education is articulated. However, it should be acknowledged that the experiences and ramifications of two world wars created more than a desire for reconstruction but also a desire for greater equality. Hence, despite attempts to establish the tripartite system after the war, the continued advocacy for ‘multilateral’ or ‘comprehensive’ schools gathered momentum. Eventually, some aspects of the Hadow Report proved influential notably the division of schools into primary and secondary schools at eleven in most LEAs. The importance of a more child centred approach that had been evident in the Hadow reports, and the development of educational philosophy, psychology and pedagogy contributed discursively to the growth of more progressive pedagogies. Indeed, within the Butler Act itself, there is much evidence that the notion of the child as an individual was surfacing as a significant philosophy. In many respects, there was sympathy between the welfare philosophy of the 1944 Act and a child centred approach. Education as welfare promoted

a social system that saw pupils as individual children in the care of the school during the day, making provision for hot school meals, milk, medical inspections and so on. The state very much saw itself in loco parentis in this respect (Gray, 2007, p.195).

Here is a fledgling recognition of the child as an individual and this new understanding of the child is reiterated clearly in the 1948 Children’s Act:
Implicit in this vision was a new perception of children—nothing revolutionary, but significant nonetheless because it was based on seeing the child as having a personalized identity that required understanding and guidance if he/she were to fulfil his/her role in helping to sustain the emotionally healthy domestic environment, the best single guarantor of national mental health and the place where liberal values would flourish (Hendrick, 2007, p. 757).

That said, there is little doubt that commissioning and publication of the 1967 Plowden Report probably signifies the heyday of child centred progressive education. What has become known as the child centred approach represented an attempt to approach the child as a figure in its own right.

The Plowden report and comprehensivisation

At the heart of the educational process lies the child. No advances in policy, no acquisitions of new equipment have their desired effect unless they are in harmony with the nature of the child, unless they are fundamentally acceptable to him (Central Advisory Council for Education, 1967, ch.2.9).

In many ways, the Plowden report on primary education was revolutionary. It distilled and developed ideas that had circulated in ‘new’, progressive education whilst combining these with a social agenda of equality. It was the work of the Central Advisory Council for Education, a broad group that included a psychologist, head teachers, a housewife, education officers, professors of philosophy and education and others including the principal of the Froebel Institute of Education. Importantly, it also evidenced the continuing and arguably strengthening importance of psychology as a way of understanding the child. Plowden’s report was rooted quite overtly in the ideas of Jean Piaget and developmental psychology. It promoted the developmental stage model of the child and the notion that the child had a ‘nature’ that would develop through self-direction if a suitable environment was supplied. Plowden provided an understanding of the education of the whole child as a more thoroughgoing psychologically justified and framed pedagogical notion.
The report was not without criticism. Much was directed to the eclectic and some would say confused appropriation and presentation of varying ideologies of progressive education and psychological models it referenced. It is fascinating but not possible to go into this here but John Darling’s ‘Child-centred Education and its critics’ gives a detailed and insightful account of the robust philosophical critiques. However, it is important to note that although Plowden was without question a watershed in the influence of generally progressive ideas on government policy and practice, and although those ideas evidence the influence of a varied progressive philosophical influence, it also develops and reiterates the validity of a developmental model of the child rooted in the discipline of developmental psychology. This asserts the child is uniquely different to the adult.

With regards to the influence of Plowden, there is dispute. There are questions about the extent to which Plowden’s ideas and recommendations were put into practice. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the Plowden report- supposed epitome of child centred, whole child pedagogy- only once makes reference to the education of ‘the whole man’ (1967, p.48, section 129) and certainly the term ‘whole child’ does not appear at all. On balance, and perhaps aided by a system that was beginning to dispense with a selective tripartite system and the eleven plus in favour of comprehensives, its ideas and recommendations were able to be adopted. Certainly, in primary teacher training colleges, Plowden was an authoritative text.

As said, education post the Second World War can be understood as a mass process of national reform with an interest in equality expressed through welfarism. In this process, the articulation of progressive ideas through the Plowden report in particular leads to a formal adoption of child centred pedagogy. Although the idea is to rebuild the nation, the knowledges and discourses that are now employed to understand the child and the influence of social concerns with equality, shift the nature of the relationship between the government and the school child. The child is understood as an individual and analysed as a psychological subject whose development can inform pedagogy. The emphasis on the whole child as a pedagogical subject
further produces the child as an object of care rather than training. The relationship between government and the child is therefore paternalistic or maternalistic. The concept of character disappears and the notion of IQ and ability and concern with the development of the child bear witness to the increasing dominance of psychology as a way of framing the educative process. Drawing on Bernstein, Ball comments that this ‘remarkable convergence…in the field of social and psychological sciences’ (Bernstein cited in Ball, 2017b, p.19) signaled the emergence of ‘a new ‘intellectual subconscious’ for education’ (ibid, p.19). This progressive, ‘invisible’ pedagogy represented an intensification of power ‘as the whole child is opened up to the expert pedagogic gaze of the teacher’ (ibid, p.21). Moreover, it brought the child into the process of constituting their own subjectivity. ‘Modern pedagogies are secular technologies of the self in which self-regulation and self-examination occupy centre ground’ (Lazaroiu cited in Ball, 2017b, p.22). The production of the child through psychologically informed pedagogy is pursued in detail in section three.

**Conclusion**

This account has been an attempt to explore some of the historical ideas, practices, policies, people, and contexts that have been part of directing how the whole child is produced by our current education system. It has taken a genealogical approach to the history of the whole child that embraces scepticism and distrust. It is all too easy to see the development of educational approaches to the child as progressive journeys of enlightenment and the notion of the whole child can neatly be framed in this way. It is this that genealogy guards against. ‘Where the soul pretends unification or the self fabricates a coherent identity, the genealogist sets out to study the beginning-numberless beginnings’ (Foucault, 1991a, p.81). Without doubt, there are many potential points of descent, many ‘numberless beginnings’ that would entail ‘a painstaking rediscovery of struggles’ (Foucault, 1980a, p.83) that have fuelled and so elucidate this process further. It is possible to identify many discourses and practices that frame and direct the trajectories of education policy. Adopting a
genealogical approach has identified these points of departure. Emphasising and exploring instances of discontinuity allows us to see how specific articulations of the whole child failed to take hold as we see with the apparent sidelining of the Hadow reports. Focussing on specificity enables us to appreciate the unique conditions that frame the meaning of character in Victorian times and emphasises the social and political situation that leads to its prioritisation. Exteriority points us to examine carefully the relationship between psychology and education as mutually reinforcing and developing disciplines in the prioritisation of psy-scientific accounts of the child. Identifying such ‘accidents, the minute diversions’, ‘the false appraisals and faulty calculations’ (Foucault, 1991a, p.81) raises a number of questions and points to a number of disjunctions in the formulation of the whole child in education policy. However, the critical purpose of this account has been to identify and problematise the way in which certain epistemological and ontological approaches have framed government education policy on the whole child. Its significance for this research lies in the foregrounding of both the emergence of a psy-scientific whole child and the subjugation of a more philosophical or spiritual/moral whole child in government policy. It has evidenced this emergence and dominance as a recurrent process that involves an interplay of multiple struggles, a ‘place of confrontation’ (Foucault, 1991a, p.81) and owes little to an evolving understanding of the true nature of the whole child. The purpose of a genealogy is to problematise and even dismantle the very thing that it is investigating; this account succeeds in beginning this process, displaying the whole child as an ‘empty synthesis’ (ibid, p.84). This thesis then takes its lead from the disruptive work begun here to dismantle the grand narrative of the whole child.
Section One: Psy-scientific discourses and the articulation of the whole child in policies of well-being and character: a bio/etho political subject

The decade prior to the election of New Labour in 1997 was dominated by the impact of the 1988 Education Reform Act, which included the establishment of a National Curriculum, and the whole child as a policy focus is hard to find. I want to begin my analysis therefore by looking at the way the whole child has been defined and articulated in education policy from the 1997 New Labour government to the appointment of Theresa May as Prime Minister in 2016. This involves an examination of New Labour’s policies on childhood well-being and the Coalition and Conservative governments’ initiatives on character education. I focus on the importance of psy-scientific discourses and more traditional philosophical character discourses and how they are drawn on to produce notions of well-being and character. I explore the ambiguities and overlaps that appear to characterise these discourses when they are utilised to articulate the whole child. I explicate some of the ontological and epistemological assumptions and implications of psy-scientific discourses. I argue that the psy-scientific model of the self they promote informs well-being and character policies to produce a whole child that constitutes a form of bio power, more specifically etho power, that supports and is part of a wider neoliberal dispositif. I hope this section will draw attention to the relationship between discourse/knowledge and power that exists at the heart of and as a critical facet of this production of the whole child. As mentioned in the introduction, each of these three key sections is preceded by a theoretical discussion of a particular Foucauldian conceptualisation of power relations.
Bio power

Foucault understands different forms of power to exist simultaneously and at times overlay and interact. Bio power exemplifies this, drawing on and forming alliances with disciplinary, sovereign and pastoral power and being incorporated into and functioning as/within a distinctive and important strand of neoliberal govern mentality. Those contingent and idiosyncratic interactions occur as fluid, complex and particular dispositifs and identifying and unraveling them is fiddly and prone to confusion and ambiguity. Perhaps, it is useful therefore to begin by establishing some of the key ideas and tools and how they are understood and employed. However, it is wise to be circumspect about the possibility of arriving at a definitive clarification of Foucault’s terms and concepts. This is due to a certain degree of inconsistency and also evolution in their use in his work which bears witness to the evolving nature of Foucault’s explorations and his willingness for that process to be public and probed.

I think it is important and helpful to begin by noting and accepting that there is at times conflation between bio power and bio politics. I understand bio power as a term that denotes Foucault’s exploration of what he sees as a new form of power in contrast to other forms of power. Initially, it is helpful to begin by tracing Foucault’s positioning and development of the concept of bio power as a contrast to sovereign, disciplinary and pastoral power. I will then consider the operation of bio power within a wider political rationality as what is understood as bio politics. In particular, my interest is in what Thomas Lemke identifies as the third distinctive use of the term bio politics in Foucault as ‘a distinctive art of government that historically emerges with liberal forms of social regulation and individual self governance’ (2011, p34).

Foucault’s first systematic account of his notion of bio power is found in his 1976 College de France lectures and in Vol. 1, ‘The History of Sexuality: Right of Death and Power over Life’ also published in 1976. He outlines the emergence of disciplinary power in the seventeenth century, a technique of power elaborated at the level of ‘mechanisms, techniques and technologies’,
and 'essentially centred on the body, on the individual body' (ibid, p.242) to increase the economic productivity of the body. He then goes on to note that in the second half of the eighteenth century, with the increase in agricultural and industrial production, scientific and technological and medical developments and the development of human sciences, a new technology of power emerged 'with the population as political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power's problem' (ibid, p.245). Knowledge, particularly as generated by the new human sciences, is fundamental to this type of power. Simplistically put, the human sciences produce the social reality of the population that is the focus and domain of bio power. Bio power, takes as its object the life of the population 'processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on' and looks at these processes as 'collective phenomena' (ibid, p.246) that through mechanisms such as 'forecast, statistical estimates and overall measures' (ibid, p.246) displays patterns and constants. He understands the emergence of this power as marking the entry of life into history and politics, 'into the order of knowledge and power, into the sphere of political techniques' (Foucault, 1998, p.142). Bio power describes the processes that 'brought life and its mechanism into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life' (ibid, p.143). This technology of power concerned itself with the regulation of life processes birth, illness death and Foucault refers to these as 'technologies of security' (Foucault, 2004, p.249) because they concentrate on securing the health and so safety of the nation as an alternative way of demonstrating, structuring and practicing power relations. But whilst life, humankind, is the focus of bio power, it is absolutely key that bio power operates between these two poles of the individual body and the population. Foucault explicitly states that his new kind of power was not separate from disciplinary power, but rather 'it does dovetail into it, integrate it, modify it to some extent and above all use it by sort of infiltrating it, embedding itself into existing disciplinary techniques' (ibid, p.242).
The two technologies of power have their own focus, field of application and modes of functioning. Indeed, together, disciplinary and bio power represents a ‘great bipolar technology’ (Foucault, 1998, p.139) forming around two poles or levels: disciplining at the level of the individual and regulating at the level of the population:

We are then, in a power that has taken control of both the body and life or that has if you like, taken control of life in general- with the body as one pole and the population as the other (Foucault, 2004, p.253).

And Foucault explicates these by what he refers to as series ‘the body-organism-discipline-institutions series’, and the ‘population-biological processes-regulatory mechanisms-state’ (ibid, p.250). Clearly, they do not operate at the same level, and they exist on a different scale (ibid, p.242), but equally and importantly they are interdependent and define each other and ‘and can be articulated with each other’ and are ‘present at every level of the social body’ (Foucault, 1998, p.141) and used by diverse institutions such as the police, family, army schools etc.

This ability to span and connect ‘life’ at different levels of existence, in/across both physical and social realities, is important. The social reality of the nature of the population is deployed, for example, through the generation of statistical norms, as a mechanism of regulation of individual bodies. The analysis and subsequent fabrication of life at this meta-level has implications for the individuals’ understanding of others and themselves.

‘Truths’ about ‘life’ that are uncovered/produced at the level of the population become the way in which power exerts a grip on the individual body. Whilst it can be argued that this relationship is reciprocal because such aggregated information is deduced from individual bodies, it is also necessary to be discerning and skeptical about the knowledge that creates these new truths of the population. Moreover, it begs questions about the wider effects of the new knowledge blocs of the human sciences, especially the impact of statistics, as they give rise to other social realities to sit alongside the population. It seems to me that as Foucault takes a broader look at bio power, perhaps now better-termed bio politics, he begins to
situate it as part of a wider shift in the way power operates in ‘society’ as a whole. It is the attempt to understand this development that leads Foucault to develop his concept of governmentality.

Bio politics and neoliberal governmentality

What should now be studied, therefore, is the way in which the specific problems of life and population have been posed within a technology of government which...has been constantly haunted by the question of liberalism (Foucault, 2010, p.323).

Now we can begin to consider how bio politics operates within and as part of a neoliberal governmentality. Indeed, as already noted, there is a degree of overlap in the way that these forms of power are conceptualised and work. The importance of knowledge and experts in the generation of social realities such as the population and the economy and the creation of subjectivities are integral to both bio political strategies and neoliberal governmentality. For Foucault, this interconnectedness was important to understanding both:

It seemed to me that these problems (populations phenomena such as birth, death rates, hygiene, health, race, life expectancy) were inseparable from the framework of political rationality within which they appeared and took on their intensity (ibid, p.317).

But as well as this overlap, it is interesting to note with Foucault that with liberalism in general, bio power also looks to be something of a problem. The operation of bio power involves monitoring the life of the individual and attempting to regulate the life processes of a population. It is hard to see this as anything other than intrusive and excessive government and yet advanced liberal societies are characterised by such developments. Neo/liberalism issues a demand for individual freedom that engenders a degree of suspicion and antinomy to what is seen as state interference. Witness the repeated outcries about the nanny state when guidelines on alcohol, sugar and meat consumption are issued. Nevertheless, government is faced with new social realities that visibilise ‘problems’ – suicide, infant mortality rates, mental health issues- that need addressing at the level of the
individual for the sake of the society. This fundamental paradox problematises the operation of bio political power.

However, far from becoming a problem, bio politics has in fact become an integral feature of neoliberal societies, critical to the formation of self-governing subjectivities. Bio politics- the production of ‘life’ as a political mode of power- forms a unique part of the process of neo/liberal governance. Technologies of bio politics are a strand of governmentality that through the formation of subjectivities conjures an impression of government at a distance and with a tactical lightness of touch. The key lies in exploring how this ‘bi polar technology of power’ works- more specifically how the two poles of population and individual are interconnected. If we can consider this, then it is possible to see that the regulation of the population and the production of individual ‘life’ are mutually interdependent and together lead to the emergence of self-governing subjectivities.

‘Life’, ‘freedom’, ‘individuality’ and the ‘self’ is and are circumscribed/produced by apparatuses of security, regulative processes and techniques, statistical analysis of life processes, administrative and managerial procedures, policies, which measure and promote aggregated features of populations. Aspects that we might not previously have placed on a statistical spectrum i.e. such as life itself, or happiness, or suicide become visibilised and this produces a new kind of knowledge of what it might mean to be human. Such features are collated and understood in terms of norms, averages and standards that in turn becomes desired outcomes, aspirations, goals and preferred lifestyles, traits, practices etc. Certain ways of being human are therefore imperativised through the apprehension of the norm. Individuals are subjected by/to and positioned on a spectrum of alternatives that are specific and restricting; and so, they are routes of power. This is power in the sense of structuring ‘the possible field of action of others’ (Foucault, 1982, p.221). The power of the norm, of statistical ‘truths’- bio power- is gentle but compelling. The norm inveigles itself into human imagination and self-assessment and nowhere is this more
beguiling or gripping than in respect of human life and security. We begin to see, judge and govern ourselves from a different perspective, a perspective that is epistemologically, ontologically and morally weighted. At this point, moral, epistemological and ontological ‘truths’ fold back into the life of singular human beings from whence they came, ferried between poles of power. This is the critical point about bio politics – its ability to bridge and transcend macro and micro levels of human nature. Lemke neatly summarises:

*Bio politics stands for a constellation in which modern human and natural sciences and the normative concepts that emerge from them structure political action and determine its goals* (2011, p.33).

It is this structuring of political action and goals that leads Foucault to the development of his notion of governmentality which in turn becomes critical to understanding the significance and influence of bio power in advanced liberal democracies.

**New Labour and the well-being of the whole child.**

There is no doubt that the child is a pivotal figure in the New Labour agenda, particularly after they were returned to power for a second term following the 2001 general election. The Children Act of 2004, the Every Child Matters programme (ECM), the appointment of a Children’s Minister and the establishment of a government Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF), vividly demonstrate the centering of the child as a policy object/subject. In a sense, there is tactical wisdom in this since the figure of the child is politically expedient: a non-controversial object of investment, lacking troublesome characteristics such as race, gender or class (Dobrowolsky, 2002, p.45). The same might be said of the eternally vague, evolving and wholesome concept of well-being which emerges as a policy objective during the New Labour years. Arguments that there should be a focus on the well-being of the child are hard to dispute or challenge. The well-being of the child represents a marriage of the non-problematic and unimpeachable to create a policy goal that has a serious set of wings.
Nevertheless, or perhaps precisely because of this, it is important to be clear exactly how this plays out and what its effects are.

In respect of the position and conceptualisation of the whole child, policies on well-being represented a seismic change from previous government forays into the education of the whole child. New Labour’s focus on well-being meant that the whole child became the object of education policy in a degree of detail and with an emphasis that was unprecedented. As I hope to have conveyed in the previous section, the whole child has surfaced in a variety of forms and from a variety of perspectives since the beginning of state funded compulsory schooling. However, the whole child had up to this point belonged within the realms of pastoral care and nascent PSE programmes, and was not the focus of national specified policy. Plowden promoted a national whole child/child centred approach in terms of pedagogy but this represented a specific and targeted focus on learning rather than a systematic attempt to address all areas, both academic and non academic, of the child’s development. Arguably, the education of the whole child was understood to take place ‘off piste’, in those engagements, activities and relationships that took place outside of formalised, directed education. However, with the policy initiative that focused on childhood well-being, the whole child moved centre stage. Spotlighting the whole child in policy had various complicated and unstable effects on how the education of the whole child was understood and practiced by the school, and this is the key focus of the thesis.

**The rise of well-being**

In many ways, well-being policies epitomise the volume, breadth and interconnectedness of New Labour’s approach to policy development. As Ball notes, it is difficult to separate education policy from wider social policy as ‘education policy is now almost entirely subsumed within an overall strategy of public services reform’ (2017a, p.117). This attempt to ‘join up’ government action is deliberate and is overwhelmingly evident in well-being policies.
This rise of interest in well-being in an educational context must also be situated within a wider global field. There is no doubt that the health and well-being of children was a developing global concern. WHO (World Health Organisation) and UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation) were already undertaking research looking at health promoting, child friendly schools published in the 1990’s (WHO, 1999a, 1999b). These reports identified links between the poor physical and mental health of children and their educational outcomes. This was reiterated and confirmed in the UK by Sir Donald Acheson’s 1998 inquiry into inequalities of health that again highlighted the link between ill health, including mental health and low educational attainment (Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), 1998). Add to this, the publication of Daniel Goleman’s influential and popular book ‘Emotional Intelligence’ in 1995, and the role of emotional health and well-being and its links to educational attainment became a significant policy focus (Weare and Gray, 2003, p.21). In many ways, concern with and policy on well-being point to a new order of government with an orientation to the mental and emotional welfare of future citizens. The attempts to conceptualise and consolidate an approach to this evidence a characteristic of research and policy on well-being, namely the broad and varied understanding that straddles arenas of physical and mental health, education and social care. This raises the inevitable question ‘What is well-being?’

The concept of well-being has a long history, or probably more accurately histories, and an entire thesis could no doubt be written recounting the many ways in which well-being has been understood and represented. (Dodge et al, 2012, Gasper, 2004). Current understandings of well-being in policy often reference both the philosophical and psychological heritage of the concept (Coleman, 2009). Many, perhaps most and possibly all, reports and research into well-being offer definitions that are similar, but rarely identical and always nebulous. Even in an attempt to focus quite specifically on how the DCSF and key agencies such as research bodies and charities have employed the term, Ereaut and Whiting’s 2008 discourse analysis identify five distinct discourses of well-being: contemporary medical
discourse, operationalised discourse e.g. an understanding in terms of outcomes and indicators, echoes of philosophical discourse, sustainability discourse and a discourse of holism. Moreover, they note that in practice these discourses overlap considerably and that the individual discourses themselves are subject to vagary and change. It is clear then that there is no consistent or agreed understanding of the term well-being (Watson et al, 2012). This is interesting because this lack of clarity seems to be a recurrent feature of the language that is drawn on to elucidate the whole child. Such ambiguity creates opportunity and space for alternative and vying definitions to surface and for meaning to evolve. An examination of how meaning and usage develops can shed light on the interplay of forces and influences that govern and shape a construct’s definition. By tracing the trajectory of well-being through specific policy initiatives, I hope to show how its scope has evolved and extended.

The articulation and evolution of well-being in policy

*National Healthy Schools Programme, The Children Act, Every Child Matters, Social and Emotional Aspects of Learning (SEAL)*

The New Labour government made health inequality a focus and this focus took place within a wider agenda of social investment. I would like to consider ‘well-being’ as it evolves through the iterations of the National Healthy Schools Programme (NHSP) focussing on the increasing significance of scope of contemporary medical and psychological discourse. This involves a consideration of how the NHSP is impacted by the key concomitant developments of the 2004 Children Act, ECM and the Social and Emotional Aspects of Learning initiative (SEAL).

The 1999 White paper *Saving Lives: Our healthier nation* outlines the NHSP, a joint initiative between the Department of Health (DoH) and Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) that aimed to promote a whole school/whole child approach to health (DHSC, 1999, 4.17). It was a school-based initiative aiming to support children and young people in developing healthy behaviours, help raise pupil achievements, reduce health
inequalities and promote social inclusion. The emphasis fell on physical health issues such as diet, nutrition and exercise. Well-being is not defined but is mentioned eight times in 165 pages both in a general sense and specifically in relation to physical, social, mental and environmental well-being, though not emotional (DHSC, 1999, 4.3, 4.38, 6.8, 6.20, 7.17, 8.10, 10.17, 10.21). The emphasis placed on physical aspects of well-being is seen in the network of local partnerships between education and health that were part of the NHSP, such as ‘Cooking for Kids’ and ‘Safer travel to school’ (DHSC, 1999, Section 4.18).

This emphasis changes with the government strategy ECM and the 2004 Children Act. Prompted by the Laming Report into the tragic death of Victoria Climbie, ECM and the subsequent Children Act aimed to ensure that all services for children, communicated and worked together so as to ensure no child could slip through the net of care again. This Act foregrounds well-being by effectively outlining in law a working definition, which has moved on to include emotional well-being. The Children Act defines well-being in relation to the five following categories:

- Physical and mental health and emotional well-being
- Protection from harm and neglect
- Education, training and recreation
- The contribution made to society
- Social and economic well-being
(Children Act, 2004, Part 1, Section 2).

These five categories were effectively translated into the five outcomes of ECM. This was a government initiative published in November 2004 intended to require and help multiple agencies coordinate their support of children and families. The categories set out were: being healthy, staying safe, enjoying and achieving, making a positive contribution and achieving economic well-being. The detailed explication of what these five outcomes mean shows clearly how the understanding of well-being has been both prioritised as an organising construct and broadened in its scope. The initial emphasis on aspects of physical health has been overshadowed. The five categories are expanded upon to each include five aims. These twenty-five
specific aims for children now encompass being ‘Mentally and emotionally healthy’, achieving ‘Personal and social development’, developing ‘positive relationships’, ‘self-confidence’ and ‘enterprising behaviour’, and being able to ‘deal with significant life changes and challenges’ (Department for Education and Skills (DfES), 2004, p.9). It is interesting to note that at the same time that well-being becomes a high profile and national focus and target, its meaning broadens to embrace social and emotional aspects of well-being. The impact of this is reflected in the development of the NHSP new national healthy school status (NHSS).

As a consequence of ECM, the definition of a healthy school was revamped to incorporate four core themes and the specification of ‘emotional health and well being’ clearly echoes the first outcome of ECM and evidences the foregrounding of mental and emotional well-being:

In 2005 the definition of a ‘healthy school’ was clarified encompassing criteria related to the four core themes of Personal, Social and Health Education (PSHE), including Sex and Relationship Education (SRE) and drug education; Physical Activity; Healthy Eating and Emotional Health and Wellbeing (Arthur et al., 2011, p.10).

However, whilst it is clear that the scope of well-being expanded, it appears from supporting material that there is ambiguity and arguably confusion regarding how it might be articulated. This is evident in two guidance documents for this new iteration of the NHSS. Published in 2004 by the DfES and the DoH, Promoting emotional health and well being through the healthy schools standards specifically draws on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs and his concept of higher levels of self actualisation to elaborate on the importance of the emotional needs of the child:

Another way of looking at the impact of emotional health on the whole child is to consider the range of needs that contribute to an overall sense of well-being. The categorisation developed by Abraham Maslow is still commonly used today. Only when the lower order needs are satisfied is it possible for someone to operate at the higher level of self-actualisation (DfES/DoH, 2004, p.13).
By contrast, published in 2007 by the DCSF and the DoH and again as guidance for the HSS, *Guidance for Schools on developing emotional health and well being* cites different and multiple models for defining emotional health and well-being (EHWB); outcomes from ECM, the key national indicators of well-being from America’s Children 2007 and a UNICEF report that outlines six dimensions of well-being:

The EHWB of children and young people has a number of dimensions, determinants and outcomes, including those illustrated opposite. The first set of outcomes are a core part of the Every Child Matters agenda, then follows a description of the indicators of wellbeing used in the USA, and finally the dimensions used by UNICEF to examine wellbeing in the 21 rich countries of the world. Each of these descriptors has significance for school leaders in determining their approach to EHWB within and beyond the National Healthy Schools Programme, and each has a body of literature to substantiate the significance in contributing to EHWB (DCFS/DoH 2007, p.8).

The NHSP demonstrates the lack of coherence and consistency in the understanding of how emotional well-being is articulated even within documentation produced by the same government departments in support of the same government initiative. The influence of different psychological discourses is clear and is presented as non-problematic. The impression is given that it does not matter what psychological approaches are utilized to articulate emotional health and well-being since the underlying problems are essentially the same. Hence, there is no critique or consideration of the implications of adopting different models. We can see this with the wholesale adoption of Daniel Goleman’s work on emotional intelligence in the Social and Emotional Aspects of Learning initiative considered below.

The government initiative SEAL- an acronym for social and emotional aspects of learning consolidates the shift of well-being to encompass emotional and mental health most clearly. This was the most prominent of many school based programmes that developed in the later stages of New Labour’s government that understood well-being as inextricably bound up with social and emotional health, literacy, skills or dispositions (Watson et
al, 2012, p.57). The definition of SEAL shows the increasing centrality of the social and emotional to an understanding of well-being:

SEAL is a comprehensive approach to promoting the social and emotional skills that underpin effective learning, positive behaviour, regular attendance, staff effectiveness and the emotional health and well being of all who learn and work in schools (DfES, 2007a, p.4).

SEAL is directly based on the work of Daniel Goleman’s highly popular book *Emotional Intelligence*. It is based on a conceptualisation of social and emotional skills…classified under the five domains of Goleman’s (1995) model of emotional intelligence. These are self-awareness, self-regulation (managing feelings), motivation, empathy, and social skills (DfE, 2010a, p.1).

SEAL evidences the prioritisation of a particular psychological discourse in extending notions of well-being and conceptualising the whole child. It marks a seemingly uncritical adoption of certain psychological discourses in government policy. Watson et al note that Goleman’s work was not without criticism (2012, p.61). Indeed, Goleman concedes that criticism of his early work was justified, and yet ‘it is on the work of those early years that SEAL is built’ (ibid, p.61). The influence of positive psychology can also be noted. Martin Seligman’s positive psychology came to the front of policy through high profile interventions initially with the US and British army advertising the benefits of ‘learned optimism’. His positive psychology model has also served as the basis of ‘teaching happiness’ programmes ‘which combine Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, elements of philosophy, spirituality, mindfulness and a range of self esteem activities’ (Watson et al, 2012, p.64) which were lent legitimation through the work of Richard Layard, a Labour government advisor and LSE academic associated with happiness economics (Layard, 2006).

The point I am trying to make here is that the understanding and articulation of well-being within English education policy has developed from a focus on physical health to an increasing focus on the affective domain. As this has happened, various psychological discourses have been drawn on to elaborate and articulate these aspects of the whole child. This has taken
place as part of a wider move across government policy in general (Ecclestone, 2007, p.457) but my focus is on the way this trend played out in education. In particular, I would like to spend some time considering some of the more critical academic responses to what has been described as the ‘therapeutic turn’ in education (Ecclestone, 2014, p.7). This involves looking in particular at the influence of psy-scientific approaches in education.

The influence of psy-scientific discourses- therapeutic education?

The programmes and policies that developed under the auspices of well-being are often presented as neutral, practical and ‘scientific’ methodologies for negotiating life. The ontological and epistemological truths they promote are unacknowledged and presented as fact in the guidance and documents that support those policies.

However, there have been analyses warning that such approaches may be potentially problematic in personal and indeed political ways. These critiques center on the claim that such ‘therapeutic’ approaches have mainstreamed a variety of psychological models of child development and behavioural psychology as well as models of the child and indeed learning that is controversial. ‘Guy Claxton notes, SEAL is embedded in a language of pseudo-science, or as he calls it ‘neurobabble’ (2005, p.28), presenting highly contentious assertions about the brain, emotions and learning behaviour as fact’ (Gillies, 2011, p.189). Indeed, many of the approaches that have come to prominence through programmes such as SEAL, represent a pastiche of various psychological approaches promoted in the US by organisations such as the Collaborative for Academic Social and Emotional Learning (CASEL). (CASEL is a not-for-profit organisation that promotes SEL as an essential part of education and offers a platform for its own research and other academic comment). Craig (2007) presents a critique of SEAL raising concerns about what she considers to be a nationwide experimentation on children. However, for the purposes of this research, it is valuable to focus on the work of Ecclestone and Hayes in particular because it offers a thoroughgoing theoretical critique of the way
in which ‘therapeutic’ education produces a particular kind of subject or child.

Building on the work of Furedi (1999, 2004), Ecclestone and Hayes locate the increasing influence of psychologically based and oriented educational programmes as part of a widespread ‘therapeutic ethos’ in social policy. Along with Furedi, they situate the rise of the preoccupation with well-being in education as part of a wider move across Western societies towards a ‘therapeutic culture’. They document, as indeed have others, the widespread saturation of popular culture with discourses of self-help, positive psychology, counseling, cognitive behavioural therapy, reflective thinking, and a variety of approaches and programmes (Emler 2001, Nolan, 1998, Pupavac, 2001). They note the leakage of such ‘psychological’ analysis and a tendency to medicalisation into ordinary culture:

In everyday life and educational settings alike, a merger between academic, political and popular concerns normalizes formal and informal ‘diagnoses’ of problems. These manifest themselves in the everyday prevalence of semi-serious claims to have ‘anger management’ or ‘attachment issues’, being ‘a bit aspergers’ or ‘oppositional defiance disorder’ or having ‘an attention and hyperactivity disorder day’ (Ecclestone, 2012, p.467).

Noting the development of ‘a powerful cultural ‘therapeutic ethos’ (ibid, p.464) Ecclestone argues that political initiatives and programmes directed toward the emotional state of citizens both ‘emanate from and also fuel’ such an ethos. This is the context for an apparent policy obsession in education with ‘soft skills’ and well-being and happiness. Ecclestone and Hayes particularly focus on New Labour’s embrace of such ‘therapeutic’ approaches as a key part of their education policy. These developments have been considered under the umbrella term coined by Ecclestone and Hayes of ‘therapeutic education’. They employ this term to refer to ‘a deluge of interventions throughout the education system (that) assess the emotional needs and perceived emotional vulnerability of children, young people and adults and claim to develop their emotional literacy and well being’ (Ecclestone and Hayes, 2009, ix). Their central concern and thesis is that therapeutic approaches in education ‘reflect and reinforce the concept of a
This diminished self is predicated on a model of human potential that ‘denies the intellectual and privileges the emotional’ (ibid, xi). Ecclestone and Hayes argue that the policy focus on emotional states promotes an image of the child as vulnerable and possibly even damaged and therefore in need of therapy rather than education. They argue that policies that are intended to empower the child, in effect foster this ‘diminished self’. This is doubly dangerous because it ‘opens up people’s emotions to assessment by the state and encourages dependence on ritualised forms of emotional support by state agencies’ (ibid, xiii).

Moreover, the effect of such ‘therapeutic approaches’ is to identify the child or individual as the site of the problem and therefore the mode of change, successfully directing attention away from society’s structural inequalities. As Ecclestone observes, ‘a crucial appeal of positive psychology is its rejection of traditional solutions to well being such as the redistribution of wealth or promotion of economic growth’ (2012, p.465). Gillies also notes this in her consideration of the emotional reflexivity promoted by SEAL. ‘The notion that feelings about self determine life success underlies a highly individualistic approach that attributes an array of social problems to poor self-esteem and its corollary low aspiration’ (2011, p.188).

The work of Ecclestone and Hayes is useful in as much as it draws attention to implicit assumptions about the nature of the self that informs many well-being approaches. They argue that such therapeutic approaches construct a deficient subject that directs attention of policy away from the wider social structures that contribute to social realities such as inequality. They focus on the way such discourses construct the child as a site of damage and difficulty and hence as a disempowered subject. However, my own research has led me to reflect on this in a slightly different way and so whilst the therapeutic programmes may promote a diminished self what seems to me critical, is that it is a self that has the capacity to be improved. The diminished and disempowered self inevitably represents an opportunity, a site, for development and empowerment. It is the nature of such ‘empowerment’ that is critical to understanding how such approaches might connect with forms of neoliberal governance. I want to postpone further
consideration of this until later in the section. At this juncture, I will continue tracing the development of whole child policies and in this respect, it is interesting to note that concerns about such ‘therapeutic education’ were not limited to the world of academic policy analysis. Indeed, this positioning of the child by such ‘therapeutic discourses’ appeared to be of considerable concern to the subsequent Coalition government elected in 2010. Indeed, antipathy to such approaches formed a significant aspect of Michael’s Gove approach as Secretary of State for Education. Policies and programmes of childhood well-being were dismantled as the more holistic approach to the education of the child appeared to be displaced by a firm emphasis on academic excellence. We can see below how the discursive prominence of academic achievement entails the subjugation of knowledge regarding the whole child.

**Coalition and Conservative governments and character education**

Once established, the Coalition government swiftly attempted to distance itself from the policies and approaches of well-being that characterised the New Labour era. Those policies and the emphasis on physical, mental and emotional well-being, were eroded from the very outset of the Coalition government. The policy shift away from well-being was signaled by Michael Gove’s actions on assuming office in 2010. These exemplified a move away from New Labour’s goal to make ‘schools institutions which seek to cure every social ill and inculcate every possible virtue’ back towards, (no doubt ironically echoing Blair) an emphasis on ‘education, education, education’ (Gove, 2009). Gove changed the Department for Children, Schools and Families to the Department for Education making it clear that this reflected his conviction to focus on academic excellence (Gove, 2009). By 2011, the DfE had archived the ECM content on their website (Symonds, 2011). Gove was scathing about the ECM agenda and subsequent guidance it promoted, allegedly alluding to it as ‘meddlesome’ (Stewart, 2012). An internal DfE memo revealed requests for a change in terminology, reported as a ‘ban on Every Child Matters’. It lists phrases
used before the 11th May (when the Coalition took office) and their replacements, so ‘Five outcomes/ECM’ is replaced by ‘Help children achieve more’ (Puffett, 2010). In addition, Gove also scrapped New Labour’s proposed primary curriculum including halting initiatives in personal, social and health education, citizenship and R.E. and withdrawing funding for SEAL (Williams, 2010).

This direction of travel continued with the appointment of a new education Secretary, Nicky Morgan in 2014 and is particularly well-illustrated if we consider the place of Personal, Social, Health and Education (PSHE). There had been a move in Gordon Brown’s New Labour government to make PSHE compulsory, in part as a response to the 2009 MacDonald Review (DCFS, 2009a). Initially, it appeared that the place of PSHE within a new National Curriculum remained of great concern to the Coalition government who launched a review of PSHE in 2011. Further, in 2013 Ofsted produced a report Not yet good enough- personal and social education (Ofsted, 2013a) and in December 2013 published detailed grade descriptors for defining PSHE (Ofsted, 2013b). Finally, the Coalition government commissioned a House of Commons Education Committee (HCEC) on April 23rd 2014 to consider PSHE and SRE (Sex and Relationship Education) in schools and specifically whether it should be given statutory status. The Committee published its report on 17th Feb 2015 Life lessons- PSHE and SRE in schools. Amongst a number of recommendations was making PSHE and SRE statutory and the funding of continuous professional development for PSHE teachers and school nurses (HCEC, Feb 2015). Nicky Morgan’s response was published on July 15th and made it clear that PSHE was not going to be made statutory. This appeared to confirm that another aspect of New Labour’s approach to the education of the whole child had been jettisoned. However, although the Coalition government’s approach clearly sought to draw a line under the well-being policies of New Labour, this did not signify a wholesale rejection of the whole child. Nicky Morgan’s appointment in 2014 heralded the introduction of a new articulation of the whole child through the traditional concept of character.
Character education became one of the defining features of Nicky Morgan’s stint as Secretary of State for Education (2014-2016), beginning with her speech to the Conservative party conference on the 30th September in 2014:

For too long there has been a false choice between academic standards and activities that build character and resilience. But the two should go hand in hand.

So last week I announced a new £5 million fund to support innovative ideas to help schools and young people develop character, resilience and grit… because as much as I want the next generation to be able to solve a quadratic equation, I also want them to be able to make a compelling pitch for a job, and to be able to bounce back if things don’t work out.

That’s why we’ve invested in areas like music, sport and debating that help to shape and teach important values like hard work, discipline, teamwork (Morgan, N. 2014).

The initial announcement concerned the setting up of the Character Innovation Fund to ‘support the development of character in schools’. In December 2014, Morgan announced ‘a package of measures to help schools instill character in pupils’ (DfE 2014a). Following the publication of a review of a number of military ethos projects, these measures included the allocation of £5 million to eight military ethos organisations to promote character education. In addition, it was announced that schools that ‘develop and build character, resilience and grit in their pupils’ will also be able to compete for new character awards. Judged by a ‘panel of education experts’, awards totaling nearly £500,000 will be given out (DfE, 2014b). A week later, in a Press Release entitled England to become a global leader of teaching character a £3.5 million grant scheme for character education was announced enabling organisations both in and out of schools to apply for grants to help them set up or expand programmes that develop character. Also, £1 million funding was announced for further research into the ways character could be taught. The Education Endowment Fund undertook to match this funding (DfE, 2014c). The details of how to apply for the various grants and awards were issued in subsequent weeks. In total, by the spring of 2015, over £10 million had been allocated to character education. Over a relatively short period of time, the government had committed itself to a
bold and expensive policy shift away from approaches and policies directed
to the well-being of the child towards a concern with the development of the
child’s character. Character education was centre stage in the education of
the whole child.

I think it is important to note that the notion of educating for character is not
new and as recounted in the previous account has been at the forefront of
educating the whole child before. It is all too easy to see its reappearance as
a simple continuity with the past. Foucault’s warning not to make too much
of such apparent continuities has proved a valuable heuristic guide in
respect of my research into character education. In many ways, the
promotion of character education seems to fit with the neo-conservative
agenda of education that was characteristic of Coalition and subsequent
Conservative policy. The emphasis on traditional values and knowledge
(DfE, 2010b, Gove, 2014) and the skepticism regarding ‘progressive’
approaches to teaching, echo a Victorian caricature into which the
moralising tones of educating for character and moral purpose fit neatly.
Alongside the promotion of faith schools and the establishment of
academies and multi-academy trusts with overtly religious and ethical
foundations and approaches such as Oasis, there was perhaps a sense that
government wished schooling and education to revive Victorian ‘virtues’.
Taylor explores the historical parallels between Victorian and modern day
discourses of character (2018). He draws attention to the Victorian
‘paternalistic concern for cultivating the character of the poor and
unemployed’ and fears about the degeneration of the population (Taylor,
2018, p.403-404). However, Taylor also notes significant and important
differences exhibited by current policies of character education, in particular
suggesting that they might be understood as a shift towards ‘psychological
governance’ (ibid, p.407). It is this ‘shift’, this reconfiguration of character
within a particular mode of governance that concerns me. Fundamental to
this development is the relationship between the psy-scientific discourses,
notably psychology, an emergent science in the 1900’s and an
understanding of character. As previously observed, whilst earlier accounts
of character utilised psychological knowledge, ultimately the development
of psychology as a discipline undermined the concept of character as a meaningful category through which to understand the education of the whole child (Roberts, 2004). It is immediately clear in the current day that psy-scientific discourses appear to be included in understandings of character. This is striking and trying to understand and describe how this might be significant comprises a major focus of the following section. As well as involving an examination of policy documents and announcements, this has entailed scrutiny of research reports that have fed into policy.

Defining character?

It might be that people are talking about the same things, but thinking about- and measuring- different things (Demos, 2015b, p.20).

This statement exemplifies the variation and confusion that appears to surround the term character. The definition of character in major research reports and DfE press releases and statements and support materials is loose and unstable. In the first two DfE press releases regarding the ‘new’ character initiative, no explicit definition of character is given but reference is made to the development of, ‘character, including values such as self-confidence, respect and leadership’ and ‘character, resilience and grit’ (DfE, 2014a, 2014b). These references are followed by the identification of various programmes and organisations understood as providing character education, notably military ethos groups, who had received funding and three high performing schools that were commended for their different approaches to the practice of character education. A week later, encouragement is offered for programmes that ‘develop virtues in pupils that are vital to fulfil their potential and realise their aspirations’, ‘self-control, humour and charity’ (DfE, 2014c). The definition finally becomes tighter as the call is made for applications to the Character Awards where there is a clear statement of how the DfE define character:

Applicants should be able to prove that their programme develops character traits, attributes and behaviours that underpin success in school and work, including: perseverance, resilience and grit, confidence and optimism,
motivation, drive and ambition;
neighbourliness and community spirit;
tolerance and respect;
honesty, integrity and dignity;
conscientiousness, curiosity and focus (DfE, 2015a).

It is possible to see a number of discourses drawn on to construct this working definition of character. The influence of the work of Birmingham University’s Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues (JCCV) is evident. Set up in 2012 as an interdisciplinary research centre, the JCCV exerts considerable influence on policy regarding character. It promotes a concept of character that entails a combination of moral, performance, civic and intellectual virtues that underpin the groupings in this list (JCCV, 2013).

Equally, there is a striking resemblance to the seven strengths outlined by the Knowledge Is Power Programmes (KIPP) in the US. KIPP is a network of charter schools that operates in ‘educationally underserved communities’ and has made character a ‘cornerstone’ of their programme (KIPP, 2018). This character programme is grounded in the positive psychology of Dr. Martin Seligman, mentioned earlier, and Dr. Chris Peterson based at the University of Pennsylvania. The focus is on seven strengths, ‘Zest, Grit, Optimism, Self Control, Gratitude, Social Intelligence and Curiosity’ (KIPP, 2018). There is also an echo of key aspects of the Penn Resilience programme developed at the University of Pennsylvania to build ‘resilience, well-being and optimism’ (Positive Psychology Centre, 2018). Indeed, generally, there is no shortage of global and national pioneers, educators, organisations, authors, groups, etc. delivering lists of character traits, mindsets, virtues, and offering programmes and resources to deliver and inculcate character.

It is clear then that the government statements cited above reference many different presentations of character. Inevitably, these varying accounts embody different epistemological and ontological models of the self and the relationship of the self to others. An understanding of how certain articulations have come to prominence in government policy therefore seems important. I now want to examine the productions of ‘character’ that
have fed into the policy development of character education in the Coalition government.

Following the setting up of the 2010 Coalition government, there was a marked burgeoning of interest in the notion of ‘character’ in a number of social policy agendas in England and Wales. In 2011, David Cameron launched *The Character Inquiry: Character should be at the heart of our responses to social problems* (Demos, 2011) conducted by the think tank Demos. Over the following few years, research by Demos and the JCCV appeared to wield significant influence over the role of character in government policy. Indeed, the Jubilee Centre and some individuals from Demos are part of wider national and global educational networks whose activities extend beyond research itself to the production, promotion and selling of services and products (Allen and Bull, 2018). Below, I examine reports produced by the think tank Demos and the JCCV paying attention to the methodologies and psychological approaches that are evident in them. I will revisit some of these groups later on in their roles as providers of character education. However, for the moment, I would like to focus on the research base that underpins current character policy.

**Demos**

The think tank Demos has been prominent in pursuing and publishing research on character and social policy even prior to the 2010 Coalition government. Although perhaps it is worth noting that alongside this research focus on character, Demos continued to research social and emotional skills so it would not be accurate to suggest that character was displacing all previous well-being approaches (Demos, 2015a). In 2009, commissioned by the Equality and Human Rights Commission, Jen Lexmond and Richard Reeves of Demos were asked to look at how, or indeed whether, the development of character impacted life chances (Demos, 2009). This particular report is an interesting place to start considering how character has been conceptualised and researched.
At the beginning of *Building Character*, detailed reference is made to the work of a number of philosophers, reports and psychological studies from Aristotle and Nicomachean Ethics and his concept of flourishing, Richard Layard and the sociology of happiness and Avner Offer’s work on well-being. However, Lexmond and Reeve express dissatisfaction with traditional accounts of character that reference a set of unique qualities including a ‘natural and unalterable personality’ since they argue such a definition would ‘position it (character) as a private matter, lying outside the realm of public policy’ (ibid, p.12). Rather, ‘certain elements of character impact equality, opportunity and fairness, it ought to be a concern for policy makers…Given that these character capabilities are overwhelmingly developed in childhood, there is a strong case for public policy interest’ (Demos, 2009, p.13). To undertake research on the impact of character and therefore bring it into a public policy domain thus necessitates an ‘updating of the idea of character’ (ibid, p.13).

Drawing on data from the Millennium Cohort Study, Lexmond and Reeve conducted an analysis on the importance of the development of three key ‘character capabilities’: application, self-regulation and empathy. Character is defined at the outset:

> Character is used here as a useful and readily understood shorthand for a set of personal *capabilities* that research shows to be associated with good life outcomes. What are labelled in this report *character capabilities* are crucial ingredients in enabling people to pursue and achieve their own individual wellbeing (ibid, p.12).

> [A] set of life skills rather than a moral disposition (ibid, p.12).

Clearly, the understanding of ‘character’ in this report draws on a variety of philosophical, sociological, psychological discourses. It is a broad and multi-disciplinary construct that carries an implication that the various discursive representations are effectively about the same thing. This is a stance that is reiterated and replayed in further Demos reports as character gains momentum as a policy focus.

In 2015, Demos launched a research programme specifically considering
how to build students character in the UK education system. This report solidified a broad, multi-disciplinary definition of character including the influence of psy-scientific discourses. In fact, not only are discourses of philosophy, sociology and psychology employed to define character, but also the research has expanded to incorporate a wide variety of other non-academic programmes and activities that take place in schools:

[W]e draw on recent research into character produced by the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues at the University of Birmingham, as well as recent studies into different attributes of character that are referred to as ‘soft skills’, ‘social and emotional skills’ and ‘non-cognitive skills’. We consider past efforts to embed character development into the education system, detailing the role of personal, social and health education (PSHE) and the citizenship curriculum, provision of extracurricular activities, as well as examples of best practice in schools (Demos, 2015b, p.9-10).

Demos (and as we shall see to some extent JCCV who co-wrote the report) employ a deliberately comprehensive, eclectic, flexible and unclear understanding of character synthesising a variety of models and approaches. What is interesting in this report is that this is beginning to cause some difficulty.

A number of those involved in their research were uncomfortable with the term character due to its moral overtones, because it was seen as ‘elitist or militaristic’ or due to its ‘connotations relating to private school or social class’ (ibid, p.20). However, these reservations and expressions of concern were reported as ‘primarily linguistic in nature, rather than substantive’ (ibid, p.20), a comment which in itself reflects a particular epistemological and methodological stance. The term character remained. Part of the justification for maintaining the term character was that it was broad enough to include moral and civic virtues in a way that other approaches concerned with social and emotional skills/ skills for life did not. This was, as I understand it, what respondents were unhappy with in the first place:

Despite some reservations among some of the stakeholders we spoke to, we argue that ‘character’ is the right term for this agenda because of its rich philosophical history, and the fact that it is one that many people recognise and understand (even if they cannot define it
The authors concluded that a loose definition of character was desirable because ‘it allowed greater autonomy for schools to develop an approach and language to character that was consistent with their context and intake’ (ibid, p.21).

The Demos researchers themselves see the advantage of a vague understanding of character in respect of the subsequent adaptability to diverse school environments. This may well show a practical and down to earth approach to developing education policy for implementation in various settings but it is not clear that this is warranted from an epistemological perspective. I think it is fair to say that this is a feature of the work of the JCCV also.

**Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues**

The establishment of the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues (JCCV) at Birmingham University also evidences the increasing interest in character education and social policy. Perhaps one of the bodies at the forefront of research and promotion of character education, it was founded in 2012 by Professor James Arthur and is ‘a pioneering interdisciplinary research centre focussing on character, virtues and values in the interest of human flourishing’ (JCCV, 2019). It considers itself a prominent informant on policy and practice. It is funded by a multi-million pound grant from the John Templeton Foundation- a philanthropic organisation founded in 1987 by businessman/millionaire John Templeton to support research especially on the relationship between religion and science (John Templeton Foundation, 2019). A significant amount of the Jubilee Centre’s work and research pertains to the possibilities and practicalities of implementing character education in schools. As such, it produces and pilots materials for the teaching of character and virtues. Its website contains a substantial
amount of material with respect to this. They promote a moral approach to character education based on virtue ethics. This lends their material a particular feel as it draws on a largely philosophical, indeed mostly Aristotelian, discourse. For example, in their Knightly Virtues programmes for primary schools, they explore well-known literary characters, Robin Hood, Joan of Arc, and include activities focused on ‘Self-discipline, Honesty, Love, Gratitude, Justice, Courage, Service, and Humility’ (JCCV, n.d).

Overall, they specify four main categories of virtues; moral, intellectual, performance and civic and promote an understanding of character in terms of these four virtues thus encompassing a variety of approaches and disciplines. Performance virtues are listed as perseverance, adaptability and resilience and a multitude of psychology-rooted programmes and indeed sports based programmes claim to promote their development. Civic virtues are described as service and citizenship and are developed through practical activities such as volunteering. Moral virtues are qualities such as honesty, gratitude and humility often portrayed as being part of the general ethos of the school. Intellectual virtues are addressed through the academic curriculum.

What particularly interests me is the way in which the terminology of psycho-scientific discourses is incorporated into their discussions of how to understand character and implement character education. Again, this reiterates a somewhat ambiguous and broad definition of character.

In 2013 they produced A Framework for Character Education in Schools that offered a particular understanding of and model for character education. Although the Jubilee Centre situates itself within the Aristotelian philosophical tradition, they acknowledge the importance of ‘recent trends in social science, such as positive psychology, that have revived the concepts of character and virtue’ (JCCV, 2013, p.2). They define character as, ‘a set of personal traits or dispositions that produce specific moral emotions, inform motivation and guide conduct’ (ibid, p.2). In terms of practical application, they state also that they understand character
education as ‘an umbrella term for all explicit and implicit educational activities that help young people develop positive personal strengths called virtues’ (ibid, p.9).

These definitions reflect an eclectic appropriation of the philosophical and the psy-scientific to elaborate and articulate character. Interestingly, in the new and revised Framework published in 2017, the JCCV specifically reference the importance of the psychology of moral development as a context for understanding the development of character. Indeed, they take what they refer to as ‘a neo-Aristotelian view of the psychology of moral development’ (JCCV, 2017, p.2) which would appear to represent a merging of both philosophical and psychological tradition and discourse as seen below. The diagram below presents the Jubilee Centre’s model and is the basis for their framework of character education (ibid, p.2). It clearly blends the philosophical language of morals and virtues with the language of psychology with a presentation in shapes and colours that would not look out of place in a psychology textbook. Their description of navigating this journey of development likewise mirrors such an amalgamation of terms:

Deepening on the nature of the education that moral learners receive, they may progress rather seamlessly through a trajectory of habituated virtue, developing autonomously sought and reflectively chosen virtue, which in turn provides them with intrinsic motivation to virtuous action. Or they may need to take a detour through a pathway of good intentions, undermined by a weakness of will, through practical habituation, which provides them with the self-regulation needed to at least be extrinsically motivated to act virtuously (ibid, p.2).
In addition, it is interesting to note that psy-scientific definitions appear to offer scope for the measurement of character. In the Jubilee Centre’s 2015 report *Character Education in UK Schools*, they address the question as to ‘whether psychological measurement can detect virtue’ (2015, p.10). The report references attempts at this:

Big-Five personality theory research has focused on what are arguably personality substrates of virtue, such as agreeableness and conscientiousness; the VIA Inventory of Strengths identifies self-reported virtues; moral dilemma tests explore some cognitive components of virtue; longitudinal observational methods aim to gauge virtues in action; and more recently, implicit testing and neuroscientific measures have focused on detecting intuitive moral responses (JCCV, 2015, p.10).

This would certainly suggest that in respect of evaluating and measuring character education, psy-scientific discourses have a particular role to play and are employed to elaborate on the nature of character.
It would seem that similarly to Demos, although perhaps with greater detail and clarity, the Jubilee Centre also embraces and endorses a comprehensive and flexible definition of character. However, it is impossible to ignore the authority accorded to drawing on psy-scientific discourse to articulate aspects of the understanding of character.

**APPG on Social Mobility**

Lastly, perhaps to demonstrate how this broad definition travels in and through policy, let us consider the understanding of character employed by the All Party Parliamentary Group on Social Mobility (APPGSM) in their 2014 *Character and Resilience Manifesto*. One of its authors is Jen Lexmond, previously of Demos and in 2014 a Director of Character Counts ‘an independent centre that promotes, designs, and evaluates public policy interventions that build character’ (APPGSM, 2014, p.2).

The foreword by Baroness Clair Tyler makes clear the conflation between social and emotional skills, soft skills and character (ibid, p.4) and this is explicitly reinforced by the definition adopted. ‘Character and Resilience’ is used here as an umbrella term for a range of concepts variously categorised as aspects of social and emotional development and as ‘non-cognitive’ or – somewhat incongruously – ‘soft’ skills’ (ibid, p.11). They refer to Demos’s work, specifically the 2011 Character Inquiry where they note how, ‘a panel of experts from developmental psychology, neuroscience, child psychiatry and youth development’ broke the notion of character down into key character capabilities- application, self-direction, self-control and empathy’ (ibid, p.11).

They do not mention a philosophical, civic or moral dimension to the definition of character they employ to arrive at their conclusion that ‘character and resilience are major factors in social mobility’ (ibid, p.6). Perhaps this illustrates that a comprehensive and flexible understanding of character that allows schools/organisations/ advisory groups to adapt it to their environment, also legitimates an understanding of character specific to a given agenda. However, the influence and importance of psy-scientific
approaches is once again apparent and seems to take a leading role in redefining an up-to-date understanding of character.

**The production of the whole child as a form of bio power**

Tracing the definitions of well-being and character developed in a variety of policy documents and initiatives suggests two key points. Firstly, there is an evolving articulation of the whole child from physical well-being through mental and emotional well-being to more recent focus on moral character. These various iterations are characterised by language that is unclear and flexible, drawing on a wide and sometimes mismatched variety of psychological and philosophical discourses. This eclectic and equivocal terminology implies and promotes a view that well-being, character, psychological traits and character virtues are all roughly the same thing. As such, it helps to gloss over the question of whether emotional and moral development should be the focus of government policy. More than this, there are significant epistemological and ontological divergences between the various philosophical, sociological and psychological disciplines represented and this seems problematic and leads me to my second point.

These developing definitions of both well-being and character are cohered by and elaborated in terms of a model of the self rooted in psy-scientific discourses. Indeed, the transition from well-being to character as a mode of articulating the whole child seems to be a cosmetic move that belies the underlying dominance of psy-scientific discourses. Character education arguably ‘translates’ terms and descriptors of philosophical virtues into a psychological language as though they were the same thing. It is not accurate to refer to a transition from well-being to character as the latter has embraced and includes the former. This results in a paradox. The whole child is framed by eclectic and ambiguous terminology that facilitates the expansion of government policy to include the affective domain. Yet a key characteristic of this equivocal production of the whole child is the intransigent underpinning of shifting polices with psy-scientific discourses.
It seems to me that this is as significant as it is perplexing and merits some consideration.

The discourses used to frame and produce the whole child are critical. Discourse is performative, it forms the objects, or subjects, of which it speaks and in so doing it is an operation of power. A particular discourse is successful in as much as it is able to secure itself as a discourse of truth, to function as an arbiter and producer of veracity and fact:

In the end, we are judged, condemned, classified, determined in our undertakings, destined to a certain mode of living or dying, as a function of the true discourses which are the bearers of the specific effects of power (Foucault, 1980a, p.94).

It is clear from this research that whilst there is undoubtedly a vagary and heterogeneity in the discursive formation of the whole child, psy-scientific discourses are dominant. This means that psy-scientific discourses set the epistemological and ontological parameters for how the whole child is understood, produced and practiced. Such psy-disciplines offer a definition and understanding of the self that is particular and serves to direct and constrain self-understanding and formation in specific ways. This production of the whole child in such a way effectively directs and structures the action of the self upon the self.

The involvement of government policy in defining and attending to the personal life of the child represents a significant shift, bringing into the realm of formal policy aspects of the child’s self and development that were previously ‘off piste’. It represents an extension and intensification of government power through education policy into the internal life of the child. Whilst government policy has often sought to direct children’s conduct, it is the internalisation of this control that is the hallmark of the neoliberal whole child. The dominance of the psy-scientific discourses is critical to this move. They promote an understanding of the construction of the whole child that is a particular operation of bio power. The question now is how best to unpick and understand how this might be happening.
Psy-scientific discourses and the somatic and molecular self

To address and situate the importance of psy-scientific discourses in respect of the whole child, I draw on the work of Nikolas Rose. Rose (1998) has focused on the role of what he refers to as the ‘psy-disciplines’ or ‘psy-sciences’ and the effect of these on our understanding and presentation of the self. More recently, his work has been concerned with exploring the nature and influence of advances in medical and scientific knowledge and technology in advanced liberal democracies (Rose, 2007). I will consider some of his contentions in greater detail.

Rose observes the resurgence of biological and genetic accounts of human capacity that have many sociologists worried:

[C]ontemporary developments in biomedicine, especially those involving genetics, will embody a conception of human beings that individualizes human worth, essentializes variations in human capacities, reduces social phenomena to the aggregate of individual actions, and discriminates against, constrains, or excludes those found biologically abnormal or defective (2007, p.50).

Rose outlines how our understanding of human ‘life’ is now focused at a molecular level and from a somatic perspective. This represents a significant change for our understanding and enactment of human nature. Rose considers that such molecularisation and somaticism facilitates an instrumental understanding of ourselves; we become divided and are able to view ourselves as amenable to what he terms ‘optimisation’. The possibility, indeed the reality, of increasingly sophisticated forms of intervention on human life mean we see ourselves as ‘things’ that can be improved, even customised. New knowledge, new actors, new markets, new technologies and new experts are introduced to manage such optimisation and they become fundamental to the way the life or the self is developed. The nature of the techniques and technologies, expensive and produced by private companies, transforms the process of enhancement. Referencing Nelkin who observes the reduction and decontextualisation of the body ‘stripping it of its cultural meanings and personal associations, reducing it to a utilitarian object,’ (ibid, p.39), Rose observes that this leads to the commodification of
the elements of vitality or life which means those optimising are engaging in a process of acquisition. ‘Now recipients of these interventions are consumers, making access choices on the basis of desires that can appear trivial, narcissistic, or irrational, shaped not by medical necessity but by the market and consumer culture’ (ibid, p.20). More than this, the emphasis on and ability to prophylactically ‘maximise’ ones health, ones ‘life’, brings with it the potential decision not to and in turn moralises that decision; the failure to be informed about ways to optimise your health are denigrated and cast in a new light. These new knowledges, the practices and their concomitant experts produce what Rose refers to as an ‘economy of hope’ which imperativises the optimisation of the self. This takes place against a backdrop of a market in medical technologies and expertise that is driven by neoliberal market principles of competition. Inevitably, ‘life’ becomes defined by forces of profit and market share. ‘Hence, the politics of the life sciences-the politics of life itself- has been shaped by those who controlled the human, technical and scientific resources necessary to fund such endeavors’ (Rose, 2001, p.15). Ultimately, these organisations are not motivated by the production of truth or health, but ‘they must be legitimated by the logics of product development and market share’ and so ‘bio politics becomes bio economics’ (ibid, p.15). In this sense, our own personal desire for health and well-being is tied up with scientific, medical, economic and political interests.

But it is not merely that aspects of morality enter into the equation in this way. Rose suspects and fears the extension of a molecular and somatic view of life to our understanding of the mind, the self, solely in terms of the brain. His concern is with ‘the apparent development of new capacities to intervene upon the mind through manipulating the brain’ (2007, p.22):

This somatization of ethics extends to the mind. Over the first sixty years or so of the twentieth century, human beings came to understand themselves as inhabited by a deep interior psychological space, and to evaluate themselves and act upon themselves in terms of this belief (Rose 1989). But over the past half century, that deep space has begun to flatten out, to be displaced by a direct mapping of personhood, and its ills, upon the body or brain, which then becomes the principle target for ethical work (ibid, p.26).
This then ‘physicalises’ aspects of human nature such as personality, emotion, moral disposition, and character; it physicalises our notion of the self. In turn, this imports the epistemological, ontological and moral assumptions in respect of choices to modify and optimise our ‘life’ to the self through blurring the boundary between biology and selfhood. It is an understanding of characteristics and relationships that we might understand as social or moral or emotional translated into/ reduced to a language of the body and physical components. In addition, this conceptualisation of the moral, personal, social self places it within an economy of hope that prioritises and moralises optimisation of the self.

Rose’s fundamental contention is that developments in the knowledge, technology, practices and expertise of the psy-sciences have blurred the boundaries between nature and culture/society, and biology and the moral and affective self. Consequently, as Lemke summarises ‘biology cannot be separated from political and moral questions’ (2011, p.100). If that biological model itself is loaded with emotional, moral and potentially political assumptions, as Rose claims it is, then the dominance of such psy-scientific accounts of human nature in programmes of the whole child is a matter of some concern. My suggestion is that the prevalence of psy-scientific discourses in policies of well-being and also character has led to the production of a molecular and somatic affective and moral self and that this has implications for extension of neoliberal governance. To analyse this, I need to consider how such an operation of power might occur.

**The whole child as a bio/etho political subject**

In order to think about this more carefully, and in particular to explore how best to grasp and conceptualise any such operation of power within the context of a neoliberal education system, I want to draw on Foucault’s notion of bio power and Rose’s concept of etho-power which is an extension and adaption of Foucault’s work. Doing this raises some difficulties at this stage, since it seems impossible to outline this without preempting a certain amount of discussion from the following sections. This
reiterates for me the difficulty of presenting a circular and reiterative process of research and understanding in a simple linear form. Clarity of argument in a scholarly work is usually assumed to require a linear, progressive presentation. It does not take that form here.

Foucault saw neoliberal governance as inextricably linked to the way that government was able to control the ‘life’ of the population through operationalising individual members of the population to take responsibility for structuring their own conduct, their own ‘life’ along specific lines. A fundamental part of this process is the conceptualisation and production of ‘life’ through certain discourses and practices. This positioning and production of life, or the self, happens in two notable ways, along an axis, or as Foucault phrases it at two poles (1998, p.139). Psy-scientific discourses produce particular ontological parameters for how to understand the self at the level of the individual body. This is what Rose’s work explicates. However, it is also important to note that psy-scientific discourse also lends itself to the production of statistically generated norms, ideals and trends, a representation of life and the self, at the level of the population. These two manifestations represent the two poles of bio power in terms of disciplining the individual and regulating the population. This is important because the relationship between these two poles of bio power, the individual and the population is critical. This field of statistically generated and normalised truths about life and the self are the context in which and the trajectory along which self-development and optimisation takes place. In this sense, I think it is clear that we can think of programmes of well-being and character as fitting into an operation of bio power in their constitution of life and the self at the level of the individual and also the population. However, there are two issues or questions that do not seem adequately addressed by this analysis.

Firstly, though more specifically addressed in Section three, I am not convinced that programmes of well-being and character are best understood as examples of disciplinary power which is of course for Foucault an integral aspect of bio power. Rather, I consider that their emphasis is on
self-discipline and regulation, the individual’s actions upon themselves. Here, and at the risk of complicating matters further, I think it is possible to draw again on Rose’s work and his notion of etho power. This seems to capture more precisely the underlying nature and direction of well-being and character programmes.

Rose’s analysis of the psy-sciences takes place within a particular understanding of changes to the importance and relation of knowledge and expertise to government in ‘advanced liberal societies’ (what others—perhaps Foucault—would refer to as neoliberal). It is an extension and adaption of Foucault’s work on bio power through a development of his concept of etho power/politics that he defines as follows:

By ethopolitics I mean to characterize ways in which the ethos of existence—the sentiments, moral nature or guiding beliefs of persons, groups, or institutions—have come to provide the ‘medium’ within which the self governance of the autonomous individual can be connected up with the imperatives of good government (Rose, 2001, p.18).

It is this emphasis on self-governance, the context in which individuals learn to understand and govern themselves and the relationship of this to wider neoliberal governance that is key. In fact, we can see this move in Foucault’s own later thinking. Looking chronologically at his lectures and publications, his work on bio politics shifts towards the theory of governmentality and technologies of the self. In a sense, it is difficult to firmly distinguish between the kind of power Rose is capturing with his notion of etho power and Foucault’s of technologies of the self.

Equally though, and perhaps by way of an aside, it is interesting to note the way in which the molecular and somatic self Rose describes echoes Foucault’s account of certain key features of the characteristics of disciplinary power. Categorisation, classification and fragmentation are fundamental to Foucault’s account of disciplinary power in which the individual body is constituted as part of a ‘multi-segmentary machine’ (1991b, p.164). But Foucault also details the way in which disciplinary power acts on the body through ‘a calculated manipulation of its elements,
its gestures, its behaviour’ (ibid, p.138). He refers to the analytical and cellular individual as a correlative of disciplinary power (ibid, p.156). There is a certain continuity in this mode of conceptualisation that seems to travel through to the composite account of the self proffered by the psy-sciences. The model of the molecular self put forward by psy-disciplines shares characteristic features with the cellular individual that is a product of disciplinary power. Rose’s account of etho power can be seen as an internalisation of disciplinary power to become self-disciplinary power rooted in an inherent epistemological affinity.

The second issue that I want to address is how exactly the focus of policies of well-being and character on the capacity of the individual to self-regulate, discipline and develop can be understood as a channel of neoliberal governance. This question is the critical point of my research overall. I am analysing how the operation of bio or etho power relates to neoliberal governance through a consideration of the specific instance of policies of well-being and character.

Building on Rose and Foucault’s ideas and arguably picking and choosing how to integrate their thinking, I would now like to address some of the assumptions of the individual self and human nature that animate well-being and character policies and link this to the wider question of neoliberal governance. In order to do this, I reference Foucault’s elaboration of the ideal typical subjectivity of neoliberalism – homo oeconomicus- and it is in this respect that discussion preempts the work of further sections. It is difficult not to anticipate and draw on the analysis of further sections because of the fundamental co-evolution of bio power and neoliberal governance. Both need to be understood first in order to fully comprehend the other and this makes for an untidy presentation. I argue that the articulation of the whole child in psy-scientific discourses is key in integrating the whole child to extend a neoliberal dispositif. It is the bio/etho political production of a self that animates the fundamental neoliberal subjectivity of homo oeconomicus. Let me explain how I think this happens.
My argument is that the dominance of psy-scientific discourses in policies of well-being and character imports a somatic and molecular account of the self to the emotional and moral self. This means that the emotional and moral aspect of the whole child is constructed as an aspect of the body, modeled as a machine with component parts. Aside from the inevitable reduction of the social, emotional and moral to the physical and biological, the production of the emotional and moral life of the whole child is made accessible in a practical and targeted manner to physical optimisation procedures. This promotes a particular way of understanding the affective self as comprising identifiable and discrete aspects that can be defined and targeted as deficient and so worked upon. These aspects are fundamentally biologically grounded and this prompts practical and measurable manipulation offering the possibility of tangible improvement. This means the construction of the emotional and moral life of the individual whole child is uniquely primed for optimisation and this is significant.

Neoliberal governance depends upon and works through the mobilisation of the responsibilised individual. Following his discussion of bio power, Foucault goes on to conceptualise this through his exploration of the neoliberal homo oeconomicus who is ‘an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself’ (2010, p.226) or an ‘enterprise-unit’ (ibid, p.225). Rose’s work offers us a specific and interesting way to flesh out this entrepreneurial ‘whole’ self, to consider a specific instance or ontology of how this self is made up through psy-sciences. This somatic and molecular construction of emotional and moral nature of the whole child is the means through which neoliberal thinking can find access to and inhabit practices of self-reflection and self-optimisation. Psy-scientific discourses offer an ontological anatomy of that self that facilitates the production and development of an homo oeconomicus.

To summarise: an analysis of policies on childhood well-being and character show the way in which the mental, emotional and moral life of the child has become a focus of government policy. These policies are informed by psy-scientific discourses that promote a model of the self that facilitates
and encourages the manipulation and management of individual emotions and moral outlooks in order to optimise an ‘enterprise unit’. This means the construction of a model of the whole child whose relationship of the self to the self is primed and attuned to, or exhibits some kind of elective affinity with, the relationship to the self characterised by the neoliberal entrepreneurial self. It is an ontological template predisposed to fit hand in glove with the self-governing neoliberal project that is homo oeconomicus.

This move represents a critical lynchpin in extending neoliberal dispositif to the emotional and moral life of the child. I would argue that this particular construction of the emotional and moral self acts as a gateway, a junction that forms a connection with or allows incorporation to a wider neoliberal dispositif. However, this accounts for one aspect of bio/etho power. The axes along which the development of the self takes places is also critical. The psy-sciences also contribute to the production of human nature at the level of the population and this forms part of the context in which work upon the self is enacted. More than this, the production of statistical averages and norms tends to the inevitable production of ideals and the desirable ‘normal’. This serves, as Foucault expounds, as a form of normalisation and regulation or using Rose’s etho power, towards forms of self-regulation. The entrance of such psy-scientific sciences into the arena of emotional and moral development of the child therefore seems concerning since it might imply the production of certain types of appropriate emotional and moral selves. Thus I am arguing; that policies of well-being and character promote and privilege certain ways of being, certain types of selves that stand as the goal of self-development and that this takes place as and is an operation of bio/etho power that is inextricably connected to and extends neoliberal governance. My suggestion is that such policies represent an intensification of neoliberal governance and an extension of bio/etho power through the engagement and structuring of the emotional and moral self.

Considering the policy definitions alone is clearly inadequate and this section represents only the start of an analysis. As said, the context in which
this understanding of and work on the self takes place is critical but the milieu of influence is wider than the poles of bio/etho power I have considered here. It is important to consider the impact of an education policy field dominated and structured by neoliberal values and practices. The enactment of well-being and character policy through the structures and discourses of a neoliberal education ‘system’ fundamentally determine the shaping of the anatomy of the whole child. It is through a consideration of such structures that we can see how programmes of whole child education form part of a neoliberal dispositif complicit in promoting particular moral and emotional selves. This forms the basis of the following section.
Section Two: The discourses and architecture of neoliberal education policy: an expanding neoliberal dispositif and governmentality

In this section, I want to explore what happens to the understanding of the whole child as policies of well-being and character are mediated and developed in and through a neoliberal education system. This involves examining the pre-existent policy field by tracing a heterogeneous ensemble of policy agendas, texts, legislation, systems of recording and assessment, research methodologies, press releases, school programmes and activities, promotional materials and websites, event agendas and technological apps. These constitute the milieu in which policies of the whole child are formed, evolve and are enacted. In fact, more than this, they constitute a context that determines the direction of self-development and self-optimisation prompted by well-being and character policies. As such, they are instrumental in introducing additional layers of meaning that serve to elaborate what I call the anatomy of the whole child.

In the first section on well-being, I trace the relationship between well-being and New Labour’s policy agenda of social mobility; an agenda that positions education as a form of social investment that can yield returns both for the individual and society in as much as, it is asserted, it both contributes to successful competition in a job market and produces a capable and well adjusted workforce. This social investment agenda exhibits key features of a neoliberal understanding of education; a conceptualisation of the child as a form of human capital and an instrumental and economic approach to the value of education. I argue that the embedded-ness of policies of the whole child within such neoliberal approaches leads to an instrumentalisation of the emotional life of the child. I then examine the effect of pre-existing systems of audit and measurement that characterise
neoliberal education systems. Their extension to gauge the success of investment in childhood well-being means that childhood well-being is caught up in systems of performativity that reiterates well-being as an instrumental good and strategy for personal and economic success.

It is worth noting that whilst I examine the way that policies of social investment circumscribe and inflect the production of a neoliberal whole child, I do not pursue the slightly different concerns this analysis raises with respect to issues of social inclusion. I would suggest that the ways in which the whole child is articulated has significant ramifications for policies of social inclusion and merits further investigation. This research points to the need to raise questions about whether policy and programmes of the whole child education assume, promote and normalise the whole child in ways that are exclusionary. To what extent do classed, gendered and racialised models of the whole child underpin and inform whole child policy and practice? What implications does the concept of the ‘wholeness’ of the whole child have for the child with disabilities? After all, the very concept of the ‘whole’ child arguably suggests an ableist conceptualisation that is highly problematic. These questions could serve as the basis for a parallel genealogy that would problematise the whole child in a different way, to show it as another ‘empty synthesis’ (Foucault, 1991, p.84). However, I can merely nod to these concerns here.

In the second section on character, I begin by noting the importance of policies of social investment as constituting a significant milieu that frames the shift to character. I go on to examine the importance and influence of the research bodies and methodologies that feed into and inform the ‘what works’ approach to policy formation and the systems of numerisation and measurement that both fuel it and are caused by it. This leads to an examination of attempts to absorb character education into systems of performativity in order to measure and calculate moral development. I also explore the effects of the ever-increasing deregulation, and privatisation and outsourcing of provision of whole child education on the apparent expansion of the market of whole child education. Overall, I argue that this
leads to an intensification of the commodification and marketisation of the whole child and a reiteration of an instrumental and economic approach and motivation towards educating the whole child.

To conclude, I suggest that these processes, practices, discourses, organisations, policies cohere as a part of a neoliberal dispositif that extends the metaphor and practices of the competitive market to the emotional and moral development of the whole child. As a consequence, social relations and ways of understanding the self are reorganised, reiteratively aligned with the characteristics, values and modes of understanding characteristic of neoliberalism. However, more than this I argue that we should understand this as an operation of power in action; that the development and enactment of these policies of the whole child represent a structuring of thought and action that bear the hallmarks of a neoliberal model of governance. They direct reflection on and constitution of the self in a way that extends neoliberal governmentality to both the emotional and moral life of the child. In doing this, they constitute the self as a self-governing entity in line with neoliberal truths and values. In short, this analysis argues that the whole child is produced as a subjectivity that extends neoliberal governmentality by harnessing the emotional and moral life of the child to neoliberal goals in multiple and reiterative ways.

**Governmentality**

Foucault’s work on governmentality in his lecture series ‘Security, Territory, Population’ begins with the contemplation of bio power and this is significant:

*This year I would like to begin studying something I have called, somewhat vaguely, bio-power. By this I mean a number of phenomena that seem to me to be quite significant, namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of political strategy, of a general strategy of power (Foucault, 2007a, p.1)*
As mentioned, his thoughts on bio power lead him to propose its mode of operation in terms of apparatuses of security (more of these later) which in turn lead him to the question of government:

In a previous lecture on ‘apparatuses of security’, I have tried to explain the emergence of a set of problems specific to the issue of the population; on closer inspection, it turned out that we would also need to take into account the problematic of government (Foucault, 2001, p.201).

I think situating the emergence of governability along this route, from bio power and its modus operandi, is illuminating. It is only when Foucault arrived at a more developed concept of governability, particularly as a way of understanding liberal and neoliberal forms of government, that the strategic importance of bio political techniques is fully appreciated.

Foucault coins the term governability to mark a transition in the way society is understood and therefore governed, a new mode and domain of power in which the state emerges as a key player. Essentially, Foucault connects a shift in the way in which society is governed with fundamental developments in how it is understood and represented, particularly through the ‘human sciences’. Indeed the knowledge of the human sciences, in particular statistics, is absolutely fundamental to governability. Governmentality emerges after society itself is constructed and visibilised as an analytical category, once ‘society’ becomes a ‘thing’. Its focus, form and target is those realities generated by certain human sciences through meta analysis of aggregated features of human beings, of society; in particular, the population and the economy; the collective health and wealth of society.

To quote Foucault directly, governability refers to

the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit it very complex, power that has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy and as its essential technical instrument (2007a, p.108).

My understanding of Foucault’s creation of this ‘ugly word’
governability then, is that he is seeking to identify and understand the
historical development of a certain mode of government in the light of new kinds of knowledge that create the social realities or ‘facts’ of population and economy. These social realities demand a new understanding and practice of government, distinguishing governmentality from sovereign or disciplinary power. The art of government is now focused on the management and ordering of ‘things’ on a scale and at a level that perhaps is too wieldy for other forms of power or government (ibid, p.97). Power emerges through the measurement and regulation of these new domains. Apparatuses or technologies of security gather and order information to create a series of events, a ‘milieu’ within which ‘things’ can be arranged (ibid, p. 99). The patterns and trends, the ‘truths’ generated appear to present and structure a field of possible actions and categories within which life takes place (Foucault, 1986, p.221). This leads to a critical and defining characteristic of governmentality in which, as we will explore later, bio politics plays a fundamental role. Governmentality works through the willingness of individuals to constitute themselves in respect of series of events, categorised by patterns, norms and variables, discernible only at the level of ‘social reality’. This latter stage, the engagement of individuals in their own government through the creation of subjectivities, is a defining feature of governmentality and one in which bio politics plays a significant part- particularly in the case of liberal and neoliberal governmentalities. To sum up so far: I understand governmentality to refer to a particular way of governing exemplified by the modern state that is dependent upon and distinguished by the development of expert knowledges and their generation of social realities, and in which importantly, governing the self is fundamental correlative. In order to fully explicate the term governmentality, it is necessary to consider liberal and neoliberal governmentality.

**Liberalism and neoliberalism as governmentalities**

Foucault sets out to explicate this new way of governing through a detailed genealogy of government (Foucault, 2007a). This genealogy traces historically contingent manifestations of ‘governmentality’ as a mode of
power from ancient Greek society, through the introduction of pastoral power to the West to the emergence of ‘raison d’état’ at the end of the sixteenth century, and finally to the development of liberalism in the eighteenth century and through to the modern day forms of neoliberalism. Foucault explores and draws out the historical significance of multiple meanings and practices of government, in order to distinguish the notion of ‘governing’ from ‘commanding’ or ‘laying down the law’ and thereby to differentiate ‘governmentality’ as a form of power from sovereign, pastoral or disciplinary or indeed any other form of power. I think it is important to emphasise that whilst the interconnectedness of Foucault’s projects can be confusing, it is fundamental to his perception of the way power relations work. Foucault is eager to point out that governmentality does not replace other modes of power; it coexists with and overlaps them, even coopts them. From a general perspective, Foucault considers all forms of power, to a greater or lesser extent, as contemporaneous:

So, there is not a series of successive elements, the appearance of the new causing the earlier ones to disappear. There is not the legal age, the disciplinary age and then the age of security...In reality, you have a series of complex edifices in which what above all changes is the dominant characteristic, or more exactly, the system of correlation between juridico-legal mechanism, disciplinary mechanisms and mechanism of security (Foucault, 2007a, p.8).

**Liberalism as a governmentality- social realities naturalised**

Many discussions regarding the meaning of governmentality begin by breaking down the neologism into its respective parts of government and mentality (Dean, 2010, Miller and Rose, 2008). This tends to emphasise the logic or mentality of rule through which a polity is governed. I find this a helpful way to understand how there are different governmentalities and to distinguish between them. From this angle, a particular governmentality can be identified in the thinking, the rationale of government that coheres assemblages such as specific knowledges, practices, institutions, techniques etc. A particular governmentality serves to unify all components, making them complicit in one another’s existence and securing them together in
mutually reinforcing and dependent alliances. Foucault’s aim, at different historical junctures, was to consider such contingent assemblages and ‘discover which kind of rationality they are using’; ascertain the ‘grid of intelligibility’ that secures such coherence. (Foucault cited in Lemke, 2002, p.55).

Whilst there are key and ‘transformative’ moments in the genealogy of this form of power, it is important to acknowledge the significance of what Foucault terms pastoral power as ‘a prelude to governmentality’ (2007a, p.184). Noting the key features of this type of power allows us to situate more clearly the development of Foucault’s concepts of bio power and governmentality.

In ‘The Subject and Power’ and ‘Security, Territory and Population’ Foucault describes how the ‘Western state has integrated in a new political shape, an old power technique which originated in Christian institution. We can call this power technique the pastoral power’ (1982, p.213). This involved the adoption of the approaches, techniques and practices of the Christian pastorate by the state. Foucault identifies pastoral power and its expansion beyond the scope of the church as ‘one of the decisive moments in the history of power in Western societies’ (2007a, p.185). Pastoral power is a power of care that is uniquely characterised by the nature of the relationship between the pastor and the flock. The pastor’s responsibility is to care for the entire flock as a whole and also each individual, ‘omnes et singulatim’, with the ultimate goal of salvation for all (ibid, p.128). Crucially, salvation rests on the pastor’s ability to discern the inner truth of every soul of the flock and Foucault emphasizes that such pastoral power ‘cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people’s minds, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets’ (1982, p.214). Clearly, the spread of pastoral power ‘outside the ecclesiastical institution’ (ibid, p.214) entailed a shift of objectives so that, for example, salvation became redefined in terms of the security and health of society. Nevertheless, the techniques, practices and mentality remained
and it is how these functioned as an operation of state power that interested Foucault.

Foucault’s extensive analysis leads him to refer to pastoral power as individualizing and totalizing form of power. It is all-encompassing as it operates around two poles at the level of the flock or population and the level of the individual. We can see how Foucault’s thinking develops from here to bio politics and governmentality and ‘foreshadows the simultaneous focus on the individual and population characteristic of neoliberal governmentality’ (Martin and Waring, 2018, p.1298). Foucault views the spread of pastoral power to the whole social body as shaping the state as ‘a modern matrix of individualization’ (1982, p.215). In his lectures, he makes explicitly clear that he sees pastoral power as a forerunner of governmentality in that it concerns itself with the production of the individual through their own understanding of themselves in respect of certain truths. It promotes the ‘constitution of a specific subject, of a subject whose merits are analytically identified, who is subjected in a continuous networks of obedience and who is subjectified through the compulsory extraction of truth’ (Foucault, 2007a, p.184). As ever, there is no linear developmental progression and it is important to reiterate that Foucault understands different forms of power and political rationalities to overlap and interact. Indeed, the pastoral techniques or ‘individualizing tactic(s)’ of disciplines and institutions such as psychiatry, medicine and education can be seen as integral to the development of neoliberal governmentality and bio politics. They facilitate and promote practices such as self-examination that are identified as key technologies of the self, fundamental to bio political power and neoliberal governmentality.

Whilst Foucault identifies pastoral power as a precursor to governmentality the most relevant part of his genealogy of governmentality for this research and indeed for the development of bio politics is the identification of political liberalism and neoliberalism as modern forms of governmentality.
Foucault’s genealogical account of governmentality defines liberalism in respect of sovereign power and raison d’état and its concomitant Polizeiwissenschaft—an early manifestation of governmentality aiming for the total control and regulation of a secular polity (2007a, p.364). Here, the notion of an omniscient and omnipotent state operated through the eighteenth-century ‘European science of police (that) dreamed of a time in which a territory and its inhabitants would be transparent to knowledge; all was to be known, enumerated and documented (Miller and Rose, 2008, p.202-3). Liberalism rejects this notion of an omniscient, omnipotent state championing a laissez faire approach that applied to society and the individual. Perhaps one of the distinguishing characteristics of liberalism is that it takes the observations that can be made about social realities such as the economy and population and sees them as evidence of / the hallmarks of naturally occurring phenomena. It locates the social reality as ‘out there’, preceding any methodological attempt to apprehend it. This has significant consequences for the way in which liberal governmentality functions. It lends weight to the importance of governing at a distance since it imputes to those social realities naturally occurring ‘righting’ mechanisms that mean that ‘things’ are best left to their own devices. Consequently, the role of the government is problematised. Moreover, not only should those social realities be left alone, the individuals that inhabit and comprise them should also be ‘free’. Liberal governmentality prioritises the freedom and rights of the individual as pre existent givens- intrinsic prerogatives of humanity. Our life and existence are inherently characterised by freedom and we proceed to surrender this as and when necessary. Liberalism is the attempt then to govern whilst surrendering as little freedom as possible and allowing states of nature to regulate themselves. Foucault sees this as an essential paradox at the heart of liberal governmentality; it is premised on the principle ‘One always governs too much’ (2010, p.319). Indeed, for Foucault, the fundamental dilemma at the heart of liberalism is ‘Why, after all, is it necessary to govern?’ (Ibid, p.319) which in many ways positions liberalism as ‘a form of critical reflection on governmental practice’ (ibid, p.321).
Neoliberalism as governmentality

In the lecture series, ‘The Birth of Politics’, Foucault gives a detailed genealogy of different versions of liberalism as a form of modern governmentality. Specifically, he examines German ordo-liberalism from 1948 -1962 and the American liberalism of the Chicago school which is perhaps better known as neoliberalism. These are specific and contingent histories and whilst both forms of liberalism are united by skepticism towards the state, it is the governmentality of neoliberalism that provides the significant governmental context for a current understanding of bio politics.

Neoliberal governmentality might merit several chapters/years of discussion, but it is essential to direct and so limit my focus. Again, the importance of knowledge is paramount in underpinning and shaping this most recent form of governmentality. Neoliberal governmentality is characterised by a privileging of economic knowledge such that the economy and its associated concepts become the lens through which all aspects of life are understood. In practice, this has meant an assertion of the value and prerogative of the market as regulator not just of economic activity but also of all forms of activity: an extension of the metaphor of the market to all areas of life but a particular understanding of the market as a place of competition rather than simply exchange. This precipitates processes of commodification, monetarisation and instrumentalisation of all activities, relations, responsibilities, practices, so that they become amenable to regulation by market principles. Arenas that were considered outside of the remit of economic thinking, of being unsuitable for the application of competitive market principles are duly brought into the market fold. This leads to the privileging of other types of knowledge; of ways of understanding that effectively create new domains and routes of power; ‘Grey sciences’, these know-hows of enumeration, calculation, monitoring, evaluation …(that) manage to be simultaneously modest and omniscient, limited yet apparently limitless in their application to problems’ (Miller and Rose, 2008, p.212). They proliferate, generating and recoding
our social realities, colonising arenas such as healthcare and education so as to reposition us as targets, outcomes, customers and clients.

Alongside this, the neoliberal desire to ‘reduce’ the state in order to secure individual freedom sees the development of a devolved market characterised by varying forms of private, voluntary, public and hybrid organisations competing to secure advantage and work. This is characterised as a new form of ‘network government’; Miller and Rose refer to a new ‘pluralization of social technologies’ which amount to a ‘de-statization of government’ (ibid, p.212) that effectively and additionally alters our experience and understanding of the social. This new environment creates a role for new knowledges and those with expertise in that knowledge to become significant in the development and enactment of neoliberal governmentality. Power flows in new directions, through new actors and along new routes. This potent combination of new knowledges, new practices, new structures, and new social relations is the context in which individual freedom and autonomy is defined and enacted. Autonomous and responsibilised individuals compete in a market as homo oeconomicus, actively enterprising themselves through their choices, aspirations and achievements.

This is the point at which it becomes pertinent to return to the question of Foucault’s interest in and concept of bio power and bio politics. Alongside Foucault’s interest in and explication of neoliberalism runs an enduring interest in the role of government in finding its focus on other newly generated social realities namely the population, hence his concurrent interest in bio politics. There is little doubt that his lectures are somewhat confusing at times in respect of the importance of this interest but it is quite clear that he sees bio power/bio politics and the government of the ‘population’ as a critical strand in neoliberal governmentality.

Bio power plays an important role in producing the kind of individual that characterises neoliberal society. It works with the neoliberal mentality of government to produce neoliberal subjectivities. Drawing on Rose, I have already explored the way in which psy-scientific discourses do this and how
familiar neoliberal tropes of improvement, optimisation and responsibilisation, fit neatly into this schema. Our personal ‘life’ is also restructured to encourage us as entrepreneurs, autonomous mini businesses responsibilised and accountable for our own fate. Market principles of competition therefore underpin our way of understanding the world, our relations with others and ourselves. This is therefore an area of government and site of operation of government; it is a route, importantly a new route, for neoliberal values. The metaphor, principles and ‘truths’ of the market are applied to all aspects of ‘life’. This section explores how the operation of bio power interacts with key features of neoliberal governmentality. What happens when the bio or etho-political whole child is mediated through a neoliberal education system?

Well-being and policy contexts

The social investment agenda

The ambiguity and flexibility of the ‘well-being’ of the child enabled it to stand at the intersection of and indeed ‘join up’, a number of New Labour’s policy agendas. Perhaps most evidently, the focus on childhood well-being stood at the heart of New Labour’s commitment to the social investment state, a term coined by Anthony Giddens (1998) to refer to state investment in human capital. Investment in human capital was promoted as a fundamental way of addressing projects of social inclusion and mobility, and education was positioned as a key social investment strategy. Returns on investment would be manifest ultimately in economic terms both for the individual and society. The improvement in educational standards would lead to successful employment that in turn would address issues of social mobility and inclusion. I think it helps to be more specific here and investigate a particular example of well-being policy and practice.

SEAL- Social and Emotional Aspects of Learning

As has been noted often, the one thing that can be said of New Labour’s policies is that there was no shortage of them. The number of health and
education initiatives under New Labour is far too numerous to recount (Coleman, 2009, p. 285). I have focused on one particular initiative as a way of illustrating the way that childhood well-being was framed within a wider policy field. My examination inevitably incorporates a consideration of a number of mutually reinforcing policy developments.

SEAL- an acronym for social and emotional aspects of learning- was a nationwide schools initiative, drawing heavily on the work of Daniel Goleman on emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995). It aimed at instilling or improving children’s social and emotional skills with the specific intention of improving their school attendance, behaviour and capacity to learn (DES, 2005). Its implementation invited schools to demonstrate that they were in part addressing the social and emotional well-being of pupils as specified in ECM and it had obvious links with other national initiatives and programmes of work such as the NHSP. The formal definition of SEAL tells us a great deal about the policy agendas relating to behaviour and attendance that frame its goals and focus:

[A] comprehensive approach to promoting the social and emotional skills that underpin effective learning, positive behaviour, regular attendance, staff effectiveness and the emotional health and well being of all who learn and work in schools (Department for Education and Skills (DfES, 2007a, p.4).

SEAL initially appeared as part of a Primary Behaviour and Attendance pilot in 2003 that was implemented in twenty-five local authorities as part of a key priority to promote positive behaviour and full attendance. After a successful pilot in primary schools between 2003 -2005 (Hallam et al, 2006), a secondary school SEAL programme was developed and ‘rolled out’ in phases from 2007. As part of the National Strategies programmes, it followed a schema known as ‘waves of intervention’ whereby whole school approaches were adopted, followed by small group work and where necessary intervention for the individual. It did not prescribe a specific package that promoted a single model, but rather offered a flexible framework that was supported by a series of guidance booklets and
materials and was characterised by a multi-agency approach and links (DfES, 2005, 2007a, 2007b).

It is clear that the rationale for the focus of emotional health and well-being was as a means to improving behaviour and learning. This is stated in the Guidance booklet- *Social and Emotional Aspects of Learning* for secondary schools, published by the DfES in 2007. This references Weare and Gray’s 2003 research to explain that ‘Well designed programmes to promote social and emotional skills have been shown to have a positive impact on pupils’ attitudes and behaviour’ (DfES, 2007a, p.10). Additionally, explaining the role SEAL can play to improve attendance:

> by helping create a social environment that is welcoming and inclusive and helping pupils to develop the social and emotional skills that are required if they are to be fully engaged in all aspects of school life (ibid, p.12).

Concerns regarding behaviour and attendance are framed in relation to the importance of future employment as explained in the section that follows: ‘Why are social and emotional skills essential in the workplace?’

> Surveys of employers have for many years shown that non-cognitive or social and emotional skills are the qualities they most want from young people coming out of the education system, and employers increasingly use these characteristics, rather than qualifications, to screen applicants, for jobs at all levels (ibid, p.13).

It is evident in these examples, that policies of childhood well-being make an overt connection between emotional skills and control, patterns of behaviour and educational outcomes and successful employment. The wider social investment and mobility agenda frames well-being as a form of human capital that needs to be accrued in order to secure success. It positions the private space of the whole child as a new site of investment and this has a number of effects. Most obviously, the emotional and mental well-being of the child becomes an instrumental rather than an intrinsic good. Well-being is valued as a consequence of the results it may produce—good behaviour, attendance, academic success, employment, social inclusion and mobility. Mental and emotional health is instrumentalised as
the motivation to educate the whole child is strategic. This instrumentalism appears particularly problematic since the ‘warm and emotional feel to SEAL’ was arguably seen by many as a welcome challenge to the target driven, exam dominated curriculum that prevails in schools (Craig, 2017, p.4). This has the effect of lending a programme such as SEAL a somewhat cynical and tactical feel. Gillies identifies the instrumentalism of SEAL and expresses concern about the implications and ramifications of the ‘instrumental targeting of emotionality’ (2011, p.189). In examining the way in which ‘empathy’ is presented in the SEAL programme, she notes that it comprises it as degree of self-interest and manipulation of others:

From this perspective, empathy becomes a strategic technique designed to better manage social encounters. Developing a good understanding of another’s point of view and expressing sympathy can represent an effective method of securing personal gain, particularly in a corporate environment (ibid, p.199).

In turn, the programme identifies particular mental outlooks, dispositions, emotional traits, behaviours as hindrances to social inclusion and mobility. In effect this means identifying certain ‘selves’ as unsuccessful, inferior and problematic. Indeed it promotes certain kinds of people. Further than this, the well-being agenda locates the problems of social inclusion and mobility at the level of the individual. New Labour’s strategy suggests that poor social mobility is at least in part a problem of an individuals’ low emotional well-being as opposed to structural problems. ‘Underpinned by a language of developmental psychology, the SEAL initiative foregrounds the personal determinants of education exclusion at the expense of broader contextualisation’ (ibid, p.195).

The agenda of social investment provides a powerful milieu in which children are encouraged to work on and manipulate their social and emotional domain. It promotes an internal relationship to the self as strategic, resulting in a commodification and instrumentalisation of the social and emotional life. Well-being is hence positioned as a particular form of human capital, and more specifically emotional capital. In effect, SEAL is an attempt to structure internal life so that children see their social
and emotional domains as sites of investment that require optimisation in order to succeed in a competitive market. This structured relationship defines the instrumental value of well-being as lying in its capacity to ensure readiness for employment and to secure the economic future of both the individual and wider society. Moreover, the emphasis on the child’s well-being locates the individual as both problem and solution, in other words as responsible. I would argue therefore that polices of social investment create a milieu that inflects policies of well-being toward an approach to self-development that is peculiarly suited and attuned to neoliberal societies. They represent an exhortation to govern emotional and social life in line with principles, values and requirements of the neoliberal market. However, this represents one strand of a complex environment in and through which well-being and the whole child is articulated/ enacted. I want to examine further aspects of what I will suggest is a neoliberal dispositif that constitute and mediate understandings and productions of the whole child.

**Accountability**

In this section, I would like to focus on the way in which policies of childhood well-being became caught up in and subject to a culture of audit and accountability that is widely recognised as a defining characteristic of neoliberal education (Power, 1997, Lingard et al, 2015).

**Every Child Matters, the 2004 Children Act**

The 2003 *Every Child Matters* (ECM) initiative and the subsequent 2004 Children Act were critical in foregrounding childhood well-being by ensuring its development became a statutory responsibility, initially at the level of the local authority but then at the level of each individual school. As noted in the previous section, the 2004 Children Act sets a working definition of well-being into primary legislation making it a statutory responsibility for local authorities to ‘promote cooperation between relevant bodies and organisations to improve the well being of children’ (Part 2 Section 10). It goes on to specify the five outcomes that evidence this, that
effectively became the statutory definition of well-being. However, it is arguably the case that much of the emphasis in ECM and the subsequent Children Act was on the coordination and cooperation of multiple organisations involved with promoting childhood well-being. The response of schools in particular appears to have been uneven. Indeed, as is evident in a comment in the 2005 Ofsted report *Healthy Minds: Promoting emotional health and well-being in schools*, it seems that some schools did not embrace the promotion of well-being as enthusiastically as was perhaps anticipated:

The large number of schools visited for this survey who were not working towards meeting the NHSS is of serious concern. Only just over half of them were aware that such standards existed. *Of these, only a very small minority of schools were working towards or had met the criteria for providing for pupils’ emotional health and well-being* (Ofsted, 2005, p.1).

This report was commissioned prior to the Children Act and ECM, although the ECM Green Paper was published in 2003 and therefore would be expected to have exerted some influence on schools. Baroness Walmsley also raised the issue in the debate in the House of Lords regarding an amendment to the 2006 Education and Inspections Act:

When amendments on *Every Child Matters* were moved in Committee, the Government countered that the Children Act 2004 was sufficient to ensure schools’ co-operation in its delivery. I dispute that. Certainly, some schools are working well with other partners to ensure delivery of wider well-being outcomes, yet others are not and do not see matters beyond educational attainment as related and part of their core business in children’s development (HL Deb, October 2008).

That said, and to demonstrate the unevenness of responses, ECM and the Children Act clearly prompted change that evidenced a concern by government to be *seen* to address the development of well-being, notably emotional well-being, more determinedly. This impact of ECM is clear in the way the NHSP was developed and promoted. In fact, it almost reads as though the NHSP is promoted as a mechanism for ensuring that a school can be seen to ‘tick the box’ of fulfilling the requirements relating to well-
being. The *National Healthy Schools Status - A Guide for Schools* shows that the new developments in the requirements for Healthy School status were specifically intended to help schools fulfil the expectations of ECM and the Children Act:

> From September 2005, Ofsted will expect schools to demonstrate how they are contributing to the five national outcomes for children stipulated by *Every Child Matters* and the Children Act 2004 – being healthy; staying safe; enjoying and achieving; making a positive contribution; and economic well being. Gaining National Healthy School status provides rigorous evidence of this and will assist you in evidencing your self-evaluation and completing your new school profile (DoH, 2005, p.2).

The point I am trying to make here is that significant though ECM and the 2004 Children Act were, the enactment of policy and the responses from schools varied. Nonetheless, it seems a pertinent point to reiterate the observation that this period is widely acknowledged as one of policy hyperactivity that makes it nigh on impossible to determine with great accuracy how exactly the implementation of these initiatives and Acts was assessed. The sheer volume of documents, guidance, support for multiple agencies is quite overwhelming and confusing. A relatively cursory internet search generates multiple archived documents produced by various agencies at a regional and local council level, proposing ways of addressing the stipulations of this new legislation- many taking the form of detailed and complicated grids and boxes. ECM itself consisted of a number of ECM reports, to list a few:


Every Child Matters: Change for Children Young people and Drugs Df.ES, The Home office and Dept. of Health 2005

Every Child Matters: Change for Children in Schools DfES 1089-2004 December 2004
What seems evident is that although ECM was undoubtedly a widespread and visible policy, there was a degree of uncertainty and unevenness in its enactment. This context serves to highlight the significance and importance of the devolvement of accountability for the promotion of well-being specifically to schools which will be addressed below. This shift to move inspection and accountability to the level of the school identified responsibility for well-being more specifically. In this respect, pressure was increased to evidence that well-being was being addressed.

**2006 Education and Inspection Act**

The most significant piece of government legislation regarding childhood well-being was passed as a late autumnal amendment to the 2006 Education and Inspection Act. The debate surrounding the relevant amendments makes for illuminating reading (HL Deb 17 October 2008). The amendment gave the governing bodies of maintained schools the statutory responsibility for the promotion of childhood well-being:

> The governing body of a maintained school shall, in discharging their functions relating to the conduct of the school – promote the well being of pupils at the school (Education and Inspections Act, 2006, Part 3, 38. 1, (5)).

This was important in prioritising the promotion of well-being in primary legislation. In discussion, former Secretary of State for Education Estelle Morris expounded on the significance of this:

> My first reason for supporting this proposal is that the crusade or huge cultural change involved in persuading professionals—teachers and those looking after children who are not teachers—to think differently needs every encouragement and tool we can possibly harness and give it. We should not miss any opportunity to make that happen. Thinking back to when I was at the department, at certain times I saw words going into legislation and, to be honest, I thought, “I am not sure that putting that word into legislation is going to achieve much”. But what I saw over the years was that it kept the agenda on that word and sent a clear signal to the education world that change was needed (HL Deb, 17 October 2006).
Lord Adonis acknowledges the ‘declaratory value of including well-being in the Bill’ (HL Deb, 17 October 2006). Interestingly, he also notes evidence from Ofsted that shows ‘a clear correlation between the Every Child Matters outcomes and pupil’s achievements’ (ibid). This recurring trope of the instrumental value of well-being bears witness to the continuing importance of the wider agenda of social mobility and investment. However, what is significant about this amendment is that it fixes well-being into a formal framework of accountability applied to all maintained schools. Given the context of prevailing policy models, this created the necessity to determine a way of measuring and articulating the well-being of children, individually and en masse, to facilitate comparison and legitimate judgement.

This legislation prompted Ofsted to produce the 2008 consultation document *Indicators of a school’s contribution to well being* demonstrating how pupil well-being might be evaluated and how schools would be audited. It argues for the importance of school level indicators that will allow schools to assess their contribution to pupil well-being. These indicators will make available ‘consistent benchmarked data’ that will ‘help schools and inspectors to consider how effectively the pupils well being is being promoted and whether it could be promoted more effectively’ (DCSF, 2008, p.8). In addition, these are supplemented by ‘a local area well being profile of all indicators in the NIS (national indicator set) relevant to the well being of children and young people’ (ibid, p.10). This enabled Ofsted to generate local authority level data about the well being of children and young people that could allow schools to benchmark their contribution within the local area. This would also allow local authorities to compare themselves against other areas should they wish to do so (ibid, p.12).

The discourse of audit and quantitative measuring is immediately apparent. This enables the production of statistical information about the well-being of school populations and of course facilitates judgement, comparison and potentially ranking. The ability to compare extends beyond the school to local areas, presumably between local authorities. I would argue that this
production of well-being at the level of various populations which then serves as the basis for assessment and judgement can be understood clearly as an operation of bio power. It has the potential to produce norms and ideals that may well serve as the basis for individual development. More than this, such a system of accountability not only encompasses the well-being of the child, it serves to assess the adequacy and success of educational professionals and organisations tending to it. The well-being of the child therefore functions to measure the competency of adults in following an assessment regime. The child’s personal and emotional welfare is now instrumentalised, not only for its own advantage in securing success and employment, but also for the advantage of others. Childhood well-being becomes a site where teachers, schools, governors etc. can demonstrate their competence and success in fulfilling policy demands and generating particular outcomes. The overbearing obligations of such systems of accountability means that teachers, inspectors, schools and governing bodies become complicit in instrumentalising children’s mental and emotional health.

At the same time, the difficulty of measuring well-being is apparent. The use of proxies is inevitable - for the ‘school level indicator’ relating to ‘quantified outcomes’, the data published includes attendance, absenteeism, exclusions and take up of school lunches. These are taken as indications of ‘pupils enjoyment of and engagement with school, their health and their prospects of achieving economic well-being’ (ibid, p.12). Needless to say, it is questionable whether attendance at school is an indicator of enjoyment or engagement, which raises questions about the validity of the research process. The identification and employment of problematic proxies for well-being demonstrate not only the difficulty of defining well-being but also bear witness to the overriding importance of enacting a system of accountability in order to give legitimacy to its pursuit in a crowded curriculum. So critical is this move to the validation of well-being policies that it continues regardless of its appropriateness. The effect is one in which well-being becomes tacked onto existing systems of auditing and
measurement in a somewhat unsatisfactory manner. Craig warns of the potential trajectory this might follow:

But the Department of Children, Schools and Families (following in the footsteps of the DfES) is grafting this focus on emotions onto its standard practices. If this initiative succeeds as planned, and schools fully implement the recommendations, all young people’s emotional lives (not just the few who have obvious difficulties) will become the focus of checklists of learning outcomes, assessments and evaluations. The next step in this approach may well be targets (2007, p.5).

Despite concerns about the further development of accountability measures for social and emotional well-being in schools, it should be noted that the election of a Coalition government in 2010 effectively halted any such plans. The increased emphasis on academic excellence and rigour that marked the Coalition’s position meant that Ofsted reports no longer attended to how schools promoted well-being or personal development. The 2011 Education Act amended the Ofsted inspection remit, removing any reference to well-being and including a judgement on the behaviour and safety of pupils (Education Act, 2011, Part 5, 41, 5A). Alongside the disinclination to make PSHE statutory and the end of funding for the NHSP (Bonnell et al, 2014), it seemed that the prioritisation of well-being was now side-lined.

The incorporation of the well-being agenda in legislation such as the Children Act, but especially in the 2006 Education and Inspections Act is a pivotal moment in the history of the whole child. It makes the commitment to children’s well-being- notably mental and emotional well-being- a legal duty that prioritised the requirement of the school to demonstrate fulfilment of policy. In doing this, it fixes the well-being of children within a regime of accountability that instrumentalises well-being differently. The well-being of the child becomes a measure of schools’ competence and compliance. I would now like to consider social investment and mobility agendas and regimes of accountability as part of, and a stage in, the evolution of a neoliberal dispositif that produces childhood well-being as an extension of neoliberal thinking, or as I go on to argue, neoliberal governmentality.
The neoliberal dispositif: policies of social mobility and accountability and the well-being of the whole child

Policies of social investment and systems of accountability set boundaries that mark out a space in which childhood well-being is understood and practiced. It is important to try and understand and conceptualise the relationship between varying policies, systems and practices and how they work together to demarcate the whole child. The dispositif is a useful model for this. It conveys how neoliberal tropes span multiple policy processes through legislation, to classroom practices, to inspection regimes, to self-reflection and encompasses discourses, concepts and systems. It addresses the layering, replication and reiteration of multiple neoliberal truths that frame policies of well-being; how they compound one another and are relentless in their effect of setting out and defining the parameters of well-being. This is important because although the borders and boundaries of the neoliberal dispositif may be fluid, heterogeneous, multi-faceted, they are not indiscriminate. They exhibit what could be described as an unsystematic coherence. All of these strands conjure and replay ways of thinking about childhood well-being and children’s personal development that are ultimately rooted in the metaphor and language of a competitive economic market. In addition, they filter out and delegitimise competing systems of thought and incorporate discourses, practices, and policies etc. that display an elective affinity with neoliberalism and offer a potential new route of extension. It is perhaps in this respect also that the importance and significance of psy-scientific discourses can be appreciated. In offering particular conceptualisations of the self, they offer routes of travel and so extensions of neoliberal conceptualisations directly to self-understanding.

We might think of this as a relationship between levels of the dispositif, between the macro level of a wider neoliberal dispositif and a level of micro-disposiitivity at which the well-being of the whole child is produced (Bailey, 2013, p.809). This is not a relationship of cause and effect but rather a ‘negotiation of sorts’ (ibid, p.811). In fact, Foucault dislikes the notion of levels and refers rather to ‘the double conditioning of a strategy by
the specificity of possible tactics, and of tactics by the strategic envelope that makes them work’ (1998, p.100). We can understand policies of well-being as specific tactics that are shaped by and develop the strategic envelope of the neoliberal dispositif.

The value of the dispositif is that it allows us to conceptualise the ‘creep’ of neoliberal governance. Having argued that psy-scientific discourses produce the whole child as a bio/etho political subject, the dispositif helps to elucidate how the pre-existing neoliberal policy field mediates this subject thus further defining the parameters of the whole child. This cumulative production is part of a small but distinct and evolving system of neoliberal governmentality extending neoliberal governance to the interior life and constitution of the whole child. Having considered the interaction of policies of well-being with social investment and practices of accountability, I now want to look, in a similar way, at the interaction with and impact of wider policy agendas on character education. This is a more extensive section as the more recent changes that have taken place in the education system have had a significant impact on the complexity of the milieu in which character is understood and ‘practiced’.

**Character Education and policy contexts**

In Section One, I noted the way the Coalition government and Michael Gove in particular had attempted to distance themselves from the policies and approaches of well-being that were developed during the New Labour governments. However, the whole child returned to prominence, but in a different way, with the appointment of a new Secretary of State for Education, Nicky Morgan in 2014. Character education was Morgan’s flagship policy and appeared to mark a significant shift in understanding and conceptualisation of the whole child from that of New Labour. That said, it is important to note that well-being programmes and influence did not disappear altogether, not least because, as noted in the previous section, articulations of character drew on terminology connected to well-being.
The social mobility agenda

Whilst there may or may not be fundamental differences between the politics of New Labour and the Coalition and Conservative governments, it would be hard to argue that they do not share a view that education is critical to, a ‘key driver’ of social mobility/inclusion/fairness. Hence, as with well-being, it is essential to situate the ‘turn’ to character within a wider policy context that understands education as a key component of social mobility and/or justice. It is clear from Nicky Morgan’s press releases surrounding the launch of the character education initiative, that the whole child remained firmly embedded within the agenda of education as a key to social mobility. Education is located as part of a ‘long term economic plan’ which promotes high academic standards and the development of character and resilience in particular as a route to personal and national economic success. This is clearly evidenced in the announcement of the character initiative referenced in Nicky Morgan’s Conservative party conference speech of 2014:

Delivering the best schools and skills is a key part of our long-term economic plan that is turning Britain around. As well as high academic standards, this means providing opportunities for all young people to develop the character and resilience they need to succeed in modern Britain (DfE, 2014b).

The place of character within the social mobility agenda is also evident in the establishment, findings and eighteen policy recommendations of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Social Mobility (APPGSM). The group examined existing research, and talked to practitioners and academics and held the Character and Resilience Summit in February 2014 bringing together ‘leading figures’ from education, charity, politics and business. ‘The Summit looked at the growing body of research highlighting how character traits and resilience are directly linked to being able to do well both at school and in the workplace’ (APPGSM, 2014, p.5). Their 2014 *Character and Resilience Manifesto* concluded that ‘character and resilience are major factors in social mobility’ (APPGSM, 2014, p.6).
Finally, in the opening of *Character Nation*, a report of policy recommendation produced by Demos for the then newly elected 2014 Conservative government, the identification of social mobility as the overarching policy framework for character is explicit. Commenting on the current focus on character education, Demos explain it has been driven by research showing that character attributes like self-regulation…, application…, and empathy…are correlated with higher educational attainment as well as good mental well-being, good health and better outcomes in the labour market (2015b, p.9).

It is clear then that character education is presented as one response to life in the increasingly competitive ‘modern Britain’. The dominant narrative is one in which educating for character is tapping into an additional set of attributes that will improve performance and increase the chances of successful employment; character as instrumental in achieving success. The social mobility and inclusion agendas of both New Labour and the Coalition and Conservative governments, rooted in the notion of social investment, position well-being and character as instrumental goods that improve chances of success. The effect of this wider educational and social agenda is to make the education of the whole child, a strategy, a tactic to facilitate broader political goals.

As an aside, it is interesting and important to note that this positioning of character development as crucial for societal success is a common and recurring trope and in particular recalls Victorian preoccupations with character. Being aware of this echo helps to clarify that what is unique about recent character initiatives is the self-conscious and individualistic manner in which children are exhorted to develop their character. This deliberate, self-oriented strategising lends present day schemes a rather different flavour to the character education of the early twentieth century. Although primarily addressed in section three, drawing on Foucault’s discussion of the development of *homo oeconomicus* helps to explicate this. Fundamental to today’s distinctively neoliberal character education is a vision of *homo oeconomicus* not as ‘the person who must be let alone’, (Foucault, 2010, p.270) to thrive or perish as market forces dictate as Foucault argues was the
characteristic of the previous *homo oeconomicus*. Rather, the neoliberal version responds to modifications and variables in the market and is malleable and therefore manageable. The neoliberal *homo oeconomicus* is ‘eminently governable’ (ibid, p.270) because determining and modifying the environment will prompt adaptation and development. Current character education programmes are critical in both producing this adaptable figure and providing a milieu that prompts and directs the development of particular traits. This is clearly seen if we consider the implications about the kind of character that might be necessitated in relation to a social mobility and investment agenda. As character education is positioned as a motor for social mobility, it follows that the priority is how schools can identify and encourage characteristics that improve social mobility. This agenda is underpinned by a conceptualisation of the world that draws on the metaphor of the market and understands the nature of that market as competitive. When life is presented as a competition, a fight for survival and success, it is scarcely surprising that qualities of grit and resilience, confidence and ambition feature prominently as desirable character attributes. These in turn ramp up the sense of urgency and concern, since their appearance on a ‘curriculum’ signals the necessity of developing them. Character, viewed from the perspective of and tailored to the requirements of neoliberalism, can be promoted to evolve in a particular direction to produce a particular kind of person. This subjectivity, a gritty, courageous, ambitious and determined uber child, is an elaboration or condensate of the neoliberal worldview. This elaboration of character feeds back into the world that creates it, extending neoliberal values to the self. These are questions that I pursue in detail in the following section.

The social mobility agenda positions character in much the same way as well-being, making character education a strategy, a tactic to facilitate broader political goals. The psy-scientific model of self that informs both notions of well-being and more recent understandings of character allows the self to be understood as divided into different areas of affective and moral capital that can and should be exploited and manipulated to achieve economic success and so social mobility. It is clear then that policies of
character education are also inflected toward an approach to self-development that is attuned to and articulated by neoliberal values. They represent an exhortation to govern emotional and moral life in line with principles, values and requirements of the neoliberal market. Particular skills and character capabilities are valued instrumentally to the extent that they bring into being particular selves that can succeed in a competitive market. This promotion of a strategic relationship to the emotional and moral self embodies and extends neoliberal principles and as such represents an extension of the neoliberal governance. In essence, the child is being counselled and incited to make itself up emotionally and morally in ways that fit into and also extends a neoliberal governmentality.

Having reiterated the importance of social investment agendas for positioning character, I would like to explore further the milieu in which character education policy has developed. I am interested in the significance and influence of a policy research field characterised by a ‘what works’, ‘evidence based’ approach and by the application of empirical methodology in character education research and policy. Continuing from the examination of definitions of well-being and character offered by organisations such as Demos and the Jubilee Centre, I explore the methodologies and approaches that have characterised policy research and consider their influence on the way character is understood. Referring back to the dominance of psy-scientific discourses in character policy, I consider the way that this shares epistemological assumptions with empirical approaches to research. I will explore the extent to which these cohere to develop an understanding of character. I begin by exploring the research milieu that informs policy and is peculiarly important for character education. It reveals a preoccupation, prior to enactment, with concerns about measuring character education so as to conform with prevailing systems of accountability in order to ensure value and attention.
Accountability

The ‘evidence based, what works’ research field

Research into character education takes place within the constraints or boundaries of a policy research field that has been shaped by the dictum ‘what works’. Ascertaining ‘what works’ in education has led to a preoccupation with measurable impact in terms of performance indicators and has gone hand in hand with an emphasis on ‘evidence based’ policy framed by ‘education scientific’ paradigms (Howe, 2005). This has led to the privileging of empirical, quantitative and statistical methodologies in educational research that has been seen as both restrictive and concerning (Smeyers and Depaepe, 2006, Biesta, 2007 and 2010a). These methodologies set the limits of what is understood as legitimate knowledge, as proof or truth, and instantiate and promote particular conceptualisations of the individual and the world. Without wishing to deviate into an extensive consideration of the epistemological and ontological implications of various social scientific approaches, it is nevertheless important to note the context that such research approaches provide.

Law and Urry (2004) conduct an exploration of the epistemological and ontological implications of social science research methods. Arguing that methodology is performative, in as much that it is constitutive of the reality it investigates, they conclude that ‘methods are not innocent’ (2004, p.404) and further, that they are political. Howe also argues the political nature of research methodologies:

The idea here is that education research methodology is internally and unavoidably political by virtue of adopting certain aims, employing certain kinds of vocabularies and theories, and proving certain people the opportunity to be (or not to be) heard (2005, p.321).

Clarke specifically observes the de-politicisation of neoliberal education policy as a result of the reduction of the political to a technical discourse...
For some academics, the practices of numeration, quantification and calculation that are integral to quantitative methodologies are a kind of hegemony of quantification that is a defining feature of neoliberalism (Howard, 2016, Lingard, 2011, Higgins and Larner, 2010). They represent and facilitate truths and practices of neoliberalism. The translation and reduction of social processes and constructs, emotional/intellectual relationships and ideas etc. into numbers echoes and is congruent with economic modeling. Rose argues that neoliberal rationalities of government require a numericised environment in which (these) free, choosing actors may govern themselves by numbers. And they depend upon the elaboration of an expertise of number, embodied in all those professions (economist, accountants, statisticians, demographers) and all those techniques (censuses, surveys, national income tabulations and formulae, accounting practices) which render existence numerical and calculable (1991, p.691).

This is the context in which to understand the way that research on character is constructed and presented. Beyond the compatibility with an economic heuristic, this ‘numericised environment’ supports the psy-scientific discourses that frame the definitions of character. Clearly, psychology as a science embraces those methodological principles of empiricism that dominate scientific research. The results of research can be quantified, analysed and presented to facilitate statistical analysis that extend the reach of assessment and feed into the policy approach of ‘what works’. In light of this, it is possible to reflect further upon the nature of ‘character’ found in the research reports.

**Can we measure character? Demos and the Jubilee Centre**

I noted in the previous section the dis-assembling and re-articulation of character as a psy-scientific discourse that produces a molecular, somatic and modifiable whole child. I discussed how this psy-scientific update of character displayed an affinity with the neoliberal entrepreneurial, enterprising subject and enabled it to be successfully incorporated into a neoliberal dispositif. Here, I argue that in addition to this affinity, it provides the basis for the subsequent research assessing and measuring the
impact of character. To develop that argument I revisit the work of Demos and their 2009 report *Building Character*.

Drawing on data from the *Millennium Cohort Study* (MCS), the Demos report includes a statistical analysis of the importance of the development of three key ‘character capabilities’: application, self-regulation and empathy. They base their assessment of this on responses to a twenty five-point Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ), used in the MCS. The SDQ is a psychiatric assessment instrument and behavioural screening questionnaire for children and adolescents designed by child psychiatrist Robert Goodman, Professor of Brain and Behavioural Medicine at King’s College London (Youthinmind, n.d.). Demos state that the SDQ captures data that serves as the outcome measurement in the data analysis conducted for this report, and hence as a proxy for the key character capabilities outlined above (2009, p.18). They have selected a targeted translation of character into specific categories that rendered it capable of subsequent statistical analysis.

This move, I suggest, is strategic rather than epistemologically grounded particularly in light of the following rather telling caveat: ‘the link between the character capabilities and the SDQ subscales is not tried and tested,’ (ibid, p.19). Hence, a justification follows referencing a study that they also acknowledge, ‘does not directly address the development of character capabilities in childhood which is the focus of this report’ (ibid, p.14).

It seems then that there is a move to articulate character so that it can be the subject of quantitative research methodology, regardless of the lack of evidence justifying this. The psychological updating of character in terms of capabilities facilitates the employment and invocation of psychometric testing to measure the impact of character development work. It allows research into character to feed into a system of accountability that directs it towards constructs that are amenable to measurement. This produces yet another level of articulation of character in empirical, scientific and statistical languages. This is a layering of ‘knowledges’-psychological,
psychometric, statistical, quantitative, empirical and economic that are attuned to and characteristic of a neoliberal approach. They feed into and fuel one another’s truth claims and as Demos recognise allow the incorporation of character development into ‘what works, evidence based’ public policy. This ‘translation’ of character into measurable and quantifiable categories severs it from associations with more traditional discourses of ethics or morals that might promote alternative stances and values. Yet this does not sideline moral development, it appears to create a space and imperative for policy research to develop a way of measuring moral development as a constituent part of the child’s character. I will consider this in the next section.

**Systems of accountability- measurement and progression**

Attempting to stage the moral development of the child is not new and has long been a concern of moral psychology. Indeed, the work of Piaget and Kohlberg remain influential and significant in education studies. However, I think that what can be seen in current research is different and more problematic.

In England and Wales, the Jubilee Centre is at the forefront of this development. The 2015 report, *Character Education in UK schools* introduces their work in this area and presents some interesting ‘results’.

*Character Education in UK schools* is a large piece of research:

Over four thousand (4,053) year 10 students (S3 in Scottish schools), aged 14 and 15, were surveyed in 31 secondary schools. In each one of these schools at least three teachers were interviewed. Teachers were also interviewed in 23 primary schools …Researchers also surveyed 3,223 secondary school students in other year groups using only moral dilemma tests, and included a further 2,848 students in the development of a practical measure for schools, called the School Virtue Measure, which was developed by the Jubilee Centre. In total, 10,207 students and 255 teachers were involved in the study (JCCV, 2015, p.7).

It both promotes and investigates a virtue-based approach to character education. Its main purpose is to set out the state of play regarding character education in schools in the UK and also to ‘explore the condition of
students’ characters’ (ibid, p.9). It states that its ultimate aim is to ‘make a positive and practical impact on the lives of students in Britain by influencing educational policy’ (ibid, p.7) and concludes with a number of recommendations. Perhaps of interest here is that it begins with a detailed discussion of methodology in the introduction to the report. The authors state, referencing ‘Biesta, 2010’, that since we live in an age of measurement, it is necessary to ‘explore the condition of student’s characters’ (ibid, p.9) to be clear what position any kind of national character education programme might proceed from. (It is not entirely clear to me that Biesta’s work points in the direction of measuring character. The book referenced expresses considerable concern about the culture of measurement and argues for reflection on the purpose of education [Biesta 2010b]). Specifically, the Jubilee Centre’s research focuses on the character of year 10 students in secondary schools across the UK, posing the question

How developed British students are with respect to moral character and the extent to which they are able to understand and apply moral virtues (JCCV, 2015, p.5).

As will be discussed shortly, the students’ development is compared to each other and international students of the same age. When discussing their methodological approaches they note, again quoting Biesta, that ‘an evidence based what works’ approach in education may be crowding out discussion of important values’ (ibid, p.10). But the implication of their research is that the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive since they comment: ‘We assume, nevertheless, that there is no reason in principle why virtue cannot be measured’ (ibid, p.10). In order to measure it, they propose a triangulated methodology initially citing the Jubilee Centre’s Kristjansson’s conclusion that: ‘a proper instrument to measure (Aristotelian) virtue needs to be an eclectic patchwork and needs to offer the possibility of triangulation’ (ibid, p.10). The dominant method is clearly set out. ‘A combination of three methods was used: students’ scores on moral dilemma tests (Ad-ICM (UK)), students’ self-reported character strengths (Values in Action Youth Survey (VIA)), and teachers’ reports on students as year groups’ (ibid, p.11). The Intermediate Concept Measure (ICM) to test
adolescent moral thinking is a psychological test, described in greater detail by Thoma, Derryberry and Crowson (2013) and the VIA Youth Survey (Park and Peterson, 2006), which measures character strengths and is rooted in Martin Seligman’s positive psychology. Semi structured interviews with teachers were also included ‘to compare teachers’ views of the students’ characters with students’ own assessments of themselves (obtained using the VIA)’ (JCCV, 2015, p.12). Teachers commented on the year group as a whole, not on individual students. Two of the interview questions were closed questions that could be processed by statistical software (SPSS) and were integral to the triangulated research design. The data from their study were statistically analysed and calculated producing some of the following results in the form of graphs and charts.
**Figure 2.1 JCCV- Chart comparing student character strengths**

**Figure 2.2 JCCV- Graph tracking development of student character**

After increasing from age 11, courage and self-discipline held reasonably steady between the ages of 13 and 15 before then increasing again. Honesty, however, was the virtue that dipped most between the ages of 13 and 15. Initially midway between courage and self-discipline at age 11, scores for honesty declined dramatically between ages 11 and 15 before then increasing but remaining the lowest-scoring virtue.
Table 3: How those Scoring the Top 20% of Ad-ICM (UK) Results Compared to those Scoring the Bottom 20% Differ in VIA Scores (ranked by difference)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Character strength</th>
<th>Top 20% of students who scored highest on Ad-ICM mean (n 663)</th>
<th>Bottom 20% of students who scored lowest on Ad-ICM mean (n 586)</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prudence</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perseverance/persistence</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Love of learning</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindness</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-regulation</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgiveness</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgement / open-mindedness</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honesty</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teamwork</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gratitude</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social intelligence</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appreciation of beauty and excellence</td>
<td>3.54</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bravery</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humility</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Love</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creativity</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspective</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curiosity</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zest</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hope</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spirituality</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humour</td>
<td>3.79</td>
<td>3.75</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 shows that the top group scored higher for 23 of the 24 character strengths, but that the divergence for some virtues was significantly greater than for others. ‘Prudence’, ‘fairness’, ‘perseverance’, ‘love of learning’ and ‘kindness’ differed most between the two groups.

Figure 2.3 JCCV- Table showing comparison of character strength averages
In addition, summary statements included many statistical comparisons including those with an ‘expert panel’, with their age group and other age groups and between genders. The following statements evidence these processes of normalisation:

Students struggled to identify why they would take a certain action (justification) more than deciding what that action would be (40.5% match with an expert panel) (JCCV, 2015, p.5).

Students claiming to do ‘charity work (or similar)’ outside of school made moral dilemma choices that were closer to the expert panel (50%) than those that did not (41%). Similarly, students who were involved in ‘music/choir’ (48%) or ‘drama’ (48%) outside of school performed better than those who were not (41% and 42% respectively), and students doing ‘art or photography’ (45%) performed better than those who did not (42%). These differences, all significant, were the most marked when looking at the relationship between Ad-ICM (UK) results and extra-curricular activities (ibid, p.16).

Performance on individual moral dilemmas matched the pattern of the triangulated year 10 sample too, as students scored most highly for self-discipline and lowest for honesty (ibid, p.19).

It is also interesting to note that girls (47%) significantly outperformed boys (37%) when faced with these moral dilemmas (ibid, p.5).

The findings on the Ad-ICM (Adolescent Intermediate Outcome Measure) involving students responding to moral dilemmas were contrasted with findings from other countries:

The Ad-ICM (UK) performance for the entire sample showed that, on average, students had less than a 50% match with expert panel choices (42.6%). This compares with high school students in the USA (49%, n=169, sd=0.28) and Macedonia (36.5%, n=266, sd=0.42); and with Taiwanese students aged 14 and 15 (53%, n=794, sd=0.24)9 (ibid, p.15).

On average, the surveyed students achieved higher total Ad-ICM (UK) scores than students from Macedonia, lower scores than USA high school samples and scores quite a lot lower than those of Taiwanese students of the same age. Although some of the samples cannot be matched exactly, these are important comparisons indicating that the year 10 UK students did not score as highly as some of their international counterparts (ibid, p.22).
The dominance of statistical methodology is obvious and indeed its assertion is the point of the report. This leads to the rather counter intuitive expression of virtues such as love and honesty in statistical terms that facilitate the comparison between individuals, cohorts and varying types of population. The point of the report is that moral qualities can indeed be measured and that subsequently, such measurement should be taken further. The final recommendation of the report suggests extending the reach of this type of assessment of character to schools through a test designed by the Jubilee Centre known as The School Virtue Measure (SVM) (ibid, p.6).

The question of measuring virtue had also been the theme of a conference held by the Jubilee Centre in 2014 (JCCV, 2014a). Conference speakers considered and promoted a variety of ways of tackling the question of measuring character. What is striking again is the prevalence of psychological/psychometric tools and approaches as a way of analysing and measuring character and virtue. The interchange-ability of terminology and the blurring of academic discipline boundaries are also notable in the titles of the numerous lectures and talks:

- Can virtue be measured using neuroimaging methods? (Ibid, p.5)
- Virtuous states and virtuous traits: How the empirical evidence in personality science scaffolds virtue ethics and the study of character (ibid, p.5).
- Quantifying the qualitative: using growth curve models to differentiate moral development among juvenile offenders (ibid, p.6).
- Virtue in Real Life: Using Smartphones to Coordinate Self, Observer, and Behavioural Data of Virtue (ibid, p.6).

Perhaps not surprisingly, given that the Jubilee Centre has co-written reports with Demos, the question of measuring character and character education programmes is also evident in Demos reports. Indeed, Demos has recommended that government should devise ‘national character outcomes’
and that ‘The DfE should create a statement of intent for education that strongly emphasizes character development and produce a national framework for character based on moral, intellectual, civic and performance skills and virtues’ (2015b, p.13). The report also mentions that in reviewing those schools that had won Character Awards, one of the distinguishing features was that alongside student led recording of personal development, there were ‘school led approaches to measure character’ (ibid, p.12).

The areas of policy research into character and the systems of accountability developed to measure it are inextricably linked. The current policy field is dominated by and necessitates research based on quantitative methodology. This methodology is able to offer a particular kind of empirical evidence necessitated by the ‘evidence based’, ‘what works’ approach that characterises policy production. The hegemony of quantitative methodology promotes and legitimatises policy definitions, categories, practices that can be articulated within this specific epistemological system of truth. The context of this research field has arguably encouraged a particular definition of character and directed subsequent policy research in a particular way. It benefits from and promotes psy-scientific accounts of the self and posits a correlation between psychological traits and moral qualities. The effect of translating character into psychological categories is that it makes it measurable by psychometric testing yielding results amenable to statistical analysis. This both secures the legitimacy of character education policy in the current research field and ensures that its recommendations of practices are amenable to systems of accountability informed by the same epistemological framework.

Latterly, it seems that the importance of the moral dimension of character, initially jettisoned or displaced by such a psy-scientific approach, has resurfaced and been subsumed into the epistemological frameworks which currently dominate in the field of social education and the concomitant systems of accountability that characterise the policy field. In effect, and I have suggested, the Jubilee Centre would appear to be at the forefront of the construction of the emotional and moral development of the child in
systems of accountability that seem intuitively at odds with what might be seen as the raison d’être of character education programmes.

**The neoliberal dispositif: policies of social mobility, accountability and the character of the whole child**

Once again it is possible to see the action of multiple discourses and practices that construct the parameters and possibilities within and through which character education policies develop. A key development charted is the extension of neoliberal governance through practices of accountability to the constitution and measurement of the ethical self. This occurs in a number of ways and we can see again the repetitive layering and multiple modalities of power at work.

The small steps of translating moral categorisations into psychological characteristics creates a space in policy research where it becomes possible and desirable to measure and assess a child’s moral development. The articulation of character in the scientific language of the quantitative empirical methodologies facilitates this and eases the incorporation of the moral into a policy research field dominated by statistical discourse. These ‘grey’ sciences, both psy and quantitative sciences, produce the social realities of populations, trends, norms etc. that are both targets and means of neoliberal governance. They facilitate the extension of ‘a calculated and reflected practice’ of governmentality (Foucault, 2007, p.165). The practices that the Jubilee Centre and Demos appear to commend involve the production of norms, averages, and standard deviations for love, friendship, honesty, and spirituality and so on. This is a process of standardisation and normalisation of ethical life. The effect is to promote certain attitudes and behaviours, certain emotions and personality traits as more successful and therefore desirable than others. This takes place within a system of accountability that places further value on structuring moral development along certain lines, both for the individual child and the teacher and the school. It extends some of the defining epistemological and ontological hallmarks of neoliberalism, namely the dominance of numerical knowledges
and values and language of competition and the market, to the moral development of the child. Further, the articulation of this development in empirical and objective methodology serves not only to reduce the complexity of moral life, it effectively sidesteps the question as to whether particular approaches to moral development are judgmental or moralistic. It renders the promotion of particular behaviours and attitudes as neutral and objective, de-politicising and de-moralising what are arguably profoundly political and moral judgments. This is at one and the same time an obfuscation and extension of neoliberal thinking. It is a reordering of the emotional and moral understanding of the self and others in line with principles of neoliberal governance that parade as objective and scientific. The overall effect of this cumulative and compounded production of character is the promotion of a calculating moral self readily available for assessment.

There is a neat epistemological and ontological affinity between the psychoscientific discourses that underpin the notions of character produced in research and policy and the quantitative methodological approaches that in turn dominate such research and policy. In the context of an education system that prioritises accountability and measurement, these affinities work to create an understanding and practice of character that consolidates the emerging bio/ethopolitical subjectivity of the whole child.

Having identified some of the small steps that have taken place to bring the moral life of the child into the fold of neoliberal thinking, I will continue exploring the details of the policy milieu, or neoliberal dispositif, focusing specifically on the way in which character education has developed in the context of a rapidly changing education system. Of particular interest is the way in which the structure of the funding process and the de-regulated, heterarchical nature of the current education system have promoted the emergence of a new kind of ‘expert’ in the arena of character education. For example, experts are cited in the awarding panel for the character awards and feature on the ‘expert panel’ cited in the Jubilee Centre’s research. It
Heterarchical governance and character education

In this section, I want to consider the heterarchical structure of the current education system and how significant this has been in relation to the way that character education policy has developed and been enacted. In particular, I focus the processes and practices that have been peculiarly characteristic of character education provision and funding.

It is evident that the development of character education policies is one small part of a set of fundamental and dramatic changes in the structure of the education system in England and Wales that is the reconfiguration of the education system as heterarchical network governance (Ball, 2009a, 2009b, Ball and Junemann, 2012, Olmedo et al, 2013). Effectively this is a restructuring of the education system that has taken place in the context of wider public sector reform that involves multiple devolutions of control and decision making and education provision. It is characterised by the emergence of new, diverse and eclectic organisations, businesses and individuals through practices such as privatisation. This influx and proliferation of new policy actors, ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Ball, 2007) and organisations and the creation of new sites of policy enactment operate as networks of governance extending nationally and globally. They incorporate multiple, diverse, connected individuals, private organisations, philanthropic bodies, edu businesses and companies whose names appear on the schedules of education festivals, conferences, policy summits, research report writers, founders and directors of national and global education consultancy companies. Many of these new actors, organisations and sites span ‘boundaries’ from fields outside of traditional education, representing the influence of the business, economic and political world. It is clear from my own research that the world of character education exemplifies this new style of heterarchical network governance. Allen and Bull set out a ‘character education diagram map’ identifying connections between various individuals and organisations that extend globally (2018, p. 441). The
Jubilee Centre and the think tank Demos and their respective key personnel are prime movers and shakers in the UK. The Positive Psychology Centre at the University of Pennsylvania is an influential ‘knowledge hub’ in the USA (ibid, p.442). The neoliberal credentials of this world are perhaps exemplified by the financial influence and support of the John Templeton Foundation, and ‘ostensibly non partisan’ organisation that has ‘ploughed considerable funding into projects aligned with right-wing agendas’ (ibid, p.441). As Allen and Bull point out, both the Positive Psychology Centre at the University of Pennsylvania and the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues at the University of Birmingham have both been recipients of considerable funding from the John Templeton Foundation (ibid, p.443).

**The funding process- character awards and grants**

The most dramatic structural development for the whole child has been the funding and awards process that is part of the character education initiative. The instigation of the Character Awards and the Character Education Grant were key planks in Nicky Morgan’s policy push on character education. Both initiatives were accompanied by DfE published criteria for schools to consider when making their applications (2015a, 2015b, 2015c). I would like to make a couple of observations about the process of funding allocation itself.

The application process, judging criteria and timeline are set out in a series of press releases (DfE, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). This system of funding allocation is quite literally a competition between schools and organisations vying for the money that has been allocated to character education by government. As a process, it is an embodiment of neoliberal characteristics with competition based on ‘merit’, understood in terms of the ability to demonstrate educational and employment success, rather than for example need, at its heart. Obviously, this is a site where what is meant by character and character education is ‘clarified’ and it is hard to imagine a process more thoroughly imbued with neoliberal values of the market and
competition. There is a reiteration of now familiar characteristics of a neoliberal policy field at work in this new initiative of character education.

The rubric clearly specifies that certain characteristics have been identified as important because they lead to success (DfE, 2015a):

Applicants should be able to prove their programme develops character traits, attributes and behaviours that underpin success in school and work…

The instrumental value of character is reiterated as subordinate to the wider goals of success both in school and after. The judging criteria specify what is important:

Evidence that the programme has impacted on aspects of pupils’ character in a way which is improving their engagement and achievement

Programmes with secondary-age children could provide evidence of improvement of preparation for further education/higher education and/or work

Evidence could include (but does not have to be limited to):
• measures of behaviour
• attendance
• parental feedback
• Ofsted judgments or equivalent
• achievement
• progress
• destination measures (DfE, 2015a).

Such criteria for success are framed by the ‘evidence based, what works’ policy mantra as it is made clear that ‘evidence’ is required to show ‘impact’ that leads to ‘engagement and achievement’:

What evidence do you have to show that the character education you provide is effective? How do you monitor its impact? (DfE, 2015a)

Proposals should develop new innovations or expand existing evidence-based practice in some, or all, of the areas below...establishing effective ways to track the progress of pupils throughout their educational journey through to employment (DfE, 2015b).
The concept of character is recounted in the application material evidencing characteristics that conjure an image of a particular kind of dynamic and go-getting individual that echoes Foucault’s *homo oeconomicus*. I am increasingly aware of the need to become more specific about the nature of the whole child that is promoted in well-being and character programmes, and I shall explore this more carefully in the following section. Nevertheless, perhaps it is useful to note the desirable characteristics in passing:

- perseverance, resilience and grit
- confidence and optimism
- motivation, drive and ambition
- neighbourliness and community spirit
- tolerance and respect
- honesty, integrity and dignity
- conscientiousness, curiosity and focus (DfE, 2015a).

The promotion of an increasingly familiar understanding of character as instrumentalised and measurable is intensified, as it becomes fundamental to a process of funding allocation. It quite literally pays to formulate and articulate character within the bounds of specific kinds of knowledge and embedded in wider policy agendas. This process of funding allocation and the kind of character education provision that accompanies it also benefits from the somewhat hybrid and flexible understanding of character that appears characteristic of the policy research. Whilst I have focused on the way in which aspects of the neoliberal policy field have increasingly tightly circumscribed the production of character, the funding and provision process encourages a seemingly paradoxical emphasis on diversity:

- The government wants to celebrate the excellence and diversity in this field, recognising that character is already being encouraged, nurtured and developed alongside academic rigour through a variety of programmes in and outside schools across the country.

Character education can be found within a school’s ethos, in the classroom and on the playground, as much as it can be found on the sports field and outside of school in the local community. Research has shown that both universal and targeted programmes can be effective, with excellent approaches including:
integration into the curriculum and wider aspects of a school
the teaching of character as a separate subject
extra-curricular activities, such as sport and music
outward facing activities, such as community work and volunteering (DfE, 2015a).

This awards and funding programme at one and the same time encourages
and showcases a wide variety of exemplary character programmes whilst
also applying criteria of judgement that are restrictive and value laden. With
this in mind, I would like to consider some of the winners of the 2015
character awards noting the diversity of approaches offered.

**Character Award winners 2015**

**King’s Leadership Academy**

The 2015 character award winner, King’s Leadership Academy, received
£35,000 for its ‘outstanding work in promoting virtue in pupils’ (DfE,
2015d). Measures employed in the school included an eighteen week
fencing programme led by an Olympic coach, including all pupils in the
school brass orchestra, weekly public speaking, philosophy and ethics
classes. Their extra curricular programme clearly plays an important role in
their provision of character education.
By contrast and with a slightly different emphasis, it is interesting to consider Mirfield Free Grammar School, a regional character award winner in 2015. Above is a screen shot from their website which introduces some of the approaches they use, also considered by the DfE to constitute character education. It is noticeable that a wide variety of approaches to the development of the whole child are offered here. It is worth considering a few of these programmes to demonstrate how their inclusion as forms of character education effectively extends an understanding of character though within an umbrella of multiple psy discourses. Mirfield Free Grammar promote an approach termed sixteen habits of mind based on the research done by Costa and Kallick and described on their website as a ‘set of behaviours that help learners change and form positive habits for lifelong learning and success’ (The Institute for Habits of Mind, n.d). Costa is an Emeritus Professor of Education at California State University and co-founder of the Institute for Habits of Mind in the U.S that promotes his
approach through training, certification and resources. The sixteen habits encompass and promote qualities such as Persisting, Managing Impulsivity, Thinking Flexibly and so on (ibid, n.d). However, they do not appear to reference a particular psychological approach. Mirfield Free Grammar do not go into detail regarding this programme but state that the benefits of forming these positive habits is promoted school wide throughout lessons, form time and staff training so that students and staff internalise them and are able to live and learn well in a complex world (Mirfield Free Grammar, 2018).

In addition, another approach adopted by Mirfield Free Grammar and included on their website is one termed ‘True Colours’. It is not clear whether the school provides this themselves or whether they employ an outside company. True Colours is described as a communication tool based on personal construct psychology. It uses a Myers-Briggs type indicator- a self-report questionnaire. This enables a person/child to be identified as one of four personality types outlined below from the True Colours U.K. website (True Colours UK LLP, 2014). According to the website, the academic psychological provenance of this approach appears to be Jungian psychology and it is a popular training programme beyond the world of education.

![Figure 2.5 True Colours website](image)
School 21

School 21 was a regional character award winner in London 2015. School 21 refer to six attributes on their website which they consider fundamental for success in the 21st century (School 21, 2018). In addition, they cite inspirations for their educational approach referenced under the title ‘Well being and Growth Mindset’. So, as listed: Martin Seligman’s book ‘Flourish’, KIPP Character Report Card (based on the American Knowledge is Power Programme), Grit: a report from the Young Foundation, Mindset by Carol Dweck. As we shall see later, one of the founders of School 21 is Ed Fidoe who is proving to be an influential figure in the increasingly high profile world of character education.

Grant recipients

In addition, groups identified for grant funding have received some high profile coverage through press releases on the DfE website. The work of the ‘military ethos’ and ‘rugby’ groups is advertised and praised and propagated as a successful way in which a school can be seen to provide character education (DfE, 2016). In Nicky Morgan’s initial announcements about funding for character education, £4.8 million in grants was allocated to ‘military ethos’ projects. Again, this represents a particular and interesting take on character education. One of those projects is Commando Joe’s ‘an elite team of military veterans on a mission to build character in schools’ (Commando Joe’s, n.d.). They aim to develop character so as ‘to prepare young people for life in modern Britain’ and do this by inspiring ‘helpfulness, a positive attitude, self awareness and a strong moral compass’ (ibid). The actual details of the programme, what they do, are not set out on the website although they offer an impressive range of courses from eight week intensive training in school time to holiday and after school programmes. They are also currently in a ‘partnership with PhDs at Swansea University to allow us to formally evaluate the work we do’ (ibid). The evidence gathered by Swansea University ‘PhDs’ has contributed to annual reports that have aided them in securing funding from the
Department for Education. They display some of these results on the website. The importance of a statistical articulation of results and the simplistic signaling of ‘trends’ is eye-catching and seemingly authoritative, though lacking substantiation.

*Figure 2.6 Commando Joe's website*
On the 31.05.2015, Nicky Morgan also announced funding for rugby coaches ‘to build character and resilience in pupils’ (DfE, 2015e). She commented later in September 2015:

All young people can learn from rugby—it teaches you how to bounce back from defeat, how to respect others and how to work together (DfE, 2015f).

Funding was given to twelve premiership rugby clubs to deliver a series of courses known as ‘On the Front Foot’. The aim of this was to

use Rugby’s core values of Teamwork, Respect, Enjoyment, Discipline and Sportsmanship to develop positive character traits such as resilience, grit, tolerance and honesty in young people across the country (Premiership Rugby, 2018).

A relatively brief examination of the character award winners and grant recipients shows how the awards process has facilitated the entry of a wide variety of ‘character education providers’ into education. It bears witness to the influx of new actors and organisations who are able to move on the understanding of the whole child. Of particular interest is the role of certain key individuals and their organisations which can be seen as a ‘character education network’ (Allen and Bull, 2018) and which I will consider below.
**Character entrepreneurs**

In this section I would like to explore further the importance of heterarchical network governance but hone in on a ‘new cadre of ‘heterarchical actors’ (Ball, 2012, p.138), ‘private actors’ (Ball, 2007, p.11), ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Ball and Junemann, 2012, p.14). In focusing on some of the key individuals in the world of UK character education, I want to show how these character entrepreneurs are a critical part of a neoliberal dispositif that is able, through a heterarchical system, to create its own sites of influence and thus produce an intensification of neoliberal thinking and governance. These character entrepreneurs are drawn from the world of education, research, business and politics and possibly comprise those elusive character ‘experts’ who feature, both at the stage of research with the Jubilee Centre but also at the stage of the funding process. ‘Winners were chosen by a panel of experts and all had to display evidence that their work has improved pupil’s outcomes from exam results to behaviour, attendance or job prospects’ (DfE, 2015d).

I will try to show that these character entrepreneurs ‘embody a new kind of self-understanding and a new set of strategic capacities and interests’ (Ball, 2007, p.11). They are involved in shaping the policy field through the allocations of funding and the receipt of awards that legitimate certain approaches. The following is a snapshot of key players and providers- ‘entrepreneurs’ - in character education in 2018. I have highlighted key actors and organisations in bold to emphasise their relationships and repeated appearance in different ventures.

**Lord James O’Shaughnessy** was Director of Policy and Research for David Cameron between 2007-2011 and was appointed to the House of Lords August 2015. He is currently Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Health (Lords). He was also founding managing Director at Floreat Education in 2014 that has subsequently become **Floreat Education Academies Trust**. This a multi academy trust currently with two primary schools and plans, according to their website, to expand further. (Floreat
Education Academies Trust, 2018). Although, it seems that they have been forced to close an existing school, since a merger with the Avanti Schools Trust intended to support them has failed (Whittaker, 2018). **Floreat Education** offers an educational model it refers to as ‘Virtue and Knowledge’ that emphasises the importance of character as well as academic knowledge. ‘We start with the idea that education is as much about developing young people’s character strengths and virtues as it is about developing their academic knowledge and skills’ (Floreat Education Academies Trust, 2018)). It also offers the **Floreat Character Programme** (having been awarded a Character Education Grant by the Department for Education), which includes a Virtue Literacy Programme based on eighteen virtues. Interestingly, in their vision, Floreat specifically note and justify a flexible and eclectic understanding of character arguing that ‘recent scientific discoveries in the cognitive sciences have confirmed the theories of the classical philosophers’ (ibid, 2018).

**Lord James O'Shaughnessy** was a founding member and previously chair of the steering committee of the International Positive Education Network. **IPEN** is an organisation, born out of a ‘meeting of minds’ in 2013 when: ‘**Martin Seligman** and **Lord James O'Shaughnessy** brought together sixteen of the world leaders in positive psychology and education’ (IPEN, 2018). This inaugural **Positive Education Summit** was held at 10 Downing St. and then at **Wellington College** (Jubilee Centre, 2018) to establish the International Positive Education Network (IPEN) and to ‘investigate how the PERMA theory can be used to underpin an entire approach to education’ (Jubilee Centre, 2018). The PERMA theory refers to **Martin Seligman’s** model of happiness and is part of his highly influential positive psychology. It is an acronym of Positive emotion, Engagement, Relationships, Meaning and Accomplishments. **IPEN** sets out its aim as seeking to challenge current educational paradigms, promote positive education and reform government policy broadly outlined in a manifesto that it invites you to sign (IPEN, 2018). It explicitly promotes itself as combining academics, character and well-being as is clear in its promotional pages for its second festival of Positive Education (IPEN, 2018). Again, character and well-being are
explicitly merged when it is stated ‘we believe that the DNA of education is a double helix with intertwined strands of equal importance Academics plus Character and Well being’ (IPEN, 2018). The event involved 30 ‘world leaders in education, academia and psychology’ including some well-known names such as Anthony Seldon and Dr. Ilona Boniwell. James Arthur and Kris Kristjansson of the Jubilee Centre presented A Framework for Character Education in Schools (Jubilee Centre 2018). Professor Angela Duckworth of The Duckworth Lab, University of Pennsylvania and Character Lab in the US attended as well as significant global leaders in the world of character education. Members of the IPEN team now include: Anthony Seldon, Vice-Chancellor, Buckingham University, previous master of Wellington College, (James O'Shaughnessy’s alma mater), Martin Seligman, Director of the Positive Psychology Center, University of Pennsylvania, Angela Duckworth, Professor of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Ilona Boniwell, ‘one of the European leaders in positive psychology’ (Positive Psychology, 2018), James Arthur and Kristjan Kristjansson from the Jubilee Centre. Further connections with these people will be explored below.

Lord James O'Shaughnessy is also co-founder of Ed-Space. Edspace is a company of ‘Nice people, serious about changing education for good’ (Edspace, n.d.). The other co-founder is Ed Fidoe. Ed Fidoe founder of School 21 that received a character award in the first awards announced in 2015 by the DfE. Essentially, Edspace appears to offer desk space, meeting rooms, public event space, high-speed internet access. ‘Ed-space is a community and co-working space for people transforming education. We are the focal point for a growing community of education organisations and entrepreneurs’ (ibid, n.d.). It hosts a ‘powerful network of over 500 educators’ and offers a variety of ‘co-working packages’, ‘access to industry connections, mentors, strategic partnerships and showcasing’ as well as organised events to meet others, who are ‘building a company or charity, looking for investments or developing an early idea’ (ibid, n.d.).
Lord James O'Shaughnessy is also the Founder and Managing Director of Mayforth Consulting, a ‘strategy and research consultancy with a primary focus on education’ (Mayforth Consulting, 2013). Amongst others, they have worked with Floreat Education, the Positive Education Summit and with Wellington College to aid in its strategy to increase their involvement in the academies programme.

Lord James O'Shaughnessy also produced the report ‘Competition Meets Collaboration’ with Policy Exchange, a centre right Think Tank of which he is an alumnus (2012). Interestingly, in light of his work with the Academies Trust Floreat Education, it recommended ways of dealing with failing schools largely through the promotion and strengthening of the academy chain model.

Lord James O'Shaughnessy has also been an advisor at Character Lab a non-profit group that promotes a ‘character lab research network’ and produces ‘playbooks’ for schools (Character Lab, n.d.). Character Lab was founded by Professor Angela Duckworth who also an attendee at the Positive Education summit and member of the IPEN steering committee. She is based at the University of Pennsylvania, alongside Martin Seligman, where she completed her PhD in psychology. Finally, Lord James O’Shaughnessy is also Honorary Senior research fellow at the Jubilee Centre.

Jen Lexmond started off at Demos looking at social mobility and character:

Her research on social mobility and child development has been widely cited in academic journals, as well as making policy impact at the highest level, being launched by the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister and referenced in government white papers and best practice policy (Lexmond, 2018).

Her conference paper ‘Character as capability’ (2012) was written for the Jubilee Centre. Jen Lexmond was a Director of Character Counts: ‘a social research and innovation company that promotes, designs and evaluates interventions that build character’ (Lexmond, 2018).
As well as creating and offering products and services and support, their focus was to help ‘family, early years and education sectors, services, to measure impact more effectively’. They were explicit and almost evangelical in stating ‘Importantly, the effect of character on desired public outcomes can be measured, predicted and priced. The earliest investments yield the highest returns- to individuals and society’ (Character Counts, n.d.).

However, since beginning this research, Lexmond has had considerable success with an app EasyPeasy- ‘The home learning intervention that prepares children for school and life. Backed by evidence’ (EasyPeasy, 2019). She is the Founder and CEO of the edtech start up EasyPeasy, a digital coaching service for early years parents. EasyPeasy are listed under the Edspace community on the Edspace website (EasyPeasy, 2019). To conclude this review, I reference some of the characteristics of this world of character education that are both significant and concerning through the final slide from a presentation at the Character and Resilience Summit by Jen Lexmond. Two years after this presentation Jen Lexmond had set up her company Character Counts and marketed the EasyPeasy app. The slide pithily concludes ‘Character counts...Let’s count it!’ (Lexmond, 2013)
I have attempted to give a flavour of the small group of tightly connected individuals, *entrepreneurs* that lead in the arena of character education. These individuals, and often the groups they represent, have considerable influence over and extract considerable benefit from policies of character education. They are new influencers in the arena of character education policy and thanks to the heterarchical nature of today’s education system; their influence on policy is significant. Policy entrepreneurs are adept at moving between arenas, they are ‘defined by mobility and hybridity’ and this is critical to their success (Ball and Juneman, 2012, p.139). **Lord James O'Shaughnessy** exemplifies this with his extensive portfolio, recently resigning from his government position and returning to an advisory role at Portland Communications, a communications strategy firm that works with multi national companies and governments (Hickman, 2019). The ability to span boundaries is critical in facilitating flow of information and influence and ensuring the visibility of, in this case, character, as a political and policy
focus. In turn, these political connections can only aid in the development of business responses to policy demands.

On examination, it would seem that these character entrepreneurs are well placed to take advantage of policy moves that they have been in a position to influence. It is not merely that they ‘lie in wait’ (Kingdon cited in Ball, 2012, p.14); they are actively involved in creating the opportunities that they exploit. Their research and businesses in part create and define the market of character education through policy development. Their organisations/businesses offer services so that schools can respond to policy they have helped to develop and indeed some have been able to secure additional funds through awards structures. Their material and websites and events are themselves sites where the definitions expand and shift, are instantiated and evolved. In effect, such individuals are producing themselves as experts in defining a field that they then proceed to market themselves in; a market in which their ‘knowledge’ is instrumental in determining both the product that is needed and the product that is sold. This is an evolving feedback loop where those defining character are also those providing character education who through that provision then are able to evolve the understanding of character further. They have contributed to defining the contours of the market of character education in which they themselves operate and moreover in which they are defined as ‘leaders’ and ‘experts’. In addition, the money that surrounds and flows through such organisations and individuals is substantial and often its route and destination lacks transparency (Robertson, 2018).

In a way, this foray into the world, or network, of character education takes this research in a slightly different direction. I have included it because I think that these actors illustrate vividly some of the key ways in which power inhabits and traverses character education policy. Tracking key figures tracks the movement of the character of the whole child from policy subject to a marketable end product. Many actors are in a position to prioritise and promote certain types of knowledge through which to conceptualise character. They are critical points in the creation of the whole
child as a bio/etho political subject and hence instrumental to expanding neoliberal governance.

**The neoliberal dispositif: heterarchical governance and character**

The brief snapshot of the award and funding system above reveals the reiteration of neoliberal tropes. The continuing wider policy context of investment in human capital with a view to improving behaviour, academic performance and therefore employability continues to position character as an instrumental good. The prevalence of psy-scientific models of the self is evident in different programmes. The nature of the process itself places schools and organisations in competition with one another for financial reward. The absolute integrity to the awards and funding process of measuring and auditing impact and progress reiterates the importance of quantitative methodologies and sciences that reduce the complex and social to the simple and numerical.

However, I think that there is something more going on in this process facilitated by a paradox at the heart of the way the whole child is being produced in this policy of character education. In order to try and explain this, I want to bring together the simultaneous ambiguity and specificity of the definition of character with heterarchical governance and the extension of the neoliberal dispositif.

One of the very important truths that is promoted by the great variety and diversity of award winners is the stance that character, well-being, extra curricular activity, PSHE are all essentially the same thing. In part, this truth can be produced because of the all-encompassing and ambiguous definition of character that has fed into policy through the policy research process. This definition evidences an epistemological stance that positions values, skills and qualities such as tolerance, motivation, integrity, and ambition as fundamental underlying characteristics that are essentially the same whatever arena they happen to be developed in. Grit is grit whether exhibited and encouraged on the rugby pitch or in an orchestra, a library or in a problem solving activity. It is this stance that effectively legitimates an
unlimited variety of approaches to character education. This allows for the flexibility that Demos commend as allowing schools a certain degree of autonomy in how they approach things. It also creates a potentially large market for purveyors of character education characterised by great scope and diversity. This market has fuelled the development of multiple and varied organisations offering programmes, courses, training, ‘expertise’, that reiterate and effectively develop such a broad definition. The funding process and character awards are opportunities for the understanding of character to be further evolved as the websites of award winners and grant recipients became new sites of influence. However, the promotion and development of such a broad understanding of character is of course mitigated by the restrictive parameters of other aspects of the policy field within which it exists and by which it is mediated. This is the root of the paradox. The variety of approaches stand in stark contrast to the specific psy-scientific accounts of human nature and practices of calculation that are characteristic features of this production of character. It seems that character education can indeed take many forms, as long as it leads to or facilitates successful educational achievement and employment that can be adequately measured. For all the diversity of provision, only those programmes that can be incorporated into these aspects of the neoliberal dispositif are recognised and funded.

Heterarchical governance works as a network of relationships within which the ambiguity of the whole child may be exploited. The broad and eclectic definition of the whole child finds multiple sites of development to create a wide and diverse market. However, it is not simply that there are new sites and avenues of influence, there are far more of them. Heterarchical governance facilitates a proliferation of smaller, localised sites and avenues of power where the activities of ‘boundary spanning’ are easier and less visible. In a way, heterarchical governance increases the surface area of power and accelerates and intensifies the evolution and spread of the neoliberal dispositif. This is peculiarly evident in character education with the proliferation of providers, a veritable cottage industry of provision evolving the understanding of character by working within a policy.
definition that is expandable and ambiguous. However, the key feature of heterarchical governance is that it is predicated on being unified by an overarching grid of accountability. ‘Small government’ can only be achieved through more pervasive, less overt but equally restrictive practices. Hence, systems of competition and accountability instantiate key neoliberal values by directing the production of character so as to reinforce the neoliberal characteristics of the whole child. This interplay of knowledge, practices and systems ensure that the whole child functions as a route of neoliberal governmentality.

The production of the whole child as an extension of the neoliberal dispositif and governmentality

In this section, I have analysed some of the key features of the English neoliberal education system and policy field and tried to make sense of the ways this inflects and incites policies of well-being and character and contribute to the production of a neoliberal whole child. I have explored how a heterogeneous combination of policy agendas, research methodologies, systems of accountability and forms and features of heterarchical network governance interact to constitute a powerful milieu that influences and enables the production the whole child. I have understood this assemblage of people and organisations, knowledge and relationships as part of an ever-evolving neoliberal dispositif. The neoliberal dispositif is characterised by and expands through a process of constant layering where various discourses, practices and systems cohere to tighten scope for thought and action, directing understanding and practice of the whole child. This is more than a thematic ordering though, it is an operation or form of power that dissipates and extends a neoliberal government rationale. It is important to be precise about how policies of well-being and character are implicated in and indeed extend this government power and I want to draw on Foucault’s notion of governmentality to try and explicate this.
To use the construct neoliberal *governmentality* is to address the ‘light touch’ nature of governance in modern advanced liberal or neoliberal societies. It identifies the governance of a population as taking place through a shared mentality or rationale of government. To quote Mitchell Dean, ‘It emphasizes the way in which the thinking involved in practices of government is explicit and embedded in language and other technical instruments but is also relatively taken for granted,’ (2010, p.25).

Absolutely integral to the notion of governmentality is the concept of subjectivity which refers to the way in which a particular government rationale or mentality produces certain aligned subject positions. Governmentality, as a form of power, works through the formation of subjectivities that embody and promulgate the mentality of government. It is these subjectivities that secure the style of ‘government-lite’ that is part of the appeal of liberalism and neoliberalism. This of course raises the question of how such subjectivities are produced and this is precisely what I think this section has explored.

Psy-scientific discourses promote bio/etho political truths and selves. Neoliberal policies rooted in notions of human capital and social investment build on this and promote a strategic attitude to the development of the self that instrumentalises the affective and moral domain. The quantitative policy field reduces constructs such as well-being and character through processes of calculation in order to facilitate assessment. Thus a model of the self is made amenable to measurement and to incorporation into systems of accountability. The deregulated market that is a significant part of the current education system leads to intensified commodification and marketisation of the whole child through the development of businesses offering solutions to policy requirements.

This milieu is the context in which self-development takes place and shapes the way the whole child develops. The relentless reiteration and multiplication of neoliberal practices and truths and their embrace and inflection of well-being and character policies constitute a neoliberal dispositif that defines the parameters of the whole child. Neoliberal
governmentality inhabits the structures and boundaries of the neoliberal dispositif that mark out and structure action. My argument is that what we see here is the creation of a space, the laying of the groundwork for the production of the whole child as a bio political subjectivity through which neoliberal governmentality is extended to the very heart of the child.
Section three: Practicing the whole child through school programmes of positive psychology and character education: neoliberal technologies of the self

In this section, I want to look at what happens with programmes of the whole child in practice and to focus on the nature of the subjectivity promoted by such programmes. Following on from the work of previous sections, this means extending my thinking about programmes of well-being and character as forms of ‘etho power’; a particular exercise of bio power that explores the individuals’ ethical, emotional and moral relationship to themselves as a form of government. It specifically draws attention to the kind of models of the self that are embedded in those technologies of the self that have a specific emphasis on psy-scientific accounts. This is helpful in focusing on and elaborating the detail of how a neoliberal whole child might be produced.

Whilst this sounds like a relatively straightforward endeavour, as with most aspects of using and applying Foucault’s thinking, it is far from that. Foucault’s thinking about the self-constitution of the subject is ambiguous and complex, and certainly goes beyond his writings on governmentality and technologies of the self. More significantly for this particular aspect of my research, the discursive ‘classroom context’ produces a set of more direct and traditional disciplinary power relations that fundamentally inflect and interact with the technologies of the self that both of the programmes examined below elaborate. This pedagogical milieu is as constitutive of the production of the whole child as the programmes themselves. I have chosen to look first at a programme of positive psychology and secondly at a character education programme of study produced by the Jubilee Centre. By way of contextualisation, both analyses are preceded by a short theoretical discussion of the psychological, philosophical and/or methodological
approaches that inform them. To begin with as with previous sections, I will discuss those aspects of Foucault’s thinking that can help to shed light upon the practices under analysis.

**Technologies of the self**

Many of the difficulties that arise when considering the development of Foucault’s work and thinking are that it is not linear or uniform; indeed Gros refers aptly to ‘a hermeneutic spiral’ (Foucault, 2005 p.515). We have a wide variety of publications; books, interviews and lectures covering an extensive time period and these coupled with Foucault’s own varied reassessments of his work can make it difficult to arrive at a coherent account: ‘Each of Foucault’s books strikes a specific tone that is muffled and distorted if we insist on harmonising it with his other books’ (Gutting, 1994, p.3). This is particularly the case when considering the analytical concept of technologies of the self that in a way seems to sit at a significant intersection or overlap between different stages of Foucault’s work on power and ethics. Consequently, I have found it helpful to take on board his comments and reappraisals on his own work as a way of understanding technologies of the self.

Foucault considers that his project has been to examine ‘forms of experience’ in terms of three interrelated categories/ perspectives or along three critical axes- knowledge/truth, power and subjectivity/ethics. His analyses bring out how ‘experience’

conjoins a field of knowledge (connaissance) (with its own concepts, theories, diverse disciplines), a collections of rules (which differentiate the permissible from the forbidden, natural from monstrous, normal from pathological, what is decent from what is not and so on) and a mode of relation between the individual and himself’ (1997, p.200).

Foucault’s focus on technologies of the self- practices and techniques through which human beings understand and constitute themselves, are
initially explored in the context of analyses that emphasise/prioritise the axes of knowledge and power. Technologies of the self can quite clearly be understood as integral to his genealogy of the state and the development of the concept of governmentality as a particular mode of modern power. From this perspective, technologies of the self are understood as part of an analytic of governmentality, as a medium of neoliberalism through the production of subjectivities, in particular homo oeconomicus. They are a constituent part of a peculiar mode of state governance and arguably this epistemological context directs/limits our perspective and understanding.

**Technologies of the self and governmentality**

Foucault’s notion of governmentality identifies and prioritises the importance of the modern individual to the modern state, as indicative of and fundamental to a certain style of power relation. It refers to a kind of power that links technologies of the self with technologies of domination: the constitution of a particular kind of subject, homo oeconomicus, as integral to the constitution of a particular kind of neoliberal governance. It is an attempt to explain how an autonomous, free, self-determining individual is part of and contributes to political and economic exploitative relations of power. Inevitably then, this means investigating not only technologies of domination such as institutions of discipline, but also inevitably technologies of the self through which individuals constitute themselves. From this perspective, technologies of the self are a fundamental part of governance. So our attention may be drawn to particular ‘points of contact’ where savior, connaissance and practices are played out in forms of constitution and self-constitution – of which pedagogies of well-being and character maybe examples.

So, whereas Foucault’s earlier work has emphasised the importance of technologies of domination in constructing the human being as a subject, his later work explores those technologies of the self. He explains that he has previously looked at ‘where certain subjects became objects of
knowledge and at the same time objects of domination. And now, I wish to study those forms of understanding which the subject creates about himself’ (Foucault, 1993 p.203). In order to explore this, he thinks in terms of practices, or techniques/technologies of the self defined as

techniques which permit individuals to effect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on their own conduct, and in this manner so as to transform themselves, modify themselves, and to attain a state of perfection, happiness, of purity, of supernatural power, and so on (Foucault, 1993, p.203).

Most importantly for this research and to secure a deeper understanding of governmentality, it is the relationship, ‘the constant interaction’ (ibid, p.203) between techniques of domination and techniques of the self that is critical. Specifically, account must be taken of

the points where the technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself. And conversely…the points where the techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion or domination (ibid,p.203).

It is in this sense that it is clear how governmentality can be understood as a contact point or a continuum/field of power. ‘The contact point where individuals are driven by others is tied to the way they conduct themselves, is what we call, I think, government’ (Foucault, 1993, p.204). ‘You can see that power relations, governmentality, the government of the self and of others, and the relationship of self to self constitute a chain, a thread’ (Foucault, 2005, p.252).

A critical and perhaps under-laboured point about techniques of the self is that they exist as part of and within social, cultural, political structures.

I would say that if I am now interested in how the subject constitutes itself in an active fashion through practices of the self, these practices are nevertheless not something invented by the individual himself. They are models that he finds in his culture, his society and his social group (Foucault, 1997, p.291)
This clearly points to an area of investigation that is potentially blurred and overlapping and in terms of analysis this is problematic. Indeed, Foucault himself points out that one of the difficulties of studying technologies of the self is that ‘they are frequently linked to techniques for the direction of others. For example, if we take educational institutions, we realise that one is managing others and teaching them to manage themselves’ (ibid, p.277).

So, technologies of the self, as the long arm of governmentality facilitate forms of self-construction but are comprised from practices that are also caught up in systems of domination and games of truth. This double-edged effect is summed up through Foucault’s use of the word subjectivities to express the subjects produced.

**Subjectivities and the homo oeconomicus**

The production of subjectivities through technologies of the self is critical to Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism as a governmentality. In particular, the neoliberal subjectivity par excellence- homo oeconomicus. It is important to understand the nature and significance of this figure for Foucault’s examination of neoliberalism.

A critical aspect of neoliberal economic analysis is a reconceptualisation of human labour as human capital. Foucault comments on the consequences of such a reconceptualisation. He notes that this shift meant that the focus of economic attention went from the market to the individual economic subject, thereby opening up human activity to the vocabulary of markets, investment and capital and enterprise. This conceptualisation underpins the nature of neoliberal governmental policies and practices that in turn create a milieu in which certain characteristics and behaviours will be prompted and successful. This is the production of homo oeconomicus, an enterprising self who makes their own life a project, ‘being for himself his own capital’ (Foucault, 2010, p.226); the embodiment of neoliberal values and attitudes that further served to extend them.
This internalisation of the neoliberal stratagem as homo oeconomicus, the entrepreneur of her/himself, is a critical hinge that brings together the governing of others (subjectification) and the governing of the self (subjectivation). In addition, this figure of neoliberal subjectivity is pivotal in ensuring the spread of market rationality to wider social phenomena.

**How to make sense of and room for freedom and autonomy?**

At this stage in the account, we have only considered the self-constitution of the subject as part of a mode of governance. I think it is fair to say that despite his new emphasis on technologies of the self, many academics felt that his subject remained essentially structurally determined. However, there is a more damaging challenge created by Foucault’s work on ethics that places it in tension with his work of power and governmentality. Foucault’s notion of governmentality positions freedom and autonomy as sites and opportunities of governance. This is done, as McNay points out, because the neoliberal notion of the self as an economised, individual enterprise alters the conventional conception of autonomy:

> Governance through enterprise construes the individual as an entrepreneur of his own life, who relates to others as competitors and his own being as a form of human capital. In this organised self relation, individual autonomy is not an obstacle or limit to social control but one of its central technologies (McNay, 2009, p.63).

In fact, the essential problem is that Foucault’s theory of governmentality views the free, autonomous, self-governing, ethical subject as the quintessential modality of neoliberal governance. This then problematises the ethical constitution of the subject as a form of resistance. The governmentality approach that positions the subject as integral to a modality of power and governance and therefore with a compromised sense of agency appears to contradict the idea of producing some kind of meaningful autonomy through practices of ethical self fashioning. To a certain extent, Ball and Olmedo attempt to address this impasse by exploring the self as a site or ‘terrain of struggle’ in the everyday (2013,
In exploring the notion of subjectivity through Foucault’s practices of care of the self, they suggest a ‘practice of ‘concrete liberty’, which is localised and flexible’ (ibid, p.94). Indeed, there has been a suggestion that programmes of self-help can be understood as practices of care of the self. Indeed on occasion, there are echoes, arguably distorted echoes, of such practices of the self in the programmes analysed below e.g. practices of self-reflection and self-writing intended to modify the self. However, for many, such explorations do not convince and the tension between the subject as an operation of power and as a site of resistance remains irreconcilable.

It seems to me it is essential, or at least helpful, to keep sight of Foucault’s work as an exploration of human experience along and across three interconnecting axes of knowledge, power and ethics. It is the unstable alliances of those axes that constitute human experience and the subject. Although the subject and experience may exist at the intersection of these axes, this should not impute any sense of termination, fixedness or essentiality.

Whilst governmentality produces and operates through subjectivities, those subjectivities are not fixed end points of an application of power from above or outside. Neoliberal governmentality is not a form of power operating on a vast expanse of pre-existent free subjects transforming them into robotic subjectivities. A given subjectivity, ‘which is of course only one of the given possibilities of organisation of a self consciousness’ (Foucault, 1990b, p.253) no more accounts for/constitutes the totality of a person’s actions than ‘freedom’ references a pre-existent state of nature. Indeed, Foucault is adamant that power relations depend on freedom since without they cease to be relations of any kind. Consequently, power relations, governmentality, technologies of the self and subjectivities exist in a state of permanent tension with points of insubordination ‘which, by definition, are means of escape’ (Foucault, 1982, p.225). This grid of power relations, or intelligibility, that Foucault attempts to portray is not
circumscribed and fixed but porous and volatile. This instability creates an opportunity for flexibility that can be understood as a point of escape or insubordination or simply as an alternative route of power. A subjectivity is both a potential point of insubordination and also a route of power because it is an unstable point of intersection, a critical hinge in a linkage through which power relations move. Here, the human subject can be governed or not and possibly be both simultaneously. With this in mind, I would like to examine the way in which particular programmes of positive psychology and character might be situated.
Personal well-being lessons for secondary school- positive psychology in action for 11 to 14 year olds by Ilona Boniwell and Lucy Ryan

Figure 3.1 Front cover of textbook Boniwell and Ryan, 2012

Personal well-being lesson for secondary school- positive psychology in action for 11 to 14 year olds by Ilona Boniwell and Lucy Ryan is based on the claims and tenets of positive psychology. It is a textbook that provides a series of thirty-six well-being lessons organised into six units with lesson plans and instructions and further handouts and PowerPoint presentations that can be downloaded from the website.
All lessons, in line with the basic premise of positive psychology are, it is claimed, ‘grounded in scientific discoveries related to well-being’ (Introduction, xvii)

I am going to focus on Unit One ‘Positive Self’ which consists of six lessons: Happy Talk, Me, Inc., My Strengths Portfolio, Confident You, My Best Possible Self and The Strengths Songbook.

I have argued previously that programmes of well-being and character problematise the education of the ‘whole child’. This problematisation of the whole child is, in many cases, the rationale and justification of
programmes of well-being. Interestingly, the resource I want to look at begins with a teacher’s introduction that also problematises well-being from two different perspectives.

Initially, Boniwell and Ryan cite the 2007 UNICEF report that places the UK in the bottom third of twenty one industrialised countries for childhood well-being, they note ‘an unprecedented increase in childhood and adolescent depression’ in the Western world (2012, ix). It is in such contexts of crisis that programmes of well-being are often promoted as forms of respite and counter balances that help students to deal with the pressures of modern life. This certainly seems to be the motivation for Boniwell and Ryan who reference numerous varied programmes of well-being in their introduction to validate such a stance (Bounce Back, Penn Resiliency programmes, SPARK Resilience programme, Social and Emotional Learning (SEL)). They reference research that shows that ‘happy people’ are more successful, creative, trusting, helpful and sociable’ (Lyubomirsky et al cited in Boniwell and Ryan 2012, x) and that self-discipline in children predicts academic success beyond their IQs (Duckworth and Seligman cited ibid). Further, Boniwell has conducted subsequent research to gauge the impact of specific well-being programmes observing a ‘significant buffering effect’ against varying forms of dissatisfaction and indicating a ‘positive impact of the well-being curriculum’ (Boniwell et al, 2016, p.85).

However, the development of the well-being whole child is not only positioned as a form of protection or combat readiness, as Boniwell and Ryan state:

> Although the case for well-being education can be made purely on the basis of prevention of ill-health, depression, anxiety and other mental health disorders, there is at least as much value in appreciating the benefits that well-being can bring (2012, p.ix)

The authors also cite research that demonstrates that ‘happy people are successful across multiple life domains’ (ibid, p.x). This adds the bonus that in the process of tackling a mental well-being problem, positive psychology can improve a child’s chance of success. This builds on the idea that failing
to educate the whole child is also a wasted opportunity. From this perspective, the education of the whole child is seen as a strategic strengthening of a child’s character such that they can more successfully negotiate a risky and competitive world of employment. Indeed, the ‘soft skills’ and character development they promote further enhance a child’s prospects and ‘portfolio’. This situates the happiness of the whole child as both an ethical and economic concern. This blurring of seemingly contradictory legitimations for such a programme is intriguing. It suggests that positive psychology offers itself as an opportunity to refuse any potential dichotomy of ethical practices and economic gain since both are available through the programme. This raises a question regarding the relationship between practices of ethical self-constitution, technologies of the self and neoliberal governmentality. Boniwell and Ryan’s introduction focuses my analysis to probe whether such practices of moral self-development have become imbricated in a neoliberal dispositif serving to extend it. However, prior to presenting my analysis, it is useful to consider some of the academic critiques that have been offered regarding the relationship between psychology and neoliberalism, and in particular positive psychology and neoliberalism.

Psychology and neoliberalism

In a 2015 article that ‘draws attention to’ the relationship between neoliberalism and psychology, Sugarman cautions that psychology is implicated in neoliberalism through the constitution of certain subjectivities. Sugarman notes the emergence of *homo oeconomicus* and raises uncomfortable questions about the responses and relations of psychology to this figure. The participation of psychologists in commending ‘personal branding’ alone is ‘ample illustration of collusion with neoliberal governmentality’ (Sugarman, 2015, p.107), but he elaborates further concerns. For example, he references the psychological conceptualisation of social anxiety as an individual disorder as promoting ‘an instrumental orientation to social and personal life, contributing to naturalizing and normalizing neoliberalism’ (ibid, p.108). In the world of education and
referencing the work of Martin and McLellan (2013), he notes the influence of educational psychologists in producing ‘the expressive, enterprising and entitled student’ (Sugarman, 2015, p.112). Sugarman argues that such students exhibit qualities of strategic goal setting, performance evaluation, self-direction, etc. that appear ‘especially well suited to the governmentality required of neoliberalism and enterprise culture’ (ibid, p.112):

By promoting particular kinds of self hood and techniques by which they are developed and attained, educational psychologists have intervened in the operations and purposes of schools to help produce forms of subjectivity suitable to neoliberal governmentality…..By designing and instituting education practices and interventions that teach us to manage ourselves and act in ways befitting the neoliberal conception of ourselves as autonomous enterprising actors, educational psychologists are partners in preserving the status quo (ibid, p.113).

Sugarman’s unease is with the ethics implicit in promoting psychological theories that he considers ‘ideologically laden’ and also with the effects they may produce. This raises concerns about the ways in which psychology produces the self through different theoretical models of human relations, through the characteristics that we are encouraged to develop and through strategies we are urged to acquire to handle our personal development. It would seem that there is at least a troubling affinity between the self that much modern day psychology promotes and the neoliberal self. Therefore, I would like to consider in a little more detail a branch of psychology that has become particularly influential in shaping a number of whole child programmes- positive psychology. My interest lies in whether this lends itself to or plays into the construction of a particular kind of moral agency characteristic of neoliberalism. It has certainly been suggested that positive psychology offers an epistemological and ontological discourse and framework through which to structure, spell out and detail exactly how such a style of moral agency might be encouraged and practiced. This claim will be addressed.
Positive psychology

The publication of a special millennial issue of the *American Psychologist* in January 2000 is generally considered to mark the arrival of positive psychology as a distinct psychological area and approach. In *Positive Psychology: An Introduction* Martin Seligman and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi sought to refocus psychology away from illness and pathology towards positive experiences, personality traits and habits. The publication of Martin Seligman’s best selling book *Authentic Happiness* followed the same year. Positive psychology focuses on individuals’ strengths to enable people to achieve well-being and to flourish. It employs a loose collection of psychological approaches proposing a scientifically grounded and measurable model of the self as containing the potential for happiness through the relentless practice of optimism. Happiness lies in the agency of the autonomous individual to effect their own development by promoting certain positive emotional states through cognitive manipulation. In order to achieve this, Peterson and Seligman (2004) further devised a formal classification of character strengths and virtues that can be measured and thus provide the basis for supportive scientific research. It is clear that positive psychology situates itself firmly within the science of psychology distinguishing itself from self-esteem movements. Seligman is Professor of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania and the website of the Positive Psychology Center based at the University of Pennsylvania explicitly references its ‘scientific publications’ (Positive Psychology Center, 2019).

In a relatively short space of time, positive psychology has become an influential, successful and pervasive ‘movement’ or approach. It has secured respect within the academic community with competitive programs in top American universities, Templeton prizes, and international conferences and attracted substantial funding from the U.S. Department of Education and other organisations (Binkley, 2014, p.26). In England, the UK Resilience programme, based on positive psychology’s Penn Resilience program was trialled in twenty-two secondary schools in England (Challen et al, 2009).
continues to be offered to schools, as do variations of it, along with Penn Resilience Teacher Training by multiple educational businesses (*Bounce Forward, Positive Psychology Learning, How to Thrive*). More recently, the University of Buckingham has adopted Positive Psychology as an approach for staff and students naming itself Europe’s first Positive University (University of Buckingham, 2017). It is also possible to take post graduate degrees in Positive Psychology at a number of new universities in England-MSc Applied Positive Psychology at University of East London, MSc Positive Psychology and Well-being at Liverpool John Moores University, MSc Applied Positive Psychology Anglia Ruskin University to name three.

However, as popular and fertile as positive psychology is, it has not been without its critics (McDonald and O’Callaghan, 2008, Ehrenreich, 2009, Binkley, 2014). Of particular interest is the recent and Foucauldian influenced work of Sam Binkley- *Happiness as enterprise: An essay on neoliberal life* (2014). Binkley analyses positive psychology as part of a neoliberal dispositif that produces the neoliberal subject. He sees positive psychology as a repudiation and adaptation of the traditional psy-disciplines that operate as a disciplinary technology producing docile, introspective subjects characteristic of the welfare approach to social government:

> Neo-liberalism would reinvent the psy-disciplines as a technology of opportunity, enterprise and self government, centred on the repudiation of that very inwardness, that docility and the pursuit of therapeutic truth that was the hallmark of the psy disciplines (Binkley, 2011a, p.92).

Binkley attempts to show that neoliberal recasts a ‘vision of psychological life as enterprise, one centred on the individual pursuit of well-being as one of calculating self interest’ (ibid, p.94). The model of the ‘happy’ self on which it is premised and promotes is one that is autonomous, free and hard working. Indeed, the individual’s capacity to take control and direct themselves and their life is the root of happiness. Binkley’s contention is that the subjectivity that sits at the heart of positive psychology’s ‘happiness’ agenda is peculiarly neoliberal in its emphasis on such individual autonomy and freedom and self interest. However, its
specific contribution to neoliberal governmentality is that it brings
‘emotional content to neoliberal subjectification’ (2011b, p.386). Binkley
argues that positive psychology represents ‘a folding of governmental
authority or a relay in the production of subjectivity’ (ibid, p.386), a ‘hinge’
that ‘illustrates how governmental rationalities transpose themselves onto
the affective dispositions of subjects as analogous emotional enterprises
centred on the cultivation and maximisation of particular emotional
potentials’ (ibid, p.387).

Binkley’s critique is both excoriating and far-reaching but does not focus on
positive psychology in schools. Although not uncritical of Binkley, the work
of James Reveley is useful in that it extends the analysis to examine the role
of positive education in schools in particular. Focussed specifically on what
he terms ‘cognitive capitalism’, Reveley employs Weber’s notion of
‘elective affinity’ to describe the relationship between positive psychology
and cognitive capitalism (2013, p.539). He identifies positive psychology’s
deployment of mindfulness training as a technology of the self that develops
personal flexibility and resilience through self-reflection and openness. He
argues that the influence of positive psychology on educational policy and
the subsequent employment of this type of training in schools have meant
the creation of those ‘very types of persons who are cognitive capitalism’s
lifeblood’ (ibid, p.543). These are subjects who are, as a result of their
mindfulness training, ‘open, psychologically flexible, curious (and) value-
creating’ (ibid, p. 543). Reveley considers the role of mindfulness and
positive psychology in transmitting ‘the neoliberal self -responsibilising
impulse down to young people’ (ibid, p.498). In intensifying self-reflection
and self-monitoring, it mirrors the self-managing individual of
neoliberalism and whilst he acknowledges that it might serve as a basis for
resistance, he remains sceptical. He concurs with Binkley that ‘happiness’,
‘flourishing’, and ‘well being’ in contemporary society are value laden
terms suffused with neoliberal overtones’ (ibid, p.507).

However, the purpose of this critique is not to argue that positive
psychology is negative in influence or effect. Indeed, there is much to
commend an educational programme that aims to develop curious and value
creating young people. It is important though to critically analyse such goals
and to situate such programmes in terms of the correspondences they exhibit
with particular ideological truths. An understanding of the complexity of the
enactment of educational policies of personal and emotional development,
as explored in Section two, necessitates a sceptical assessment of the ‘points
of contact’ with neoliberalism.

I would argue that Binkley, Reveley and others have demonstrated an
affinity between the tropes of neoliberal governmentality, in particular the
production of *homo oeconomicus*, and the goals and tenets of positive
psychology. In seeking to structure a particular kind of relationship of the
self to the self, positive psychology actively seeks to promote and create a
subjectivity that seems peculiarly suited to succeed in a neoliberal world.
The happy subject does indeed bear a remarkable resemblance to *homo
oeconomicus*, a ‘man of enterprise and production’ (Foucault, 2010, p.147).
I think it is possible to see this process more clearly if we consider an active
programme of positive psychology.

**Discourse analysis**

On examining the six lessons included in Unit 1 ‘Positive Self’, it is quickly
apparent that the invocation of ‘science’ and also ‘research’ contributes to a
framing of the approach of positive education as value and belief neutral
and as ‘fact’ driven and proven. I want to begin by considering this.

**The power of ‘science’, ‘research’ and ‘facts’**

One of the striking aspects of this programme is the way in which it is
uncritically presented as an objective, uncontroversial, value and belief
neutral approach to personal development. The first lesson, ‘Happy talk’,
begins with a teacher led ‘Reflection on Happiness’ which displays and sets
this tone with a series of assertions.
First of all Western countries (...) have achieved a sufficient level of affluence so that survival is no longer a central factor in peoples’ lives...

Personal happiness is becoming more and more important because people are becoming more individualistic. This means they worry more about what they think and how they feel and less about what other people think about them.

Finally we now have a science of well-being that aims to study what does and does not contribute to happiness and how to make things that already work well even better (Boniwell and Ryan, 2012, p.3).

These statements are laden with assumptions and merit some considerable interrogation. They are presented as statements of fact lacking referencing or substantiation. However, this is not acknowledged or allowed for in the lesson plan. This is of particular interest to me as a one-time teacher of religion and ethics in non-faith schools. In my experience, great care and thought has to go into the way in which different religious and ethical belief systems are presented and discussed with students so as to avoid exerting undue influence or causing offence. Contrast the introduction to this textbook ‘Personal and Social Issues in World Religions’, specifically addressing the diverse opinions and views held within one religious approach:

But you may find a South African Christian who supports apartheid, or a Buddhist monk who joins in a violent demonstration against the Chinese control of Tibet. Therefore, it is often better to say ‘Some Christians believe….’ Or ‘Most Buddhists think that… There may always be exceptions to a rule’ (Thompson, 1992, p.6).

Such textbooks usually make clear the situated-ness of beliefs about and approaches to ethical issues. Explicit links are made between religious belief and the action or approach it leads to which make clear the particularity of a religious stance: ‘Because of these sorts of ideas Christians believe that’ (Jenkins, 1994, p.16). Likewise, one could point to the grade descriptors for The Welsh Joint Education Committee’s (WJEC) Religious Studies GCSE syllabus. One calls for ‘An expanded justification of two viewpoints’ when discussing the moral aspects of an issue and how it relates to society and another descriptor concerning communication demands ‘an
adequate recognition of an alternative or different point of view’ (Burridge et al, 2009, p11). This positive psychology unit stands in stark contrast to the attempts to acknowledge and welcome diversity that characterise so much of the religious, ethical and personal education that takes place in schools. Whilst it may well be delivered in a way that emphasises its particularity, it is written in a way that suggests that positive psychology and its principles are simply ‘scientific’. ‘Students are asked to define the concept of ‘strength’, with the teachers adding the scientific definition as ‘a positive character trait that feels authentic and energising’ (Linley cited in Boniwell and Ryan, 2012, p.13). Detailed analysis of the linguistic presentation of material reinforces the presentation of positive psychology as a factually determined analysis of personal development rather than a particular approach characterised by key beliefs and values.

It is evident from the outset that assertions that might well be seen as contentious or at least to merit debate are presented in declarative statements. The use of declarative statements creates a tone that is assertive and implies that the information recounted is unequivocally true and does not need scrutiny.

**Personal happiness is becoming more and more important because people are becoming more individualistic (Boniwell and Ryan, 2012, p.3).**

**people who are happy have better friends and relationships, in general, they are more popular, trust people more and also help them more (ibid, p.5).**

**Many young people avoid doing new activities for fear of looking foolish or being humiliated. This is called ‘what if’ thinking (ibid, p.22).**

**Before language, the only way humans could think was through images. But as homo sapiens became civilized through the increased use of language, the imagery capacity of our brain atrophied (ibid, p.27).**

The lack of modality in the way information is presented imputes an objectivity and certainty to claims and so suggests no necessity for debate and critique. These statements are far from unequivocal and yet neither the
lesson plan, nor the suggested activities encourage debate or discussion of these statements. The consequence is to purvey arguably contentious material as ‘fact’ and thus close down or at least direct discussion along certain lines. For example, are people becoming more individualistic and if so, is this across all cultures? Has the imagery capacity of the human brain atrophied and if this is claimed, what is the evidence?

It is also taken as obvious that it is appropriate that ‘science’ and ‘research’ are definitive sources of validity, confirming their relevance and importance in the context of personal development. Such assumptions may be in part legitimated through the increasing influence of ‘scientific knowledges’ on policy formation, a process Bradbury et al describe as ‘a series of translations of knowledge from emerging scientific fields into policy making’ (McGimpsey et al, 2017, p.908). This hegemony of scientific knowledge constitutes what Foucault describes as a ‘regime of truth’ (1994, p.131) with which policy must comply to gain credence. On page one, the ‘scientists’ definition’ of happiness is part of the aims and objectives of the lesson. The PowerPoint presentation allows the

**Teacher to introduce two scientific conceptions of happiness and well-being: feeling good and flourishing (ibid, p.1).**

And although there is an acknowledgement that

**happiness still means many different things to different people (ibid, p.3).**

this is despite the fact that

**we now have a science of well-being (ibid, p.3).**

Likewise, research and researchers are referenced time and again. This takes place either by general, unreferenced mention of research.

**abundant research that indicates the link between strengths performance and life satisfaction (ibid, p.13).**

**scholars of positive psychology (ibid, p.14).**

**research indicates…(ibid, p.14).**

**research has demonstrated that...(ibid, p.16).**
Or by reference is to particular studies and academics in much the same way as academic referencing occurs.

The strength of perseverance appears key to exam success (Duckworth and Seligman, 2005, p.939) (ibid, p.16).

Confidence is an essential part of developing a positive self (Craig 2007) (ibid, p.20).

See K.M.Sheldon ands S. Lyubomirsky (2006) 'How to increase and sustain positive emotion' for more details (ibid, p.25).

For a more detailed explanation of this exercise, see the book, The How of Happiness (Lyubomirsky 2007, p 100-11) (ibid, p.28).

The majority of these references is drawn from the writings of proponents of positive psychology and so contributes to the creation and reinforcement of a regime of truth. This effectively determines the kind of questions and queries that might arise and the kind that never emerge. In addition, the legitimacy and authority of the programme is established within and through academic convention and scientific discourse. It is secured as ‘in the true’ (Foucault, 1981, p.61) and the particular account of truth it promotes and is validated by ‘is centred on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions that produce it’ (Foucault, 1986, p.31). The situation and production of the personal, moral, emotional development of the child within such a regime of truth obfuscates significant epistemological and ontological assumptions. This in turn means that emotional and moral development is explored without the kind of caveats that would be exhibited in a Religious Studies or PSE classroom, for example, questioning epistemological and ontological premises or highlighting cultural relativism. When this style of approach occurs in faith schools, the accusations of dogmatism and indoctrination fly. With this programme of positive psychology its’ location within the ‘regime’ or ‘game’ of truth of science defines this practice differently.
Admittedly, the emphasis positive psychology places on situating itself as a science serves as a major part of its validation and unique selling point, but this is not the issue so much as the way in which this is then presented in the classroom. The presentation of ‘science’ and ‘scientific research’ as having a definitive grasp on ‘truth’ is highly problematic and steers dangerously close to what might be labelled scientism (Stenmark, 2013, p.2103-2105). The issue of scientism in education, notably science education itself, has already generated some concern particularly when the curriculum addresses issues of societal change and the place of humanity in the world. In Connect, the UNESCO International Science, Technology and Environmental Newsletter, this is clear:

Scientism arises when the scope of relevance of scientific method and knowledge in human affairs is exaggerated or misrepresented. For example, if scientific rationality is equated with rationality as such…or where scientific methods and ideas are thought to be sufficient to deal with complex moral issues (UNESCO, 2005, p.1).

Indeed, from a Foucauldian perspective, it is not simply an inadequacy of a scientific regime of truth to deal with the moral, rather it is more an erasure or displacement of moral with scientific truths. Happiness is ‘scientised’, generating a new body of scientific knowledge and expertise that can, in turn, be sold. This is surely a quintessential neoliberal double as both governance and profit are achieved simultaneously.

The validation of the programme is then rooted in ‘science’ and ‘research’, and these are in turn linguistically presented in the form of incontrovertible facts and evidence. The consequence is the promotion of a particular and distinctive epistemological and ontological approach to personal development as though it were objective, uncontentious and value free. This ensures that debate is effectively narrowed if not closed down and the potential relevance or helpfulness of other perspectives is not explored. Moreover, it is a powerful mechanism of persuasion and legitimation that potentially serves to induce individuals and indeed schools to buy into positive psychology and positive education programmes. This constitutes a
regime of truth which structures moral and ethical thinking and action along particular lines. I will explore this in greater detail now.

**Ethical work - Practices of self-reflection**

This programme of positive psychology uses a variety of teaching techniques and exercises. However, perhaps unsurprisingly, the practice of self-reflection is key. To be clear, this is not self-reflection in the sense of considering what your individual views on certain issues are. It is specific and targeted reflection on ‘who you are’. In particular, this activity stands at the heart of the lessons Me, Inc., which involves establishing a Personal Brand Identity (PBI) and My Strengths Portfolio. I think it is helpful to consider the nature of self-reflection that is prompted here. In PBI, students are directed to contemplate themselves as a brand to gain,

| clarity about who you are, what you stand for and what is unique about you (Boniwell and Ryan, 2012, p.9) |

I have already noted Sugarman’s observation that personal branding as an approach in psychology evidences an uncomfortably close relationship to neoliberal thinking. It echoes Foucault’s analysis of the new neoliberal *homo oeconomicus* as ‘an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself’ (2010, p.226). In fact, I would argue that aside from the obvious influence of business terminology, personal branding only really makes sense in a market context. This is clear in the statement,

| As many students will understand all successful companies have a great brand image and individuals are no different (ibid, p.9). |

In this branding exercise, students are encouraged to manage and promote themselves in exactly the same way as a company. Indeed, PBI handout one specifically identifies the exercise as comparable with corporate branding.

| Imagine yourself as your own company in need of a corporate identity (handout 1). |

The aim of the lesson is explicit in the teacher’s notes as to help
students create a personal brand so that they learn to become effective in taking charge of their own identity and how they project this to others (Boniwell and Ryan, 2012, p.9).

There is no explanation as to why it is important to know who you are, why it is important to be able to convey this to others and no explanation of who ‘others’, or the audience, are. The ultimate purpose of the exercise is not spelt out.

The second handout reiterates the importance of the views of others, of establishing a particular kind of relation to others, perhaps echoing the role of focus groups in market research.

While it is important for your brand to reflect your views, it is also useful to gain the feedback from your friends and schoolmates (handout 2).

It is not clarified as to why it is important to receive feedback. Further, handout 3 adds a degree of urgency in conveying your brand to your audience.

You are aware that we live in a ‘sound bite’ culture. That means that you have to be able to communicate who you are and what you stand for in a short period of time exactly as a good advert does (handout 3).

I think the nature of self-reflection prompted here is distinctive and unusual and I would like to consider the significance of this. Contemplation and self-reflection on who you are and what values you represent and embody is an activity commonly understood as an ethical, moral, political perhaps spiritual or religious exercise. It suggests a process of self-exploration and discovery that is inherently valuable to the individual as part of a journey of self-discovery. There is no audience to this activity or process, except arguably in a religious context when some would argue God or a deity bears witness to the process. Yet the nature and framework of the self-reflection in these lessons are markedly different.

The encouragement to reflect on who you are is accompanied by the direction to think about how best to convey this to an unknown audience. The question of consciously tailoring your ‘self’ to a particular audience
seems critical and again speaks to the omnipresence of power relations. This ‘audience’, imaginary or real, structures and is invoked to structure the reflection of the individual. It calls on the student to imagine that their self-reflection is visibilised and this represents an internalisation of the gaze and judgement of the other. Whilst the audience is not specified, given the scene setting of the teacher’s introduction, and the heritage of branding, one might plausibly speculate that one audience is future employers. As such, this activity of personal branding reframes and directs self-reflection with a view to commodification and marketisation; it smacks of a business opportunity. It is a mode of self-reflection that aims to reduce the self to a post it note or sound bite (handout 3) in order to make it accessible. This is patently not self-reflection solely to gain further clarity about who you are, but rather to do this with a view to marketing yourself.

In Lesson three, the discourse of business dominates again as students are directed to put together a ‘Strengths Portfolio’. This activity interpolates a managing rational self that inspects and assesses their emotional tool kit for strengths. It is a form of self-reflection that positions certain aspects of the self e.g. emotions, as flexible and improvable. It encourages a degree of calculation, manipulation and investment in respect of qualities that might seem inappropriate targets of strategic management such as forgiveness, hope and love. The context and goal of this responsibilised approach to self-development is also made clear as it spells out that the rationale for self-reflection is success. It facilitates the assessment and then improvement of performance with a view to success and life satisfaction.

Research indicates that top achievers know their capabilities and set their goals slightly above their current level of performance (Boniwell and Ryan, 2012, p.14).

The models of branding and portfolios that frame self-reflection are quite obviously borrowed from the corporate world. The programme effectively imports the discourse of business, of the market to a realm of personal, moral, ethical and emotional experience and development. Both models re-construe self-reflection to echo models of business and in doing so offer a
very particular framework and a process through which a relationship to the self can be established. This is self-reflection that is productive in the sense that *homo oeconomicus* is ‘for himself his own capital, (being) for himself his own producer’, producing ‘his own satisfaction’ (Foucault, 2010, p.226). This self-reflection paves the way for appropriate investment in the self and this changes the nature and indeed purpose of self-reflection. In both models, the question of audience becomes paramount, as indeed does the question of success. Students reflect on themselves, on who they are, through the gaze of an audience and that audience appears to be the market and future employers. This tends towards the production of a reduced, abbreviated version of the self- easy to read and digest, clear, uncomplicated and in these respects an echo of social media profiles of the self. This truncated and stylized self, prepared for competition and the market, is arrived at through a process of calculation and strategic investment. Both models suggest on-going practices of self-reflection that determine how an individual should relate to himself or herself. This is reinforced by homework. Students are required to record how they use a particular strength everyday as well as tracking their strengths scores over time through an online questionnaire. Below, I want to consider how the form and process of such a self, such a ‘whole child’ is fleshed out. I want to consider the particular kind of qualities that characterise a neoliberal whole child.

*Happy, shiny, confident subjects*

As discussed, both Binkley (2014) and Reveley (2013) make compelling cases for the affinity between positive psychology’s happy subject and the archetypal neoliberal *homo oeconomicus*. I would like to consider the traits that appear to characterise the successful happy person of positive psychology. Scrutinising the lesson material (teacher’s aims, worksheets, PowerPoint, activities etc.) provided by Boniwell and Ryan’s positive education programme, I argue that it is possible to demonstrate significant correspondence between the two.
This is apparent from the first lesson on happiness where instrumental ethical reasoning shows that the importance of happiness is linked to the consequences of happiness. The consequences are embodied in the ‘happy person’ who displays patterns of behaviour and/or personal characteristics that are understood to predict and lead to success. In the textbook, we learn that happiness is valuable because it facilitates endurance, focus and diligence and these qualities in turn lead to success and even longevity. Students learn about the positive characteristics and successes of happy people; they learn that it quite literally pays to be happy:

| happy people persist longer at a task that is not very enjoyable |
| happy people are better at multitasking and are more systemic and attentive |
| people who are happier tend to work harder and are more likely to succeed. In fact happier children even tend to earn higher salaries when they grow up |
| people who are happy have better friends and relationships, in general, they are more popular (Boniwell and Ryan, 2012, p.5). |

It is clear that this particular understanding of happiness entails a significant degree of responsibilisation. The implication is that human beings are able to and should control and manage their emotional states. The reasons for this are numerous but the advantages of being happy are encapsulated in values and behaviours that resemble a happy homo oeconomicus, as highlighted by Binkley (2014), Reveley (2013) and Sugarman (2015). This is a strategic and calculating approach to and valuation of happiness and it has a very particular ‘look’. If we consider the ways in which the happy person is portrayed with the way they are not, it makes the particularity of the textbook’s descriptions more apparent. Happy people are persistent, hard working, successful, popular, well paid and live longer. ‘So happiness can buy an extra 9.4 years of life (Danner et al. 2001)’ (Boniwell and Ryan, 2012, p.5). By contrast, the implication of the textbook’s presentation is that happy people are not content in their own company, satisfied by a life of serving others, sensitive, scatter brained, or indeed short lived.

Similarly, the confidence quiz and consequences handout exhibit themes and characteristics that conjure a very particular image of the confident
individual. It is explicitly stated that the answer to the various questions on the quiz should be ‘Yes’ and so they tell us a great deal about what the confident person should look like and how they should behave. It is worth considering a number of them to appreciate also the cumulative effect.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Handout</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Can you go to a party by yourself?</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Can you enter a room full of strangers without feeling uncomfortable?</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>These questions imply that it is good, perhaps preferable to be self reliant, or rather that it is less good to be reliant on others. However, the context for self-reliance is interaction with others whom you do not know. The image conjured is of an individual exploring new and uncertain environments with a degree of self-belief and independence. As a set of individual characteristics, it echoes the entrepreneurial subject.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can you be assertive in most situations?</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you regularly try out new things even if they scare you?</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>These questions evidently prioritise the importance of ‘taking control’ of situations, with a particular understanding of how control might be secured. The image is of an individual who is willing and keen to put him or herself forward rather than blend into the background. Likewise, this individual will manage and moreover master their fears so that they are not held back. They will overcome both external and internal constraints exhibiting a degree of determination, adaptability and an appetite for the new that again conjures the entrepreneurial and risk taking neoliberal individual.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you contain your levels of worry?</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you regulate how much TV you watch?</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a friend has made you upset or angry can you deal with these emotions by speaking directly to the friend involved?</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These questions highlight the perceived importance of self-awareness, self-regulation and self-control of both habits and emotions. The confident individual is self-consciously steering his or her own life, actively dealing with obstacles to their own discomfort as they arise. Their own emotional responses to situations may be obstacles and it is this that is the focus of their ‘work’.

*Are the activities you take part in chosen by you? (Handout 4)*

Again, the emphasis is on the active, decision making individual who follows their own desires. In the life of the confident child, they are the nub of action and choice not ‘others’ and yet it is hard to see how this might actually work out in the child’s world. Self-determination and responsibility are presumably some of the qualities that the question is trying to elicit and yet this takes place in the context of a lesson and quiz which the child has no choice but to engage.

*Do your friends encourage you to challenge yourself? Do your friends boost your confidence? (Handout 4)*

And lastly, it would seem that relationships should be assessed according to their value for you. Friends are there to reiterate and reinforce your personal development in large part defined by your capacity to push yourself and take risks. Friends seem to be valuable to the extent that they propel you onwards and upwards rather than as offering comfort and safety.

These questions reveal a certain way of construing confidence. There seems little scope here to validate the shy, sensitive, thoughtful, introverted child and it is both interesting and a little depressing to note that the quiz is based upon a book called ‘The ultimate book of confidence tricks’. This would appear to point to a rather particular and duplicitous relation to the self and others and again calls up the image of a vulnerable and neurotic individual, ‘anxious, under stress and increasingly insecure’, ‘one whose anxieties and insecurities are the objects of government’ (Isin, 2004, p.225). This confidence quiz both produces and preys on the fears of the insecure subject.
and the portrayal of confidence is associated with very particular character traits that echo accounts of the neoliberal subject.

The association of particular character traits with happiness and confidence validates, promotes and facilitates a model of the self that understands the self in a particular relation to the world and itself. In as much as this is then taken on as a route of personal development, a ‘grid of intelligibility’, it serves to replicate and extend a certain way of seeing, understanding and acting; it instils certain power relations. So, it is important to consider carefully what we learn about this particular way of being, of relating to the world and to the self.

The image is of an individual that responds adeptly and actively both to their internal and external environment. The latter is important since it is this response or relation that is the critical hinge. To quote Foucault, *homo oeconomicus* is ‘the person who accepts reality or who responds systematically to modifications in the variables of the environment’ (2010, p.270). It is this capacity, lauded in the above questions, that enables the ‘environment’ and all its values, its epistemological and ontological tenets to be folded into the personality traits of an individual. Moreover, it is in this way that *homo oeconomicus* is ‘eminently governable’ (ibid, p.270) since s/he has internalised a worldview as a set of aspirations and desirable traits. The happy and neoliberal self is risk taking, assertive, entrepreneurial, independent, self-regulating. As such, s/he has become a ‘correlate of governmentality’ and now responsibilised, active and self-determining, s/he will continue to work on mastering the internal environment and modifying the external environment through this grid of intelligibility that is *homo oeconomicus*.

This process shows how the promotion of particular personality characteristics form an ethical and ontological framework through which individuals may then relate to themselves and direct their personal and emotional growth. This is a technology of the self embodying and promoting neoliberal values and structuring the emotional and ethical relationship of the self to the self in neoliberal terms. To adapt Rose, who is
here talking about medical techniques, I suggest that such programmes of the whole child are also techniques that ‘do not merely promise coping, nor even cure, but correction and enhancement of the kind of persons we are or want to be’ (2007, p.26).

**Discipline- The classroom milieu**

Foucault’s account of disciplinary power locates the school firmly alongside the prison and asylums as a disciplinary institution. Much has been written on the school as a disciplinary institution and the observation of disciplinary techniques of hierarchical observation, dividing practices, self-surveillance, etc. as characteristics of classroom management is unsurprising (Hunter, 1994). Student experience of classroom management and control, ‘timetables, compulsory movement, regular activities, solitary meditation, work in common, silence, application, respect, good habits’ (Foucault, 1991b, p.128) constitute ‘a modest, suspicious power’ (ibid, p.170).

Despite attempts, some more determined than others, to move to more open planned, child centred classrooms, all of the above have arguably remained the case, as Ford explicitly considers (2003). There are many studies considering pedagogical practices as an example of disciplinary power (Gore, 1995, Besley, 2002, Allen, 2014, Raaper, 2019). The development and increasing prevalence of confessional practices- technologies of the self has also been noted (Besley, 2008). My reason for highlighting this is that such exercises of power represent an immediate, regulative and often overwhelming social reality that constitutes students as ‘docile bodies’. It is in this pre or co-existent context that positive education lessons take place, and it is impossible to overlook this. Foucault is at pains to emphasise the ‘interrelationships’ of power relations, the way in which different modalities of power overlap and reinforce one another (1982, p.216-219). The way in which the lessons are structured and organised and the activities they include frame this as a standard programme of study characteristic of the vast majority of curriculum subjects. It is an entirely normal routine of didactic teaching that position the teacher as the source and arbiter of knowledge, controlling its delivery. The teacher introduces each new topic
through a presentation that outlines the discourses and categories that will frame and direct learning. As mentioned, the presentation of these is in declarative sentences and framed as non-problematic. This means that for any self-reflection or discussion to be seen as valid, it must be framed in terms of the issues and terminology set up by the teacher. This chimes with Gillies observations of a SEAL classroom where the sharing of emotions in group activities were structured by unspoken boundaries that limited the feelings and thoughts pupils were permitted to voice. Only certain forms of emotional expression were sanctioned and these were monitored closely by the teacher (2011, p.192).

In the positive education unit I have looked at, teacher presentation and led debate is followed by a series of varied activities both individual, small group and class based involving work sheets and tasks that ensure the student is active and busy. There is a significant amount of small group work where students are required to share the results of their introspection. They are asked to examine themselves honestly and personally and then relay that information to a group of peers. In Lesson Two, students swap their personal ‘ads’ and read out each others to the group (Boniwell and Ryan, 2012, p.9-10). They are also asked to describe one another in three positive words and to say what kind of person they see each other as being. In Lesson Three, students offer feedback to one another in a small group, regarding their personal strengths (ibid, p.16).

Sharing information with the group is a powerful mechanism of control exposing students to the gaze and judgement of other students. Indeed it is interesting to note that control is the explicit rationale for one of these small group activities where students swap their ads and read out one another’s

*It means the students will have to take the exercise seriously* (Boniwell and Ryan, 2012, p.10).

This suggests that the group activity functions as a technology of control as well as providing the useful feedback that it is apparently valuable to
receive. Interestingly, explicitly utilising group pressure to ensure the lessons activities proceed as intended flags up the concerns about student compliance. Indeed, in the Me. Inc./Personal Brand Identity lesson, the issue of control surfaces in the teacher’s notes.

It is worth the teacher checking that students are replying honestly and positively and the teacher can also help them with their answers (ibid, p.9).

This may well suggest that the activity- where students choose three people to describe them and say what kind of person they are- is prone to subversion. It is not difficult to imagine the ways in which a teenager might disrupt the lesson by being invited to share their opinions of another. The guiding presence of the teacher to ‘help students’ with their answers suggests an invocation of disciplinary power to avoid an activity becoming a site of resistance.

This type of group sharing activity is not only a mechanism of control. It also imparts a quality to the nature of self-reflection that chimes with the notion of promoting yourself and selling yourself. We have learned from the branding lesson that when reflecting on yourself, it is necessary to take into account how you come across to others. However, what was not entirely clear in that lesson was who the audience might be. I would argue that in the immediate context of the classroom, the audience is likely to be either the teacher or peers. The effects of these audiences will vary in part due to the person performing. While I have argued that the practices of this programme have the potential to operate as technologies of the self, it is not that simple. The impact of the classroom situation may override any genuine engagement with the subject matter of the lesson. Students may be more preoccupied with generating the correct answer and behaviour for the teacher or may wish to entertain their peers by subverting the activities.

Technologies of the self of whatever kind are contingent on the modalities of power they operate in relation to and this programme exemplifies the embedded-ness and complexity of relations of power. No doubt an ethnographic account of a lesson in practice would reveal even greater
diversity and complexity. There is a blurring of technologies of the self and
disciplinary techniques that bolster and also unpick each other. They create
strange paradoxes. The model individual that is constructed in this
programme would be recognised by their distinctively neoliberal traits,
ambition, creativity, grit, autonomy, determination, and optimism. Yet, the
child in the classroom lacks autonomy and freedom of opinion, expression
or behaviour because they are children in an adult’s world. A display of
autonomy or risk taking would be defined as disruptive behaviour and
punished. The activities of self-reflection are utilised as a mechanism of
classroom control, honesty is exhorted in an environment that is potentially
hostile and exploration and examination of the self is funnelled into
abbreviated displays of thirty second adverts or post it notes. The
overwhelming immediate and multivalent activity of the classroom dynamic
and context serves to deflect and transform routes of power.

**The positive neoliberal child**

This programme of positive education is an attempt to produce a person
who reflects upon themselves and their actions in a particular way by
orienting their internal dialogue and outer presentation. Further, it offers
practices and activities that can be continued throughout life to ensure that
the construction of this ‘person’ can be on-going and self maintained.

The rationale or motivation for pursuing happiness is in part that it leads to
‘successes’ of particular kinds but what binds people to this approach is that
its truths are scientifically proven and validated by research. As a moral
code, it is rooted in the psy-scientific regimes of truth and it is compelling
because it is ‘in the true’ (Foucault, 1981, p.61). The nature of the
relationship of the self to the self is one of management and investment,
with its attendant characteristics of risk assessment, risk taking and
measurement. In other words, the mode of existence towards which all this
effort is directed is the autonomous self-managed self who bears a striking
resemblance to *homo oeconomicus*. These practices also function as
disciplinary technologies as performativity appears to creep into even our
own reflection on personal development. The analysis references the
situated-ness and contingency of this particular technology of the self and how it interacts with/is embedded within technologies of domination. I suggest that such programmes of positive education can be usefully understood as one of the ‘contact points’, ‘folds’, ‘hinges’ where such technologies of the self and technologies of domination meet within a neoliberal dispositif. In the following section, I want to conduct a similar analysis of a programme of study designed as part of a character education programme.

*My character by the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues*

*My character-Enhancing future mindedness in young people: A feasibility study* was a three year project conducted and produced by the JCCV designed for students aged 11-14 years old. Its aim was to ‘discover a new way of teaching character, and, more specifically, the virtues of future mindedness’ (JCCV, 2014, p.7). The focus was on the value of guided self–reflection. In addition, it served as an opportunity to assess the feasibility of using randomised control trials (RCT) to assess character interventions. As recorded in a documentary video on the Jubilee Centre’s website, the project team worked with students and teachers and website and graphic designers to produce the programme and materials. An initial suggestion of thirty virtues was duly whittled down to the eight virtues that form the basis of the programme. The subsequent resources- a website and a hard copy journal- were piloted over a one year period by over one thousand students in six schools across England. The *My character* resources are now available on the Jubilee Centre’s website.

https://www.jubileecentre.ac.uk/1631/character-education/

The *My Character* resources are a set of ten journal units that are based on eight character traits: Having a dream, Being Patient, Working in Teams, Being Creative, Having Courage, Saving for the Future, Helping Others and Being Determined. The full series has an introduction and a review. Each journal entry or unit contains activities, quotes, biographies of inspirational people and a glossary of terms.
Whilst I want to concentrate on the teaching material itself, the report on the project explains the context in which these materials were produced and there are a few salient issues that arise.

**Research methodology, virtue ethics and positive psychology**

An important aspect of the project was the background against which it developed. This was a concern that character education was characterised by ‘a linguistic swamp of undefined terms, porous research designs and dubious findings’ (JCCV, 2014, p.4). As well as defining terms and producing materials therefore, a critical feature was to assess the possibility of assessing the impact of the programme, particularly through RCTs:

Large well-funded studies typically rest on a flawed concept of human character. Smaller, well-focused studies lack proper controls and suitable design. My Character is a striking and welcome exception: the sample is large; the six schools are varied; and there are multiple data sources. Most impressive is the use of the Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT), which is the gold standard methodology for social science research (ibid, p.4).

To date many character education interventions have used light-touch evaluative methods. We need a greater understanding of how more scientifically rigorous methods, such as RCTs, might be harnessed to measure the impact of educational interventions, and more specifically those designed to develop character. A greater understanding of how to measure impact will in turn provide a better understanding of ‘what works’ in character education. More robust evidence will be useful to make the case for character education to both policy makers and practitioners (ibid, p.10).
It is clear that the report is framed by and embedded in a discourse of ‘what works’ associated with a concomitant quantitative methodological approach. Moreover, it is explicit that such a methodological approach offers the scientific rigour necessary to legitimate the research conducted into character education. As examined in the previous section, the epistemological affinity between quantitative approaches and systems of accountability and audit is critical in securing the validity and success of policy. I want to examine or suggest the impact this has on the understanding of character that can be seen in the My Character materials.

It is critical to investigate and try to be precise about how character is understood and to identify the discourse or game/regime of truth that legitimates it. The Jubilee Centre follows tradition, as do many character education protagonists and programmes, in rooting their approach in virtue ethics, an ethical school that is derives from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics:

The fundamental feature of virtue ethics is that morality is conceived as and concerned with the cultivation of certain disposition or traits-virtues-of the individual’s character, rather than, for example, rules or principles. This distinguishes it from deontological and consequentialist moral theories. In practice, most versions of virtue ethics will encompass all three, notably the teleological goal of flourishing or eudaemonia. Virtue ethics has undergone multiple developments and the ‘virtues’ that constitute good character are variously conceptualised and hotly debated, but most suggest traditional categorisations of moral, performance, intellectual and civic virtues. The Jubilee Centre follow suit and set out their own detailed understanding in their Framework for Character Education and Character Education in UK

3 All three authors are affiliated to the Jubilee Centre.
The *My Character* project draws on all of these in order to frame the key quality of future mindedness that serves as a focus for the project (JCCV, 2014, p.8).

It would be impossible and arguably unhelpful to investigate the strands of virtue ethics in detail or even to analyse the heritage that the Jubilee Centre draw on. However, I think there is a significant characteristic of their approach that I explored in the previous section in relation to research methodology and systems of accountability that needs noting. It concerns the elaboration of a philosophical understanding of character through psychological, psy-scientific categories to produce a blended understanding of character and the self.

Virtue ethics often stands accused of essentialism and of promoting a unitary, internal subject. However, there are arguably versions of virtue ethics that side step this criticism and we shall look at these later, but for now it is interesting to note the way this question is addressed by the Jubilee Centre. Whilst the virtue ethics of the Jubilee Centre seems quite clear, the influence of other approaches is still evident. The Jubilee Centre appears to subscribe to the view that there is an overlap or interrelationship between virtue ethics and positive psychology. This is acknowledged more or less explicitly:

> In this report, the terms ‘virtue’ and ‘character strength’ will be used interchangeably; however, there is a contestable separation between the two in recent virtue-based positive psychological theory (Peterson and Seligman cited in JCCV, 2015).

Positive psychology is also embraced as an added ‘string to the bow’ of character education. This is particularly evident in the *My Character* project where the value of positive psychology for the project is emphasised:

> A contemporary manifestation of future mindedness is found in the fields of ‘positive thinking’ and ‘positive psychology’. Positive psychology includes…developing a strong sense of meaning and purpose. The latter particularly supports the positive appreciation of future mindedness as a key to human flourishing (JCCV, 2014, p.8).
In addition, the ambiguity and eclectic nature of ‘character’ is compounded by the observation that performance virtues and enabling virtues such as resilience are ‘commonly referred to as ‘soft skills’ in ‘contemporary school policy discourse’ (ibid, p.4).

The point I am making is that there seems to be an assumption that the epistemological and ontological frameworks of positive psychology and virtue ethics are compatible and/or overlap. The notion of character is slightly ambiguous, eclectic and fluid and is therefore able to incorporate and utilise alternative models of the self. The effect of this in terms of one of the aims of the project is clearly set out in their findings and discussion of the suitability of ‘outcome measures’:

We developed the ‘I believe’ questionnaire specifically for this trial with considerable involvement from many relevant stakeholders, so its psychometric properties required investigation. The aim was to capture views on the eight character virtues that the My Character project seeks to develop. The individual questions had good psychometric properties, exhibiting the range of responses without obvious ambiguity’ (ibid, p.13).

The translation or development of the philosophical notion of character or virtue, in terms of psychological categories facilitates the measurement of character. This in turn allows for the assessment of the success or otherwise of character intervention programmes which is so valuable in securing validity. This is one way in which character is caught up in a neoliberal dispositif through its incorporation into a regime of truth of statistics, of audit and accountability.

**Virtue ethics and responsibilisation**

The Jubilee Centre understands its programmes of character education as programmes of self-development through student reflection on ‘who they are’. It involves students actively in their own moral development. To an extent, this is unsurprising given that the Jubilee Centre subscribes to a virtue ethics approach. The predominant, defining and most salient characteristic of all versions of virtue ethics is that it is a moral theory focused on agency of the individual and their development of themselves as
the site of morality. The virtuous person is the exemplar and guide as to how to act morally and so the prerogative is to concentrate on their personal development as a virtuous person. It is the emphasis on the embodiment of virtues in the self that is key. Indeed, the central practice of self-reflection that the My Character study focuses on is understood as an activity of moral self-constitution. The report references Hallberg’s 1987 article stating that reflective writing in the form of a personal journal is ‘person making’ (ibid, p.9). They also emphasise that such moral development is the individual’s own responsibility. The foreword to My Character by Professor Kevin Ryan summarises this.

My character leads students to realize that the kind of person they want to become is ‘their work’ ‘their own responsibility’. It engages them actively in the crafting of their own characters’ character formation is not something that a teacher or a school does for or to a student. Rather informed students do this for and to themselves (ibid, p.4).

This added sense of obligation to self develop, to make ones moral development a self-conscious project displays an affinity with accounts of individualised and responsibilised neoliberal subjectivities. To draw on Novas and Rose’s analysis of advanced liberal accounts of personhood, this particular production of character, of the self makes ‘productive alliances and combinations with forms of selfhood that construct the subject as autonomous, prudent, responsible and self actualizing’ (2000, p.507). It seems important therefore to interrogate carefully the framework and nature of such self-reflection. I want to try and explicate some of the key ideas and ideals that ‘scaffold’ the activities of moral development contained in the My Character programme.

**Discourse analysis**

**Developing character for success**

It is noticeable that the rationale for character education and development of particular traits appears directly connected again to ‘success’. This picks up on and elaborates the connection made between social investment and
mobility agendas explored in policy documents in Section one and replays the same theme noted in the positive psychology programme. The materials suggest an instrumental rationale for the development of certain characteristics and the goal is success and this is found across the individual modules.

In the Introduction ‘My life, your life, our future’, students are encouraged to reflect upon who they are and who they want to be. The purpose of this is to ‘enable you to achieve your dreams’. The journal is described as ‘the passport to your successful future’.

Interestingly, the word success appears again in a series of quotes.

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The road to success is always under construction. Success is ninety nine per cent mental attitude.
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The connection that is made between character and success is explicitly addressed on the next page. People judge you but

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people judge you on your character more than perhaps anything else. This is why it is so important to think about your character...Having a good character is your passport to a successful future.
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Likewise, in the unit titled Having a Dream the opening paragraph states,

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Successful people often say they were successful because they followed a dream
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In Saving for the future, the opening line is

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A key characteristic of a successful person is someone who is able to save for the future.
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In the unit on Patience,

```
Being successful in your future is a waiting game
Success comes to those who wait
For most people, becoming successful takes time.
Did you know that those who have the willpower to be patient are more likely to be successful?
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Working together

Can you think of an inspirational hero who you think has worked well with other people to achieve success?

The suggestion is that these character traits are important because they can help individuals be successful, but not because they are valuable in their own right. Since success frames the importance of character development, it seems important to have a sense of what success might mean. However, this is unexplored presumably because it is taken for granted that we all know what success looks like - it is an obvious truth. This is easy to see if we consider the ‘Having a dream’ unit.

The unit identifies ‘having a dream’ as part, perhaps the beginning, of a path that leads to success. Martin Luther King serves as an example of this and presumably the achievements of the civil right’s movements would constitute a degree of success. This is an ‘obvious’ example of success. However, one could arguably select the example of Nigel Farage who also clearly had a dream and many would say had considerable success in fulfilling it. The point is that without interrogating what constitutes ‘success’, the programme is unwittingly assuming an uncritical and particular vision of success. This means that there is a narrative underpinning the programme that is taken as obvious and non-contentious. It seems to me therefore important to try and explore what that narrative might be. It is possible to get a sense of this if we consider both the practices and the goals of this character education programme.

Success is individual

Inevitably, character education by its very nature emphasises the importance and role of the individual in determining their life. The individual is the locus of activity and their success and failure is determined by their strengths and weaknesses and their capacity to work on them. In a sense, this very approach already presupposes certain ways of understanding society and success. In focussing on inspirational individuals, My Character reiterates that the key defining quality of success is that it is individual. The
particular choice of successful individuals and their character traits provides a narrative of what ‘success’ looks like and how it is achieved. The selection of individuals as exemplars of character traits arguably crystallises or raises problems that may appear less visible when referring to unembodied traits. It visibilises dimensions of gender, race and class very clearly. I want to consider some aspects of the narrative about success that is produced in *My Character*. Below is a list of the individuals looked at in the programme with the corresponding theme that they illustrate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Having a Dream</th>
<th>Martin Luther King and Bill Gates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saving for the Future</td>
<td>David Attenborough and Lord Alan Sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having Patience</td>
<td>Nelson Mandela and Jonny Wilkinson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping Others</td>
<td>Mother Teresa and Camila Batmanghelidjh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being Determined</td>
<td>Sir Chris Hoy and Nick Vujicic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having Courage</td>
<td>Anne Frank and Christopher Reeve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Together</td>
<td>Scott Parker and Barack Obama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thinking Creatively</td>
<td>J. K. Rowling and Chris Anderson</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 3.4 List of figures and themes in My Character unit of study*

The individual examples of success range from sporting achievement, charity work, and entrepreneurial and business success. Three of the sixteen examples are male, white entrepreneurs; Bill Gates, Alan Sugar and Chris Anderson (the Founder of TED Talks). Nine out of the sixteen examples are white males. Looking at the individual success stories carefully, it is not hard to see that these are people who display various individual attributes of following their visions, working hard and being prepared to take risks. Many are archetypal neoliberal success stories.
Bill Gates- Having a dream

The point often made in relation to construction of entrepreneurial neoliberal subjects, is that the emphasis on individualism and corresponding responsibility distracts from structural conditions that contribute to success or failure (Ball, 2013). As such, its individualisation of social problems serves to depoliticise them, to un-problematise them. It is interesting to consider the vision of society that is effectively endorsed by the inclusion of Bill Gates as an example of an inspirational person. The emphasis is on him as a ‘businessman, investor and philanthropist’. His dream/vision included

- **billionaires giving away money and working to alleviate poverty**
- **the wealthy donating huge percentages of their money to good causes.**

There is an assumption that it is legitimate and unproblematic for an individual to be able to amass such great wealth. The fact that said individual is a white, middle class male does not appear to raise questions about social justice, equality of opportunity or distribution of wealth. It uncritically endorses a particular model of society in which the role of charity and philanthropy is significant and substantial.

Alan Sugar- Saving for the future

Alan’s story is one that emphasises hard work, resilience and saving money.

- **He had to work very hard and plan for his future**
- **Lord Sugar worked very hard to get where he is today**
- **He overcame bullying at school by working hard and saving money for his future and having faith that he would be successful**

In fact, his upbringing was tough.

- **However instead of becoming depressed Lord Sugar worked hard and focussed on his money-making ventures.**
It is hard not to flinch at the Semitic caricature, but ultimately this is the story of an individual overcoming his situation through sheer hard work and determination. There are echoes of a resilient neoliberal subject here, which aligns with and supports the notion of the responsibilised subject who is constructed as ‘free’ to take charge of their own welfare (Foucault, 2010, p.64). This resilient subject who can stave off mental illness, ‘encourages the idea of active citizenship, whereby people, rather than relying on the state, take responsibility for their own social and economic well-being’ (Joseph, 2013, p.42). And of course, Sugar’s difficulties are understood as ‘personal crises or accomplishments decoupled from economic and social circuits of accumulation and dispossession’ (Bottrell, 2013, n.p.). He is a master of himself first and therefore his situation and that is sufficient to explain his ‘success’.

**Camila Batmanghelidjh- Helping Others**

It is interesting to compare the way in which Camila Batmanghelidjh’s route to success is described with Alan Sugar’s.Whilst both appear to be forces of nature, by contrast, hard work does not seem to feature at all for Camila. Her early life was dangerous and risky.

Her father, a close ally of the Shah, was arrested and imprisoned and their mother went missing, leaving Camila and her sister stranded in the UK with no access to money. Nevertheless, with the help of another agent, namely the British government, she was able to gain political asylum.

Rather than pointing to her hard work, it states that she simply ‘went on to gain’ her degree.

went on to gain a First in Theatre Arts.

Likewise, it is presented as an act of fortuity that she was able to develop her work.

She discovered a knack for helping emotionally damaged children.
In addition, Batmanghelidjh is portrayed as an emotionally motivated, passionate individual. Kid’s Company succeeded mostly down to Camila’s vision drive and strong desire to help those around her.

What is interesting here is that clearly the story is one of a journey from risk and adversity to success; a narrative that accords well with neoliberal subjectivities who find in risk a positive opportunity to overcome and succeed. Indeed, this is true neoliberal resilience emphasising not merely bouncing back but grasping setbacks as opportunities. Camila illustrates that ‘Knowing when and how to exploit uncertainty to invent a new and better future is equally a prominent feature of the adaptable, flexible and enterprising subject of resilience’ (O’Malley, 2010, p. 506). And yet, in this narrative it is emotional labour and application, rather than hard work, as well as intervention from others, which motors this process. Gill and Orgad’s discussion of the feminisation of the neoliberal message in self help books and resources is insightful. They reference Henderson and Taylor’s work as they note the observation of a ‘particular emotional tone in texts’ that introduces ‘emotionalism’ as a way of feminising neoliberal ideology (Henderson and Taylor cited in Gill and Orgad, 2018, p.484).

Whilst, it is clear to see the overriding neoliberal subjectivity of the enterprising, risk taking, resilient, entrepreneurial subject here, Camila and Alan also conform to traditional gendered stereotypes of hard working resilient men and emotional caring women. Indeed, it is notable that in the unit ‘Helping others’ both examples are women. Given that overall only four out of the sixteen famous exemplars were women, it is interesting that half of them have ‘succeeded’ within a stereotypical ‘caring’ role.

The point about these examples is made with some caution because I might easily have selected Mother Teresa, Martin Luther King and Anne Frank. However, I do think they illustrate some of the difficulties that can arise without careful scrutiny of the way character traits are ‘embodied’ and the
messages that might be propagated. What is evident though, is that all of these individuals are responsible for their own success, however that may be defined or however they achieved it. They are fully responsibilised and therein lies not only the secret to their success but its defining feature. Further than this, the explicit message of this programme is that the qualities that have led to success can be emulated and developed. These are not proposed as natural qualities alone and this is the point of character education. O’Malley comments on the enterprising subject that ‘resilience has shifted from being a natural given to being a technique to be applied wherever advantageous’ (2010, p.506).

The overall approach of character education prioritising the relevance of the individual agent in effecting change and development, dovetails with the role of the individual in a neoliberal society. Individual inspirational characters, especially entrepreneurs, conjure the successful homo oeconomicus who is responsible for both their own success and failure. Lack of consideration of any societal, political or cultural determinants in individual success promotes the view that they are not relevant. It also forecloses discussion of them. Lastly, I want to consider the particular practice of self-reflection as promoted in the My Character programme.

**Practices of self-reflection, instrumentalism and audience**

As is mentioned in the My Character report, the practice of self-reflection is encouraged in this programme. Moreover, it is tied to the keeping of a journal, so the activity of writing it down. This makes it very evident that self-reflection and discussion are highly circumscribed and provides evidence of how they are directed. Activities are structured so that much of the self-reflection consists of closed activities- writing lists or completing sentences.

In terms of theme, obviously self-reflection is directed to character but also, again, success. The use of the journal itself reiterates the goal of success. At least part of the purpose of the journal is to encourage a discussion in terms of ‘goals, strategies, and performance’ (JCCV, 2014, p.7) and the result of
this was that it would ‘lead to them (students) becoming more accomplished and successful adults’ (JCCV, 2014, p.7). This is a potent combination. Students are directed to reflect on themselves in terms of the individual character traits they might benefit from developing in order to secure success. They are being encouraged to think about themselves and their relationship to the world in a very particular way. This effect is compounded or doubled by an additional, albeit occasional, direction to reflect on themselves through the eyes of others. This signals that it is important to be able to visibilise character. It also serves to internalise the judgemental gaze of the ‘other’ so as to normalise action and behaviour. As with the programme of positive psychology, this evidences the significance of the milieu of classroom practice as a form/display of concomitant disciplinary power.

In Unit two on Dreams, this visibilisation is for the benefit of an employer.

Now write down five things you can do to show future employers you have these character traits (i.e. I volunteer to show I have compassion for others)

Further, in Unit five Helping Others, volunteering is considered from the perspective of what it looks like and what it indicates about the volunteer. Volunteering visibilises your character.

By becoming a volunteer you are making a statement to others about the sort of person you are. Volunteering shows that you are a good citizen and a person of good character.

Integrity: Volunteering shows that you are a person of integrity that you have principles and know what is right and wrong

Humility: the important thing when you volunteer is that you are being selfless. This shows that you have humility and a respect for others

The ‘showing’ changes the tone of the activity and suggests a degree of duplicity of motive. Whilst I am sure the Jubilee Centre would contest this, it does seem plausible to suggest that this attitude to character development is strategic, perhaps even cynical. As Brown, Lauder and Ashton’s research suggests (2011), qualifications are not enough to guarantee employment in a
global economy and it is hard to entirely expunge the image of a student constructing their CV years from this date. The fact that this journal and the programme itself is part of a study to assess the impact of character education embeds it further within a field of visibility and judgement.

Perhaps the most startling aspect of the journal and the activities for self-reflection and discussion is that they appear to lack an opportunity for critique. In general, there is no opportunity to debate issues of morality or ethics regarding political systems or revolt, the structural organisation of society that allows and endures such disparity of wealth that creates Bill Gates. There appears to be little opportunity to challenge or even discuss the way certain virtues are presented or even included. The non-contentious manner in which the material is conveyed is problematic. It presents as obvious a particular way of understanding the self and therefore the self’s relation to the world; it is fundamentally a ‘structuring the action of others’ (Foucault, 1982). The combination of visibilisation and observation with the measuring of the self against exemplars and ideals positions the journal as a form of examination along the lines of a disciplinary technology. The term ‘self examination’ seems to aptly express the nature of this activity; it appears to work as an examination-a normalising, individualising technology. Yet the exhortation to the individual to take up the reins of self-examination in terms of such visibilisations and observations clearly passes into the realm of technologies of the self.

**My neoliberal Character**

The *My Character* programme here promotes an agenda that identifies the individual as responsible for his or her own success and failure. Moreover, the qualities feted are presented as universal and essential and the implication is that they are therefore/should be present in everyone. Whether one undertakes to develop them is a choice, even to the extent where it would appear that depression is a choice. More than this, the individual is located as the site where social or political problems such as injustice and poverty can and arguably should be addressed. It replicates neoliberal tropes of individualisation and responsibilisation and draws on
discourses of the audit culture and self-marketisation. It encourages students to take part in relations of power that are characteristic of neoliberal governmentality, to assume a relationship to themselves in which they are positioned as powerful peddlers of neoliberal tropes. It encourages the performance of a particular kind of character that echoes with the classic neoliberal entrepreneur.

**Technologies of the self and the production of the whole child as a neoliberal subjectivity**

We can understand these programmes of positive education and character education as promoting technologies of the self that draw on and promote models of the self that are fragmented, or to use Rose’s terminology molecular. The ethical work they commend is facilitated by this fragmentation of the self into identifiable parts that can be targeted and improved. These practices and exercises of self-reflection represent an extension of the neoliberal practice of responsibilisation (Shamir, 2004) to the individual’s emotional and moral self. Situated within a policy field that stresses social investment, they foster an instrumental relationship to the development of personal, emotional and moral selves. The process of personal development then entails the fragmentation and identification of discrete and key personal characteristics that can then be commodified, instrumentalised and improved for the purposes of ‘success’. This effects an internalisation of a neoliberal gaze that overtly aims to structure how the personal self relates to and understands the world and others. It is an explicit example of how neoliberalism ‘out there’ becomes neoliberalism ‘in there’ (Ong, 2007) and as such represents a critical stage on the continuum of a neoliberal dispositif and neoliberal governance through the constitution of new emotional and moral subjectivities.

I have also noted, especially in respect of the positive education programme, the situated-ness and contingency of technologies of the self and how they interact with and are embedded within technologies of domination. This stresses the conceptualisation of governmentality as a continuum, a chain, in which technologies of the self are ‘frequently linked to the direction of
others’ (Foucault, 1997, p.277). This both complicates and enhances an understanding of such a site as a point at which government occurs. These programmes can be usefully understood as one of the ‘contact points’, ‘folds’, ‘hinges’ where technologies of the self and technologies of domination meet within a neoliberal dispositif and where there is a clear and active presentation of the kind of ‘whole child’ in production.
The neoliberal whole child- a cuckoo in the nest

A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest’ (Foucault, 1990a, p.154).

This thesis began with a feeling of discomfort and a degree of puzzlement. The education of the whole child appeared to be something that had simultaneously disappeared and yet also become highly visible in the current education system - a kind of Schrodinger’s whole child. Whilst talk of educating the whole child often references an approach or understanding to education rooted in a personal and ethical relationship, this did not appear to be the point of many high profile policy developments. It seemed that the whole child was being produced in policy in a new way, evolving in a manner and direction that represents a break with more traditional usage. The thesis therefore began with a problematisation of the whole child and the policies that have brought the whole child under the gaze of government. This problematisation raised questions about the way government policy structures the relationship between the child, school and government. These are questions about power, what power relations can look like and how they work in and through policy.

The thesis constitutes a systematic analysis of the relations of power that traverse a particular set of education policies that produce the whole child. It situates the critical interrogation of the multiple, multifaceted and constantly evolving manifestations of the whole child within the wider neoliberal education policy field. In trying to understand and articulate the production of the whole child and its connection with or expression of different modalities of power, a number of Foucault’s analytical tools have been deployed. The result is a detailed anatomy of the neoliberal whole child along three axes of power, truth and the subject emphasising the intimate and inextricable connections between those axes. Each section of research
has lent weight to and foregrounded different aspects of the production of the whole child-discourse, bio power, governmentality, and subjectivity. It has been equally important to probe and elaborate the points where these three angles of focus intersect and explain how they cohere and work together since these connections, these repetitive resonances are vital to securing and producing the whole child as true.

The analytical frame of the dispositif has been a critical tool in grasping this complexity and in facilitating an exploration across an array of diverse categories. It has enabled me to conceptualise and map the way the whole child has become ‘played by’ and caught up in the wider neoliberal policy milieu and developed and produced as a neoliberal subjectivity. It has also helped me to identify the multiple anchor points that tether and secure the education of the whole child as an unequivocally laudable educational goal. It is important to explore this heterogeneity since it is critical to its tenacity, affording the opportunity for adaptation and evolution.

In particular, the dispositif’s analytical embrace of various different forms, discourses and practices has allowed me to explicate the relationship between the bio/etho political subjectivity of the whole child and neoliberal governance. This is a significant contribution to research on whole child education policy and to the field of neoliberal studies in detailing an example of how neoliberalism is able to get ‘in there’. Tracing the small steps involved in the production of a bio/etho political subjectivity makes visible how neoliberal governance is extended to the inner emotional and moral life of the child. It explicates how power operates through the restructuring of the inner self according to neoliberal values and truths. It recounts a re-creation and re-articulation of the emotional and moral landscape of the whole child’s inner life that is more than an incorporation of the child’s soul into a mode of governance. It is a displacement and erasure of the soul with an internal life that both mirrors and is amenable to the grey, scientific discourses of the number- a replacement of the soul with a machine, an emotional and moral ‘abilities machine’.
Having begun this research, six and a half years ago, from a place of personal and professional unease, it ends in a similarly uncomfortable place. Aspects of this research that have concerned me, for example, the significant and repeated efforts to measure, compare and rank character qualities such as love and friendship have received a boost from recent government policy. Ofsted now have as part of their remit the measurement of the school’s contribution to the development of students’ character (Ofsted, 2019, p.11) and the Jubilee Centre held a conference- *Implementing the New Ofsted Framework: Character Education Policy and Practice* in June to discuss the ramifications of this for assessment practices (JCCV, 2019). There is little sign that this is generating debate or causing outrage and I am astonished by this and worry whether this thesis addresses such concerns directly. I contend that it does, or at least that it begins to, because for me, the most critical aspect of this thesis is that it makes the neoliberal whole child visible. Let me conclude by explaining why I consider this so important:

*I will say that critique is the movement by which the subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth* (Foucault, 2007b, p.47).

This thesis is a ‘calling out’, an identification of the neoliberal whole child as distinctive and value laden. Perhaps it is my past life as a Religious Studies teacher that shapes my sense of the necessity, importance and justice of doing this. Attempts to form a Muslim, Christian, Jewish whole child are identifiable. Such faith discourses and practices are visible in the context of a Western liberal society and school system. Overtly religious beliefs, concepts and values cannot help but stand out. The values and beliefs they embody and promote can be appreciated or challenged and subverted, but above all else, they can be seen. This is not so easy with the whole child that is invoked in policies of well-being and character. The employment of psy-scientific discourses sits neatly within our current Western culture and education system such that its particularity and specificity is unnoticed. Psy-scientific knowledge is easily incorporated into policy agendas and technologies of accountability and performativity that
obscure their epistemological and ontological truths. The result is that in 
schools today, we have multiple programmes tending to the whole child that 
are purveying ways of understanding the self, others and the world that are 
pejorative yet unchallenged. The point is not whether neoliberal values and 
beliefs are wrong or right or even whether they are dangerous. The point is 
that they are not subject to scrutiny but are passed on as common sense, 
objective, obvious truths without interrogation or challenge because they are 
unnoticed. What this thesis begins to do is to make the neoliberal whole 
child ‘noticeable’ in part by pointing to its striking paradoxical nature. The 
neoliberal whole child is riddled with multiple strange contradictions and 
paradoxes and these are significant and can be interrogated.

The language of the neoliberal whole child is often vague and ambiguous 
yet on examination it is rather specific and circumscribed by psy-scientific 
discourse. The emphasis on values, emotions and the personal is strait 
jacketed into statistical systems of measurement. Epistemological and 
ontological transformations and translations take place that simplify and 
reduce the complex and ambiguous and ineffable to the calculable and 
simple. The promotion of the entrepreneurial, resilient, autonomous 
confident risk taker occurs in an environment where children cannot go to 
the toilet without asking and lack autonomy and freedom of opinion, 
expression or behaviour because they are children in an adult’s world. 
Activities of self-reflection are utilised as a mechanism of classroom 
control, honesty is exhorted in an environment that is potentially hostile and 
exploration and examination of the self is funnelled into abbreviated 
displays of thirty second adverts or post it notes. These paradoxes are 
important. They are weak points in the hinges that keep the neoliberal 
dispositif together, fault lines in a governmentality that is perhaps 
overstretching itself. They are the points at which a neoliberal regime of 
truth butts up against other regimes of truth. As tightly cohered as the 
neoliberal whole child is, it is not seamless. Viewed from these alternative 
perspectives, the neoliberal whole child looks awkward, uncomfortable and 
problematic. These paradoxes that are disjunctions, ‘cracks, silent shocks, 
malfunctionings’ (Foucault, 1990a, p.156) they are the points at which
conflicting views collide and they can provide a springboard for critique and challenge:

[How not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them (ibid, p.44).]

Lastly, to explain why I think it is so important to apprehend and challenge the neoliberal whole child. It is not only the ontological and epistemological truths promoted through this production that are of concern but it is also the approach to and understanding of education it embodies. The current production of the whole child is situated within and extends a neoliberal approach to education that privileges an instrumental attitude toward learning, others and the self, fetes numerical knowledges that reduce the personal and social and ethical relationships of the child and in turn normalises certain selves and relationships. Returning to my initial comments at the outset of this research, I understand this approach to education as an extension of neoliberal governance that has significant personal, emotional, social and moral implications for those involved. For many, the education of the whole child is a powerful signifier that challenges this; it is emblematic of an understanding of education that prioritises ‘the ethical importance of the singularity and uniqueness of the subject and relationality in education’ (Winter, 2017 p.70). The neoliberal whole child is claiming and trading on an identity that hints and suggests one approach yet instantiates and imports another, an imposter, a cuckoo in the nest if you like. These vague and ambiguous understandings of the whole child found in policy on well-being and character obfuscate conflicting visions of education and facilitate disingenuous debate about the ethical selves and relationships that can be fostered and maintained within the current neoliberal education system. It allows miscommunication that can give the appearance that issues and concerns regarding the development of the self and relationships are adequately addressed when perhaps they are not. It implies one particular understanding of education whilst instantiating another. Under the guise of personal, emotional and ethical self-development, neoliberal governance catches and creates ‘us’ unaware. My
concern and argument is that the education of the whole child has become a strategy of neoliberal governance that is concealed by the obvious and unchallenged truth that schools should educate the whole child. I would like to think that this thesis makes this truth contentious.

Indeed, truth is no doubt a form of power (Foucault, 1990c, p.107).
Appendix A: Critical Discourse Analysis

I analysed specific sections of the websites of eighteen multi academy trusts of differing faith traditions: six Roman Catholic, six Church of England, three of ‘Christian ethos’, one Muslim, one Sikh and one Hindu. Fifteen had sections specifically dedicated to a declaration and explanation of their ‘vision’, ‘mission’, ‘ethos’, ‘values’ – the majority of them being under a section called ‘About us’. An ad hoc perusal of eighteen secular multi academy trusts found a similar statistic with values statements featuring in ‘About us’ sections. The location of ‘ethos and values’ statements in ‘About Us’ sections in both secular and faith multi-academy trust (MAT) websites suggested these were tactics for establishing an identity. These MATs, both faith based and secular, feel the need to explain ‘who they are’ and for faith schools in particular, it would seem that this is approached through an elaboration of values and ethos. The values and ethos statements in turn were distinguished by the recurrence of certain themes, the most commonly occurring being the importance of developing the whole child through the provision of a holistic education. I therefore focused on how the terms values and ethos interacted with the notion of educating the whole child.

The term ‘value’ is frequently collocated with words that indicate their primacy in the identity of the school, notably through the use of ‘core values’ or ‘core Christian values’. These are made in declarative statements that reinforce the formative quality of values in determining how the Trusts operate in general, not just in the classroom. For example, a number specifically relate their values to their approach to teacher’s employment and benefits for the community.

‘Nurturing teachers and school leaders, mindful of their vocation and well being’ (Diocese of Canterbury Trust).
‘to engage with and serve the needs of the local community
‘To seek the social, spiritual and economic advancement of the local community’ (ESF).
There are multiple allusions and metaphors regarding the foundational and integral role of values in defining and distinguishing the faith school. Again, this is reiterated in the categorical nature of the declarative statements and the lack of modality expressed in respect of an unequivocal commitment to such values.

‘The church ethos and values are at the heart of everything the schools aim for..’ (St. Piran’s), ‘relationships underpinned by strong core values’ (St. Mark’s) or the Trust is ‘rooted in Christian values’ or ‘based upon values of compassion’.

This correlation between identity and values is presented as positive and non-problematic. In a sense, it not only serves to distinguish the faith school but also functions as a source of integrity and a legitimisation of the institution. It is not simply that faith schools are offering a particular educational approach, as is the case with organisations such as Waldorf Steiner schools. They are doing more than claim that their unique selling point is a holistic education that develops the moral and spiritual dimensions of pupils. The connection between values and their identity implies that their provision of such a moral education is a defining characteristic of what they do because it defines who they are.

‘Our ethos is an expression of our character-it is a statement of who we are and therefore the lens through which we assess all we do…. We are community-we are relationships, We are learning- we are achievement, We are unique-we are inclusive, We are enjoyment- we are perseverance, We are hope- we are future. We are Oasis’ (Oasis). ‘Our approach is underpinned by a sense of moral purpose and a commitment to doing what is right for children…’ (United Learning).

However, there is no explication of what a value might be; an understanding of the word is taken as obvious since again, statements are declarative and lack modality. In fact, a closer investigation of the values that are described across the faith Trust websites indicates significant variation in the understanding of what constitutes a value.
to ‘confidence’ and ‘creativity’ as values

MAT talk of ‘empathy and social responsibility’

refer to ‘leadership strength’ and Cidari refer simply to ‘inclusive values’.

These values can be characteristics of the trust or characteristics that they wish to instill in pupils or indeed both. At the same time, the association with the word ethos makes the claim that these values are in some way pervasive and form part of the environment of the schools. Values, through ethos, underpin and shape the Trust and in turn, the Trust’s ethos is the evidence that values are instantiated. Clearly, such values and ethos are integral to the educational environment of these faith schools. They are tacitly presented as contributing to the holistic approach to the development of the child that is portrayed as distinctive aspect of the faith school experience.

‘We are here for the whole person. Trust, honesty, empathy and social responsibility are Christian values’ (Good Shepherd).
‘We offer an unparalleled understanding of the whole child’s educational journey, mindful of both academic achievement and personal development’ (Aquinas Trust).
‘At All Hallows we provide an education which focuses on the formation of the whole person and on our vocation and purpose in life’ (All Hallows).

Whilst the values and ethos of the Trusts are presented as fundamental and implicit, there is a more ‘formal’ education of the whole child that is presented as an addition to standard educational provision. Indeed, a clear and recurring distinction is made between academic education and social, moral and spiritual education that is presented as ‘enrichment’. A certain facet of the moral education that takes place is integral and fundamental and pertains to the values of the organisation and is evidenced and transmitted through its ethos. However, there is also specific curriculum provision of enriching, extra curricular activities that on occasion appear to be optional and additional to a core academic education. Whilst these are not contradictory or competing models, it hints at the difficulty of clarifying quite what kind of educational experience is being claimed or offered. In addition, whether integral or additional, the emphasis on providing social,
moral and spiritual education rarely referenced ‘personal’ development, which is dominant in the websites of the non-faith trusts.

| The Dominic Barberi Trust refers to ‘pupil’s spiritual, moral, social and cultural development’. |
| ESF refers to ‘academic, moral and spiritual potential’ |
| St. Piran’s Cross Trust refer to ‘a wide range of sporting and creative opportunities to support children in becoming rounded citizens.’ |
| Cidari MAT refer to ‘the right of every child in our schools to receive the best educational experience possible which develops them academically, socially, spiritually and emotionally’. |

This compounds the ambiguity about what might be entailed in educating a whole child. Inevitably, the Trust websites provide a general introduction to educational philosophy and practice and therefore in order to gain a better understanding of what might constitute an education of the whole child, it is valuable to investigate the websites of individual schools.

Here, the distinction between a core academic curriculum and an enriching programme that is able to develop the additional ‘bits’ of the whole child is again evident. This approach implies that the ‘whole’ of the whole child is understood not in terms of coherence but in terms of constituent parts with the impression that you can just keep on adding to it, upgrading the whole child ad infinitum. The whole child comprises a series of components that are arguably a reflection of and constructed by a fragmented curriculum offering lessons in social, moral, physical, religious, academic education. The education of the whole child in this context appears to mean an almost quantitative approach of quite literally adding value. This suggests a rather particular model and understanding of a human being’s development as well as raising questions about how the value/s added are selected and quantified.

It is interesting that the transmission and instantiation of values in and through structures or pedagogy is absent and rather the location of values in human beings is elaborated. This is explicitly worked out through the publication of lists of values and desired character traits. These moral, social, personal etc. characteristics are effectively embodied values that range from honesty to leadership, resilience and grit to empathy and
punctuality. On first reading, the following character traits/values are most prevalent across the different schools.

**Determination, commitment and resilience**

‘Grit: Finishing what one starts; completing something despite obstacles; a combination of perseverance and resilience.’

‘We understand that ‘greatness’ does not come without huge amounts of hard work and effort and we know that we must never give up’.

‘Educational research shows that in order to have a successful career and build successful relationships at work and throughout life, young people need much more than good academic grades’ (Coulsden Academy).

“We persevere by chasing success and trying to reach our goals We have a positive attitude and don't give up even when it is difficult” (Walthamstow Academy).

**Aspiration, potential, ambition**

‘Through our passion, commitment and innovation we nurture, challenge and guide learners to excel in a life of limitless potential.’

‘Aspiration: Having the highest expectations of oneself; never allowing obstacles to limit ambition or provide excuses (Coulsden Academy).

‘An Enterprising Future- Inspiring Creativity, Unlocking Potential, Outperforming Expectations’ (North Oxfordshire Academy).

‘Ambition’ (Northampton Academy).

**Enthusiasm, zest, positive attitude**

‘We have a positive attitude’ (Walthamstow Academy).

‘Zest: Approaching life with excitement and energy; feeling alive and activated – (Coulsden Academy).

**Inclusion, respect, empathy**

‘Self-Control: Regulating what one feels and does; being self-disciplined; making the right choices, even under pressure’ (Coulsden Academy).

‘Respect’ (Northampton Academy).

‘We are polite, have manners and are sensitive to others' feelings and beliefs’ (Walthamstow Academy).

‘We help to ensure that everyone has the same chance of reaching success We accept everyone and value everyone's contribution We intervene when we see inequality taking place’ (Walthamstow Academy).
It is unclear in what way many of the mentioned values might differ from skills, especially ‘soft skills’. For example, leadership, communication and taking responsibility all feature in multiple lists of values whilst additionally being key soft skills targeted for development in educational campaigns. Taken in isolation from a given context, it is hard to imagine what these values look like. There is little doubt that determination, grit, resilience and ambition are qualities exhibited by many of the most ‘disruptive’ pupils in the school system. Yet it seems likely that in such a context the words ‘willfulness’ and ‘intransigence’ might be employed. This suggests that perhaps these lists of values imply other values that remain unexamined and taken for granted. In sum, the analysis of the faith school websites presents an intriguing if somewhat confusing picture of a whole child constructed from a values discourse that is equally unclear.

Although I have not yet carried out a similar critical discourse analysis on secular state Trusts’ and schools’ websites, I have conducted a cursory overview. It is instantly clear that policies and statements rather than visions and missions dominate these websites. An interesting side note is that the term ‘pastoral care’ that features in faith schools appeared to have been superseded by policies such as safeguarding and/or behaviour for learning in the secular schools. Further, as anticipated there is an extensive range of initiatives and programmes: Personal and Social Education, Social and Emotional Aspects of Learning, personalised learning, well-being, health and nutrition, Learn to Learn, character education and on. Of course, this is not to say these are not to be found in faith schools, but they did not feature prominently on the websites. Consequently, these secular websites have a very different feel and the influence of psychological discourses, such as positive psychology, is obvious. It is noticeable that the endeavour to educate the whole child seems to result in an exponential growth of approaches and programmes. The website of Mirfield Grammar School and Sixth Form is one illustrative example of both this and the influence of psychological based initiatives. Under their Teaching and Learning page they detail; Habits of Mind, Kagan Cooperative learning, The Structure A Month club, Mindset, Be the Best You Can Be programme, Assertive
Mentoring, Attitude matrix, and Make It Stick: The Science of Successful Learning. The embeddedness of this whole child in a discourse of psychological theory that contrasted starkly with the values discourse so fundamental to the definition of the whole child in faith schools.

**Websites**

Academies Enterprise trust [https://sites.google.com/a/aetinet.org/academies-enterprise-trust/](https://sites.google.com/a/aetinet.org/academies-enterprise-trust/)

Ark schools [http://www.arkschools.org](http://www.arkschools.org)

Aquinas Church of England Education Trust [http://aquinastrust.org](http://aquinastrust.org)

Avanti schools trust [http://www.cidarieducation.co.uk](http://www.cidarieducation.co.uk)

Bishop Hedley Catholic High school website down

Bishop Justus Church of England school [http://www.bishopjustus.bromley.sch.uk/120/aquinas](http://www.bishopjustus.bromley.sch.uk/120/aquinas)

Bishop Wheeler Catholic academy trust [http://bishopwheelercatholicacademytrust.org](http://bishopwheelercatholicacademytrust.org)

Blessed Edward Bamber Catholic multi academy trust [http://www.bebcmat.co.uk/](http://www.bebcmat.co.uk/)

Cardinal Griffin Catholic College [http://www.cardinalgriffin.staffs.sch.uk](http://www.cardinalgriffin.staffs.sch.uk)

Carmel education trust [http://www.carmeleducationtrust.org.uk](http://www.carmeleducationtrust.org.uk)

Cidari multi academy trust [http://www.cidarieducation.co.uk](http://www.cidarieducation.co.uk)

Coventry multi academy trust [http://www.covmat.org](http://www.covmat.org)

Diocese of Canterbury MAT [https://www.canterburydiocese.org/childrenandschools/multiacademytrust/](https://www.canterburydiocese.org/childrenandschools/multiacademytrust/)

Dominic Barberi multi academy company [http://www.dominicbarberimac.org.uk](http://www.dominicbarberimac.org.uk)

Emmanuel schools foundation [http://esf-web.org.uk](http://esf-web.org.uk)

Kent Catholic schools partnership [http://www.kcsp.org.uk](http://www.kcsp.org.uk)

King’s school, Hove [https://www.kingsschoolhove.org.uk](https://www.kingsschoolhove.org.uk)
Good Shepherd multi academy trust http://www.thegoodshepherdmat.co.uk

Madani schools federation http://www.madani.leicester.sch.uk

Mirfield Free Grammar school and sixth form http://www.themfg.co.uk/Habits-of-Mind/

Nishkam school trust http://www.nishkamschooltrust.org

Oasis Learning http://www.oasiscommunitylearning.org/content/about-ocl

Oasis Coulsden http://www.oasisacademycoulsdon.org/content/vision-values-11

Oasis Southbank http://www.oasisacademysouthbank.org/content/vision-values-27

Rochester Diocesan academy trust http://www.rdat.org.uk

South Nottingham Catholic academy trust http://www.southnottinghamcat.com

St. Antony’s Catholic college http://www.st-antonyss.com

St. Augustine of Canterbury Catholic High school http://www.staugs.org.uk

St. Christopher’s multi academy trust http://www.stchristophersmat.org

St. James’s Church of England High school http://www.st-james.bolton.sch.uk

St. Julie’s Catholic High school http://www.stjulies.org.uk

St. Mark’s Academy Trust http://www.stmarksacademy.com

St. Peter’s collegiate school http://www.speters.org.uk

St. Piran’s multi academy Trust http://www.stpiranscross.co.uk

United Learning http://www.unitedlearning.org.uk/About-Us/Our-Ethos-and-Values

United Learning Manchester Academy http://www.manchester-academy.org


United Learning North Oxfordshire http://www.northoxfordshire-academy.org
Appendix B: Handouts supporting Boniwell and Ryan’s *Personal well-being lessons for secondary schools: Positive psychology in action for 11-14 year olds.*

Handout 1

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**Your Personal Brand Identity – Part 1 handout**

Imagine yourself as your own company in need of a corporate identity. You are ‘Me, Inc.’ in need of a Personal Brand Identity (PBI).

Your PBI is how you look, act and sound. It is what makes you stand out from the crowd and be an individual. A successful PBI never loses sight of your individuality – you live it with family and friends as well as at school. A stranger will ‘get it’ when they meet you. Your PBI is special to you. You can fine-tune it but should never lose sight of what makes you so special today and what you know that you are capable of in the future.

Look at the words below and circle those that feel like you to help you create your brand. Add in any words or phrases of your own at the bottom. Please take no more than 10 minutes to complete this. Have fun!

**What I project (or I want to project)**

- fashionable
- optimistic
- entertaining
- easy-going
- flexible
- sociable
- personal
- entrepreneurial
- unflappable
- sporty
- serious
- international
- cool
- team player
- open-minded
- leader
- energetic
- decisive
- creative
- casual
- gentle
- classic
- impactful
- friendly
- kind
- chic
- trendy
- attractive
- supportive
- sensitive
- intelligent
- creative
- understated
- relaxed
- free-spirited
- focused
- risk-taking
- self-aware
- dynamic
- dramatic
- driven
- independent
- confident
- generous
- geeky
- friendly
- insightful
- impulsive
- capable
- dreamer
- competitive
- funny
- generous
- fun-loving
- optimistic
- determined
- refined
- assertive

**My own additional words:**

_________________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________________

This questionnaire has been adapted from, and inspired by *Branding Yourself* (Spillane 2000).

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Your Personal Brand Identity – Part 2 handout

While it is important for your brand to reflect your views, it is also useful to gain the feedback from your friends and schoolmates.

Choose three people in the classroom you believe will give you an accurate view of what you project and tell them you are going to ask them two questions about yourself.

Ask them to be honest and positive in their answers!

1. If you met me today for the first time, what kind of person would you say that I am?
2. In three (positive) words or fewer, how would you describe me?

Please take no more than 10 minutes to complete this exercise and record your answers below:

Person 1
- I would say you are
- I would describe you as

Person 2
- I would say you are
- I would describe you as

Person 3
- I would say you are
- I would describe you as

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Handout 3

Your Personal Brand Identity – Part 3 handout

You are aware that we live in a ‘sound-bite’ culture. That means that you have to be able to communicate who you are and what you stand for in a short period of time – exactly as a good advert does. Therefore, in the next 10 minutes you are going to create your own 30-second ad.

Your ad should be a combination of what you want to stand for and project (your answers to Part 1); the best of how others see you (your answers to Part 2) and some further creative help here:

✓ If you were a car, what sort of car would you be?
✓ If you were an animal, would sort of animal would you be?
✓ If you were a holiday destination, where would you be?

Using all your creative juices, now write your ad below.

My 30 second ad
(Ensure this is legible as you will be swapping sheets with someone else.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I am</th>
<th>And my friends think I am</th>
<th>If I were a car/animal/holiday, I would be...</th>
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</table>

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The Confidence Quiz handout

Look at the 15 questions below and ‘reality check’ your own levels of confidence. You want as many ‘yes’ answers as possible.

- Do you think positively about yourself and others? Y/N
- Do you contain your levels of worry? Y/N
- Are you able to relax and do nothing without feeling guilty? Y/N
- Would you consider yourself to be lucky? Y/N
- If a friend has made you feel upset or angry, can you deal with these emotions by speaking directly to the friend involved? Y/N
- Can you be assertive in most situations? Y/N
- Do you regularly try out new things, even if they scare you? Y/N
- Do you regulate how much TV you watch? Y/N
- Are the activities you take part in chosen by you? Y/N
- Can you go to a party by yourself? Y/N
- Can you enter a room full of strangers without feeling uncomfortable? Y/N
- If you went to fancy dress party to find you were the only one dressed in a costume, could you laugh it off? Y/N
- Do your friends encourage you to challenge yourself? Y/N
- Do your friends boost your confidence? Y/N
- Do you view the future with excitement? Y/N

Adapted from The Ultimate Book of Confidence Tricks (Taylor 2003)
Appendix C: Organisations

Bounce Forward. Available at: https://www.bounceforward.com/

Cambridge Home School. Available at: https://www.chsonline.org.uk/

Education Otherwise. Available at http://www.educationotherwise.net

How to Thrive. Available at: http://www.howtotherive.org/who-we-are/)

Human Scale Education. Available at http://www.hse.org.uk/

John Templeton Foundation (2019) Available at: https://www.templeton.org/about

Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues (2019) Available at: https://www.jubileecentre.ac.uk/

Net School. Available at: https://www.net-school.co.uk/

Oasis. Available at: https://www.oasiscommunitylearning.org/who-we-are/who-we-are

Penn Resiliency Programme. Available at: https://ppc.sas.upenn.edu/services/penn-resilience-training

SPARK Resilience programme. Available at: https://sparkcurriculum.org/
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