

# Settling into Semantic Space: An Ambiguity-Focused Account of Word-Meaning Access

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## Abstract

Most words are ambiguous: individual wordforms (e.g., “run”) can map onto multiple different interpretations depending on their sentence context (e.g., “the athlete/politician/river runs”). Models of word-meaning access must therefore explain how listeners and readers are able to rapidly settle on a single, contextually appropriate meaning for each word that they encounter. This article presents a new account of word-meaning access that places semantic disambiguation at its core, and integrates evidence from a wide variety of experimental approaches to explain this key aspect of language comprehension. The model has three key characteristics. (i) Lexical-semantic knowledge is viewed as a high-dimensional space; familiar word meanings correspond to stable states within this lexical-semantic space. (ii) Multiple linguistic and paralinguistic cues can influence the settling process by which the system resolves on one of these familiar meanings. (iii) Learning mechanisms play a vital role in facilitating rapid word-meaning access by shaping and maintaining high quality lexical-semantic knowledge throughout the lifespan. In contrast to earlier models of word-meaning access, this account highlights individual differences in lexical-semantic knowledge: each person’s lexicon is uniquely structured by their specific, idiosyncratic linguistic experiences.

## Word Meaning Access: The Challenge of Lexical Ambiguity

The ability to rapidly and accurately access the meanings of words when they occur within sentence contexts is a key component of language comprehension. This task is made difficult by the inherent ambiguity of most words, which can refer to different concepts in different contexts. This review integrates current research to present a unified theoretical account of how ambiguous words are learned, represented and processed.

The most salient form of lexical ambiguity is found in homonyms such as “trunk” that have multiple unrelated meanings (e.g., “the trunk of a car/tree/elephant”). This form of ambiguity is relatively rare, and is present for about only 7% of relatively frequent wordforms (Rodd, Gaskell, & Marslen-Wilson, 2002). In contrast, more than 80% of wordforms are polysemous - they can refer to more than one related word sense (Rodd et al., 2002). For example, the verb “run” is highly polysemous – it has a multitude of different interpretations that are appropriate within different sentence contexts (e.g., “the athlete/river/program/paint/manager/dye/train/candidate runs”). Successful word-meaning access occurs when an *appropriate* interpretation (i.e. the interpretation that was intended by the speaker/writer) is selected from the range of familiar possibilities.

Lexical ambiguity is often viewed within psycholinguistics as a troublesome nuisance that adds to the processing demands that are associated with successful language comprehension (Johnsrude & Rodd, 2016). However it is important to remember that polysemy adds considerably to the communicative power of language by allowing communicators to flexibly convey a rich array of meaning from their finite set of familiar word forms. Polysemy also provides an important source of linguistic creativity: speakers can creatively extend familiar words beyond their original meanings. This creative aspect is most apparent for ‘regular polysemy’: those clusters of words that have systematic patterns of senses. For example, the meanings of animal names can be productively extended to refer to the meat that comes from that animal (e.g., chicken, lamb, ostrich etc.; Copestake & Briscoe, 1995; Mahesh Srinivasan & Rabagliati, 2015). In addition, it has been argued that ambiguity is a functional property of language that *improves* communicative efficiency (Piantadosi, Tily, & Gibson, 2012). Specifically, these authors argued, based on a statistical analysis of several

different languages, that so long as words are used within rich, informative contexts, then this ‘re-use’ of wordforms actually *reduces* the processing demands on the language system. (Piantadosi et al., 2012).

Note also that some degree of semantic disambiguation may inevitably occur even for relatively unambiguous words; successful communication requires that comprehenders focus on those aspects of a word’s meaning that are most relevant in the current, specific context. For example, the ‘sourness’ feature of the word ‘lemon’ is more readily available in a sentence that indicates that the lemon is to be eaten compared to one where it is to be rolled across the floor (Tabossi, 1988b). Similarly, the appropriate physical features of an ‘onion’ will depend on whether it has just been ‘chopped’ or ‘weighed’ (Altmann & Ekves, 2019 for review).

The acknowledgement that most common words are (to varying degrees) ambiguous, requires that lexical-semantic disambiguation is a core component of models that aim to explain how word meanings are accessed/retrieved. This approach is in stark contrast with many influential models of lexical processing, which make the simplifying assumption that there is a one-to-one mapping from word form to word meaning (e.g., Plaut, McClelland, Seidenberg, & Patterson, 1996) and provide no mechanism for dealing with lexical-semantic ambiguity.

One highly influential model of word-meaning access, that did explicitly acknowledge the challenges placed by lexical ambiguity on word-meaning access, is the ‘Reordered Access’ model (Duffy, Morris, & Rayner, 1988). The model made two central claims. First, when a wordform is encountered, its different, familiar meanings become available simultaneously. Second, the timing with which specific meanings become available is influenced by two factors: (i) their relative frequency in the language (dominance), and (ii) the preceding sentential context. These constraints allow for rapid access (and then integration) of word meanings that are highly frequent in the language and/or that are strongly supported by the surrounding context. These properties allow the word-meaning access system to avoid unnecessary distraction from word meanings that are unlikely to be correct. These two core claims of the Reordered Access model have stood the test of time and are supported by a wide range of evidence, for both written and spoken language (see Vitello & Rodd, 2015 for review).

More recently however, research has revealed a richer and more complex view of how the meanings of ambiguous words are learned, represented and processed. While these results do not undermine the core claims of the Reordered Access model, evidence has now shown that readers/listeners use a far wider range of distributional cues about the usage of different words meanings and make use of this learned information to ‘nudge’ themselves towards correct meanings quickly and accurately. The current paper will review current experimental findings, and integrate these findings into a new empirically driven theoretical account of word-meaning access that has three key characteristics.

i) Distributed representations of word meanings

Familiar word meanings are represented by distributed representations that correspond to stable states within a complex, structured high-dimensional semantic space (Armstrong & Plaut, 2016; Rodd, Gaskell, & Marslen-Wilson, 2004).

ii) Fluent disambiguation is facilitated by integration of multiple linguistic and paralinguistic cues

A wide range of contextual cues influence word-meaning access, such that contextually appropriate meanings are more readily available. The immediate sentence context provides the primary disambiguating cue but, word-meaning access is situated within a highly interactive cognitive system that also allows non-linguistic cues (such as the identity of the speaker) to support successful word-meaning access (Cai et al., 2017).

iii) Learning mechanisms shape and maintain high quality lexical-semantic knowledge

Lexical-semantic space continues to be shaped by personal linguistic experience throughout the lifespan. Not only are new *unfamiliar* word meanings being continually integrated into the existing lexical-semantic space (e.g., Rodd et al., 2012), but also learning from recent linguistic experiences with *familiar* word meanings continues to reshape and maintain high quality lexical knowledge throughout the lifespan (Rodd et al., 2016; Rodd, Lopez Cutrin, Kirsch, Millar, & Davis, 2013).

## Distributed Representations of Word Meanings

Word meanings are dynamic and highly variable. The same word form can map onto to a multitude of different semantic interpretations. One way of capturing this is to assume that each familiar word meaning corresponds to a single point in a high dimensional semantic space (Armstrong & Plaut, 2008; Borowsky & Masson, 1996; Joordens & Besner, 1994; Kawamoto, Farrar IV, & Kello, 1994; Rodd et al., 2004).

Within this framework, the meaning of a relatively unambiguous word (e.g., “SHOE”) will correspond to the single point within semantic space in which all its constituent semantic features are active and all other possible semantic features are inactive. The form-to-meaning mapping for such words is straightforward and unambiguous: a single wordform maps directly onto its single lexical-semantic representation (Figure 1). In contrast, for ambiguous words the situation is more complex: a single wordform maps forward onto multiple different interpretations that consist of different combinations of semantic features. It is the one-to-many mapping between form and meaning that creates the need for semantic disambiguation. This view that single wordforms can map onto many different possible lexical-semantic representations is in direct contrast with a more common computational approach to modelling the mapping from wordform to word meanings that usually make the simplifying assumption that the meanings of all wordforms can be captured by a single vector within semantic space (e.g., Plaut, McClelland, Seidenberg, & Patterson, 1996).

<Insert Figure 1 here>

Importantly, this approach captures a key linguistic distinction between homonymy and polysemy (Rodd et al., 2002). Homonyms (e.g., “bark”) that have multiple, unrelated meanings will map onto multiple uncorrelated combinations of lexical-semantic features (Figure 1). These distinct word meanings correspond to distant points within semantic space. In contrast, polysemous words (e.g., “run”) consists of a single wordform that maps onto multiple different correlated representations that are situated closer to each other within semantic space (Figure 1). Thus, within this framework the distinction between related word senses and unrelated word meanings is therefore simply one of degree. In both cases the different interpretations of the wordform correspond to different points within semantic space. The only difference is the relative proximity of the meanings: related words senses share many aspects of meaning and therefore lie in adjacent areas of semantic space, while unrelated word meanings are uncorrelated and therefore correspond to more distant locations. This approach accommodates the finding that there is considerable variability in relatedness within the class of polysemous words (see Klein & Murphy, 2001 for discussion of how different senses of polysemous words are often be judged to be relatively *unrelated*). This approach also removes the need for researchers to draw a relatively arbitrary dividing line between these two forms of ambiguity.

A critical concept within this framework that allows a model of this type to cope with the prevalence of ambiguity is that of the attractor basin (McLeod, Shallice, & Plaut, 2000; Plaut et al., 1996). As the system learns the appropriate form-to-meaning connections lexical-semantic space develops a highly structured collection of interconnections such that semantic features that tend to co-occur are positively connected, while incongruent semantic features develop reciprocal, inhibitory connections. These connections ensure that that familiar combinations of lexical-semantic features that correspond to known word meanings correspond to highly stable states (known as attractor basins). Once the network enters such an attractor basin its activation tends to remain relatively unchanged – there is no pressure for the network to move away from that stable combination of semantic features (until the next word is encountered). In contrast, if the network activates an unfamiliar/inappropriate combinations of semantic features, the co-activation of incongruent semantic features ensures that its activation state is not stable. Under such conditions the network of connections within the lexical-semantic representations will ensure that the activation of semantic features will update/change in a manner that moves its current state away from a meaningless, unstable state towards a more stable, familiar representation.

This distributed framework views the retrieval of a word's meaning as a dynamic settling process. In particular, for ambiguous words, the lexical semantic network will usually initially enter a relatively unhelpful blend state that will likely contain inconsistent elements of meanings that correspond to different possible interpretations of the incoming wordform. The network then incrementally moves away from this unstable state and settles into a stable state that corresponds to one of the familiar interpretations of that word. Successful word meaning retrieval occurs when the network successfully settles into a familiar, stable state within lexical semantic space. Various factors such as the prior state of the network and other currently active semantic information (i.e. its preceding context) as well as recent/long-term experience with the ambiguous word itself will determine which of the alternative meanings is more robustly activated and wins the competition during the active settling process. This attractor structure therefore provides the core mechanism for semantic disambiguation, ensuring that whenever an ambiguous word is encountered one or other of its possible interpretations is eventually settled upon and it is unlikely to linger in a non-meaningful blend state.

A model of this sort was previously implemented by Rodd et al. (2004) building on earlier connectionist models of lexical ambiguity (Borowsky & Masson, 1996; Joordens & Besner, 1994; Kawamoto, Farrar & Kello, 1994). Importantly, simulations using this network not only showed that this approach was able to adequately capture how these different types of ambiguous words might be represented, but that the network showed appropriate settling behaviour that simulated human lexical decision performance. Specifically, the simulations revealed the same pattern of ambiguity effects that had been observed by Rodd et al., (2002) who showed that lexical decision times for words with multiple different unrelated meanings (e.g., "bark") are slower than for unambiguous words. This effect arises in the network due to the additional processing required to move the network from an initial blend state that corresponded to a mixture of the words two meanings towards one or other settled familiar word interpretation. In contrast, to this 'ambiguity disadvantage' seen for homonyms, Rodd et al., (2002) reported *faster* lexical decision times for wordforms that were ambiguous between multiple related word senses (e.g., "run") compared to unambiguous words. (See Rodd, 2004 for similar results from a reading aloud task.) The network simulations indicated that for such polysemous words, a more complex pattern of settling behaviour is observed: early in the settling process, these words benefitted from their broad, deep semantic attractor basins that correspond to the large cluster of semantically unrelated meanings. However later in settling, a disadvantage emerged as the ambiguity between the different related senses prevented optimal settling behaviour. These results are compatible with the lexical decision data reported by Rodd et al., (2002) if we assume that lexical decisions are made relatively early in the time-course of word-meaning access – as soon as sufficient information about the word has been retrieved to distinguish it from the non-word filler items. (See Rodd, 2018 for further discussion of the effects of ambiguity on lexical access and Armstrong & Plaut, 2016 for extensive discussion of the settling dynamics of networks of this sort).

It is important to note that this account places no explicit limits about the extent/nature of the information about word meanings that is contained within the mental lexicon. As discussed in detail by Elman (2009, 2011), recent years have seen a significant shift away from the view that the mental lexicon only contains "a small chunk of phonology, a small chunk of syntax, and a small chunk of semantics" (Jackendoff, 2002), towards a more 'enriched' view in which the lexicon contains wide range of complex, idiosyncratic information about individual words. For example, experimental evidence supports the view that readers can keep track of the differing grammatical preferences (e.g., transitive vs. intransitive) for the alternative senses of a polysemous verb such as "shatter" (Hare, Elman, Tabaczynski, & McRae, 2009). Recent accounts have also emphasised the degree to which information about 'real world knowledge' influence the earliest stages of lexical processing and may therefore be considered for inclusion within mental lexicon (Elman, 2009). The current account places no explicit limit on what information should be considered to be 'lexical' and instead takes the pragmatic view that any conceptual/semantic knowledge that is *consistently* relevant to the interpretation of a particular word, becomes readily available to the reader/listener and therefore constitutes part of its 'word meaning'. Future empirical work will determine the extent to which this open-ended, flexible approach to the lexicon is warranted.

Future work is also needed to how this framework can be extended to allow the meanings of multiple consecutive words to be simultaneously represented within the same network, most likely by allowing the

semantic features of each word to remain separately bound to its corresponding phonological/orthographic features (Rabagliati, Doumas, & Bemis, 2017).

Finally, these models of monolingual word-meaning access must be extended to deal with the additional complexity that arises for individuals who speak more than one language. In particular, these models must consider the additional cross-language ambiguity that can occur for languages with similar wordforms. For example, language pairs such as English and Dutch include wordforms that map onto different meanings in the two languages: for example the Dutch word “room” translates to “cream”. These words, which are relatively rare, are known as ‘interlingual homographs’ or ‘false friends’. In most cases, such words are easy to disambiguate because there are strong contextual cues that indicate which language is currently being used. However, despite these cues, this form of ambiguity does disrupt processing by bilingual speakers (Dijkstra, Grainger, & Van Heuven, 1999; Poort, Warren, & Rodd, 2016). Future models of word-meaning access should aim to unify theoretical accounts that have been developed on the basis of evidence from monolingual and bilingual individuals (Poort & Rodd, 2019).

### **Fluent disambiguation is facilitated by fluent integration of linguistic and paralinguistic cues**

Within this theoretical framework, meaning disambiguation is viewed as a dynamic settling process in which the current state of the network moves away from some initial ‘blend state’ that includes elements of multiple different interpretations, towards a single familiar word meaning. However, while the presence of attractor structure within lexical-semantic knowledge ensures that this settling process always occurs, on its own this property of the network cannot ensure that the ‘correct’ meaning is accessed. Fluent, accurate semantic disambiguation requires that the network is highly sensitive to the distributional statistics of language, such that during the settling process the network’s activation is ‘nudged’ away from irrelevant meanings towards the correct interpretation of the wordform: the network must utilise a variety of predictive cues to settle into the correct attractor basin and not be lured into those basins that correspond to irrelevant, distractor meanings.

This interactive view arises directly from the foundational connectionist assumptions of this framework about the architecture of the language processor. Specifically, this approach assumes that successful comprehension arises as the result of sophisticated learning mechanisms that constantly work to extract helpful statistical regularities about which aspects of incoming information (do not) co-occur. As described above, these mechanisms ensure that lexical-semantic features of individual words are (i) boosted if they have previously co-occurred in known, familiar words, and (ii) produce interference if they are mutually incompatible. Similar learning mechanisms ensure that for each ambiguous word that is encountered the system maximises the probability of settling into the ‘correct’ meaning by boosting the availability of meanings that are compatible with (or predicted by) the current context.

This highly interactive view of word-meaning access is closely aligned with ‘constraint-based’ models of sentence processing that focus primarily on grammatical aspects of sentence comprehension (MacDonald, Pearlmutter, & Seidenberg, 1994, see Elman, Hare, & McRae, 2004 for review). These models assume that comprehenders make use of a wide range of lexical, semantic, and pragmatic information when assigning grammatical roles to words.

One important cue that helps readers/listeners to access the correct meaning of each wordform is the presence of biasing words in the preceding sentence context. For example, the word “bark” will be interpreted very differently when it is preceded by either the word “dog” or the word “tree”. A large body of research has attempted to specify exactly *how* these cues operate. The field has focused on three key (related) questions about how sentence context influences word meaning access. Specifically, researchers have attempted to specify (i) the stage of processing at which context plays a role, (ii) the mechanism(s) by which the system assesses the congruency between a word’s alternative meanings and the sentence context, and (iii) the type(s) of contextual information that can influence word-meaning access. The following sections review the relevant evidence on these key issues and how these findings can best be accommodated within the current framework.

The psycholinguistic literature contains a wealth of evidence from studies that aimed to reveal the stage of processing at which contextual cues operate (see Witzel & Forster, 2015). These experiments have aimed to distinguish between opposing views about the structural relationship between (low-level) word-meaning access and (higher-level) sentence processing mechanisms. At one end of the theoretical spectrum are ‘*exhaustive access*’ models of word meaning access (Onifer & Swinney, 1981; Seidenberg, Tanenhaus, Leiman, & Bienkowski, 1982; Swinney, 1979). These models fall within the general class of *autonomous* or *modular* models of language processing (Fodor, 1983). Under this view, when an ambiguous wordform is first encountered, all of its familiar word meanings are all automatically initially accessed/retrieved in parallel regardless of any contextual cues. Such models only permit context to influence the meaning selection/integration processes that occur after all the possible meanings have been accessed/retrieved. In contrast, ‘*selective access*’ models fall within the class of *interactive* models of word-meaning access, and assume that contextual cues can directly modulate word-meaning access. Under the strongest version of this interactive account, if the preceding context is sufficiently strong then it can prevent the access/retrieval of meanings that are inconsistent with this context and can thereby ensure that only the contextually relevant meaning is accessed (Tabossi, 1988; Tabossi, Colombo, & Job, 1987).

Taken together, the available evidence is incompatible with the most extreme versions of the modular position that context can make *no* contribution to the initial access of word meanings (Sheridan, Reingold, & Daneman, 2009). Specifically, this view seems incompatible with a range of findings showing that the time taken to read ambiguous words varies considerably according to whether the preceding context is supportive or inconsistent with participant word meanings – these contextual effects can be observed even on measures of eye-movement behaviour that are thought to reflect the earliest stages of word-meaning access. (See Duffy, Kambe, & Rayner, 2001 for a comprehensive review of findings concerning how ambiguous words are processed within sentence contexts.)

In addition, the strongest version of the interactive models has frequently been viewed as inconsistent with the finding (known as the ‘subordinate bias effect’) that readers show consistent processing delays when an ambiguous word with one strongly dominant meaning (e.g., “pen”) are preceded by words that are strongly biased towards a different, subordinate meaning (e.g., "Because it was too small to hold all the new animals, the old pen was replaced"; Duffy et al., 1988). This effect is usually interpreted as showing that prior context *cannot* prevent the reader from automatically accessing the preferred, dominant meaning – it is the competition with this (contextually irrelevant) dominant meaning that is assumed to be delaying the processing of the ambiguous word (Kellas & Vu, 1999; Pacht & Rayner, 1993; Rayner, Binder, & Duffy, 1999; Rayner, Pacht, & Duffy, 1994; Sereno, 1995). Importantly, the subordinate bias effect has been observed even when the ambiguous word is preceded both by a global contextual cue that sets the topic of the discourse at the start of the paragraph, and by a local contextual cue within the same sentence as the target ambiguous word (Kambe, Rayner, & Duffy, 2001).

On the basis of these findings, researchers converged on an intermediate view, as instantiated in the reordered access model: all familiar word meanings are initially accessed, but context can directly influence their relative levels of activation/availability such that word meanings that are compatible with the preceding sentence context are more readily available than they would be in an unsupportive context (Duffy et al., 2001).

However, recent evidence has shown that if a five-sentence strongly constraining context precedes the ambiguous word then this subordinate bias effect can be eliminated (Colbert-Getz & Cook, 2013). In addition, Leininger & Rayner (2013) have shown that the magnitude of the subordinate bias effect can be significantly reduced when the preceding, biasing context contains the target ambiguous word itself. Taken together, these results indicate that very strongly biasing contexts can influence the early stages of lexical access, such that only the contextually appropriate meaning seems to be (selectively) accessed. More generally, these results emphasize the powerful influence that context can play in guiding word meaning access, and go some way to explain why word-meaning access appears so effortless in contextually rich, natural language contexts.

In the context of the current distributed framework, this view is operationalised by assuming that contextual cues can directly modulate the settling behaviour of the network, and that this contextual modulation can

begin to operate as soon as the word meaning(s) begin to become active. Specifically, when an ambiguous wordform is encountered activation feeds forward to automatically begin to activate semantic features that correspond to all of its familiar interpretations. Under this view the primary role of context is to ‘nudge’ the current state of the network during the settling process such that the network moves rapidly towards the word meaning that is best supported by the current context. In addition, this approach assumes that when very strong contextual cues are available then this ‘nudging’ will be more rapid and efficient compared with when only weakly constraining contextual cues are available. This approach therefore allows context to influence (i) which meaning is ultimately selected (settled into), as well as (ii) how rapidly this settling process occurs. Importantly, this approach does *not* rule out the possibility that when relatively balanced ambiguous words occur within a neutral context, then settling may be sufficiently slow that words that occur *after* the ambiguity can influence the settling trajectory. For example, in the spoken sentence “The woman hoped that both pears/pairs taste sweet” , the initial settling process for the homophone “pears/pairs” may be influenced by the meaning of the word “taste” (Rodd, Longe, Randall, & Tyler, 2010). Current evidence is equivocal about how long the system can remain in this transient pre-disambiguation ‘blend’ state, i.e. how long it can maintain elements of meaning that correspond to more than one possible interpretation (Vitello, 2013). Studies that have explored the impact of varying the distance between an ambiguous word and its subsequent disambiguating context have produced conflicting findings (Leinenger, Myslín, Rayner, & Levy, 2017; Miyake, Just, & Carpenter, 1994; Rodd, Johnsrude, & Davis, 2012). Resolving this issue remains a key challenge for the field.

One key property of this proposed mechanism by which context can directly influence word-meaning access is that it avoids the need for the system to incorporate a mechanism that directly assesses the relative congruence of all the different meanings of a words within a given context. This approach contrasts with the (computationally demanding) alternative that have been suggested in which the system initially accesses all possible word meanings and attempts (in parallel) to (i) integrate these different possible interpretations with the ongoing representation of the preceding sentence/discourse, and then (ii) compare these (partially) complete higher-level representations to determine which of the alternative word meanings is most plausible. However given that most word are (to varying degrees) ambiguous and a single sentence can therefore contain numerous consecutive ambiguities, such a mechanism could result in a requirement to compute infeasible numbers of complex discourse representations in parallel (see Witzel & Forster, 2015 for further discussion). The current view is broadly consistent with the more parsimonious approach put forward by Witzel & Forster (2015), who propose that all meanings of an ambiguous word are initially activated, with subsequent meaning selection being driven by a “fast-acting, low-level heuristic based on intralexical connections” (Witzel & Forster, 2015; pg. 159).

This approach assumes that if any of the words that precede an ambiguous word are either (i) strongly associated or (ii) overlapping in semantic content with one of the word’s possible meanings then these contextual cues will act to ‘nudge’ the activation state towards that word meaning. For example, in the phrase “the dog’s bark” the lexical-semantic knowledge activated in response to “dog” will be rapidly retrieved and then will influence the settling trajectory for the word “bark” by nudging it towards the dog-related meaning, due to the learned associative/semantic relationships between the words “dog” and “bark”. Under this view, contextually appropriate meanings benefit from an accumulation of positive reinforcement from all the related semantic content that is currently co-active within the language system, while inappropriate meanings are discarded because the ‘winner-takes-all’ nature of the attractor basin structure necessarily requires them to be deactivated in the presence of a contextually supported alternative. Thus the rejection of inappropriate meanings is viewed as a relatively passive process in which they are essentially discarded due to the absence of evidence in their favour, not because of a more active process that first activates and then discards them. Importantly, this approach does not require the system to explicitly evaluate the potential relationships between the context and *all* possible meanings.

However, recent evidence concerning the important role of event representations in language comprehension suggests that this view that word meanings are boosted via simple co-activation of any associated/related word meanings is likely to be overly simplistic. Models of event representations (Altmann & Ekves, 2019; Elman, 2009, 2011) emphasize the structured nature of the information that we encode in response to incoming language input – sentences such as “the chef chopped the onion” need to be encoded in a manner that captures

not only the participants in the events (i.e. the chef and the onion), but the relationships between these participants and how their states of are likely to be changed by the actions/events (Altmann & Ekves, 2019). These models also emphasize the importance of our knowledge about how events are structured in the world in understanding how comprehenders select/access the most appropriate information about words. This view suggests that when thinking about how ambiguous words are processed within sentence context we may need to develop more sophisticated, structured accounts of contextual constraints whereby word meanings are boosted if they fit well into the ongoing event representation that is being constructed in response to the ongoing discourse.

So far, this discussion of contextual constraints has focused on the disambiguation process that occurs when an ambiguous word is first encountered. In natural language environments, words are usually presented within relatively rich conceptual contexts that provide multiple convergent contextual cues. Misinterpretations in natural situations are relatively rare: listeners/readers usually have sufficient information to allow them to select the ‘correct’ word meaning for the majority of word that they encounter. Note that ambiguity resolution always involves the convergence of form and meaning: while contextual cues are usually not sufficient to predict a unique lexical candidate from the set of all the possible words in a person’s mental lexicon, they are nearly always sufficient to determine which of the possible meanings of a particular ambiguous word were intended by the speaker/writer. So, for example, while the sentence context “the boy heard a loud ...”, would not tell the listener what the next word would be (i.e. it could be “noise”, “sound”, “car” etc.), once they have heard “the boy heard “the boy heard a loud bark” there is sufficient contextual information for them to be confident about which of the known meanings of bark is intended. From this perspective, ambiguity resolution should be viewed as a convergence between form and meaning – only when these two constraints act together is the reader/listener able to accurately assess the meaning of the words that they hear.

However, on some, relatively rare, occasions (e.g., when a very low frequency word meaning is encountered in a relatively weakly constraining context) the system will produce an inappropriate response to a wordform and settle into the wrong attractor basin. On these occasions the ‘wrong’ meaning will be ‘passed forward’ to the subsequent higher-level comprehension processes, i.e. will begin to be integrated with other elements of the sentence/discourse. These (rare) conditions will result in the need for a re-evaluation of the word’s meaning. We will return to this reinterpretation aspect of semantic-disambiguation later.

A final important question concerning how context influences word-meaning access, is the requirement to specify exactly what forms of contextual cues are permitted to influence the settling process. The current, interactive account takes a pragmatic approach: it assumes that *any* conceptual/semantic information that is currently active within the language system (broadly construed) can potentially influence lexical-semantic disambiguation, and that the degree of influence is directly related to the current level of activation/availability of the relevant cue. For instance when the ambiguous word “bark” is immediately preceded by the word “dog” the ‘nudge’ provided will be very strong due to (i) the strength of the semantic-associative relationship and (ii) the proximity of the words resulting in an overwhelmingly strong contextual bias that would drive very rapid and successful disambiguation. In contrast, if the only cue to the disambiguation of “bark” was a word that was more weakly represented in the ongoing discourse or was more weakly related/associated to the appropriate meaning then the degree of contextual constraint would be weaker making disambiguation (via settling) a slower and less reliable process.

Importantly, recent evidence has revealed that linguistic content of the preceding words is not the only source of contextual bias that influences word-meaning access. Recent results from Cai et al., (2017) demonstrate that listeners’ interpretation of ambiguous words is influenced by their knowledge of the speaker. Specifically, Cai et al., (2017) examined the effect of speaker accent (British versus American) on the interpretation of words that have different dominant meanings in the two dialects (e.g., “bonnet”). Results from a range of tasks confirmed that for native speakers of British English the meaning that is dominant in British English (i.e. car part) is (of course) usually more readily available. But intriguingly, Cai et al., (2017) found that the availability of the subordinate American-dominant meaning (e.g. type of hat) can be boosted, even in British participants, when the words are spoken in an American accent. Importantly the experimental evidence show that the effect is not driven by dialect differences in the pronunciation of the current individual token. Neutral-accent speech items, created by morphing British- and American-accented recordings, were interpreted in a

similar way to accented words when they were embedded in a context of more strongly accented words. For example, an accent-neutral version of “bonnet” was more likely to be interpreted as referring to a hat when it was surrounded by American-accented speech. These experimental data therefore strongly indicate that listeners generate an ‘accent context’ for the individual speaker that they are listening to and use this to modulate the availability of different word meanings (see Cai et al., 2017 for further details of the likely mechanism by which speaker knowledge can influence lexical processing).

These data make clear that listeners are able to keep track of reliable differences in how words are used by speakers from different dialect communities. Importantly, these findings cannot be explained via a simple semantic-priming type mechanism: it is not that all ‘hat related’ meanings are more active when a US accent is detected, it is only in the presence of the word form “bonnet” that the hat-related meaning is boosted in the presence of this accent. In addition, Cai et al., (2017) suggest that speaker accent is unlikely to be special in terms of its ability to directly modulate word-meaning availability and that listeners are likely to have also learned expectations about how word-meaning use varies according to other group-level factors such as age, gender and social class. Perhaps most intriguing is the possibility that we may keep track of the idiosyncratic biases in the ways that highly familiar individuals tend to use specific words. Future work is needed to determine the extent to which listeners (and readers) acquire and maintain specific word-meaning usage knowledge of this sort. Further research is also needed to assess the extent to which broader contextual cues (e.g., visual scene information) can directly modulate the initial stages of word-meaning access.

But many unanswered questions remain. Very little is currently understood about exactly what types of linguistic (and paralinguistic) information provides ‘strong’ contextual constraints and about the extent to which the usefulness of any given cue is modulated by the relative position of the cue and the ambiguity within the discourse. Further, little is understood, about how information from multiple, probabilistic cues are integrated together. One area of research that is likely to provide important constraints on the development of this aspect of psycholinguistic theory is the use of corpus based analyses to quantify, from an information theory perspective, the informativeness of different types of linguistic cues across varying time windows. In conjunction with experiments designed to explore the relative contributions of different types of contextual constraints in more naturalistic disambiguation scenarios this approach can potential reveal underlying principles that govern real-word disambiguation.

### **Importance of Learning Mechanisms in the maintenance of high quality lexical representations**

Within this framework, the structure of stored lexical-semantic knowledge is critical for fluent word meaning access. Good comprehenders must fine tune their lexicon to (i) ensure an appropriate attractor structure for all the words that they know in order to avoid uninterpretable blend states and (ii) optimise the use of contextual cues to guide the settling process towards the ‘correct’ meaning of each word they encounter. Therefore a foundational assumption of this theoretical approach is that *learning* plays a key role in supporting skilled comprehension of words.

First, the system must (of course) be able to learn entirely new form-meaning pairs that are encountered (e.g., learning for the first time that “ping” refers to getting in touch via digital means). Second, and more relevant to the topic of lexical-semantic disambiguation, the system must retain the capacity to learn new meanings for already familiar wordforms, for example due to technological innovation (e.g., the social media senses of “tweet”, “post” and “troll”). New meanings must also be learned when we learn new academic subjects or hobbies (e.g., the rowing-related meanings of “square”, “catch” and “feather”), or enter a new dialect community (e.g., “piece” can mean a sandwich in Scotland and a gun in America). This form of word learning can result in a previously unambiguous word with a previously straightforward form-to-meaning mapping gaining additional complexity with respect to its lexical-semantic representation and acquiring a more complex one-to-many mapping. Similarly, already ambiguous words can continue to acquire additional meanings/senses throughout their lifespan. Thus, exposure to new word meanings can result in lexical-semantic space being reshaped and gaining complexity. Studies have shown that adult participants are highly skilled at working out the meanings of novel word senses (Clark & Gerrig, 1983; Frisson & Pickering, 2007)

and that they can retain good memory for new word meanings after relatively few exposures, with relatively little forgetting being observed after a one week delay (Hulme, Barsky, & Rodd, 2019).

Recent studies of adult word learning have revealed several interesting characteristics of this form of new meaning learning. Fang, Perfetti and Stafura (2017) compared learning of new meanings for familiar words to a condition in which both the form and meaning of the new word were unfamiliar. Their results support a ‘biphasic pattern’ in which early in learning is more successful for familiar wordforms compared to the novel wordforms, but later in learning this pattern is reversed. They suggest that the familiarity of a wordform initially facilitates learning because the relevant form-based representation already exists and so does not need to be newly constructed, but that later in learning the interference between the alternative meanings plays a more influential role in constraining learning success. Similarly, Rodd et al., (2012) showed that new meanings for familiar wordforms are more easily learnt when they are semantically *related* to a word’s existing meaning. For example, it is relatively easy to learn that a “sip” is ‘a small amount of data’ due to the semantic link with its existing ‘small drink’ meaning. Taken together these studies indicate that, at least for adults, the pre-existing structure of lexical-semantic space, and the existing form-to-meaning mapping(s) for a particular word form has a significant impact on the ease with which new lexical knowledge can be inserted into the store of lexical-semantic knowledge. All new learning occurs within an already highly structured system – this existing structure is of significant benefit when the to-be-learned information shares informational content with existing knowledge but creates additional challenges when form-meaning pathways must be built that conflict with the information already stored.

In addition to this form of new meaning learning in which an entirely new stable state is inserted into the lexicon, it has recently become clear that learning mechanisms also play a key role in allowing individuals to maintain and reshape their existing lexical semantic representations for *familiar* word meanings throughout their lifespan.

It has long been known that individuals are sensitive to the distributional properties of word meanings. In particular, an extensive body of work has emphasized that both listeners and readers are highly sensitive to the overall relative frequencies of word meanings in the language, known as ‘meaning dominance’ (e.g., Hogaboam & Perfetti, 1975; see Duffy et al., 2001 for a review). There is abundant evidence confirming that more frequent word meanings are more easily accessible. For example when presented without any surrounding sentence context a word like “pen” will most likely be interpreted as referring to its most common ‘writing implement’ meanings and not as referring to its less frequent (subordinate) ‘animal enclosure’ meaning (Twilley, Dixon, Taylor, & Clark, 1994). In addition, as discussed earlier, a large number of studies in which readers’ eye-movements are tracked during reading have shown that meaning dominance plays a key role in determining how easily ambiguous words are understood within a range of different types of sentence structures (Duffy et al., 2001; Vitello & Rodd, 2015). These dominance effects can be readily explained within the attractor basin framework by assuming that the mappings from form to meaning are built up over time such that word meanings that have been more frequently encountered are able to build up stronger connections (i) from form-to-meaning and (ii) within their lexical semantic representation (Mukhia, 2018).

More recently however, a more nuanced picture has emerged concerning exactly *how* the availability of word meanings is driven by an individual’s specific pattern of *recent* and *longer-term* experiences with that particular word (Rodd et al., 2016). Research has shown that adult lexical-semantic representations are surprisingly malleable and that learning mechanisms play a key role in allowing individuals to keep track of both short-term and long-term changes in their linguistic environment.

First, it has been shown that individuals keep track of *long-term* changes by adjusting their lexical-semantic representations in response to their recent linguistic environment such that those meanings that are more likely to be encountered in the future are most easily accessible. Rodd et al. (2016) investigated word meaning preferences within a group of recreational rowers who all knew a set of rowing-related meanings for highly familiar words such as “catch”, “square” and “feather”. They found that the availability of these specific meanings increased with the number years of rowing experience of the participants, showing that the availability of these meanings increased in response to individuals’ prolonged exposure to an environment in

which these word meanings were often used. Similarly, Wiley, George & Rayner (2016) showed that baseball experts had more trouble ignoring word meanings that relate to baseball (compared with non-experts) even within sentence contexts that are strongly biased towards the non-baseball meaning (e.g. “Monica had a great fear of things flying around her head. She looked for the BATS that lived in the shed”). These studies support the view that individuals respond to their long-term experience with particular vocabulary items over periods of several years by increasing the availability of these word meanings. This work also emphasises the individual differences that are inherent in lexical-semantic representations – no two people share the same exact linguistic history and so each individual has their own uniquely idiosyncratic store of lexical-semantic knowledge. While speakers of a shared language will (mostly) share a common set of known word meanings, the ease with which these different word meanings come to mind will differ significantly according to their specific experiences with these word meanings.

In addition to these incremental effects of long-term experience with word meanings, evidence from word-meaning priming paradigms has revealed listeners and readers are particularly sensitive to very recent encounters with ambiguous words (Rodd et al., 2013): recently encountered word meanings are more readily available than would be expected from their overall frequency/dominance. In particular, lower frequency meanings that are usually relatively difficult to access become more readily available when they have been encountered within the preceding minutes/hours. This ‘boosting’ of recently encountered meanings serves to reduce the processing load when word meanings are used repeatedly within the same conversation or document.

In the standard word-meaning priming paradigm, participants initially encounter ambiguous words within strongly disambiguating contexts (e.g., “The farmer moved the sheep into the PEN”). Then, after a delay (typically 20-40 minutes) they perform a task that provides a measure of the availability of the word’s meanings. The most commonly used test of word-meaning availability has been word association (Betts, Gilbert, Cai, Okedara, & Rodd, 2018; Gilbert, Davis, Gaskell, & Rodd, 2018; Rodd et al., 2016, 2013); in these experiments, for each ambiguous word participants are asked to produce the first related word that comes to their mind (e.g., “PEN-enclosure” vs “PEN-paper”). Results show that participants are more likely to retrieve the subordinate word meaning if it had been previously encountered (compared to a control, unprimed condition). Speeded semantic relatedness task has also been used to measure meaning availability: participants decide whether the ambiguous wordform is related to a probe word that is only related to one of its meanings (e.g., “PEN-enclosure”). Faster responses to the probes related to the primed meaning (compared with an unprimed baseline) are taken as evidence that the primed meaning has become more readily available (Gilbert et al., 2018).

Both these word-meaning priming paradigms have consistently shown that following just one encounter with an ambiguous word in a strongly disambiguating context there is a substantial boost in meaning availability. This boost is particularly strong at very short delays (2-3 Minutes; Rodd et al., 2013; 2016), but remains robust and relatively stable after 20-40 minutes (Rodd et al., 2016). Remarkably, significant priming from a single prime encounter has even been reported to be present after 24 hours when participants are able to sleep soon after the encounter (Gaskell, Cairney, & Rodd, 2019), suggesting that these short-term changes to word meaning availability can make substantial contributions to longer-term changes. Word-meaning priming has not only been shown in carefully controlled lab-based conditions, but also in more naturalistic conditions where the primes were presented within short vignettes within a radio programme and the test of priming was conducted via a subsequent web-based word association task (Rodd et al., 2016).

Word-meaning priming experiments make clear that adults adjust their lexical-semantic knowledge in response to their linguistic environment. They also have revealed several important characteristics of the underlying mechanism(s) that supports this learning. Gilbert et al., (2018) examined the extent to which information about word meanings that is gained within one modality (e.g., speech) is transferred to the other modality (e.g., reading). In these experiments ambiguous target words were primed with either written or spoken sentence. After a 20 minute delay, participants’ interpretations of these ambiguous words was tested by presenting them in either written or spoken form. Experiments using both word association and speeded semantic relatedness decisions as measures of word-meaning priming revealed the same pattern: (i) significant cross-modal priming and (ii) no evidence that cross-modal priming was reduced compared to the condition in

which both prime and test were presented in the same modality. These results were interpreted as evidence that priming should be characterised as changes to an amodal store of lexical-semantic knowledge that is shared between listening and reading. Importantly, these data are inconsistent with early accounts of word-meaning priming that suggested that learning resulted in (modality-specific) changes to the mapping between a word's phonological/orthographic form and its (amodal) semantic representation (Rodd et al., 2013).

However, although these results suggest that learning in the standard word-meaning priming paradigm is amodal in nature, they do not require that all learning about the likely future availability of word meanings is generic and will necessarily transfer to all future instances of that word, regardless of factors such as its modality. Indeed the effects of speaker accent described earlier (Cai et al., 2017) make clear that listeners can (under some conditions) to keep track of reliable differences in how words are used differently in different forms of spoken English compared with written English. Taken together these two sets of experiments suggest that individuals usually use their linguistic experiences to update modality-general expectations about the likelihoods of different meanings, unless there are salient, systematic cues (such as accent) that indicate that words are being used differently in different environments.

One intriguing question that arises is how learners make changes to their lexical-semantic knowledge into the lexicon *without* negative consequence for their existing stored knowledge. One explanation of how new linguistic information is acquired and integrated with existing knowledge is provided by the two-stage 'complementary systems account' of language learning (McClelland, 2013). Under this view, short-term memory for recently encountered stimuli is primarily supported by hippocampal memory systems, and that sleep plays a key role in the subsequent offline consolidation of this knowledge by allowing these hippocampally mediated memories to be replayed and strengthened within cortical networks (Davis & Gaskell, 2009). It has been suggested that this two-stage approach to long-term acquisition of knowledge about words facilitates careful integration of old and new information and prevents unhelpful overwriting of existing knowledge (Mirkovic & Gaskell, 2016). Critically, this view suggests that not all learning about word meanings necessarily reflects direct changes to the lexicon itself.

Current evidence in support of the complementary learning systems (CLS) model of word learning comes almost exclusively from experiments in which entirely new wordforms are learned (e.g., Dumay & Gaskell, 2007; Gaskell & Dumay, 2003). However recent evidence suggests that similar mechanisms may support learning about word meanings. Gaskell et al., (2018) found that the magnitude of word-meaning priming seen after 12 or 24 hours is significantly boosted when the learning takes place immediately before a period of sleep. This suggests that the short-term boost in word meaning availability that is seen at intervals of 20-40 minutes (e.g., Rodd et al., 2016) may not reflect a long-lived change to the stored mental lexicon. Instead it suggest that it is only with sleep that the knowledge acquired about word-meaning availability is integrated into the lexicon. Specifically, Gaskell et al. (2018) suggested that the hippocampus facilitates the encoding or binding of new associations between the words in the prime sentences, and that this newly acquired hippocampal representation could "form a second source of information alongside more permanent lexical semantic knowledge" that can influence performance on the latter word association test. They suggest that this hippocampal trace would tend to decay within the course of a day, but that sleep can facilitate the use of this newly acquired information to modulate long-term stored (cortical) lexical-semantic knowledge. This account of same-day word meaning priming is inconsistent with earlier claims that word-meaning priming reflects direct modulation of stored (cortical) lexical-semantic knowledge (Gilbert et al., 2018; Rodd et al., 2016, 2013).

Taken together, these studies of word-meaning learning provide a view of lexical learning in which listeners/readers build up new, temporary representations of the ongoing discourse that they the encounter. These representations not only provide the immediate disambiguating context that facilitates processing ambiguous words, but the binding of words within this discourse to other elements of meaning can alter the disambiguation of ambiguous words that are encountered on the time-scales of 20-40 minutes (Rodd et al., 2016). Importantly, sleep-related consolidation can allow some aspects of these experiences to be retained overall longer time periods. This form of learning ensures that the complex high-dimensional lexical-semantic space is continually being adjusted, maintained and refined by making small, incremental changes such that

the future cognitive load associated with understanding ambiguous word in context is minimised (Johnsrude & Rodd, 2016).

Preliminary evidence has suggested that the extent to which lexical-semantic space is reshaped reduces over the lifespan with older adults weighting their recent experiences less heavily than their younger peers (Rodd et al., 2016), but these data come from naturalistic, correlational studies and more carefully constructed lab-based experiments are needed to confirm this finding and explore potential explanations.

In summary, the learning mechanisms that are an intrinsic component of distributed connectionist models of word-meaning access (e.g., Rodd et al., 2004) provide a straightforward account of how listeners/readers make incremental changes to their stored lexical-semantic knowledge such that more frequently encountered meanings become increasingly more readily available over time. This accounts for the well-established meaning dominance effects reported in the literature (Vitello & Rodd, 2015) as well as the idiosyncratic effects of individuals' different linguistic experiences (Rodd et al., 2016). Recent evidence has shown the need for these models to also incorporate a more short-term form of lexical retuning by which meanings encountered within the past hour become more readily available – future work will assess the viability of different accounts of these effects which emphasise either (i) direct retuning of stored lexical-semantic knowledge or (ii) the contribution of knowledge of recent linguistic events that is stored outside the mental lexicon.

### **Future Directions: Towards a Neurobiological Account of Word-Meaning Access**

This article has focused providing a purely *cognitive* description of how word meanings are learned, represented and processed. Future work is needed to link this theoretical framework with *neurobiological* accounts that specify more precisely the neuroanatomical basis of (i) stored lexical-semantic knowledge and (ii) any additional cognitive resources that support fluent disambiguation. Numerous fMRI studies of lexical ambiguity have attempted to provide the experimental data that is needed to constrain such neurobiological models. These studies have typically compared high-ambiguity sentences with low-ambiguity control sentences. These studies have consistently identified (i) posterior regions of the middle/inferior temporal lobe and (ii) posterior regions of the left inferior frontal cortex (LIFG) (Bekinschtein, Davis, Rodd, & Owen, 2011; Davis et al., 2007; Rodd, Davis, & Johnsrude, 2005; Rodd, Vitello, Woollams, & Adank, 2015; Rodd, Johnsrude, et al., 2012; Rodd, Longe, et al., 2010; Tahmasebi et al., 2012; Vitello, Warren, Devlin, & Rodd, 2014; Zempleni, Renken, Hoeks, Hoogduin, & Stowe, 2007). However the interpretation of these results remains disputed and there remains relative little consensus about the precise functional roles of these different (sub)regions within this network.

There is widespread agreement that brain regions in the left temporal cortex (and inferior parietal cortex) provide a range of stored lexical knowledge, including the phonological, syntactic and semantic properties of words (Hagoort, 2005, 2014). It might therefore seem plausible that the ambiguity-related activations that have been seen in the posterior *temporal* lobe might reflect increased processing that is required within stored lexical-semantic knowledge to settle on the meanings of ambiguous words. However, it is far from straightforward to assume that this region is a key 'storage' area for lexical-semantic knowledge. Some authors attribute this region a role in providing the 'sound to meaning mapping' that is required for spoken words (Hickok & Poeppel, 2004, 2007, 2015). Under this view this region is not the site for storage of amodal lexical-semantic knowledge, instead, it is hypothesized to store information regarding "the relation (or correspondences) between phonologic information on the one hand and conceptual information on the other" (Hickok & Poeppel, 2015). Other researchers have argued that the posterior regions of the middle temporal lobe supports the control processes that operate on semantic knowledge that is assumed to be stored in more anterior regions of the temporal lobe (Jefferies, 2013; Jefferies & Lambon Ralph, 2006; Noonan, Jefferies, Visser, & Lambon Ralph, 2013; Ralph, Jefferies, Patterson, & Rogers, 2016; Thompson et al., 2018). It is therefore premature to make strong claims about the neurobiological substrate of the distributed lexical-semantic knowledge that is accessed in response to spoken and written words, except to say that these representations are likely to be (i) widely distributed across brain regions, (ii) incorporate diverse aspects of meaning, and (iii) should *not* be viewed as a discrete, localised 'module' of the brain.

There is a similar lack of consensus with respect to the frontal lobe activations that are seen in response to high-ambiguity sentences. Some of the first evidence for the involvement in frontal regions in lexical-semantic disambiguation came from studies showing that patients who had been classified as Broca's Aphasics had difficulties in using contextual cues when retrieving subordinate word meanings (Hagoort, 1993; Swaab, Brown, & Hagoort, 1998; Swinney, Zurif, & Nicol, 1989). Convergent, and more anatomically precise, evidence also emerged from neuroimaging studies of sentence processing: fMRI studies have very consistently shown activation in the posterior portion of the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG; sometimes referred to as Broca's Area) in response to sentences containing ambiguous words, compared with low-ambiguity sentences (Bekinschtein, Davis, Rodd, & Owen, 2011; Davis et al., 2007; Rodd, Davis, & Johnsrude, 2005; Rodd, Vitello, Woollams, & Adank, 2015; Rodd, Johnsrude, & Davis, 2012; Rodd, Longe, et al., 2010; Tahmasebi et al., 2012; Vitello, Warren, Devlin, & Rodd, 2014; Zempleni, Renken, Hoeks, Hoogduin, & Stowe, 2007).

There is general agreement in the field that although these frontal regions are critical for fluent processing of lexical-semantic knowledge, they do not themselves contain stored lexical-semantic knowledge. Neuropsychological evidence is strongly in support of this view. In particular, patients with semantic aphasia (SA), who typically have large left-hemisphere lesions showing maximal overlap in left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) appear to have difficulty accessing semantic knowledge in a flexible and task-appropriate way, despite their store of semantic information being largely intact (Corbett, Jefferies, & Lambon Ralph, 2011; Jefferies & Lambon Ralph, 2006; Noonan et al., 2013; Rogers, Patterson, Jefferies, & Lambon Ralph, 2015). This view that the LIFG is important for guiding or controlling access to lexical semantic knowledge is consistent with a wealth of evidence from fMRI showing elevated responses when the tasks or stimuli place increased demands on cognitive control systems that have described the contribution of the LIFG in terms of 'semantic selection' or 'controlled retrieval' (e.g., Thompson-Schill, D'Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997; Wagner, Paré-Blagoev, Clark, & Poldrack, 2001). This view that Broca's area's contribution to lexical-semantic disambiguation should be viewed in terms of providing cognitive control and not stored semantic knowledge is also consistent with evidence that the role of this region in sentence processing is NOT restricted to the processing of *semantic* knowledge, but also shows elevated responses when sentences' complexity/ambiguity arises due to their syntactic structure (e.g., Rodd, Longe, Randall, & Tyler, 2010; Rodd, Vitello, Woollams, & Adank, 2015). Finally, evidence from dual-task methodologies also indicate the involvement of relatively general cognitive mechanisms to lexical-semantic disambiguation (Rodd, Johnsrude, & Davis, 2010).

This view of LIFG function is consistent with the view that with respect to semantic disambiguation, the contribution of the LIFG should be viewed as a top-down control/selection mechanism that modulates stored lexical-semantic knowledge. Under this view the extent to which different stored word meanings become active can depend not only on bottom-up information being received via current perceptual signals, but is also influenced by direct top-down modulation of this knowledge guided by higher level sentence, discourse or situational information. Under this view, frontal control systems provide vital error signals and top-down control mechanisms that guide lexical semantic access and prevent the system becoming 'stuck' in inappropriate settled meaning states. The requirement for top-down modulation is assumed to be increased for high-ambiguity sentences due to the increased likelihood that the default/preferred interpretation of the ambiguous word will be incorrect.

However this is not the only theoretical framework that can provide an explanation for the involvement of the LIFG in semantic disambiguation. An alternative view is the LIFG provides the workspace within which complex sentence and discourse level representations are built bottom-up from incoming lexical semantic knowledge. Under this view, lexical semantic information is delivered to the LIFG from activated lexical-semantic knowledge and that the LIFG provides the necessary workspace to construct complex, combinatorial higher-order sentence/discourse level representations. For example, Hagoort has suggested that this region provides a 'unification space' in which elements of lexical-semantic meaning are unified in to higher-order representations (Hagoort, 2005; Hagoort, 2014). Under this view, the increased activation in the LIFG in response to highly ambiguous sentences reflects the increased unification demands that arise when conflicting

elements of lexical knowledge are accessed in response to ambiguous words. It is the unification process that supports true disambiguation as distinct elements of the sentence are integrated into a coherent whole.

These two accounts of the role of the LIFG have proved to be difficult to distinguish using experimental paradigms and further research is needed to characterise more precisely the role of the region in dealing with lexical-semantic ambiguities, and how the functional capacity that is provided by this region interacts with stored (temporal lobe lexical-semantic knowledge) to support rapid fluent comprehension.

## Conclusions

In this review I have integrated findings from a range of experimental paradigms to provide an account of how readers and listeners are able to fluently and rapidly understand word meanings. I have suggested that complex, high-dimensional lexical-semantic representations provide the foundation for semantic disambiguation. The attractor structure of this space ensures that familiar word meanings correspond to stable settled states and prevent the network from settling into unhelpful blend states that contain incompatible elements of meaning. I have emphasized two key properties of this approach to word-meaning access. In both cases these arise directly from these foundational connectionist assumptions about the architecture of the language processor.

First, word-meaning access is highly interactive: a wide range of the linguistic and non-linguistic cues that are available during comprehension can directly influence this lexical-semantic settling process. I argue that fluent disambiguation of ambiguous words within sentence context relies critically on the sensitivity of the system to all and any cues that are available to the listener/reader and that reliably predict which meaning was intended by the speaker/writer.

Second, learning mechanisms play a key role in shaping and maintaining these high quality lexical-semantic representations throughout the lifespan that allow individuals to (i) adapt to changing linguistic environments and (ii) make use of the very recent experience to increase the availability of those meanings that are most likely to be encountered in the near future. Importantly, these learning mechanisms provide the necessary sensitivity to the range of linguistic and non-linguistic cues that can support fluent disambiguation.

## Figure Legends

Figure 1. Representations of different types of words within distributed framework. (Drawings taken from Betts (2017).

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