Dialogical exemplars as communicative tools:

Resituating knowledge from dialogical single case studies

Abstract

In this article, we develop the concept of 'dialogical exemplars' as communicative tools for scholars who wish to 'resitize knowledge' (Morgan, 2014) from dialogical single case studies. Exemplars are typological representatives that try to convey typicality in non-taxonomic terms, yet in the existing literature, they are defined in terms of their relationship to a population, class, or sample. We suggest instead that 'dialogical exemplars', as specific instances that have the self-other at their core, can be used to convey the 'wholeness' of cases to various audiences. To support this proposition, we draw upon two single case studies, built thirty years apart, that are concerned with children's daily lives and experiences. Specifically, we develop a dialogue with and between children's play scenes from each case study not only to make the case for 'dialogical exemplars', but also to evidence the process of collaboratively moving between cases, through which we arrived at the concept. We highlight that this process is one that researchers often go through, but, rather curiously, rarely document. In conclusion, we suggest that existing approaches to 'resituating knowledge', as proposed by Morgan (2014), might be better thought of as several, non-linear, stages in the process of dialogical research.
**Introduction**

In intellectual contributions about the methodological and analytical approaches that are consistent with dialogical epistemology (see e.g. Aveling et al., 2015; Gillespie & Cornish, 2014; Gillespie et al., 2008; Marková et al., 2007; Zittoun, 2014), scholars have advocated for single case studies that involve ethical and dynamic self-other(s) interdependencies (Marková, 2016; Marková et al., this issue). The case study method, a longstanding approach to qualitative research, has not been without its critics, and debates about the generalisability of such research are now routine (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Forrester, 1996; Salvatore & Sato, 2010). Given these challenges, scholars such as Mary Morgan (2014) have proposed to approach generalisation as an issue of ‘resituating knowledge’ that has been locally and specifically produced. The question of whether or not one can generalise from *dialogical* single case studies, however, is both new and unexpectedly generative. This is partly because one first assumes that the answer to this question is ‘no’. Given the central tenets of dialogical epistemology, routes to statistical generalisation (that do not regard the self as ethical or relational) are clearly inappropriate. Similarly, analytical generalisation, at least in some of its guises, is inconsistent with taking seriously the uniqueness of self-other relations (see Marková et al., this issue). Even proceeding through abduction (Zittoun, 2017; Valsiner, 2019) in its relation to theory leaves the addressivity that characterises researchers’ claims unaccounted for. In this article, we build upon Morgan’s (2014) argument, and instead approach the question of generalisation from dialogical single case studies as a question of knowledge resituation.

Our thinking on this topic began with a study published by Lloyd and Duveen (1992) on gender identities in educational settings. When published, this study was not described in dialogical terms, but has since proven to be instructive in the development of the criteria for dialogical single case studies (Marková et al., this issue; Zittoun, this issue). As researchers, we were introduced to each other through this case: one of us, a former student of Gerard Duveen, and the other, a student of one of Gerard’s former colleagues; both of us sociocultural psychologists with an interest in children’s relationship to gender. In our dialogues about this research, and about more recent research conducted by one of us (Cabra, in preparation) on gender differentiation in children’s play, we started to think carefully about what it is that we were doing, and what, if anything, we were generating. It soon became apparent that although Cabra’s research came thirty years later, re-reading Lloyd and Duveen’s (1992) case study through the dialogical lens with which she had chosen to construct her own was valuable: in all of our conversations, both together and with others, we found ourselves focussed on specific instances, within each case study, of children’s play. In this article, we attempt to document this dialogue, and the process through which we arrived at an understanding of these play scenes as ‘dialogical exemplars’. We contend that these specific instances, more typically defined as ‘data extracts’, are sites at which different processes and relations that convey the ‘wholeness’ of a case converge. For this reason, dialogical exemplars can be used as communicative tools for scholars to ‘resituate knowledge’ in ways that transcend locality and specificity, while remaining consistent with the relational departure point of dialogical epistemology.

*Morgan’s (2014) strategies for resituating knowledge*

In ‘Resituating Knowledge: Generic Strategies and Case Studies’, Morgan (2014) outlines three strategies that enable scientists (in all disciplines) to ‘resituate knowledge’, that is, to make locally generated knowledge relevant to other sites. These strategies are distinguished on the basis of the level of generality being discussed, whether to another local site, to several local sites, or through...
exemplifying a type. The first strategy, local to local transfer, is described as direct between two sites, although the process of resituating in these cases may be akin to ‘stepping stones’, insofar as it depends upon a series of careful comparisons between sites in terms of “contexts, events, elements, and causal processes” (Morgan, 2014, p.1015). In contrast, resituating knowledge from one local site to several others relies upon a process of desituating, and then resituating, that knowledge. In this second strategy, what is specific needs to become abstract before it can become available to several different local sites. Although a degree of comparability is still important to this process, the second strategy is more like a ‘ladder’, and requires a certain form of conceptual characterisation. Specifically, it requires that researchers ascend from one local site in a sort of “middle-level abstraction” (Morgan, 2014, p.1018) from the local, to less than general, level.

The third strategy, establishing the local as general in different ways, is more complex. Described as a process that leads to ‘representatives’: either ‘constructed representatives’ (from a number of local sites to a definition of typical characteristics) or ‘exemplar representatives’ (from one local site that itself defines the type), this strategy also requires a degree of comparability between cases. This is particularly so for “statistically constructed representative[s]” (Morgan, 2014, p.1020), but also relevant to ‘exemplar representatives’, the latter of which are concerned with what can be considered ‘typical’ in non-taxonomic terms.

Morgan’s (2014) strategies are a valuable attempt to think cross-disciplinarily about the status of knowledge that is gained from single case studies, and specifically about the processes by which researchers might move beyond the particularities of their cases. In what follows, however, we attempt to explain how these strategies, in dialogical research, take a rather different shape: as stepping (and skipping) stones; as snakes and ladders; and as employing dialogical exemplars that convey the ‘wholeness’ of cases to various audiences. Our analyses lead us to suggest that (i) resituating knowledge involves several, non-linear, stages, and (ii) dialogical exemplars are one way for researchers to engage in this open-ended process.

Documenting the process of resituating knowledge from dialogical single case studies

Stepping (and skipping) stones

The case studies with which this article is concerned were built over thirty years apart, with Gerard Duveen and Barbara Lloyd studying gender identities in classrooms in England during the years 1986-1989, and Martina Cabra studying children’s gender differentiation across different settings in Switzerland during the years 2017-2019. Both studies adopted a sociocultural approach; Lloyd and Duveen (1992) grounded their project in the theory of social representations, and were clearly also influenced by Piaget and Vygotsky (Duveen, 1997), and Bartlett (Moscovici, 1990). Inspired by the first case, Cabra’s is an explicitly dialogical single case study that combines insights from sociocultural psychology to understand gender as a semiotic system (Lloyd & Duveen, 1990) with cultural theories of gender as performative (Butler, 1990, 1993).

In terms of their contexts, Lloyd and Duveen’s (1992) research was conducted at a time when psychologists generally distinguished between sex (as biological) and gender (as social) (Archer & Lloyd, 1986); when teachers in primary schools (in the UK, for children aged 5-11 years) had received explicit directives from local government authorities to avoid sexism in the classroom; and when the possibility that children might identify outside of the gender binary was not yet part of public discussion. Cabra’s study, conversely, was conducted during the so-called ‘Gender Revolution’ (National Geographic, 2017); in scholarly circles, it is now increasingly common for theorists to
conceptualise gender as something that is ‘done’, rather than something that one ‘has’ (West & Zimmerman, 1987); and in social life, the gender binary of ‘two and only two’ (Lucal, 1999) has been subject to increasing, and increasingly vociferous, challenge.

One of the questions we first asked ourselves, then, was whether this lack of equivalence between contexts meant that the knowledge gained from Lloyd and Duveen’s (1992) research resisted direct resituation to Cabra’s case. We raise this question here to reflect upon what the direct resituation of knowledge, in Morgan’s definition, means. She stresses the need to find relations of equivalence to identify similarities between cases, and thus resituate case study ‘findings’. Yet, if we establish comparability based on difference rather than equivalence, as we could with Lloyd and Duveen (1992) and Cabra’s work, we need to ‘skip’ stones, as well as ‘step’ them. In so doing, we skip some of the stages traditionally thought of as necessary to make inferences from one case to another. This point is obvious, and it is not new: as researchers, we dialogue with, and take inspiration from, case studies conducted by other researchers, irrespective of whether we establish relations of equivalence between theirs and our own. With respect to the cases with which we are concerned, the strategy of stone stepping was based neither upon finding equivalences across contexts, nor on the assumption that similar findings would be generated. Rather, relying on apparent empirical differences and conceptual commonalities (the latter being a mutual acknowledgement of sociogenetic, ontogenetic and microgenetic processes as central for developing a sociocultural understanding of the dynamic nature of social life; see also Marková et al., this issue; Zittoun, this issue), Cabra framed her research questions in a similar way to Lloyd and Duveen (1992), asking, in particular, how the process of gender differentiation takes place. The stepping (and skipping) stones strategy may therefore generate knowledge about the questions to pose in a dialogical single case study, and the lens through which to view the case (here on children’s relationship to gender).

**(Snakes and) ladders**

Whether or not we put it in writing, as researchers we also often move between studies, reflecting upon the research we are doing in relation to previous contributions (stone stepping), and indeed reflecting upon previous contributions in relation to our own. In other words, we produce dialogues between texts and ideas, and dialogue with our academic colleagues using texts. For the cases presented in this article, we found this dialoguing between—what we here call the ‘snakes and ladders’ strategy—highly rewarding. As we shall show, the ascent from Cabra’s research to middle-range concepts and subsequent return to Lloyd and Duveen’s (1992) work allowed us to re-read the latter as a dialogical single case study, which, like Cabra’s, provides an insight into gender as a semiotic system that is evident in children’s (inter)actions. From dialoguing between the cases, we developed two insights, relating to semiosis, and to multivoicedness, respectively. We now turn to what this strategy of (climbing up) ladders and (going down) snakes looked like in practice.

**Gender as a semiotic system**

Cabra’s study explicitly examined gender through uses of semiotic means, conceiving the material culture described by Lloyd and Duveen as semiotic resources (Gillespie & Zittoun, 2010) for doing gender (Butler, 1990). Re-reading Lloyd and Duveen’s (1992) research, we see a similar preoccupation with social constraints and children’s engagements through sign-use, most notably in the authors’ careful attention to the material environment of the classroom and its relationship to the children who occupy it. Indeed, in their edited volume, published two years prior to the book...
with which this article is concerned, Lloyd and Duveen (1990) made their focus on children’s sign use most explicit, arguing that it is this that evidences the internalisation of social representations of gender (or “the emergence of children as semiotic actors”; Lloyd & Duveen, 1990, p.32). However, this theoretical (dialogical) orientation is at worst lost and at best implicit in their 1992 publication, and it is only through Morgan’s (2014) ‘ladder’ strategy that we gain this insight. Here, ‘climbing up’ the ladder results in a conceptual clarification of ‘what can be found in a classroom’ in terms of the semiotic means for doing gender, which is then used to return to Lloyd and Duveen’s (1992) research, allowing us to look locally at their material, in which children’s sign-use is clear.

As a case study concerned with how children engage with the semiotic world, children’s free play is of particular interest in Cabra’s research. A child entering a classroom in free play time can choose which corner to go to (family, market, school, garage), and what to do in it. There is an organisation of the space in the classroom: one can find food supplies in the family corner, but not in the garage; building blocks are not found in the school corner, but rather inhabit the construction corner. Children learn early on what goes where by establishing correspondences between things (Piaget, 1932, 1979). They also engage with what interests or matters to them through their relations to others. As such, children’s choices (Hviid, 2016) in the context of free play reflect the interplay between the social semiotic fabric and the engagements within the life of a child.

Consider the following example, of Nadine, whom Cabra first observes in kindergarten. At this time, Nadine chose to free play with her peers using plastic animals. Once having started school, and with the only friend she kept from kindergarten, Nadine tended instead to follow the friend to the family (rather than the animal) corner, and play ‘mummy’. A few months later, Nadine was observed both at home and at school playing a hybrid of animals and family (animal families, in which she took on the role of an animal family member). In this example, Nadine chooses—to play animals, mummy and daddy, or animal family—in the three moments described. In Cabra’s analysis, these moments collectively reflect the evolving relation between the social fabric (e.g. toys in school corners, rules and directives) that comprises the semiotic system to which Nadine has access, and her engagements (e.g. her interest in animals, and her friendships with other children).

Consider now the example of Seth, with which Lloyd and Duveen’s (1992) study begins:

9.29am Seth selects the orange/pink nightie from the dressing up rack, though he has a lot of trouble getting it on before he finally succeeds. Then he tries to put on the white tutu number on top. More difficulty. Great concentration. No-one really takes much notice. One girl, Charity, does come up to him and says ‘It’s not for you Seth’. He looks a bit bemused, but goes back to struggling with the white tutu. After a great deal of trouble he takes it to the teacher and asks her to put it on him. ‘Oh no Seth, that’s the smallest dress we’ve got, you won’t fit into it. Let’s look for something else. [The teacher suggests.] Seth chooses a skirt. Teacher says ‘That’s nice’ and also encourages him to put on a waistcoat. (Lloyd & Duveen, 1992, p.3).

Now that we have conceptualised gender as a semiotic system, and articulated the role of material culture as a resource for doing gender, we can consider that these scenes reveal the complex role of “semiotic elements as catalysts” (Kadianaki & Zittoun, 2014, p.192; see also Cabell, 2010) in unfolding self-other-object dynamics. Here, cultural elements (i.e. the nightie and the tutu), and others’ explicit social directives (i.e. ‘It’s not for you Seth’ and ‘Let’s look for something else’) carry existing social norms and introduce meanings into the psychological system that could potentially be taken up in further situations. Such semiotic elements are therefore relevant for understanding the relationship between crystallised systems of meaning (such as social representations; Zittoun et al.
2003), and how they come to function in concrete instances, in the weaving together of the fabrics of the social world and a person’s life. Climbing down from characterising gender a semiotic system and from considering material culture as a resource for doing gender therefore sheds new light on the organisation of findings in Lloyd and Duveen’s (1992) research. Moreover, this strategy also raises new questions regarding temporality insofar as the taking up of semiotic elements takes place in time. We now therefore move to consider how the signs that make up the dialogues identified (see Zittoun, 2018) feature in the play scenes observed by the authors in the two studies.

**Hearing gender in multivoiced interactions**

What are the consequences of others’ directives for Seth? What happens next? Are the encouragements and discouragements of others accepted, refused, or transformed by him—and other children—in different interactions? Which dialogues are continued, and under what circumstances? Cabra’s study explicitly focused on how dialogues evolve and take shape in different places, foregrounding the dialogical dynamics in children’s interactions over time. In the following example, drawn from field notes, 4-year-old Natalie is trying to convince the researcher to play with a princess doll instead of a motorbike:

> Natalie is the mum and I am the baby. They are leaving for school and she asks which toy I would like. She wants me to take the princess doll from the movie Frozen.¹ Taking a motorbike from the floor, I tell her, “I’d rather play with the motorbike”. Natalie looks at me and replies, “No, it’s not allowed, the teacher said so, these are the rules dear”. She pauses, and then says, “You cannot take the motorbike because it’s too big”. She goes to get a little bottle, returns, and says, “It’ll be good for you, it’ll do you good to take the doll”. Finally, she points her finger at me, and says, “It is not the children’s choice; it’s the parents who decide”.

In this example, we can clearly identify traces of others’ speech. Natalie puts the researcher at the receiving end of previous dialogues to explain why some things are allowed in school (“the teacher said so”), why we are supposed to get medicine when unwell (“it’ll be good for you”), and why, as children, we do not choose what to do (“it’s the parents who decide”). In other words, she draws on different directives and justifications that carry social norms to support what she wants to happen. As a form of ventriloquism (Gillespie, 2005) or multivoicedness (Aveling et al., 2015), such interactions demonstrate the interplay between social constraints and engagements in dialogue. These interactions also evolve over time, thus also serving as examples with which to understand the relationship between microgenesis and ontogenesis.

If, as before, we move from Cabra’s examples to the conceptual clarification of gender as being heard through multivoiced interactions, and return to re-read Lloyd and Duveen’s (1992) examples in these terms, we also find examples of multivoicedness in interaction. Consider the following example, which appears in this exact form in the book:

**Script Y**

1. **Oscar:** (on mattress.) I’m the daddy.

2. **Sally:** (To Rachel.) Dinner’s not ready, so just wait.

3. **Betty:** (To Oscar.) And you hear my crying a-ha-aah-aah.

4. **Oscar:** (Goes to Betty, who is still crying.) Be quiet, baby, be quiet.

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¹ *Frozen* is a Walt Disney children’s movie that tells the story of a princess who sets off on a journey to find her estranged sister, whose powers have condemned the kingdom to eternal winter.
5. Oscar: I put that by your bed in case you wanted some dinner. (He goes back to bed.)...

(...) 

12. Sally: No! Get off Mummy’s and daddy’s bed. You’re being a very naughty girl today.

13. Betty: (Crawling over to them.) Googa googa.

14. Sally: Will you get that cover, baby?

15. Betty: (Hands cover to Sally.)

16. (Going to bed, baby crying, tap dripping – relevant?)...

17. Sally: I’m the princess. (Sits down on the bed.)

18. Betty: Pretend, pretend, I want, pretend you was a bit beautiful and I was...


In this exchange, Oscar takes the voice of daddy; Sally, of mummy; and Betty, of baby. These children have been babies, perhaps they have siblings; they have been a part of such common exchanges between adults and children in daily life. Through re-reading with multivoicedness in mind, we can see that this particular exchange is clearly polyphonic. We see in it a form of ventriloquism that from Bakhtin’s perspective, taken up by Gillespie (2005, p.10), testifies to “the accumulation of discourses from diverse social enclaves”. Thus the multivoiced nature of interactions between children appears to be a conceptual characteristic in both cases, and attending to these voices reveals something further about children’s relationship to gender as a semiotic system.

The ladders strategy therefore allows us to resituate the knowledge gained from Cabra’s case in a dialogical re-reading of Lloyd and Duveen’s (1992) research, providing an insight into gender as a semiotic system that is evident in children’s (inter)actions. Through this strategy we simultaneously gain an additional insight into both case studies, insofar as the dialogical nature of the interactions in each case pertained to play situations. Moving between Cabra’s case and Lloyd and Duveen’s (1992)—in a multiple move of ascending ladders and descending snakes—prompted us to ask further questions. Is there something about play that brings out the multivoiced and dialogical nature of human interaction? Is play inherently dialogical? In the play scenes documented in this article, relations unfold under certain conditions and all sorts of self-other relations are evoked. Play displays its own kind of normativity and time-space dynamics. While some norms can be suspended, others cannot; some things can be invented, changed or transformed; spaces can fluctuate, and time can reverse or speed up.² We gain these insights in part from Nadine, Seth, Natalie, Sally, Oscar and Betty; in part from Cabra, and from Lloyd and Duveen (1992); and ultimately through dialoguing between the play scenes in each case study. It is therefore to these scenes, as ‘dialogical exemplars’, that we now turn.

² There is not sufficient space in this article to explain play as dialogical (but see Cabra, in press; in preparation). We have so far tried to reflect upon the semiotic and multivoiced nature of play interactions, which constitutes, in general terms, a dialogical approach to play. In brief, this implies recognising, beyond its multivoiced and semiotic nature, how normativity, time and space, fiction and reality are within play uniquely articulated, thus constituting its own communicative genre.
**Dialogical exemplars**

The use of empirical material in qualitative research to substantiate researchers’ claims is commonplace (Fahy, 2008). But what is the status of these ‘bits of data’ that are deployed to support researchers’ propositions? In the literature, an exemplar is “a given manifest content (...) represented in terms of a set of diachronic and synchronic combinations of an infinite set of occurrences” (Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010, p. 823). Yet, these sets of occurrences—presented in some sort of relation and in reference to specific content—will always be considered exemplars of something. Are they ‘examples’? Representative exemplars? Constructed representatives? These questions are posed, using Morgan’s (2014) language, in terms of the relationship between the empirical material chosen and a general population, class, or sample. In contrast, we view these exemplars through a dialogical lens, and suggest that the rich empirical material chosen to support researchers’ analyses constitutes something of a ‘world-within-a-world’ (Stenner, 2017). Exemplars have the characteristic of conveying the ‘wholeness’ of cases, as sites of convergence of the different dynamics at stake, as well as serving as testimony of the ethical concerns of researchers. They are also communicative tools: that is, a way to return abstract analyses and conclusions to their origin, and thus a means through which to convey the wholeness and richness of cases to different audiences.

What is the meaning of the claim that dialogical exemplars convey the ‘wholeness’ of cases? We start from the proposition that a dialogical single case study is concerned with processes of change (or dynamics; see Marková et al., this issue), and contend that there are different levels at which these can be studied (in the life of a person, in the course of an interaction, or in a historical period). Returning to the first example, of Nadine, whose play took the form of animal families, it is possible to show how this dialogical exemplar conveys this concern with dynamics: there are a series of microgenetic instances in which certain play themes are chosen and negotiated; there is also a description of what is there, and with which objects to play what, as crystallisation of a sociogenetic kind. Having followed Nadine over time, Cabra was also able to identify the ontogenetic aspects of what matters to her, and how she usually interacts—by finding a combination that allows her to resist the direct imposition of the social fabric through her interests, in a kind of ‘quiet resistance’ to gender norms that are anchored in objects and imposed by her peers.

Dialogical single case studies also convey the dialogical nature of human experience through their concern with multivoicedness (Hviid, this issue). In several other exemplars considered in this article—Script Y (Lloyd & Duveen, 1992), and Natalie and the doll/motorbike (Cabra, in preparation)—we documented how different forms of ventriloquism appear in children’s experience of gender. Through these examples, it is possible to show how dialogical exemplars evidence the multivoiced nature of human interactions. More broadly, we find the convergence of different levels, where objects and forms of spatial organisation are inhabited and taken up in children’s interactions, while taking concrete form within each child’s life. As such, these are not simply examples of individual children’s play in dialogical perspective, but speak to the broader themes of dialogical single case studies, and can be used to convey cases in their ‘wholeness’, despite ostensibly being a relatively small part of these wholes.

The example of Natalie is of further interest as a demonstration of the sense in which dialogical exemplars are testimony of the ethical concerns of researchers. In Cabra’s work, this commitment is clear in two senses: the first, relating to the researcher’s literal engagement in play. In Natalie’s doll/motorbike example, we see how the ‘dialogical problems’ that can result from the positioning of ‘researcher’ and ‘researched’ (Hviid & Beckstead, 2011; see also Zadeh, 2017) are resolved through the researcher’s engagement with the child’s interests, through play. We suggest
that such examples can therefore reveal the commitment of the researcher to her participants as it unfolds in the field, and so her commitment to a research ethics that is consistent with dialogical epistemology.

Yet it is also through the documentation of these play scenes, in both Cabra’s and in Lloyd and Duveen’s (1992) case studies, that researchers’ commitments to their participants are communicated. Beyond being cases of ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973) that enable audiences to have ‘confidence’ in authors’ conclusions (see e.g. Gaskell & Bauer, 2000), we suggest that these exemplars, being richly detailed parts of lives as they are lived, are ethical. We make this proposition in spite of the fact that Lloyd and Duveen (1992) themselves described their extensive use of material from observations as a “manifest limitation” (Lloyd & Duveen, 1992, p.171), having drawn a distinction between the sophistication of children’s ‘explanations’ and children’s ‘practices’. Yet it is through these different dialogical exemplars that their commitment to the lives of their participants, and an engagement with their experiences, is clearest. Indeed, it is noteworthy, but perhaps not surprising, that readers have often drawn upon the example of Seth in their commentaries about Lloyd and Duveen’s (1992) work specifically, and in reflecting upon sociocultural phenomena in general (see e.g. Howarth, 2010; Gillespie & Cornish, 2010).

In this sense dialogical exemplars can also serve as communicative tools that open up dialogue between different audiences. It is here that we arrive at the conclusion that dialogical exemplars can serve as a strategy for ‘resituating knowledge’. Communicated to different audiences (to oneself as researcher; to communities of researchers; to participants; and to communities), they are a form of communication about the interplay between the social semiotic fabric and the engagements within the lives of the people being researched. They are the means by which the researcher invites further dialogue about the interplay between the social semiotic fabric and the engagements within the lives of the people being researched. They are the means by which the researcher invites further dialogue with an anticipated audience, and so are a means to preserve the ‘open-ended’ nature of cases (Bakhtin, 1984). As researchers, we have all attended conferences in which the ‘rich empirical detail’ (Cornish, this issue) provided by our colleagues ‘moves’ us (Hviid, 2008) in ways that theory alone cannot. We contend that this is because exemplars are not simply a matter of colour, or a decorative addendum to a theoretical argument, but rather instances for dialogue, with the self-other at their core, through which the ‘wholeness’ of cases can be communicated. Dialogical exemplars, then, are not a means of verification, but a communicative tool with which to ‘resituate knowledge’ in different contexts.

Conclusion

In this article we have suggested, building on Morgan (2014), that the process of resituating knowledge from dialogical single case studies may involve stepping (and skipping) stones; climbing up ladders—and going down snakes; and using dialogical exemplars. In closing, we return to the fact

3 On this point, it is perhaps worth remembering that Duveen (2000), in his appraisal of Piaget’s method, was inspired by how his research interactions took “concrete shape around the…particular child” (Duveen, 2000, p.85). There is not sufficient space in this article to discuss the historical trajectory of Duveen’s scholarship, but of note is that in his early academic life, he was supervised by Gustav Jahoda, known for his contributions to the study of children’s perspectives in cultural psychology (Marková & Jesuino, 2018). ‘Gender Identities and Education’, as a book grounded in the theory of social representations, does not have an explicit ethics. Yet the theory of social representations was influenced by Moscovici’s reading of Nietzsche, Pascal, and Spinoza, through whom he came to reflect upon ethical values and standards, and his vision for social psychology was directly positioned as at odds with the unethical paradigms he saw populating the discipline at the time (Marková, 2017).
that the concept of dialogical exemplars emerged through our attempt to make explicit what the process of resituating knowledge could look like. It is rare to find scholarship that attempts to document extended dialogues between different studies. Rather, dialogues tend to take what has gone before as a point of contention, such that researchers generally include previous findings to discuss them critically (Alessandroni et al., 2019), to specify new research questions (Zittoun et al., 2018), or to extend a theoretical argument to new empirical territory (Tau, 2018). If we were to unfold this process in time, as we have tried to do here, we may find that such strategies for knowledge ‘use’—resituation in Morgan’s terms (2014)—take the form of several, non-linear, stages, and involve the use of exemplars (whether dialogical, or otherwise).

In our final analysis, we have proposed the concept of dialogical exemplars as instances where processes of change and ethical commitments converge in a sort of ‘world-within-a-world’ (Stenner, 2017). Through their particular ordering of relations, and because of the content to which such instances refer, dialogical exemplars capture the complexity of processes and relations that are at the core of dialogical single case studies. Questions remaining may relate to who ‘chooses’ the instances that serve as exemplars, and what could be lost by choosing some, and not others. We suggest that because dialogical exemplars also facilitate the return of abstract analyses and conclusions to their origin for different audiences—research participants, colleagues, and students, amongst others—they in fact open, rather than close, the ‘worlds’ from which they came, and therefore invite further dialogue.

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References


