Horton, J;
(2020)
Aggregation, Risk, and Reductio.
Ethics
, 130
(4)
pp. 514-529.
10.1086/708534.
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Abstract
Is there any number of people you should save from paralysis rather than saving one person from death? Is there any number of people you should save from a migraine rather than saving one person from death? Many people answer “yes” and “no,” respectively. The aim of partially aggregative moral views is to capture and justify combinations of intuitions like these. In this article, I develop a risk-based reductio argument that shows that there can be no adequate partially aggregative view. I then argue that the only plausible response to this reductio is to accept a fully aggregative view.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Aggregation, Risk, and Reductio |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1086/708534 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1086/708534 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10089021 |
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