Opportunities Galore! Growth Unlimited!
Business, Higher Education Policy and the Neoliberalisation of Indian Higher Education

Shelina Thawer

Institute of Education - University College London

PhD Thesis

Supervisor
Distinguished Service Professor of Sociology of Education
and former Karl Mannheim Professor of Sociology of Education

Stephen J. Ball

2019
Declaration

I, Shelina Thawer, declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Copyright

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without the proper acknowledgement of the author.
Abstract

This thesis is about money in Indian Higher Education (HE) policy. More specifically, it is about describing the processes of neoliberalisation of the Indian Higher Education sector which reveals the prevalence of money and how education policy itself can serve as a profit opportunity for business.

This thesis draws on Foucault’s concept of governmentality, understood as a means of steering and guiding the conduct of individuals, and deploys the approach of ‘following policy’ and Social Network Analysis as its methodological and analytical tools to describe these processes of neoliberalisation. It identifies the key policy actors in Indian HE policy formulation, and describes how the socio-economic nature of their networks facilitate the flow of policy, ideas, practices, influence and money, within and between their multi-sited networks, and facilitate in reforming the Indian HE sector.

The thesis illustrates how incremental policy moves which render and transform ideas into reformative imperatives, alongside the introduction of legislative measures and the creation of new institutions by the Government of India, serve to privilege and incentivise business to invest in the Indian HE sector. It demonstrates that the Government of India is an active - and necessary - facilitator of a form of network governance as it shifts the responsibility of Indian HE to business leaders and their networks, thereby situating the private sector - and the profit motive - centre stage of Indian HE policy, provision and delivery.

It is intended that this analysis will contribute to the understanding of the vested interests in India’s HE sector while enabling an enhanced comprehension of the strategies that can promote, facilitate and advance policy reform alliances as India prepares to become a global player in HE.
Fig. 1. Key words: Business; Higher Education Policy; Money; Neoliberalism; Foucault; Governmentality; Policy Mobilities; Social Network Analysis; India.
**Impact Statement**

Though this impact statement does not form part of the formal assessment of the thesis, recent changes in procedures, influenced more broadly by the Research Excellence Framework (REF), require doctoral researchers to include an impact statement in their doctoral submission, or what I term, a projected ‘academic selfie’. Given the subject matter of this thesis, this is somewhat ironic, though not entirely surprising, and highly symptomatic of the neoliberal times at higher education institutions where evidence of the usefulness and value of education, along with that of the academic researcher, is measured by way of anticipated and projected citations, readings, publications, and other visibly measurable, quantifiable factors and indicators. Implicit in this is the worrying possibility, among a number, that this ‘impact’ comes to not only define ‘success’ but to control and dictate future research agendas along lines of conformity and pre-determined goals.

I did not embark on my PhD journey with a view to having or making an ‘impact’, nor am I able to predict whether this study will have an impact, what shape or form it may take or indeed, how it will impact. Nor do I consider such an assessment to be either desirable or appropriate, suggesting as it does an erosion of the intrinsic value of education. Relatedly, I am of the view that a ‘piece of research doesn’t start as if it were year one, nor does the scholar begin as a tabula rasa…’ (Cohn, 1980, p.220) but that ‘we all continually draw on the achievements of many others and it is the shared work that has the impact, more than the individual contribution’ (Marginson, 2018).

My motivation for this PhD was - remains - personal which centres on policy formulation, the sites of its articulation, forms of its mobilisation, and concerns of equity and access to Higher Education by vulnerable groups in lower- and middle-income countries. It is possible that those with similar interests or concerns, whether within academia or outside, might find my modest contribution which builds on the works of numerous others, some of whom feature in the pages to follow, of interest and of use. I hope that proves to be the case.
Acknowledgements

My near, dear and loved ones, for believing in me throughout this incredible and wonderful PhD journey and enabling it to happen - I am forever in your debt.

My supervisors and personal tutors during my periods of HE study at the IoE who have contributed to my PhD academic journey:

Professor Paul Morris, who cultivated my interest in policy transfer and supervised my MA Comparative Education dissertation. Paul’s tutelage has played a vital part in helping me embark on my PhD journey. I will always remember Paul’s kindness.

Distinguished Service Professor and former Karl Mannheim Professor of Sociology of Education Stephen Ball for inspiring and encouraging me throughout my PhD. It has been humbling to have had the privilege of Stephen’s supervision, as well as the benefit of his kindness and generosity of spirit throughout this PhD journey - I am truly grateful.

I am also very appreciative of the wonderful friendships formed during my time at the IoE which have been maintained over distance and time.

This thesis is dedicated to my parents and maternal grandparents.
## Contents

**Declaration**  
1

**Abstract**  
2

**Impact Statement**  
4

**Acknowledgements**  
5

**Abbreviations**  
8

**List of Figures and Tables**  
11

**Introduction - Rationale and Outline of Thesis**  
12

**Chapter 1 - Methodology**  
18
- Introduction
- So as not to ‘Misunderestimate’ N/neoliberalism
- N/neoliberalism – What’s in a Name?
- N/neoliberalism and Policy Mobilities
- N/neoliberalism as Governmentality
- Social Network Analysis
- Methods

**Chapter 2 - Pre - Colonial and Colonial India**  
40
- Introduction
- Scene Setting: Essential Parts, Caste and Indian Merchants
- The East India Company
- Unorthodox Alliances
- Higher Education in Pre-colonial India
- Higher Education in Colonial India
- The Orientalists
- The Anglicists
- Macaulay’s Minute on Education (1835)
- Hindoo College and Ram Mohan Roy
- Contemporary Implications
- Genetic Imprints
- Conclusion

**Chapter 3 - Independent India**  
80
- Introduction
- Beginnings
- Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
- Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India
- Confederation of Indian Industry
- GoI and Business Relations
- Conclusion
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 4</th>
<th>Neoliberal India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When Did Reforms Begin?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Liberalisation under Indira and Rajiv Gandhi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The IT sector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why Reform? and the Role of Advisors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5</td>
<td>Prime Minister’s Council on Trade and Industry, Business Elites and the Indian School of Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Prime Minister’s Council on Trade and Industry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Framework for Private Investment in Education, Health and Rural Development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Business Networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian School of Business - Too Famous to Fail</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6</td>
<td>Diaspora Strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora Strategies and Global Governmentality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7</td>
<td>Capital Accumulation, Trade and Investment in Indian Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Accumulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade, Investment, and the Commodification of Indian Higher Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-India Business Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-India CEO Forum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Relations and Dividing Practices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 8</td>
<td>Government as Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Government to Governance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 9</td>
<td>Concluding Remarks and Reflections</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References
Abbreviations

ABG - Aditiya Birla Group
ADB/I - Asian Development Bank/Institute
AGM – Annual General Meeting
AICTE - All India Council for Technical Education
AIEI - Association of Indian Engineering Industry
AmCham India - American Chamber of Commerce in India
ASSOCHAM - Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India
BATIAC - British Asian Trust India Advisory Council
BITS - Birla Institute of Technology and Science
BJP - Bharatiya Janata Party
BoP - Bottom of the Pyramid
CEO - Chief Executive Officer
CFO - Chief Financial Officer
CII - Confederation of Indian Industry
DA-IICT - Dhirubhai Ambani Institute of Information and Communication Technology
DAMT - Dhirubhai Ambani Memorial Trust
DAU - Dhirubhai Ambani University
DS – Diaspora Strategies
EIC - East India Company
E&Y -Ernst & Young
ET -Economic Times
FDI - Foreign Direct Investment
FEIB -Foreign Educational Institutions (Regulations of Entry and Operations) Bill (2010)
FICCI - Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry
GATS - General Agreement on Trade & Services
GCPI - General Committee of Public Instruction
GG - Governor General
GoI -Government of India
GOPIO - Global Organization of People of Indian Origin International
GRFDT - Global Research Forum on Diaspora and Transnationalism
GSPC - Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation
HC - Hindu College
HDFC - Housing Development Finance Corporation
HE -Higher Education
HEI - Higher Education Institutions
HoC - House of Commons
IACC - Indian American Chamber of Commerce
IACC-USA - Indian American Chamber of Commerce – USA
IAS - Investor Awareness Programmes
IACS - Indian Administrative Service
IBEF - India Brand Equity Foundation
IBM - International Business Machines
IBRD - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICC – Indian Chamber of Commerce
ICCC - Indian Canadian Chamber of Commerce
ICICI - Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India
ICT - Information and Communication Technology
IIM - Indian Institute of Management
IIM-A - Indian Institute of Management in Ahmedabad
IIM-B - Indian Institute of Management in Bangalore
IIM-C - Indian Institute of Management in Calcutta
IIT - Indian Institute of Technology
IIT-D - Indian Institute of Technology Delhi
ILO - International Labour Organization
IMF - International Monetary Fund
INC - Indian National Congress
INSEAD - European Institute of Business Administration
ISB - Indian School of Business
IT - Information Technology
ITC - Indian Tobacco Company
JNTU - Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University
KNOMAD - Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development
LBS - London Business School
LSE - London School of Economics
MAHE - Manipal Academy of Higher Education
MBA - Master of Business Administration
MCA - Ministry of Corporate Affairs
MD - Managing Director
MEA - Ministry of External Affairs
MEC - Mahindra École Centrale
MGES - Manipal Global Education Services
MHRD - Ministry for Human Resource Development
MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MOIA - Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs
MoU - Memorandum of Understanding
MP - Member of Parliament
MRTP Act - Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act
MSME - Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
NASSCOM - National Association of Software and Service Companies
NCAER - National Council of Applied Economic Research
NDA - National Democratic Alliance
NEP - National Education Policy
NIIT - National Institute of Information Technology
NKC - National Knowledge Commission
NRI - Non-Resident Indian
NSDA - National Skill Development Agency
OBCs - Other Backward Classes
OECD - Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC - Overseas Indian Citizen
OIFC - Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre
PBD - Pravasi Bharatiya Divas – (Indians Abroad Day)
PDPU - Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University
PIO - Person of Indian Origin
PM - Prime Minister
PMCTI - Prime Minister’s Council on Trade & Industry
PMoI - Prime Minister of India
PMO - Prime Minister’s Office
PPP - Public Private Partnership
PTI – Press Trust of India
PwC - PricewaterhouseCoopers
RBI - Reserve Bank of India
REF - Research Excellence Framework
RIL - Reliance Industries Limited
SCs - Scheduled Castes
SEBI - Securities and Exchange Board of India
SG - Secretary General
SNA - Social Network Analysis
STs - Scheduled Tribes
TCG - The Chatterjee Group
TiE - The Indus Entrepreneurs
UGC - University Grants Commission
UKIBC - UK-India Business Council
UN - United Nations
UN-DESA - The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UP - Uttar Pradesh
URIB - Universities for Research and Innovation Bill (2012)
USIBC - US-India Business Council
WB - World Bank
WBCSD - World Business Council for Sustainable Development
WEF - World Economic Forum
WTO - World Trade Organisation
WW2 - World War Two
List of Figures

Figure 1. Key Words 3
Figure 2. Who, what, where... 37
Figure 3. Directions, Lessons, Imperatives, Reforms for India Ambani-Birla Report, 2000 123
Figure 4. RIL and Chairman Profile 128
Figure 5. Mukesh Ambani Network 130
Figure 6. Kumar Mangalam Birla Network 132
Figure 7. Rajat Gupta Network 136
Figure 8. Ministry of Corporate Affairs Investor Awareness Programmes (IAPs) 167
Figure 9. Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) 168
Figure 10. Sam Pitroda Network 169
Figure 11. Sam Pitroda Website Profile 171
Figure 12. FICCI Higher Education Summit 2014 Tweet 179
Figure 13. Anand Mahindra Tweet 183
Figure 14. Anand Mahindra Network 184
Figure 15. Mahindra Group Forays into Engineering Education with Ecole Centrale Paris 185
Figure 16. NR Narayana Murthy Network 186
Figure 17. High Court Ruling: Universities Liable to Pay Tax 188
Figure 18. Raghuram Rajan Network 192
Figure 19. ABG Tweet on Bits Pilani 194
Figure 20. USIBC Partners 198
Figure 21. Indo-US CEO Forum Members 204
Figure 22. The Global Expansion of Neoliberal Ideas 233

List of Tables

Table 1. Timeline of the EIC – Key Dates 54
Table 2. Distribution of Number of Firms Contributed By Top Six Supporters of FICCI 89
Table 3. Destructive and Creative Moments of Actually Existing Neoliberalism 106
Table 4. Members of the PMCTI 120
Table 6. Members of the ISB Founding Group and Early Governing Board 142
Table 7. Members of the USIBC 199
INTRODUCTION

RATIONALE and OUTLINE of THESIS

Ball (2012b) has noted that the ‘subtext of neoliberalism’ is money and that in most education policy research, money rarely merits a mention; with concerns of finance treated ‘as abstractions’. He argues that in the interface between education policy and neoliberalism, ‘money is everywhere’, and policy itself is a profit opportunity (Ball, 2012b). This research seeks to explore the presence of this ‘subtext of neoliberalism’ in Higher Education (HE) policy in India. With education increasingly represented as having a ‘symbiotic relationship’ with the economy (Ball, 2011), it seeks to trace and document what can be termed a ‘ratchet’ effect (Ball, 2008a), of small incremental policy moves which render and transform ideas into necessary reformative imperatives that serve to privilege and incentivise business within India and abroad to invest in the India HE sector thereby placing the private sector - and the profit motive - centre stage of Indian HE policy and delivery. Using Social Network Analysis (SNA), I will explore and map the presence of local, national, global networks of business leaders and companies, representing new actors, new sites of articulation and influence in the Indian HE policy process and education service delivery which signal ‘a shift in the centre of gravity around which policy cycles move’ (Jessop, 1998, p.32).

This research aims to do the above by having as its over-arching question:

- **Q1**-What is the role of business in HE policy in India?

With two following subsidiary questions:

- **Q1a**-Who are the key actors involved in HE policy in India and what is the nature of the relationship between them?

- **Q1b**-What influences and interests do these key actors bring to bear on Indian HE policy?

Against the context of which, an additional abstract question will be explored:
• Q1c-How is neoliberalism mediated and ‘glocalised’ in a ‘non-Western context’ and setting?

By means of the first subsidiary question (Q1a), the study seeks to identify the key actors in Indian HE policy through an initial analysis of a Government of India (GoI) commissioned report on Education (see below for further details). Of particular interest here are the relationships, links, associations - personal, professional, educational, cultural, social - between the identified individuals and business and how these personal relationships and business connections may assist and contribute to network formations. Informed by the first subsidiary question, the second (Q1b) will explore and identify broader affiliations and networks; the various sites in which they are located and the influences and interests represented therein. In relation to the more abstract question (Q1c), this will entail an exploration of certain aspects of business history of India, of caste and the contemporary politics of India’s diaspora, as well as some of the associated modes and forms of policy mobility. Accumulatively, and by the means of these questions, this thesis will explore and attempt to describe the flow of policy, ideas, influence and money, within and between networks from multiple sites and how these networks can facilitate the ‘global expansion of neoliberal ideas’ and practices (Ball, 2012a).

It is intended that this analysis will contribute to the understanding of the vested interests - local, national and global - in India’s HE sector while enabling an enhanced understanding of the strategies that can promote, facilitate and advance policy reform alliances as India prepares to become a global player in HE.

THESIS OUTLINE

Organisationally, this endeavour, as outlined above, will be undertaken in the following way. Chapter One provides the conceptual and analytical framework and the methodological orientation of this thesis. Here the omnipresence of neoliberalism alongside the vexing and contentious problem of its definition and understanding in
research scholarship is explored before advancing Foucault’s notion of neoliberalism as governmentality as the framework in which this study is situated, where governmentality is considered as a ‘formula of rule’ (Rose, 1993 - emphasis in original) and the ways in which ‘the conduct of government is linked to the government of conduct’ (Minson in Dean, 1996, p.212). Following this, the favouring of the term ‘policy mobilities’ (Peck and Theodore, 2010) deployed in this thesis to capture the fluid, process-like character of policy making (Peck and Theodore, 2001), its movement and flows, as well as that of policy actors, ideas and money, from different sites and scales are explained. Additionally, the merits of the accompanying visual presentation of ‘patterns of connection’ (Crossley, 2016), ‘social ties and group attachments’ (Scott, 2000) between actors, as enabled by the use of Social Network Analysis (SNA) as a methodological and analytical tool, are outlined.

Chapters Two, Three and Four are historical and essentially concentrate on business history in India, and government - business relations during different historical settings within which the gradual but steady ascendency of business is shown. This historical approach and setting is important and additionally serves to fulfil two particular but inter-related objectives. First, it acknowledges Olssen, Codd and O’Neill’s (2004, p.3) conception of education policy ‘as a politically, socially and historically contextualized practice or set of practices’ which, given the fact that early British initiatives in HE were undertaken in colonial India (Altbach, 1989) with their inherent Western and early liberal influences, makes a pre and colonial historical setting, in considering the neoliberalisation of Indian HE, not just necessary but essential. Additionally, and relatedly, such an historical approach and endeavour strives to avoid what Peck (2010, p.35) calls ‘foreshortened conceptions of neoliberalism, ... which pay insufficient attention to this long trajectory of ideational evolution...’

Accordingly, Chapter Two is set in pre and colonial India and is presented in two sections but with considerable interplay between them. The first half provides a description of caste and the participation of Indian merchants and traders as members of a caste group in commercial India, depicting some of their characteristics.
The chapter also shows the ways in which, the East India Company (EIC) proved to be one of the main agents of change in business and politics in India (Roy, 2012). The second half of the chapter focuses on Indian HE with a brief account of the indigenous tradition of learning prior to colonial rule. It then proceeds to aspects of the Orientalist-Anglicist controversy and introduces the Hindoo College ‘the only Western-styled institution of higher learning to be found anywhere in what is presently known as the third world’ (Kopf, 1979, p. 42). Additionally, it outlines the ‘contemporary implications’ (Altbach, 1989) and significance of the English language and other ‘genetic imprint[s]’ (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1972) or enduring aspects of this colonial experience on Indian HE.

Chapter Three outlines the composition of business communities and considers the extent to which the social and kin-ship based aspects of their networks assisted in consolidating their presence in the lead-up to and in the aftermath of the country’s independence through the creation of organisations representing trade, industry and commerce, in particular the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI). It also considers government-business relations under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister.

Chapter Four, the last of the historical chapters, briefly describes the introduction of economic reforms in India, concerning itself chiefly with the economic reforms undertaken by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The chapter next attends to the relationship of the GoI with big business as well as with small and medium businesses, from which the Information Technologies (IT) sector was to emerge and covers the significance of this sector. The chapter also provides an account of the ‘common ground’ between business, government advisors and administrators (Brown, 1962) in relation to these economic reforms and the ‘homegrown’ aspect of their introduction.
Marking the beginning of the empirical chapters (Five - Eight), Chapter Five is made up of three parts. The first, briefly introduces the report, The *Policy Framework for Private Investment in Education, Health and Rural Development* (GoI, 2000) and its accompanying ‘directions, lessons and imperatives’ for India’s HE system against the backdrop of the Prime Minister’s Council on Trade and Industry (PMCTI) constituted by the GoI in 1998. The second, then chiefly concentrates on the two principal elite business leaders, members of the PMCTI and authors of the policy framework document, and their business, social and other networks both within and outside of India. The third and final part of the chapter focuses on the Indian School of Business (ISB) which serves an illustrative case to show on the one hand, the gravitation of business and the deployment of business, social and academic networks in its establishment but also, on the other hand, the relationship of business to Indian HE.

Chapter Six describes the efforts by the GoI to harness and cultivate ‘Indians Abroad’ or its diaspora and the identification of HE as a means by which to realise India’s full potential in the shape and form of its ‘demographic dividend’ and, through a host of initiatives, incentivise global business leaders to invest in the Indian HE sector. Thus, on the one hand, the chapter shows how diaspora strategies (Ho, Hickey, and Yeoh, 2015), exemplify ‘the rise of a global governmentality’ (Larner, 2007, p.338) where GoI’s relations with Indians abroad ‘are being rethought and put to new purposes’. And on the other, it sets the stage for the next chapter, beginning by showing how this outreach by the GoI to business and its diaspora by promoting the HE as investment opportunity is advancing the privatisation of the sector and its investment and trade.

Chapter Seven continues with the investment theme in terms of personal ventures into HE by business leaders as a means to capital accumulation and, in doing so, shows how by ‘doing good’, as encouraged the GoI, businesses seek to profit and ‘do well’. It further shows how in their quest for new markets and new profits, HE is commodified and treated as a tradable good and service. Taken together, this chapter shows that in the interface between education policy and neoliberalism, ‘money is everywhere’, and policy itself is a profit opportunity (Ball, 2012b).
Chapter Eight considers neoliberalism’s concept of ‘*limited government*’ (Ball, 2012b). It does so by examining the role of the GoI, (the nature of) its partnership and the alignment of its interests with that of business (domestic, diasporic and foreign) in relation to Indian HE, as depicted/illustrated in the preceding chapters. It considers how with the opening up of HE to the ‘for-profit’ sector, the role of the state is redefined, suggesting not its diminishment but rather a change in the mode of governing Indian HE and the shift from what is sometimes described as ‘*government to governance*’ (Rhodes, 1996). This chapter also briefly consolidates the main points of the various chapters of the thesis as a means by which to proceed to the next and final Chapter (Nine) which provides some concluding observations and reflections.
CHAPTER ONE

METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the conceptual framework deployed in this study along with the methodological orientation applied. I begin with a review of the literature on neoliberalism or neoliberal theory, including an acknowledgement of some of the debates and contestations that prevail. I then present the idea of policy mobilities (Peck and Theodore, 2010) to describe the movement and flows of policies across various geographical sites, scales and places before advancing Foucault’s notion of neoliberalism as governmentality as the conceptual framework in which this study is situated. Following this, I go on to the use of Social Network Analysis (SNA) as a methodological tool that seeks to visually capture and display the diffused nature of these mobilities and flows, including those of actors, ideas, values and money. Finally, I describe the methods and how this study was undertaken.

So as NOT TO ‘MISUNDERESTIMATE’ N/neoliberalism

Increasingly in the analyses of neoliberalism, the ways in which neoliberalism is perceived and characterised as well as the ways in which it is imposed and reproduced, continue to be important considerations (Peck and Tickell, 2002). Various terminologies and ‘definitions’ have been both formulated and deployed to describe the movement of neoliberal education policies and their effects. Irrespective of how described - whether as ‘policy transfer’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996), ‘travelling reforms’ (Steiner-Khamsi and Waldow, 2012), or ‘policy mobilities’ (Peck and Theodore, 2010), it is broadly acknowledged that this field of study is ‘diverse and contested’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2012). See also Benson and Jordan (2012); Dussauge-Laguna (2012); Marsh and Evans (2012); McCann and Ward (2012b); Peck (2013); Peck and Tickell (2012) and Peck and Theodore (2012).
Although it is not the intention to provide a lengthy and descriptive narrative of these contestations here, I do briefly note and acknowledge the nature of these on-going debates below; and in particular, the wider acknowledgement among scholars that: ‘an intellectual cross-fertilisation is very much needed’ (Steiner-Khamsi, 2012, p.4); the argument that ‘greater examination of the socio-economic contexts in which transfer agents operate would be very helpful’ (Benson and Jordan, 2012, p.335); and of the need ‘to use insights developed within different disciplines and utilise different concepts and frameworks’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2012, p.344).

As elaborated below, this study seeks to respond to the call for the need to ‘shift away from the nation-state policy as government paradigm’ (Ball, 2012a, p.xii), and to ‘see’ education policy and governance on a different scale and through new conceptual lenses (p.16), and for an exploration of neoliberalism ‘out there but also right here side by side in mongrel forms of market rule...’(Peck, 2013, p.135). In these terms I consider some effects of neoliberalism, from above, below and the ‘spaces in between’ on systems, logics and patterns of restructuring (Peck and Tickell, 2002) in order to gain a better understanding of ‘actual existing neoliberalism[s]’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) in all its varied or ‘variegated’ forms (Brenner, Peck and Theodore, 2010). As such, this study considers and understands neoliberalism as a dynamic unfolding process and seeks to capture the flow and mobility of actors, policy, ideas, and capital in relation to HE policy in India and to describe how they are mobilised. Here, the processes of neoliberalisation are invoked to capture and describe contemporary political, economic, social and cultural transformations and [re] arrangements where privilege and emphasis is given to economic and market relations and its extension to all aspects of governing strategies and individual relations. That is to say, a ‘penetration in almost every single aspect of our lives of the discourse and/or the practice of commodification, capital accumulation, and profit making’ (Carvalho, and Rodrigues, 2006, p. 342, citing Wood, 1997 in Shamir, 2008, p.3). In other words, money, or what Ball (2012b) refers to as the ‘subtext of neoliberalism’, and its specific role and relation to Indian HE policy.
N/nNEOLIBERALISM - WHAT'S in a NAME?

As signalled earlier, considerations around the characterisation and perception of neoliberalism continue to fuel debates and struggles in research scholarship. Where there does appear to be a consensus is that there is very little agreement on what is meant by ‘neoliberalism’ (England and Ward, 2007). The omnipresence of neoliberalism is such that it is considered simultaneously to be both commonplace and pervasive and has descriptions such as a ‘planetary vulgate’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2001) ascribed to it to explain its ubiquity. Rather like globalisation which often - and very confusingly - in literature, is used interchangeably with neoliberalisation and has come to represent a ‘floating signifier filled with excesses of meaning’ (Popkewitz and Rizvi, 2009, p.1); neoliberalism is similarly alluded to and described as a term that is ‘oft-invoked but ill-defined’ (Mudge, 2008, p.703), ‘a rather overblown notion’ (Dean, 2014, p.150), serving as a catch-all term that potentially runs the risk of functioning ‘as an all-purpose denunciatory category or where it is simply invoked as ‘the way things are’’ (Flew, 2014, p.51). This has led some to use the term with ‘some trepidation’ on account of it being used so widely and loosely ‘that it is in danger of becoming meaningless’ (Ball, 2012a, p.3) and, given such lack of specificity, has raised questions about the term’s analytical utility (Dean, 2014).

Yet, as Peck (2013, p.134) observes, the ‘unmistakable doggedness itself commands a certain kind of attention’ underlining a possibility that the very nature of the debates around its definition and usage may be a reflection of its complexity, pervasiveness and elusiveness. As Peck (2010, p.31) notes elsewhere:

the contested and unstable character of the signifier itself might actually reveal something about the nature of the signified processes, phenomena and practices. The tangled mess that is the modern usage of neoliberalism may be telling us something about the tangled mess of neoliberalism itself.

As such, even though the term neoliberalism is not considered to be entirely satisfactory, Hall (2011, p.706) argues ‘… there are enough common features to warrant giving it provisional conceptual identity … I would also argue that naming neoliberalism is politically necessary to give the resistance to its onward march content, focus and a
cutting edge’. Preferring and opting to use the term advanced liberalism in place of neoliberalism, Rose (1993, p.283, emphasis in original) asks: ‘what is liberalism if we consider it neither as a political philosophy nor as a type of society but as a formula of rule?’ Conceptualised as a formula of rule, its American variant with its emphasis on specifying the limits of the state is argued to create ‘… the possibility of a potentially unlimited form of non-state intervention as a mode of government, one which is more pervasive for its subtlety and lack of visible institutional definition’ (Dean, 2002, p.193). Indeed, Larner (2000) cautions that in failing to understand neoliberalism’s discursive effectivity as a formula of rule and as a means of governing individuals from a distance, as captured by Foucault’s notion of governmentality (of which more below), runs ‘the risk of underestimating the significance of neoliberalism for contemporary transformations in governance’ (p.5). In other words, it is to ‘misunderestimate’ neoliberalism (Peck, 2013).

N/nEOLIBERALISM and POLICY MOBILITIES

The term ‘policy transfer’ refers to the means by which the ideas, policies, institutions and/or their practices of any given political system in a country is incorporated into the policy making domain of another, with the aim to develop and/or change its existing policies and practices of institutions (Dolowitz, 2001). Inherent in this approach is the tendency to present ideas, policies and / or their practices as ‘out there’, an external ‘force’ which is ‘imported’ into or imposed on local settings (Peck and Tickell 2002) whereby the influence of key politicians and/or political organisation takes on an overriding importance in policy reform programmes initiated and explained through a relatively rational ideological framework (Larner, 2000).

Peck and Theodore’s (2010) suggested alternative term, deployed in this study, is ‘policy mobility’, to better and more accurately describe the movement of policies, not in neat, distinct, linear and compact forms or ‘complete packages’, but rather, the movement of policies in a gradual more piecemeal fashion which are then (re) assembled differently or in particular ways, places and for particular purposes (McCann and Ward 2012b). Policy mobilities thereby capture the social, selective, fluid, and process-like character of policy
making (Peck and Theodore, 2001) and all the complexity, ‘ad hocery and messiness’ that this entails (Ball, 1993).

With the term ‘policy mobility’, the domestic/international or local/global binary is underplayed, allowing for an acknowledgement and recognition that global activity is not confined to the global and can take place at multiple levels and on multiple scales with ‘domestic’ policy actors acting globally in their own right (McCann and Ward, 2011) - what McCann (2011) terms ‘local globalness’. Marginson and Rhoades (2002) make the point along similar lines, arguing that the removal of the domestic/international binary which the term policy mobility enables means that local variations of global forces and issues of ‘street level’ implementation do not become obscured or smoothed over. They assert that equal weight and attention needs to paid to the global, national, local aspects of policy as it is through these domains that policy flows can simultaneously originate, articulate and pass. In other words, the sites from and to which policies are enabled and mobilised need to be understood as unconstrained and dynamic, and not as sharply defined territories which stress physical or geographic proximity (Sassen, 2003).

Thus, of equal importance to how policies are mobilised, is how their form and effects are transformed by these journeys and interactions ‘along the way’, or ‘in the telling’ as they are moved from place to place (McCann, 2011); and the ways in which they remake connections across a range of diverse and ‘variegated’ or uneven landscapes (Peck and Theodore, 2001).

For Harvey (2005, p.2) neo-liberalism is:

... in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.

This is what Ong (2007) describes as Neoliberalism with a big ‘N’. Neoliberalism here is associated with a set of principles and values encompassing: the individual; freedom of
choice; market security; and minimal government which, given its corresponding adherence and commitment to ideas of efficiency, innovation, competition and enterprise, largely entails the ‘colonisation of economic imperatives’ (Ball, 2001, p.xxviii). This is exemplified in HE policy by an emphasis on human capital development, prioritising and meeting the needs of the global economy, thereby seeking to safeguard the competitiveness of the national economy (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010). Even though neoliberalism has a ‘common thread’ across a range of political-economic, social, and cultural (trans) formations (Hall in Peck, 2013) and, through the deployment of policies with these common underlying principles represents a ‘paradigm convergence’ (Ball, 2001); neoliberalism is not an ‘end state’ with an universalising effect but rather more ‘a system of diffused power’ (Hardt and Negri in Peck and Tickell, 2002). Its underlying character best described as a transformative process which needs to be more accurately understood as being a ‘directional’ rather than a ‘destinational’ form of capitalist political economy (Peck, 2013).

Appadurai (1996, p.32), through his concept of ‘scapes’, describes a ‘new global cultural economy... which involves ‘...interactions of a new order and intensity’ (p.27). This new global cultural economy consists of: ethnoscapes (to describe people in motion as workers, students); technoscapes (referring to rapidly changing technologies that move at high speeds); financescapes (the movement of capital); and mediascapes (referring both to ‘the electronic capabilities to produce and disseminate information’ (p.35) as well as to world images that media creates. Through the concept of the various ‘scapes’, Appadurai seeks to illustrate the flowing and irregular forms that emerge along with their accompanying effects.

Similarly, though with a greater emphasis on the effects beyond the cultural, Urry (2000) highlights the significance and importance of objects, senses, time and space in the analyses of global processes. Focusing on physical, imaginative as well as virtual movements Urry illustrates how the mobilities - of people, ideas, messages, images, and money - across borders serve to reorganise social life in complex and irregular ways.
Policy ideas have become correspondingly mobile with changes in global economic activity, giving rise to new practices associated with the global mobility of capital (Rizvi, 2009). Among increasing numbers of people moving across national boundaries, education, and HE in particular, also features significantly as a driver of the global mobility of people. Rizvi argues that this mobility of people globally is progressively resulting in the development of immigration and labour recruitment policies that are closely aligned with the neoliberal policy objectives of international education. This serves to illustrate that the increasing level of global mobility of people is both driven by and attuned to other mobilities – of capital and finance, and of ideas, images and technologies (Rizvi, 2009) and as captured earlier by Appadurai (1996) and Urry (2000).

Castells (2000) describes the ways in which communities are increasingly becoming networked and talks of a ‘network society’, the dynamics of which rely on the ability to communicate within the network with commonly held values and objectives; and where the network form of organisation is argued to be powerful and pervasive. Again, here the emphasis is on flows and mobility whereby policies move through and are adapted by networks of social relations, involving diverse participants with a variety of interests, purposes and influence, which are held together by a commitment to a ‘discursive ensemble’, which circulates within and is given legitimacy by these network relations (Ball, 2012a). As Harvey (1989, p.15) argues:

*From the stand-point of long-run capital accumulation, it is essential that the different paths and different packages of political, social and entrepreneurial endeavours get explored. Only in this way is it possible for a dynamic and revolutionary social system, such as capitalism, to discover new forms and modes of social and political regulation suited to new forms and paths of capital accumulation.*

This is indicative of neoliberalism as a process of gradual, increasing in-scope-and-scale changes. Thus, a distinctive feature of contemporary capitalism is its ability to operate on multiple scales, which are made up of inter-dependent parts of a globalizing economy where networks of individuals or institutions - acting across various distances and through diverse intermediaries (Dicken, Kelly, Olds, and Yeung, 2001), bring interests, influences and discourses to bear.
As indicated, integral to this mobility and flow is the use of discourse to both introduce and promote neo-liberal ideas - what Ball (2012a) refers to as the family of concepts and commitments - which run along the lines of: individualism, responsibility, enterprise and entrepreneurship, market solutions/freedom, and limited government in programmes of action (p.26). These concepts and commitments through their circulation and reiteration from different voices in different sites within these networks gain credence and momentum (Ball, 2012a). This in turn further enables the mobilisation and circulation of policy. In effect, Ball argues that neoliberalism needs to be understood not so much as abstract ideas but as a discourse - a set of practices that are realised in ‘actually existing’ and mundane forms in different settings and locations.

As Ball (2010b) highlights, the presence of new actors and new interests, who are carriers of the discourse and the practices of neoliberalism, has given rise to multiple sites and spaces of policy making activity in education both within and outside the state, with lines between public and private providers becoming increasingly porous and difficult to delineate. This represents a ‘respatialization of space’ which situates the policy process beyond the nation-state (Ball, 2012a). The ‘territory of influence’ over policy is expanded rendering the sites in which it is articulated both diversified and disassociated (Mackenzie and Lucio, 2005).

Marginson and Sawir (2005, p.281-282) suggest ‘flows’ and ‘networks’ invoke ways of talking about connectedness which depict/convey a sense of movement, joining-up, linkages that ‘talk to our sense of living in the global … and we begin to free ourselves from the notion of an invisible essence.’ And in this sense, the concepts of ‘flows’ and ‘networks’ become central to our understanding of cross-border relations and effects (Marginson and Sawir, 2005).

In this respect and in relation to education policy specifically, the concepts of networks and the ‘criss-crossing of mobilities’ across increasingly porous borders (Urry, 2000) described above attempts to show how education policies represent a particular formation of values whose authority is allocated at the intersection of global, national
and local processes (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010). The control and regulation this implies, serves to indicate that there are new ways in which governments now work which are globally networked, requiring steering and governing at a distance, and which have implications for the ways in which educational policies are developed (Popkewitz and Rizvi, 2009). This, in turn, relates to new practices of educational governance and the ways in which rhetoric of a global skills force for a global market is used to marketize education - and increasingly HE - in particular (Popkewitz and Rizvi, 2009). Olssen and Peters (2005, p.313) advance the view that the role of HE for national economies has taken on such an importance that it has become the 'new star ship in the policy fleet' for governments around the world and as 'key driver[s]' in the knowledge economy, HE institutions have been encouraged to develop links with industry and business.

As policy mobilities are simultaneously fixed in and mobilized through social actors and their associated institutions, what this approach enables is to consider who the mobilisers of policy are. This is important in the first instance because it acknowledges the possible power relations at play in this process, and secondly, it enables a closer scrutiny of governance techniques and the technologies (that is to say, the strategies and tactics) of government (McCann, 2011).

Increasingly, governments draw on ideas and experience of a multitude of professionals or experts from the worlds of business, philanthropy, academia among others and deploy committees of inquiry (Rose and Miller, 1992). The representation of the binary state versus market which characterises much of neoliberal discourse does not effectively depict the diverse ways in which power is exercised in contemporary societies (Rose and Miller, 1992). This leads Rose and Miller to argue that in ‘advanced liberal democracies’ political power is exercised through strategic and shifting alliances between diverse authorities in various projects to govern numerous aspects of economic activity, social life and individual conduct of ‘free subjects’.

This aspect of governing individual conduct is what Ong (2007) describes as neoliberalism with a small ‘n’ - ‘a technology of governing “free subjects” that co-exists
with other political rationalities’ (Ong, 2007, p.4). The question of ‘how to administer people for self-mastery’ requires strategic responses to population and space for optimal gains in profit. In viewing neoliberalism as ‘governing by calculation suggests new relations between the governing, the self-governed and the space of administration’ (p.4).

Ong (2007) makes an interesting distinction between the strategies of governing and self-governing in advanced liberal nations and those in emerging and what she terms ‘non-Western contexts’. In the latter, where the emphasis is on the development and creation of educated and self-managing citizens who can compete in a global market place, the strategy of governing and self-governing cannot be uniformly applied to all groups since such ‘actively pro-talent strategies’ (p.6) necessarily select and target certain populations and places. Ong explains that in these emerging ‘non-Western contexts’, policies favouring the production of free, self-managing subjects are introduced in environments where claims of culture, politics and considerations such as class, religion and caste come to play. As neoliberal policies are essentially about the ‘re-management of populations in relation to the dynamism of global markets’ (p.4), neoliberal strategies respond to problems of governing by making calculated choices about intervention in an unfolding situation. This leads Ong to argue that neoliberal logic is best conceptualized as a migratory technology of governing that interacts with situated sets of elements and circumstances. Conceptualised in this way, neoliberal practices spread not out of universal reproduction, but through the paths carved out through the global marketplace of ideas and practices (Ong, 2007, p.5).

In addition to highlighting the very important notion of neoliberalism as a process, what the above serves to illustrate is that social relations in contemporary society can be better understood not in terms of diminishing state power – which again characterises so much of neo-liberal discourse - but rather in terms of the transformation of state power (Exley and Ball, 2013).
N/nEOLIBERALISM as *GOVERNMENTALITY*

Foucault’s concept of *governmentality* - which he defines as the ‘the conduct of conduct’ which ranges from ‘governing the self’ to ‘governing others’ and the ‘governing of populations’ - plays a pivotal role in his study of power. Inherent in the use of this concept, Foucault seeks to show how the modern state and the modern autonomous individual co-determine each other’s emergence (Lemke, 2002, pp. 50-51).

Further, in making the useful distinction between government and governance, Foucault seeks to show that less government does not necessarily mean less governance (Larner, 2000). Foucault does not assume government to be a technique that can be used by state authorities; rather he considers the state itself as a tactic of government (Lemke, 2002). It is these very tactics which:

> make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the public versus the private...; thus the state can only be understood in its survival and its limits on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality (Foucault in Lemke, 2002, p.58).

Viewed from this perspective, the so-called retreat of the state is in fact a prolongation of government; neoliberalism is not the end but a transformation of politics that restructures the power relations in society. Therefore, the ‘*diminished state*’, a neoliberal pre-occupation, is nothing more than a shift from formal to informal techniques of government, brought on by the appearance of new actors and authorities on the scene (Lemke, 2002).

In governmentality studies literature, it is argued political rationalities (modes of thinking) and political technologies (the strategies, techniques, and procedures by which political programmes are made practicable or rendered deployable) are interconnected and co-produce one another and it is through their combined application that particular forms of political power emerge and political rule is accomplished (Miller and Rose, 2008, p.16; see also Lemke 2010). This leads Dean (2002, p.188) to point out, ‘Foucault’s approach is less a general theory of the state or even of governing itself than a strict analytical attention to the mechanisms of government and rule and their manifestations in diverse practices’.
In this respect, Lemke (2002) asserts a political rationality (or modes of thinking) is not pure, neutral knowledge that simply ‘represents’ the governed reality. It is an element of government itself which helps to create a discursive field in which exercising power is ‘rational’. Thus, the concept of governmentality requires not only to question whether neoliberal rationality is an adequate representation of society but also how it functions as a ‘politics of truth’, producing new forms of knowledge, conceiving different notions and concepts that contribute to the ‘government’ of new domains of regulation and intervention (Lemke, 2002). Neoliberalism, in seeking to limit the role of the state through the invocation of individual choice, simultaneously involves forms of governance that encourage both institutions and individuals to conform to the norms of the market. The qualities of enterprise and innovation are expected not just from business but also political subjects (Lemke, 2002). In this process, the government itself becomes a sort of enterprise (Lemke, 2001) - a ‘neoliberal government’ (Ball, 2010b) – who tasks itself with fostering competition and market-inspired strategies and plans of action for individuals, groups and institutions alike (Lemke, 2001).

Against this backdrop of definitions and debates around understandings of neoliberalism, neoliberalism in this study is understood as incorporating elements of what has been characterised above as big ‘N’ and small ‘n’ neoliberalism (Ong, 2007). That is to say, big ‘N’ neoliberalism with its associated set of values of individualism; freedom of choice; market solutions; and minimal government, which entails the ‘economization of the social’ (Shamir, 2008) and the seemingly endless pursuit of new opportunities for profit or capital accumulation. This is coupled with small ‘n’ neoliberalism whereby the emphasis given to economic or market relations is extended to all aspects of governing strategies and individual relations, which serve to rework relationships between the governing and the governed (Ong, 2006). This is captured by Ong’s description of small ‘n’ neoliberalism as the ‘new mode of political optimization’ (p.3).

Following Ong (2007, p.5), neoliberalism in this study is conceptualised and deployed as a ‘migratory technology of governing’. Such an approach conceptualises neoliberalism
not as ‘an economic tsunami’ (Ong, 2007, p.3) bringing about universalising, totalising, inevitable effects or predetermined outcomes. Rather, one which is more nuanced, allowing for its selective ‘interaction’, contextual variations and ‘local globalness’ (McCann, 2011). Particularly in ‘non-Western contexts’, such as India, where neoliberalism ‘itself is not the general characteristic of technologies of governing’ (Ong, 2006, p.3) but where other forms of governing exist in which conditions of liberty or freedom ‘are much more ambiguous where the free co-exist with the unfree’ (p.6). Considering neoliberalism as a ‘migratory set of practices’ (Ong, 2007, p.4) allows for an enhanced analysis of how the flows and mobilities of these practices interact in such environments and ‘participate in mutating configurations of possibility’ (p.4).

I also need to make an additional point before moving on to introduce SNA as a method by which I research these flows or mobilities of ideas, values and practices. Earlier Foucauldian Literature on governmentality, whose writing has been self-described as the Foucault Effect and is associated with scholars who have been described as forming and belong to an ‘Anglo-Foucauldian school’ (see Jessop, ND), provide insights into thinking about forms of governance and the exercise of political power in advanced capitalist societies. In this literature the argument advanced is that political power over a population within a nation state does not rest with nor is it derived from a central or single authority (such as the state) (Rose, 1993). The view of political power here is diffused, resting with and emerging from a wide range of forces and groups which are not necessarily confined to and by a territorial state. In short, political power here is understood to be ‘beyond the state’ (Rose and Miller, 1992). This thesis, which cites and draws on this earlier literature, should not be read as privileging this micro-analysis over and above the macro-analysis of political power. As Jessop (ND, p.4) points out Foucault’s earlier emphasis and analysis of microphysics of power which the earlier writings privilege, should not detract from or neglect Foucault’s later interest and investigations into new macrophysics of state power, ‘viewing it as an emergent and vital strategic site for coordinating multiple arts of government’. As Jessop goes on to add, as Foucault’s own work and thinking developed, he later called for an ascending analysis of power which was concerned with the mobilization and the composition or assemblage
of local power networks into more global projects and structures (Jessop, ND, p.5, emphasis in original).

Such an analysis concerns itself with investigations into:

how the state comes to act as a centre for other forms of government, what are the means which enable it to act in this way, how its locales are constructed by specific means of knowledge and mechanisms of power, and how it enrols local relations and networks of power in its relations (Dean, 2002, pp.180-181).

By investigating political rule and political power in this way, attention can be drawn to the multiplicity of forces and groups involved in governance and the actions of the state are not reduced to 'a relatively coherent and calculating political subject' (Miller and Rose, 1990, p.3).

Further, the processual rather than structural nature of government is made manifest whereby political rule can be viewed in continuum with what has gone before and offers a more wide-ranging account of the current political and social transformations and makes visible the depth and breadth of the processes of domination and exploitation (Lemke, 2002, p.54).

SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

The task/aim of network methodology 'must be to identify the actors in these networks, their power and capacities, and the ways through which they exercise their power through association within networks of relationships.' (Dicken et al., 2001, p.93)

Following on and building on the notion of mobilities, networks and flows in the conceptual framework in the preceding section, the use of SNA as my methodological and analytical tool is guided and informed by Ball's (2012a, p.6) study of global educational policy networks and governance where the term 'networks' is used firstly, as 'an analytic technique for looking at the structure of policy communities and their social relationships' - the more visible aspects of these relationships, and secondly, as a
'conceptual device ... used to represent a set of ‘real changes’ in the forms of governance of education, both nationally and globally'.
SNA is considered to be useful for exploring and investigating kinship patterns; company or governing board memberships and for producing and analysing what is described as ‘relational’ data which refers to the contacts, ties, relations; group attachments (Scott, 2000) as well as ‘meetings and co-present conversations’ (Urry, 2004) all of which relate one actor to another, potentially affording the actor access to the same goods or resources. Borgatti, Mehra, Brass and Labianca (2009) identify four broad categories of relations: similarities, social relations, interactions, and flows - all of which have relevance, bearing and suitability to this study. In short, SNA attends to patterns of connection (Crossley, 2016), focusing its analysis upon sets of ‘ties’ (described as the ‘lines’) between actors (described as the ‘nodes’). Further, the analysis has particular interest in the kinds of things that ‘flow’ through the networks and whether such networks can affect how they flow (Edwards, 2010). Examples of possible areas of interest, and of direct relevance to this study, would include the flow of influence, the flow of social support, the flow of information, the flow of ideas and the flow of money.

Edwards notes that on the whole, SNA has tended to focus upon personal networks and while this may raise questions of how boundaries of networks are delineated or drawn, studies which have used personal networks have justified its usage by arguing that networks are by nature, ‘permeable, partial and dynamic’ (Heath, Fuller and Johnston, 2009, p.646). Or as Crossley (2010, p.8) stresses, ‘Relationships are not things that are either absent or present. Nor are they uniform. They are lived histories of iterated interaction which constantly evolve as a function of continued interaction between parties (or significant absences of interaction)).’

Similarly, Howard’s (2002, p.550) concern that ‘whereas social network analysis renders an overarching sketch of interaction, it will fail to capture detail on incommensurate yet meaningful relationships’ is in part addressed in this thesis by situating the networks within the broader, richer and contextual findings of this study which serve to visually complement the narrative. The choice of SNA in this study of global elite and powerful Indian business b/millionaires is also in part in recognition of Ball’s (2005, pp. 114-115) broader point from his experience of interviews of elites, where he argues:
the purposes and intentions of political actors are important but they do not provide a sufficient basis for the interpretation of policies and policy making ... the actors’ voices elicited from fieldwork can be interpreted and understood in different ways ... [that is to say] ... the data is polyvocal ... accordingly, no one interpretational mode or set of theoretical tools or interpretational stance is adequate or exhaustive of the analytical possibilities of policy analysis.

SNA can assist in generating and analysing relational data in a number of ways - for example through narrative, observational and visual data - Edwards (2010) details numerous studies that have used a qualitative approach to social network research. More recent examples of the use of the qualitative approach in social network research which have a bearing on this study, include: Ball (2008b; 2009a; 2012a); Ball and Exley (2010); Ball and Junemann (2012); Ball and Thawer (2019); Nambissan and Ball (2010) - all of which have used social network research to analytically and conceptually convey as well as visually illustrate the ‘nexus of influences and interdependencies’ (Ball, 2001, p.xxx) in their individual studies of education policy networks and governance.

This is not to suggest that networks can explain all aspects of the policy process, as Ball (2008b, p. 748) explains, network relations ‘do not totally displace other forms of policy formation and policy action.’ Furthermore, as Ball (2012a) recognises and acknowledges, the limitation is that networks research often cannot take into account the ‘behind the scenes’ activity. However, what social network research enables is the visual mapping of a large number of relationships and associations from multiple sites in far-flung, diverse geographical locations - and any corresponding patterns - that would be much harder to convey by use of narrative alone (Edwards, 2010). In this respect, social network research serves to capture and illustrate the more fluid aspects of networks and, more importantly, their potential capacity for evolution and transformation.

The choice of SNA in this study is not only in acknowledgement of Steiner-Khamsi’s (in Popkewitz and Rizvi 2009, p.52) call for making the analysis of social networks a more central feature of scholarship in the field of transfer studies. It also responds to Ball’s (2012a, p.4) stress on the need for ‘new methods, concepts and new research sensibilities’ to better understand the ‘new actors and organisations ... forms of participation and relationship[s]’ engaging in education policy and in the ‘global expansion of neoliberal
ideas’ (Ball, 2012a p.2). The social network research approach is ‘set within a broad set of epistemological and ontological shifts across political science, sociology, and social geography which involve a lessening of interest in social structures and increasing emphasis on flows and mobilities’ (p.5).

The concept of flows and mobilities, as indicated, is key here and the use of the internet and social media sites offer distinct possibilities to access the ‘social’ in social networks (Ball, 2012a). Useful data can be gleaned on the relations between and movements of people including the activities in which they are engaged, events they may be attending and the views or thoughts they may have and share. Often the communications on social media can reveal the location of individuals and their role, function or purpose at events. In their mapping of twitter topic networks, Pew Research (2014) equate social media to the new ‘public square’ where ‘knowledge sharing’ is carried out, warranting equal attention and study as any public gathering on a physical landscape. The mapping of social media conversations is argued to provide new insights because analysis can include the opinions expressed on Twitter and the information sources cited in their tweets. An added dimension which is highlighted is the extent to which these online conversations are followed by a broader audience where the potential for impact can extend beyond the participants themselves. Such mapping can assist in highlighting the people leading the conversation and the extent to which their ‘content’ is relayed in these networks can be significant (Pew Research, 2014).

METHODS

This study uses the Government-commissioned report, *The Prime Minister’s Council on Trade and Industry: Report on A Policy Framework for Reforms in Education* (GoI, 2000), the actors commissioned with its compilation and the committee members, as a starting point and initial focal point of analysis. This is complemented by a combination of methods involving: 1] substantial and extensive internet searches focusing on: business leaders - starting with the authors of the government commissioned report, their companies, newspaper interviews; newspaper reports; speeches; events; Annual General
Meetings (AGMs); GoI and Prime Minister of India webpages, university and business information websites; business magazines and business leaders’ profile web-pages. Following on from which, 2] the identification of and subscription to appropriate electronic newsletters, newsfeeds, blogs, and web posts in addition to the monitoring of social media sites such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Google + sites - (Fig. 2).

Alongside this, 3] relevant policy documents as well as press, company, government committee and financial reports were also identified for the purposes of generating material. Finally, 4] material was drawn from the ‘society pages’ and ‘lifestyle’ pages of newspapers to explore the social engagement and activities of government officials and business leaders, among others and as identified during the course of this study (2014-2018), to generate visual data on social relations.

From the material generated, connections, associations and partnerships both existing and in formation were mapped and visually presented. Work on capturing and creating these visual networks was an on-going process, which required on-going monitoring, reviewing and vigilance so as to visually capture any changes during the period of this study. The ‘relational data (see above) generated was stored on an excel spreadsheet and visually represented in the form of network maps.

Inherent to this process from the initial starting point of the government commissioned report was ‘following policy’ (Peck and Theodore, 2012), providing ‘insights into the ‘wheres’ of policy and the ‘whos’ – that is who does it, and how’ (Ball, 2015b, p.467); ‘attending to the relationships, events, and exchanges that make up network activity’ (Ball, 2016, p.2) and most importantly, as a key aim of this study, to follow the ‘subtext of neoliberalism’ - money.
Business Leader Mukesh Ambani (Reliance Industries) address:

...it is important to be open to capital and expertise from all over the globe...It is critical that millions of our youth are trained, are educated and skilled to make sure that they contribute to your Make in India vision.

Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vur2xLQwb7k
Published 25/09/14, accessed 30/06/14

On Twitter: Business Leader Anand Mahindra

Source: @anandmahindra 1:56 PM - 29 Sep 2014
https://twitter.com/anandmahindra/status/516572255934230528

Source: @anandmahindra 6:35 PM - 3 Nov 2014
https://twitter.com/anandmahindra/status/529341095067398144

Source: @anandmahindra 2:22 AM - 11 Nov 2014
https://twitter.com/anandmahindra/status/531995442548969472

On Twitter: Business Leader Sam Pitroda

Source: @Sam Pitroda 3:24 PM - 31 Mar 2014
https://twitter.com/sampitroda/status/450639751054233601

Fig. 2. Who, what, where.....
Fig. 2. Who, what, where.... contd.
Accumulatively, deploying SNA as a method for researching mobilities, connections and interactions within networks enables staying ‘close to practice’ (McCann and Ward 2012a, p.45); and tracing the travels of policy actors; following and mapping policy, people and money to sites as well as events where the ‘past, present and a potential future of a policy can co-exist’ (p. 48).

A final point before concluding this chapter. Indian HE is the case in point that displays or illustrates the processes of neoliberalisation. But this ‘case’ of Indian HE cannot be viewed or studied separately and in isolation from the country itself and its rich history. Nor can adequate justice be done in the space and time available in a single thesis to a country as geographically, socially, and culturally diverse as India with its own varied practices, traditions, rituals and customs and where historical, geographical settings and locations have a bearing as do their accompanying political effects. To address this, at least to some extent, I undertake a reinterpretation of secondary material to trace shifts in political-economic discourses and identities in India from its pre-colonial time, during its colonial history, at independence and at the time neoliberal reforms were introduced ‘in earnest’ in India in 1991. Additionally, and relatedly, I follow historical convention in relation to the names of India’s cities which have undergone a change in recent years, except when in direct quotation. Therefore: Bombay, Calcutta, Madras rather than Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai, respectively.

Thus, equipped with the conceptual and analytical framework of governmentality and policy mobilities with the accompanying methodological tool of SNA, the setting of the next chapter will be pre/colonial India where commercial India and traditional Indian learning will be introduced before proceeding to describe the effects and impacts of Western, liberal influences and enduring aspects of this colonial experience on Indian HE and more broadly.
CHAPTER TWO

PRE - COLONIAL and COLONIAL INDIA

If . . . the English language could be introduced into the transaction of business . . it would be attended with convenience and advantage to Government and no distress or disadvantage to the natives . . . To qualify themselves for employment, they would be obliged to study English instead of Persian. If schools were established in the districts . . . a few years would produce a set of young men qualified for business, whose example and success would spread, and graft the institution gradually into the manners of the people.

Peter Francis, officer of the East India Company in Calcutta 1775 (in Guha, 1997, p.167)

Men like my grandfather and my father were typical of a new, professional middle class that emerged in the nineteenth century under British rule with the introduction of the English language and Western education. This class not only produced clerks for the East India Company but also lawyers, teachers, engineers, doctors, bureaucrats - all the new professions that were required to run a country. Since passing an exam was the only barrier to entering this class, its members came from various castes and backgrounds. Although opportunities were open to all, the upper castes were the first to seize them and hold on to them. Once they learned English, acquired an education, and cleared an exam, rewards and prestige were showered upon them. They became the new elite and closed ranks. The rise of a new Westernized urban elite matched the decline of the landed gentry. To be sure, local landlords, chieftains, and zamindars . . . continued to hold sway but men of new learning like my grandfather and father threatened their social position. Equally, this new middle class endangered the intellectual monopoly of the Brahmins. But the Brahmins were clever . . . many of them took to English education, passed exams, and became part of the new middle class . . . They could now rant in English and chant in Sanskrit.

Das (2000, p.10)

‘Relations of power, also, they are played; it is these games of power . . . that one must study in terms of tactics and strategy, in terms of order and of chance, in terms of stakes and objectives’.

Foucault (in Olssen, Codd and O’Neill, 2004, p.49)
INTRODUCTION

Olssen, Codd and O’Neill (2004, p.2) argue that any analysis of neoliberal education policy needs to go beyond a mere understanding of the educational context or the ‘pronouncements’ of the ‘policy makers’; rather such an analysis requires an exploration and understanding of ‘the dynamics of the various elements of the social structure and their intersections in the context of history’. At the heart of such an undertaking, they assert, is the ‘conception of policy as a politically, socially and historically contextualized practice or set of practices’ entailing a recognition that the meaning of texts lie in the interplay between the text and social structure’ (p.3). Accordingly, the ensuing historical Chapters (Two, Three and Four) of this study, beginning here with the pre and colonial period in India, are undertaken in this spirit and endeavour. Such an approach and endeavour additionally strives to avoid what Peck (2010, p.35) calls ‘foreshortened conceptions of neoliberalism, … which pay insufficient attention to this long trajectory of ideational evolution…’. Furthermore, Olssen, Codd and O’Neill (2004, p.11) stress the importance of an understanding of ‘the origins and determining influences of that policy in relation to social, cultural, political and economic forces that transcend the context of its national production’.

Such an undertaking requires some essential scene-setting. The first half of this chapter begins by providing a brief description of caste, the nature of rule during the pre-colonial and colonial period, followed by a description of some of the characteristics, features and practices that prevailed in pre and colonial India. In particular, it considers caste and the participation of Indian merchants as members of a caste group in commercial India. It then narrates the nature of interaction and collaboration of Indian merchants with the East India Company (EIC) an ‘organisation that … served profit and power’ (Roy, 2012, p.4) as well as with its agents/officers; and how, as well as the ways in which, the EIC proved to be one of the main agents of change in business and politics in India (Roy, 2012).
The second half of this chapter acknowledges Altbach’s (1989) stress on the colonial experience, legacy and impact on Indian HE. India, the largest British colony, was, as Altbach points out, where early British initiatives in HE were undertaken with English being ‘one of the most important legacies of the British academic and intellectual tradition’ (p.11) which, he goes on to argue, has ‘contemporary implications’ (p.16) and significance. Concomitantly, this historical focus reveals additional enduring aspects of this colonial experience on Indian HE. Specifically, the role of government in the creation of universities and in the governance of universities; a preponderance of private management in HE; and a public-private alliance in Indian HE, all of which constitute and function as ‘genetic imprint[s]’ serving to ‘dictate … [s] … the further evolution of their institutional arrangement, not with exactitude … but with certain dependability’ (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1972, p.13). I attend specifically to the example of the Hindoo College ‘the only Western-styled institution of higher learning to be found anywhere in what is presently known as the third world’ (Kopf, 1979, p.42) in order to describe these various aspects as well as to illustrate how through its education policy, the EIC as a colonial power sought to govern the ‘native’ population over it which it ruled.

Despite the division of the chapter into two parts, there is a degree of interplay between the narratives, particularly in the second half where the majority of the analysis is concentrated and again in the concluding remarks to this chapter.

An additional opening point of observation is also necessary at this juncture. When talking of India historically in the pre and colonial period, as this chapter does, it needs to be remembered that current day India, current day Pakistan, and current day Bangladesh were formerly one country and collectively shared the geographical territory described here. Relatedly, the time period covered in this chapter spans across seventeenth - twentieth centuries, therefore, for reasons of space, relevance and focus, only the most significant events or periods which make up this narrative can be accommodated here. Additionally, India, even after independence, is a huge continent-sized country with incredible diversity and regional/provincial variations to match, so the national level account provided here, and in the subsequent chapters, must necessarily allow for such variations and diversity.
SCENE SETTING: ESSENTIAL PARTS, CASTE and INDIAN MERCHANTS

Perhaps more so than with other colonial countries, considering India historically involves a recognition of its evolution through a gradual interplay of cultural and social developments, absorbing elements from ‘the outside’ by way of the presence of actors present and active within its territory and their practices, during and through the course of which process India’s own ‘essential parts’ were transformed, strengthened or constructed (Habib, 1997). This statement is qualified on the grounds that among the country’s essential parts considered here and of relevance to this study, is caste - ‘so marked a feature of Indian society’ (Habib 1990, p.379) - and relatedly, markets and merchants. The latter, likewise, have been part and parcel of India’s history with merchants featuring as a caste in the country’s socially stratified society (Das, 2012b). As this might already indicate, there is an occupational or functional division and categorization within the caste structure as sanctified by the Hindu religion and premised largely on the readings - and writings - of Brahmanical texts and scripts. Implicit in these Hindu texts is the justification of a hierarchy of caste system along the lines of purity, as well as notions of status and power that such stratification within a single hierarchy implies. This four-ordered hierarchy as advanced by the Brahmanical texts and scripts, gives primacy to the Brahmins (the scribal or literary caste, priest, teacher), followed by the Kshatriyas (warrior, landholder, ruler), Vaishyas (merchants), and the Shudras (peasants, manual labourers, artisans). Under each caste innumerable and diverse other sub-castes are grouped numbering approximately 3,000, followed by those groups considered ‘less pure’ or low caste (formerly derogatively referred to as the ‘Untouchables’) and tribals. However, it would be more accurate to talk of multiple hierarchies as no caste group accepts and leaves unchallenged their alleged impurity, although, as Gupta (2000, p.1) points out, ‘they readily allege that there are other castes that are indeed polluting’.

Aside from the Hindu and Jain (usually grouped together) other religious groups in India include Christians, Muslims, Sikhs, Jews and Zoroastrians or Parsis (originally from Persia - current day Iran).
To capture the diversity of the numerous social and cultural groups, Das (2012b) talks of the ‘ordered heterogeneity’ nature of traditional Indian society, with each group having their own traditions, beliefs, laws, customs and rites.

Against this diversity and order, additional and varying levels of power and rule in pre-colonial India included: the Mughal Emperor - the king of kings and sovereign power; the Hindu kings of the localities (and guardians of the caste order); warrior farmers (and controllers of village life). Interactions, alliance-making/breaking between these varying levels of power and authority meant that nature of power and rule in India was complicated, fluid, differentiated and hierarchical with overlapping rights and obligations (Bayly, 1988). This was particularly the case during the eighteenth century when events in the country and the resulting chaos that ensued (see below) rendered political authority even more fluid (Bayly, 1998).

This contextual scene setting is necessary in relation to the activities, interactions, collaborations and alliance making with the EIC and its officers which are to follow below. But first, a brief insight into commercial India and an introduction to our mercantile community, the Bania merchants.

Pre-colonial India boasted a very large indigenous mercantile caste, with the sub-castes grouped under Bania\(^1\) being the most important in commercial India (Habib, 1990).\(^2\) Singled out for particular attention are the Marwaris who, named after their place of origin, Marwar in the state of Rajasthan, are regarded as the most prominent sub-group of the Banias in northern and western India. Banias are described as being willing and open to entering into commercial ventures with each other as well as with other sub-castes within it, and of being supportive to each other in times of need. Habib argues that while this sense of solidarity and fraternity among group members assisted in securing their control and domination over commercial activity, a major contributing

---

1 Bania is derived from the Sanskrit word, banik or vanik, meaning merchant or trader (see Habib, 1990).
2 Habib focusses on just two mercantile communities in this particular study; however, as he acknowledges, this is not to ignore or disregard the presence of other indigenous mercantile groups such as the Khatris of the Punjab (and the main rivals to the Banias), the Muslim Bohras of Gujarat, nor other merchants such as the Parsis and Armenians (p.397).
factor ‘surely lay in the training they received from early childhood in arithmetic, accountancy, and methods of business, sharpened by constant, acute competition with their peers’ (Habib, 1990, p.383). Encouragement and advice from family elders may also have had a part for, ‘Too much study was meant for a Brahman or Bhat. The son of a Banik ... [Bania] ... should sit in the shop’ (Banarasldas in Habib, 1990, p.384).

In reflection partly of this competition in the commercial sphere of pre-colonial India and partly of the ‘ordered heterogeneity’ (Das, 2012b) nature of traditional Indian society, these inherited skills and ways of life, passed on from one generation to another, were nurtured and honed by community/group members or elders to establish an advantage and specialisation in one sphere of life or another. In the case of the Banias, this advantage-seeking took the form of specialising in two types of commercial activity: firstly, as brokers or agents, and secondly, as bankers (also known as shroffs) and money changers. With the exception of south India where the usage of brokers in business transactions was largely unknown, the prevalent use of their services as brokers elsewhere enabled the Banias to specialise and dominate this particular commercial activity (Habib, 1990).

Assisted by their kinship based networks (see also Chapters Three and Five) and commercial linkages to other Banias within their sub-caste group - who could be found to operate at various scales ranging from village level and dealing in grains; in towns as shop keepers; to smaller scale peddlers of items ranging from oil, cloth, to jewels (Subramanian, 1991) - the Bania brokers were able to provide a wide range of services from the purchase to sale of goods to securing finance to Arabian, Egyptian, European and other merchants (Habib, 1990). They devised a particular form of promissory note or bill of exchange known as the hundi which, although was based on their own arbitrarily fixed exchange rate and involved substantial charges (Tripathi, 1971), provided a vital service as it could be encashed via their networks at various points of the country, thereby serving as a safe, secure and efficient way of transferring funds. In this way, not only was the business of trade vastly assisted by the services provided by the Bania

---

3 Banarasidas was a Shrimali Jain Bania of the seventeenth century (Subramanian, 1991).
brokers, they came to occupy and command a central position in commercial India (Habib, 1990). Indeed, Bania brokers were considered:

so expert in their business, that hardly anybody can be without them. They give them commissions of all kinds; though it be known that they make their profit of everything, yet Men chuse rather to make use of them, than to do their business themselves ... They are of a pleasing humor, for they reject no service, whether honourable or base, and are always readie to satisfie those who employ them... (Thevenot, in Habib, 1990, p.391).

While seemingly indispensable, this function the Banias provided should not be taken to read that they monopolised commercial activity (Habib, 1990); they had to share the market activity and business with others, competing, as noted above as well as collaborating with other traders including from the European companies: the French (late arrivals, comparatively speaking), Portuguese (waning influence), the Dutch and the English (considered the most active) (Tripathi and Jumani (2007). A key shared characteristic among the various traders was the pursuit of profit, as Tripathi and Jumani (2007, p.7) remind, describing the Indian merchants ‘as shrewd and calculating as merchants anywhere else, including their European counterparts. In fact, it is their profit motive more than anything else that determined their business strategies....’

Given the nature of their business - overseas trade - geography was important, and the major European companies operated from their fortified settlements at/nearby some major Indian ports. However, it is the East India Company (EIC) which had its operations at Surat (in the current day western state of Gujarat) where it was headquartered from 1630, and in the presidency towns created between 1632-1690 (Roy, 2012); namely, Madras (in the southern state of Tamil Nadu); Bombay (in the current day western state of Maharashtra), and Calcutta (in the eastern state of Bengal), that is of concern to this study and to which attention is turned next.
THE EAST INDIA COMPANY (EIC)

The British firm the EIC formed in 1600, was, like its Portuguese, Dutch and French counterparts, drawn to India by the financially lucrative prospects of trade in her highly sought-after goods such as cotton and spices, and made its first voyage to India in 1601. At the height of its success, the EIC was considered the most important mercantile firm in London with access to considerable financial resources and, given the political make-up of its founders and backers, enjoyed corresponding levels of political influence. As a company, it was unusual in that it had military prowess and strength (Das, 2012a) which it put to effective use in India, not least in providing (at a cost) this military power for the protection and the growth of European inland trade which ultimately served to weaken and undermine the foundations of the regional and local kingdoms (Bayly, 1988).

Naturally, the EIC had to work within the environment prevalent at the time in India in terms of local customs, traditions, and trading practices as outlined above, as well as negotiate with the Indian kings and nobility in matters of trade. As it turned out, the EIC in India also served as a means for private enterprise for its own employees, many of whom engaged in lucrative side businesses of their own and from which they profited hugely (see below). Though the relationship between local agents hired by EIC agents for the procurement of goods functioned more along the lines of employer/employee; local agents hired by private traders, on the other hand, were on a more even keel and functioned like partnerships driven by mutual need and dependency (Roy, 2012).

Of the Indian merchants to have benefited the most from the presence of the European traders and travellers in Surat and Bombay were the Parsi merchants. Though numerically speaking a small group, the Parsis were highly influential and from quite early on, acted as the EIC’s economic and political middlemen, assisting the British in their dealings with the Indian Hindu population and securing valuable contracts and concessions in return (Lamb, 1955, p.104). The period between the end of the eighteenth century into a considerable portion of the nineteenth century is described as the golden age of the Parsis (Roy, 2012).
However, from around the eighteenth century the EIC’s main partners were the Bania bankers and money changers (*shroffs*), the wealthiest and inclined to being ‘*liquidity prone*’ (Tripathi and Jumani, 2007) and on whom the EIC came to depend not only for loans, for which they were charged exorbitant rates (Tripathi, 1971) as already noted, but also for the movement of their profits and revenues from and between their presidency towns by way of the indigenous *hundi* system (Roy, 2012). Meanwhile, the profits on the part of the Bania bankers and money changers were re-invested into their own-going mercantile activities rather than for the purposes of diversifying into new areas, a propensity which was to serve them well later (see below).

Events in eighteenth century India proved to be decisive and momentous in her history and two are particularly worth singling out. The first was the death of the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707 and the demise of the mighty Mughal Empire during which time numerous provinces broke away to form independent or autonomous states/kingdoms. The ensuing political vacuum effectively paved the way for the EIC, hitherto a trading company and trading partner, to become India’s political ruler (Tripathi, 1971) - see Table 1 further below for some of the noteworthy dates in relation to the EIC.

The second event was the battle of Plassey in Bengal in 1757 (led by Robert Clive, initially a clerk with the EIC in Madras and later Baron of Plassey) and its subsequent capture which essentially meant that in the absence of a ruler, Bengal, one of the richest regions in India, came to be governed by the British ‘by proxy’ (Roy, 2012). Following Plassey, both the expansion of British commercial enterprise and the expansion of political rule in India began in earnest (Tripathi, 1971).

Under colonial rule, and as allies of the British, Indian princes continued to govern just under half of the country; but the greater part of India and most vital to long-distance trade, was under direct British rule (Roy, 2014).
The EIC has been described as an organisation that served profit and power and proved to be one of the main agents of change in business and politics in India (Roy, 2012), and it is to that I turn next, focussing on Calcutta in Bengal, the commercial heartland of the EIC as well as its cultural and political capital.

UNORTHODOX ALLIANCES

It needs to be stressed that the arrival of the EIC in the early 1600s (or that of other European traders) did not alter the occupational or functional division within the Hindu caste system in pre-colonial India, as described above, in any significant or noteworthy way. The trading and commercial activities remained the traditional occupation of the Vaishyas (merchants), an occupational activity they came to dominate almost till the beginning of the nineteenth century (Tripathi, 1971). Further, the education system that prevailed until the early nineteenth century (see below) served largely to reinforce this occupational structure and division, as sanctified by the caste system, leading Tripathi to describe occupational mobility in Indian society as ‘one of the hardest cakes of custom’ to soften (p.59).

However, Tripathi asserts that two factors slowly but surely began to change this state of play. The first was the sheer volume and scale of the combined commercial activities of the EIC, former employees and those of the free merchants. These commercial activities were unprecedented and on a scale never before experienced by the Indian merchants, presenting them - and others - with a host of new economic and business opportunities. This was particularly the case when, after the loss of EIC’s monopoly of the India trade in 1813 (see Table 1 below), the number of managing agency houses and their activities grew and expanded (Tripathi, 1971). Managing agency houses were established in Calcutta, Bombay and Madras towards the end of the eighteenth century by former employees of the EIC and were affiliated to British firms in London initially with the view to facilitate money transfers or remittances to England. However, the managing agency

---

4 British plans to partition Bengal along religious (Hindu / Muslim) lines emerged in 1905 (Kohli, 2004).
5 Until 1911, after which Delhi became the colonial capital (Kohli, 2004).
houses soon diversified and engaged in the more profitable activities of trade and commerce (Tripathi, 1971).

The managing agency system provided a legally protected means by which the financial and administrative aspects of groups of independent companies was centrally managed or controlled by a firm (or managing agency), for a fee. The managing agency itself was made up of a handful of individuals with skills and ability in business and/or significant financial resources which wielded considerable power and authority over the company/ies it managed, including: control over financial matters; decision-making powers; share and voting arrangements - though, more often than not, the agency members themselves served as board directors of the company/ies they were managing (Brimmer, 1955) - see next chapter. Brimmer notes, ‘with a few notable exceptions, the Indian ... [managing] ... agency firms seem to administer the operating companies under their control with a view to obtaining the maximum profit in the shortest possible time...’ (p.559).

The second factor was what Tripathi (1971) refers to as the changes in the material environment brought about as a result of British rule. These changes included, among other things, the spread of Western ideas, the beginning of secular education, and the formation of movements such as the Brahmo Samaj in Bengal (see below). Combined, these changes served to loosen the traditional hold of religious practices and traditions (see below). In effect, what this meant was that the opportunities for material gain and commercial activity were viewed more favourably - in particular by the Brahmins (the scribal or literary caste, priest, teacher). Thus, in Calcutta between the years 1834 and 1847 a host of business partnerships and joint ventures were entered into by Bengali Brahmins and Englishmen - ‘an entirely new phenomenon in Indian business life’ (Tripathi, 1971, p.62) and which others (Roy, 2012) have described as ‘unorthodox alliances’.

One such example is Dwarkanath Tagore, father of the renowned poet Rabindranath Tagore, a Brahmin and, like his fellow supporters of the Brahmo Samaj movement, a sympathiser of Western ideas and culture who considered British rule as being
advantageous to India (Tripathi, 1971). He co-founded the Carr Tagore Company with the Englishman William Carr; and established a bank and a steamship company among other ventures. Dwarkanath Tagore is pointed out by his biographer as being ‘the first high-caste Hindu to enter business’ (Tripathi, 1971, p.62). Family member Prasanna Kumar Tagore, and one of the Directors of the Union Bank is another example, among others.

Even though these partnership business ventures were short-lived (owing to their mismanagement), ‘their first appearance was certainly a breakthrough in the Indian entrepreneurial pattern’ (Tripathi, 1971, p.62). All the more remarkable as business or money-making was held in low esteem at this point in history (Tripathi, 1971) with the merchant ‘only a step ahead of the labouring shudra’ in the four-caste hierarchy’ (Das, 2000, p.xiv). As Tripathi (1971, p.65) remarks,

>Hinduism... [was] ... not immune to external influences, nor had the Indians internalised its value system to such an extent so as to withstand the pressure of profitable opportunities which emerged in the wake of material changes. While the rituals remained intact, the behaviour changed significantly...

Nor were these ‘unorthodox alliances’ (Roy, 2012) in reference to just the Brahmins, they applied equally to the Bania merchants. Worthy of note are the Bania merchants at the house of the Jagat Seths, who served as bankers to the nawabs (princes or local governors) of Bengal but whose interests, success and fortunes from their money-lending activities were closely tied to those of the British. Indeed, the ‘stealing of Bengal’ (Das, 2012a) at Plassey in 1757 was largely enabled by the support provided by Jagat Seth to the political and economic activities of the British in Bengal (Tripathi, 1971), and particularly to Robert Clive at the EIC with whom he was on friendly terms (Das, 2000). Das estimates that Robert Clive, through this capture of Plassey, made a personal fortune of £230,000 (which Das approximates to be the equivalent of US$140 million, at the time of his writing). Das highlights that the capture of Plassey provided the EIC and the British with the title to the land around Calcutta which gradually extended to Bengal and ultimately to the whole of India.
As Bayly (1988, p.5) emphasises, ‘Indians remained, therefore, active agents and not simply passive bystanders and victims in the creation of colonial India … [their] … own interests had become far too closely intertwined with the fate of the Europeans’ (p.50).

It was these ‘unorthodox alliances’ (Roy, 2012) and particularly, ‘the stealing of Bengal’ (Das, 2012a), which was ultimately to make Indians view merchants and foreign companies with suspicion and distrust (though see Chapters Four and Five). Indeed, India’s independence movement was in part premised on the notion of self-sufficiency and self-reliance in economic policy largely as a result of these ‘unorthodox alliances’ (Das, 2012a; Roy, 2012).

The inherent complicities implied by the ‘unorthodox alliances’ (Roy, 2012), the part played by secular education and the formation of movements such as the Brahmo Samaj which Tripathi (1971, p.63) considers to be a contributing factor in breaking the ‘backbone of occupational immobility’ are discussed next. However, as a precursor to what is to follow, it is worth mentioning that the economic liberal Adam Smith, quite possibly finding inspiration in the antics of these merchants, traders and businessmen, European and Indian alike, and drawing on the rich material at his disposal through the presence of the EIC, its employees and private traders in India, published The Wealth of Nations in 1776 (Table 1 below). In his work, which came to be defined as the ‘invisible hand theory’, he lays stress on the pursuit of self-interest and opportunistic behaviour on the part of individuals, believing this advantage seeking behaviour to not only be natural or the true state of human nature but key to economic social progress. Inherent in this, alongside a commitment to free trade, is the notion of laissez-faire or a non-interventionist, limited state and a corresponding view of markets as being the fairest and best means by which the pursuit of these self-interests can be realised (Olssen, Codd and O’Neill, 2004).
To briefly recap: above, Tripathi (1971) described the entry of non-commercial/non-trading castes, specifically the Brahmins, into business in the presidency city of Calcutta. Among other things, Tripathi attributed this entry and formation of new 'entrepreneurs' in Bengal in the 1830s (and shortly thereafter in western parts of India), to exposure to Western ideas, secular education and the formation of social reform societies such as the Brahmo Samaj in Bengal which Tripathi (1971, p.63) considers to be a contributing factor in breaking the 'backbone of occupational immobility'. This second half of the chapter sets out to consider these Western influences in HE policy in India under British rule, beginning with a brief summary of India’s education system in pre-colonial India.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1600</td>
<td>EIC receives charter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1601-03</td>
<td>James Lancaster leads the first voyage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1605</td>
<td>Accession of Emperor Jahangir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1611-12</td>
<td>The seventh, eighth and the ninth voyages take place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1627</td>
<td>Accession of Emperor Shah Jahan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1630</td>
<td>Surat declared the headquarters of the EIC’s Indian Ocean interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1639</td>
<td>Francis Day builds Fort St George in Madras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1653</td>
<td>Madras becomes a ‘presidency’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1659</td>
<td>Accession of Emperor Aurangzeb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1669</td>
<td>Bombay becomes a property of the EIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1685</td>
<td>The chief establishment on the western coast shifted from Surat to Bombay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1707</td>
<td>Emperor Aurangzeb died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757</td>
<td>Battle of Plassey or Palashi (13 June)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1765-69</td>
<td>Clive holds office as Governor of Bengal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1772-73</td>
<td>Warren Hastings is Governor of Bengal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1773</td>
<td>Regulating Act of Lord North. The offices of Governor General and Council, and a Supreme Court, created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1774-84</td>
<td>Warren Hastings holds office as the first Governor General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1776</td>
<td><em>Wealth of Nations</em> published</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1786</td>
<td>William Pitt’s EIC Act formally secures the Parliament’s authority to regulate all civil, military and revenue affairs of the EIC’s territories in India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1813</td>
<td>Promulgation of the Charter Act, leading to the end of the monopoly trading rights in India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1833</td>
<td>The EIC’s commercial powers abolished. It existed as an administrator of India in partnership with the Crown. The EIC’s own Court of Directors still had some say in Indian affairs, but the Board of Control, in which the government dominated, had far more say in matters of policy. (P.200-201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>Parliament endorsed the formal right of the EIC to administer India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>The Indian mutiny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>Government of India Act, 1858; direct British rule of India begins (till 1947)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>The EIC formally dissolved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Roy (2012)
HIGHER EDUCATION in PRE-COLONIAL INDIA

Prior to colonial rule, India’s education system in relation to the Hindu religion could be categorized as being predominantly religious and literary in character, intended as an introduction to religious initiation with a stress on observance of religious texts and associated concerns of the spiritual and emotional wellbeing of individuals (Choudhary 2008). This largely served to reinforce the occupational divisions and stratifications of the caste system as prescribed and legitimized by the religious texts and scriptures (Tripathi, 1971). Thus, though open to all - except the Shudra caste (peasants) whose learning was restricted - in practice, education was monopolized by the Brahmin (upper) caste (Jha in Choudhary 2008). Buddhist education, imparted by monks in monasteries, was open to all; likewise with the Madrasas which were not confined to just Muslims and where opportunities were provided for Hindu students to study Hindu religious scriptures (Ghosh in Choudhary 2008), and where the philosophical works of Aristotle and Plato were also studied alongside Persian literature. The medium of instruction was Sanskrit, Arabic (considered the classical languages as well as being the language of the religious texts); Persian (language of the wealthy and affluent, its stature equivalent to that of French in medieval England); and the numerous vernacular languages - which were mostly used for and by the trading castes and communities (Spear, 1938).

The most defining aspect of the education system at the time, as Spear points out, was that ‘patronage and religious duty were the keynotes of the whole system. To support learning ... [was] a matter of social obligation’ (Spear, 1938, p.88). Thus, under Islamic tradition and to a lesser extent the Hindu tradition, public institutions of learning were mostly for the poor and, on account of their poverty, students were provided stipends to attend; such public institutions were supported by grants in the form of land or other private means; while those with the means to have private tuition, studied at home (Spear, 1938).

Early efforts in education beyond this indigenous tradition were undertaken by missionaries, private individuals, and officers from mid-seventeenth century onwards, as the example below of the Hindoo College established in 1817 illustrates. The missionaries though welcome initially in spreading Christianity through their education initiatives, were, after the capture of Plassey in 1757, less so and the Court of Directors at...
the EIC, aiming for religious neutrality, refused to authorise Christian proselytization by
the missionaries (Sharp, 1920, p.4), though this was to change later following the EIC
Charter Act of 1813 (see below).

**HIGHER EDUCATION in COLONIAL INDIA**

The EIC as noted above was a commercial enterprise with trade as its primary function
and objective. In its early days in India, the EIC’s work and concern with education was
largely restricted to sending for chaplains out to India to see to the spiritual welfare of
its own Christian employees and their families. After the capture of Plassey (mid-
eighteenth century), questions began to surface on how best to manage and govern the
Indian populace over which the British Company now ruled. These questions and
reflections in relation to education ranged from: was the aim of education to spread
Western education or continue with the established practices of Eastern learning?
Relatedly, should the medium of instruction be English, Sanskrit, Persian or the vernacular
languages (such as Bengali, Hindi etc. ...)? Should this task be undertaken by
missionary/indigenous institutions or those directly under the control of the EIC? Was it
the responsibility of the government to educate all or just a select few with the view that
that they would, in turn, pass on their learning and educate others? (Nurullah and Naik,
1943). These deliberations and accompanying strategies for governing which define
early education policy under British rule has come to be known as the Orientalist -
Anglicist controversy (Kopf, 1979) and spanned a period between the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.

**THE ORIENTALISTS**

In the initial stages of colonial rule the established practices and institutions of learning
were left to function as they were. Oriental learning was additionally supported through
the establishment of the Calcutta Madrasa in 1781 for Islamic learning by the first
Governor-General (GG) of India, Warren Hastings; Benares Sanskrit College in 1792 by
the resident at Benares, Johnathon Duncan; and Poona College for Hindu learning by the Commissioner of the Deccan, Mountstuart Elphinstone (Basu, 1989).

The decision to leave things unchanged and maintain the established practices and institutions of learning were shaped both by established practices in relation to education in England as well as more practical considerations and requirements of the time in India. In England, education at the time was the responsibility of the family and the church thus, there was little inclination to either interfere or assume that responsibility in India (Basu, 1982; Sharp, 1920). The establishment of the supplementary colleges by Hastings, Duncan and Elphinstone were private initiatives - at least initially (see below). These had a more practical intention of ensuring a supply of trained Indian officers familiar and conversant in Sanskrit, Persian and Arabic who were needed to assist English judges in interpreting local customary laws, thereby providing the means by which indigenous practices and knowledge in relation to governing could be drawn (Nurullah and Naik, 1943). Further and relatedly, cordial relations with influential members of the local Hindu and Muslim communities were essential to secure and legitimise British rule; therefore, the EIC undertook to uphold and maintain the traditions of India’s earlier rulers who had similarly contributed and supported centres of learning (Nurullah and Naik, 1943), of which more below.

However, mounting pressure on the GG Warren Hastings and his like-minded officers at the EIC from the Anglicists for the introduction of English and Western education, led to the inclusion of a clause in the EIC Company Charter Act of 1813 in which it stipulated that a small fund (approximately 10,000 pounds) could lawfully be spent (though it was not obligatory) on the ‘revival and improvement of literature and the encouragement of the learned natives of India’ and the ‘introduction and promotion of a knowledge of the sciences among the inhabitants’ (Basu, 1982, p.3). This led not only to the official entry of missionaries and the establishment of English schools, it also constituted the beginning of the state system of education in India under colonial rule, serving as the first important landmark in education policy in India (Basu, 1982). Drawing on archival correspondence, Spear (1938, p.90) highlights how the opening of India trade that same
year,\textsuperscript{5} identified the need for English among the indigenous population: "\textit{[a] knowledge of English is found to facilitate the intercourse of the natives with the commercial part of the community, especially since the opening of the trade.}"

It needs to be said, however, that until the time of Warren Hastings' departure in 1823, this yearly fund remained unspent until the establishment that same year of the General Committee of Public Instruction (GCPI)\textsuperscript{7} in Bengal, responsible for Education at the EIC. After the GCPI's establishment, not only were additional oriental colleges established with Western education and literature undertaken through the vernacular languages, but additionally, English classes were held in existing colleges and English schools were encouraged (Spear, 1938).

Broadly speaking the Orientalists retained their influence on education policy in Bengal until the early 1830s when, under the liberal reformer William Cavendish Bentnick, GG of India (1828-1835), the prominence of the Anglicists emerged (Evans, 2002).

Before proceeding further, it is worth noting that during Bentnick's tenure the EIC Company Charter Act was renewed in 1833 for another 20 years and because some of the provisions assist in the narrative, they are summarised very briefly here. Firstly, it stipulated that Indians, irrespective of caste or creed, could hold a post in the EIC. Secondly, the control of the government of Bengal was extended to the other two presidency towns, Bombay and Madras, which effectively meant that all policy decisions made in Bengal were enforceable in the other two presidencies. Thirdly and finally, provision was made for an additional legal member to be added to the three-member Executive Council of the Governor-General of Bengal; the first legal member to be appointed was Thomas Babington Macaulay who came to India in 1834 (Nurullah and Naik, 1943).

\textsuperscript{5} 1813 marked the end of the EIC's monopoly in India (Roy, 2012), see earlier part of this chapter and Table 1.
\textsuperscript{7} The GCPI was replaced in 1842 by a Council of Education (Nurullah and Naik, 1943).
THE ANGLICISTS

The call and push for the reform of education policy in India was led by the Evangelicals, the Utilitarians, and the Liberals - collectively known as the Clapham Sect (Basu, 1982). The Sect was an influential evangelical network of EIC officials, MPs, like-minded individuals and their family members. These included: Charles Grant who, after arriving in India in 1767, became Director of the Court of Directors at the EIC on a number of occasions and then its Chairman, he served as a Member of Parliament (MP) in England, and was a friend of and advisor to the philanthropist and politician William Wilberforce on concerns relating to India. Zachary Macaulay, philanthropist and Governor of another British colony, Sierra Leone, an ally of William Wilberforce and father of Thomas Babington Macaulay. Thomas Babington Macaulay who, in 1834, a year before his famous Minute on Education (see below), became a Law Member of the GG’s Council in India, President of the GCPI responsible for education at the EIC, served as a MP, and, on his arrival in India, he stayed with William Bentinck during which time their friendship developed (Spear, 1938). In the early 1830s Grant's son, Charles Jr, ‘was one of Macaulay’s closest political associates’ (Clive in Evans, 2002, p.264). Also in keeping with family tradition, Charles Trevelyan, officer with the EIC, Macaulay’s future brother-in-law, and ‘the favourite among Bentinck’s officials’ (Ghosh, 1995, p.23). Members also included Utilitarians, such as the philosopher Jeremy Bentham and his ‘faithful lieutenant’ James Mill (Ghosh, 1995, p.20) as well as his son, John Stuart Mill among others (Evans, 2002; Ghosh, 1995).

Members of the Clapham Sect led their calls for reform by problematising Indian traditions of learning and Indian religion. Problematisation is understood here as the means by which attention is brought to an obstacle or problem thereby creating the possibility for an intervention so as to be able to remove or rectify it or to potentially bring about its transformation (Miller and Rose, 2008); an intervention or transformation moreover, which is in line with the social, economic and political objectives of government, as described below.
Thus, for Grant, Hinduism was considered a ‘fabric of error’, Trevelyan declared Hinduism and Islam to be ‘false religions’ (Spear, 1938), while for Macaulay indigenous learning and Hinduism constituted ‘priest craft’ (Ghosh, 1995). The Sect members were equally united in their belief that only the infusion of Western ideas, knowledge, science – the West’s ‘superior lights’ – through the English language – could lead to a ‘regeneration of Hindu society’ (Ashby, 1966, p.48) and the eradication of the ‘ignorance and misery’ of the people (Young in Ghosh 1995, p.19). Or, as James Mill revealingly asserted and what was ultimately brought to fruition, ‘the great end of Government should not be to teach Hindu or Mahommedan learning, but useful learning’ (Spear 1938, p.83).^8

It was in Macaulay’s Minute and what came to follow that these influences were to find full expression and would shape and define Indian HE. As Stokes (1959, p.43) asserts from ‘the tide that was engulfing the English mind in the eighteen thirties … the most eloquent expression of … English liberalism is to be found in Macaulay’.

MACAULAY’S MINUTE on EDUCATION (1835)

While Western Education and the English language were rationalised as the means or vehicle through which reform of indigenous education was to be sought, Macaulay’s reasoning was premised around the notions of commerce/free trade, profit, private, the advantage seeking and self-interested individual invoking choice, markets as sites of exchange/veridiction and, relatedly, the limited role of the state – some of the key defining characteristics of classic liberalism (Olssen, Codd and O’Neill, 2004) and encapsulated in the notion of individual freedom and liberty. However, it is in relation to the means by which the EIC government’s economic and political security as well as its political legitimacy was to be secured through the Indian population over which the EIC now governed, liberalism’s real significance lies, as elaborated below.

---
^8 James Stuart Mill who joined the London office of the EIC in 1823, was ultimately to oppose the reforming assertions of his father, as articulated here, arguing that a narrow focus on Western learning would serve to advance the vocational goal of education at the expense of learning for its intrinsic value (Ashby, 1966).
Thus, mindful of the primary and over-riding objective of the EIC, trade, and concern with the economy, Macaulay lays stress on the need for English, anticipating it to 'become the language of commerce throughout the seas of the East...' (Sharp, 1920, p.110), having suggested in an earlier speech in the House of Commons (HoC) that it was only through the development of trade in India that England could benefit or profit and that civilizing India was the proper British policy for it would enable the creation of a wealthy and orderly society linked in the closest commercial connexion with England (Stokes, 1959, p.44).

Critiquing what Macaulay considers an over excessive role in governing on the part of the Orientalists and thereby displaying a characteristic feature of liberal rule and its preoccupations with 'excessive' government (Dean, 2010), he pours scorn over the idea of providing stipends for attending the institutions of indigenous learning ‘while those who learn English are willing to pay us’ (Sharp, 1920, p.112); Macaulay suggests instead that ‘on all such subjects the state of the market is the detective test’ (p.113), whereby people should be ‘left to make their own choice between the rival systems of education’ (p.116). Describing those in receipts of stipends as ‘being bribed by us to learn what they have no desire to know’ (p.116) and, relatedly, talks about the realisation ‘of profits of twenty per cent on its outlay’ from the sale of English books (p.114), contrasting this with the burden on the public purse of those in receipt of stipends for ‘education ... so utterly useless to them’ (p.117).

However, despite the differences between the Orientalists and Anglicists, they were in accord on two fundamental points, as Macaulay points out in his Minute. Both agreed on ‘the intrinsic superiority of the Western literature’ (Sharp, 1920, p.109), and both agreed that, given the size of the population, it was ‘impossible for us, with our limited means, to attempt to educate the body of the people’ (p.116). In effect, this meant a bias towards educating the ‘influential classes’ or ‘learned natives’ as the 1813 Charter Act set out. Both these differences and the fundamentals on which they were in accord, had at their core concerns with security (political as well as economic), legitimacy of rule and relatedly, the management of the population which began to emerge as an area of
interest in Europe from around the eighteenth century. That is to say, the management of the population in such a way so as to bring about this political, economic security and, for the colonial ruler, legitimacy of rule.

It was during the eighteenth century when issues of security took on an increasing importance in England and Europe more broadly. These issues were in relation to the legitimacy of rule between ruler and the ruled and the ways in which this rule could be secured and consolidated which defined and affected the form and practice of government - from one of imposition (through law) to one whereby the population, or sections of it, was managed through control, constraint, regulation or direction (Olssen, 2006) - in other words, by degrees of freedom. As previously noted (Chapter One), government for Foucault, and as deployed in this thesis, constitutes of activity aimed to steer, or shape the conduct of individuals or communities – in other words, management of the population and individuals within it. It is the fine balancing act or interplay between concerns of security (which can be made fragile by too little government) and population and the degrees of freedom of individuals within it (which can be endangered by excessive government) which can vary at different points in time, that provides an illustration of this art of government (Olssen, 2006). What can be evidenced in this art of government, here under the emerging liberal forms of rule (and in subsequent chapters under advanced liberal/neoliberal rule - see in particular, Chapters Four - Eight) is the ‘relationship between government and the governed in which individuals are identified as, on the one hand, the object and target of governmental action and, on the other hand, as in some sense the necessary (voluntary) partner or accomplice of government’ (Burchell in Olssen 2006, p.221).

All this is captured in Macaulay’s reference to the concerns of the Orientalists’ in wanting ‘...to secure the co-operation of the native public, and that we can do this only by teaching Sanscrit [sic] ... and Arabic’ (Sharp, 1920, p.112). This is also evidenced by the fact Hastings and his officers sought to maintain cordial relations with ‘influential members’ of the local Hindu and Muslim communities, following in the footsteps of India’s earlier rulers in upholding their traditions of supporting indigenous centres of
learning (Nurullah and Naik, 1943) - doing so entailed, as already known, paying stipends (or ‘bribes’ in Macaulay’s language) to pupils to enable them to attend. Thus, the Orientalists at that time were guided by religious traditions and pre-existing practices, which they were still trying to understand in order to be able to govern. To do otherwise, ‘too little’ or, worse, interfering, would have made the Company government’s very fragile early rule in India ever more precarious.

Macaulay’s critique of what he considers ‘excessive government’ on the part of the Orientalists, are equally about security concerns - economic and political. Framed this time in defence or respect of the liberty/freedom of the individual and seeking to create the necessary (market) conditions under which individuals can pursue their interests and exercise their liberties (choice) is the means by which the company government’s security and legitimacy of rule can now best be secured, as evidenced by Macaulay invoking the notion of ‘choice between the rival systems of education’ (Sharp, 1920, p.116) for which ‘the market is the detective test’ (p.113). (This point is covered in greater detail below). In this sense, as with the Orientalists, to govern effectively or prudently and legitimately, is to respect the liberty/freedom (and aspirations) of the governed. An attempt, as it were, at reconciling the practices of freedom with the exercise of government (Burchell in Olssen, Codd and O’Neill, 2004).

Continuing in this vein, Macaulay states his preference ‘to give larger encouragement to the Hindoo College at Calcutta’ (Sharp, 1920, p.116-117) and relatedly, his wish:

> to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern, - a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population (p.116).

Above, attention was drawn to the ways in which individuals can simultaneously be identified as ‘the target of governmental action’ on the one hand and the ‘partner or accomplice of government’ in another (Burchell in Olssen 2006, p.221) and the Hindoo College, and in particular one of its co-founders, Ram Mohan Roy, is helpful in illustrating
this. This focus shows how the EIC government, its officials and individual officers/administrators, through their interactions and alliance-seeking efforts with 'influential classes' / 'learned natives' (as outlined above), were able to enlist the Hindoo College and one of its co-founders, Ram Mohan Roy and his followers, to function as a centre of other forms of government rule (Dean, 2010).

Although Macaulay had the support of most of the merchants and mercantile officers in Calcutta in the push for English language and Western education (Stokes, 1959), it needs to be said 'the impulse behind the educational changes did not flow from the calculations of British policy makers alone' (Basu, 1982, p.7). The most effective and vocal advocates of Western education proved to be indigenous (Kopf, 1979) who realised that knowledge of the English language not only facilitated their interactions and dealings with the company merchants but also opened up possibilities of employment with the company or other private agency houses which fuelled its popularity (Basu, 1982). Its most staunch advocate was Raja Ram Mohan Roy, co-founder of the Hindoo College; vocal in his opposition to the proposed establishment of a Sanskrit College in Calcutta in a letter to William Pitt, Lord Amherst in 1823 (see Sharp, 1920, pp.99-101); and 'in practice ... a convinced Anglicist, and a reformer only less drastic than Bentinck himself' (Spear, 1938, p.94).

THE HINDOO COLLEGE and RAM MOHAN ROY

The Hindoo College (latter day Presidency College in the University of Calcutta), described as 'the only Western-styled institution of higher learning to be found anywhere in what is presently known as the third world' (Kopf, 1979, p.42), was established in Calcutta in 1817. For Howell (in Ghosh, 1995, p.20) ‘the foundation of this college marks an important era in the history of education in India, the first spontaneous desire manifested by the natives in the country for instruction in English and the literature of Europe’.

9 University status was conferred on Presidency College on 7th July of 2010 – see the Presidency University website <https://www.presiuniv.ac.in/web/presidency_history.php>, accessed 13/05/18.
The university’s website notes that the college ‘...aimed from the beginning at a liberal, scientific and secular education, stood on the side of the ‘Anglicists’ in the famous Anglicist-Orientalist debate’ and ‘...for modern, western [sic] education in the English medium.’ Its establishment marked the beginning of English HE in India and, according to the Presidency College’s (1955, p.2) account of the history of the college, its ‘most striking feature ... was its determined effort to impart secular education’ and a cultivation of European science and literature.

The college catered almost exclusively for the ‘respectable classes of Hindus’ or ‘wealthy Baboos’ (p.11). Though an education fund was created to assist with meeting the costs of tuition fees, only a handful of students received free tuition, the remainder had to pay fees with the practice of free tuition being abandoned altogether shortly thereafter (Presidency College, 1955, p.2). ‘The foundation of the Hindu College was ... an experiment not merely in transplanting European culture but also in ‘native’ management...’ (p.2).

As in the presidency towns of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras where the prosperous in collaboration with European officials and businessmen set up English schools, the establishment of the HC was a collaborative effort involving officials from the EIC, businessmen and wealthy citizens of Calcutta such as businessman and watchmaker David Hare, Sir Edward Hyde East (Chief Justice of Bengal, 1813-23; and MP); Sir Edward Ryan (Chief Justice of Bengal, ND); and Ram Mohan Roy among others.

Born in British ruled Bengal, Ram Mohan Roy, came from a wealthy orthodox Brahmin family and was a product of the Oriental policy of learning. He initially worked as a translator and broker for various British officers, before eventually working for several years as a Dewan (a revenue collector) for John Digby, an EIC official at Rungpur, in Bengal (Spear, 1938). Ram Mohan Roy reportedly made his fortune through money lending, managing his estates and speculating in British EIC bonds.11

10 https://www.presiuniv.ac.in/web/presidency_history.php, accessed 13/05/18.
It was through John Digby, that Ram Mohan Roy learnt English and was introduced to Western culture and literature (Wilson, 2016); aided in part also by the growing printing and publishing efforts in providing translations of Western textbooks, ideas and thinking prevalent at the time in a number of Indian languages (Kopf, 1979). This exposure to Western ideas, culture and literature went hand in hand with the critical questioning of his own religion (Hinduism) leading him to subsequently denounce Hinduism in its traditional form, and the caste system with its inherent divisions and stratifications.12

Ram Mohan Roy went on to form the Brahmo Samaj (Society of Brahma),13 a Hindu reformist sect whose members such as Dwarkanath Tagore - co-founder of the Carr Tagore Company with the Englishman William Carr and ‘the first high-caste Hindu to enter business’ (Tripathi 1971, p.62) - who, like Ram Mohan Roy, were receptive to Western ideas and values which they considered to be more progressive and beneficial to India. Known as the Bhadralok (gentlefolk), they served as intermediaries and agents or brokers to the British. In Bengal, they were drawn from members of the upper castes who came to monopolise virtually all the opportunities provided by colonial rule such as the service-related professions and the private professions (Ray in Kopf, 1979, p.87) and were staunch in their conviction that entrepreneurship and capitalism alone could solve India’s socio-economic problems (Kopf, 1979). Recall, it was exposure to Western ideas, secular education and the establishment of social reform societies such as the Brahmo Samaj in Bengal, among other factors, that Tripathi (1971) attributed to the entry of non-commercial/non-trading castes, specifically the Brahmans - exemplified in Dwarkanath Tagore - into business with the agency houses established in Calcutta in Bengal in the 1830s (and shortly thereafter in western parts of India).

13 Others refer to the Brahmo Samaj as the ‘Divine Society’ (see Bayly, 2008).
As Kopf (1979, p.89) points out,

the bhadralok were ... a distinctively new social grouping in India ... composed of an elite... The class was urban, nor rural; it was literate and sophisticated; its status was founded more on wealth than on caste; it was a professional, not a literati group; it was receptive to new knowledge, ideas, and values; it absorbed new attitudes and its intellectuals created a syncretic cultural tradition; and perhaps most important, it mentally transcended kin and caste and thought in broader social terms.

It is through the ‘practices of the self’ (Dean, 2010) - evidenced here by Ram Mohan Roy’s critical questioning of the practices in relation to Hindu religion and the associated tradition of learning, aided and enabled by the exposure to Western ideas, literature and values - and the resulting self-transformation (Ram Mohan Roy’s denunciation of Hinduism in its traditional form and the caste system) that we can begin to see how these ‘practices of the self’ fall in line and work in tandem with the ‘practices of government’ (Dean, 2010). It is through these combined practices and techniques that ‘unorthodox alliances’ (Roy, 2012) described earlier were enabled and how such practices came to be a factor in breaking the ‘backbone of occupational immobility’ (Tripathi, 1971, p.63).

To repeat an earlier point, English was not imposed (Basu, 1989), rather it played to the wishes/desires of individuals such as Ram Mohan Roy, members of the Brahmo Samaj and others that were to follow. This appeal or inducement was presented in Macaulay’s Minute as a choice ‘between rival systems of education’ enabled through a comparison of the individual’s present - what the indigenous Indians had or achieved in relation to education, as articulated by the Anglicists: ‘false religions’, ‘priest craft’, ‘ignorance and misery’ - with the promise or inducement of an imagined or potential alternative and what they could/should be/have/achieve (Miller and Rose, 2008) - the West’s ‘superior lights’ and a ‘regeneration of Hindu society’, all encapsulated in the notion of freedom or liberty.

Hunter (1996, p.159) makes the observation that ‘freedom becomes a characteristic of individual action only after conduct has undergone moral problematization’, along lines
reflected here. It was through an initial problematisation (of Indigenous traditions of learning) as articulated by the missionaries, through dissemination of Western ideas and values in the Indian languages, and by officers of the EIC, as represented by members of the Clapham Sect (above), that the subsequent problematisation of individual conduct (such as those on the part of Ram Mohan Roy, the members of the Brahmo Samaj) vis-à-vis those very early indigenous traditions of learning of which they were a product and from which they sought liberation, was enabled and made possible. That is to say, it is in the simultaneous identification of individuals as ‘the target of governmental action’ on the one hand and the ‘partner or accomplice of government’ on the other (Burchell in Olssen 2006, p.221), as evidenced here in the shape and form of ‘the learned natives’, the ‘influential classes’ or ‘wealthy baboos’, as exemplified in Ram Mohan Roy and in the Brahmin businessman Dwarkanath Tagore, that we find Charles Trevelyan’s ‘intelligent and zealous co-operators’ (Basu, 1982, p.6) in legitimating and enabling the EIC’s colonial political rule.

Furthermore, as Dirks (2001) points out, caste, which had been political from the outset, was used here to justify colonial power and rule, thereby assisting in upholding a very particular form of indirect rule. Although inherent in the presentation and enactment of choice (secular Western education over the indigenous tradition) was the resulting transformation of and severance with the traditional forms of social organisation or communal obligations which originally defined it, those other pre-existing systems of rule were not displaced by colonial rule. Rather, as Dirks (2001) asserts, they came to co-exist. Bearing in mind that inherent in the Hindu caste system there exists a form of both pastoral and disciplinary power where on the one hand, the Brahmin in his role and capacity as priest provided both moral authority and pastoral guidance; and, on the other, a traditional educational system which until the early nineteenth century reinforced the occupational structure and divisions within the caste system (Tripathi, 1971), and of which our Bania merchant is a product. Rose (1990), drawing on the works of Weber, talks of how forms of religious association can mould individuals and direct the practical conduct of everyday economic existence. Thus, colonial rule, by privileging the upper caste Brahmins and seeking their advice on customs, gave them primacy and served to legitimate and endorse the hierarchy of the Brahmanical texts (Gupta, 2000), thereby
enabling multiple forms of rule and power to be both exercised and diffused (Dean, 2010). In other words, colonial political rule could only operate ‘on the basis of other, already existing power relations’ (Foucault in Marshall, 1995, p.24).

Additionally, in the Bania merchants then we have the traditional indigenous *Homo economicus* - economic man or man of exchange – and, on the other, the Brahmins, the aspiring wannabes and indigenous *Homo economicus* in the making, both a product of education, traditional and modern respectively and accompanying forms of disciplinary and pastoral power.

Bentinck’s ‘*entire concurrence to the sentiments expressed in this Minute*’ (Sharp, 1920, p.117) in effect marked the beginning of the use of English as the official language and constitutes a second important landmark of education policy in India; thereafter, all funds for education made available to the GCPI were channelled towards English education (Basu, 1982) and an increasing emphasis on ‘useful knowledge’ and ‘useful learning’ (Spear, 1938) with a view to fulfilling the EIC government’s economic - and primary - objectives. One objective, as noted earlier in this chapter, was in relation to trade, the EIC’s raison d’etre and primary objective, for which English was found to be useful (Basu, 1982; Spear, 1938). Another important economic consideration behind the introduction of the English language was as part of a remedial measure against the high pay of English officers and formed part of a larger efficiency drive in keeping administrative costs low. One cost-cutting measure was by employing Indians in subordinate positions in the judicial and revenue branches for which knowledge of the English language was needed (Basu, 1982; Spear, 1938) all of which was shortly to be realised.

In 1837, the English language replaced Persian as the official language as well as in the courts of law. This was followed by a subsequent announcement in 1844, that those who had received an English education would get preference in all government appointments. Thus, English provided the means of entry to the professions and government service which served to seal the popularity of the English language (Basu, 1982). Implicit in this
was the promotion of HE learning for the sole purpose of employment and material gain rather than for its intrinsic value, thereby constituting a decided shift from its traditional form (Basu, 1989). Indeed, as Spear (1938, p.94) shows, the demand for English language was more for its 'utilitarian rather than for its cultural value ... chiefly, however, it is to be feared, with a view to their better qualification for employment in the mercantile offices'.

As already noted, the intention on the part of either the Orientalists or the Anglicists had never been to educate the masses. What Macaulay had envisioned was the creation of a class who would ultimately be conveyors of 'knowledge to the great mass of the population' (Sharp, 1920, p.116). This subsequently came to be the policy advocated by the GG Lord Auckland in 1839 whereby the focus continued on the education of the upper classes 'who have leisure for study and whose culture would then filter down to the masses' (Basu, 1982, p.9). However, this did not prove to be the case, as Das (2000) signals in the opening quote of this chapter. Partly because, as already noted, traditional Indian Hindu society was hierarchical and differentiated, where education was the privilege of the upper castes; and relatedly, the prevailing tendencies were to regard knowledge as sacred (Basu, 1982). Furthermore, Basu explains that the practice and tradition of orally communicating religious and other texts further restricted literacy rates which in turn served to widen the already significant gap in terms of access. Thus, it was predominantly the upper castes who availed themselves of Western education and benefited from it the most, followed by the Parsis, Jews and Jains (Basu, 1982).

Additionally, these upper castes also came to take up the opportunities of access to Western education rejected by the Muslim elites in India, who, unsuccessfully, sought to retain their traditional forms of learning and power. Their increasing political and economic marginalisation and accompanying educational disadvantage was ultimately to contribute to the formation of Pakistan14 (Altbach, 1989). In short, the almost exclusive focus on the urbanised upper castes and the professional middle classes came at the expense of the masses (Basu, 1982).

---

14 At the time of India’s partition along religious (Hindu/Muslim) lines, current day Pakistan and Bangladesh were one country.
It was not until around the time of the renewal of the EIC Charter (in 1853) that calls began to emerge for the establishment of universities in India and in 1857 the Universities of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay were established based on the model of University of London which at that time primarily examined and conferred degrees to affiliated colleges (Basu, 1982).

The idea of an examining university was favoured by Dr F.J. Mouat, then Secretary to the Council of Education, as it ‘would meet the difficulty of devising a suitable examination for entry into government service and provide a superior type of public servant’ (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1972, p.19). Though modelled on the University of London, these universities - supported by government funds - were at the outset premised on considerable control and regulation being maintained by the government in India than the English counterpart on which they were modelled as Rudolph and Rudolph (1972) highlight in relation to an independent academic senate. Not wishing to ‘introduce a body apart from and independent of the government’, led the Board of Directors at the EIC to recommend instead that ‘a majority of the senate be for the present at least appointed by Govt..’ (p.17). Based on this model, teaching took place in the affiliated colleges while the universities essentially functioned as examining bodies, determining and controlling the curriculum - which catered largely to the administrative needs of the government in India at the time as well as to the emerging professions, particularly law, where employment prospects were high. In essence, what this structure enabled was the centralised control over the colleges (Altbach, 2009).

Strict controls were likewise maintained on staff and students, leading some to describe the academic professions in universities in the colonial period as having a ‘culture of subordination’ (Gilbert in Altbach, 1989) but to do otherwise was considered educationally unwise and thought to be fraught with political perils (Basu, 1989). This is also reflected in the fact that during this period, unlike their British counterparts, universities (and many colleges) in India were government established and government funded (Basu, 1989; Rudolph and Rudolph, 1972). These political apprehensions on the part of the colonial ruler were ultimately justified; as Altbach (1989) points out, Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) in colonial contexts were almost inevitably sources of
political agitation and from where future national political leaders were to emerge. India was to prove no exception.

Many of the above and related features of India’s colonial education system persist even after her independence in 1947, leading Basu (1989, p.179) to make the observation, ‘a century after their foundation … Indian universities have not been able to extricate themselves from their own brief history’ (see also my concluding remarks and reflections in Chapter Nine).

CONTEMPORARY IMPLICATIONS

The popularity of English after India’s independence continued unabated, surpassing that under colonial rule (Basu, 1989). Though Gandhi considered the English language to be ‘among the many evils of foreign rule … [and argued] … The sooner, therefore, educated India shakes itself free from the hypnotic spell of the foreign medium, the better it would be for them and the people ’ (p.175); he, like other nationalist leaders such as Jawaharlal Nehru, spoke and wrote in English as well as in their own language, for, as Guha (2008, p.762) points out, in terms of outreach beyond individual regions, ‘its use was indispensable. Thus a pan-Indian, anti-British consciousness was created, in good part by thinkers and activists writing in the English language’.

When, after Jawaharlal Nehru’s death, renewed efforts were made to replace the English language with Hindi, strong opposition from the non-Hindi speaking states in southern India, particularly Tamil Nadu, amid claims of ‘Hindi imperialism’ by their northern counterparts led to the decision being revoked within a fortnight of it having been made (Guha, 2008) - see also Chapter Nine. The appropriation of Western education and the English language by the upper castes under colonial rule, at the expense of the masses, awarded it the status of language of the elites, symbolising power, prestige and social progress or advancement (Guha, 2008).
As Gopal (in Guha, 2008, p. 764) observes,

*That knowledge of English is the passport for employment at higher levels in all fields, is the unavoidable avenue to status and wealth and is mandatory to all those planning to migrate abroad, has meant a tremendous enthusiasm since independence to study it.*

Jawaharlal Nehru wanted to retain the English language not only because he believed it would help in the country’s unification, along lines noted above, but also in terms of what it had to offer in relation to scientific and technological advancement. However, as Guha (2008, p. 764) elucidates, ‘largely unanticipated has been its role in fuelling economic growth. For behind the spectacular rise of the software industry lies the proficiency of Indian engineers in English’.

As Chapter Four will demonstrate, this decision to retain English as one of the country’s official language and the language of instruction in HE - especially in the sciences and at the postgraduate level (Altbach, 1989) - serves to lend India a distinct advantage in terms of the global employability of its workforce, evidenced most particularly in relation to India’s IT sector (Kapur, 2002). And as Roy (2012, p. 220) asserts, ‘it is hard to explain the second kind of... [global] ... flow without the first, colonial, kind’. It is in this respect that Altbach’s (1989) singling out of the English language as being ‘one of the most important legacies of the British academic and intellectual tradition’ (p. 11) which holds ‘contemporary implications’ (p. 16) and significance comes into play. Likewise, in relation to the mobilities of international students to Western or English-speaking nations - as in the case of Indian students venturing abroad for their education (Chapter Six), or indeed that of expatriates whereby - such ‘large-scale exchange ... [can be] ... a source of considerable Western influence’ (p. 21) within the HE sector, as Altbach underscores. This aspect is illustrated in this study in relation to the business leaders and the Indian diaspora seeking to reform the HE sector in India (see Chapters Five and Six in particular, as well as Chapter Seven).
However, as will be shown in Chapter Seven, not all have access to such forms of social and cultural capital (Fernandes, 2006) and as Basu (1989), highlights, the diversity as well as the geographical size and spread of India means Western influences cannot be said to be uniformly spread across the country. Thus, while English is the medium of instruction in the older universities and affiliated colleges founded during the colonial period, these tend to cater for the wealthy and influential classes, as stated above; those HEIs with Hindi or regional languages as the medium of instruction cater for students from the middle and lower middle-classes (Basu, 1989) - see Chapter Nine. As in the colonial period, the majority of the HEIs institutions continue to function as examining bodies where success in the examinations is viewed as the sole purpose of academia and employment considered the ultimate goal of education (Basu, 1989).

As the above has highlighted, English language instruction was actively sought in the colonial period as it provided a means to employment. The introduction of English education played a key role in producing administrators and professionals needed to govern the country as well as the creation of middle class, as Das (2000) points out. However, as Basu (1989) reminds, the main - and intended - beneficiaries were the wealthy and influential classes who had a vested interest in its continuance; therefore, this link between English language skills and employment prospects continues to retain its significance. What had previously been the Indian Civil Service under British rule became, after independence, the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) and, like its predecessor, retained English language as an entry requirement for employment in the service where many of these middle classes gravitated (Fernandes, 2006). Potter (in Fernandes, 2006) highlights the fact that in the period between 1953 -1983, public sector employment quadrupled from 4.1 million to an estimated 16.2 million from which this middle class benefited. HEIs, likewise, are also significant sources of employment for the middle classes who guard their positions jealously (Altbach, 1993) - or, as Das (2000) suggests, they close ranks (see also Chapter Seven for a greater discussion on this and my concluding remarks - Chapter Nine).
The period shortly after independence to 1989 witnessed a rise in student numbers in HEIs from 174,000 in 28 universities and 695 colleges in 1950 to 3,948,000 students in 144 universities and 6,912 colleges in 1989 – a growth rate of almost 10 percent a year (Nair in Altbach, 1993). This growing demand was fuelled by concerns related to economic security; as degree holders have access to kinds of employment considered more prestigious, the availability of places in colleges and universities takes on a greater significance among the aspiring middle class.

While the focus here has been on the education policy under British rule, this should not detract from the institution building that was undertaken with other foreign assistance and private foundations which are mentioned here briefly. India’s highly prestigious Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) were established with foreign collaboration and assistance (from the USA, the UK, the then USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany), and based on Western models (Agarwal, 2007). The Indian Institutes of Management in Ahmedabad (IIM-A) and Calcutta (IIM-C) were both set up with financial assistance from the Ford Foundation and in close collaboration with the School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in the case of IIM-A; while the IIM-C was additionally assisted by the Harvard Business School. Basu (1989, p.180) points out that beyond this assistance ‘... American advice was rarely sought and seldom accepted’. Though, as Agarwal (2007) observes, over time the practice of having guest faculty in these institutions served not only to introduce new curriculum, but also a new academic culture in Indian HE which became unique to theses elite institutions - see also Chapters Four, Five and Seven.
GENETIC IMPRINTS

Writing in relation to HE in India under colonial rule, Rudolph and Rudolph (1972, p.13) observe that:

*historical traditions and experience create values, culturally defined norms, and modes of behaviour that survive even when original conditions that gave rise to them fade... [that]... function like a genetic imprint, which dictates the further evolution of their institutional arrangement, not with exactitude... but with certain dependability.*

They go on to identify some characteristics which have contributed to the ‘*genetic imprint*’ on Indian HE. The first is the very powerful role the government played from the outset in the creation and government of universities. Another is the preponderance of private management in HE. And finally, that cooperation characterised the relations between private and public sectors of education. Having already described the first of these characteristics above, focus here will be on the last two characteristics by way of concluding this chapter.

The example above of the Hindoo College (latter day Presidency College in the University of Calcutta) again serves as a useful illustration, this time of the permeable nature of the boundaries between public and private and the early public financing of private initiatives in relation to Indian HE. Although, the Hindoo College was a private endeavour and initially privately financed, its establishment was in the first instance enabled by government approval; the subsequent appeal for financial assistance from the government served to bring the government collaboration with the owners of the Hindoo College closer still, thereby reflecting an early blurring of public and private dependency and support as well as a particular form of governance (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1972). This financial collaboration went on to become part of government policy with the adoption of grant-in-aid procedures.
Grant-in-aid refers to a form of financial assistance provided by the government to help cover a deficit/admissible expenditure of recognised college/s without assuming full financial responsibility. In turn, the colleges are required to conform on matters related to examination procedures or the curriculum and are under the control of universities, themselves dependent on the government for their survival (Shah, 1975).

Reflecting practices in nineteenth century England in relation to secondary school education, the directors of the EIC in 1854 decided:

*the most effectual method of providing for the wants of India ... will be to combine from the exertions and liberality of the educated and wealthy natives of India ... We have, therefore, resolved, to adopt in India the system of grants-in-aid which have been carried out in this country ... [England]... with very great success* (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1972, p.15).

This was to have a couple of important consequences. The first was that the grants-in-aid policy in 1854 led to the establishment of a substantial number of private schools which, by the end of that century, went on to become colleges, and this private sector has been important in shaping Indian HE. While a considerable number of educational institutions were established or maintained by philanthropists, others were established by various caste - and sect - communities who sought to preserve or improve their own social status and economic opportunities by way of providing access to modern educational opportunities (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1972, p.21).

Second, these private initiatives were premised on the expectation that government (financial) assistance would be provided when requested or as needed; accompanied by a corresponding expectation on the part of the government that it would have a say in the running of private institutions. Thus, though privately managed, implicit in the grant-in-aid relationships with the private colleges is governmental control over curriculum and faculties that university affiliation entails. But more crucially, what this public-private financial alliance serves to do is to create *'conditions under which private interests may capture public resources for private ends'*(Rudolph and Rudolph, 1972, p.23).
Reflecting these patterns, or ‘genetic imprint’[s] in relation to the grants in aid in India after independence, Carpentier, Chattopadhyay, and Pathak (2011) point out that up until the 1980s, the GoI not only financially supported public HEIs but also assumed responsibilities for some set up by the private sector, thereby bestowing a sense of legitimacy upon these private initiatives.

However, this sense of legitimacy was in a way also extended to those initiatives set up by the private sector without any level of financial support from the GoI, most particularly in relation to professional and technical education where these demand-led private institutions proliferated. As Chapter Four shows in relation to the IT sector, and as Carpentier, Chattopadhyay, and Pathak (2011) highlight, private enterprise played a vital role in the development of this sector which provided significant employment prospects for those graduating with the requisite skills, including proficiency in English - as noted above.

Relatedly, as Carpentier, Chattopadhyay, and Pathak (2011) caution, the growth of private participation in HE has implications for the less privileged groups not least as high fees often accompany private enterprise in HE and these can have the most impact on access for these groups and serve to perpetuate existing inequalities or reproduce further inequalities (Carpentier, 2010) - see also Chapter Seven.

Thus, in a similar manner that the prospect of government employment in colonial India fuelled a demand for English language instruction and led to the mushrooming of private colleges to meet this demand; the IT sector in India following the introduction of economic reforms (Chapter Four), mirrors a similar trend, except this time the employment prospects are to be found not in government or the public sector but predominantly in the private sector.
CONCLUSION

There are ‘genetic imprint[s]’ (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1972) of altogether another sort which have been alluded to above but which need highlighting and drawing attention to here. As the above has shown, the provision of Western education was selective and elitist in terms of the opportunities it offered, but it also served to create indigenous elites who have themselves become part of the global elite (Tikly, 2001) - see Chapters Three, Four and Five. Additionally, Bania merchants, particularly during the interwar years when, having ascertained the profitability of new ventures, shifted from their traditional money lending and banking activities and diversified into the sugar, cement, textiles, construction and chemicals industries, as well as newspapers and publishing; aided in no insignificant way by their ‘liquidity preference’ proclivities (Tripathi and Jumanji, 2007). Some of the largest business houses in contemporary India such as the Birlas, the Goenkas, the Dalmias - whom we encounter in subsequent chapters became established and consolidated during this period (Tripathi, 1971) - see particularly the next chapter and Chapter Five.

The next chapter looks more closely at some of these large business houses after independence and, as signalled earlier, how through their kinship based and family networks, Indian business leaders set about consolidating their presence in the lead-up to and in the aftermath of the country’s independence through the creation of organisations representing trade industry and commerce - in particular, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI).
I was not an admirer of my own class or kind, and yet inevitably I looked to it for leadership in the struggle for India’s salvation; that middle class felt caged and circumscribed and wanted to grow and develop itself. Unable to do so within the framework of British rule, a spirit of revolt grew against this rule, and yet this spirit was not directed against the structure that crushed us. It sought to retain it and control it by displacing the British. These middle classes were too much the product of that structure to challenge it and seek to uproot it.

Jawaharlal Nehru (in Fernandes, 2006, p.19)

“I have felt that we businessmen have got a limited influence; yet it is such an influence as can be of great help if it is correctly utilized”

Ghanshyam Das (G.D.) Birla (in Kochanek, 1971, p.866)

…it is necessary to pay attention to the castes and communities … In a situation where society is highly stratified into caste and sub-caste groups, permitting little mobility between one occupation and another, the history of rise and development of modern business becomes, to a large extent, the history of the activities of members of certain groups…

Gadgil (in Damodaran, 2008, p.6)
INTRODUCTION

In describing the relationship between the sub-caste groups of the Bania caste in the previous chapter, fraternity among their community and the kin-ship based nature of the Bania merchants networks was only briefly alluded to. Here the social and economic aspects of their networks are explored in greater detail to help explain how Indian business leaders set about consolidating their presence in the lead-up to and in the aftermath of the country’s independence through the creation of organisations representing trade industry and commerce - in particular, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI). Connectedly, a brief introduction is also provided to the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM) - the oldest chamber with its historical roots in colonial India - and, post-independence, the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). This focus on networks in this chapter serves firstly, to illustrate the importance of the networks of Indian business leaders of interest to this study; secondly and relatedly, to introduce the two main trade and industry organisations, in particular the FICCI and the CII, because of their significance in relation to Indian HE, as Chapters Five - Seven demonstrate. This chapter also considers the perception of business and its relations with the GoI, most particularly under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s leadership, India’s first Prime Minister after the country’s independence. This is intended with a view to laying the groundwork to show the steady and growing ascendancy of business in the subsequent chapters and thereby the intensification of neoliberal influences and forms of rule (see Chapters Five – Eight).

Scott (1991), drawing on the studies of numerous authors on networks of corporate power, undertakes to describe some of the features of businesses and their formation in certain East Asian contexts which, given the broad geographical scope, are differentiated by historical and cultural variations. Businesses in Japan, for example, prior to the onset of World War II (WW2) are described as operating along family lines and are kinship-based businesses akin to those of traditional wealthy merchant and samurai families. The traditional Chinese family system is similarly shown to have kinship-based business formations and enterprises but unlike its more authoritarian Japanese counterpart, it is more patriarchal in nature; that is to say, all sons potentially stand to inherit a stake in
the family run operations, rather than just one. In this way, each son can assume the role of patriarchal head of their own households and enterprises (Todd in Scott, 1991). In Taiwan, business formations are assisted by personal investments secured through alliances with immediate family members or close family relations, including through marriage, and there is thus an element of reciprocity in the shared business enterprise. These formations are described as sharing similar traits to those of traditional merchants in China (Numazaki, in Scott, 1991).

Business formations in India incorporate elements of the above, being closest perhaps to those of the Chinese and Taiwanese, alongside its own variations. Early accounts of our Bania merchant, encountered in the previous chapter primarily as a broker and a banker, reveal the patriarchal, family-oriented nature of their networks which are underpinned by joint commercial activities, shared investments and profits and which operate as ‘family firms’ (Habib, 1990) as this account from seventeenth century India reveals:

*These brokers are commonly, as it were, chiefs of their families, for whom they hold all the joint property in trust to turn it to account. For that reason those qualified by years and experience are selected so that they may be able to secure benefit to all the kinsmen, being both the depositories and guardians of their goods. Every evening, when they return from business . . . the oldest of the kinsmen assemble at the house of the broker, who renders an account of what he has done during the day, and they hold counsel together as to what should be done in the future. He is especially exhorted to take care of their business, and if possible to defraud rather than be defrauded* (Tavernier in Habib, 1990, p.388).

Birla (2009) contextualises these ‘family firms’ (Habib, 1990) further in order to illustrate the active nature of their networks, the extent of their scope and reach. She asserts that the porous nature of the boundaries between kinship and commerce, as exemplified by our Bania merchants, enabled the formation of extensive networks of both connections and capital. More often than not, this was secured by way of a careful and prudent marriage as well as by lineage and descent, which also usefully served to expand the business activities into new geographical localities. The family firm thus represents relations that are simultaneously made up of immediate family members as well as those of the community or sub-caste group.
As Birla explains:

*the family firm, then, was not simply a discrete institution tied to a single or perhaps a few households. Its successful operation depended upon extensive networks that were as much public in their material import as they were private and personal in their selective construction* (Birla, 2009, p.16).

Of course, such practice, fortified by marriage and kinship, lends itself to perpetuity over successive generations while at the same time safeguarding the unity and control of the family business. This is not to suggest that these family firms all lived harmoniously and ‘happily ever after’, but rather that this social and economic aspect of these networks are an integral feature. This is also indicative of the embedded nature of these practices which are elaborated on in Chapter Five in relation to the business leaders and policy actors of concern to this thesis.

This combination of business and commercial links with those of kinship by and through their networks has proved outstandingly successful for the Bania and the Marwari community in particular. Akin to Useem’s (in Scott, 1991, p.182) corporate decision-makers (see Chapter Five), this prowess and the accompanying proliferation of their enterprises has provided the Bania businesses and the Marwaris in particular with power and influence across the Indian business system as a whole - though this is not to suggest their business connections and operations are limited to India, they are global as subsequent chapters (Five - Eight) show.

**BEGINNINGS**

The first chamber of commerce was formed in 1834 in Calcutta when William Bentinck was still the GG of India, followed shortly thereafter by the port cities and trading centres Bombay and Madras (Mehta, 1944). Writing at the time in his capacity as President of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), Mehta argues that while Indian business had some representation in terms of membership, it was the Europeans who dominated these chambers and, perhaps not surprisingly, it was their interests that prevailed. Their greater experience, organised ways of working and political
connections were considered to have given them an advantage over Indian business, lending these European chambers considerable power and influence and thereby ensuring their opinions and interests shaped and defined economic policy in British India (Mehta, 1944).

It was largely in response to these privileged European interests and the continued marginalisation of indigenous business that the National Chamber of Commerce, the first chamber of commerce consisting of Indian business-leaders, emerged in Calcutta in 1887. Its emergence coincided with the growth of the national independence movement in the country and the formation of the Indian National Congress (INC)\textsuperscript{15} party: ‘This ... is not entirely an accident ... because in the years to come the political movement for self-government was to have its counter-part in the economic movement for the encouragement of Indian enterprise’ (Silver Jubilee Souvenir of the FICCI, 1927-51 cited in Brown, 1962, p.127).

Similar centres were to follow across India and it was from these associations and alliances that the FICCI was to subsequently emerge in 1927. The origins of its formation are relayed in a conversation between two business leaders, Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas and Ghanshyam Das (G.D.) Birla:

\begin{quote}
We felt at that time that Indian commercial opinion did not carry sufficient weight with Government ... In the absence of such a federation, Government more often than not, under the conditions then prevailing, were guided by the opinions of the European commercial bodies voiced through the Associated Chambers of Commerce... (Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas, “My Associations with the Federation,” Silver Jubilee Souvenir, cited in Brown, 1962, p.128).
\end{quote}

The background of these leaders is revealing though by now perhaps less surprising. Purshotamdas Thakurdas was from the Bania community in Gujarat and Bombay’s leading cotton merchant (Damodoran, 2008). G.D Birla, was likewise from the Bania community from Marwar, Rajasthan but settled in Calcutta, and whose business interests

\textsuperscript{15} Frequently referred to simply as Congress.
ranged from jute to cotton, later diversifying into new areas such as paper and sugar. He was:

*managing director of Birla Bros., Ltd., an Indian firm of managing agents ... [with] ... extensive business and industrial connections. He served as president of the Indian Chamber of Commerce, Calcutta, in 1924, and of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry in 1929...* (Birla, 1944, p.126).

Das (2000, p.193) asserts ‘... *the Marwaris achieved their biggest successes in the British trading post of Calcutta. They smelled the chance for big money and they flocked there to become brokers and agents to the British*’.

With these two Bania business leaders at the helm and given the very social and economic nature of their networks, the establishment of such a federation on which the FICCI was conceived and ultimately realised comes as no surprise. The Bania community especially were almost uniquely placed to carry out such an undertaking. Having been the main economic beneficiaries of British colonial rule and under whom they prospered - alongside the Parsis of Bombay (Chapter Two) it was their immense wealth, financial liquidity, as well as the range and scale of their commercial activities, that set them apart from other groups and enabled them to assume this leadership role, particularly in matters related to trade and finance (Markovits, 2008). Furthermore, as indicated above, it was their formidable networks which were key in enabling them to establish an India wide presence, in which factors of family, locality and caste all came to play. As Bayly (2008, p.11) observes, ‘*their social organisation and marriage patterns allowed them an all-India reach*’.

In a similar vein, Markovits (2008, p.206) remarks:

*their ties to the community of merchants from the same region were ‘social’, in particular through the marriage network ... it was a rare occurrence that a merchant who had ‘migrated’ from a specific region had no relationship at all, even a very informal one, to merchants from the same region residing in the same locality... Among Marwari merchants, localities of origin played a particularly important role in nurturing solidarities ... [where] it appears that communal institutions such as ... the dharamshala, or communal hostel, were managed on the basis of specific castes or regions...* (p.209).
Das (2000) provides precisely such an account of the nurturing of such solidarities - as well as enterprising tendencies. Writing about the successes of the Marwaris in Calcutta, Das relates an account by G.D. Birla, co-founder of the FICCI, of apprentices who had migrated there and were provided free lodging at a hostel provided by a fellow Marwari businessman:

*G.D. Birla used to say that this hostel spawned many entrepreneurial careers. At night, the young apprentices would exchange stories of their commercial exploits of the day and draw lessons from them. Some of these stories became legendary. Passed on by word of mouth for generations, it was their version of Harvard Business School cases* (Das, 2000, p.193).

Along with connections of marriage and capital, the functioning of these highly social networks then were occasioned and sustained by ‘*meetingness*’ (Urry, 2003) depending and relying on ‘*….specific co-present encounters*’ (p.155) that became central to their functionality and during which their stories and commercial experiences were shared, exchanged and circulated not just within the immediate group but passed on intergenerationally as Das (2000) suggests, indicative also of the embedded nature of such practices (see Chapter Five). This aspect of sharing and exchanging information among these community members is akin to what Boden (in Urry, 2003, p.167) writing in another context, likens to ‘*a shared understanding of “what’s happening”*’. Places such as the dharamshala, or communal hostel, through word of mouth came to be known over time as ‘*good for networking although it is [sic] ... not known precisely who will be encountered on any specific occasion*’ (Urry, 2003, p.166). Drawn together through their caste and regional networks, there are no real ‘*strangers; only potential members of people’s ever-expanding networks*’ (p.168) serving to produce what Urry calls ‘*network capital*’.

Such encounters were as much about establishing, strengthening and consolidating their networks and commercial undertakings as they were about identifying new opportunities for expansion and devising strategies for attaining them. Against this context, this highly networked community then can be argued to have provided a vital foundation for mobilising business associations and links with a view to establishing the FICCI. (In
Chapter Five, this socially and economically expansionary nature of their networks (Castells, 2000) is considered further in relation to Indian HE).

The financial support provided by wealthy business leaders such as G.D. Birla lent the FICCI considerable weight and political influence, not only by virtue of its close association with the INC, but most especially because of the close friendship between G.D. Birla and Gandhi - a fellow member of the Bania caste and founding father of India’s Independence movement. This friendship was mutually supportive: the annual meetings at FICCI were inaugurated by Gandhi and likewise, the FICCI lent its support to Gandhi’s leadership in political and financial matters (Brown, 1962).

From its conception then, the FICCI served as the indigenous voice of business serving on the one hand to counter that of the British, as represented by the umbrella organisation, the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM), referred to above by Purshotamdas Thakurdas and introduced below; and on the other hand - and more importantly - it sought to fill the anticipated vacuum left by the British on their expected and sought-after departure, towards which the independence movement was advancing. The alignment of the FICCI with the national independence movement provided the FICCI with the means to do so and thereby carve out a future role for indigenous business interests to be represented in the formulation of Indian economic policy (Brown, 1962). Indeed, Gandhi used the notion of ‘trusteeship’ to remind Indian business of their roles and obligations within Indian society and towards national economic development (Balasubramanian in Nayak, Maclean, Harvey and Chia, 2007).

FEDERATION of INDIAN CHAMBERS of COMMERCE and INDUSTRY

Damodaran (2008) in his review of the pictorial account of the FICCI’s history displayed at its headquarters in Delhi, reveals that its past presidents are predominantly from what he describes as traditional mercantile communities. By this he refers to ‘mainstream and
the trading’ communities such as the Banias/Jains from Gujarat, the Marwaris from Rajasthan, and other non-Gujarati Banias/Jains, the Parsis, the Chettiar's, the Lohanas and Bhatias. Damodaran (2008, p.9) describes these groups as having the ability and propensity to ‘nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere’, as illustrated above in relation to the Banias, and the Marwaris in particular.

The FICCI is the largest of the trade associations described here and largely represents older, more traditional, indigenous, family-owned businesses (Kochanek 1996). Initially, membership of the FICCI was restricted to industry/trade associations or chambers of commerce. However, following a change in rules in 1951, individual firms were allowed to join FICCI directly. While this served the original purpose of increasing membership contributions, the real benefit was to the big business houses in that their collective efforts and willingness to finance the FICCI ensured their domination of both leadership and policy-making within the Federation (Kochanek, 1971). In his study, Kochanek shows that just six business houses provide a third of the total FICCI membership and income with one - Birla House - contributing 74 firms as associate members (see Table 2, below), enabled by the managing agency system. The previous chapter described the managing agency system but it is worth recalling here briefly that the system provided considerable power and authority over the companies it managed including in: decision-making powers; share and voting arrangements; control over financial matters; as well as selection powers over the board of directors of company/ies under its management (Brimmer, 1955).

Because of their ability to control votes - partly through their block of associate members or indirectly through their control over various member bodies - these big business houses, such as Birla, were able to control entry into the all-important Executive Committee. The Executive Committee is in essence the power house of the FICCI, in that members of the Executive Committee have a say over both the selection of the President of the FICCI as well its overall organisational policy (Kochanek, 1971).
In describing the recruitment policies of the Federation's presidents since its formation, Kochanek shows this power is concentrated with a small number of people. While traditionally, the selection of the Presidents sought to be representative of different regions of India, Kochanek shows that between the years 1927-1967, 21 business houses provided a total of 32 out of 43 Presidents, during which time ‘the pre-eminent position is monopolized by Birla House which has supplied four presidents since 1927’ (Kochanek, 1971, p. 872). Thus, while the interests of these business houses may converge in certain areas, in others they remain in competition with each other and seek to outbid each other (Kochanek, 1971). Separately, it is worth drawing attention to Brown's (1962) observation that membership of the Executive Committee was not restricted entirely to business leaders, it also included members of the INC.

### Table 2. Distribution of Number of Firms Contributed by Top Six Supporters of FICCI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House</th>
<th>Caste</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No. of Companies</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birla</td>
<td>Marwari (Maheshwari)</td>
<td>Calcutta</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thapar</td>
<td>Hindu (Khatri)</td>
<td>Calcutta</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalan</td>
<td>Marwari (Aggarwal)</td>
<td>Calcutta</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singhania</td>
<td>Marwari (Aggarwal)</td>
<td>Calcutta</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahu Jain</td>
<td>Jain-Bania</td>
<td>Calcutta</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangur</td>
<td>Marwari (Maheshwari)</td>
<td>Calcutta</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>116</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kochanek (1971)

At the time of data collection, another member of the Birla family and a relation to one of the key policy actors in this study, was the immediate past President of the FICCI – see Chapter Five.
Next, I offer a brief introduction to the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM) and the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) before moving on to describe business government relations during this time.

ASSOCIATED CHAMBERS of COMMERCE and INDUSTRY of INDIA

The Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM) has its origins in colonial India representing British interests, commerce and trade, as noted by Purshotamdas Thakurdas above, making it the oldest chamber of commerce of the three business associations described here (see also Kochanek, 1995). Following a process of reorganisation in the 1980s, there was greater representation of both foreign multinationals and ‘more managerially oriented Parsi and Gujarati firms of Bombay led by Tatas’ (Kochanek 1987, p.1281). Its annual meetings were inaugurated by a minister, in contrast to the FICCI, whose annual meetings were inaugurated by the Prime Minister of India (see Brown, 1962). But as members of this chambers stress, unlike the FICCI, their interaction is not so much with the government, “we would rather deal in a club, over a glass of whiskey, with senior administrators . . .” (interview cited in Kohli, 1989, p.316). This all-important business interaction with administrators and government advisors is covered in the next chapter.

CONFEDERATION of INDIAN INDUSTRY

The origins of the CII lie in the merger in 1972 between the Indian Engineering Association, a British creation from 1895, and the Engineering Association of India, its indigenous counterpart created in 1942, and named the Association of Indian Engineering Industry (AIEI). After another couple of name changes, it finally emerged as the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) in 1992 (Kochanek, 1996). As well as being the richest membership organisation it is also the youngest of the three private sector associations described here. Some of its defining features include: its proactive approach in developing overseas contacts for the promotion of Indian exports; the creation of functioning and operational bases overseas; a secretariat made up of analysts and the use of data-based studies offering an industry-wide view. It has come to represent
younger managers drawn from newer and less established sectors (and therefore regarded as less elite-dominated, unlike the FICCI) such as electronics, software and computer technology (Kochanek, 1995) and those regions of India underrepresented by FICCI - like the south. Although later it opened its membership to all industries, as late as 1993, its members were still drawn predominantly from the engineering industry (Kochanek, 1996). It has worked at cultivating a close working relationship with bureaucracy – ‘India’s permanent government’ (p.167). (As already signalled, the significance of these relationships is considered in the next chapter).

The CII is generally regarded as a professional, outward looking organisation and has worked at developing links with the economic ministries such as the Ministry of External Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), stressing a joint purpose and objective in relation to economic development. On account of its growing influence, the CII considers itself the ‘junior partner of the government’ (Kochanek, 1996, p.167) thereby earning itself a reputation in turn - from the FICCI and ASSOCHAM (and quite possibly from others) - ‘of being a handmaid and stooge of the government’ (p.167).

PERCEPTION of BUSINESS and GoI - BUSINESS RELATIONS

The business community and their profiteering ways were traditionally held in low esteem (Lamb, 1955); where business and businessmen were ‘considered to be greedy, dishonest, and untrustworthy’ (Kochanek, 1971, p.867); ‘...rapacious exploiters who might be grudgingly tolerated but whose motives and actions are always suspect’ (Kochanek, 1987, p.1281); their characters and practices were likened to those of a crook ‘...who uses his ill-gotten gains to corrupt the public life and to engage in ostentatious displays of wealth in a poor country’ (Kochanek, 1971, p.867).

As noted in the previous chapter, Das (2012a) also attributes this suspicion and distrust in part to the capture of Plassey and the ‘stealing of Bengal’. Business leaders on their part, were very aware of the poor regard in which they were held as this account by one of the FICCI Presidents in 1951 reveals: ‘The fact must be recognized, however unpalatable it may appear to be, that businessmen are now under suspicion everywhere.
We are fast losing good will. This is no doubt sad, but, nevertheless, true.’ (Nalini R. Sarkar, "My Days in the Federation," Silver Jubilee Souvenir, cited in Brown, 1962, p.131).

The approach to counter and alleviate this regard and perception on the part of business leaders affiliated to the various trade, commerce and industry organisations described here, was a blend of caution and the maintaining of friendly relations (by way of contributions) with ministers and civil servants on the one hand, to a more vocal form of lobbying, on the other. The latter led, in 1956, to the establishment of the Forum for Free Enterprise (also known as the ‘Bombay Group’), initiated by the Tatas. The purpose of the ‘Bombay Group’ was to ‘educate public opinion’ on the achievements of the private sector and to both alert the public to and caution against ‘...the dangers of State Capitalism’ in relation to the planned economy and increased regulation against business (Brown, 1962, p.131). Neither the ‘Bombay Group’ nor its activities received much support from the FICCI; nor did the latter raise objections to the GoI’s efforts at central planning or the production of yearly plans (Brown, 1962). Part of this, it would seem was down to simple pragmatism owing to perceived lack of real alternatives to the INC. While the FICCI contributed heavily to the Congress, business leaders were often irritated by Nehru’s frequent reference to free enterprise as a "return to the law of the jungle," with his expressed wish to see the economy controlled ‘for public purpose and not for private profit’ (Brown, 1962, pp.132-133). In the absence of another viable political alternative, the FICCI sought to work with Nehru. A few members of the FICCI did align themselves with a new political party that emerged in 1959, the Swatantra (Sanskrit word meaning self-reliance) Party, which publicly accused the Congress of curtailing the freedom of the individual and called for the abolition of the Planning Commission. The FICCI sought instead to have greater role for the private sector within it and suggested that business leaders be associated with the work of the Planning Commission - an idea welcomed by Prime Minister Nehru (See Brown, 1962).

By and large, though the FICCI’s views were frequently sought by the GoI on a range of themes including on sounding out on matters of yet-to-be decided policy, with ministers frequently invited to FICCI headquarters for informal discussions and briefings, the FICCI,
in terms of its ability to influence outcomes, is thought to have had little effect during this time (Brown, 1962). Despite this, business groups remained active in promoting their interests. Concerns and criticisms of government's annual plans were tempered with recommendations for legislation that strengthened and safeguarded enterprise and economic freedom. Thus, while the FICCI at its annual session in 1961 welcomed the Third Five Year Plan, it went on to urge the government to ‘view management and entrepreneurial ability as a key economic resource that requires to be released and fostered through incentives so as to make possible any successful widespread capital investment for productive activity’ (The Federation resolution is in Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Session, cited in Brown 1962, pp.141-142).

Under Nehru’s premiership, there is a discernible shift away from the previous *laissez-faire* form of government to a more interventionist role, as evidenced in the shape of the Planning Commission, the accompanying yearly and five yearly plans, as well as the increased regulation against business, which was sufficient to cause the agitation among business leaders to create the ‘Bombay Group’ in order to ‘educate public opinion’ on the contributions of the private sector (Brown, 1962, p.131).

This shift signalled the acknowledgement in Europe at the time that the faith in the notion of the naturalness of a self-regulating order of society, or of self-interested individuals always operating in the public interest, or indeed, even of their ability to deal with the consequences of their actions, was perhaps misplaced. Rather, what was required was a greater, more active and ‘positive’ role for the state in social and economic provision and aimed at ‘civilizing rather than abolishing capitalism’ (Olssen, Codd and O’Neill, 2004, p.129).

This shift in economic and political thinking which entailed a move towards a re-envisioned and visibly enhanced role for the state from its *laissez-faire* predecessor is largely attributable to John Maynard Keynes, whose views on economic management came into prominence and served as official policy guidance around the beginning of the twentieth century (Olssen, Codd and O’Neill, 2004). Forms of intervention under this
re-envisioned and ‘positive’ role of the state also included cooperation with other
governments and international agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank (WB) - see next chapter. Keynes’ guiding principle, like those of
similarly-minded social democratic or welfare state liberals was: ‘*The important thing for
government is not to do things which individuals are doing already, or to do them a little
better or a little worse, but to do those things which at present are not being done at all.*’
(Keynes in Olssen, Codd and O’Neill, 2004, p.123) and which included guaranteeing a
minimum standard of living and education for all (Chapter Two).

Thus, against the context of Nehru’s warnings against a ‘*return to the law of the jungle*’
- by which is meant the unchecked and unconstrained individual economic activity and
applied here in relation to business and free enterprise - and despite the mistrust of
indigenous business prevalent at the time, there remained a close and on-going
engagement between the GoI and business. The welcomed participation (by Nehru) of
the FICCI in the Planning Commission, and the soliciting of the FICCI’s views on policy on
the part of the GoI, are indicative of this. What can be discerned under Nehru’s
premiership are attempts at reigning in and restraining - ‘*civilising*’ - indigenous capital
and to temper its excesses not ‘*abolishing*’ or alienating it. That is to say, to regulate
indigenous capital and address its shortcomings or find the means to correct its failures
but simultaneously, to situate their concerns within the wider and broader social context
of societal needs, where matters of poverty, concerns about livelihoods, food, shelter,
education, and health of the all-important masses – and on whose vital support India’s
freedom movement had been won – competed and rivalled with those of free enterprise
in India.

Still, it is important to bear in mind that inherent in these attempts at seeking greater
equality and parity, the intended effect was to create the enabling and positive conditions
for the functioning of as many as possible in India’s economy, including enabling means
by which to provide a minimum standard of living and education for all (Olssen, Codd
Interest groups, as exemplified by the trade, commerce and industry organisations here, provided a process, the means by which, through their membership, they could advance their cause, voice their concerns, air their grievances, raise their objections, shape or perhaps even lend their support to ‘on yet to be decided’ economic policy (see next chapter). However, just to be clear, this is not to suggest a mere interest group articulation, it is rather to show that a particular deployment of the notion of ‘trusteeship’ as advocated by Gandhi on the part of business leaders (Balasubramanian in Nayak, Maclean, Harvey and Chia, 2007) in relation to the country’s economic development and growth - and arguably its very survival if it was to secure and retain its political and economic independence - was ever present, but one which at this point required this ‘civilising’ and restraining of indigenous capital against wider societal and more pressing needs.

Moreover, it needs to be stressed that from the outset, inherent in this notion of ‘trusteeship’ was privileged access for the FICCI to the heart of government as well as ‘a moral authority to project policy measures, which, they could claim, were not based solely on a narrowly focused self-interest’ (Tyabji, 2015, p.100). Chapter Six in particular shows this notion of ‘trusteeship’ and custodianship deployed to incentivise and encourage business leaders - including diasporic business leaders - to invest in the Indian HE sector (among others) and act in the interests of India - ‘for India’ and ‘the Motherland’ - thereby bestowing on and lending their business ventures and endeavours in relation to Indian HE an on-going or continuous legitimacy and moral authority.

Brown (1962) makes an important observation in relation to India’s bureaucracy in terms of policy implementation and business. In his article, Brown asserts, and as the above signals, that Nehru, was ‘a life-long advocate of socialism, the supreme architect of the Five Year Plans and an implacable critic of capitalism - though willing to accord it a place within the planned economy’ (p.142) whose persona and charisma defined and dominated the political scene in India following its independence. In light of their own poor reputation, Brown adds, business leaders stood little chance against such a formidable and charismatic adversary. The very poor image of business was at its peak
during Nehru’s leadership when the state was placed at the ‘commanding heights of the economy’ and Nehru ‘the Brahmin ... and ... socialist’ was at its helm (Das, 2012b, p.82). However, as Brown (1962) observes, the responsibility of implementing policy was largely devolved to bureaucrats in the various ministries, staffed by trained economists, advisors and administrators, with whom business leaders were now interacting and with whom they were to find ‘common ground’, as the next chapter illustrates.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has focused on the networks of the Indian Bania merchants, showing the social, economic and kinship ties that constitute their networks and how these have assisted in the creation of trade bodies such as the FICCI and consolidated their presence in independent India. By way of introduction to some key businesses that feature later in the empirical chapters (Five - Eight) and their representation on trade, commerce and industry organisations, a brief overview of the ASSOCHOM and CII was also provided.

This chapter has also shown the characteristic feature of business and the private sector in India to be family-oriented and controlled where family, caste, religion and region each have a part to play in the fostering and development of businesses and business relations.

Further, it has revealed these business houses to be overwhelmingly represented by the traditional trading communities of India such as the Bania/Jains; the Marwaris, Gujaratis, and the Parsis who constitute India’s business elite (Kochanek, 1987) - some of whom are considered in greater detail in Chapters Five and Seven. Though these big businesses are now being joined, albeit in a smaller way comparatively speaking, by what Damodaran (2008) refers to as India’s New Capitalists (see next chapter and Chapter Five), these traditional mercantile business houses continue to dominate India’s business community (Kochanek, 1971, 1987)- see Chapter Seven.
Separately, this chapter has described the continuing poor regard for the business community and provided an overview of the relationship between GoI and business under Jawaharlal Nehru's leadership one which is characterised as *'civilizing rather than abolishing'* (Olssen, Codd and O'Neill, 2004) indigenous capital. This perception of business and its relationship to the GoI serves by way of contrast to the vastly improved and praise-worthy image, shown chiefly in Chapters Five and Six but introduced in the next chapter, revealing the growing importance and ascendancy of business and their ever-closer moves to the governing structure in relation to Indian HE.

The next chapter presents the introduction of economic reforms in India under the leadership of Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, and to a greater extent her son, Rahul Gandhi. It describes some of the defining features of these reforms as well as some of their effects and considers Brown’s (1962) observation above regarding the *'common ground'* between business, government advisors and administrators in relation to those economic reforms.
CHAPTER FOUR

NEOLIBERAL INDIA

‘India’s IT minister, Pramod Mahajan, once quipped that India is a leader in “IT and beauty contests, the two areas that the government has stayed out of.”’
Kapur (2002, p.94)

In both India and abroad the software industry is commonly acknowledged as the ‘poster boy’ of the reforms ... To explain the rise of the software sector one must invoke factors both proximate and distant ... Some credit is certainly due to the reforms of 1991, which opened up the foreign market for the first time. But some credit must also be taken by Rajiv Gandhi’s government, which gave special emphasis to the then very nascent electronics and telecommunications industries. Moving back a decade further, the Janata government’s expulsion of IBM allowed the development of an indigenous computer manufacturing and maintenance industry. But perhaps the story should really begin with Jawaharlal Nehru’s government, which had the foresight to set up a chain of high-quality engineering schools, and the wisdom to retain English as the language of higher education and ... international communication. For, as one respected analyst of the IT sector comments, ‘India’s greatest asset is a large, educated, English speaking workforce that is willing to work at relatively low wages’. This is a delicious irony: that this showpiece of market liberalization was made possible by a man committed to a state-sponsored path of economic development.
Guha (2008, pp.696-698)

The middle class of today is qualitatively different from the old middle class that I wrote about in India Unbound. That consisted mainly of civil servants who lived in government housing and sent their children to government schools. Its heroes were Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Today’s new middle class is a creature of the economic reforms and is connected to rapid growth in the private sector. Its heroes are business captains. Its success is celebrated in Bollywood movies and on more than 400 television channels in different Indian languages.
Das (2012b, p.93)
INTRODUCTION

This chapter briefly describes the introduction of economic reforms in India. It concerns itself chiefly with the economic reforms undertaken under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi,\textsuperscript{16} which shared some commonalities with those of his mother, Indira Gandhi, (following her re-election in 1980)\textsuperscript{17} and provided the foundation upon which to build, as well as some significant departures. Additionally, it covers aspects of the period up to and a little beyond the leadership of P. V. Narasimha Rao\textsuperscript{18} of the same Congress (I) Party when economic reforms started in earnest and against the context of which the policy document central to this thesis, was to subsequently emerge (see Chapter Five). This is largely intended to help contextualise and provide essential scene setting for the second half of the chapter where government and business relations are explored with a particular focus on small and medium businesses, and from which the Information IT sector was to emerge. Finally, it considers Brown’s (1962) observation noted in the previous chapter regarding the ‘common ground’ between business, government advisors and administrators in relation to these economic reforms. This serves to pave the way for the empirical and central chapters of this thesis (Five - Eight).

Again, it needs to be stressed that this historical chapter as with the previous two, seeks only to provide a contextual overview of aspects and elements that have a direct bearing on this study; it cannot, for reasons of space, focus and relevance, provide an in-depth description and analysis of all the changes that took place during this timeframe. The most substantial part of the analysis is presented towards the end of the chapter.

\textsuperscript{16} Rajiv Gandhi, son of Indira Gandhi, took up the mantle of premiership after the assassination of his mother, and served as Prime Minister of the Congress led government from 1984 - 1989. He was assassinated in 1991. 
\textsuperscript{https://www.britannica.com/biography/Rajiv-Gandhi}

\textsuperscript{17} Indira Gandhi – the only child of Jawaharlal Nehru - served as Prime Minister of the Congress led government for three consecutive terms (1966 -1977) and a fourth term from 1980 until her assassination in 1984. 
\textsuperscript{https://www.britannica.com/biography/Indira-Gandhi}

\textsuperscript{18} Following Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination, Narasimha Rao served as Prime Minister for the minority led Congress Party from 1991 - 1996. Narasimha Rao is also known as the “Father of Indian Economic Reforms”. 
\textsuperscript{https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/former_pm/shri-p-v-narasimha-rao-2/}
WHEN DID REFORMS BEGIN?

Brenner, Peck, Theodore (2010, p.184) emphasize the uneven character of neoliberalism arguing that since their initial emergence in the 1970s, neoliberal regulatory experiments ‘have unfolded in a sporadic yet wave like nonlinear sequence, generating important cumulative impacts ... or patternings.’ Such ‘cumulative impacts and patternings’ can certainly be discerned within the Indian context, with Denoon (1998), identifying three such economic liberalisation ‘episodes’ in India; the first of which was between the years 1966 - 1968, under the leadership of Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi.19 Added to this could be another ‘episode’ attributed to Indira Gandhi when she returned to power in 1980 after India’s state of emergency (1975 - 1977), but which went ‘relatively unnoticed’ (Kohli, 1989, p.308), reasons for which are elaborated on below. The second ‘episode’ identified by Denoon followed in 1985 - 1987 under the leadership of her son, Rajiv Gandhi, where the reforms are described as ‘broader in scope and more significant than those attempted by his mother nineteen years earlier’ (Denoon, 1998, p.51); and finally, the 1991 - 1994 ‘episode’ under the leadership of P. V. Narasimha Rao of the same political party, ‘who ultimately took economic liberalization further than any prior prime minister’ (p.55).

Akin to Brenner Peck, Theodore’s (2010) characterisation, this episodic and evolving nature of the liberalisation of India’s economy is sometimes attributed as following ‘a somewhat jagged path’ (Denoon, 1998, p.55); operating ‘in fits and starts since 1980’ with ‘...the spurt in liberalisation during 1985 - 87’, followed by ‘the comparatively slow, halting and half-hearted character of liberalisation’ (Sridharan, 1993, p.1); with ‘two steps forward and one step backward, and back to muddling through.’ (Kohli, 1989, p.311) ‘...until the new and ongoing initiatives of the minority Congress government since July 1991’ (Sridharan, 1993, p.1).

19 Except for the period between March 1977 - January 1980 when the Janata government was in office, Indira Gandhi governed India from 1966 - 1984, when after her assassination, her son, Rajiv Gandhi assumed office (Denoon, 1998).
ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION under INDIRA and RAJIV GANDHI

While both Indira Gandhi (after her re-election in 1980) and her son, Rajiv Gandhi, prioritised economic growth and developed a pro-business approach and strategy to achieve this growth (Kohli, 2006a) where they differed was in scope, as alluded to above, as well as in the degree of visibility and public pronouncements given to the economic liberalisation process. Indira Gandhi, mindful of her credentials and standing with the poor, albeit against the context of her failure to ‘garibi hatao’ (abolish poverty), still retained poverty alleviation and its associated programmes as the main policy framework of her party; undertook popular vote-winning acts such as the nationalisation of banks and pursued anti-monopoly legislation.

Simultaneously, Indira Gandhi downplayed and quietly went about securing alliances with big business and established committees headed by senior administrators and advisors, well regarded by Indian business leaders (see below), to help bring about necessary reforms which laid emphasis on deregulation but which advocated staunch and active governmental support for Indian business and big business in particular (Kohli, 2006a). Some of these pro-business measures included: the dilution of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (the MRTP Act) which had until then served to limit the growth and expansion of big business. Tax relief was provided to enable this growth and expansion accompanied by providing the necessary legal framework to enable Indian business to raise funds directly from the public to finance new investments and expansion (Kohli, 2006a). However, fearing electoral reprisals, Indira Gandhi underplayed these economic changes, and was therefore able to present an image more of continuity, along lines advocated by her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, than change, which explains why her liberalising initiatives (after her re-election in 1980) went ‘relatively unnoticed’, as Kohli (1989) observes.

This approach is in sharp contrast to that of her son, Rajiv Gandhi, a former airline pilot who had never publicly voiced any political ambitions (Denoon, 1998) and who assumed the leadership following the assassination of his mother, albeit under the ‘tutelage’ of his advisors (Kohli, 1989), of whom more later. Rajiv Gandhi publicly announced his priorities by stating his government’s commitment to a new ‘liberal’ beginning entailing:
'judicious combination of deregulation, import liberalization and easier access to foreign technology' (Kohli, 1989, p.312). Equally significant and constituting a second departure from the path taken by his mother Indira Gandhi, was that the budget speech made no reference to the word socialism, which immediately earned the budget and Rajiv Gandhi, the label of 'pro-rich by a pro-rich govt' from opponents, amid demands from within his own party for a renewed commitment to continuity with the past (Kohli, 1989). In effect and practice this meant a slowing down of the liberalising agenda and a publicly voiced renewed commitment to socialism while quietly pushing ahead with reforms which took the form of: offering substantial tax concessions to business as well as the urban upper middle classes; the liberalisation of certain imports; further dilution of the MRTP Act along lines set in motion by his mother, Indira Gandhi, accompanied by substantial relaxation of licensing regulations of domestic business as well as providing them with assurances about future taxation patterns (Kohli, 1989; 2006a).

The middle classes constitute an important group during this period whose growth in the 1980’s was ‘marked by the rapid expansion in numbers of television sets (which rose from about 2 million to 30 million in the 1980s) ’ (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000, p.124), among other goods, and who were considered:

Rajiv Gandhi’s people, at home in a new political climate, happy with the new political jargon, relieved that the Government no longer tries to tax everyone to distraction in the name of the poor, enamoured of a prime minister who understands the importance of colour TV (India Today quoted by Dubey in Corbridge and Harriss, 2000, p.124).

Furthermore, Fernandes (2006, p.131) notes that:

despite historical dependencies on the state ... [here in relation to HE provision and public sector employment illustrated in Chapter Two] ... the middle class has increasingly resorted to privatized strategies designed to gain individual benefits, rather than through organized political pressure on the state...

including in relation to HE which Fernandes argues constitute a 'broader pattern of privatized middle-class strategies designed to gain upward mobility through the acquisition and deployment of various forms of social, cultural, and economic resources' (Fernandes, 2006, p.132) - see also Chapter Seven.
Under Rajiv Gandhi’s leadership the relationship between business and the GoI (and the key advisors), is described as ‘probably never ... closer in India than under the first three years of Rajiv Gandhi [s] ... ‘ leadership and where his economic priorities can be considered ‘primarily as pro-business and only secondarily as pro-market and pro-competition’ (Kohli, 1989, p.318). This can be evidenced by the fact that business at this time while broadly supportive of Rajiv Gandhi’s efforts at liberalizing the economy, were not supportive to the idea of external competition; seeking instead to be domestically insulated, deregulated and strengthened first, thereby determining the pace at which reforms took place. As Kochanek (in Sridharan1993, p.11) points out, ‘Indian business always wants selective liberalisation’. This is similarly evident when the head of the FICCI (cited in Kohli, 1989, p.317) is quoted as saying:

... after three decades of highly protective industrialization, liberalization cannot be taken up simultaneously on all fronts - it has to be phased. The first stage has to be to allow domestic competitiveness. Only then (after a while), we should open up to outside force.

These tactics and sentiments aimed at protecting the interests of indigenous business can be seen to be echoed by senior advisors such as L. K. Jha,20 who reportedly had direct access to Rajiv Gandhi, and was said to have given assurances to business leaders that ‘domestic industry “built up with so much effort and sacrifice,” will not be allowed “to be killed by imports”‘ (cited in Kohli, 1989, p.318). Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi himself proclaimed: ‘Competition within our domestic economy is being fostered. Progressively, we will open our economy to the winds of international competition‘ (cited in Kohli, 1989, p.318).

For this progressive opening up of India’s economy, the GoI deployed a set of strategies entailing a gradual and tentative introduction of import liberalisation, testing the impact and effects on its economy and on business groups generally, and extending or withdrawing its reforming measures as necessary. There emerged therefore a pattern where those attempts aimed at liberalising the economy that sparked opposition or were met with resistance from big business, were deferred; while those that had nominal

20 L. K. Jha also served under Indira Gandhi’s leadership and was said to be against the rapid opening of India’s economy to external competition (Kohli, 1989).
impact on a particular business group or industry or could be passed through on the quiet without any accompanying political announcements were the measures implemented. In this respect in relation to economic reforms, big business is argued to have veto giving powers (Kohli, 1989); though, as illustrated immediately above, there was more consensus and collaboration than opposition between GoI, its advisors and business.

These reforms were important not just for the already established big business who were thus being protected and promoted but also enabled other new entrants, such as Reliance (see Chapter Five), to grow and emerge during this time and go on to compete with the two main business houses in India at the time, the Tatas and Birlas (see Chapter Five). Although it is worth pointing out here, that big business, including new entrants such as Reliance, were regarded as being very closely connected to government where contributions to party funds were provided in return for concessions – what Kochanek (1987) terms ‘briefcase politics’.

What can be seen during this period is the closer alignment of political and economic goals of the government with that of business than previously, a ‘pro-business’ agenda during which process, the GoI seeks on the one hand to strengthen its relations with business in securing domestic economic growth, preparing and fortifying Indian business’ domestic market, paving the way for its eventual integration into the global market economy; while on the other, withdrawing (seemingly almost by stealth) from its earlier commitment to and protection of the poor and more vulnerable in Indian society. Indian business on its part can be seen here to be seeking an active and enabling state in creating the necessary conditions in preparation for its anticipated functioning in a competitive market economy (Collier, 2012) primarily through deregulation and secondly through gradual import liberalisation (Kohli, 1989). As Burchell (in Olssen, 2006, p.220) emphasises, ‘the market exists, and can only exist, under certain political, legal and institutional conditions that must be actively constructed by government’. Illustrations of this active construction in relation to Indian HE are alluded to briefly below, while Chapters Five - Eight provide a more substantial account. Evident during this period is
the processual, gradual or piecemeal and selective aspects of the liberalising policies introduced, the choice and pace of which is largely determined by business as evidenced by Kochanek’s (in Sridharan1993, p.11) observation about business always wanting which ‘selective liberalisation’ as well as by their ‘veto giving powers’ to matters of policy (Kohli, 1989), as mentioned above, in which they were aided by advisors to the government (see below).

Such broader economic policy moves and measures as briefly outlined here constitute what Brenner and Theodore (2002) identify as a mix of ‘destructive moments’ and ‘creative moments’ of actually existing neoliberalism (Table 3 below) whereby the selective and phased withdrawal of state support for big business and the dismantling of domestic protectionist policies on the one hand (destructive moments) accompany or are followed by their counterpart (creative moments). The latter can be evidenced by the preparatory measures ahead of the opening up of the Indian economy to the world economy, or the promotional aspects of state efforts towards ‘sunrise’ industries such as the IT sector, and the emerging ‘networked’ forms of governance in relation to HE with the co-opting of business and private enterprise in the form of investments in the Indian HE sector, as illustrated below.

This is not to suggest that these ‘creative / destructive moments’ are clear cut, neat, linear policy shifts and transformations with defined starting and finishing points, as Brenner and Theodore (2002) caution and as signalled at the beginning of this chapter. As shown here and alluded to above, these incremental policy shifts and changes were tentative, phased, trialled, amended, revised and selectively taken up and implemented over a period of time under successive governments considered here, and particularly under Rajiv Gandhi. As such, they are much more indicative and illustrative of the processual open-ended nature of these liberalising market - oriented reforms rather than an ‘end-state’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002), as the ensuing chapters show under the intensifying neoliberal reforms in relation to Indian HE. In this respect and as Peck and Tickell emphasise, it is more useful and helpful to talk of ‘neoliberalization’ to capture this processual, open-ended and evolving nature rather than ‘neoliberalism’. Chapter Seven
covers the ‘*directional*’ rather than ‘*destinational*’ (Peck, 2013) aspects of neoliberal reforms in relation to Indian HE.

**Table 3. Destructive and Creative Moments of Actually Existing Neoliberalism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site of Regulation</th>
<th>Moment of Destruction</th>
<th>Moment of Creation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| *Form of intercapitalist competition* | • Selective withdrawal of state support for leading national industries  
• Dismantling of national protectionist policies  
• Dismantling of national barriers to foreign direct investment | • New forms of state support for “sunrise” industries                             |
| *The state and other forms of governance* | • Abandonment of Keynesian forms of demand-management  
• Dismantling of traditional national relays of welfare service provision  
• Shrinking of public sector employment | • Mobilization of strategies to promote territorial competitiveness, technological innovation, and internationalization  
• Establishment of public–private partnerships and “networked” forms of governance |

Source: Adapted from Brenner and Theodore (2002)

**THE IT SECTOR**

While primary importance was always given to big business, this creation of the necessary conditions in which India’s businesses could grow and flourish domestically without external competition, was also applied and extended towards small and medium businesses from which the IT sector was to emerge. Again, this was through protectionist measures initially to progressively more promotional measures, the latter of which are attributed to Rajiv Gandhi (Kapur, 2002) but which cannot be viewed in isolation from its inherited legacy, as the opening quote to this chapter by Guha (2008) illustrates.
Driven entirely by the private sector competing in global markets, the IT sector as Guha (2008) highlights above, is one which has benefitted from a number of historical and inherited factors, all of which have facilitated and therefore played a part in its success. The retention of English - the language of India’s former colonial ruler - as an official language in linguistically divided independent India (Chapter Two); the combined effects of the expulsion of the International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) in the late 1970s and the protection measures geared towards the sector which led to domestic induced innovation (Kapur, 2002); the publicly funded science and engineering educational institutions; as well as other measures such as the curbing of entry of big business into new sectors and their expansion in existing sectors; all of which enabled the emergence and growth of new software firms in the early 1980s.

By thus invoking ‘factors both proximate and distant’ in relation to the success of the IT sector and attributing the role of successive governments in this process, Guha (2008, p.696) could have also included Macaulay and members of the Clapham Sect (Chapter Two). These ‘factors’ are as much illustrative of ‘multiple governmentalities’ (Miller and Rose, 2008) or calculated ways of thinking or of doing things to achieve particular ends or fulfil particular objectives, as they are indicative of the path dependent and path shaping character of neoliberal projects (Brenner, Peck, Theodore, 2010). While liberalism, as I have shown in Chapter Two, was introduced in India under British colonial rule, it continued under Nehru’s leadership in its variant Keynesian-based welfarism form, before progressing to a form of ‘advanced liberalism’ (Rose, 1993), as being considered here. As such, ‘neo’ liberalism can also - and needs to be - ‘taken to refer to the project’s historical and ideological positioning after nineteenth-century liberalism’ (Peck, 2010, p.36) which in contrast to its earlier form, envisioned a positive role for the state, that is to say interventionist, as indicated in the previous chapter, including in the creation of the necessary conditions (markets) and entrepreneurial and competitive conduct within them (Barry, Osborne and Rose, 1996). Viewed in this way, reveals, ‘the complex ways in which political forces, historical traditions, and existing institutional arrangements all shaped why and how the process of neoliberalization actually occurred’ (Peck, 2010, p.48), as is further illustrated below.
In saying this, I do not wish to suggest a neatness or a sense of coordinated order to the actions of the successive governments in India over this vast historical period when in practice, there can often be a lack of order and coherence in state action as well as opportunistic tendencies, periods of experimentation, and revisions. This can be evidenced above where the GoI’s liberalising efforts are described as operating ‘in fits and starts’ (Sridharan, 1993, p.1) with ‘two steps forward and one step backward, and back to muddling through.’ (Kohli, 1989, p.311) and as previously signalled in relation to the ‘creative and destructive moments of actually existing neoliberalism’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) - see also Chapter Eight.

The importance and significance of the IT sector in relation to this study is that for Kapur (2002, p.95) the IT sector ‘represents the new face of Indian capitalism’. Kapur makes this point on account of the fact that the IT sector comprises of India’s upper castes in a profession both regarded as and entailing ‘clean work’ that did not require getting ‘their hands dirty’ (p.98); with additional respectability of the profession provided by the technological and scientific aspects of programming software - an intellectual bent suited to this upper strata (p.98) (Chapter Two). Further, as Kapur emphasises, it was the success of India’s IT sector that dispelled the long-held suspicion and contempt of markets, business and the private sector and legitimised capitalism, citing Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee\(^{21}\) to help make his point:

> the shining success of Indian IT professionals, both in India and those working in the U.S. and elsewhere in the world, have unleashed a tremendous energy among our people. Most of the success stories are scripted by first generation entrepreneurs who were not born in the families of lakhpatis and crorepatis (millionaires) (Kapur, 2002, p.103).

This fostering, nurturing, protection and the promotion of the capabilities of this segment of society and the sector (IT) in which it is engaged - predominantly exports-based - as described here, constitutes what Ong (2007) describes as a form of governing by calculation in relation to global market opportunities which entails the separation of

\(^{21}\) Atal Bihari Vajpayee served three terms as India’s Prime Minister. The first term was in 1996 but, unable to form a BJP majority government, he resigned after 13 days. The second term was from 1998-1999 (BJP coalition led government to form the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), part of which was as “care-taker Prime Minister” owing to rifts within the coalition parties, leading to fresh elections. The third and final term was from 1999-2004, the BJP led NDA, which lasted its full term. [https://www.indiainfoline.com/prime-ministers-of-india/atal-bihari-vajpayee](https://www.indiainfoline.com/prime-ministers-of-india/atal-bihari-vajpayee).
some groups for special attention. This represents an illustration of what Ong (2006) describes as ‘exception of neoliberalism’ whereby a particular group (here the upper castes) is singled out for special attention in societies where forms other than neoliberal rule exist (such as caste) or those with an inherited colonial legacy, as in the case of India. Ong (2006) cites the example of the setting up of special economic or administrative zones as ‘spaces of exception’, where ‘neoliberalising technologies of governance are selectively deployed’ (p.8) ‘... to promote and intensify market-based calculations’ (p.76).

In relation to India and the IT sector, such a ‘space of exception’ would be the software technology parks established in 1989 for precisely this purpose and which have come to be described as the ‘"new temples of modern India", according to Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’ (Kapur, 2002, p.96). In a similar but contrasting fashion, there can also exist cases of ‘exception to neoliberalism’ (Ong, 2006) where parts of the population are excluded from such market-based calculations, as discussed in Chapter Seven in relation to vulnerable and marginalised groups in Indian HE.

Such forms of attention to global market opportunities, the attempts at fostering and developing specific capacities, the [re] emergence of new entrepreneurial patterns and initiatives, particularly among the upper castes reflect, as argued earlier, the changing nature of the state and governmental rationalities or programmes (Lemke, 2010). In other words, they are indicative of ‘new forms of intervention and regulation based on new strategic goals’ (Peck, 2010, p.9).

During this time frame, government imperatives are not merely restricted to the performance or protection of its national economy and those of business but to induce and seek to secure global economic advantage, through nurturing non-trading castes into business and making them competitive. However, as Chapter Seven demonstrates and Chapter Eight highlights, these neo-liberal rationalities operate/function alongside other rationalities of government whereby the GoI acts as mediator of class/caste interests in relation to Indian HE.

The additional importance and significance of the IT sector in relation to this study is that the success of the IT sector was to have two knock-on effects. The first was an increased demand for HE particularly in engineering courses which relatedly led to the proliferation
of private colleges that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s to cater for this increased demand, presenting a potentially lucrative business opportunity for the private sector (Kapur, 2002) – see Chapters Two and Seven.

The reference by the Prime Minister of India to IT professionals working in the US led to the second knock on effect of the IT success story - it changed the GoI’s relationship with Indians residing and working abroad, that is to say, its diaspora. While the flow and mobility of Indians has a very long history, the migration and subsequent settlement of the skilled and highly skilled professionals initially in the UK but also the US after WW2 marked a new trend in India’s historically complex emigration pattern, popularly termed as the ‘brain-drain’. While these group of migrating professionals were viewed prejudicially initially - deemed disloyal and unpatriotic as they were the beneficiaries in most part of the publicly subsidised education system (Pande, 2013); they were reviled during the time of India’s economic crisis and considered to have contributed it by withdrawing large sums of money from their Indian investments, leading to the devaluation of the rupee and rendering inevitable the economic reforms that followed (Mani and Varadarajan, 2005).

Paradoxically, the very same reforms which led to the opening up of India’s economy yielded some unexpected gains in the form of ‘brain-regain’: investments, remittances, philanthropy, transfer of technology and skill (Pande, 2013). The IT sector though a result of domestically protected, nurtured and cultivated capabilities, is often also cited as one of the best examples of diaspora-induced growth, credited with kick-starting the so-called ‘IT revolution’ in India. Pande draws attention to the fact that out of the top 20 Indian software businesses, 19 were founded by or are managed by professionals from the Indian diaspora. This boom and ‘revolution’ in IT is credited with creating a $100 billion industry in India, whereby ‘returning’ Indians from work or study in America helped found big IT companies such as Infosys (Economist, 21 May 2015), co-founded by business leader NR Narayana Murthy (see Chapters Five, Six and Seven in particular).
Against the context of this IT boom, there begins to emerge in the decade after the reforms a host of GoI initiatives which illustrate the shift in the attitude of the GoI towards its diaspora. One such initiative was the establishment of a High-Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora, in September 2000. One of its recommendations included the setting up of an Indians Abroad Day to be celebrated both in India and abroad on 9th January every year, the first of which, in 2003, was organised in partnership with the FICCI at which, and in subsequent years, investment opportunities are presented for business and private entrepreneurs in a host of areas including [higher] education which are framed in the context of ‘for India’ and for ‘the motherland’ (see Chapter Six).

There are three things which are noteworthy here. Firstly, notions of patriotism can be seen to be directed specifically at those individuals who, either through their own personal endeavours in business, or professionally through their firms / organisation have attained proven and valorised forms of economic success (Rose, 1990). Secondly, the offer of incentives to business and private entrepreneurs to privatise the Indian HE sector. Thirdly, and relatedly, emerging ‘networked’ forms of governance in relation to HE can be discerned through the co-opting of business and private enterprise in the Indian HE sector in the form of investments, constituting other ‘creative moments of actually existing neoliberalism’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) in addition to those noted above. (See Chapters Six – Eight where these aspects are covered in greater detail).

WHY REFORM? and the ROLE of ADVISORS

Denoon (1998) points out that two of the reforming ‘episodes’ (1966-68 and 1991-94) were launched following crises while the 1985-87 ‘episode’ under Rajiv Gandhi’s leadership may not have occurred at all if there had not been a smooth and direct succession between mother and son.

One explanation attributed to Prime Minister Rao initiating economic reforms is that the GoI, who had up until this time been ‘living on borrowed time and borrowed money’ (Bhaduri and Nayyar, 1996, p.29), could no longer afford to do so and had no option but
to seek financial assistance from the IMF and the WB and in return for which reforms would need to be re-initiated. This, in turn, has raised questions about whether the reforms were the result of external pressure from the IMF and the WB and a condition of their financial assistance. Writing on the 25th anniversary of the 1991 economic reforms, Montek S Ahluwalia (2016), former deputy chairman of the (now disbanded) Planning Commission (also see below), refutes the allegation of WB or IMF pressures, arguing instead that the 1991 reforms were ‘home-grown’ and the result of a process of re-thinking which had taken place well before the crisis. Indeed, Kohli (2006a) points out the decision to undertake major reforms of the economy had been on the minds of key policy-makers during the 1980s but who were merely waiting for ‘an appropriate political moment’, which finally emerged with the ‘crisis’ of 1991. When the opportunity presented itself, reforms in India were justified and advanced on the grounds of the inefficiency of the public sector; the failure of social and redistributive approach to poverty alleviation programmes such as land reforms; and the general discrediting of the socialist policies adopted and pursued since independence, most particularly under Nehru’s leadership (Kohli, 1989).

The point about ‘crisis’ is significant here. Peck (2010, p.12) states that neoliberal ascendency has often historically proven to be ‘a crisis-driven or crisis-animated process’ and which has been ‘more often than not enabled by crisis’ (p.19), along lines evidenced here. The discrediting of the past, the notion of lying in wait for an opportune moment and a general sense of inevitability, as reasons advanced for the implementation of economic reforms in India as given here, have echoes of the attempts to advance liberalism as a viable alternative policy to Keynesian policies by members of the Mont Pelerin Society from 1940s onwards, which were ‘scrupulously formulated for this very eventuality, as a total critique of Keynesian rationality and welfare-state government’ (p.20). As Peck observes and as Chapter Seven illustrates, these ideas had found fertile ground in free-market think tanks, the financial community, and business organisations, who were in different ways using, and disseminating the ideas of Friedman and Hayek and of the Mont Pelerin Society more broadly (Peck, 2010).
Against this context of the impetus behind the introduction of economic reforms in 1991, there were three other factors and considerations at play here which are interrelated and need mentioning. The first is that policies aimed at economic liberalisation as well as their pace, to a lesser extent under Indira Gandhi, but particularly under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi and after, were being advanced and determined by their advisors, who were more reform-minded and inclined towards economic liberalisation (Kohli, 1989), and with whom business, and big business in particular, had much in common (Brown, 1962), as signalled in the previous chapter.

Secondly and relatedly, the character and background of the advisors under Rajiv Gandhi signalled and constituted a ‘sharp break with the past’ (Kohli, 1989, p.312). Whereas earlier greater faith was placed on the competencies and abilities of the more left-leaning economists educated and professionally trained in England; during the period under consideration, it was increasingly those with training in institutions such as the WB, who were regarded and esteemed (Kohli, 1989).

Under Rajiv Gandhi’s leadership, advisors included: Bimal Jalan, a graduate of Oxford, who went on to become Executive Director at both the IMF and the WB. Montek Ahluwalia, another Oxford graduate, who worked briefly at the IMF, as well as in the Prime Minister’s Office; as noted above, he held the post of deputy chairman of the Planning Commission and was appointed finance secretary following the liberalisation policies of 1991, and ‘who perhaps more than any other technocrat shaped India’s economic policies over nearly two decades’(Kapur, 2004, p.373). Manmohan Singh also studied at Oxford, he went to serve on the governing board of the Asian Development Bank (ADB); represented India on the Board of Governors of the IMF as well as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); held numerous government posts including Economic Advisor in the Commerce Ministry, Chief Economic Advisor in the Ministry of Finance, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, Chairman of the University Grants Commission (UGC); Finance Minister under Prime Minister Rao at the time of the

---

introduction of the liberalisation policies in 1991 before going on to become India’s Prime Minister.

As Bhaduri and Nayyar (1996, p.63) observe:

*this makes for an interesting two-way movement ... it would seem that there is a revolving door between the Ministry of Finance in New Delhi (or elsewhere in the developing world) and the World Bank or the IMF in Washington DC.*

It was these advisors, most of whom were ‘known for their decontrol and pro-liberalization proclivities’ (Kohli, 1989, p.312), who were able to advance the cause for bringing about economic reforms. However, Rajiv Gandhi, when Prime Minister, went further still in that his advisors included individuals such as Arun Nehru and Arun Singh who had backgrounds as executives of multinational corporations which lead business leaders to proclaim ‘... for the first time in independent India, they have felt as if they were not cheats or pariahs, that they were part of the national mainstream’ (Kohli, 1989, p.316).

The implied - and inherent - suggestion of the blurring of the binary ‘here’ and ‘over there’ or of the ‘local’ and the ‘global’ as encapsulated in the idea of a ‘revolving door’ between New Delhi and Washington DC (Bhaduri and Nayyar, 1996), with the suggestion of simultaneous presence in both places and its fusion, captures precisely the ‘local globalness’ (McCann, 2011) character and feature of the business leaders and policy actors in this study and serves as the means by which the ‘global expansion of neoliberal ideas’ (Ball, 2012a) is facilitated and circulated in relation to the Indian HE sector. This acts as the continuous theme of this thesis and is most particularly covered in Chapters Five - Eight.

Additionally, it is largely under Rajiv Gandhi and through his involvement of executives from multinational corporations that the change in attitude towards business is most pronounced or at least, most evident. As signaled earlier, this positive regard for business was on the ascendant, as Chapters Five - Eight further illustrate.
The third and final factor and consideration behind the impetus for the introduction of economic reforms in 1991 was, perhaps not surprisingly given the make-up of the circle of advisors and business leaders surrounding Rajiv Gandhi and subsequent leaders, that there was an inclination and push to ‘learn from the West’ and a corresponding waning of anti-colonial sentiments than had been the case immediately after India’s independence (Kohli, 1989).

CONCLUSION

This chapter presented an overview of the introduction of economic reforms in India under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi and showed some of the commonalities with as well as departures from the reforms initiated by his mother, Indira Gandhi (following her re-election in 1980) and of the period thereafter. In doing this, I have identified some of the ‘important cumulative impacts ... or patternings’ (Brenner, Peck and Theodore, 2010, p.184) of the neoliberal regulatory experiments, trials and policy shifts undertaken over this period.

I then showed the government and business relations during this time, including in relation to small and medium businesses, from which the IT sector emerged. I indicated the significance of the IT sector, not only as the ‘posterboy’ of economic reforms (Guha, 2008), but, with the appropriation of the IT professions and the sector by the upper castes, as ‘representing the new face of Indian capitalism’ and legitimising capitalism (Kapur, 2002, p.95), the IT sector thereby changed the perception of business - bringing it respectability.

Last but by no means least, I have described the ‘common ground’ (Brown, 1962) between business and government advisors and administrators in relation to these economic reforms and showed their shared characteristic of ‘local globalness’ (McCann, 2011). India, as evident here, has not been insulated from outside influences, nor has it been a mere bystander in the wake of these influences, as these historical chapters have shown, its ‘essential parts’ (Habib, 1990), of which only one has been focused upon while
others merely commented on here, have been strengthened, transformed and constructed.

The next chapter continues with this focus on the process of neoliberalisation specifically in relation to Indian HE. It begins with the constitution of the Prime Minister’s Council on Trade and Industry (PMCTI) to deliberate on, among other things, Private Investment in Education and from which the policy document central to this thesis, the *Policy Framework for Private Investment in Education, Health and Rural Development*, emerged in 2000. As well as providing a brief overview of some of the contents of the policy, the next chapter introduces two principal elite business leaders charged with the compilation of this policy framework document and after whom the report came to be known as the Ambani-Birla Report.
CHAPTER FIVE

PRIME MINISTER’S COUNCIL on TRADE and INDUSTRY

BUSINESS ELITES

and the

INDIAN SCHOOL of BUSINESS

The challenge that we face ... is to bridge the large gap between the education have-nots and the haves while, simultaneously, radically upgrading education content, delivery and processes to foster a competitive, yet cooperative, knowledge-based society. Given the magnitude of the challenge and the complexities involved, this will call for a national mission unprecedented in the history of mankind. We have to fundamentally change our mind-set – from seeing education as a component of social development to realising it as a means of creating a new information society, resplendent with knowledge, research, creativity and innovation. It is not a social expenditure but an investment in India’s future. The education opportunity before us is right, so funds have to be made available under any circumstances. Neglect of education will turn out to be India’s nemesis. This is not the time for just reforms. It is time for a revolution – a knowledge revolution ... that embraces information technology, fosters freedom and innovation and induces a market oriented competitive environment ... vital for our future. The need of the hour is for bold steps, not incremental and tentative ones.


... for a domain of action, a behavior, to enter the field of thought, it is necessary for a certain number of factors ... to have provoked a certain number of difficulties around it. It is problematization that responds to these difficulties ... it develops the conditions in which possible responses can be given ... 

Michel Foucault in an interview with Paul Rabinow (May 1984)
INTRODUCTION

Against the background of the Prime Minister’s Council on Trade and Industry (PMCTI) constituted by the Government of India (GoI) in 1998, this chapter briefly introduces the report, *Policy Framework for Private Investment in Education, Health and Rural Development* (GoI, 2000) and its accompanying ‘directions, lessons and imperatives’ for India’s HE system (Fig.3). It then chiefly focuses on the two principal elite business leaders, Mukesh Ambani and Kumar Mangalam Birla, members of the PMCTI charged with the *Policy Framework for Private Investment in Education, Health and Rural Development* (GoI, 2000) report, and their business and socio-economic networks both within and outside of India. It will explore and describe the nature of the ties and associations of these business leaders which link them together by class, caste, religion, business, family and friendships, as well as their membership of educational and other organisations, all of which underpin the exercise of power and influence.

Using the Indian School of Business (ISB) as an illustrative case, it will show how these associations - capitals - assist in network formations and enable the ‘*global expansion of neoliberal ideas*’ (Ball, 2012a) and, in doing so, attempts to describe some aspects of the partnership between these business leaders and the GoI. The ISB is also a good example on two other fronts in that it serves to show on the one hand, the gravitation of business and the deployment of business, social and academic networks in its establishment, and, on the other, the relationship of business to Indian HE.

Just to reiterate a few key points about networks from my Methodology Chapter (One). Networks as deployed here serve a dual purpose, both of equal importance: firstly, as a method for the analysis of higher educational reform and shifts in patterns of governance, and secondly as a visual ‘*representation of active social relations and of sites of social and policy activity* ’ (Ball, 2017, p3). Thus, the interest here is on policy actors, ‘*patterns of connection*’ (Crossley, 2016) or relations, group attachments, kinship ties, company or board membership, ‘*meetings and co-present conversations* ’ (Urry, 2004),
events in and through which ‘policy and its associated discourses ... are made mobile’ (McCann and Ward, 2012a, p.43) and flows of influence, support and money are enabled. It needs to be stated here that the origins, evolution and boundary of the network presented and analysed are defined by and focused on the ISB; as such the network is not exhaustive of all the relations between members and excludes other relationships and serves to act more as a vehicle for the analysis.

Additionally, this reforming business network needs to be considered against the context of the historic and contemporary role of caste in Indian business and commerce (Chapters Two and Four), the relationship of these actors and their caste to the changing values and economic policies of the Indian state, and the ways in which this produces a ‘glocal’ neoliberalism. ‘Glocal’ refers to the impact of the interplay and fusion of local, indigenous practices (Ball, 2017) or what Ong (2007) refers to as ‘situated elements’ with global ideas, values and practices and the means by which policies are at once made ‘mobile and mutable’ (McCann & Ward, 2012a), as I elaborate below.

PRIME MINISTER’S COUNCIL on TRADE and INDUSTRY

Seven years after the GoI embarked on a series of reforms aimed at liberalising India’s economy, the GoI in August 1998, constituted a Council on Trade and Industry (PMCTI) aimed at creating ‘policy dialogue on important economic issues relevant to Trade and Industry’ and which formed a part of the government’s efforts ‘to refashion policy instruments for achieving its desired economic goals and impart momentum to the growth process’. 23 Though recommendations from the initial two meetings, which centred around the broad theme of ‘What Ails the Indian Economy’, were reported by the GoI to have been implemented, political events in the country which led to a general election resulted in the Council having to be reconstituted.

At the first meeting of the reconstituted Council on 11 December 1999, the Chair, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee gave a speech outlining the objectives of the Council during which he emphasised that ‘the development imperatives of India require joint and concerted action by both Government and … [the] private sector’, and suggested the formation of Special Subject Groups around a number of themes from among the members of the reconstituted Council. Membership of this Council at this meeting was made up of highly successful and wealthy business leaders as well as two key institutions representing Indian Industry and Commerce (Table 4 below).

Given a 60-day period, members were asked to consider and recommend implementable (emphasis added) action points in a number of areas including: Private Investment in Education, Health and Rural Development (assigned to Mukesh Ambani and Kumar Mangalam Birla); Good Governance in the Private Sector (assigned to Kumar Mangalam Birla and NR Narayana Murthy); and Harnessing the Wealth and Talent of Indians resident abroad for Development (assigned to Mukesh Ambani). The groups could co-opt officials from the relevant Ministries / Departments - interactions between which would be facilitated by the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) - and any external experts as necessary.

Table 4. Members of the PMCTI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members of the PMCTI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mukesh Ambani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratan Tata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gouri Prasad Goenka, President (designate), FICCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanjeev Goenka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajeev Chandrasekar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nusli Wadia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Secretary to Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

POLICY FRAMEWORK for PRIVATE INVESTMENT in EDUCATION HEALTH and RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Rather like the reform-seeking members of the Clapham Sect in nineteenth century India encountered in Chapter Two, the business leaders charged with the compilation of this policy framework document, Mukesh Ambani and Kumar Mangalam Birla, likewise set about problematising Indian HE, as indicated in the extract from the preface of the report provided in the opening lines of this chapter. As noted previously (Chapter Two), this process of problematisation, or the act of making a problem visible, simultaneously renders it amenable to intervention and paves the way for alternative forms or modes of governing to be formulated (Miller and Rose, 2008). In this respect, there are similarities with the past, or, as Miller and Rose put it, ‘family resemblances ... in ways of thinking and acting’, particularly in relation to the ‘nature and limits of politics and intervention’ (p.17), as illustrated below.

Thus, the report,26 simultaneously highlighting India’s huge potential, the GoI’s inefficiencies and deficiencies in its management of the HE sector and the challenges ahead, sets out a series of ‘lessons’, ‘directions’, and ‘imperatives’ (GoI, 2000) which, with its emphasis on privatisation, markets, innovation, efficiency and entrepreneurism, largely entails what Ball (2001) describes as the appropriation of education policy by economic imperatives. It considers that ‘an important objective of education is to enhance one’s standing in society and create economic value’ which can be measured by the ‘earning potential of the graduating student’. Lamenting that ‘the Indian education system is not market oriented’ (GoI, 2000, p.105), it states that:

market based systems reward enterprise, risk taking, skill and agility, but offer less security and a constantly changing environment. In such a context, education is vital since those who compete best have an enormous advantage in the fast paced world economy ... Global capital constantly seeks and flows to more favourable opportunities, including well trained, productive and attractively priced labour forces in a market friendly and politically stable business environment. Education will be at the centre stage in creating such an environment (GoI, 2000, p.3).

26 This report covers all sectors of education however, the co-opted academic committee members are from HE institutions and associated regulatory bodies giving the report a leaning towards the HE sector - also see Table 5
And in this, ‘the Government should play the role of a facilitator. Government must exercise its regulatory role to streamline higher education to ensure that it is meaningful, purposeful and cost effective’ (GoI, 2000, p.106) ‘... the Government must ... leave higher and professional education to the private sector’ (p.137). However, it notes that education alone is not sufficient, it must be accompanied by economic opportunities which ‘necessitate an economy free from controls ... In this sense, reforms in education and in the economy are mutually reinforcing’ (p112). It considers that, ‘business and industry have a vital role to play in establishing world class institutes of higher learning. Leading business houses must be encouraged to establish such institutes and universities’ (p108) see Fig. 3 below.
The education sector has been largely neglected in India. This neglect can turn out to be India’s undoing and nemesis ... This is not the time for just reforms. It is time for a revolution. The need of the hour is bold steps, not marginal and tentative ones. For fortune, they say, favours the bold (p.138)

In view of global participation of the Universities, the issue concerning their jurisdiction of geographical territory needs a review. Also the University should be allowed to establish their centres of studies at various locations in India and abroad (p.73)

... Government must ... leave higher and professional education to the private sector (p.137)

Motivate non-resident Indians to participate in India’s education programmes on a voluntary or sabbatical basis (p.95)

Business and industry have a vital role to play in establishing world class institutes of higher learning. Leading business houses must be encouraged to establish such institutes and universities (p.108)

Education must shape adaptable, competitive workers who can readily acquire new skills and innovate... Skills as a result of education must have economic value beyond their intrinsic merit (p.10)

Indian institutions and universities must be able to attract overseas students. The Indian education system, once reformed, will have the ability to attract a large number of foreign students. This will have to be encouraged in order to generate additional finances ... (p.111)

... a gradual move to full cost recovery in HE and encouraging the emergence of a largely self-financing private sector.... Because the gap between private and social returns is larger for HE, students and parents must bear part of the costs of HE (p.10)

...there has to be a mix of government and private initiative ... HE must involve private initiatives including setting up of private universities (p.36)
Govts. must encourage private financing by taking on some of the risks that makes financial institutions reluctant to lend for HE ... A credit market for education, with selective scholarships, especially in HE must be nurtured (p.10)

the power of people in India is enormous. Imagine the potential for growth and development if over a billion people, one sixth of humanity, are educated, creative and enterprising. We have the numbers, but not the quality ... Labour is both as a promise as well as a peril in Indian society (p.92)

... universities should take the path of self-sufficiency through higher students’ fees, donations and endowments, alumni contributions, linkages with corporate establishments for research (p.105)

Foreign direct investment in education will have the benefit of improving standards and quality of education. It can facilitate global integration of the Indian education ... The Government should allow foreign direct investment in education. To begin with, this can be limited to education in science and technology (p.110)

Market India as a destination for affordable, high quality education (p.95)

A redefinition of government role in higher education would call for a major privatisation of the university education system in India. A Private University bill should be legislated to encourage establishment of new private universities in the fields of science and technology, management, economics, financial management and other critical areas with commercial application (p.108)

a strong emphasis on vocational education and education that is market oriented, especially in ... HE is called for (p.36)

an obsession for the use of technology, particularly, IT and communications technology, must pervade the education system (p.36)

All courses from the UG level should have a module on entrepreneurship (p.73)
Seemingly then in this articulation, a policy framework is presented which sets out a vision of a neoliberal HE system, intended to produce neoliberal subjects within a neoliberal political rationality in which a new role is envisaged for government and for the market; one which sees the erasure of education as a public good and its replacement with an investment model.

The report acknowledges the ‘insights provided by a number of educationists, social scientists, policy planners and the Business Intelligence Unit, Chennai in the preparation of the report’ (GoI, 2000, Preface). Represented among this group: India's top and highly respected engineering and management schools - the IITs and IIMs respectively; three US universities: Stanford - Asia Pacific Research Centre; the Yale School of Management; University of California at Berkeley; a research institute based in The Netherlands; and regulatory bodies, among others (Table 5 below). The report, Policy Framework for Private Investment in Education, Health and Rural Development, when published in April 2000, became known as the Ambani-Birla report, after the two businessmen charged with its compilation, and it is to them attention turns next.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.P.J. Abdul Kalam</td>
<td>Principal Scientific Adviser to the GoI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amrik Singh</td>
<td>Former Secretary, Association of Indian Universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M Anandakrishnan</td>
<td>Vice chairman, Tamil Nadu State Council for HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashok Chandra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.K. Chhabra</td>
<td>Former Secretary, UGC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.B. Dhar</td>
<td>Director (Research), Association of Indian Universities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.S. Gore</td>
<td>Former Vice Chancellor Bombay University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasmukh Shah</td>
<td>Chairman, Gujarat Ecology Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.S. Jha</td>
<td>Former Director, IIT Kharagpur &amp; Vice Chancellor, Banaras Hindu University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joyojeet Pal</td>
<td>University of California at Berkeley, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.P. Kapoor</td>
<td>Director, Thapar Institute of Engineering and Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.V. Kapur</td>
<td>Chairman, Reliance Power Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A W Khan</td>
<td>Vice Chancellor, Indira Gandhi National Open University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kireet Joshi</td>
<td>Chairman, Auroville Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.K. Khana</td>
<td>Former Chairman, All India Council of Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.G.K. Menon</td>
<td>Former Union Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Mukhopadhyya</td>
<td>Senior Fellow, National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navin C. Nigam</td>
<td>Chairman, All India Council for Technical Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nita Kumar</td>
<td>Research Fellow, NIAS, The Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.A. Padmanabhan</td>
<td>Director, IIT-Kanpur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pradeep Khadawala</td>
<td>Former Director, IIM-Ahmedabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rafiq Dossani</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Research Centre, Stanford University, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.S. Rajput</td>
<td>Director, National Council of Educational Research and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.S Raju</td>
<td>Director, IIT-Delhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.S. Srinavasan</td>
<td>Former Trustee of B.M.S. Educational Trust and B.M.S. Hospital Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S P Sukhatme</td>
<td>Chairman, Atomic Energy Regulatory Board &amp; Former Director, IIT-Mumbai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shyam Sunder</td>
<td>Yale School of Management, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subir Choudhary</td>
<td>Former Director, IIM-Calcutta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T.K.N. Unnithan</td>
<td>Former Vice Chancellor, Rajasthan University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Veera Raghavan</td>
<td>Director, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan (BHV) and Former Secretary (HRD), GoI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Venkitramanan</td>
<td>Former Governor, Reserve Bank of India &amp; Finance Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yajulu Medury</td>
<td>Chairman and Managing Director, Educational Consultants India Ltd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Business Intelligence Unit, Chennai
ELITE BUSINESS NETWORKS

The members of this caste are so subtle and so skilful in trade that... they could give lessons to the most cunning Jews. They accustom their children at an early age... they are always with their fathers, who instruct them in trade, and do nothing without at the same time explaining it to them... (Tavernier in Habib, 1990, p.384)

In their study of elite business networks, Harvey and Maclean (2008) show how various types of capital - economic, cultural, social - are to a degree convertible into other types of capital. And that invariably, including in the ‘rags-to-riches story’, connections and connectability play a crucial role in acquiring social capital - be it through networks, mentors or role models (Laird in Harvey and MacLean, 2008). The two principal business leaders - and policy actors - introduced here, Mukesh Ambani and Kumar Mangalam Birla, India’s prominent and highly successful business leaders and arguably, in terms of their class, the elites of India, exemplify this description. Represented here are possibly two of India’s most recognisable names both of whom inherited their highly successful businesses from their respective fathers at a young age. While hailing from different sub-caste communities, Mukesh Ambani and Kumar Mangalam Birla both belong to the Bania mercantile caste in India. With an estimated fortune of US$23billion, Mukesh Ambani, India’s richest man, is both Managing Director (MD) and Chairman of Reliance Industries (RIL), India’s largest private sector company.27 Kumar Mangalam Birla as head of the Aditya Birla Group of companies (ABG) is estimated to be worth over $8.6billion and ranks in the top ten of India’s billionaires.28 Both men are highly educated, Mukesh Ambani is a graduate of the University of Mumbai after which he pursued his MBA at Stanford University in the US; Birla with a degree in commerce from the University of Mumbai, obtained his MBA from the London Business School (LBS).

Mukesh Ambani’s father, Dhirubhai Ambani had a comparatively more humble beginning to that of his son. Born in a small village in Gujarat, and too poor to go to college, he

began his working life as a shipping clerk in Yemen but returned to Bombay to begin trading in synthetic yarn, exporting his products to Africa and London. Unable to secure loans from banks in India, he offered shares in his growing company to the public and the rise in Indian shareholders in the 1980’s has been attributed to him (Das, 2000). He is often described, including by his son, as the father of Indian capitalism (Economist, 02 August 2014). Under his eldest son’s leadership, the business has diversified extensively and very profitably into other areas (Fig. 4 below).

Reliance Group Industries Limited is India’s largest private sector enterprise, with annual revenues in excess of US$ 66 billion. Reliance enjoys global leadership in its businesses. It is the largest polyester yarn and fibre producer in the world and among the top five to ten producers in the world in major petrochemical products.

The Group’s activities span exploration and production of:

- oil and gas
- petroleum refining and marketing
- petrochemicals (polyester, fibre intermediates, plastics and chemicals)
- textiles
- retail

It’s Chairman and MD is acknowledged as ‘setting up one of the most complex 4G broadband wireless services ... that address the entire value chain across various digital services in key domains of national interest such as Education, Healthcare, Security, Financial Services, Government-Citizen interfaces and Entertainment’


As Fig. 5 below illustrates, Mukesh Ambani has an extensive network - a blend of corporates; business schools and think tanks which include: World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) - in turn linked up with a host of business schools
such as Yale School of Management, IIM-Bangalore (IIM-B), European Institute of Business Administration (INSEAD), Wharton Business School; British Asian Trust’s India Advisory Council (BATIAC) whose patrons/trustees/members include: His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, Kiran Mazumdar Shaw (Indian School of Business (ISB), The Right Honourable Patricia Hewitt(UK-India Business Council) among others.

He is a member of the World Economic Forum (WEF); London School of Economics (LSE) India Advisory Group; Indo-US CEOs Forum (see Chapter Seven); and heads the private Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University (PDPU). He also serves on the board of think tanks such as the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) India's oldest and largest independent, non-profit, economic policy research institute, whose past governing board members include the former Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and business leader, Ratan Tata (also a member of the PMCTI).29 He was also formerly on the board of the private, family owned Dhirubhai Ambani Institute of Information and Communication Technology (DA-IICT), named after his father and now owned by his brother, Anil Ambani. The network map also illustrates the immediate family members involved in his business ventures.

29 http://www.ncaer.org/governing_body.php, accessed 31/01/2015
Kumar Mangalam Birla hails from a more established lineage. Kumar Mangalam Birla’s great grandfather was Ganshyam Das Birla (G.D. Birla) (Chapter Three), whose fortune at the time of India’s independence in 1947, made Birla among the top two business houses in India. The businesses built by G.D. Birla’s youngest son, Basant Kumar and grandson Aditya Vikram - father of Kumar Mangalam Birla, - are reputed to have formed the most diversified industrial house after the Tatas (Damodaran 2008, p.31).

As noted earlier and worth reiterating here, G.D. Birla was a close confidant of Gujarati-born Gandhi, one of India’s founding fathers, both having hailed from the same Bania mercantile caste. As Chapter Three showed, G.D. Birla, along with small number of other
businessmen from India’s mercantile communities, though almost exclusively the Bania mercantile caste, established the FICCI in 1927 (Damodaran, 2008). The FICCI, a member of the PMCTI, is India’s apex body of business and industry whose history is closely interwoven with India’s ‘struggle for independence, its industrialization, and its emergence as one of the most rapidly growing global economies. FICCI has contributed to this historical process by encouraging debate, articulating the private sector’s views and influencing policy’. And finally, it is to be remembered that the majority of FICCI’s past presidents, in reflection of its founding members, have been from the mercantile Bania caste.

Kumar Mangalam Birla’s networks (Fig. 6) include national regulatory bodies - Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI); trade bodies (CII, Advisory Council of ASSOCHAM); privately run, family owned education establishments (G.D. Birla Medical Research and Education Foundation, Birla Institute of Technology and Science (BITS) Pilani) whose board members include family members Sidharth Birla - immediate past president of the FICCI - and Shobhana Birla Bhartia who chairs and runs HT Media, publisher of the English daily Hindustan Times, and business paper Mint. Kumar Mangalam Birla is a member of the US - India Business Council (Chapter Seven); and the Asia Pacific Advisory Board of the London Business School (LBS) which has an adjoining Aditya Birla India Centre, established and named after Kumar Mangalam Birla’s father, Aditya Vikram (A.V. Birla). The work of the Aditya Birla India Centre is to help ‘business leaders in India and throughout the world better understand the work which needs to be done in India - and how best it may be done’. The LBS ‘was instrumental’ in the founding of the Indian School of Business (ISB) in Hyderabad, India. He is also a board member of the ISB, of which more below.

30 http://blog.ficci.com/about/, accessed 06/05/15.  
31 At the time of data collection. Sidharth Birla was President of the FICCI for the year 2013-2014. Source: http://ficci.in/about-Past-President.asp, accessed 03/02/14.  
32 http://page2rss.com/4a659c7caaff55c5cf814a8c80c4fb0b0e, 23/06/2010, accessed 13/10/14.  
As the networks maps indicate and as Chapter Three illustrated, Indian businesses tend to be family run businesses - ‘family firms’ (Habib, 1990) - and often, though not always, inherited and which seek to carry on the traditions, values, and principles which underpin them. They tend to hire from their own kin and trust features highly. This would certainly appear to apply here as Kumar Mangalam Birla, explains:

Mahatma Gandhi was killed in my great-grandfather’s home ... India’s founding father used to stay at Birla House when he came to Delhi, the house and garden are now a shrine ... Growing up, I hardly needed to visit the memorial to be reminded of the values held by my close-knit Marwari family. Our tiny community, originally from Rajasthan, has had spectacular success in business, in part because we have maintained tight familial relations and traditional values ... Marwari
traders apprenticed their sons to other Marwari firms, loaned each other money, and insured one another’s goods, confident that their partners held to these same codes. I took over the company ... age 29, after the sudden death of my father. At Marwari business houses, including Birla, the top ranks of executives traditionally have been filled with other Marwaris ... [ABG] is now one of India’s most globalized conglomerates ... [with] operations in 36 countries on five continents ... Over 60 percent of our revenues come from overseas. In the 1970s, my father ... expanded widely in Southeast Asia. Since I took over, we've made a dozen acquisitions overseas, worth more than $8 billion, in sectors as varied as mining, pulp, aluminium, and insurance. We’ve branched out into Australia, America, Canada, and Europe ... our top management remains all-Indian, if not all-Marwari... 34

Such ‘kinship-based market practice’ or ‘vernacular capitalism’ (Birla, 2009) as noted by Kumar Mangalam Birla in this example above of Marwari traders, firms and business houses, by complying with group expectations can also serve to generate social capital whereby the reciprocity implied in this ‘is not oriented to a particular other but to the web of social networks of the entire community’ (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993, p.1325). As such, the economic destinies of individual members depend heavily on ‘the character of their own communities’ (p.1322). Thus, this aspect of their practice could be likened to ‘family embeddedness’, a perspective deployed by Arregle, Batjargal, Hitt, Webb, Miller and Tsui (2015), drawing on the work of Aldrich and Cliff (2003) to denote the strong and interdependency between family and entrepreneurship. Here the family plays a strong role in business-related decision-making processes and their outcomes which Arregle et al (2015) attribute to years of socialisation within the family, enabling sharing of norms, values, and beliefs among family members, as here, and represents an important source of network ties in which entrepreneurs can be embedded.

Often these business ties are further extended and strengthened through marriage to families of similar castes and backgrounds (Chapter Three) whereby the family serves to act as a ‘builder and source of social capital’ (Bubolz, 2001), functioning in supplying ‘the glue’ that enables other parts of the social and economic system to function together (Boulding in Bubolz, 2001), as is the case here:

34 http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/asia-pacific/butter_chicken_at_birla, (paras. 1-3; 6), accessed, 07/07/14
India Inc will usher in the New Year with the high-profile wedding of Nayantara, daughter of Chennai industrialists Shyam Kothari and Nina Kothari, with Shamit, son of (Congress MP) Shobhana Bhartia (chairperson of Hindustan Times, daughter of industrialist K K Birla) and Jubilant Group CMD Shyam Bhartia. Nayantara's mother Nina is Dhirubhai Ambani's daughter. To celebrate his niece's wedding, uncle Mukesh Ambani is hosting a party in his 27-storied residence, Antilla, in Mumbai. Shamit's and Nayantara's is the latest example of how business families in India often come together through weddings. "The business community is also a very large and strong community, similar to the linguistic, caste and religious communities. And just as people feel comfortable in their respective communities, business communities, too, feel comfortable within their own circles. People know each other and also derive power out of each other," a high-profile CEO told ET.

Thus, these two principal policy actors and highly prominent and influential business leaders are linked by ties of class, caste, family and closely aligned business interests which have an overspill into the HE sector and the access this enables to elite educational establishments, both by way of industry - academia links, but also by way of their associations and links with and ventures into the HE sector, as will be shown using the ISB as an illustrative case (see below).

As Harvey and Maclean (2008) have underscored, the combination of these ties which encompass - family, educational establishments and corporate or professional associations - are considered the most fundamental in forging the life chances of individuals. Individual members are argued to occupy ‘positions of possibility’ in social relations which are ‘reflective of underlying power relations’ determined by their economic, social and cultural capital (Anheier, Gerhards and Romo; Bourdieu; Oakes, Townley and Cooper, in Harvey and Maclean, 2008, p.23).

The ISB, to where attention is turned next, serves as an useful illustration not only in terms of the workings of the social and economic aspects of these business leaders networks and that of others’, and how these can be mobilised towards new ventures and opportunities; but also because it reveals the twofold relation of business to HE: as

recipient, on the one hand of appropriately skilled graduates, and, on the other, as producer in terms of returns or profit opportunities.

**INDIAN SCHOOL of BUSINESS - TOO FAMOUS to FAIL**

The ISB is a not-for-profit organization, funded entirely by private corporations, foundations and individuals within and outside of India. Running collaborative programmes with other select business schools such as the IIM-Ahmedabad (IIM-A), IIM-Bangalore (IIM-B), IIM-Calcutta (IIM-C). It has a governing body which includes ‘heads of Fortune 500 companies, noted entrepreneurs and leading academics, who have devoted time, thought, and resources towards establishing the School’.

It was envisioned, by its founders (see below), as a world class management institute which ‘anticipated the leadership needs of the emerging Asian economies’ and which addressed ‘a latent need of industry: professionals with experience and exposure to global practices’.

Operating on the principle of meritocracy with regard to student admissions, the ISB was the brainchild of former senior McKinsey executive, Rajat Gupta. Rajat Gupta is a graduate of IIT-Delhi, Harvard Business School and went on to serve on several boards of business schools: Kellogg, Business School, MIT, and Harvard Business School of which he is an alumni; as well as companies such as Proctor and Gamble and Goldman Sachs where he was Director. He additionally served as a trustee member of the Rockefeller Foundation, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and was also a member of the U.N. Commission on the Private Sector and Development (see Fig. 7 below).

---

36 http://www.isb.edu/about-isb/leadership-and-governance, accessed 31/01/14
37 http://www.london.edu/about/global-outlook/global-collaboration#.VTQyQ8J3yP8,23/06/2010, accessed, 31/01/14
In an interview, Rajat Gupta begins with a justification for ISB’s high fees and explains its inception:

I look at ISB. When we started it, everybody said, this country can’t afford it. I say, this country can’t afford not to. The most important thing about ISB is that it needs blind admission. If somebody is qualified, on merit, he/she will get admission, scholarships, other financial aid. They will be able to come to this institution. And in spite of that kind of assistance, we make it a self-sufficient institution. ...I have spent a lot of time doing work on this at McKinsey, to think how we can scale up. Now I chair the pan-IIT movement, basically saying how do we scale up. We’ve been saying, give us the mandate to have more IITs and we will go ahead and create them.

... Right from the point when I was three or four years old [sic] in McKinsey, I used to come back here and do a lot of different work in my own way that was small at that time. My friend ran adopted villages in Haryana and I would go there and teach ... what struck me when I was the managing director of McKinsey, I said to myself what can I do on a substantial scale? So I started thinking, and said I know business schools best because we were the largest recruiters from business
schools in the world. So why not start a business school? I actually wanted to do it in IIT Delhi because I went to IIT Delhi. So I had a lot of discussions at IIT Delhi and it became clear that I couldn't do what I really wanted within that system.

So what happened was that the director [of IIT-Delhi, V S Raju, and member of team behind the Ambani-Birla report – see Table 5] then told me you should do it independently. At that time I was having a dialogue with different people and 12 or 15 of us came together and formed the founding group.

No government has been able to solve the problem of poverty. The key issue is to unleash the entrepreneurial spirit, to create business leaders. The government should create an even playing field and then get out of the way. Every country that has gone from poverty to development has done that. In that context, institutions like ISB are important.

According to me, what is important is at what pace you can expand. So create lots of institutions. The state should … probably get out of the business of higher education. Lots of people can do that.38

In his publication: An idea whose time has come – story of the Indian School of Business (ISB), Sinha (2011) the school’s first dean, former consultant and, subsequently, partner at McKinsey, suggests that the formation of this founding group of the ISB, alluded to above by Rajat Gupta, was enabled largely because Rajat Gupta ‘personally knew most of - if not all - the leading businessmen in India as well as round the world ‘ (p.7), and was able to draw on the ‘reservoir of goodwill - and capital - in the Indian business community’ both within India and ‘among the expatriates’ (p.12) and, because of his professional links, was also able to draw on the ‘immense resources of McKinsey and Co in India and around the world’ (p.12).

In the prefatory note, Adi Godrej, Chairman of Godrej Industries and chairman of the ISB at the time of writing, describes how five years after the economic reforms began in earnest in India:

a small group of Indian businessmen came together in pursuit of a shared dream. I was fortunate to be one of that group … We knew exactly what we wanted, what we thought India needed … That little group that met in 1996 has grown since, but our contribution was merely to provide part of the funding and to generate ideas... (Sinha, 2011, prefatory note)

This group of leading Indian businessmen included: Anil Ambani, MD of Reliance - which at that time was jointly owned with his older brother Mukesh Ambani; ‘expatriate’ Purendu Chatterjee, McKinsey partner and Chairman of private equity firm The Chatterjee Group (TCG); and Keki Dadiseth, Chairman of Hindustan Lever. When press reports emerged of separate and independent discussions that were taking place between Kumar Mangalam Birla and the LBS to establish a private business school in India, Kumar Mangalam Birla was also approached to join the founding group of the ISB, as was another ‘expatriate’ Lakshmi Mittal, Chairman and CEO of Arcelor Mittal. Adi Godrej was instrumental in bringing on board Harvard Business School Alumni and business leader Rahul Bajaj, founder of Bajaj Autos:

Adi Godrej rang me up … one of the main reasons for my agreeing to join the board and be associated with ISB was the people there. People like Anil Ambani, Adi Godrej and the others – these were people I could talk to and listen to … serious people (Sinha, 2011, p.12).

Through their contacts and networks this group grew to include other business leaders such as: Yogesh Deveshwar, Chairman - Indian Tobacco Company (ITC) Ltd, Deepak Parekh, Chairman - Housing Development Finance Corporation (HDFC), NR Narayana Murthy, Founder and Chairman – Infosys, Analjit Singh, Chairman - Max India Group, K V Kamath, MD - Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI) Bank. Although they subsequently resigned, Anand Mahindra, then Deputy MD - Mahindra and Mahindra and Ratan Tata, Chairman - Tata and Sons, also featured as initial members.

The expansion of the governing board members corresponded with their individual commitment to ‘contribute US$1m to jumpstart the project … some … were even more generous’ (Sinha, 2011, p.13) and by October 1996, over US$15m had been raised. Nor was the investment by members limited to funds, the responsibility of finding suitable land on which to build the ISB and negotiating a suitable price for it fell to Reliance Land (Ambani); Godrej Properties (Godrej) and HDFC Property Ventures (Parekh) and, during the course of 1998 once suitable locations had been identified, the private jet that flew members to various parts of the country to view the shortlisted sites was provided by Reliance Industries (Ambani).
Later, following a series of setbacks, delays and the ensuing rising costs—approximated at $80m, when it became apparent that the initial fund would be insufficient for their plans, a new fundraising drive was launched by the members: ‘everyone worked their networks, at home and abroad. People called on personal and business friends and asked for donations’ (Sinha, 2011, p.53), resulting in pledges of $50m (the remaining shortfall met by loans).

As Sinha acknowledges, the board members were not thinking solely of India: while ‘making a contribution to the Indian economy and its development was a clear priority’ (p.38), and ‘patriotism played no small role’ (p.186); board members were also thinking of the globalising world and the increasing interplay between the emerging economies of Asia and the West and the potential role that ISB had to play in this and the creation of future managers and leaders - it was in ‘everyone’s interests’ that the idea of ISB should succeed and, in this respect, ‘selling the dream’ (p.186) became an important and essential part of the project.

Not only highly networked, these business leaders are bound by shared values, perspectives and objectives, able to communicate with ease within their networks and enabling the flow of information, ideas, influence and capital. In informing, involving and encouraging the participation of like-minded others - as Sinha remarks ‘the more the prominent names that became involved, the more other prominent names wanted to become involved’ (p.17, emphasis in original) - these alliances are not randomly made but strategically formed and highly contingent and illustrative of their socially and economically expansionary nature (Castells, 2000).

There is an additional and important element to the nature of these reforming business networks. Sinha (2011) describes how very early on in its history the ISB was threatened with closure by the All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) on the grounds of

---
39 The AICTE is a statutory body and national level council for technical education under the purview of the Department of HE at the Ministry for Human Resource Development (MHRD). Set up in 1945 as a national level advisory body on the facilities for technical education and to promote coordinated development at a national level. See: https://www.aicte-india.org/
'commercialisation' and that this failure to get accredited by the statutory body meant that ISB was forced to issue a certificate for the MBA programme rather than a degree as first envisaged. He describes the ISB as having subsequently 'become part of the fabric of Indian business education' (Sinha, 2011, p.104). He explains that part of the exercise in providing his account of the founding of the ISB and ways and means by which the founding members were able to achieve or 'realise the dream,' was so that others with a similar goal or ambition to establish a business school or an academic institution would be able to refer to the ISB experience, use it as a case study and draw lessons from it; arguing that the ISB has changed the rules of the game and that 'ISB begins where IIMs end' (p.95).

Sinha highlights areas where the ISB has been particularly innovative such as in the offering of one-year programmes, which had not been offered in India before; he describes the visiting faculty model as 'original and unique' to ISB (Sinha, 2011, p.192) and that the ISB came to be referred to as 'fly by night' on account of visiting faculty just flying in for a particular seminar and leaving. Sinha argues this challenges the notion whether permanent faculty are necessary for great teaching, and suggests that perhaps attention needs to be given to the ways in which to make 'faculty more globally mobile' (p.193) and by association, temporary. He goes on to add that 'we broke the mould by charging high fees and, along with this, we introduced student loans' (p.193).

Thus, by 'selling the dream' and animating their networks, these business leaders and reformers are not merely injecting and expending energy and effort, they are also experimenting, feeling their way, 'trying things out and getting things done, changing things' - making things happen - even if this entails circumventing or 'short-circuiting' blockages or obstacles (Ball, 2008b, pp.760-761). These are not ordinary or minor changes nor are they just related to Indian business education, these examples as provided by Sinha are significantly reforming with potential and capacity for diffusion to the Indian HE sector as a whole, as Sinha says in relation to the ISB’s innovations, ‘...all these things broke new ground in India’ (Sinha, 2011, p.194).
By virtue of their wealth and ability to wield influence, these networks of elite business leaders are able to bring both credibility and legitimacy to their ventures. It is noteworthy that when the first meeting of the reconstituted PMCTI was convened in December 1999, five of its members: Ratan Tata, Kumar Mangalam Birla, NR Narayana Murthy; Rahul Bajaj and Mukesh Ambani (via Reliance which at that time, was jointly owned with his brother, Anil Ambani) were already committed to the idea of ISB and had invested in it in terms of ‘ideas’ - as Adi Godrej explains above – time, and/or, more crucially, money, in making ‘the dream’ come true. These members were not mere committee members participating in the PMCTI both in their capacity as advisors to the GoI and as business leaders, but co-collaborators and co-investors in a project to which they had given shape, and to which they were personally, professionally and financially committed to realising.

A significant and noteworthy dimension to this founding group and early governing board of business leaders is, that with a notable exception, it consists almost entirely of India’s mercantile communities, in which the Bania caste predominates, as Table 6, compiled below illustrates.
**Table 6. Members of the ISB Founding Group and Early Governing Board**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rahul Bajaj</td>
<td>Bajaj Auto, Chair</td>
<td>Bania&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>→</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anil Ambani</td>
<td>Reliance, then MD</td>
<td>Bania →</td>
<td>→</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukesh Ambani&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Reliance, then part of</td>
<td>Bania →</td>
<td>→</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K M Birla</td>
<td>Aditya Birla Group, Chair</td>
<td>Bania →</td>
<td>→</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakshmi Niwas Mittal</td>
<td>Arcelor Mittal, Chair and CEO</td>
<td>Bania →</td>
<td>→</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deepak Parekh</td>
<td>Housing Devpt. Finance Corp. (HDFC), Chair</td>
<td>Bania →</td>
<td>→</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dipak Jain&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Kellogg, Dean</td>
<td>Bania →</td>
<td>→</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajat Gupta</td>
<td>McKinsey and Co, MD and ISB, Co-Founder</td>
<td>Bania →</td>
<td>→</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunil Bharti Mittal</td>
<td>Bharti Enterprises, Chair and Group CEO</td>
<td>Bania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rakesh Bharti Mittal</td>
<td>Bharti Enterprises, MD and VC</td>
<td>Bania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nandini Piramal</td>
<td>Piramal Healthcare Ltd</td>
<td>Bania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalaj Ashwin Dani</td>
<td>Asian Paints Limited, President</td>
<td>Bania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogesh Deveshwar</td>
<td>Indian Tobacco Co (ITC) Ltd, Chair</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adi Godrej</td>
<td>Godrej Industries, Chair</td>
<td>Parsi&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>→</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keki Dadiseth</td>
<td>Hindustan Lever, Chair</td>
<td>Parsi →</td>
<td>→</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratan Tata&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Tata and Sons, Chair</td>
<td>Parsi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anand Mahindra&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Mahindra and Mahindra, Chair</td>
<td>Khatri&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt; (Mercantile)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Banias are from the Hindu/Jain faiths, mostly from the states of Gujarat and Rajasthan.

<sup>b</sup> Mukesh Ambani, brother of Anil Ambani, is included here as at the time, Reliance group of companies was jointly owned by the two brothers and contribution from Reliance is cited in Sinha (2011).

<sup>c</sup> Dipak Jain, at the time Professor of Marketing at Kellogg, is included as he is described as being ‘one of ISB’s strongest supporters’ (Sinha, 2011, p.23) and Kellogg, along with Wharton, was one of the first of the business schools, to sign an MOU with the ISB in 1997, followed, in 2000, by the LBS.

<sup>d</sup> Predominantly from the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat, Parsis are of the Zoroastrian faith and not part of the Hindu caste system.

<sup>e</sup> Both Ratan Tata and Anand Mahindra subsequently resigned.
Represented in this table are two of India’s traditional mercantile communities of different faiths: the highly successful Banias who, advantaged by their historical trading and banking networks, are renowned for their control over and success in commercial activities as well as their ‘single-minded capacity for acquisition’ (Habib, 1990, p.384), as
previously established (Chapters Two and Three); and the numerically smaller and influential Parsis who, as Lamb, (1955, p.104) reminds, from very early when India was colonised, acted as Britain’s economic and political middlemen in dealing with the Indian Hindu population, securing valuable contracts and concessions in return. As Chapter Two showed, both these communities have established histories of trading and, in the case of the Banias, by virtue of belonging to the Hindu caste system, a religiously sanctified culture of trading. The Bania caste in particular, for whom trade was considered their rightful occupation, are acknowledged to have remained the most faithful to their occupation and for longer than any other caste (Russell and Hiralal in Habib, 1990). While the Banias hail predominantly from the neighbouring states of Gujarat and Rajasthan, the Parsis are mostly from the current day neighbouring states of Maharashtra and Gujarat - formally one province, Bombay, and under colonial rule, a province of British India (Chapter Two).

Also represented in the compiled table, are the Khatris, a smaller and more localised mercantile caste from the state of Punjab who historically were ordinary shop-keepers and money lenders when not employed as lawyers, teachers or revenue officials in their capacity as administrators of the state (Damodaran, 2008; Russell and Hiralall, 1916b). And finally, the Brahmins (upper caste Hindus) and the Bengali Bhadralok (mostly upper-caste, middle class educated Hindus from Bengal - the ‘scribal castes’ - who traditionally served the state) - see Chapter Two. Damodaran (2008) describes their entry into business as a largely a post-independence occurrence in which they were assisted, among other things, by early access to secular education, the English language, and the resulting foreign collaborations and licencing arrangements that this early access and their proximity to the sea ports enabled (Chapter Two).

The global computer software company, Infosys, founded by first generation Brahmin business leader from Karnataka, NR Narayana Murthy (member of the PMCTI and ISB founding group) serves as but one example of the change in the social composition of India’s business community (Chapter Four). Others relevant to this study include another first-generation business leader Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw of Biocon Ltd. from Gujarat (later
a member of the governing board of the ISB, see last column of Table 6); and Ramdas Madhava Pai, son of the surgeon TMA Pai from coastal Karnataka, pioneers of self-financing colleges in India and latter day Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE) - see Chapter Seven.

Describing India as ‘unbound’ following the ‘statist’ economic path pursued by India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, and the introduction of reforms by Prime Minister Rao as India’s ‘second Independence’, business historian, self-proclaimed libertarian and former CEO of Procter and Gamble, Das (2000) suggests that following the economic liberal reforms of the 1990’s ‘baniaisation’ - that is to say, non-mercantile communities following the Bania community into trade and business, or entrepreneurialism more broadly - has spread more widely to Indian society. Alluding to the Banias money-making tendencies and propensity for capital accumulation, he states:

*Instead of morally judging caste, I seek to understand its impact on competitiveness. I have come to believe that being endowed with commercial castes is a source of advantage in the global economy. Banias know how to accumulate and manage capital. They have financial resources and more important, financial acumen. They have ... the propensity to take calculated risks. They have proven their flexibility of mind as they have graduated from trading to industry. These constitute significant strengths. After the economic reforms, our business houses have acquired new respectability and are on the rise socially. More and more people want to emulate them and become entrepreneurs. Making money has become acceptable. There is a huge change in people’s attitudes and intellectuals call it the ‘baniaisation of Indian society’. The children of the Brahmins and Kshatriyas no longer view the civil service as the career of choice. They want to get an MBA and go into business. Indeed, business schools are one of the biggest growth industries. Money and not power is what motivates young people ... our new entrepreneurs in software, e-commerce ...and other knowledge industries are predominantly emerging from the non-commercial castes* (Das, 2000, pp.163-164).

Noteworthy here is the interplay of the historical and contemporary role of caste in Indian business and commerce, and global and local values and ideas producing an interesting effect, a ‘glocal’ neoliberalism. There exists on the one hand, an indigenous and local form of ‘kinship-based market practice’ or ‘vernacular capitalism’ (Birla, 2009) which reveals the culturally and historically embedded practices within these personal, social, financial, commercial relations and associations among Indian businesses (Scott, 1991).
This embeddedness is encapsulated by the Marwari traders, firms and business houses in particular, as narrated by Kumar Mangalam Birla above, and the Bania mercantile community more broadly (Chapters Two and Three) – in which caste and money - plays such a pivotal role, as Das (2000) highlights above. And on the other hand, the introduction of neo-liberal reforms in the 1990s which against the context of the changing values and economic policies of the Indian state (Chapter Four), produces what might be described as a ‘glocal’ neoliberalism, as captured by the ‘baniaisation’ (Das, 2000) of Indian society.

Arguably, parallels - and a form of continuity and intensification - can be discerned here. Earlier influences and introduction of Western, liberal ideas and values under colonial rule in India broke the ‘backbone of occupational immobility’ (Tripathi, 1971, p.63), enabled the formation of ‘unorthodox alliances’ (Roy, 2012), led to the rise and popularity of the English language and the accompanying proliferation of schools and colleges offering the medium of instruction (Chapter Two). In a similar fashion, neoliberal values and influences, most particularly with its emphasis on entrepreneurialism, can be evidenced here as a form of ‘glocal’ neoliberalism or ‘baniaisation’ (Das, 2000) and the valorisation of business, accompanied by a rise and demand for MBAs and, correspondingly, a growth in business schools, as Das suggests. This is akin in a way to Rudolph and Rudolph’s (1972) ‘genetic imprint [s]’.

In this sense, neoliberal practices cannot be viewed as operating or functioning alone; rather neoliberal practices can be said to be operating alongside already existing and established business practices and mutated forms of market rule (Peck, 2013) in which the past, present and the imagined future are interwoven. As Peck (2013, p.140) emphasises, ‘neoliberalism is never found alone and it never acts alone’. Peck (2010, pp.46-47) elaborates elsewhere, ‘... as a mobile technology of governance, it must always cohabit with others ... [requiring] coalition partners, allies and supporters ... In this sense, it can be seen as a parasitic form of political practice ...’. As such, neoliberal processes need to be considered ‘... amongst others of neoliberalism that are not only elsewhere and ‘out there’, but also right here, side by side in mongrel forms of market rule, and
amongst others to neoliberalism, its various competitors, would-be successors, and alternatives’ (Peck, 2013, p.135), and as encapsulated by ‘baniaisation’ (Das, 2000).

If, as in ISB’s 'strapline', business is a force of good, caste here is similarly depicted as a force of good and advantage by Das (2000), as well as one of change - both transformative and reformative. On the one hand, while historically the Bania community has been denied a high position and status within the hierarchical caste system (Chapters Two – Four) and as Das notes above in relation to the business houses acquiring ‘new respectability’, what is being singled out and valorised are very specific skills and attributes of the Bania business leaders which bear a direct relation to their wealth and class, and accords these Bania business leaders authority, credibility and worth enabling them to bring their ‘entrepreneurial capital’ (Ball, 2008b) to bear upon their ideas and ventures. And by way of emulation, purportedly, enabling those who have these same set of skills - or have the ability to acquire them, as Das suggests, through MBAs offered by business schools, such as the ISB - to be enterprising and take advantage of opportunities that the opening up India’s economy and the global economy more broadly may have to offer.

On the other hand, and paradoxically, while this ‘entrepreneurial capital’ (Ball, 2008b) is being extolled and elevated; what is being alluded to here by ‘baniaisation’ (Das, 2000) is neither complimentary nor virtuous, rather the opposite. The term, with its derogatory connotations and associations with a lamentable set of values not worthy of emulation is deeply embedded in Indian society, given its high levels of poverty and multiple social divisions (Chapter Two). Its meaning, along with the extent and effect of these shifting attitudes, values and the broader transformation in Indian society can only fully be appreciated or understood when considered against how business, trading castes, and Banias, most especially, were traditionally regarded. While earlier chapters alluded to this, it is worth recapturing the regard in which this group was held very briefly here so as to be able to realise the full extent of this transformation but also because one reference bears a direct relation to a founding group member of the ISB and key policy actor in this study.
While the Vaishya (merchant/trade) caste traditionally ‘held a higher position than the Shudra (peasant and manual labourer), they were vastly inferior to the Brahmin and the Kshatriya’ (Damodaran, 2008, p.2) and the view of the Brahmin Hindu statesman and philosopher, Kautilya (300 BCE), author of the ancient Indian political treatise Arthashastra (The Science of Wealth), that merchants and businessmen were ‘thieves, in effect, if not in name’ was widely held (p.2). The low esteem in which business was traditionally regarded in India is similarly but more evocatively conveyed by Tripathi (1971) who uses a proverb from late 19th century India in which the Jain Bania is described as drinking filtered water while sucking unfiltered blood of the poor. Closer still to this study and founding group members, G.D.Birla, great grandfather of Kumar Mangalam Birla, is reported as being known as ‘moneylender of last resort... who charges extortionate interest and dispossesses widows of their land and jewellery when the loan is not repaid, ... the ruthless tycoon who did not stop at anything...’ (Das, 2004, para. 1).

Thus, while the wealth of the Bania business leaders may be valorised, their opportunistic means of acquiring this wealth is less so, and, ‘banaiisation’, by its pervasiveness through its gradual inclusivity of the non-commercial castes, can be seen to be unsettling the established practices of these communities. ‘Banaiisation’ constitutes a form of ‘global assemblage’ (Collier & Ong, 2005), that is to say an amalgam of local/national/global elements and circumstances in which factors of class, caste, religions, cultures, traditions and historical practices co-exist and intermingle. These can be seen to be producing transformative effects that are productive, consumptive and potentially ‘liberating’ but within which tensions and dynamisms coexist side by side as established practices are simultaneously unsettled and given impetus. Through these transformative and reformative processes, creatively and functionally new and very powerful authorities with claims to knowledge are created (Rose, 1993).

What is being suggested here is that the mercantile Bania caste alongside their ways of working - which have by tradition focused on profit and capital accumulation - by association and extension to the other communities represented Table 6 above, constitute a ‘dynamism encountered’ (Ong, 2007). This serves to provide delimiting
‘conditions of possibility’ (p.5) in which neoliberal logic and practice, recontextualised as ‘baniaisation’ (Das, 2000) and constituting a variety of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ (Brenner and Theodore, 2002), can flourish. These are ‘situated sets of elements and circumstances’ (Ong, 2007, p.5), or practices and interactions which assist in mediating and advancing the ‘global expansion of neoliberal ideas and practices’ (Ball, 2012a) and lend it traction.

The current governing board members of the ISB which still includes most of the founding group early governing board members, (Table 6 above), and the next generation leaders board has expanded largely along similar caste lines as a partial exercise indicates, though some other castes are also introduced such as the Shudra and Nadar who are among ‘some of the most successful entrepreneurs of late ... from castes who for centuries have worked the land’ (Guha, 2008, p.699) - see last column of Table 6 above.

The expansion of the ISB in 2012 into Mohali in the state of Punjab also reflects this trajectory. With encouragement from the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the second campus was enabled with greater ease and assistance from the state government - by way of land - and the involvement of four business leaders for whom Punjab represents their home state: Analjit Singh (Max India); Sunil Kant Munjal (Hero Corporate Service); Rakesh Bharti Mittal (Bharti Enterprises) and Atul Punj (Punj Lloyd Group) who collectively committed $45m to the establishment of the campus (Sinha, 2011). With the exception of Mittal who is from the Bania caste, all the other three business leaders - as well as the former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh - belong to the Khatri mercantile caste.

Aside from these associated links of class and caste among the business leaders, closer inspection shows their further associations by way of memberships of other management schools such as the IIM-A (NR Narayana Murthy; Mukesh Ambani; Anil Ambani), IIM-B (Mukesh Ambani; Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw), Wharton (NR Narayana Murthy; Anil Ambani), Stanford (NR Narayana Murthy; Mukesh Ambani) and Harvard (Ratan Tata; Rahul Bajaj; Rajat Gupta) Schools of Business of which they are also Alumni. Membership of the CII
is also a recurring feature (Anand Mahindra, Adi Godrej, Y Devashwar, KV Kamath, Rahul Bajaj and Kumar Mangalam Birla). Nor should the association of Kumar Mangalam Birla with the FICCI (member of the PMCTI), by way of family member Sidharth Birla, be forgotten.

There are associations which are also of a more personal nature, whereby businesses and families are linked through marriage, (Kumar Mangalam Birla, Rahul Bajaj, Anil Ambani, Mukesh Ambani and Jalaj Ashwin Dani); or which are based on close and longstanding friendships, as shown or signalled earlier. In 2012, when Rajat Gupta was convicted in the US for insider trading, a (now defunct) website was created for him 'www.friendsofrajat.com', through which his supporters came out in his defense, among them:

Reliance Industries chairman and billionaire Mukesh Ambani has said that he has known Rajat for over 20 years: "In every conversation I have had with him over the years, he was always talking about the things he wanted to do for India ... he will always be a friend of mine."

Collectively, the relations outlined above serve to show the deep, complex and intricate nature of these networks as well as high degrees of connectedness - in every sense of the word. Drawn and held together by a set of values, their vision and ideas of doing good ‘for India’, or, as founding group member AGodrej remarks earlier about the business leaders’ collective vision behind the ISB, in ‘pursuit of a shared dream’, these networks of elite and highly influential leaders can be likened to ‘circuits and systems bearing power’ (Marginson and Sawir, 2005, p.281). Power here not only in terms of the economic power – important though this has been shown here - but discursive power which is a crucial element within these flows and networks (Ball, 2007) which through articulation, repetition, and circulation lend credence and legitimacy to neoliberal ideas and values. In this sense, these business leaders and policy actors can be likened to ‘carriers of global effects and creators of global effects’ (Marginson and Sawir, 2005, pp.281-282).

If the ISB has served as an example of the evolving nature of networks and, in and through their animation, the skilful deployment of the business leaders’ various capitals, it is also illustrative of the close partnership between the GoI and business.

Privileged by their by wealth, their extensive global business networks and thus economic power and bound by this wealth, status, class and caste which enables them to act almost in a collective manner over a sector which they dominate, these business leaders are akin to the government’s ‘inner circle’ (Useem, 1984) where they have formal – and informal - access to governmental decision making processes. This is either by way of specially created advisory councils or committees in which business leaders dominate, such as the PMCTI, or through business organisations and trade bodies, such as the FICCI and CII (Chapter Three), both of which are also represented on the PMCTI (Table 4 above). In short, these business leaders constitute ‘the highest circles of government consultation’ (Useem, 1984, p.18), as described in Chapters Three and Four and as subsequent chapters further illustrate.

At the ISB’s inauguration in December 2001, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee called on the education system in both the government and private sectors to ‘tap into … [India’s] … great demographic opportunity’. Identifying education as a key with which to unlock India’s potential, the Prime Minister welcomed the new spirit of competition among the different states of India. Alluding to the State of Maharashtra’s failed bid in securing the ISB investment because of its strict adherence to its reservation/affirmative action policy towards the most marginalised groups in India, the Prime Minister praised the efforts of the Chief Minister (CM) of Andhra Pradesh in securing the ISB deal, stating: ‘Those states that are more enterprising, hardworking … will naturally get ahead in this era of competition. But the beauty of this competition among states is that, whoever wins, it is India that ultimately wins’. Referring to the ISB as manifestation of patriotism and gratitude that successful Indians have towards their motherland, he complimented this collective action of many Indian businessmen in India and abroad.41

CONCLUSION

Against the context of the PMCTI, I briefly introduced the main aspects of the Policy Framework for Private Investment in Education, Health and Rural Development (GoI, 2000), its accompanying ‘directions, lessons and imperatives’ for India’s HE sector as articulated by the two business leaders charged with the policy formulation, Mukesh Ambani and Kumar Mangalam Birla; which, in addition to its projection of a neoliberal vision of the Indian HE system and its graduates, envisages a new role for the GoI and business/market.

Following on from this, some of the business and socio-economic networks of these elite global business leaders and authors of the report were explored whereby their ties and associations were shown to be linked by class, caste, religion, business, family and friendships as well as by their membership of elite educational institutions, among others.

I described how the interplay and fusion of an indigenous, local form of ‘kinship-based market practice or vernacular capitalism’ (Birla, 2009) with the introduction of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s, produces a form of ‘glocal’ neoliberalism, recontextualised as ‘baniaisation’ (Das, 2000), which constitute ‘situated elements’ (Ong, 2007) that lend traction to the expansion of neoliberal ideas, values and practices.

Relatedly and using the ISB as an illustrative case, I demonstrated how these elite business leaders’ socio-economic ties and associations - their capitals - assist not only in network formations but equally to their mobilisation to new ventures and opportunities which enable the ‘global expansion of neoliberal ideas’ (Ball, 2012a) in relation to Indian HE. Using the ISB as an illustrative case also served to show the relationship of business to Indian HE not just in relation to the potential creation and reservoir of ‘appropriately skilled’ graduates but also in terms of potential future returns or profit opportunities (Chapter Seven).

Thus, from Prime Minister Vajpayee’s speech at ISB’s inauguration above, there emerges a picture in relation to Indian HE in which the private sector, as represented by the business leaders - Indian as well as diasporic and founding group members of the ISB - is invited to ‘tap into … [India’s] … great demographic opportunity’ and to unlock her potential, to which HE is key. Inherent in this picture is also another form of ‘parallel’ in
that just as the Hindoo College in Calcutta described its establishment as an ‘experiment in native management’ and involved the participation of business in its establishment (Chapter Two), the ISB here, or at least its founding group members, are likewise invited to assist the GoI in a similar form of population management, or in tapping into the country’s ‘demographic opportunity’. This represents, as signalled earlier, ‘family resemblances in ways of thinking and acting’ and for alternative forms or modes of governing to be formulated (Miller and Rose, 2008, p.17).

This idea of competition between states to realise India’s potential and ‘demographic dividend’ as voiced in Vajpayee’s speech and reframed by the Bharatiya Janata Party-led (BJP-led) National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government under Narendra Modi as ‘competitive federalism’ and the contribution to the ‘motherland’ by India’s diaspora are explored and considered next. In doing so, the role of the two trade bodies, CII and FICCI, and some of the business leaders encountered in this chapter, all of whom appear time and again in subsequent sections, in partnering the government to enable this outreach and assisting the GoI in doing its work in relation to Indian HE, will also be explored.
CHAPTER SIX

DIASPORA STRATEGIES

We are a young nation ... for the next 40 years we would ... [sic] ... have a youthful, dynamic and productive workforce when the rest of the world, including China, is aging. The International Labour Organisation has predicted that by 2020, India will have 116 million workers at the beginning of their career in the age bracket of 20 to 24 years... In fact, in 20 years the labour force in the industrialised world will decline by 4 per cent, in China by 5 per cent, while in India it will increase by 32 per cent. With these favourable demographics and the enormous economic opportunities available in a globalising world, education is the ticket for realising your potential ... if we fail - our demographic dividend risks become a demographic disaster. This makes good, effective, relevant education ... a social and economic necessity ... for India.

Dr Shashi Tharoor, former Union Minister of State for Human Resource Development 42

... the individual becomes important for the state insofar as he can do something for the strength of the state. And in this perspective, there is a kind of political marginalism, since what matters here is only political utility...

Foucault (1988, p.409)

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter showed how the GoI referred to the ISB as the manifestation of patriotism and gratitude by successful Indian businessmen in India and abroad towards their 'motherland', a patriotism which it sought to encourage in its various states, identifying education as a key with which to unlock India's potential or 'demographic dividend'. This harnessing of 'Indians Abroad' will be explored and described here through the initiatives undertaken by the GoI, beginning with the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD) - Indians Abroad Day. The PBD illustrates the new and growing importance of India's diaspora following the country's economic reforms and how, in contrast to its previous attitude, the GoI is re-constituting diaspora as national subjects in various ways including through changes to immigration policies. Seeking a shift away from mere remittances to investments, the inclusion of education as one of the sectors for investments makes it particularly noteworthy which, it is argued here, is scaled up by the appropriation of such initiatives by business leaders - new and previously encountered - through the Public Private Partnership (PPP) created Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC), in which throughout the role of the trade bodies such as the FICCI is central. This chapter will begin to show and subsequently develop further in the next chapter, how this outreach to the diaspora by promoting the HE as investment opportunity is advancing the privatisation of the sector and its investment and trade.

DIASPORA STRATEGIES and GLOBAL GOVERNMENTALITY

Ho, Hickey, and Yeoh (2015) describe diaspora strategies (DS) as initiatives aimed at mobilising emigrants for the purposes of economic development and or nation building. While higher income countries seek and rely on the knowledge and skills of global talent to drive their economic growth, lower- and middle-income countries, such as India, rely on remittances and personal investments by nationals abroad who retain and maintain links with their 'motherland' or community. Such inward flows of capital can be an invaluable source of finance which governments, particularly of lower- and middle-income countries, are increasingly keen to optimise. As will be shown below, while DS can be government led, they can also be led by social actors - in this study business
leaders both within India and abroad, predominantly the US. Categorised by their governments as ‘talent’, they are considered highly skilled and able to advance the economic growth of their countries. Such ‘talented’ individuals include: financial professionals, engineers and investors or entrepreneurs.

Before proceeding further, it is worth noting here that the term Indian diaspora is problematic in that the use of the term to describe overseas Indians collectively cannot adequately convey the diverse set of people (regions, languages, religions, class and caste) and the migration patterns (causes, consequences, period of migration, and host country variations) it subsumes (Pande, 2013). This point is expanded on where it assists in describing the changes in the GoI’s DS in relation to ‘Indians abroad’, however, this chapter/thesis does not seek to provide a description of ‘the mosaic of Indian identities abroad’ (p.59).

Following Larner (2007, p.334) here the rise of formal DS seeks to ‘make manifest new conceptions of governance premised on conceptions of global flows, networks and mobility’ and thereby exemplifying ‘the rise of a global governmentality’. By ‘global governmentality’, it is meant that the governing of individuals is extended to beyond the territorial boundary of the nation-state, to encompass global/regional/national spaces where, in the new forms of population management - such as through DS, the binaries of ‘here’/’there’ are removed. More specifically, it is how the GoI’s relations with Indians abroad ‘are being rethought and put to new purposes’ (p.338).

As a driver of the global mobility of people, education, and HE in particular, features significantly. The triple agency report led by Asian Development Bank Institute (2014), reports that students from Asia constitute 52% of all international students in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and more than half the recent Asian migrants in OECD countries are highly educated and ... represent an important contribution to the skilled workforce in OECD countries...’ (pp.iii-iv); the report regards the Asian region as being the main driver behind the growth in skilled migration (p.15).
According to the OECD (2013), the number of international students has more than doubled between the period 2000 and 2011. The largest numbers of international students are from China, India ... with Asian students accounting for over half of all students studying abroad worldwide in 2011 (OECD, 2013) with the forecast continuing to point upwards.

 Meanwhile, UN figures on migration show that 232 million people, or 3.2 per cent of the world’s population, live abroad worldwide and potentially make a ‘very important contribution to social and economic development both in the countries of origin and ... destination ... [and represent] ... a crucial means of broadening access to resources and reducing poverty’ (UN-DESA, 2013, paras. 7-8).

As the World Bank’s press release on global migrants’ remittances posted on its website\(^4\) shows, a total of $436 billion was sent back to the migrants’ home countries in the year 2014, of which $70 billion was sent back to India, beating China and the Philippines to top place. The remittances of $70 billion by Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) during 2014 exceeded the earnings from India’s flagship software exports which peaked at $65 billion. The press release adds that in addition to these large annual flows of remittances, migrants in high income countries ‘are estimated to hold savings in excess of $500 billion annually ... [representing] ... a huge pool of funds that developing countries can do much more to tap into’ (para. 11).

Of these global migrants, India’s Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs’ (MOIA)\(^4\) estimates the number of Indians living abroad at 25 million. This figure comprises of both of Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) – who are not citizens of India - and Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) – who are citizens of India. As the MOIA in its 2012-2013 annual report acknowledges, for developing countries such as India, these remittances can go some way in addressing the problems of poverty and inequality and can serve to ‘reinforce the symbiotic development-migration paradigm’ (GoI, 2013, p.7). While some of these


\(^4\) In 2016, the GoI announced its decision to merge the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs’ (MOIA) with the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), see: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Government-to-merge-overseas-Indian-affairs-ministry-with-MEA/articleshow/50491031.cms, 03/02/17.
diaspora are low or semi-skilled workers predominantly in the Gulf States, the others are highly skilled professionals, workers and HE students who reside and work in developed countries such as US (the most favoured destination), Canada, UK and, increasingly, Australia. While this flow and mobility of Indian migrants is not new, it gathered impetus with the emigration of IT professionals in the 1990s (Chapter Four) and has steadily grown (GoI, 2013).

Drawing attention to long established patterns of ‘diasporization of communities’, Rizvi (2009, p.271) highlights the complex link between historical patterns of mobility by communities to more contemporary forms: where previously this mobility represented a relatively more permanent move, it is now more contingent – aspirational and opportunistic even – which he attributes to being more reflective of the practices and logic of capital accumulation which is to ‘induce subjects to respond fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions’ (Ong in Rizvi, 2009, p.271).

The growth in the mobility of its subjects has resulted in the GoI’s attempt to institutionalise its diaspora through government policies and programmes by way of a host of initiatives, as described in Chapter Four. These initiatives which signal a shift in the attitude of the GoI towards its diaspora are not aimed solely at enhancing the country’s global competitiveness and stimulating its economic development, important though these considerations are, but also on harnessing and capitalising on existing diasporic networks, particularly those of business leaders, to both facilitate and advance the transnational flow of capital, not merely in the form of remittances, but most particularly in the form of investments, and of relevance to this study, in Indian HE.

With a key concern for India being the creation of an employable workforce to harness and optimise its demographic dividend (Ernst and Young, FICCI, and GoI, 2012), it is perhaps unsurprising that the prevalent discourse in India stresses the needs of the global economy and a globally skilled workforce and serves to rate education in economic terms and in relation to its contribution to international market competitiveness (Ball, 2010b). Particularly, as increasingly student migration can provide
the means for employment and residency in host countries leading thereby to the formation of future Indian diaspora and all that this has to offer in economic terms.

The opening quote of this chapter on India’s demographic dividend in a way symbolises/conveys a sense of the description of the qualities attributed to India’s existing and established diaspora - youthful, dynamic and productive (and implicit in this hardworking and enterprising) - who the GoI, through its DS, currently wishes to enfold and assume its responsibilities towards and bring under its ‘parental charge’. These are qualities which, as will be shown below, the GoI celebrates and champions as ‘talent’. Simultaneously, it is suggested here, these very same qualities represent the attributes of India’s future diaspora and ones which the GoI wishes to cultivate and nurture, as it is also suggested here, through the reformation of its HE sector, conjuring up in the process a world of (economic) possibilities.

As noted in Chapter Four, a host of government initiatives, some of which are covered here, were established with the establishment of the High-Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora in September 2000 illustrating most the shift in the attitude of the GoI towards its diaspora. Described as a major initiative, this High-Level Committee sought to create a policy framework for creating a more conducive environment in India to ‘leverage these invaluable human resources’ - and thus forge stronger ties between the Indian Diaspora and India, as well as to highlight their expectations from their mother country. The appointment of the High-Level Committee was said to represent ‘a historic first step since our independence’.45

One of its recommendations included the setting up of a Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Indians Abroad Day) to be celebrated both in India and abroad on 9th January every year, the first of which, in 2003, was organised in partnership with the FICCI ‘where [the] cream of the Indian community from all over the globe’ were to be present. Targeting a selected audience, the event was publicised via Indian embassies to various Indian chambers of commerce around the world, as well as to Indian-owned businesses, and private

45 http://indiandiaspora.nic.in/pressrelease.htm, accessed 11/05/15
entrepreneurs among others. Sessions over the three-day period promised to cover: 
*Economic Development, International Trade, Education.* The carefully chosen date represents the day in 1915 when Mahatma Gandhi ‘the greatest Pravasi’ [Indian abroad], *returned to India ... led India’s freedom struggle and changed the lives of Indians forever.*Evocatively framed in this way and compared to Gandhi, India’s diaspora are somehow - and very powerfully - constituted as stewards or custodians of India’s economic wellbeing and the realization of its economic potential. An extension as it were of the theme of ‘trusteeship’ required of Indian business leaders by Gandhi after independence (Chapter Three). Though the date continues to be a defining feature and reference point of the event, serving as an example of the patriotism demanded of its diaspora, the DS of the GoI does not demand its permanent return to India, like Gandhi, only that it return to ‘do good’ (see Mani and Varadarajan, 2005).

Larner (2007) observes that although highly skilled expatriates may no longer be required to return, as ‘returnees’ they are nonetheless subject to new strategies that engage them in activities in their ‘motherland’. In this case here, the returnee – selected from the professional elites and business leaders - is invited, indeed incentivised (see below) to invest in the ‘motherland’ in a range of sectors, including Indian HE. Recounting her own personal experience upon returning to her homeland, Malaysia, as an ethnic Chinese, Ong (2014) remarks on the change in attitude and behaviour of immigration officials, previously ‘disdained former citizens’ such as herself are now welcomed back as ‘bringers of cash’. Ong argues that construed as builders of the economy of the ‘motherland’, the returning citizen is regarded and treated as a vehicle for channelling resources, thereby representing an ‘intricate manoeuvre’ in the notion of flexible citizenship (Ong, 2014).

This notion of welcoming the ‘returning citizens’ to use Ong’s term under the banner of PBD is noteworthy in another way. Describing how Jawaharlal Nehru, when Prime Minister, left the decision of whether or not Indians abroad chose to remain Indian

---

46 http://indiandiaspora.nic.in/pbdivas.htm, accessed 11/05/15.  
citizens (and therefore able to claims on the ‘motherland’) or took up the nationalities of host countries, Mani and Varadarajan (2005) argue that whereas the categories NRI and PIO referred to different histories of migration as well as different class positions, under the PBD initiative these two categories were conflated into one to produce a singular historic narrative and signal a marked departure from previous government policies towards NRI and PIO populations. They explain while the term NRI, initially introduced in 1973, was used to describe the professional migrant in Europe and North America, the category PIO - more prominent term in the late 1990s – was more generically used to include descendants of immigrants who had left India during its colonial period to provide unskilled and semi-skilled labour in other colonial territories. The use of the singular ‘diaspora’ rather than in its plural form at the PBD illustrates the ways in which India’s diasporas have been actively reimagined within the nationalist practices of the contemporary Indian state and serve to produce a single history of cultural, economic, and political affiliation to India reflecting the GoI’s new approach and relationship with its diaspora (Mani and Varadarajan, 2005).

And these have continued and gathered apace since the first PBD in 2003. Under successive coalition governments of different political leanings, the PBD continues to be underpinned by an emphasis on economic reform and development cultivated by incentivised foreign investment (see below) and accompanied by announcements of relaxation of visa rules for ‘Indians abroad’ or the launch of new schemes aimed at facilitating the mobility of ‘Indians abroad’, their financial capital and ‘talent’ into India to facilitate their involvement in education. This is exemplified in the former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s announcement in 2011, following the launch of the PIO card in 1999 and the introduction of the Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) scheme in 2005:

Our Government had introduced the Overseas Citizen of India card and the People (Person’s) of Indian Origin card to facilitate visa-free travel to India as well as to provide the rights of residency and participation in business and educational activities in India. We have recently reviewed the functioning of these schemes, and have decided to merge the OCI and PIO cards into a single facility. We hope to iron out some of the problems that have arisen in the implementation of these schemes. 

More recently at the PBD in 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated:

*NRI are a big strength of India, and India can make a global impact by reaching out to them. The Prime Minister said he was happy to announce that he had fulfilled all promises made to NRIs, such as lifelong visa for PIO cardholders, merging of PIO and OCI schemes.*

As signalled at the outset, India’s ‘*talent*’ as represented in its diaspora is celebrated and championed by the GoI, representing a set of attributes and skills that need to be highlighted and worthy of emulation. One of the features of the PBD when initiated, included an award-giving ceremony in recognition of Indians abroad deemed to have made contributions to their countries of residence as well as their ‘commitment’ to their ‘*motherland*’. Among the recipients in 2003 was Rajat Gupta, MD of McKinsey and founder of the ISB, in recognition of being:

*...the first PIO to become the CEO of the prestigious global corporation at a remarkably young age ... and spearheaded ... [sic] firm’s global expansion ... an exemplary story of a person of Indian origin giving leadership to a global concern, resting on professionalism and management skills ... He played a key-role in the establishment of the Indian School of Business ... played an important role in mobilizing a prominent section of the American leadership to pay objective attention to India’s concerns in general and economic issues in particular.*

Speaking a year later as a panellist in the plenary session where the theme was India and the Diaspora: Vision 2020, Mukesh Ambani reinforced this vision of Indian achievers who represent ‘*talent*’:

*India is today perceived as an emerging power, a country associated with achievers and a country whose people are acknowledged for their knowledge, talent, enterprise and intellect. The Diaspora must be commended for bringing about this radical change in perception.*

Linking education to talent, he advocated:

*Our education sector must be radically reformed if India has [sic] ... to attain global leadership in ideation and innovation ... India cannot achieve global leadership without making efforts to enhance market access through more bilateral and multilateral agreements.*

---

50 http://indiandiplomacy.nic.in/Citation_2003.pdf, (p.7), accessed 11/05/15.
51 http://indiandiplomacy.nic.in/PlenarySessionIV.pdf, (p.17) accessed 11/05/15.
Not only does the above highlight the emphasis on ‘talent’ but also how it is defined and constructed by both the GoI - through the award giving ceremony as exemplified by Rajat Gupta award above - as well as by business leaders, as articulated by Mukesh Ambani above, with a further very explicit link made to the education sector and the need for its reformation if such ‘talent’ in India is to be both cultivated and optimised and the potential of its demographic dividend to be realised. Almost as it were, lending legitimacy to the calls for the reform of India’s HE policy in which, in their own ways, these business leaders are central advocates. Underpinning this is the importance of the diaspora in the process – present and future - and the economic prosperity it promises, as epitomised and more importantly articulated here by these educated, professional elites and business leaders. Additionally, inherent in this construction of what constitutes as successful and representative of ‘talent’ is a reflection of how India wishes to be perceived and be positioned globally (Dickinson and Bailey, 2007) – see Chapter Eight.

Earlier government efforts to create a database are being scaled up under Prime Minister Modi’s leadership who, under the theme of ‘cooperative yet competitive federalism’, wishes to further systemize the pooling of ‘talent’:

*I want each state to build a global talent pool ... find out how many people from your states are living abroad and connect to them... they all want to do something for India ... A 100 Investors summit in Delhi won’t make a difference ... but one in each state would take India forward.*

This falls in with the range of techniques as described by Larner (2007) that seeks to engage highly skilled Indians abroad and also highlights the emphasis on accessing global economic networks through the identification and mobilisation of diaspora who have multiple affiliations such as, for example, Gujaratis, Punjabis, and all the linguistic, religious and ethnic diversity this encapsulates, but under the overarching idea of a common identity, that is India. Or as Singh (in Pande, 2013, p.64) describes it, the ‘many diasporas within the overarching Indian diaspora’.

---

Some have suggested that the idea of diaspora is appropriated in strategic ways (Dickinson and Bailey, 2007; Larner, 2007) and the identification, categorisation and leveraging of diaspora can be highly selective in terms of determining who is included/excluded from efforts to engage with and mobilise diaspora populations. Mani and Varadarajan (2005) in their coverage of the first PBD event, remark on the active recruitment of entrepreneurs and educated professional immigrants settled in Europe and North America at the PBD, selectively singled out as being of strategic importance to India’s economic growth and development and considered the most representative of India’s economic ambitions. This, they point out, is in stark contrast to those excluded, considered outside of the ‘Global Indian Family’, namely communities from current day Pakistan and Bangladesh - formerly part of pre-Independent India and both predominantly Muslim – who are markedly absent from the categorisation of diaspora by the GoI. Such ‘pro-talent strategies’ then which are aligned to the ‘dynamism of global markets’ necessarily select and target certain populations where considerations such as class, religion and caste come to play (Ong, 2007, pp.4-6) and through which selection, exclusion becomes an integral component.

Though first inaugurated by Prime Minister Vajpayee in 2003, the PBD has subsequently been administered by different coalition governments, and the annual event in 2014 included a pre-PBD Youth event ‘Youth Pravasi Bharatiya Divas 2014’ held in New Delhi in partnership with the MOIA and managed by the FICCI, during which the MOIA ‘exhorted the young Diaspora and the Indian youth to come together in developing strong networks to forge partnerships in trade, industry, entrepreneurship ... This will lead to the creation of wealth and employment...’ and where it was also announced that:

*the GoI was in the process of introducing a new National Youth Policy with a view to empowering the youth of the country to achieve their full potential. The new youth policy will focus on developing the youth into a productive work force by providing them the right education and skills and promoting entrepreneurship.*

This was complemented in with the PBD in London where education aimed at skill development was touted as a huge sector for investment for UK companies. On this

---

occasion, the event was held in association with the Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC) - (see below).

What begins to emerge here is a complex set of relations between enterprise, investment, global governance and education - where politics, nationality, reforms and profit are conjoined in the neoliberalisation of HE in India against the context of international competitiveness and for ‘the motherland’.

However, this event and series of initiatives and measures aimed at the diaspora should not be considered as being unique to India. Rather, such strategies and tactics of re-engagement are being championed by global and transnational institutions who encourage nurturing relationships between ‘the motherland’ and its diaspora. As Larner (2007) notes, diaspora communities are no longer simply the concern of migration officials but also increasingly economic development agencies whose efforts are bolstered by global institutions, as the below illustrates.

OVERSEAS INDIAN FACILITATION CENTRE (OIFC)

The Global Agenda Council on Migration of the World Economic Forum (WEF) describes its recent engagement with the private sector on the benefits of migration, particularly in relation to the global competition for talent. This labour mobility is considered ‘a fundamental human resource strategy’ and one which, proactively pursued, can represent economic growth and prosperity. It states that the private sector has been ‘far more forthcoming about the merits – indeed, the imperatives – of migration, than most government stakeholders’. One reason being, ‘businesses are accountable to shareholders – not voters – and understand that migrants and migration generate profit’. It describes the initiative to connect businesses to diaspora investors and markets ‘a new frontier for migration and development policy’ of which the Indian example, the ‘OIFC provides a good model’. It explains that contacts with over 6,000 overseas Indians has been made through business forums and road shows held in the Caribbean, Europe,
North America, the Middle East, South Africa and Southeast Asia and that ‘greater impetus is required to scale-up these schemes’ and ‘expand their global coverage’.

The OIFC singled out above as ‘a good model’ is part of the DS initiatives undertaken by the GoI (see also Figs. 8 and 9) and serves to illustrate the continuing emphasis placed on the engagement of business and diaspora investors, particularly in relation to HE. The OIFC was established in 2007 in association with the CII, ‘in recognition of the potential of Overseas Indians to invest in the emerging opportunities in their home country’ and aimed at ‘facilitating Business-to-Business partnership between Indian Business and Overseas Indians’. At its first meeting of the governing council, as trustees, ‘eminent Overseas Indians’ such as business leader Sam Pitroda (USA); and ‘eminent businessmen from India’ Analjit Singh, Chairman Max India Ltd and Sunil Kant Munjal Chairman, Hero Corporate Services (the latter two both on the governing board of the ISB, see previous chapter) were called upon ‘to infuse innovative ideas to address issues concerning Overseas Indians and connect them to India.’

---

56 http://www.pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page.asp?relid=30307, accessed 29/01/15
Investor Awareness Programmes (IAPs)

The Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) organizes Investor Awareness Programmes (IAPs) with the objectives of creating awareness amongst the investors...and facilitating informed investment decisions... During the period 01.04.2012 to 28.02.2015, 6402 such programmes have been organized. Besides, 100 programmes were also organized in rural areas... In addition, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) also conducts similar programmes through Resource Persons, Investor Associations, Exchanges, Depositories and various trade bodies... The Companies Act, 2013 and the rules made thereunder seek to promote... protection of interest of investors.

The Government has put in place a liberal policy on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), including investments from Non-Resident Indians (NRIs). The Government reviews the FDI policy from time to time with a view to making it more investor friendly, including for NRIs. The Government promotes investment through dissemination of information on the investment climate and opportunities in India. The Government also coordinates with apex industry associations, in their activities relating to promotion of industrial cooperation to stimulate inflow of foreign direct investment into India. The Government has also set up 'Invest India', a joint venture company with Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), as a not-for-profit, single window facilitator, for prospective overseas investors and to act as a structural mechanism to attract investment into the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) sector. In 2007, the Government established the OIFC in association with the CID... OIFC has organized several Investment and Interactive Meets in different countries, also during Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (PBD) in India. Further, an electronic portal has also been launched to reply to the queries of potential overseas investors by OIFC and its knowledge partners.

A written reply by Arun Jaitley, Minister of Corporate Affairs to a question posed in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament).

The OIFC website has a page devoted to Education, which describes the sector ‘as a strong potential market for investments in training and education sector, due to its favourable demographics (young population) and being a services-driven economy’; citing the report by Ernst and Young (2011), ‘40 million by 2020: Preparing for a new paradigm in Indian Higher Education’ which notes that the HE sector ‘witnesses spends of more than Rs 46,200 crore (US$ 8.38 billion), which is estimated to grow at an average rate of more than 18.0 per cent to over Rs 232,500 crore (US$ 42.17 billion) in 10 years’. It goes on, ‘the Indian education sector is also considered as one of the major areas for investments, as the entire education system is going through a process of renovation, according to a report ‘Emerging Opportunities for Private and Foreign Participants in Higher Education’ by PricewaterhouseCoopers’. The education sector webpage on this site is hosted by Sam Pitroda, Chairman of the National Knowledge Commission (NKC).

Source: compiled from [http://www.oifc.in/sectors/education](http://www.oifc.in/sectors/education), accessed 27/02/14

Fig. 9. Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs.
The ‘eminent Overseas Indian’ business leader and trustee of the OIFC, Sam Pitroda, is a self-made telecommunications millionaire who was born to Gujarati parents in India and has spent his time in both the US and India, as well as travelling extensively worldwide, as his twitter account attests. He served as a board member to the Ambanis’ private university (DA-IICT), established in their home state of Gujarat in 2001 (a year after the publication of the Ambani-Birla report). This association is also personal - Sam Pitroda was an invited guest when Mukesh Ambani hosted a welcome party for HH Prince Charles and Camilla when they visited India in 201358 (see Fig. 2, Chapter One). As part of his

58 http://photogallery.indiatimes.com/events/mumbai/royal-couples-welcome-party/articleshow/25578354.cms, accessed 30/06/14
work with social causes in India, Sam Pitroda is Chairman of the India Food Banking Network established in 2010 to create a network of Food Banks in India. He is joined on the board by the husband and wife team Shobhana Bhartia (Kumar Mangalam Birla’s aunt) and Hari Bhartia. See Fig. 10 above. His personal website reports recent fundraising efforts in establishing a not-for-profit university in Bangalore.

His profile on his website (Fig. 11 below) indicates, that he has worked closely with the GoI on a number of initiatives, including the telecommunications sector and HE. As noted above in relation to the OIFC, he was chairperson of the NKC, which was constituted in June 2005 as a high-level advisory body to the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. In the NKC’s Report to the Nation (GoI, 2009) which places emphasis on the privatisation of Indian HE, the NKC describes the HE sector as being in a in state of ‘...a quiet crisis...which runs deep’ (p.65); with the present regulatory system authorising entry to the HE sector as ‘cumbersome’ and the barriers to entry ‘too high’ (p.62), suggesting simultaneously that the much needed expansion of the HE sector is not ‘possible without enhanced levels of financing’ which ‘must necessarily come from both public ... and private sources’ (p.63). The NKC finds lamentable that while ‘there has been a de facto privatisation of education’ in the fields of engineering, medicine and management, ‘private investment in university education, where more than 70 per cent of our students study, is almost negligible’ (p.73). Estimating that ‘Indian students overseas are spending US$ 4 billion’ on fees and maintenance, equalling ‘an enormous ... source of finance’ for HE in India, wishing ‘... if only we could create more opportunities for students with increased places and enhanced quality in our system’ (p.74). It further advocates the formulation of policies for the entry of foreign institutions into India (GoI, 2009, p.74).

On release of the first NKC report in 2007, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh emphasised that the Commission ‘must be involved in ensuring the implementation of their innovative ideas’ (GoI, 2007, Foreword).

59 http://www.indiafoodbanking.org/about/board, accessed, 14/02/15.
In the policy statements of the NKC, only briefly alluded to here, we see the repeated problematisation of Indian HE and a related set of concerns, all with a predominantly economic focus – money – with the accompanying offer of solutions which require private and commercial involvement. Although Sam Pitroda, in making reference here to the involvement of the private sector in the provision and delivery of Indian HE, does not allude to profit, education policy and education reform increasingly represent business opportunities and are underpinned by the opportunity to profit; not least when the involvement and participation of business and their capital in Indian HE is not only sought, encouraged, but incentivised, as evidenced here by these host of government initiatives, not least the OIFC. As (Ball, 2012b, p.24) stresses, in the world of business, ‘profitability is what counts in the final analysis’. (This profit motive is shown to be more evident in the next chapter).

On the one hand, the OIFC and the involvement of eminent business leaders serves as an example of government led DS that seek to progressively select and target professional emigrants and business elites whose business, ethnic and kinship networks...
and competencies they wish to capitalise on. On the other hand, while remittances can be an important source of revenue - as with India - there is an implicit intention to advance cross-border flow and exchange of capital in the form of investment, as the reference to HE above illustrates. Successive governments in India - of all political persuasions - have progressively introduced a host of initiatives aimed at harnessing the potential of its overseas Indians which are akin to ‘neoliberal projects to mobilise human capital and international business links which they believe can help enhance national economic competitiveness in the global knowledge-based economy’ (Ho, 2011, p.8).

Additionally, as Ho notes, this selective targeting of elite business leaders is premised on the belief that their international connectedness and entrepreneurship can help develop global economic opportunities, stimulate economic development and contribute to nation-building (see Chapter Eight).

‘Eminent Overseas Indians’ such as business leaders Sam Pitroda and Rajat Gupta; and ‘eminent businessmen from India’ such as Analjit Singh, Sunil Kant Munjal, Mukesh Ambani - latter four previously encountered through their association with the ISB - are examples of what (Ong, 2006, p.14) describes as ‘self-enterprising citizen-subjects’ who serve as links between India’s ambitions and its access to global capital and markets. This point is captured by Urry’s (2000) notion of the mobility of people, ideas, and money across borders and the criss-crossing of multiple new national/cultural flows and networks this entails and how this connects the sites ‘from and to’ in social, cultural, political and economic ways. Equally, as Ball (2016) points out, there is an interdependency of actors and the movement of ideas in the framing of problems, policy directions, and in the form of the reformation of the HE sector, as shown previously through the Ambani Birla report, and here, as articulated by Mukesh Ambani and Sam Pitroda. Through their participation at the PBD (Rajat Gupta, Mukesh Ambani; Sam Pitroda61); the involvement with the NKC (Sam Pitroda); or in the Committee on Corporate Participation in Higher Education (chaired by NR Narayana Murthy - see next chapter); as well as the OIFC (Sam Pitroda, Analjit Singh; Sunil Kant Munjal), these ‘eminent businessmen’ reflect a history of on-going effort in their endeavours to bring about these reforms to the Indian HE sector which are animated and lent impetus by

their social connectedness (Ball, 2016). Further, as Ball observes, through this discursive labour, these ‘eminent businessmen’, speak with one voice. As highly successful, rich, powerful businessmen and entrepreneurs, they also ‘enact, embody, and disseminate narratives of enterprise’ (Ball, 2010c, p.14), providing ‘enterprising solutions to social and educational problems’ and where, as ‘heroes of enterprise’, their opinions and voices are granted a special legitimacy that lend validity to new policy discourses (Ball, 2009a) that place particular emphasis on the privatisation of the HE sector and are neoliberal in character. Indeed, the contribution of private entrepreneurs in transforming India’s higher education system is often commended by the FICCI (2012).

In an interview with the Global Research Forum on Diaspora and Transnationalism (GRFDT), Mr. Ramsaran, President of the Global Organization of People of Indian Origin International (GOPIO - USA) describes its on-going promotional work in partnership with Government and Non-Government Organisations in India. He talks of some of the ‘strides in encouraging Indian Diaspora investments in ... education ... in India, in collaboration with MOIA and OICF, ... FICCI, Indian American Chamber of Commerce - USA (IACC-USA), Indian Canadian Chamber of Commerce (ICCC), and others’. This work is intended to garner increasing support for NRI and PIO investment in India bolstered by annual events organised by the MOIA (since 2003) to ‘celebrate diasporic lives and capitalize ... knowledge, expertise, skill and investment from the worldwide Indian diaspora ... state Governments are also looking forward to attract their (state) diasporas. Gujarat, Kerala, Rajasthan and Punjab are among ... states that are celebrating ... diaspora's achievements and providing platforms for engagement’. Examples are provided of diaspora engagement of investment opportunities, whereby a number of options available to NRIs are described: 100% rebate in stamp duty if they buy land for the investment or for projects; 100% rebate in property tax for 10 years; 50% - 100% rebate on paver duty.

---

63 Ibid., p.8.
In all this, as can be evidenced from the above, through the role of the trade bodies such as the Indian chambers of commerce, the CII and FICCI, OIFC, these initiatives are not only being scaled up but, through their focus on business to business partnerships, there is a steady and gradual appropriation of such initiatives and events such as PBD by business. However, it is perhaps the FICCI whose role has been has been the most noteworthy, certainly the most consistent. With an ambitious stated claim in 2003 to bring about a ten-fold increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow to $5 billion by 2008 from the Indian diaspora, the FICCI subsequently went on to boast of becoming the first industry chamber globally to establish a diaspora division, as the trade body acknowledges:

*Indian Diaspora has left deep footprints through their enterprise and skills... FICCI recognizes the importance of Its Diaspora and the need for India’s Diaspora to reconnect with emerging India... recognizing this need FICCI has established a Diaspora Division, the first Industry Chamber globally to do so... The Diaspora Division is a unique initiative of FICCI, along with Migration Division, under the leadership of its Secretary General, Dr. A Didar Singh... The division aims to create an eco-system with Indian Diaspora globally for cross-fertilization of ideas, knowledge sharing and resource mobilization, towards socio-economic development of India while also developing a stronger community of overseas Indians around the world.*

*FICCI has been associated with the India’s largest diaspora event - PBD since its first edition when with a vision to forge a constructive relationship with our Diaspora overseas and make it participate in India’s socio-economic development, a beginning was made by the then NDA Government and FICCI in 2003 to organize the first ever PBD. FICCI have so far organized its 7 editions with Government of India.*

More recently, in response to a call from the National Skill Development Agency (NSDA) urging the ‘Indian Diaspora to help drive innovation in skill development by bringing in ideas, models and collaborations from country of their residence; bring in funds for NSDA...’ the Secretary General (SG) of the FICCI, Dr Dadar Singh in a press release responded, ‘there is immense opportunity for India to leverage the diaspora network .... Forums like PBD provide the perfect platform for connecting diaspora to the entire community of innovators and entrepreneurs in India to forge lasting partnerships.’

---

64 http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2003/02/18/stories/2003021802470500.htm, accessed 20/05/15
65 http://ficci.in/international/54533/Project_docs/diaspora-engagement.pdf, accessed 03/05/15
CONCLUSION

Here then are examples of how the GoI, international organisations, state agencies, trade bodies and individuals are all thinking beyond national boundaries in their efforts to generate new forms of economic development. Through an assortment of means such as newsletters, web pages, databases, events, state-created institutions, ‘eminent overseas Indians’ and elite professional business leaders are being actively identified and harnessed to national development projects (Larner, 2007, p332). As shown here, individuals - in the form of business leaders, regions or states within India and governments alike are actively involved in advancing their interests and animating, fostering, cultivating and encouraging global relationships (Larner, 2007) Against this context, Larner argues that DS represent a ‘new geographic imaginary and political-economic field … [and] involve the active constitution of new spaces and subjects’ (p.332). The significance of the rise in DS lies in the fact that it reveals how state agencies, policymakers and individuals, by thinking beyond their national borders, are generating ‘highly fluid, non-territorial forms of organisation’ (Amin in Larner, 2007, p.342); and how the interplay of governmental strategies and individual mobilities is bringing globalising spaces and subjects into being (p.342). These processes ‘involve a diverse set of organisational, relational and calculative practices’ (Larner, 2015, p.198) entailing governing at a distance that can reveal ‘global governmentality’ in action.

Concomitantly, these processes reveal another important aspect in relation to HE. The appropriation of the HE sector by these idealised business leaders, along lines described above, with the accompanying emphasis on privatisation of the sector, is leading to what Tilak (2008) describes as the abdication of responsibility by the state and constitutes a shift from hierarchy to heterarchy (Ball, 2010a). Heterarchies, as Chapter Eight explains, are a new modality of governance based upon network relations – here of business leaders and entrepreneurs, Indian as well as from abroad – which are politically constructed and serve to act as a policy device enabling not only the flow of capital or money but new forms of policy influence and practices into education policy (Ball, 2009a).
GoI support for recommendations for new policy formulations or ‘innovative ideas’ from business leaders, along lines of Prime Minister Singh above in relation to the NKC report and Sam Pitroda, serve to lend corresponding support to the expansion of business opportunities in HE (Ball, 2009b), earlier initiated by the PMCTI and by means of Vajpayee’s invitation to founding members of the ISB to tap into India’s ‘great demographic opportunity’ (Chapter Five).

The partnering of business with government as exemplified by the OIFC, a public–private collaboration, constitute ways and means by which Indian HE is presented as a business opportunity, as indicated in the examples here, which serve to commodify education and legitimise business and commercial participation and their associated practices within education (Ball, 2018). The OIFC with its focus on business leaders and entrepreneurs and the encouragement - and incentivisation - of investment into the Indian HE sector not only privileges privatisation but seeks to facilitate cross-border private participation by these ‘heroes of enterprise’ (Ball, 2009a) thereby making the sector more ‘amenable to further business penetration’ (Ball 2009b, p.95) and where diaspora global business leaders Sam Pitroda along with his other counterparts here, become key policy actors. This can increasingly mean, as here, that business - as events such as the PBD illustrate - are now essential parts of the policy process (Ball, 2016) and where the involvement of trade bodies such as CII and FICCI is leading to the trade and investment of HE in India (next chapter).
CHAPTER SEVEN

CAPITAL ACCUMULATION, TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN EDUCATION

Today the Business School is talking about global poverty; a topic I believe is a new trend in itself. When businesses start talking about global poverty ... this is a trend that I believe is one of the most important in the 21st Century ... why should global business be interested in the war against global poverty? My immediate response is direct and simple; because it is in their enlightened self-interest ... the war against global poverty helps create huge new markets. Competition today is over a relatively small number of customers and a huge latent customer base lies untapped ... Imagine 3 billion new consumers in the global market. It can pave the way for at least 30-trillion dollars in new consumption, as much as the entire current global output ... Over the past five decades global corporations saw healthy growth in home markets ... in an era of globalization, governments are not the only institutions that provide public services. About 80 percent of financial flows to the developing world now come from private sources ... Private enterprises have emerged as a major source of economic power ... are able to champion projects ... to bring skills, knowledge and access on a huge scale ... global corporations must be seen as builders of human capacity ... The fact remains that much of the world goods and services are out of the reach of the global population. Global corporations must learn to play on the cost volume trade-offs to address huge market opportunities ... In the field of education ... corporations can work with governments to develop and deploy key technologies ... All of us in the global corporate sector must strongly advocate free trade and competition ... free trade creates opportunities by allowing resources to flow where they are put to productive uses ... Within India, our challenge really is to bring into the workforce between 15 and 20 million people on a yearly basis for the next 15-years, and to keep all these people productively employed is a great developmental challenge.67

Mukesh Ambani, RIL, Global Business and Global Poverty Conference, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2004

‘...the State, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far from being able to occupy the whole field of actual power relations...’

Foucault (in Gordon, 1980, p.122)

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter/s have established in the first instance, the economically expansionary nature of social networks (Castells, 2000) evidenced by the collective investment endeavours by business leaders in HE in the shape of the ISB (Chapter Five); and secondly, the investment potential of HE sector in India for India’s diasporas and efforts by the government to incentivise FDI participation in the sector (Chapters Four and Six). This chapter continues with the investment theme in terms of personal ventures into HE by business leaders as a means of capital accumulation and in doing so I intend to show how by ‘doing good’, as encouraged to do by the GoI, businesses seek to profit and ‘do well’. I further seek to show how in their quest for new markets and new profits in which they are aided and encouraged by the GoI, HE is commodified and treated as a tradable good and service. Accumulatively, this is intended to pursue further the overarching concern of this thesis with the ‘subtext of neoliberalism’ and to show that in the interface between education policy and neoliberalism, ‘money is everywhere’, and policy itself is a profit opportunity (Ball, 2012b). This chapter will also demonstrate (and develop further in the next chapter) how the opening up of HE to the ‘for-profit’ sector, resulting in the increase in trade in private education service provision and delivery by business, the role of the state itself is redefined.

CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

Business and policy interest in HE can largely be attributed to four factors which are interlinked. The first of these is India’s demographic dividend (see previous chapter) with 64% of its population expected to be in the working age group by 2021 (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013) – creating an expected surplus of 47m people in the working age group within the same timeframe, according to the India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF), of which more below.

Secondly and relatedly, a corresponding rise in HE enrolments, as the tweet by FICCI and global accountancy firm Ernst and Young (E&Y) projects at the Higher Education Summit in India in 2014 (Fig. 12), which is largely expected to be met by the private sector.

Thirdly, India’s global middle class\(^69\) is currently estimated at 50 million people but this is projected to grow steadily, reaching 200 million by 2020; after which India’s middle-class growth is expected to accelerate, reaching 475 million people by 2030 (Ernst and Young, 2013). The underlying assumption being this is a class with rising aspirations and the means to pay for HE for their children (Chapter Four).

Accumulatively, these factors translate to the fourth factor, money, perhaps the most important incentive above the others for businesses. Certainly, institutions such as the IBEF, which works closely with stakeholders across government and industry and promotes the ‘Made in India’ label to ‘overseas markets’, describes India as ‘...preferred investment destination, rapidly growing market, standing on the threshold ... [sic] years of unprecedented growth’ and, in relation to HE stresses the financial promise the sector holds, ‘with current spends of more than US$8.52billion, the Higher Education sector in India is estimated to grow to over US$ 42.89billion by 2020’\(^70\)

---

69 Defined as those earning between US$10 and US$100 per day; people in this income bracket are considered a “global middle class” — i.e. middle class by the standards of any country, a definition found to be useful for business (Ernst and Young, 2013, p. 3)

70 India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF) [http://www.ibef.org/industry/education-sector-india.aspx](http://www.ibef.org/industry/education-sector-india.aspx); accessed 24/06/14
In a similar vein, the Parthenon Group (2012), a global management consultancy firm which acts as strategic advisors to CEOs and business leaders which in 2014 was acquired by E&Y - the FICCI’s ‘knowledge partner’ - observes, the HE sector in India has ‘investor friendly characteristics ... rarely found together in one business ... [thereby] offering a strong business opportunity’ (p.6). It goes on to add:

Private universities play the role of an intermediary between students and the job market ... supply trained talent to the market and ultimately support nation-building and economic progress. Private ... universities are capital efficient and self-sustaining enterprises for entrepreneurs and investors ... and offer investors a profitable addition to their portfolio (p.10).

In short, to use accountancy firm Deloitte’s (2012, cover page) summation of the prospects of the Indian Higher Education Sector and on which I draw for the title of this thesis, Indian HE offers ‘Opportunities aplenty! Growth unlimited!’. The potentially lucrative prospect the sector promises are reiterated by Mukesh Ambani in an interview in 2007:

always invest in businesses of the future and invest in talent. We believe in these two principles even today ... [My father] believed that we could raise money from the capital market and return it with profits. His second belief was that India is a great opportunity...

The strategy was: while we strengthen our current business, we will use our cash flows to invest in the businesses of the future. That's how Infocomm was born ...We saw the IT business coming. I lived in Silicon Valley. I knew it was a big opportunity ... We got into telecom in the ’90s by bidding for cellular licences. But I felt that the real value is in the convergence of information and communication...

I believe that everyone should be able to relate to market economy. If you produce something, you should be able to sell it at a market price ... India is long on talent and we need to create as many jobs as possible in manufacturing and services ... Education is one of the many services we aim to offer. I personally worked for three months on education and healthcare as part of Prime Minister Vajpayee’s advisory. It is a tougher mountain to climb. After our restructuring, we wondered what we should be getting into and got the best brains together to visualise where the big opportunities are. We studied what people want to spend their money on at all income levels and in different geographies. People first want to spend money on food -- that is common across the world. The second, in India, is education. So, there is a huge opportunity...

Here in this early media interview, Mukesh Ambani provides a very good illustration of how education policy and relatedly education reform, can serve to provide a profit opportunity for business (Ball, 2018). Here through his involvement with the PMCTI from which the Ambani-Birla Report and Policy framework document on Indian HE – and central to this thesis - was to emerge, an opportunity and potential demand for a service in [Higher] Education provision and delivery is identified - constituting an investment ‘in businesses of the future’, one which offers a potential return ‘at market price’ and thereby representing ‘a huge opportunity’, that is to say a business opportunity. Additionally, education here represents diversification, and the sort of new market opportunity which ‘restless capital’ is always seeking (Ball, 2009b).

As noted previously (Chapter Two) and as Tripathi and Jumani (2007) suggest below Indian business strategies are no different, indeed in their historical analysis of Indian business from the eighteenth century onwards, Tripathi and Jumani point out, ‘it is their profit motive more than anything else that determined their business strategies’ (p.7).

Set against the context of the opening quote of this chapter on global poverty by Mukesh Ambani, what is also being sought here is two sets of returns; one of profit and the other social (Eggers and Macmillan in Ball, 2018) - see below.

Putting thought to practice, Mukesh Ambani’s philanthropic arm of RIL, Reliance Foundation set up in 2010, declares on its website plans to establish a world-class, multidisciplinary university in the state of Maharashtra for which land is being acquired.

Making reference to the Universities for Research and Innovation Bill (URIB) 2012, pending and awaiting deliberation in Parliament at the time (of which more below), a RIL official was reported as saying:

> The university will have state-of-the-art facilities and attract students from across the globe. We are waiting for the passage of the Bill, so that we are clear the university will have its own identity and autonomy. We do not want the university to be under the state or central government,” said an RIL official. “We will wait and watch till the Bill is passed, with all the checks and balances in place. Innovation universities shall have autonomy in matters such as awarding of degrees and diplomas, appointing teaching and research faculty, determining student fees, and faculty salary.”

Nor is Mukesh Ambani alone in considering education as ‘*businesses of the future*’ and ‘*a huge opportunity*’, as he describes above. Examples of personal ventures of business leaders of direct relevance to this study reveal similar opportunistic tendencies:

Anil Ambani - MD and Chairman of Reliance Anil Dhirubhai Ambani (ADA) Group, brother of Mukesh Ambani, who ranked 13 among India’s richest with an estimated net worth of US$6.3 Billion⁷³ - is reported as having plans to set up a university in Bhopal. The Dhirubhai Ambani University (DAU), under the Dhirubhai Ambani Memorial Trust (DAMT), has 110 acres of land already allocated to it by the state government and towards which the DAMT has indicated an investment of INR500 crore (approx. US$93 million). Reportedly, the university will offer studies and research in Information and Communication Technology (ICT).⁷⁴ This university would be in addition to the private DA-IICT in Gujarat (established in 2001 and conferred the status of university in 2003) which was formerly jointly owned by the Ambani brothers, but which is now owned by Anil Ambani.

Billionaire Anand Mahindra, Chairman and MD of Mahindra Group manufacturers of automobiles, with an estimated net worth U$1.3 Billion, and who believes ‘*education is the most privatisable of all social institutions*’,⁷⁵ is a member of the World Bank’s Advisory Board and laments India’s ranking in the ease of doing business in the country (Fig. 13).

---

He is a member of the Indo-US CEO Forum (of which more below), serves on the board of the think tank National Council of Applied Economic Research along with Mukesh Ambani, is a close associate of Nandan Nilekani (co-founder of Infosys and member of the NKC, chaired by Sam Pitroda), Rajendra Pawar (co-founder of the National Institute of Information Technology (NIIT) Group - a learning and training outsource provider providing assistance with curriculum design and learning delivery – and on the board of ISB) and Naina Lal Kidwai (Country Head HSBC India and President of the FICCI) - see Fig. 14 below. Anand Mahindra donated $10 million to the Harvard Humanities Centre which has since been re-launched as the Mahindra Humanities Centre.\(^76\)

In 2013, the Mahindra Group established the Mahindra École Centrale in India in collaboration with École Centrale Paris and the Hyderabad-based Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University (JNTU) - Fig. 15.
Furthermore, the participation of business leaders in HE is not restricted to its provision and delivery by way of their own establishments and institutions. As has been shown in the case of the ISB, it can also take the form of investments – NR Narayana Murthy’s financial investment in Manipal Global Education Services (MGES) being an illustration in point. NR Narayana Murthy, co-founder of the global software firm Infosys Technologies Ltd (Chapters Four and Five), with an estimated net worth of $1.8 Billion; he is a member of the PMCTI; the Indo-US CEO Forum (of which more below); and board member of ISB, IIM-A; he chaired the Committee on Corporate Sector Participation in Higher Education on which Pramath Sinha served as a member (see Fig.16 below).
NR Narayana Murthy is an advocate of sectoral reform:

*I personally feel that before funding, we have to provide full freedom to institutions to determine their destiny. The market should become the leveler, the decider. Let the market decide whether an institution is good or not... One of the good things in today’s India is that the middle class is increasing. And all of us are ready to make huge sacrifices to give quality education to our children. So I don’t know whether it is the money that is the biggest bottleneck. The biggest bottleneck is freedom.*

He is also of the view that ‘the achievement of the private sector in Higher Education is best illustrated by Manipal, which is the Harvard of India’.\textsuperscript{78} Manipal is headed by Mohandas Pai, who is currently the Chairperson of the Board of MGES Private Limited and Advisor to the Manipal Education and Medical Group. He serves on the boards of IIT – Bhubaneswar and the UK-India Business Council (UKIBC); is Chairman of the Education section of the FICCI; he also served as a member of NR Narayana Murthy’s Committee on Corporate Sector Participation in Higher Education (Fig. 16 above). Mohandas Pai was formerly Chief Financial Officer (CFO) with Infosys, as well as serving on its Board of Directors\textsuperscript{79} (Fig. 16 above). This close and long-standing association between Mohandas Pai and NR Narayana Murthy is further strengthened by partnerships in the form of investments:

\begin{quote}
Manipal Global Education Services will buy back all the financial investors, including tech czars ... N R Narayana Murthy, in a deal worth $270 million or, Rs 1450 crore ... investors ... N Murthy ... owns about 22% stake in the Bangalore-headquartered company, also India’s largest in education services. The buyback deal values the company at a little over $1.2 billion ... higher than the previous $850-million ... valuation at which Murthy invested in the company ... Infosys founder Narayana Murthy had invested Rs 200 crore ... about three years ago, but will exit with a fairly healthy 18% annualized return ... In fact, this could be a maiden profit for Narayana Murthy’s Catamaran Ventures, floated almost four years ago.\textsuperscript{80}
\end{quote}

MGES is a technology-driven international provider of HE services which includes corporate and vocational training. Headquartered in Bangalore, it also owns and operates campuses in Malaysia, Antigua, Dubai and Nepal. Its history dates back to 1953 when it began its operations along PPP lines obtaining land from the state government for the establishment of a medical college as well as the use of the government hospitals for teaching purposes and in 1993 was granted Deemed University Status.

\textsuperscript{78} http://smude.edu.in/opinion/eminent-speak, accessed 27/02/14
\textsuperscript{79} http://manipalglobal.com/mage/about-us/leadership/mohandas-pai.html, accessed 26/04/15
Operating on the lines of self-sufficiency - by way of student fees - the group gradually expanded its services in the HE sector both within India and beyond.\textsuperscript{81} In 2014, Manipal University made news following a high court judgement on the sales of its application forms and prospectus to potential students whereby the judges in Karnataka ruled that the ‘huge profits/surplus from the sale of application forms and prospectus’ was indicative of the university’s intention to make profits / surplus from such sales, adding, ‘... because a university was established for imparting education doesn’t mean it is not indulging in business to make profit ... intention to make profit is clear from the materials placed on record’ - see Fig. 17 below.

Depending on the exchange rate used, 1 crore in Indian currency equals approx. 120,000GBP; therefore the funds generated from the sales of application forms and prospectus for the period 2005/6 amounts to approx. 300,000GBP; 2006/7 approx. 660,000GBP; 2007/8 approx. 540,000GBP; 2008/09 approx. 480,000GBP; 2009/10 approx. 420,000GBP. The example is but one of many and the figures are significant as can be seen even without a tax rebate / revision of any sort.

Literature prepared by Intellecap Investment Banking Services, boasts that almost $1 billion has been invested in the education sector from the period 2010-2013 through private equity, venture capital, strategic investments, and it predicts strong continued growth in the sector, particularly in the formal segments of K-12 and HE which, within this stated period, represent approximately 68 per cent of the investment flows and continue to lead investor interest. It adds that while lack of clarity on the regulatory framework is making ‘international strategic players’ cautious, ‘transactions such as ...the exit by private equity players from Manipal Education are viewed as positive trends’.\textsuperscript{82} This positive trend referred to here is of course the ‘healthy 18% annualized return’ on an initial investment of ‘Rs 200 crore’ by ‘private equity player’ NR Narayana Murthy, noted above.

\textsuperscript{82} http://www.indiacorporated.com/education/item/3083-trends-in-education-investment-in-india.html, accessed 13/02/14
In the preface of their book documenting the history of Indian business, Tripathi and Jumani (2007, p. ix), affirm that the term business in a broad sense encompasses all activities and transitions of goods and services with an eye on profit, adding that this can be reflected in the strategies of Indian business (p.7). The examples provided of the business leaders and policy actors in this study and the opening quote of this section by Mukesh Ambani at the Stanford Graduate School of Business in 2004 where he advocates ‘free trade and competition’ and in which he talks of ‘new markets’, ‘huge untapped customer base’, ‘3 billion new consumers’, ‘30 trillion dollars in new consumption’, ‘huge market opportunities’, can be said to be testament to that. The eradication of poverty
through profits and tapping into ‘the fortune at the bottom of the pyramid’ as advanced by Prahalad (2005) is reflective of corporate and business strategies in seeking and identifying new commercial opportunities and ventures which are profitable and generate returns on investments. For Prahalad, who Businessweek in their profile of the author in the book describes as possibly ‘the most influential thinker on business strategy...’ and is said to have featured among the top ten management thinkers of the world in every major survey for over ten years [p.xix], the bottom of the pyramid (BOP) represents a major engine of growth and global trade (p.10), a system of inclusive capitalism (p.xiii) whereby it is possible to ‘do well by doing good’ (p.2).

Certainly, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), a coalition of multinational corporations/business associations and which boasts links to numerous prestigious business schools, of which Mukesh Ambani is a member and to which ISB is networked (Chapter Five), similarly explains that its approach reflects a belief that the pursuit of sustainable development ‘is good for business and business is good for sustainable development’. This extension of business and enterprise interest and participation in new social domains formerly considered as being beyond ‘the calculus of profitability’ (Harvey, 2007, p.35), serves an illustration of the reframing ‘of socio-moral concerns from within the rationality of capitalist markets’ (Shamir, 2008, p.3, emphasis in original) where doing good becomes – and seemingly is - good for business. In this respect, business schools become prime sites where ideas about ‘doing well by doing good’ are shared and exchanged with the almost inevitable effect of instilling the responsibilities and obligations - as articulated here of ‘alleviating poverty’ and ‘doing good’, ‘for India’ - within the ‘market’ and thereby becoming ‘the business of market actors’ (Shamir, 2008, p.3). This is illustrated by Mukesh Ambani who goes on to add at the same conference at Stanford:

*The Business School experience honed my business skills, helped me network, and I think that being part of the MBA program was invaluable for me. When I went back to India it made me see business in the context of development and alleviating poverty.*

---

It is to be remembered that these business leaders are themselves largely the products of prestigious business/management schools either in India/abroad (US, predominantly) to which, as alumni, they retain their links by serving on their advisory boards. Unlike their diasporic counterparts they returned to India either to continue/take up the reins of the family business or to establish new businesses, where their finely-honed instincts of identifying and creating new opportunities for profit come to the fore both in terms of new markets (those at the BoP, the growing Indian middle class, India’s demographic dividend) and sector (as represented and illustrated here by Indian HE). As Ball (2012b) points out, in this broader quest for new markets and new forms of capital accumulation, new interests and new education providers driven by the profit motive increasingly come into play. Education policy and education reform, as shown here, and as Ball argues ‘are no longer simply a battleground of ideas, they are a financial sector, increasingly infused by and driven by the logic of profit’ (Ball, 2012b, p.27).

Concomitantly, this profit motive - framed as a force of good (Ball, 2012a) - on the part of the business in this study lays stress on ‘private’, ‘freedom’, ‘talent’, ‘opportunity for profit’, ‘middle class’, ‘market’, ‘user fees’, ‘merit’, and ‘self-financing’, as articulated by business leaders and illustrated above. And in doing so, business sensibilities are rationalised and joined up with policy aspirations in creative and powerful ways, rendering particular sets of ideas as self-evident, natural and ‘true’. That is to say, ‘language is deployed in the attempt to produce certain meanings and effects’ (Edwards, Nicoll and Tait, 1999, p.620) and makes plausible particular ways of thinking and acting.

These discourses of reform work in a variety of ways to create new spaces for action, exclude alternatives, legitimate new voices (such as those of business and the private sector), attribute cause and effect and make some things seem natural and others inevitable. Additionally, and as stated previously in Chapter Three, a form of moral authority and self-legitimation is provided to these business leaders when policy measures are presented as acting in the interests for ‘the motherland’ or ‘for India’ rather than out of self-interest (see Tyabji, 2015).
Nor is it just businessmen who articulate these views but others such as Raghuram Rajan (former governor of the RBI; Professor of Finance at the University of Chicago; former chief economist of the IMF; alumni of IIT-Delhi, IIM-A, and a post graduate of MIT; a visiting professor for the WB; one of ISB’s first visiting member of faculty - Fig. 18) and who is an advocate of 'user fees'.
Speaking at a seminar in 2004 on ‘How can India be ... [sic] G-5 power?, Raghuram Rajan, joining Mukesh Ambani, is quoted as claiming:

Access to money is available ... For IIM students, companies are standing with bags of money ... Users should learn to pay, Ambani said. Rajan said the government should completely sever the umbilical cord which ties existing higher education institutes to it: By setting these institutions free to compete, the government will help them in improving the quality of education which they provide, he said ... The students can obtain the financing to pay high tuition fees. Also these institutes have enough of an alumni base to finance the remaining expenses.84

Such views as articulated here have echoes of those of Friedman (1955), critiquing the GoI’s ‘special treatment’ of education, considering attempts at financing and subsidizing its provision as both inappropriate and unwarranted, and an example of ‘indiscriminate extension of governmental responsibility’ (p.123). Underscoring the view that the best way to allocate resources and opportunities is via the market, the GoI, as instructed and directed here by Raghuram Rajan, Mukesh Ambani and other business leaders in this study, need only concentrate its efforts on its ‘real responsibilities’, namely facilitating market conditions and behaviour (Friedman, 1955).

It is hard to overlook the form of capital that is present and at work within these networks which is based on a set of institutionalised relationships (IIMs/IITs/business schools including the ISB) and which provides a form of group membership based on mutual acquaintance and recognition (Ball, 2003). Through these networks with their very clear commitment to a ‘discursive ensemble’, as described above, market solutions gain currency and legitimacy through their advocacy and circulation within these network relations (Ball, 2012a).

These intended/planned forays into HE by the business leaders in this study complement those already in existence such as - to cite one example of direct relevance to this study - the privately run ‘deemed to be’ University BITS Pilani - established much earlier with

campuses in Pilani in the Indian state of Rajasthan (1964), Dubai (2000), Goa (2004), and Hyderabad (2008). Owned by the ABG, headed by Kumar Mangalam Birla (see Fig. 19), and whose board membership includes his aunt Shobhana Bhartia, Chairperson and Editorial Director of Hindustan Times Media Ltd. and his cousin, Sidharth Birla, immediate past President of the FICCI\(^\text{85}\) at the time of this study.

None of the above should be taken to suggest that private actors in the provision of HE in India are new, clearly they are not, as established in Chapter Two and further illustrated by Manipal and Bits Pilani above; however, as illustrated above and in what follows, there is a sense of ‘a creeping in of a market philosophy into education’, (Tilak 2005, p.4030). Or, as Rizvi (2016, p.6) elaborates: ‘there is something different about the contemporary language of privatization: it now appears to have become tied to a neoliberal rationality in which ideas relating to educational reform are increasingly defined in market terms’, as evidenced in the quotations above.

Additionally, implicit in this call for reform of the Indian HE sector is the potential opening and carving up of opportunities for business participation in the HE sector - a practical interplay between the neoliberal pressure for reform and its corresponding quest for and the creation of new markets and avenues for enterprise (Ball, 2012a).

\(^{85}\) Sidharth Birla was President of the FICCI for the year 2013-2014. Source: http://ficci.in/about-Past-President.asp, accessed 03/02/14.
Charting the transition of private HE in India from ‘philanthropy to profits’, Tilak (2006) points out that in their earlier ‘form’, private universities and colleges were established mostly by private individuals/trusts and funded entirely by private sources. Largely philanthropic in nature, they operated within the framework of government rules and regulations and on the premise of providing a public good. With the emergence of state provision of HE, philanthropic efforts transitioned to co-existing with the public sector. Though privately managed, these institutions were financed by the state, and regarded as assisting governmental efforts in the provision of education. Individual private resources, limited at best, were supplemented by student fees with all other costs recouped from and met by the state. Financial assistance from the state brought these ‘private’ institutions under government control, in terms of rules and regulations, and therefore not unlike government systems of higher education in many respects (Chapter Two). As Tilak notes, profit was not a defining characteristic feature of these two types of private institutions. But as he goes on to observe, the nature and pace of growth of private education more recently is radically different from previously and marks ‘one striking dimension regarding the recent general expansion of private higher education’ (Tilak, 2006, p.114).

Though in receipt of substantial hidden subsidies in the form of land and material at concessional prices and tax rebates, the more recent third type of private institution is not reliant on state support, nor does it operate or function on philanthropic motives, as was previously the case. Rather, these new institutions are what Tilak (2006, p.114) describes as an ‘extreme form of privatization’, a market-oriented profit-seeking private higher education. Free from government control, and motivated and operating along ‘for profit’ principles whose source of revenue is mainly derived from tuition fees, these private institutions operate as business firms, and draw on business principles to serve their stakeholders: consumers, clients and owners of the institutions (Tilak, 2006).

Further, this emphasis on the profit motive suggests greater leanings towards more marketable and revenue-generating courses and the convergence towards engineering, management, or ICT studies, as evidenced here, is therefore unsurprising. Private
universities and colleges responsible for raising their own funds, veer towards such revenue generating and therefore financially lucrative courses which are considered to be in high demand and for which students are willing to pay high fees (Jayaram, 2013). Indeed, the reliance on students’ fees is an important feature of private higher education institutions in India, which on average are approximated to be 50 to 80 times higher than those in public institutions and account for 100% of the total costs of higher education in these institutions (Tilak, 2014).

Describing the very high rate of growth of private higher education experienced in India, particularly since the beginning of the 1990s and the earnest onset of India’s liberalisation policy (Chapter Four), as ‘unbelievably rapid’, ‘unprecedented’, ‘alarming’, and the growth of private self-financing colleges as ‘phenomenal’, Tilak (2014, pp.32-33) argues that the growth of the profit-oriented commercial institutions has been an important feature of the 1990s and thereafter.

TRADE, INVESTMENT and the COMMODIFICATION of INDIAN HE

Represented here - and in what follows - is an illustration of the neoliberal reformation of the state whereby public sector education services are opened up to private sector participation along for-profit lines, with responsibility for the design, management or delivery of certain aspects of public education entrusted to the private sector (Ball and Youdell, 2007). This is described as an ‘exogenous’ form of privatisation which, as Ball and Youdell explain, is usually preceded - and therefore enabled - by its counterpart, ‘endogenous’ privatisation. With the latter form, ideas, techniques and practices from the private sector are imported to the public sector, rendering its functions more business-like. Combined, this privatization in and of education can work to make education more like a ‘commodity’ where the emphasis shifts from education serving as a public good to a private commodity and correspondingly transfers the responsibility of the state unto the individual citizen (Ball and Youdell, 2007).

In a similar vein, Tilak (2008) argues the commodification of HE and its treatment as a tradeable good entails, on the part of the GoI, a shift away from ‘commitment to higher
education’ to ‘commitment of higher education’ (Tilak, 2008, p.462, emphasis in original) as exemplified by the inclusion of education in the negotiations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This is best illustrated by the introduction of two bills, introduced under the previous government led by Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and geared towards reforming the HE sector. As Tilak (2011) informs, two of the most important and visible modes of trade under the GATS framework are the cross-border mobility of students and cross-border institutional mobility both of which are enabled by the Foreign Educational Institutions (Regulations of Entry and Operations) Bill (FEIB, 2010) and the Universities for Research and Innovation Bill (URIB, 2012). The underlying feature of these bills is the emphasis on the privatization of the HE sector functioning along market principles, with very high degrees of autonomy granted to new institutions - including foreign institutions (Tilak, 2012). Reforms of this nature serve to further accommodate international and national demands to open up HE to the ‘for-profit’ sector by way of investment and trade in education service provision and delivery (Tilak, 2011) and which, as will be shown, are implicitly linked with capital accumulation strategies of business leaders described above.

Legislatively reforming measures such as these and the broader emphasis on private, the resulting commodification of education, and the facilitation in its trade are complemented by and given momentum by other means and through other endeavours. For the purposes of illustration and argument two are presented here: the US-India Business Council (USIBC) and its affiliate, the US-India CEO Forum. Formed 30 years apart by the governments of US and India, the USIBC and the Forum function as sites and conduits of policy whereby emphasis is laid on privatisation, and open trade of and investment in HE. Both facilitating and advancing the reformation of the Indian HE sector through closer global economic integration by way of opening up of India’s economy and enabling the flow of capital across borders, the USIBC and the Forum constitute a form of ‘neoliberal offensive’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002) in which business leaders in this

86 Following a series of set-backs and delays, the previous Manmohan Singh-led government bypassed Parliament and issued an ‘executive order’ allowing foreign educational institutions to set up branches in India— albeit with certain restrictions (www.livemint.com), accessed 10/05/14
87 The Bill lapsed in Parliament after failing to reach cross-party agreement.
study, and business more broadly, are principal players as well as potential - and intended - beneficiaries.

US-India Business Council (USIBC)

The USIBC is described as ‘the premier business advocacy organization representing more than 300 of the largest global companies investing in India’ - see Table 7 overleaf for an indication of some of its members. Headquartered in Washington, D.C. and with offices in New York, California and New Delhi, the USIBC’s primary stated aim is ‘to serve as a direct link between business and Government leaders, resulting in increased trade and investment to strengthen ties between the two nations’. Among its activities is ‘an annual work plan that targets specific issues important to its member-companies ... to advance sector-specific reforms in India. In addition, USIBC’s Executive Committees organize industry missions to India to present to counterparts and the Government of India a united front to forge policy reform advance’. USIBC partners include the major industry and chambers of commerce in India, such as the FICCI and CII, as well as Indian Chambers of Commerce in the US from whose membership the Council draws both contacts and expertise (see Fig. 20 for USIBC partners).

---

**USIBC Partners**

USIBC is partnered with the premier industry and trade associations in India, including the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), the American Chamber of Commerce in India (AmCham India), National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM), The Indus Entrepreneurs (TiE), and the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce (IACC). These relationships provide USIBC-member companies with invaluable expertise and contacts throughout the United States and India.


---

88 [http://www.usibc.com/about](http://www.usibc.com/about), accessed 19/03/15.
Table 7. USIBC Members
The USIBC produces newsletters which provide descriptions and details of partnerships, ventures and collaborations on the part of its members and which serve to showcase its links as well as areas of particular interest, not least in Indian HE. The USIBC has been holding events and webinars in the US as well as India on the HE sector, as this extract below from its 2011/2012 newsletter demonstrates:

*On the occasion of the first-ever U.S.-India Higher Education Summit, Indian Minister of Human Resource Development Kapil Sibal stated, “It is only through education that we hope to empower populations across the globe to confront the challenges of the 21st century.” Emerging from the discussions surrounding the Summit was the theme that collaboration between our countries needs to go beyond traditional collaboration to include new solutions to train and prepare the next generation of skilled workers in order to solve the problems confronting the world.*

*Through its education initiative, USIBC also convened a group of academic and industry participants following the summit to discuss public-private partnerships in education ... Participating in the roundtable were Indian Minister Kapil Sibal, U.S. Assistant Secretary Robert Blake, Indian Ambassador to the U.S. Nirupama Rao, and Adviser to the Prime Minister Sam Pitroda. During the discussion, Minister Sibal explained the role of the private sector in education.*

In evidence here is a convergence of interests between the needs of government (highly skilled labour force, global competitiveness, minimising the costs of provision) and business interests - which serve to produce a sort of ‘*policy window*’ for reform.

This first summit in HE at which, along with US and Indian government officials, Sam Pitroda participated in his capacity as advisor to the Prime Minister of India, has been followed by other activities, events and ventures hosted or undertaken by USIBC or its members, including in 2013 the signing of USIBC's Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in HE with Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University (PDPU).

---

The PDPU was established as a private university through the Gujarat State Act in 2007 and is headed by Mukesh Ambani:

On January 10, one day prior to the start of the Vibrant Gujarat Summit, USIBC President Ron Somers signed a ... (MoU) in higher education with Pandit Deendayal Petroleum University (PDPU) at Gandhinagar, Gujarat. Through the MoU, USIBC and PDPU will work together on developing world-class energy technology exchange and energy education, with special emphasis on research. USIBC and PDPU will explore opportunities for joint research initiatives, interactions that link member companies with students and faculty, and other collaborative ventures. Reliance Industries Chairman Mukesh Ambani heads PDPU, and the Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation (GSPC) promotes the university.90

Other events and initiatives include webinars along the lines of the one held in December 2014, titled, ‘India’s Higher Education Market – Opportunities and Challenges in the New Environment’, and billed as the first in a series focusing on Education and Skill Building to discuss the ‘changes which are taking place in the Education space in India ... foreign education institutions need to understand the changing landscape to be more comfortable in engaging with India’.91

The USIBC was established in 1975 – a decade which has come to be characterised as one of extensive macroeconomic woes experienced in the form of high unemployment and inflation, especially in the US and the UK, accompanied by fast depleting tax revenues and escalating social expenditure (Harvey, 2005; Peck, 2010). During this time, neoliberal market reforms (pro-business and minimalist government in character) which were presented as a viable (and only) alternative to the so-called Keynesian induced crisis served to provide ‘ready-to-go’ and palatable solutions to the crisis by its advocates (Peck, 2010). These ‘ready-to-go’ solutions were given impetus and purchase by the accompanying proliferation of ‘sites of persuasion’ and ‘policy intermediation’ institutions (Ball, 2012a) which functioned as sites from where ideas for reform were implanted, generated and circulated. Such centres and institutions included think tanks, governmental agencies and professional associations such as Chambers of Commerce...
(Peck, 2010). Indeed, Harvey (2005, p.43) draws attention to the Powell Memorandum, named after the Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Lewis Powell Jr, who in a confidential memo to the US Chamber of Commerce in August 1971 laments the prolonged criticism of and opposition to US free enterprise arguing ‘...the time had come - indeed it is long overdue - for the wisdom, ingenuity and resources of American business to be marshalled against those who would destroy it.'

Against this context, the USIBC, with Chambers of Commerce and entrepreneurial networks as its choice of partners, which by way of its advocacy and its latter-day activities in relation to HE, serves as an example of the 'social state' giving way to that of the 'enabling state' (Rose, 2000) and illustrative of the GoI relinquishing its 'special treatment' of education as advocated by its neoliberal reformers. Entailing - and manifesting - a steady shift and movement from what Peck and Tickell (2002) describe as ‘prototype neoliberalism’ (as encapsulated by the USIBC when first formed and the formulation of an 'alternative' vision to the discredited Keynesian welfare state), to the subsequent and more creative and constructive moments of the neoliberal process or ‘roll-out neoliberalism’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002) where, through the establishment of new institutions, the formulation of new policies and forms of governance, conditions and spaces are created for the neoliberalisation of HE in India (Chapter Four).

Indeed, the process of 'roll-out neoliberalism' relates to and reflects precisely the ‘changes which are taking place in the Education space in India’ alluded to in the USIB webinar above. Some of the institutions have already been encountered and described in the previous chapter, such as the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs’ (MOIA), the Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre (OIFC), which are part and parcel of the changing landscape in India in relation to HE and the participation of business in the sector. These efforts are bolstered by the joint venture company set up by the GoI with the FICCI, 'Invest India' which, as its website states\(^2\), permits 100% FDI in the education sector; as well as by regulatory frameworks, such as the above-mentioned FEIB 2010 and URIB 2012 among numerous other bills formulated by the GoI. It seems to matter little that these

\(^2\) [http://www.investindia.gov.in/?q=education-sector](http://www.investindia.gov.in/?q=education-sector), 27/04/13, accessed 03/06/14
bills failed to get passed in Parliament – and others lapsed - since they have proved to ‘fail forward’ (Peck, 2010). That is to say, they have served to provide the means ‘to sustain a transformative direction in reform’ efforts (Peck, 2013, p.145, emphasis in original), and have lent themselves to initiate further rounds of neoliberal intervention. All this is captured by what the now disbanded GoI Planning Commission93 called for, namely the facilitation ‘... of private sector growth in higher education ... [whereby] innovative Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) should be explored and developed’ (GoI Planning Commission, 2011, p.102) and in the need for a ‘re-examination ... of the not-for-profit’ tag in HE ‘for pragmatic considerations’ (GoI Planning Commission, 2013, p.100). Unquestionably, these measures are indicative and illustrative of the steady and progressively incremental policy moves - a ‘ratchet’ effect (Ball, 2008a) - and are tantamount to the privileging and incentivisation of business as new providers of HE services and proclaim India to be open to and for business in HE.

This can be evidenced in the participation of business leaders such as Sam Pitroda in his capacity as advisor to the Prime Minister at the roundtable event following the first ever US-India HE summit above and Mukesh Ambani in the USIBC MoU who have been provided a platform from which to present analyses of, and solutions to, policy questions; and the platform is business organisations and chambers of commerce that have as their function the privileging of the voice of the private sector which advocates ‘public partnerships in education’ and the role of the ‘private sector in education’ and refers to ‘India’s Higher Education Market’. And in this aspect, the US-India CEO Forum has had a key role to play.

US-India CEO Forum

Affiliated to the USIBC, is the US-India CEO Forum (hereafter the Forum). It was on the recommendation of the Forum that the former US President Barack Obama and the former Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, agreed to convene a US-India Higher

93 The Planning Commission, formed by India’s first Prime Minister Nehru in 1950, was dissolved in 2014 and was succeeded by NITI Aayog or the National Institution for Transforming India, established in the same year.
Education Summit, ‘Education: Exploration of Cooperative Ventures’, chaired by senior officials from both countries in 2011 (see above), as part of a continued effort to strengthen educational opportunities and access to HE.74 (See Fig. 21 for members of the Forum).

---

First constituted in 2005 by the Governments of the US and India, the US-India CEO Forum is described as:

_a true public-private endeavor to enhance bilateral trade and investment. The Forum gives U.S. and Indian CEOs the opportunity to discuss issues of mutual interest and to develop recommendations to both governments for actions to enhance the trade, investment and people-to-people ties that are driving our bilateral relationship._\(^{95}\)

In a fact sheet on US-India commercial, trade and economic cooperation, released by the Department of Commerce in 2015, the US and India are reported as sharing ‘_a strong and growing commercial and economic relationship, driven by entrepreneurs and businesses in both countries._’\(^{96}\) The factsheet goes on to note two countries shared priorities of generating economic growth, job creation and the strengthening of the middle class. Stressing the Obama Administration’s commitment to:

_strengthen the economic engagement that lies at the center of our bilateral relationship ... this engagement, which includes business, education, cultural, familial and people-to-people ties, has always been at the leading edge of the U.S.-India partnership, and continues to expand._\(^{97}\)

Rather like the USIBC, the Forum similarly manifests an alignment of interests, priorities and strategies which are simultaneously government to government, government to business and business to business. As noted above, the governments of US and India are acting on the recommendations of business leaders to strengthen opportunities and access to HE and who, as the US-India Commercial, Trade and Economic Cooperation Fact Sheet above points out, are driving ‘_the strong economic and commercial relationship_’ between the two countries. Inherent within these efforts to facilitate the trade in education are business aspirations for capital accumulation (domestic, diasporic and foreign) which are aided and supported by the GoI. Recall that Sam Pitroda as chair of NKC lamented the outward flow of funds towards HE in foreign education institutions (see previous chapter) - money which could be kept within India and from which business

\(^{95}\) [https://www.commerce.gov/tags/us-india-ceo-forum](https://www.commerce.gov/tags/us-india-ceo-forum), accessed 23/09/15


and the private sector could potentially benefit through their own ventures and plans of expansion in the Indian HE sector, as discussed earlier in this chapter.

Further, the ‘opportunities and access to HE’ alluded to above, is also indicative of the aspiration to optimise and benefit from India’s demographic dividend, the potentially lucrative prospects offered additionally by the projected increase in HE enrolments - intrinsically linked to India’s demographic dividend, and by the anticipated consumption patterns of the steadily growing middle class in relation to HE. The consumption patterns of the middle class are not merely in relation to its ability to pay for the HE of its children; significant and important though this potential is, as indicated at the outset (see also Chapter Four). It is also due to the fact that Indian business finances itself and its ventures by raising capital from the public - in large part made up of India’s growing middle class - which thereby acquires a stake in corporate profitability (Kohli, 1989; Sridharan, 2004). There is a thus a relationship of reciprocity, of mutual benefit among Indian business and the Indian middle class or rather, a certain segment of the Indian middle class, which aids and advances this reform process and capital accumulation strategies (Chapter Four). This relationship is revealing of the nature of these connections, the networks, the ideology, practice and the flow of ideas, the opportunities between them (Ball, 2012a), and the inherent business values and sensibilities they embody and bring to bear.

And there is no need to wander far from these pages to see examples of this. Earlier in this chapter, there is the example of Infosys Co-Founder NR Narayana Murthy’s investment in Manipal which yielded a healthy and profitable return for the Infosys co-founder. Infosys, established in 1981 by seven engineers, itself is reportedly said to have ‘minted 5 billionaire families’ for some its co-founders, a family member and its former chief financial officer who all, in one form or another, had a stake in the company. As its former chief financial officer (and current chairperson of MGES – see above), Mohandas Pai, elucidates, ‘Infosys is primarily a middle-class company founded by middle-class people with high social and ethical values - it democratized wealth, and a large number of people came into substantial wealth’.

---

Mukesh Ambani similarly points out when describing the principles which guide and inform their family business decisions whereby his father, ‘... believed that we could raise money from the capital market and return it with profits’. Mukesh Ambani’s father, Dhirubhai Ambani is described as the father of Indian Capitalism (noted previously in Chapter Five), on account of raising funds from the public for his company Reliance, and who is attributed with having gone about:

*single-handedly creating an ‘equity cult’ among the Indian middle class ... Thanks to him, Indian shareholders increased from one to four million between 1980 and 1985. Of these one in four was a Reliance shareholder ... By 1983, a Reliance shareholder had achieved a 75% annual compounded rate of return ...* (Das, 2000, p.212).

There is thus outlined in the working of the Forum an explicit statement of the relationship between business interests in the form of private capital and the government, with the latter creating the necessary conditions which not only facilitate profitable capital accumulation for business – and its investors - but also contribute to the creation of an ‘officially’ sanctified way of thinking about education (Olssen and Peters, 2005) which is, moreover, specifically driven by an emphasis on trade in private HE and fosters a consumerist culture within the sector. Indeed, the characterisation of the HE sector in India by the USIBC as ‘India’s Higher Education Market’ as noted above commodifies and equates education as any other service and good to be traded in the ‘marketplace’. This is along the lines of the treatment of education by the GATs which formalises market processes and procedures for international trade in services, and similarly makes no distinction between trade in services like education and trade in other goods and services, thereby reducing education to a commercial, market-based activity (Tilak, 2011). While the internationalisation of education is not new, the growth in student mobility (see previous chapter) combined with the potential for high financial returns, as outlined above, makes the HE sector in India a lucrative prospect for potential foreign education providers, such as those in the US, investors (domestic, foreign, diasporic), and business more specifically, as well as assisting the GoI in securing India a place in the global HE market. Little wonder then the ‘*strengthening of the middle class*’ as noted here is a shared priority for both governments as well as business.
In the workings of both the USIBC and the Forum, there is the combination of purposeful and successful interventions on the part of these elite policy actors - ‘entrepreneurs and businesses’ as described above - as well as by the GoI, and a shared commitment to their realisation. While the USIBC and the Forum serve as examples of US inflected neoliberal strategies mediated through its activities and its advocacy for reform by these business networks, they are also illustrative of (some of) the institutional sources of power on which these business leaders are drawing and the power relations at play (McCann, 2011).

Here then, on the one hand, can be evidenced the self-interested goals of profit maximisation with business leaders acting as both the architects of policy but also, seemingly, the beneficiaries. And on the other, the favouring and privileging of business, aided and abetted by the GoI through the creation of institutions and legislation aimed at de/regulation to assist in the explicitly provided support for private accumulation, profitable investment and trade in HE. In effect, the GoI is acting as a ‘commodifying agent’ (Ball, 2012a) through its rendering of education as a commodity, as illustrated here, as well as by creating the necessary economic environment, as evidenced in the ‘roll-out’ interventions and through the facilitated workings of the USIBC and the Forum, within which business can operate and arguably prosper. In this respect, as Ball notes, the interests of market and state are conjoined.

However, these networks, as this study has shown and is being argued here, are formidable, powerful and influential. They are an elite group of Indian business leaders who represent a dominant segment of Indian business with an extensive web of global connections. Given the scale and diversity of their businesses and the control they command over the Indian economy, they enjoy especially high status and in effect are the heard voice of the business community; they are influential and constitute part of India’s elite on account of their wealth; and they are strategically networked to major business associations, as has been shown here. They are accorded a particular legitimacy and privilege by the government, constitute a part of its ‘inner circle’ (Useem, 1984) - Chapter Five - because as the CII Family Business Network India Chapter points out, Indian businesses - which are family businesses - ‘form the backbone of the Indian
economy’, requiring a nurturing to ‘extend the lifespan of the family business so that the economy can continue to derive benefit from their contribution’. As this study has shown, the policy actors’ businesses are family businesses - which are global, diverse and extensive family businesses to boot – but which are also run along the lines of class and caste.

In the excerpts from her book, *The Doctor and the Saint*, Booker Prize author Arundathi Roy (2014, para.1) talks of the disparity in India between the ‘more than 800 million people ... [who] live on less than Rs20 a day’, and India’s billionaires whose corporations ‘virtually own and run the country’ with ‘politicians and political parties function [ing] ... as subsidiary holdings of big business’; emphasising that most of these corporations which are largely global in their operations are owned by mercantile communities – predominantly the Banias – and the upper castes, the Brahmins. She highlights that the interests and operations of these corporations range from:

- ports, mines, oil fields, gas fields, shipping companies, pharmaceutical companies, telephone networks, petrochemical plants, aluminium plants, cellphone networks, television channels, fresh food outlets, high schools, film production companies, stem cell storage systems, electricity supply networks and Special Economic Zones. (Roy, 2014, para.3)

Referring to the Forbes global list of billionaires featuring 55 Indians whose total net worth equalled US$189.1 billion, Roy singles out eight from the top ten as being particularly worthy of mentioning on account of the fact that they all belong to the Bania caste and whose wealth combined with the other two business leaders in the top ten outstrips those of the remaining 45 Indian billionaires on the list - of which a further 19 are from the Bania caste. Included among the top eight are Mukesh Ambani (RIL), Kumar Mangalam Birla (ABG), Lakshmi Mittal (Arcelor Mittal), Sunil Mittal (Bharti Airtel); adding, that while the rest of the list is made up mercantile communities and the Brahmins, ‘there are no Dalits or Adivasis in this list’ (Roy, 2014, para.3).

---

101 Categorised as Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) respectively in India’s Constitution.
Thus, in respect of the elite business leaders and policy actors in this study, their ideas for HE policy reform are rendered powerful and influential by virtue of their class and caste, their formidable and globally extensive business, economic and political networks as well as their considerable control and command over the Indian economy. Not only do these business leaders shape education policy with tacit support of the government, but as evidenced by their presence and participation at the Forum, the PMCTI, at the launch of ISB and elsewhere in this study, at the invitation of the GoI. Of course, it is to be remembered that the Ambani - Birla Report was commissioned by the PMCTI, and not by the Department of Education, or the Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD), or the University Grants Commission (UGC) or other relevant education body or Ministry that would ordinarily be tasked with such an undertaking.\textsuperscript{102}

When the Forum was reconvened during President Obama’s visit to India in January 2015, among those reported to have attended included Cyrus Mistry of Tata Sons as well as the Ambani brothers, Mukesh and Anil. Godrej chairman Adi Godrej was reported as saying, ‘\textit{Big ticket FDI will start coming in two to three years; \ldots CEO forum to recommend policy action in \ldots education’}.\textsuperscript{103} While Anand Mahindra rather tellingly revealed, ‘\textit{The closed-door meeting was more listening; they were listening to us’}.\textsuperscript{104}

Deemed to be ‘\textit{in the conversation}’(Urry, 2004, p.120), these business leaders by virtue of their position within and through their networks, occupying and speaking from multiple positions and platforms as they do, are able to speak to and for education reform – publicly and privately (Ball and Thawer, 2019) – at high profile events and meetings such as those of the Forum. These relations are joined-up by public and private engagements, diverse social interactions and interrelations, opportunities for collaboration, much purposeful effort and an elaboration of their shared epistemic commitments (Ball and Thawer, 2019). These are ‘\textit{sociologically complex actors \ldots whose identities and professional trajectories are often bound up with the policy positions and}’

\textsuperscript{102} http://www.countercurrents.org/vijayan300315.htm , accessed 30/03/15.  
fixes they espouse’ (Peck and Theodore, 2010, p.170). At these high-profile closed-door meetings as exemplified by the Forum, USIBC Summits and roundtables, through the articulation of their ideas and the values that these business leaders bring from their business and management education and backgrounds, policies are not merely mobilised nor are they ‘simply travelling across a landscape – they are remaking this landscape, and they are contributing to the interpenetration of distant policymaking sites’ (p.170). These globally connected business leaders and policy actors represent transnational power-soaked epistemic networks engaged in the promotion of policy whose cross-border interconnectedness enable mutual referencing in policymaking and ‘message management’ (Peck and Theodore, 2015). Moreover, by enabling their global social, political and economic connections, ‘these generative nodes become key spaces in the fields of social and education policy’ (Ball and Olmedo, 2011, p.86). As illustrated above and throughout this study:

particular kinds of speakers are privileged and ‘get heard’ within these networks, and their versions of policy discourse are bringing into existence new forms of policy through a dual process of commodification and financialisation, ... various forms of social and network capital ... [are deployed], which translate...[s] into the right to speak and the necessity of being heard’ (Ball and Olmedo, 2011, p.88).

Similar to Ball’s (2012b) own observations in relation to his study of the role of global philanthropy in education, what is very much in evidence above is the presence of ‘big business’ and the corresponding presence and involvement of ‘big money’. As Ball suggests and as evidenced here, money here represents power in a number of ways: the power to get things done; the power to ‘partner’ with governments in solving social problems; the power to speak and enact policy; and in terms of class and caste, money is representative of elite social power. The pursuit of profit, here portrayed and dressed as a force for ‘doing good’ so as to lend meaning to what is being attempted here, can be seen to be deployed to neoliberalise Indian HE. The privileging and incentivising of business and the encouragement of the privatisation of the HE sector serves not only to mediate class and caste interests, but in the orientation of the sector from ‘state to market’ (Tilak, 2005), the replacement of social democratic visions of HE to ones which are market driven fostering a consumerist culture.
Neoliberalism, as evidenced here ‘is neither natural nor inevitable, it is being done and planned and enacted’ (Ball, 2015a, para. 2), both functioning and serving as ‘a nexus of common interest between various forms of contemporary capital and the contemporary state’ (Ball, 2015a, para. 9). In all this neoliberalism’s concept of ‘limited government’ (Ball, 2012b) as articulated by business leaders and policy actors in relation to HE as ‘freedom,’ ‘market’ ‘hands off,’ ‘get out of the way’ ‘is thrown into question. As illustrated, the GoI evidently plays a key role in creating the necessary and appropriate market conditions, including the requisite laws and institutions for its operation which entails - indeed requires - a proactive creation of an environment conducive for market exchanges to take place (Olssen and Peters, 2005). In this sense, the characterisation of capital as ‘restless’ and the attribution of creative and opportunistic tendencies to business leaders and policy actors here applies similarly to the GoI. The notion of ‘restless’ government captures the creative and opportunistic tendencies deployed by the GoI in facilitating reformative measures in HE with distinct biases towards the private sector and business, as this study has shown. Implicit in this process is the key role of the GoI as a facilitator and enabler, whereby the GoI itself becomes a sort of enterprise (Lemke, 2001) - ‘a neoliberal government’ (Ball, 2010b) whose task it becomes to devise market-modelled strategies and plans of action for individuals, groups and institutions alike (Lemke, 2001). By way of which a new form of organisation practice is brought into being - a metaorganisation (Ball, 2012a) - entailing the shift in the role of the state from government to governance and from bureaucracy to networks, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

POWER RELATIONS and DIVIDING PRACTICES

In describing India’s economic growth strategy, Kohli (2006a, p.1251) talks of how since the 1980’s the GoI has ‘slowly but surely embraced Indian capital as its main ruling ally …’ and in the process ‘…leaving many others out in the cold’ (Kohli 2004, p.285). This relationship forms part of the broader pattern within the Indian economy alluded to by Arundathi Roy above and from which the business leaders in this study have largely been the beneficiaries. Looking at the (disclosed) wealth among India’s billionaires, Gandhi and Walton (2012) suggest the main source of this wealth is derived from sectors where
there is significant connectivity with the state and potentially thick with ‘economic rents’. ‘Rent-thick’ sectors such as for example - real estate, construction, mining, telecom, cement and media – are classified as such ‘because of the pervasive role of the state in giving licences, reputations of illegality, or information on monopolistic practices’ (Gandhi and Walton, 2012, p.12). While they do not suggest that the wealth was acquired through the (legal or illegal) exercise of influence, they do note ‘that impressive wealth creation occurred in sectors with substantial potential for rent-extraction and rent-sharing between private and government players’ (p.13). Other sources of wealth were from sectors such as IT/software, pharmaceuticals, finance, automotive among others.

Ajit, Donker and Saxena (2012) in their study of caste diversity of corporate board structures in India based on a sample of top 1,000 companies listed on the Indian stock exchange, found little evidence of caste diversity with almost 65% of the membership consisting of Banias and Brahmins, followed by Kshatriyas and foreign directors. They liken corporate board membership to an ‘old boys club’ based on caste affiliation and indicative of corporate India being ‘a small and closed world’ (p.42).

Arguably, a similar pattern in relation to Indian HE sector can be discerned here. The privileging and incentivisation of business in the investment, provision and delivery of HE with the accompanying sanctioning of a particular vision of (commodified and private) HE on the part of GoI, constitutes of the embrace ‘of Indian capital as its main ruling ally’ Kohli (2006a, p.1251) alludes to and the power relations at play, as illustrated above.

Concomitantly, the simultaneous stress laid by business leaders and policy actors, in relation to HE, on ‘private’, ‘freedom’, ‘talent’, ‘opportunity for profit’, ‘middle class’, ‘market’, ‘user fees’- ‘eye watering fees’ in the case of the ISB, ‘merit’, ‘self-financing’; as well as the emphasis on skills formation and the creation of the ‘next generation of skilled workers’ as expressed in the activities of the USIBC and in the priorities of the Forum, are indicative of ‘dividing practices’(Foucault, 1984). ‘Dividing practices’ refer to forms/means of classification, categorisation or control that serve to divide or exclude individuals/groups along lines of identity (Foucault, 1984) which here run along lines of class as well as caste, as I elaborate below.
Premised as these emphasis and priorities are on a restricted set of concerns about the role of education in meeting the needs of the global economy and human capital optimisation which serves to safeguard the competitiveness of the national economy (Rizvi and Lingard, 2010), HE as defined here is represented as having a ‘symbiotic relationship’ with the economy (Ball, 2011) and envisaged as a creator and producer of a future work force seemingly equipped with the necessary skills to ‘navigate’ in globalised markets. However, this emphasis on the creation of educated, skilled and self-managing citizens who can compete in a global market place, cannot be applied to all groups in socially and economically stratified India where such strategies can conflict with claims of class, religion and caste and require as Ong (2007) argues ‘strategic responses’ and ‘calculated choices’ about intervention.

This is aptly captured in a slightly lengthy but illustrative blog and worth reproducing here in full. The blog is from the World Economic Forum (WEF) in 2011, a forum at which this study’s business leaders participate and where Mukesh Ambani and Kris Gopal Krishnan (Co-founder of Infosys, serves as Co-chair at WEF, Davos, Chair of the Board of Governors IIT-Bangalore, Board of Governors IIM-Bangalore and IIT-Madras, former president of the CII and member of the United Nations Global Compact Board) serve as board members:

It’s no secret that India’s education system is greatly lagging behind its rapid economic growth, booming population and ambitions as a global power. But India’s richest man has a simple solution: change the law and let the private sector build the world-class universities the government has so far failed to fund and create ... And so India’s government and industry need to work together to meet the aspirations of the country’s young, and growing, population. The best way to do that is “building a world class university,” Mukesh Ambani, billionaire chairman of Reliance Industries told investors and policymakers at the World Economic Forum’s India Economic Summit on Sunday.

“Now in India, by law, ... [the] ... private sector cannot build ... [such institutions],” he added. “We’ve talked about how important education is, and if you really want to build a not-for-profit education university, the framework doesn’t exist for that, the rules don’t exist for that, the legislation ... [doesn’t] ... exist”.

Ambani is already putting his money where his mouth is. He’s in talks with the London School of Economics to set up universities in India ... He praised the efforts of Prithviraj Chavan, the chief minister of Maharashtra ... in fast-tracking the legislation that would allow Reliance and LSE to move forward with their plans. Chavan, also seated on the panel, said the very vastness of the population...
such world-class universities might serve is actually what keeps the government from being able to pass legislation that will allow them to be built.

“The big challenge before the political system in India is managing the diversity in the country,” he said. “We have already got that legislation through ... [in Maharashtra] ... the difficulty is now what kind of social justice parameters do we add into that.”

Chavan said that affirmative action programs – which reserve seats for students from historically oppressed tribes or castes – would need to be included, but that such social programs might come at the cost of high-quality investment in the field.

“International universities do not want any shackles by affirmative action programs, but how do I reconcile the two?” he said. “That is the diversity and the contradiction... [of this system].”

This then provides precisely the example requiring ‘strategic responses’ and ‘calculated choices of intervention’ as maintained by Ong (2007), where serving to enhance and privilege this study’s business leaders’ capital accumulations strategies in HE requires careful negotiation and/or circumvention of potentially conflicting interests and claims. Certainly, in relation to the business leaders in this study with regard to HE and to some of the vulnerable communities such as India’s scheduled castes (SCs), scheduled tribes (STs), and other backward classes (OBCs) broadly alluded to by the former Chief Minister of Maharashtra above that make up the country’s considerable population, the interplay of these conflicting interests, ‘strategic responses’ and ‘calculated choices’ are in evidence.

This can be captured by Ong (2007, p.6) argument, ‘Neoliberalism here crystallizes conditions that engender both self-reliant but state/elite-dominated professionals on the one hand ... [and those] seeking protection against capitalist dispossession on the other.’


106 Scheduled Castes (SCs) - formerly referred to as the Untouchables. SCs or Dalits (meaning Oppressed) are castes recognized by the Constitution as deserving special assistance in respect of education, employment and political representation. SCs are a separate category to the Other Backward Classes/Castes (OBCs)

107 Scheduled Tribes (STs) - Adivasi (indigenous) populations recognized by the Constitution as deserving special assistance in respect of education, employment and political representation. STs are a separate category to the Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Classes/Castes.

108 Other Backward Classes (OBCs) - described by the Constitution as ‘socially and educationally backward classes’ for whom compensatory actions are now authorized by the state. OBCs are a separate category to the Scheduled Castes and Tribes.
However, neoliberal calculations (exemplified with the emphasis on the next generation of ‘skilled workers’, needs of the ‘global economy’ as articulated in the USIBSC webinars and roundtable meetings) and neoliberal choices (exemplified by the stress laid on ‘user fees’ – or in the case of the ISB, ‘eye watering fees’, ‘blinds admission’ and ‘merit’) are limiting and those they seek to limit serve as examples of ‘exception to neoliberalism’ (Ong, 2006) with attempts to exclude certain communities and groups of the Indian population from benefiting from capital development (Ong, 2006) - and social mobility and advancement - clearly discernible. Yet it is precisely through this situated interplay and deployment of neoliberal calculations and choices, as outlined here, for populations to be ‘teased apart and then recombined in milieus that link up with global markets’ (Ong, 2007, p.7). By doing so makes it possible not only to participate in and take advantage of the opportunities that the global economy presents and rationalise forms of governing within the framework of ‘optimising’ in relation to those global market opportunities (Ong, 2006), but potentially serves also to perpetuate existing but contested caste hierarchies and reinforce class, caste divisions and prevailing economic inequalities.

In their study of caste and class communities in positions of power and influence in public institutions in Allahabad,\(^\text{109}\) Aggarwal, Drèze and Gupta (2015, p.45) found these positions to be, ‘heavily dominated by a small group of upper castes - Brahmins and Kayasthas in particular. Disadvantaged castes, for their part, are largely relegated to subordinate or menial positions. The findings raise troubling questions about the resilience of caste hierarchies’. Among other things, the authors call for ‘better enforcement of reservation norms’. Likewise, their data shows that prestigious and well-paid professions such as business management, engineering, law, teaching and accountancy are dominated by the upper castes. They report that in relation to positions involving manual work, the proportions of OBCs, Dalits and Muslims rise significantly.

Through their findings, Aggarwal, Drèze and Gupta (2015) argue that claims of shortage of qualified/skilled personnel among disadvantaged social groups, sometimes advanced

\(^{109}\) In Uttar Pradesh (UP) - India’s most populated state.
by the upper castes - (and often from business who lay emphasis on talent and merit) – is unjustified, as, in their study, almost half of all graduates in UP were OBC, Dalit or Muslim. However, they find relatively high levels of education among the upper castes certainly contribute to the upper-caste dominance of positions of power and influence - ‘In fact, in some cases it seems to be the main explanation’ (Aggarwal, Drèze and Gupta 2015, p.49). Thus, in principle, if disadvantaged groups were able to secure fair educational opportunities, they would also have a fair share of these occupations. They go on to assert that aside from higher education levels, upper castes also enjoy more extensive and powerful social networks with friends and well-wishers in positions of influence; this they attribute not just to their relative affluence or level of education but also to their caste and family ties. Not surprisingly then perhaps, the upper castes in their study are found to guard their privileged access to positions of power and influence. Crucially, the lower levels of representation in these public institutions by the socially disadvantaged groups is not just a reflection of historical disadvantage, but also a symptom of active resistance (against reservation norms) from the privileged castes and ‘...quite likely, many other barriers are used to guard caste privileges’ (p.49). Such practices not only serve to undermine these disadvantaged groups constitutional right to equality of opportunity and reinforce class divisions and economic inequalities but also perpetuate the caste hierarchy.

Furthermore, a similar pattern with discriminatory undertones can be discerned in relation to recruitment practices. Jodhka and Newman (2007) in their study of corporate hiring managers in Delhi, assert that one of the most important question asked of candidates related to their family background to ascertain their suitability for the post and that of the company recruiting. This importance was matched with the stress placed on their ability to speak and communicate in good English. In one of their cited examples of a large media company with bases in 16 Indian states, candidates were recruited on the basis of ‘merit’ but also who were considered worldly, sophisticated and well educated which, as Jodhka and Newman acknowledge ‘in principle, individuals with this kind of cultural capital could come from any background. In practice, the institutions and experiences that produce cosmopolitanism are rarely accessible to members of the SCs’ (Jodhka and Newman, 2007, p.4126).
Moreover, as Jodhka (2008) emphasises, most hiring is done through hiring agencies, on campus or through internal recommendations. As such the hiring process cannot be considered to be an open one. The ISB is a good example of campus recruitment as this reported statement reveals:

*Through the ‘integrated’ placements concept, ISB made all efforts to reach out to a large number of recruiters and as a result, the number of companies participating and offers made has seen a significant increase. A total of 421 companies (increase of 21% over last year) contributed around 798 offers (increase of 27% over last year) as on date," ISB said in a statement.*

Among the sectors said to have made the largest numbers of offers on ISB campus were IT (represented by companies such as Apple, Facebook, Google, IBM, Microsoft among others); Consulting services (represented by McKinsey and Company, Ernst and Young, Boston Consulting Group, Parthenon among others) and financial services (Citibank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, among others).

Nor is the ISB alone, Mukesh Ambani turned to IIM-B (where he is a governing board member) to help with recruitment for an executive assistant. The chairperson of the career development services at IIM-B was reported as saying: ‘Reliance Industries is a regular recruiter at IIM-B campus’.

Ong’s (2007) point about neoliberalism itself not being a general technology of governing in ‘non-Western contexts’ takes on particular significance in culturally diverse country such as India. Given the social and economic divisions as described here, the country cannot be considered merely as ‘an inert receptacle of market-driven forces and effects’ (p.4) because not only do ‘strategies that seek to get people to be self-improving and competitive rub up against the claims of culture, religion and caste’ (p.6), but as has been shown here, these claims and the situated practices can take precedence and prevail. Similar to Ong’s example of China, all too often these disadvantaged groups in

---


India constitute and are considered to be a source of cheap labour and as such can be subject to exploitation by elites.

Here then is ‘an milieu where the free co-exist with the unfree’ shaped by the interplay between ‘neoliberalism as exception and exceptions to neoliberalism’ (Ong, 2007, p.6). A milieu in which the interests of business, capital, upper caste and class are aligned and in which, at the same time, is reflected a prior commitment to both social protection and control. But as the example of Mukesh Ambani and his (so far thwarted) plans to establish a private university with the LSE shows, serving to enhance and privilege this coalition of interests around ‘glocal’ capital accumulation requires careful negotiation and/or circumvention of potentially conflicting interests on the part of the GoI.

Some have suggested that successful negotiations under (GATS) and the (WTO) on HE and to which the GoI is committed would solve this potential dilemma for the GoI and absolve it of its responsibilities to continue to safeguard and uphold the constitutional provisions for disadvantaged groups, since agreement would require compliance to WTO rules and regulations and would remove these safeguards (see Teltumbde, 2015). Certainly, the notion of ‘merit’ and ‘user fees’ serve as dividing practices and tactics in aiding such negotiation and circumvention: enabling the tapping into the potential at the BoP and the purchasing power of the growing middle class with its widening social base by business while still maintaining the divisions at this strata, but also enabling India to position itself in economic terms to be able to compete globally and integrate itself into the global economy via its ‘skilled’ workers.

CONCLUSION

Above, I developed on the investment theme in relation to Indian HE described in the previous chapter/s (Five) and governmental efforts to incentivise and enable FDI participation in the sector (Chapters Four and Six), by focussing on the personal ventures into HE by business leaders as a means of capital accumulation. In doing so, I illustrated in the first instance, how the opening up and offering of HE to the ‘for-profit’ sector is
resulting in the increase in trade in private education service provision and delivery by business; and in the second instance, how by ‘doing good’, businesses seek to profit and ‘do well’ and that policy itself is a profit opportunity (Ball, 2012b).

Additionally, I have shown how in their quest for new markets and new profit opportunities, in which the business leaders and policy actors are aided by the GoI, their commodified and private vision of HE functions as ‘dividing practices’ (Foucault, 1984). These practices exclude certain communities and groups of the Indian population and serve as examples of ‘exception to neoliberalism’ (Ong, 2006), serving to potentially perpetuate existing but contested caste hierarchies. Against this backdrop, and as signalled earlier, the next chapter will focus on the GoI as a facilitator and enabler in these processes and consider the shifting role of the state from ‘government to governance’ (Rhodes, 1996) and from bureaucracy to networks.
Friends, I welcome all of you to this first meeting of the Advisory Council on Trade and Industry. This Council is about partnership and trust. And building bridges between Industry and Government. Not merely about what you expect from Government or Government expects from you. But jointly embark on a course of action. A course that will fulfil the underlying objectives I had outlined at the National Conference and Annual Session of the CII on the 28th April namely, “To Together create a Mindset Revolution to Harmonise the Objectives of Economic Liberalisation and Social Liberalisation”. The success of the Resurgent India Bonds was the demonstration of the faith which our NRIs have in the strength of our economy. In this environment, we must work towards a SEVEN POINT approach for this Council. First, there is need to rekindle the spirit of enterprise. Indian entrepreneurs have excelled. They are second to none. Second ... to demonstrate that India has an attractive economic prospect for domestic and foreign investors. Third, focus on measures which can enhance the productivity and competitiveness of Indian corporates to face the increasing challenges of globalisation. Fourth, to focus on some immediate concerns. Concerns which are in your mind and ours. How do we get on to a higher growth path? A path which will impart a new momentum. What tangible steps can be taken which will, say ... Lead to a revival of the capital market. Sixth, to invest and foster “Knowledge as an industry”. Through investing in skills. And in Human Resource Development. This is a big agenda. We need to organise ourselves purposefully. And gainfully. I have made some general observations and would request you to give your reactions not only on what needs to be done in the immediate future but also over a longer span. And on the sort of issues and procedures which we need to adopt to optimise the benefits of your presence here. The presence of some of India’s best entrepreneurs. And whose presence we greatly value in this Council. I look forward to hearing your views.

Opening observations of the Prime Minister of India at the first Meeting of The Trade and Industry Council on 18.9.98

I wanted to study the art of governing, that is to say, the reasoned way of governing best and, at the same time, reflection on the best possible way of governing. That is to say, I have tried to grasp the level of reflection in the practice of government and on the practice of government ... to grasp the way in which this practice that consists in governing was conceptualised both within and outside of government, and anyway as close as possible to governmental practice ... In short, we could call this the study of the rationalization of government practice in the exercise of political sovereignty. Foucault (2010, p.2)

113 I have not listed all seven points, points Five and Seven are omitted.
INTRODUCTION

Building on the groundwork laid in the previous chapter, this chapter considers the concept of ‘limited government’ (Ball, 2012b). It does so by examining the role of the GoI, (the nature of) its partnership and the alignment of its interests with that of business (domestic, diasporic and foreign) in relation to HE as depicted/illustrated in the preceding chapter/s. The intention is not to repeat or go over previously covered ground; rather, it is to discuss role of the GoI from the different relational aspects illustrated and discussed in this thesis. In particular, the emphasis on ‘private’ in HE by business leaders in this study; the simultaneous attempts by the GoI to tap into and optimise business networks; and to accommodate and enable the efforts of business to privatise the HE sector. This chapter considers how with the opening up of HE to the ‘for-profit’ sector, the role of the state is redefined suggesting less of its diminishment but rather entailing a change in the mode of governing Indian HE and the shift from what is sometimes described as ‘government to governance’ (Rhodes, 1996). That is to say, the move from administrative or bureaucratic government to network governance involving and encouraging the participation of business and the private sector in Indian HE policy and service delivery, as illustrated and described in the preceding chapters. The chapter concludes with a summation of the main aims and purpose of this thesis and its accompanying research questions.

From GOVERNMENT to GOVERNANCE

Rhodes (1996) acknowledges the myriad of terms for the word governance and varying usage to describe changes in public sector provision and delivery in the UK to signify a change in the role of government - ‘a new process of governing; a changed condition of ordered rule; or a new method by which society is governed’ (p.653, emphasis in original). Rhodes explains that governments have the (relative) ability to choose between governing structures – or a ‘new operating code’ – and that this choice of governing structures is a matter of practicality based on the conditions under which each governing structure works most effectively. Increasingly operating alongside markets and hierarchies, autonomous self-organising networks (of non-state actors) are said to have
become a pervasive feature of service delivery and, with their increased involvement and participation in the policy making process, public service provision and delivery, the power and authority of the state is argued by some commentators to have been diminished (Rhodes, 1996).

Neoliberal ideas and notions of ‘free market’, ‘de-regulation’, ‘free trade’, ‘privatisation’ tend to be accompanied by the related concept of ‘limited government’ (Ball, 2012b). This ‘trademark antistatist rhetoric’ (Peck, 2010) is represented and articulated by business leaders in this study as ‘freedom’, ‘markets’, ‘hands off’, ‘get out of the way’ in relation to Indian HE, simultaneously calling on and requiring the GoI to relinquish its ‘special treatment’ of the sector, as demonstrated in the previous chapter/s. In illustrating this in a variety of ways, I began to develop the argument in the previous chapter that this relinquishing of its ‘special treatment’ of HE in India entails in its place the GoI assuming the role and responsibilities of a ‘commodifying agent’ (Ball, 2012a). This occurs both through its rendering of education as a commodity and by the creation of the necessary economic and regulatory environment for business participation in the Indian HE sector. In other words, the privileging, incentivising of business (domestic, diasporic and foreign) and the encouragement of the privatisation of Indian HE by the GoI on the one hand, accompanied by the creation of necessary economic conditions, including the requisite regulatory framework and institutions, to facilitate and enable this, on the other.

It was further indicated that implicit in the assumption of this role as ‘commodifying agent’ (Ball, 2012a) entailed the shift in the role of the state from ‘government to governance’ (Rhodes, 1996) and from bureaucracy to business networks. In short, a structural coupling was suggested between the emphasis on private by the network of business leaders and the change in role and function of the Indian state on the other. This argument is further developed and advanced here, the tone and substance of which is set by the opening observations of the Prime Minister of India (as per the opening remarks of this chapter) at the first meeting of the PMCTI to India’s business leaders, and from which the Ambani-Birla Report was to emerge (Chapter Five). Namely, words
deployed by the Prime Minister of India to business leaders such as ‘working together’, ‘a valued presence in the council’; ‘hearing your views’; ‘optimise the benefits of having you here’, ‘jointly embarking on a course of action’, ‘organise ourselves purposefully - and gainfully’, and encapsulated by the word ‘partnership’.

Peck (2010, p.337, emphasis in original) observes that ‘in practice neoliberals too are statists (just different kinds of statists)’ who, by highlighting and discrediting the workings and functions of the state and its institutions, serve to set about to ‘retasking the state’ (p.9). The Ambani-Birla report (GoI, 2000) which emerged from the PMCTI is illustrative of this deploying as it does a series of imperatives with its ‘Lessons, Directions and Concerns’ (see Chapter Five): ‘the Government should play the role of a facilitator. Government must exercise its regulatory role to streamline higher education to ensure that it is meaningful, purposeful and cost effective’ (GoI, 2000, p.106) ... the Government must ... leave higher and professional education to the private sector’ (p.137); ‘business and industry have a vital role to play in establishing world class institutes of higher learning. Leading business houses must be encouraged to establish such institutes and universities’ (p108). Some of these directives and tasks have resulted in the GoI assuming a number of roles which showcase its role as a facilitator for business: as a ‘commodification agent’ (Ball, 2012a) and as ‘market maker’ (Ball, 2012b), as has been made clear (in particular, see previous chapter). Implicit in this ‘retasking’ of the state are the on-going attempts at [re] defining state competencies and the division between public and private (Jessop, 2007) and have served to reorient Indian HE to private sector’s needs and interests, which as shown here, is to support capital accumulation strategies of business leaders, facilitate trade and enhance the flow and mobility of capital in relation to Indian HE (Chapters Six and Seven).

In assuming these roles and responsibilities, the GoI as described here is not passive nor is it a mere bystander, it is an energetic force in these governing processes (Ball, 2009b). Attuned to the interests of business - soliciting and inviting its views - and actively engaged in accommodating and aligning its interests simultaneously with that of business on the one hand and, at the same time, being receptive to global market forces
and trends to enable it to compete in a global market place, on the other. Indeed, as Larner and Walters (2004) assert, the global is increasingly central to the way in which economic, political and social relations are thought about and acted upon. As an emerging economy and one with aspirations of becoming a global player in HE, the GoI as evidenced here can be seen to be seeking to optimise its current and projected assets such as - the country’s demographic dividend; the projected rise in HE enrolments; an aspiring and rising middle class; the prospect of untapped resources in the shape of savings and investments of its diasporic ‘talent’; and last but by no means least, the optimising of elite business networks - ‘India’s best entrepreneurs ... second to none’ in the words of Prime Minister of India - who serve as links between India’s ambitions and its access to global capital. In doing so, the GoI is simultaneously acting in the interests of these socially and economically powerful elites.

These examples which, in this study, are manifest in the privileging of business as well as in the proactive encouragement and facilitation of the privatisation of HE and the linking up of the HE sector to the requirements of international competitiveness, serve as examples of the GoI organising itself ‘purposefully - and gainfully’ and ‘working together’ with business to realise its ambitions and the achievement of political ends by different means (Ball, 2008b). In this deployment of said assets and the pursuit of strategies to enable this, the GoI has shown its tendencies as a ‘competition state’ (Jessop 2002).

In this respect, there is a mutual accommodation and coordination between capital accumulation and regulation (Ball, 2007) where by ‘retasking the state’ (Peck, 2010), the state itself is modified and restructured so as to enable and enhance business opportunities for profit and capital accumulation at home and abroad. As the Prime Minister of India’s opening observations to its members – ‘and friends’ -at the first PMCTI above illustrate, there is the invitation - an extension of a hand in friendship even - to ‘some of India’s best entrepreneurs’ and, by ‘jointly embarking on a course of action’, an explicit support for the development of an approach to policy which works towards providing the necessary economic conditions or a regulatory framework enabling the expansion of business opportunities (Ball, 2007) within the HE sector. This is akin to what
Jessop (2002, p.243) describes as ‘the combination of the ‘invisible hand’ with the ‘invisible handshake’ and the ‘competition state’ at work aiming ‘to secure economic growth within its borders and/or to secure competitive advantages for capitals based in its borders even where they operate abroad’ (p.96). And, as evidenced here, these borders are expanded, extended and redrawn to include India’s diasporic business leaders.

Inherent within these processes and the ‘partnership’, the subsequent appropriation of the Indian HE sector by business leaders, and the accompanying emphasis on privatisation of the sector, is leading to what has been described by some as the abdication of responsibility by the state (see Tilak, 2014) and constitutes a shift from hierarchy to heterarchy and the establishment of a new form of control (Ball, 2010a). Heterarchies, as remarked previously (Chapter Six), are a new form of governance based upon network relations - here of business leaders and entrepreneurs - which are politically constructed and serve to act as a policy device enabling new forms of policy influence and practices into education policy (Ball, 2009b). Implicit in this shift is the redrawing of ‘the public-private divide, reallocating tasks, and rearticulating the relationship between organizations and tasks’ (Jessop, 2002, p.199) across the public/private divide and, as in this study, can include a complex and intricate mix of: the creation of committees (the PMCTI, the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora); private-public partnerships (OIFC, the Forum,) the active involvement of entrepreneurs (business leaders) to provide innovations and solutions to social problems (HE); as well as the involvement of trade bodies (FICCI/CII). That is to say:

\[\text{tasks and services previously undertaken by the state and public sector organizations are now being carried out by various ‘others’ in various kinds of relationships among themselves and to the state as well as the remaining more traditional organizations of the public sector} \]

(Ball, 2010a, p.15).

Heterarchies and the network relations within them serve as both the medium for and the message of public sector reform, as illustrated in this study. However, as Ball explains, these relations do not entirely replace other forms of policy formation and enactment, nor do these relations mean that the state totally relinquishes its capacity to steer policy;
rather they play their role alongside ‘the judicious mixing of market, hierarchy, and networks to achieve the best possible outcomes’ (Jessop, 2002, p.242).

As such ‘the state retains an important role precisely because of the development of such regimes’ of governance (Jessop, 2002, p.203). As signalled earlier, these processes of governance need to be considered and situated within the context of India’s pluralistic society and all the social, cultural, religious and linguistic diversity that this signifies. As already established (see previous chapter), by privileging and incentivisation the participation of big business in the HE sector, the state serves to mediate class and caste interests and requires ‘strategic responses’ and ‘calculated choices’ about intervention (Ong, 2007) on its part. Therefore, what is also being reflected here by this ‘limited government’ is the upholding and protection of the historical principle of ‘ordered heterogeneity’ (Das, 2012b) of wider Indian society that runs along the lines of joint family, caste, religion and the linguistic state and their respective laws and customs. Thus, there is an interplay here of governing processes that exist both beyond the state (Rose and Miller, 1992) and by and within the state.

That said, it is not being suggested that the paths to reforms in the Indian HE, as advocated by business leaders in this study, are straightforward, uncomplicated, automatic or guaranteed. Clearly they are not, as noted previously in relation to reforms more broadly - see Chapter Four - and as illustrated in the previous chapter whereby Mukesh Ambani laments the lack of legislation that would advance his plans to establish a private university and are indicative of the constraints that can be placed on the GoI as it seeks to manage the cohesion - and division - of different social groups and their potential dis/favouring and dis/empowerment. The resulting and perceived conflicting and ‘confusing statements being simultaneously made’in government documents, plans and other statements (Tilak, 2014, p.32) in relation to private HE might be suggestive of the strategic nature and character of the GoI as well as of its heterogeneous strategies (Lemke, 2002) and calculative practices of governing and their inherent ‘ad hocery and messiness’ (Ball, 1993). As Rose and Miller (1992, p.190) observe, ‘government is a congenitally failing operation’ as it seeks to navigate the course between competing
policies and plans and ‘the discrepancy between ambition and outcome’ (Rose and Miller (1992, p.191).

It needs to be remembered the PMCTI (Chapter Five), was rationalised in the first instance as an initiative by the GoI intended to ‘refashion policy instruments for achieving its desired economic goals’, a new way of doing things to address the question of ‘What Ails the Indian Economy’ in the decade India introduced neoliberal reforms in India. An initiative created at the outset with the ‘intention of fostering a partnership between government and business’ with the stated recognition that the ‘development imperatives of India require joint and concerted action by both Government and private sector’.

Accumulatively, this is indicative not so much of diminishing state power or a state in retreat but rather a transformation of state power (Exley and Ball, 2013), signalling a ‘shift in the centre of gravity around which policy cycles move’ (Jessop, 1998, p.32) and ‘the reflexive use of decentred guidance strategies’ (Ball, 2009b, p.96), as the GoI shifts from formal to informal techniques of government and invites and involves business leaders in this study to be active players in HE policy formulation, service provision and delivery. The formation of the PMCTI, the Ambani-Birla report (GoI, 2000), the establishment of PPPs such as the OIFC, the Forum the USIBC (Chapters Five - Seven), the harnessing, cultivation and nurturing of business networks and partnerships and the formation of processes of governance, as described and evidenced here, function as strategies of reform of the Indian HE sector on the one hand and of the Indian state itself on the other brought on by a change in the practice of government in relation to HE as described in this study. Here, as it has been shown, is the need to consider privatisation and the state interdependently (Ball, 2009b), and as being mutually formative with each one co-determining the presence of the other (Lemke, 2007).

The ‘invisible hand’ with the ‘invisible handshake’ and the ‘competition state’ (Jessop, 2002) combined with the ‘embrace of Indian capital’ by the GoI, (Kohli, 2006a - see previous chapter) as described in this study all constitute elements of this ‘partnership’ between business and the GoI that help realise the GoI’s ambitions and facilitate and advance the capital accumulation strategies of business leaders in this study. As Rose and Miller (1992) note governments increasingly draw on the ideas and experience of a range of professionals – in this research elite business leaders – and constitute commissions or committees, as is the case here, in order to govern numerous aspects of economic activity. As evidenced in this study, by virtue of their membership of the PMCTI and their role as advisors - ‘partners’ - and, in the case of Mukesh Ambani and Kumar Mangalam Birla, as authors of the Ambani-Birla report, business leaders are now essential parts of the policy process (Ball, 2016) with the GoI, inviting and drawing on their views and experience through initiatives such as the PMCTI and the resulting Ambani-Birla report and the Forum. Such strategies and practices as described here while they enable the GoI to divest itself of its obligations and responsibilities at the same time make the business leaders its ally and governing partner (Rose, O’Malley and Valverde, 2006) in relation the India HE sector. Simultaneously, such opportunities to serve on committees and the recommendations and publications that emerge or produced can also serve to create opportunities for profit for business as Ball (2009b) points out and as Mukesh Ambani reveals in his interview (see previous chapter). Privileged and given legitimacy by the GoI, these socially, politically, economically connected and globally networked elite business leaders, as carriers and practioners of neoliberal discourse, serve as advocates, disseminators, and enactors of HE policy. Viewed against the context described here, the public/private dichotomy that characterises neoliberal discourse can be misleading and runs the risk of not fully capturing the power relations and governing processes at play (Rose and Miller, 1992), or, as Larner (2000) cautions, and as evidenced here, ‘limited government’ does not necessarily equate to less governance.
SUMMATION

To summarise then and directly address the aims and purpose of this thesis and its accompanying research questions. This thesis has been able to demonstrate that the key policy actors involved in the Indian HE policy process - and in certain cases HE provision and delivery - are part of a powerful, global business elite Indian (domestic and diasporic) network, that is highly prominent and influential, and connected to ‘local’, ‘national’, ‘global’ networks of other global elite business leaders, companies, institutions or organisations – some representing trade industry and commerce, think tanks and business schools. While some of these connections are professional and advisory in relation to governing boards and councils, others involve ties of class, money, caste, education – both in relation to their own education, that is to say, most are graduates of prestigious and foreign institutions and, more often than not, business schools, but also through their involvement and investment in the education sector.

It is evident that they have similar and shared business interests which spill over into relations that are also personal, familial and highly social where, given that these big businesses - and they are predominantly big business - are also essentially ‘family firms’ (Habib, 1990), kinship ties, business interests, shared values, caste and class merge. These key policy actors and global business leaders are not only holders of various kinds of capitals - social, cultural, entrepreneurial (Ball, 2008b) and network capitals (Urry, 2003)- but their social relations and strategic alliances with their inherent interdependencies and interconnectedness assist and contribute to highly effective network formations that facilitate the circulation of policy, ideas, influence and money.

As demonstrated, it is through these business leaders and their networks that their business and market led principles premised on neo-liberal notions - what Ball (2012a, p.26) refers to as the ‘family of concepts and commitments’ – which, as stated above, have run along the lines of enterprise, private, market solutions/freedom, and limited government - are brought to bear on Indian HE policy. As illustrated, these influences have been articulated and reiterated by different business leaders at different times in
different places and events and, at other times, in unison but whether individually or collectively, all serve to promote, circulate and mobilise HE policy and in doing so lend momentum and legitimacy to HE policy (Fig. 22 below).

The emphasis by these business leaders and policy actors is placed on ‘talent’, a globally skilled workforce for a global economy, an accompanying view and treatment of education in purely utilitarian and economic terms, and its contribution to international market competitiveness (Ball, 2010b). Inherent in this is the treatment of education as a tradeable commodity, not least because organisations related to trade and commerce, such as the CII and FICCI, have been involved in or party to the promotion of education as an investment opportunity for businesses (Indian, diasporic, foreign) and entrepreneurs.

Nor can the influences and interests that these business leaders bring to bear on Indian HE be viewed in isolation from caste. Caste is a crucial aspect both in terms of the character and makeup of the Indian business community in this thesis, that is to say predominantly - though not exclusively - made up of the Bania caste group, but also in relation to strategies of Indian business which have been shown to be premised on profit from very early on India’s history (Habib, 1990; Tripathi, 1971; Tripathi and Jumani, 2007). The greater acceptance of the idea of ‘making money’ following the liberalisation of the Indian economy in the 1990’s, and its characterisation as the ‘baniaisation’ of Indian society (Das, 2000) after the Bania caste group to reflect the entry of the upper castes into business, or entrepreneurialism more broadly, is indicative of these influences and interests on Indian HE policy, as mediated by the policy actors and business leaders from the Bania caste group. The culturally and historically embedded practices of early Indian merchants/traders as members of a caste group in commercial India, exemplified by the business leaders from the Bania caste group most particularly, functioned as ‘situated elements’ (Ong, 2007) following the liberalisation of Indian economy, and served to advance neoliberal ideas, values and practices leading to the production of a ‘glocal’ form of neoliberalism, recontextualised as ‘baniaisation’ (Das, 2000).
This thesis has been about the neoliberalisation of Indian HE, or more specifically, about the ‘subtext of neoliberalism’, that is to say, about the role of money, in Indian HE policy. And the prevalence of money has been evident, most particularly in the form of profit opportunity for business – indeed, ‘money is everywhere’ (Ball, 2012b). At the heart of the constitution of the PMCTI, during which Indian HE policy was outsourced to India’s ‘best entrepreneurs’ and their assistance enlisted in shouldering the responsibility of Indian HE provision and delivery, has been the explicit message and intended effect: the privileging of notions of private and relatedly, money and a profit opportunity. The problematisation of Indian HE, the reforming measures and de/regulatory interventions, the institution building, Indian HE policy formulation itself, all serve as examples of the ways in which Indian HE represents new opportunities, new ventures and new markets for the global elite Indian and diasporic business leaders in this study.

But money is also evident in another but related sense as represented by big business, by the m/billionaire business leaders themselves and, by association, their class and caste. Money as represented and illustrated in historical and commercial India, by early Indian merchants/traders, as exemplified by the Bania caste group, as well as by the EIC, its agents and officers, and their interactions, mutual dependencies and the resulting effects and impacts; in investments in HE and/or provision and delivery; and in notions of ‘trusteeship’, ‘for India’, for ‘the motherland’ and in ‘doing well’ out of ‘doing good’.

The next and final chapter provides some concluding reflections and observations.
The global expansion of neoliberal ideas

I personally feel that before funding, we have to provide full freedom to institutions to determine their destiny. The market should become the leveler, the decider.
NR Narayana Murthy, Infosys

The Government must leave higher and professional education to the private sector.... Leading business houses must be encouraged to establish such institutes and universities.
Ambani-Birla Report

....private investment in university education....is almost negligible
Sam Pitroda, NKC

By setting these institutions free to compete, the government will help them in improving the quality of education which they provide.... The students can obtain the financing to pay high tuition fees...
Raghuram Rajan, former governor, RBI

we broke the mould by charging high fees and....we introduced student loans.....
Pramath Raj Sinha, ISB

The state should probably get out of the business of higher education.
Rajat Gupta, McKinsey and ISB

education is the most privatizable of all social institutions.......
Anand Mahindra, Mahindra Group

Users should learn to pay....
Mukesh Ambani, RIL
CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND REFLECTIONS

It may be that the public mind of India ... having become instructed in European knowledge, they may, in some future age, demand European institutions. Whether such a day will ever come I know not ... Whenever it comes, it will be the proudest day in English History.

Macaulay, Speaking in the House of Commons on the Charter Act of 1833 (Nurullah and Naik 1943, p.114)
This thesis has attempted to cover a lot of ground over a considerable historical period in very limited space and even so, only some aspects of the relations between business and HE have been touched upon. Particularly in relation to the historical chapters, there has been a difficult balancing act between depth and breadth. At this juncture of the thesis it is customary to provide some final observations and concluding remarks. This runs the risk of somehow suggesting a neat periodisation in which changes happened or that somehow the story has been told and is over, neither of which is intended or implied here. Rather, thus far, what we have is a mere snapshot of the neoliberalisation of Indian HE and how this is being enabled and effected. This process is simultaneously enabling, transforming, mutating and emerging - neoliberalism's onward march, as it were.

From the time of the initial data collection to the draft of the empirical chapters to this culmination point, a couple of things can be argued here with a certain degree of certainty to have remained the same, while others have changed, may change or are in the process of changing, which are singled out as being noteworthy and meriting attention - possibly providing the building blocks from which further research can develop. In other words, in what follows constitute both forms of 'genetic imprint' (Rudolph and Rudolph, 1972) and 'contemporary implications' (Altbach, 1989) of India's colonial legacy.

Possible changes and developments which are in the pipeline and need vigilance are related to India’s affirmative action or reservation policies in HEIs. Recent plans announced by Prime Minister Modi’s BJP-led government – and approved by both houses of parliament - propose to reserve 10% of government jobs and seats in HEIs for India’s ‘economically-backward’ upper castes. Affirmative action, highly contentious and political in India at the best of times and more so when government jobs are scarce, is aimed to support the country’s marginalised and most socially disadvantaged groups. Built into the country’s constitution, the reservation policies are capped at 50% by the Supreme Court of India and thus far, have largely been applied to public HEIs not private ones. This proposed amendment signals a departure as the GoI is for the first time proposing that all private institutions, aided as well as unaided, who hitherto have been exempt from applying affirmative action policies, begin to do so (see Chapter Seven in
relation to dividing practices and Chapter Eight in relation to the Government’s role in mediating class and caste interests). Further, this proposed 10% would be applied over and above the Supreme Court imposed cap. Thus, while the plans may not come to fruition, the increasing clamour for reservation from the land rich but crop poor upper castes is on the rise and has repercussions for those the policy is intended to protect. As Chapter Seven indicated attempts to exclude lower caste and other socially disadvantaged groups from HEIs in relation to access to education as well as jobs is already prevalent with existing reservation and affirmative action policies in place; it is likely that with the proposed amendments to the constitution, an already existing problem and unsatisfactory situation is likely to be exacerbated. While the prospects of employment in government service may have been a viable and credible alternative at the time of India’s independence and have worked mainly to the advantage of the middle-class groups (predominantly made up of the upper castes - Chapter Two), prospects for employment in the public sector have progressively shrunk while the rise in the numbers of India’s jobless continues to grow.

Increasing demands from the upper castes for reservation in HEIs and jobs may partly be explained by their growing anxiety (and resentment) at the increasing representation of marginalised and socially disadvantaged groups in HEIs and the resulting easing of the ‘erstwhile near-monopoly ‘of the upper castes in Indian HE, according to a recent study carried out by Professors Deshpande and Apoorvanand from Delhi University on ‘Exclusion in Indian Higher Education Today’. Though still under represented in relation to their numbers in the population, women, OBCs, SCs, and STs, have all increased their participation rate, albeit with continuing forms of exclusion that are reportedly ‘more subtle and not easily captured in statistics ’ which include among a couple of other factors, ‘the role of English language as the gatekeeper to higher education’, according to Deshpande, co-author of the study.

---

118 A petition has since been filed in the Supreme Court challenging the constitution amendment bill https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/10-quota-for-poorer-sections-challenged-in-sc-petition-says-it-breachess-50-reservation-ceiling/story-cwcvU1S3TCLuPqgYVYP.html, accessed, 10/01/19


This point on the English language is of course not new ( Chapters Two - Four and Seven all cover its significance) but worth re-emphasising, precisely because of its ‘contemporary implications’ (Altbach, 1989) and the fact that, in relation to things remaining the same, it represents a ‘constant’ and a form of continuity. Rizvi and Lingard (2010, p.97) maintain that while global influences play a significant role in driving national systems of education toward a similar policy outlook, ‘...the reforms which result always have a vernacular character as they build incrementally on what has gone before within specific education systems’. Though this is true, the Indian HE system is based on Western influences and models (Chapter Two) and though it has ‘indigenous content’ ( Altbach, 1993) ‘in terms of books, research, journals and the like’ (p.5), the fact remains that in relation to public Indian HE, ‘the weight of the historical past is a heavy burden for Indian higher education ... the will to part from the past or even to open up the system in significant new directions has been lacking’ ( p11) - see also, Basu (1989).

As established in Chapter Two, though Gandhi was keen for ‘educated India’ to free itself from the ‘‘hypnotic spell of the foreign medium’ (Basu, 1989, p.175), as he described the English language, efforts to do so proved difficult and highly contentious and as Altbach (1993, p.6) highlights ‘in those relatively few countries that have changed the medium of instruction to an indigenous language, difficulties have been encountered and standards have almost without exception declined’. Thus, those in India who attend institutions of learning which offer Hindi or regional languages as the medium of instruction rather than ones offering English, can potentially be disadvantaged or excluded from the outset in terms of access to such forms of social and cultural capital ( Fernandes, 2006) and be subject to ‘dividing practices’, as the recent study by Deshpande and Apoorvanand (above) further suggests. English as a medium of instruction became from the time of colonial rule - and remains - the privilege of the elites and the urban middle class. It continues to symbolise power, prestige and social progress or advancement and thereby not only denoting social status but bestowing it and is mandatory not only for employment within metropolitan cities in India following the liberalisation of India’s economy but also for employment or study abroad (Guha, 2008), as illustrated in Chapters Six and Seven. With the increasing emphasis on both private participation in
HE and the wider global economy, knowledge and proficiency in the English language is - and will remain - not only desirable but crucial.

It also needs highlighting that the issue of language more broadly continues to prove politically charged and highly contentious. Renewed efforts to incorporate a three-language formula with particular reference to Hindi and English into the draft National Education Policy (NEP) 2019 have reportedly been dropped following protests - mainly, though not exclusively, in the southern state of Tamil Nadu - about the ‘imposition of Hindi’. Intended to create ‘greater national integration’, the adoption of the three-language formula would have required students in Hindi-speaking states to learn ‘a modern Indian language’ other than Hindi and English, while those in non-Hindi-speaking states, such as Tamil Nadu - historically the most vociferous opponent to the ‘imposition of Hindi’ (as noted in Chapter Two, see also Guha, 2008) – would have been required to learn Hindi along with the regional language and English.\(^{121}\)

Chapter Six, described the significance of student mobility in relation to HE, and pointed out India’s stress on the country’s ‘demographic dividend’, the role of HE in realising this potential and associated economic prosperity and growth, and how the GoI looks to business leaders to assist in and partner with to achieve this growth. Thus, another ‘constant’ is the involvement of Indian business in the country’s development and nation-building efforts. Bayly (2008) makes the point that within the Indian context, indigenous business and entrepreneurs, with their sense of the local market and ability to gauge local patterns of consumption (p. 25) - including in Indian HE, as this thesis has demonstrated - have been vital to India’s economic development and have contributed to India’s economic advancement. Certainly, the extremely powerful and evocative framing of the involvement of business firstly in India’s formation and independence and subsequently in her economic development and growth by notions of ‘trusteeship’ ‘for the motherland’ and ‘for India’ has been very evident from the insights provided in this thesis (Chapters Three - Six) and extremely difficult to question or doubt. In this sense...

\(^{121}\) https://indianexpress.com/article/education/3-language-policy-national-education-policy-draft-revised-2-members-object-5763516/, accessed 04/06/19
of their close involvement, the business leaders in this study and the GoI have been ‘fellow travellers’ (Dean, 2014) in India’s journey and are likely to remain so, as recent announcements in relation to Indian HE and the ‘Indian Institutes of Eminence’ in particular illustrate.

While the GoI continues to ponder on whether and how to allow the entry of foreign universities into India, plans to establish 10 public and 10 private domestic but globally competitive ‘Indian Institutes of Eminence’ have been proposed as a viable alternative by the GoI with a provisional budget of approximately £1.2 billion for the 10 public institutions reportedly having been approved. Under plans announced, these institutes will have considerable autonomy to set their own fees for foreign students (anticipated from Asia and Africa), salaries for foreign faculty as well some discretion on admissions (Times Higher Education Supplement, August 24, 2017).

While the three public institutions include the technologically oriented Indian Institute of Science - Bangalore, IIT-Bombay and IIT-Delhi; among the private institutions selected for this tag which are of significance and direct relevance here include: the Birla Institute of Technology and Science (BITS) at Pilani, Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE) (Chapter Seven) and the yet-to-be established Mukesh Ambani’s Jio Institute. According to plans submitted to the Central government by Mukesh Ambani’s Reliance Foundation, Jio Institute is to be built on 800 acres of land near Navi (New) Mumbai, and reportedly projected to provide returns of Indian Rupees (INRs) 100 crore (approximately 1 billion INRs or GB£10million, depending on exchange rates) from 1,000 students in the first year of operation, with another projected increase of Rs 208 crore from 2,000 students in the second year.

Amid controversy at the Jio Institute having been selected for the ‘Indian Institutes of Eminence’ tag before its existence and establishment, the MHRD was forced to defend and justify its decision and issued a statement saying:

---

122 Presumably owing to funding constraints, only six institutes have been identified and named (reduced from the original 10 proposed), with the provisional budget for each public institute set at approximately an additional US$150 million over five years according to Altbach and Choudaha (2018).
Mukesh Ambani’s endeavour follows a line of tradition and established custom here as the privately-owned BITS Pilani and Manipal were greenfield efforts at the time (Altbach and Choudaha, 2018). While these recent developments build on the work of this thesis and serve to illustrate the continuing facilitation and encouragement of the involvement of business in Indian HE, important and noteworthy in itself; there is an additional aspect here which serves to highlight aspects of resistance to change and reform within public sector Indian HE which, for reasons of space and focus, I could only briefly allude to (Chapters Seven and Eight). Altbach (1993) has previously highlighted the politically charged character of Indian HE and the associated difficulties in achieving consensus around its reform; more recently, however, along with colleagues, Altbach, Reisberg, Salmi, and Froumin (in Altbach and Choudaha, 2018, p.25), he goes so far as to assert, ‘creating a new university with world-class ambitions is more desirable than attempting to reform an existing one that is resistant to change’.

Thus, while these ‘Indian Institutes of Eminence’ are intended to benefit the ‘nation as a whole’ to use the words from the MHRD above, what they, and the associated reforming aspects they represent, are not necessarily welcome or palatable to the ‘nation as a whole’ - nor, for that matter, accessible to the ‘nation as a whole’. Though the proposed legislation allowing the entry of foreign universities into India to establish branch campuses, as encapsulated by the Foreign Education Providers Bill (FEIB, 2010) - Chapter Seven, may continue to languish in India’s parliament and remain unresolvable; a potential and viable alternative is (selectively) available from the ‘glocal’ business leaders in this study in the form of the proposed ‘Indian Institutes of Eminence’, including those yet to be established in the form of Mukesh Ambani’s Jio institute, to cater for the seemingly insatiable (not only) Indian demand for Western and European education and institutions. Macaulay would be pleased.

REFERENCES


Ernst and Young (2013). Hitting the sweet spot: The growth of the middle class in emerging markets. Available at: https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Hitting_the_sweet_spot/%24FILE/Hitting_the_sweet_spot.pdf, accessed 24/06/14.


