Transcalar Urban Governance:
Planning and Development in the
“Oil-City” of Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana

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Declaration

I, Thien Vinh Dac Nguyen, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Thien Vinh Dac Nguyen
Abstract

In 2007, Ghana located commercial quantities of oil and gas off its Western coast, near the city of Sekondi-Takoradi. This discovery galvanised different groups wishing to benefit from these natural resources. With a view on Sekondi-Takoradi, this thesis examines how urban governance is exercised in relation to planning and development outcomes where there are multiple actors each with their own motivations, interests and agendas. In the wake of the oil discoveries, this thesis shows how the state, civil society and transnational corporate actors contest, negotiate and converge to shape future possibilities in the city in a transcalar manner across local, national and international scales of power. This research builds on network approaches to urban governance, particularly urban regime theory. Rather than view power as concentrated and held by a dominant force, urban regime theory asserts that multiple actors leverage different resources and skills to forge cross-sector governing arrangements which can both enable and disable development. This thesis makes the following contributions: First, it argues for including and localising the role of transnational corporations in urban regimes in an African context. Despite the financial power of corporations (e.g. transnational oil companies), corporations rely on local social-political networks and city resources for their business activities. Second, this thesis brings forward a postcolonial intervention to urban regime theory, by focusing on the agency of the local state and civil society actors to shape urban development outcomes. Far from a weak state, it shows how the local state in Sekondi-Takoradi (i.e. city government and traditional authorities) builds governing capacity by convening local and transnational actors through planning processes and development management. Third, this thesis shows how civil society organisations in Sekondi-Takoradi expand local state capacity by participating in legislative and planning processes to co-produce inclusive development outcomes, while also challenging state and corporate authority. This thesis thus argues that these distinctive actors—the local state, civil society, and transnational corporations—are mutually constitutive of one another through the transcalar governance of urban development.
Impact Statement

This thesis explores the dynamics of governance and the politics of urban development in a city with powerful transnational corporations and global economic interests. The case study for this PhD research is the city of Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana, which is home to over 500,000 residents (Ghana Statistical Services, 2014) and features a transnational oil and gas industry. After the discovery of large quantities of oil and gas resources off Ghana’s Western coast near Sekondi-Takoradi in 2007, the city became a base for transnational oil and gas companies involved in the exploration and production of these natural resources. In this context, this research focuses on how distinctive groups—local government, traditional authorities, civil society organisations, international development agencies, and transnational corporations (oil companies and property developers)—shape development projects and future possibilities in the city. This thesis challenges conventional understandings of urban governance and natural resource management, particularly in African contexts, by showing the potential for inclusive and progressive urban development outcomes, issues of unequal power relations notwithstanding.

The core academic impact of this PhD research is that it contributes to a more nuanced and hopeful narrative of African cities, rather than portrayals about how their local governments are weak, absent or even corrupt. This thesis illuminates how, despite being financially constrained and often understaffed, in order to influence certain development outcomes and to mobilise capital investment, the local state and civil society organisations build their governing capacities through land-use and development management, as well as through strategic planning processes. This research also demystifies the role that transnational corporations play in development. With a focus on major oil and gas companies in Sekondi-Takoradi, this thesis shows how those companies rely on local social and political networks and city resources in order to successfully pursue their activities and business operations. Based on these research findings, this thesis argues that these diverse groups in the city are mutually constitutive of one another, despite having different interests, motivations and agendas. Thus, this thesis contends that scholarship on urban governance in the wake of the settlement of transnational firms and capital investment, particularly in African contexts, needs to take into context the agency and capacities of the local state, civil society organisations and citizens to shape their urban futures.
The wider impact of this PhD research is that it provides practical and inspired accounts of how engaged citizens and concerned groups can create and contribute to governance pathways to influence social change. This thesis thus provides an encouraging and optimistic framework for identifying the capacity of humans to work to achieve a better world, despite issues of social difference and systemic challenges. On a personal level, this thesis also illuminated for me what it means to be a global citizen by showing me how, as a politically engaged researcher and citizen, I can participate and bring forth more inclusive forms of governance locally and globally.
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<tr>
<td>ABFA</td>
<td>Annual Budget Funding Amount</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACEP</td>
<td>African Centre for Energy Policy</td>
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<td>CDB</td>
<td>China Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEPIL</td>
<td>Centre for Public Interest Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>COLANDEF</td>
<td>Community Land and Development Foundation</td>
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<td>CPP</td>
<td>Convention People’s Party</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<td>CSPOG</td>
<td>Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas</td>
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<td>CSR</td>
<td>Corporate Social Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>District Assembly</td>
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<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (United Kingdom’s Development Aid Agency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECG</td>
<td>Electric Company of Ghana</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>Enterprise Development Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Environmental Protection Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>FoN</td>
<td>Friends of the Nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>GHF</td>
<td>Ghana Heritage Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (Germany’s Development Aid Agency)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNPC</td>
<td>Ghana National Petroleum Company</td>
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<td>GSF</td>
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An oil block refers to an area of land licensed for oil and gas exploration and production by the central government. An oil block can contain multiple fields that consist of oil and gas resources. As of 2016, Ghana has 15 oil blocks. More information: [https://www.ghanapetroleumregister.com](https://www.ghanapetroleumregister.com).

The Jubilee Field refers to the field where commercial quantities of oil and gas were first discovered in 2017, with production beginning in 2010. The Tweneboa, Enyenra, Ntomme (TEN) Fields are the other fields under production, with production beginning in 2016.

Completed in 2011, the West Africa Gas Pipeline (WAGP) refers to the 678 kilometre (421 mile) gas pipeline that delivers gas from Nigeria (via the Escravos-Lagos Pipeline) to terminal stations and customers in Itoki (Nigeria), Lagos (Nigeria), Cotonou (Benin), Lomé (Togo), Tema (Ghana) and Sekondi-Takoradi (Ghana). There are plans to extend the gas pipeline to Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire). It is a joint venture consisting of public and private companies from Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana. More information: [http://www.wagpeco.com](http://www.wagpeco.com).
Chapter One

1. Introduction

1.1. Striking Oil in Ghana

“Even without oil, we are doing so well...with oil as a shot in the arm, we’re going to fly...Oil is money, and we need money to do the schools, the roads, the hospitals. If you find oil, you manage it well, can you complain about that?”

–John Kufuor, President of Ghana, June 2007

“Here in Ghana, you show us a face of Africa that is too often overlooked by a world that sees only tragedy or a need for charity. The people of Ghana have worked hard to put democracy on a firmer footing, with repeated peaceful transfers of power even in the wake of closely contested elections. And with improved governance and an emerging civil society, Ghana’s economy has shown impressive rates of growth...So I believe that this moment is just as promising for Ghana and for Africa...This is a new moment of great promise.”

–Barack Obama, President of the United States, July 2009

After a century of minor oil and gas discoveries, Ghana’s President John Kufuor announced in June 2007 that the country had discovered commercial quantities of oil and gas in the Jubilee Fields off the coast of Sekondi-Takoradi (BBC News, 2007; GhanaWeb, 2007). While estimates vary as to the total quantity of Ghana’s offshore oil, the first oil field in production, the Jubilee Field, has reserves estimated at around three billion barrels and 1.2 trillion cubic feet of gas, the latter being equivalent to 162 million barrels of oil (GNPC, 2008; Kastning, 2011). According to the International Monetary Fund, the oil and gas revenues from the Jubilee Field alone could earn the Ghanaian government a cumulative $20 billion US dollars between 2012 and 2030 (Gary et al., 2009). As of 2016, there are 15 active petroleum agreements signed between the Government of Ghana and local and transnational oil companies for the exploration and production of 15 oil blocks (large areas of licensed land), with each block potentially consisting of multiple oil and gas fields (Petroleum Commission Ghana, 2016). Based on these estimates, Ghana is poised to be
the fourth largest producer of oil in sub-Saharan Africa by 2020, after Nigeria, Angola and the Republic of Congo (Reuters, 2016). Despite their economic volatility, oil and gas are resources laden with hopes and expectations. In light of the oil and gas discoveries, optimism about Ghana’s future is contrasted with concern about the “resource curse,” a narrative which focuses on why resource-rich countries (many of which are in Africa) tend to be poorer and more under-developed than less well-endowed countries (Auty, 2002; Collier, 2010; Oliveira, 2007; Ross, 2001; Sachs and Warner, 2001, 1997, 1995). Explanations of the resource curse range from the idea that these are weak states with poor governance (Reno, 1999) to the “Dutch Disease” effect, whereby countries suffer from the boom-and-bust of a global economy when they excessively rely on a primary resource or industry (like oil and gas) at the expense of diversifying their economy and investing in other industries (Andrews, 2013; Le Billon, 2001; Watts, 2004). Despite the conceptual limitations of the resource curse, for instance, its overemphasis on macroeconomics and weak causality between resource dependency and authoritarian regimes (Haber and Menaldo, 2012; Rosser, 2006; Watts, 2004; Weszkalnys, 2011), narratives about the dangers of oil and gas resources continue to shape discourses about the necessity of policy interventions and “good governance” (Barry, 2004; Ferguson, 2006; Weszkalnys, 2011). As such, hopeful expectations about ensuring that oil and gas resources are a “blessing” rather than a “curse” are embedded within a governance context, where Ghana is promoted as an exemplar democratic country capable of going beyond the “tragedy” of resource mismanagement in Africa (Aydin, 2011; Debrah and Graham, 2015; Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012; Heilbrunn, 2014). This discovery of oil and gas resources has been marked by the galvanization of citizens, civil society organisations, traditional authorities, different levels of Ghanaian government, local businesses and transnational corporations aiming to benefit from the promise of oil and gas resources through governance of its windfalls. With the oil and gas discoveries bringing about social change, heightened economic opportunities and altered perceptions of place, this research scrutinises the relationship between governance and development outcomes across a multiplicity of local and transnational actors.

Under this context of Ghana’s entry into the global oil economy, this thesis adopts an urban lens by focusing on the city of Sekondi-Takoradi. In the wake of Ghana’s insertion into the global oil economy and given its proximity to oil and gas fields, Sekondi-Takoradi has emerged as the base to Ghana’s oil and gas industry. Although this thesis focuses on
the urban governance of oil windfalls, it firmly acknowledges the multi-layered and “transcalar” nature of political power in the city. This research examines how multiple state, private and civil society actors—working across local, national and international scales—contest, negotiate and coordinate their interests and agendas in shaping urban development outcomes and possibilities. Despite fears about a resource curse, the discovery and production of oil opens up new pathways for development and mobilises various actors, with oil and gas representing promise, modernity and opportunity in different ways for each of them. This thesis provides a nuanced perspective on how these local and transnational actors exercise governance, as they negotiate their relationships, create political arrangements and engage in the processes of strategic planning.

This research thus moves away from totalising narratives about the pervasiveness of global capitalism and neoliberalism as external forces in shaping urban governance, particularly in African contexts. It recognises that urban governance consists of the constant interplay between globalising internal dynamics and localising external forces, characterised by complex networks of power relations, tensions and agreements and the contestation and convergence of interests and agendas. It builds on networked approaches to governance, particularly urban regime theory, while arguing for both “postcolonialising” and “transnationalising” understandings of urban governance in our world of cities. Rather than seeing economic forces as structuring social life, this research recognises that economic problems are embedded in the world of social relations (Barry and Slater, 2002; Callon, 1998; Weszkalnys, 2011). This approach entails seeing “economic process as conversation and coordination, the subjects of the process not as factors but as reflexive human actors, both individual and collective, and the nature of economic accumulation as not only material assets, but as relational assets” (Storper, 1996). This thesis shows how transcalar urban governance has been exercised through three development pathways in the city of Sekondi-Takoradi: corporate-led, state-led and civil-society-led.

1.2. Research Problem

This thesis expands inquiry into how different groups of people who are tied to the possibilities of cities engage in urban politics to influence development outcomes. By contesting, negotiating and coordinating their urban goals and agendas, their interactions
and social relations define and redefine the nature of governance and the city itself. The thesis engages with the tensions and outcomes that arise from the simultaneous relations of contestation and collaboration between different actors.

The discovery of oil and gas off the coast of Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana in 2007 has galvanised local and international civil society groups and traditional authorities, along with the state at multiple levels of governance and transnational corporations seeking to benefit and advance their visions of development as part of these economic opportunities. In the context of these oil and gas windfalls, there is a heightened sense of hope, expectation and concern and about the city’s trajectories of development and its urban future. This research aims to understand how competing urban agendas, which include pro-market and redistributive goals, play out and shape urban development outcomes in this political context. As such, the overarching research question for this thesis is as follows:

How is governance exercised in relation to development outcomes in the “oil-city” of Sekondi-Takoradi across a multiplicity of local and transnational actors, each with their own motivations, interests and agendas?

In order to answer this question, this thesis also seeks to understand the interlocking relationships, negotiations and agendas of three core actors: the local state (i.e. traditional authorities and local government), transnational corporations (e.g. oil companies) and civil society organisations. The following sub-questions serve to operationalise this research by informing this thesis’s methodological approach during fieldwork and data collection. In the wake of an oil discovery off the coast of the city of Sekondi-Takoradi, this research asks:

- How do transnational corporations work with and against the local state, civil society organisations and local communities to shape urban development outcomes?

- How does the local state in Sekondi-Takoradi (i.e. traditional authorities and city government working in parallel) envision the city’s potential futures and strategise for particular urban development agendas? How do they create and expand their governing capacity through planning and land management?
How do civil society organisations utilise state pathways (e.g., planning process and legislative channels) to push for inclusive development agendas? How do they challenge state and corporate authority?

These questions inform the overarching analytical framework of this thesis: a transcalar approach to urban governance, which focuses on cross-sector alliances and engagements in a manner that challenges the binaries of internal/external and local/global. This thesis localises the presence of transnational corporations and the notion of externalised economic forces. It also “transnationalises” the role of the local state by showing how the state builds its capacity, as it manages transnational resources and externalised processes and policies.

Studies of urban governance have shifted from a pluralist approach of examining open competition among different groups with an autonomous state serving as arbiter toward networked approaches that simultaneously recognise power relations and processes of negotiation and co-operation (Lindell, 2008; Stone, 1993). Broadly defined as “urban regime theory,” this networked approach to governance takes a “middle ground” between structure and agency to examine the assembling of social relations among a wide range of public and private actors, each with uneven access to different kinds of resources (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003; Kantor et al., 1997; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; Stone, 1993).

Further studies on the formation of urban regimes and networked governance also reference “growth coalitions,” “public-private partnerships,” “policy networks,” “stakeholder participation,” “collaborative planning” and “regional assemblages” (Allen and Cochrane, 2007; Elander, 2002; Healey, 1998; McCann and Ward, 2011; Pierre, 1998; Savitch and Kantor, 2002). These urban regimes are defined by collaborative arrangements through which local government and private actors assemble the capacity to govern (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003; Kantor et al., 1997; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; Savitch and Kantor, 2002; Stone, 1993) and where power is conceptualised as fragmented and generative (Healey, 2003). Urban regime theorists have drawn on case studies from cities in the U.S. and Europe, where their analytical lens brings alliances into view. These alliances
are often forged between locally dependent businesses and the formal local government under a territorialised approach to urban space.

In this sense, local economic development is seen as centred around how local governments and land-based elites form “growth machines” to expand the local economy, using a territorial and spatial logic to view urban growth (Logan and Molotch, 2007; Molotch, 1976; Wilson and Jonas, 1999). Scholars of both the urban regime and growth machine theories argue that the complexity of urban agendas, coupled with the role of civil society actors, prevent deterministic development outcomes in cities (Savitch and Kantor, 2002; Stone, 1993). According to Savitch and Kantor (2002), given the blend of “global challenges and local responses,” cities have different “bargaining positions,” as they pursue strategies to compete for capital investment in the “international marketplace,” (p. 19). In this context, city governments and coalitions adapt to global economic shifts by internally negotiating and pursuing a mix of market-based and social-centred strategies that foster urban development and growth. As such, there many urban strategies that shape urban development. These ideas around local economic development and whom it benefits are agendas driven by both public sector and private sector actors (Pike et al., 2007; Savitch and Kantor, 2002). Drawn into these urban governance debates are concerns about not only shifts from managerialism to entrepreneurialism, but also the role of cities in capitalist accumulation (Harvey, 1989). Urban scholars Jamie Peck, Nik Theodore and Neil Brenner (2009) argue that cities have become increasingly central to the “reproduction” and “mutation” of neoliberalism. This ideology “rests on competitive and unregulated markets” through the deployment of “the deregulation of state control over industry, assaults on organized labour, the reduction of corporate taxes, the downsizing and/or privatization of public services and assets, the dismantling of welfare programs, the enhancement of international capital and the intensification of interlocality competition” (Peck et al., 2009, p. 50). These neoliberal critiques also speak to growing inequalities in African cities, where market-based approaches to service delivery are seen as benefiting elites and the private sector amidst reductions in taxes and shrinking state-subsidised social programmes (Bond, 2000; Davis, M., 2007; Harvey, 2005) While Brenner et al. (2010) are attuned to the “variegated” and “hybridised” character of neoliberalism with its multiple trajectories and mutations, as well as to the sites of resistance against neoliberalism, this analytic does not fully capture the dynamism of the city with its many competing agendas, multiplicity of actors and creative processes that shape urban development (Parnell and
Robinson, 2012; Simone, 2004). In addition, Aihwa Ong (2006) questions the reach of neoliberalism by calling upon critics to focus on the places where “neoliberalism is not the general characteristic of technologies of governing” (p. 3).

Attuned to the contradictions and varying impacts of neoliberal policies, the geographer Garth Myers (2011) argues that these policies generally shift responsibility from the central state towards emphasis on “strengthening the private sector [and] opening the door to transnational capital” while “enabling democratic, municipal governments and empowering community groups” (p. 107). As Sue Parnell and Jennifer Robinson (2012) attest, while the neoliberal analytic is nuanced in its “concern about growing urban inequalities,” it nevertheless does not capture “the range of urban processes shaping a diversity of urban contexts” or “the agency of the local state as potentially developmental, even progressive” (p. 594). Building on practice-based experiences, Parnell and Robinson (2012) show how anti-poverty interventions by the post-apartheid South African state have strong developmental aims: service delivery for the poor, environmental protections and wealth redistribution (p. 602). Parnell, Pieterse and Swilling (2002), for example, posit that, decentralisation polices can result in the expansion of local government to focus on services for the urban poor (p. 7), while Ferguson (2015) argues for taking stock of new kinds of distributive politics and policy possibilities that go beyond influential accounts of neoliberalism and social exclusion (p. 4).

By engaging with this postcolonial intervention, this thesis revisits the agency of the local state in African cities and their engagement with transnational actors and civil society through a case study of the “oil-city” of Sekondi-Takoradi. Given issues of poverty and developmental challenges that exist alongside economic growth opportunities, the state’s urban development agendas are varied (United Nations Human Settlements, 2010). This thesis shares the concerns of African studies authors in seeking to understand the role of the local state in shaping development outcomes. Under the urban regime framework, although local governments like that in Sekondi-Takoradi are often constrained by the lack of material resources, they have the technical capabilities and social influence to form alliances with the private sector and civil society for development projects, thus exercising and expanding their governing capacity. Writing from a post-structuralist approach that focuses on the creative and coordinating ways in which local actors in African cities make use of what is available to them to build community and forge emergent economies, urban
studies scholar AbdouMalique Simone (2004) challenges scholars to investigate how “the capacity to generate new and largely ephemeral forms of social collaboration are important in this process” (p. 214).

This thesis focuses on the specificity of the state in Africa and its relations with wider, external forces. It adopts a dual conceptualisation of state in which it is both an institution and a set of social relations (Cochrane, 1999; Sharma and Gupta, 2009). In this vein, Abrams, 1988; Dean, 1999; Li, 2005 among other scholars, have critically argued against conceptualising the state as distinctive, monolithic and autonomous. For Abrams (1988) the state is not a real “material object,” but rather it is a symbolic “idea” made up of “internal and external relations of political and governmental institutions.” Employing a Foucauldian analysis, Li (2005) argues for moving beyond seeing the state as a “thing that is concentrated in a bureaucratic apparatus and the top echelons of the ruling regime, from which it spreads outward across the nation, and downward into the lives of the populace” (p. 385). It is also not about an “up there” state versus a “down there” populace that’s resisting (Li, 2005, p. 395). This research builds from Jean-François Bayart’s (2009) conceptualisation that the state in Africa is rhizomatic, made up of a multiplicity of political alliances and patronage systems that connect traditional leaders with modern elites and their wider kinship networks. As Ghana’s local state consists of the metropolitan assembly and traditional authorities working in parallel, the contours of the state are produced and reproduced through state practices and relations with wider society (Agbosu et al., 2007; Ahwoi, 2010). In this case, it is thus possible for non-state actors to work “in” as well as “against” the local state (Cochrane, 1999).

By postcolonialisng and transnationalising urban regime theory, this thesis focuses on the relationships between the local state and transnational actors in Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana. It expands understandings of urban regime theory by inquiring about the role of transnational actors, challenging the notion that externalising global forces can undermine local governments (Parnell and Robinson, 2012; Stone, 2015). This research engages with the concept of transnationalism by examining the ways in which transnational actors cross national borders as individuals and groups to “inhabit the city, forge translocal connections and create new modes for being-in-the-world” (Smith, M.P. cited in Conradson and Latham, 2005, p. 227). This research engages with the concept of transnationalism by focusing on transnational organisations (with their transnational capital, labour force and
equipment), as well as global policies and best practices that shape resource management and development. In Sekondi-Takoradi, there are a multitude of transnational actors working in the city, particularly as a result of its oil and gas industry. These actors range from oil companies and oilfield services companies, to engineering firms, to civil society organisations and the individuals who work for them. Although this research acknowledges the power of transnational actors in shaping growth and development, it also explains how they embed their relations into a social context, whereby their abilities to successfully operate and conduct business relies on localised partnerships with the state, traditional authorities and civil society. This research also goes beyond seeing governing coalitions as arrangements between the private sector and local government in order to address the role of civil society organisations as drivers of development outcomes (Davies and Imbroscio, 2008; Le Galès, 2002; Pierre, 2011).

This thesis therefore aims to contribute to debates about the nature of urban governance, stretching urban regime theory beyond U.S. and European case studies by examining the specificities of the local state and the modes of governance operating in the “transnationalised” city of Sekondi-Takoradi. By doing so, this research hopes to extend understandings about the parameters and conditions through which governing coalitions and arrangements take form in cities that are increasingly globalised. In order to answer the question about how governance is exercised in Sekondi-Takoradi, this thesis analyses three different development pathways or sites of governance in the city: corporate-led, state-led and civil society-led. All of these varying pathways involve governance arrangements and interactions amongst a wide range of actors—local and transnational, public and private, governmental and non-governmental. In situating this research around a local state that is contributing to both pro-market and inclusive development agendas, while also creating coalitions with transnational corporations and civil society organisations, this thesis sheds light on how different actors navigate constraints and opportunities to forge their capacity to shape urban futures.

1.3. Potential Contributions

This research examines how local and transnational actors exercise governance to shape urban development outcomes in a “transcalar” manner—across local, national,
international scales—in the oil-city of Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana. By doing so, it extends understandings about the politics of how cities work and operate across a multiplicity of interests and agendas. In addition to illuminating the uneven terrain of resources and power in the city, it also shows how multiple groups leverage their different financial assets, skills and connections to forge governing arrangements. It recognises the multiple and complex relationships, actions and arrangements of different actors living and working in cities. As framed by urban regime theory, power is fragmented in cities, and development is made possible through collaborative arrangements between public and private sector actors. In light of their constraints and available resources (material and non-material), they assemble their capacity to govern (Kantor et al., 1997; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; Stone, 2015, 1993). In addition, while the private sector has always been “an object, partner, and agent of development” (McEwan et al., 2017), there is a “revival” in the development practice of seeing the private sector—particularly transnational corporations—as a development agent (Banks et al., 2015; Blowfield and Dolan, 2014; Mawdsley, 2015; McEwan et al., 2017). Following Blowfield and Dolan (2014), changing corporate-community interactions, coupled with a rise in new business models, partnership arrangements and financial instruments have facilitated not only the re-emergence of the private sector in the development practice, but also renewed critical engagement about the relations and governing arrangements forged between the private sector, the state and civil society across varying scales.

This thesis therefore brings forward a postcolonial intervention to urban regime theory, focusing on the agency of the local state and transnational and civil society actors in the postcolonial city of Sekondi-Takoradi. It recognises that African states, such as present-day Ghana, continue to have a long history and strategic engagement with the global political economy (Bayart, 2009; Davidson, 1991). This research argues that it is possible to draw and learn from the specificities of the local African state (e.g. the coexistence of an elected city assembly and traditional authorities), which is often seen as incapacitated or weak, by instead focusing on how the local assembly and traditional authorities (despite their relative financial constraints) draw on their technical capabilities and social relations to negotiate with local and transnational private sector actors to shape development outcomes. Despite the real challenges facing African cities, this thesis argues for recognising the motivations and dynamism of African cities. It also draws on postcolonial critiques that highlight the range of creative, adaptive and innovative strategies developed by networks of state and
non-state actors in making, unmaking and remaking African cities, as they address both development challenges, as well as modernist urban visions (Robinson, 2006; Simone, 2004).

Another conceptual contribution that this thesis makes is bringing a transnational lens to the study of urban governing arrangements. Studies based on urban regime theory have largely focused on local actors, tied to the economic possibilities of a place. This thesis calls for including transnational actors in the making of urban regimes. As cities are increasingly globalised, it is important to understand how transnational actors and global processes are drawn into urban governance networks, and in turn, how the local state responds to these changes. In addition, beyond focusing on the relationship between the state and private actors (such as transnational oil companies), this thesis also shows the institutional role that local civil society organisations play in shaping and pushing for inclusive development goals, as they draw upon state pathways, such as planning processes and legislative channels, while simultaneously challenging state and corporate authority. Rather than view the civil society organisations as actors that can weaken state capacity, this thesis shows the potential for civil society organisations to strategise with state, corporate and other non-state actors to co-produce outcomes that align with pro-poor and inclusive development agendas. As they partner with international donors and partners, these civil society organisations are also drawn into global policy circuits and discourses, giving rise to the transnational nature of civil society, as well. Thus, rather than viewing urban governance from a strictly local level or assuming the economic imposition of transnational actors and processes, this thesis extends understandings of how governing arrangements come together across these scales. Through a detailed case study of Sekondi-Takoradi, this research also makes an empirical contribution to network approaches in urban governance and urban regime theory, bringing forward a case study for Africa, whereas previous case studies tend to focus on North American and European cities.

By focusing on the city, another contribution that this thesis makes is by applying an “urban lens” to the study of resource governance. Following noted geographers Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift (2017), an urban lens, or “seeing like a city” posits that the interwoven agency of countless actors and the assembly of a wide range of materials in an entangled web of networks make cities. The flows and interactions of a wide range of actors and materials constantly affect new urban possibilities and the spatial forms of cities. Rather
than focus on macro-economic theory, the “resource curse” and national-level interventions concerning resource governance, the dynamism of the city and its potential to shape discourses and development outcomes is put back into view. According to historian Nelida Fuccaro (2013), the urban lens is often neglected in resource studies: “the city is seen as a mere accessory of state power, as an appendix to the national and global oil economies” (p. 2). An urban lens can also show that it is crucial to recognise the ways in which materials are bound up in a world of other materials, forms of knowledge and social relations (Barry and Slater, 2002; Callon, 1998; Weszkalnys, 2011). This thesis takes this insight forward by recognising how the different materialities and social relations that assemble to make up the city (e.g. infrastructural networks and political land management systems) influence the social and material possibilities of the oil industry and other industries that call the city home.

An important contribution of this study is examining governance and the pursuit of urban development outcomes across a multiplicity of transnational corporate and local actors in an “African” city without falling into stereotypes about the city and people who call it home. This thesis analyses the relationships and strategies amongst transnational actors, the local state and civil society organisations in a city undergoing socio-economic change as a result of a growing oil and gas industry. It recognises the complex interactions amongst these different actors, working across local and transnational scales in shaping governance and development in the city. This study focuses on the interactions between the local state and civil society that “localise” and “ground” the power and presence of transnational oil companies and explores how their governance relations shape urban development outcomes. This research thus moves away from viewing transnational capital as an externalising force that influences city-based actors to compete with other cities for national and international investment.

Rather, this thesis examines the ways in which the state engages with transnationalised processes and actors on its own terms to bring its urban development agendas forward. Importantly, it shows how despite the financial limitations of the local state, as evidenced by the Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly, the state’s capacity rests on its ability to convene a wide range of local and transnational actors through planning issues and processes (e.g. Medium Term Development Plans and Citywide Structural Plans), which opens up governance pathways for different actors to envision, negotiate and contest
development goals. Relatively, the state’s capacity also involves its ability to shape development projects through land management and planning procedures. As demonstrated in the case of Sekondi-Takoradi, local and transnational investors rely on traditional authorities and local government agencies to obtain land and building rights. This includes the ability of local governing bodies (traditional authorities or city agencies) to evict and/or relocate occupants on sites that are proposed for development. Despite the city’s push for local economic development and growth, it is important to recognise how city officials also need to address pro-poor and developmentalist goals when implementing citywide plans in order to maintain political influence. In addition, the activism of civil society organisations, grassroots organisers and the media, alongside their electoral power and involvement in planning and legislative processes, serves as a counterbalance to state and corporate pursuits. This thesis shows how different groups in the city—the local state, transnational corporations and civil society organisations—are distinctive based on their resources, skills and interests, yet are mutually constitutive as they shape multiple development outcomes. As such, this research remains open to the possibilities of social change in a city without assuming any linear development trajectory.

1.4. Overview of Chapters Presented in the Thesis

This thesis is organised into seven chapters. Following this introductory chapter, the second chapter presents an overview of the current debates and discourses that frame this research. The third chapter lays out the research setting as well as the justification for the qualitative methods employed. The three chapters to follow are empirically based. They focus on three development pathways—corporate-led, state-led and civil society-led—following the respective local development interventions of transnational oil companies, local authorities (which includes traditional authorities and the city government) and civil society organisations. Each of these empirical chapters builds on the urban regime framework by focusing on the constraints of each of these actors and the different resources and skills they bring to the negotiation of development strategies and outcomes. They consider how these actors work around particular constraints and use their resources to negotiate and forge cross-sector governing arrangements to enable development outcomes in their favour. The final chapter is the conclusion, followed by references and appendices. An overview of each chapter follows.
Chapter Two, “Towards Networked Governance: Multiple Actors, Different Resources and Mutual Dependencies,” frames this research in terms of academic debates and positions the potential contributions of this project. It bridges literatures on urban regimes, coalitions and local economic development with postcolonial narratives about the agency of the state and civil society in African cities in the wake of transnational capital, while applying a distinctive “transcalar” approach to governance and development. By focusing on the multi-layered and fragmented (rather than monolithic or centralised) nature of political power in the city, this transcalar approach cuts across scales of analysis by simultaneously localising the role of transnational corporate actors as development actors and transnationalising the capacity of the local state and civil society organisations to shape urban development outcomes. This chapter expands urban regime theory (a networked approach to governance) to focus on how local and transnational actors in an African city mobilise, negotiate and leverage their resources as they pursue development outcomes amidst an urban context where there is a heterogeneity of actors, interest and agendas. This chapter adds nuance to the role of private sector development and shows how transnational corporations are socially embedded in the places they operate. Employing a postcolonial intervention, it revisits the agency and specificity of the state (which includes traditional authorities and the local state) and civil society organisations and locates their capacities to govern in response to globalising neoliberal agendas and the presence of transnational corporate actors. Informed by analyses of African contexts, this chapter also calls for blurring the state-society divide. It does so by focusing on how civil society organisations, through participation in planning and legislative processes, can expand the credibility and governing capacity of the intertwined state and civil society as they co-produce inclusive development outcomes.

Chapter Three, “Context and Methodology: Researching in Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana” lays out the methodological framework of this research, provides a historical overview and profile of the research setting, and details the different methods used to generate data in Sekondi-Takoradi. Data collection consisted of 51 semi-structured interviews held in Ghana between 2013-2015. These interviews took place with transnational corporations, including oil companies and property developers, local and international civil society organisations and government employees. They involved nine months of fieldwork, including observation of development-related activities, as well as review and analysis of 20 years of local planning documents, budget, and policy documents, plus background data
and online sources. This chapter is also informed by data from a preliminary study in May 2013 and initial contacts made from January to July 2008, when this researcher was a foreign exchange student in Ghana. It also provides a rationale for the methods used in this qualitative research project: semi-structured interviews, attendance at stakeholder and community meetings, thematic analysis of planning, budget and policy documents and participant observation. In addition, this chapter discusses the limitations of this project and issues of positionality in relation to this US- and UK-based researcher living, working and researching in the city of Sekondi-Takoradi.

Chapter Four, “Localising Transnational Corporations: Oil Companies, Socio-Political Networks and Urban Development Politics,” focuses on corporate-led development in Sekondi-Takoradi by examining the interactions and processes that ground and localise transnational oil companies in an urban context. It argues that despite their economic power and the fact that many policy level decisions are made at the national scale, they are drawn into local political processes and local economic development agendas that “ground” their presence. While the national context in which oil companies operate, coupled with global discourses about the resource curse, transparency and role of public scrutiny shape the ways the oil companies do business; this thesis shows how oil companies must establish local networks of knowledge to function. In order to create a local base, they need to assemble materials, machinery, technologies, infrastructure, staff, offices, homes and capital for their business operations. As such, they work with local authorities and civil society actors in informal and formal ways to develop their operations, and maintain good public relations that mitigate business and reputational risks. These business development practices entangle them in wider conversations about urban development outcomes. This chapter contributes to analyses about the localisation of transnational corporations through their engagement with the local state and civil society organisations and their role as active urban development actors in an African context.

Chapter Five, “The State in Action: Building Governing Capacity Through Collaborative Planning with Local and Transnational Actors” argues for revisiting the local state in studies of urban governance in African cities. Although this chapter acknowledges the financial constraints facing local authorities in the city, it argues that the local state possesses technical capabilities and political influence. This chapter shows how the local state (consisting of traditional authorities and city government working in parallel) builds
governing capacity and shapes development outcomes in a diverse and transnational city. Expanding on the dual conceptualisation of the state as both institutional and as a set of relations (Cochrane, 1999), this chapter contextualises the local state in Sekondi-Takoradi as consisting of the parallel institutions of the Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly (STMA) and traditional authorities, and relationally, through its interactions and negotiations across a multiplicity of non-state actors. These non-state actors include citizens, local and international civil society organisations, local businesses and transnational corporations. This chapter then focuses on how the capacity of the local state rests on its abilities to convene these different local and transnational actors to contribute to development and structural plans, and its authority to regulate development projects through land management, including overseeing planning and building permits, evicting and relocating occupants on proposed land for development and facilitating certain forms of public infrastructure (e.g. roads, water, electricity). This chapter argues for transnationalising perspectives concerning the local state in African contexts by recognising its capacity to negotiate and respond to the development objectives of transnational corporations as it balances competing pro-growth and pro-poor development agendas.

Chapter Six, “Civil Society Organisations, Participatory Planning Processes and Strategies for Inclusive Development” focuses on how civil society organisations advocate for pro-poor and redistributive development agendas as they challenge state and transnational corporate authority. By leveraging their positionality as existing somewhere between the state, market and grassroots groups, these civil society organisations drawn upon state capacities to participate in planning and legislative processes and push for inclusive development outcomes. In the context of strong transnational actors (corporations, donors, agencies) in Sekondi-Takodorai, this chapter shows the potential for civil society organisations to influence development outcomes as they negotiate, contest, collaborate and co-produce with state and non-state actors across local and transnational scales of power. This chapter examines how civil society organisations mobilise and localise global discourses around resource management and democratic governance to monitor and evaluate oil and gas revenues, as well as scrutinise the practices, policies and development projects initiated by the state and transnational corporations. Civil society-led actions include the the creation of the Public Interest Accountability Committee at the national level (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012), the formation of Community, Environmental, Monitoring and Advocacy Groups (CEMAGs) at the local level (Van Alstine, 2014) and
the passage of a comprehensive “local content” law (L.I. 2204) in 2013 (Ablo, 2018, 2015). This law guarantees Ghanaian participation in its oil and gas industry by ensuring that Ghanaian businesses, investors and employees make up the majority of the industry’s value chain and workforce. These empirical examples contextualise the capacity of civil society organisations in Sekondi-Takoradi to contribute to inclusive urban development outcomes, as they co-produce community action plans with the local state that feed into city and regional plans. These civil society organisations also call upon the state and transnational corporations to further address wider social, economic and environmental concerns at both the urban and regional levels.

The concluding chapter contains summative remarks. It lays out the research findings of this thesis. It also shows the theoretical contributions of the research to wider debates in political geography and urban studies. It bridges literatures on urban regimes, coalitions and local economic development that focus on the mobilisation of transnational capital investment (based on Western cities) with postcolonial perspectives on the agency of the local state and civil society organisations in African cities that shape urban development outcomes. In this vein, this thesis calls for a transcalar approach to urban governance that simultaneously localises the role of transnational corporations as development actors and transnationalises the capacity of the local state and civil society organisations to foster multiple development trajectories in African contexts. In addition, this chapter suggests further avenues for potential research, which could enlarge a cosmopolitan conceptualisation of cities by recognising how urban governance networks consist of distinctive, yet mutually constitutive actors collaborating, negotiating and contesting across local and transnational scales and sources of power in the city.
2. Towards Network Governance: Multiple Actors, Different Resources and Mutual Dependencies

2.1. Introduction

Building upon networked approaches to urban governance and moving away from seeing power as concentrated in the state, this chapter articulates the mutually constitutive relations and negotiations between the local state and transnational corporate actors in not only shaping urban development outcomes, but also creating capacities to govern. This chapter bridges together literatures on urban regimes, coalitions and local economic development with postcolonial narratives about the agency of the state and civil society in African cities in the wake of transnational capital, while applying a distinctive “transcalar” approach to city politics and development. As it “transnationalises” the strategies and governing capacity of local government, traditional authorities and civil society to engage in and address urban development ambitions and challenges, this approach seeks to simultaneously localise transnational corporate actors and the globalising presence of capital in cities. In order to do so, this chapter draws upon the analytical lens of “urban regime theory,” which examines how state and non-state actors utilise their resources and skills to negotiate and forge collaborative governing arrangements that shape urban development (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; Stone, 2015, 1993).

This research acknowledges concerns raised by critics of neoliberal urban governance about how certain incentives and growth strategies spearheaded by city governments for transnational capital can usher in elitist forms of urban development, giving rise to hierarchies and inequalities across cities and within cities ((Brenner et al., 2010; Harvey, 2006; Sassen, 2011, 2001). Amidst concerns about intercity competition and the spread of neoliberal policies that facilitate privatisation and the flow of transnational capital at the expense of social provisions provided by the state (Peck et al., 2009), this chapter draws from postcolonial interventions that challenge the global coverage of neoliberalism (Ferguson, 2006; Ong, 2006; Parnell and Robinson, 2012) while highlighting the creative capacities of the local state, civil society organisations and communities to foster hybridised
and alternative forms of urban development (De Boeck and Plissart, 2006; Myers, 2011; Parnell and Robinson, 2006; Simone, 2004). This thesis also calls for bringing back the “dynamism” of the city with its countless actors, rationalities, temporalities and materialities (Amin and Thrift, 2017; Robinson, 2006). It draws on Patrick Le Gales’ (1998) call to focus on the complex modes of social regulation (beyond laws that regulate the market) that shape the “stability” of arrangements between groups and institutions. In this vein, Le Gales (1998) urges urban governance researchers to examine “the method of coordinating diverse activities, or relations between actors; the allocation of resources in relation to these activities or these actors; and the structuring of conflicts (prevention, resolution)” (p. 483).

The thesis contributes to these analytical threads by investigating the relationships and outcomes amongst state, market (i.e. transnational corporations) and civil society actors, which shape urban development in a manner that is neither deterministic nor linear. This thesis’ analytical approach is distinctive in that it argues for examining the agency and mutual dependencies amongst multiple actors—transnational corporations, the local state and civil society actors—as they shape urban development in a postcolonial African city.

This chapter is organised into six sections. Section 2.2 justifies the applicability of urban regime theory as a relevant and analytical approach to studying governance, yet argues for stretching the approach beyond case studies of Western cities and for including transnational corporations as active development actors. This chapter then details the role of private sector actors (specifically transnational corporations) in development (Section 2.3), given their “revival” in the wake of new business models, partnerships and narratives. In this context of corporate-led development, this chapter shows how transnational corporations are socially embedded in the places they operate and how their ability to conduct business depends on their external relations with the local state and civil society organisations. While there is opportunity to leverage upon corporate financial contributions to foster development projects, this is weighed against potential issues of exclusion and the lack of alignment with government plans.

Employing a postcolonial intervention, this chapter then revisits the agency and specificity of the state and civil society in African cities. Section 2.3 establishes that the local state in Africa often consists of both elected local government and traditional authorities (as is the
case in Ghana), and that a conceptualisation of the state requires engaging with a variety of institutions and their different relations with wider civil society. In addition, it recognises that the contemporary local state has to navigate competing development agendas that call for both pro-growth and pro-poor development strategies in the wake of globalisation and decentralisation. By illuminating understandings of the role of the local state with regards to its developmentalist responsibilities, this section positions this thesis to examine how the local state builds its capacity to respond to globalising forces, including the nascent presence of a transnational corporate industry. Following a review of the state in African cities, this chapter critically engages with literature that examines the role of civil society organisations in fostering development and democracy. It argues for blurring the state and civil society divide, as they are constitutive of one another (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999; Gupta, 1995; Sharma and Gupta, 2009). Rather than seeing civil society as weakening or co-opting the responsibilities of the state, this thesis shows how civil society participation and mobilisation reveals not only the porous nature of the state, but also how such actions and efforts add governance credibility and capacity to both the state and civil society organisations at local and international levels.

By deconstructing the relationships and practices amongst state, civil society and transnational corporate actors in an African city in the wake of oil-led development, this chapter calls for a transcalar approach to examining urban governance. Through this approach, transnational actors rely on local networks, while the local state and civil society are actively shaping the presence of transnational actors and their investment in urban development, often drawing on their own transnational links and resources. This chapter thus critically engages with a politics of scale viewed through an urban lens. Doing so allows recognition of uneven power relations while also confronting ideas around fixity and mobility (Allen et al., 2005; Massey, 1991; McCann and Ward, 2011). This discussion employs a scalar vocabulary in order to examine how political actors occupy and gain access to local, national and transnational resources, yet it is spatially cognisant that power is dispersed and mobilised across multiple scales, beyond any centres or hierarchies (Allen, 2004; Cox and Wood, 1997; Jonas, 2006). As Allen and Cochrane (2007) argue, urban regions are not territorially fixed but constructed through an assemblage of political actors. These regions are “relational yet interdependent spaces that are open to reinvention as politically meaningful spatial entities” (p. 1163) and where “political actors [operate] in a looser, less centred system, mobilizing through networks rather than through conventional
hierarchical arrangements” (p. 1166). While this thesis builds on the idea of multi-scalar and networked governance across a multiplicity of actors, it focuses on three core groups: transnational oil companies, the local state and civil society organisations. These three groups are independently influential and possess different resources, networks and skills when negotiating for urban development agendas, all of which reflect their interests. However, this PhD research acknowledges that cities consist of tangles of human and non-human networks and countless actors and entities that configure and arrange to shape different modalities of urban life (Amin and Thrift, 2017, p. 5). While this thesis is conceptualised around three core development pathways (corporate, state and civil society-led), it sees development outcomes as resulting from processes that initiate conversations about desire and possibility, forging new social and material arrangements within and beyond these identified pathways.

2.2. Stretching Urban Regime Theory

This section builds on urban regime theory, a networked approach to urban governance, which seeks to explain how development projects come to fruition given the multiplicity of actors and interests in the city (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; Savitch and Kantor, 2002; Stone, 1993). Urban regime theory, while grounded primarily in experiences from Western cities, offers an approach to studying governance that focuses on relationships, negotiations and coalitions with different groups holding the “power to” come together rather than the “power over” others (Stone, 1993). Urban regime theory offers an analytical approach to the terrain of uneven power relations and resources, but focuses on the agency of different actors to forge governing arrangements that achieve urban development outcomes. This section commences by analysing the origins and contributions of urban regime theory before arguing for the need to stretch the concept of urban regimes beyond case studies of Western cities. It also makes the case for extending the approach’s engagement along with the transnational scale. It argues that, in the wake of concerns about globalization and the revival of transnational corporations in development, urban regime theory, as with other networked approaches to governance, needs to specify the role of transnational corporations as development actors, as they work with and against state and civil society actors in enabling or disabling certain development outcomes.

As this thesis is concerned with the ways in which different actors with varying resources
(i.e. financial capital, technical capacity and social capital) shape development in a city undergoing globalised economic transformations, urban regime theory, as a “middle ground” approach, is valuable in that it recognises the interplay between structure and agency (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003). While discourses on capitalism, globalisation and colonialism serve as important analytical tools in studies on urban governance and development, particularly in African cities with natural resources (such as oil and gas), these macro and structural factors interact with the practices and actions of different agents that shape urban forms in unexpected ways (Amin and Thrift, 2017; Lefebvre, 1991). Urban regime theory thus takes into account both structure and agency as well as formal and informal networks to examine how public and private actors, each with uneven access to varying kinds of resources and capabilities, come together to enable urban development outcomes (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003; Kantor et al., 1997; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; Stone, 1993.) In doing so, it also offers a novel framework for understanding urban governance beyond the stalemate between “pluralist” and “elitist” frameworks, also referred to as the “community power debates” (Bridge and Watson, 2008; Davies and Imbrosio, 2008; Judge et al., 1995; Rast, 2015). Building on Floyd Hunter's (1953) study *Community Power Structures: A Study of Decision Makers*, which examines how a small group at the top of the power structure in an unnamed city makes policy decisions that shift downwards, the “elitist” analytical framework in urban governance argues that local democratic politics is a “smokescreen” for economic interests (Harding, 1995, p. 39). C. Wright Mills (1956) also observed this of American politics: how alliances between military, corporate and political leaders form the “power elite” dominate American institutions. On the other hand, in the “pluralist” tradition, Robert Dahl, in his study of New Haven, *Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City* (1961), argues that power was not as concentrated as suggested by Hunter, because even though local leaders had influence, public policy was more diffused. In addition, according to pluralists, there is an emphasis on the power of electoral politics and the ability of the voting process to dictate policy agendas among competing policy groups (Judge et al., 1995; Stone, 1993).

Building on these conflicting traditions, urban regime theory came into prominence with the publication of Clarence Stone’s (1989) *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988*, which aimed to bridge the elitist-pluralist divide as well as pave a middle ground between structure and agency. Stone’s analysis of regime politics follows the influential work of Fainstein and Fainstein (1982) and Elkin (1987). In Stone’s (1989) study of Atlanta, he
focuses on the mobilisation and electoral strength of black voters in a city that had been largely run by the wealthy white class in political power. The emergence of a bi-racial coalition in Atlanta drew on the different resources that these groups had to offer, enabling William B. Hartsfield, a white mayor, to remain in power from 1942 to 1962 while also paving the way for the election of Atlanta’s first black mayor, Jackson Maynard (1974-1982, 1990-1994) (Stone, 1989).

Stone’s (1993) contribution to urban regime theory draws from urban pluralism’s conceptualisation that power is diffused in a “system of fragmented and unstable political attachments” (p. 4). Urban pluralists regard the state as an autonomous entity where political power is exercised via a democratic electorate that decides through consensus which development agendas to prioritise. Urban regime theory, on the other hand, wrestles with how and why coalitions form in light of the plurality of competing interests, different groups’ access to resources and uneven power relations, which stems from an “elitist” analytical framework. Clarence Stone (1993) thus sees urban regime theory as working with a “social production model of power” (p. 8).

With a focus on power relations, urban regimes are defined by collaborative arrangements through which the local government and non-state actors assemble the capacity to govern (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001). Related to concepts of collaborative governance and planning, power is conceived as fragmented, generative and potentially collaborative (Healey, 2003). For Stone (1993), governance requires cooperation between private actors (and the mobilisation of their private resources) by public actors (e.g. local government), who have their own non-financial resources. Local governments, for instance, have technical and legal capabilities. According to Clarence Stone (1993) a development regime involves private sector investors contributing financial resources while relying on local government to navigate public processes that include “acquiring and clearing land, building public facilities or providing other subsidies” (p. 19). Relatedly, analyses on the formation of “growth machines” draw on understanding coalitions between local governments and land-based elites whereby both groups aim to benefit by employing an economic and territorial logic to urban growth (Logan and Molotch, 2007; Molotch, 1976; Wilson and Jonas, 1999). Furthermore, competing groups, from neighbourhood associations to property developers to local governments, have different resources that they can bring to the bargaining table. Stone (1989) argues for recognising that preferences and interests are
fluid rather than fixed, asserting that this allows space for cross-sector collaboration. Scholars of urban regimes argue that the heterogeneity of urban agendas, coupled with the role of civil society actors pushing for inclusive forms of development, prevent deterministic and purely elitist development outcomes in cities (Kantor et al., 1997; Stone, 1993).

H.V. Savitch and Paul Kantor (2002) extend urban regime theory by considering the wider contexts in which regimes form. Following Savitch and Kantor (2002), cities have different “bargaining positions,” as they pursue strategies to “compete for private capital in the international marketplace” (p. 46). Whether a city has bargaining advantages or disadvantages is based on variables such as “market conditions, intergovernmental support, popular control, and local culture” (Savitch and Kantor, 2002 p. 46). These variables shape how city governments and coalitions adapt to global economic shifts as they internally negotiate and pursue a mix of market-based and social-centred strategies that foster urban development and growth. The following table, from Savitch and Kantor (2002, p. 103), outlines some of the policy choices that steer urban development: Market-centred policies encourage private-sector development through subsidies and low taxes for businesses, market-driven land-use, freeways for private automobiles, privately financed housing and enhancing downtowns. Social-centred policies focus on public-sector development, integrated land use planning, high taxation, land preservation, public housing and mass transit.
Urban regime theory thus provides a lens to examine how politics and bargaining contexts give rise to different governing arrangements and how these arrangements shape urban development outcomes. Under this lens, “global cities” and cities with favourable market conditions (e.g. New York, Toronto, Paris, Milan) and “command and control functions” with corporate headquarters, government agencies, business support services, tourist attractions and media networks tend to have more bargaining advantages (Hall, 2001; Sassen, 2001; Savitch and Kantor, 2002). According to Savitch and Kantor (2002), compared to cities with unfavourable market conditions, weak inter-government coordination and weak public engagement, these cities can push for more social-centred development planning gains. The dynamics and negotiations amongst local and transnational private sector actors, local governments, and to some extent civil society actors, give rise to different types of urban regimes.

The political scientist Jon Pierre (2011) proposes four types of regimes: managerial, pro-growth, welfarist and corporatist. In a managerial regime, non-elected officials, such as senior-level administrators and managers apply business management skills (like customer service) to make cities more efficient ((Pierre, 2011, p. 43). According to Pierre, pro-growth regimes are the most prominent form of governance. These entities focus on local economic development that is made possible through partnerships between the private sector and local governments. On the other hand, welfarist regimes, led by local
government officials, typically emerge in cities with declining economies and limited private sector support. City officials, with the support of residents, push for national welfare policies that benefit the locality. These types of regimes can lend themselves to corporatist regimes, where civil society actors with special interests push for development agendas with city officials. According to Pierre (2011), these four models are “ideal types,” in that most cities will display some elements of several, if not all of the models.

Despite the range of regimes and governing arrangements conceptualised by urban regime theorists, this thesis aims to stretch the analytical lens in two ways. The first is that there has been limited application of urban regime theory in African contexts, where the local state is not seen as an active driver of effective local economic development outcomes (Rodríguez-Pose and Tijmstra, 2007, p. 523). However, according to Rodríguez-Pose and Tijmstra (2007), the spearheading of public-private partnerships by local governments to foster both pro-poor and pro-growth (local economic) development outcomes is on the rise throughout sub-Saharan Africa, beyond key examples found in South African cities. Following C.M. Rogerson (1999), South African cities have been experimenting with local economic development strategies and public-private partnerships in the pursuit of reconstruction in post-apartheid South Africa, with mixed results across different metropolitan areas. According to Patsy Healey (1997), there is a need to examine public-private partnerships beyond assumptions of elitism and neoliberalism to get to the heart of potentially collaborative arrangements that shape local economic development. Part of the problem in advancing urban regime theory in an African context is that African cities are seen as having incapacitated governments. This is not to say that urban regime theory is not able to stretch beyond the context of American cities or only be applied at the city level. For instance, urban regime theory has been applied to compare urban development between the cities of Paris, Milan, Glasgow, Naples, New York, Houston, Detroit and Liverpool (Kantor et al., 1997), at the regional level in the southeastern United Kingdom (Allen and Cochrane, 2007) and at the neighbourhood level in Los Angeles (Purcell, 1997). However, as these examples highlight, analyses of urban regimes have largely remained in North American and European contexts (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993; DiGaetano and Strom, 2003; Pierre, 1998; Ward, 1997).

Although urban regime theory, akin to other networked approaches to governance, offers a useful analytical lens to locate how different groups come together to shape political order
and governance-beyond-the-state, the focus has remained on how intercity competition at the international level drives cities to provide incentives to attract transnational capital and corporations. According to critics of neoliberalism, this is of concern given that cities are moving away from managerial approaches (where they administer social services) to entrepreneurial approaches, where tax incentives, funneling public funds to build infrastructure, and other policies that encourage transnational capital and corporate investment that further elitist and exclusionary forms of urban development occur. These neoliberal polices thus establish an environment of deregulation, while also providing funding available for social subsidies and programmes, with competition for economic investment potentially shaping the social fabric of the city. According to Sassen (2001), this interplay between globalisation and urbanisation creates a stratified global labour market with low-paying service workers catering to high-earning corporate elites in a hierarchy of cities, with global cities establishing their cultural and economic dominance. Moreover, literature on global gentrification focuses on the spatial inequalities and displacement that can ensue when corporations and economic elites move into cities (Sassen, 2001; Slater, 2012; Smith, 2005, 2002). These issues speak to important concerns about the corrosive power of elite alliances between transnational corporations and the state, as well as issues around social justice and rights to the city.

This thesis contributes to scholarship by recognising the importance of identifying how local and global processes and conditions give rise to different regimes and governing arrangements in which some outcomes are undemocratic and exclusionary. However, this thesis also draws attention and contributes to scholarship that questions the imposition and coverage of neoliberal logic, emphasising the multiple social, material and political arrangements that make up cities. Ferguson (2006) cautions against employing evolutionary and natural metaphors (such as “flow”) in studies of global capitalism, calling attention to the ways in which the movement of capital crisscrosses and is *global-hopping* rather than *globe-covering* (p. 38). For instance, Ong (2006) shows how neoliberalism is an exception in some places, serving as a malleable technology employed for experimentation by governments. In addition, this thesis draws on Sue Parnell and Jennifer Robinson’s (2012) contention that city governments tend to balance pro-poor and pro-growth agendas. This includes cities that have adopted progressive agendas seeking to address histories of inequalities. Moreover, this thesis identifies the agency of the city as grounded in its role as a dynamic convener of socio-cultural, material and economic processes that enables
improvisation and innovation in both “informal” and “formal” contexts (De Boeck and Plissart, 2006; Myers, 2011; Robinson, 2006; Simone, 2004), and opens up the possibility of cross-sector configurations and governing arrangements across local and transnational scales that give rise to potentially alternative and inclusive forms of development.

2.3. Identifying Different Modalities of Private Sector Development

According to Nelida Faccaro (2013), the city has been taken for granted in the literature on oil development, as “the city is seen as a mere accessory of state power, as an appendix to the national and global oil economies” (Fuccaro, 2013, p. 2) This research builds on this field of inquiry by recognising the diversity of corporations as actors, their competing logics and ambitions, and the ways in which they rely on and are shaped by their interactions with state and civil society actors. More specifically, this research focuses on corporations as “social forms, actors embedded in complex relations, and entities that produce and undergo transformation” (Welker et al., 2011) and the “friction” of their interactions with other actors (Tsing, 2011). This chapter examines literature addressing the role of transnational corporations in shaping urban development outcomes, with attention to their relationships with the state, civil society organisations and local communities.

Private sector collaboration is often promoted by governments, international financial institutions and development aid agencies as an engine of economic growth and as a potential funder and implementer of development projects (Davis, P., 2012; DFID, 1999; Miraftab, 2004a; UNDP, 2012; USAID, 2002). While the private sector “has always been an object, partner and agent of development” (McEwan et al., 2017, p. 32), there is a “revival” in their portrayal as active drivers of development (Davis, P., 2012; Mawdsley, 2015; McEwan et al., 2017). This re-emergence of the private sector’s role in development is facilitated by a changing landscape of new business models, financial instruments, cross-sector partnerships and attitudes about corporate-community engagement (Blowfield and Dolan, 2014; Kindornay and Reilly-King, 2013; McEwan et al., 2017; Moolaert, 2013). With a push for “beyond aid” agendas (Janus et al., 2015; Mawdsley, 2015; Moyo, 2009) coupled with the rise of financialisation in shaping new forms of development (Mawdsley, 2018), development agencies and local governments are turning to the private sector for financial aid and investment (Black and O’Brien, 2016; Blowfield and Dolan, 2014; Di Bella et al., 2013; Janus et al., 2015; Mawdsley, 2015). More generally, the role of the private sector in
development is seen as being marked by the participation of strategic government partners in local economic development and urban regimes, especially given the financial constraints of the local state (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra, 2007; Savitch and Kantor, 2002). On the other hand, the enabling of the private sector by governments, characterised by decentralisation and deregulation, is criticised for bringing about the “rollback” of the welfare state and the decline of social services (Jessop, 2002; Peck, 2013; Theodore et al., 2011). In this scope, the role of the private sector opens up questions about its relations with other actors, concerns about equity and the potential of wider social and economic benefits within evolving and dynamic development contexts (Briggs, 2008; Chant and Sweetman, 2012; Mawdsley, 2017; Miraftab, 2004a).

This section critically examines the different modalities and motivations behind private-sector-led development, as this understanding serves as a way to “locate” the sites of engagement and governance between transnational corporations and other actors in the contexts in which they operate. Di Bella et al. (2013) provide clarity to the varied ways in which scholars and practitioners can approach various forms and pathways of private sector development. While there is “definitional imprecision” as to what constitutes the private sector (Miraftab, 2004a), studies tend to focus on businesses that embrace commerce and trade (Blowfield and Dolan, 2014) involving individuals, small and medium-sized enterprises, co-operatives and transnational conglomerates operating in informal and formal sectors (Di Bella et al., 2013). This chapter focuses specifically on transnational corporations (e.g. oil companies) since they are seen as innovative, financially powerful and capable of contributing to development aims locally and globally (Nelson, 2010). In addition, the scale of the world’s largest transnational corporations also puts them in the spotlight (not without controversy) as part of the solution for addressing global poverty (Kolk and van Tulder, 2006; Lodge and Wilson, 2006; Prahalad, 2009; Schwittay, 2011; Van Tulder, 2010).

In order to examine the role of transnational corporations in shaping urban development outcomes, Di Bella et al. (2013) offers three analytical frames: 1) private sector development; 2) private sector in development; and 3) private sector engagements for development. First, private sector development refers to the activities and policies enacted by governments and multi-lateral and bi-lateral aid agencies which seek to attract private sector investment. This includes creating an enabling environment geared towards private sector funding and growth. Second, private sector in development points to the contributions made by companies as part of their core business operations that shape economic growth
and development. This relates to impacts such as job creation, the utilization of local supply chains, taxation, as well as mitigation of social and environmental effects. Third, private sector engagements for development goes beyond traditional business practices, with companies conscientiously implementing projects that align with inclusive development outcomes, creating localised and sustainable value chains and transferring their technologies and operations to local communities, meanwhile adopting transparent and responsible business practices (Di Bella et al., 2013, p. 10-13). Echoing McEwan et al. (2017), these categories are not mutually exclusive. For instance, corporate social responsibility programmes can fall into any of these groups (p. 33). The following sections build on this topology to examine the different forms of corporate-led development projects taking place in cities.

As articulated by Di Bella et al. (2013), private sector development broadly refers to the enabling of the market and transnationalised forms of investment through national and localised policies. It is important to note that despite these activities, the idea that private-sector development has provided equitable social and economic benefits does not necessarily follow; much of the literature in the fields of urban governance and development shows otherwise (Bond, 2000; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001).

Scholarship on urbanisation in the wake of globalisation is characterised by concerns about the dispersal and centralisation of capital by transnational corporations, entrenchment of state-facilitated neoliberal policies, negative effects on the housing market and the rise of spatialised social inequalities. As Brenner et al. (2010) argue, “neoliberalism is seen to extend the structural power of transnational corporations and haute finance, while superseding the regulatory constraints on capital mobility and financial speculation” (p. 192). Following Brenner et al. (2010), scholars writing from political economic approaches critique the imposing power of transnational corporations and the pervasiveness of market and profit-driven rationalities at the urban level. In this context, city governments are seen as being in competition for financial investments at the international level, thus they create incentives (e.g. lower taxes, lax regulations, public investment in infrastructure) to bring corporate investment to their cities (Harvey, 2006, 1989; Savitch and Kantor, 2002). This can contribute to “growth coalitions” that enable urban development projects to take place, yet this can come at the expense of social subsidies and programmes (Logan and Molotch, 2007). There is also growing concern about the implementation of neoliberal policies by the state and establishment of elite pacts and clientelist relations between state actors and
corporate interests at the expense of the urban poor. In addition, David Harvey (2006, 1989) argues that city governments are not only going to great lengths to cater to private investors, but also taking on risks by investing public money into infrastructure. In turn, these processes further the financialisation of urban space and the maximization of accumulation to the benefit of real estate and property developers (Harvey, 2006, 1989). Simultaneously, the physical presence of transnational corporations in global cities, where they “centralise” their activities and where their production and services are “dispersed,” is also adversely affecting property markets (Sassen, 2011). The construction of office buildings, housing and other retail services to cater to the corporate elite can lead to speculative real estate booms, particularly in the downtown areas (Florida, 2017; Keil, 2010).

These corporate economics are seen as affecting the cities which host or cater to these global firms, particularly in relation to housing markets, with developers building speculative properties for corporate elites, thus inflating rents and housing prices. In addition, the demand to accommodate corporate elites can result in the gentrification and displacement of people from working class neighborhoods (Smith, 2002; Slater, 2011). Exclusive enclave communities and rising rents have been attributed to places where transnational oil companies operate; for example, in Luanda, Angola (Metcalf, 2013) and Malabo, Equatorial Guinea (Appel, 2012). There are also concerns about the “gentrification” of certain neighborhoods as a result of the oil industry in Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana (Eduful and Hooper, 2013). In addition, according to Sassen (2011), this interplay between globalisation and urbanisation creates a stratified global labour market with low-paying service workers catering to high-earning corporate elites. In addition, the concentration of corporate firm also leads to a hierarchy of cities, with global cities establishing their cultural and economic dominance in the global order of cities. While these concerns speak to the “variegated” nature of neoliberalism (Brenner et al., 2010) and the social problems of the concentration and dispersal of global capital, a number of scholars argue against generalised accounts, instead focusing on specific sites of global-local interaction, negotiation and contestation. Moving away from an economically deterministic framework, Savitch and Kantor (2002) contend that cities have their own resources and skills with which to negotiate for transnational investment. This thesis thus brings forth the agency and positionality of cities, with their countless actors (including city governments and civil society organisations), materialities and dynamism to contest corporate authority and push for their own diverse development outcomes, which consist of pro-poor and pro-
growth agendas.

While *private sector development* focuses on the construction of enabling environments for private sector activities, which have been shown to have negative effects at a city scale, *private sector in development* refers to how governments and development agencies are turning to businesses and corporations as a way to provide financial investment and technical support for development projects (Di Bella et al., 2013; McEwan et al., 2017). This idea is not new, informing the literature on urban regime theory and growth machines, where local governments leverage their technical abilities to set incentives and guide businesses through permitting processes in return for financial investment in place-based development projects. This collaborative arrangement thus opens up the possibility of *private sector for development*, which could bring to life more inclusive development outcomes. Relatedly, the conceptualisation of private-public partnerships as a development model and strategy, is increasingly being pursued in the development field (Miraftab, 2004a; Pedersen and Huniche, 2006; Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra, 2007). Within this context, transnational corporations are seen as “agents of development” by giving back in the form of community development and funding social responsibility programmes (McEwan et al., 2017). Within the extractives industry, Ferguson (2006) argues that these transnational corporations, while being expected to contribute to “thick” forms of development, for instance providing accommodation, health care and education for their employees and in the areas they operate, are increasingly reluctant to do so. According to Hannah Appel (2012), in the case of oil companies in Equatorial Guinea, the corporations are “disentangling” from the social and political realities and challenges outside their enclaves, instead arguing that this is the responsibility of the government. At the same time, a number of authors have argued that even when oil companies claim to disentangle from the state, they tend to intervene in other ways, like lobbying for favorable corporate policies such as tax benefits, even if this contributes to weakening state capacity (Frynas, 2010; Shaffer and Hillman, 2000).

Given narratives about the seemingly intrinsic corrosiveness of oil-related investment on the state in Africa, a dominant and problematic narrative emerges. Due to the distinctive “cursed” qualities of oil, a particular form of “global governance”—derived from Western contexts, if not through Western “governance” interventions—is necessary for the equitable management of oil production. Briefly, the resource curse attempts to understand
how despite being abundant in resources, Africa remains paradoxically a “poor” continent (Ross, 2001; Sachs and Warner, 2001, 1997, 1995). Indeed, the resource curse sought to explain the paradox of why, as Auty (2002) asserts, “a favourable natural resource endowment may be less beneficial at low and mid-income levels of development than conventional wisdom suggests...they may actually perform worse than less well-endowed countries” (p. 1). African states become the case studies used to refer to the resource curse.

Economists attribute this resource curse to a number of reasons, ranging from the “Dutch Disease” to poor governance. With the “the Dutch Disease,” economists argue that African states suffer from the case of resource primacy, where money floods into one industry, like oil, so investment is not made in other industries, like agriculture. Moreover, dependency on one resource subjects a country to the volatility of the global market: rising prices create booms, falling prices creates a bust. In this sense, there is less “openness” to the markets since there is not a diversity of exports. Moreover, this narrative follows that as states gain rapid wealth from one particular industry, they are less inclined to collect local taxes, thus being held less accountable to the voting public (Watts, 2004). In attempts to reconcile the economic-centric resource curse with issues of politics, the curse became embedded within greater narratives about African nations being “successful failed states” (Oliveira, 2007). In this sense, the curse embraced causal claims concerning oil weakening democracies; contributing to the weakening (of already poor) governance, and the corruption between political elites and oil companies (Shaxson, 2007). Yet at the same time, these resource curse scholars highlight the need for strong democracies with solid legal frameworks (derived from a Western context) for the management of oil. As such, this form of global “good governance” is touted as enabling a business environment’s “ethical” and “distributive” returns on resource extraction, but also ensuring stability for economic growth, capital investment, and extraction (Ferguson, 2006; Reno, 1999). Problematically, these interventions can be seen as furthering the neoliberal agenda, as they help facilitate global flows of capital and oil investment, creating more ideal environments for oil companies (Duffy, 2005; Ferguson, 2006, 2005; Reno, 1999). Moreover, according to Ferguson (2005), states with strong IMF and World Bank state-reform interventions tend to be “more successful at developing capital-attracting enclaves” (p. 380).

In this context, new-oil producing nations are subject to particular good oil governance “experiments.” According to Gisa Weszkalnys, in São Tomé and Príncipe, although not a
single drop of oil has been extracted since the commercial discovery in the early 2000s, Jeffrey Sachs and his team—who were known for their neoliberal “shock therapy” approaches—were called in at beginning of the oil boom to create a governance framework (Weszkalnys, 2011). Thus, new oil-producing nations find themselves subject to an overwhelming volume of governance interventions involving numerous expert reports and opinions, with international agencies pushing the transparency and anti-corruption agenda; this is what Andrew Barry (2004) coins “ethical capitalism.” Ethical capitalism also helps oil companies disentangle and recover from their bad publicity in the past decades—particularly in the context of Shell oil in Nigeria (Frynas, 2001). Critics of corporations note how approaches in the name of “ethical capitalism,” like transparency measures, anti-corruption agendas and corporation social responsibility projects, can paradoxically impede the autonomy of local actors and their agendas for development. Given the rise of social entrepreneurship and relationships between corporations and grassroots actors, some researchers view corporations as “an opportunistic agent of development…as market-based approaches to development have mainstreamed claims to poverty alleviation, access to basic needs, and partnership with the entrepreneurial poor” (Thieme, 2015, p. 229).

For McEwan et al. (2017), the issues arising from the role of *private sector in development* include the imprecision in the way in which communities are defined; the lack of alignment and integration with national and local plans; the top-down nature of their governance engagement; and the conservative visions of development, much of it protecting the bottom lines of corporations, and contributions to ad-hoc projects (p. 31). Relatedly, Frynas (2005) contends that corporations tend not to engage with local communities about how best to shape development, as their main motivation is based on profit, not offering social assistance.

While there are challenges and pitfalls with having transnational corporations engage in development projects, the examination of multiple actors in urban governance is important for understanding how private-sector development opportunities prompt action by different actors. For instance, while remaining critical of public-private partnerships, Miraftab (2004a) argues that “the state is essential to regulate the relationship between the [corporate and community] partners and keep the playing field level” (p. 89). Relatedly, drawing on concerns about state inadequacies and corporate behavior, Edwards (2011) and Vogel (2010) argue for the capacity of civil society actors (at local and global levels) to
regulate and challenge the state and market actors. In addition to examining how ideas about corporate-led development can open up governance pathway, changing attitudes about the increase of new cross-sector partnerships and ethical capitalism have also given rise to the concept of “social entrepreneurship,” in which companies are balancing business and profit-seeking with social impact (Blowfield and Dolan, 2014; Moulaert, 2013; Muthuri et al., 2012).

2.4. Engaging with the Specificities and Agency of the State in Africa

Building on postcolonial perspectives on the state, this thesis positions the state (in Africa) and the relations that constitute and produce the state as being vital to the enabling or disabling of urban development projects. This section commences by focusing on the distinctiveness of the state in Africa, as compared to an idealized bureaucratic Weberian state, before addressing how the specificities of the state in an African context inform wider non-state interactions and shape urban governance processes.

According to Bayart (2009) the state in Africa is haunted by a legacy that paints it as lacking statehood, in part because it differs from the idealised Weberian models of the state, derived from colonial and Western contexts. Building on the work of the eminent sociologist Max Weber, Michael Mann’s (1984) influential conceptualisation of the state perceives it as an autonomous and centralised hierarchical bureaucracy, detached from “all particularistic, specialised ties to kin, locality, class, Church etc.” (p. 204). Certainly, these theories of the state have been expanded upon and challenged, for instance through Foucault’s governmentality (or the techniques of government), Abram’s (1988) notion of the state system consisting of groups of agencies and practices, and Dean's (1999) focus on how the state’s methods of discipline and management/invention of the economy give it structural form. These conceptualisations point to a range of different ideas about the behaviours and presumed functions of the state. This genealogy of the state is not unlike James Scott’s (1998) optic of “seeing like the state,” in which the state continues to be seen as being “up-there” with stored powers, and arranges space as it holds a monopoly on interventions to bring about improvement (Scott, 1998, cited in Li, 2005).
In order to situate the state in Africa, this thesis focuses on poststructuralist and postcolonial perspectives of the state. It also draws on the necessity of engaging with the specificities of the state-society relations that shape the governance of cities in African contexts. In the 1980s and 1990s, a wave of theory emerged which historicised and drew attention to the complexity of the state in Africa. Bayart (2009) argues for adopting a *longue durée* approach to the study of African state politics by moving away from centring Africa’s history on the imposition of colonialism and slavery. Instead, Bayart (2009) asserts that the state in Africa is rhizomatic, (based on Deleuze and Guattari) consisting of networks sprouting everywhere like a root system, rather than a single (hierarchal) tree trunk with branches reaching outward. In addition, Bayart (2009) states that African political elites engaged in relations with the wider global economy by adopting strategies of extraversion to manipulate and appropriate resources for their self-interest, giving rise to the “politics of the belly.” As such, the state in Africa consists of the relations between state elites and their internal neo-patrimonial networks, as well as their engagement with externalising forces from the global economy.

In adding an urban and rural dimension, Mahmood Mamdani (1996), argues that the specificity of colonial domination and focus of control of native authority and resistance created a bifurcated state in Africa, with direct rule in urban areas and a system of tribally organised local authorities in rural areas. In this sense, contemporary states in Africa feature hybridised state elements. This is reflected in a number of countries in Africa, including Ghana, where there is a parallel system of formal government agencies existing alongside “traditional authorities.” Building on the work of the Africanist Patrick Chabal, Filip De Boeck (1998) argues that “Africans have been remarkably inventive in capturing imposed state structures and turning them into their own, in various processes of retraditionalisation and “political Africanisation” (p. 89).

It is helpful to describe the state in Africa as consisting of multiple and conflicting rationalities, informed by pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial norms that play out in state-society relations and in governance and planning processes (Watson, 2009, 2003). In focusing on the African state within a transnational frame, it is important to recognise how neoliberalising and decentralising policies have influenced adaptations and shaped urban governance. Alongside processes of democratisation and decentralisation through the 1980s and 1990s, many African governments adopted social and economic liberalisation
programmes (for Ghana, this was called the Structural Adjustment Programme) (Boafo-Arthur, 2013; Ninsin, 2007; World Bank, 1993, 1984). At a more economic level, these policies shrunk state expenditures while privatising services. On the other hand, central or national state responsibility was relegated to the local level—according local governments and civil society organisations more control over governance and planning processes (Alam and Nickson, 2006; Devas and Delay, 2006; Parnell et al., 2002). It is within this context that this research focuses on state-society relations. As Parnell et al. (2002) argues, decentralisation placed more responsibility on local governments to respond to developmental needs, while those governments were also being fiscally constrained. According to Parnell and Robinson (2006), local governments are increasingly tasked with balancing plans that call for economic growth while addressing issues of inequality and developmentalist agendas. In this context, according to Bénit-Gbadou (2011), discourses on decentralisation and participation actually serve to bring the state closer to the citizens (“far from a Weberian ideal”), with citizens engaging in negotiating and adapting to state practices (p. 6). In this context, the next section reviews civil society organisations, focusing specifically the ways in which they work with and against the state, and with a view to contributing to wider discourses of urban regimes on the possibility for collaboration and co-production (Ostrom, 1990; Watson, 2014).

2.5. Civil Society, Democratic Governance and Inclusive Urban Development

While the previous section focuses on the relationship between the private sector and the state in forging governing arrangements for growth, this section analyses the role of civil society organisations in democratic governance and international development discourses. This section applies a critical transnational frame to the study of civil society organisations to examine their positionality, limitations and potential in fostering inclusive development aims. In moving away from an analytical lens that focuses on political power as being concentrated in the state, this thesis turns to examining the civil society actors, initiatives and spaces that shape the notion of “governance-beyond-the-state.” This weighs different literature and concerns than conventionally considered in urban regime theory, as it focuses on the creation and expansion of governance capacity by both state and civil society organisations in an African context. This occurs through their relations with one another.
and their combined negotiations with transnational corporate actors for urban development outcomes. Instead of focusing on how localised state-society relations are impacted by globalising forces and transnational corporate actors, this thesis brings into view the ways in which transnational corporate actors become localised and how civil society organisations draw from state pathways and transnational links to push for inclusive development agendas on their own terms.

Studying civil society is important for this thesis because it reveals how the “boundary between the state and non-state realms is drawn, and how the state is reproduced and challenged as a vertically encompassing entity” (Sharma and Gupta, 2006, p. 17). Adopting Mamdani’s call for examining “actually existing civil society” and Cornwall’s (2008) call for focusing on “clarity through specificity” this thesis follows the interplay between the state, civil society organisations and development agencies, each with their own agendas and expectations (p. 281). Stemming from a neoliberal critique of international development, there are concerns about the ways in which some civil society organisations can legitimise forms of externalised structural adjustments as they take on state responsibilities, despite furthering democratic participation (Swyngedouw, 2005). This section commences by examining these debates, with a focus on the rationalities and critiques behind championing civil society organisations as partners in developmentalist processes. This section pivots to focus on dynamic and emergent relationships and interactions between the state and civil society in African contexts. This thesis then argues for understanding and blurring the boundaries between the state and civil society, to focus on ways in which civil society organisations contest and collaborate with the state, formally and informally, within and beyond state-led spaces. While proceeding with caution, recognition of the specificities of state-society relations allows room for identifying the spaces and pathways that make civil-society-led forms of inclusive urban development a possibility. As such, this thesis argues for recognising the agency of the civil society organisations to negotiate and build alliances with a porous state, the private sector and transnational donor agencies, thus extending urban regime theory beyond examples of state and private sector alliances.

Before discussing the role of civil society organisations in development, as written by their promoters and critics, it is important to note that the concept is one that is elusive, consisting of binaries and a myriad of actors and initiatives (Banks et al., 2015; Lemanski and Tawa Lama-Rewal, 2013; Lindell, 2008; McIlwaine, 1998). Working definitions frame it
as a public space between the state and individual (Hadenius and Ugglä, 1996), which consist of associations organised around different types of activities (de Tocqueville, 2000; Edwards et al., 2001; Foley and Edwards, 1996; Woods, 1992). These associations include political and economic associations, voluntary organisations, community groups, trade unions, religious groups, as well as business and professional organisations, and a wide range of NGOs (McIlwaine, 1998). Aside from seeing civil society as consisting of actors who make up a particular public space, it is also seen as an arena of debate where norms and values are established (Edwards, 2009). This relates to Habermas’ (1984) concept of “communicative action” which posits that agreement and cooperation is possible through reasoned argumentation, deliberation and communication.

Despite civil society’s definitional ambiguities and its wide range of activities (Ray, 2012; Sjögren, 1998; Tostensen et al., 2001), civil society organisations continue to be promoted in the development field, which draws on the underlining notion that civil society is vital to democracy. For the purpose of this research, this thesis focuses on civil society organisations and the “kinds of work” (Mercer and Green, 2013) that they do in relation to government agencies and donors (p. 107). Broadly referred to as civil society organisations (CSOs) in the Ghanaian context, this space includes international and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as well as typically smaller community-based organisations (CBOs). It is important to note that this group also includes business, trade unions and professional organisations, such as the local Chambers of Commerce, the Ghana Bar Association, the General Transport, Petroleum and Chemical Workers’ Union, and includes the participation of traditional authorities who straddle the line between the state and civil society. It is noted that while the development context focuses on the work of CSOs that champion their proximity to the grassroots (Mercer and Green, 2013) and are “invited” to participate in donor-led and state-led spaces (Cornwall, 2002; Miraftab, 2004b). As such, there are noted critiques that the work of CSOs excludes the wide range of political actors and actions, including “inventing spaces” of protest and new social movements (Cornwall, 2002; Miraftab, 2004b). For instance, Partha Chatterjee (2004) distinguishes between “civil” and “political” society: “civil society” refers to “the closed association of modern elites” who have “civic freedoms” and express their grievances through rational law (p. 4). While this definition speaks to rights that CSOs possess in developing contexts, which is necessary in democratic governance, it is important to acknowledge how “non-modern elites” also know their rights and use them to navigate
legal governance pathways (by self-organising, leveraging political ties, or connecting with transnational links).

On the other hand, “political society,” according to Chatterjee (2004), describes the urban poor who are excluded from rights. They access the state through local politicised arrangements with politicians under conditions of state control (Bénit-Gbaffou and Oldfield, 2011; Chatterjee, 2004). Based on the Brazilian context of new social movements, James Holston (2008), for instance, focuses on the collision between insurgent movements, led by those living in the city who seek basic resources and shelter (claiming a “right to rights”) and “entrenched regimes of citizens” (p. 246). Here, it is important to note that the concept of civil society is messy and includes spaces that do not fall neatly into these binaries and definitions. The plurality of actors and efforts that make up CSOs/associations and social movements not only have dissimilar relationships, but contribute to changing definitions of civil society-led spaces.

This thesis takes a broad definition of CSOs (which includes NGOs and CBOs) and explores their roles as key features and partners in development in both the context of Ghana as a middle-income developing country and in reference to natural resource management. From an urban regime standpoint, civil society organisations (if they’re able to come together for shared aims), also possess the technical skills, resources and the ability to mobilise the electorate in order to bargain and advance their development agendas in relation to other groups (Dahl, 1961; Pierre, 2011; Savitch and Kantor, 2002; Stone, 1993, 1989; Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987). Scholars writing on local economic development literature also focus on how local associations and groups (such as neighbourhood councils) negotiate with the state and private sector actors for their place-based interests (Cox and Mair, 1988; Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra, 2007; Rogerson and Rogerson, 2010).

This section sets out to examine the relations between civil society organisations and the state in a transnationalised frame, particularly in reference to development and global resource management discourses. In this lens, states and civil society organisations are drawn into conversation as they follow certain global policy templates and initiatives, as promoted by donors and development agencies. By detailing these relations, it allows this study to pursue the constraints and limitations of development, as well as the capacity and potential for collaboration among these different groups who are socially, materially and
politically embedded across local, national and international governance scales. As Mercer (2003) argues, understanding governance and “forms of sovereignty” in African contexts is less a question of identifying whether more or less power lies with the African state vis-a-vis the International Financial Institutions, than about identifying the myriad power relations operating in and through a range of actors who intervene in the interests of ‘development’ to produce particular outcomes” (p. 742). Relatedly, Mohan (2002) warns, studies on governance and development should not obfuscate relations of power between donors, civil society organisations and recipients of aid. In addition, Mohan (2002) points to the internal tensions between NGOs; for example, he argues that local NGOs in Northern Ghana have been known to create their own “fiefdoms” and some officers have used their affiliations with NGOs for self-promotion. A number of scholars also caution against power imbalances that exist under this banner of “partnerships” (Craig and Porter, 2003; Crewe and Harrison, 1998; Hearn, 2001; Maxwell and Riddell, 1998; Mercer, 2003; Mohan, 2002). With a view on power dynamics, this thesis focuses on the interactions, relationships and governance arrangements between civil society organisations in relation to the state and donors, as well as with traditional authorities (who do not fall neatly between the state/civil society divide) and transnational corporations. These diverse actors are not only embedded in the contemporary political urban landscape in African cities, but also have access to uneven resources for negotiation.

According to critics of developmentalism, donor-led sources of finance and funding have propelled states to appear democratic, to decentralise state agencies and to give institutional responsibilities to civil society, as well as to adopt practices that make them lean and efficient in exchange for access to financing and funds (Barry et al., 1996; Ferguson and Gupta, 2002; Paley, 2002). In turn, these practices are part of the circulation of neoliberal logics. As a result, states are subject to global templates and policies that advocate for “good governance,” which includes transparency and accountability (Mercer and Green, 2013; Weszkalnys, 2011). However, this process can further privatisation and economic insecurities through the logic of empowering individuals (Peck and Tickell, 2002; Phillips and Ilcan, 2004; Roy, 2005; Sharma, 2008). The localisation of these policies, which actively champion civil society organisations, has served as a double-edged sword. Indeed, their implications are “Janus-faced” (Swynegedouw, 2005). Applying Foucault’s concept of governmentality (the rationalities, tactics and technologies of governing), Swynegedouw (2005) argues that while new forms of participation are re-shaping state-society relations in
potentially democratising ways, the flip side is that there is a potential consolidation of technologies of government by elite networks (“horizontal civil society”) that disempowers others. In addition, this new political arrangement of “strong governance” through the “cohesion in civil society” also produces “stronger economic dynamics,” leading to the restructuring of the state and capitalism (Swyngedouw, 2005, p. 1997). Other scholars argue that discourses on “participation” and “empowerment” in the name of “capacity building” as carried out by CSOs ultimately places the burden of public services and personal welfare in the hands of both individuals and communities (Chatterjee, 2004; Cruikshank, 1999; Leve and Karim, 2001; Phillips and Ilcan, 2004). In this vein, there is concern that the promotion of CSOs as “partners” in development ultimately serves to legitimise externalised forms of intervention and continued structural adjustment programmes (Mohan, 2002).

Recognising these concerns, Chabal and Daloz (1999) argue for paying close attention to the behaviours and interactions amongst political actors, as they argue against envisioning African politics as “a contest between a functionally strong state and a homogenously coherent civil society” (p. 21) For instance, Bayart (2009) articulates the neo-patrimonial ties and the “politics of the belly” that continue to shape both formal and informal systems of rule in African societies, cutting across state-society boundaries. In addition, Lindell (2008) notes that it is common for leaders of civil society associations to also be members of political parties (p. 1891-1892). Bénit-Gbaffou (2011), demonstrates how local residents in South African “access” the “porous state” by forging connections with local councillors and state representatives in order to avoid eviction. This highlights, then, what is a murky space between democratic participation, clientelism, and state-society relations. Given the blurred divide between state and civil society, this thesis focuses on how civil society actors engage with the state through collaborative planning, spreading to co-production processes.

This chapter extends understanding about networked governance beyond the role of state and private sector actors to focus on how civil society organisations shape inclusive urban development outcomes. As examined in the previous two chapters, the political localisation of transnational capital, coupled with the capacity of the local state to convene diverse actors, opens up governance pathways for a range of players to envision, negotiate and contest development goals. In this context, this chapter shows how civil society
organisations push for pro-poor and redistributive development agendas by leveraging their positionality as existing somewhere “between” the state, market and grassroots and by drawing upon state capacities. According to Vanessa Watson (2014), “how state and society engage on issues related urban planning has been a prominent theme in planning literature for at least the last two decades,” with debates being informed by different traditions, positions and contexts (p. 63). These discussions build on literatures that focus on “collaborative” and “communicative” planning (with Healey, Forester, Innes as key scholars) and the idea of “co-production” (Watson, 2014) occurring between the state and civil society. How stakeholders engage to shape the formation of place-based policies and development agendas within and beyond planning processes is a core focus of this thesis. This focus also serves as the analytical thread for concepts such as “collaborative planning,” “strategical spatial planning,” “urban regimes,” “network governance,” and “public-private partnerships” (Allen and Cochrane, 2007; Elander, 2002; Hajer and Zonneveld, 2000; Healey, 1998; McCann and Ward, 2011; Pierre, 1998; Savitch and Kantor, 2002; Stoker, 1998). Problematically, as Westerink et al. (2017) argue, these literatures tend to show how companies and state actors tend to hold sway in planning processes, thus it is important to critically examine how citizens engage in these processes (p. 148). While Healey (2006) shows how non-governmental organisations and non-state actors shape development through “formal” planning processes (p. 288), scholars writing in informal contexts have focused on the capacity of citizens to self-organise (Simone, 2004; Roy, 2009) and to contribute to “insurgent” forms of citizenship (Holston, 1999; Miraftab, 2004b). This thesis acknowledges a wide range of strategies utilised by civil society organisations and grassroots organisers across different spaces of political participation and activism, from the halls of stakeholder meetings to streets where protests take place.

With a view toward bridging ideas of collaborative planning with grassroots activism, this thesis turns to focus on how civil society organisations contribute in various ways to citywide and regional planning processes to address deficits in local state knowledge and capacity, and on how this state-society engagement co-produces a potentially more transformative and inclusive urban development agenda. It is important to note that circulations of neoliberal logics do shape and condition planning outcomes, the role of civil society actors, and the resources available for progressive aims (Albrechts, 2013), yet communicative and strategical spatial planning provides an arena for a plurality of interests,
conflicts, and power relations to play out (Forester, 2010). As Albrechts (2013) argues, in critical analyses of “citizen participation” (particularly from more structuralist frameworks), a wide range of relationships between the state and civil society seems to be “compressed into one-sized-fits-all” (p. 47). In this narrow perspective, citizen participation becomes relegated to examples of protests, rather than recognition of moments where coproduction emerges between state and civil society (Albrechts, 2013). While there are differing versions of ideas of coproduction in strategic spatial planning (Albrechts, 2013; Watson, 2014), a starting definition comes from the Nobel-Prize economist Elinor Ostrom. Ostrom (1996) writes that “coproduction implies that citizens can play an active role in producing public goods and services of consequence to them. Coproduction is one way that synergy between what a government does and what citizens do can occur” (p. 1073). As such, citizens can play key role in collaborating with their governments to shape public interventions and services.

2.6. Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed relevant work analysing urban governance and development aims in a manner that cuts across local and transnational scales, as well as a range of different actors. It argues for seeing power as diffused across a multiplicity of actors, each with their own interests, motivations, agendas and strategies. This chapter builds on network approaches to urban governance, particularly urban regime theory. Urban regime theory focuses on how various actors—local government, private sector actors and civil society organisations—with different access to resources (financial and non-financial) forge collaborative coalitions or regimes in order to further their development agendas. However, this chapter argues for stretching urban regime theory beyond existing case studies of North American and European cities by applying a postcolonial intervention to that theory and extending analysis on the role of transnational actors as development actors in urban governance. It also provides a robust study on the state-society relationship informed by analyses of African contexts.

Even though urban regime theory focuses on the processes of coalition-building and collaborative governing arrangements across sectors, this chapter engages with understandings of power, contestation and the politics of scale. It builds on frameworks
that see power as dispersed and present in all social relations. In seeing power as not held by any group, this chapter builds on Foucault’s concept of governmentality to focus on the multi-layered practices and processes of different actors, which contribute to governance in the city. This chapter problematises hierarchical and structural approaches to power, which see power as concentrated in particular static entities and at a particular “scale,” usually in the hands of a state or transnational corporations. As such, this chapter argues for the idea that actors and their political actions operate simultaneously across international, national and local scales in cities, which feature the intertwining of local and global processes. While this thesis shares concern about the power of transnational capital to shape cities and the potential for economic disparities as a result of spatialised capital accumulation, it moves away from linear and deterministic predictions about future governance and social order in cities. This research aims to apply this postcolonial lens in order to stretch understandings of network approaches to urban governance beyond the grips of Western contexts. In doing so, it recognises the agency of the state and civil society actors in postcolonial contexts to shape the world in which they live.

In summary, this chapter elaborates this thesis’ distinctive analytical framework: it argues for building on and expanding understandings of networked governance (particularly urban regime theory). It argues that it is important to include the role of transnational corporations in the forging of governing arrangements, a role that goes beyond the logics of capital accumulation and the spatialisation of urban development. It also argues for revisiting the agency of the state in African contexts, by recognising its rhizomatic relations with wider society, its competing development agendas (both pro-growth and pro-poor) and its capacity to shape development outcomes. It also calls for blurring the divide between the state and civil society, challenging the idea that civil society exists outside the state, and examining the potential for the state and civil society to co-produce development policies and outcomes. It also reasons against viewing civil society organisations as a potential threat to governmental capacity, instead showing how civil society participation in planning processes and legislative channels can create and expand the credibility and capacity of the intertwined state and civil society.

The following chapters show how three core development actors in Sekondi-Takoradi—transnational oil companies, the local state and civil society actors—coordinate, contest and collaborate for their agendas and interests. It also examines the constraints and uneven
terrain of power and resources available to these various actors as they forge their “capacity to act” in the city. Before turning to narratives about “transcalar” urban governance in Sekondi-Takoradi, the following chapter focuses on research design, methodology and reflexivity, all of which brought this PhD project to life.
3. Context and Methodology: Researching in Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana

3.1. Introduction

3.1.1 Landscapes of Development

There is a coastal two-lane highway that connects Sekondi-Takoradi to two iconic cities in the east—Cape Coast and Accra. I took this trip frequently while living in Ghana in 2014 and 2015. The bus heading west to Sekondi-Takoradi departed from the bustling and ordered chaos of Kaneshie, one of Accra’s largest markets. I would walk through a crowded maze of street vendors, pedestrians and vehicles to decide if I wanted to get on a tro-tro (privately owned rapid minibuses of varying comfort), an air-conditioned 15-passenger “Ford” van, or a coach bus. I usually boarded the vehicle that would fill up and leave the soonest. Moments waiting for the car to fill or sitting in traffic typically presented opportunities for shopping from out the window. Street hawkers walk alongside vehicles selling domestic and imported goods: FanIce ice cream, hard boiled eggs, fried dough balls, plantain chips, British biscuits, drinks, medicinal supplements, tissues, handkerchiefs, maps, and electronics, to name a few. Sometimes the ride would start with a Christian sermon. Most of the time, there was a banality to the rides: passengers falling into conversation with their friends, some read, others napped. Many were on their phones. There were plenty of smartphones, and some even pulled out tablets or laptops to watch movies. Some coach buses had television monitors where they usually screened Nigerian soap operas. Meanwhile, the world outside also passed by, as the vehicle zooms past the landscapes of old and new. The outskirts of Accra revealed unpaved dirt roads and freshly paved roads, unfinished buildings with cinder blocks and newly built and shiny bank offices. Even in these outskirts, there were people walking on the streets avoiding areas with open gutters, getting into tro-tros and taxis, and the busy streets with street hawkers and vendors are ubiquitous.

Driving down the highway toward the suburbs of Accra, we would pass by the luxury West Hills Mall development, which opened its doors and turned on its escalators in October
2014. It is considered the largest mall in West Africa, at 27,700 square meters (About the West Hills Mall, 2017). Built by the South African property group, Atterbury, it features major South African stores like Shoprite and Edgars while including a cinema complex and a mix of local and international brands like Lego, Vodafone and Sunglass Hut. In the distance, there are views of huge mansions and newly built residential communities perched on hills, amidst red earth and green bush. The road traverses smaller towns and villages before passing through Winneba, home to Ghana’s largest school of education and the annual bushbuck (antelope) hunting festival, Aboakyer. Before long, the road passes Cape Coast University, before winding along the coast. On the coast, there are views of palm trees and the haunting Elmina Castle, where thousands of African slaves passed through the door of no return.

About five hours later, depending on traffic, our car would enter Sekondi-Takoradi, with a billboard or two that referenced the “Oil City.” Huge oil filling trucks and quarry trucks pass, slowly, down this highway. Entering Takoradi, the small airport also features a large informal urban farm, where farmers can be seen tending to cabbage and other vegetables. On the left, across from the airport and farm, is 21-acre plot that was once home to an automobile repair and mechanics industry before being cleared to make way for the Takoradi Mall. The following Map 2, “Places of Interest in Sekondi-Takoradi,” shows Kwame Nkrumah roundabout, which is near the Takoradi Mall and serves as one of the main transportation connections in the city. This roundabout was under renovation for several months, causing major traffic jams in and out of the city.
Map 2: Key Places of Interest in Sekondi-Takoradi

Caption: Map of key points of interest in Sekondi-Takoradi relating to this research. Map by Max Richman, with data from OpenStreetMap Contributors, created on 15 March 2018.
At the centre of the grassy roundabout are billboards advertising face cream, Guinness beer, and phone companies like Tigo. Many main roads converge at the roundabout. One road leads to Market Circle, a large indoor and outdoor market place, with stalls and small shops selling a wide variety of goods: vegetables, textiles, beauty supplies, and electronics. Figure 3.1 shows a street scene from the perspective of the second floor of Market Circle, looking out onto the street. This view shows a bustling market, with Woodin, an upscale fabric store, a bank, cars, motorcycles, bicycles and pedestrians, as well as numerous vendors sitting under big umbrellas and store awnings. Within view of the Kwame Nkrumah roundabout is a small hotel located next to a complex of different oil companies: Tullow Oil, Baker Hughes, GNPC, and Oceaneering. Getting off at Kwame Nkrumah roundabout, there are tro-tros and taxis waiting to drive passengers to other destinations in the city: to apartments and houses, ocean view hotels, government offices in Sekondi, to the Takoradi Technical University, or to a number of local and international NGOs operating in the city (USAID, Global Communities, the Sekondi-Takoradi Chamber of Commerce, Friends of the Nation, COLANDEF, to name a few).

**Figure 3.1: Street Scene from the Market Circle Business District in Takoradi**

Caption: View from the second story of the indoor Market Circle complex looking out to the street below commercial and residential buildings, street vendors, vehicles and pedestrians. Photo courtesy of author, taken on 2 April 2015.
Some passengers might choose to leave the centre of the city, heading eastward out of town on the Agona-Takoradi road, which includes rubber plantations as well as farmland that has been cleared to make way for new oil-related businesses and luxury real estate development. Map 3, “Regional Map of Sekondi-Takoradi,” shows some of these developments, which include a building owned by Halliburton, a transnational oil company; an exclusive luxury residential community called Oil Village and a proposed 2000-acre mixed-use development called Petronia City. These maps show how oil and gas activity have shaped the built and spatial form of the city.
Caption: A regional map showing the site of new developments east of Sekondi-Takoradi. Map by Max Richman, with data from OpenStreetMap Contributors, created on 15 March 2018.
There is also another option for reaching Sekondi-Takoradi besides the five-hour-plus road journey. For five times the price of a coach bus, there is a morning and late afternoon 30-minute Starbow flight between Accra and Takoradi. In 2015, the cost of this one-way journey was 225 Ghanaian Cedi, roughly 39.47 British pounds or $59.21 US Dollars. Many of these passengers can afford to stay at the number of four-star and five-star hotels in the city, which cost at least $100/night, more than some Ghanaians make in a month. Figure 3.2, Photo of luxury real estate in the Beach Road neighbourhood, shows the view of the Atlantic Hotel, an ocean-view and five-star hotel that caters to wealthy travellers and corporate employees. This hotel was one of the first five-star hotels in Takoradi, but others have since been built throughout the city.

**Figure 3.2: Photo of Luxury Real Estate in the Beach Road Neighbourhood**

Caption: View from the Atlantic Hotel, a five-star hotel, located in the Beach Road neighborhood with luxury residential properties in the background. Photo courtesy of author. Taken 12 February 2015.

The option to fly to/from Accra or stay at a five-star hotel reveals that there is a wealthy class of travellers in Ghana and a market for them. It also shows that some of the technological and modern amenities remain out of reach for many in Ghana, with Ghana’s

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2 The exchange rate in April 2015 was £1.00 British Pound (GBP) = GH₵ 5.70 Ghanaian Cedi or $1.00 US Dollar (USD) = GH₵ 3.80 Ghanaian Cedi.
per capita income at just over $100/month and the minimum daily wage at about $2/day.\(^3\)
(World Bank Open Data, 2015). There’s also a different view from the sky. Flying out of Takoradi, a beautiful coastline with palm trees can be seen below, as well as Market Circle, the commercial heart and major market of the region, the industrial Takoradi port with large shipping vessels and containers and oil platforms in the sea.

These journeys and perspectives not only reveal diverse cityscapes and spatialised forms of Ghana, but also the historicised social, economic and political relations that continue to transform and change the social fabric and built form of these places. Not only do these evocative journeys highlight my own particular “way of seeing” and conception of what places represent, but they provide glimpses into the ways in which people continuously create, shape and change the places they are in. Since the discovery of oil, the past ten years have been marked with complex transformations in the city, from its spatial form to social life. The aim of this PhD thesis is to capture change and development in the city, while it is being shaped by a wide range of actors, without falling into stereotypes about an African city and the people who call it home. This research remains open to the possibilities of change in the city without assuming any linear development trajectory.

\(^3\) According to the World Bank’s Open Data catalogue, in 2015, Ghana’s GDP per capita was $1353.64 US Dollars, or roughly $112.80/month (World Bank Open Data, 2015). However, not all Ghanaians make this, as Ghana’s daily minimum wage in 2015 was GHC 7.00 Ghanaian Cedi (GHS) or $1.84 US Dollar (USD) or £1.22 British Pound (GBP) per day.
3.1.2 Purpose of this Chapter

This chapter contextualises the research setting and the methods I undertook in this project. Informed by a social constructivist approach to the study of our social world, Chapter 3 establishes the grounds for the presentation of research results to follow. It sets the rationale for why certain methods were chosen. The chapter also lays out the research setting of this project by providing a historical context for the city of Sekondi-Takoradi, a contemporary profile of the city in light of the oil and gas boom, and a discussion of stakeholders involved in the governance of the city. The following sections include the methodological framework, an overview of the data collection, and analyses of the different methods used in this research. The methods employed in this research consist of interviews, attendance at stakeholder meetings, textual analysis of planning and policy documents, participant observation and personal conversations and correspondence. Fieldwork was conducted in Ghana from August 2014 to April 2015, plus an earlier pilot study undertaken in May of 2013, as well as follow-up correspondence with interviewees between 2015-2019. To conclude, the chapter addresses reflexive questions about my research limitations and “positionality” as a foreign researcher in the city.

3.1.3 Impetus for this Research

The impetus for this research stems from my initial curiosity about the potential changes that would take place in Sekondi-Takoradi and in Ghana following the country’s entry into the global oil economy. I was living in Accra as an undergraduate exchange student at the University of Ghana, Legon as the news of Ghana striking oil was reverberating across the country and in the world. One month into my time in Ghana, in February 2008, then-U.S. President George W. Bush made his first appearance in Africa with his visit to Accra. There was fanfare and speculation about President Bush’s visit: was it a move for the U.S. to gain access to African oil? Was it to curb China’s influence in the region? Later on, as I was conducting research for the project, I would learn that President Bush’s visit coincided with Venezuela’s threat to cut oil exports to the United States. In July 2009, newly elected U.S. President Barack Obama also made his first state trip to Africa with a visit to Ghana. (Many thought that he would make an appearance in his father’s native country of Kenya). During his visit, President Obama spoke of the interconnectedness between Africa and the
world, Ghana’s firm footing as a democratic country, oil bringing great opportunities and the mutual economic benefits stemming from being continued trade partners (Obama, 2009). This was before the U.S. expanded its domestic production of oil and gas through fracking. While this research touches on elements of urban change, it does so not through a quantitative study that measures the numerical effects of the oil and gas industry, but rather by focusing more on how this economic context opens up opportunities for understanding the dynamic nature of governance, development outcomes and ambitions about the future of cities strongly affected by these changes.

3.2. Research Setting

3.2.1 Historicising Urban Regimes in Sekondi-Takoradi

This section gives further background and context about this project’s research setting and the city of Sekondi-Takoradi. It begins by historicising the city, arguing against portrayals of the city as a “sleepy town” (BBC News, 2011). It highlights how the city has grown in size and density in relation to a long history of regional and global trade. This section also historicises the changing urban regime in Sekondi-Takoradi, providing a context for examining how urban regime theory can be “stretched” to include transnational oil and gas corporations. The second section provides a contemporary profile of the city and social, economic and political issues arising from the oil and gas discovery off Sekondi-Takoradi’s coast. It then provides an overview of the different stakeholders transforming the city. While it is near impossible to capture the countless actors, networks and actions that shape the city, this thesis provides insight into some of the key stakeholders interacting to enable development outcomes in the city. Ghana’s governance system has been held up as both a beacon of pre-colonial indigenous state sovereignty (Davidson, 1991; Edgerton, 2010; Shillington, 2012) and as a contemporary “successful” democratic state (Boafo-Arthur et al., 2008; Gyimah-Boadi, 2009; Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012). The history and resiliency of the state in Ghana has also undergone a range of political ideologies, experiments and experiences that contribute to the current robustness and complexity of the state (Boafo-Arthur, 2007; Ninsin, 2007; Nugent, 1996, 1995). Ghana’s resource-rich cities, such as Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi, in particular, have had long histories of changing urban regimes, with a “bewildering succession of municipal authorities”
(McCaskie, 2009, p. 142). In other words, there have been different configurations of urban regimes, noted for “intense politicking for advantage and prestige…[with] the system [working] through informal connections not formal structures (McCaskie, 2009, p. 143).

As with Ghana more generally, Sekondi-Takoradi’s engagement with the global political economy and relationship with transnational actors is not new, since the area has had a long history with international trade and exchange (Obeng-Odoom, 2014). Prior to European colonialisation, the area consisted of fishing villages lived in by different ethnic groups that traded with one another, with the majority ethnic group being the Ahanta (ibid). Although there are a wide range of ethnic groups, intermingling and speaking many languages, the main language currently spoken, aside from English, remains Fante, a language that is part of the Akan languages (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014a). The area’s trading history also included trading with Europeans, with the historical record dating back to the fourteenth century (Obeng-Odoom, 2014; Shillington, 2013). In 1644, the Dutch built Fort Orange in Sekondi and in 1659, they built Fort Witzen in Takoradi (Obeng-Odoom, 2014; Owusu-Ansah and McFarland, 1995). These two forts, along with other forts that dot Ghana’s coastline (most notably Cape Coast Castle and Elmina Castle in the Central Region), are remnants of the region’s engagement with varying European groups in the trans-Atlantic slave trade, which persisted from the late 1400s to mid-1800s (Shumway, 2014; Thornton, 1998). Following the defeat of the Asante after nearly one-hundred years of war, the British, with their sights set on expanding their economic territory after the decline and abolition of slavery, declared this area the “Gold Coast” colony in 1874 (McSheffrey, 1983; Reynolds, 1975).

Given Sekondi-Takoradi’s history of trade, proximity to natural resources (e.g. gold, timber, rubber, and palm oil) and coastal access for merchant ships, these two localities continued to play a prominent role in the region’s engagement with the global political economy under British colonialism (Obeng-Odoom, 2014; Plageman, 2013). As such, Sekondi-Takoradi’s economic and political rise and significance can be traced back to its role as Ghana’s first deep-water port and hub to the network of railways that connected the area to Ghana’s resource-rich regions. A combined political regime involving the British colonial government and traditional authorities first enabled trade, followed by the construction of these major infrastructural projects.
Before highlighting how the British colonial government needed to work with traditional authorities for economic endeavours, it is important to note that the relationship between British officials and chiefs (in particular those from the Ashanti region) was tenuous, and included long periods of warfare. Indeed, political order in Ghana’s pre-colonial state consisted of rule by multiple systems of chiefdom, which continue to inform the rationalities and workings of governance in present-day Ghana. For instance, the modern-day traditional area under the Asante (or Ashanti) remains culturally important, given the reach of the Asante. By the 1670s, the Asante under the rule of the Osei Tutu (Shilling, 2012, p. 201) had unified 60% of what is now present-day Ghana (Dumett, 2005, p. 53). While the Asante can trace their roots back to at least 1500 BCE (Dumett, 2005, p. 53), this period under the rule of Osei Tutu also established Kumasi as a trading centre in the heart of the region’s goldfields (Shilling, 2012, p. 201). Taking on the title of the Asantehene, Osei Tutu is credited as being the founder Kingdom of Ashanti, aided by support from religious priests (who presented him with the Golden Stool, a symbol of kingship) and profits from controlled goldfields that other chiefs gave to him in tribute (Collins and Burns, 2014; McCaskie, 2000; Shillington, 2012). Following Osei Tutu’s reign, his Asantehene successors expanded the Asante’s reach, while also selling war captives to slave traders off the coast (Shilling, 2012). As Bayart (2009) contends, state elites, in the form of traditional authorities or chiefs, benefited from the gold trade, and later the slave trade. Under the reign of Asantehene Osei Kwadwo (1765-1777), a centralised state was introduced, with men appointed to political positions based on merit as demonstrated in battle, commerce, administration, or diplomacy, rather than by lineage or by birth (Collins and Burns, 2014, p. 141). These historical details are important in highlighting the rise of resource-rich cities, like Kumasi and later Takoradi, as well as the ways in which indigenous forms of governance have shaped and continue to shape modern-day Ghana.

The 19th century was a time of great conflict over the Asante’s sovereignty (Edgerton, 2010). During this time, as a means of maintaining their territorial reach and power, the Asante fought with the Fante, Ga, Akim, and Akwapim, as well as with the British Empire, who allied with the aforementioned groups (Edgerton, 2010; Wilks, 1989). After four “Anglo-Ashanti” wars which lasted nearly 100 years, the Asante became a British protectorate and referred to as the “Gold Coast” in 1901 (Edgerton, 2010; Wilks, 1989). Other parts of the region were also under colonial rule. The British adopted a system of “indirect rule,” which also relied upon Gold Coast’s traditional leaders to serve in their
colonial administration and maintain their economic endeavours (Apter, 2015; Rathbone, 2000). The Native Jurisdiction Ordinances of 1878 and 1883 extended the authority of local chiefs, giving them judicial power over local affairs (Rathbone, 2000). During this time, violent crimes and property disputes were tried in “Native Courts,” with chiefs as judges. In addition, the “customary laws” of birth, marriage, death and inheritance also fell on the shoulders of chiefs (Rathbone, 2000). As Kwame Arhin argues, “colonial government took away the power of the traditional rulers and gave them authority in local government” (Arhin, 1985, p. 108 cited in Rathbone, 2000, p. 11). These processes of indirect and shared rule provided the foundation for mutual political and economic benefit.

Looking to expand their economic empire, British Colonial Governor Gordon Guggisberg, launched a Ten Year Development Plan for the period of 1920-1930 (Fuseini and Kemp, 2015) which focused on infrastructural development and the construction of schools and hospitals. Around this time, chiefs raised appeals to British firms and the British colonial government, indicating that they were suffering from the high costs of transporting their resources to the coast for export. This was particularly true for cocoa, which was subject to spoilage during the long journey (Plageman, 2013). These efforts lead to the construction of the deep-water port at Takoradi and the extension of the railways, with Sekondi serving as the headquarters.

In exchange for financial investment in building the port and railways, ordinances were passed requiring that chiefs find a workforce for these projects (ibid). According to Rathbone (2000), British decision-makers had concluded that they could only rule the Gold Coast effectively with the assistance of the country’s traditional rulers…[who had] access to land and the people who worked on that land” (p. 10). Image 3.2, Photo of “Traditional Authorities and British Colonial Government in Takoradi, 1925,” shows a ceremonial event organised by the British colonial government in the Gold Coast to introduce the Omanhene or “chief” to the Edward VIII, Prince of Wales, during his visit. This photo, part of a series, conveys the cultural and political importance of traditional leaders in the establishment of a colonial regime in the Gold Coast.
Restrictions marked by previous ordinances changed over time with the evolution of the British indirect rule. By 1946, Ghanaians would hold the majority of seats in the colony’s legislative council, in addition to holding administrative and judicial responsibilities under the Native Administration Ordinance 1939 and the Native Courts Ordinance 1944, which extended native modes of governance beyond previous ordinances. The following Figure 3.4, shows a map of the Gold Coast’s railway system, which connects areas with natural resources to the three cities of Kumasi, Accra, and Sekondi-Takoradi. Takoradi, written in red, serves as the headquarters of the railway system, complete with a deep-water port.
Figure 3.4: Photo of Map of Gold Coast Railway, with Sekondi-Takoradi as the Headquarters

Original caption: Map of the Gold Coast Railway. Showing Feeder Road and the Principal Agriculture and Mineral Areas. Date: March 1922. Courtesy of The National Archives, UK. Image is licensed under a Creative Commons license (no known copyright restrictions) Note: the railway lines are in black, with motor roads in red.
The construction of the port and railways ushered in urbanisation, including increased population, and gave rise to the Railway Workers Union. Table 3.1, “Population of the Sekondi-Takoradi in relation to Accra and Ghana” shows how the city has been growing steadily in terms of absolute numbers, while “Table 3.2: Compound Annual Growth Rates in Sekondi-Takoradi, Accra and Ghana” calculates the rate of compound growth and potential of “urbanisation” in Sekondi-Takoradi, Accra, and Ghana as a whole.

Table 3.1: Population of the Sekondi-Takoradi in relation to Accra and Ghana

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Year</th>
<th>Population of Sekondi-Takoradi</th>
<th>Population of Accra</th>
<th>Population of Ghana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>22,431</td>
<td>61,558</td>
<td>3,163,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>44,557</td>
<td>135,926</td>
<td>4,118,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>123,313</td>
<td>338,396</td>
<td>6,726,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>143,982</td>
<td>617,415</td>
<td>8,559,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>188,203</td>
<td>956,157</td>
<td>12,296,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>289,593</td>
<td>1,658,937</td>
<td>18,912,079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>559,548</td>
<td>2,076,546</td>
<td>24,658,823</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.2: Compound annual growth rates in Sekondi-Takoradi, Accra and Ghana

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inter-census period</th>
<th>Sekondi-Takoradi</th>
<th>Accra</th>
<th>Ghana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931-1948 (17 years)</td>
<td>4.12%</td>
<td>4.77%</td>
<td>1.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-1960 (12 years)</td>
<td>8.85%</td>
<td>7.90%</td>
<td>4.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1970 (10 years)</td>
<td>1.56%</td>
<td>6.20%</td>
<td>2.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1984 (14 years)</td>
<td>1.93%</td>
<td>3.17%</td>
<td>2.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984-2000 (16 years)</td>
<td>2.73%</td>
<td>3.50%</td>
<td>2.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2010 (10 years)</td>
<td>6.81%</td>
<td>2.27%</td>
<td>2.69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: While the total population of Ghana figures remained consistent across primary and secondary sources, the population for Sekondi-Takoradi and Accra prior to 1960 differed between various census reports. There were inconsistencies, with some localities using de facto counts, while others used de jure counts.
In order to assess this data, it is important to understand the definition of urbanisation. Deborah Potts (2012) argues that contrary to the exaggerated figures concerning urbanisation in African cities, there is much variation in the patterns of urbanisation in sub-Saharan Africa. The demographic definition of urbanisation that Potts (2012) offers calls for understanding population changes in cities in relation to population change at the national level: “for urbanisation—in the sense of an increase in the urban share of the national population—to occur, the rate of urban growth must exceed that of the national population growth” (Potts, 2012, p. vii). Thus, prior to Ghana's independence from British rule, from 1931 to 1948, Sekondi-Takoradi’s population growth was 4.12%, while Accra’s was 4.77% and Ghana’s as a whole was 1.56%. This means that both Sekondi-Takoradi and Accra were experiencing urbanisation, with Accra at a slightly higher rate. Indeed, Sekondi-Takoradi and Accra were growing rapidly between 1931 and 1948 during the height of infrastructural projects and British export industries in the two cities. Growth in Sekondi-Takoradi continued through the 1948-1960 period, coinciding with a global population boom, and the peak in the world's population growth rate in the 1960s (UNFPA, 2006; Lam, 2011; World Bank, 2019).

Following independence and the government's focus on state-led industries and trade, from 1948 to 1960, Sekondi-Takoradi experienced a population boom and its highest rate of urbanisation to date. Sekondi-Takoradi had an annual compound growth rate of 8.85%, outpacing Accra’s 7.90% and Ghana’s overall rate of 4.17%. Archived photographs from the British National Archives reveal that Sekondi-Takoradi was a bustling industrial town in the 1950s. In addition, a social survey published in 1950 revealed that the city had a “cosmopolitan ethos” (Busia, 1950). A 1955 Household Budget Survey estimated that 90 per cent of earnings in Sekondi-Takoradi came from formal wage employment, compared to 67 per cent in Accra and 22 per cent in Kumasi, most of them benefiting from Sekondi-Takoradi’s port and railway industries (Jeffries, 1978, p. 19).

The economic growth in Sekondi-Takoradi is notable not only for contributing to urbanisation in the city, but also for giving rise to the Railway Workers Union, a politically conscious working class trade union. Figure 3.7, “Photo of Railway mechanics in Sekondi-Takoradi, 1925” shows the inside of a railway workshop, with Ghanaian mechanics, as well as the tools and parts necessary to maintain the railway system.
According to Busia (1950) the railway workers, headquartered in Sekondi-Takoradi composed the largest formal sector association in 1946, more than those working in local government. The railway workers had important political influence, with the leader of the Railway Workers Union also serving as a member of the Convention People’s Party, headed by Kwame Nkrumah. The Railway Workers Union was instrumental in calling Nkrumah to pursue “positive action” or a series of political protests and strikes that would pave the way for Ghanaian independence from British rule and put Nkrumah in power as the first president of Ghana (Jeffries, 1978; Rathbone, 2000). It is important to highlight the history of the Railway Workers Union, as a political and civil society organization, given that their political mobilisation ushered in a regime beyond that established between the British colonial government and chiefs.

With a focus on modernising Ghana through industrialisation and governance reforms, Nkrumah’s presidency was also marked by his dislike of traditional authorities. Under Nkrumah, his administration passed a series of laws limiting the participation of chiefs in
national and municipal government (McCaskie, 2009; Rathbone, 2000). In turn, traditional authorities, most notably the Asantehene (head of the Ashanti), welcomed the military coup-d’etat that removed Nkrumah from power:

The chiefs wasted no time in showing their attitude to the coup. The Asantehene, generally considered to be one of the most influential chiefs on account of his age and experience and the size of his chiefdom, welcomed the opportunity for chiefs to reign in peace now that Nkrumah had gone, and the general reaction was that a usurper had got his just deserts. Demands were soon made for the restoration of various powers taken away by Nkrumah, and the granting of a few others, and for the restoration of chiefs ‘improperly’ deposed by Nkrumah. (Pinkney, 1972, p. 25)

After the fall of Nkrumah and democratic rule in Ghana, the decades to follow were marked by periods of dictatorships, military rule, and severe economic crises (Ninsin, 2007). The fragmented nature of political power and its changing national and local political regimes in Ghana continued throughout the discovery of oil and gas off the coast of Sekondi-Takoradi. It is important to note that since 1992, Ghana’s economic liberalisation (as a condition for political stability and financial support from the World Bank and IMF) also expanded local government and public participation in governance (Boafo-Arthur, 2013; Ninsin, 2007; World Bank, 1993, 1984). In 1992, Ghana drafted a new constitution, held parliamentary elections, as well as elected Jerry Rawlings as president (under the Fourth Republic) (Boafo-Arthur, 2007). Of particular importance to this research is how the creation of the 1992 Constitution, which was informed by social and economic liberalisation development discourses, led to the establishment of regional and local levels of government and a decentralised planning system (Ahwoi, 2010). Political stability, in addition to the Ghanaian government’s re-investment in Takoradi’s port (which was neglected under Nkrumah, who built the Tema port near Accra), coupled with the new oil industry, shows how the city has been experiencing a period of population growth and urbanisation since 2000. Indeed, demographic data from after the year 2000 has shown that Sekondi-Takoradi had a population growth rate of 6.81% compared to Accra’s 2.27% and Ghana’s 2.69%. These figures correspond with ethnographic accounts about increased migration in the city among Ghanaians and foreigners hoping to benefit from the region’s rubber industries as well as its oil and gas economy (Yankson et al., 2017).
As part of its rapid population growth, in 2007, Sekondi-Takoradi split from the Shama Ahanta East metropolitan district to form its own Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly. This is noted given that this ushered in new political leaders responsible for a smaller and more densely populated urban center. At the time of the oil discovery, key local leaders included the Metropolitan Chief Executive, or mayor of Sekondi-Takoradi, who’s appointed by the president to work alongside the democratically elected Metropolitan Assembly, and the five democratically elected Members of Parliament (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014a). Sekondi-Takoradi also featured Regional Coordinating Councils, as well as the Western Region House of Chiefs (chiefs continued to hold political influence while owning and managing land in Sekondi-Takoradi and in the wider region). The following table shows Ghana’s local government system, which was in place across Ghana and in Sekondi-Takoradi at the time of the oil and gas discovery in 2008. Under Ghana’s decentralised government system, the Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies (MMDAs), are the “highest political, legislating, budgeting and planning authority at the local level,” responsible for formulating and executing plans, programmes and policies that contribute to the development of the area (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung et al., 2016, p. xiii).

**Figure 3.6: Ghana’s Local Government System**

![Diagram of Ghana's Local Government System](source: Own table, with data from Ahwoi, 2010.)

Regional Coordinating Councils—which are composed of a regional minister, deputy ministers, the District Chief Executive, two chiefs, and regional heads of state agencies—
serve to harmonise the activities and plans created by the different districts (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung et al., 2016, p. xiii). In addition to their regional coordinating council, the assemblies are also influenced and guided by other central government entities, sub-assembly councils and units, as well as voters who elect two-thirds of all assembly members (Commonwealth Local Government Forum, 2016). The other one-third of all assembly members, as well as the “mayors,” are appointed by the President of Ghana, though there are proposals underway to make these positions elected (Commonwealth Local Government Forum, 2016). In terms of the actual make-up of the assemblies, they each consist of:

• The District, Municipal or Metropolitan Chief Executive [mayor]⁵;
• One person from each electoral area within the district elected by universal adult suffrage…in accordance with regulations of the Electoral Commission,
• Members of Parliament
• Other members appointed by the President in consultation with traditional authorities and interest groups (Article 5, Local Government Act 936, 2016).

At the level of the sub-metropolitan assembly, the membership consists of fifteen to twenty elected Assembly Members, up to five members from unit committees, and up to five members appointed by the regional minister in consultation with the traditional authorities and other interest groups (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung et al., 2016, p. 21). The sub-metropolitan assembly is responsible for supporting the metropolitan general assembly, but also for building, maintaining and the enforcing the use of public spaces (such as markets, parks/gardens, and public toilets) (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung et al., 2016, p. 22). In addition, urban/town/area councils, as well as unit committees, are all made up of elected positions. Their elections are also conducted by the Electoral Commission, the agency tasked with running and determining constituent boundaries. These sub-assembly councils and unit committees do not hold any legislative powers. However, they help collect revenue, contribute to district development plans, maintain records and support the assembly with other administrative tasks (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung et al., 2016, p. 21).

⁵ Officially referred to as the Metropolitan, Municipal, or District Chief Executive. For instance, as a Metropolitan Assembly, Sekondi-Takoradi has a Metropolitan Chief Executive, though this person is usually referred to as the “mayor” (Commonwealth Local Government Forum, 2016).
Aside from this dual system of government, which includes democratically elected officials and appointed officials organised at different levels (metropolitan, regional, national) who work with traditional authorities, Sekondi-Takoradi’s urban regime also consists of a robust civil society. Ghana has continued to benefit from its network of civil society groups, which have developed to advocate for democratic rule (for instance, the Ghana Bar Association pushed for multi-party elections in the 1990s), while also pushing for transparency in the mining sector and putting more regulations into practice in the oil and gas industry. Some of these groups were funded by international development agencies, like USAID, DfID, GiZ, which pushed for nationwide resource governance initiatives. In 2010, there were over 115 civil society groups—including those based in Sekondi-Takoradi—that came together to form the Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas (funded in part by Oxfam America) to scrutinise oil agreements (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012). In addition, Ghana also has over 150 radio stations and 20 TV stations that provide news and commentary about the management of oil and gas and the potential of these resources to benefit all Ghanaians (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012).

Even prior to the oil and gas discovery, noted civil society organisations, like Friends of the Nation and ACEP, had been working on mining issues in the wider Sekondi-Takoradi area. In fact, their programs were renamed to focus on governance in the “extractive industries” once oil and gas resources were discovered. Hen Mpaono, an organization based in Sekondi-Takoradi focused on coastal governance and sustainable fishing also expanded the scope of their work to include regional environmental governance relating to oil and gas. In addition to these organisations, trade unions in different industries, including timber, gold mining, rubber, railways and the port continued to have a local presence and widen their focus to include those working in the oil and gas industries. Given the role of Sekondi-Takoradi as a market city (with a “Market Circle”), local businesses also formed a core constituency, leading to expanded membership and activities with business organisations like the Sekondi-Takoradi Chamber of Commerce.

Needless to say, the oil and gas discovery, and the economic activities to follow, are guided by an urban regime in Sekondi-Takoradi that has shifted based on the motivations and negotiations among varying levels of the Ghanaian government, traditional authorities, and local, regional, national, and international civil society organisations. In this context, transnational oil and gas companies are entering an urban regime that was ready to be
“stretched” to govern not only these new resources, but also the range of transcalar actors involved.

3.2.2 Contemporary Profile of Sekondi-Takoradi in the Wake of Oil Discovery

In 2007, shortly after Ghana’s discovery of large commercial quantities of oil and gas reserves, international newspaper coverage painted Sekondi-Takoradi as a “sleepy” or “ghost” town poised to emerge as a “boomtown” (BBC News, 2011). Figure 3.5, “Photo of a Coastal Road in Sekondi with Oil Platforms Located Offshore” shows the proximity of oil and gas infrastructure to the city.

Based on historical and critical perspectives about the city, this assessment is simplistic and misleading. As the previous section argues, Sekondi-Takoradi has been a trading port and gateway to global markets long before the discovery of oil. This storyline draws on the
assumption that oil, as a “magical” commodity, has the capacity to build an oil industry town practically overnight, doing so by entering a place void of culture, social relations, infrastructure and governance. This place also happens to be an African city, a categorisation that is laden with negative stereotypes. Moreover, the usage of “boomtown” connotes the thought of a temporary place forged in the hinterlands or frontier, subject to a potential “bust” in the future. This research critiques the theoretical antecedents that give rise to these narrow and deterministic narratives about the lack of a past, present and future in Sekondi-Takoradi.

Thus, this thesis aims to understand how this dynamic city, consisting of a wide range of actors, responds to the presence of powerful transnationalised actors shaping and implementing potentially beneficial urban agendas. As this thesis’ analytical framework directly engages with power relations, it recognises the financial power and scale of the transnational oil company. For instance, the Jubilee Field, the first oil field in production, has brought in $3.4 billion dollars through oil taxes and government payments from 2011-2016 (PIAC, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012). As of 2016, there are 15 oil blocks in exploration, with each of these blocks potentially holding multiple oil and gas fields. With the exception of three oil blocks, the remaining 12 oil blocks are located offshore, near Sekondi-Takoradi (see Map 1: “Location of Ghana’s Oil Fields” on page 14).

There are currently more blocks subject to being licensed near the coast of Sekondi-Takordi, with new discoveries and proposed oil development/production plans taking place. Despite the volatility of global oil and gas prices, these resources have become a major GDP contributor, with oil currently behind gold and cocoa as export commodities (Government of Ghana annual budget, 2017). According a market research firm, Oxford Business Group, Ghana’s oil and gas industry is “comparatively young, and open for investment all along the value chain” (Oxford Business Group, 2018).

In order to work in the oil and gas industry, companies have to register with the Petroleum Commission. To date, there are over 400 registered petroleum companies, many of them with offices and company accommodations in Sekondi-Takoradi. This is not only due to the city’s proximity to the oil fields, but also its infrastructural resources and proposed future investments (e.g. port, railways, Navy base, airport, university, hospital, etc.). There are a range of small and large oil companies based in the city, including Tullow Oil (the
main equity partner of the Jubilee Field and the TEN Fields, the latter being the next fields up for extractive production), the state-run Ghana National Petroleum Company, Eni (the world’s 11th largest oil company, based in Italy), Baker Hughes, Hess, Halliburton, Weatherford and Schlumberger. In addition, transnationalised luxury property developers, construction companies, engineering firms, and the hospitality industry have also moved into the city. For instance, construction firms like Murray Roberts, a South African company that built the Burj Al Arab hotel in Dubai, the fifth tallest building in the world that stands on a man-made island, is also one of contractors working on the €357 million euro Takoradi Port expansion project, with one of its objectives being to expand facilities for the oil and gas industry. Figure 3.8, “Photo of Takoradi Port in 2015” shows the different facilities that make up the port, from shipping containers to warehouses, as well as the port’s proximity to the train tracks (see area near the trees).

**Figure 3.8: Photo of Takoradi Port in 2015**

![Image of the Takoradi Port and its proximity to the railway lines (seen in the foreground next to the greenery). Photo courtesy of author. Taken 2 April 2015.](image-url)

In 2015, the port handled 27% of Ghana’s seaborne traffic, 68% of Ghana’s seaborne exports and 15% of Ghana’s seaborne imports (Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority,
Major commodities handled through the port include manganese, bauxite, clinker, wheat, bulk and bagged cocoa, quicklime, containerised cargoes, and equipment for the mining and oil and gas industry (ibid). In addition to the port, Ghana’s railways system (which is headquartered in Sekondi) is experiencing a new wave of investments, with billions of dollars of investment funds in discussion (Afenu, 2018). For instance, the city benefited from a $165 million railway extension project from Kojokrom to Sekondi and Kojokrom to Takoradi, which was completed in 2016 (Peprah, 2016).

On an everyday level, qualitative accounts draw on concerns about the city’s increased cost of living, real estate market, road deterioration, traffic, crime and environmental problems (Ablo, 2018; Mahama, 2012; Obeng-Odoom, 2014). For instance, “Oil Village,” a gated and exclusive housing community located between Sekondi-Takoradi and the bordering Ahanta West district have rents that range from $1000 to $4000 U.S. dollars per month, when the average household (74 percent) earns between $60 and $150 U.S. dollars per month (Obeng-Odoom, 2014, p. 101). Figure 3.9, “Property Located Inside Oil Village” shows a single-family house with high rents that are out of reach for most Ghanaians.

Figure 3.9: Property Located Inside Oil Village

Caption: A single-family house located inside the gated “Oil Village” neighborhood. Rents range from $1000 to $4000 US dollars per month. Photo courtesy of author. Taken 2 April 2015.
In a survey with 636 respondents, Alexander Eduful and Michael Hooper (2015) found that certain neighbourhoods in Sekondi-Takoradi were undergoing processes of gentrification: expats were displacing well-off local Ghanaians in areas such as Beach Road and Chapel Hill, with home rentals ranging from $2000-$8,000 U.S. dollars a month. Figure 3.10, “Photo of a Residential Street in Chapel Hill, Sekondi-Takoradi,” shows newly built residential buildings and hillside mansions lining the street next to older shops, thus showing the variety and unevenness of development in the city.

**Figure 3.10: Photo of a Residential Street in Chapel Hill, Sekondi-Takoradi**

Around Market Circle, middle-income Ghanaians were displacing low-income and low-middle income Ghanaians (Eduful and Hooper, 2015). In addition to the construction of new luxury accommodations and residential communities, the Takoradi Mall, a project spearheaded by a South African real estate fund, was completed in December 2018, costing $40 million U.S. dollars (Emmanuel and Tornyi, 2018; GhanaWeb, 2018). The politics of this mall’s construction will be elaborated upon in the following chapter. Given this range of urban pressures and problems, civil society organisations and the local state have mobilised on these issues to ground their development agendas, as they seek capital investment from national and transnationalised entities. The aim of this thesis is not to quantify urban transformation in the city, but rather to examine the politics of urban development in a city with powerful transnationalised actors and interests, as well as
concerned local state and civil society actors. The following section discusses this thesis’ methodological framework and justifies the qualitative methods utilised in this research study.

3.3. Methodological Framework

The previous section lays out the background of the city, both historically and contemporarily. It also expands on the impetus, interest and scope of this project. This chapter now turns to focus on the methodological framework of this project and why certain qualitative methods were chosen.

This research is based on fieldwork conducted in Ghana, primarily in the city of Sekondi-Takoradi, and occasionally in Accra, over the course of eight months. Some political decisions made in Accra affect Sekondi-Takoradi, and there were meetings taking place in Accra and stakeholders living there whose work impacted development in Sekondi-Takoradi. Aside from the sustained period of fieldwork, an initial one-month preliminary study also took place in May 2013. After I left Ghana, I also conducted a few follow-up interviews (in-person and over video) with key informants from 2015-2017. In addition, personal connections and notes from my first visit to Ghana as a foreign exchange student at the University of Ghana, Legon from January to July 2008 also contributed to the making of initial contacts for this thesis. As this thesis is about the city of Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana and how different groups of people shape its urban futures, interviews and commentary from stakeholder meetings was the main source of data, followed by textual analysis of plans and policy documents. Ethnographic data, in the form of participant observation, also contributed to the thesis.

This research and the case study that informs it are grounded in qualitative methods. It builds on a social constructivist paradigm to understanding the world. Social constructivism or interpretivism argues that individuals seek to comprehend their environments by developing and ascribing meanings to experience. The scope of this project focuses upon how different social actors, through engaging with each other, not only develop meaning for themselves, but that these multiple meanings can be interpreted by social researchers to construct some knowledge about our world (Holstein and Gubrium, 2004). These meanings are varied and multiple, and the researcher is engaged in interpreting complex meanings rather than narrow meanings. Schwandt (1994) describes the politics of choosing
this particular outlook with respect to the philosophy of science or knowledge production:

Proponents of these persuasions share the goal of understanding the complex world of lived experience from the point of view of those who live it. This goal is variously spoken of as an abiding concern for the life world, for the emic point of view, for understanding meaning, for grasping the actor’s definition of a situation, for Verstehen. The world of lived reality and situation-specific meanings that constitute the general object of investigation is thought to be constructed by social actors (p. 118).

In employing this outlook, this research provides detailed descriptions and insights into how multiple actors interpret and experience the world (Limb and Dwyer, 2001). In addition, these qualitative methods “do not start with the assumption that there is a pre-existing world that can be known, or measured, but instead see the social world as something that is dynamic and changing, always being constructed through the intersection of cultural, economic, social and political processes” (Limb and Dwyer, 2001, p. 21). In keeping with this idea, the research focuses on the dynamic and changing world of Sekondi-Takoradi by examining different stakeholders’ aspirations and visions and their engagements with one another in shaping the urban agendas of the city. Interviews with key stakeholders, and observing, recording and taking notes at meetings enabled me to better understand the interactions and processes of governance and urban politics.

These qualitative methods—from interviews to participation at meetings to analysing the multiple meanings of plans and policy documents—speak to a wider concern in social research concerning moving away from positivist approaches, particularly in postcolonial contexts (Crang and Cook, 2007; Flyvbjerg, 2001). The qualitative approach employed in this research builds on postcolonial critiques, which argue that knowledge production is partial, situated and rooted in multiple subjectivities. While critical and “subaltern” narratives focus on oppression and otherness given the complicated history of colonialism, this thesis calls for post-structuralist conceptions of human agency, negotiation and strategic collaboration. By acknowledging history and possibility, this thesis aims to generate knowledge from postcolonial contexts.

This thesis also draws from pragmatist approaches to social research, which focus on the political practices and actions of different actors to affect social change (Barnett and Bridge, 2013; Flyvbjerg, 2001). Informed by “pragmatic” political philosophers (e.g.
(Dewey, 1929, 1897; Rorty, 1999), this approach has been a cornerstone of inquiries into the making of democracy and associational life in America, and helps ground how to approach the study of urban governance in Ghana. In Making Social Science Matter, Bent Flyvbjerg (2001) maintains that that the social sciences ought not to try to replicate the natural sciences by adopting a positivist approach—which focuses on replication, big theory and a reliance on quantitative methods—in its pursuit of knowledge production (Dewey, 1929, 1897; Rorty, 1999). Flyvbjerg argues for the importance of context in social research. A way forward with contextualising the social world is through understanding power relations and examining what Flyvbjerg calls practical wisdom. Building on Aristotle’s concept of phronesis, practical wisdom focuses on the processes of deliberation and decision-making in relation to people’s particular dispositions and values. These neo-pragmatist approaches can ground case studies, which, far from being universal, extend knowledge because they can provide insights and lessons for other contexts.

3.4. Operationalising “Transcalar Urban Governance”

“Transcalar urban governance” is a core concept of this thesis. Following Halbert and Rutherford (2010), who draw on research from the School of Territorial Economies, this research builds on the notion of transcalarity to conceptualize how planning and development outcomes are made possible through interconnected relationships and resources organised across different localities and scale. According to Jane Wills (1999), scale is a technical term that refers to a representation of an area, particularly in the field of cartography. However, human geographers argue that the concept of scale was taken for granted, with scale being produced through social, political and economic processes (Taylor, 1981; Smith, 1984; Wills, 1999; Herod 2009). In other words, scale is often used to frame social order and action (like the national state, or local wage bargaining), but the conflicts and struggles that give rise to scale itself is under-theorised. As such, the key issue is to move beyond focusing on scale as a place of engagement, where a social actor passes from one discrete arena to another, such as from the local to global (Cox, 1998). Instead, it is necessary, to focus on the relations that foster scale by examining how social actors make themselves local or global—for instance—how a corporation might localise its business linkages by using local suppliers or how an organization might become global through establishing relationships with other organisations around the world (Herod, 2010).
As Colletis-Wahl et al. (2008) posit, these actors operate across many geographies and spaces, pulling natural, human, and financial resources from multiple localities and multiple scales. While this thesis acknowledges that there are jurisdictional differences between local, national and international scales (Termeer et al., 2010), it argues that urban governance operates across these distinctions in a number of ways. Various actors working and living in the city are organised along different scales based on their agendas and motivations (e.g. local government or a transnational corporation). Challenging both a hierarchal and static view of scale, this thesis adopts a transcalar approach by recognising that the processes of urban governance and the development of networks in the city require constant movement across localities and scales. In this vein, this thesis aims to capture the transcalarity of interactions, negotiations and decisions among different groups and networks as they shape place-based development in a city. As such, this thesis focuses on the ways in which different actors are “lodged” in the urban region through their relationships and pursuits of development agendas.

Methodologically, this thesis operationalises transcalar urban governance in two ways. It focuses on the relations of power “as it flows through networks between the state and institutional actors in the market and civil society” (Pieterse, 2005, p. 3). It also locates moments of governance-in-action at stakeholder meetings, town halls, corporate events and community meetings, as well as through documentary materials in the form of policy statements and plans among a wide range of groups that operate at local and global scales as they influence development and planning outcomes in the city. Secondly, it moves beyond a focus on the political engagement between actors organised along varying scales—for instance, local government, local traditional authorities, local community-based organisations, international donors and transnational corporations. Instead, this thesis focuses on how these different groups move across scales (in a transcalar manner). This means examining the ways in which transnational corporations become localised through their public relations and business operations and how local government becomes transnationalised through its interactions with other cities, agencies and transnational corporations as both entities seek to manage development outcomes. By operationalising urban governance in a transcalar manner, this research moves beyond seeing development outcomes as imposed by an actor operating in a particular scalar and organizational order (e.g. a national plan for the city development). Instead, this opens up an innovative lens for
understanding not only how scales are socially contested, negotiated, and produced, but also how urban development and city-making are continually reconstituted.

### 3.5. Overview and Rationale of Data Collection

According to Denzin and Lincoln (2005), qualitative research is a “situated activity that locates the observer in the world [and] consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible” (p. 3). These practices can include “field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings and memos to the self” (Ibid). I utilised all of these primary sources for my research, in addition to a wide range of documentary materials, such as census reports, national and city plans, acts of parliament, newspaper articles, research documents and photographs and video recordings of events. These primary sources captured first-hand accounts of the people, places, policies and events that shape the potential futures of the city. This research also draws on secondary sources in the form of analytical and theory-based texts, opinion articles and second-hand accounts of conversations and events, with which it was important to exercise caution about rumour. All these data sources are then analysed based on the operationalisation of concepts (like governance and citizenship) and key themes. Thematic analysis in qualitative research involves examining the data for themes or patterns that relate to the research questions. Initial codes or labels were used to describe this data with qualitative software (HYPERResearch), followed by searching for patterns to generate broader themes from these initial codes.

#### 3.5.1 Interviews and Stakeholder Meetings

This thesis examines how different stakeholders (the central government, local government, multinational corporations, traditional authorities and civil society organisations) and their political agendas shape the city. It focuses on how these groups have approached change and development in light of the oil industry in the city. Representatives from these groups became my key respondents. In addition, conversations with a range of people living in the city who do not fall neatly into these categories, like local business people, academics and journalists also served as primary data sources to corroborate information and enrich understanding. Since representatives from these groups were my respondents and primary data sources, my research sites (in addition to the city itself) were the places these people primarily conducted their work: in their offices, at
stakeholder and community meetings, at coffee shops and restaurants. Furthermore, participant observation, living in the city, and attending meetings allowed further perspective as to the primary individuals who make up the network of stakeholders in the city. The section entitled “3.4.1. Interviews and Stakeholder Meetings” includes a table of the various stakeholders and decision-makers who shape the governance of oil windfalls and oil-led development in the city.

Before going on my extended fieldwork trip from August 2014-April 2105, I mapped the different groups I wanted to interview; this consisted of multiple levels of government, civil society organisations, oil companies and traditional authorities. During my first months in the field, I utilised my social networks, namely friends of friends who were working in international development for their contacts. Through their connections with local civil society organisations and at the Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly, these contacts invited me to stakeholder meetings in both Accra and Sekondi-Takoradi. Leaning into social networks, in addition to being a familiar face at meetings and in the city, proved to be most effective in getting access to interviews. Initial contact with oil companies was made possible through advocates I knew in the United States and the United Kingdom who worked in the fields of social entrepreneurship and financial inclusion. After making contact, I reached out to representatives at corporate headquarters in London for local employee contacts in Ghana. After being connected, I was able to interview local oil and gas employees based in Ghana. This thesis relied on in-person interviews with stakeholders and representatives of key groups, including academics and journalists. These groups were mapped out as having a vested interest in the development agendas of the city and were active agents shaping its governance.

In terms of research ethics, care was taken to ensure consent, prevent ‘coerced’ responses and to mitigate the danger of reputational harm to the interviewees and their organisations or companies. I gained consent with interviewees, who knew about the nature of this research. Most of these interviews were recorded after obtaining documented consent. In other instances, participants asked that only notes be taken. Some interviews took place during walk-alongs or site-visits, including the Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly offices, National Development Planning Commission, B-BOVID/Tractor’s Farm, Oil Village and the Takoradi Port Expansion Project, which provided a more embodied,
grounded and interactive engagement with interviewees and the built environment (Lee and Ingold, 2006).

Concerning research ethics and issues of confidentiality and anonymity, this thesis aims to protect the privacy and reputation of informants while sharing rich ethnographic insights about their social world. Despite the emphasis on confidentiality in social science research, there are no clear guidelines to help researchers balance their conveyance of detailed and accurate accounts shared by informants and protecting the identities of those who participate (Gubrium et al., 2012, p. 457). Thus, although no promises of full confidentiality or anonymity were made, as this would make social research “impossible” to conduct, this thesis endeavours to ensure that informants are not identified (e.g. no real names are used here, except for public figures making publically recorded speeches) (Wiles et al., 2008, p. 426). In an effort to provide an accurate account of the perspectives of different stakeholders in the city, the research only cited recorded interviews or written correspondence, while indicating the general position of the informant at their (named) organisation or company. In instances where it would be easy to identify the informant, this thesis did not name the organisation or company, instead it lists a generalised category. Ensuring that care would be taken to ensure confidentiality during data collection also helped to build trust and rapport with informants (Baez, 2002).

In addition, this thesis takes extra care in handling the data collected from transnational corporations. Interviews with representatives from transnational oil companies, as well as the property developer behind the Takoradi Mall, are anonymised even further in that the names of the companies are not revealed in this thesis. Instead, the research provides the 2014 revenue figures of different transnational oil companies that were interviewed as part of this thesis in order to give a sense of their size and financial power. This was an informed decision made by this researcher, despite being granted permission by these corporate informants to record and identify their respective companies. Due to the scale of transnational corporations (in particular oil and gas companies) as well as their financial power and reputational concerns, it was decided that it was best to hide the identities of the companies that were interviewed. This consideration was made since, in comparison to government and civil society organisations, not all of the opinions and activities mentioned by representatives from these transnational corporations are publically available. In addition, as powerful economic “elites,” transnational corporations are subject to greater
personal, professional and political vulnerabilities (Lancaster, 2017; Welch et al., 2002), thus making interviewing them methodologically challenging before, during and after the interview. This includes issues of being granted interview access, to concerns about the lack of openness during interviews, to wider issues post-interview about what kinds of data can be shared and how potential backlash and politicalised ramifications can be mitigated (Welch et al., 2002). This PhD research study, however, recognises that protecting confidentiality must be weighed against potential legal and moral obligations that call for breaking confidentiality in instances of abuse and harm (Wiles, 2006). This thesis thus takes a careful approach to providing accurate accounts of urban governance and urban development politics, while ensuring the confidentiality of the actors who graciously granted interview access (Lancaster, 2017).

Rubin and Rubin (2012) posit that interviewing not only helps portray on-going social processes, but also enables the interviewer to examine the complexity of the world through understanding multiple perspectives. Interviews are especially useful at capturing people’s experiences, opinions, aspirations, and feelings. This research employed semi-structured interviews as the flexibility of this method allowed for the discovery and elaboration of information that is important to the informants and might not have been obvious to the researcher at first. The revealed information also builds on the strength of this method, giving space for interpreting and contextualising verbal and non-verbal cues, and leaving room for important meanings to emerge. Interview guides, complete with the questions that framed discussion, can be found in Appendices 1-4.

Table 3.3 is a summary list of the number of participants interviewed and their organisational affiliations. A total of 51 semi-structured interviews took place with 48 individuals (see Appendix A for a full list of interviewees and Appendix B for a list of personal communications). Some actors were interviewed multiple times, which was necessary for building rapport and for keeping timelines of certain development projects in the city updated. In some instances, multiple representatives were interviewed from the same organisation or institution. The following table categorises the groups of informants, but it is important to recognise that some individuals have multiple professional roles that span across these categories. However, these labels are helpful in situating the positionality of the informants at a particular point in time (i.e. within the scope of this project) and for
recognising the complexity of different types of groups that shape governance and development in the city.

Table 3.3: Research Informants and Organisational Affiliations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
<th>Organisations and entities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Government</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority; National Development Planning Commission; Office of the President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Authorities</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly; Sekondi-Takoradi Planning Unit; Western Region Coordinating Council; Western Region House of Chiefs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transnational Oil Companies</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Different oil companies, ranging in revenue from $2 billion US to over $40 billion, all in 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Enterprises</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ghana Supply Chain (funded by USAID, implemented by PYXERA, in collaboration with Government of Ghana); Enterprise Development Centre (funded by Jubilee Field oil partners, in collaboration with Government of Ghana)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Developers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Oil Village (Ghanaian); Takoradi Mall (South African)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Businesses</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi Chamber of Commerce; Other local businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghanaian Civil Society Organisations</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>African Centre for Energy Policy (ACEP); Centre for Public Interest Law (CEPIL); COLANDEF; Friends of the Nation; Hẹn Mpoano, Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC); Western Region Development Network of NGOs (WERENGO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organisations and Donors</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Australian Youth Ambassadors for Development (AYAD); Australian Volunteers for International Development (AVID); Global Communities; Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GiZ); Free the Children/Me to We; Management Systems International (MSI)/Tetra Tech; Oxfam America; PYXERA Global; USAID; KPMG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>University of Ghana, Legon; Duke University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Media</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>News 1, JoyFm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own table.

In addition to in-person interviews, my attendance at stakeholder meetings proved to be invaluable in understanding the wide landscape of players involved in urban development. This researcher was able to hear different perspectives, observe interactions and triangulate data. I was invited to all these meetings by the host organisers and asked for permission before recording the proceedings (see Table 3.4). Most of the large public forums had camera crews and journalists in attendance.
Table 3.4: Stakeholder Meetings and Forums Attended

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting/Forum</th>
<th>Date and Location</th>
<th>Groups in Attendance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two-Day Multi-Stakeholders Forum on the Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill</td>
<td>30th September and 1st October 2014</td>
<td>Civil society organisations (including fishermen’s associations and trade unions), traditional authorities, Chamber of Commerce, donor agencies, central government, trade unions, oil companies, media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-Day Civil Society Organisations (CSO) Forum on the Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill and the Marine Pollution Bill</td>
<td>14th and 15th October 2014</td>
<td>Civil society organisations (including fishermen’s associations and trade unions), traditional authorities, Chamber of Commerce, donor agencies, central government, oil companies, media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Environmental Monitoring and Advocacy Group Meeting</td>
<td>16th October 2014</td>
<td>Friends of the Nation (local CSO), engaged citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Stakeholder Forum on the Millennium Challenge Corporation II Agreement</td>
<td>28th October 2014</td>
<td>Civil society organisations, donor agencies, Ghanaian firms, central government, trade unions, media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Interest and Accountability Committee 2013 Report Launch</td>
<td>30th October 2014</td>
<td>Civil society organisations, religious organisations, traditional authorities, Chamber of Commerce, donor agencies, central government, media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi 2014-2017 Medium Term Development Plan Public Hearing</td>
<td>7th November 2014</td>
<td>Local government, traditional authorities, civil society organisations, donor agencies, trade unions, oil companies, media, engaged citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly Social Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Training Program</td>
<td>18th November 2014</td>
<td>Local government agencies, local businesses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own table.

3.5.2 Development and Spatial Plans, Maps and Policy Documents

Documents, plans, policy directives and opinions are important in providing the background, impetus and reasoning behind development agendas. These documents also serve as a sort of “artefact” for how different actors publicly verbalise their views of the
world—through quantifying, visualising and giving meaning to certain issues. Documents capture and represent particular viewpoints of certain actors during a particular time and place. These documents also reveal power dynamics in terms between who is included and excluded in the context specific processes and in their creation. In addition, documentary sources track a deeper and on-going engagement with a particular topic or issue, something that might get lost in a short interview. Together with interviewing informants, these documents help to triangulate data and add rigour to the interpretation of perspectives and meanings about the social world.

This research follows three planning pathways, which also influenced the analysis of the documents created as part of these processes. The first is Medium Term Development Plans, which are created and spearheaded by the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) throughout Ghana. Following the passage of the 1992 Constitution, Ghana’s planning system was both systematised and decentralised. Starting in 1996, each MMDA has been required to develop their own Medium Term Development Plan that aligns with the national plan and guidelines. This PhD thesis examines 20 years worth of development plans at the city and national level. In addition, earlier national plans, created during the British colonial period and after Ghana’s independence in 1957 were also examined. These materials were accessed through archival research at the National Development Planning Commission’s library and through the assistance of planners at the local and regional level. Recent Medium Term Development Plans have been created through collaboration between local assemblies and local and international civil society organisations. Other government plans that inform this research include national-level plans developed by different sectorial ministries. This includes the Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority’s Takoradi Port Master Plan (February 2002), as well as a recent Ministry of Transport’s Railways Master Plan of Ghana (December 2013). Other government documents at both the local and national levels that contributed to this PhD study include annual budgets and oil and gas receipts from 2012-2016. In order to calculate population changes and compound annual growth rates, this thesis relied on census data. Census reports from 1931, 1948, 1960, 1970 and 1984 were available at the Library of Congress in Washington DC. Census reports from 2000 and 2010 were available online at the Ghana Statistical Services website. Census and population data were important in quantifying historical and contemporary narratives of urbanisation.
Aside from plans spearheaded by the government, the Jubilee Partners (consortium of oil partners developing the Jubilee Oil Fields) also influenced and funded the creation of a Structural Plan for the city, in consultation with local and regional government and civil society actors following the oil discovery. The “Structure Plan for Sekondi-Takoradi” dated July 2012 has not been finalised, but it remains in circulation at the local assembly level and among civil society actors. A Ghanaian consultancy firm, The Consortium, managed this plan. Other materials provided by Tullow Oil (the main oil partner), which are largely available through their website, include their public-facing annual reports and external audit reports, which also informed this study. The audit reports, dating from 2012-2016, were prepared for the International Finance Corporation by an Italian firm, D’Appolonia S.p.A. In addition, Environmental Impact Assessment reports and public consultation reports (from public input meetings) for the drilling of the Jubilee Field and the Tweneboa, Enyenra, and Ntomme (TEN) Fields shaped this research. These documents provide information about Tullow Oil’s position concerning their social and economic role in developing the oil fields and the context for their actions to mitigate social and environmental risks.

A third set of planning documents that inform this thesis are those created by civil society organisations, specifically the Sekondi-Takoradi Spatial Development Plan 2010-2013, published in July 2013. This plan was spearheaded by an international civil society organisation, Global Communities in partnership with the Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly. The plan, funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, mapped out the social and infrastructure needs of residents in different neighbourhoods in the city, including their access to schools, health clinics, water and electricity. Other policy reports created by civil society organisations and aid agencies include USAID’s CSR Dialog Platform Oil & Gas in the Western Region (March 2012) and the creation of the Western Region Spatial Plan by a consortium of local and international civil society organisations throughout the region. There are also numerous policy reports by a wide range of civil society actors that contribute to the knowledge of oil management in and beyond the city that are unlisted here.

Visual materials, in the form of photographs and maps, also contributed to this thesis. “Then and Now” photographs of Sekondi-Takoradi appeared in a copy of Oil City Magazine while I was in the field. Some of the “then” photos—historical photographs of the city—
are included in this thesis. They are part of the digitised, “The World in A Lens” collection, organised by the UK’s National Archives. Historical maps of Ghana from 1900 and of the city from 1949 were available at the Geography and Map Division at the Library of Congress in Washington DC. Throughout my time in Ghana I took videos, and also photographed and recorded latitude and longitude coordinates of landmarks. The latitude and longitude coordinates were used to create the maps in this thesis, including Maps 1, 2, and 3, found on pages 14-16. These maps display the proximity of the oil fields to the city and the range of transnational oil companies with offices in the city, which, given the close physical distance of the resource to where people live, raises aspirational questions about local economic development. In addition, the images help to illuminate how new projects of development and modernity exist in parallel to old spaces, rather than erasing them. This reveals how cityscapes hold history as their urban spaces undergo processes of making and remaking.

### 3.5.3 Participant Observation and Field Notes

A key characteristic of qualitative research is that the study takes place in the “natural setting” (i.e. the field) of the subjects. In addition to observing and interviewing participants and listening to their voices at meetings during my fieldwork in Ghana, this thesis also draws from my experiences as a participant-observer—I too, became a participant in this research project. Moments that come to mind consist of merely living in the city, from residing in a newly constructed home on a street recently named “Petroleum Lane,” to experiencing the frustrations of traffic, water shortages and power outages, to eating and spending money at street stalls, markets, shops and hotels. In addition, during some interviews and stakeholder meetings, the questioning turned to focus on myself, in that participants wanted to hear my thoughts and preliminary findings. Fieldwork is particularly important in “cross-cultural” research and as a qualitative method because it allows the researcher to engage in the context of the informants’ lives and form embodied experiences about the research topics. By living in the city, new questions and understandings emerge that help situate different forms of collected data. In addition, field notes serve to capture participant observation as a form of qualitative method. These notes also “record” one’s observations and sensibilities at a particular time and place. As context is an important feature of social constructivism and qualitative research, there is perhaps nothing more important than living in the context one is studying.
3.6. Making Sense of Data

The previous sections provided an overview and rationale for the types of methods employed and how data was both collected and generated to inform social inquiry set forth by this PhD research. This next section examines the practicalities of how data was organised, coded and analysed.

Textual data from interview transcripts, meeting notes, medium term development plans and field notes were all digitalised. While notes and plans are important for contextualising this research, care was taken to listen to, transcribe and code interviews in a rigorous manner that informed interpretation and analysis. “Coding” is a process that involves finding themes and patterns in the data. This research was aided by qualitative software called HyperRESEARCH, which allows digital documents to be uploaded and text to be highlighted and codes assigned, as well as giving space for personal notes. There were a total of 115 codes, divided into nine key categories, which include: actors, constraints, development aims, planning processes, embodied experiences, relationships and strategies. While this technology saves on time and labour, scholars writing on methodology warn against relying on the programme for quick pattern recognition versus the benefits of gaining a deep knowledge of the material (Crang, 2001). While the first set of codes allowed for the “emergence” of ideas, there was a constant reflexive process to validate the relationship between the data and categories that formed (Crang, 2001; Mills et al., 2006). As Anselm Strauss (1987) argues, there are two dual processes occurring in coding: the first involves recognising the “in vivo” codes which are brought up by participants themselves and which the researcher regards as important and the second involves analytical or socially constructed codes abstracted from the data by the researcher (p. 33). Coding and annotating sections of transcripts, notes and key planning documents helps to build up an interpretation. Rather than starting and ending with a grand theory, knowledge is grounded and generated through patterns of meaning that emerge from interpreting and contextualising the perspectives of the interviewed actors.

As Stone and Priestley (1996) argue, care must be taken to not misinterpret or quote participants out of context. With coding that involves finding themes or categorical “codes” across interview transcripts and other texts. There is constant reflection and grappling with the different perspectives on and issues with the contexts. According to
Peter Jackson (2001), interpretation is the most critical step in a research project. When examining the different themes or codes that emerge, it is important to group and regroup themes to form what he coins “discursive repertoires.” Building on the literary theorist notion of the “interpretative community,” Jackson (2001) raises the issue that many different readings can co-exist, as our world is one of complexity and contradiction, and while interpretive rigour can help create shared understandings, it is impossible to derive a single definitive interpretation of the social world. Thus, it is possible to be rigorous with both triangulating data, and to form interpretations that are not misconstrued, where participants are quoted out of context, contributing to multiple narratives about a situation or place. The process of reflexively analysing data and situating this interpretation to form a wider narrative involved listening to competing perspectives, maximising multiple voices and contextualising stories about political relationships and development aims in a manner that recognised individual subjectivities.

3.7. Research Limitations and Positionality

3.7.1 Limitations

The first set of limitations on this research involves the challenges of interpreting and contextualising the multiple voices and opinions I encountered during the course of fieldwork. It's easy to overlook, but one of the benefits I enjoyed as a researcher was that Ghana’s vibrant democracy translates into strong freedom of speech and freedom of the press. However, this also meant that it was necessary to not only identify key stakeholders to interview, but also to understand the importance of reflecting on the complex context of political criticisms. Political criticisms around the state and oil and gas management were common in Ghana, stemming from frustrations and dissatisfaction with certain processes and outcomes. However, it was important for me not to draw conclusions and generalisations about the weaknesses and disappointments of the local state, since these moments of heated discussions revealed how individuals were simultaneously critical and hopeful as they participated in the politics of urban development.

According to Freedom House (2016), a U.S. based NGO that promotes human rights and measures freedom worldwide, Ghana is classified as a “free” country with a high aggregate score of 83 out of 100 for political rights and civil liberties (Baez, 2002). In comparison, the UK is also classified as free, with a score of 95 out of 100 (Freedom House, 2016).
People from all walks of life spoke openly about politics in Ghana, including their frustrations with the government and foreign corporations. During my pilot study in May 2013, the Ghana Supreme Court proceedings about the legitimacy of the 2012 presidential elections were being broadcast across the country’s radio stations, and most Ghanaians were closely following the news. Ghana’s Independent Electoral Commission had declared John Mahama of the National Democratic Congress as the winner with 50.7% of the votes, just a few thousand votes short of a run-off with New Patriotic Party candidate Nana Akufo-Addo. While on a long tro-tro ride from Accra to Takoradi, a friend of mine openly discussed the state of politics in Ghana, stating “we are a democracy and things are good. But it’s the politicians and their closed-door meetings. We don’t know where money is going and how it’s getting spent.” Despite his criticisms about “how people become politicians to get rich,” he still voted in the 2012 elections, along with 79.43% of eligible Ghanaian voters (Freedom House, 2016). As a teacher, he voted for the NDC and felt that it was a waste of time and expenses for the NPP to challenge the elections, considering that “all the knowledgeable people” know that the election results are legitimate. No violent protests took place while the Supreme Court was reviewing the case. Also during this month of my pilot study, the faculty members at the University of Ghana, Legon discussed how they were just returning to work after being on strike for three weeks. In addition, this strike had support from most public sector employees—including primary and secondary school teachers, doctors and pharmacists—who were fighting for better salary conditions given high inflation and rising living costs.\footnote{When I was in Ghana in 2008, Ghana had recently debased its currency to achieve near-parity with the U.S. dollar, where 1 Ghanaian Cedi (GHC) was almost $1 US dollar (USD). In May 2013, the price of the Ghanaian cedi had dropped: $1 USD converted to around 2 GHC. The price of the Ghanaian cedi would continue to drop. When I was back in the field in August 2014, $1 USD equalled 3.7 GHC. An American researcher at the University of Ghana, Legon requested that the institute where she worked pay her based on the amount of her first month’s salary in US dollars, rather than in Ghanaian cedis. My landlords in Takoradi asked me to pay them in either dollars or euros as well. In an effort to re-stabilise the cedi and Ghanaian economy, President John Mahama’s administration turned to the IMF for help, signing an aid agreement where Ghana would receive $918 million over three years.}

The second set of limitations involves being attuned to voices that might be missing from this thesis. This research followed a meso-level analysis in framing governance as neither the total imposition from the top nor the result of opposition from below. To this end, the majority of the individuals interviewed, and the perspectives gleaned, are from those “in the middle,” many of whom were upwardly mobile. The Ghanaians interviewed—who
worked at news agencies, civil society organisations, multinational corporations and universities, or owned their own businesses—spoke English, were university educated, and primarily middle class by Ghanaian standards. According to the 2010 Population and Housing Census, 12.4% of the population in Sekondi-Takoradi has attended tertiary education and 58.2% are literate in English and a Ghanaian language (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014b). Although some spoke of their humble upbringings, they are all working in organisations and entities with relative influence and with some access to power. Despite political tensions, they are seen as having a legitimate voice in shaping governance issues in the city and country. They are invited to the table for discussions about planning and policy. The foreigners interviewed for this thesis work for international development agencies, universities and multinational corporations acknowledge their relative wealth and privilege, particularly by Ghanaian standards, but many of them do not feel like they are in positions of power per se.

Many of those interviewed were part of civil society organisations, which are seen as holding relative legitimacy in governance. This thesis, however, does not capture the perspectives of some small grassroots groups working in poorer neighbourhoods. I made unsuccessful attempts at meeting community organisers from organisations such as the People’s Dialogue, an organisation affiliated with Slum Dwellers International (SDI). Unfortunately, I did not meet any representatives from the People’s Dialogue at the community and stakeholder meetings that I attended. Although this leaves out the important work being done by these groups in some of the city’s most aggrieved communities, there is still much to learn about the multi-layered and complex nature of urban development by transnational corporations, the state and other civil society organisations.

The third set of limitations involves a major health epidemic that occurred during my fieldwork. When I arrived in Ghana in the autumn of 2014, the West African Ebola virus epidemic was at the height of its outbreak in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. There were concerns that the virus would spread to Ghana. My London-based university asked for regular updates, fearing that I might have to be airlifted out of Ghana. While no cases of the virus were ever reported in Ghana, fears of a potential outbreak caused the cancellation

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7 In comparison, 27.2% of the UK population reported having a “degree level” or above qualification and 48% having had participated in higher education.
of many international conferences. This included international “trade” conferences put on by the oil and gas sector. While I was able to interview oil and gas representatives and employees in Sekondi-Takoradi, it would have been beneficial to interview a wider range of private sector actors involved in the oil and gas industry. Despite this limitation, it served as another first-hand opportunity to see how governance actors came together to prepare for a potential public health emergency (e.g. radio updates, health trainings, establishment of quarantine zones).

3.7.2 Positionality

This thesis is very much about unravelling assumptions and learning about and from an African city. From a personal standpoint, this involved being reflexive about theory and on-the-ground realities and constantly asking questions about my positionality or my place in relation to others. This was not easy. Much of this research derives from navigating multiple worlds. I remember feeling uncomfortable being treated to a meal in Accra by a transnational Ghanaian couple that cost more than some monthly salaries. I remember sitting in an air-conditioned SUV driven by an aid worker one day and then sitting on rusty tro-tros with no suspension or seatbelts the next. In The Vulnerable Observer: Anthropology that Breaks Your Heart, Ruth Behar (1996) discusses feelings of cognitive dissonance and vulnerability on the research journey:

[T]he voyage is never simply about making a trip to a Spanish village of thick-walled adobe houses in the Cantabrian Mountains, or a garden apartment in Detroit where planes circle despondently overhead, or a port city of cracking pink columns and impossible hopes…Loss, mourning, the longing for memory, the desire to enter the world around you and having no idea how to do it, the fear of observing too coldly or too distractedly or too raggedly, the rage of cowardice, the insight that is always arriving late, as defiant hindsight, a sense of utter uselessness of writing anything and yet the burning desire to write something, are the stopping places along the way. At the end of the voyage, if you are lucky, you catch a glimpse of a lighthouse, and you are grateful. Life, after all, is bountiful. (Behar, 1996, p. 3)

As a Vietnamese-born woman raised in California with U.S. citizenship in pursuit of a PhD in London, these identities provide me with access to these multiple worlds, even when my presence was seen as a novelty to some. During one of my first interviews with a noted
professor at the University of Ghana, Legon, he expressed to me his dismay at being denied a visa to the United Kingdom to attend a conference. While sharing digital files with me, an urban planner in the city stated that this request was not one that a Ghanaian PhD student would make. In a friendly manner, he discussed how researchers from the West are more “confident” in asking for things. In other words, we have a sense of entitlement. One American PhD student exercised transparency laws as an appeal to get government officials to discuss issues in the extractives industry. In a handful of instances, through my connections working in the social entrepreneurship sector in London, I was introduced to people working in social responsibility and social innovation in Ghana. Two of my corporate contacts in Ghana came from these leads. In addition, these privileges (including being a funded student) allowed me to simply move around the cities of Accra and Takoradi and to interact with different urban cultures. In spite of my relative access and privilege and the knowledge gathered, I was also always cognisant that the people I was interviewing and interacting with, particularly Ghanaian citizens, were the real experts in enacting social change there.

Recognising my positionality while remaining open to learning from others meant challenging my own reactions and sensibilities. Walking down the streets of Ghana was frustrating at times because as a foreigner, I stood out. Some foreigners preferred driving instead of walking in the open streets. As someone who looks Asian, Ghanaians would shout “China” or say “ni hao” (Mandarin Chinese for hello) at me. Sometimes they’d yell “oburoni” which is the catch-all word for white person or foreigner in Akan. Some of my Western friends perceived these instances as a lack of education or cosmopolitanism on the part of Ghanaians. Yet I encountered the same thing—people asking me if I’m Chinese, or saying “ni hao,” or even worse, “ching chong,” while in the streets of Rome, London and Washington, DC. As someone who calls America home, along with many other places, it’s difficult to feel out-of-place, judged and misunderstood. In the same vein, what I experienced is similar in sentiment to how many Ghanaians feel about the stereotyping assumptions made about them and their country.

There’s a silver lining to this story of being called Chinese in the streets of Sekondi-Takoradi. On two occasions, while in the inner market and near the taxi stand at Market Circle, a few Ghanaians would shout back, “no, she’s American!” when they heard someone yell “China” towards me. This is likely due to the getting to know me through my
other visits. This is revealing because while it’s easy to jump to conclusions based on the actions of a few, I was constantly reminded of the diversity of perceptions, sensibilities and viewpoints of those I interviewed. In addition, this meant not falling into biases about certain groups and not simplifying their vested interests. This includes not seeing all Ghanaian politicians as corrupt and all corporate executives as greedy. This is not to say that these are not issues of concern, but also that there are a wide range of relations, processes and personal sensibilities that shape these issues and our world at large.

In many senses, this thesis reflects my personal journey unpacking what it means to be a global citizen, a refugee, immigrant and expat. I have called a number of places around the world home: Viet Nam, the United States, the United Kingdom and Ghana. This research speaks to my concerns about how one can be a politically engaged citizen and contribute to inclusive forms of governance locally and globally. As such, this PhD thesis is a particularly hopeful one in that it believes in the capacity of humans to act towards a better world, despite issues of social difference and systemic challenges.

The following three empirical chapters focus on development from the respective vantage points of transnational oil companies, the local state and civil society. They are organised around understanding the social, economic and political constraints of each of these actors and the different resources and skills they mobilise upon to push for their development agendas. This research shows how this context of constraints and resources (material and non-material) influence how these actors forge cross-sector governing arrangements, and as such, shape the potential for multiple development trajectories in the city.
4. Localising Transnational Corporations: Oil Companies, Socio-Political Networks and Urban Development Politics

4.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the role of transnational corporations in fostering urban development outcomes in Sekondi-Takoradi, with attention paid to their relationships with the state, civil society organisations and local communities. Private sector collaboration is often promoted by governments, international financial institutions and development aid agencies as an engine of economic growth and as a potential funder and implementer of development projects (Davis, M., 2012; DFID, 1999; UNDP, 2012; USAID, 2002). While the private sector has always been an object, partner and agent of development (McEwan et al., 2017), there is a “revival” in its portrayal as an active driver of development (Davis, 2012; Mawdsley, 2015; McEwan et al., 2017). This re-emergence of the private sector is facilitated by a changing landscape of new financial and business models, cross-sector partnership and narratives (Blowfield and Dolan, 2014; Kindornay and Reilly-King, 2013; McEwan et al., 2017; Moulaert, 2013). With a push for “beyond aid” agendas (Janus et al., 2015; Mawdsley, 2015; Moyo, 2009), coupled with rise of financialization for new forms of development (Mawdsley, 2018), development agencies and local governments are turning to the private sector for financial aid and investment (Blowfield and Dolan, 2014; Di Bella et al., 2013; Janus et al., 2015; Pedersen and Huniche, 2006).

Political geographers have debated the role of the private sector in development. On the one hand, they are seen as strategic government partners in local economic development and urban regimes, especially given the financial constraints of the local state (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; Pike et al., 2007; Savitch and Kantor, 2002). On the other hand, the enablement of the private sector by governments, characterised by decentralisation and deregulation, is criticised for bringing about the “rollback” of the welfare state and the decline of social services (Jessop, 2002; Peck, 2013; Theodore et al., 2011).

In addition, global movements around ethical capitalism, social entrepreneurship, and
corporate social responsibility—which promote balancing business outcomes with social impact—also shape the interactions and negotiations between the private sector (in particular corporations) and other groups across sectors and scales (Andrews, 2016; Barry, 2004; Fowler, 2000; Hilson, 2007; Peredo and McLean, 2006; Vallentin and Murillo, 2012). These movements are thus concerned with the extent to which private sector actors, especially those that are large and transnational, can provide social value while turning profit, along with enacting potentially harmful social, political and economic business practices (O’Neill, 2016; Welker et al., 2011).

Within this scope, the role of the private sector opens up questions about its power relations with other actors, concerns about equity, and the potential of wider social and economic benefits within evolving and dynamic development contexts (Briggs, 2008; Miraftab, 2004a). Important to note are emergent theorisations about “political settlement” in cities of the Global South, which look at the relationship between formal and informal institutions (which are ingrained and ephemeral) and the distribution of power in contexts undergoing economic change and capitalist transition (Goodfellow, 2018; Gray, 2016; Khan, 2010; Simone, 2004). The utilisation of this tripartite framework, coupled with this PhD’s transcalar approach, furthers scholarship on urban governance that challenges conventional assumptions about informality, corruption, and clientelism among diverse actors in African cities and elsewhere (Goodfellow, 2018; Roy, 2005).

Amidst critical concerns about the political and financial power of transnational corporations, this chapter examines how they are drawn into urban governance networks and planning pathways that shape development outcomes in the city, from providing basic provisions to networked infrastructure. While much has been written about interurban competition for private sector investment, this chapter contributes to nuanced understandings about how transnational corporations both rely on and contribute to city resources and localised socio-political networks in order to operate and sustain their businesses. This chapter draws on the urban regime framework and networked approaches to governance, focusing on how state and non-state actors have the “power to” negotiate and forge alliances despite their uneven power relations and access to resources. Stretching this analytical lens, this chapter provides nuance to how local government officials, traditional authorities, and civil society organisers leverage their technical skills, connections and knowledge to challenge, engage and work with transnational corporations. This chapter
traces these cross-sector relations to focus on how they make and remake new transcalar governance, with transnational corporations responding to certain urban development needs and agendas.

This chapter also draws on postcolonial critiques that shed light on the agency and multiple rationalities that inform the state and governance systems in African cities (Parnell and Robinson, 2012; Pieterse, 2008; Simone, 2004; Watson, 2009, 2003). It also acknowledges that despite their constraints and challenges, all cities are dynamic and creative, with the possibility of fostering new spaces and urban futures (Amin and Graham, 1997; De Boeck and Plissart, 2006; McFarlane and Rutherford, 2008; Myers, 2011; Parnell and Robinson, 2012; Robinson, 2002; Silver, 2014). In other words, this chapter’s approach nuances the distinctive agency and specificity of the state, civil society, and the city itself in “localising” the globalising presence and actions of transnational entities. With a view on transnational oil companies in the city of Sekondi-Takoradi, the focus is on how these entities are drawn into the politics and promise of urban development.

This chapter is organised into six sections. The next section contextualises the interplay between the private sector and various forms of and interventions in development in Sekondi-Takoradi. It differentiates between private sector development, private sector in development and private sector for development. Section 4.3 provides background about the transnationalised oil and gas industry in Ghana and opens up a discussion about the role of macro-economics and policies related to private sector development, which touches on development on an urban scale. Section 4.4. shows how oil companies require interaction with local networks—whether through relationships with local government, traditional authorities and connected individuals—in order to gain access to land (e.g. for warehouses, offices and employee accommodations), logistical and infrastructural coordination (e.g. port access and Naval support in patrolling the waters), and other resources (e.g. rule of law, labour and supplies) in order to operate. In turn, they have to respond to expectations about contributing to urban development outcomes. Section 4.5 elaborates on how transnational corporations are drawn into global policy networks that call for “ethical” considerations (Barry, 2004; Benioff and Southwick, 2004; Dolan, 2007; Prahalad, 2009) in which they are expected to mitigate social and environmental harm while contributing to the social good. Despite the vagueness of these pursuits, transnational oil companies depend on localised forms of public relations, from corporate social responsibility
programmes that fund development projects to hosting consultation meetings, in order to maintain their good reputation in the eyes of their investors (Banks et al., 2016; Frynas, 2001; Gardner et al., 2012; Rajak, 2011). While the transcalar nature of governance lends a hand in establishing the legitimacy of corporations and the invited parties involved, these corporate social responsibility programmes are also contested spaces, with corporations having to respond to the failures and promise of their community-development projects, and social and environmental mitigation practices, all while protecting their own business operations.

Drawing on interviews with corporate managers (working for oil companies), government officials and civil society representatives, annual, audit and public consultation reports by oil companies; and advisory and planning documents by civil society and local government, this chapter’s overall aim is to challenge narratives about the imposition of externalised global capital on urban development and to contest visions of this as a straightforward competition for footloose capital. This chapter aims to contribute to new understandings about the ways in which transnational corporations are drawn into localised forms of development through mutually constitutive relations with local actors.

4.2. Locating Different Modalities of Corporate-Led Development

This section critically examines the different modalities and motivations behind private-sector-led development, as this understanding serves as a way to “locate” the sites of engagement and governance between transnational corporations and other actors in the contexts in which they operate. Di Bella et al. (2013) provides clarity concerning the varied ways in which scholars and practitioners can examine different forms and pathways of private sector development. While there is “definitional imprecision” concerning what constitutes the private sector, Miraftab (2004a), studies businesses that embrace commerce and trade (Blowfield and Dolan, 2014), involving individuals, small and medium-sized enterprises, co-operatives and transnational conglomerates operating in informal and formal sectors (Di Bella et al., 2013). This chapter focuses specifically on transnational corporations (e.g. oil companies), since they are seen as financially powerful and capable of contributing to development aims locally and globally (Nelson, 2010, pp. 84–90). In addition, the personification and scale of the world’s largest transnational corporations also puts them in the spotlight (not without controversy) as part of the solution for addressing global poverty (Kolk and van Tulder, 2006; Lodge and Wilson, 2006; Prahalad, 2009;
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2. “Identifying Different Modalities of Private Sector Development”), there are a variety of indirect and direct ways in which the private sector shapes development. To recap, Di Bella et al. (2013) identifies three modalities used to study the relationship between the private sector and development: 1) private sector development; 2) private sector in development; and 3) private sector engagements for development (p. 10-13). Of course, these categories are subjective and not mutually exclusive, but they provide a lens to identify the complex ways in which corporations are socially embedded in the politics of development.

First, private sector development refers to the broader enabling political and economic environments that aim to foster private sector growth and investment (Di Bella et al., 2013). This includes, for instance, “neoliberal” policies (e.g. tax cuts, lax regulations, building infrastructure for corporations) spearheaded by local governments to attract transnational capital investments (Brenner et al., 2010; Harvey, 1989; Savitch and Kantor, 2002). According to urban regime theorists, local governments often rely on financial resources from private sector actors (Logan and Molotch, 2007; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; Rodríguez-Pose and Tijmstra, 2007; Savitch and Kantor, 2002). This approach of enabling the conditions for the private sector to thrive and serve as a provider of public goods and services has also been a strategy promoted by international financial institutions and donors in “developing” contexts through the processes of economic liberalisation, decentralisation and structural adjustment programmes (Boafo-Arthur, 2013; Bratton et al., 2005; Herbst, 1990; Mohan, 1996).

In the case of Ghana, transnational corporations have benefitted from a range of financial incentives for “priority” areas, such as agriculture, energy, infrastructure, property development, manufacturing, tourism and mining, as well as oil and gas (GIPC, 2018). These stimuli also provide reduced corporate tax rates for manufacturing businesses that are located in regional capitals other than Accra and Tema, as well as even further reduced corporate tax rates for those located elsewhere (GIPC, 2018). In addition, Ghana also established four free zone enclaves, including one in Sekondi. Businesses that manufacture from these free zones have a tax-free holiday for 10 years. This exemplifies how financial incentives for transnational oil and gas companies in Ghana are considered to be more favourable compared to others in the region (Wood Mackenzie, 2012 cited in Phillips et al., 2016). Given that these transnational corporations, specifically those in Sekondi-Takoradi,
are benefitting from reduced tax rates when the city is undergoing increased urban pressures, these financial incentives are noteworthy to consider (Obeng-Odoom, 2012, 2014). These pressures stem from more people migrating and settling in Sekondi-Takoradi while municipal services and infrastructure struggle to keep up with the pace of urbanisation (Oteng-Ababio et al., 2017; Yankson et al., 2017).

According to critics of neoliberalism, financial incentives and policies that favour the private sector are problematic when they are implemented at the expense of providing social subsidies and public provisions (Brenner et al., 2010; Jessop, 2002; Theodore et al., 2011). The weakening of the welfare state, coupled with the rise of corporate employees in cities, can contribute to spatialised inequalities such as gentrification and displacement (Lees et al., 2015; Sassen, 2014; Slater, 2012; Smith, 2005). On another level, there are concerns that these largely foreign transnational corporations are posited to increase their wealth through natural resources and raw materials, while local residents fail to benefit. International politics scholar Mark Langan (2017) thus argues for bringing back the concept of “neo-colonialism”—which was a prominent concept in Kwame Nkrumah’s writings—by focusing on how corporate and foreign interventions can impede Ghana’s sovereignty and development.

While these are important concerns, this thesis moves away from focusing on the politics of private sector development in cities (i.e. neoliberal urban governance) to examine why transnational corporations operate and become embedded in urban networks, even beyond the lure of financial incentives. This can include the availability of resources (e.g. oil and gas), city amenities (e.g. the port and railways) and social networks (e.g. city government and civil society organizations) that come together to shape conditions of corporate engagement. In addition, this thesis argues for localising the role of transnational corporations by drawing on more complex forms of social regulation beyond laws that regulate markets. For instance, Patrick Le Galès (1998) asserts that regulation as an expression of governance involves: “The method of coordinating diverse activities, or relations between actors; the allocation of resources in relation to these activities or these actors; the structuring of conflicts (prevention, resolution)” (p. 483). This chapter thus turns to focus on the two modalities in which the private sector is seen as a potential development actor.
Secondly, private sector in development points to how corporations are seen as contributors to local economic development by expanding local participation supply chains and creating job opportunities as part of their core business practices (Di Bella et al., 2013; IFC, 2012; Savitch and Kantor, 2002). Private sector in development also includes the ways in which companies follow certain legal stipulations, as expressed in state-regulated environmental impact assessments, such as paying taxes or mitigating negative social and environmental effects (Di Bella et al., 2013). This chapter expands understanding about the conditions that give rise to private sector involvement in development. It quantitatively details how taxes, royalties and government payments remunerated by transnational oil companies, as well as their corporate responsibility budgets, become sites of political engagement, with the local state and civil society groups pushing for urban development outcomes. It shows how these corporate payments and programmes open up pathways for the local state and civil society organisations to advocate for certain forms of development in the city (by the national government), and push for local content laws that require the oil and gas industry to employ local Ghanaians and contract with regional businesses for their supply chains. Thus, the local state and civil society organisations mobilise around the rhetoric of private sector involvement in development by making the case for local economic development in the city. This is particularly relevant because transnational corporations that rely on local networks are required to utilise city and state resources (from obtaining planning rights to infrastructural services) and to maintain good public relations in order to operate in the city.

Third, private sector engagements for development refer to the potential of corporations to contribute to progressive and inclusive development outcomes in local communities that go beyond their standard business practices (Di Bella et al., 2013; Halme et al., 2012). According to McEwan et al. (2017), it is important that corporations implement projects that are not only sustainable, transparent and responsible, but also in alignment with both national and local plans. This is related to the concept of planning gains, specifically those financed by private property developers as a condition of their building operations (Healey et al., 1996; Ratcliffe et al., 2004). There is also concern in the literature as to whether these planning gains are a kind of “development tax” or “legitimate” development benefit (Ratcliffe et al., 2004, p. 115). This chapter follows this analytical thread by examining how, given the reliance of transnational corporations on the local state and civil society organisations and city resources, this opens up the potential for beneficial “planning gains”
or impactful urban development projects. Despite failures and criticism of certain forms of corporate social responsibility programmes, this chapter provides two examples of private sector engagements for development, including the construction of the Jubilee Technical Training Centre at the Takoradi Technical University and the renovation of a busy roundabout (among other projects, such as the funding of schools and hospitals), which can be found in local development plans. The next section examines the scale of the transnationalised oil and gas industry in Sekondi-Takoradi and the capacity for corporate investment in the city.

4.3. Historicising Transnational Capital and Political Settlement in Sekondi-Takoradi

There has been a long history of transnational corporations and capital “flowing” through the city of Sekondi-Takoradi. From the building of forts with European traders in the 17th century, to the establishment of railways connecting the city to mineral hinterlands in the 18th century, to the construction of Ghana’s first deepwater port in 1928 (Hilling, 1977; Meredith, 1976; Obeng-Odoom, 2012; Plageman, 2013), the region has a long history with the global political economy and externalised corporate actors from elsewhere (Bayart 1997). This thesis chapter extends research that seeks to complicate the relationships between the private sector, state and civil society. It does so by drawing on the political settlements approach, which examines how social order is produced through ingrained and emergent formal and informal institutions and their power relations. These institutions both shape and are shaped by political and economic contexts (e.g. democratic rule, economic liberalisation).

Historically, the role of corporations in national-level and city-level governance (particularly in cities of the Global South) has been marked by studies that focus on informality, clientelism, and the influence of political elites (Bayart, 2009; Goodfellow, 2018). For instance, Bayart (2009) argues that the politics of accumulation throughout Africa involves a “symbiosis” between administration and business and between intermediaries of the State (like chiefs and their aides) and colonial powers (p. 70-71). At the same time, Bayart (2009) acknowledges the mutual reinforcement of political and civil society, the expectations of patrimony and kinship, and the factional struggles that challenge hierarchies and political order.
In Ghana, land disputes were historically common in the mining sector, even before the arrival of transnational mining corporations. Tensions around land rights continue today, involving mining companies, local and foreign small-scale “artisan” miners, the central government, local authorities, chiefs, and families relying on the land for their livelihoods (Adonteng-Kissi, 2017; Akpalu and Parks, 2007; Andrews, 2015; Kidido et al., 2015; Nyantakyi-Frimpong and Kerr, 2017; Osei-Kojo and Andrews, 2016). While the central government issues mining licenses and owns all mineral deposits on behalf of the Ghanaian people (as expressed through various laws), 80-90% of land is customarily owned and controlled by traditional authorities (Cobbinah and Niminga-Beka, 2017; Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). To add complexity to this arrangement of land rights and benefits, 10% of mining revenues are allocated to subnational authorities, which include traditional leaders, the stool landowner (like the head of a family), and district assemblies (Bebbington, 2018, p. 182-183). According to (Hickey, 2013) and (Bebbington et al., 2018), the governance of mineral extractions requires creating pacts and coalitions, often between shifting political and economic elites.

Utilising a political settlement approach to study Ghana’s transnationalised oil and gas industry, Bebbington (2018), among others like Obeng-Odoom (2014) and Mohan et al., (2018), argue that transnational corporations, as externalised actors, are benefitting from competition among Ghanaian elites. Mohan and Asante (2018) and Bebbington (2018) both refer to this current system as “competitive clientelism,” which differs from a traditional system of patron-client relations of dependency. Instead, elites are competing to for transnationalised pacts and agreements to assume or remain in power and win tight elections. This competitive process of attracting transnational capital is reflected not only in the history of the establishment of the oil and gas industry in Ghana, but also through the way in which presidential elections are decided (based upon how the two main political parties are managing and expanding the industry).

For instance, the U.S.-based company that “struck” oil in Ghana—Kosmos—came to Ghana after being recruited by George Owusu, a Ghanaian businessman, and Dr. Kwame Bawuah Edusei, Ghana’s Ambassador to the United States under President John Kufuor of the New Patriotic Party (Whitfield, 2018). Owusu and Edusei also formed an oil and gas company, the EO Group, which was given a 3.5% equity stake by Kosmos for facilitating
the oil agreement and discovery. When Kosmos wanted to sell their stake to ExxonMobil for $4 billion dollars in 2009 (which would mean that the E.O. Group would benefit), the National Democratic Party (NDC), under newly elected President John Atta Mills, initiated legal action to block the sale by triggering a U.S. Department of Justice investigation into corruption charges (Phillips et al., 2016; Whitfield, 2018). Upon being cleared for corruption with Kosmos by the U.S. Department of Justice, the E.O. Group was able to sell its shares to Tullow Oil for $305 million dollars. In order to prevent this money being funneled into the NPP election finances, the NDC government ensured E.O. that it would receive its proceeds from the sale after the 2012 elections (Dogbevi, 2018; Mohan et al., 2018; Whitfield, 2018). This history of the beginning years of the oil and gas industry in Ghana demonstrates the shifting nature of national-level coalitions between political parties and transnational capital.

While political competition and legal frameworks at the national level inform local politics, this chapter argues for examining urban regimes and political settlements from an urban lens that acknowledges the dynamism of cities, its diverse actors, and the multiple arrangements between formal and informal institutions that shape social order and development. As urban scholar Tom Goodfellow (2018) argues, it’s important to not “homogenize” the governance in the Global South by focusing on informality and clientelism writ large. As such, this PhD thesis joins Goodfellow, 2018; McFarlane and Waibel, 2012; Rakodi, 2006; Roy, 2011; Simone, 2004; Watson, 2009 to focus on ephemeral informal institutions and networks that shape urban life and land use. This thesis thus draws on literature that show how relations between corporations, the state, and civil society exist in forms and networks that are simultaneously stable and fluid, with political order being subject to change based on the interactions and negotiations occurring among these different groups. For instance, with regard to land rights, not only is there a complicated system for acquiring rights, but also residents can live in “gray spaces” that are neither formal nor illegal (Yiftachel, 2009). As argued by Oldfield and Bénit-Gbaffou (2011) urban residents in the Global South also “access” the “porous” formal state by engaging in informal relationships with local government officials to avoid eviction. In another instance, Jon Silver (2014) shows how slum dwellers in Accra improvise with the materials around them in order to connect to the country’s increasingly privitised energy networks, thus generating access to infrastructure while incrementally changing the city’s built form. With focus on a “Community Cleaning Service” project initiated by a
transnational corporation in Nairobi, Thieme (2015) highlights how “informal” waste workers were able to “hustle” this transnational corporation by partnering as micro-franchisee entrepreneurs. These many examples show how political settlements involve much more than changing configurations between political elites and the private sector. In fact, there are a wide range of interactions and processes among the state, corporations, and civil society (including everyday residents) that shape development outcomes. This chapter thus focuses on the entanglements with and localisation of transnational corporations by the local state and civil society through both formal and informal processes. First, it provides context about the relevance and significance of transitional oil and gas companies, as new urban actors in Sekondi-Takoradi.

4.4. On the Scale of the Transnational Oil and Gas Industry in Sekondi-Takoradi

The aim of this section is introduce the transnational companies that make up the oil and gas industry in Ghana and to examine national frameworks and macro-level narratives about private sector development. Thus, it contextualises the relations between different actors, materialities, policies and knowledge bases that not only produce the corporate oil industry in the city, but also, as a result of heightened economic expectations, inform the urban governance of development goals.

As of 2016, there are 15 oil blocks in Ghana (Petroleum Commission Ghana, 2016). A map of the proximity of these oil blocks to the city of Sekondi-Takoradi can be found in Map 1: “Location of Ghana’s Oil Blocks” on page 14. Despite the constitution and oil laws stating that oil is meant to benefit the people, there’s also another dimension as to who technically owns the rights to production. The following table, entitled “4.1: List of Equity Partners in Ghana’s Oil and Gas Industry” outlines who holds the licensing and rights to produce certain oil blocks (Petroleum Commission Ghana, 2016). With the exception of Saltpond and East Keta, all the oil blocks are located off the coast of the Western Region, near Sekondi-Takoradi. The chart shows that all the oil blocks involve transnational oil companies, with headquarters in the USA, UK, South Africa, Italy, Nigeria, Canada and Iraq. In addition, the state-owned Ghana National Petroleum Company (GNPC) is an equity partner in all of the oil blocks. To date, there are two oil fields in production, the Jubilee Field and the Tweneboa, Enyenra, Ntomme (TEN) Fields. The Jubilee Field was
first located in 2007, with production commencing in December 2010 (Tullow Oil, 2010). The Tweneboa, Enyenra, Ntomme (TEN) Fields, delivered oil for the first time on August 2016 (Tullow Oil, 2016). The equity partners of these two sites of oil production are referred to as the “Jubilee Partners,” with the primary equity partner (Tullow Oil) having a base in Sekondi-Takoradi. Many other oil supporting services, including Schlumberger, Weatherford and Halliburton, have offices in the city to support the production of these fields.
Table 4.1: List of Equity Partners in Ghana’s Oil and Gas Industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract Area</th>
<th>Equity Partners &amp; Country Headquarters</th>
<th>Agreement Date</th>
<th>Current Phase or Activity</th>
<th>Production End Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Saltpond Oil and Gas Field</td>
<td>Saltpond Offshore Producing Company (Nigeria, USA, Ghana) GNPC</td>
<td>30-Jul-2004</td>
<td>Processes underway for decommissioning</td>
<td>29-Jul-2024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Offshore Cape Three Points</td>
<td>GNPC ENI (Italy) Vitol (Netherlands)</td>
<td>15-Mar-2006</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>14-Mar-2036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Deepwater Tano</td>
<td>GNPC Tullow (UK) Anadarko (USA) Kosmos Energy (USA) PetroSA (South Africa)</td>
<td>19-Jul-2006</td>
<td>Production (Jubilee) Development (TEN)</td>
<td>18-Jul-2036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Deepwater Tano-Cape Three Points</td>
<td>GNPC HESS (USA)</td>
<td>19-Jul-2006</td>
<td>Appraisal Phase</td>
<td>18-Jul-2036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. East Cape Three Points</td>
<td>GNPC Cola Natural Resources (unknown) Medea Development (Italy)</td>
<td>12-Apr-2013</td>
<td>Initial Exploration Phase (Seismic Data Processing and Interpretation)</td>
<td>11-Apr-2043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. South Deepwater Tano</td>
<td>GNPC AGM Petroleum (Gibraltar)</td>
<td>12-Apr-2013</td>
<td>Exploration (Seismic data acquisition, processing and interpretation)</td>
<td>11-Apr-2038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Expanded Shallow Water Tano</td>
<td>GNPC ERIN Energy (USA)</td>
<td>27-Mar-2014</td>
<td>Initial Exploration (G&amp;G Studies)</td>
<td>26-Mar-2039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Central Tano Block</td>
<td>GNPC AMNI (Nigeria)</td>
<td>27-Mar-2014</td>
<td>Initial Exploration (G&amp;G Studies)</td>
<td>26-Mar-2039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. South West Saltpond Block</td>
<td>GNPC BRITTANIA-U (Nigeria) Hills Oil (Ghana)</td>
<td>17-Jul-2014</td>
<td>Initial Exploration</td>
<td>16-Jul-2039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. South-West Tano Block</td>
<td>GNPC Heritage Blue Star (Ghana)</td>
<td>17-Jul-2014</td>
<td>Initial Exploration</td>
<td>16-Jul-2039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. East Keta Block</td>
<td>GNPC Heritage Blue Star (Ghana)</td>
<td>17-Jul-2014</td>
<td>Exploration</td>
<td>16-Jul-2039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. South-West Cape Three Points Block</td>
<td>GNPC A-Z Petroleum Products (Nigeria) ECO Atlantic (Canada)</td>
<td>18-Jul-2014</td>
<td>Initial Exploration (G&amp;G Studies)</td>
<td>17-Jul-2039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Offshore Cape Three Points South Block</td>
<td>GNPC UB Resources (Iraq) Houston Drilling Management (USA) Royalgate Energy (USA)</td>
<td>18-Jul-2014</td>
<td>Initial Exploration</td>
<td>17-Jul-2039</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chart from Ghana National Petroleum Commission (GNPC) (2016), updated to include country headquarters of the corporate or parent companies. Most of the companies listed established subsidiary companies with Ghanaian offices.
The main equity shareholder for the Jubilee and TEN Fields is a UK-headquartered oil company called Tullow, which was established in 1985. In 2016, Tullow operated in 18 countries, held 102 licenses, and had 68 oil fields, producing an average of 71,700 barrels a day (Tullow Oil, 2016) In comparison, BP, one of the world’s largest oil companies operated in over 70 countries and produced 1.3 million barrels a day (BP Global, 2016). During the early 2000s, large multi-national oil companies did not want to take financial risks in looking for offshore oil off the coast of the Western Region. The price of oil was relatively low during this period (under $40 in nominal prices) and the odds of a sizeable discovery were speculative and risky (Boynton, 2014; Kufuor, 2010). From 2004 up until the time when commercial quantities of oil were confirmed in Ghana in 2007, the price of oil was on the rise, making the reward of an oil find worth the high financial risk for oil companies (Boynton, 2014; Kufuor, 2010). As indicated by Table 4.1, “List of Equity Partners in Ghana’s Oil and Gas Industry,” after oil had been discovered in 2007, more transnational oil firms applied for licenses for oil exploration and production. Figure 4.1 shows the breakdown of equity shares among the oil producers of the Jubilee and TEN Fields. With the Jubilee Field commencing production of oil and gas in 2010, the “Jubilee Partners” shareholder breakdown and the country where the company is headquartered is as follows: Tullow (35.48%, UK); Kosmos (24.08%, USA); Anadarko 24.08%, USA); GNPC (13.64%, Ghana); and PetroSA (2.73%, South Africa). With the TEN Fields, which starting producing oil in 2016, the same partners are involved, although Tullow and GNPC have more shares: Tullow (47.19%); Kosmos (17%); Anadarko (17%); GNPC (15%); PetroSA (3.82%).
In addition to the oil producers of these 15 oil blocks, there are currently over 400 registered service companies that are permitted to work in Ghana’s oil industry (Petroleum Commission, 2016). In order to officially work in the industry, these companies are required to register their company and pay fees with the Petroleum Commission at the national level. A published list from 2011, entitled “Ghana National Petroleum Corporation: List of Registered Service Companies with Permit,” features four types of...
“ownership structures” for the 403 listed oil service companies (Petroleum Commission Ghana, 2011). These four categories centre on the extent to which a service company is Ghanaian or foreign owned (Petroleum Commission Ghana, 2011). These categories are:

- Ghanaian company with more than 50% Ghanaian ownership (245 companies)
- Ghanaian company with 50% Ghanaian ownership and 50% foreign ownership (8 companies)
- Ghanaian company with more than 50% foreign ownership (116 companies)
- Foreign company with more than 50% foreign ownership (34 companies)

The first category, “Ghanaian company with more than 50% Ghanaian ownership,” consists of 245 companies. There are 8 companies listed in the second category of “exactly 50% Ghanaian ownership and 50% foreign ownership.” Under the third category of “Ghanaian company with more than 50% foreign ownership,” there are 116 listed companies. For the “foreign company with more than 50% foreign ownership,” there are 34 listed companies. Major transnational oil service companies listed include Halliburton, Weatherford and Schlumberger. There are a range of services and a substantial effort of coordination that contributes to the workings of the oil industry that stretch across local and global assemblages of information and materiality.

The roughly 245 Ghanaian companies with 50% Ghanaian ownership offer office/warehouse rental; repairs and maintenance; handling of waste; drilling equipment; assist in immigration and customs clearances; provide helicopter transportation from Accra or Takoradi to the oil platforms; and offer emergency medical and rescue (Petroleum Commission Ghana, 2011). The large transnational oil services companies are involved in these processes, too, but their specialities involve providing the technologies to drill and measure the oil wells. They, too, rely on local companies and brokers to set up their logistical bases. In addition, there is also a whole “downstream” industry that emerges as well: food and catering service, hospitality and everyday transportation.

This point about mutual dependencies between transnational firms and local networks that strengthen their development ambitions will be further elaborated upon. There is a wide range of local and transnational actors that assemble to make the oil “industry.” Referring to the industry as “machineries of oil,” the historian Katayoun Shafiee (2018) argues that
the oil industry is a massive undertaking that involves the moving of oil through a variety of technical, legal, scientific, and administrative networks. There is a tremendous amount of materials and skills required to bring the industry to life. Drawing on the history of BP in Iran, Shafiee (2018) argues that these networks require alliances and connections that change local politics and shape the nation-state. BP. Andrew Barry (2013), also argues how the material politics, or the agency of the materials, mobilise and shape the actions of human actors (). While this thesis is sympathetic to studies that focus on techno-material assemblages (and studies in “new materialism”), its main focus is on how the presence of transnational corporations and their formal and informal relationships with the state, along with local business advocates and civil society actors, come to assemble new transcalar understandings of urban governance, all while enabling and disabling certain forms of development stemming from the private sector. Overall, the range of services and materialities that make up the industry inform dynamic development agendas and strategies spearheaded by the local state.

4.5. Localising Transnational Corporations and Private Sector Growth in the City

According to Blowfield and Dolan (2014), businesses, as part of the private sector, are seen as the primary creators of wealth and economic development (p. 2014). In line with Di Bella et al.’s (2013) conceptualisation of the “private sector in development,” this section focuses on the foundation of how the private sector (specifically transnational corporations) is seen as creating value for its owners, partners and shareholders and contributes to the creation of jobs, along with supply goods and services. In addition, businesses are increasingly seen as direct development agents engaged in “bottom billion capitalism” initiatives, such as Fair-Trade labelling, microfinance, bottom of the pyramid schemes, and social entrepreneurship, which is meant to address issues of poverty and the potential of businesses to do good (Blowfield and Dolan, 2014, p. 23).

By tracking the governance of transnational capital (in the form of oil receipts) and business opportunities, this section traces the potential pathways of private sector development. It shows how corporations and the local state mobilise around the narrative of combining commercial activities with social purposes (eg. oil windfalls for the state’s budget, expanding higher education access, and job training and employment).
Yet, this thesis shows that the socio-economic benefits derived from private sector development need to be weighed against issues of how top-down development priorities are implemented and who benefits or is excluded from local economic development. This section commences by quantifying government payments through taxes and royalties and exploring how these funds are distributed, leading to a politics, as well as criticisms, around the distribution of these funds at the national and regional level.

The second half of this section follows the logic of local economic development and shows how transnational corporations, the local state and entrepreneurs leverage the idea of expanding local business opportunities through local content provisions (e.g. localising supply chains and employment) as a means to maximise profit and deliver development promises—even though this excludes those who are not part of the “formal sector,” and there is definitional ambiguity about “the local.” The aim of this section is to scrutinise the logic of “trickle down” private sector development by interpreting the utilisation of transnationalised oil payments and the politics around local content provisions (i.e. local supply chains and employment).

4.5.1 Taxes and Receipts: Uneven National-Level Urban Development Priorities

One of the main arguments made about the role of private sector actors in development refers to the way in which they can increase the tax base at a national and local level and increase employment. As Savitch and Kantor (2002) argue, this form of urban development (e.g. taxes and jobs) can be both market-oriented as well as socially-centred (p. 103). The promotion of increasing the economic activities of the private sector must be weighed against concerns of environmental degradation, the rise of spatialised inequalities (i.e. increase housing prices and cost of living) and the manner in which this can “disentangle” oil and gas companies from addressing social, environmental and economic concerns (see Appel, 2012; Ferguson, 2006). This section turns to examine not only financial investment of oil and gas resources in Ghana, but also the potential for these resources to shape different urban development trajectories.

The production of oil and gas from the Jubilee Field alone can bring anywhere from $250 million to nearly $1 billion dollars a year to the central government of Ghana in taxes and royalties (Ghana Ministry of Finance, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013). In Ghana, oil and gas
companies are required to pay the following: royalty rate of 10%, a gas royalty of 5%, initial participating interest of 10%, an additional participating interest of 15%; and corporate tax of 35% (Adam, 2014; EITI, 2016). The oil industry tax rate of 35% is higher than the standard tax rate of 25% and the reduced tax rate of 22% for hotels (Adam, 2014; Ghana Ministry of Finance, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013). Table 4.2, below, shows how much Ghana has gained from taxes, royalties and gas sales from the Jubilee Field and Saltpond (a small field in Central Region of Ghana). The following U.S. dollar amounts flowed into Ghana’s annual budgets from corporate taxes and royalties paid by the oil and gas industry: $444.1 million (2011); $531.6 million (2012); $846.7 million (2013); $977.7 million (2014); $395.7 million (2015); and $247.1 million (2016).

Table 4.2: List of Petroleum Receipts from 2011-2016 in U.S Dollars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Royalties – Jubilee</td>
<td>122,941,144</td>
<td>150,642,450</td>
<td>175,006,213</td>
<td>192,660,810</td>
<td>104,208,697</td>
<td>57,851,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royalties – Saltpond</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>104,193</td>
<td>403,276</td>
<td>151,986</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carried and Participating Interest</td>
<td>321,183,580</td>
<td>390,428,872</td>
<td>453,573,866</td>
<td>499,330,322</td>
<td>270,083,791</td>
<td>149,936,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Income Tax</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>216,985,498</td>
<td>284,546,191</td>
<td>20,410,832</td>
<td>29,546,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum Holding Fund Interest</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>124,082</td>
<td>30,468</td>
<td>73,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Rentals</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>448,225</td>
<td>798,332</td>
<td>907,050</td>
<td>465,920</td>
<td>465,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas Sales</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>553,815</td>
<td>379,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas Carried and Participating Interest</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>8,923,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>444,124,724</td>
<td>541,623,740</td>
<td>846,767,184</td>
<td>977,720,441</td>
<td>395,753,523</td>
<td>247,175,390</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 4.3 “Payments and Distribution of Oil Revenue (in Millions of U.S. Dollars)” shows the millions of dollars that have entered the budget and Ghana Petroleum Funds since 2011. Established through the Petroleum Revenue Management Act of 2011, the Ghana Petroleum Funds (GPFs) consist of the Ghana Stabilization Fund (GSF) and the Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF) (Government of Ghana, 2011; Natural Resource Governance
The GSF is used to cushion the budget against revenue shortfalls arising from price and production volatilities. The GHF is meant for future use in the form of “an endowment to support development for future generations when petroleum reserves have been depleted” (Government of Ghana, 2011; Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2013; Stephens, 2018). While speaking at Chatham House in London, UK, Ghana’s Deputy Minister of Finance, Mona Helen Quartey, stated that these funds are intended for “intergenerational equity” (Daily Graphic, 2014). As of 2017, over $262.50 million dollars has gone into the Ghana Heritage Fund (Adam, 2014; Ghana Ministry of Finance, 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013).

| Table 4.3: Payments and Distribution of Oil Revenue (in Millions of U.S. Dollars) |
|---------------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Ghana Annual Budget Funding (ABFA)         | 2011   | 2012   | 2013   | 2014   | 2015   | 2016   |
| Ghana Stabilisation Fund (GSF)             | 54.81  | 16.88  | 245.73 | 271.76 | 15.17  | 29.51  |
| Ghana Heritage Fund (GHF)                  | 14.40  | 7.24   | 105.31 | 116.47 | 6.50   | 12.65  |
| Ghana Petroleum Funds (GPF): combined total of GSF and GHF | 69.21  | 24.12  | 351.05 | 388.23 | 21.67  | 42.16  |

Source: Own table based on data from (Adam, 2014; EITI, 2016)

* Note: Due to a shortfall, $53.69 million was drawn from the GSF to the ABFA in 2015 (Ghana Ministry of Finance, 2017)

From 2011-2016, Ghana made nearly $3.4 billion dollars from the Jubilee Field. While preparations were underway for another field (Project TEN), this field was the only one in production during this research (2014-2015). As of 2016, Ghana has 15 active petroleum agreements, which include the Jubilee and TEN Fields, as well as new fields under exploration. While oil payments to Ghana’s GDP growth fluctuated between 2011-2017, oil has become a core GDP contributor, with government budgets comparing rates of GDP growth with oil and GDP growth without oil (Ghana Ministry of Finance 2011-2016). As a resource, oil is currently behind gold and cocoa as an export commodity and GDP contributor in Ghana (Ghana Ministry of Finance, 2017). While these figures quantify the financial and geographic scope of the oil and gas industry in Ghana, government payments (in the form of taxes and royalties) are also mechanisms by which the private sector defines its contribution to development ((Di Bella et al., 2013; Ferguson,
In particular, we believe transparent disclosure of tax payments helps governments, citizens and international opinion formers to debate how wealth from oil resources should be managed sustainably and equitably…we pay our taxes in the jurisdictions in which our activities are undertaken in accordance with the domestic tax law and applicable production sharing agreements. Within this, we seek to benefit from incentives and reliefs offered by our host governments, enhancing our ability to generate value for all our stakeholders. (Tullow Oil, 2018)

In line with their mission of “shared prosperity,” Tullow Oil believes that their financial contributions generate value for the company and stakeholders (such as the central government) at a macro-level. However, Appel (2012) argues that this notion of “paying taxes” allows transnational corporations, particularly oil companies, to “disentangle” from the socio-economic realities in the places they operate, as opposed to becoming integrated into specific development activities. Ferguson (2006) highlights how this contributes to “thin” forms of development.

Given the different incentives from which oil businesses benefit, including cost recovery deductions, favorable loans from international financial institutions, as well as the existing and proposed tax-free zones, interviewees raised questions about how much transnational oil and gas companies actually pay. In an interview with a representative from COLANDEDF, a local civil society organisation focused on securing land tenure rights and land resource management, the interview subject specifically raised objections about a proposed $700-million “free port” located in Atuabo, a town west of Sekondi-Takoradi near Ghana’s border with the Ivory Coast. Spearheaded by Lonrho, a British conglomerate, and the Government of Ghana, the free port would be a tax-free economic zone, which would directly compete with the Takoradi Port. According to this representative:

The Takoradi Harbor can’t expand until that project is completed, until they [Lonrho] have recouped their costs. So that effectively makes the Takoradi Harbor redundant, with a private port that doesn’t even belong to Ghanaians. It got to Parliament, how? I know there were some chiefs and MPs who were opposing the development. What some are saying is that it will bring jobs for young people in the
Even though the Atuabo free port project was approved by an NDC-majority Parliament under an NDC President, and supported by the Paramount Chief of the Nzema East Traditional Area (which includes Atuabo), five NPP Members of Parliament filed a lawsuit against the project, specifically challenging the expansion restriction placed on the Takoradi Port. The five MPs were Kwaku Kwarteng, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) MP for Obuasi West, Kwabena Okyere Darko-Mensah, NPP MP for Takoradi, Joseph Cudjoe, NPP MP for Efia, Mavis Hawa Koomson, NPP MP for Awutu Senya East and Kofi Brako, NPP MP for Tema Central (Citi 97.3 FM, 2015; GhanaWeb, 2014). These constituencies include areas that utilise the Takoradi Port, including Takoradi, as well as Tema, a city with its own state-owned port. Litigation delayed the project until the NPP regained power in the 2016 general elections. By this time, costly delays and political opposition halted the plan. As of 2019, former President John Mahama of the NDC has promised that he will revive the Atuabo free port project if he is reelected in the 2020 general elections (GhanaWeb, 2019; Kaku, 2019).

This port example, as well as criticism about how transnational corporations are an important tax base and drive economic development, shows the politicised and dynamic nature of corporate investment at local and national levels. Based on questions of geography and impact, it also highlights ways in which private sector policy is contentious and ever changing, with different local actors shaping the trajectories of private sector development. Given the complexity of financial systems, it’s difficult to ascertain the balance between taxation and incentives in furthering a “competitive” market and inclusive growth (Kundt, 2017). Nonetheless, this section traces how different actors mobilise to increase the transparency of these funds and the tax mechanisms to push for certain forms of development. As such, ideas about the impact of private sector growth are mobilised by different actors, particularly those in “host” cities through increased government resources and business, and job opportunities from transnational corporations (particularly the “extractive” oil and gas industry). Corporate taxes and royalty receipts serve as a starting point for quantifying how much money is available and the problems associated with distribution, while also providing a terrain for debate and open questions about how to effectively share and distribute wealth at the local level. Thus the role and impact of
transnational capital becomes contested across different scales and development aims.

At quick glance, the governance of these resources at a national level shows that there are interactions between the President, Minister of Finance and Parliament, General Auditor, Investment Advisory Committee and the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (made up of experts from various CSOs, professional bodies and think tanks) that feeds into the transparent management and disclosure of these oil and gas windfalls (*Managing the Public Trust*, 2013).

**Figure 4.2: Management and Accountability of Oil Funds**

![Diagram of Management and Accountability of Oil Funds]

Source: “Natural Resource Funds: Ghana” table from the *Managing the Public Trust* report by the Natural Resource Governance Institute and Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, 2013

However, there is no detailed allocation of how the majority of the funds—which feed into the national, regional and local government budgets—are to be spent and how this furthers development. As such, they become a contested terrain of debate across local, regional and national scales, but particularly at the urban level, where oil production and growth is taking place and impacting daily life. At the “Improving the Legal and Regulatory Framework in Maximizing Benefits from our Petroleum Resource Stakeholders’ Forum” (2014), local civil society organisations in Sekondi-Takoradi were critical of the Minister of Finance’s discretionary power in being able to decide the broad areas in which to invest in
Referring to the 2013 allocation of oil funds, the Ministry of Finance allocated oil and gas funds in the following areas, as cited in the PIAC Annual Report (2014):

1. Agriculture and modernization, which received GH₵ 13.60 million (2.5%)
2. Roads and infrastructure, which received GH₵ 372.07 million cedis (68.4%)
3. Amortization of Oil Loans, which received GH₵ 137.92 million cedis (25.4%)
4. Capacity building, which received GH₵ 20.18 million cedis (3.7%)

In an interview, a manager at the African Centre for Energy Policy (ACEP) clarified the issues behind the funding of these priority areas: “There is big discretionary power given to the finance minister, in the law, to decide four areas every three years where the oil revenues will be spent. What we do see is that the minister prioritises alright [sic]. He wants to spend it in agricultural modernisation, roads and other infrastructure, capacity building, and amortisation of oil loans” (Interview A1, Local CSO, 31/10/2014). According to this policy think tank manager, this is problematic because of a lack of alignment across different levels of government and local communities: “there is no comprehensive plan as far as I know. It just states in the [national] budget the specific broad areas that the minister of finance wants to spend the money… There isn’t any alignment with the medium term development or sector plans” (Interview A1, Local CSO, 31/10/2014). Medium term development plans, which will be further discussed in the next chapter, are four-year “local government” development plans spearheaded by metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies, while sector plans refer to the different activities of federal ministries or agencies.

While the annual PIAC 2013 report details all the central government funded projects financed by oil revenues, which are being pursued across Ghana, the report problematises how the road projects benefitted the most from the funds allocated (in 2013, it received 68.4% of oil-generated funds), yet “virtually all are yet to be completed” since the funds have been stretched thinly across many projects (PIAC, 2014, p. xi). Asked how these government-led projects are pursued, a manager at Global Communities elaborates:
Obviously they can’t fund everything…and one thing that needs to be taken into consideration is the fact that most of the projects that are heavily capital dependent, are almost always funded by the central government. Depending on the political environment, the ability of the mayor or local political leadership to lobby with the central government, then they [local districts] would be able to get funding for some of these projects. Recently, the discovery of the oil, the government has awarded some contract to resurface most of the tar roads in the city [Sekondi-Takoradi]. Interview A15, International CSO, 16/10/2014

Compounding this issue about how the allocation of funds have been concentrated is the politics of local lobbying and the uneven distribution of funds across different regions in Ghana. While the PRMA law requires that the funds be used “to undertake even and balanced development of the regions “(PRMA, Section 21(2c), 2011), the PIAC 2013 Annual Report shows how the Western Region (the region with the oil and gas discovery) received the highest portion of government-led development from oil revenues. The following table, 4.7: Regional Breakdown of ABFA-Funded Projects 2011-2013” shows how the central government budget was allocated across the 10 regions.

**Figure 4.3: Regional Breakdown of ABFA-Funded Projects 2011-2013**

![Regional Breakdown of ABFA-Funded Projects 2011-2013](image)

Source: Own table, with data from PIAC, 2014.

As this chart shows, the Western Region, which hosts oil and gas activities, received 27%
of the annual budget funds, followed by the Ashanti Region at 15%, then the Eastern and Greater Accra Regions at 14%. According to the Ghana Statistical Service’s “Urbanisation in Ghana” census-based report, these four regions are considered to be the most “urbanised” (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014a). While the authors of the report acknowledge that the definition of urban is multifaceted, they define an urban locality as an area with a minimum population size of 5,000, where more than 60 percent of its residents are engaged in nonagricultural activities (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014a, p. 4).

During the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) 2013 Report Launch meeting, a civil society representative raised the issue of this unequal distribution of oil funds and biases towards more wealthy and more urban regions: “We see that the four most deprived areas, the three Northern Regions and the Central Region received less than 10%. This is not in line with law” (Meeting transcript. Coconut Grove Hotel, Accra. 30/10/2014). At the same time, local leaders from Sekondi-Takoradi and the wider region argue that more funds should go to the area, given that the region deals with negative affects from hosting the oil industry. Nana Kwesi Agyeman IX, the Vice President of the Western Region House of Chiefs and Omanhene of Lower Discove, argues: “As the bread basket…and if you consider the pressure on our infrastructure, we should get more to be able to maintain them…anything not below 20 percent” (Blay, 2016).

Based on these figures, private sector development, in the form of oil generated funds produced by taxation and royalties, has gone predominately to the road sector, with the Western Region and its capital city of Sekondi-Takoradi benefitting from a higher share of funding. As a manager at Global Communities, an international development organisation based in the city since 2007, stated: “If there were no oil, I don’t think probably that the roads would have been fixed. Maybe some kind of agency would have given the aid. But the oil discovery has spurred quite a lot of, you know, infrastructure” (Interview A15, International CSO, 16/10/2014). Despite the fact that the Western Region receives a larger proportion of central government funding for roads, funding and construction delays remain (PIAC, 2013). With the logic that that there has been increased congestion and extra demands placed on the city’s roads by oil companies, the local assembly has also turned to transnational corporations for funding. The role of private sector actors, in particular oil and gas companies, in directly funding development will be touched upon later.
Scholars writing from a political economy approach have criticised the ways in which governments benefit transnational corporations and support neoliberal growth by funding infrastructure. Some development practitioners have called this agenda socially conservative (Banks et al., 2016; Bebbington et al., 2008; McEwan, et al. 2017). However, it is important to consider the range of development agendas pursued by local governments and communities, some of which might include dealing with issues of traffic, poor roads, and other forms of networked infrastructure, while others are focused on expanding social services (e.g. access to education and health facilities) and protecting eco-fragile zones amidst concerns of climate change. It should be noted that these varied development goals are ranked differently among local communities in Sekondi-Takoradi, yet all of these development priorities are featured in the Sekondi-Takoradi 2014-2017 Medium Term Development Plan. For instance, in Berlan and Dolan’s (2014) assessment of “social premium” projects spearheaded by the UK Fairtrade Organisation, there is a tendency for Western audiences to emphasise “health, gender, education and clean water,” whereas the interviewed community members welcomed “non-orthodox” preferences, such as “roads, cars, television, places of worship or simply a cash transfer in place of a community project” (p. 50). As Banerjee and Duflo (2011) argue, Western scholarship on development economics often conflates local communities as objects rather than agents of development. The scholarship also often confuses their rationalities, such as why a television might be more important than food (p. 36).

In the case of Sekondi-Takoradi, this involves considering why various communities placed road construction as a development priority, despite historical funding delays by the central government and despite significant competing priorities. Information from the Medium Term Development Plan and interviews with city planners indicates why this is the case. For one, there has been increased pressure on the roads as a result of heavy trucks serving the oil and gas and construction industries (STMA, 2010, 2014a). In addition, urbanisation has resulted in more people moving into the city and traveling around. There has also been an increase in car ownership rates throughout Ghana. These reasons have been raised in interviews, with the local government (the STMA) pushing for infrastructural funding from different entities, including the central government, donors and transnational oil companies like Tullow Oil and the Jubilee Partners (Interview A28, STMA, 12/11/2014). On another level, certain peri-urban local communities based on the edge of city boundaries
commented (in their local action plans) that their access is limited during moments of heavy rainfall when unpaved roads become flooded and difficult for passenger busses and cars to navigate. These reasons show how the local state and local communities draw on their interests to take advantage of resource windfalls in a context where there are new transnationalised private actors.

4.5.2 Local Content Provisions: Participation in Supply Chains and Employment

While the previous section focuses on private sector involvement in development through taxation, royalties and government payments by transnational corporations, this section elaborates on the politics of local content provisions (e.g. local supply chains and job opportunities). According to urban regime scholars, the promise of local economic development through job creation and small business growth drives some localities to welcome corporate firms (Cox and Mair, 1991, 1988; Massey, 1995; Savitch and Kantor, 2002). There is currently a re-emergence of international financial institutions and donors promoting economic growth agendas that focus on expanding local participation in corporate industries, a type of development outcome (Kindornay and Reilly-King, 2013; Mawdsley; 2015). This section moves beyond quantifying the extent to which the transnational oil and gas industry has contributed to job creation and local value from an economic standpoint. Instead, it looks at how this discourse of localising the private sector in development has been mobilised by the local state and civil society organisations to shape the participation of transnational oil companies in Sekondi-Takoradi.

This section shows how the passage and implementation of Ghana’s local content law (LI 2204, 2014) and the rationalities behind it serve as a mechanism to expand local participation in the transnational oil industry, while also serving as a “business case” for transnational corporations. Although these provisions create new spaces of opportunity for local entrepreneurs, small and medium sized businesses, and training centres, questions remain concerning definitional ambiguity about what constitutes “the local,” who has access to broker business contracts and who can gain employment with transnational corporations. There are also issues of power surrounding who has connections to access this corporate industry through state or formal organisational pathways. However, this chapter shows that the mobilisation of the local state and civil society organisations (particularly the Chamber of Commerce) to localise the business of transnational corporations while expanding local economic opportunities, has created a new site of
engagement for a developmentalist state, though issues of access need to be addressed.

Although local content policies have been around since the 1970s, being first introduced in the North Sea (e.g. Norway and the United Kingdom), they have gained further traction with the recent oil and gas discoveries (Heum, 2008; Tordo et al., 2013). Ranging from restrictions on imports and direct state intervention in the industry, local content policies aim to increase local participation and create long-term value through the transfer of technology. These policies also have the goals of increasing local employment and ownership, along with the establishment of industrial plants and refineries to create petroleum-based products (Tordo et al., 2013, p. xi.). While these policies can coincide with corporate social responsibility programmes and have historically been important (Frynas, 2010), new local content policies driven by government and international bodies have created a different regulatory regime (Tordo et al., 2013).

In 2013, five years after the discovery of oil and gas, Ghana passed Legislative Instrument (LI) 2204 into law. This law’s aim is to ensure that Ghanaians benefit from oil and gas by directly regulating participation by Ghanaian businesses and citizens under the categories of goods, services and staff. “Table 4.7: Local Content Goals” shows the local content goals, defined by the percentage of Ghanaian businesses and citizens involved in the oil and gas supply chain.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>5 years</th>
<th>10 years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Goods and services</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>60% - 90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Recruitment and training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Management staff</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>50% - 60%</td>
<td>70% - 80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Technical core staff</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>50% - 60%</td>
<td>70% - 80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Other staff</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Within 10 years (by the year 2020), Ghana aims to localise the oil industry by ensuring that 60-90% of goods and services, 70-80% of management and core staff, and 100% of “other staff” will be Ghanaian. The law also requires that an indigenous Ghanaian company, other
The current two oil fields in production, Jubilee and TEN, do not have any indigenous companies as equity partners, thus this 5% requirement is a change in policy that will affect future oil fields (GNPC, 2016).

The Local Content and Local participation Policy Framework (2010), which informed the creation of the LI 2204 law, is as follows:

1. Maximize the benefits of oil and gas wealth generation on a comprehensive local content platform by maximizing the use of local expertise, goods and services, job creation for people, businesses and financing in all aspects of the oil and gas industry value chain, and retention of the benefit within Ghana, and also develop local capability in all aspects of the oil and gas industry
2. Develop local capability in all aspects of the oil and gas value chain through education, skills and expertise development, transfer of technology and know-how and an active research and development portfolio
3. Achieve a degree of influence or control over development initiatives for local/domestic stakeholders
4. Achieve at least 90 percent local content and local participation in all aspects of the oil and gas industry within a decade
5. Increase capabilities and international competitiveness of domestic businesses and industrial sectors

The passage of this local content law informs and is influenced by a wider interplay of capitalist logic: the scale of labour, information, technology and materials that form the industry, the ambitions and agendas of local actors, as well as ideas about sovereignty in a postcolonial state. To this extent, the conflicts over resource governance link to wider concerns about territory, identity, rights, and citizenship (Bebbington and Bury, 2013; Watts, 2004). Support for local content laws vary based on context, but is often driven by governments, civil society organizations, and local business interests (Arthur, P. and Arthur, E., 2014; Tordo et al., 2013; Warner, 2017).
There are various factors for how and why corporations get involved in supporting local content laws, which can limit their autonomy to hire and procure supplies necessary for their ventures. According to Arthur and Arthur (2014) and Warner (2017), local content policies are often negotiated terms and expressed through joint ventures between governments and oil companies, which spell out tender processes, hiring practices and operating costs. The second approach involves oil companies proactively undertaking in direct assistance to local firms to increase capacity, reliability, and stability by providing financial products and social and physical infrastructure to support local economic growth (Warner, 2017). Both of these approaches have played out in Ghana, with government officials and activists calling for indigenous benefits of oil and gas revenues and oil and gas companies to promote local economic development in the name of “shared prosperity.”

Resulting from the call for local content, transnational oil companies have created public relations reports and plans conveying their compliance to this law. As monitored and regulated by the Petroleum Commission, transnational oil companies that fail to provide a local content plan and comply with the regulated requirements are liable to pay a penalty of 5% of proceeds of petroleum activities (up to $5 million U.S. dollars) or have their oil licenses or contracts cancelled (Article 26, LI 2204, Government of Ghana, 2014). Rather than make a normative claim about the benefits or problems with this specific policy and wider ideologies and political agendas to localise global capital, the politics of local content opens up a governance site and negotiated space between transnational corporations, local providers and institutional brokers. The following charts show how Tullow Oil and Schlumberger, two major oil companies based in Sekondi-Takoradi, map out their needs and capacity for local supplies, services and staff.
Chart 4.8 “Tullow Oil: Upstream Opportunities” shows the range of specialist and non-specialist business and staffing opportunities needed to run the company’s operations. Specialist jobs include mechanical, engineering, and field construction services; while non-specialist activities include providing catering, IT services, personnel transport, communications, accommodations and facilitates and waste management, among others.
Chart 4.9 “Schlumberger: Planned Opportunities for Local Player” shows how Schlumberger, a transnational oil company headquartered in the U.S. (with a revenue of $32 billion in 2018) defines its operational needs: facility management services, customs clearance services, inspection and certification, light vehicle rental, labour and outsourcing services and visa and protocol services. Included in this list are jobs that also require localised knowledge and an understanding of Ghana’s governance, for example ensuring that employees have necessary visas (at times emergency visas, which require the signature of a government official) and in the event of customs clearances. According to Schlumberger’s local content plan, in 2017 they spent $21 million U.S Dollars on local spending in these different categories, representing 70% of their total spending in Ghana (Dadzie, 2018). At the 2018 Local Content Procurement Conference, Halliburton, another transnational oil company headquartered in the U.S, stated that they spent $17 million in 2017, on the following local content needs (Halliburton, 2018):
1. Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO)
2. Waste management
3. Facilities Services
4. Equipment Inspection/Testing/Calibration
5. Logistics Equipment (Trucks & Lifting equipment)
6. Electronics
7. Welding and Fabrication
8. Chemicals

These supply chain areas require the services of a wide range of local actors working in “non-specialist” roles that include personnel transportation, waste management, training staff, customs clearance, warehousing, IT services, and medical/emergency services. More “specialist” roles are also listed. These include creating Environmental Assessment Reports, as well as mechanical and electrical engineering required in the oil fields. As the aforementioned list of 400-plus registered companies attests, a multitude of these companies are Ghanaian firms seeking to enter the global oil and gas industry, many of whom have set up offices in Takoradi.

Urban development strategies, such as local job expansion and engaging with local supply chains transcend the binary of market-based or social-centred policies, as they can widen the scope of who participates in the global economy at a more local level (see Savitch and Kantor, 2002; Rodríguez-Pose, 2007 on LED in sub-Saharan Africa). In addition, from a more economic approach, transnational oil companies can also potentially benefit from these local participation policies since good public relations help mitigate potential reputational risks, which is particularly in the interest of their investors (Banks et al., 2016; Frynas, 2001; Gardner et al., 2012; Rajak, 2011). Given the persistent criticism as to the capacity of transnational oil companies to contribute to localised and beneficial forms of development (see Ferguson, 2005) development initiatives that build local capacity for transnational corporations and the places they operate serve to transcend assumptions about the inherently “extractive” nature of the oil and gas industry. A manager working for a Sekondi-Takoradi-based transnational oil and gas company (with a revenue of over $30 billion US dollars in 2014), elaborated on how it is easier to hire staff and source supplies locally: “As a last resort, if we really can’t get what we’ll need locally, we will look overseas
and invite large internationals to set up in Ghana and assist. But for this, it’s a huge business case, and strangely, large corporates seem to require more spoon-feeding than local companies (Interview A39, Transnational Oil Company, 30/10/2017). This section thus shows the potential for the local state and civil society organisations to mobilise around ideas of private sector-led local economic development strategies as a way to build local economic-based capacity as they cater to the activities required in the transnational oil and gas industry.

4.5.3 Fulfilling the Promise of the Private Sector in Development

Moving away from a focus on neoliberal policies that facilitate private sector growth, this section focuses on the capacity of the private sector in contributing to development. It looks at the politics of governing resource windfalls in the forms of taxes and government payments and through the expansion of local opportunities for local businesses and citizens to participate in the oil and gas industry. This section aims to localise the role of the transnational oil and gas industry in Sekondi-Takoradi by showing the capacity of the local state and civil society organisations to lobby for funds, as well as to push for mutually beneficial policies, such as the passage and implementation of a local content and local participation law (L.I. 2204). Despite the promise of local content policies to expand local economic opportunities, issues of access need to be taken into account. For instance, Jesse Ovadia (2012) argues that in Angola, recent local content policies have simultaneously expanded economic development by localising the participation of Angolan companies in the oil and gas industry, yet also leave elite power in the hands of the president and Sonangol, the parastatal oil group. In the case of Ghana, it is important to consider how despite the fact that resource windfalls are managed by the central state, the local state and civil society organisations are able to lobby for localised forms of urban development. They are able to do so by articulating urban pressures and problems (i.e. traffic and deteriorating roads, high cost of living, etc.) that result from being a host city to the oil land gas industry.

In addition, the passage of local content policies in Ghana spearheaded by the local state, the Sekondi-Takoradi Chamber of Commerce, and other civil society organisations not only open up direct opportunities for economic participation, but also allow for an industry stemming from demand for training and certification programmes. For instance, in Sekondi-Takoradi, there are a number of organisations seeking to expand local capacity
through training programmes, including the Chamber of Commerce, the Enterprise Development Centre (a $5 million centre funded by the Jubilee Oil Partners and Government of Ghana) and the Ghana Supply Chain Development Programme (funded by USAID). The idea of expanding local capacity through education and training is also expressed in the city government’s Medium Term Development Plan 2014-2017, which aims to expand “training and employment of the youth in the oil sector” by establishing a local university and utilising both international funds and NGO support (STMA, 2014a).

In the words of a Senior Executive interviewed at the Sekondi-Takoradi Chamber of Commerce:

Building local capacity doesn’t take place over night… Let me say on record that the local content bill will not build capacity. It is the implementation of the actions within the local content that will build capacity. For us, it is a natural consequence that we try to build capacity of our members to be able to work in the industry. (Interview A27, Local Business, 07/10/2014)

In addition, a Senior Advisor at USAID’s Ghana Supply Chain Development Programme stated that the organisation aims to expand economic opportunities to small and medium enterprises:

Our main target group[s] are the businesses, the SMEs. Our success is evaluated on how directly the money we invest in their training improves their best business practices and their competitiveness. That’s what we’re judged on so we try to stay really focused on like the training we’re doing now. (Interview A13, Donor, 25/03/2015)

Funded by USAID and implemented by PYXERA Global, according to the web page about the Ghana Supply Chain Development Programme’s, from 2013-2016 they trained 650 individuals from 254 SMEs, awarded 550 certificates, conducted 96 training workshops, and helped SMEs secure over 78 contracts with oil, gas, and power companies (PYXERA Global, 2016). These contracts have totalled over $18 million U.S. Dollars (Ibid).
While the long-term impacts of local content policies and the lobbying efforts of the local state and civil society organisations remain to be seen, by testifying to urban pressures (as a result of the transnational oil and gas industry), as well as through leveraging discourses on the promise of private sector development via the implementation of local content policies and trainings that expand local capacity, this section shows how these organisations are capable of lobbying for local economic development.

4.6. Transnational Corporations for Citywide Development Outcomes

Section 4.4 previously demonstrated how the transnational oil industry can contribute to development by paying taxes and royalties that feed into government budgets. It also discussed the potential for local Ghanaian businesses and citizens to be increasingly involved in and benefit from working in the industry. This section turns to focus on the role of transnational corporations as active development actors in the city and the potential for planning gains. It commences to examine how transnational oil companies rely on the local state and city resources in order to operationalise their businesses. This point was addressed in the last section, with transnational oil companies complying with and supporting local content provisions that expanded local participation. Extending on their reliance on local networks, this section expands on how oil and gas companies lean on the local state to acquire land and planning rights, engage with local state and civil society actors to maintain good public relations that mitigate social, environmental and reputational risks, and utilise urban infrastructures for their business activities. Based on these localised networks and relationships with the local state and civil society organisations, this section argues that it is possible for transnational corporations to contribute to urban development outcomes and finance planning gains that are potentially beneficial and align with the city’s development agendas. This chapter commences by examining how transnational oil companies rely on local knowledge, local professionals and city resources in order to establish their physical presence in the city. In addition, the chapter utilises a case study focusing on a transnational corporation in the city that relied on the capacity, authority and skills of local government and traditional authorities in order construct a multi-million dollar warehouse for their operations.
4.6.1 Corporate Dependency on the Local State and City Resources

This section focuses on the ways in which transnational corporations depend on local socio-political networks, in particular the local state, as well as city resources, in order to operate in the city. In turn, they are required by the local state and civil society organisations to respond to development priorities by directly contributing to mutually beneficial development outcomes, also referred to as “planning gains.”

In Ludovic Halbert and Hortense Rouanet (2014)’s analysis of foreign firms in Bangalore, India, the organisations are able to “anchor” their operations by creating “transcalar territorial networks”. Under this conceptualisation, these foreign firms are able to operate while “filtering away risk” by building a transcalar network of land-based fixers, intermediaries and partners (Halbert and Rouanet, 2014). Through this analysis, capitalist logics about creating profit and minimising uncertainty serve to localize, while also stretching a network across local and global scales. These foreign firms require locals who can navigate the complexity of formal and informal rules present in local-regional markets. This section provides an example of a major transnational oil company (with revenues exceeding $30 billion US dollars in 2014) depending upon traditional authorities to acquire land rights and relocate farmers occupying the land, in addition to relying on the city government to facilitate access to networked infrastructure.

Ghana’s land management system combines multiple rationalities and planning traditions, stemming from the hybridisation of colonial practices of zoning and the parallel state system consisting of traditional authorities and the government. For instance, 80% of land in Ghana is held in the hands of traditional authorities or families, and acquiring land rights requires negotiating with local traditional leaders (e.g. chiefs) (Cobbinah and Niminga-Beka, 2017; Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). At the same time, the local governments in Ghana are tasked with keeping land records, providing building permits, expanding access to networked infrastructure (e.g. water and electricity) and managing competing development agendas (as expressed in its citywide development plans). As Watson (2009) argues, there are multiple rationalities and temporalities of colonial, indigenous and contemporary planning systems that exist simultaneously in cities of the Global South. Watson (2009) further elaborates on how this context can open up hybridised and effective governance
processes—for instance, the reconciliation of traditional or customary land rights with that of government record keeping. This is the case in Ghana.

In an interview, a manager from a major transnational oil company (with revenues of over $30 billion US Dollars in 2014), shared how they work with local state authorities:

One of my last projects in Ghana was to build a $5.8 million workshop. We obtained a 99-year lease for 22 acres. As farmers for subsistence farming were using the land unofficially, we had to move them off the land. [So] we liaised with traditional councils [traditional authorities]. We also had to go through the permitting offices for the establishment of the site and supply of critical services: electricity, water, telecommunications. None of which were available on the site. Further, as this was virgin bush, used only for local subsistence farming, we needed to carry out an Environmental Impact Assessment. (Interview A39, Transnational Oil Company, 30/10/2017)

This example demonstrates how despite being a major transnational oil companies, these businesses depend upon traditional authorities in order to acquire land rights and to relocate farmers occupying the land. They also need the local government agencies for planning permissions and critical infrastructural services for their business activities. In the same interview, the manager at this transnational oil company also elaborated upon how they had to work with local brokers and networks in order to get their business up and running, from ensuring that 75% of their staff consisted of Ghanaians, to acquiring heavy machinery and sourcing local accommodations for their staff.

Transnational oil companies also rely on the city for other forms of infrastructure services. In Sekondi-Takoradi, this includes utilising the Takoradi port for storing and moving oil resources. The transnational oil industry is set to benefit from the expansion of the port, which is budgeted at €357 million euro and spearheaded by the central government, with support from Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly (GhanaWeb, 2015). According to the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment for the port expansion project (2015), the oil boom narrative played a very strong role in the impetus for the expansion of the port:
With the emergence of oil and gas industry in the Western Region of Ghana, it has become even more urgent to upgrade the Takoradi Port infrastructure to meet the demands of the emerging cluster of port businesses. The improved infrastructure at the port will also enhance [private-public partnership] PPP ventures. The PPP concept, which is a key government economic reform agenda and strategy to increase private sector involvement in infrastructure and public services delivery reflects the desire of GoG [Government of Ghana] to improve the quality, cost effectiveness, and timely provision of public infrastructure and services in Ghana. (Ministry of Transport, 2015, p. vii)

The potential benefits listed in the Takoradi Port expansion project’s Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) (2015) include: offering employment opportunities and generating new sources of revenue for development, from export tariffs to leasing storage space (Ministry of Transport, 2015, p. xi.) While transnational oil companies are looking to the Harbour Authority for assistance with their port expansion project, they also turn to the local government for other land needs. In the 2014-2017 STMA Medium Term Development Plan, one of the development objectives included urging the STMA to collaborate with traditional leaders and the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum to acquire land banks for the Jubilee Partners (STMA, 2014a, p. 155). For instance, in the project description of Tweneboa, Enyenra, Ntomme (TEN) Project’s Environmental Impact Assessment (2014), Tullow Oil states, that “twice daily helicopter support will also be required for crew transfers. The offshore support base is proposed to be at the existing Port of Takoradi and heliport facilities at the naval base” (Tullow Oil and Environmental Resources Management, 2014, p. 2).

The aim of this section is to show how transnational oil companies work with the local state (rather than bypass the state) in order to pursue their business activities and operate in the city. The following section now turns to examining the potential for these transnationlised arrangements to foster beneficial planning gains, where transnational oil companies are directly contributing to urban development outcomes.

4.6.2 The Potential For Planning Gains

Within the context of corporate engagement in development, there is a range of motivations for why corporations choose to pursue or contribute to development in the
places where they operate. Focusing on oil companies, Frynas (2005) suggests that these reasons include: obtaining competitive advantage, maintaining a stable working environment (i.e., preventing local “hindrance” of projects), managing external perceptions and keeping employees happy (since employees want to feel like they’re making a difference). Seeking to distance themselves from narratives of “corporate harm” (Benson and Kirsch, 2010), corporations are seen as contributing to development goals as a way to improve their reputations and gain access to the places where they operate (Blowfield and Dolan, 2014; Frynas, 2005; Kapelus, 2002; Muthuri et al., 2012). Norwithstanding criticism in the literature (as well as in Ghana) about the ways in which CSR projects can be “reactionary” and “ad-hoc” (Frynas, 2005; McEwan, 2017), with questionable impact, especially when they do not align to local and national plans, this section focuses on the potential for transcalar cross-sector collaboration between transnational corporations and local state and civil society actors. Despite noted “failures” of certain CSR projects in Sekondi-Takoradi, this section examines the governing arrangements and processes that led to corporate funding of two urban development projects: the construction of the Jubilee Technical Training Centre (JTTC) at the Takoradi Polytechnic (now renamed Takoradi Technical University) and the renovation of Shippers Roundabout.

In Ghana, Tullow Oil and the Jubilee Partners (which includes Tullow Oil) have participated in development through a range of social investment programmes, which is more commonly referred to as corporate social responsibility. Table 4.5 shows the annual budget of social investment projects by Tullow Oil and Jubilee Partners from 2011-2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tullow Ghana Limited Standalone Projects</th>
<th>Jubilee Partners Funded Projects</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$2,180,000</td>
<td>$7,000,000</td>
<td>$9,180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>$260,000</td>
<td>$10,300,000</td>
<td>$10,560,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$2,370,000</td>
<td>$6,130,000</td>
<td>$8,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>$4,000,000</td>
<td>$5,900,000</td>
<td>$9,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$3,600,000</td>
<td>$5,500,000</td>
<td>$9,100,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tullow Ghana Independent External Monitoring 2016 Report (D’Appolonia S.p.A., 2016). This report serves as annual audit of Tullow Ghana’s compliance with the issues brought up in previous environmental impact assessments, in addition to measuring its social investment programme.
Since 2011, the total social investment budget between these two entities has totalled anywhere between $8.5 million to $10.5 million U.S. dollars per year (Tullow Ghana Independent External Monitoring, 2016). The budgets are greater than some the major international aid and donor-driven projects taking place in the city. For instance, from 2010-2015, the USAID-funded Local Governance and Decentralization Program (LOGODEP) had a total budget of $12 million U.S. dollars spread over five years (USAID, Final Performance Evaluation Report 2015). The DFID-funded Western Region Coastal Foundation, which aims to facilitate dialogue around resource management between stakeholders in the six coastal regions, has a budget of £9,899,991 for the period of January 2014-December 2019 (DFID, 2018). These corporate social responsibility funds thus become another site by which different actors negotiate for the financing of development projects.

Turning to the potential of the utilisation of these funds, as well as the potential for planning gains, this section draws on previous analysis about the ways in which transnational oil companies rely on the local state for their activities, and in turn, how they are inclined to contribute to development. As noted in a previous example, a major transnational corporation relied on traditional authorities for land rights, as well as the relocation of farmers occupying the land, in order to build a $5.8 million dollar workshop. In turn, they felt the need to informally contribute to certain forms of development for the relocated farmers:

We liaised with traditional councils to arrange another water source for them. That was the main reason they worked this land, there was a stream running through it. So, we liaised with the local chiefs and sunk a borehole between two villages, and also installed water pumping and purification facilities for them. This benefited the villages as well as the farmers. We also decided to take on some community projects in the area as well. (Interview A39, Transnational Oil Company, 30/10/2017)

This example shows how transcalar governing arrangements consist of negotiations between different actors, in which transnational corporations are directly drawn into the urban development process as development actors. As previously mentioned, in the wake
of the development of the transnational oil and gas industry in Sekondi-Takoradi, the local state and civil society organizations have advocated for expanding local capacity and participation of Ghanaian businesses and citizens in the oil and gas industry. One direct contribution that the Jubilee Partners have made is the funding of a $6 million Jubilee Technical Training Centre (JTTC) at the Takoradi Polytechnic. Following the establishment of this centre, the Polytechnic also became a fully-fledged university with the ability to grant awards. (It was also consequently renamed Takoradi Technical University).

According to Andrews and Playfoot (2014), the construction of the JTTC demonstrates an effective partnership: the Jubilee Partners financed the centre, while the university gave the land. Tullow Oil provided funding to hire trainers to train the polytechnic’s staff and faculty so that they would be the future educators. All of the equipment and resources belongs to the Polytechnic, and after a period of funding, it will be up to the Polytechnic to self-fund (p. 66). This example is highlighted as an effective form of corporate-financed development because it drew upon circulating local content policies about expanding local participation, while addressing wider developmental concerns about having quality educational facilities that were raised in the city’s Medium Term Development Plan 2014-2017.

A second effective and beneficial plan involves the renovation of a roundabout in the city near the port that is frequently accessed by heavy trucks servicing oil and gas companies, as well as the conception of the port construction project. Despite the decentralised government system in Ghana, roadwork is largely funded by the central government, with the Ministry of Urban Roads and Highways tasked with the renovation of highways and urban roads (Ahwoi, 2012). However, in light of the oil and gas boom in the city, oil companies have increasingly provided funding for the renovation of roads. In the words of a manager at Global Communities:

One thing that needs to be taken into consideration is the fact that most of the projects that are heavily capital dependent are almost always funded by the central government. STMA, with its own locally generated revenue, cannot fund most of these projects. So most of the projects that are heavily capital dependent are mostly funded by the central government. Depending on the political environment, the ability of the mayor or local political leadership to lobby with the central
government, then they would be able to get funding for some of these projects…
The oil companies, they step in, like if you look at the case with roundabout, if there is an issue which is of importance to the city then they are going to step in and offer to help. (Interview A15, International CSO, 16/10/2014)

A manager at a major transnational oil company in the city and planner at the STMA confirmed that the Shippers Authority Roundabout, which is located near the port, was indeed funded by a transnational oil company for $500,000 USD. Following the process of how this funded roundabout came to be, a planner at the STMA stated:

Yes, road renovations [are] part of general road maintenance, which is part of the plan we prepare. Most of the roads are funded by the budget of the central government. But once the assembly recognized that the funds were not forthcoming, we wrote to the oil companies to tell the assembly to improve that roundabout. And they responded by letting us do it. (Interview A28, STMA, 12/11/2014)

When asked in an interview why their transnational oil company (with over $2 billion U.S. dollars in revenue in 2014) funded the roundabout, a manager stated:

There are very specific ways that we can support things that are related directly to our mission…where we should [be] part of the solution. So for instance, [we] supported the fixing of the Shippers Roundabout and that was to contribute to the city’s development in that that we use that road often. Other specific areas in the city are with the fishing communities. [We] have supported a beach project where we put up boulders that controlled the waves that come to that town to stop the erosion of the sea. (Interview A38, Transnational Oil Company, 02/04/2015)

The specific renovation of this roundabout can be found in both the national government and city government’s plan for the port expansion project, as well as concerns about the state of roads and roundabouts expressed in the city government’s medium term development plans. The process by which the local state proposed funding and received funding—in exchange for a host of other services and resources that the city provides (e.g. port access, land acquisition, planning permissions)—creates conditions for mutually
beneficial projects. All of these are centred on the idea of expanding educational opportunities and infrastructure that facilitates economic growth, which has wider benefits for the city and are stated in the city’s development agendas.

4.7. Conclusion

This chapter commenced by highlighting the financial and technical resources that transnational oil companies have at their disposal. Without including downstream effects, Ghana’s Jubilee Oil Field alone contributes anywhere from $250 million (2016) to nearly $1 billion a year (2014) to the national budget. Despite their economic power, transnational oil companies rely on local networks and their connections and skills to “anchor” their business operations and navigate governance systems already in place. In addition, transnational oil companies exist within transcalar social, legal, and material networks that shape they ways they do business. These networks are also constraining. These constraints include public scrutiny, the lack of social legitimacy and their reliance on local networks of knowledge and labour to mitigate risk and operationalise on the ground. Given these constraints, these transnational oil companies build alliances and connections with local actors to carry out their operations, and as such, foster corporate-led development outcomes in the city. This chapter shows how oil companies contribute to planning by opening up the conversations around the potential benefits and effects of oil-fueled growth in the city. While they may choose to disentangle from local social realities, their presence entangles them in the workings of governance. Building on understandings about the workings of transnational oil companies, one can see that they operate under governance models of cost-efficiency and risk mitigation. Risk mitigation encapsulates and shapes their social relationships in many ways. For one, they focus on building local legitimacy as a way to mitigate political uncertainty and public relations disasters. Secondly, they rely on local networks for labour and supplies. This chapter also uses a case study to show how a transnational oil company worked with local authorities, specifically traditional leaders, to find land and relocate occupants off the land. These companies also rely on the local state and local contractors to set up water and electricity and other forms of infrastructure for their workshops. They also need to apply for the right planning and legal permissions. Given legal stipulations around employing a local work force, they also must hire local staff from the industry.
This thesis argues that the transnationalised processes that bring about different forms of corporate-led development, while establishing pathways and spaces for negotiation by the local state, result in certain development outcomes. While these transcalar sites of governance lend a hand in establishing the legitimacy of corporations and the invited parties involved, they are also contested spaces, with corporations having to respond to the promises and failures of their community-development projects, social and environmental mitigation practices and the state of their business operations. This chapter thus shows the potential of mutually beneficial planning gains in the form of expanding local participation and local capacity through the financing of the Jubilee Technical Training Centre (JTTC) (among other training programmes, like the Enterprise Development Centre) and the renovation of urban roads, which are expressed as development priorities by both the local state and civil society organisations.
5. The State in Action: Building Governing Capacity Through Collaborative Planning with Local and Transnational Actors

5.1. Introduction: Two Vignettes of Development and State Power in the City

Cities remain at the centre of academic and policy debates. The United Nations even adopted a global urban agenda (e.g. Habitat III) as one of its core strategies (United Nations, 2016; Parnell, 2016). With a focus on urban governance, local authorities are seen as playing a key role in the implementation of solutions that make cities more liveable, democratic and inclusive for those who call it home. This chapter examines how a local state builds its governing capacity and shapes development outcomes in a diverse and transnational city, despite its financial constraints. Expanding on the dual conceptualisation of the state as both institutions and set of relations (Benson and Kirsch, 2010), this chapter contextualises the local state in Sekondi-Takoradi as consisting of the parallel institutions of the Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly (STMA) and traditional authorities and, relationally, as constituted through the local state’s interactions and negotiations across a multiplicity of non-governmental actors. These non-governmental actors include citizens, local and international civil society organisations, local businesses and transnational corporations.

This chapter focuses on how the local state’s engagement with these different actors through the “governmental technologies” of strategic planning and via formation of cross-sector partnership arrangements not only creates its governing capacity, but also enables state-led development outcomes. When it comes to who directly benefits, these outcomes, which are derived from the diverse interests and needs of different actors, are multifaceted and contradictory. These outcomes connect to competing and divergent agendas, from enhancing the city’s global competitiveness and private sector growth (tenets of neoliberalism) to pursuing more redistributive and progressive goals such as expanding social services and protecting the environment. At the same time, it is difficult to classify large-scale development projects in the city—from public infrastructure to shopping centres—as inherently exclusionary or inclusive, as diverse coalitions and multiple...
rationalities drive these projects. While the last chapter highlighted the agency and importance of the local state in powering transnational corporate actors, this chapter establishes how the local state builds its capacity and capability to respond to transnationalised urban development issues despite being financially constrained. This chapter grounds understanding of state capacity in the local state’s ability to mediate land and development-based conflicts, convene different actors to negotiate planning processes and to mobilise resources by adopting a discourse of improving the city.

This chapter begins with two contrasting vignettes to highlight the competing agendas of the local state. One about the frustrations of living in a city during a period of dumsor-dumsor, the Ghanaian phrase for “off and on,” used to describe load shedding and the inconsistent supply of electricity (Agbenyega, 2014). The other is about the contentious construction of the Takoradi Mall, branded as the city’s first “world-class” luxury shopping mall. It then pivots to address the financial constraints of the local state in its inability to finance either of these capital-intensive development projects, or any of those found in its Medium Term Development Plans (MTDP) from 2010-2013 and from 2014-2017. This chapter explores the enabling political conditions that open up pathways for the local state to exert its social influence and mobilise resources from other actors to become a driver and agent of development. In the wake of decentralisation, these political conditions include the state’s abilities to convene various actors in strategic planning; grant building permits and licenses; facilitate land rights (including evicting and relocating land occupants); and initiate and contribute to development programmes. In addition, the local state’s influence and actions are also shaped by transnational corporations seeking access to city resources (as demonstrated in Chapter 4), as well as international donors and civil society partners wishing to implement global policies and programmes that address the transparency, accountability and democratic governance of resource windfalls (Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; World Bank, 2010).

5.1.1 Vignette 1: The Takoradi Mall: Constructing a World-Class Mall in the City

Located on a busy thoroughfare, across the street from the airport, and neighbouring oil company offices is a large, vacant and fenced off area called Tanokrom Kokompe (nestled just on the edge of the bustling Market Circle business district). Grassy mounds of dirt on this 21-acre site can be seen from the sky when one flies from the Takoradi airport. The span of this site borders two roads that lead into and out of town: to Agona in the east,
which consists of beach resorts, rubber plantations and newly built gated communities and to the major cities of Cape Coast and Accra to the west. It is also located near Takoradi’s main central roundabout, Kwame Nkrumah Circle. From 2014 to 2017, the site remained vacant, with a fading sign plaster on a fence that read: “Coming Soon: Takoradi Mall.” (See Figure 5.1 below for the sign, followed by Figure 5.2 for the image of the completed mall).

**Figure 5.1: Photo of “Takoradi Mall, Coming Soon” Sign**

![Image of Takoradi Mall “Coming Soon” sign in front of a fenced and vacant lot. Photo courtesy of author. Taken 2 April 2015.](image)

Following land and air disputes, as well as forceful evictions, which will be addressed later in this chapter, the first phase of the Takoradi Mall (a $66 million dollar project) was completed in December 2018 (Abban, 2018; Appiah, 2018; Osei, 2018). The mall consists of 11,000 m² of retail space, 74 stores, and 375 parking spaces (Abban, 2018). Phase Two of the project includes the construction of a multi-purpose entertainment complex (Abban, 2018; Appiah, 2018; Osei, 2018).
The impetus for the mall started in 2013 when a local Ghanaian investor and alleged owner of the site approached a South African real estate developer to construct the city’s first luxury mall. This luxury real estate developer also has a portfolio that includes Accra’s largest shopping and office spaces. According to a manager on the Takoradi Mall project:

“We could not have asked for a better site for the mall. It’s central. It’s next to the airport, not far from Market Circle. Takoradi is ready for a mall. Not just for the oil and gas people, but mining expats up in Tarkwa and the growing middle class⁸ (Interview A24, Property Developer, 18/02/2015). When asked about the company’s vision for development in Takoradi, this manager responded in a follow-up interview:

We are transforming the African skyline. What is our vision in general? Just to give people decent, A-grade facilities, which they’ve never had before. Decent, A-grade facilities for offices, shopping centres, commercial spaces like this. This [building that we are in] is the first A-grade office in Ghana. Before this [coffee shop] people didn’t have places like this to come and sit in, to have meetings, they didn’t have it. In the first world, these sorts of things are common; you know that, but not in West African countries. Our vision is to provide this sort of stuff, at a market

⁸ Tarkwa is located around 85km north of Takoradi. It is known as a centre for gold mining and manganese mining.
regulated sort of rental, where our tenants can still afford it, and we improve Ghana at the end of the day (Interview A24, Property Developer, 05/03/15).

Yet the Takoradi Mall site held a different purpose and industry. In the past, 2,800 artisan mechanics making up an “informal” automobile repair industry, previously occupied the land. The Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly, most notably its former mayor, Captain Anthony Cudjoe, have been publically supportive of the mall’s construction, to the extent of evicting and relocating the previously occupied mechanics off the land. On 7th February 2014, the city’s police force and the military forcefully evicted the mechanics from the site based on orders given by city officials. Their shops and homes were bulldozed as the land was cleared to make way for the $66 million mall. Following the eviction and bulldozing of the land, the site remained vacant due to a legal dispute about ownership rights. After over three years of vacancy, construction commenced in October 2017, and was completed in December 2018.
The ambition for constructing the Takoradi Mall can also be found in the city government’s Medium Term Development Plans for the 2010-2013 and 2014-2017 years, as well as in the transcripts of town hall meetings in which Assembly members and planners discussed how “relocation” is part of the process of modernising the city with new buildings, roads and flyovers. The mall developer also discussed working closely with the city to obtain all the necessary planning permits. In both of the plans, the “construction of a modern mall” was listed under the thematic area of “Enhancing Competitiveness of Ghana’s Private Sector” through the policy objective of “Improve[ing] Private Sector Competitiveness Domestically and Globally” (STMA, 2010, 2014a). However, while the discourse of development plans had shifted since the 1996-2000 plan, which focused on poverty alleviation in the most deprived of areas; even the most recent 2014-2017 plan,
which focused on economic competitiveness in a cosmopolitan city includes progressive principles such as, “progressively expand social protection intervention to cover the poor” (p. 22). This stands at odds with proposals like the construction of the mall, which represent a focus on market competitiveness at the global scale.

This vignette raises the question as to how a large-scale development project can come to fruition in a city with a limited budget and tax-base. While at first glance, this type of “modern” luxury real estate development project might be seen as an imposition from a profit-seeking international investor, it also shows how support from the local state, as well as from a potential local consumer base, is necessary for such a construction project to succeed. Contrary to discussions about the weaknesses of local governments particular to African cities, this chapter will develop this example to show how the local state, through its strategic planning process (e.g. creation of development plans and role in development management) found the rationale and capacity to evict the occupants on the land and form a partnership with an international real estate developer to bring forward a new major development. The later sections of this chapter will also further analyse the problematic partnership between the city’s Assembly and the real estate developer, which led to the displacement of these artisan mechanics. At first glance, this shows the capacity of business elites and the local state to come together to form “growth machines,” in which land-based investments increase their profitability and urban land value (Molotch, 1976; Wilson and Jonas, 1999; Logan and Molotch, 2007). However, a closer look reveals the paradoxes and range of local state interventions and agendas in urban development, given the range of relations and negotiations that the local state has with diverse actors pushing for different agendas, which concerns both pro-poor and pro-growth elements.

5.1.2  Vignette 2: Dumsor-Dumsor: Electric Power Outages in the Oil-City

At a multi-stakeholder forum on the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s Ghana Power Compact\(^9\) in Accra, Benjamin Boakye, the Deputy Director of the Africa Centre for Energy Policy opened the forum—focused on how to build consensus around the

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\(^9\) The Millennium Challenge Corporation is a development aid agency separate from USAID and the Department of State. This particular meeting took place on 28 October 2014 in Accra. A series of these meetings took place in 2014 and 2015 and was informally referred to as Millennium Challenge Corporation II (MCC II). The first compact (MCC I) led to the construction the George W. Bush Highway, a six-lane, 14-kilometre highway in Accra.
implementation of a $500 million grant to tackle Ghana’s power sector challenges—with the following statement: “I don’t want to lose confidence in our power sector, in the role of government, but we also want to support the MCC to succeed. It’s about restructuring the power sector. I think it’s a joy of every Ghanaian to see that every morning, afternoon, and evening that your power is always on” (Meeting transcript. Coconut Grove Regency Hotel, Accra. 30/10/2014). As private sector investment is part of the Electric Company of Ghana’s growth strategy under the MCC compact, discussions at the forum, which consisted of members of civil society, representatives from the United States Embassy, the Chairman of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Ghanaian businesses, academic institutions and journalists expressed their concerns about the partial privatisation of the Electric Company of Ghana,

These national-level policy discussions were taking place at a time when unpredictable electric power outages were frequent, thus affecting everyday life in Ghana. Dubbed “dum-sor-dum-sor” (written as dum sɔ in the Akan language), “dum” means “off,” while “sɔ” or “sor” means “on.” These power outages became more common through 2012 and by the time of my fieldwork from August 2014-April 2015 they had become exacerbated to the point where there could be 24-hour power outages followed by 12 to 24 hours of power. They caused widespread frustration, with residents never knowing in which neighbourhoods or at what times these power outages would take place. It was a common practice to charge all devices while the electricity was on or go to places with backup generators. Thus, those who had the means bought backup power banks for their phones, battery operated fans, and/or fuel-operated generators. Businesses and companies complained about the financial costs of the power outages, as it was costly to run generators for long periods of time.

Not only was Ghana failing in its plan to be a net exporter of energy, it was falling short of meeting the needs of local consumption. This sentiment was shared during an interview with a manager at ACEP (Interview A1, Local CSO, 31/10/2014). In Sekondi-Takoradi, the issue was not that residents were not connected to the power grid, the issue centred on power shortages. Despite 99% of Sekondi-Takoradi’s residents being connected to the national power grid, compared to the Ghanaian national average of 72%, electricity was the fourth most important “service priority” after water, education and health (stemming from the 2012 Citizens Report Card). Due to frequent power interruptions and outages, as well
as confusion about the billing system, only 37% of residents across the city were satisfied with their electricity supply. The wealthiest areas in the city, Chapel Hill and Beach Road, tended to be less dissatisfied with their electricity than other parts of the city. It’s difficult to ascertain the reasons why, but it might be due to their access to backup generators, and a connection to the grid that allows for fewer power interruptions from illegal connections.

According to the 2012 Citizens Report Card, given the “slow pace at which requests or applications for electricity connections are handled by the ECG [Electricity Company of Ghana]” (CHF International (now Global Communities) and STMA, 2012, p. 46), residents turn to illegal connections (which can burden electricity transformers and lead to outages). According to the citizen review of government services (the 2012 Citizens Report Card), the STMA (local government) should facilitate interactions between citizens and the ECG (a state company): by having the ECG communicate when it was rationing or fixing electricity lines as well as educating residents about new billing systems (ibid).

Figure 5.4: Map of residents’ access to electricity

While electricity responsibility falls to the central government (given that they own the ECG), local governments can lobby to ensure that their constituents are connected on the national grid. This objective can be found in Sekondi-Takoradi’s Medium Term Development Plan 2014-2017, as well as a stated ambition to install transformers to prevent damage and potential fires from power surges (STMA, 2014a). Dumsor dumsor became such a local and national crisis that in Sekondi-Takoradi’s 2014-2017 Medium Term Development Plan “negotiating a frequent flow of electricity, including donating a generator to area hospitals” was one of the priorities in the plan. In addition, Nana Akufo-Addo, the NPP presidential challenger to the incumbent President John Mahama of the NDC Party ran on a platform of blaming dumsor-dumsor on poor leadership and pledging to end power outages. In contrast with the previous one, this vignette, shows how citizens still turn to the state (at different levels) to deliver and facilitate access to “the suite of built environment services, including water, power, and transport,” as well as social services like
health, education, welfare and security services (Palmer et al., 2017, p. 7). For instance, residents recommended that the STMA facilitate discussions with the ECG (and other utilities) to improve access and reliability, as well as to create a schedule and plan around the rationing of services like electricity (CHF International and STMA, 2012).

These two vignettes demonstrate some of the competing agendas that confront local authorities. In the wake of decentralisation and democraticisation, local authorities have to promote global economic competitiveness while dealing with problems like social exclusion, poverty, and unemployment (Beall, 2002; Watson, 2009). Development projects, whether they be the construction of a mall, increasing the power supply, providing water, or building schools and hospitals, are often costly and stretch the budgets of city governments beyond capacity. Under these conditions, strategic spatial planning on the part of city governments requires negotiations and forging cross-sector partnerships to secure financial resources in order to fulfil elements of the city’s vision. The rest of the chapter will now focus on how the local state builds its governing capacity by balancing competing agendas, creating strategic plans by convening varying actors, deciding which development projects to facilitate and granting building permissions and licenses for businesses. This thesis argues that these actually existing state capacities enable the local state to shape the city’s urban development agenda in a context where there are powerful transnational corporate actors.

5.2. Contextualising the Local State and Development Planning in Ghana

5.2.1 Framing Complexity and Competing Agendas in Urban Governance

The last section discussed two development imperatives in the city, which have competing logics: the construction of a luxury shopping mall which led to the eviction of 2,800 mechanics who occupied the site; and the need to provide public utilities like affordable and regular electricity to all citizens. There are also many other priorities facing the city: increasing rent prices, unemployment, road conditions, traffic, water, sanitation, education and health. Inherent in debates about the political agendas of the city is the tension between market-based approaches that expand the city’s global competitiveness and the
need for social progressive and redistributive programmes that cater to more disadvantaged populations (i.e. “pro-poor” agendas) (Savitch and Kantor, 2002; Robinson, 2006).

To assess these competing agendas, motivations and logics of development in Sekondi-Takoradi, this thesis builds on networked approaches to governance (including urban regime theory), which addresses the question as to how governance and development outcomes are achieved in cities where there are a plurality of interests (Healey, 2003; Stoker, 1995; Stone, 1993). It examines how different groups gain their capacity to act when power is diffused and generative (Healey, 2003; Stoker, 1995; Stone, 1993). Although there is a plurality and heterogeneity of interests, there is not an “open competition” of ideas, even in democratic places with locally elected officials. Following urban regime theory, there is also an uneven terrain concerning what kinds of resources groups have access to for shaping policy agendas and its outcomes. Under this context, different actors have to negotiate, strategise and build partnerships, with these groups bringing distinctive resources to the bargaining table. Though common, these partnerships are not solely based between business elites and local government (nor do they reflect seeing government as an extension of the capitalist class), but rather they show that the interplay between power, interests and politics in the city is one of complexity and dynamism (Healey, 2003; Stoker, 1995; Stone, 1993). Given the complexity of urban life and its relationship to governance and planning, Patsy Healey (2003), building on practical experience and academic analysis, argues against elite and Marxian applications of power:

Analysts of public policy who looked closely at the relations surrounding policy formation and implementation increasingly highlighted the existence of “policy networks,” “policy communities” or “advocacy coalitions.” Looked at in a relational way, these analysts perceived governance activity as driven by and performed through a nexus of complex interactions, linking the spheres of the state, the economy and civil society in diverse, if typically highly uneven, ways. These networks and “communities linked together, in different combinations, experts in particular fields, officials working in various levels of government, lobby groups and elected government ministers. (p. 29)

Operating from this frame of complex interactions and arrangements among diverse groups, urban regime theorists focus not only on regulating the technical capabilities of
local government, but also on government’s ability to bring private actors into a governing coalition in which resources are mobilised to achieve shared policy outcomes. Under this landscape of politics, Clarence Stone (1993) argues that different groups have various resources at their disposal in their negotiations:

Resources need not be material. As pluralists have long argued, they can consist of skill, ability to inspire, organizational capacity, technical expertise, or other intangible factors. However, material resources are helpful… Moreover, repeated face-to-face exchange, material transactions can lead to less shallow and more complex relationships. (p. 11)

The potential resources of each actor and the range of “governmental technologies” available to the state vary, based on the social and historical context of the city. These particularities shape the types of political arrangements found in cities, and thus, enable different modes of governance or regimes. Some cities might have a more clientelistic model, where politicians broker deals and favour particular interests in return for political support and patronage (Pierre, 2011). Other cities adopt a more corporatist pro-growth model, which aligns business elites and local governments, like big-city mayors, around issues like revitalization (Pierre, 2011). Some foster a more managerial model where such city governments turn to private firms for cost-effective delivery of municipal services. Under a pluralist model compromise and consensus are central tenets, while a populist model is where city governments cater to grassroots mobilisation. As with the case across cities, including Sekondi-Takoradi, these modes of governance or urban regimes, are characterised by complex networks of power relations, competing and converging interests, and tensions and agreements. These regimes can exist at any given time and typically exist in hybrid forms (Stoker, 1995). Although discussions about the political economy of cities express concern about the shift of urban governance from managerialism to entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989), and from a welfare state to a neoliberal, post-Fordist one (Amin, 1994; Jessop, 1994), urban governance in cities consists of much more than external forces. As Healey (2004) argues:

Clearly, urban governance situations are not self-contained systems. There is a continual interplay between internal dynamics and external forces, endogenous and exogenous dynamics. “External” influences flow into specific episodes through the
experience of actors, through the networks, discourses and legal frameworks which shape governance processes and through the broad social, economic and political forces which shape governance cultures (p. 95).

One way to examine the nature of urban governance is through a focus on “strategic planning,” which draws attention to how different groups seek to shape urban spaces. Strategic planning is an inherently political process, as it mobilises attention from across a multiplicity of actors on the discourses of urban futures and change and brings forward plans for how resources can be allocated in the making, unmaking and remaking of a place (Healey, 2006). Taking this approach will allow us to address how the local state’s vital role in creating, facilitating, managing and implementing strategic citywide plans—by and through convening a range of local and transnational actors—serves to establish and extend its governing capacity. The next section sets out to contextualise the relationship between the local state, and strategic planning and development goals in Sekondi-Takoradi in the wake of Ghana’s decentralisation efforts.

5.2.2 Decentralisation, the Local State and Development Planning in Ghana

This section contextualises the enabling political capacity of the modern local state in Sekondi-Takoradi by historicising local state governance in Ghana, as well as its relationship to development vis-à-vis building alliances and strategic planning. This section shows how the current local state organizes around the discourse of decentralisation and mobilises formal government structure to advance development outcomes, despite its financial constraints. It also navigates, negotiates and convenes local and transnational actors in the city through strategic planning processes and development management by drawing upon national and global development discourses (as framed by the central state, donors and international civil society organisations) concerning public-private partnerships, “good governance,” resource transparency and participatory planning.

Following a period of political and economic instability, the passage of the 1992 Constitution, followed by a national democratic general election and the promulgation of the Local Government Act 1993 (Act 462) by Parliament signalled a turn toward decentralisation in Ghana. Under this act, the country was divided into 10 administrative regions, each with their own regional ministers, and metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies (MMDAs) were created throughout the country (Ahwoi, 2010). In 1995,
President Jerry Rawlings presented Parliament with a development plan under this new constitutional rule, entitled *Ghana: Vision 2020, The First Step: 1996-2000*, which aimed to “raise Ghana to the ranks of the middle income countries of the world within a generation” (Government of Ghana, 1995, pp. vii–viii). The plan spoke of halting the decline of the Ghanaian economy, which had persisted since the 1970s. It suggested embarking upon the task of “repairing damage” to the country’s infrastructure, such as “roads, schools, hospitals, railways, and the ports,” by ensuring “the availability of inputs, spare parts and materials so that ordinary farmers, entrepreneurs and industrialists could obtain their most basic needs within a fair and equitable system” (Government of Ghana, 1995, p. i). What set this plan apart from plans of the past was the creation of a planning framework that directly involved local municipalities in the realisation of the national plans through the framing of their own strategic local plans. Financing for this plan largely derived from grants and loans from multilateral agencies, which furthered the role of the international development field and its practitioners in the planning landscape of today’s Ghana. *Ghana Vision 2020* sought to stabilise Ghana both economically and politically, meanwhile introducing a systematic system of local government and planning.

The passage of the Local Government Act 1993 (Act 462), coupled with a decentralised planning framework—which falls in line with its wider structural adjustment programme—was part of the strategies Ghana followed as a beneficiary of World Bank and IMF stabilisation funds from the late 1980s. Decentralisation, a global policy discourse at the time, ushered in both economic and social liberalism in Ghana. On the one hand, it reduced the centralised power of the national government by encouraging civil society and individuals to participate in the economy and take on some formal government responsibilities. On the other hand, decentralisation put a system of local government in place in Ghana, which engaged citizens in democratic and participatory processes.

Under the current system of decentralised planning, while the central government through the NDPC provided the national priorities and guidelines, sectorial agencies and all 216 MMDAs were tasked with developing their own Medium-Term Development Plans. This planning structure provided a pathway for local governments to transform general, broad and grand development priorities into localised social-economic development agendas. Sekondi-Takoradi’s 1996-2000, 2002-2005 and 2006-2009 plans were under the jurisdiction of the Shama Ahanta East Metropolitan Assembly, which was established in 1994. Prior to
1994, the area was known as the Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly. Under the 2010-2013 Plan, District Assembly boundaries were redrawn, and a few years following the oil discovery, Sekondi-Takoradi became its own Metropolitan Assembly once again. This 2010-2013 Plan was also the first plan after the discovery of oil that explicitly included the role of the STMA in fostering oil led development in the city.

This expansion of local government has created an environment where officials have to fulfil the ambitions of the national state with the remit of attending to local realities. In this role, they have emerged as a convening body—they not only must bring together a wide range of concerns and interests toward the creation of a development plan, but must also mobilise beyond the central government to generate funding for these plans. With the STMA, for instance, starting in the 2000s, the local state negotiated directly with the World Bank and for public-private partnerships. Currently, the STMA is also negotiating with donor groups, international and local civil society groups, citizens, businesses and transnational oil companies to enable development outcomes.

This is not new per se. According to Jean-Francois Bayart (2009), Africa has had a long engagement and history with global political economy, whereby through the politics of “extraversion,” local leaders managed their unequal relationship with external powers in a manner where they were able to derive resources to manage “internal” or local population. Indeed, there has been a long engagement and alliances forged between the local state and external actors in Ghana. Prior to independence, the local state, under the authority of chiefs, was one where alliances were forged between colonists and these African leaders. This worked well for the British, who adopted a governance framework of “indirect rule,” which relied on the Gold Coast’s traditional leaders and local institutions (as direct rule and more administration would prove to be costly) to further their economic interests (Apter, 2015; Rathbone, 2000). The Native Jurisdiction Ordinances of 1878 and 1883 gave authority to local chiefs throughout the Gold Coast. This also extended their judicial power. The majority of crimes of violence and property were tried in “Native Courts” with chiefs as judges. In addition, the “customary laws” of birth, marriage, death and inheritance also fell on the shoulders of chiefs. As Professor Kwame Arhin argues, “colonial government took away the power of traditional authority and gave them authority in local government” (Rathbone, 2000).
This period of colonial, indirect rule saw the authority of chiefs in Ghana grow, which solidified a system of patronage, and at times, a “politics of the belly” in which clientelism and corruption intertwined to the benefit of the “big men” or chiefs (Bayart, 2009; Rathbone, 2000). Even so this “politics of the belly” was challenged by the British Colonial government, which introduced municipal authority in the major coastal towns of Accra, Cape Coast and Sekondi-Takoradi, as well as in the Asante stronghold of Kumasi. The British also enacted regulations around export goods, which were in the hands of chiefs. This tension in the role of chiefs in state governance continued through post-independence Ghana. While Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana and his socialist and nationalist party, the Convention People’s Party of Kwame Nkrumah, had a “strong distaste” for chieftaincy, seeing the position as an extension of imperialism, his administration only managed to weaken the formal government powers of chiefs by limiting their participation on local councils (no more than one-third membership on councils), instead creating Marketing Boards to regulate different export goods. Much of these goods were controlled by chiefs and furthered the state responsibility of the local government to collect taxes and provide services for local citizens (Rathbone, 2000). However, Nkrumah did not manage to do away with the role of chiefs in governance completely. During this time, in order to carry out his national-level plans, Nkrumah held lengthy negotiations with potential development partners, including the World Bank, the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union (Yergin, 1998, pp. 83–88).

This brief history highlights two issues that shape the local state in Ghana in contemporary times. The first is that, even during British colonialism in Ghana, there was never a sole imposition by external forces. Instead, there was and continues to be a constant interplay between local dynamics. The second is that past governing practices continue to shape the nature of governance in the present. In this sense, there remains a dual system of the local state in Ghana. Chiefs, including those in Sekondi-Takoradi, continue to be landholders and command a patronage system, even as many of these chiefs are increasingly transnational citizens (Kleist, 2011). In order to ascertain rights to the land and apply for the right planning permits and permissions under this system of “legal pluralism” in Ghana any developer in Sekondi-Takoradi needs to negotiate with local chiefs, the Office of Administrator of Stool Land, central government agencies such as the Lands Commission, the Land Valuation Board, Land Title Registry and the local assembly (Agbosu et al., 2007; Blocher, 2006; Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). An estimated 80 percent of land in Ghana is
held on a “customary” basis by chiefs, clans and or “tendamba” (or “first settlers”) system (Kasanga and Kotey, 2001). As chiefs also hold cultural power: they are often in attendance at ribbon-cutting ceremonies and sit at the table at stakeholder meetings. Traditional authorities join state officials and civil society representatives in matters of planning and governance, even though their authority has gone through ebbs and flows depending on regime preferences (Boafo-Arthur, 2001).

5.2.3 The Local State and the Formation of Urban Regimes

As the previous section demonstrates, local governments, consisting of local district assemblies, municipal assemblies and metropolitan assemblies have emerged to play a large role in strategic planning pertaining to land-use and development outcomes. This is due to their role as the conveners of city plans and strategies, managers of localised state budgets, and as a point of contact for investments from the central government, donors and aid agencies and the private sector. It’s important to understand the dynamism of the local state in Ghana by recognising that it consists of both locally appointed and elected officials that make up “local government,” as well as traditional leaders who have social clout and hold land rights. As a site of a Metropolitan Assembly and the capital of the Western Region, not only does Sekondi-Takoradi have locally elected city officials and Members of Parliament, it also features central government appointees and those working in central and regional government agencies.

While the Metropolitan Chief Executive (also referred to as the “mayor”) is appointed by the sitting President (though there have been public calls to change this to an elected position), at the city-level, Sekondi-Takoradi currently has 72 Assembly members, 27 of which are appointed by the President and his/her political party (Ghana Statistical Service, 2014). These different Assembly members also sit on various committees. The Sekondi-Takoradi metropolitan area also has five Members of Parliament who represent them, with 275 Members of Parliament in total. In addition, there are three traditional authorities with paramount or traditional lands in Sekondi, Essikadu and Takoradi. Nana Kobina Nketiah V is the paramount chief for the Essikadu traditional area; Nana Whinney is the “caretaker” paramount chief of Sekondi paramountcy and Osahene Katekyi Busumakura III is the paramount chief of Takoradi traditional area.
In this context, these traditional leaders own land and manage rights in areas of their jurisdiction, while working with local governments to record land rights on these lands. In Sekondi-Takoradi, land is also owned and managed by individuals, families, and different levels of government, in addition to these traditional leaders. In this context, these various state and appointed state officials and traditional leaders also form wider relations with their constituents—from local residents to business communities—in both formalised and informalised ways.

In a more formalised manner, the local state can draw on its power to be a formulator and implementer of land-use and development plans (for instance, as articulated by the Constitution and indicated in the ways in which local government is partially funded by donor agencies). Multiple pathways and urban regimes can emerge from this: the local state enabling developments that might have widespread benefits, such as building schools, hospitals, infrastructure and green spaces. On the other land, alliances and regimes between the local state and private sector can lead to eviction and demolition based on something as simple as a wish to make the city more aesthetically pleasing, regardless if these strategies are in a city plan or not (Ghertner, 2015).

These formalised strategies, as articulated by legislative pathways, are also shaped by informalised arrangements and negotiations that create urban regimes and alliances, as well. Goodfellow (2018); Rakodi (2006); Roy, (2011); Simone, (2004); Waibel and McFarlane (2012); and Watson (2009) argue that ephemeral informal networks between residents and among residents, state officials and businesses also shape urban life and development in African cities. This is due in part to the complicated ways in which land use is envisioned and managed, as well as the constant negotiations for survival and well being in African cities. For instance, Yiftachel (2009) shows how residents can live in “gray spaces” that are neither formal nor illegal, as they navigate to preserve land tenure. Various actors, from local governments to regional land commissions, to traditional leaders and heads of families, also manage and rights and information about land rights. Oldfield and Bénit-Gbaffou (2011) show how tenants facing potential eviction “access” the “porous” formal local state by engaging in informal relationships with local government and by promising their vote in exchange for land tenure.
It is important to note how urban regimes that consist of local state actors in African contexts are shaped by the changing forms of the local state and its rationalities, from the pre-colonial days of “traditional” rule, to the presence of a colonial state that worked with and against certain traditional leaders, to the contemporary system of decentralised government. These rationalities, as Watson (2009) argues, continue to play out in African contexts that allow for hybridised forms of governance, with the local state forming alliances and creating governing processes that involve diverse actors. The following sections aim to capture the at times contentious and collaborative nature of the local state in Sekondi-Takoradi and how it forges relationships and shapes urban development outcomes through its relations with a wide range of stakeholders in the city, as it also balances both pro-growth and pro-poor agendas.

5.3. On Strategic Budgeting: Making Priorities and Leveraging for Funding

While the last section establishes the planning context, this section considers the financial constraints of the Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly through an analysis of the city’s published annual budgets from 2001-2015. The coordination, approval and contestation of what goes into the city’s budgets are a dynamic site of governance. Budgeting also feeds into larger strategic planning processes, as some, but not all of the ambitions from the draft structural plan or development plan become tangible budgeted outcomes. Although the STMA’s annual budgets are small compared to cities in the West (which tend to have larger tax bases) and in relation to the budgets of some private developers and donor agencies operating in the city, the local state mobilises and draws upon resources from across the city—found in the budget, as well as outside of it—in order to implement development projects, promote its public image and advance its regulatory authority. As demonstrated in the annual budgets, these resources include funding from the central government, multilateral donors and other partners, as well as its own legal and regulatory system of collecting property taxes, fines and fees from permits and licenses.

The STMA’s city budgets are not static spreadsheets outlining line items of what is spent (even though they include that), but also set out ambitions about increasing the locality’s revenue base. Examining these budgets, and seeing where money comes from—in terms of
partnerships and regulatory revenue-generation—reveals a way in which the state builds its governing capacity. This section focuses on financial constraints, budgets and regulatory mechanisms, while the next section will focus on how this feeds into strategic planning and place governance.

According to Mariana Valverde (2012), the local state’s regulatory mechanisms to generate revenue, which are based on the inconsistent implementation of “law, ordinances, bylaws, rules, policies, inspection practices and regulatory fines” shapes its relationship to other actors in the city, as well as the social and spatial form of the city (p. 6). Ghana’s decentralisation programme of the 1990s ushered in the formalisation of this “regulatory architecture” to the city level. In addition to creating development plans that would speak to national plans, the local state increasingly deals with bureaucracy of “place governance” (permitting building, for instance, after land titles are cleared though traditional authorities or the Lands Commission), as well as generating revenues. These regulatory responsibilities include collecting fees, licenses, fines and property taxes; creating annual budgets; approving building permits; and coordinating for the service-delivery of education, health, electricity, sanitation and water—either through the central state or private actors. Other responsibilities including having a spatialised understanding of the city—for instance, the central state and international engineering firms relied on the local state to locate vacant land for the expansion of the Takoradi port’s bulk storage facilities (STMA, 2010, 2014a).

The examination of the budgets of the local government reveals the state in action: how it navigates the financial constraints of small budgets, the ways in which these funds are allocated, and how it obtains these funds through the central state and partners or through everyday regulatory means. The budgets show how much is spent under three main categories: “salaries and compensation,” “goods and services” and “asset transfers.” Salaries and compensation is the total paid to central government and Assembly staff in the city; goods and services consist of how much it costs to run the Assembly, from keeping the lights on to updating the financial management information system; while asset transfers refer to the utilisation of grants, as well as capital expenditures. The development projects found in the budgets consist of some, but not all of the ambitions of the Medium Term Development Plans. This will be expanded upon later in this section, but has to do with the prioritisation of actually existing funds. The specific projects are allocated under the categories of “education, health, social welfare and community development, works,
economic, administration and physical planning and waste management.” The following are just some of the nearly 50 projects under the domain of the local government: “construction and completion of a six unit classroom block with facilities in Kojokrom,” the “construction of a library complex in Takoradi,” and “the implementation of the school feeding programme,” “the maintenance of street lights,” and the “construction of twenty artisan garages at Kokompe and construction 25 block garages and two-storey skills and training centre at Kokompe [as a result of the Takoradi Mall eviction]” (STMA, 2014a).

The following table, Table 5.6, shows the actual STMA budgets from 2001-2014 in Ghanaian cedis (GHC). This shows how the actual annual budgets of the STMA have been growing dramatically since 2001. These figures, drawn from the annual working budgets, are publically made available on the city’s website. In 2001, the city’s budget was over GHC6,000,000 (adjusted for inflation, with 2014 as the reference year). By 2014, the budget was GHC 24,234,752. This demonstrates that the budget increased fourfold in the span of 14 years. The intention of this chart is to show how the local government have been mobilising to increase funds—and even through the budgets are rather small in comparison to cities in the West. As such, budgets serve as a tool by which the local government draws in collaborators.
Figure 5.6: STMA’s Actual and Estimated Budgets (2001-2014)

Source: own chart, based on data from the STMA budgets from 2001-2014, see real figures (adjusted for inflation) in orange, with 2014 as the reference year.

The use of budgeting signifies the growing role of local government as a driver of development as it coordinates and justifies its revenue usage, which is derived from internally generated funds, and also comes through transfers from the central government, donor agencies and other partners. In addition, budgeting becomes a site of government coordination: in 2009 the Government of Ghana passed the Legislative Instrument (LI) 1961, which created a composite budget process, bringing together the decentralised departments with the Assembly to formulate the budgets. Prior to 2009, the decentralised department budgets were aligned to their Ministry’s sector plan (i.e. education, health, social welfare and community development, urban roads, agriculture, etc.) while the assemblies had their own central administrative budgets. Under this composite budget process, representatives from the different departments, along with the finance officers, the Metropolitan Chief Executive (mayor) and regional minister have to meet and decide on the annual plans. The global norms around good governance and transparency require local governments to share these budgets publically; therefore, they are a way in which the local government shows how it is spending its money, which also subjects it to scrutiny. The way in which budgets are created and implemented is therefore political, contentious and
subject to change. Local governments are also attuned to the transnational circulation of city policies and global discourses about improving urban governance.

These policies include the ideas behind participatory budgeting, whereby citizens, in partnership with government officials, create budget rules, prepare and implement budgets. Participatory budgeting can be traced back to Brazil, with the full implementation of a participatory budget occurring in Port Alegro in 1989. Civil society activists and the Brazilian Workers Party advocated for participatory budgeting as a resistance to the “hegemonic processes of globalization,” which they argued led to social exclusion and marginalisation. Thus participatory budgeting was a tool to open up “spaces for democratic participation” and redistribute resources (de Sousa Santos, 1998). Since then, it has spread across the world to 1,500 municipal governments like Sekondi-Takoradi. Its advocates also include grassroots, “bottom-up” organisers, as well as international donors like the World Bank (Silva, 2015). In 2015, the SMTA applied to be part of the “Open Government Partnership Initiative,” which calls for financial transparency and participatory budgeting.

The notion of citizen participation as being part of the budgeting and planning processes was a strong current in policy documents and stakeholder meetings. For instance, in the recent 2014-2017 Medium Term Development Plan, the executive summary states: “The process of preparing the Plan was participatory and was prepared in line with the guidelines of the National Development Planning” (STMA, 2014a, p. iv). Another section of the plan specifies how “in line with the decentralization policy of the country, the CHF [renamed Global Communities] and STMA have partnered to develop pro-poor participatory approaches to inclusive planning and pro-poor intervention. The approach seeks to ensure sustainability of investment in community services by making beneficiary communities the primary focus” (STMA, 2014a, p. 114). While these examples might seem to put the onus of participatory budgeting on civil society activists, budgeting processes also open up pathways in which the local state mobilises the private sector. In the partnership document between the STMA and the Open Government Partnership Initiative, the STMA lays out the impetus for this partnership: “Aside from being a hub of Ghana’s young and burgeoning oil and gas industry, it hosts the second largest port in the country. As a result

10 The Open Government Partnership Initiative is organised around a steering committee made up of rotating civil society and government leaders. It received unrestricted funding from the Hewlett Foundation, Omidyar Network, Ford Foundation and Open Society Foundation, with restricted funding from USAID and UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hivos Netherlands and in-kind support from Google, Government of Brasil, Government of the UK, and Twaweza.
of the sprawl of oil service companies and its attendant attraction of job seekers into the Metropolis, there has been an increased demand on the STMA to improve the delivery of public services… This has become paramount when citizens are citing a rise in the cost of living without tangible benefits from growth in the industry” (STMA, 2016, p. 1). Later on, in the document, the city mobilises the discourse of “public participation” to draw on the private sector, specifically in the budgeting process, with this commitment:

Partner with private sector associations to kick-start a systematic and participatory way of engaging with large businesses in setting fees (in international terms: taxes) that they pay to the Metropolitan Assembly. The Metropolitan Assembly will engage the leadership of private sector organisations: AGI [Association of Ghana Industries] and STCCI [Sekondi-Takoradi Chamber of Commerce & Industry] to develop a strategy and engagement work plan for fixing fees. (STMA, 2016, p. 16)

Under this partnership plan, the local state defines large businesses—which include oil service companies—as part of the “public,” while arguing for a new system of local taxation. Currently, transnational oil companies pay taxes and royalties at the national level, with oil service companies having to pay a fee to the Petroleum Commission in order to register their companies. This local policy commitment to collect more taxes and fees from big businesses differs from portrayals about the rise of tax exemptions under neoliberal urban governance (Friedmann, 1993).

Aside from budgeting (as a process) being counted as a site of governance, the annual budget also illuminates where the STMA obtains its funds and how it seeks to generate more funds from these revenue sources. As Chart 5.7 shows, the city’s internally generated revenues have been steadily increasing, but that the city receives an increasing proportion of “transfers and grants” from the central government, donor organisations and other partners, including private sector developers.
The central government for instance, provides funding for the School Feeding Programme, in addition to contributing to the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF). The AFD along with CIDA, DANIDA and KFW set up the District Development Fund (DDF), while the World Bank set up the Urban Development Grant (UDG). In addition to international civil society organisations contributing to development budgets, private sector developers have, as well. For instance, the Takoradi Mall developers provided the local government with funds for the relocation of the evicted mechanics from the proposed mall site to a new site (STMA, 2015). This is confirmed by the city’s budgets, interviews with the mall developers, city planners and in newspaper articles, with figures for the contribution being around $200,000 USD or GH₵ 600,00 in 2014.
As Chart 5.7 demonstrates, in 2001 the STMA received about GHC 6,000,000 from central government transfers and donor grants. By 2014, the figure had grown to being nearly GHC 21,000. While in 2001, the STMA was entirely dependent on the central government, by 2014, they were generating their own revenues to a small extent. While there was a steady period of growth from 2001 to 2008, after the slump in 2009, the city’s revenues have been significantly increasing. In comparison to transfers and grants, the city’s internally generated revenues—which come from its regulatory system of taxes, fines and fees—have been on the rise as well, but at a much slower pace. In 2001, the city generated GHC 397,322 in revenues (through taxes, fines, licenses, etc.) and in 2014, that figure increased by over four-times to GHC 4,762,791.

Chart 5.8 shows the sources of the city’s internally generated revenues. “Rates” refers to property rates or property taxes, which are collected annually. The Land Valuations Board determines the value of the property. “Lands” refer to the levies paid for building plans and permits, as well as mining royalties on “stool” land owned by traditional authorities. Fines and fees are collected for by-law infractions, daily tolls that street vendors pay to operate at markets, parking tolls and fees, and any fines from the court system. Licenses regulate the operation of any business, and these “business operating permits” (BOP) are to be renewed every year. Surplus funds from the annual budgets go into interest yielding investments that generate “investment income.” Miscellaneous refers to anything not included in the list. According to this list, the city generates the most revenue from property rates, followed by fees and fines which includes the daily tolls that street vendors pay and the issuance of licenses to operate a business in the city. This internally generated revenue chart shows how the state has been building its state capacity in many ways. These include by increasing its revenue collection over the past 15 years, from well under GHC 400,000 (in 2001, adjusted for inflation) to nearly GHC 1,400,000 in 2014. While these figures show that the local state is very financially constrained, this chart also shows the tools the local state can employ as part of its currently existing capacities to manage development projects in the city (for instance, through licensing and permit fees).
Figure 5.8: STMA’s Internally Generated Revenues by Source (2001-2015)

Source: own chart, with data from the STMA budgets from 2001-2015
5.4. The Convening Power and Strategic Planning Role of the Local State

In exploring the relationship between the local state and place governance, this section examines how the local state utilises the governing tool of strategic planning to build capacity, to brand the identity of the city, convene and arbitrate ideas about the city’s future and mobilise resources from both the private sector and donors to enact development outcomes. This section specifically focuses on the role of structural and strategic plans in framing political relations in the city of Sekondi-Takoradi and how the local state employs the discourses of these plans to strengthen its influence on the outcomes. This chapter focuses on how the local state utilises the processes and “content” of these plans to expand its governing capacity. According to Oren Yiftachel, although planning, with its aim to improve people’s living conditions, is seen as an “agent of positive change and a “force of social reform,” when it is devised to structurally exert control and oppression, like through discriminatory zoning practices, it also has a potential “dark side” (Yiftachel, 1998). Instead of seeing planning and its impacts as inherently good or bad, planning can be interpreted as a “process for decision-making” (Huxley 2009), which seeks to “influence socio-spatial relations for various purposes and in pursuit of various values” (Healey, 2003). As such, planning is a processual and relational tool, as well as a site of governance.

There are many different types of plans that shape urban life in Sekondi-Takoradi. However, since Metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies are considered the highest units of local government in Ghana (Commonwealth Local Government Forum, 2016), the Assembly-spearheaded Medium Term Development Plan is seen as the planning document that drives the development agendas of the different assemblies. In Sekondi-Takoradi, the Medium Term Development Plan has been produced every four years over the last 20 years (1996-2017) and remains an important tool for shaping the city’s urban agenda and development outcomes. It is important to note that Sekondi-Takoradi’s city resources, in the form of the port, railway and now base for the oil and gas industry, also mean that it is shaped by different sectorial and central government plans. While these various plans are created at a national level, they help form and solidify planning as an important field of practice for setting the agenda of development outcomes in Sekondi-Takoradi.
Amidst this range of national plans, it is important to note that the district’s locally produced development plan is important, not only because it shows the city’s distinctive development priorities, but also through the process in which it is created, as it requires participation from different stakeholders. The STMA’s Medium Term Development Plan for 2014-2017 states:

The participatory nature of the plan preparation process will mean that all stakeholders will be keen to ensure that planned activities are undertaken in a way that will benefit the people through improvement in the living conditions in the Metropolis. It is strongly believed that all stakeholders will play their respective roles to ensure successful plan implementation (p. vi.).

As John Friedmann (1993) argues, in the field of planning, it is important to “privilege the local over national and transnational spaces,” as localities are the “the spaces of people’s everyday lives” and it is in these spaces that “meaningful citizenship participation can take place” (pp. 482-483). However, national and transnational conditions do matter in that they can facilitate or constrain local planning practices.

In Sekondi-Takoradi, the practices of planning have gained significance due to national policies that privilege Ghana’s urban centres, as well as the presence of the oil and gas industry in the city. Although development plans across Ghana vary widely, with funding constraints making it unlikely that all the development projects are implemented, the process and priorities listed in the varying plans shape how different development actors respond to them. As a director at USAID stated in an interview, given that it serves as a “blueprint,” there is certainly “utility” in the MTDP and its use as a “negotiating tool.” This director highlighted how, given the funding constraints that make it difficult for the districts to implement these detailed plans, USAID (along with GiZ and Global Communities) has supported the city’s aim of increasing its internally generated revenue by mapping its streets with plots that can turn green or red, indicating if a person or a business has paid their property taxes. Depending on the context (such as in the case of Sekondi-Takoradi), where there are new economic opportunities and developments on the horizon, local plans serve as sites of negotiation.
According to a Representative at Hen Mpoano, a local civil society organisation providing technical, planning and policy support to coastal regions, given the land use changes as a result of the oil and gas industry, there is urgency around the creation of local spatial plans in the coastal districts (including Sekondi-Takoradi):

Spatial planning was ushered into the current planning processes mainly driven by oil and gas development. As oil and gas were companies coming in, they have facilitated development. There was a need for spatial plans to be formulated, especially for the six coastal districts in Western Region, which includes the STMA. (Interview A16, Local CSO, 09/12/2014)

As the above quote shows, given the proposed land use pressures, there was a need to coordinate and formalise planning at the local and regional level. In addition, this Hen Mpoano Representative elaborated on the importance of moving beyond a “technical” or rationalised view of planning, and toward a more collaborative and strategic planning process that takes into account wider social and political procedures:

You can’t talk about planning and ignore the wider political processes that go alongside the technical planning. There is nowhere in the world that these types of things happen disparately. So, you want to look at planning, you need to also look at the contestation of the politics, which relate to economics as well as the social dimensions. (Interview A16, Local CSO, 09/12/2014)

Planning in Sekondi-Takoradi not only involves the physical ordering of the city, but rather, is a site of strategic visioning involving political contestation about social and economic change. The following section compares two plans: a “Draft Structure Plan for Sekondi-Takoradi” which was sponsored by the Jubilee (Oil) Partners and the city’s Medium Term Development Plan for 2014-2017. Important to note is that the “Draft Structure Plan for Sekondi-Takoradi” was created by an Accra-based consultancy group called “The Consortium,” in consultation with local government (STMA) and civil society organisations. Although civil society representatives referred to this structure plan as the “Jubilee Plan,” since there was real ownership over the plan, it remains in draft form. The second plan, the Sekondi-Takoradi Medium Term Development Plan 2014-2017, is the assembly’s local plan for shaping development outcomes in the city. This chapter aims to
show how city officials have been able to mobilise around the discourses of these two plans while asserting their role in bringing these plans to life. It also highlights the power of the local state as an actor in pushing for collaborative planning processes despite its relative lack of financial and institutional capacity, which proved to be more legitimate than the “structure plan” funded by the Jubilee Partners. Aside from budget constraints and a limited tax base, the Sekondi-Takoradi Development Planning Unit consists of a Chief Development Planning Officer, two senior planners and two associate planners for the entire metropolis.

5.5. Beyond Rational Planning: On the Failures of the Oil-Funded Structure Plan for Sekondi-Takoradi

Despite the criticisms of civil society actors that social investment programmes are implemented in an ad-hoc manner without much public consultation, the initial arrival of transnational oil companies in the city ushered in heightened expectations about large-scale infrastructural changes to come. Since 1996, local planning consisted of the creation of development plans by the Metropolitan Assembly. These plans focus on socio-economic issues that first sought to address poverty alleviation, but then gradually evolved to opening up the city to private sector growth. The presence of transnational oil companies paved the way for new imaginative planning in the city, including a focus geared toward large-scale infrastructure projects there. This next section examines the Jubilee Partners’ Structure Plan for Sekondi-Takoradi and the ultimate failure of this plan. To this day, the plan remains in draft form. Although public input was gathered for its creation, the plan’s implementation lacked buy-in from a wide range of actors.

The Jubilee Partners, the partnership of oil companies involved in the production of the Jubilee Fields, sponsored and funded a Structure Plan for Sekondi-Takoradi. Created by a consultancy group called, “The Consortium,” the plan features large-scale development projects in the city. This plan also employed a language of modernity. While the plan remains in draft form, the discourses found in the plan continue to be circulated among local government officials and civil society organisations in the city. When asked about the STMA’s vision, a planner retrieved a copy of Jubilee Partner’s structural plan from his desk (Interview A28, STMA, 12/11/2014). This planner proceeded to skim the document and
shared the plan’s vision, while discussing the city’s role in bringing it to life. The structure plan’s vision reads:

Sekondi-Takoradi is at the cross-roads...an opportunity is beckoning for an otherwise slagging city to be transformed into a showpiece of an urban space in contrast to the gloomy picture that all the urban centres in Ghana present. The opportunity even beckons Sekondi-Takoradi to out stage several cities and oil cities in Sub-Saharan Africa, easily putting the twin city onto the international stage...once an international airport emerges in Sekondi-Takoradi in the mist of the oil and gas economy, the entire dynamics of the twin city could explode...it could explode negatively into the most chaotic unplanned city...or positively into that retrofitted dynamic, bustling rare example of a liveable African city! ...Over the next 15-20 years, Sekondi-Takoradi would have been so rejuvenated to become an iconic city, competing and outbidding the rival cities... In the process, these investments would have a positive impact on the living conditions of the vast majority of the residents of Sekondi-Takoradi. (Jubilee Partners, 2012, p. 10)

When asked to clarify what this vision means for the city, the planner stated:

We are moving away from implementing small, small projects to highly capitalized projects. We think this is the best way to go for sourcing funding. We are also looking at the major markets. We are looking at areas with office complexes. Modern accommodation, for those who work in those complex offices. We envision that all the semi-slum structures there will all go. And then maybe multi-complex offices for the big companies, for the oil companies, and big time hotels. Everything is in the structure plan, it enhances infrastructure and services. It talks about our roads, how we want it to look in the next 20-25 years. With the discovery of the oil, and the influx of the people into the city, it create[s] traffic congestion on our streets. This means we need to look at the conditions of our roads in order for us to accommodate it. It’s been busy. (Interview A28, STMA, 12/11/2014)

This vision of the city is based on enhancing its global economic competitiveness against other cities, particularly capital cities in West Africa, through a large-scale planning processes that completely transforms the infrastructure of the city: upgraded houses, the
clearing of semi-slum areas, the construction of buildings and complexes that cater to new firms, and renovation of roads. The following images, Figures 5.9 to Figure 5.12, show some of the proposed projects that come directly from this structural plan:

**Figure 5.9 Image of a 3D Model of the Proposed Kwame Nkrumah Convention Centre in Sekondi**

Caption: This plan calls for the construction of a Kwame Nkrumah Convention Centre in Sekondi, complete with multiple buildings and parking spaces. Most large stakeholder meetings are currently held at hotels in the city. Source: Jubilee Partners, 2012

**Figure 5.10: Images of proposed green spaces in the city**

Caption: This plan calls for increased in public parks and green spaces in the city. Source: Jubilee Partners, 2012
Figure 5.11: A Model of a Proposed Multi-Storey Car Park Facility in the Central Business District

Caption: A multi-story car park to be built in the Central Business District is a proposed construction project in this plan, as road congestion and inadequate parking near Market Circle is a concern. Source: Jubilee Partners, 2012

Stemming from projected urbanisation and a population boom, this plan argues that Sekondi-Takoradi is conveniently geographically situated in terms of its connections to other urban centres nationally and in West Africa, a focus on expanding transportation networks would place Sekondi-Takoradi at the centre of regional economic activity.

Figure 5.12: Map of “Potential ECOWAS Travel Pattern”

Caption: Visualising Takoradi as a transformation hub. Source: Jubilee Partners 2012
By 2014, however, this structure plan was largely abandoned and remained in draft form. Unlike the Medium Term Development Plan, it is not publically available online. In interviews with civil society actors and local government officials, it’s unclear why the plan was abandoned. A manager with a donor agency in the city believes that the plan was “unrealistic” and “ambitious” (Interview A46, Donor, 17/10/2014). As Bent Flyvbjerg et al., argues (2009), large-scale infrastructural projects are often marked by “delusion” and “deception”: Their costs tend to be underestimated and benefits overestimated. This creates processes in which these projects and plans are set up to fail in a number of ways (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009). Another reason is a lack of alignment with the city’s currently existing development plan and limited stakeholder engagement. In an interview, a manager from an international civil society organisation based in Sekondi-Takoradi who was involved in the consultation of the structure plan, posited:

The [issue with] the oil companies are that they contract some engineer and some consultant to do the corporate social responsibility for them [including with the structure plan]. And these consultants and engineers in most cases they don’t work directly or they don’t look at the Assembly’s Medium Term Development Plan…From my personal perspective, what I have noticed with the oil companies is that they do not really follow strict planning and community engagement processes. (Interview. Anonymised International CSO, 2014)

In this vein, such a top-down form of planning was bound to fail, not necessarily because it was too ambitious, but because there was a lack of cross-sector buy-in for the plan. In addition, even the Jubilee Partners question their will and desire surrounding their role as a sole actor carrying any local plan. Despite the financial resources that oil companies have at their disposal, the implementation of citywide planning strategies requires the assembling of different actors, agendas and materials. Oil companies lack the spirit, legitimacy and technical expertise to independently transform the structural and social fabric of a city. According to them, these responsibilities are best left to the local state. A manager for a major transnational oil and gas company involved in the creation of the plan, stated, in an interview:

I am unaware of [us, the company,] having a vision for the city, but I am aware that [we] want to support city authorities as much as possible to plan with the
development of the city. So far for instance [we were] involved in drafting of the spatial plans...to help the city plan land use... We are responsible up to a point [but] obviously it’s the government’s responsibility to develop these communities. (Interview A38, Transnational Oil Company, 02/04/2015)

Spearheaded by the Jubilee Partners, the failure to finalise or implement this modernist structure plan for Sekondi-Takoradi shows how planning requires collaboration and stakeholder buy-in at all stages of the process. This structure plan is very different in tone and content from the city’s development plans, which speak to the needs of everyday citizens in the city. The city’s development planning process will be discussed in the next section, highlighting the limitations of corporate-led, rational forms of planning following the arrival of transnational corporations.

5.6. Towards Collaborative Planning: On the Creation of the Medium Term Development Plans

Compared to the Jubilee Partners’ Plan, the 2014-2017 Sekondi-Takoradi Medium Term Development Plan’s vision, mission and understanding of economic competiveness (a priority theme derived from the national framework), focuses on a more human scale involving improving living standards and the local contributions of the city and region (STMA, 2014a, p. 1):

**Vision:** The Assembly visualizes a united cosmopolitan area where its people actualize their aspirations of internally accepted standards of living enjoyed on a peaceful, reliable and sustainable [manner] in this century.

**Mission:** The Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly exists to improve the living conditions in the metropolis through the provision of sustainable Socio-Economic development and Good Governance that is responsive to the needs of the people.

Although the main policies for ensuring and sustaining macro-economic stability are controlled at the level of central government, the contribution of Sekondi-Takoradi to the overall economy of Ghana cannot be underestimated. Indeed most of the macro-economic
gains made in 2010 through 2011 could be attributed to contributions of the oil and gas sector (which include gold, timber, manganese, bauxite and cocoa in the Western Region). Sekondi-Takoradi’s role was significant. The city’s economy was actually boosted in the period under review as a result of an increase in the number of companies in the oil and gas logistics and banking sectors. The service sector dominated the economy in Sekondi-Takoradi during the period under review, accounting for over 60% of economic activities in the city, and was followed by industry and agriculture. The number of new businesses registered in the Metropolis during the period under review was four thousand and four hundred (4,400). During the period under review, the Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly also played its statutory role of ensuring the effective functioning of the Metro-Security Council and facilitating the effective administration of justice, thereby contributing to the overall security of Ghana, a pre-requisite for macro-economic stability (STMA, 2014b, pp. 1–2).

While recognising the role of the central government, the plan also explicitly accentuates the role of the city in contributing to the economy of the region and country as a whole. The city becomes an actor, rather than merely an accessory to national economic development objectives. Although the 2014-2017 plan discusses macro-economic concerns, there is also a focus on the social needs of the population. However, these current strategies have a citywide focus, rather than those found in the 1996-2000 development plan, which centers around poverty alleviation through targeted interventions in the most deprived areas. These city-wide initiatives include a slum upgrading programme; providing livelihood training in agriculture and fishing; and providing citywide electricity, clean water and sanitation, in addition to keeping up an investor friendly environment in the region. For the first time, climate change, vulnerability and disaster management became themes, and wetlands were deemed important as a part of planning for erosion and sea-level rise in coastal areas. I now highlight three development priorities, listed in the 2014-2017 development plan (STMA, 2014b, pp. 123–124):

11 The following passage is from the Executive Summary of the 1996-2000 development plan: The 5-year Plan is dominated by a large number of activities involving social infrastructure, especially schools and clinics, which is normal in relatively underdeveloped areas. Nevertheless, it prioritises development basically in terms of alleviating the conditions of poverty created by extremely poor environmental health conditions prevalent in the Metropolis. Thus, its main thrust is on mitigating poverty due to poor environmental conditions through waste management, education and resettlement of populations away from congested areas, business centres and markets.
Enhancing Competitiveness In Ghana’s Private Sector:

- Promote local economic development
- Liaise with financial institutions to provide business support funds
- Upgrade artisans’ enclaves
- Access to modern shopping mall
- Training of the youth in artisanal skills with start-up capital
- Development of industrial city and warehousing enclave
- Regulate the operations of mechanics/artisans

Oil And Gas Development

- Specialized University established for oil and gas sector
- Training and employment of the youth in the oil sector
- Development of roads and railway networks
- Development of hospitality sector, including re-creational facilities

Human Development, Productivity And Employment

- Upgrading of existing basic schools infrastructure and provision of new ones
- Improvement in the quality of education at the kindergarten and primary school levels.
- Investments in community libraries
- Supply of adequate teaching and learning materials
- Organize in service training for teachers
- Financial support to brilliant, but needy students
- Create youth development centre
- Ensure balance in spatial distribution of health facilities
- Provision of disability friendly infrastructure
- Provide modern public sports facilities for swimming, basketball, volleyball, lawn tennis, gym, boxing hall

Other development priorities in the development plan include “Accelerated Agriculture Modernization And Sustainable Natural Resource Management;” “Infrastructure and Human Settlements Development;” and “Transparent and Accountable Government.” The development plan consists of a wide range of large development priorities. Although
development projects, say the construction of a mall or an oil workshop, are not led by the Assembly, the fact that these types of projects are in the plan allows the local state to assert its influence, particularly when it comes to potentially evicting people off the land. It also becomes a way for the local state to mobilise around the discourse and find partners to enact development outcomes.

While there is tension between plans and the implementation of the plans, in the case of Sekondi-Takoradi, development planning is a political tool and site of negotiation and helps to further refine understandings of the local state in action. At the public forum for the 2014-2017 Medium Term Development Plan\textsuperscript{12} going to the Assembly, the Chief Development Planning Officer, stated:

> In brief, the Medium-Term Development Plan spells out the intentions of the Assembly for the next four years. It's the document that will guide the development process from 2014 to 2017. And it's a document that every person, every institution which want to do business with the Assembly would have to adhere to. It spells out what we have as an Assembly. It spells out our development goals, objectives, and strategies. It spells out the potential, opportunity, challenges, and constraints that we have as a city. It spelled out our program of action, that is, the projects that we will implement from now up to 2017…

Planning is a process. We have been developing infrastructure, roads, networks, electricity, and all that. The city would continue to improve the road network. [The] road network is number one key to development of the city. So when you want specific, then I would tell you, number one is our roads. Number two, social interventions. We'll continue to provide schools, health facilities for the city. Number three, we want to have clean environment. So the issue of waste will also be tackled as seriously. So these are the three key areas that the city will emphasise in the next four years.

The public forum consisted of representatives from oil companies, local businesses, local and international civil society organisations, donor agencies, journalists, traditional authorities and the public at large who were invited by city officials. As the previous

\textsuperscript{12} This took place on 17 November 2014 at the Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly building.
statement demonstrates, the Assembly has a wide agenda—tackling social interventions, infrastructure and making a clean environment. The development plan frames the political relations across these different groups—and puts the Assembly as an organising entity at the centre. Anyone who wants to do business in the city needs to go through the Assembly.

The Chairman of the Development Planning Committee of the Assembly chimed in with a focus on the necessity for resources in the rollout of the projects. While there is no mention in the 2014-2017 development plan of interchanges and flyovers, this discourse, which has been circulating in the city since the arrival of transnational oil companies and the Jubilee Partners-funded structure plan, came into view during this public forum:

My expectation about this medium-term plan is that if we get the resources, the necessary resources to rule everything out, it’s going to transform the metropolis for good, because for the first time we’re going to see some, you know, interchanges and flyovers so that, you know, road congestion would definitely be something of the past. Our worry, or my worry is where to source for the funds and how the people who are the beneficiaries of the various projects are going to cooperate to get the programmes rolled out, because we’re here when we had some of the, you know, the problems being created by some people about some of the projects...

‘Your bridge has collapsed, we want to bring you a better bridge so that you can get, traffic flowing in your area,” and you say, “No, we don’t want a better bridge, and you’re going to beat even the chief executive? I mean, what is that? And you’re having railway rehabilitation works and you are dropping waste, you’re dropping wastes into the projects areas. How do you expect the project to flow?” You see, so these are some of the things that we need the cooperation of the people. Let us all agree in principle that if we need to expand our roads, structures are going to be affected. Some structures will be pulled down.

So if, unfortunately, your structure is to be affected, I mean, go by the necessary compensations and then make sure that... And we’re also calling on whatever authorities that when it comes to payment of compensations, let us be very, you know, up and doing so that the people can be cleared off the way, and such
projects can go on. I want to believe strongly that, if in the next four years all these proposed projects are actually implemented, Sekondi-Takoradi is going to change and change for the better.

In directly speaking to the issue of forced evictions and demolitions, the Chairman of the Development Planning Committee sees the STMA as a force for good in its attempts at transforming the city—yet places blame on every citizen who “create problems” for the state. Through planning, and through this public forum, while there is an acknowledgement of the conflicts between the state and everyday citizens, the framing device here is that the Assembly sees itself as doing what is best. Demolition, in this case, is seen as a way to improve the image of the city (like “making the city clean” or “modern”) while addressing issues of public health and other standards. However, these policy discussions do not include concerns about displacement. Such plans, then, accentuate the power of the local state—as it is able to facilitate compensation and evict people in the name of changing the city for the better.

When asked about the financing of the plans and if the city gets enough funding from the Common Fund—a funding source from the central government—the Chief Development Planning Officer replied that they get very little from this source, instead, the Assembly works to generate its own funds:

The [District Assembly] Common Fund is just one source. When it comes to the revenue mix of the Assembly in terms of development, Common Fund is not so significant. Our IGF [internally generated funds] is far bigger than the Common Fund that we receive. But that not outstanding, we'll also make sure the little that we'll get from Common Fund will also be put to very good use. But I will tell you the funds for our development for the next four years would be from our PPP [private public partnerships].

We also make sure that donor interventions, which demands [sic] accountability, transparency, and all that for that fund to flow, we'll make sure that transparency prevails. Our records, our travel licenses, our accounts are opened to public scrutiny so that we'll continue to get performance funds from our donor partners.
Most of the major roads that we are undertaking. This year, we’re going to emphasise on PPP. What I mean is that, collaboration with the private sector. We are seeing that we cannot go it alone because they are heavy-capital intensive projects. So we’re going to open our doors to the outside world to partner the city in developing this infrastructure.

We’re not relying on only central government, we are looking at investment from the private sector so that at the end of the day, the town re-coups their investment through tolls and fees that will be collected.

In this planning context, the Assembly utilises the vision and development priorities in the plan in order to seek private sector investment and partners with donor agencies. It also mobilises around global discourses of transparency and accountability as indicators of its relative strength as a local state, and as a means to obtain funds from donor agencies. Finally, the Assembly makes it clear that it’s not reliant on the central government, that it is its own entity. It is not only capable of collecting fines, fees and tolls, but also has the capacity to form partnerships with potential transnational actors who can fund heavy capital-intensive projects. The next section focuses on budgeting and regulatory mechanisms, which inform the governing capacity of the local state while opening it up for cross-sector partnership arrangements.

5.6.1 Forging Private-Public Partnerships: From Service Delivery to Mall Construction

The last sections discuss the agency of the local state in relation to strategic planning, budgeting and permitting in the city. These practices are not only informed by local needs, but also by the national context and global policy discourses that champion certain approaches to development. Within the national Shared Growth and Development Agenda 2014-2017 (GSGDA II), the Government of Ghana highlighted the financial and technical restrictions involved in financing public infrastructure. One of the core objectives of the national plan involves “increasing the effectiveness and productivity of capital expenditure and pursuing PPP approaches to the provision of public infrastructure” (Government of Ghana, 2015, p. 68). In addition, the priority areas for the PPPs are around power generation, roads and railways, large-scale housing development, water, healthcare,
sanitation and public safety—issues that were raised in Sekondi-Takoradi’s local development plans, as well. The push for PPPs comes from not only the national level, but it is also a discourse espoused by institutions like the World Bank. The global call for PPPs, calls for transparency, accountability and participatory planning in an age of “good governance” have circulated the globe, with local authorities mobilising them. Some of these ideas are linked to concepts of human rights, citizenship and democratic principles. In this context, local authorities serve as intermediaries in translating these transnational ideas and policies into pragmatic interventions on-the-ground. As Parnell et al., (2002), the democraticising of local government represents a “fusion of local and global visions of how to achieve sustainable, democratic development at the local scale” (p. 87).

According to a World Bank (2013) report, the STMA has undertaken a number of joint ventures with the private sector. The report argues for a mutually beneficial relationship between the STMA and private sector:

Advantages in using PPP arrangements derive from the local definition of investment needs and funding, besides the fast track contracting process for studies and final designs and construction. Also, the PPP provides an independent administration and supervision alternative provide[d] that adequate mechanisms for transparency and accountability are built under the agreement (World Bank 2013, p. 7).

Examples include “an engineered landfill facility at Sofokrom at the cost of GHC$2.536 million; Shippers Roundabout jointly funded by the Assembly, Tullow Oil Company and its Jubilee Partners at the cost of GHC$500,000 as well as a slaughterhouse. The Assembly already signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with two companies for the construction of the Takoradi market. They also have planned bridges and flyovers to link the central business area to ease vehicular and human traffic” (Bosompen et al., 2012, pp. 7–8). These PPP projects—including descriptions about bridges and flyovers—are found in planning documents as well as in conversations with local government officials. The next section highlights how this climate of creating partnership arrangements translates to a multitude of programmes and projects that transcend public infrastructure to other projects and programmes that shape development in the city—including the construction of the mall and oil workshops, as well as the mapping of properties in the city.
This section elaborates on partnership arrangements between the local state and transnational actors in relation to government-led strategic plans. In the 2014-2017 Medium Term Development Plan, the financial strategies of the Assembly focused on increasing its internally generated funds through the following methods:

1. Revaluation of properties in the metropolis
2. Identification of new revenue sources
3. Developing a more effective revenue data collection mechanism
4. Sensitization of the public to pay rates
5. Minimize revenue collection leakages
6. Increasing the performance in the Functional Organizational Assessment Tool (FOAT) [a measurement tool used in order to access the District Common Fund]

As the Assembly is technically constrained in its revenue collection, it partnered with development donors to build its revenue generating capacities. In an interview with the manager at Global Communities, an international civil society organisation partially funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the manager discussed how Sekondi-Takoradi is the first city in Ghana to name all of its streets: “Suddenly, emergency services can find your home. Tourists can find their way around the city. But perhaps the most significant step is in providing public services” (Interview A15, International CSO, 16/10/2014). Although it will take a system of recording street addresses coupled with a regulatory and enforcement system for the STMA to increase its local property tax base, civil society organisations and local government officials see this as a real possibility. In this case, partnership arrangements extend beyond the private sector and local government to also include international donors. This is not new in the city, but it speaks to the creative ways by which the STMA has extended its governing capacity—the capability to collect taxes—through mobilising the technical and financial expertise of international organisations and donors.

Some of the partnership arrangements are less formal in that MOUs are not signed; rather, the local state facilitates some developments. An example of this is the demolition and eviction of the artisan mechanics on the Takoradi Mall site. According to both the mall developer and city officials, there was a willingness by both parties to make the mall a
reality, a feature of modernity in the city. This local government assistance includes helping the mall developer obtain all the right planning permissions—as well as using the development plan and the police force to clear the land. As the local state in Ghana consists of both traditional authorities (many with land rights) and district assemblies, potential private investors and developers need to go through these local authorities in one way or another to make their projects happen, including through obtaining land titles and permits.

This culture of building partnership arrangements informs governance in the city and sets the tone for the relationships that local authorities have established with new transnational actors in the city. As a manager for one of the transnational oil companies stated:

> There are reasons why Ghana is considered to be “Africa 101.” It is relatively well developed, relatively corruption-free, and they have a genuine eagerness for expansion and improvement. If I can compare Ghana to other countries in Africa that I have worked in—28 countries in all—then this would be the easiest, or at least in the top five easiest places to do business. (Interview A39, Transnational Oil Company, 30/10/2017).

While at first glance, public-private partnerships can be seen as extending neoliberal policies (Heame, 2014) and contributing to the “hollowing out” of the state, following Jon Pierre (2011), private-public partnerships have been historically present in governance models and there are precedents for such pro-growth cooperation models. In addition, while local governments might not play a financing role, their other roles of regulating, mediating, coordinating and monitoring development in the city contribute to a complex arena of conflict, interest and the ultimate “distribution” of resources (Pierre, 2011; Savitch, 1998). In the case of Sekondi-Takoradi, the local state’s engagement with a wide range of stakeholders in the formation of strategic plans opens up pathways for financing and building partnerships, which actually strengthen its governing capacity, rather than weakening it.
5.6.2 Licensing, Permitting and Granting Development Rights on Place-Based Opportunities

Despite the financial constraints of local governments in Ghana, such as delays in central government transfers and the inefficiencies of revenue collection, particularly in rural areas, metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies possess the potential to generate additional revenues (Mabe and Kuusaana, 2016; Thomi et al., 2000). Looked at in another way, many local governments around the world are relatively financially constrained in relation to meeting the development needs of their citizens, yet it is through drawing upon their regulatory mechanisms, such as fining and permitting—which are not always applied consistently or rationally—that the local state builds its governing capacity.

Three examples illustrate how local state authorities utilise current technical capabilities and governmental tools in their relationships with international business actors in the city. The first vignette of this chapter discussed how the construction of the Takoradi Mall led to the eviction of 2,800 mechanics that occupied that land. Although the site remained vacant for a few years after the eviction as ownership of the land was under litigation, the local government drew on discourses about the modernity of the city (as evident in town hall meetings). And while it took time to decide who had property rights to the land, the local government was certain that the artisan mechanics who currently occupying the land did not have the right to stay, and so arranged to remove them in order to strengthen their ambition.

In Sekondi-Takoradi, the construction of a shopping mall appeared in the 2010-2013 and 2014-2017 Medium Term Development Plans. The South African mall developer relied on the support of the local government—particularly then Mayor Captain Cudjoe—to obtain permits and coordinate the relocation of the evicted artisans to a new site. In an interview with a manager working for the mall developer, this manager discussed how his company had to work with different levels of government. Navigating the bureaucracy was frustrating at times. (Interview A24, Property Developer, 19/12/2014). As noted during an unrecorded portion of the interview:

This manager says there has certainly been a challenge with bureaucracy, Ghana hasn’t been investor friendly. So much paperwork. For instance, it costs $500,000
to join the Ghana Investment Promotion Authority. They pay whatever they’re
told. The manager says that the company has to abide by all the standards and
stipulations. They have all their building permits already. In Ghana, for a project
like this, they need the following plans or approvals: building plan (which was done
with the STMA), Ghana Highways and Roads with a Traffic Impact Assessment,
the EPA with an Environmental Impact Assessment and Fire. He says that they
can’t build willy-nilly. They can’t take that risk. They need to do serious due
diligence since they can’t spend say $10 million and start building and then stop.
They also can’t afford bad press or risky investments, they have shareholders and
investors and they have to follow the law. It’s always good to have local
government on your side, they’ve been helpful especially in Takoradi, particularly
Captain Cudjoe. The manager says that it wasn’t cheap, getting all these plans
together and paying consultants. They’ve spent close to $300,000. Not to mention
the relocation costs of the mechanics. He says they spent about $200,000 on that.
(Notes from Interview A24, Property Developer, 19/12/2014)

In addition, according to the manager of the mall development, even though the property
rights to the proposed mall site were under private ownership, the company also interacted
with chiefs and traditional authorities: “We involve them all the time, they’re involved in
everything, even if they might only do ceremonial duties” (Interview A24, Property
Developer, 19/12/2014). In Kumasi, for instance, both President Nana Akufo-Addo and
Otumfuo Osei Tutu II, the Asantehene (traditional ruler of the Kingdom of Ashanti),
opened the $95 million dollar Kumasi City Mall. During the opening ceremony, it was
revealed that the food court would be named after the Asantehene’s late Queen mother,
Nana Afia Kobi Serwaa Ampem II (Osei, 2017; Adogla-Bessa, 2017). These instances
highlight the role of traditional authorities as stakeholders and political leaders, as well as
the dual political and cultural nature of commercial culture in Ghana.

Under this network of legal pluralism, businesses and developers have to navigate different
government agencies and traditional authorities for land rights, symbolic buy-in and to
obtain permits. In the case of transnational oil companies in Ghana, even though oil
concessions are regulated at the national level through the Petroleum Commission, the
companies interact with local authorities in order to build a business base. These
companies relied on a network of local real estate connections, while, as demonstrated in
Chapter 4, also constructing some of their own buildings through liaising with local landowners and the state. Given the presence of transnational corporations in the city, oil companies rely upon and work with the local state in order to obtain land development rights and access the city’s range of built environment services and infrastructures.

In another example, a food establishment owner who caters to transnational oil companies, international aid workers and wealthy Ghanaians in the city, shared her experience of setting up a business in the city:

Luckily we already acquired a tax number a few years before when we started working in Ghana because that took about five months to get from the tax office. Then we went to the registrar office in Sekondi. There you register the company name and the shareholders. Then we needed a work permit and residence permit. Because the company is wholly foreign-owned we needed a letter from GIPC that states that we invested $50,000 or more in goods or money that comes from outside of Ghana. So then we started building. However, we were stopped by STMA because the building was too close to the roadside. We had to move the building back a few feet. That’s why we have that funny looking sidewalk in front of the [establishment]. STMA also gives license for restaurants but we also need a permit from tourism authority… We paid I think all in all GHC 6,000 for licenses, but not all at once. GIPC is most expensive with $1000 USD for two years or something ridiculous like that (Personal Communications, B12, Small Business Owner – Café & Catering, 08/09/16).

These foreign businesses discuss the frustrations of both the “bureaucraticisation” and complexity of the local state in Ghana. But they also show the entanglements transnational actors face (whether it be an expat setting up a business, an international real estate developer or a transnational oil company) in having to negotiate with local authorities through the permitting and licensing processes, while sometimes having to legitimise their land claims, evicting occupants if necessary. While transnational oil companies can turn to firms to manage their local real estate needs—from finding offices spaces to homes—those who construct buildings have to go through the processes of acquiring building permits (Personal Communications B15, STMA Planner, 27/05/2017). Case studies from Western cities demonstrate that permitting, licensing and planning issues are often messy, with individuals and planners making planning deals using systems of regulations and codes that
are archaic, subjective and hard to grasp in totality (Valverde, 2012). In Sekondi-Takoradi, individuals do put up buildings without permits, even though they realise that they might get fined or have to halt construction (Interview A3, Local CSO, 01/10/2014; Interview A15, International CSO, 16/10/2014). However, for transnational companies and expats, this is not a risk they are willing to take, especially as their establishments are more prominent, and thus subject to a greater risk of scrutiny (Interview A15, International CSO, 16/10/2014, Interview A24, Property Developer, 19/12/2014). In this sense, they must work at varying levels with local consultants and the state, particularly the local government, to obtain licenses and building permissions. In New York City, budding food vendor entrepreneurs turn to “myriad arrangements organized through commissaries, family networks and third-party brokers who manage the illegal transfer of permits and vehicles,” while navigating different government agencies to obtain the right licenses to operate in the city (Koch, 2015, p. 1138). Examining the governing tools of permitting and licensing, which are also under the jurisdiction of the Planning Department in Sekondi-Takoradi, reveals how the local state’s governing capacity also rests on its role in licensing businesses and regulating land use planning (as informed by the citywide strategic plan), which ultimately influences when and how development projects are built in the city.

5.7. Conclusion

This chapter focuses on the local state as defined by the Metropolitan Assembly and traditional authorities, as well as their relationships with a wide range of non-state actors. It outlines the financial constraints of the local state, but also shows how it leverages its technical capabilities to influence development in the city. Despite its limited budgets and internally generated revenues—both of which have been growing steadily—it still shapes countless development projects in the city. It shows how the state leverages its capabilities through its role as a convener of different actors across the city and builds on collaborative planning strategies. Unlike plans that are created solely by the Jubilee Oil Partners or by international development agencies, the state produces plans that have the buy-in across different sectors, including civil society and the transnational oil companies. This chapter shows how local authorities in Sekondi-Takoradi also leverage their legal responsibilities to build up their governing capacity across a diverse terrain of local and transnational actors. It shows how city government and local traditional authorities have the right to determine zones for development, whether that be supporting the construction of oil company
warehouses, advocating for the construction of the Takoradi Mall or finding space for the expansion of the Takoradi port. In other words, the state’s actually existing governing capacities, rooted in strategic planning and land use rights, allow it to shape Sekondi-Takoradi’s urban futures in relation to development outcomes in a cosmopolitan city with a range of transnational corporate firms.
6. Civil Society Organisations, Participatory Planning Processes and Strategies for Inclusive Development

6.1. Introduction

This chapter extends understanding about networked governance beyond the role of state and private sector actors to focus on how civil society organisations shape inclusive urban development outcomes. As determined in the previous two chapters, the political localisation of transnational capital, coupled with the capacity of the local state to convene diverse actors, opens up governance pathways that allow a range of actors to envision, negotiate and contest development goals. According to Vanessa Watson (2014), “how the state and civil society actors engage in issues related to urban planning has been a prominent theme in planning literature for at least the last two decades,” with debates being informed by different traditions, positions and contexts (p. 63). In this context, this chapter shows how civil society organisations push for pro-poor and redistributive development agendas by leveraging their positionality as existing somewhere “between” the state, market and grassroots, as well as by drawing upon state capacities and international connections with donors and other civil society partners.

This chapter builds on literatures that focus on “collaborative” and “communicative” planning (with Healey, Forester and Innes as key scholars) and the idea of “co-production” (Ostrom, 1996; Watson, 2014) between the state and civil society. The section also shows how civil society organisations in Sekondi-Takoradi expand local state capacities and responsibilities by participating in legislative and planning processes. It also draws attention to regional concerns beyond city boundaries. In addition, these literatures relate to this thesis’ analytical lens concerning urban regimes and governance networks that consist of actors working across sectors and scales. However, unlike in this thesis, much of the literature on urban regimes focuses on partnerships between city governments and private sectors in Western contexts, sometimes at the expense of developmentalist objectives. With a view on a Ghanaian city in the global south experiencing a transnationalised resource boom, this chapter examines the potential of civil society organisations to work with the
state, even as they simultaneously challenge state agendas and corporate authority. Through these actions, civil society organisations “co-produce” more localised and redistributive urban development agendas while expanding the territorial reach of the state. The chapter also shows how this state-society interface not only furthers the legitimacy of civil society organisations as development actors, but also expands the credibility of the state and its capacity to pursue more socially impactful urban development agendas.

A core idea in planning theory is Habermas’ concept of communicative action, which focuses on how language, communication and deliberation fosters reasoned agreement and consensus (Habermas, 1984). Building on Habermas’ theorisations, Patsy Healey (1992) summarises communicative planning through the following points:

- Planning is an interactive and interpretative process,
- Planning is undertaken among diverse and fluid “discourse communities” or cultures,
- Planning requires “respectful” interpersonal and intercultural discussion where problems and strategies are identified and evaluated and conflicts mediated
- Planning involves developing a critical, reflexive capacity which has both evaluative and creative potential
- Planning opens strategic discourse in forms, which are as inclusionary as possible.
- Planning allows participants to learn new things about themselves, their relations, their interests, values, and understandings
- Planning has the power to transform situations through the power of the better argument and as an explicit exercise in imagining the future. (p. 221-222)

In their critique, Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1997) argue that Habermasian-inspired forms of “communicative planning,” “inclusionary discourse,” “planning through debate” and “collaborative governance” (e.g. Forester, 1988; Healey, 2006, 2003, 1997, 1992) need to address issues of power, rather than assume a neutral and pluralist political process of “uncoerced and undistorted” interactions (p. 1976). Drawing on Foucauldian perspectives of power, (Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002; Huxley, 2017; Yiftachel, 1998) assert how governing technologies of surveillance and the enforcement of zoning practices have contributed to racist and exclusionary spaces. Addressing these critiques, Healey (2006) argues that communicative planning is concerned with power relations, yet it focuses on
how power is more than the ability of a formal authority to force and impose agendas, but rather the ability to mobilise, imagine and invent (p. 24). Communicative approaches to planning have also inspired strategic spatial planning, and now a turn towards examining ideas of co-production (Parnell and Pieterse, 2014; Watson, 2014). Drawing on these approaches, this chapter focuses on how non-state actors employ their “power to-” shape urban development outcomes. While the state and private sector are seen as key partners in the making of urban regimes and growth machines that enable development projects, this chapter nuances the participation of civil society organisations.

Relatedly, civil society participation is a core interest in development studies,” with international development agencies and donors arguing that civil participation is vital to democracy and development (Cornwall, 2008; Edwards and Hulme, 1992; McIlwaine, 1998; Robinson and Friedman, 2007). For instance, civil society organizations are seen as important actors for holding the state accountable and can serve as a solution to the negative effects of undemocratic forms of natural resource management (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012; Humphreys et al., 2007). A number of scholars have challenged claims that civil society organisations contribute to progressive forms of development, arguing that they can actually further neoliberal governance by taking on the work of the state (Craig and Porter, 2003; Peck and Tickell, 2002; Swyngedouw, 2005). In light of these debates, and given the fact that civil society organisations remain prominent actors in studies on governance-beyond-the-state, this chapter focuses on the engagement between civil society organisations, the state, and governance processes. Furthermore, this chapter’s particular concern and contribution to these debates is to examine the potential for civil society to influence development outcomes in the context where there are strong transnational corporate actors, such as in Sekondi-Takoradi (e.g. oil companies).

Building on Watson’s (2014) call to focus on moments of state-society “co-production,” this chapter contributes to these debates about the potential of civil society organisations to co-produce development agendas with the state that speak to inclusive, redistributive and pro-poor development goals. In order to do so, these civil society organisations engage in strategies of collaboration and contestation. With a insight into civil society organisations working on local and global concerns in the city of Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana, this chapter traces how civil society organisations build on and extend democratic forms of state capacity (e.g. participatory planning and legislative channels) in light of powerful
transnationalised economic interests in the city. This chapter commences by examining ways in which local civil society organisations co-produced multiple governance spaces through interfacing with the state and international agencies and bodies, for instance through the establishment of legislative instruments that monitor and evaluate different aspects of the oil and gas industry. The chapter then moves to examine how civil society organisations work with local “communities” (a sub-city administrative unit) to produce community action plans that are incorporated into medium-term development plans. This chapter also shows how concerns raised by local communities within and beyond the administrative boundaries of a city serve to expand the spatial “territory” of state responsibility, giving rise to new regionalised areas of interventions by the state and donor agencies.

The overall aim of this chapter is to examine how civil society organisations work with the capacities of the state (for example, through planning and legislative changes) to further inclusive development agendas, even as they contest agendas spearheaded by state and corporate actors. This chapter thus shows how state-society relations can further the capacity of the local state without weakening it (which is a concern of neoliberal critics regarding international development interventions), as well as extend the spatial and territorial scope of state intervention by redefining understandings of urban regional boundaries.

6.2. Setting the Scene: On City-Forming Civil Society Organisations

Before examining the efforts of civil society actors in shaping place-based governance, this section aims to set the scene by providing the historical context of civil society organisations in Sekondi-Takoradi and highlighting the current city-forming CSOs in Sekondi-Takoradi. It draws upon analytical threads concerning tensions in defining civil society as within the state or separate from the state. These tensions continue to play out in Sekondi-Takoradi and elsewhere in the region, where informal settlement, distributive policies, and “improvisionation” by grassroots groups like the People’s Dialogue and Ghana Federation of the Urban Poor (both are in collaboration with Slum Dwellers International (SDI) have led recognition of “informal” economies, as well as opened up spaces of negotiation with local officials (Simone, 2004; Watson, 2014).
Drawing on theoretical threads from Chapter 2, analyses on civil society in African contexts focus on the ways in which civil society groups simultaneously work with and against the state. In this sense, the impetus for CSO formation in African contexts is far ranging. It includes relationships that these groups have with traditional authorities, as well as the presence of a “political” civil society in the sense of trade unions (e.g.) railways, the institutionalisation of civil society organisations (at times funded by international donors), as well as more informalised political arrangements that continue to operate throughout the city. On the one hand, historicised accounts point to the “blurring” of the boundary between the state and civil society. In this instance, relations between political leaders and those they serve are seen as intertwined. As argued by Chabal and Daloz (1999), and based on historicised relations that continue today, “the business of politics is more usually conducted along informal vertical channels of relations (patron-client networks, communal organizations, etc.), linking the elites with the rest of the population” (p. 21). At the same time, Chabal and Daloz (1999) point to moments of “organized political opposition” in the form of violent and non-violent protests, strikes, and campaigns that challenge the political order (p. 21). This is certainly demonstrated by the rise of trade unions in Ghana (particularly the railway workers) that challenged colonial rule to help usher in Ghanaian independence under Kwame Nkrumah. In addition, Western interventions by donors have further institutionalised civil society as a sphere that can hold governments accountable in exchange for funding and support (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Ferguson, 1994; Mercer, 2003). As such, civil society organisations across the world include political and economic associations, voluntary organizations, community groups, trade unions, religious groups, and professional organisations that stretch local and international scales (McIlwaine, 1998).

The tensions spelled out by this context continue to play out in African frameworks. Despite the push to formalise and institutionalise civil society in African contexts (partly driven by donors and international organisations), the historicised blurring of state and civil society, coupled with informality, continue to shape the formation of social order, the built form and urban regimes. According to Lindell (2008), “In many African cities, with extensively informalised systems of service provision and livelihoods, popular groups have devised their own sets of rules for regulating relations irrespective of state policy or approval (p. 1882). Recent examples in the African context include the improvisational and casual ways in which residents and groups form their own informal economies and methods they use to “assemble” informal infrastructures to connect to energy networks,
both of which incrementally change the urban form (McFarlane, 2011; Silver, 2014; Simone, 2004). While these instances point to emergent and informal formations of civil society, examples also point to the ways in which residents and groups often negotiate with government officials for certain favours in exchange for political or electoral support (Bénit-Gbaffou and Oldfield, 2011; Goodfellow, 2018; Harris, 2014). This gives rise to urban regimes marked by informal relationships between the local state, community leaders, and everyday residents who live in “gray spaces,” between formality and illegality (Yiftachel, 2009).

In setting the scene for examining “city-forming” civil society organisations in Sekondi-Takoradi, there are many diverse groups operating across local, national and international scales that utilise grassroots mobilization, as well as institutional support donors and international organisations. This includes traditional authorities, small and international civil society organisations, donor and international financial institutions, trade unions, local business associations like the Chamber of Commerce, and grassroots mobilisers and activists. Their strategies for improving their living conditions and shaping urban development projects are diverse and involve working with and against stakeholders in both formalised and informalised political arrangements.

6.3. Collaboration, Contestation and Co-Production: The Role of Civil Society Participation in Planning

The idea of stakeholders together creating place-based policies and development agendas is a core focus of this thesis. This also serves as the analytical thread for concepts such as “collaborative planning,” “strategic spatial planning,” “urban regimes,” “network governance,” “public-private partnerships” (Allen and Cochrane, 2007; Elander, 2002; Hajer and Zonneveld, 2000; Healey, 2003; McCann and Ward, 2011; Pierre, 1998; Savitch and Kantor, 2002; Stoker, 1998). However, as Westerink et al., (2017) argues, there needs to be a focus beyond seeing citizens as reactionaries to the state (p. 148). For instance, Healey (2006) posits that it is possible for non-governmental actors to participate in specific initiatives and contribute to formal spheres of decision-making on a citywide level (p. 288). In addition, scholars writing from contexts of informality (and non-Weberian systems of government) have focused on the capacity of citizens to self-organise (Albrechts, 2013; Healey, 1992) contribute to “insurgent” forms of citizenship (Holston, 2008; Mirafttab, 2009). With a view toward bridging ideas of collaborative planning with those of grassroots
activism, this thesis turns to focus on how civil society organisations contribute to citywide and regional planning processes to address deficits in local state capacity and how this state-society engagement co-produces a more transformative and inclusive urban development agenda. Of importance is that neoliberal logics and agendas do shape the conditions of planning outcomes, the role of civil society actors, and the resources available for progressive aims. At the same time, communicative and strategic spatial planning provides an arena for a plurality of interests, conflicts, and power relations to play out beyond deterministic development trajectories (Albrechts, 2013; Healey, 1992). As Albrechts (2013) argues, studies on neoliberal urban governance tend to compress citizen participation into a “one-size-fits-all” model that focuses on protests and critical responses to top-down agendas, rather than recognition of moments where co-production emerges between state and civil society.

While there are differing versions of the concept of coproduction in strategic spatial planning (Albrechts, 2013; Watson, 2014), a starting definition comes from the Nobel-Prize economist Elinor Ostrom. In Ostrom (1996), “coproduction implies that citizens can play an active role in producing public goods and services of consequence to them. Coproduction is one way that synergy between what a government does and what citizens do can occur” (p. 1073). Moreover, Ostrom (1996) argues for finding “synergy” between the state and citizen participation:

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\text{Prior efforts directed at improving the training and capacity of public officials have frequently had disappointing results. Efforts directed at increasing citizen ‘participation’ in petitioning others to provide goods for them have also proved disappointing. Efforts directed at increasing the potential complementarities between official and citizen production or problem-solving activities may require more time at the initial stage of a process, but promise a much higher, long-term return (p. 1083).}
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Pointing to the example of physical infrastructure, in which there are examples of fragmentation and “splintering” due to privatisation (Graham and Marvin, 2001) and “improvisation” (Silver, 2014), Ostrom (1996) offers instead the potential of identifying complementarities in infrastructure, for instance, between the major “trunk” lines (as organised by agencies due to the scale and financial requirement) and the planning of
smaller “feeder” lines that stem from local needs and capabilities (p. 1083). As Ostrom (1996) suggests, there are issues of corruption at the state level, thus forms of “horizontal” participation are necessary for the realisation of long-term development outcomes (p. 1084). These issues have been raised in contexts of the global South, in which patronage and clientelism continue to shape civil society participation in development projects (Bénit-Gbaffou and Oldfield, 2011; Mohan, 2002; Robins et al., 2008). However, there is “logic” to the actions of poorer communities (Robins et al., 2008), since they shift between “different clientelism and rights-based citizenship claims, using apparently contradictory discourses opportunistically” (Waston, 2014, p. 70). Important here is to examine the ways in which poor communities and civil society organisations “access” the “porous” state for their aims, far from the ideal of the Weberian state (Bénit-Gbaffou and Oldfield, 2011).

6.4. Civil Society Participation and the Formation of Legislative Instruments in Ghana

This section provides context that frames civil society participation in Ghana, highlighting both its limitations and potential. The section commences with an institutionalist legal framework before focusing on how some civil society actors engage in legislative pathways (for instance, by forming the Public Interest Accountability Committee that monitors state and corporate sectors) in a liberal democratic context. The section then moves to describe how community groups and civil society organisations, (some funded by donors), have contributed to urban planning pathways as a way to negotiate and contest their development agendas. This includes civil society actors operating on different scales, from local to national, and engaging in different strategies, from more formal to informal. As Miraftab (2009) highlights: “Movement members sit in boardrooms and use both the court and judicial systems and formal politics to pursue the citizenship rights granted by [the] Constitution. But they combine that use of formal, legal strategies with informal survival livelihood practices and with oppositional practices. Their strategies range from informal negotiations…to mass mobilizations and protests, sit-ins, and land invasions – as well as the use of courts and legal claims” (p. 37). This section shows how the politics of planning for urban development outcomes can bring together these different citizen-led strategies.

Individual liberties that enable civil society participation are enshrined in Ghana’s 1992 Constitution include: freedom of the press and expression, freedom of thought, freedom to practice any religion, freedom of assembly, freedom of association and freedom of
movement (Ghana Constitution, 1992, Chapter 5, Article 21). These freedoms facilitate certain forms of civil society action (Gyimah-Boadi and Oquaye, 2000). The drafting of the constitution and the rights enshrined coincided with a move by the central government to pursue social and economic liberalisation programmes in exchange for debt relief. According to Mercer and Green (2013), the “civil society policy template” has been present throughout Africa since the 1980s, with links to democratic transitions and structural adjustment programmes (p. 2). These processes are coupled with wider calls by civil society actors for political stability and democracy. For example, in the early 1990s, the “Movement for Freedom and Justice” (MFJ) fought for the return of multi-party politics and civilian rule in Ghana, as opposed to military rule under Rawlings (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996).

As such, international development discourses, central government action, and civil movements paved the way for contradictory and duelling processes that place state responsibilities in the hands of local governments and civil society actors. In theory, under the logic of liberal democracy, this political framework protects the rights of citizens to engage in political affairs; however, it also provides incentives for the state and civil society organisations to expand “participation” in governance as a means of donor funding. Much has been written about the potential pitfalls of civil society participation (i.e. politics of inclusion/exclusion, elite capture, weakening the state capacity), yet civil society organisations continue to play a prominent role in democracy and development discourses. As such, an alternative form of examining state-society engagement is necessary, particularly in bridging literatures on collaborative and co-production planning strategies with contexts found in cities of the global south.

This section traces some of the sites of civil society participation in governance, showing how civil society organisations mobilise international discourses and build on state capacities to shape new “kinds of work” as they move away from being service providers to being “partners” in ensuring state accountability and transparency (Mercer and Green, 2013). In the case of the oil and gas industry in Ghana, this includes monitoring and evaluating funded development projects (oil-revenue) and creating demand for training programmes after the passage of the local content law at local and national levels. These examples have been used in Chapter 4 to highlight the logic behind “private sector development,” yet they also point to how civil society organisations shape development
pathways in light of “growth” agendas spearheaded by the state and private sector actors. These examples (the formation of legislative instruments) do more than point to a more institutionalised form of civil society engagement with government pathways. These government pathways also provide the context for the following sections, which trace how civil society organisations contribute to more inclusive forms of planning and how their relations with the state define the territorial reach and responsibility of state action.

In 2010, following the discovery of oil off the coast of Sekondi-Takoradi, in 2010, nearly 110 civil society organisations, including policy think tanks, small community-based organisations, and environmental groups came together to form the “Civil Society Platform for Oil and Gas” (D’Alessandro et al., 2014; Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh, 2012). This Platform received support from Oxfam America, the Revenue Watch Institute, and the World Bank, making it a “stakeholder” in conversations with the central state, parliament and transnational oil companies (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh 2012). Here we see civil society network that operates across different scales, from the local to transnational, being drawn into policy discussions. In response to calls for transparency and accountability by civil society organisations, the Mills (NDC) Administration drafted and passed the Petroleum Revenue Management Act (PRMA) and Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill in 2011. These two pieces of legislation called for:

Clear procedures for the custody and transfer of petroleum receipts between the central bank, as a designated custodian, and the government; the mandatory annual transfer of 30 per cent of total petroleum revenues into separate stabilization and future savings funds; the mandatory publication by the Finance Ministry of quarterly reports of petroleum receipts and expenditures; multiple audits of the petroleum accounts and the establishment of the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC), a thirteen member independent watchdog group tasked with monitoring and reporting on government stewardship of petroleum funds and compliance with the law. (Gary et al., 2009)

Civil society, in this case, was able to ensure that the Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) would be independent, nominated by statutorily non-state stakeholders, free from the political-party nominees. Moreover, civil society organisations rejected Parliament’s proposal to reserve a seat on the board for a member of the state-owned
Ghana National Petroleum Company (GNPC) (Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh 2012). These legal frameworks for civil society participation, which are weighed against concerns about who gets “invited” (Cornwall, 2002; Miraftab, 2004b) nevertheless enable legislative pathways and governance arenas for civil actors to contest state action (or inaction) and the effects of the oil and gas industry on everyday citizens. In Ghana, civil society organisations (with financial support from donors) continue to host stakeholder forums around the effects of the oil and gas industry. In Edgar Pieterse’s (2008) model of urban governance, Pieterse argues that “neo-corporatist stakeholder forums” serve as a predictable space for negotiations about key issues across multiple stakeholders: private sector, civil society and the state (p. 7). Some question the potential of these meetings to contribute to progressive outcomes and whether they lead to the furthering of elite spaces of governance. Yet, as Pieterse (2008) espouses:

Should these criticisms lead us to reject the role of multi-stakeholder forums in advancing radical democratic urban politics? I think not. It is crucial to remain aware of the depoliticising dangers of such forums along with the built-in tendency to cater for well organised, resourced and articulate political groups. Yet, given the complexity of urban development challenges it is imperative to build broad-based agreement, even if provisional and continuously renewed, about the future direction of the city and how to get there. (p. 7)

For example, on October 14, 2014, three Ghanaian NGOs—Friends of the Nation, ACEP and CEPIL, with support from WERENGO and funding from STAR Ghana, organized the “CSO Forum on the Marine Pollution and Exploration and Production Bills” in Takoradi. The two-day meeting, which was conducted in both English and Fante, was attended by:

- Ghanaian petroleum workers (from Schlumberger, Baker Hughes and Stellar Logistics),
- Members of the Trade Union Congress (TUC),
- Fishermen from the group CANOE,
- CEMAG (a volunteer environmental monitoring committee)
- National policy think tanks such as ACEP and CEPIL
- Local assembly members
During this meeting, points were raised about the importance of amending two pieces of legislation—the Marine Pollution Bill and the Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill—so that more local communities would benefit. A representative from Friends of the Nation summarised:

We need to maximize our revenue generation. We need to make sure that companies are paying taxes. It’s not an issue of employment, but also the quality of employment. How do the companies participate in development? We need to make sure there are proper investments, if companies are doing social investments, they should do good ones, not just a random thing to put there. We also want to minimise environmental damage. We know it’s a finite resource, from 15-20 years when the oil disappears, we are left with our environment. While there will be some damage now, we need to minimise it. We are seeing obstruction of fishing activities especially in major fishing seasons. (Meeting transcript. CSO Forum. SSNIT Conference Hall, Takoradi. 01/10/2014)

During this discussion, different members shared a wide variety of strategies. These included monitoring social and environmental impacts that affect “livelihoods,” issues that are found in the oil and gas companies’ Environmental Impact Assessments. Members argued for following up with the local government officials as well as the community development officers from oil companies. Others argued for “streamlining” the ideas raised—about expanding quality jobs, for instance—with the city’s Medium Term Development Plan. Finally, the head of a trade union argued that “there needs to be focus on the poor and underprivileged” and that the group can start fighting with “union mechanisms” such as taking collective action through strikes and protests (Meeting transcript. CSO Forum. SSNIT Conference Hall, Takoradi. 01/10/2014). For instance, unionised Ghanaian employees from the oil company Schlumberger staged a strike six months prior, demanding that increased salaries be more in line with those of their expatriate counterparts (MyJoyOnline, 2014; Nyabor, 2014).

What is important to note here is that the idea of civil society includes having an “arena” (Edwards, 2011) for discussing and generating ideas related to policymaking and governance. In other meetings attended by this author in 2014-2015, various civil society representatives shared problems that could be addressed through stakeholder participation,
legislative instruments and state pathways. When asked about the origins of the local content law, which was passed in 2013, a representative from the Sekondi-Takoradi Chamber of Commerce shared that these stakeholder meetings (like the one referenced above) contributed to the passage of certain civil society-led pieces of legislation:

It’s difficult to trace the origins [of the local content law]. It’s different policymakers, organisations and individuals that all came together to provide input…advocacy is one of the main services of the chamber, so talking to the business community and bundling their opinions and needs is everyday business, and it’s no different for the oil and gas business. To get the law passed, we provided input and we also spoke a lot with the Takoradi MP Kwabena Ochere-Darko Mensah who was also MP at the time sitting in parliament. He was a major player in getting the bill passed into law. (Personal Communications, B11, STCCI Business Advisor, 26/01/2018)

Derived at “local” stakeholder meetings, these ideas make their way through national legislative channels, with local and national organisations pushing for policy implementation at varying levels of government. For instance, at the annual Public Interest Accountability Meeting (the government advisory group that monitors oil and gas revenues), one of the board members reported:

[The Government] should have spent more on capacity building. They should focus on expenditure to this or very much will be in the control of foreigners…The government should endeavour to focus its expenditure under the capacity building priority area on interventions that will directly enhance the capacity and capabilities of Ghanaians to play a bigger role in the emerging oil and gas industry as envisioned in the Local Content Policy and Regulations. (Meeting transcript. Coconut Grove Regency Hotel, Accra. 30/10/2014)

While it’s difficult to trace the multiple logics and actions that enable and disable development projects, concerns about the distribution of economic benefits and discussions about local content by civil society actors have shaped investments by oil companies and the state. This includes examples from Chapter 4 concerning Tullow Oil’s $6 million dollar investment in the “Jubilee Technical Training Centre” at the Takoradi
Polytechnic (renamed Takoradi Technical University), as well as other training programmes co-funded by the central government and donor agencies, including the Ghana Supply Chain and Enterprise Development Centre. In addition, in light of concerns about local capacity and the local content law, the Sekondi-Takoradi Chamber of Commerce organised the “Ghana Extractive Industry Safety Conference.” According to the Senior Executive at the Sekondi-Takoradi Chamber of Commerce:

It’s one thing having the policies, it’s another having the capacity to implement the policies…with this conference, the occupational health and safety conference in the extractive industry, this will critique policies, this will analyse policies. This conference will bring new policies to make the industry relevant. That is the premise of this conference. Then beyond this, we are also setting up a learning center now to provide competence. Competence to companies, specifically local companies in order to implement Health and Safety Policies to be relevant in the industry. (Interview A27, Local Business, 07/10/2014)

The following section moves beyond legislative instruments, which informs Ghana’s democratic local governance context, to show how civil society organisations contribute to inclusive planning aims through the creation of localised community action plans that feed into the city’s Medium Term Development Plan. In light of strong market-based logic for economic growth (e.g. neoliberal agendas), this area provides a rich context for studying state-society engagement around the coordination of inclusive urban development outcomes,

6.5. Co-Producing Planning Knowledge: Self-Enumeration and Evaluations of City Services

As Chapter 5 argues, the formation of Medium Term Development Plans, which are organised by local governments (district, municipal and metropolitan assemblies) convenes a wide range of interests and players, from local grassroots organisers to transnational corporate actors. Analyses of Sekondi-Takoradi’s plans show how the development agendas of these plans have changed over time. For example, while the first plan focused on poverty alleviation, later plans centred on growing the economy by supporting the oil and gas industry, as well as other forms of private sector development. However, there are
elements in the plan that speak to wider social and environmental concerns, and are
grounded in progressive and developmentalist goals. Parnell and Robinson (2006) raised
this insight about how local governments need to balance competing agendas. Referencing
the 2002 adoption of Joburg 2030, the City Development Strategy (CDS) created by the City
of Johannesburg, Parnell and Robinson (2006) argue that this citywide strategy is “a serious
attempt to reconcile the competing interests which frame the challenges of city
development in Johannesburg” (p. 342). The strategy combines the accommodation of
global economic activities (pro-growth ambitions) with delivering basic services to informal
settlement (pro-poor needs) (Parnell and Robinson, 2006, p. 342). Relatedly, political
parties are elected based on their ability to balance competing interests and mobilise
different voter bases (Bénit-Gbaffou et al., 2013; Fourchard, 2012; Lindell, 2008). This
section thus traces the process of how civil society organisations contribute to city
development plans, moving away from market-based and economic growth strategies
towards prioritising and identifying the needs of locally underserved communities.

Before turning to concentrate on the formation of civil society-led “community action
plans,” which feed into Medium Term Development Plans, it is important to note that
these plans and the articulations of certain types of development by local communities exist
within a wider context of knowledge formation. According to Watson (2014), one of the
practices of co-production is that of self-enumerating and settlement mapping, usually by
informal settlements, as a way to “specify demands” and “increase their visibility” to the
state (p. 67). However, following Foucault, these techniques of governmentality—of
counting, mapping and planning—have also been employed by the state apparatus to
govern and control populations (Foucault, 2007, cited in Ghertner, 2015). As James Scott
(1998) argues, state intervention, through large-scale schemes, requires legible
measurement: “whatever units are to be manipulated, they must be organised in a manner
that permits them to be identified, observed, recorded, counted, aggregated, and
monitored” (p. 183). However, anthropologist Tania Murray Li (2005) questions this
“spatial optic” of the state as being “up there” (p. 384). Challenging the idea that the state
has a “monopoly” on improvement, Li argues for situating the state and development
schemes within “a tangled set of practices, processes and relations” (p. 384). These tools—
the census, map, and plan—can be mobilised by both state and non-state actors to co-
produce development aims that improve urban conditions. Following anthropologist
Arjun Appadurai (2012) the “rituals” of self-enumeration by non-state actors, particularly
those living in poorer and informal contexts, put the power back into the community
through this “right to research” and “self-knowledge” that is capable of “deepening democracy” (p. 640). These “rituals,” which originated from pavement dwellers in India, have circulated through transnational networks (such as Slum Dwellers International) and been adopted by other civil society organisations (Watson, 2014). In Sekondi-Takoradi, the international NGO Global Communities (formerly CHF International), with support from local government, expanded this practice of enumeration across the city.

Migration related to the oil and gas boom increased demand for city services in Sekondi-Takoradi (Obeng-Odoom, 2014; Yankson et al., 2017). In response, USAID, Global Communities, and the STMA created the Citizens Report Card, which enumerated and mapped out how citizens felt about city services. 834 households were selected for the study. Neighborhoods ranked their priorities, while also assessing the city’s service delivery. For instance, the Citizen’s Report Card map shows residents’ satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with services such as water, education, public health, public toilets, solid waste, security, roads drainage, public markets, and residents’ perception about the STMA. More importantly, these processes facilitated in-person meetings between service providers and local communities over quality of services (or the lack thereof). The ranking of service needs and assessments about the quality of the services across the sub-metro areas reveal spatial patterns of inequality, allowing civil society actors to define certain areas as underserved in comparison to other areas. The report, which details residents’ evaluation of city services, prompted a response from the city mayor, Captain Cudjoe:

The Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly considers residents of the ‘Oil city’ as clients who we serve with municipal services and their feedback is of utmost importance. Our mission as an Assembly is to improve the living conditions of citizens of the Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly through the provision of sustainable socio-economic development and good governance that is responsive to the needs of the people and the STMA Citizens report card helps us do just this. Major findings from the survey and its recommendations will fill in the gaps to improve municipal governance, which translates into more efficient and better services for our clients. The Assembly considers the information gathered as primarily objective information that complements the data utilized by the Assembly for planning purposes. (CHF International and STMA, 2012)
Despite displaying managerial language of “efficiency,” what is important to note here is how information, rooted in the opinions of local residents, as enumerated and mapped by civil society organisations, serves to quantify notions of unequal access and justify demands that the city provide and deliver better services. Moving from the practice of enumeration, the following section focuses on how civil society organisations contribute to citywide planning processes.


There is a variance between how planning is supposed to take place in theory (for instance, Ghana’s decentralised planning system) and in practice (for instance, multiple actors with competing interests and needs), in cosmopolitan cities marked by difference. This relates to Sandercock’s (2000) contention that matters of transnational migration, post-colonialism and the rise of civil society come together to put issues of difference on the planning agenda (p. 14), making the task of “managing our coexistence in a shared space” (Healey, 1997, p. 3, cited in Sandercock, 2000) a dynamic and difficult one. According to (Robins et al., 2008) while state agencies (for instance, the planning unit), politicians, and donor-funded NGOs are seen as “mediators of liberal democracy, rights and citizenship,” their programmes often run up against political realities and cultures (p. 1075). This chapter tracks how planning is conceptualised and how it is practiced between the local state, civil society organisations and local communities, focusing on the possibility of inclusive development.

Ghana’s decentralised planning system stems from the 1992 Constitution, which divided the country into 10 administrative regions, each with their own regional ministers, and metropolitan, municipal and district assemblies (MMDAs) (Ahwoi, 2010). However, vestiges of former planning systems remain in place, such as keeping land rights in the hands of traditional authorities and giving local government the administrative task of creating and implementing certain planning processes, the latter being a feature of the British colonial system of indirect rule ((Apter, 2015; Gough and Yankson, 2000; Rathbone, 2000). Following the creation of Ghana’s local government and decentralised planning system, President Jerry Rawlings’ administration published the Ghana: Vision 2020, The First Step: 1996-2000 national plan in 1995. This plan aimed to spur economic growth by investing in infrastructure development, in farmers and agricultural outputs, and in
industrialists and their production. As part of the decentralised planning system, local district assemblies were tasked with creating plans and development objectives that fed into this overall national framework (ibid).

This planning system remains in place. In fact, the national plans and guidelines formulated by the National Development Planning Commission inform the Medium-Term Development Plans at the district assembly level. In practice, national guidelines are often delayed and the planning processes (including implementation) are often underfunded. At the same time, these plans remain strategic, with this state pathway convening a wide range of actors, while the plans provide a blueprint that is used to usher in certain types of development projects. In theory, as part of the planning process, local governments, along with their planning units, are tasked with soliciting comments and development agendas from all sub-city “community units.” For instance, in Sekondi-Takoradi, there are a total of 49 communities (USAID et al., 2010). In practice, planning offices are often under-resourced and constrained, with funding delays and staffing shortages (Acheampong, 2018; Owusu, 2008; Yeboah and Obeng-Odoom, 2010). In this context, multiple civil society organisations, from international NGOs to smaller community-based organisations, politically engage with this process of plan making.

In the words of a director at Global Communities, based in Sekondi-Takoradi:

With the planning laws of the country, you are supposed to have visited all these communities and interacted with them, listened to them, note what are their visions, their aspirations, their needs and everything and these are supposed to reflect into the Assembly’s plan…But when we came in we decided to ensure that each and every community is involved…Those communities that we don’t work with are the ones like Beach Road, where you go and you have a facility that was leased $5000 a month. Those places are already well-planned, there is water, there is electricity, revenue is collected. That doesn’t mean that they are left out of planning. These are where all the big people live…When they need something…they can walk into Mayor’s office and say, look, the lights in our area went off for two days and now we don’t have light. The Mayor will quickly make sure that it is rectified. These are people who have voices and they are not our concern. Those that we are concerned about are those who do not have that kind
of power to be able to go to challenge the authorities on their issues. (Interview A15, International CSO, 16/10/2014).

Spearheaded by Global Communities with local implementation support from COLANDEF a local civil society organisation focused on securing land tenure rights and land resource management, the “IncluCity,” initiative aimed to solicit input from 35 communities—the most disadvantaged ones—to feed into the city’s Medium Term Development Plan. The metropolitan assembly decided on the 35 communities based on poverty indicators from its 2010 census data. This approach explicitly recognizes that some communities are more underserved than others in the city.

Figur 6.1: Global Communities’ “IncluCity Model” for Inclusive Planning

Source: Global Communities, 2015

Dubbed the “Grassroots Outreach and Civic Awareness Campaign for Citizen Activism and Participation of the Urban Poor in Governance,” this community-level planning process was facilitated by the Development Planning Unit of STMA and two civil society organisations, one international and one local, although both had offices in the city. Funding for this programme came from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, with
support from Cities Alliance (a global partnership formed between the World Bank and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements). The process for the creation of the community action plans started with a two-day training workshop that included “assembly members, unit committee members, traditional authorities, opinion leaders and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) present in each of the communities” (Global Communities, “IncluCity,” 2015). This language, derived from an international organisation’s informational document, conveys how international organisations have a general sense of who they want to participate and invite (e.g. opinion leaders and CBOs). Yet, it is local organisations and political leaders who have the knowledge and capacity to mobilise and organise specific individuals and organisations to attend meetings and participate in planning processes (e.g. fishmongers and dressmakers).

Asked in an interview how groups are identified as part of this participatory planning process, a representative from another civil society organisation, Friends of the Nation stated:

We have various identifiable groups, so we have the traditional leaders, we have women’s groups, youth groups, we have fishmongers, we have dressmakers. So, all the various identifiable social economic groups, they send their representatives to the meetings to discuss. And we meet the people in terms of their area councils. So, the area councils are the sub-district [government] structures. (Interview A8, Local CSO, 09/10/2014)

It is important to note here that international donors and NGOs like USAID and Global Communities rely on local community-based organisations (like Friends of the Nation) in order to connect to “the grassroots” (Mercer and Green, 2013). These connection tactics extend beyond email to include in-person meeting invitation delivery, text messages, and phone calls. An expanded transcalar urban lens shows how local organisations cross global scales by working with international groups and their causes, just as they localise the presence of international donors and NGOs.

While this quote does not make clear that there are systems in place to ensure a fully inclusive model of participation (which is difficult to measure), what is does make evident is that civil society organisations work within existing governance structures: working with
traditional authorities and sub-district area councils. Criticism has been made that this could exclude some people from such “invited” spaces (Cornwall, 2002) and that some of the development priorities might not be radical or progressive. Yet at the same time, we see the expanded reach of state responsibility (on planning matters) being facilitated by civil society organisations. In addition, given the prominence of planning processes and new pathways for funding development (including donors, central government, oil and gas companies), civil society organisations recognise the important of contributing to these development plans. In the words of representative from COLANDEF:

Once your medium-term development plan is available, whatever CSR [corporate social responsibility] project that oil and gas [companies] want to invest and carry out, or whoever [else], they need to look at the plan and see: this is where the assembly wants to go. We help them achieve it, because we believe that we cannot leave development solely to the assembly. It has to be a shared effort. (Interview A3, Local CSO, 25/11/2014)

The Friends of the Nation representative also echoed this same sentiment:

So, we want to streamline things, so that we avoid duplication and also to promote for the effective utilisation of limited resources available because if we are aligned with each other, the assembly would also get some relief because they know that if they put this plan…it [could be] funded by the oil companies. (Interview A8, Local CSO, 09/10/2014)

This quote is evocative in that it argues for the importance of medium-term development plans, a focus of the previous chapter. Here civil society organisations recognise the dual scalar nature of the local state: these organisations understand that they are part of the assembly (as city citizens living in the assembly), yet at the same time, they choose not to see “development” as defined by the local government (also called the assembly). These civil society groups are arguing that they help inform and define the local state and its plans. In Johanna Rapp’s (2017) analysis of the challenge of governing natural resources in Ghana’s petroleum sector, the author found that respondents generally approve of the role that traditional authorities and civil society organisations play in governing Ghana’s oil and gas resources, yet caution against assuming that these actors always represent the interests
of local communities (p. 119). This thesis is mindful that studies on governance need to focus on the practices and actions of different actors, in other words, what they do not, only what they say they do. The next section focuses on the ways in which local community interests have been represented and expressed in urban planning processes, as facilitated by civil society organisations.

Another practice that informs the co-production of city-wide plans includes the creation of community action plans. This following section compares six community action plans out of 35 that were created from the following communities: Adientem, Akromakrom, Effiaakuma, Kwesimintsim, New Takoradi, and Nkontompo. These six plans are chosen for analysis because they are from comparatively different communities, all existing within the boundaries of Sekondi-Takoradi. Two are rural communities that have small populations (Adientem and Akromakrom), two are inner city communities with large populations (Effiaakuma and Kwesimintsim), and two are coastal communities where fishing is the main industry (New Takoradi and Nkontompo). The table below depicts a synthesis of six action plans collected during fieldwork from the STMA’s Development Planning Unit, the department tasked with the creation of the city’s Medium Term Development Plans.
### Table 6.1: A Survey of Six Community Action Plans in Sekondi-Takoradi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Specific Priority Areas</th>
<th>Estimated Cost of Projects (2012-2015)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adientem</strong></td>
<td>One of the few communities that lack access to public basic school. The inhabitants are mainly farmers. Agriculture is the main economic activity of the people, in which about 80% of the inhabitants engage. Community is poorly served in terms of basic services.</td>
<td>1. Education 2. Roads and drainage system 3. Youth Empowerment 4. Water and sanitation 5. Agriculture 6. Health 7. Energy 8. Security</td>
<td>618,500 cedis for 24 projects. Top three projects are: 1. Construct a 6 unit classroom block with ancillary facilities 2. Provide a 6 bedroom housing unit for teachers with ancillary facilities 3. Seal 3 km length of road from the community to Anaji with asphalts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Akromakrom</strong></td>
<td>Farming community, about 99% of inhabitants engage in agriculture. The community is poorly served in terms of basic social amenities. Access to good sewerage infrastructure is virtually non-existent in the community. The road leading to the community is unengineered and in a very deplorable state.</td>
<td>1. Road 2. Water and Sanitation 3. Energy 4. Agriculture 5. Education 6. Health</td>
<td>352,500.00 cedis for 24 projects. Top three projects are: 1. Construction of a community bridge 2. Fill and gravel the main road linking the community to other communities. 3. Construct two mechanized borehole water supply system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effiakum</strong></td>
<td>Effiakuma is a “slum” community. Due to its inadequate socio-economic infrastructure, it is regarded as one of the moderate poverty pocket areas within the Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolis.</td>
<td>1. Drainage 2. Water and Sanitation Electricity Road Education Employment Sports</td>
<td>862,000 cedis for 20 projects. Top three projects are: 1. Desilt drains 2. Construct six refuse platforms and provide refuse containers 3. Rehabilitate access roads in the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kwesimintsim</strong></td>
<td>Kwesimintsim is a “slum” community. This is a community that has been in existence for over 200 years. Due to the slum nature of the community there are few roads and alleys, as well as a scarcity of land.</td>
<td>1. Road 2. Education 3. Water and Sanitation Agriculture 4. Urban/community development 5. Local economic development 6. Health 7. Security</td>
<td>1. Develop one football field 2. Construction of drainage system from Obiri Lotteries to R. Ayilley and desilt drains 3. Construct three public stand pipes facilities and three storage facilities (water kiosk)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Population: 689 (based on 2010 estimate)*

*Population: 500 (based on 2010 estimate)*

*Population: 47,245 (based on 2010 estimate)*

*Population: 26,670*
New Takoradi

New Takoradi is located on the coast. It is regarded as one of the low-income communities within the Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolis and has inadequate socio-economic infrastructure. The community is characterised by high unemployment, a high rate of unskilled youth, poor environmental conditions, high incidence of sanitation related diseases and high levels of illiteracy. In 1924, when the Takoradi Harbour construction became a necessity, the community was relocated to the current location.

Population: 19,902 (based on 2010 estimate)

1. Water and Sanitation
2. Education
3. Energy (Electricity)
4. Road
5. Youth development
6. Private sector
7. Health

317,000 cedis for 20 projects. Top three projects are:
1. Provision of an incinerator in the community to reduce the dumping of refuse along the sea
2. Provision of scholarship scheme for brilliant but needy children in the community
3. Link 30 JHS graduates to vocational and technical schools

Nkontompo

Nkontompo is a fishing community and is one of the high poverty pocket zones within the metropolis. The community is flood prone and has a poor drainage system. The main economic activity of the people is fishing. Being a coastal community, about 90% of the population depends on fishing and its related activities as their main source of livelihood. The seasonal nature of fishing renders the majority of the people underemployed during the lean season.

Population: 5,978 (based on 2010 estimate)

1. Drainage system
2. Water and Sanitation
3. Education
4. Energy (Electricity)
5. Road
6. Youth development

372,200.00 cedis for 14 projects. Top three projects are:
1. Continuation and completion of the sea defense wall
2. Construct a retaining wall at the basic school
3. Rehabilitation of the JHS classroom block


Despite statistics highlighting the rate of informality and unemployment in the city (Ghana Statistical Services, 2010), local economic development and private sector growth rank low
on the list of priorities for development across the six communities. The project aims of all of these community plans speak to concerns about social-centred and infrastructural development projects—water, sanitation, health and education. They do not discuss many of the national guidelines, nor do they broach the city’s Medium Term Development Plan, which explicitly speaks to private sector growth in relation to the oil and gas industry. These plans provide more flexibility in catering to community needs versus those that are spearheaded by national or city governments. These action plans, which stem from 35 communities (a precise municipal unit) are more grounded in the realities at the sub-metropolitan level. In addition, these plans also provide a baseline and reveal what the community considers to be important assets—for instance the “slum” community in Kwemintisin shared that they have high quality teachers—over 97% are trained (ibid).

While the city’s MTDP outlines strategies for expanding the oil and gas industry and focuses on economic growth in the city, it also shares concerns that are raised by the community action plans, which tend to focus on issues of water, sanitation, electricity, pollution and road renovation. Although there are issues of financing and implementation for all the projects that different communities would like to see take place, these plans help to elaborate more effective use of resources. This ensures that projects that do take place are needed in a particular community and that capital intensive projects, like construction of hospitals or schools, serve areas in which there is a lack of infrastructure. In addition, these plans contribute to wider conversations about the need for the city government to invest in practices that increase its tax base. The creation of these local community action plans also helps sell the definitions of participatory planning to local citizens so that they can see that it is a process of governance that ensures that there is space for community and civil society voices to inform city strategies and visioning processes. These plans also serve as indicators of what does and does not get built, and how communities move forward and mobilise on their own to identify their needs.

6.7. Expanding the Regional Responsibility of the Local State

This section brings into view how state-society engagement through the politics of spatial planning serves to co-produce and expand understandings of scale and territory. As argued previously, by collecting input from local communities that are often underserved in terms of planning, as well as enumerating and ranking city services, civil society organisations
contribute to fostering a more inclusive planning process by providing direct feedback and data to inform development priorities. Continuing with an examination of civil-society-led planning processes, this section pivots to show how civil society organisations expand the “territorial” responsibility of the state to address regional concerns, which include bringing neglected coastal issues into governance and development agendas. As Jonas (2006) argues, debates about scalar categories have “opened up a world of multiple scales. It has freed our narratives from the singular and limiting preoccupations of locality on the one hand, and of globality on the other” (p. 400). In fact, Allen and Cochrane (2007) argue that the notion of regions as territorially fixed is problematic since they are relational assemblages consisting of private and public agencies, along with central, regional and local governments, that are ‘lodged’ in spaces of this socially constructed region. This is an important note, and was experienced during the course of this PhD research. For example, it was difficult to define the boundaries of the metropolitan region and the affected area while having to deal with issues associated with an emergent transnational corporate industry (oil and gas, specifically). In an interview, a representative from Hèn Mpoano, a local civil society organisation, expressed that attention was not being paid to issues of coastal governance, and stated the following:

One of our goals was to establish the enabling conditions for what we claim as a nested coastal governance for the western region. Nested in this sense means that we saw that there was a need to clarify the rules of all the different actors as far as coastal governance was concerned. These rules need to have both bottom-up and top-down interactions. We were trying to facilitate some dialogue between communities and then the national government. Based on the pressures coming from oil and gas development, oil and gas exploration, all the development plans happened on the immediate coast [Sekondi-Takoradi]. We felt that more and more the pressures on the coast will increase. Even now, these pressures are visible due to all the development happening along the coast when even you take Ellembele and Jomoro as a case. The gas infrastructure coming through is affecting the entire coastal districts because they are laying pipelines right from Ellembele to Shama. Look at the distance: over 1000km of gas pipeline being laid. We thought that these pressures would be mounting down the road. There is proposed infrastructure, oil and gas, with a deep-water seaport… More generation facilities have been planned for some of these coastal areas. There are
planned airports or airstrips, at least in each of the six coastal districts. (Interview A16, Local CSO, 09/12/2014)

As the above quote articulates, one of the issues for urban development strategies was that pressures from oil and gas expanded to other areas and jurisdictions. In this instance, the area of concern extended beyond the limits of the Sekondi-Takoradi metropolitan area. As Alan Harding (1995) echoes, to take city-regions seriously means focusing on how the spatial dimensions of particular material contexts (for instance, environmental pollution) inform and shape the actions of multiple actors (p. 455). My interviews attest to the fact that while urban development is concentrated in Sekondi-Takoradi, the “negative” effects of development, as well as desire for development, stretches beyond the limits of the STMA. In this sense, socio-economic dynamics taking place in Sekondi-Takoradi are affecting neighbouring areas, for instance with the effects of “spill over” and potential rise in cost of living, as well as issues around how these neighbouring areas are not benefiting as much relative to Sekondi-Takoradi.

These sentiments were echoed by a number of interviewees. A programme manager at Friends of the Nation stated, “the STMA is choked. There is no land available…That’s why there’s spillover…so these facilities are going to Ahanta West or Shama [neighbouring areas]. You see a lot of service companies going there,” (Interview A8, Local CSO, 09/10/2014). Another commented, “I think the future though is all west from here…there’s just more opportunity to expand. People are very mobile, so I think people will look to moving outside” (Interview A13, Donor, 25/03/2015). While these urban pressures are stretched beyond the limits of the city, there is also concern toward the lack of development taking place outside the urban centre. As a small business owner located outside of the Sekondi-Takoradi city limits notes:

The development hasn’t spread. So, I’m advocating that the development is supposed to trickle down to the other rural areas and develop the other rural places instead of concentrating in Sekondi-Takoradi. Everything which is best is located within Sekondi-Takoradi. That is why you have overpopulation and rural-urban migration. (Interview A34, Local Business, 12/02/2015)

In McCann’s (2007) piece on Austin, Texas, McCann drew attention to the challenges of
the local state and activists to balance the management of the city’s growing high-tech sector (and its expansion to suburban areas) with worries about the environmental degradation of fragile landscapes, as well as the displacement of low-income people. As a result, political activists harnessed the city’s planning processes to push for conservation and specified neighbourhoods in need of redevelopment. Through these state-society relations and issues of concern, city authorities were able to regulate these fragile landscapes, through the practice of “extra-territorial jurisdiction,” in which the state of Texas allows municipal boundaries to extend in certain land use cases (McCann and Ward, 2011, p. 189). At that time, the focus on environmental concerns at the expense of human needs (as an activist put it), also pushed city authorities to respond to issues related to housing prices and fears of gentrification, which was spurred by concepts such as the “good city” (McCann, 2007, p. 190). In McCann’s (2007) example, state-society relations expanded the state’s territory of responsibility, in a spatial as well as material sense.

Issues on urban sprawl and spill-over, environmental degradation as well as the effects of oil-related development on livelihoods and regional development, have become of central concern for civil society actors. During a civil society stakeholder meeting, members discussed a range of regional issues: air and sound pollution; the offshore oil industry’s effects on marine ecosystems; oil spills and leaks; increased cost of living; effects on livelihoods (for instance, the issue of fisher folk not being able to fish nearby); and population pressures affecting land erosion (meeting transcript). In responding to these issues, and in light of the socio-economic impacts affecting the region, civil society organisations Friends of the Nation and Hẹn Mpoano have advocated for expanding both the issues and territory which they are concerned with. These civil society organisations are working across perceived scales of governance, as well as fostering new spatial imaginations that require new kinds of interventions by a range of stakeholders, in particular state actors. This is further demonstrated by Hẹn Mpoano’s partial list of recent and planned activities:

- Creating an emerging national-local partnership: The Hẹn Mpoano has successfully engaged with a wide range of collaborators at the national level to legitimize the learning-by-doing and participatory approaches to solving complex coastal issues at the community and district levels.
- Improving district-level planning: Hẹn Mpoano has been working closely with coastal communities since 2009 to identify and establish their needs in a process of
“learning-by-doing.” Coastal management and fisheries related concerns now appear in District spatial plans and are currently being integrated into Mid-Term Development Plans.

- An innovative agreement to promote ecosystem-based management of Amanzule wetlands – shared between the Districts of Jomoro and Ellembelle – has been signed by key stakeholders, including traditional authorities and government leaders.

- Joint Development Planning Areas option for ICM [Integrated Coastal Management]: Hën Mpoano, with encouragement from the NDPC [National Development Planning Committee] and its chairman, is working with the six coastal districts in the Western Region to design and establish a ‘Joint Development Planning Area’ (JDPA) option or its equivalent to implement ICM in critical coastal ecosystems and landscapes (Hën Mpoano, 2016).

Despite these ambitious goals, a program coordinator from Hën Mpoano discussed frustrations in working with national-level government appointees (i.e. Regional Ministers) to create a new regional focus that consists of six coastal districts:

All the district chief executives were part of this conversation. Based on our analysis, they were motivated and willing to go in for this integrated decision-making process but when we reached the national, central level, we needed the blessing of the Regional Minister, his Deputy and the Regional Coordinating Council. But we couldn’t have their endorsement. It didn’t go through for several reasons… From the political point of view, one reason was look why just the six coastal districts? If he endorses it as a political figure then the others are not part of this process will be taken as you are favouring one district over us…Don't forget, politically most of this oil and gas investment are being directed at the six coastal districts. Because of all the pressures that are coming to the coast, they will bear the brunt of any oil spill and any hazards that come along the coasts. (Interview A16, Local CSO, 09/12/2014)

In this example, not only is the state “porous,” consisting of different actors, but there is also tension between the state and civil society actors around issues of jurisdiction, territory and what constitutes areas of state responsibility and concern. Although there is not a
legalised framework that regionally binds these six coastal districts civil society engagement with the local state through planning practices has contributed to expanding the territorial responsibility of the state spatially (beyond city limits, towards the coast and sea) and materially (beyond urban development in the city centre, towards social and environmental concerns). These new material and territorialised concerns that are being raised by community-based and civil society organisations are reflected in recent state planning documents. The Sekondi-Takoradi Medium-Term Development Plan for 2014-2017, for instance, lists the following issues under the “Accelerated Agriculture Modernization and Sustainable Natural Resource Management” theme:

- All the water bodies and the beaches are severely polluted
- Depletion of mangrove
- Deep deficit in public green areas, open spaces, street landscaping and beautification
- Conservation features such as the monkey sanctuary and historical buildings of significance are all under threat
- Issues of climate change sea-level rise and exploitation of fragile coastal resources have receive [sic] little attention

Based on these points, we see that the city’s development agenda stretches to include wider issues of climate change, sea level rise, and fragile coastal resources, which the city lists as having received little attention and which strongly affect neighbouring communities and districts. Moreover, the efforts of a variety of civil society actors—from fishing communities to environmental groups—has also contributed to a new regional focus by donor and development aid agencies, which provides further opportunity to bring central state actors into the discussion. At the end of 2015, a representative at KPMG stated that the company was supporting DFID’s launch of a new development programme that focused on coastal issues referred to as the “Coastal Foundation.” According to this representative:

This idea of the Coastal Foundation was to bring the oil companies together… Instead of them sponsoring, say, roundabouts in the city, they can bring their money together and do a proper development program and also find a way of using some of the revenues for the development of the coastal areas around the western
While it’s difficult to track how this programmatic idea came into fruition, social and material issues raised by civil society actors contributed to reimagining ideas about territory and developmental responsibility, all through the relationships amongst different actors operating across scales. In this sense, civil society actions and changing state-society relations also drew in international donors and development agencies, lodging them into a new regional space.

6.8. Conclusion

Literature on the role of civil society organisations in development raises concerns about how the work of these societies can contribute to neoliberal forms of governance, as take on state services or focus on conservative agendas. However, this chapter demonstrated how civil society organisations, through strategies of collaboration and contestation, were capable of co-producing with the state strategies and plans that further inclusive development principles. As a representative from Friends of the Nation states:

So, we undertake very extensive participatory process, going to the communities, with aerial photos, to solicit the current land use plan. Then we ask their preferences for the future and what are the critical coastal resources and climate change issues in the district. So, we’ve done this process. One of the outputs of this process was to have a Spatial Development Framework and also Structural Plans in the district to guide the land use and development planning. Then along the way, the oil companies specifically Tullow also sponsored Spatial Plans with the six coastal districts in the Western Region. So, some of the information that we have gathered also went to enrich the spatial planning processes. (Interview A8, Local CSO, 09/10/2014)

As the above quote and aforementioned examples show, decentralisation and fragmentation of governance processes can be “picked up” by civil society organisations through their work across multiple jurisdictions. As it can contribute to formation and implementation of the local state’s citywide plans and its development agendas, knowledge from civil society organisations can serve to strengthen the capacity of the state. Civil society organisations also push the local state to address development concerns raised by
local communities (for instance, through their assessment of the quality and availability of city services), while stretching the “territory” of state responsibility to include the areas that fall outside of the city limits.
7. Conclusion

In the wake of Ghana’s oil and gas discoveries near the city of Sekondi-Takoradi, this thesis set out to examine how governance is exercised in the city in relation to planning and development outcomes, across a multiplicity of stakeholders, at once opportunist and concerned. Rather than answer the quantitative question of whether these natural resources are a “blessing” or “curse” for the city, this thesis examined a diversity of urban actors, exploring how their relationships, negotiations and interactions have shaped urban development outcomes in this place. Although cities feature countless actors, this thesis focused on three core actors in Sekondi-Takoradi: transnational corporations (specifically oil companies), the local state (e.g. city government and traditional authorities working in parallel) and civil society organisations. This PhD research identified these three groups as distinctive, with different sets of interests, resources, skills and connections influencing development issues in the city. This thesis also bridges analyses offered by studies on networked governance, urban regimes and local economic development with postcolonial perspectives on the agency of the local state and civil society in African contexts. By challenging the territorial bases of these analyses, this thesis showed how a transcalar approach to the study of urban governance yields new insights about the nature of cross-sector governing arrangements and the potential for inclusive development outcomes. This approach simultaneously localises the role of transnational corporations as it transnationalises understandings about the governing capacities of the local state and civil society in an African city with a global oil and gas industry.

This thesis makes three original findings that extend the theoretical range of analyses of urban development politics. First, this thesis brings into view the relationships that the local state and civil society organisations in this African “oil city” have with transnationalised actors, processes and issues in relation to development outcomes. Rather than portray the local state as weak or absent, by convening diverse local and transnational actors, it draws on postcolonial interventions to show how the local state builds its governing capacity, as well as its ability to manage land and building rights that shape the city’s urban development. This PhD research thus provides an innovative optic for examining the capacities of the local in a postcolonial and non-Western context, in which
the local state is often seen as incapacitated and resource-constrained. Second, this thesis analytically localises the role and participation of transnational corporations as active development actors in the city. Moving beyond neoliberal critiques about the imposing economic power of transnational corporations and their ability to bypass the state, this thesis argues that these powerful transnational actors actually rely on and directly engage with local state and civil society organisations in order to access important urban resources for their business operations and activities. In turn, these arrangements provide avenues in which local state and civil society actors negotiate with transnational corporations for particular planning gains that have citywide benefits. Third, this thesis shows how civil society organisations can extend state capacities by co-producing planning strategies and policies that further inclusive urban development outcomes. Civil society organisations also serve to define and expand the regionalised areas of development intervention that fall beyond the administrative boundaries of the local state. These three findings contribute to the overall aim of this thesis, which shows how the local state and civil society actors find their capacity to govern in relation to powerful transnational interests and actors, and where development outcomes are rendered possible through transcalar urban governance networks.

7.1. Summary of findings

This chapter now elaborates the findings of this thesis, its theoretical contributions and areas for potential future research. The thesis opened with narratives around hope and expectation following Ghana’s oil and gas discovery. It then focused on governance using an urban lens, specifically on Sekondi-Takoradi, a regional capital city located near the oil and gas fields. Studies on resource governance (including oil and gas) tend to address the “resource curse” through national-level “good governance” interventions. The resource curse framework, which focuses on why resource-rich countries are paradoxically less developed, is limited based on its overemphasis on macro-economics and causal assumptions about weak and authoritarian states in Africa (Haber and Menaldo, 2012; Rosser, 2006; Watts, 2004; Weszkalnys, 2011). As such, despite the multitude of ways in which natural resources are governed throughout the world, oil and gas resources continue to be seen as a threat to democratic rule and redistributive politics (Ayanwu and Erhijakpor, 2014; Heilbrunn, 2014). Moving beyond macro-economic theorisations of oil and gas resources, which view the city as an “accessory” to national state power (see Fuccaro, 2013), this thesis brings the ways in which oil and gas resources are embedded in
the dynamic social context of the city, with its countless capable actors, materialities and infrastructures into view (Amin and Thrift, 2017; Robinson, 2006).

This writing thus engaged with ideas about multi-scalar and networked urban governance (Allen and Cochrane, 2010, 2007), whereby the social relations among multiple actors in interaction with countless materials and infrastructures come together to shape urban possibilities (also see McFarlane, 2011 on urban assemblages). In this vein, this thesis follows analytical frameworks that show power as not only being diffused, fragmented and relational (Allen and Cochrane, 2010; Dahl, 1961; Stone, 1993), but also how it is “generative,” expressed in the “potentialities” of different actors “to act, to do things, to mobilise, to imagine and to invent” (Healey, 2007, p. viii). In other words, this thesis has aimed to elucidate the governing capacity of different groups, drawing on their “power to” rather than “power over” others to shape urban futures (Stone, 1993, p. 8). The second chapter, “Towards Network Governance: Multiple Actors, Different Resources and Mutual Dependencies” provides the analytical framework of this thesis. It draws upon urban regime theory, which focuses on how distinctive groups and actors in the city possess and have access to different resources, skills and connections, along with facing different sets of constraints (Savitch and Kantor, 2002; Stone, 1993). Given this state of affairs, these distinctive actors forge cross-sector governing arrangements or regimes in order to enable or disable development projects in cities (Savitch and Kantor, 2002; Stone, 1993).

However, this thesis has argued for stretching urban regime theory and challenging political economic approaches to urban governance. The latter tends to accentuate the ways in which city governments compete with one another to incentivise and attract local and transnational capital investment, leading to a decline in social subsidies and a global rise in spatialised forms of inequality (Castells, 1983; Harvey, 1989; Lees et al., 2015; Peck et al., 2009; Sassen, 2014; Smith, 1996). Recognising these spatialised economic concerns, this thesis’ analytical framework and potential theoretical contributions involve proposing the extension of networked governance frameworks and their scalar vocabulary to simultaneously include transnational corporate actors (such as oil companies) as development actors, and to bring into view the agency of the local state and civil society actors in postcolonial African contexts. Rather than portray the local state as weak or absent, this thesis draws on postcolonial interventions that recognise the capacity of the local state in African contexts, as well as the continent’s long historical engagement with
the global political economy (Bayart, 2009; Davidson, 1991). It also contributes to further understandings of how the state in some African contexts consists of both local “formal” governments and traditional authorities working in parallel and concurrently in their relations with wider society. It should be noted this differs from a Weberian ideal of a hierarchal, bureaucratic and autonomous state (see Mann, 1984).

Based on this complex conceptualisation of the state in Africa, this thesis has demonstrated the ways in which the local state builds its governing capacity as it responds to and negotiates with transnational corporate actors (e.g. oil companies) in a city experiencing change as a result of an emerging oil and gas industry. It thus has argued for a “transcalar” approach to urban governance, in which the interactions and negotiations among different actors concerning development issues cut across local, national and transnational scales, even though their social relations “lodge” them in a city. As highlighted in this thesis, Allen and Cochrane (2007) argue that an urban region is assembled relationally and acted upon by different actors “lodged” in the spaces of this constructed region and engaged in a politics of scale (p. 1171). This thesis highlights the ways in which the local state, civil society, and transnational corporate actors work in the city of Sekondi-Takoradi in a transcalar manner in the wake of oil and gas discoveries off its coast. For instance, this thesis’ transcalar approach to urban governance has produced an understanding of how transnational corporations work with local social and political networks. It also shows how city society organisations work with local communities, transnational donors, agencies and transnational corporations, while indicating that the local state works with these different local and transnational actors as they all seek to shape urban development outcomes in the city.

In order to operationalise this transcalar conceptualisation of urban governance, this thesis utilises largely qualitative research methods, particularly semi-structured interviews and participant observation at stakeholder meetings. These interviews and meetings consist of representatives from city government, local and international civil society organisations, and transnational corporations (e.g. property developments and oil companies). Personal correspondence, textual analysis of relevant policy documents, and secondary sources also serve to triangulate data. As this research aims to understand the perspectives of different actors (operating in and across constructed “scales” in the city), these qualitative methods are appropriate, as they generate rich descriptions and insights into the subjective
experiences of these different actors in relation to planning and development processes, allowing this research to situate its responses into a wider social context (Burawoy, 1998; Flyvbjerg, 2001).

Each of the empirical chapters (Chapters Four to Chapter Six) thus focus on the respective perspectives of the following actors: transnational oil companies, the local state and civil society organisations. The chapters each examine the different resources, skills and connections available to each actor—as well as their constraints—in pushing for their own development goals. In this context, these different actors leverage the assets they have at their disposal by forging cross-sector partnerships, coalitions and regimes to move beyond their own constraints and shape development outcomes. This thesis argues that urban governance, as is the case in Sekondi-Takoradi, consists of these multiple governing arrangements among different actors: the local state, civil society organisations and transnational corporations.

The first perspective that this thesis examines is that of transnational oil companies and their relation to different modalities of private sector-led development (see Di Bella, 2013; McEwan, 2017). Rather than focus on the activities and policies that create an enabling environment for private sector funding and growth (e.g. neoliberal urban policies and rationalities involving trickle-down economics), this thesis assesses the role of transnational corporations as development actors and their capacity to directly engage in development. In the wake of the oil and gas discoveries near Sekondi-Takoradi, this thesis analyses how the presence of new transnational corporate actors, primarily oil companies, but also property developers, enables new development possibilities. With a focus on how transnational corporations are “social forms” and embedded in the complex relations in the places they operate (see Welker et al., 2011), this thesis argues that despite their financial power and technological knowledge in the production of material resources, transnational corporations rely on transcalar networks (including local authorities) in order to operate.

The first empirical chapter, “Localising Transnational Corporations: Oil Companies, Socio-Political Networks and Urban Development Politics,” posits that that transnational oil companies exist within social contexts of constraints that affect their ability to do business. These constraints include public scrutiny, the lack of social legitimacy and the companies’ reliance on local networks of knowledge and labour to mitigate risk and operationalise on
the ground. While transnational oil companies dominate Ghana’s oil and gas industry, these companies rely on multiple types of transcalar networks—legal, material, and social-political. It is an industry that is capital, material, labour and knowledge-intensive. Given these constraints, these transnational oil companies build alliances and connections with local authorities, which involves local government officials, traditional authorities and civil society representatives, who carry out their operations. As such, these interactions give rise to the potential of corporate-led development outcomes in the city. This empirical chapter shows how oil companies contribute to planning by opening up conversations around the potential benefits and effects of oil-fueled growth in the city.

This thesis explores how, within the logic of making profit, oil companies address issues around mitigating social, economic and environmental risks that affect their business. Risk mitigation encapsulates and shapes their social relationships in many ways. For one, they build local legitimacy as a way to mitigate political uncertainty and social relations disasters. For instance, as this research study has shown with evidence from environmental impact assessments and corporate social responsibility programmes, oil companies’ legitimacy as oil operators licensed by the state (and at times financed by international financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank) involves responding to social, economic and environmental concerns raised by state officials, traditional leaders and civil society representatives. These conglomerates also work with local stakeholders to mitigate risk, as they rely on the Ghanaian Navy to enforce “no fishing zones” near their oil platforms and civic leaders to spread awareness and serve as responders and mitigators in the event of an oil spill. Secondly, due to a mixture of legal “local content” stipulations, good public relations, and cost and logistical efficiency, these transnational oil companies continue to depend on local networks for labour and supplies. Finally, this chapter uses a case study to show how a major transnational oil company (with revenue of over $30 billion dollars in 2015) worked with the local government and traditional authorities in Sekondi-Takoradi to navigate land and building rights for the construction of its warehouses, offices and housing. It also worked with local government agencies in order to access certain forms of urban infrastructure (e.g. ports, railways, roads, water and electricity).

These sites of corporate engagement with the local state and civil society organisations open up governance pathways for the negotiation of potential planning gains. However, these gains have to be weighed against the potential issues of exclusionary forms of
development and lack of alignment with urban and regional government plans. Despite criticisms about the effectiveness of certain corporate social responsibility projects in Sekondi-Takoradi, I note two case studies involving effective public-private partnership. Drawing on the advocacy by the local state and civil society organisations to expand local participation of supply chains and employment in Ghana, the Jubilee Partners (a consortium of oil companies developing the Jubilee Field, Ghana’s first commercial field) provided funding for a $6 million Jubilee Technical Training Centre (JTTC) at the Takoradi Polytechnic (renamed and converted to university status as Takoradi Technical University in 2016). According to Andrews and Playfoot (2014), the construction of the JTTC demonstrates an effective public-private partnership: the Jubilee Partners financed the centre, while the university provided the land and learning environment (p. 66). Tullow Oil (the primary equity partner of the Jubilee Partners) then provided funding train the polytechnic’s staff and faculty, preparing them to equip future students with skills and degrees to work in the oil and gas industry. In addition, all the equipment and resources belong to the university, and after a period of funding, it will be up to the university to self-finance. Since it not only draws on local content policies focusing on expanding local economic opportunities, but also addresses wider development concerns that have been articulated in citywide plans about the development of quality educational facilities, this example highlights an effective form of corporate-financed development.

Another example points to the capacity of transnational oil companies to fund urban road development, given funding delays by the central government. Located near the Takoradi Port, the Shippers Authority Roundabout was funded by Tullow Oil for USD $500,000. In response to concerns about the degradation of the roundabout by heavy trucks catering to the oil and gas companies, when they realised that central government funds were not forthcoming, the city authorities requested that the oil companies improve and fund the roundabout. This example demonstrates the capacity of the local state to ascertain physical infrastructural conditions at a local level (even though centralised infrastructure, like urban roads and freeways, are under the jurisdiction of the central government) and to make requests for funding from various potential financial partners, including transnational oil companies. Equipped with both development and structural plans of the city, city officials have also been able to raise funding for infrastructural projects from other private sector actors and international donors and aid agencies.
Given the establishment of a global oil and gas industry in Sekondi-Takoradi, the second empirical chapter, “The State in Action: Building Governing Capacity Through Collaborative Planning with Local and Transnational Actors” addresses the capacity of the local state to tackle transnationalised issues and shows how the capacity of the local state rests on its abilities to convene diverse local and transnational actors through collaborative planning processes, along with highlighting its technical authority in managing land and building rights. This chapter details how the local state in Sekondi-Takoradi consists of the Metropolitan Assembly (“city government”) and traditional authorities, while detailing their relations with non-state actors. It outlines the financial constraints of the local state, but demonstrates how it leverages its technical capabilities to influence development in the city. Despite the city government’s limited operating budget (mostly dependent on central government and donor funding), and steadily growing internally generated revenue sources, it continues to shape urban development agendas as the convener of development plans. Its jurisdiction over facilitating or delaying urban development projects through its land management procedures is also pivotal.

For instance, the local state produces plans that have the buy-in across different sectors, including local civil society organisations, international donors, and transnational corporations (from property developers to oil companies). In addition, plans that are spearheaded and funded by transnational oil companies and international development agencies are seen as legitimate not only if they involve a wide range of stakeholders in consultation with the City Assembly, but also if they are approved (through a vote) by the Assembly. In addition to setting the urban agenda of the city, both city officials and traditional authorities utilise their ability to facilitate and define zones for development projects, whether that be supporting the construction of warehouses for oil companies (as noted in Chapter 4), evicting and relocating occupiers of proposed land for mall development, or finding space for the expansion of the Takoradi Port. On a more technical level, traditional authorities own the majority land rights in Ghana, while local government agencies help record land transactions and approve building permits. These capabilities show the capacity of the local state to define urban development outcomes. Despite criticism about delays and inconsistencies in planning processes at the household level, the local state (consisting of traditional authorities and local governments) wields technical and political power in relation to urban development projects initiated by transnational oil companies and property developers, as demonstrated by this thesis’ empirical accounts.
In addition to critically engaging with ideas of state-led and market-led development, as spearheaded by state and transnational corporate actors, this thesis has examined the important role of civil society organisations in urban governance. The third empirical chapter, “Civil Society Organisations, Participatory Planning Processes and Strategies for Inclusive Development” illustrates how civil society organisations leverage their positionality to exist somewhere “between” the state, market and grassroots in order to participate in the governance of urban development agendas. Moving away from concerns that the development responsibilities that civil society organisations take on can weaken the capacity of the state, this thesis focuses on how civil society organisations work with the state through planning and legislative channels, while challenging corporate and state authority. This thesis draws on postcolonial conceptualisations of state-society relations that blur the boundary of the state and civil society (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Comaroff and Comaroff, 1999; Sharma and Gupta, 2009) and acknowledges the ways by which self-organizing citizens access and negotiate with the “porous” state for their interests and needs (Bénit-Gabffou and Oldfield, 2011).

With a view an African city experiencing a transnationalised resource boom, this thesis examines the potential of civil society organisations to co-produce urban development outcomes in conjunction with state agencies, transnational donors and agencies, and corporate actors. The empirical data that has informed this section on civil society-led development shows how civil society organisations (working across local and transnational scales, featuring a range of actors and policy discourses) work with local communities to co-produce local action community plans which are incorporated into the city’s medium term development plans. In addition, through their relations with local communities and concern for social, political and environmental issues that extend beyond the boundaries of the city, these civil society organisations advocate for a more integrated and regional approach to planning and development. In this way, civil society organisations are capable of “rescaling” the territorial boundaries and responsibilities of state agencies, donors and corporations. Utilising case studies from other African contexts, as well as the case of Sekondi-Takoradi, this chapter shows how the state-society interface can not only further the legitimacy of civil society organisations as development actors, but also how it has the potential to expand the credibility of the state and its capacity to pursue more socially impactful urban development agendas.
7.2. Contributions

Based on these research findings, this thesis makes both empirical and theoretical contributions. With a focus on Sekondi-Takoradi, and by engaging with the specificities of the local state and civil society in an African context, the analysis adds a detailed ethnographic case study to studies on urban regimes and urban governance. Most case studies in urban regime theory tend to focus on Western cities, with local governments that have strong institutional and bureaucratic capabilities and robust tax bases. Building on postcolonial perspectives of state-society relations in African contexts, this thesis draws on accounts that establish the agency and capacity of the local state and civil society actors, which challenges Western-derived representations about the lack or absence of the state in Africa. Rather than view the particularities of hybridised African states (which differ from the Weberian ideal of a state) as inherent weaknesses, this thesis works with postcolonialist accounts to focus on how the state and civil society actors in African contexts have had long histories of statehood before, during and after colonialism, and have continued to adapt to the different rationalities that inform governance.

On a methodological and empirical level, this thesis engages with the specificity of the local state by analysing the roles of the city assembly and traditional authorities working in parallel on land management and development issues in the city. As Robinson (2006) reminds researchers and policymakers: African cities, like all cities around the world, are “ordinary” in that they also must deal with the challenges of how to provide social provisions and spearhead economic growth amidst growing urban populations. Parnell et al. (2002) also argue that in the wake of democratic transitions and decentralisation policies throughout Africa, local governments are important sites for the realisation of progressive development outcomes (Myers, 2011).

In this vein, this thesis contributes to scholarship on urban regimes and governance by focusing on how the local state in African contexts (despite its financial constraints) is capable of forging governing arrangements with local and transnational actors. Utilising its legitimacy in creating citywide development agendas and its influence on urban development projects, the local state thus navigates and negotiates the terrain of local and transnational capital investment as it forms transcalar governing arrangements with civil
society organisations, donors, local businesses and transnational corporations. Rather than focus on the imposition of transnational capital, this thesis shows how the local state in an African context (the “oil city” of Sekondi-Takoradi) convenes a range of local and transnational actors around its collaborative planning processes, while also drawing on its authority in land management to shape urban development outcomes in the city.

A second contribution made by this thesis is including transnational corporate actors as development actors in the making of urban regimes, particularly in an African context. Although cities are increasingly globalised, studies of the role of urban governance tend to focus on how cities compete with each other for transnational capital at the expense of progressive social-centred policies. Instead, this thesis engages with the dynamism and vitality of cities, which consist of multiple actors, networks, materials and infrastructures that assemble in creative ways to constantly make, unmake and remake cities (Amin and Thift, 2016; Robinson, 2006). In Amin and Thift (2017)'s book Seeing Like a City, they encourage researchers to look at the agency of the city (as an assemblage made up of many assemblages) (p. 2). Their “optic” thus de-emphasises the study of cities through the lens of capital accumulation (e.g. Brenner and Schmid, 2014) and spatial agglomeration of firms (e.g. Scott and Storper, 2015; Storper, 2013). Diouf and Fredericks, 2014; Myers, 2011; Robinson, 2006; and Simone, 2004 also argue for recognising the agency of African cities and their capacity to create multiple development alternatives and shape new urban possibilities, despite their problems and challenges. By engaging with the agency of all cities, including African cities, this thesis illuminates the ways in which transnational corporations are entangled and socially embedded in the places they operate. In other words, they are mutually dependent on the city itself, as well as the multiple distinctive actors that they co-operate with.

This thesis approaches the study of resource governance with a focus on an urban scope. Studies on resource governance are dominated by a political economy approach that focuses on macro-economics, the resource curse, and national-level policy interventions. This research shows how networks of different actors operating with and through the city can influence the governance of natural resources. It thus engages with the capacity of the city and urban actors to shape development outcomes in relation to resource windfalls, thus challenging top-down and macro-level approaches to the governance of resources. By adopting an urban lens, this thesis shows how there are many networks—social, legal,
material—that make the oil and gas industry “work.” Based on this networked perspective, there are many touch points actors can use to leverage and influence the future of the oil and gas industry. This has been demonstrated by the capacity of oil and gas companies to reposition their core business practices to focus on renewable energy and more “equitable” forms of capitalism. Despite this thesis’ critical stance on corporate-led community development, the capacity for transnational corporations to contribute to socially centered agendas that are aligned with the needs of local communities is also in evidence. By focusing on the ways in which oil and gas companies are socially and politically embedded in the places they operate, this research aims to demystify the oil and gas industry (and assumptions about the “intrinsic” dangers of these resources)

7.3. Potential Future Research

This thesis proposes three areas for potential future research. First, this PhD research wishes to draw upon perspectives offered by scholars of “new materialism” towards renewing studies on resource governance in urban contexts (Bennett, 2009; Braun and Whatmore, 2010). Second, this thesis aims to build upon approaches in “comparative urbanism” to generate further understandings of local state capacities and the formation of transcalar governance networks across different urban contexts (Harris, 2008; Mcfarlane, 2010; McFarlane and Robinson, 2012; Robinson, 2011). Third, this PhD research intends to advance studies on South-South development cooperation beyond the North-South development axis (Chin and Quadir, 2012; Mawdsley, 2017, 2015).

Research coalescing around “new materialism” focuses on the agency of materials and artefacts to trigger actions and affective responses that shape physical, social and political arrangements of collective life in cities (Bennett, 2009; Braun and Whatmore, 2010). Although this thesis examines urban governance by identifying social arrangements that shape development possibilities in a city experiencing resource windfalls, there is space for this research to investigate how the agency of materials feature and directly shape the politics and formation of hybridised socio-material arrangements. For instance, Andrew Barry (2013) argues in Material Politics: Disputes Along the Pipeline, that objects do not exist in isolation, but are bound up in the production of information about their quality, safety, compatibility and environmental impacts (p. 5). In turn, the generation, circulation and disputes about the information attached to these materials not only influences
infrastructural assemblages (e.g. oil pipelines), but also plays a role in shaping local and global politics. Indeed, the findings from this PhD thesis are suggestive regarding understanding how materials, infrastructures and social networks come together. Further studies drawing from the work of “new materialism” can further illuminate collective life in cities as constructed through the interactions of material and non-material things (Bennett, 2009; Braun and Whatmore, 2010. Of particular future interest is examining how city plans and their dynamic proposed projects emerge and take form—from “lively” planning events that bring different city elements together, to debates about the information conveyed in these plans, to currently existing social, material and political artefacts and arrangements in the city. By examining how materials and artefacts act in the world, this can provide renewed understandings about how natural resources, infrastructures and the built environment affect social order and governing arrangements. The fourth chapter here, “Localising Transnational Corporations: Oil Companies, Socio-Political Networks and Urban Development Politics,” touches on this topic, focusing on the process of how assembling materials inspired oil companies to engage in local politics. Further studies can nuance how actual materials and their proposed configurations can disrupt, as well as generate new forms of collective life and social order in cities.

A second area for potential research draws on “comparative urbanism” (McFarlane, 2010; Robinson, 2011), which seeks to advance global urban theory by drawing upon a wide range of diverse contexts and methodological approaches. One of the aims of “comparative urbanism” is to foster more global, cosmopolitan and diverse articulations of urban theory (McFarlane, 2010; Robinson, 2011). Insights from this PhD research can further comparative understandings of local state capacities to shape development possibilities across different urban contexts. This capability is shaped by their varied histories of planning and land management, modes of governance and engagements with transnational and interests. This can include identifying the extent and capacity to which cross-sector partnerships form in widely different contexts, such as small or large cities with established or emergent natural resources, with planned or capitalist economies, and with different constellations of local and transnational actors.

Further ethnographically inspired accounts and new methodologies of comparison across different urban contexts with different governance actors and rationalities can help to shift the theoretical emphasis on deterministic economic theorisations in both resource
management and urban governance. By applying a transcalar approach to urban governance across different resource-rich urban contexts, this approach contributes to further comparative lessons concerning the conditions and parameters under which collaborative arrangements are made possible. Learning more about the making of transnational urban regimes, like those fostered in Sekondi-Takoradi, serves to illuminate different governance pathways that can be mobilised by different actors to extend inclusive and equitable development outcomes. Additionally, further insights into the actually existing capabilities of African local government can be brought forward through comparative studies, building on the findings of this thesis regarding the convening power and planning role of the local state in Sekondi-Takoradi.

The final area of proposed research is on the politics of South-South development collaboration (Chin and Quadir, 2012; Mawdsley, 2017, 2015). This rise in development donors and actors from the Global South has been witnessed in Ghana, with China emerging as a core development actor. For instance, this thesis briefly touched on the topic of how China loaned Ghana $3 billion dollars in exchange for fifteen years of oil revenues and for ensuring that 60% of oil infrastructure go to Chinese contractors (Mohan, 2010). While South-South development collaboration is not new (Mawdsley, 2015, p. 9), the past decade has witnessed a trend towards the unsettling of the “North to South” development aid trajectory (Esteves and Assunção, 2014). Since these infrastructural projects funded by Chinese investors occurred outside Sekondi-Takoradi, in the wider Western Region, this thesis paid limited attention to China-Ghana relations, among other non-Western partners. Given increased interest in the field of development studies concerning “South-South” relations, research on how these different actors and their agendas shape urban development outcomes is of particular interest.

### 7.4. Towards a Transcalar Approach to Urban Governance

The overall contribution of this PhD thesis is to illuminate the politics of urban development involving a wide range of actors who are situated in the city, but who operate transnationally. The aim of this study was to provide a rich and complex account that acknowledges the agency and capacity of different actors to shape local contexts. It has been the aim of this thesis to contribute to a more cosmopolitan and dynamic account of politics in an African city without falling into stereotypes about its dysfunctions,
weaknesses and insurmountable problems. The research has thus focused on how local state and civil society actors make urban governance “work” in an African city, by building their governing capacities and experimenting with creative strategies as they interact with wider transnational actors and processes.

This PhD research has sought to remain open to the possibilities of social change in urban areas without assuming any linear development trajectory, particularly in African contexts. It provides empirical and practice-based accounts of how, in the wake of strong transnationalised interests, the local state and civil society organisations leverage their capabilities, skills and connections to create their capacity to govern. As such, this thesis adds to understanding how cities work, operate and change, and specifically how they are governed. It specifically contributes to urban regime theory and networked approaches to governance from a “transcalar” perspective—across local and transnational scales—and indicates that we can learn from experiences of African cities in framing urban political theory. As a result, given that urban development processes increasingly feature transnational actors and processes, the findings of this thesis are of potential significance in many other urban contexts around the world.
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Appendix 1: Coded List of Qualitative Data

Primary qualitative data collected for this thesis took place over three periods. A preliminary study took place during the month of May 2013. Extended fieldwork in the city of Sekondi-Takoradi (with trips to Accra) followed from August 2014-April 2015. Follow-up correspondence with interviewees took place in London from May 2015-October 2017. The primary qualitative data collected, which informs this study, is divided and coded into the following four categories:

1. Semi-structured interviews
2. Personal communications (informal conversations, e-mail, and Whatsapp, Facebook and text messages)
3. Participant Observation (attendance at forums, site-visits and audio recorded events)
4. Sources of written primary data (census data, national and city plans, maps, government budgets and policy reports)

Semi-Structured Interviews are classified as meetings that were pre-arranged with pre-guided key questions. These interviews are semi-structured, meaning that while pre-written questions guided the interview, other questions were raised when relevant topics came up during the course of the interview. Interviews are cited in the thesis by the interview code, followed by the group category, and then the day, month and year of the interview. For instance, an interview with a manager at the African Centre for Energy Policy (ACEP) is cited as: (Interview A1, Local CSO, 02/04/2015). The position and name of the organisation or company is not included in the parenthetical citation as these details are found in the rest of the sentence.

Personal communications consists of conversations that occurred “informally” as well as follow-up correspondence in the form of emails and short messages (over Whatsapp and Facebook). In all of these instances, the interlocutor was made aware of the nature of this research, with the discussion being open-ended. As a researcher living in the city, these

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13 The systematic organisation of this coded qualitative data list was derived from Julia Franziska Ruppel’s PhD thesis (2015), entitled Ghana: From fragility to resilience? Understanding the formation of a new political settlement from a critical political economy perspective
conversations and forms of correspondence provided relevant information in a more open and less formal setting than an interview, which also serves to triangulate data. Written correspondence is cited in this thesis by the personal communications code, followed by individual’s role, and then the day, month and year of the correspondence. For instance, email correspondence with a planner at the STMA is cited as: (Personal Communications B1, STMA Planner, 16/10/2017). An asterisk in the table indicates instances of written communication in contrast to informal conversations.

**Participant observation** includes attendance at stakeholder meetings, forums and site-visits (for instance to the Takoradi port, city assembly, property developments, and driving tours of the city). While notes were also written daily as part of an ethnographic practice of recording and reflecting on living and researching in the city, participant observation and in-depth notetaking, audio recordings and official minutes during these key events informed this study.

**Sources of written primary data**

Sources of written primary data are incorporated throughout the PhD thesis and referenced by in-text citations and in the bibliography. These documents include: national and local plans, census data, maps and reports. These documents were obtained via research visits to the following institutions: Ghana’s Environmental Protection Agency, Ghana’s National Development Planning Commission, Ghana’s Western Region Coordinating Council, Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly’s Development Planning Unit, Balme Library at the University of Ghana, Legon, the British Library (UK), and the Library of Congress (USA). Documents were also requested from the following organisations: USAID’s LOGODEP, Global Communities, Oxfam, Hen Mpoano and Friends of the Nation. Printed and online newspaper and magazine that recorded events also served as sources of primary data.
A) List of semi-structured interviews

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Code Group</th>
<th>Organization or Company</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date(s) of Interview</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>A1.</td>
<td>Local CSO</td>
<td>African Centre for Energy Policy (ACEP)</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>31/10/2014</td>
<td>Accra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2.</td>
<td>Local CSO</td>
<td>Centre for Public Interest Law (CEPIL)</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>01/10/2014</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3.</td>
<td>Local CSO</td>
<td>COLANDEF</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>25/11/2014</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
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<tr>
<td>A4.</td>
<td>Local CSO</td>
<td>Community, Environmental, Monitoring and Advocacy Group (CEMAG)</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>12/11/2014</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A5.</td>
<td>Dixcove Assembly</td>
<td>Dixcove District Assembly</td>
<td>Government Official</td>
<td>18/05/2013</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A7.</td>
<td>Social Enterprise</td>
<td>Enterprise Development Centre</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>12/11/2014</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A8.</td>
<td>Local CSO</td>
<td>Friends of the Nation</td>
<td>Representative 1</td>
<td>09/10/2014</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A9.</td>
<td>Local CSO</td>
<td>Friends of the Nation</td>
<td>Representative 2</td>
<td>16/10/2014</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
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<td>A10.</td>
<td>Local Business</td>
<td>Ghana National Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>Board Member</td>
<td>09/10/2014</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
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<td>Central State</td>
<td>Ghana National Development Planning Unit</td>
<td>Planner</td>
<td>21/10/2014</td>
<td>Accra</td>
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<td>Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>06/03/2015</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
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<td>A13.</td>
<td>Donor</td>
<td>Ghana Supply Chain Development Programme</td>
<td>Senior Advisor</td>
<td>25/03/2015</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
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<td>GiZ</td>
<td>Advisor</td>
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<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
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<td>Global Communities</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>16/10/2014</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
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<td>09/12/2014</td>
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<td>Journalist</td>
<td>30/10/2014</td>
<td>Accra</td>
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<td>KPMG International Development Assistance Services</td>
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<td>24/10/2014</td>
<td>Accra</td>
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<td>12/02/2015</td>
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<td>Property Developer</td>
<td>Oil Village</td>
<td>Property Manager</td>
<td>24/03/2015</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
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<td>International</td>
<td>Oxfam America</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>24/10/2014</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Property Developer</td>
<td>Real Estate Developer of the Takoradi Mall</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>19/12/2014; 18/02/2015; 05/04/2015</td>
<td>Accra</td>
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<td>A24</td>
<td>Property Developer</td>
<td>RREDA Estates</td>
<td>Property Manager</td>
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<td>Sekondi-Takoradi Chamber of Commerce and Industries (STCCI)</td>
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<td>STMA</td>
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<td>Small Business Owner – Café &amp; Catering</td>
<td>Co-Owner</td>
<td>17/11/2014</td>
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<td>Small Business Owner – Hotel</td>
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<td>Local State</td>
<td>STMA-Citywide Slum Upgrading Facility</td>
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<td>TRACTOR Ghana</td>
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<td>07/10/2014</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
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<td>A36</td>
<td>Transnational Oil Company</td>
<td>Transnational Oil Company (~$2.2 US billion dollars in revenue in 2014)</td>
<td>Associate</td>
<td>12/11/2014</td>
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<td>Transnational Oil Company (~$2.2 US billion dollars in revenue in 2014)</td>
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<td>Transnational Oil Company</td>
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<td>Transnational Oil Company (~$40 billion US dollars in revenue in 2014)</td>
<td>Associate</td>
<td>14/10/2014</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
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A41. Transnational Oil Company
Transnational Oil Company (~$800 million US dollars in revenue in 2014)
Chauffeur
24/03/2015 Sekondi-Takoradi

A42. Academic
University of Ghana, Legon
Academic & Local Government Advisor
13/05/2013 Sekondi-Takoradi

A43. Academic
University of Ghana, Legon
Academic & Local Government Advisor
20/05/2013 Sekondi-Takoradi

A44. Academic
University of Ghana, Legon
Academic & Local Government Advisor
07/05/2013 Sekondi-Takoradi

A45. Academic
University of Ghana, Legon
Researcher
15/05/2013 Accra

A46. Donor
USAID LOGODEP
Senior Advisor
17/10/2014; 18/02/2015 Sekondi-Takoradi

A47. Local CSO
Western Region Development Network of NGOs (WERENGO)
Representative
12/02/2015 London

A48. Central State
Western Regional Coordinating Council
Planner
18/02/2015 Sekondi-Takoradi

B) Personal Communications

<table>
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<th>Code</th>
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<td>20/10/2014; 24/10/2014</td>
<td>Accra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B4.</td>
<td>BBC News</td>
<td>Reporter</td>
<td>07/04/2015</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5.</td>
<td>Bicycle for Development Organisation</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Multiple times, 2014-2015</td>
<td>Accra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B6.</td>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>30/09/2014</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B7.</td>
<td>Kings College London</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>01/09/2014</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B8.</td>
<td>Kumasi Hive</td>
<td>Co-Founder</td>
<td>16/02/2015</td>
<td>Accra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B9.</td>
<td>Me to We</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Multiple times, 2014-2015*</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B10.</td>
<td>Right to Dream Academy</td>
<td>Associate</td>
<td>08/09/2014</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B13.</td>
<td>Small Business Owner – Trucking Company</td>
<td>Owner</td>
<td>01/12/2014</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B15.</td>
<td>STMA Department Planning Unit</td>
<td>Planner 2</td>
<td>Multiple times, 2014-2015*</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B16.</td>
<td>Transnational Oil Company (~$15 billion US dollars in revenue in 2014)</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>06/09/2014</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B17.</td>
<td>Transnational Oil Company (~$40 billion US dollars in revenue in 2014)</td>
<td>Associate</td>
<td>06/09/2014</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B20.</td>
<td>University of California, Santa Barbara</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>20/10/2014</td>
<td>Accra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B21.</td>
<td>WARA</td>
<td>Doctor</td>
<td>04/12/2014</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B22.</td>
<td>Western Region Development Network of NGOs (WERENGO)</td>
<td>Representative</td>
<td>Multiple times, 2014-2015</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B23.</td>
<td>Western Region House of Chiefs</td>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>24/03/2015</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C) Participant Observation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date and Location</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Organisations (CSO) Forum on the Petroleum Exploration and Production Bill and the Marine Pollution Bill</td>
<td>14th and 15th October 2014 SSNIT Conference Hall, Takoradi</td>
<td>Civil society organisations (including fishermen's associations and trade unions), traditional authorities, Chamber of Commerce, donor agencies, central government, oil companies, media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Environmental Monitoring and Advocacy Group Meeting</td>
<td>16th October 2014 Boyboison Hotel, Sekondi</td>
<td>Friends of the Nation (local CSO), engaged citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driving tour of the city</td>
<td>24th March 2015</td>
<td>Tour given by a development advisor and taxi driver (with photo and video documentation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driving tour of the city</td>
<td>16th March 2013</td>
<td>Tour given by a property manager who grew up in the city (with photo and video documentation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving the Legal and Regulatory Framework in Maximizing Benefits from our Petroleum Resource Stakeholders' Forum</td>
<td>30th September and 1st October 2014</td>
<td>Civil society organisations (including fishermen's associations and trade unions), traditional authorities, Chamber</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Venue/Location</th>
<th>Attendees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Stakeholder Forum on the Millennium Challenge Corporation II Agreement</td>
<td>Akroma Plaza Hotel, Takoradi</td>
<td>of Commerce, donor agencies, central government, trade unions, oil companies, media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28th October 2014</td>
<td>Civil society organisations, donor agencies, Ghanaian firms, central government, trade unions, media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mensvic Hotel, Accra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Interest and Accountability Committee (PIAC) 2013 Report Launch</td>
<td>Coconut Grove Regency Hotel, Accra</td>
<td>Civil society organisations, religious organisations, traditional authorities, Chamber of Commerce, donor agencies, central government, media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30th October 2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi 2014-2017 Medium Term Development Plan Public Hearing</td>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly</td>
<td>Local government, traditional authorities, civil society organisations, donor agencies, trade unions, oil companies, media, engaged citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7th November 2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly Social Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Training Program</td>
<td>Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Takoradi</td>
<td>Local government agencies, local businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18th November 2014</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site-visit at Takoradi Port</td>
<td>6th March 2015</td>
<td>Site visit given by a Project Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tour of Oil Village</td>
<td>24th March 2015</td>
<td>Tour given by a Property Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tour of social enterprise farm</td>
<td>9th October 2014</td>
<td>Tour given by owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tour of the city assembly</td>
<td>12th November 2014 and 7th March 2015</td>
<td>Tour given by city planners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2: Interview Guide for Transnational Oil Companies

1. Introductions: What is your role and how long have you been with the company?
2. How long have you lived in Sekondi-Takoradi?
3. What is your company’s vision for development of the city and the region?
4. How is your company contributing to the development of the city (STMA)?
5. How is your company contributing to development in Sekondi-Takoradi? In Ghana?
6. Do you have strategic plans for the development of the city (STMA)? If so, how were they formulated?
7. What successes have you had with the social investment program?
8. How do you decide which projects to fund?
9. Which projects have you funded in the city (STMA)?
10. What challenges have you faced?
11. How do you engage with communities? What processes are in place?
12. Has the social investment budget been affected by decreasing oil prices?
13. Which groups are you in collaboration with and how?
   a. What is your relationship with local government?
   b. What is your company’s relationship with chiefs and traditional authorities?
   c. What is your relationship with civil society?
14. What is your company’s position with the Local Content Law?
15. How does your company decide which local companies you want to work with?
16. How did your company set up business in Ghana, particularly in Ghana?
17. How did your company find real estate – homes and offices – for your employees?
18. How would you compare working in Ghana to other places?
19. Do you have documents that you can share with me?
Appendix 3: Interview Guide for Civil Society Representatives

• Introductions: What is your role and how long have you been with the organisation?
• How long have you lived in Sekondi-Takoradi?
• What is your organisation’s vision for Sekondi-Takoradi’s development given the discovery of oil?
• What are your goals and aims as a civil society organisation?
• What changes have you seen in the city as a result of oil and gas?
  o What’s been positive? What’s been negative?
  o How has this impacted local businesses?
• Are you part of the Ghana Civil Society Platform on Oil and Gas?
• Can you give me an overview of planning system here?
• How are you involved planning processes in the city?
  o Are you involved with the Medium Term Development Plans?
  o Do you create your own plans?
• Concerning the government’s management of oil, what have they done well? And…not so well?
• In what ways are you working with the central government?
• In what ways are you working with the local government?
• In what ways are you working with oil companies?
• What have you been successful at achieving?
• What challenges are you facing?
• Were you involved in the local content bill? What are your thoughts on it?
• In what ways are local communities involved?
• How do you mobilise for support locally?
• Where do you get your funding from?
• Do you have documents that you can share with me?
Appendix 4: Interview Guide for Local Government Officials

• Introductions: What is your role and how long have you been in this role?
• How long have you lived in Sekondi-Takoradi?
• What is the city’s vision for the development of Sekondi-Takoradi?
• How would you like to see the city change?
• What changes have you seen in the city as a result of oil and gas?
  o What’s been positive? What’s been negative?
  o How has this impacted revenues in the city?
• Can you give me an overview of planning system here?
  o Can you give me the process for the creation of the Medium Term Development Plans? Why have there been delays?
  o Can you elaborate on internally generated revenues, how do you collect them?
  o Do you work with oil companies around permitting?
• In what ways are you working with the central government?
• In what ways are you working with oil companies?
• How do you work with civil society and everyday citizens?
• Are there any participatory governance/planning initiatives in the city?
• What are your thoughts on the local content bill?
• Can you give me an update on the Takoradi Mall development?
• What challenges are you facing?
• How does the city get its funding? Has there been an increase since the oil and gas discovery?
• Do you have any planning documents and city budgets you can share with me?
Appendix 5: Interview Guide for Property Developers

• Introductions: Can you tell me a bit more about yourself and your role? How about specifically with this project?
• What was the impetus or motivation for building this property? And when was this?
• Is oil and gas a driving force behind this project?
• Who are the original investors that started the project?
• Who else has joined as an investor?
• Who is the designer or architect for this property?
• What kind of shops will be located?
• How has the local government (STMA) been involved? Are they supportive of the project?
• Did you work with traditional authorities to acquire land?
• What is the budget for this project?
• How did you acquire the land?
• What kind delays have you experienced?
• What kind of resistance have you received with this project?
• What would you like to see improve with regards to setting up a business here?