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The 2019 Report of The Lancet Countdown on Health and Climate Change

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187	AAP – Ambient Air Pollution
188	AUM – Assets Under Management
189	BEV – Battery Electric Vehicle
190	CDP – Carbon Disclosure Project
191	CFU – Climate Funds Update
192	CO ₂ – Carbon Dioxide
193	COP – Conference of the Parties
194	COPD – Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease
195	CPI – Consumer Price Indices
196	CSD – Climate Sensitive Disease
197	DALYs – Disability Adjusted Life Years
198	DPSEEA – Driving Force-Pressure-State-Exposure-Effect-Action
199	ECMWF – European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts
200	EEIO – Environmentally-Extended Input-Output
201	EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone
202	EJ – Exajoule
203	EM-DAT – Emergency Events Database
204	ERA – European Research Area
205	ETR – Environmental Tax Reform
206	ETS – Emissions Trading System
207	EU – European Union
208	EU28 – 28 European Union Member States
209	EV – Electric Vehicle
210	FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
211	FAZ – Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
212	FISE – Social Inclusion Energy Fund
213	GBD – Global Burden of Disease
214	GDP – Gross Domestic Product
215	GHG – Greenhouse Gas
216	GtCO ₂ – Gigatons of Carbon Dioxide
217	GW – Gigawatt
218	GWP – Gross World Product
219	HAB – Harmful Algal Blooms
220	HFC - Hydrofluorocarbon
221	HIC – High Income Countries
222	HNAP – Health component of National Adaptation Plan
223	HT – <i>Hindustan Times</i>
224	ICS – Improved Cook Stove
225	IEA – International Energy Agency
226	IHR – International Health Regulations
227	IPC – Infection Prevention and Control
228	IPCC - Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
229	IRENA - International Renewable Energy Agency
230	KP – Kaiser Permanente

231	LMICs – Low- and Middle-Income Countries
232	LPG – Liquefied Petroleum Gas
233	Mt – Megaton
234	MtCO ₂ e – Metric Tons of Carbon Dioxide Equivalent
235	MODIS – Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer
236	MRIO – Multi-Region Input-Output
237	NAP – National Adaptation Plan
238	NASA – National Aeronautics and Space Administration
239	NDCs - Nationally Determined Contributions
240	NHMSs – National Meteorological and Hydrological Services
241	NHS – National Health Service
242	NO _x – Nitrogen Oxides
243	NYT – <i>New York Times</i>
244	OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
245	PHEV – Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle
246	PM _{2.5} – Fine Particulate Matter
247	PV – Photovoltaic
248	SDG – Sustainable Development Goal
249	SDU – Sustainable Development Unit
250	SHUE – Sustainable Healthy Urban Environments
251	SO ₂ – Sulphur Dioxide
252	SSS – Sea Surface Salinity
253	SST – Sea Surface Temperature
254	tCO ₂ – Tons of Carbon Dioxide
255	tCO ₂ /TJ – Total Carbon Dioxide per Terajoule
256	TJ – Terajoule
257	ToI – <i>Times of India</i>
258	TPES – Total Primary Energy Supply
259	TWh – Terawatt Hours
260	UHC – Universal Health Coverage
261	UK – United Kingdom
262	UN – United Nations
263	UNFCCC – United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
264	UNGA – United Nations General Assembly
265	UNGD – United Nations General Debate
266	USA – United States of America
267	V&A – Vulnerability and Adaptation
268	VC – Vectorial Capacity
269	VLV – Value of a Life Year
270	WHL – Work Hours Lost
271	WHO – World Health Organization
272	WMO – World Meteorological Organization
273	WP – <i>Washington Post</i>
274	YLL – Years of Life Lost

275 Executive Summary

276 The Lancet Countdown is an international, multi-disciplinary collaboration dedicated to
277 monitoring the evolving health profile of climate change, and providing an independent
278 assessment of governments' delivery of their commitments under the Paris Agreement.

279 The 2019 report presents an annual update of 41 indicators across five key domains: climate
280 change impacts, exposures, and vulnerability; adaptation, planning, and resilience for
281 health; mitigation actions and health co-benefits; economics and finance; and public and
282 political engagement. It represents the findings and consensus of 27 leading academic
283 institutions and UN agencies from every continent. In order to generate the quality and
284 diversity of data required, the collaboration draws on the world-class expertise of climate
285 scientists, ecologists, mathematicians, engineers, energy, food, and transport experts,
286 economists, social and political scientists, public health professionals, and doctors.

287 The science of public health and climate change describe two possible future scenarios – a
288 world that has responded to this threat, and one that has not. Whilst this can also be
289 described as a continuum, the Lancet Countdown's indicators bring the present-day
290 decisions and implications surrounding these two pathways, into sharp focus.

291

292 **The health of a child born today will be impacted by climate change at every stage in their**
293 **life. Without significant intervention, this new era will come to define the health of an**
294 **entire generation.**

295 Evidence provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the International
296 Energy Agency, and the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration is helpful in
297 understanding and contextualising the reason for such a momentous shift. The Paris
298 Agreement lays out a global target of “holding the increase in the global average
299 temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the
300 temperature increase to 1.5°C”. The world has so-far observed a 1°C temperature rise above
301 pre-industrial levels, with feedback cycles and polar amplification seeing a rise as high as 3°C
302 in North Western Canada.^{1,2} Indeed, eight of the ten hottest years on record have occurred
303 in the last decade.³ Such rapid change is primarily driven by the combustion of fossil fuels,
304 consumed at a rate of 171,000 kg of coal, 11,600,000 litres of gas, and 186,000 litres of oil
305 per second.⁴⁻⁶ Progress in mitigating this threat is intermittent at best, with CO₂ emissions
306 continuing to rise in 2018.⁷ The carbon intensity of the energy system has remained
307 unchanged since 1990 (Indicator 3.1.1), and from 2016 to 2018, total primary energy supply
308 from coal increased by 1.7%, reversing a previous downwards trend (Indicator 3.1.2).
309 Correspondingly, the healthcare sector is responsible for some 4.6% of global emissions,
310 steadily rising across most major economies (Indicator 3.6). Global fossil fuel consumption
311 subsidies increased by 50% over the last three years, reaching a high of \$429 billion USD in
312 2018 (Indicator 4.4.1).

313 Following this path, a child born today will experience a world that is over four degrees
314 warmer than the pre-industrial average, with climate change impacting their health at every
315 stage of life – from infancy and adolescence to adulthood and old age. Downward trends in
316 global yield potential for all major crops tracked since 1960 threatens food production and
317 food security, with infants often worst affected by the potentially permanent effects of
318 undernutrition (Indicator 1.5.1). Children are among the most susceptible to diarrhoeal
319 disease and experience the most severe effects of dengue fever. Trends in climate suitability
320 for disease transmission are hence particularly concerning, with nine of the ten most
321 suitable years for the transmission of dengue fever on record occurring since 2000
322 (Indicator 1.4.1). Similarly, since an early 1980s baseline, the number of days suitable for
323 Vibrio (the pathogen responsible much of the burden of diarrhoeal disease) has doubled,
324 and global suitability for coastal Vibrio cholerae has increased by 9.9% (Indicator 1.4.1).

325 Through adolescence and beyond, air pollution – principally driven by fossil fuels, and
326 exacerbated by climate change – damages the heart, lungs, and every other vital organ.
327 These effects accumulate over time, and into adulthood, with global deaths attributable to
328 ambient PM_{2.5} remaining at 2.9 million in 2016 (Indicator 3.3.2) and total global air pollution
329 deaths reaching 7 million.⁸

330 Later in life, families, agricultural and construction workers, and livelihoods are put at risk
331 from increases in the frequency and severity of extremes of weather, driven by climate
332 change. At the global level, 53% of countries experienced an increase in daily population
333 exposure to wildfires from 2001-2014 to 2015-2018 (Indicator 1.2.1). Perhaps
334 unsurprisingly, India and China sustained the largest increases, with an increase of over 15
335 million and 10.5 million exposures over this time period. The economic cost per person
336 affected by wildfires is over 48 times that of flooding.⁹ In low-income countries, 99% of
337 economic losses from extreme weather events are uninsured, placing a particularly high
338 burden on individuals and households (Indicator 4.1). Temperature rises and heatwaves are
339 limiting the labour capacity of populations at increasing rates. In 2018, 45 billion potential
340 work hours were lost globally compared to a 2000 baseline, and Southern parts of the
341 United States of America (USA) lost as much as 15-20% of potential daylight work hours
342 during the hottest month of 2018 (Indicator 1.1.4).

343 Elderly populations aged over 65 years are particularly vulnerable to the health effects of
344 climate change, and especially to extremes of heat. From 1990 to 2018, populations in every
345 region has become more vulnerable to heat and heatwave, with Europe and the Eastern
346 Mediterranean remaining the most vulnerable (Indicator 1.1.1). In 2018, these vulnerable
347 populations experienced 220 million heatwave exposures globally, breaking the previous
348 record of 209 million set in 2015 (Indicator 1.1.3). Already faced with the challenge of an
349 ageing population, Japan had 32 million heatwave exposures in 2018, the equivalent of
350 almost every person over 65 experiencing a heatwave. Finally, whilst they are difficult to
351 quantify, the systemic risks of climate change, such as those seen in migration, poverty
352 exacerbation, violent conflict, and mental illness affect people of all ages and all
353 nationalities.

354 Much of the data up to present day suggests that this first pathway is more closely aligned
355 with the current global trajectory.

356

357 **And yet, a second path is apparent. It is clear that such an unprecedented challenge**
358 **requires an unprecedented response which accelerates the pace of change, transforming**
359 **the health of that same child born today, right the way through their life.**

360 In a world that matches the ambition of the Paris Agreement, this child would see the
361 phase-out of all coal in the UK and Canada by their 6th and 11th birthday; they would see
362 France ban the sale of petrol and diesel cars by their 21st birthday, and they would be 31
363 years old by the time the world reaches net zero in 2050, with the UK's recent commitment
364 one of many to come. These changes and many more could result in cleaner air, safer cities,
365 and more nutritious food. They would see renewed investment in health systems and vital
366 infrastructure, as well as greater care for the broader determinants of health.

367 Considering the evidence available in the 2019 indicators, there are signs that the beginning
368 of such a transition may be unfolding. Despite a small uptick in coal use in 2018, in key
369 countries such as China, it continued to fall as a share of electricity generation (Indicator
370 3.2.1). Correspondingly, renewables accounted for 45% of global growth in power
371 generation capacity that year, and low-carbon electricity reached a high of 32% of global
372 electricity in 2016 (Indicator 3.1.3). Global per capita use of electric vehicles grew by an
373 enormous 20.6% between 2015 and 2016, and now represents 1.5% of China's total
374 transportation fuel use (Indicator 3.4). Improvements in air pollution seen in Europe from
375 2015 to 2016 could result in a reduction of Years of Life Lost worth €5.2 billion if this
376 reduction remained constant across a lifetime (Indicator 4.2). In a number of cases, the
377 savings from a healthier and more productive workforce with fewer healthcare expenses
378 will cover the initial investment costs of these interventions. Similarly, more resilient cities
379 and health systems are beginning to emerge. Almost 50% of countries and 69% of cities
380 surveyed reported efforts to conduct national health adaptation plans or climate change
381 risk assessments (Indicators 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and 2.1.3). These plans are now being implemented,
382 with the number of countries providing climate services to the health sector rising from 55
383 in 2018 to 70 in 2019 (Indicator 2.2) and 109 countries reporting medium to high
384 implementation of a national health emergency framework (Indicator 2.3.1). Growing
385 demand is coupled with a steady increase in health adaptation spending, which represents
386 5% (£13 billion) of total adaptation funding in 2018 and has increased by 11.8% over the
387 past 12 months (Indicator 2.4). This is in part funded by growing revenues from carbon
388 pricing mechanisms, which saw a 50% increase in funds raised between 2016 and 2017, up
389 to \$33 billion USD (Indicator 4.4.3).

390 Taken as a whole, current progress is inadequate, and the indicators published in the Lancet
391 Countdown's 2019 report are suggestive of a world struggling to cope with warming that is
392 occurring faster than governments are able, or willing to respond. There are too many
393 missed opportunities to improve public health, and leadership in recognising these links at

394 the UN General Assembly is too often left to Small Island Developing States (Indicator 5.3).
395 Indeed, it is those who will be affected most by climate change that have led the wave of
396 school climate strikes across the world. The scale and scope of the transformation to a low-
397 carbon economy needs to accelerate if the second of these two pathways are to become a
398 reality.

399 Delivering such an unprecedented transition will require bold, new approaches to research,
400 policymaking, and business. It will take the work of the 7.5 billion people currently alive, to
401 ensure that the health of a child born today, isn't defined by a changing climate.
402

403 Introduction

404 Human wellbeing, and the stability of local communities, health systems, and governments
405 all depend on how they interface with the changing global climate.^{10,11} Across the world, an
406 average temperature rise of 1°C since a pre-industrial baseline^{1,2} has already revealed
407 profound impacts, with more severe storms and floods, prolonged heatwaves and droughts,
408 new and emerging infectious diseases,¹²⁻¹⁴ and compounding threats to food security. Left
409 unabated, climate change will define the health profile of current and future generations,
410 will overwhelm hospitals and health services around the world, and undermine progress
411 towards the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and efforts to
412 achieve universal health coverage (UHC).^{15,16}

413 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) recent Special Report on Global
414 Warming of 1.5°C makes the scale of the response required, clear: global annual emissions
415 must halve by 2030 and reach net-zero by 2050 in order to limit warming to 1.5°C, whilst
416 recognising that no amount of climate change is considered 'safe'.² Placing health at the
417 centre of this transition will yield enormous dividends for the public and the economy, with
418 cleaner air, safer cities, and healthier diets. Analysis focused on only one of these pathways
419 – cleaner air through more sustainable transport and power generation systems – confirms
420 that the economic gains from the health benefits of meeting the Paris Agreement
421 substantially outweigh the cost of any intervention by a ratio of 1.45 to 2.45, resulting in
422 trillions of dollars of savings world-wide.¹⁷ This complements recent assessments from
423 outside the health sector, which estimate that a robust response to climate change could
424 yield over US\$26 trillion, and 65 million new low-carbon jobs, by 2030 compared to a
425 business-as-usual scenario.¹⁸

426 Monitoring this transition from threat to opportunity, and demonstrating the benefits of
427 realising the Paris Agreement, is precisely why *the Lancet Countdown: Tracking Progress on*
428 *Health and Climate Change* was formed. As an international, independent research
429 collaboration, the partnership brings together some 27 academic institutions and UN
430 agencies, from every continent. The indicators and report presented here represent the
431 work and consensus of climate scientists, geographers, engineers, energy, food, and
432 transport experts, economists, social and political scientists, public health professionals, and
433 doctors.

434 The 41 indicators of the 2019 report span five domains: climate change impacts, exposures,
435 and vulnerability; adaptation planning and resilience for health; mitigation actions and their
436 health co-benefits; economics and finance; and public and political engagement (Panel 1).
437

Working Group	Indicator	
Climate Change Impacts, Exposures and Vulnerability	1.1: Health and heat	1.1.1: Vulnerability to extremes of heat
		1.1.2: Health and exposure to warming
		1.1.3: Exposure of vulnerable populations to heatwaves
		1.1.4: Change in labour capacity
	1.2: Health and extreme weather events	1.2.1: Wildfires
		1.2.2: Flood and drought
		1.2.3: Lethality of weather-related disasters
	1.3: Global health trends in climate-sensitive diseases	
	1.4: Climate-sensitive infectious diseases	1.4.1: Climate suitability for infectious disease transmission
		1.4.2: Vulnerability to mosquito-borne diseases
	1.5: Food security and under-nutrition	1.5.1: Terrestrial food security and under-nutrition
1.5.2: Marine food security and under-nutrition		
Adaptation, Planning, and Resilience for Health	2.1: Adaptation planning and assessment	2.1.1: National adaptation plans for health
		2.1.2: National assessments of climate change impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation for health
		2.1.3: City-level climate change risk assessments
	2.2: Climate information services for health	
	2.3: Adaptation delivery and implementation	2.3.1: Detection, preparedness and response to health emergencies
		2.3.2: Air conditioning – benefits and harms
	2.4: Spending on adaptation for health and health-related activities	
Mitigation Actions and Health Co-Benefits	3.1 Energy system and Health	3.1.1: Carbon intensity of the energy system
		3.1.2: Coal phase-out
		3.1.3: Zero-carbon emission electricity
	3.2: Access and use of clean energy	
	3.3: Air pollution, energy, and transport	3.3.1: Exposure to air pollution in cities
		3.3.2: Premature mortality from ambient air pollution by sector
	3.4: Sustainable and healthy transport	
	3.5: Food, agriculture, and health	
3.6: Mitigation in the healthcare sector		
Economics and Finance	4.1: Economic losses due to climate-related extreme events	
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	4.3: Investing in a low-carbon economy	4.3.1: Investment in new coal capacity
		4.3.2: Investments in zero-carbon energy and energy efficiency
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4.4.3: Use of carbon pricing revenues		
Public and Political Engagement	5.1: Media coverage of health and climate change	
	5.2: Individual engagement in health and climate change	
	5.3: Engagement in health and climate change in the United Nations General Assembly	
	5.4: Engagement in health and climate change in the corporate sector	

438 *Panel 1: The Lancet Countdown Indicators*

439

440 Strengthening a global monitoring system for health and climate change

441 This collaboration builds on three decades of work around the world, which has sought to
442 understand and assess the scientific pathways linking climate change to public health.¹⁴ In
443 2016, the Lancet Countdown launched a global consultation process, actively seeking input
444 from experts and policymakers on which aspects of these pathways could and should be
445 tracked as part of a global monitoring process. The final set of indicators were selected,
446 based on: the presence of credible scientific links to climate change and to public health; the
447 presence of reliable and regularly updated data, available across temporal and geographic
448 scales; and the importance of this information to policymakers.¹⁹

449 Overcoming the data and capacity limitations inherent in this field and remaining adaptable
450 to a rapidly evolving scientific landscape has required a commitment to an open and
451 iterative approach. This has meant that the analysis provided in each subsequent annual
452 report replaces analyses from previous years, with methods and datasets being
453 continuously improved and updated. In every case, a full description of these changes is
454 provided in the appendix, which is intended as an essential companion to the main report,
455 rather than a more traditional addendum.

456 The 2019 report presents 12 months of work refining the metrics and analysis. In addition to
457 updating each indicator by one year, key developments include:

- 458 - The strengthening of methodologies and datasets for indicators that capture: heat
459 and heatwaves; labour capacity loss; the lethality of weather-related disasters;
460 terrestrial food security and undernutrition; health adaptation planning and
461 vulnerability assessments; air pollution mortality in cities; household fuel use for
462 cooking; and qualitative validation of engagement from the media and national
463 governments in health and climate change.
- 464 - The expansion of geographical and temporal coverage for indicators that capture:
465 marine food security; national adaptation planning for health; health vulnerability
466 assessments; climate information services for health; the carbon intensity of the
467 energy system; access to clean energy; and Chinese media engagement in health and
468 climate change.
- 469 - The construction of new indicators that capture: exposure to wildfires; the
470 transmission suitability for cholera; the benefits and harms of air conditioning;
471 emissions from livestock and crop production; global healthcare system emissions;
472 economic cost of air pollution; and individual online engagement in health and
473 climate change.

474 There is also ongoing work to establish indicators for concepts which are inherently difficult
475 to quantify, such as the mental health effects of climate change. In addition, three indicators
476 included in previous years – covering migration, global health adaptation funding, and
477 academic engagement in health and climate change – will be re-introduced in subsequent
478 years following work to improve their data and methods. For the second consecutive year,
479 these changes represent significant updates to a majority of indicators – a pace which will
480 only accelerate as additional funding and capacity from the Wellcome Trust and the Lancet

481 Countdown's partners grow. Going forward, the collaboration will seek to further
482 strengthen its scientific processes, continuously review its indicators, and produce internally
483 coherent frameworks to guide the development of new indicators. To this end, the Lancet
484 Countdown remains open to new input and participation from experts and academic
485 institutions willing to build on the analysis published in this report.

486

487 [The year in health and climate change](#)

488 The 2019 report points to a number of worsening human symptoms of climate change. Over
489 220 million additional exposures to extremes of heat occurred in 2018 compared to a
490 climatological baseline, higher than ever previously tracked (Indicator 1.1.3). This occurred
491 at a time when vulnerability to these extremes is rising across every region (Indicator 1.1.1),
492 and the warming experienced by human populations reached four times that of the global
493 average temperature rise (Indicator 1.1.2). Around the world, resultant losses in labour
494 capacity were seen, with a number of the Southern states in the USA losing as much as 15-
495 20% of daylight capacity, for workers in construction and agriculture (Indicator 1.1.4). The
496 effects of this warming extended to other extremes, with 106 countries experiencing a
497 marked increase in the daily population exposures to wildfires when compared to baseline
498 (Indicator 1.2.1). In the case of infectious disease, 2018 was the second most suitable year
499 on record for the transmission of diarrhoeal disease and wound infections from *Vibrio*
500 bacteria, and nine out of the last ten most suitable years for the transmission of dengue
501 fever have occurred since 2000 (Indicator 1.4.1).

502 Despite this, the carbon intensity of the global energy system has remained flat since 1990
503 (Indicator 3.1.1), and access to clean fuels for household services is stagnating (Indicator
504 3.2). Perhaps of greatest concern, total primary energy supply from coal increased by 1.7%
505 from 2016 to 2018, reversing a previously observed downwards trend (Indicator 3.1.2), and
506 CO₂ emissions from the energy sector, far from falling, rose by 2.6% from 2016 to 2018
507 (Indicator 3.1.1). Global fossil fuel subsidies rose to \$429 billion in 2018, a 33% rise from
508 2017 (Indicator 4.4.1), and healthcare-associated emissions now represent 4.6% of global
509 emissions and continue to rise across most major economies (Indicator 3.6). Fossil fuel use
510 continues to contribute to ambient air pollution, which resulted in 2.9 million deaths in
511 2016 (Indicator 3.3.2).

512 Whilst these emerging health impacts and the lack of a coordinated global response portray
513 a bleak picture, they also mask important trends that lie behind the data. Encouraging
514 reductions in investment in new coal capacity and a fall in coal as a share of total electricity
515 generation continue (Indicators 4.3.1 and 3.1.2). Renewable energy accounted for 45% of
516 total growth in 2018 (Indicator 3.1.3), and low-carbon electricity represented an impressive
517 32% share of total global electricity generation in 2016 (Indicator 3.1.3). A reduction in air
518 pollution in Europe from 2015 to 2016, if held constant, could result in a reduction in Years
519 of Life Lost valued at €5.2 billion, annually across a lifetime (Indicator 4.2). At the same time,
520 the world is beginning to adapt, with almost 50% of countries, and 69% of cities surveyed,
521 reporting the completion or undertaking of a climate change risk assessment or adaptation

522 plan (Indicators 2.1.2 and 2.1.3). This is resulting in implementation, with 70 countries
523 providing climate services to the health sector in 2019 and 109 countries completing
524 medium to high implementation of a national health emergency framework (Indicators 2.2
525 and 2.3.1) These changes are supported by new commitments from the UK to reach net
526 zero by 2050,²⁰ with others soon expected to follow.

527 In the health sector, the UK's Royal College of General Practitioners and Faculty of Public
528 Health divested their fossil fuels investments (Indicator 4.3.4), and new analysis suggests a
529 growing and more sophisticated recognition of the health benefits of the response to
530 climate change in the media (Indicator 5.1).

531 Many of the trends identified in the 2019 Lancet Countdown report are deeply concerning.
532 The world is failing to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions and is too slow in responding to
533 climate change. Nevertheless, the continued expansion of renewable energy, increased
534 investment in health system adaptation, improvements in sustainable transport, and growth
535 in public engagement suggests ongoing reasons for cautious optimism. At a time when the
536 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is preparing to review
537 commitments under the Paris Agreement in 2020, greatly accelerated ambition and action
538 in these sectors may yet be able to meet the world's commitment to remaining "well below
539 2°C."²¹
540

541 Section 1: Climate Change Impacts, Exposures, and Vulnerabilities

542 Climate change and human health are interconnected in a myriad of complex ways.¹⁴
543 Building on the Lancet Countdown's previous work, section 1 of the 2019 report continues
544 to track quantitative metrics along pathways of population vulnerability, exposure, and
545 health outcomes that are indeed indicative of the cost to human health of climate change,
546 and thus the urgent need to reduce GHG emissions. The impacts tracked here in turn
547 motivate and guide climate change adaptation (section 2) and mitigation (section 3)
548 interventions.

549 The work in section 1 spans exposure-oriented indicators that are closer to the climate
550 signal, such as exposure to extreme weather events (Indicator 1.2.1), changes in crop yield
551 potential (Indicator 1.5.1), and labour productivity (Indicator 1.1.4), through to indicators
552 closer to health outcomes, such as those related to infectious diseases (Indicators 1.4.1 and
553 1.4.2).

554 Changes in warming and weather events are not evenly distributed across the globe, and
555 some populations are more vulnerable than others. This is reflected through indicators that,
556 for example, focus on particularly vulnerable populations (Indicator 1.1.1) and by
557 disaggregating data at the regional level (such as Indicators 1.1.1 and 1.3).

558 Whilst it is certainly true that the effects of climate change vary by geography and that
559 these will not always be negative, it is also true that these so-called 'positives' are often
560 short-term in nature, and quickly overwhelmed and outweighed by other exposures. One
561 such example is seen in Australia, where any benefit that may have been gained from CO₂
562 fertilisation is both small and largely outweighed by greater climate variation, with crop
563 yields now stalling as harvests are increasingly affected by more frequent drought.²² Even
564 disregarding the negative effects of temperature change, any CO₂ fertilisation benefits are
565 likely to be short-lived, as CO₂ concentrations of more than 450 parts per million (ppm) will
566 negatively affect grain quality.²³

567 For 2019, a new metric, tracking exposure to wildfires, has been added (Indicator 1.2.1), as
568 has an expansion of climate suitability of infectious diseases (Indicator 1.4.1) to now include
569 cholera transmission risk. These indicators portray a world which is rapidly warming, where
570 environmental and social systems are already feeling the effects of climate change, and
571 human health is being affected as a result.
572

573 Indicator 1.1: Health and heat

574 The most immediate and direct impact of a changing global climate on human health is seen
575 in the steady increase in global average temperature, and the increased frequency,
576 intensity, and duration of extremes of heat. The pathophysiological consequences of heat
577 exposure in humans are well documented and understood, and include heat stress and heat
578 stroke, acute kidney injury, exacerbation of congestive heart failure,²⁴ and increased risk of
579 interpersonal,²⁵ and collective violence.²⁶ Here, four indicators are related to heat, tracking
580 the vulnerabilities, exposures, and labour implications of a warming world.

581


582 *Indicator 1.1.1: Vulnerability to extremes of heat*

583 **Headline finding:** *Vulnerability to extremes of heat continues to rise among elderly*
584 *populations in every region of the world with the Western Pacific, South East Asia and*
585 *African regions all seeing an increase in vulnerability of over 10% since 1990.*

586 Certain populations are more vulnerable to the health effects of heat than others. The
587 elderly are particularly vulnerable, especially those with pre-existing medical conditions
588 (such as diabetes and cardiovascular, respiratory, and renal disease).²⁷ Outdoor workers,
589 while younger and healthier overall, are also vulnerable due to heightened exposure. This
590 indicator presents a heat vulnerability index, with the data and methods unchanged from
591 previous years, and provided in detail in the appendix.

592 The elderly, in all regions of the world, are becoming increasingly vulnerable (Figure 1).
593 However, the highest increase from 1990 to 2017 has been seen in the Western Pacific
594 (33.1% to 36.6%) and African (28.4% to 31.2%) regions. Overall, Europe remains the most
595 vulnerable region to heat exposure (followed closely by the Eastern Mediterranean region),
596 due to its elderly population, high rates of urbanisation, and high prevalence of
597 cardiovascular and other chronic diseases.

598



599
600

Figure 1: Trends in heat-related vulnerability for populations over 65 years by WHO region

601


602 *Indicator 1.1.2: Health and exposure to warming*

603 **Headline finding:** The mean global summer temperature change experienced by humans
 604 continues to increase significantly faster than the mean global summer temperature change
 605 across the whole planet. In 2018, a 0.8°C mean change relative to the 1986–2005 baseline
 606 was experienced by the world population, compared to a 0.2°C global mean change over the
 607 same period.

608 This indicator compares the population-weighted temperature change from a 1986-2005
 609 baseline with the global average temperature change over the same period, using weather
 610 data from the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF),²⁸ ERA-
 611 Interim project and population data from the NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications
 612 Center (SEDAC) Gridded Population of the World (GPWv4).²⁹ Full details are provided in the
 613 appendix, along with an explanation of improvements for the 2019 report, which uses
 614 higher resolution climate and population data (0.5° grid instead of 0.75° grid).

615 Figure 2 presents the trend in global and population-weighted temperature change. The
 616 population-weighted temperatures (normalised for population growth) continue to grow at
 617 a significantly faster pace than the global average, increasing the human health risk. The

618 global average population-weighted temperature has risen by 0.8°C from the 1986–2005
 619 baseline to 2018, compared with a global average temperature rise of 0.2°C over the same
 620 period.



621
 622 *Figure 2: Mean summer warming relative to the 1986–2005 average*

623


624 *Indicator 1.1.3: Exposure of vulnerable populations to heatwaves*

625 **Headline finding:** In 2018, 220 million more heatwave exposures were observed, breaking
 626 the previous record set in 2015. Japan alone experienced 32 million heatwave exposures, the
 627 equivalent of almost every person aged 65 and above experiencing a heatwave in 2018.

628 Heatwaves across all of the Northern Hemisphere made headlines in 2018, reaching new
 629 highs for a number of countries.³⁰ The definition of a heatwave, and methods used here
 630 remain unchanged from previous reports (see appendix). For the 2019 report, demographic
 631 data from the NASA SEDAC GPWv4,²⁹ with each heatwave exposure event being one
 632 heatwave experienced by one person (see appendix). This indicator was also improved with
 633 a higher resolution (0.5° grid instead of 0.75° grid).

634 Figure 3 presents the change in heatwave exposure events relative to the recent past
 635 average. The increase in heatwave exposure events (220 million, which is 11 million more
 636 than the 2015 record) is due to a series of heatwaves across India (45 million exposures); in
 637 central and northern Europe (31 million exposures in the EU); and northeast Asia, where the

638 heatwave affected Japan, the Korean peninsula, and Northern China. There were 32 million
 639 exposures in Japan alone, the equivalent of almost every person aged 65 and above in Japan
 640 experiencing a heatwave in 2018.³¹



641
 642 *Figure 3: Change in the number of heatwave exposure events (with one exposure event being one*
 643 *heatwave experienced by one person) compared with the historical average number of events (1986–*
 644 *2005 average)*

645

646 *Indicator 1.1.4: Change in labour capacity*

647 **Headline finding:** *higher temperatures continue to affect people’s ability to work. In 2018*
 648 *there were 45 billion additional work hours lost compared with the year 2000, due to rising*
 649 *temperatures.*


650 This indicator highlights the important impact of climate change on labour capacity in
 651 vulnerable populations.³² People’s ability to work is affected by both temperature and
 652 humidity, which are both captured in the Wet Bulb Globe Temperature (WBGT)
 653 measurement. Labour productivity loss estimates for every degree increase of WBGT
 654 beyond 24°C range from 0.8% to 5%.³³ Reduced labour productivity is often the first
 655 symptom of the health effects of heat, and, if not addressed, may lead to more severe
 656 health effects, such as heat exhaustion and heat stroke.

657 This indicator assesses labour capacity loss by assigning work-fraction loss functions to
 658 different activity sectors in accordance with the power (metabolic rate) typically expended
 659 by a worker performing that activity. Unsafe work hours are calculated as a function of the
 660 WBGT and the internal heat generated by work activity within three sectors: service (200W),
 661 manufacturing (300W) and agriculture (400W), and analysed on an hourly basis by 0.5° grid
 662 cell.³⁴ This is then coupled with the proportion of the population working within each of
 663 these three sectors to calculate potential work hours lost (WHL).^{29,35} This indicator has been
 664 improved to include the impact of sunlight on the work hours lost by calculating the
 665 increase in WBGT using solar radiation data available from the ERA database, with full
 666 methods referred to in the appendix.

667 The global atmospheric temperature and humidity in 2018 were slightly more favourable for
 668 work than in 2017, but the upward trend of work hours lost since 2000 remains clear (Figure
 669 4). In 2018, 133.6 billion of potential work hours were lost, 45 billion hours more than in
 670 2000.



671 Figure 5 presents a map of the equivalent potential full-time work lost in the sun and the
 672 shade. Of note, for 300W work in the shade (typical for manufacturing), over 10% potential
 673 daily work hours are lost in densely populated regions such as South Asia. For 400W work in
 674 the sun (typical for agriculture and construction), even workers in the Southern parts of the
 675 USA (below a latitude of 34°N, with Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and
 676 Florida particularly affected), lost 15-20% of potential daylight work hours in the hottest
 677 month in 2018.

678



679 *Figure 4: Potential global work hours lost by sector 2000-2018*

680



681
 682
 683
 684
 685

Figure 5: Potential full-time work lost assuming all work in the shade or all work in the sun (12 hours a day, 365 days a year) based on the percent of people working in agriculture (400W), industry (300W) and services (200W) in each grid cell

686 Indicator 1.2: Health and extreme weather events

687 *Indicator 1.2.1: Wildfires*

688 **Headline finding:** 106 out of 196 countries saw an increase in daily population exposure to
689 wildfires in 2015-2018 compared to 2001-2004, with India alone experiencing an increase of
690 15 million daily population exposures to wildfire. This not only poses a threat to public
691 health, but also results in major economic and social burdens in both higher and lower-
692 income countries.

693 The health impacts of wildfires range from direct thermal injuries and death, to the
694 exacerbation of acute and chronic respiratory and cardiovascular symptoms due to a rise in
695 ambient particulate matter.³⁶ Additionally, the global economic burden per person affected
696 by wildfires is over twice that of earthquakes and over 48 times that of floods.⁹
697 Furthermore, recent climatic changes including increasing temperature and earlier
698 snowmelt contribute to hotter, drier conditions, that increase risk of wildfires. Yet, they
699 remain an important component of many ecosystems, although they can be ecologically
700 harmful through human ignition or where forest management practices do not fully account
701 for it including support for periodic, natural burning.


702 This new indicator represents the difference between the average number of days people
703 were exposed to wildfire in each country during the most recent four years, as compared to
704 a 2001-2004 baseline period. It was developed using Collection 6 active fire product from
705 the Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) aboard the NASA Terra and
706 Aqua satellites.³⁷ Fire point locations were matched to a political border shapefile from the
707 Global Burden of Disease (GBD), and consequently joined with population count per
708 squared kilometre, taken from NASA SEDAC GPWv4.²⁹ The result is an annual sum of people
709 experiencing a fire event per day. The mean number of person-days exposed to wildfire was
710 taken for years 2001-2004 (the earliest for which data with adequate coverage and
711 resolution is available) and compared with the mean from 2015-2018.

712 Overall, this indicator reports a mean increase of 169,802 person-days exposed to wildfire
713 per year over the period studied, however the change experienced in some countries is far
714 greater than the global increase. India, China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mexico,
715 and Iraq sustained the largest increase in the number of persons impacted by wildfire-days,
716 with a maximum difference of nearly 15,102,000 person-days in India followed by
717 10,454,000 person-days in China (Figure 6). Countries such as Indonesia, Russia and Nepal
718 saw significant reductions in the number of people affected.

719


720

721 a)



722
723

b)



724
725
726

Figure 6: Human exposure to fire. a) Average change in annual person days exposed to wildfires between 2001-2004 and 2015-2018; b) Person days exposed to fire in 2018

727 *Indicator 1.2.2: Flood and drought*

728 **Headline Finding:** *Extremes of precipitation, resulting in flood and drought, have profound*
729 *impacts on human health and wellbeing, with South American and South East Asian*
730 *populations experiencing long-term increases in both phenomena.*

731 This indicator tracks exposure to extremes of precipitation, using weather and population
732 data used in previous reports,^{16,38} and described in full in the appendix. Analysis across time
733 and space reveals regional trends for drought and extreme heavy rain that are more
734 significant than global trends, reflecting the varying nature of climate change depending on
735 the geographical region.


736 Floods are particularly problematic for health, resulting in direct injuries and death, the
737 spread of vector- and water-borne disease, and mental health sequelae.³⁹ Figure 7 provides
738 a global map of extremes of rainfall as a proxy for flood, and demonstrates that South
739 America and South East Asia are experiencing the largest increases.

740 Prolonged drought remains one of the most dangerous environmental determinants of
741 premature mortality, affecting hygiene and sanitation, as well as resulting in reduced crop
742 yields, food insecurity, and malnutrition.³⁹ The change in the mean number of severe
743 droughts highlights increased exposure in large areas of South America, Northern and
744 Southern Africa, and South East Asia, with many areas experiencing a full 12 months of
745 drought throughout the year.

746

747

Mean change in number of extreme rainfall events over 2000 to 2018 period



748
749
750

Figure 7. Mean change in number of extreme rainfall events per year over the 2000-2018 period (change calculated relative to mean of 1986-2005)

751

752 *Indicator 1.2.3: Lethality of weather-related disasters*

753 **Headline Finding:** To date, there has been a statistically significant long-term upward trend
754 in the number of flood and storm related disasters in Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas
755 since 1990. At the same time, Africa has experienced a statistically significant increase in the
756 number of people affected by these types of disasters.


757 This indicator tracks the number of occurrences of weather-related disasters, the number of
758 people affected, and the lethality. These are formulated as a function of the hazard
759 (magnitude and frequency) and the vulnerability and exposure of populations at risk, using
760 data from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters.⁴⁰ For the 2019 report,
761 disasters have been separated into two groupings: flood and storm related disasters; and
762 heatwave and drought related disasters. Further detail of these methods and data are
763 presented in the appendix.

764 For the heatwave, drought and extreme temperature related disasters, no statistically
765 significant global trend was identified, reflecting the geographically local nature of such
766 events. However, in the case of floods and storms, a statistically significant trend in
767 occurrence was identified individually across Africa, Asia, and the Americas (Figure 9). There
768 has also been a statistically significant increase in the number of people affected by floods

769 and storms in Africa, although there was not a statistically significant increase in the
770 lethality of these events.

771 The relative stability of the lethality and numbers of people affected due to these disasters
772 could be possibly linked to improved disaster preparedness (including improved early
773 warning systems) as well as increased investments in healthcare services, and is discussed
774 further in section 2.⁴¹⁻⁴³ Importantly, work from the 2015 Lancet Commission demonstrates
775 that a business-as-usual trajectory is expected to result in an additional 2 billion flood-
776 exposure events per year by 2090, overwhelming health systems and public infrastructure.¹⁴

777



778
779 *Figure 8: Time series of occurrences of flood and storm related disasters. Significant increases in*
780 *occurrences of these disasters against the base period of 1990-1999 have occurred in Asia, Africa and*
781 *the Americas. Standardised anomalies are calculated by taking the annual value from the average*
782 *value from 1990-2018, normalised by the standardised value from 1990-2018 Dashed lines and R²*
783 *values present the linear relationship between time and the frequency of event occurrences in Africa,*
784 *the Americas and Asia*

785


786 Indicator 1.3: Global health trends in climate-sensitive diseases

787 **Headline finding:** *Whilst large improvements are occurring in mortality due to diarrhoeal*
788 *diseases, malnutrition, and malaria, mortality due to dengue is rising in regions most*
789 *affected by these diseases.*

790 As described in the preceding indicators, climate change affects a wide range of disease
 791 processes. Whilst those indicators track change in exposure, suitability and vulnerability to
 792 these disease outcomes, this indicator tracks mortality to climate-sensitive diseases using
 793 updated GBD data (see appendix).⁴⁴ Mortality due to earthquake and volcano events is
 794 removed from 'forces of nature' to give estimates for weather-related events.

795 Mortality from all climate-related causes is rising in the Western Pacific and South East Asia
 796 and remains flat in Europe (Figure 9). Death from diarrhoeal diseases and protein-energy
 797 malnutrition continue to decline in regions most affected (Africa, South East Asia and
 798 Eastern Mediterranean) and malaria mortality has had a strong decrease since the 2000s in
 799 Africa. However, mortality from dengue fever continues to rise, with South East Asia seeing
 800 the strongest increase in dengue fever mortality.

801



802
 803 *Figure 9: Deaths per 100,000 population by WHO regions and disease. Data taken from IHME GBD*
 804 *2017*⁴⁴

805

806 Indicator 1.4: Climate-sensitive infectious diseases

807 *Indicator 1.4.1: Climate suitability for infectious disease transmission*

808 **Headline Finding:** *Due to a changing climate, environmental conditions are increasingly*
809 *suitable for the transmission of numerous infectious diseases. Suitability for disease*
810 *transmission has increased for dengue, malaria, Vibrio cholerae and other pathogenic Vibrio*
811 *species. The number of suitable days per year in the Baltic for pathogenic Vibrio reached 107*
812 *in 2018, the highest since records began and double the early 1980s baseline.*

813 Climate change affects the distribution and risk of many infectious diseases.³⁹ The 2019
814 Lancet Countdown report, updates its analysis of dengue virus, malaria and *Vibrio* with the
815 most recently available data (see appendix). Each trend is presented, as well as an
816 additional analysis for cholera transmission risk.


817 The methodology used to track climate suitability is similar for each of these pathogens. For
818 the mosquito-borne infectious diseases, suitability for transmission is affected by factors
819 such as temperature, humidity and precipitation. For dengue, vectorial capacity (VC) is
820 calculated, which expresses the average daily rate of subsequent cases in a susceptible
821 population resulting from one infected case, using a formula including the vector to human
822 transmission probability per bite, the human infectious period, the average vector biting
823 rate, the extrinsic incubation period and the daily survival period.⁴⁵ For malaria, the number
824 of months suitable for transmission of *Plasmodium falciparum* and *P. vivax* malaria parasites
825 is calculated based on temperature, precipitation and humidity. Climate suitability for both
826 of these mosquito-borne diseases is averaged for the most recent five years for which data
827 is available and compared with a 1950s baseline.

828 *Vibrio* species cause a range of human infections, including gastroenteritis, wound
829 infections, septicemia, and cholera. *Vibrio* species are found in brackish marine waters and
830 cases of infections are influenced by sea surface salinity (SSS), sea surface temperature
831 (SST), and chlorophyll-a concentrations.⁴⁶⁻⁴⁸ Climate suitability for *Vibrio* species was
832 estimated based on SSS and SST globally and focally for two regions in which *Vibrio*
833 (excluding *V. cholerae*) infections are most frequently observed. For pathogenic *Vibrio*
834 species (excluding *V. cholerae*), an average of the five most recent years for which data is
835 available is compared with a 1980s baseline, whereas the new *V. cholerae* specific analysis
836 compares the most recent three years with a 2003-2005 baseline (based on data
837 availability). Full detail on methods can be found in the appendix.


838 Climate suitability for transmission is rising for each of the pathogens studied. The second
839 highest VC for both dengue vectors was recorded in 2017, with the 2012-2017 average 7.2%
840 and 9.8% above baseline for *Aedes aegypti* and *Aedes albopictus*, respectively (Figure 10).
841 This continues the upward trend of climate suitability for transmission of dengue, with nine
842 of the ten most suitable years occurring since 2000. Malaria suitability continues to increase
843 in highland areas of Africa, with the 2012-2017 average 29.9% above baseline. The

844 percentage of coastal area suitable for *Vibrio* infections in the 2010s has increased at
 845 northern latitudes (40-70° N) by 3.8% compared to a 1980s baseline, with 2018 the second
 846 most suitable year on record (5.0% above the baseline) (Figure 11). The area of coastline
 847 suitable for *Vibrio* has increased by 31.0% and 29.0% for the Baltic and USA Northeast
 848 respectively. Additionally, the number of days per year suitable for *Vibrio* in the Baltic
 849 reached 107 in 2018, which is double the early 1980s baseline and the highest on record.
 850 Globally, suitability for coastal *V. cholerae* has increased by 9.9%, driven by regional
 851 increases in Asia, Europe, Middle East, North America, and Northern and Western Africa.

852



853
 854 **Figure 10: Changes in global vectorial capacity for the dengue virus vectors *Aedes aegypti* and *Aedes***
 855 ***albopictus* 1950-2017**



856
 857 **Figure 11: Change in suitability for pathogenic *Vibrio* outbreaks as a result of changing sea surface**
 858 **temperatures a) globally, divided into three latitudinal bands (northern latitudes = 40-70°N; tropical**
 859 **latitudes = 25°S-40°N; and southern latitudes = 25-40°S); b) the Baltic and c) United States North East**
 860 **coast**

861

862 *Indicator 1.4.2: Vulnerability to mosquito-borne diseases*

863 **Headline finding:** *Climate change induced risk of mosquito-borne diseases may be offset by*
864 *improvements in public health systems. Dramatic investments in public health have resulted*
865 *in a 31% fall in global vulnerability observed from 2010–2017. However, this success is not*
866 *spread equally, with vulnerability to recurrent dengue outbreaks increasing in the Western*
867 *Pacific and South East Asia over the same period.*

868 The indicator above describes the influence of climate over the transmission of numerous
869 vector-borne diseases. Importantly, population vulnerability to this phenomenon is
870 modulated by human, social, financial, and physical factors as well as to the adaptive
871 capacity of a community.^{49,50}

872 Country-level data from the World Health Organization (WHO) International Health
873 Regulations' (IHR) core capacities for the years 2010 to 2017,⁵¹ are used as a proxy for
874 adaptive capacity. *Aedes aegypti* vulnerability is defined by abundance and VC as described
875 in Indicator 1.6.1. This index estimates the population-level risk of exposure to *Aedes*
876 mosquitoes, accounting for the public health core capacity to cope with the potential
877 impacts. A full account of the methods can be found in the appendix. A contraction of the
878 vulnerability to dengue is observed from 2010 to 2017 in tropical and sub-tropical areas of
879 South America, Africa and Asia. However, this decrease in vulnerability has levelled off in
880 recent years, with a reversing trend in the Western Pacific and South East Asia Regions.

881

882 *Indicator 1.5: Food security and undernutrition*

883 *Indicator 1.5.1: Terrestrial food security and undernutrition*

884 **Headline finding:** *All major crops tracked – maize, wheat, rice and soybean – demonstrate*
885 *that increases in temperature have reduced global crop yield potential.*


886 Currently, improvements in nutrient and water management, as well as expansion of
887 agricultural area in lower income countries, are seeing global food production rise.^{52,53}
888 However, the global number of undernourished people appears to have been increasing
889 since 2014, driven by challenges to access, availability, and affordability of food.⁵⁴ There is
890 growing evidence that crop production is threatened in complex ways by changes in the
891 incidence of pests and pathogens;⁵⁵ increasing water scarcity;⁵⁶ and increased frequency
892 and strength of extreme weather conditions that can damage or even wipe out harvests.⁵⁷
893 Globally, crop yield potential for maize, winter wheat, and soybean has reduced in concert
894 with increases in temperature (Figure 12), challenging efforts to achieve SDG 2 to end
895 hunger by 2030.⁵⁷

896 Crop yield potential was tracked for wheat, rice, soybean, and maize. Change in crop growth
897 duration is used as a proxy for yield potential. It is based on the time taken in a year to

898 accumulate a reference period (1981-2010) accumulated thermal time. A reduction in crop
899 duration means the crop matures too quickly with lower seed yield.⁵⁸ This methodology is
900 described in full, in the appendix, alongside a full description of the CRU database used.⁴⁴
901 This data resonates with a meta-analysis of the literature by Zhao et al. (2017).⁵⁹ which
902 suggests that global yields of these four key crops are reduced by 6%, 3.2%, 7.4% and 3.1%
903 globally for each 1°C increase in global mean temperatures.

904

Global



905

906

907

Figure 12: Change in crop growth duration (days) for five crops. The dashed line shows the average change in crop duration over the reference period 1981-2010 baseline

908

909 *Indicator 1.5.2: Marine food security and undernutrition*

910 **Headline finding:** *Between 2003 and 2018, sea surface temperature rose in 34 of 64*
911 *investigated territorial waters, undermining marine food security.*

912 Fish provide almost 20% of their animal protein intake to 3.2 billion people, with a greater
913 reliance on fish sources of protein often in LMICs, particularly small island developing states
914 (SIDS).⁶⁰ Climate change threatens fisheries and aquaculture in a number of ways, including
915 through SST rise, intensity, frequency, and seasonality of extreme events, sea level rise, and
916 ocean acidification.⁶¹ Acute disturbances such as thermal stress lead to impaired recovery of
917 the coral reefs, which threatens marine fish populations and therefore marine primary
918 productivity, a key source of omega3 fatty acids for many populations.⁶²

919 This indicator tracks SST in territorial waters, selected for their geographical coverage and
920 importance to marine food security, using data sourced from FAO, NASA and NOAA with all
921 methods described in full in the appendix.⁶³⁻⁶⁵ This has been further developed and now
922 includes 64 territorial waters (including countries where data is available) located in 16 FAO
923 fishing areas This indicator is complemented by monitoring of coral bleaching due to
924 thermal stress (abiotic indicators), and per-capita capture-based fish consumption (biotic
925 indicator) (see appendix). Between 2003 and 2018, SST has risen in 34 of the 64 territorial
926 waters, with the maximum increase in SST observed over this time being 3.5°C in Finland.

927
928

929 *Conclusion*

930 The indicators presented in this section provide evidence of the exposures, vulnerabilities
931 and impacts of climate change on health. Continued work on attribution remains an
932 important consideration here. For example, in earlier reports, migration was addressed,
933 where questions of attribution to climate change remain particularly challenging.^{16,19}
934 Irrespective of how climate change migrants are counted,⁶⁶ many factors contribute to
935 health risks faced by migration. Health impacts depend on both pre-existing conditions (e.g.
936 mental health and nutritional status, desire or not to migrate, and existing health systems)
937 along with interventions (e.g. healthcare access, provision of food and shelter, and changing
938 health-related resources).

939 Similarly, in 2018 the links between climate change and mental health were highlighted.¹⁶
940 Mental health may variously be affected negatively by heatwaves, loss of property and
941 livelihoods due to floods, or climate-induced migration. However, although links between
942 climate and mental health are many and varied, they are highly socially and culturally
943 mediated. Attempting to operationalise such an idea as a single-number indicator linking
944 climate change and mental health outcomes remains elusive, yet quantifying these impacts
945 is of clear importance.⁶⁷

946

947 Section 2: Adaptation, Planning, and Resilience for Health

948 As knowledge of the health consequences of climate change increases, so too does the
949 urgent need to redouble efforts to protect people from adverse effects, particularly given
950 the lack of dramatic material progress on mitigation. Health systems will be placed under
951 increasing and overwhelming pressure, and it is now clear that adaptation is essential, even
952 with the most ambitious mitigation efforts.⁵⁰ An adaptation gap is apparent, signalled in
953 some of the impacts discussed above, and the rapid introduction of better-developed and
954 funded adaptation initiatives across all sectors is necessary to close this divide. The health
955 sector was highlighted as one of the top three priority areas for adaptation in an analysis of
956 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions prepared for the Paris Agreement.⁶⁸

957 By their very nature, adaptation and resilience measures are local and specific to regional
958 hazards and underlying population health needs. Identifying readily available global metrics,
959 with adequate data and proximity to climate change and to health adaptation is particularly
960 challenging.⁶⁹⁻⁷¹ Beyond this, evaluating the success of any interventions is difficult, given
961 that the goals of adaptation are inherently long-term, and no counterfactual is readily
962 available. Rising to this challenge, the work in this section has expanded, from the initial
963 three indicators proposed in 2016,⁷² to the eight presented here. The structure of these
964 indicators, and this section, builds on the WHO Operational Framework for building climate
965 resilient health systems,⁷³ monitoring progress across the following selected domains:

- 966 • Adaptation planning and assessment (Indicators 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and 2.1.3)
- 967 • Adaptive information systems (Indicator 2.2)
- 968 • Adaptation delivery and implementation (Indicators 2.3.1 and 2.3.2)
- 969 • Adaptation financing (Indicators 2.4.1 and 2.4.2)

970 True to an iterative approach, many indicators have been further developed. Metrics
971 evaluating national health adaptation planning and vulnerability mapping have increased
972 the number of country respondents, from 40 to 100 (Indicators 2.1.1 and 2.1.2). Additional
973 information on implementation and government funding is included alongside qualitative
974 analysis, undertaken as part of the validation of the self-reported data. A new indicator
975 focuses on air conditioning use as an adaptive measure to heat mortality (Indicator 2.3.2).
976 This is the first of a new suite of indicators under development, which monitor adaptation to
977 a specific exposure pathway, complementing existing work on health adaptation efforts as a
978 whole.

979 A number of indicators in this section rely on self-reported data in surveys of national and
980 subnational governments to track health adaptation, with clear strengths and limitations to
981 this approach. Self-reported survey data is subject to response and nonresponse error with
982 local verification difficult,⁷⁰ however the datasets here – from the WHO and the Carbon
983 Disclosure Project (CDP) – provide the best available information on national- and city-level
984 health-specific adaptation globally. More information on the validation of the national data
985 can be found in the appendix.

986

987 Indicator 2.1: Adaptation planning and assessment

988 *Indicator 2.1.1: National adaptation plans for health*

989 **Headline finding:** *Recognition of climate change health adaptation needs is widespread, and*
990 *planning is underway. In 2018, almost half of countries surveyed reported having a national*
991 *health and climate change plan in place.*

992 Over the past decade, there has been a steady increase in countries scaling up health
993 adaptation projects to build climate resilience.⁷⁴ The lessons learned from these experiences
994 have highlighted the benefit of strengthening health policy and planning to achieve timely
995 and effective climate adaptation and mitigation in the health and health determining
996 sectors.

997 This indicator, based on data from the 2018 WHO Climate and Health Country Survey,⁷⁵
998 tracks the number of countries that have a national health and climate change plan or
999 strategy, current levels of their implementation and the commitment of national health
1000 funds for achieving the health adaptation and mitigation priorities outlined by governments
1001 in these documents. Importantly, the country response rate has more than doubled, with
1002 100 countries reporting in the 2018 survey compared with 40 countries reporting in the
1003 2015 survey presented in earlier Lancet Countdown reports.¹⁹


1004 Global coverage of national adaptation plans for health is growing, with 49 out of 100
1005 countries now having a national health and climate change plan in place. Just over half of
1006 these countries report at least a moderate level of implementation of their plans (Figure
1007 13), however challenges to full implementation remain, with less than 20% of countries
1008 reporting that action is being taken on a majority of their key priorities. National funding for
1009 implementation of health and climate change plans was identified as a central constraint
1010 across all income categories with fewer than 4 in 10 countries reporting to have at least
1011 partial funding for the implementation of their main health adaptation and mitigation
1012 priorities (Figure 13).

1013 A further analysis of approximately 40 strategies/plans, collected as part of the survey,
1014 highlights three key issues. First, approximately 40% of the documents that were received
1015 were published over 5 years ago. Additionally, although a broad range of climate-sensitive
1016 disease (CSD) priorities were identified across most of the documents, many did not
1017 elaborate on these climate-related health risks and less than half provided sufficient detail
1018 on the current and future burden of CSDs, vulnerable populations, or other relevant
1019 information. Finally, only a small number of plans are directly linked to the National
1020 Adaptation Plan (NAP) process as part of the UNFCCC. Opportunities therefore exist in
1021 national health and climate planning to update and expand the comprehensiveness of plans
1022 and for these to be developed into health components of NAP (HNAPS),⁷³ thereby anchoring

1023 health within national climate processes and potentially strengthening access to
1024 international climate finance for health adaptation.

1025

1026



1027

1028 *Figure 13: Number of countries with a national health and climate change plan or strategy (n=100)*


1029

1030 *Indicator 2.1.2: National assessments of climate change impacts, vulnerability, and*
1031 *adaptation for health*

1032 **Headline finding:** *Of 100 countries surveyed in 2018, 51 indicated that a national assessment of*
1033 *health vulnerability to climate change had been conducted. However, of these, less than 40%*
1034 *reported that assessment findings had influenced the allocation of human and financial resources.*

1035 An adequate health adaptation response requires an assessment of which populations and
1036 geographical areas are most vulnerable to different kinds of health effects, and the corresponding
1037 capacity of health services. A health vulnerability and adaptation (health V&A) assessment serves as
1038 a baseline analysis against which changes in disease risks and protective measures can be monitored
1039 and strengthens the case for investment in health protection.⁷⁶ As above, data for this indicator is
1040 sourced from the 2018 WHO Climate and Health Country Survey.⁷⁵ Additional information on the
1041 survey methods and data can be found in the appendix.

1042 An increasing number of countries are undertaking national V&A assessments, majority of countries
 1043 indicating that these assessments are having at least some influence over policy prioritization (Figure
 1044 14). However, translating evidence into funding decisions remains an issue, with less than 40% of
 1045 countries reporting that resource allocation is guided by evidence generated from V&A assessments.



1046
 1047 *Figure 14: Number of countries that have conducted a scientific assessment of health vulnerability*
 1048 *and adaptation to climate change (n=100)*

1049

1050 *Indicator 2.1.3: City-level climate change risk assessments*


1051 **Headline finding:** *In 2018, 54% of global cities surveyed expected climate change to*
 1052 *seriously compromise their public health infrastructure, with 69% of cities actively*
 1053 *developing or having completed a comprehensive climate change risk or vulnerability*
 1054 *assessment.*

1055 The effects of climate change are experienced locally, with cities and local government
 1056 forming a crucial component of any health adaptation response. For this indicator, the
 1057 Lancet Countdown works with the CDP to include data from their annual global survey of
 1058 cities.⁷⁷ Two components of this data are analysed: the number of global cities that have
 1059 undertaken a climate change risk or vulnerability assessment; and their perceived
 1060 vulnerability of critical health infrastructure to climate change. In 2018, 489 cities
 1061 participated in the survey, with most (61%) coming from high-income countries.

1062 Figure 15 presents the proportion of cities that have undertaken a risk or vulnerability
 1063 assessment, by income group. Just over half (52%) of all responding cities have undertaken
 1064 an assessment and a quarter either have an assessment in progress (17%) or intend to
 1065 undertake an assessment in the future (7%). This represents a small, but steady increase

1066 from 2017.¹⁶ The health impacts of climate change are of increasing concern for cities, with
 1067 (54%) of responding cities noting that critical assets and/or services related to public health
 1068 would be impacted by climate change, compared with 51% in 2017.¹⁶

1069



1070
 1071 *Figure 15: Proportion of cities that have conducted climate change risk assessments, by World Bank*
 1072 *income group*

1073

1074

1075 **Indicator 2.2: Climate information services for health**

1076 **Headline finding:** Progress has been observed in the number of countries providing climate
 1077 services to the health sector, increasing from 55 in 2018 to 70 in 2019.

1078 It is essential that meteorological and hydrological services work with health services to
 1079 monitor and prepare for the climate-related risks to health tracked in section 1.⁷³ This
 1080 indicator tracks national climate information services for health using data reported by
 1081 national meteorological and hydrological services to the World Meteorological Organization
 1082 (WMO) Country Profile Database integrated questionnaire.

1083 Seventy national meteorological and hydrological services of WMO Member States reported
 1084 to provide climate services to the health sector, 15 more than reported in the 2018 Lancet
 1085 Countdown report.¹⁶ Of these, 18 were from Africa, 5 from the Eastern Mediterranean, 22
 1086 from Europe, 13 from the Americas, 4 from South East Asia, and 8 from the Western Pacific.
 1087 Additional detail was provided by 47 respondents, with a number of services working with
 1088 the health sector and creating products accessible to the health sector. However,

1089 application to policymaking remains low, with only 4 out of the 47 Member States reporting
1090 that climate services are guiding health sector policy decisions and investments plans.

1091

1092


1093 **Indicator 2.3: Adaptation delivery and implementation**

1094 *Indicator 2.3.1: Detection, preparedness and response to health emergencies*

1095 **Headline finding:** 109 countries have medium to high implementation of a national health
1096 emergency framework, preparing for all public health events and emergencies.

1097 The International Health Regulations (IHR), as described in Panel 6 of the 2017 Lancet
1098 Countdown report³⁸ are an international legal instrument aimed at helping the global
1099 community prevent and respond to acute public health risks, over a set of core capacities.⁵¹
1100 The development and strengthening of these core capacities is assessed by an annual survey
1101 of State Parties, which has been improved from a yes/no questionnaire from 2010 to 2017,
1102 to a more detailed graded questionnaire (1-5, assessing the degree of implementation).
1103 More information can be found on the survey tool, in the appendix. This improved method
1104 makes determining historical trends difficult, however will greatly enhance work going
1105 forward. Capacity 8 (C8) of the IHR focuses on countries' national health emergency
1106 framework (NHEF), which applies to all public health events and emergencies, covering
1107 disease outbreaks, air pollution, extreme temperatures, droughts, floods and storms, as well
1108 as societal hazards (such as conflict and financial crisis). The survey includes three
1109 components: planning for emergency preparedness and response mechanism; management
1110 of health emergency response operations; and emergency resource mobilisation (see
1111 appendix).⁷⁸

1112 In 2018, 182 WHO Member States completed the survey relating to a national health
1113 emergency framework. Of these, 109 countries had medium to high implementation of the
1114 three components for this core capacity (Figure 16). However, the degree of
1115 implementation varies greatly by region, with Africa reporting 21.3% and Europe reporting
1116 75.5% achieving medium-high implementation.



1117
1118 *Figure 16: Implementation status of the IHR National Health Emergency Framework Core Capacity*

1119

1120 *Indicator 2.3.2: Air conditioning – benefits and harms*

1121 **Headline finding:** *Use of air conditioning as an adaptation measure is a double-edged*
 1122 *sword: on the one hand, global air conditioning use in 2016 reduced heat-related mortality*
 1123 *by 23% compared with a world without any air conditioning; on the other hand, it also*
 1124 *confers harms, by contributing to climate change, worsening air pollution, substantially*
 1125 *adding to peak electricity demand on hot days, and enhancing the urban heat island effect.*

1126 Indoor cooling is an important adaptation to extreme heat, with air conditioning emerging
 1127 as a primary mechanism. Access to household air conditioning is highly protective against
 1128 heat-related mortality;⁷⁹ however it is also associated with substantial indirect harms. On
 1129 hot days in locations with high air conditioning prevalence, this can account for more than
 1130 half of peak electricity demand.⁸⁰ Electricity generated for air conditioning use contributes
 1131 to both CO₂ and PM_{2.5} emissions, and waste heat from air conditioning can paradoxically
 1132 increase night time temperatures by more than 1°C.⁸¹ Hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) refrigerants
 1133 used for air conditioning can escape into the atmosphere where they act as powerful
 1134 greenhouse gases (GHGs). In baseline scenarios, these HFC emissions will rise to 1-2
 1135 GtCO₂eq per year by 2050.^{82,83} Consequently, a nuanced approach to heat adaptation must
 1136 be deployed, which protects vulnerable populations across the world from heat-related
 1137 morbidity and mortality, whilst minimising the health and other co-harms of air pollution,
 1138 the urban heat island effect, and worsening climate change.

1139 This new indicator includes four components: the proportion of households using air
 1140 conditioning; the prevented fraction of heat-related mortality attributable to air
 1141 conditioning use; CO₂ emissions attributable to air conditioning use; and premature
 1142 mortality from air conditioning attributable PM_{2.5}. Unpublished data for air conditioning use,


1143 electricity consumption, and CO₂ emissions was provided by the International Energy
1144 Agency (IEA). The prevented fraction,⁸⁴ the percent reduction in heat-related deaths due to
1145 a given proportion of the population having household air conditioning, compared with a
1146 complete absence of household air conditioning, was calculated using a relative risk for
1147 heat-related mortality of 0.23 for having household air conditioning compared with not
1148 having household air conditioning,⁷⁹ and the proportion of the population with household
1149 air conditioning. The air pollution source attribution methods discussed in section 3
1150 (Indicator 3.5.2) were used to calculate deaths due to PM_{2.5} emissions from air conditioning.

1151 Between 2000 and 2016, the world's air conditioning stock (residential and commercial)
1152 more than doubled to 1.62 billion units and the proportion of households with air
1153 conditioning increased from 21% to 30% (Figure 17). In 2016, this proportion was 4% in
1154 India, 14% in the European Union, 58% in China, and ≥90% in the USA and Japan.
1155 Correspondingly, the global prevented fraction of heat-related mortality increased from
1156 16% in 2000 to 23% in 2016, ranging from <10% in India, Indonesia, and South Africa to
1157 ≥66% in the USA, Japan and Korea.

1158 These trends have also been associated with significant harms. In 2016, air conditioning
1159 accounted for 10% of global electricity consumption and 18.5% of electricity used in
1160 buildings.⁸⁵ Under the IEA's baseline scenario, these figures will increase in 2050 to 16% and
1161 30%, respectively.⁸⁵ CO₂ emissions from air conditioning use tripled from 0.35 gigatons in
1162 1990 to 1.1 gigatons in 2016 (Figure 17), and are projected to rise to 2 gigatons in 2050 in
1163 the IEA's baseline scenario.⁸⁵ In 2016 the number of premature deaths due to PM_{2.5}
1164 exposure attributable to air conditioning was 2480 in India, 2662 in China, 1088 in the
1165 European Union, and 749 in the USA.

1166 Fortunately, one path forward provides for adaptation against heat-related mortality for
1167 those who need it, without the associated harms of GHGs and PM_{2.5} emissions, excessive
1168 electricity demand, and undue contribution to the urban heat island effect. Air conditioning
1169 use could be reduced by promoting energy efficient building design through strong,
1170 enforced building codes.⁸⁵ Traditional building designs in tropical and sub-tropical regions
1171 reduce thermal stresses by providing shade, thermal mass, insulation, and ventilation.⁸⁵
1172 There is great potential to reduce the harms of air conditioning by increasing its efficiency,⁸⁵
1173 by generating electricity from non-fossil-fuel sources, and by implementing the Kigali
1174 Amendment to the Montreal Protocol to phase-down HFCs.⁸⁶

1175



1176
 1177 *Figure 17: Global proportion of households with air conditioning, prevented fraction of heat-related*
 1178 *mortality due to air conditioning, and CO₂ emissions from air conditioning*

1179
 1180 [Indicator 2.4: Spending on adaptation for health and health-related activities](#)

1181 **Headline finding:** *In 2018, global spending on health adaptation to climate change was*
 1182 *estimated to be 5% (£13 billion) of all adaptation spending, and health-related spending was*
 1183 *estimated at 13.5% (£35 billion). These estimates represent increases in absolute and*
 1184 *relative terms over previous data.*


1185 A higher demand for health adaptation measures requires increased adaptation funding.
 1186 This indicator tracks adaptation spending, using 2015/16, 2016/17 and 2017/18 data from
 1187 the Adaptation and Resilience to Climate Change (A&RCC) dataset produced by kMatrix,⁸⁷ as
 1188 described in the 2017 and 2018 reports.^{16,19} Data in this year’s indicator covers 191
 1189 countries and territories that have data reported in the A&RCC dataset. Per capita values
 1190 are based on 183 countries with population estimates from the International Monetary
 1191 Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook.⁸⁸ “Health adaptation” focuses on national spending
 1192 specifically within the formal healthcare sector, whereas “health-related adaptation”
 1193 follows spending related to the health industry, disaster preparedness, and agriculture.

1194 Spending on adaptation to climate change in health and healthcare increased by 11.2% in
 1195 2017/18, compared to 2016/17 data. This percentage increase is, notably, larger than the
 1196 change in adaptation spending as a whole (an increase of 6.5% on last year). At the country
 1197 level, growth of health adaptation spending ranges from 17.5% (United Kingdom) to 10.0%
 1198 (Latvia). There are lower increases and lower variation in the health-related values, from
 1199 11.1% (United Kingdom) to 6.8% (Kazakhstan). Importantly, health still represents a small

1200 proportion of total adaptation spend, having grown from 4.6% in 2015/2016 to 5.0% in
 1201 2017/2018.

1202 Grouped by WHO Region, the highest percentage change for health adaptation spending is in
 1203 Europe (12.06%), and the highest per capita spending is in the Americas (£4.23 for health,
 1204 £11.2 for health-related) (Figure 18). By comparison, in the African, Eastern Mediterranean
 1205 and South East Asian regions, per capita health adaptation spending is less than £1.

1206



1207 *Figure 18: Adaptation Spending for Financial Years 2015/16 to 2017/18. A) Total health and health-*
 1208 *related A&RCC spending (£m), B) Health and health-related A&RCC per capita (£). Plots are*
 1209 *disaggregated by WHO Region. 'Eastern Med.' denotes the Eastern Mediterranean Region*
 1210

1211

1212

1213 **Conclusion**

1214 Whilst many of the indicators presented in section 2 are moving in a positive direction, the
 1215 pace of the adaptation response from the health community remains inadequate in the face
 1216 of unmitigated climate change. The number of countries with national adaptation plans for
 1217 health and the number of countries and cities that have assessed health risk and
 1218 vulnerabilities has increased, along with the spending on health adaptation. Thorough
 1219 consideration of the best adaptation options is required before implementation goes ahead.
 1220 For example, the health benefits of adaptation measure such as air conditioning may be
 1221 counteracted by the harms they cause through a contribution to heat generation, climate
 1222 change and air pollution (Indicator 2.3.2).

1223 These findings and those from the UN Environment Adaptation reports, show that further
1224 work is required globally, both in terms of the planning and implementation of adaptation
1225 for health.^{89,90} The Lancet Countdown will continue to invest in its capacity to track health
1226 adaptation by building on existing methods, sourcing new data, and developing a guiding
1227 framework and the systematic identification of indicator gaps.
1228

1229 Section 3: Mitigation Actions and Health Co-Benefits

1230 As section 1 highlighted, the health impacts of climate change are already occurring, and
1231 require an urgent response, both in terms of health adaptation (section 2) and also,
1232 importantly, in mitigation in order to minimise future climate change.

1233 In keeping with the Paris Agreement’s commitment of “well below 2°C”, and to pursue a
1234 1.5°C target, it is necessary for global emissions to peak as soon as possible (some studies
1235 suggest 2020) and then follow a steep decline to 2050.² However, current mitigation actions
1236 and commitments are not consistent with this goal. Indeed, at 53.5 GtCO₂e, total global
1237 GHG emissions for 2017 were the highest ever recorded.⁹¹ Current commitments under the
1238 Paris Agreement are far from sufficient, with 2030 emissions estimated to be lowered by
1239 only 6 GtCO₂e - half the reduction required to achieve a 2°C scenario and one fifth for a
1240 1.5°C scenario.⁸⁹

1241 Discussions of GHG emissions reductions must be more directly coupled with the positive
1242 economic and health benefits that they bring. Mitigation actions improve health in the long
1243 term, through avoided climate change, but also in the near term through numerous
1244 pathways such as, reductions in risk of respiratory and cardiovascular disease attributable to
1245 air pollution,⁸ reductions in the risk of diseases related to physical inactivity and obesity due
1246 to increased cycling and walking,⁹² and a suite of improvements that result from healthier
1247 diets.⁹³

1248 Section 3 of the 2019 Report of the Lancet Countdown tracks mitigation and its health
1249 consequences, by sector:

- 1250 • Energy (Indicators 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.2)
- 1251 • Air pollution (Indicators 3.3.1, 3.3.2)
- 1252 • Transport (Indicator 3.4)
- 1253 • Agriculture (Indicator 3.5)
- 1254 • Healthcare (Indicator 3.6)

1255 Crucially, it adds two new indicators of great importance to health – emissions attributable
1256 to livestock and crops (allowing a more nuanced discussion about the health and climate
1257 benefits of reductions in ruminant meat consumption), and emissions from national
1258 healthcare systems.

1259 The major sectors of global GHG emissions are electricity and thermal power generation,
1260 transport, industry, and buildings. Overall CO₂ emissions from fossil fuels have risen by 2.6%
1261 from 2016 to 2018 (Indicator 3.1.1). Concerningly, coal phase-out has reversed, with a 1.7%
1262 increase from 2016 to 2018 seen in total primary energy supply (Indicator 3.1.2). However,
1263 more encouragingly, growth in renewables continues apace and comprised 45% of total
1264 growth in electricity generation. Currently, modern renewables represent 5.5% of global
1265 electricity generation (Indicator 3.1.3), but are predicted to reach 30% by 2023.⁹⁴ The
1266 implication for air pollution of both of these trends is important. With continued demand

1267 for fossil fuels and an increase in coal consumption, ambient air pollution attributable
1268 deaths have remained stagnant, resulting in 2.9 million deaths in 2016 (Indicator 3.3.2).

1269 The transport sector is an equally entrenched emitter (Indicator 3.4), with GHG emissions
1270 and fuel use maintaining a modest growth trajectory of 0.7% per capita CO₂e in 2016. While
1271 there has been a dramatic increase in electric vehicle (EV) use, they continue to represent a
1272 small proportion of the global fleet. Yet countries such as China have positioned EVs as the
1273 future of driving with electricity in transport reaching 1.5 % of total fuel use.

1274 Feeding the global population is a critically important aspect of health and wellbeing along
1275 with ensuring economic stability and security. However, the agriculture and food sector are
1276 both energy and carbon intense and an important area for climate change mitigation.
1277 Global agricultural GHG emissions (Indicator 3.5) have increased between 2000 to 2016 by
1278 14% for livestock and 10% for crops.

1279 The health sector is on the frontline of climate change and plays a vital role in any response.
1280 It is also a major contributor to GHG emissions (Indicator 3.6), with global estimates as high
1281 as 4.6% of global emissions in 2016.

1282

1283 [Indicator 3.1: Emissions from the energy system](#)

1284 [Indicator 3.1.1: Carbon intensity of the energy system](#)

1285 **Headline Finding:** *In 2018, the carbon intensity of the energy system remained flat, at the*
1286 *same level as in 1990. However, GHG emissions from fossil fuel combustion has returned to a*
1287 *growth trajectory, rising by 2.6% from 2016 to 2018. Limiting warming to 1.5°C would*
1288 *require a 7.4% year-on-year reduction from 2019 to 2050.*


1289 In the 2019 Report of the Lancet Countdown, this indicator includes data to 2016,
1290 supplemented with additional statistics for 2017⁹⁵ and 2018.⁹⁶ It tracks the carbon intensity
1291 of the energy system, monitoring the CO₂ emitted per terajoule of primary energy supplied.
1292 Key improvements in this analysis are seen in the disaggregation of fuel type, the extension
1293 of data back to 1970, and the inclusion of new projections forward to 2050. A full
1294 description of the data and methods is provided in the appendix.

1295 Global emissions of CO₂ from fossil fuel combustion, having been flat between 2014-16,
1296 have increased to a new high of 33.1 GtCO₂ in 2018 (Figure 19).⁹⁶ This 2.6% increase over
1297 the last two years is due to continued growth in energy demand, mostly from fossil fuels.

1298 The carbon intensity of the energy system will need to reduce to near zero by 2050. In the
1299 last 15 years, carbon intensity has largely plateaued, as the growth of low carbon energy has
1300 been insufficient to displace fossil fuels. However, recent IEA data suggests that carbon
1301 intensity may be starting to reduce, with gas slowly displacing coal (Figure 19).⁹⁶

1302

1303



1304

1305 *Figure 19: Carbon intensity of Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) for selected region and countries,*
 1306 *and global CO₂ emissions by fuel type, 1972-2018. Carbon intensity is shown by lines (primary axis)*
 1307 *and global emissions by stacked bars (secondary axis). This carbon intensity metric estimates the*
 1308 *tonnes of CO₂ for each unit of total primary energy supplied (tCO₂/TJ). For reference, carbon intensity*
 1309 *of fuels (tCO₂/TJ) are as follows: coal 95-100, oil 70-75, and natural gas 56*

1310

1311 *Indicator 3.1.2: Coal phase-out*

1312 **Headline Finding:** *From 2016 to 2018, TPES from coal increased by 1.7%, driven by growth in*
 1313 *China and other Asian countries.*


1314 Coal phase-out is essential, not only as a key measure to mitigate climate change, but also
 1315 to reduce morbidity and mortality from air pollution.⁸ As of December 2018, 30 national
 1316 governments, along with many sub-national governments and businesses, have committed
 1317 to coal phase-out for power generation through the Powering Past Coal Alliance.⁹⁷ In this
 1318 year’s Lancet Countdown report, this indicator tracks total primary energy supply from coal,
 1319 plus projections for coal phase-out, using the scenarios that informed the IPCC Special
 1320 Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C.²

1321 Coal has returned to a growth trajectory from 2016 to 2018 (Figure 20), however, due to the
 1322 overall growth in global energy demand, the share of coal in primary energy supply
 1323 continues to fall (see appendix). Coal continues to be the second largest contributor to
 1324 global primary energy supply (after oil) and the largest source of electricity generation (at
 1325 38%, compared to gas, the next highest at 23%). Most of this growth is in Asia, notably
 1326 China, India and South East Asia.

1327 Rapidly decreasing coal use to zero is critical to meeting the commitments of the Paris
 1328 Agreement. For example, nothing short of an 80% reduction in coal use from 2017 to 2050
 1329 (a 5.6% annual reduction rate) is consistent with a 1.5°C trajectory.

1330

1331



1332 Figure 20: Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) coal use in selected countries and regions, and global
 1333 TPES coal, 1978-2018. Regional primary energy supply of coal is shown by the trend lines (primary
 1334 axis) and total global supply by the bars (secondary axis). Data are shown to at least 2017, and
 1335 extended to 2018 for selected regions and global supply (where data allows)
 1336


1337 *Indicator 3.1.3: Zero-carbon emission electricity*

1338 **Headline Finding:** In 2018, renewable energy continues to account for a large share (45%) of
 1339 growth in electricity generation, with 27% coming from wind and solar.

1340 With the power generation sector accounting for 38% of total energy-related CO₂ emissions,
1341 that renewables displace fossil fuels is crucial. This indicator tracks total low carbon
1342 electricity generation (which includes nuclear and all renewables, including hydro) and new
1343 renewable electricity generation (excluding hydro), using the World Extended Energy
1344 Balances dataset from the IEA.⁹⁶ Renewable electricity generation was also projected using
1345 the scenarios that informed the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C.² A full
1346 description of the datasets, methods, and these projections is provided in the appendix.

1347 In 2016, low-carbon electricity globally accounted for 32% of total global electricity
1348 generation (Figure 21). As costs continue to fall, solar generation continues to grow at an
1349 unprecedented rate of around 30% per annum (whilst still only accounting for 2% of total
1350 global generation).⁹⁸

1351 An assessment of 1.5°C compliant scenarios highlights that generation from new
1352 renewables sources (solar, wind, geothermal, wave and tidal) need to increase by 9.7% per
1353 annum, to a level in 2050 that is larger than the total global electricity generation today.
1354 Since 1990, the annual growth rate for these renewable sources was over 14%, a very
1355 promising trend, but one that must be maintained for a further three decades.
1356



1357 Figure 21: Renewable and zero-carbon emission electricity generation (excluding bioenergy), 1990-
 1358 2016. A) Electricity generated from zero carbon sources, TWh; B) Proportion of electricity generated
 1359 from zero carbon sources; C) Electricity generated from renewable sources (excl. hydro), TWh; D)
 1360 Proportion of electricity generated from renewable sources (excluding hydro)

1361

1362 **Indicator 3.2: Access and use of clean energy**


1363 **Headline Finding:** Almost 3 billion people live without access to clean fuels and technologies
 1364 for cooking, with usage at just 8.6% in low-income countries. The consumption of zero
 1365 emission energy in the residential sector remains at just 24% in 2016 and a rate of growth of
 1366 2% per year since 2000.

1367 Universal access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all is a key
 1368 determinant of economic and social development and is Goal 7 of the SDGs.⁹⁹ Access to
 1369 energy is also central to health and well-being, both through its contribution to economic
 1370 and social development and by its use in healthcare facilities for clinical processes, water
 1371 and temperature control, lighting, and ventilation.¹⁰⁰

1372 This indicator combines both a top-down and bottom-up approach from both IEA and WHO
 1373 datasets, capturing total household energy use and fuel use for cooking respectively. Figure
 1374 22a analyses aggregated data on access to energy from the IEA, IRENA, UN Statistics
 1375 Division, WBG and WHO,¹⁰⁰ data on the proportion of clean energy in the residential sector
 1376 from the IEA.¹⁰¹ Figure 22b tracks household clean fuel use, with data representing an
 1377 impressive effort from the WHO to bring together thousands of national household surveys
 1378 across three decades and over 140 countries. Full details of the methods, definitions, and
 1379 data for this indicator are provided in the appendix.

1380 Access to electricity has risen from 83% in 2010 to 87% in 2016, although approximately 1
 1381 billion people remain without access to electricity, mostly living in rural areas in sub-Saharan
 1382 Africa and South Asia. Access to clean cooking has improved by just 1% since 2010, with
 1383 41% (just less than 3 billion) remaining in access-deficit.¹⁰² In 2016, the global proportion of
 1384 clean energy use in the residential sector was approximately 24%, up from 17% in 2010
 1385 (Figure 22).¹⁰¹ However, solid biomass which contributes to respiratory and cardiovascular
 1386 disease attributable to household air pollution,¹⁰³ is currently estimated to account for 36%
 1387 of total residential sector energy use. There remains a large access deficit, with only 8.6% of
 1388 low- and 46.1% of low-middle-countries using clean fuels for cooking to present day.

1389 Future forms of this indicator will work to link residential energy and fuel use to household
 1390 air pollution morbidity and mortality across the world. Panel 2 provides an example of one
 1391 possible approach to achieving this as a proof-of-concept, in slum housing in Viwandani,
 1392 Nairobi, Kenya.



1393 a) b)
 1394
 1395 *Figure 22: Household clean energy use. a) proportion of zero emission energy consumption in the*
 1396 *global residential sector, 2000-2016; b) proportion of clean fuel use for cooking*

1397

This case study focuses on indoor exposure to PM_{2.5}, the mortality attributable to this exposure, and CO₂e emissions in slum housing in Viwandani, Nairobi, Kenya. It is intended as a proof of concept for the development of a future suite of indicators. In this setting, cooking is done with solid fuels (14.6%), kerosene (72.9%), or electricity (12.5%). Most dwellings lack space heating (84.6%), with the rest using solid fuel heaters from June to August. Houses without electricity use kerosene-burning koroboi lamps for lighting year-round; 8-hour average ambient outdoor pollution levels are around 67µg/m³.¹⁰⁴

Current indoor exposure and space heating estimates were estimated using EnergyPlus,¹⁰⁵ calibrated to monitored indoor levels in dwellings using different fuel types and ventilation behaviours.¹⁰⁶ Two scenarios were modelled, involving the following changes in exposure and heating energy consumption:

- 1) Electrification of all existing stoves, lamps, and heaters using the current electrical network, which was assumed to reduce outdoor pollution by 40% based on the estimated contribution of residential combustion to annual mean air pollution in Nairobi from the GAINS model.¹⁰⁷
- 2) Electrification as in (1), but with low energy lighting, and heaters installation extended to all dwellings. Additionally, upgrades to dwelling energy efficiency and airtightness in-line with local sustainable design guidelines.¹⁰⁸

CO₂e emissions for the various fuels were taken from GAINS and Klimont et al (2017).¹⁰⁹ Air pollution exposure for different age groups was estimated using a time-weighted average of time spent indoors and outdoors based on information from local experts. Associated annual premature mortality due to PM_{2.5} exposure was calculated by applying the GBD's integrated exposure–response functions (IERs)¹¹⁰ to estimate cause-specific deaths for the local population.

Current mean 24-hour exposures in Viwandani are estimated to average 60 µg/m³ with the fuels producing an estimated 425 kg of CO₂e per household year. Electrification was estimated to result in appreciable reduction of both GHG emissions and PM_{2.5} air pollution (and hence PM_{2.5}-related premature deaths – see table below). For upgrades to the building envelope and increased electric heating and lighting coverage, the decrease in CO₂e emissions was broadly similar to that for electrification, but with substantially greater reduction in PM_{2.5} concentrations and hence air pollution-related premature deaths. Such wholesale changes, however, do not reduce indoor exposures to less than the WHO-recommended limit of 10 µg/m³. Therefore, reduction of indoor pollution to adequate levels would also necessitate further significant reductions in outdoor ambient levels or the application of additional technologies such as air filtration systems.

Scenario	Annual CO ₂ e emissions (kg CO ₂ e/household/year)	Annual average PM _{2.5} air pollution (µg/m ³)	Reduction in air pollution-attributable premature deaths
Current	425	60	--
Electrification	210	31	22%
Upgrading dwellings	211	25	28%

1398 Panel 2: Household air pollution conditions in Nairobi, Kenya

1399

1400 Indicator 3.3: Air pollution, transport, and energy

1401 Exposure to ambient air pollution, most importantly fine particulate matter (PM_{2.5}),
1402 constitutes the largest global environmental risk factor and is responsible for several million
1403 premature deaths every year.^{8,111,112} Most of the exposure to PM_{2.5} results from
1404 anthropogenic activities, and much of this is associated with combustion of coal and other
1405 fossil fuels for electricity generation, industrial production, transport, and household
1406 heating and cooking, and therefore PM_{2.5} emissions share many of the same sources as GHG
1407 emissions.¹¹³

1408 Indicators 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 report on source contributions to ambient air pollution and its
1409 health impacts, drawing from the GAINS model,¹¹⁴ which calculates emissions of all
1410 precursors of PM_{2.5} on a detailed breakdown of economic sectors and fuels used. Underlying
1411 activity data are based on statistics reported by the IEA.¹¹⁵ A more detailed methodology is
1412 provided in the appendix.

1413 *Indicator 3.3.1: Exposure to air pollution in cities*

1414 **Headline finding:** *Urban citizens are continuing to be exposed to high levels of air pollution,*
1415 *with 83% of cities exceeding the WHO's recommended safe level. A major share of the*
1416 *pollution is associated with energy use, particularly residential combustion.*


1417 The world is becoming increasingly urbanised, with 70% urbanisation expected by 2050.¹¹⁶
1418 Due to the concentration of population and emissions, many cities have become hot spots
1419 of air pollution. Few cities worldwide remain below PM_{2.5} concentration levels below the
1420 WHO guideline of 10µg/m³ annual mean, while many cities exceed this standard several
1421 fold.¹¹⁷ The highest measured concentrations in recent years have been reported in South
1422 and East Asia, while big data gaps exist in other world regions. Particularly concerning is the
1423 fact that these high concentration levels have been further increasing or stagnant in many
1424 regions of the developing world. A positive exception to this trend is China, where many
1425 highly polluted cities have experienced strong improvements in air quality in recent years
1426 due to drastic emission control efforts. Cities in Europe and the US have seen slowly
1427 decreasing PM_{2.5} levels thanks to effective implementation of air pollution control
1428 legislation.

1429 This analysis estimates source contributions to ambient PM_{2.5} concentration levels in urban
1430 areas outside Europe (more than 3,500 cities over 100,000 inhabitants), with results
1431 aggregated to the WHO world regions. It is calculated here that 83% of these cities do not
1432 meet the WHO guideline on ambient PM_{2.5}.

1433 Figure 23 shows the estimated PM_{2.5} levels and their source attribution for the year 2015. In
1434 most regions, residential fuel combustion of solid fuels for cooking and heating is the
1435 dominant source. While coal is prominent in some countries, the majority of the burden

1436 comes from the use of biomass in traditional stoves, which is often associated with net GHG
 1437 emissions as well due to unsustainable harvesting.

1438



1439

1440 *Figure 23: Source contributions to ambient PM_{2.5} levels in urban areas, by WHO region, for the year*
 1441 *2016*

1442

1443 *Indicator 3.3.2: Premature mortality from ambient air pollution by sector*

1444 **Headline finding:** *In 2016 there were 2.9 million premature deaths due to ambient PM_{2.5}*
 1445 *pollution, with global mortality approximately stagnant. On a decadal scale, improvements*
 1446 *are seen in some regions due to efficient emission controls, particularly from industrial*
 1447 *processes and power generation.*


1448 Knowing the sources of ambient air pollution is essential for designing efficient mitigation
 1449 measures that maximise benefits for human health and climate. This indicator estimates the
 1450 source contributions to ambient PM_{2.5} and their health impacts on a global level, quantifying
 1451 contributions from individual economic sectors and highlighting coal combustion across
 1452 sectors.

1453 Results for 2016 are similar to the estimates for 2015, with an overall number of premature
 1454 deaths attributable to ambient PM_{2.5} estimated at 2.9 million. The dominant contribution

1455 varies between and within world regions; in Africa household cooking is the overwhelming
 1456 source while in other regions industry, traffic, electricity generation, and agriculture play
 1457 bigger roles (Figure 24). Small decreases are visible in the European Region (mainly from
 1458 coal power plants) and in the Western Pacific region. In the last 10 years, some sustained
 1459 improvements are seen from emission trends in Europe and Western Pacific regions,
 1460 presumably due to implementation of end-of-pipe emission controls on power plants
 1461 (Western Pacific) and also other emission sectors in Europe. However, worldwide currently
 1462 still more than 440,000 cases are estimated to be related to coal burning.

1463

1464



1465
 1466 *Figure 24: Premature deaths attributable to ambient PM_{2.5} in 2015 (upper bars) and 2016 (lower*
 1467 *bars), by economic source sectors of pollutant emissions, for the 2015 population. Coal as a fuel is*
 1468 *highlighted by hatching*

1469

1470

1471 [Indicator 3.4: Sustainable and healthy transport](#)

1472 **Headline Finding:** Global road transport fuel use increased 0.7% from 2015 to 2016 on a per
 1473 capita basis. Fossil fuels continue to dominate, but their growth is being tempered
 1474 somewhat by rapid increases in biofuels and electricity.


1475 As with electricity generation, transition to cleaner fuels for transport is important for
 1476 climate change mitigation and will have the added benefit of reducing mortality from air

1477 pollution.⁹² Fuels used for transport currently produce more than half the nitrogen oxides
 1478 emitted globally and a significant proportion of particulate matter, posing a significant
 1479 threat to human health particularly in urban areas (Indicator 3.3).¹¹⁸ Additionally, the health
 1480 benefits of increasing uptake of active forms of travel (walking and cycling) have been
 1481 demonstrated through a large number of epidemiological and modelling analyses.^{41,92,119-121}
 1482 Encouraging active travel, in particular cycling, has become increasingly central to transport
 1483 planning, and there is growing evidence that bikeway infrastructure, if appropriately
 1484 designed and implemented, can increase rates of cycling.¹²²

1485 Global trends in levels of fuel efficiency and the transition away from the most polluting and
 1486 carbon-intensive transport fuels are monitored using data from the IEA; specifically, it
 1487 follows the metric of fuel use for road transportation on a per capita basis (TJ/person) by
 1488 type of fuel.^{123,124} In response to feedback, this year's indicator displays data in three
 1489 categories of fuel: fossil fuels, biofuels, and electricity.

1490 Globally, per capita fuel use increased by 0.7% from 2015 to 2016. Although fossil fuels
 1491 continue to contribute 95.8% of total fuel use for road transport, the use of clean fuels is
 1492 growing at an increasing rate: fossil fuels grew by 0.5% compared to 3.3% growth in biofuels
 1493 and 20.6% growth in electricity. In China, electricity now represents 1.5% of total
 1494 transportation fuels use. This is more than any other country and an 80% higher share than
 1495 that seen in Norway (0.85%). A growing number of countries and cities have announced
 1496 plans to ban vehicles powered by fossil fuels and auto-maker Volkswagen has announced
 1497 that it will stop developing engines that run on petrol or diesel after 2026.¹²⁵

1498



1499 *Figure 25: Per capita fuel use by type (TJ/person) for road transport with all fuels (left) and non-fossil*
 1500 *fuels only (right)*
 1501

1502 Some cities have made considerable progress towards improving levels of cycling. Vitoria-
 1503 Gasteiz in Spain is notable, where cycling mode share has increased from close to zero to
 1504 almost 15% in less than a decade.¹²⁶ The city's transport policy has strongly promoted
 1505 cycling through the expansion of the cycle lane network, improved cycle parking facilities and
 1506 the introduction of safety courses and new cycling regulations as well as communication on
 1507 the health benefits of cycling.¹²⁷ The search for a more comprehensive metric of active
 1508 transport remains elusive, principally limited by scarcity of data access in this field.

1509

1510 Indicator 3.5: Emissions from livestock and crop production

1511 **Headline finding:** *Total emissions from livestock and crop production have increased by 14%*
1512 *and 10%, respectively, from 2000 to 2016, with 93% of livestock emissions attributed to*
1513 *ruminants.*


1514 Current dietary trends are contributing to both non-communicable diseases (NCDs) and
1515 GHG emissions, as well as other impacts on the planet, including biodiversity loss and
1516 impacts on water and land use.⁹³ In particular, excess red meat consumption contributes to
1517 both the risk of cardiovascular disease and type 2 diabetes as well as GHG emissions.¹²⁸ To
1518 this end, whilst total emissions from crops and livestock will need to decline significantly in
1519 the future, particular attention should be given to capitalising on low-carbon production
1520 processes, and reducing the consumption of ruminant meat and other animal source foods,
1521 particularly in high income settings.^{16,38} Importantly, the nuance and complexity of any such
1522 indicator must be stressed, and it is clear that there is no ‘one-diet-fits-all’ solution.⁹³

1523 For the 2019 Lancet Countdown report, this indicator focuses on emissions from livestock
1524 and crop production. The new analysis added here provides a novel method of
1525 understanding the emissions profile of agricultural groups – for example, ruminant
1526 livestock. A full description of the methods and data is provided in the appendix.

1527 Overall emissions from livestock have increased by 14% since 2000 to over 3.2 GtCO₂e in
1528 2016 (Figure 26). Ruminants contribute 93% of total livestock emissions (3 GtCO₂e per
1529 year), with non-dairy cattle (used for meat) contributing 62-65% of this (see appendix).
1530 However, the largest increase in emissions from 2000 to 2016 has come from poultry, which
1531 has an increase in emissions of 58% (rising from 30.6 million tonnes CO₂e in 2000 to 48.5
1532 million in 2016), more than double that of non-dairy cattle.

1533

1534



(a) Emissions from Livestock

(b) Emissions from Crop Production

1535
1536 *Figure 26: Global livestock (a) and crop (b) GHG emissions annually from 2000-2016, by process*

1537 Total emissions from crop production have increased by 10% since 2000, to around 2 billion
1538 tonnes of CO₂e in 2016. Paddy rice cultivation, releases methane, contributes around half of
1539 these emissions (47-50%), with cultivation of organic soils and fertiliser contributing 27-29%
1540 and 21-25% respectively.

1541

1542

1543 [Indicator 3.6: Healthcare sector emissions](#)

1544 **Headline Finding:** *Global healthcare sector GHG emissions were approximately 4.6% of the*
1545 *global total emissions.*


1546 Section 2 makes clear that the healthcare sector is central in managing the health damages
1547 of a changing climate, however, it is also a significant contributor of GHG emissions, both
1548 directly and indirectly through purchased goods and services. Recent national-level studies
1549 for the US,¹²⁹ Canada,¹³⁰ and Australia¹³¹ have used environmentally-extended input-output
1550 (EEIO) modelling, finding that healthcare sector emissions represent between 4-10% of total
1551 GHG emissions in those countries. EEIO models have been in wide use since the 1970s,¹³²
1552 and underpin consumption-based accounting of emissions performed at national and global
1553 scales.¹³³ An important advantage of using EEIO modelling is that estimates of healthcare
1554 sector emissions are performed on a life cycle basis, meaning that that all emissions are
1555 accounted for, from the electricity usage of healthcare facilities, to the energy to produce
1556 and transport medical equipment and pharmaceuticals.

1557 National-level studies cannot easily be compared due to differences in how emissions
1558 inventories, monetary input-output tables, and health expenditure data are collected in
1559 each country. In addition, some portion of healthcare sector emissions in each country is
1560 imported from other countries as embodied carbon in traded commodities, thus requiring a
1561 global scope and the use of multi-region input-output (MRIO) models that cover more than
1562 one country. For this edition of the Lancet Countdown, a standardised, international

1563 measure of healthcare sector GHG emissions was created using multiple MRIO models
 1564 (EXIOBASE, WIOD) that cover 40-47 countries and rest-of-world regions, in combination
 1565 with WHO health expenditure data for 187 countries, assigned to the MRIO model
 1566 geographic units.

1567 Figure 27 shows variations in per capita healthcare-related GHG emissions as a function of
 1568 time, affluence, and the proportion of national economic output spent on healthcare. Per
 1569 capita, US emissions are significantly higher than those of any other country, and have risen
 1570 steadily over the study period 2007-2016. However, per capita healthcare emissions of
 1571 other countries have increased even more significantly, albeit from a lower base, including
 1572 China (CN, 180%), South Korea (KR, 75%) and Japan (JP, 37%). In contrast, Greece's
 1573 healthcare GHG emissions showed a marked decrease (GR, -35%), likely reflecting economic
 1574 hardships in that country. Results using the WIOD MRIO model show similar trends but
 1575 slightly lower absolute GHG emissions. The lowest per capita emissions modelled were for
 1576 India (IN) and Indonesia (ID), at less than 1/40th those for the USA. Comparison of emissions
 1577 per capita and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita show a levelling off trend of
 1578 healthcare emissions versus affluence, again with the exception of the US.

1579 Overall, healthcare was responsible for approximately 2250 Mt CO₂e in 2016, or 4.6% of the
 1580 global total emissions (excluding land use change). A parallel global analysis using a different
 1581 MRIO model (EORA) just looking at CO₂ (excluding other GHGs) for 36 countries determined
 1582 a healthcare contribution of 4.4% to the global total for the countries considered,¹³⁴
 1583 corroborating the results presented here.



1584 Figure 27: Per capita healthcare GHG emissions by country: (left) as a function of GDP per capita,
 1585 bubble widths indicate proportion of national spending on healthcare; (right) over time 2007-2016.
 1586 Colour key: green=Europe, light brown=Africa; grey=South Asia/South East Asia, pink=North/Central
 1587 Asia, red=East Asia, yellow=Oceania, blue=North America; purple=Latin America. Abbreviations
 1588 follow ISO two-letter country codes
 1589

1590

Health systems are increasingly responding to the dual challenges of the health impacts of climate change and the contribution of the healthcare sector to GHG emissions. From 2013 to 2018, participants from health systems, health centres and hospitals, from 19 different countries, and representing 9,199 health centres and 1,693 hospitals, have participated in the Health Care Climate Challenge. The Challenge addresses key areas including local climate change risk assessments, health adaptation plans, fossil fuel and renewable energy project investments, and work with government agencies to support GHG emissions reductions and healthcare sector adaptation.

One leader in climate action progress is Kaiser Permanente (KP), the largest non-governmental health system in the United States. Since 2008, KP reduced its operational GHG emissions by 29% while expanding its healthcare services to 3.1 million additional Americans. As of early 2018, 36 of its facilities hosted onsite solar panels. KP is working to increase its purchasing of renewable electricity to 100% of total usage by 2020. Anesthetic gases account for 3.5% of KP's GHG emissions. Between 2014 and 2017, KP achieved a 23% reduction in GHG emissions associated with its use of anesthetic gases through progressive elimination of the drug Desflurane.¹³⁵

The largest example of a health system taking steps to reduce GHG emissions and other environmental impacts comes in the form of the UK National Health Service (NHS). From 2007 to 2017, a national-level analysis not included above, demonstrates that the NHS reduced its GHG emissions by 18.5%, while clinical activity increased by 27.5% over the same time period.¹³⁶ Efforts are also being made to reduce water use, plastic waste and air pollution from the NHS.

1591 *Panel 3: Healthcare sector response to climate change*

1592

1593 Conclusion

1594 The indicators of section 3 present a mix of encouraging and concerning trends. Renewable
1595 electricity generation continues to grow, as does access to energy and the rate of electric
1596 vehicle sales. However, the carbon intensity of the energy system remains unchanged, with
1597 coal supply increasing, reversing the recent trend, and significant effort is required to
1598 decarbonise the agricultural and healthcare sectors. The summation of all of this is that GHG
1599 emissions continue to rise. Next year (2020) is important for two reasons – it is the year the
1600 implementation period of the Paris Agreement begins, and the year most studies suggest
1601 global emissions must peak then in order to remain on a 1.5°C pathway. To meet both
1602 commitments, a substantially stronger global response is required urgently, to reduce GHG
1603 emissions and minimise the future health risks of climate change.
1604

1605 Section 4: Economics and Finance

1606 Section 4 examines the financial and economic dimensions of the impacts of climate change,
1607 and of mitigation efforts required to respond . Although many indicators in this section may
1608 appear to be distant from human health, they are key to tracking the health of the low-
1609 carbon transition that underpins current and future determinants of human health and
1610 wellbeing described in sections 1-3.

1611 The projected economic cost of inaction to tackle climate change is enormous. For example,
1612 if the world were to experience warming of 5°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100, the
1613 Economist Intelligence Unit projects that around \$18.4 trillion of the world’s current stock
1614 of manageable assets would be at risk. At 6°C of warming, this rises to \$43 trillion –
1615 equivalent to over half the current value of all the world’s stock markets.¹³⁷

1616 Investment to mitigate climate change substantially reduces these risks, and generates
1617 further economic benefits. For example, the UK’s independent Committee on Climate
1618 Change calculated that achieving net-zero emissions in the UK in 2050, in line with the more
1619 ambitious objective of the Paris Agreement, is likely to require investments of 1-2% of the
1620 UK’s GDP in 2050. However, if the economic value of co-benefits to human health (and
1621 savings to the NHS, for example from reduced air pollution), and the creation of low-carbon
1622 industrial opportunities are considered, the economic implications are likely to be positive
1623 .¹³⁸ Global economic benefits are likely to be maximised (and costs minimised) if strong
1624 policy action is taken as soon as possible to accelerate the low-carbon transition.

1625 The nine indicators in this section fall into four broad themes:

- 1626 • Economic costs of climate change (Indicator 4.1);
- 1627 • Economic benefits of tackling climate change and air pollution (Indicator 4.2);
- 1628 • Investing in a low-carbon economy (Indicators 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, and 4.3.4);
- 1629 • Pricing GHG emissions from fossil fuels (Indicators 4.4.1, 4.4.2 and 4.4.3).

1630 The 2019 report adds an additional indicator tracking the economic value of change in
1631 mortality due to air pollution (Indicator 4.2).

1632

1633 Indicator 4.1: Economic losses due to climate-related extreme events

1634 **Headline Finding:** *In 2018, a total of 831 climate-related extreme events resulted in \$166*
1635 *billion in overall economic losses. Although most losses were in high-income countries and*
1636 *insured, no events in low-income countries were covered by insurance.*

1637 The indicators in section 1 presented changes in exposures and resulting health impacts of
1638 climate-related extreme events (Indicators 1.2.1, 1.2.2 and 1.2.3). The economic costs of

1639 extreme climate-related events may also exacerbate the direct health and wellbeing
 1640 impacts they produce. This indicator tracks the present-day total annual economic losses
 1641 (insured and uninsured) across country income groups relative to GDP, resulting from
 1642 climate-related extreme events.

1643 The data for this indicator is sourced from Munich Re’s NatCatSERVICE,¹³⁹ with climate-
 1644 related events categorised as meteorological, climatological, and hydrological events
 1645 (geophysical events are excluded) as well as data from the World Bank Development
 1646 Indicator Database.¹⁴⁰ The methodology remains the same as was used in the 2018 Report
 1647 of the Lancet Countdown,¹⁶ and full methodology, along with data for 1990-2018 can be
 1648 found in the appendix (Figure 28).




Figure 28: Economic Losses from Climate-Related Events Relative to GDP

1649

1650 Global economic losses due to extreme climate-related events in 2018 were \$166 billion,
 1651 around half the value experienced in 2017, but still higher than any other year since 2005
 1652 (Figure 28). As in previous years, economic losses are highest in high-income countries, but
 1653 with well over half of the losses in high-income countries were insured. By contrast,
 1654 although in previous years less than 1% of losses in low-income countries were insured, in
 1655 2018 not a single event recorded created losses covered by insurance.

1656

1657 Indicator 4.2: Economic costs of air pollution

1658

1659 **Headline Finding:** *Across Europe, improvements in particulate air pollution from human*
1660 *activity were seen from 2015 to 2016. If the levels of pollution for these two years remained*
1661 *the same over the course of a person's life, this difference would lead to an average*
1662 *reduction in Years of Life Lost worth €5.2 billion, annually. However, held constant over the*
1663 *remaining lifetime of the current population, the costs of Years of Life Lost from 2016 levels*
1664 *of anthropogenic PM_{2.5} pollution in Europe would still exceed €129 billion, annually.*

1665

1666 Indicator 4.2 is a new indicator for the 2019 report, capturing the economic costs of the
1667 impact of air pollution on human health. It will be developed in to a full suite of metrics over
1668 the coming years, with 2019 presenting values for the European Union alone. It places an
1669 economic value on the Years of Life Lost (YLL) that result from exposure to PM_{2.5} from
1670 anthropogenic sources, for the EU.

1671 This indicator is based on estimates of the total YLL to the 2015 population of EU member
1672 states that results from PM_{2.5} exposure experienced in a given year, if such emissions and
1673 subsequent population exposure were to remain constant over the course of their lifetime.
1674 Each YLL is assigned a 'Value of a Life Year' (VLY) of €50,000, which is the lower bound
1675 estimate as suggested by the EU Impact Assessment Guidelines¹⁴¹ (full details can be found
1676 in the appendix). In this year's report, the economic value of YLLs resulting from consistent
1677 exposure to PM_{2.5} from anthropogenic sources experienced in both 2015 and 2016 is
1678 calculated. Complete details for this indicator can be found in the appendix.




Figure 29: Economic value of annual average Years of Life Lost due to PM_{2.5} exposure

1679 Figure 29 illustrates the results for each of the EU28 countries. As described under Indicator
 1680 3.5.2, anthropogenic PM_{2.5} pollution decreased between 2015 and 2016 in Europe, largely
 1681 due to a reduction in emissions from the power sector. If the population of the EU in 2015
 1682 were to experience anthropogenic PM_{2.5} emissions at 2016 levels consistently to 2115,
 1683 instead of levels experienced in 2015, the total annual average economic value of the
 1684 reduction in YLLs would be around €5.2 billion. However, even at 2016 levels of
 1685 anthropogenic PM_{2.5} pollution, the total annual average cost to the 2015 population would
 1686 still be €129 billion, with the greatest costs generally found in countries with the largest
 1687 populations. The greatest projected average YLLs per person are in Hungary, Romania and
 1688 Poland (at over 8 months per person), with an EU average of 5.7 months of life lost per
 1689 person.

1690 For the first iteration of this indicator, it was not possible to calculate annual YLLs
 1691 attributable to PM_{2.5} exposure in a given year. However, methodological refinements mean
 1692 that this metric should be reported in the 2020 report.

1693

1694 Indicator 4.3: Investing in a low-carbon economy

1695 *Indicator 4.3.1: Investment in new coal capacity*


1696 **Headline Finding:** *Global investment in new coal-fired electricity capacity declined again in*
1697 *2018, continuing the downward trend experienced since 2011.*

1698 Whilst Indicator 3.1.2 tracks progress on coal phase-out through the total primary energy
1699 supply of coal, this indicator looks to the future of coal-fired power generation through
1700 tracking investments in coal-fired capacity.

1701 The data source for this indicator (IEA) remain the same as in the 2017 Lancet Countdown
1702 report,¹⁹ however the methodology has altered, and been retrospectively applied to
1703 recalculate all data presented. The revised approach considers ‘ongoing’ capital spending,
1704 with investment in a new plant spread evenly from the year new construction begins, to the
1705 year it becomes operational. Previously, data were presented as ‘overnight’ investment, in
1706 which all capital spending on a new plant is assigned to the year in which the plant became
1707 operational. Further details are found in the appendix. Data for 2006-2017 using the old
1708 methodology are also presented in Figure 30 for comparison.

1709 Whilst TPES for coal increased in 2018 (Indicator 3.1.2), investment in new coal-fired
1710 electricity generating capacity continues the downward trend experienced since 2011.
1711 Interestingly, this decline was in large part due to reduced investment in the same countries
1712 that increased their coal TPES in 2018 (China and India), providing hope for coal phase-out.
1713 The number of total Final Investment Decisions (i.e. the decision to begin construction)
1714 declined 30% in 2018, with costs and construction times for new plants generally increasing
1715 due to larger, more efficient and complex designs, and the use of advanced pollution control
1716 systems, in response to concerns over air quality.¹⁴²

1717



1718 *Figure 30: Annual investment in coal-fired capacity 2006-2018 (an index score 100 corresponds to*
 1719 *2006 levels) (Source: IEA, 2019)¹⁴²*

1720

1721 *Indicator 4.3.2: Investments in zero-carbon energy and energy efficiency*

1722 **Headline Finding:** *Trends in energy investments are currently heading in the wrong*
 1723 *direction. In 2018, investments in fossil fuels increased, whilst investments in zero-carbon*
 1724 *energy decreased.*

1725 Indicator 4.3 monitors global investment in zero-carbon energy, energy efficiency, fossil
 1726 fuels, and electricity networks. It complements the tracking of zero carbon electricity
 1727 generation (Indicator 3.1.3) in section 3 and potentially predicts future trends in this
 1728 indicator. All values reported are in US\$2018, with data sourced from the IEA.¹⁴² The data
 1729 sources for this indicator remain the same as described in the 2017 Lancet Countdown
 1730 report,¹⁹ however the methodology has been updated somewhat (see appendix).

1731




Figure 31: Annual Investment in the Global Energy System

1732 Total investment in the global energy system remained stable at around \$1.85 trillion in
 1733 2018, following a steady decline between 2015 and 2017 (Figure 31). Investment in fossil
 1734 fuels increased slightly, driven by an increasing oil price, whilst investment in zero-carbon
 1735 energy slightly decreased, driven by reduced investment in renewable electricity – partly
 1736 the result of continually declining costs. Investments in energy efficiency and electricity
 1737 networks remained stable between 2017 and 2018.

1738 In contrast with growth in zero carbon electricity generation (Indicator 3.1.3), these
 1739 investment trends are currently not consistent with limiting warming to well below 2°C. The
 1740 IEA estimate that in order to achieve a pathway consistent with the goals of the Paris
 1741 Agreement, investment in zero-carbon energy, electricity networks that enable it, and
 1742 energy efficiency, must collectively grow by two-and-a-half times by 2030 (even with further
 1743 expected reductions in the cost of such technologies and actions), and account for at least
 1744 65% of total annual investment in the global energy system.^{137,142}

1745


1746 *Indicator 4.3.3: Employment in renewable and fossil fuel energy industries*

1747 **Headline Finding:** In 2018, renewable energy provided 11 million jobs – an increase of 4.2%
 1748 from 2017. Employment in fossil fuel extraction industries also increased to 12.9 million – a
 1749 2% increase from 2017.

1750 There are well documented occupational health consequences of in working in some key
 1751 fossil fuel industries, such as risk of injury and respiratory disease as well as risk of damage
 1752 to hearing and skin.¹⁹ On the other hand, with appropriate planning and policy, the

1753 transition of employment opportunities from high to low-carbon industries may yield
 1754 positive consequences for both the economy and human health.¹⁴³

1755 This indicator tracks global direct employment in fossil fuel extraction industries (coal
 1756 mining and oil and gas exploration and production) and direct and indirect (supply chain)
 1757 employment in renewable energy, presented in (Figure 32). The data for this indicator are
 1758 sourced from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) (renewables) and IBIS
 1759 World (fossil fuel extraction).¹⁴⁴⁻¹⁴⁶ The data for fossil fuel extraction employment for 2012-
 1760 2017 differs significantly from that presented in the 2018 Countdown report, due an
 1761 improved methodology in the data collection and estimation methodology for global coal
 1762 mining employment by IBISWorld. Similarly, values for hydropower and Other Technologies
 1763 for renewable energy employment have been revised, following methodological changes.
 1764 Further detail is found in the appendix.



1765

Figure 32: Employment in Renewable Energy and Fossil Fuel Extraction Sectors

1766 In 2018, around 11 million people were employed either directly or indirectly in the global
 1767 renewable energy industry. This represents a 4.2% increase from 2016, with growth in five
 1768 out of six categories. Employment related to solar PV grew by over 7%, and remains the
 1769 largest employer, with China responsible for nearly-two thirds of related jobs. Overall, 32%
 1770 of global renewable energy jobs are held by women.¹⁴⁶

1771 Growth in employment in the fossil fuel extractive industries has been driven both the
 1772 growth of coal mining in China and other emerging markets (particularly India), despite a
 1773 decline in many higher-income countries, and the upstream oil and gas industries, following
 1774 rising prices in 2018. However, it is expected that employment in both industries will

1775 decrease in the coming years due to slowing growth in demand for coal in key markets such
1776 as China, and a decline in other (particularly high-income) markets, as the transition to low-
1777 carbon electricity continues, and a potential decline in oil and gas prices coupled with
1778 increasing productivity.^{144,145}

1779 *Indicator 4.3.4: Funds divested from fossil fuels*

1780 **Headline Finding:** *The global value of new funds committed to fossil fuel divestment in 2018*
1781 *was \$2.135 trillion, of which health institutions accounted for around \$66.5 million; this*
1782 *represents a cumulative sum of \$7.94 trillion since 2008, with health institutions accounting*
1783 *for \$42 billion.*

1784 Originating in the late 2000s, the divestment movement seeks to both remove from the
1785 fossil fuel industry its ‘social license to operate’ and guard against the risk of losses due to
1786 ‘stranded assets’, by encouraging investors to commit to divest themselves of assets related
1787 to the industry. The debate on the direct and indirect consequences of these approaches is
1788 nuanced and complex, with evidence on their effects only just beginning to emerge.¹⁴⁷

1789 This indicator tracks the total global value of funds divested from fossil fuels, and the value
1790 of divested funds coming from health institutions, using data provided by 350.org,¹⁴⁸ with
1791 full methodology described in the appendix.

1792 From 2008 to the end of 2018, 1,026 organisations with cumulative assets worth at least
1793 \$7.94 trillion, including 23 health organisations with assets of around \$42 billion, had
1794 committed to divestment, including the World Medical Association, the British Medical
1795 Association, the Canadian Medical Association, the UK Royal College of General
1796 Practitioners, and the Royal Australasian College of Physicians. The annual value of new
1797 funds committing to divesting increased from \$428 billion in 2017 to \$2.135 trillion in 2018.
1798 However, health institutions have divested at a reduced rate, with just \$866.5 million
1799 divested in 2018, compared to \$3.28 billion in 2017.

1800

1801 *Indicator 4.4: Pricing greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels*

1802

1803 *Indicator 4.4.1: Fossil fuel subsidies*


1804 **Headline Finding:** *In 2018, fossil fuel consumption subsidies increased to \$427 billion - over a*
1805 *third higher than 2017 levels, and over 50% higher than 2016 levels.*

1806 Negative externalities, including the varied direct and indirect consequences for human
1807 health, mean that the true cost of fossil fuels is far greater than their market price.¹⁴⁹ Fossil
1808 fuel subsidies (both for their consumption and their extraction) artificially lower prices even

1809 further, promoting overconsumption, further exacerbating both GHG emissions and air
1810 pollution.

1811 This indicator tracks the value of fossil fuel consumption subsidies in 42 (mostly non-OECD)
1812 countries. Although these countries account for a large proportion of such subsidies around
1813 the world, they are by no means comprehensive, meaning that the values reported are
1814 conservative. The methodology and data source (IEA) for this indicator remains unchanged
1815 since the 2017 Lancet Countdown report,¹⁶ and is described there and the appendix. Data
1816 for 2008 and 2017, which was previously not available, are now included.

1817 Whilst fossil fuel subsidies declined between 2012 and 2016, Figure 33 this trend was
1818 reversed in both 2017 and 2018, reaching \$319 billion and \$427 billion, respectively (Figure
1819 33). The values presented above do not include the economic value of the unpriced
1820 negative externalities. If these were to be included, the IMF estimated that in 2017 global
1821 subsidies to fossil fuels, using this definition, increases to \$5.2 trillion – equivalent to 6.3% of
1822 Gross World Product (GWP).¹⁵⁰



1823
1824 *Figure 33: Global Fossil Fuel Consumption Subsidies 2008-2018*

1825

1826

1827 *Indicator 4.4.2: Coverage and strength of carbon pricing*

1828 **Headline Finding:** Carbon pricing instruments in early 2019 continue to cover the 13.1% of
 1829 global anthropogenic GHG emissions, but with average prices around 13% higher than
 1830 experienced in 2018

1831 Adequately pricing carbon emissions is an essential component in shifting investment to
 1832 develop a low-carbon economy. This indicator tracks the extent to which GHG emissions
 1833 around the world are subject to a carbon price, and the weighted-average price these
 1834 instruments provide (

1835

1836 Table 1: Carbon Pricing – Global Coverage and Weighted Average Prices per tCO₂e. * Global
 1837 emissions coverage is based on 2012 total anthropogenic GHG emissions

1838

	2016	2017	2018	2019
Global Emissions Coverage*	12.1%	13.1%	13.1%	13.1%
Weighted Average Carbon Price of Instruments <i>(current prices, US\$)</i>	\$7.79	\$9.28	\$11.58	\$13.08
Global Weighted Average Carbon Price <i>(current prices, US\$)</i>	\$0.94	\$1.22	\$1.51	\$1.76

1839

1840
 1841

1842 The range of carbon prices across instruments continues to be vast (from <\$1 /tCO₂e in
 1843 Poland, Ukraine and the Chongqing and Shenzhen pilot schemes in China , to \$127 /tCO₂e in
 1844 Sweden), although weighted-average prices in early 2018 were 13% above 2018 levels,
 1845 driven in large part by an increasing price under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) (the
 1846 largest carbon pricing instrument in the world, responsible for nearly half the economic
 1847 value of all instruments combined).

1848 As illustrated in Figure 34 further carbon pricing instruments are under consideration. With
1849 the addition of these instruments – and in particular the Chinese national ETS (replacing the
1850 existing sub-national ‘pilots’), over 20% of global anthropogenic GHG emissions will be
1851 subject to a carbon price.¹⁵²

1852

1853

1854 *Indicator 4.4.3: Use of carbon pricing revenues*

1855 **Headline Finding:** Revenues from carbon pricing instruments increased by \$11 billion
 1856 between 2017 and 2018, reaching \$44 billion, with \$24.4 billion allocated to further climate
 1857 change mitigation activities.

1858 As the previous indicator outlined, adequately pricing carbon is essential for mitigating GHG
 1859 emissions. How the revenue generated by these pricing instruments is used will also have
 1860 important consequences. Four ways the revenue may be used include: investment in further
 1861 mitigation; investment in adaptation; recycling for other purposes (such as enabling the
 1862 reduction of other taxes or levies); and contributing to other general government funds.
 1863 This indicator tracks the total government revenue from carbon pricing instruments and
 1864 where this is allocated.

1865 Data on revenue generated is provided on the WBG Carbon Pricing Dashboard,¹⁵¹ with
 1866 revenue allocation information obtained from various sources. Only instruments with
 1867 revenue estimates and with revenue received by the administering authority before
 1868 redistribution are considered. Further information on the methodology and various sources
 1869 used to obtain information on revenue allocation can be found in the appendix.

1870
 1871 *Table 2: Carbon pricing revenues and allocation in 2019*

	Mitigation	Adaptation	Revenue Recycling	General Funds	Total Revenue (US\$)
Proportion of total funds (%)	56.6%	0.6%	12.8%	30%	-
Value (US\$)	\$24.36 billion	\$258 million	\$5.50 billion	\$12.91 billion	\$43.03 billion

1872 Government revenue generated from carbon pricing instruments in 2018 totalled over \$44
 1873 billion; an \$11 billion increase from the \$33 billion generated in 2017. This was driven
 1874 increasing prices of allowances sold at auction in the European Union Emissions Trading
 1875 System (EU ETS), higher tax rates for instruments in Alberta, British Columbia and France,
 1876 and allowance sales in California and Quebec.¹⁵³

1877 The revenue allocated to mitigation activities increased by around \$10 billion between 2017
 1878 and 2018, whilst revenue allocated to revenue recycling and general funds remained stable
 1879 in absolute terms. Revenue allocated to adaptation however reduced significantly, from
 1880 over \$1.5 billion to around \$250 million.

1881 Conclusion

1882 Section 4 has presented indicators on the economic impacts of climate change, the finance
1883 and economic underpinnings of climate change mitigation, and the economic value of the
1884 health-related benefits it brings. The results of these indicators suggest that the shift to a
1885 low carbon global economy is in some respects slowing, and in yet other cases, previously
1886 promising trends highlighted in the 2018 report are falling into reverse gear. Given the need
1887 to transition the global economy to net-zero GHG emissions by 2050 in order to limit
1888 warming to well below 2°C, governments at all levels, in collaboration with the private
1889 sector and the population at large, must take immediate steps towards implementing
1890 strong, ambitious policy and related action to steer and rapidly accelerate their economies
1891 towards a low-carbon state, conducive to human health and wellbeing.

1892

1893

1894 This indicator uses data from the World Bank Carbon Pricing Dashboard.¹⁵¹ The full
 1895 methodology is presented in the appendix and remains unchanged from the 2017 Report of
 1896 the Lancet Countdown.

1897 The coverage of carbon pricing instruments remained at around 13.1% of global
 1898 anthropogenic GHG emissions between 2018 and 2019, implemented through 44 national
 1899 and 27 sub-national instruments.

1900
 1901 *Table 1: Carbon Pricing – Global Coverage and Weighted Average Prices per tCO₂e. * Global*
 1902 *emissions coverage is based on 2012 total anthropogenic GHG emissions*

1903

	2016	2017	2018	2019
Global Emissions Coverage*	12.1%	13.1%	13.1%	13.1%
Weighted Average Carbon Price of Instruments <i>(current prices, US\$)</i>	\$7.79	\$9.28	\$11.58	\$13.08
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


Figure 34: Carbon pricing instruments implemented, scheduled for implementation, and under consideration. Adapted from World Bank Group (2019)

1907 The range of carbon prices across instruments continues to be vast (from <\$1 /tCO₂e in
1908 Poland, Ukraine and the Chongqing and Shenzhen pilot schemes in China , to \$127 /tCO₂e in
1909 Sweden), although weighted-average prices in early 2018 were 13% above 2018 levels,
1910 driven in large part by an increasing price under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) (the
1911 largest carbon pricing instrument in the world, responsible for nearly half the economic
1912 value of all instruments combined).

1913 As illustrated in Figure 34 further carbon pricing instruments are under consideration. With
1914 the addition of these instruments – and in particular the Chinese national ETS (replacing the
1915 existing sub-national ‘pilots’), over 20% of global anthropogenic GHG emissions will be
1916 subject to a carbon price.¹⁵²

1917
1918

1919 *Indicator 4.4.3: Use of carbon pricing revenues*

1920 **Headline Finding:** Revenues from carbon pricing instruments increased by \$11 billion
 1921 between 2017 and 2018, reaching \$44 billion, with \$24.4 billion allocated to further climate
 1922 change mitigation activities.

1923 As the previous indicator outlined, adequately pricing carbon is essential for mitigating GHG
 1924 emissions. How the revenue generated by these pricing instruments is used will also have
 1925 important consequences. Four ways the revenue may be used include: investment in further
 1926 mitigation; investment in adaptation; recycling for other purposes (such as enabling the
 1927 reduction of other taxes or levies); and contributing to other general government funds.
 1928 This indicator tracks the total government revenue from carbon pricing instruments and
 1929 where this is allocated.

1930 Data on revenue generated is provided on the WBG Carbon Pricing Dashboard,¹⁵¹ with
 1931 revenue allocation information obtained from various sources. Only instruments with
 1932 revenue estimates and with revenue received by the administering authority before
 1933 redistribution are considered. Further information on the methodology and various sources
 1934 used to obtain information on revenue allocation can be found in the appendix.

1935
 1936 *Table 2: Carbon pricing revenues and allocation in 2019*

	Mitigation	Adaptation	Revenue Recycling	General Funds	Total Revenue (US\$)
Proportion of total funds (%)	56.6%	0.6%	12.8%	30%	-
Value (US\$)	\$24.36 billion	\$258 million	\$5.50 billion	\$12.91 billion	\$43.03 billion

1937 Government revenue generated from carbon pricing instruments in 2018 totalled over \$44
 1938 billion; an \$11 billion increase from the \$33 billion generated in 2017. This was driven
 1939 increasing prices of allowances sold at auction in the European Union Emissions Trading
 1940 System (EU ETS), higher tax rates for instruments in Alberta, British Columbia and France,
 1941 and allowance sales in California and Quebec.¹⁵³

1942 The revenue allocated to mitigation activities increased by around \$10 billion between 2017
 1943 and 2018, whilst revenue allocated to revenue recycling and general funds remained stable
 1944 in absolute terms. Revenue allocated to adaptation however reduced significantly, from
 1945 over \$1.5 billion to around \$250 million.

1946 Conclusion

1947 Section 4 has presented indicators on the economic impacts of climate change, the finance
1948 and economic underpinnings of climate change mitigation, and the economic value of the
1949 health-related benefits it brings. The results of these indicators suggest that the shift to a
1950 low carbon global economy is in some respects slowing, and in yet other cases, previously
1951 promising trends highlighted in the 2018 report are falling into reverse gear. Given the need
1952 to transition the global economy to net-zero GHG emissions by 2050 in order to limit
1953 warming to well below 2°C, governments at all levels, in collaboration with the private
1954 sector and the population at large, must take immediate steps towards implementing
1955 strong, ambitious policy and related action to steer and rapidly accelerate their economies
1956 towards a low-carbon state, conducive to human health and wellbeing.

1957

1958

1959 Section 5: Public and Political Engagement

1960

1961 As earlier sections have made clear, climate change is human in both its origins and its
1962 impacts. Its origins lie in the burning of fossil fuels, particularly by early-industrialising and
1963 richer societies, and its impacts include an increasing toll on human health. Reductions in
1964 global GHG emissions at the speed required by the Paris Agreement depend upon
1965 engagement by all sectors of society.

1966 Section 5 focuses on engagement in four domains: the media, government, corporate sector
1967 and, for the first time, individual engagement. It tracks trends in engagement across the last
1968 decade, complementing this evidence with analyses of the content and dynamics of
1969 engagement in 2018. The section builds on methods used in earlier Countdown reports
1970 which continue to be refined and extended.

1971 The media is central to public understanding of climate change; it provides a key resource
1972 through which people make sense of climate change and assess the actions of governments
1973 to address it.¹⁵⁴⁻¹⁵⁷ The media indicator (5.1) includes an analysis of global coverage of
1974 health and climate change in 62 newspapers from 2007 to 2018. For the 2019 Countdown
1975 report, we have additionally included coverage of health and climate change in China's
1976 *People's Daily* (in its Chinese-language edition, *Renmin Ribao*). As the official outlet of the
1977 Chinese party-state, the *People's Daily* is China's most influential newspaper.¹⁵⁸ The
1978 indicator has been further enhanced by a content analysis of the elite press in two
1979 contrasting societies, India and the USA. Elite newspapers both reflect and shape
1980 engagement in climate change by governments and elite groups.¹⁵⁹⁻¹⁶³

1981 The internet is an increasingly important medium of civic engagement and has transformed
1982 individual access to global knowledge and debates. The second indicator tracks
1983 engagement in health and climate change through individuals' information-seeking
1984 behaviour on the online encyclopaedia, Wikipedia.¹⁶⁴ Because of its accessibility, breadth
1985 and user trust, Wikipedia is one of the most widely-used online resources.¹⁶⁵⁻¹⁶⁹

1986 The third indicator relates to government engagement in health and climate change. The
1987 global public recognise that climate change is harming people and support government
1988 action to limit GHG emissions.¹⁷⁰⁻¹⁷² The indicator focuses on high-level government
1989 engagement in health and climate change at the United Nations General Assembly. It tracks
1990 references at the UN General Debate, the major international forum where national leaders
1991 have the opportunity to address the global community on issues they consider
1992 important.^{173,174}

1993 The fourth indicator relates to the corporate sector, recognised to be central to achieving a
1994 rapid transition to a carbon-free economy, both through its business practices of and via its
1995 wider political and public influence.¹⁷⁵⁻¹⁷⁷ Focusing on the health sector, the indicator tracks
1996 engagement in health and climate change through analyses of the annual reports submitted

1997 by companies signed up to the UN Global Compact, the world's largest corporate
1998 sustainability initiative.¹⁷⁸

1999

2000 [Indicator 5.1 Media coverage of health and climate change](#)

2001 **Headline finding:** *Media coverage of health and climate change continued to increase*
2002 *between 2007 and 2018 with the elite press paying attention to the health impacts of*
2003 *climate change and the co-benefits of climate change action*

2004 This indicator tracks coverage of health and climate change in the global media, including in
2005 the Chinese People's Daily. Additionally, it provides insight into what aspects of the health-
2006 climate change nexus are receiving attention in the elite media in India and the USA. For the
2007 2019 Report of the Lancet Countdown, methods to track newspaper coverage have been
2008 improved; greater attention is also given to the content of coverage.

2009 Global media coverage of health and climate change has increased since 2010. As with
2010 broader coverage of climate change, spikes in media engagement with health and climate
2011 change coincided with major events in climate governance.¹⁷⁹ These include the 2009 and
2012 2015 UNFCCC COPs in Copenhagen and Paris and, in 2016, the Paris Agreement and the
2013 Sustainable Development Goals coming into force. Nonetheless, health continued to
2014 represent only a small proportion of wider coverage of climate change. Analysis details,
2015 together with data sources and methodological enhancements, are described in the
2016 appendix. The indicator is based on 62 newspapers (English, German, Portuguese, Spanish)
2017 selected to provide a global spread of higher-circulation papers.

2018 Extending this analysis, Figure 35 tracks coverage of health and climate change in the
2019 *People's Daily*. While the Chinese media has changed and diversified in recent decades, the
2020 *People's Daily* retains its dominance.^{158,180,181} Across the 2008-18 period, there was an
2021 average of 2519 articles per year relating to climate change. A small proportion of these
2022 related to human health, with a mean of 14 articles a year. Spikes in coverage are less
2023 closely tied to landmarks in global climate change governance (such as the signing of the
2024 Paris Agreement in 2015) than in the global media. The explanation may lie in the timing of
2025 *People's Daily* coverage of global events, including the COPs, which occurs after their
2026 conclusion; coverage of November/December COPs may therefore occur in the following
2027 calendar year.

2028 This addition to Indicator 5.1 was based on the *People's Daily* online archive,¹⁸² and
2029 combined electronic searching of the text corpus (key word searches and algorithm-based
2030 natural language processing) with manual screening of the filtered articles. Full details of
2031 methods are provided in the appendix.




Figure 35: Number of articles reporting on climate change and on both health and climate change in the People's Daily 2008-2018

2032
2033
2034

2035 The analysis of the content of coverage focused on the high-circulation elite press in India
2036 and the USA: *Times of India (ToI)*, *Hindustan Times (HT)*, *New York Times (NYT)* and
2037 *Washington Post (WP)*. Two time-periods were selected to cover months (July-September)
2038 where both countries experienced extreme weather events (monsoon flooding and wildfires
2039 respectively) together with months (November-December) covering the 2018 COP in
2040 Katowice. Articles in Nexis and Factiva were keyword searched and manually screened for
2041 inclusion. Template analysis was used to identify themes; *a priori* coding (Lancet
2042 Countdown indicator-derived) and inductive coding (from recurrent topics in the data) were
2043 employed.¹⁸³ Full details of methods are provided in the appendix, together with additional
2044 analyses.

2045 Coverage of health and climate change clustered around three broad connections between
2046 health and climate change (Panel 4). The first theme related to the health impacts of
2047 climate change. Discussed in 62% of the articles, these impacts related to climate change-
2048 related stressors (e.g. increased temperatures, wildfires, precipitation extremes, food
2049 security, population displacement) and health sequelae (e.g. vector-borne disease, heat
2050 stress, mental ill-health). Heat-related health impacts were the most commonly-mentioned
2051 impact. A second theme (44% of articles) focused on the common determinants of health
2052 and climate change, particularly air pollution, and the co-benefits to be derived from
2053 mitigation strategies to address them (e.g. investment in clean energy, active travel and
2054 plant-based diets). The third theme related to adaptation. Evident in 13% of the articles, it
2055 included both emergency response and longer-term planning. The three themes were
2056 represented in similar proportions in *HT*, *NYT* and *WP* while *ToI* gave greater emphasis to
2057 common causes and co-benefits (see appendix for further details).

Health impacts of climate change

'Climate change [is] making mosquitoes bolder and the germs they transmit stronger, leading to a spurt in mosquito-borne diseases, particularly chikungunya' (ToI, 9 August).

'As large wildfires become more common – spurred by dryness linked to climate change – health risks will almost surely rise ... a person's short-term exposure to wildfire can spur a lifetime of asthma, allergy and constricted breathing.' (NYT, 17 November)

Benefits of addressing climate change and health together

'To protect our future, new infrastructure must be low-carbon, sustainable and resilient... In 2030, this kind of climate action could also prevent over 700,000 premature deaths from air pollution annually...If cities are built in more compact, connected and coordinated ways, they can improve residents' access to jobs, services and amenities while increasing carbon efficiency.' (HT, 5 December)

'For a short time on Thursday night, a small but fiercely determined group of marchers took over a busy D.C. street to demand better safety for pedestrians and bicyclists... The District has reported 31 traffic deaths so far this year, up from 29 in all 2017.... Yet lives could be spared ... even if it means taking the space from curbside parking. Gove said. "This is a public health crisis. This is a climate change crisis."' (WP, 16 November)

Adaptation

'Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (AMC) has adopted a heat action plan which necessitates measures such as building heat shelters, ensuring availability of water and removing neonatal ICU from the top floor of hospitals. It has helped bring down the impact of heatwave on vulnerable populations.' (ToI, 29 November)

'We rarely do much to protect our cities until disaster strikes.... (the) effects of climate change, including the ways it boosts droughts, floods and wildfires, would put more pressure on cities to adapt, mitigate the effects of climate change and become resilient... preparing for disasters and recovering from weather challenges require many different strategies, including holding that rainwater, keeping the flow from going into the drains faster, raising your homes above the flood line.' (NYT, 13 December)

2058 Panel 4: Dominant themes in elite newspaper coverage of health and climate change in India and the
2059 USA

2060

2061 Indicator 5.2 Individual engagement in health and climate change


2062 **Headline finding:** *Individuals typically seek information about either health or climate*
2063 *change; where individuals seek information across these areas, it is primarily driven by an*
2064 *initial interest in health-related content.*

2065 The internet is an increasingly important domain of public engagement, particularly for
2066 information-seeking on issues that engage people’s attention.¹⁸⁴ This indicator tracks
2067 individual-level engagement in health and climate change in 2018 through an analysis of
2068 usage of Wikipedia, the world’s largest encyclopaedia. With reviews noting its
2069 accuracy,^{165,185} Wikipedia is one of most-visited websites worldwide,¹⁶⁶ with a high
2070 correlation between user visits to Wikipedia and search activity on Google.¹⁸⁶ The analysis is
2071 based on the English Wikipedia, which represents around 50% of global traffic to all
2072 Wikipedia language editions.

2073 This is a new indicator for the 2019 Report of the Lancet Countdown and its analysis uses
2074 the online footprint of Wikipedia users to map the dynamics of public information-seeking
2075 in health and climate change.^{164,187} It analyses ‘clickstream’ activity, reported on a monthly
2076 basis, that captures visits to pairs of articles, for example an individual clicking from a page
2077 on human health to one on climate change .¹⁸⁸

2078 Articles were identified via key words and relevant hyperlinks within articles, refined using
2079 Wikipedia categories and then filtered by the initial key words. Data and methods are
2080 described in the appendix, together with further analysis.


2081 Figure 36 indicates that articles on health and on climate change are internally networked,
2082 with extensive co-visiting within these clusters. However, it points to little connectivity
2083 between the clusters. Health and climate change are seldom topics that an individual
2084 connects when they visit Wikipedia; initial engagement in one topic rarely triggers
2085 engagement in the other. In addition, the majority (79%) of co-visits originated from a
2086 health-related page, with only a minority driven by an initial interest in a climate-related
2087 topic (Figure 37).



2088

2089 *Figure 36: Connectivity graph of Wikipedia articles on climate change (red) and health (blue) visited*
 2090 *in 2018. Popularity of articles is indicated by node size; lines represent co-visits in clickstream data*

2091



2092

2093 *Figure 37: Aggregate monthly co-clicks on articles in Wikipedia related to human health and climate*
 2094 *change in 2018*

2095

2096 Indicator 5.3 Government engagement in health and climate change

2097 **Headline finding:** National leaders are increasingly drawing attention to health and climate
2098 change at the UN General Debate (UNGD) in a trend led by small island developing states
2099 (SIDS), with SIDS making up 10 out of 28 countries referencing the climate change-health
2100 link at the UNGD in 2018.

2101 This indicator tracks high-level political engagement with climate change and health through
2102 references to this topic in annual statements made by national leaders in the UNGD. The
2103 UNGD takes place at the start of the annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) and provides a
2104 global platform for all UN member states to speak about their priorities and concerns.


2105 An updated dataset, *the United Nations General Debate corpus*, was used for the analysis,
2106 based on 8,093 statements (1970-2018).^{189,190} Key word searches used sets of health-
2107 related and of climate change-related terms; engagement in the health-climate change
2108 nexus was determined by the proximity of relevant key words within the statement.
2109 Methods and data, as well as further analyses are presented in full in the appendix.

2110 Figure 38 shows the proportion of countries that make reference to the links between
2111 health and climate change in their UNGD statements, together with the proportion referring
2112 separately to climate change and/or to health. In 2018, 28 countries in total referenced the
2113 climate change and health link at the UNGD.

2114 It points to an upward trend in government engagement in health and climate change since
2115 1970, and one in-line with broader trends for engagement in climate change. This increase
2116 is particularly noticeable since 2004, peaking in 2014, when more than 20% of national
2117 leaders spoke of the links between climate change and health. This spike coincided with the
2118 transition from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the Sustainable Development
2119 Goals (SDGs) and the COP 21 in Paris. Since 2014, conjoint references to health and climate
2120 change have remained broadly stable; in 2018, 13% of countries made such references.
2121 However, Figure 38 points to much higher levels of engagement in health and climate
2122 change as separate issues. Around 75% of all countries referred to climate change and 50%
2123 to health issues in their 2018 UNGD statements.

2124 The upward trend in engagement in health and climate change is led by the SIDS, for
2125 example, Fiji, Palau, Samoa, Dominica, and St Kitts and Nevis, with 10 SIDS making reference
2126 to the climate change-health link. In these speeches, connections between climate change
2127 and health are explicitly made and linked to wider inequalities between and within
2128 countries. For example, the 2018 address by St Kitts and Nevis notes that “NCDs and
2129 climate change are two sides of the same coin” while Dominica’s statement makes clear
2130 that “climate change arises from activities that support and reflect inequalities... It is the
2131 poor whose lands are impacted by severe droughts and flooding and whose homes are
2132 destroyed and whose loved ones perish. It is the poor who have the least capacity to
2133 escape the heavy burdens of poverty, disease and death.” The social justice theme is

2134 echoed in other speeches; for example, the Malawi address notes that “the hostile
 2135 consequences of climate change, food insecurity and malnutrition are serious threats in a
 2136 country that still relies on rain-fed subsistence agriculture.”



2137
 2138 *Figure 38: Proportion of countries referring to climate change, health, and the intersection between*
 2139 *the two in their UNGD statements, 1970-2018*

2140

2141

2142 **Indicator 5.4 Corporate sector engagement in health and climate change**

2143 **Headline finding:** *Engagement in health and climate change remains low among companies*
 2144 *within the UN Global Compact (UNGC), including companies in the healthcare sector.*


2145 This indicator tracks corporate sector engagement through references to health and climate
 2146 change in companies that are part of the UNGC, a UN-supported platform to encourage
 2147 companies to put a set of principles, including environmental responsibility and human
 2148 rights, at the heart of their corporate practices.¹⁹¹ While the UNGC has been the subject of
 2149 critique, it remains the world’s largest corporate citizenship initiative.¹⁹²⁻¹⁹⁴

2150 Companies submit annual Communication of Progress (CPs) reports with respect to their
 2151 progress in advancing UNGC principles. Over 12,000 companies have signed up to the UN
 2152 Global Compact from more than 160 countries.¹⁷⁸

2153 Analysis was based on key word searches of sets of health-related and of climate change-
 2154 related terms in CP reports in the UNGC database;¹⁷⁸ conjoint engagement in health and

2155 climate change was identified by the proximity of relevant key words within the CP report.
2156 Methods, data and additional analyses are presented in full in the appendix. With very few
2157 reports available prior to 2011, the analysis focuses on the period from 2011 to 2018.

2158 Up to 2017, a small proportion of companies made reference to the links between health
2159 and climate change.¹⁶ The pattern continues in the 2018 CP reports. While around 45%
2160 and 60% of the 2018 reports refer to climate change and to health respectively, only 15%
2161 refer them together (see appendix). This pattern was even more pronounced in the
2162 corporate healthcare sector, which might be expected to be the global leader in addressing
2163 links between health and climate change (Figure 39). In 2018, while the majority of health
2164 sector companies referred to health (72%) and an increasing minority to climate change
2165 (47%), only 12% made conjoint reference to both.



2166
2167 *Figure 39: Proportion of healthcare sector companies referring to climate change, health, and the*
2168 *intersection of health and climate change in CP reports, 2011-2018*

2169
2170 **Conclusion**

2171 Engagement by all sectors of society is essential if action on climate change is to be
2172 mobilised and sustained. Section 5 has focused on key domains of engagement, including
2173 the media, governments, the corporate sector and, in a new indicator, individual-level
2174 engagement. Each is recognised to be central to moving global emissions onto a pathway
2175 that holds global temperature increases to below 1.5°C.¹⁹⁵

2176 Two broad conclusions can be drawn from the analyses presented in section 5. First,
2177 engagement in health and climate change has increased over the last decade, with a more
2178 pronounced upward trend for engagement by the media and government than by the
2179 corporate sector. With respect to the elite media, there is evidence of informed and
2180 detailed engagement with the health impacts of climate change and with the co-benefits of
2181 climate change action. At the global forum of the UN General Assembly, an increasing
2182 number of countries are giving attention to the health-climate change nexus. Led by the

2183 SIDS, these countries are highlighting the north-south inequalities in responsibility for, and
2184 vulnerability to, climate change and its adverse health impacts.

2185 Although media engagement is increasing, it is episodic rather than sustained, with ‘issue
2186 attention’ increasing at key moments in global climate governance, particularly the UNFCCC
2187 COPs. The role of the COPs in public and political engagement has been noted elsewhere,
2188 with the meetings providing a global stage for both national leaders and non-government
2189 organisations, including scientists, religious leaders and health professionals, to contribute
2190 to the public debate.^{179,196} The pattern for the corporate sector, including the healthcare
2191 sector, is different; it does not display spikes in engagement linked to the global governance
2192 of the planet.

2193 Second, while engagement has increased over the last decade, our indicators suggest that
2194 climate change is being more broadly represented in the media and by governments in ways
2195 that do not connect it to human health. As this suggests, the human face of climate change
2196 can be easily obscured. The analysis of individual engagement illustrates this pattern. The
2197 online footprint of Wikipedia users confirms that, while health is a major area of individual
2198 interest, it is rarely connected with climate change. In the public’s mind, it appears that
2199 ‘health’ and ‘climate change’ represent different and separate realms of knowledge and
2200 concern and, where connections are made, this is driven by an interest in health rather than
2201 climate change.

2202 Taken together, these two conclusions point to modest progress in making health central to
2203 public and political engagement in climate change but underline the challenge of mobilising
2204 action at the speed and magnitude required to protect the health of the planet and its
2205 populations.

2206 Conclusion: The 2019 Report of the Lancet Countdown

2207 *The Lancet Countdown: Tracking Progress on Health and Climate Change* was formed four
2208 years ago, building on the work of the 2015 Lancet Commission. Since then, the
2209 collaboration has grown from a small initiative based at University College London, into a
2210 global, independent research collaboration, bringing together 27 of the world's leading
2211 academic institutions and UN agencies.

2212 It remains committed to an open and iterative process, always looking to strengthen its
2213 methods, source new and novel forms of data, and partner with global leaders in public
2214 health and in climate change. The 41 indicators presented in the 2019 report represent the
2215 consensus and work of the last 12 months, and are grouped in to five categories: climate
2216 change impacts, exposures, and vulnerabilities; adaptation, planning, and resilience for
2217 health; mitigation actions and health co-benefits; economics and finance; and public and
2218 political engagement.

2219 The data published here elucidate ongoing trends of a warming world threatening human
2220 wellbeing. As the fourth hottest year on record, 2018 saw a record-breaking 220 million
2221 additional exposures to extremes of heat, coupled with corresponding rising vulnerability
2222 across every continent. As a result of this and broader climatic changes, vectorial capacity
2223 for the transmission of dengue fever was the second highest ever seen, with 9 out of the
2224 last 10 most suitable years occurring since 2000. Progress in mitigation and adaptation
2225 remains insufficient, with the carbon intensity of the energy system remaining flat; 2.9
2226 million ambient air pollution deaths; and a reversal of the previous downward trend of coal
2227 use.

2228 And yet, as the material effects of climate change reveal themselves, so too does the
2229 world's response. Just under 50% of countries tracked have developed national health
2230 adaptation plans, 70 countries provide climate information services to the health sector,
2231 109 countries have medium to high implementation of a national health emergency
2232 framework, and 69% of cities have mapped out risk and vulnerability assessments. Health
2233 adaptation funding continues to climb, with health-related funding now responsible for
2234 11.8% of global adaptation spend. Finally, public and political engagement continues to
2235 grow, with flash-points around the school climate strikes, the UNFCCC's annual meetings,
2236 and divestment announcements from medical and health associations.

2237 The last three decades have witnessed the release of increasingly concerning scientific data
2238 demonstrating the importance of a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. Whilst there are
2239 a number of positive indicators published here, CO₂ continues to rise. The health
2240 implications of this are apparent today, and will most certainly worsen without immediate
2241 intervention.

2242 Despite increasing public attention over the last 12 months, the world is yet to see a
2243 response from governments which matches the scale of the challenge. With the full force of

2244 the Paris Agreement being implemented in 2020, there is a crucial shift that must now occur
2245 – one which moves from discussion and commitment, to meaningful reduction in emissions.

2246

2247

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