Button, T;
(2014)
XII-The Weight of Truth: Lessons for Minimalists from Russell's Gray's Elegy Argument.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
, 114
(3pt3)
pp. 261-289.
10.1111/j.1467-9264.2014.00373.x.
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Abstract
Minimalists, such as Paul Horwich, claim that the notions of truth, reference and satisfaction are exhausted by some very simple schemes. Unfortunately, there are subtle difficulties with treating these as schemes, in the ordinary sense. So instead, minimalists regard them as illustrating one-place functions, into which we can input propositions (when considering truth) or propositional constituents (when considering reference and satisfaction). However, Bertrand Russell's Gray's Elegy argument teaches us some important lessons about propositions and propositional constituents. When applied to minimalism, these lessons show us why we should abandon it.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | XII-The Weight of Truth: Lessons for Minimalists from Russell's Gray's Elegy Argument |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2014.00373.x |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9264.2014.00373.x |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10085880 |
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