

1 **Do à la carte menus serve infertility**
2 **patients? The ethics and regulation of IVF**
3 **add-ons.**

4
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24 **Running title:** The ethics and regulation of IVF add-ons

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27

28 Abstract

29 Add-on treatments are the new black. They are provided (most frequently, sold) to people undergoing
30 in vitro fertilization on the premise that they will improve the chances of having a baby. However, the
31 regulation of add-ons is consistently minimal, meaning that they are introduced into routine practice
32 before they have been shown to improve the live birth rate. Debate over the adequacy of this light-
33 touch approach rages. Defenders argue that demands for a rigorous approval process are paternalistic,
34 since this would delay access to promising treatments. Critics respond that promising treatments may
35 turn out to have adverse effects on patients and their offspring, contradicting the clinician's
36 responsibility to do no harm. Some add-ons, including earlier versions of PGT-A, might even reduce
37 the live birth rate, raising the prospect of desperate patients paying more to worsen their chances.
38 Informed consent represents a solution in principle, but in practice there is a clear tension between
39 impartial information and direct-to-consumer advertising. Because the effects of a treatment can't be
40 known until it has been robustly evaluated, we argue that strong evidence should be required before
41 add-ons are introduced to the clinic. In the meantime, there is an imperative to identify methods for
42 communicating the associated risks and uncertainties of add-ons to prospective patients.

43

44 Capsule

45 How should IVF add-ons be regulated? Is it ethical to provide unproven treatments? How can we
46 inform patients about the risks and uncertainties?

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48 Keywords: IVF, add-ons, regulation, informed consent, ethics

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Introduction

The decision to seek treatment for infertility usually follows from a failure to conceive naturally, often after years of trying. The investment of the couple is physical, emotional, and in non-public health systems, financial. Nobody has IVF on a whim.

The likelihood that treatment will result in a live birth varies considerably depending on the patient's prognostic profile, and in some populations first line treatments such as intra-uterine insemination (for unexplained or mild-male infertility) or ovulation induction (for anovulatory infertility) have a high success rate (1, 2). Despite this, IVF is often employed as the default first line treatment for patients presenting with various kinds of subfertility, causing some commentators to suggest that it is overused (3). Unfortunately, IVF frequently doesn't result in a baby; the US national report of the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technologies (SART) puts the cumulative live birth rate per attempted egg retrieval at 37% (4). Although multiple IVF attempts may increase the cumulative chance of live birth, many patients do not have babies as a result of their treatment. Each time treatment fails, patients are faced with a choice: give up or try again. Patients may feel that they have to make this decision under time pressure, and that delays deliberating could very well cause them to lose their opportunity to conceive and have children. These concerns might be exaggerated, since material decline in fertility manifests over a timespan of years rather than months, but may be voiced by some treatment providers. Moreover, patients often have to decide which clinic to attend in order to maximise their chance of success.

This situation creates competition for patients, and IVF clinics frequently market themselves both by emphasising their superior performance (not always with veracity (5-7) and by offering to make

77 people's 'dreams come true' (8). Attempting to gain a competitive edge, or perhaps simply hoping to
78 maintain parity with rivals, clinics offer optional add-on treatments to people undergoing IVF. These
79 add-ons are non-essential interventions which may be offered to people undergoing IVF with the
80 claim that they will increase the chance of success, such as endometrial scratching, embryo glue,
81 steroids to suppress immunity, or preimplantation genetic testing for aneuploidy (PGT-A). While data
82 on global patterns of add-on usage are limited, a UK survey of clinic-users initiated by the Human
83 Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) reported that 74% of respondents had used at least
84 one add-on, that usage was growing, and that usage was greater with privately funded treatment (9).
85 Add-ons should be distinguished from additional procedures that are rendered necessary by some
86 diagnoses (such as intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) or surgical sperm retrieval for some
87 couples with severe male factor infertility). They should also be distinguished from treatments that are
88 integral to IVF. For example, although we can debate which ovarian stimulation protocol is most
89 effective and safe, IVF typically requires some form of ovarian stimulation to be performed, and so
90 we would not consider any particular protocol to constitute an 'add-on'. If add-on interventions were
91 unequivocally effective (improving the cumulative live birth rate per started cycle), their sale would
92 not pose an ethical quandary. However, robust supportive studies of the effectiveness of these
93 procedures are lacking, with no add-on therapy being given the green light in a recent review of the
94 evidence in the United Kingdom (10). Given the considerable uncertainty around whether add-ons
95 work, questions arise regarding the appropriateness of offering them to patients who are often
96 desperate, and believe that clinics rely on validated science for all treatments. Is it ever acceptable to
97 offer, and sell, treatments of unclear effectiveness and safety? Under what circumstances? How
98 should this be regulated and how should any regulation be implemented?

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101 *How are add on treatments regulated?*

102

103 The regulation of IVF add-ons is consistently minimal (11). Usually, new fertility interventions are
104 rapidly adopted on the basis of case reports, rather than following formal regulatory review (12). In

105 the United States, The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) only requires a full benefit/ risk
106 evaluation when human cellular and tissue-based products are manipulated to a “more-than-minimal”
107 degree (13) in (12). So far, no fertility intervention has been considered as meeting this criterion. In
108 the United Kingdom, HFEA has limited power to prevent the sale of add-ons, or to control pricing
109 (14). When considering a new treatment, HFEA can only refuse it on the grounds of safety;
110 effectiveness is not a consideration. However, the UK regulator has issued a consensus statement in
111 conjunction with industry and patient stakeholder groups outlining several principles of responsible
112 innovation (15). These state that add-ons may be offered even when there is little or conflicting
113 evidence provided that information about the current state of knowledge is given to patients. Where
114 there is no evidence of efficacy and safety, the statement advises that treatments should only be
115 offered as part of research. Both the HFEA and the Victorian Assisted Reproductive Treatment
116 Authority (VARTA) in Australia provide information to consumers to make them aware that add-ons
117 may not improve their chance of success (10, 16). However, there is no such regulatory body in the
118 U.S, nor in most other countries.

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121 Self-regulation, in conjunction with market forces, appears to represent the standard for regulation of
122 IVF innovations in many parts of the world. This is not just true for Western nations (17) (18).
123 Consequently, in markets such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Slovenia where very little IVF is
124 privately funded and most is delivered in state hospitals (19) use of add-ons is believed to be lower,
125 although data are lacking.

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129 *How should IVF add-ons be regulated? Current proposals*

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132 While the status quo amounts to a self-regulated free-for-all driven largely by commercial pressures, it
133 is unclear whether or not this will persist. Both executive and popular interest in add-ons has
134 increased, partially as a result of high-profile media coverage of the topic in the UK (20), and this
135 may lead to some form of regulatory response from policy makers.

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138 However, support for changes to the regulatory framework surrounding new reproductive treatments
139 is far from universal. Although arguments in favour of more stringent regulation have been advanced
140 (12, 21-24), there have also been defences of current standards (25-27). A key argument in favour of
141 reform states that self-regulation is an unsuitable model for IVF. A free market in goods and services
142 relies upon consumers choosing not to buy useless products. If a mobile phone company were to
143 produce a new high tech phone which did not work, then after an initial flurry of interest in the new
144 product, its failings would become apparent and the market for it would disappear. Because there can
145 be no guarantee that any cycle of IVF will lead to the birth of a baby, a cycle is more likely to fail
146 than it is to work, and because patients only experience the outcome of their own situation, it is much
147 harder for consumers of infertility services to tell for themselves whether an add-on treatment is worth
148 purchasing. Rather than relying on individual patients ‘voting with their feet’ in order to crowd out
149 useless interventions, it may be necessary instead for an expert regulator to make recommendations
150 for them.

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153 On the other side of the fence, proponents of the status quo emphasise the point that any regulatory
154 delay might deprive patients of beneficial treatments (27). Supporters of this view generally frame the
155 potential effects of add-ons as being neutral at worst. Under this framing, the call for tighter
156 regulation is both paternalistic and perverse; patients are being “chided” by reformers for wanting to
157 leave no stone unturned (27). It is an effective argumentative device; if it were true then there would
158 be no debate to be had. It is, nonetheless, a red herring, because unfortunately some innovations do

159 turn out to worsen patient outcomes. This can be true even of well-established treatments that are
160 routinely used (28). For example, many embryos that were reported to be abnormal (mosaic)
161 following PGT-A were discarded, but we now know they can lead to normal pregnancies and they are
162 frequently transferred. As a result, it now appears that many patients who paid for earlier versions of
163 PGT-A reduced their chance of having a baby (29).

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166 Except in cases where treatment effects are very large and stable (30-32), it is not known whether a
167 treatment is beneficial or disadvantageous until it has been robustly evaluated, although this point
168 sometimes gets lost amidst the excitement of having a new treatment to employ and a new product to
169 sell. It can be difficult to remove an ineffective or harmful treatment from use once it has been widely
170 adopted, both due to the enthusiasm of clinicians and the preferences of patients. For example, a
171 recent large randomised controlled trial of the add-on treatment endometrial scratching suggested that
172 the painful procedure has little or no effect on live birth rates (33), but this has been greeted with
173 claims that it might work for some specific categories of infertile women (34). Intracytoplasmic sperm
174 injection for non-male factor subfertility remains common, despite a lack of randomised evidence in
175 its favour. If a trial had been mandated prior to the introduction of the techniques, the widespread
176 provision of ineffective treatments could have been prevented.

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179 Consequently, it has been argued that full regulatory review should be required before the
180 introduction of a new reproductive treatment unless there are no more than minimal safety issues
181 compared to the current standard, there is no risk of reduced live birth rates, and there are no risks of
182 societal harm (12). Very few add-ons would meet all three of these conditions, particularly when
183 potential risks to offspring are considered (12) (21) (22). An ideal paradigm for the development and
184 introduction of new embryological techniques has been described, beginning with hypothesis-driven
185 basic research and moving through stages of animal testing, research on donated human embryos, and

186 clinical trials of increasing magnitude and scope, culminating in a thorough health technology
187 assessment (21). The use of animal models is unlikely to be applicable for many interventions, due to
188 the fact that physiological differences may obfuscate effects in humans (see the example of ICSI, (21,
189 26)). On the other hand, with few exceptions, the clinical benefit of most interventions can and should
190 be evaluated in a randomised trial (32).

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194 *Informed consent when effectiveness is questionable*

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196 Patient-centred, evidence-based medicine is a collaborative enterprise with patients and health
197 professionals focused on the medical needs of the patient, and a relationship grounded in trust,
198 fidelity, and veracity (35). Respecting the choices of patients who have made informed decisions
199 about their medical preferences lies at the heart of informed consent and reflects the principle of
200 autonomy in practice. Obtaining informed consent places duties on clinicians to ensure patients
201 understand the risks and benefits of proceeding with an intervention by providing relevant
202 information, as well as clarifying incomplete or misleading information, and ensuring that patients are
203 making decisions without coercion or undue pressure (36). As informed consent is only possible if
204 sufficient information on effectiveness and safety is available, there should be pressure on developers
205 and suppliers of the add-on interventions to generate such information. Given concerns around add-on
206 interventions in a low-regulation context, the challenges for patients are clear: effectiveness will
207 rarely be known with certainty yet patients want, and often need, to make decisions now. Most add-on
208 interventions are effectively experimental; the claims made on some fertility websites are not
209 quantified and evidence is not cited to support such claims (7); and the potential risks for both women
210 and offspring undergoing add-on interventions are unknown.

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213 Neither can these concerns be seen in isolation to other relevant aspects: the social pressures on
214 patients to have children; one's desperation to have a child of one's own (37), possible conflicts of
215 interest between commercial providers and their obligation to act in the patient's best interests (38,
216 39), and the vulnerabilities of patients (including their financial welfare). Ensuring that patients are
217 supported to make an informed choice that reflects their preferences and values may be especially
218 challenging within this context. Concerns around financial conflict of interest are heightened by the
219 prospect of corporatisation of reproductive care; some umbrella organisations representing several
220 IVF clinics are listed companies, so their primary interest is shareholder profit. In a clinical setting,
221 one way to expand a business is to treat to excess, which includes selling additional unnecessary
222 treatments to patients and treating people who don't need to be treated (38). Informing people that
223 they don't need to buy your product is antithetical to raising the stock price, and this is the core
224 tension between informed patient choice and direct to consumer marketing.

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226

227 Increasing the range of infertility treatment add-ons in recent years has created new ethical challenges.
228 Is more choice necessarily a good thing for patients? Some may argue providing choices aligns with
229 respecting patient autonomy. Yet autonomy's reach is limited and cannot be seen in isolation of the
230 health professional's duty *not* to provide treatments that are ineffective, futile, or of questionable
231 safety (40). Moreover, giving patients more choice may not always be in their best interests (41).
232 Even where a patient may pay the full cost for an add-on intervention, it may be justifiable to limit
233 their choices when the add-on's effects are unlikely to contribute to the goals of a successful
234 pregnancy. Where there is a substantive possibility that the add-on may actually reduce the patient's
235 chance of success, the principle of non-maleficence may be brought to bear (40).

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239 *Where do we go next?*

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242 In the absence of mandatory regulatory review of new reproductive interventions, and in light of the
243 minimal restrictions on how clinics advertise their products, the question becomes how best to inform
244 prospective patients so that they can make a genuinely well-informed, autonomous decision regarding
245 how to be treated (36).

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248 The establishment of consensus-based classifications of treatments might be one option. For example,
249 a scoring tool has been developed by the ESHRE special interest groups in Ethics and Law, and
250 Safety and Quality in ART to distinguish between experimental, innovative and established treatments
251 (42). The tool incorporates four domains: efficacy, safety, procedural reliability and transparency and
252 effectiveness. Treatments must pass a threshold in all four in order to achieve a higher classification.
253 In addition to the criteria for categorising infertility interventions, there is a need to identify effective
254 methods for communicating the risk and uncertainty of add-ons to prospective patients (such as the
255 EPIC fertility add-ons project: https://lse.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bdAnfkKd2YGp5qd). General
256 proposals for conveying research results to lay audiences have been made (43) but have not been
257 successful in this goal (43, 44).

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260 It is likely that a bespoke approach to risk communication may be required for infertility treatments,
261 since the multistage nature of IVF means that success rates can be presented using a variety of
262 denominators (5). This can change both the impression of an intervention's effectiveness (the live
263 birth rate for PGT-A looks better when calculated per transfer procedure, but worse when calculated
264 per cycle started) as well as the meaning and relevance of the statistic. It is asking too much of
265 patients to parse statistical subtleties, despite suggestions from some authors that patients "must be
266 critical of the information they are exposed to" (45). Nevertheless, encouraging patients to ask the five

267 questions recommended by the Choosing Wisely campaign, before having any test, treatment or
268 procedure, might help them make more informed decisions: ‘Do I really need this test, treatment or
269 procedure?’; ‘What are the risks?’; ‘Are there simpler, safer options?’; ‘What happens if I don’t do
270 anything?’; and ‘What are the costs’ (www.choosingwisely.org.au). In the context of IVF, we might
271 add ‘how will this treatment affect my chances of a live birth?’ Informed consent also requires that
272 any uncertainties, for example around the size of an intervention’s effect, are communicated to
273 patients, since patients may have individual opinions about the monetary value of modest increases in
274 birth rate. The quantification and reduction of this uncertainty is, of course, one of the principal
275 motivations for conducting randomised controlled trials. The development of decision aids for
276 patients, based on high-quality evidence, could be useful in this space.

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279 Supposing a suitable mode of information can be identified, it remains to work out how this
280 information should be passed to patients. It would be desirable for patients to have this information
281 brought to their attention at the point of care, but the commercial setting might make impartial
282 consultancy challenging. One proposal arising from a recent executive review is the development of
283 “compliance standards for the provision of information in relation to adjuvant treatments, which
284 includes a requirement to advise patients how to access the resources developed by the regulators”
285 (46). The report goes on to recommend that these compliance standards should be included in the
286 conditions of clinic registration. But of course, this will not be the only information that patients rely
287 upon when deciding whether to pay for additional treatment services. People with infertility often
288 report doing their own research before embarking on treatment, and this generally means gathering
289 material online, often from blogs and Facebook groups, where the quality and accuracy of information
290 may be distinctly variable (9).

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293 Poor information provision about research leading to excessive intervention has been included in a
294 recently proposed taxonomy of abuse in assisted reproductive technologies (47). It has become clear
295 that self-regulation cannot be relied upon to protect patients from ineffective and unnecessary
296 treatment, particularly in settings where IVF is privately funded. While industry opposition is
297 inevitable, stronger regulation appears to have broad support (48). Until that time comes, the best way
298 to empower both consumers and caregivers is to find ways to translate our knowledge about add-ons
299 in a way that does justice to any risks and uncertainties. Nonetheless, the moral imperative to reduce
300 those risks and uncertainties remains strong.

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