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Thomas Aston
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**Declaration**

I, Thomas Aston, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

..............................................Thomas Aston
Impact Statement

Some impacts from the thesis have already materialised inside academia. An earlier version of the thesis’ literature review was acknowledged as an important input into the Partnership for African Social and Governance Research’s (PASGR) book on the politics, public policy and social protection in Africa (see Awortwi, 2017). Likewise, primary and secondary data from the thesis informed Ayliffe et al’s (2018) literature review on the role of social accountability in social protection. Planning for data collection in El Alto also enabled the opportunity to test proxies for peri-urban vulnerability through Bolivia’s household survey. This materialised into a working paper on the subject with the Institute for Advanced Development Studies (INESAD) (Andersen, Aston and Cardona, 2014).

In terms of future impact, the thesis’ analytical focus on discourse provides greater attention to the role of ideas in the policymaking of social protection in Bolivia. This focus remains underappreciated in the wider Latin American welfare state literature (see Weyland, 2006). Secondly, the thesis identifies critical gaps in connections between social mobilisation, policy design, and oversight, which are necessary to substantiate claims related to rights-based social assistance (see McGuire, 2013; Ferguson, 2015; Postero, 2017). Dissemination of both these aspects may thus trigger further reflection and debate regarding the role of ideas, the causal significance of civil society pressure, and perceptions of entitlement.

The contributions of the thesis outside academia are primarily related to public policy design and service delivery. Learning from shortcomings in Bolivia has informed the evaluation of “Community Reports” accountability mechanisms in the Dominican Republic’s Solidaridad Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) and the design of pilot social accountability mechanisms in Egypt’s Takaful and Karama CCT. Various questions from the thesis’ household survey were used in the accountability pilot in the governorates of Assuit and Giza. In Bolivia, preliminary findings were shared through a presentation at Bolivia’s Central Bank in 2014. This triggered discussion with UDAPE on targeting, vulnerability, administrative capacity and accountability mechanisms (see Mendizábal, 2014).
Abstract

This thesis aims to explain the key political economy drivers for the introduction of universal cash transfer programmes in countries which rely on natural resources, considering how their introduction and expansion may strengthen or weaken citizen-state relations in this context. The thesis uses Bolivia as a case study, focusing on the period 2005 – 2014, with fieldwork undertaken in La Paz and El Alto. It employs a political economy analysis framework and uses process tracing and discourse analysis as primary methods, supported by surveys and interviews. We argue that in this context the introduction and scale up to universal cash transfers is primarily driven by shifts in the fiscal capture of natural resource rent, the salience of redistributive and egalitarian ideas in political discourse, and the combination of political linkage strategies employed by politicians to appeal to citizens. We posit that higher-level normative ideas are particularly important, especially if these are domestic in origin and arise from or relate to core political constituencies. Despite evidence of resource nationalist ideas and rights-based language, we find the role of civil society to be weak. Moreover, we assert that where programmes are strongly influenced by charismatic (populist) political linkage strategies and where mechanisms for citizen-state interface are weak, programmes are more likely to be perceived as patronage than rights. We argue that in this context, cash transfers do not constitute “rightful shares,” and ultimately do not strengthen rights-based citizen-state relations.

Key words: Cash transfers, discourse, populism, citizen-state relations

Final word count: 99,998 words (including annexes)
Acronyms

ADB  Asian Development Bank
ADN  Nationalist Democratic Action Party
AFP  Pension Fund Administrator
ALP  Adaptable Loan Programme
ANAMBO  National Association of Older Persons of Bolivia
AUH  Universal Child Allowance
BDH  Human Development Grant
BIG  Basic Income Grant
BoA  Bolivian Aviation
CCT  Conditional Cash Transfer
CGD  Center for Global Development
CIDEM  Centre for Information and Women’s Development
CIDOB  Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia
CMP  Child Money Programme (Mongolia)
CNAMIB  National Confederation of Indigenous Women of Bolivia
COB  Bolivian Workers Central Union
COFADENA  Armed Forces Corporation for National Development
CONALCAM  National Coordinator for Change
CONAMAQ  National Council of Ayllus and Maarkas of Quillasuyu
CONAN  National Food and Nutrition Council
CONAPES  National Council for Economic and Social Policy
CONDEPA  Nationhood Awareness Party
CONAJUREB  National Pensioners’ Confederation
COR-EI Alto  Regional Labour Federation-EI Alto
CSO  Civil Society Organisation
CSUTCB  Rural Workers Union Federation
CT-OVC  Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children Programme
DAB  Bolivian Customs Depots
DFID  Department for International Development
DP  Democratic Party (Mongolia)
DSF  Debt Sustainability Framework
ECLAC  United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
ENAF  National Foundries Company
ENDE  National Electric Company
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENFE</td>
<td>National Railways Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENTEL</td>
<td>National Telecommunications Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESID</td>
<td>Effective States and Inclusive Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>EXTENSA</td>
<td>National Programme for Health Coverage</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAM</td>
<td>Municipal Association Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCI</td>
<td>Individual Capitalisation Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FEJUVE</td>
<td>Federation of Neighbourhood Associations – El Alto</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
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<tr>
<td>FISP</td>
<td>Farmer Input Support Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOB</td>
<td>Freight on Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>FONCOM</td>
<td>Complementary Funds</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOPEBA</td>
<td>Basic Pensions Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRUV</td>
<td>Universal Pension Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSE</td>
<td>Social Emergency Fund</td>
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<td>FSI</td>
<td>Social Investment Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSTMB</td>
<td>Union Federation of Bolivian Mine Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAC</td>
<td>Consolidated Customs Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>German Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Highly-Indebted Poor Countries initiative</td>
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<td>HSNP</td>
<td>Hunger Safety Net Programme</td>
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<td>ICE</td>
<td>Foreign Consumption Tax</td>
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<tr>
<td>IADB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<td>Direct Hydrocarbons Tax</td>
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<td>IEF</td>
<td>Ethical Family Income</td>
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<td>IEHD</td>
<td>Special Tax on Hydrocarbons and Derivatives</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
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<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>Institute for Advanced Development Studies</td>
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<td>IRUE</td>
<td>International Exports Tax</td>
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<td>ISAE</td>
<td>Exports Tax</td>
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<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Transaction Tax</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITGB</td>
<td>Furniture Tax</td>
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<tr>
<td>IUE</td>
<td>Corporation Tax</td>
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<tr>
<td>IVA</td>
<td>Value-added Tax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAC</td>
<td>Kebele Appeal Committees</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAPOP</td>
<td>Latin American Public Opinion Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEAP</td>
<td>Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIWPR</td>
<td>Legislating and Implementing Welfare Policy Reforms</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIC</td>
<td>Low Income Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMIC</td>
<td>Lower Middle-Income Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAS</td>
<td>Movement towards Socialism Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBL</td>
<td>Free Bolivia Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDC</td>
<td>Motherland Democratic Coalition (Mongolia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDG</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDRI</td>
<td>Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIR</td>
<td>Revolutionary Left Movement Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>Revolutionary Nationalist Movement Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPRP</td>
<td>Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRTKL</td>
<td>Revolutionary Liberation Movement Tupaq Katari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTR</td>
<td>Marginal Tax Rate</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEP</td>
<td>New Economic Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSPEB</td>
<td>Social Observatory for Bolivian Education Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTB</td>
<td>Territorial Base Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAIS</td>
<td>Nutrition Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>National Action Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASGR</td>
<td>Partnership for African Governance and Social Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDC</td>
<td>Christian Democrat Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANE</td>
<td>Emergency Employment Plan</td>
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<td>PMT</td>
<td>Proxy Means Test</td>
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<td>PNCTP</td>
<td>Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>PODEMOS</td>
<td>Social and Democratic Power Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing Power Parity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRAF</td>
<td>Family Allocation Programme</td>
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</table>
PRSP  Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PRT  Power Resources Theory
PTA  Parent-Teacher Associations
QCA  Qualitative Comparative Analysis
RC-IVA  Complementary Value-added Tax
RPS-DIC  Integral Community Development and Social Protection Network
RUDE  Unique Students' Registry
SAP  Structural Adjustment Programme
SCG  Senior Citizen's Grant
SCT  Social Cash Transfer
SEGIP  The General Service for Personal Identification and Driving Licences
SIESTA  Statistical Information System
SMGV  Medical Insurance for Older Persons
SNMN  National Insurance for Maternity and Childhood
SOE  State-owned Enterprise
SRM  Social Risk Management
SSN  Social Safety Net
SSPAM  Older Persons Health Insurance
SUMI  Universal Infant-Maternal Health Insurance
TASAF  Tanzania Social Action Fund
TCF  Trillion Cubic Feet
TGN  National Treasury
TIPNIS  Indigenous Territory and National Park of Isiboro Sécure
UCL  University College London
UCS  Solidarity and Civic Union Party
UCT  Unconditional Cash Transfer
UDAPE  Social and Economic Policy Analysis Unit
UDAPSO  Social Policy Analysis Unit
UMIC  Upper Middle-Income Country
UN  National Unity Front Party (Bolivia)
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
UNRISD  United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
USA  United States of America
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VIPFE</td>
<td>Vice-Ministry for Public Investment and External Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YPFB</td>
<td>Bolivian Fiscal Petroleum Deposits</td>
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Introduction

Since the turn of the 21st century, cash transfer programmes have emerged as perhaps the leading policy instrument in the fight against poverty in low- and middle-income countries. In 1999, there were only ten pure income transfer programmes globally, but by 2015 there had been a nine-fold increase in programme adoption (UNU–WIDER, 2018). In 2010, it was estimated that close to 900 million people in the developing world lived in households receiving cash transfers (Barrientos and Hulme, 2013: 4). This rapid expansion has seen a growth of scholarship concerning programme effectiveness (see Hanlon et al. 2010 for a discussion), but also increasing interest in the political factors facilitating or restricting their provision (Hickey, 2006, 2009; Pelham, 2007; Seekings, 2008; Barrientos and Pellisser, 2013; Lavers and Hickey, 2015).

In Latin America, recent years have seen a growth in scholarship assessing the economic and political drivers for the universalisation of social policy in upper-middle income countries with the most generous welfare states (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007; Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; Huber and Stephens, 2012; Pribble, 2013; Martinez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2016). This thesis argues that there has been insufficient attention given to the study of low and lower-middle income countries in the region, their experience of universalisation and alternative pathways to success (Weyland, 2005, 2006; Müller, 2009, 2014; Huber and Stephens, 2012; McGuire, 2013). Of particular interest to this thesis is the path taken by low or low-middle income countries which also have high levels of commodity dependence and a high proportion of exports tied to mineral or hydrocarbons sectors. We will call these countries natural resource dependent. Over the last decade, Bolivia was a country which shared these features. Through this case, the thesis seeks to uncover the political economy drivers which explain the introduction and scale up of universal cash transfer programmes in this context and understand the effects of this process on citizen-state relations.

We understand political economy as the study of how interests, institutions and ideas shape agents’ behaviour and are negotiated through political processes which influence, and are influenced by, the production and distribution of resources (Leftwich, 2008: 6; Hudson and Leftwich, 2014: 6; Hickey, Sen and Bukenya, 2015: 5). A substantial literature on the political economy of welfare states has stressed institutional explanations for social policy expansion (Skocpol, 1992; Pierson, 1994; Korpi, 1998; Huber and Stephens, 2001, 2012; Segura-Ubiergo, 2007; Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; McGuire, 2010; Pribble, 2013; Martinez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2016). Political and economic institutions are undoubtedly
important to the development of government-protected minimum standards of income and social services (see Wilensky, 1975: 1 on welfare states) and public actions to respond to socially unacceptable levels of vulnerability, risk and deprivation (see Conway and Norton, 2000: 7 on social protection). Formal rules are central to establishing fiscal space and enshrining legal guarantees to sustain benefits. However, a focus on the most successful welfare states with typically higher levels of economic development and resource availability, longer social policy legacies, and evolutionary progression make comparisons with lower-income or lower-middle income countries problematic (Huber and Stephens, 2012; Pribble, 2013).

Recent Latin American scholarship in upper-middle-income countries has emphasised the role of intense electoral competition in prompting leaders to respond to citizens’ demands and promote robust social policy commitments (McGuire, 2010; Pribble, 2013; Martinez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2016). Scholarship on the politics of social protection in sub-Saharan Africa across predominantly low and lower-middle income countries has also suggested that electoral competition may play an important role in driving increased commitment (Granvik, 2015; Grebe, 2015; Hamer 2015a; Kabandula and Seekings, 2016; Siachiwena, 2016, 2017; Awortwi et al. 2017; Hickey et al. 2018). However, the attention in this African scholarship to political branding and electoral threat suggests that in lower-income and less institutionally stable contexts, electoral competition may not necessarily drive durable commitments.

Another crucial issue for the political economy of social protection is ideas. For both conceptual and methodological reasons, the role of ideas has been understudied in the political economy of the welfare state (Wilensky, 1975; Skocpol, 1992). However, a shift towards discursive institutionalism has opened up new lines of enquiry to demonstrate how the exchange and positioning of ideas may influence policy choices (Lavers and Hickey, 2015; Miorelli, 2016, 2018). Recent scholarship has drawn attention, in particular, to the role of transnational ideas in shaping the introduction of social protection, often promoted by transnational policy coalitions (Weyland, 2006; Leisering, 2009; Deacon, 2012, 2013; Lavers, 2016a; Lavers, 2016b; Hickey and Bukenya, 2016; Martinez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2016; Pruce and Hickey, 2017; Hickey and Seekings, 2017, 2018). While the embrace of transnational ideas may be potentially quite limited and instrumental (Hickey et al. 2018: 9), in countries which depend on natural resources, we argue that domestic ideas are key to determining the scope of programmes and a transition towards more radical universal policies.
Alongside ideas, economic factors play an important role in the political economy of social protection, particularly in relation to policy scope. Fiscal constraint is recognised as a key impediment to social policy expansion across a wide variety of contexts (Segura-Ubiержo, 2007; Haggard and Kaufman, 2008). While economic factors do not determine outcomes, controlling for these may offer a misleading picture of how securing resources relates to domestic and transnational political processes. One key concern of this thesis is to understand the relative balance between external and internal factors in shaping fiscal space which underpins the introduction of more radical policies. Countries able to rely on natural resource rent rather than donor contributions or income taxes may have different fiscal constraints and opportunities and a potentially higher degree of autonomy over policy choices (Barrientos and Pellissery, 2013; Ulriksen, 2013; Hujo, 2015). The case of Bolivia is one of few countries reliant on natural resources which introduced universal cash transfer programmes, and also one of few countries which directly harnessed commodity windfalls and hypothecated natural resource rents to fund programmes (Ortiz et al. 2015; Mosley and Abdulai, 2016; Daroca Oller, 2016; Paz Arauco, 2018).

Research assessing the political economy of social protection in mineral rich countries has been led chiefly by advocacy goals. Efforts have focused on the role of governments in mobilising domestic resources to increase social expenditures. These accounts generally suggest a shift from donor dependence to domestic ownership, partly enabled by civil society mobilisation and more effective use of rent taxes (Hujo and McClanahan, 2010; Hujo, 2011, 2012, 2015; Daroca Oller, 2016; Hatcher et al. 2016; Paz Arauco, 2018). Much of this scholarship has failed to provide a full account of the causal forces at play or a balanced appraisal of the relative bargaining power of domestic and international actors (Gelders, 2015; Ortiz et al. 2015; Urban, 2016; Kidd, 2018). An alternative view stresses populist and clientelist politics as a key driver of change, yet these accounts disagree regarding programmes’ socio-political effects (Kjær, and Ulriksen, 2014; Buxton, 2014; Fritz, 2014; Yeung and Howes, 2015). With limited perception data from programme recipients, to date, it has been difficult to draw definitive conclusions.

Relatedly, James Ferguson’s (2015: 14) reading of the rise of cash transfers in mineral-rich Southern Africa suggests that they may represent a ‘new kind of political claim-making’ and ‘open new possibilities for political mobilisation.’ However, to date, there has been little empirical research to evidence this claim-making, the influence of social mobilisation, or eliciting citizens’ perceptions of programmes in this context. Given its high levels of social mobilisation, Ferguson (2015: 196) identified Bolivia as a case where cash transfers may
perhaps represent “rightful shares” of natural resource wealth. Recent Bolivian scholarship appears to support this view, highlighting civil society’s role in mobilising resources and passing social protection legislation (McGuire, 2013; Carnes and Mares, 2014; Anria and Niedzwiecki, 2014; Daroca Oller, 2016; Postero, 2017; Paz Arauco, 2018). These accounts also resemble past scholarship in high and upper-middle income countries emphasising civil society pressure as a key driver of social policy expansion and universalism (Korpi, 1998; O’Connor and Olsen, 1998; Teichman, 2008; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Huber and Stephens, 2012; Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2016). However, we will argue that the evidence to support this claim in the Bolivia case is poor and that causal connections between social mobilisation, resource mobilisation, and policy proposals are unsatisfactory.

Another key area in which cash transfers may influence citizen-state relations is through accountability and citizen oversight of programmes. Scholarship assessing citizen-state relations in social protection has focused largely on the introduction of citizenship-related legal guarantees and civil society mobilisation to achieve these guarantees (Hickey, 2011; Barrientos, 2013; Leisering and Barrientos, 2013; Barrientos and Pellisery, 2013). More recently, efforts have been made to develop frameworks to analyse the role of accountability in social protection and its potential in strengthening citizen-state relations (Hickey and King, 2015; Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2017; Ayliffe et al. 2018). While theoretically persuasive, there remain few case studies which demonstrate positive effects, and a focus on outlier successes raises questions regarding representativeness (see Adato et al. 2016; Evans et al. 2018). The Center for Global Development (CGD) has also provided various prospective accounts regarding the potential of cash transfers improving citizen-state relations in oil-rich countries (Birdsall and Subramanian, 2004; Gillies, 2010; Moss and Young, 2009; Moss, 2011; Devarajan et al. 2011; Gelb and Majerowicz, 2011; Sayne and Gillies, 2011; Rodriguez et al. 2012). Given that these proposals have yet to be adopted, however, these claims remain untested. Indeed, surprisingly few studies elicit recipients’ perceptions of programmes to substantiate relational claims. This is an important gap the thesis will help fill.

**i) Key Arguments**

The main contributions of the thesis are two-fold. Firstly, we argue that to understand the introduction of universal programmes in natural resource dependent countries, greater attention must be paid to the role of domestic ideas. In particular, we will argue that shifts in the political salience of higher-level normative ideas related to redistribution and equality is
fundamental. These ideas are crucial to explaining why universalism is chosen over targeted programmes in contexts which have sufficient fiscal space to do so. Secondly, we will challenge the empirical basis for claims that cash transfers constitute “rightful shares” of natural resource wealth and that new programmes necessarily strengthen rights-based citizen-state relations. We will argue that claims regarding the influential and progressive role of civil society are poorly founded in the case, and assumptions related to citizens’ perceptions of their entitlements are also flawed. As Bolivia is held up as a case of rights-based social protection (McGuire, 2013; Ferguson, 2015; Postero, 2017), the thesis’ findings have important implications regarding the onerous conditions required to achieved rights-based social protection.

We will argue that the introduction and scaling up to universal cash transfers in this context is primarily driven by three key factors: (i) shifts in fiscal capture of natural resource rent, (ii) changes in the political salience of redistributive and equalitarian ideas, and (iii) the combination of political linkage strategies employed by politicians to appeal to political constituencies. We will further argue that the introduction of programmes in this context does not evidently strengthen rights-based citizen-state relations.

We will argue that a shift in the capture and hypothecation of natural resource rent is key to expand fiscal space, or ‘sustainable budgetary room (Heller, 2010: 2),’ for social protection. Commodity prices play a central role, and the introduction of new rent taxes are important to harness price windfalls. We will argue that, together, these expand domestic political autonomy and provide scope for higher programme coverage and expenditure (Barrientos and Pellissey 2013; Ulriksen, 2013; Hujo, 2012, 2015; Ortiz et al. 2015; Mosley and Abdulai, 2016). The relative bargaining power of governments with international actors, and the timing of rent capture and hypothecation are also considered to be important to whether this autonomy is achieved in practice. Given high levels of fiscal volatility, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) play a significant role in shaping incentives to increase or restrain social expenditures. While loan conditionalities may not play a decisive role (Weyland, 2005, 2006), we will argue that international debt relief initiatives have been an important enabling factor yet at the same time decreased the leverage of IFIs to impose conditions which would otherwise restrict programme scope and spending.

Secondly, we will argue that domestic normative ideas related to redistribution and equality play a key role in driving the introduction of universal programmes. While the normative appeals of international actors may not be persuasive unless they cohere with the ideas of domestic leaders (Weyland, 2006; Lavers and Hickey, 2015), the normative ideas of these
leaders and legitimacy considerations with core constituents regarding the appropriate use of rents and choice of eligible beneficiaries of social assistance are crucial to the adoption of universal programmes. Legitimacy considerations also overlap with political linkage strategies employed by political parties and leaders to appeal to constituents. While some political settlement arrangements seem more conducive than others in allowing domestic ideas to prevail (Lavers, 2016a, Lavers, 2016b), the thesis’ findings suggest that domestic ideas related to redistribution and universalism are likely to be important across settlement types in this context.

While the Bolivia case suggests that intense electoral competition and pressure from left-wing parties may not be pre-conditions for universalism, as has been suggested elsewhere (Pribble, 2013; Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2016), we will argue that elections may provide ‘political windows of opportunity’ for political parties and their leaders to appeal to different constituencies by expanding the scope or scale of benefits (see Kindgon, 1984: 182). However, appeals are primarily supply-driven, relating to the political linkage strategies employed by politicians to garner support from citizens (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Pribble, 2013: 36). Clientelist strategies which are narrowly targeted to specific constituencies, provide excludable benefits, or one-time payments, are likely to narrow the scope of beneficiary groups and frustrate the expansion of cash transfer programmes. On the other hand, programmatic and charismatic political linkages are typically geared toward the provision of benefits to the entire polity, either as entitlements or in return for political loyalty, respectively. As these linkage strategies fit different institutional paths and may have contrasting socio-political effects, they have typically been separated (Pribble, 2013: 36). Yet, the Bolivia case will demonstrate how these strategies may be combined under populist leadership to appeal to political constituencies, and that both strategies support universalism.

The thesis will argue that introducing universal cash transfers in countries which rely on natural resource rent will not necessarily strengthen rights-based citizen-state relations. We argue that civil society mobilisation related to natural resource ownership does not clearly translate into rights-claims for entitlements, inputs into policy design, or engagement in programme oversight. We will show that labour-based organisations may play an ambivalent role, with claims based as much on corporatist appeals as notions of rights. We will argue that citizens’ perceptions ultimately hinge on how programmes are presented to them through communicative discourse and how citizens interact with programmes (Schmidt, 2002; Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2017; Ayliffe et al. 2018). We will demonstrate that even with
legal guarantees and a language of rights, if programmes are presented to citizens in connection to a patron, and if citizen-state interface mechanisms are weak, benefits will not be interpreted as rights or strengthen rights-based citizen-state relations. Akin to recent conclusions in sub-Saharan Africa (Hickey et al. 2018), in a natural resource dependent context, we will argue that the introduction and expansion of cash transfers continues to reflect chiefly a politics of patronage rather than a politics of rights.

**ii) Structure of the Thesis**

In chapter 1, we will establish the basis on which to understand the political economy of social protection. Firstly, as the potential for expanding social protection relies on mobilising resources, we will first consider the scope for domestic resource mobilisation and redistributive capacity in low and lower-middle income countries. We will then look at the potential to expand fiscal space through natural resource rent as an alternative. As commitment to expand social protection depends on negotiating priorities, we will then consider arguments in welfare state scholarship related to how political institutions influence commitment to social spending. We will focus on the role of civil society, political regime type, and electoral competition in driving commitments towards universalism. Thirdly, we will consider the importance of politician-citizen linkage strategies, and how different appeals may have shaped policy choices towards universalism in Latin America. Given issues of comparability between low- and high-income contexts, we will then review recent scholarship on the politics of social protection in sub-Saharan Africa and compare findings with lower-income countries in Latin America. Finally, as the rationale for policy choices is crucial, we will assess ideational explanations for introducing cash transfer programmes. We will consider how transnational and domestic ideas may influence decisions, assessing the potential significance of different types and levels of ideas and arenas of discourse, and we will also reflect on how discursive framing may play a role in shaping policy choices.

In chapter 2, we will review scholarship concerning the socio-political significance and effects of social protection, focusing on cash transfers in particular. Different notions of social contracts have a bearing on the socio-political significance of social protection, so we will first review differences between interest-based and rights-based social contracts and see how these relate to “safety net” and citizenship-based approaches to social protection. Extending the citizenship focus, we will then assess the plausibility that cash transfers may represent “rightful shares” of natural resource wealth, considering whether such claims likely reflect notions of entitlement rooted in convictions of citizenship or gifts rooted in
expectations of patronage. We will then propose potential indicators to assess whether citizens’ relationship to cash transfers reflects a sense of entitlement or patronage. We will focus on legal guarantees and citizen-state accountability processes as cornerstones of rights-based social protection and reflect on the difficulties of overcoming perceptions of patronage. Finally, we will appraise evidence of citizens’ perceptions of cash transfers and potential expectations of reciprocity, primarily focusing on the available evidence of electoral effects and presidential popularity in Latin America.

In chapter 3, we will explain the thesis’ criteria for case and policy selection. We will present our analytical framework, methodology, and key arguments that will be defended throughout the thesis, as well as field study sites, study process, limitations, and issues of informed consent.

In chapter 4, we aim to explain the economic, political and discursive context inherited by the first Morales administration in 2005. We will first consider the origins of resource nationalist discourse in Bolivia’s post-colonial history, focusing on contestation with international actors over the ownership and control of natural resources. Given the potential importance of fiscal constraints, we will critically examine the period of structural adjustment and demonstrate how hydrocarbon rent and social protection became increasingly intertwined through Bolivia’s social pension. Thirdly, we will look at the role of elections and political linkage strategies with constituents in shaping the introduction of the social pension and increasing importance of social assistance, despite fiscal constraints. We will then reflect on the role of increased political competition and acceptance of anti-institutional politics in helping to explain the rise of President Morales. Finally, we will consider the role of donor conditionalities and institutional crises in reigniting resource nationalist pressure for rent capture and redistribution prior to Morales’ election.

In chapter 5, we will reappraise the role of discourse in the introduction of universal cash transfers under the first Morales administration. In order to compare alternative explanations regarding the political economy of social protection in Bolivia, we will first review the merits of past scholarship focused on electoral incentives, civil society pressure, and transnational policy diffusion. As some degree of fiscal space is necessary to fund national scale cash transfer programmes, we will assess the key factors which explained shifts in fiscal space prior to the introduction of Bolivia’s first national scale Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs). Having established the fiscal foundations, we will then review how cash transfers were framed in competing campaigns in the 2005 elections and how higher-level ideas filtered down into specific policy choices. We will focus on the negotiation over policy scope
between the political executive and bureaucrats and the competing ideas underpinning their positions. We will also assess the role of civil society and IFIs in promoting their agendas in this space, and how elections and referenda may have influenced programme scope, timing and roll out.

In chapter 6, we will assess the expansion of cash transfer programmes during President Morales’ second term. With fiscal and ideational foundations in place, we will focus on potential shifts in political linkage strategies and the role of civil society pressure and elections. We first will reflect upon institutional differences between the two CCTs and social pension regarding legal guarantees and mobilisation capacity of programme recipients, which may have a bearing on divergent pathways towards programme expansion. Secondly, focusing on the 2014 election, we will consider how elections may help accelerate commitments to increase programme beneficiaries and transfer amounts. We will then compare cash transfer expansion between 1997 and 2019, assessing commitments across the political spectrum. Finally, we will reflect upon how shifts in fiscal constraint may have restricted policy expansion after 2014.

In chapter 7, we will assess the socio-political effects of Bolivia’s cash transfer programmes. After a brief review of claims in recent scholarship, we will consider President Morales’ communicative discourse in public speeches to legitimise the programmes and the combination of political linkage strategies employed to appeal to constituents. This will include a focus on rights-based language, moral positioning and the normative ideas of core constituents. We will then review the use of imagery, performance, and branding during political campaigns and transfer distribution events and how charismatic political linkage strategies appealed to constituents. We will clarify the formal legal guarantees in place for the programmes and then present survey and interview evidence of citizens’ knowledge and perceptions of the cash transfer programmes to see how these match formal entitlements. We will then assess the potential role of citizen-state interface in shaping citizens’ perceptions of the state and their entitlements. Finally, we will consider reciprocity effects from the programmes related to Presidential and governmental approval and perceptions of state legitimacy.

In the conclusion we will present a summary of findings related to cash transfer introduction and expansion in Bolivia. We will emphasise the importance of domestic ideas, supported by fiscal capture and combination of political linkage strategies as a causal package to introduce and expand universal cash transfers. However, while charismatic linkage strategies may help enable universalism, we will argue that they also undermine rights-
based citizen-state relations, as citizens interpret programmes as personalised patronage rather than entitlements. We will then compare findings within the case across time and with other natural resource dependent countries to consider the degree to which these findings may apply to similar contexts over time. Finally, we will offer some recommendations for further research.
Chapter 1: Drivers for Expanding Social Protection

To understand the political economy drivers for introducing and expanding cash transfer programmes in a natural resource dependent context, we argue that it is necessary to consider three key dimensions: (i) the production and distribution of economic resources which enable or frustrate potential for introduction and expansion; (ii) the ideas of policy actors, which provide the rationale for choices, and (iii) the political institutions and processes through which ideas, interests and resources are negotiated.

In this chapter, we will first consider the role of economic factors in shaping the potential expansion of social protection. These include fiscal constraints, the capacity to mobilise domestic resources and also capture rent to expand social expenditures in a natural resource dependent context. To illustrate this, we will reflect on the contingent pathways in Mongolia and Zambia to capture and hypothecate natural resource rent to increase spending on cash transfer programmes.

We will then review arguments for how political institutions shape commitment to social protection. This includes an assessment of how democratic institutions may influence increases in social spending and commitment to universalism. We will consider class-based explanations related to the strength of labour and civil society pressure and how these relate to partisan politics. Focusing on Latin America, we will then assess the relative importance of political linkage strategies and how these may shape the scope of policy choices towards universalism. Next, we will review recent scholarship on the political economy of social protection in sub-Saharan Africa for comparison with lower-income countries in Latin America, focusing on the role of elections, political settlement types and linkage strategies in introducing more ambitious programmes.

Finally, we will review ideational explanations for the introduction and expansion of cash transfers, considering how transnational and domestic ideas may influence policy decisions. We will review the potential contribution of global initiatives, IFIs and policy coalitions. We will then look at the importance of different types and levels of ideas and arenas of discourse, and how the framing of policy options may play a role in influencing the scope of interventions.
i) **Fiscal Space for Social Protection**

Social protection can be understood as ‘the public actions taken in response to levels of vulnerability, risk and deprivation which are deemed socially unacceptable within a given polity or society (Conway and Norton, 2000: 7).’ In this definition, social protection is a matter of public policy which encompasses current deprivation of the poor and future vulnerabilities of the non-poor to shocks and life-cycle events. In the second half of the 20th century, most low and middle-income countries in the South established social insurance schemes. Yet, these schemes seldom reached beyond a small group of workers in formal employment, and required growing public subsidies, which made them increasingly regressive (Barrientos, 2007). Social protection may encompass social insurance (such as health insurance), social welfare (such as protection services), and social equity measures through legislation (Aston and Jones, 2012), but the term has increasingly referred to antipoverty or social assistance programmes. Estimates in 2010 suggested that globally, nearly 900 million people benefited, directly or indirectly, from social assistance (Barrientos and Hulme, 2013: 4). Within this, cash transfer programmes were the most popular form of social assistance.

One key consideration for the introduction of universal cash transfer programmes is fiscal space. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines fiscal space as the ‘availability of budgetary room that allows a government to provide resources for a desired purpose without any prejudice to the sustainability of its financial position (Heller, 2010: 2).’ While this definition depends upon sustainability thresholds, it is nonetheless useful to consider potential trade-offs between short and medium-term policy goals in the expansion of social spending. Key to the achievement of fiscal space is the design and functioning of economic institutions.

Following Douglas North (1990: 1), institutions can be understood as the formal rules and informal norms and constraints which structure political, economic and social interaction. Formal rules may include legal guarantees such as constitutions, laws, decrees, policies, or property rights. Informal norms and constraints typically include sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct. As North (1995: 18) argues, ‘institutions are formed to reduce uncertainty in human exchange.’ They require a ‘collective acceptance of… status (Searle, 2005: 8),’ and this acceptance ensures relatively ‘stable expectations of behaviour (Hodgson, 2006: 2)’ and equilibrium (Kingstone and Caballero, 2009). Institutions also establish incentive structures which guide agents, in line with their interests and ideas (North, 1990).
Economic factors such as growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) have long been considered a strong correlate of social spending in industrialised countries, as richer countries are generally more likely to increase coverage by population and different types of risk. While the correlation is not fully reliable across all countries (Barrientos, 2016b), industrialised countries typically have more generous welfare states, which, similar to social protection, we understand as government-protected minimum standards of income and social services (Wilensky, 1975: 1). In assessing the key features shaping the development of welfare states across 21 middle-income countries across Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe, Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman (2008) found that fiscal constraints were one of two main factors which impeded progress on social spending, and this was particularly acute in Latin America. Various scholars in the region have come to the same conclusion that economic growth was important, and that fiscal constraint was a key impediment to social policy expansion (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007; McGuire, 2010; Huber and Stephens, 2012).

While fiscal constraint is a common impediment, some form of “social protection floor” through minimum guarantees such as social transfers for children or old age pensions is achievable in the majority of low and middle-income countries (Social Protection Floor Advisory Group, 2011: xxii). Bierbaum et al.’s (2017) Social Protection Floor Index of 129 countries estimates that only 13 countries required more than 10% of GDP to achieve minimum income of $US1.90/day in 2013. The authors judged that these countries would not be able to provide a social protection floor without substantial international support, and a further 16 countries which required more than 5% of GDP were also considered to require some form of international support. Most recent estimates for the provision of a basic social protection floor through cash transfers in low- and middle-income countries range between 0.4% of GDP and 5.7% of GDP (Social Protection Floor Advisory Group, 2011; Ortiz et al. 2015). While potentially achievable, the mean estimate of around 4% of GDP is over double what most countries spent on social assistance in 2010 (Barrientos, 2016b). Thus, beyond reallocation of expenditure, many governments would need to mobilise significant additional resources or require support from international donors to expand social protection.

Domestic resource mobilisation remains a serious challenge in most low and lower middle-income countries. While Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries have average tax revenues of 34% of GDP (OECD, 2013), this is 21% for Upper Middle-Income Countries (UMICs), 18% for Lower Middle-Income Countries (LMICs), and only 13% for Low Income Countries (LICs) (IMF, 2011 in Moore, 2013: 7; House of
Commons International Development Committee, 2012). Therefore, reaching even 2% of GDP constitutes a very substantial proportion of tax revenues in lower middle- and low-income countries. Increasing tax revenues is not a straightforward task particularly in lower middle- and low-income countries, as the overall tax take is largely determined by the structure of national economies (Moore, 2013).

State capacity for redistribution also varies significantly between countries. Martin Ravallion (2009) measured state capacity for redistribution in 90 countries, calculating how much would need to be transferred to end absolute poverty in 2005 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), where the whole population received a transfer of US$1.25 a day, and then converted this into a Marginal Tax Rate (MTR) on the rich on their earnings above US$13 per day. Ravallion (2009: 2) found that the marginal tax rates needed to close the poverty gap for the international poverty line of $1.25 a day exceeded 100% for countries with consumption per capita under US$2,000 per year. He argued that, even for middle-income countries, redistribution of this scale is feasible only if one allows for a basic income significantly less than US$1.25 a day and/or significant tax burdens on those earning less than US$13 a day.

Chris Hoy and Andy Sumner (2016) updated Ravallion’s analysis on marginal tax rates using 2011 PPP and a poverty line of U$15 per day. They argued that by this point many middle-income countries did have sufficient domestic capacity to raise taxes or reallocate public spending to fully address the national aggregate poverty gap. They suggested that through new taxation almost all countries with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita over US$2,000 (i.e. nearly all lower-middle income countries) could end US$1.90 poverty and US$2.50 poverty. However, with a GNI per capita of US$1,500, Zambia, for example, would need an MTR of 219.66% and 377.47% respectively. Thus, increases in personal income taxes alone may be insufficient in contexts which have both high levels of poverty and narrow revenue streams, compelling such countries to seek donor support or consider alternative sources of domestic revenue mobilisation.

a) Rent Capture in Natural Resource Dependent Countries

Countries which have abundant natural resources such as hydrocarbons and minerals appear to have an alternative to mobilise resources to expand social protection. Where governments are able to access and harness revenues from natural resources, they may have more autonomy from both international actors and domestic voters to develop ambitious social protection policies (Ulriksen, 2013; Barrientos and Pellissery, 2013: 11).
Yet, one key historical reason for why this autonomy has not materialised in countries heavily dependent on natural resources was ‘lack of access to their own surplus’ from rent-generating sectors (Frank, 1971: 33). Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto’s (1979) distinction between “nationally controlled economies” and “enclave economies” is informative in this regard. The basic premise of their distinction was that most profits in enclave economies were siphoned off, leaving a residual surplus sufficient only to maintain or expand the natural resource enclave of oil, gas or mineral exports (Cardoso, 2009).

Cardoso and Faletto (1979) did not discuss which data would allow one to assess precisely which countries were enclaves. Their argument has been critiqued because various supposed enclaves, including Bolivia, had rent-generating sectors under domestic ownership at the start of the 20th Century, thus undermining the argument for foreign-dominated path dependence over the long term (Conning and Robinson, 2009). While the Bolivia case will show that patterns of ownership in rent-generating sectors may have various reversals over time, ultimately what matters is whether governments are able to access and harness this rent rather than whether formal ownership is predominantly foreign or domestic.

Dependence on natural resources and changes in access to natural resource rent are considered central to fiscal space in “mineral rich” countries (Hinojosa et al. 2010). The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) has conducted various streams of research to analyse the introduction and expansion of social assistance in mineral rich countries. As these programmes are largely designed for advocacy purposes, they have a tendency to inflate the role of domestic political agency and social mobilisation (see Hujo and McClanahan, 2010; Hujo, 2011, 2012, 2015; Daroca Oller, 2016; Hatcher et al. 2016; Paz Arauco, 2018). However, the general conclusion that “rent capture” is key to harnessing natural resource wealth for social development seems to hold true at least for large scale expansion of social protection expenditures in low and lower-middle income countries such as UNRISD’s cases of Bolivia and Mongolia (see Hujo, 2015).

While rent capture may be a precondition for large scale expansion significantly in excess of 1% of GDP (see Seekings, 2017 for a discussion on this threshold in Southern Africa), governments also need to allocate these resources to social protection expenditures. The clearest example of this is through the hypothecation of natural resource rent for social protection. Assessing the rise of this strategy in Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Zambia, and Ghana, Paul Mosley and Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai (2016: 3) refer to this hypothecation as “linked taxation.” They argue that forging the link between taxation and redistributive expenditure was designed to ‘present the state as credibly committed to fair dealing between
different interest groups—and thereby to construct a more durable and stable political settlement (2016: 3 – 4).¹ While there are reasons to doubt Mosley and Abdulai’s (2016) assessment of such benign motivation in all these cases, the decision to make a direct connection between taxation in the natural resource economy and redistributive social expenditure does appear to be a key driver of change.¹

Ortiz et al. (2015: 3) further note that Bolivia, Mongolia and Zambia are the only three countries financing universal pensions, child benefits and conditional cash transfers directly from taxes on mining and gas revenues. Of the eight fiscal options identified,² we find that the only factor these three cases had in common was the increase in tax revenues from natural resources. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) spotlights Bolivia as an example of ‘how countries with natural resources can create fiscal space (Urban, 2016: 15).’ While Bolivia expanded fiscal space through taxes on natural resources, no mention was made of international commodity prices in either study, and debt restructuring is inaccurately presented as being driven by domestic actors rather than IFIs, as we will discuss in chapter 5.

Capacity to capture and hypothecate natural resource rent will likely depend on the relative bargaining power of governments with international actors, and the timing of rent capture and hypothecation. The role of IFIs in the expansion of social spending is contingent rather than constant, given that swift changes in economic circumstances often trigger increased engagement (Weyland, 2006; Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; McGuire, 2010). In various accounts, IFIs are given limited attention, yet they play a potentially important role through their imposition of conditionalities promoting neoliberal reforms attached to loans (Weyland, 2006; Huber and Stephens, 2012). Part of the reason IFIs have received relatively limited attention is due to selection bias towards the most successful welfare states. Jennifer Pribble (2013), for example, notes that the relative absence of IFIs was likely an important facilitating factor for the pursuit of universalistic reforms in Chile and Uruguay.

Variation in capacity to capture and hypothecate rent for social spending is well illustrated by comparing the cases of Mongolia and Zambia and the effects of copper price fluctuations and rent taxes. Between 2003 and 2005 there was a four-fold increase in raw material prices

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¹ The authors note that in Ghana windfall taxes were not specifically earmarked for social protection (Mosley and Abdulai, 2016: 10).
² (i) Increasing tax revenues; (ii) expanding social security coverage and contributory revenues; (iii) lobbying for increased aid and transfers; (iv) eliminating illicit financial flows; (v) realocating public expenditures; (vi) tapping into fiscal reserves; (vii) borrowing or restructuring debt, and; (viii) adopting a more accommodative macroeconomic framework
In May 2006, Mongolia introduced a Windfall Profits Tax on copper and gold exports, and this generated significant budget surpluses. Just days before, a CCT, the Child Money Programme (CMP), was made universal for all children under 18 years of age.

Following a steep fall in copper prices in September 2008, on the explicit condition of greater ‘fiscal responsibility,’ the Mongolian government received a bailout loan from the IMF of US$229.2 million on the 1st April 2009 (IMF, 2009: 1). The World Bank considered that this ‘renewed crisis’ generated a ‘window of opportunity (Fritz, 2014: 58)’ to urge the Mongolian government to reintroduce targeting in the CMP. The Rio Tinto and Ivanhoe mining consortium also imposed the precondition that the government repeal the Windfall Profit Tax in August 2009 in order to sign an agreement for the Oyu Tolgoi copper-gold mine. In October 2009, the consortium agreed to pre-pay royalties for 2010 which enabled the government the following month to relaunch the universal programme (Fritz, 2009: 59).

These decisive enabling actions from external actors are excluded from most recent scholarship (Ortiz et al. 2015; Gelders, 2015; Hatcher et al. 2016; Kidd, 2018).

In Zambia, a Windfall Profits Tax on copper was introduced in March 2008. Suffering the same commodity price fall in September 2008, pressure from the Zambia Chamber of Mines led the government to repeal the tax less than a year later. Tax collection was ineffective and erratic as tax changes followed price declines (Simpasa, 2013; Manley, 2017). Tax recovery increased by only ZMW400 million (around US$33 million) between 2007 and 2008 (Urban, 2016). By 2009, cash transfer provision in Zambia was thus considered ‘affordable’ and ‘sustainable’ only as long as donor support continued, and ‘any extension of provision [was considered] wholly contingent on increased donor allocations (McCord, 2009: 4; Habasonda, 2009).’ However, with international copper prices more than doubling and fiscal revenue from mining trebling between December 2008 and October 2013, partly due to an increase in the mineral royalty from 3% to 6% (Urban, 2016), when the poverty-targeted Social Cash Transfer (SCT) was scaled up by 700%, the government had significantly greater potential to enable expansion. Fiscal space has not gained significant attention in recent scholarship, in part, because scale up constituted only 0.1% of GDP, but also because the Zambian Ministry of Finance continued to be in favour of proportional budget increases for social protection (Siachiwena, 2016: 16; Seekings, 2017: 19).

3 Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, and Zambia were all recipients of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, yet Mongolia failed to qualify (IMF, 2005a; 2005b). This partly explains why a bailout from the IMF was necessary.

4 Zambia’s budget between 2013 and 2016 shows that social protection spending as an overall proportion of the total actually decreased from 2.8% to 2.4% (Chikwanda, 2012 – 2015, Mutati, 2016). Moreover, spending on the
Despite an increased budget, the SCT expansion took place amid recurring fiscal deficits between 2012 and 2015, alongside a five-fold increase in external debt stock between 2011 and 2015 (Chelwa, 2015). Mongolia also doubled cash transfer expenditures in 2011 despite a negative fiscal balance (Yeung and Howes, 2015; Lakhagvasuren, 2015). This demonstrates that significant expansion may take place over the short term even without (temporarily) available budgetary room, based on future expectations of rent capture.

From her analysis of the catalytic effect of aid on domestic resource mobilisation in sub-Saharan Africa, Cécile Cherrier (2013) has argued that a strong involvement of foreign aid actors in the origins of SCTs jeopardises their social, political and financial sustainability. While this may be true over the medium to long term, over the short term, international actors may play an important role in filling fiscal capacity gaps necessary to sustain cash transfer expenditures. In Mongolia, we saw the key role of the IMF and mining companies in 2009, and in 2011 capacity gaps were filled by borrowing from commercial banks (Yeung and Howes, 2015). In Zambia, while there is some disagreement regarding the strength of the role of bilateral donors in the scale up of the SCT in October 2013 (Siachiwena 2016; Pruce and Hickey, 2017; Seekings, 2017), Siachiwena (2017) notes that sustaining budgetary commitment in 2015 relied on bilateral donors, which mobilised an additional K30 million (US$2.5 million) on top of the K40 million (US$3.3 million) agreed, as the Zambian government disbursed only K110 million (US$9.1 million) of the K180 million (USD$15 million) formally committed. This shows the continued importance of donor funding as a buffer rather than as a catalyst.

Therefore, international commodity prices, transnational debt and loan arrangements, and the effective introduction of rent taxes are thus likely to be important to fiscal space for social protection in countries which rely on natural resource rent. However, as Seekings’ (2017) analysis in Southern Africa clearly shows, while fiscal capacity and affordability are important, commitment to expand social spending relies to a large degree on political, normative and ideological factors. The following section will thus review scholarship on the role of political institutions and party politics, with a particular focus on Latin America.

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5 By 2012, the GDP ratio of nominal public debt rose to 51.3% (World Bank, 2014: 16), surpassing the recommended 40% threshold of the Debt Sustainability Framework.

6 Ghana’s Livelihood Empowerment against Poverty (LEAP), Kenya’s Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC), Zambia’s Social Cash Transfer, Ethiopia’s Poverty Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and Lesotho’s Old Age Pension programmes
ii) *Political Institutions and Partisan Politics*

Democracy is widely argued to be a key factor influencing redistributive social policy and levels of social spending in Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe (Huber and Stephens, 2001; Huber and Stephens 2012; Segura-Ubiergo, 2007; Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; McGuire, 2010; Lustig et al. 2012). Latin American welfare state scholarship, in particular, has paid attention to democratic institutions as both a catalyst and amplifier for social policy commitment. Huber and Stephens (2012: 241), for example, refer to democracy as the ‘beginning of the causal chain.’ Democracy is argued to have a strong direct influence on health, education and social security spending, and the length of democratic rule is deemed to be an important predictor, as more democratic regimes are argued to be more likely to expand social spending over the long term (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008).

Focusing on welfare state development in high income countries, advocates of Power Resources Theory (PRT) affirm that democratic institutions should be viewed from a ‘vertical [rather than horizontal] perspective (Korpi, 1998: ix).’ Taking a Marxist view of class relations, PRT scholars argue that capitalist classes have greater control over economic resources and differential bargaining power to shape welfare provisions, yet they contend that the balance of power between capital and labour is fluid (Korpi, 1998; O'Connor and Olsen, 1998: 6). Following Wilenksy’s (1975: 66) argument regarding the strength of working-class based organisations and the ‘collective push for equality,’ PRT scholars argue that welfare states developed farthest in nations where labour was strongest; where workers unionised they were able to mobilise and collaborate with other classes such as white-collar workers, applying pressure on authorities to reform, or punishing them where they failed to do so (O'Connor and Olsen, 1998: 6 – 7; Esping-Andersen, 1998).

Relatedly, Judith Teichman (2008) argues that civil society pressure has been a key driver in the development of the welfare state in Latin America. Teichman (2008) highlights that the two Latin American countries with the lowest level of inequality, Costa Rica and Uruguay, were characterised by successful “redistributive compromises” in the first half of the twentieth century, arguing that elite and public support for equitable welfare arrangements prevented their dismantling under neoliberal administrations. In Bolivia, scholars have also suggested that civil society mobilisation was a key factor in pension reform, both in terms of

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7 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, and Uruguay
8 Measured by the duration of parties in the executive and proportion in the lower house
enabling fiscal space and in passing cash transfer legislation (Carnes and Mares, 2014; Anria and Niedzwiecki, 2014; Daroca Oller, 2016; Paz Arauco, 2018). However, as we will see in chapters 5 and 6, these accounts fail to demonstrate precisely how such mobilisation influenced policy proposals.

In general, the strength of labour seems more likely to play a role in certain forms of social protection which pool risk such as health insurance or contributory pensions (Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1985) rather than social assistance such as conditional or social cash transfers which are individual benefits and also tend to have a weaker organisational base to collectively claim entitlements. Social pensions may lie somewhere in between the two. In Bolivia, for example, Santiago Daroca Oller (2016: 3) refers to ‘implicit’ and ‘informal’ agreement between citizens and the state in mobilising resources for the social pension. Yet, such influence appears quite thin and indirect, and as we will show, it seems more likely that policy proposals will be generated by political society (politicians, parliamentarians and political parties) in a top-down fashion rather than by civil society (see Skocpol, 1992; Segura-Ubiergo, 2007; Hickey, 2011; Cherrier, 2013).

Pressure from labour unions and civil society is commonly channelled through left-wing political parties. Yet, these proposals often lay dormant until after economic or political crises. Haggard and Kaufman (2008: 45, 47) suggest that different pathways in welfare state development are partly the result of ‘critical junctures’ and ‘realignments’ between elites and labour or peasant organisations which forge links with left-wing political parties. These links are argued to change the composition of the political elite and such realignment is thought to influence labour policy, in particular. These junctures or ‘focusing events (Kingdon, 1984: 24)’ are often moments of crisis, and as Sam Hickey (2006: 25) points out, programmes often ‘emerge either [when] the demands of capital alter or when the social impacts of liberalised capitalist economies become too great to be borne in political terms.’ These moments of rupture and realignment may thus trigger new commitments to expand social policy, particularly where left-wing governments have strong connections with labour and peasant organisations and are able to promote reforms within government (Skocpol, 1992; Korpi, 1998; Pribble, 2013).

With a similar focus on the balance of class and party-political power, state-society relations and transnational power structures, Huber and Stephens’ (2001) argue that partisan politics was the most important factor that shaped the development of welfare states in advanced industrial economies. They demonstrate that social democratic administrations in the North were the most generous in terms of transfer payments, such as old-age pensions (Huber
and Stephens, 1998). However, it is less clear the degree to which partisan politics, in itself, has driven social policy expansion and universalism in Latin America or in other regions.

How the strength of civil society and partisan politics influences social policy expansion may also depend on the type of social policy instrument and how these resonate with the goals of different political regimes. Scholarship which claims that left-wing party ideology and political regime type are significant factors contributing towards universalisation have typically focused on social security and healthcare (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007; McGuire, 2010; Pribble, 2013; Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2016). The growth in CCTs in Latin America coincided with the “Left Turn,” and this has led some scholars to assert that left-wing political parties saw it as incumbent on them to address the social debt left by neoliberal governments through cash transfers (Teichman, 2008; Barrientos, 2013; Pena, 2014). While there may be an urge for a “redistributive compromise (Teichman, 2008)” or “double movement (Polanyi, 2001; Putzel, 2002)” to compensate for the challenges of economic reform, this is not unique to left-wing governments. Indeed, Natasha Borges Sugiyama’s (2011) comparative research clearly shows that the expansion and emulation of CCTs in Latin America (from 9 countries in 2003 to 19 in 2009) was not a left-dominated trend, as CCTs were embraced uniformly across the political spectrum.

If political regime type were a strong explanatory factor, then we would anticipate not only a difference in commitment between right-wing and left-wing governments, as Pena (2014) asserts, but also greater commitment from the most strongly left-wing governments. Analyses on Latin American political economy over the last decade distinguish two types of left-wing government in the region. On one hand, a ‘moderate left’ which maintains the institutions of global capitalism and liberal democracy, pursuing social policy within strict fiscal limits, and on the other hand a ‘contestatory left,’ which rejects neoliberalism and, at least rhetorically, challenges the constraints of economic globalisation, championing participatory democracy and pursuing more “ambitious” social policy (Hunter et al., 2010; Kingstone, 2011).

There is little evidence that ‘contestatory-left’ governments in Latin America were necessarily more progressive or had higher levels of social spending that the ‘moderate left’ (Lustig et al.

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11 These countries include Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay.
12 These countries include Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Argentina.
Moreover, there is significant variance in the type of programmes introduced, from geographically targeted social protection in Venezuela (*Misiones*), poverty-targeted CCT programmes and a social pension in Ecuador (*Bono de Desarrollo Humano* – BDH) to universal CCTs and a universal social pension in Bolivia, and a Universal Child Allowance (AUH) in Argentina. With generally weaker institutionalisation of the party system, programmes are argued to be more closely connected with political leaders and with programmes tied (directly or indirectly) to commodity revenues, and reforms are considered to be more erratic and unsustainable (Hunter *et al.*, 2010: 160; Flores-Macías, 2010; Lustig *et al.*, 2012; Pribble, 2013).

Previous social policy design, or policy legacies, may also influence the nature and scope of social policy reforms. These legacies favour certain policy options over others, generating stakeholders through the distribution of benefits, which makes policy retrenchment more challenging (Skocpol, 1992; Pierson, 1994; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; Pribble, 2013). Policy legacies provide reinforcing feedback loops which generate path dependence (Pierson, 1994), and this path dependence seems especially important for cases with the longest histories of a welfare state such as Uruguay or Chile. However, the emergence of these policies and ‘policy architectures’ is still argued to stem from past architectures and the financial and political incentives underpinning their creation (Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2016: 1, 16). This suggests such architectures are more pertinent to policy continuity than as an explanation for policy change.

We find weaker policy legacies in countries with weaker political party institutionalisation and more personalistic politics such as in populist-left regimes of Venezuela and Argentina, and these contexts ostensibly convey more ephemeral commitment to universalism (Pribble, 2013). Yet, in such contexts, policy change may happen not by evolution or even punctuated equilibrium but by ‘serial replacement’ of institutions (Levitsky and Murillo, 2012: 5). So, institutional feedback loops appear to provide a better explanation for the drivers of equilibrium than change.

A major shortcoming of Latin American welfare state literature is that it is heavily focused on success cases such as Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay which manifest a cluster of favourable economic and institutional conditions. This scholarship acknowledges limitations in comparisons with poorer countries in the region and with the populist left (Huber and

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13 Eligibility criteria, sources of funding, process of defining benefits, who provides the benefits, and market alternatives
Stephens, 2012, Pribble, 2013). In short, this scholarship has been good at explaining slow evolutionary change and punctuated equilibrium in higher-income countries with a relatively high degree of path dependence over the long-term, but worse at explaining rapid changes of social policy in cases such as lower-income and institutionally weak Bolivia. As Huber and Stephens note (2012: 263), various countries which were not included in their sample had dramatically different levels of economic development, ‘low[er] resource availability’ and less ‘latitude for action.’ These countries were judged to be ‘less incrementalist,’ more statist, more centralised, with more direct democracy, based more on charismatic leadership (Pribble, 2013). This suggests that alternative causal pathways are possible.

Even if policy proposals may not always stem directly from civil society demands, how political parties and their leaders appeal to labour unions, civil society groups and the general public remains significant. In the following section we will consider how political linkage strategies may shape political incentives to expand social policy commitments.

a) Political Linkage Strategies in Latin America

In recent years, a number of scholars have argued that electoral competition is a key factor in the expansion of social policy and commitments to universalism in Latin America (McGuire, 2010; Pribble, 2013; Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2016). While perhaps not a necessary factor, as expansion happens both inside and outside electoral periods, competition may become important, contingent upon the types of constituents to whom political parties and their leaders appeal, and the types of strategies they employ to engage these constituents. Indeed, these strategies are also likely to have a bearing on whether social assistance programmes themselves will be geared towards narrow groups or a broad sector of society (Pribble, 2013).

Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson (2007: 7) refer to two types of citizen–politician linkages. The first of these is clientelism, which the authors equate with patronage. In North American scholarship the definition of clientelism has been narrowed to refer to a specific type of political exchange, which may broadly be understood to refer to the following characteristics:

- **Reciprocal**: Credibility rests on a *quid pro quo* two-sided exchange between politicians and voters (Stokes, 2007; Robinson and Verdier, 2013) or voters and bureaucrats (Fox, 1994, 2012);
- **Contingent**: The exchange between patrons and clients must be contingent and potentially reversible (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Hicken, 2011);
- **Excludable:** The inducements must be a private good targeted to specific constituencies and therefore excludable (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Diaz-Cayeros et al, 2007);
- **Brokered:** The exchange needs to be monitored by intermediaries to enforce compliance (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007, Stokes *et al.*, 2013).

Kitschelt and Wilkinson refer to the opposite of clientelism as “programmatic politics (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 7).” Programmatic connotes the transparent announcement and implementation of policies, non-contingent receipt of benefits, and indirect political exchange. The authors contend that programmatic linkages deliver benefits to large groups (functional club goods) and the entire polity (collective goods), rather than targeting private goods to specific geographic or demographic constituencies. Despite being a private good, CCTs are commonly viewed as an emblematic example of programmatic policy because benefits are not directly reciprocal, contingent, excludable, or brokered (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni, 2007; Fox, 2012; Stokes *et al.* 2013).

A focus on brokering and monitoring of compliance in contingent exchanges (Stokes *et al.* 2013) is geared toward an assumption that political leaders seek to convince either core voters (Diaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni, 2007) or swing voters (Stokes, 2005). Yet, nationwide programmes may appeal to both core and swing voters, and thus imply different political incentives which are not clientelist, as per the above definition. Evidence from Brazil and Argentina demonstrates how the political executive may aim to remove the potential for local political mediation (Ansell and Mitchell, 2011; Miorelli, 2016). This evidence shows how Presidents claimed credit through a (formally) programmatic strategy via the provision of collective goods. Aaron Ansell and Keni Mitchell (2011) suggest that in Brazil, rolling out the *Bolsa Familia* CCT nationally was a means for President Fernando Henrique Cardoso to cut out governors from mediating programme distribution and claiming credit as an executive initiative. Ansell and Mitchell (2011: 309) refer to this as “bossist” clientelism and suggest that in such a context, Presidents are likely to ‘extend CCTs to increasingly broad swathes of the population.’ In both Brazil and Argentina, it has been suggested that at the time of introducing national programmes both Presidents Cardoso and Fernández de Kirchner were looking to bolster their own presidential legitimacy shortly after elections, and this provided incentives to deliver programmatic goods to the entire polity rather than focusing resources towards specific geographic constituencies (Ansell and Mitchell, 2011; Miorelli, 2016).
Given a greater propensity for charismatic politics in lower-income countries in the region (Huber and Stephens, 2012: 263), we might anticipate the incentives for Presidential involvement and credit claiming to be more pronounced. A review of Latin America’s lower-income countries revealed that all the cash transfer programmes in the late-1990s to mid-2000s were presidential initiatives and the President’s office had ‘a direct influence over policy formulation and adoption (Barrientos and Niño-Zarazúa, 2011: 419).’ Armando Barrientos and Miguel Niño-Zarazúa argue that programmes were introduced by new administrations keen to demonstrate their commitment to the poor. Barrientos and Pellissery (2013) further affirm that identity politics may help sustain and enlarge social assistance programmes, but they do not interpret the use of identity politics as furthering either clientelist or populist objectives. We disagree with this assessment, as cases such as Argentina and Bolivia demonstrate that while identity politics may help sustain and enlarge programmes, direct executive input and credit-claiming signal efforts to engender a patronage-based relationship.

Following Kitschelt and Wilkinson’s (2007) typology, Pribble (2013) argues that programmatic linkage strategies are associated with the greatest progress towards universalism, in large part, because more extensive processes of deliberation and more explicitly programmatic politics are argued to lock leaders into more durable commitments. Pribble (2013: 33) loosens the binary division by referring to ‘predominant’ external linkage strategies by political parties to their constituencies. She refers to Bolivia’s Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism – MAS) party as a “charismatic movement.” Her reference to charisma explicitly draws on Max Weber’s (2012 [1947]: 328) portrayal of charismatic authority (non-programmatic), which is contrasted with rational-legal authority (programmatic). Charismatic authority lies in the ‘arbitrary “grace” of the chief (2012: 347)’ and is considered legitimate due to the leader’s ‘exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (ibid.).’ Efforts to create unmediated political linkages through a strongman (caudillo, or fiefdom) have been a key strategy for left-populist regimes such as those in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, or a political dynasty linked to a previous caudillo, as in the case of Argentinian Peronism (Miorelli, 2016).

A charismatic linkage strategy is closely related to populism, and while a contested concept, we argue that populism is chiefly charismatic, combining political strategy, moral discourse, and performative style. Although there remains debate regarding which aspect is the dominant feature, we argue that these need not be mutually exclusive. For our purposes,
populism will be understood to involve leaders who pursue a strategy to achieve direct, unmediated and uninstitutionalised support by performing to an audience of unorganised “people” who they claim to represent (Weyland, 2001; Ostiguy, 2001, 2017; Madrid, 2008; Moffitt, 2016; Weyland, 2017). This strategy is conveyed through a discursive moral position, invested with elements of social justice (Laclau 1979; Arditi, 2005; de la Torre, 2014; Müller, 2016), contrapuntally presented against the “system” and “the elite.” This position generally entails a particular political style centred around ‘a spectacle, a show, a performance… with coded gestures of transgression and closeness (Ostiguy, 2017: 92; De la Torre, 2014)’ typically conveyed through low-brow manners, against the high-brow manners of rule-following technocrats (Mouffe, 2005). Leaders may also make use of cultural symbols of shared affinity to bind them to the people (Moffitt, 2016; Ostiguy, 2017).

To choose between either programmatic and clientelist (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007) or even to prioritise predominant linkage strategy (Pribble, 2013) of an incumbent political party obscures the fact that populist leaders, in particular, leverage a combination of programmatic, clientelistic and personalistic linkages concurrently (Resnick, 2014). Populist leaders who pursue a strategy to achieve direct, unmediated and uninstitutionalised support have incentives to introduce collective goods that benefit large constituencies, and particularly the unorganised poor. Indeed, as their moral discourse is typically invested with elements of social justice, at least rhetorically, we might anticipate various references to programmatic characteristics (e.g. transparency of selection criteria, non-contingent receipt of benefits) and a framing of benefits as rights. Programmatic and charismatic linkages therefore become difficult to separate, and it may sometimes be artificial to do so.

Argentina’s Universal Child Allowance (AUH) programme demonstrates the complex interplay of programmatic and charismatic appeals. Romina Miorelli’s (2016: 10) analysis of the AUH reveals various salient features of what we may label programmatic linkage. The AUH is a universal programme, it provides regular social assistance, written into law with a stable source of funding and framed by President Fernández de Kirchner ‘within a discourse of rights.’ When it was launched in 2009, the President affirmed that it was a ‘redistributive [and] just system for all (Fernández de Kirchner, in La Nación, 29/10/09).’ Miorelli (2016) argues that the programme was centrally administered, in part, to overcome the power of local brokers (punteros). Yet, the timing of introduction shortly after a mid-term election defeat (losing 32 seats) suggests programme introduction was partly influenced by a perceived threat to electoral continuity. The programme was introduced by executive decree, avoiding congress for six years before it was written into law, and transfer increases were
announced publicly by President Fernández de Kirchner herself on television, which suggests unmediated credit-claiming. Miorelli (2016: 2) therefore contends that the AUH was part of a wider project to weave ‘a thread of identification within a commitment to a political proposal’ of Kirchnerismo.

Mongolia demonstrates the tension between programmatic and clientelistic strategies, and how electoral periods may contribute towards the latter. The right-wing Democratic Party (DP) made a campaign promise of a Tug10,000 (US$8.50) monthly grant per child, and the party distributed voucher books which could not be redeemed until after the 2004 legislative election (Schafferer, 2005). However, the scope of the programme proposed was initially universal, and the aim was to benefit ‘all children below the age of 18 (MDC 2004: 1, in Fritz, 2014: 56).’ So, the initial strategy was arguably both clientelist and programmatic. A grand coalition under DP President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj introduced a proxy means-tested conditional benefit, the Child Money Programme (CMP). One week before passing the Windfall Profits Tax in May 2006, the programme became universal. However, increased party-political fragmentation generated incentives for competing electoral pledges in the 2008 legislative elections through one-time cash payments. The highest bidding left-wing Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) won the election, but the election law was later amended in 2011 to prevent mineral-funded cash transfers from becoming a campaign issue again (Beard, 2013; Yeung and Howes, 2015). It has been argued that fiscal volatility and economic constraints have prevented the government from entrenching the CMP into a legislative framework to safeguard its coverage and sustainability (Lakhagvasuren, 2015; Peyron-Bista and Amgalan, 2016).

However, given the durability of the AUH and recent increase in payments under President Mauricio Macri’s right-wing Republican Proposal party, as well as the durability and expansion of programmes by the MAS party under President Evo Morales in Bolivia, Pribble’s (2013) argument that charismatic linkage strategies necessarily materialise into ephemeral commitments to universalism seems partly flawed, at least over the medium term. However, differences between laws and decrees and close association with charismatic leaders or political dynasties does suggest that citizens may perceive the commitment to certain programmes as being weaker and linked to a politics of patronage rather than rights.
b) Cash Transfers and the Politics of Patronage in Sub-Saharan Africa

Given the aforementioned concerns regarding case selection preference towards high income or upper-middle income countries (see Huber and Stephens, 2001, 2012; Haggard and Kaufman 2008), until recently, there has been a conspicuous gap studying the political economy of the welfare state in lower-middle- and lower-income countries, and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. While we do not assume full comparability with lower-income countries in Latin America, similarities in fiscal space, patrimonial politics, and the role of transnational actors in the design and delivery of social protection suggests there is some scope for comparison. In the following section we will assess recent insights and compare these with lower-middle- and low-income countries outside the region.

The Partnership for African Governance and Social Research (PASGR) took Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda as case studies to assess the politics of cash transfers in sub-Saharan Africa. The authors argued that the politics of patronage and expectations of an electoral pay-off drove the trend to expand cash transfers. Similar to low-income and left-populist countries in Latin America, they found that in all five countries the office of the President or Vice-President had direct influence in the design, selection of target districts, and/or implementation of programmes (Awortwi et al. 2017). The authors also found that promises to expand coverage and budgets of cash transfers were bolstered during elections in all five case studies and it was argued that this was conceived as the ‘promise of new gifts (Awortwi, 2017: 122).’

The Legislating and Implementing Welfare Policy Reforms (LIWPR) programme at the University of Cape Town investigated the highly varied cases of Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania (and Zanzibar), Malawi, Zambia, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Lesotho, Ghana and South Africa. Similar to assessments in Latin America (Haggard and Kauffman, 2008; Huber and Stephens, 2012), the programme emphasises the shift in democratic institutions and the transition from authoritarian to competitive multi-party democracies in the 1990s. Many of the studies in the programme highlight the importance of electoral competition as an important contributory factor for expanding social protection reforms, including in Botswana (Hamer 2015b), Malawi (Hamer and Seekings, 2017), Zambia (Siachiwena, 2016, 2017), Ghana (Grebe, 2015), and Zimbabwe (Chinyoka and Seekings, 2016).14

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14 In Mongolia, both leading parties made competing pledges to fund cash transfers through expected mineral rent in the 2004 and 2008 elections, and in December 2011 the Election Law was amended to prevent mineral funded cash transfers from becoming a campaign issue again (Yeung and Howes, 2015).
Scholars within the programme also highlight pro-poor branding as a contributory factor in Malawi, Botswana, Ghana and Zambia (Hamer, 2015a, 2015b; Grebe; 2015; Siachiwena, 2016, 2017). Sam Hamer draws (2015a) attention to the fact that social protection programmes may constitute a political resource, arguing that they played a central role in Malawian President Joyce Banda’s pro-poor branding, and in Botswana, Hamer (2015b) notes President Ian Khama’s (2008 – 2018) remarketing of the country’s employment-based social assistance programmes to serve new governmental objectives around employment and poverty reduction. Hangala Siachiwena (2016, 2017) also points out the importance of political branding for Zambian President Michael Sata and his successor Edgar Lungu. The latter’s presidential campaign, for example, included billboards of presidential running mate Inonge Winna claiming credit for the transfer’s achievements. This is a feature we will see in the Bolivian case.

Cash transfers may also be argued to support re-branding and deflecting opposition to unpopular reforms. Larissa Pelham (2007) and Mia Granvik (2015) note the role of Lesotho’s Old Age Pension (OAP) in offsetting the political costs of raising taxes. In Mexico, Ana De la O (2012) notes the role of the Oportunidades (Opportunities) CCT in softening opposition to the removal of food subsidies. In Bolivia, Katherina Müller (2009) highlights the role of the Bonosol social pension in softening opposition to the privatisation of public enterprises, and we may also see the role of the programme in helping President Sánchez de Lozada to shed his image as a ‘neoliberal heartless capitalist (Sánchez de Lozada and Fauget, 2014: 12).’ Likewise, in Mongolia, with promises to redistribute wealth to the majority of Mongolians, Verena Fritz argues the CMP allowed the right-wing Democratic Party to ‘shed its negative image as a party favouring neoliberal policies (Fritz, 2014: 56 – 57).’ Thus, cash transfers may signal inclusive credentials and bolster the progressive image of political parties and individual leaders across a wide variety of economic and political contexts.

The Politics of Social Protection project within the Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) programme at the University of Manchester analysed the political economy of social protection expansion in Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia, and focused on elite commitment, variation in political settlements and the potential role of transnational ideas. A political settlement may be defined as a common understanding and agreement between contending interest groups and classes. A settlement arises through an iterative process of bargaining, negotiation and compromises, and defines the division of spoils between competing interest groups (Di John and Putzel, 2009; Laws 2012; Laws and Leftwich, 2014). Institutions are considered to provide mechanisms for distributing rents.
within society to different interest groups (Di John and Putzel 2009: 4; Khan 2010; Lavers and Hickey, 2015).

Tom Lavers and Sam Hickey (2015: 9, 11) have employed Mushtaq Khan’s (2010) typology which identifies four clientelist settlements (developmental coalition, authoritarian coalition, dominant party, and competitive clientelism) to help explain variation. Lavers and Hickey (2015) note that a political settlement framework has similarities with typologies of “open” and “limited access orders (North et al. 2011)” and “inclusive” and “extractive” institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Each of these frameworks places emphasis on compromises and deals made between elites to allocate rents in order to solve the problem of violence and ensure political stability. “Extractive” political and economic institutions enable the concentration of power and rents in the hands of a small elite, with limited constraints on the political executive (Robinson, 2011). They generate barriers for various groups to effectively access formal institutions such as bureaucracies, courts or legislatures. Where access to formal institutions and the distribution or rents is more restricted, and property rights are less secure, deals rely on personalised exchange (North et al., 2011: 12, 13).

Tom Lavers’ (2016a, 2016b) analysis of Rwanda and Ethiopia shows that social protection was a key part of a development strategy which bolstered the legitimacy of the ruling coalition in aspiring developmental states employing a long-term time horizon. On the other hand, the cases of Uganda and Zambia, defined as having weak dominant party and competitive clientelist political settlements respectively, were judged to have shallower commitment to social protection (Hickey and Bukenya, 2016; Pruce and Hickey, 2017), geared towards the ‘maximis[ation of] immediate political returns (Lavers and Hickey, 2015: 9 – 11),’ and this is partly related to threats to regime continuity (Hickey et al. 2018: 12). For example, Hickey and Bukenya note:

‘Uganda’s “commitment” to social protection emerges as a somewhat half-hearted and instrumental embrace of yet another form of vote-buying clientelism, rather than a return to an ideological form of developmentalism (Hickey and Bukenya, 2016: 18).’

With a perception of electoral threat, President Yoweri Museveni was said to use the expansion of cash transfers to help shore up marginal seats. In Zambia, Pruce and Hickey (2017: 18) also found that President Michael Sata initially removed any mention of social transfers in the left-wing Patriotic Front’s (PF) manifesto, which demonstrates a shallow embrace of a specific policy option. However, various scholars draw attention to a corruption
scandal in the Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP) which offered an opportunity to present the SCT as a viable alternative to deliver on campaign commitments to “put money in [voters’] pockets (Siachiwena, 2016; Pruce and Hickey, 2017).”

While Uganda and Zambia have different settlement types, the nature of appeals by the executive to lower-level factions within these settlements appears crucial to expansion. Employing a charismatic linkage strategy, both Presidents have leveraged a populist mode of mobilisation and anti-elite discourse to help secure the political loyalty of the urban poor without alienating rural voters (Carbone, 2005; Resnick, 2010, 2014). Both regimes displayed weak ideological commitment to social protection and short time horizons. However, Zambia expanded the SCT nationally whereas Uganda expanded the programme in a single district – Yumbe (Hickey and Bukenya, 2016: 9; Siachiwena, 2016, 2017; Pruce and Hickey, 2017). This difference suggests Museveni continued to be motivated by a clientelist linkage strategy, but, following the FISP scandal, Sata responded to incentives to present a more programmatic image, even if this was largely rhetorical. This comparison demonstrates fluidity between specific types of settlements (Lavers and Hickey, 2015: 25; Bebbington et al. 2017: 21; Humphreys Bebbington and Huber, 2017). However, it also suggests that the combination of (vertical) political linkage strategies employed to engage particular constituents within the settlement may perhaps matter at least as much as the specific type of settlement itself as an explanation for the nature of expansion.

A further issue is that different types of settlement may deliver similar effects. Bebbington et al. (2017: 21) argue that the comparable success in poverty reduction in Bolivia and Peru over the last decade ‘presents a challenge to arguments about the relations between political settlements and inclusive development.’ In recent years, Bolivia had a dominant-party settlement and espoused a rhetorically socialist ideology, whereas Peru had a competitive clientelist settlement and it had both left and right-wing governments and a market-based ideology (Humphreys Bebbington and Huber, 2017; Sanborn et al. 2017). As George Gray Molina (2014) notes, both countries benefited from a commodity boom which generated fiscal surpluses and enabled procyclical spending, but how policy-makers chose to redistribute that surplus differed. Sanborn et al. (2017) note that in Peru, following the exile of President Alberto Fujimori, President Alejandro Toledo created the mining Canon in 2001 which distributes 50% of central government tax revenues from mining to subnational authorities. In Bolivia, following the exile of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in 2003, President Hormando Vaca Diez established the Direct Hydrocarbons Tax (IDH) which captured 50% of hydrocarbons revenues for the national treasury.
Both countries were judged to manifest ideas of ‘resource populism,’ with narratives of ‘justice (Bebbington et al. 2017: 8)’ and both countries introduced education and health CCTs through supreme decree. However, Bolivia hypothecated a portion of rent to fund cash transfers and Peru did not, and policy choices for programme coverage differed. In 2005, alongside the geographically targeted mining Canon, Peru introduced a poverty targeted CCT, Juntos (Together), initially distributing transfers of around USD$30 per month to 60,000 households across the four poorest provinces, expanding to 742,096 households (Peruvian Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion, 2019). Bolivia introduced two universal CCTs and adapted a universal social pension, distributing transfers of less than USD$30 per annum eventually reaching 44% of the population (Bolivian Ministry of Finance, 2016). According to Lustig et al. (2012: 4), 68.5% of benefits went to the non-poor in Bolivia compared to 29.1% in Peru. Such significant differences in coverage suggest not only that differences in political linkages may matter but lead us to enquire how ideas underpinning different political settlements may influence the divergent pathways.

iii) Transnational and Domestic Ideas

Despite earlier efforts to consider ideology as an explanatory factor for differences in the commitment of welfare states (Wilenksky, 1975), ideas have received surprisingly little attention in scholarship. While Theda Skocpol (1992: 16) notes the potential importance of national values, she argues that scholars ‘failed to pinpoint exactly how cultural values, intellectual traditions, and ideological outlooks have concretely influenced the process of political conflict and policy debate.’ Notwithstanding, idea-oriented approaches to political economy are valuable because they ‘capture dimensions of human interaction normally lost in other perspectives (Hall, 1997: 185).’ Ideas are a ‘primary source of political behaviour (Béland and Cox, 2012: 3; Gofas and Hay, 2010)’ as they provide the ‘blueprints’ that underpin rules and incentive structures (Blyth, 2003). Ideas may include ideologies, discourses and beliefs, values, social norms and even day-to-day perceptions and preferences (Schmidt, 2009; Bicchieri, Lindemans and Jiang, 2014). While interests are typically conceived as things agents want apart from the ideas agents have, Mark Blyth reminds us that cognates of interest such as wants and desires often overlap with ideas actors have related to what is socially desirable (Blyth, 2003: 697). While political elites’ interests may comprise a mixture of a desire for developmental outcomes, personal enrichment and political continuity (Levy and Walton, 2013: 15), these wants and desires are

15 The authors also found evidence of these ideas in Zambia and Ghana.
linked to elites’ own values and beliefs and their interpretation of what political constituents consider socially desirable, and which thus underpin their support for these leaders.

In this sense, ideas, interests and institutions are inter-related (see Holmes and Jones, 2010). Ideas ‘are simultaneously the media through which agents understand the world and the materials that constitute it (Blyth, 2011: 84).’ Yet in order to understand how ideas concretely influence processes of political conflict and policy debate it is important to analyse ‘what policy actors say to one another and to the public in their efforts to generate and legitimize a policy programme (Schmidt, 2002: 210).’ As Viviene Schmidt notes, without this exchange of ideas, ‘it is very difficult to explain how ideas go from individual thought to collective action (Schmidt, 2011: 56).’

There remains debate regarding the relative importance of transnational and domestic ideas in influencing social policy reforms. Lutz Leisering (2009) argues that the adoption of Social Cash Transfers (SCTs) was primarily due to the adoption of global ideas, particularly the increased acceptance of human rights discourse. Hickey and Seeking (2018) note how different ideas between DFID and the World Bank may also have influenced the nature of SCT roll-out in parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea (2016) further suggest that the spread of universalist social policy in Latin America was largely due to small groups of experts sharing ideas in international policy networks. Three channels are typically argued to be important to the diffusion of transnational policy ideas: global platforms such as the social protection floor initiative, the lobbying and policy prescriptions of IFIs, and transnational policy networks.

At a global level, the ideas of a social protection floor first emerged in February 2000, yet these only gained attention in 2008 after the global financial crisis when the Director-General of the ILO, Juan Somavia, formally announced his support for the proposal (Deacon, 2013). This was adopted by the ILO’s 183 member states in 2012, including guarantees of basic income security such as social transfers (in cash or in kind) and universal access to essential affordable social services such as health and education (Social Protection Floor Advisory Group, 2011: xxii; ILO, 2012). The proposal was embraced by United Nations agencies such as the ILO, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Cecchini and Nieves Rico (2015: 343) carried out a review of legislation on social protection in Latin America for ECLAC. They found that the great majority of countries in the region espoused a rights-based approach to social protection. Close to half had explicit guarantees to social
protection, and this was found across the political spectrum.\(^{16}\) However, as the Bolivia case will show in chapters 5 and 6, while exchanges in policy networks may influence the language used and framing for international audiences (Gonzales, 2010; Meave, 2010), they may not necessarily have substantial influence over whether the programmes chosen are targeted or universal.

Bob Deacon (2012, 2013: 17) notes that IFIs have been slow to embrace universal social protection and have impeded the universalisation of social protection in line with pro-market paradigmatic ideas and concomitant preference for a minimalist state. Adopting the perspective of cognitive heuristics, Kurt Weyland (2005, 2006) assessed pension and healthcare reform in Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Peru, focusing on the emulation of Chile’s pension privatisation. Weyland (2006: 8, 87) asserts that IFI’s main instrument of coercion, loan conditionality, was not decisive for pension privatisation in the region, even in lower-income countries where the Bank should have more leverage. In Bolivia, even though one tranche of World Bank credit was made conditional on passing pension reforms, Weyland (2005) argues that:

‘Even this poor, aid-dependent country exercised considerable autonomy in policymaking [and]… the project's fate depended primarily on domestic political considerations and power constellations, not conditionality (\textit{ibid}: 24).’

Weyland contends that redistributive struggles were ‘driven by clashing [domestic] interests, leaving little room for symbolic and normative concerns (Weyland, 2006: 9).’ He suggests that neoliberal norms which underpinned proposals for pension privatisation never achieved hegemony in social security reform in the region, and where countries were argued to have strong traditional values such as in Costa Rica, reformers resisted neoliberal ideas of individualism, stressing ideas of solidarity instead (Weyland, 2006: 89, 91). While the normative ideas of IFIs failed to resonate in various countries in the region, Weyland contends that pragmatic arguments to solve pre-existing technical problems were the most effective means of persuasion, aided by tight personal relationships between international and domestic bureaucrats. Yet, as Weyland notes ‘politicians retain[ed] the last word (2006: 83).’ In the Bolivia case, in chapter 4 we will see that it is difficult, in practice, to disentangle (normative) legitimacy considerations, ‘political acceptability (Weyland, 2006: 121)’ and the pursuit of interests in pension reform under President Sánchez de Lozada.

\(^{16}\) Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, and Uruguay
While Weyland (2006) offers compelling evidence for the precedence of domestic sovereignty in pension reform in the late 1990s, in the mid to late 2000s the rapid diffusion of CCTs in the region suggests that IFIs may have played a more significant role than in pension reform. Across various countries in the region, the World Bank and IADB have been shown to play an important promotional role, hosting conferences, exchanges and providing funding, particularly to lower-income countries such as Honduras, Nicaragua and Bolivia (Sugiyama, 2011; McGuire, 2013; Pena, 2014).

Weyland’s (2006: 9 – 11, 39) argument is that international normative appeals from international agencies through ‘moral suasion and legitimacy’ were not persuasive. While we agree with this contention regarding transnational normative persuasion, we argue that domestic ‘legitimacy considerations’ are far more important than Weyland suggests. The case of Mongolia’s CMP is an example where the normative preference of IFIs for targeting narrowly was clearly expressed but was resisted due, in part, to a failure of their ideas to cohere with local societal values. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) maintained that the CMP was ‘costly because some of the recipients are not poor (ADB, 2017: 2)’ and the World Bank claimed that ‘many of the beneficiaries are not those most in need… [and] falling commodity prices serve[d] to amplify the need for the programs to achieve their goals efficiently (Anderson, 2015: 2).’ Hodges et al. (2007) argued that this targeted vision was at odds with the prevailing values of the Mongolian public and their memories of universal programmes in the 1980s. The electoral platform of the Motherland Democratic Coalition (MDC) in 2004 outlined the goal to ‘redistribute “social wealth” [to] the majority of the people (MDC 2004: 1, in Fritz, 2014: 56 – 7),’ expressing a clear preference for universalism. Yet, focus group data from Hodges et al. (2007) and Yeung and Howes (2015) contradict one another regarding whether citizens were in favour of targeting cash transfers to the poor or universal programmes. Survey data from the Sant Maral Foundation suggest that support for universal cash transfers actually declined between 2009 and 2016 versus other forms of spending.17 Notwithstanding this disagreement, leaders’ interpretations of these normative preferences suggest that a clash of societal values was likely an important consideration.

Given higher levels of aid dependence in many sub-Saharan African countries, one would assume that IFIs and bilateral donors would have greater leverage to promote the adoption of their ideas such as poverty-targeted social transfers and CCTs. However, as Hickey et al.

17 Support for universal cash transfer programmes declined from 20.5% to 8.3% over the period and support for social programmes for the poor also declined from 14.4% to 10%. Support for economic development and investment in education and health were consistently more popular options (Sant Maral Foundation, 2009 – 2016), but the erratic provision of cash transfers throughout the period likely contributed to this fall.
(2018: 9) note, donors’ ideas may be limited to putting the idea of policy reform on the agenda, rather than ensuring the adoption of specific reforms. Evidence from Rwanda (Lavers, 2016a), Ethiopia (Lavers, 2016b), Tanzania (Ulriksen, 2016) and Botswana (Hamer and Seekings, 2017) suggest that a variety of governments and regime types may have had strong resistance to pressure from foreign donors to reform social protection. Lavers and Hickey (2015: 3) thus argue that transnational ideas must be compatible with the ideas and interests of domestic elites.

Lavers and Hickey’s (2015) use of Schmidt’s (2002) framework for discursive institutionalism helpfully distinguishes different types, levels, and directions of ideas. In terms of idea types, the case of Zambia illustrates well the relative importance of normative and cognitive ideas, within coordinative discourse among policy actors. Schmidt (2002: 214) distinguishes cognitive ideas, which establish a logic of necessity, typically based on scientific data providing technical solutions and normative ideas, which demonstrate the appropriateness of a policy and typically appeal to societal values.

Various scholars have drawn attention to the importance of normative ideas of key government actors in blocking reform in Zambia (Cherrier, 2013; Kabandula and Seekings, 2016; Siachiwena, 2016; Pruce and Hickey, 2017; Seekings, 2017). In particular, Finance Minister Ng’andu Magande was argued to have viewed himself as a self-made man and had strong ‘productivist’ beliefs which favoured work and wealth creation rather than state “handouts (Seekings, 2017: 16).” Comparing budget speeches of Finance Minister Alexander Chikwanda who took over from Magande in October 2011, we see clear reference to Patriotic Front’s manifesto commitments to deliver ‘more money in people’s pockets (Chikwanda, paragraph 5, 2012),’ but for the 2014 budget speech, which announced the aforementioned funding increase for the SCT, we find criticism of ‘poorly targeted subsidy programmes’ and ‘better designed social protection’ such as the SCT and new mention of empirical evidence published two months before regarding programme effectiveness in ‘targeting the poor’ and ‘reducing poverty (Chikwanda, 2013, paragraphs 62 – 3, see also Michelo, 2015).’

This suggests that normative ideas were a key factor blocking reform, but cognitive ideas were employed as material to address elite actors’ prioritised development challenges (Pruce and Hickey, 2017). The degree to which scientific knowledge (cognitive ideas) was important is disputed. Some scholars suggest the positive dividends from positioning political choices as technical ones (Hickey and Seekings, 2018: 1), others consider that scientific arguments were counter-productive in the case (Harland, 2011; Cherrier, 2013). Empirical
evidence may be useful to convince bureaucrats regarding available policy alternatives, but leaders themselves also need to be open to empirical evidence. Given the tight relationship between actors’ interests and ideas, they must also cohere with leaders’ normative ideas (Lavers and Hickey, 2015). Hence, in line with Weyland’s (2006) argument, while transnational actors may promote available policy options, adoption requires some degree of anchoring and coherence with the normative ideas of these leaders, otherwise transnational policy ideas may fall on deaf ears. In Ethiopia, Lavers (2016b: 19) argues that normative ideational fit trumped evidence. In Ghana we also see proposals for a two-year time limit for the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme from the Minister for Gender, Children and Social Protection, Otiko Afisa Djaba, based on the belief that “social assistance should be temporary, that Ghanaians should be productive and take care of their own daily needs (GhanaWeb, 22/10/17).” Hence, in quite varied political contexts, normative ideas appear to lead the discussion.

In terms of levels of ideas, Lavers (2016a) makes the persuasive argument in Rwanda that ideational fit goes beyond policy-level ideas, as these were reframed and adapted to fit with local traditions and paradigmatic ideas related to the role of the state and programmatic ideas related to the role of socio-economic development in enfranchising stakeholders within the political settlement (Lavers, 2016a: 3, 6). Indeed, as Lavers notes (2018), normative justifications are central to revenue sharing arrangements in commodity dependent countries. As we will see in the Bolivia case, paradigmatic ideas of “resource nationalism” are key to justify rent capture and hypothecation for social expenditures. We also find evidence for this narrative in Mongolia and Zambia (Fritz, 2009; Resnik, 2014), as social protection ultimately fits within a wider “distributional regime (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005 in Lavers and Hickey, 2015)” related to the natural resource sector. However, as the Peru case above suggested, whether resource nationalist ideas translate into the choice for universal rather than targeted social assistance appears to hinge in large part on domestic ideas related to targeting and universalism.

While transnational actors may play a role in promoting policy ideas, higher-level societal values and norms appear to be significantly more important in influencing the scope of benefits. In higher income countries, Huber and Stephens (2001) note that in social democratic states, a citizenship criterion predominates, and this has contributed to the adoption of universal programmes, whereas in liberal welfare states, contributory principles predominate, and we find a preference for means-tested programmes. The degree to which societal values, beliefs and ideologies may play a role has been questioned in Latin America.
due to inconsistencies in the ideology of political parties supporting reform (Weyland, 2006). To demonstrate this, Pribble (2013) underscores the ideological variation of Argentina’s Justicialist Party between the Menem and Fernández de Kirchner administrations and the distance between words and actions for universal social policy in Venezuela under President Hugo Chávez. This may also reflect that fact that higher level ideas do not always translate into coherent policy proposals due, in part, to incentive problems within the political linkage strategies these leaders pursued.

Schmidt distinguishes two functions of discourse: a coordinative function which represents the exchange of ideas among policy actors, and a communicative function which serves policy actors as the means for persuading the public, through discussion and deliberation (Schmidt, 2002, 2008). This provides us with different arenas in which ideas are exchanged and legitimised. However, it is also important to understand how political frontiers are drawn in the construction of discourse, as these shape which ideas are included and which are excluded. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s (1985) notion of ‘nodal points,’ which are ‘privileged discursive points of partial fixation (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 100)’ is useful to understand how dominant discourses frame and legitimise policy choices. One key component which underpins this is ‘the construction of antagonisms and the drawing of political frontiers between “insiders” and “outsiders (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 3 – 4),”’ as this helps define what is ‘sayable’ and ‘exclud[es] certain possibilities (Laclau, 1980 in Panizza, and Miorelli, 2012: 83).’

Comparing Chile Solidario/Ingreso Ético Familiar (Solidary Chile/Ethical Family Income, IEF) and Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo Humano (Human Development Grant, BDH), Romina Miorelli (2018) argues that shifts in ‘discursive framing’ and ‘resignification’ are important to understanding cash transfer reforms (see also Panizza and Miorelli, 2012). Miorelli argues that ideas related to the role of the state were a key distinguishing feature, and this centred on two nodal points: the notion of state “assistance” (asistencialismo) and re-interpretations of the past governments’ approaches to poverty. The reframing was in line with each government’s political projects and normative views in relation to the purpose of social assistance. In Ecuador, programme expansion was argued to be linked to President Rafael Correa’s aim to recover the interventionist role of the state, as expressed in the Citizens’ Revolution (Revolución Ciudadana) in his electoral campaign (Miorelli, 2018). On the other hand, in Chile, the transition to the IEF expressed a fundamentally different view of the roles and responsibilities of state and citizens, with ministerial representatives affirming that Chile Solidario was designed to connect the poorest families with the state whereas the IEF was
designed to connect the poorest families with work. In this sense, *asistencialismo* was re-signified either to legitimize and expand the role of the state in providing social assistance (Ecuador) or to de-legitimize and reduce the role of the state in providing such assistance (Chile).

Therefore, we see that ideas may play a significant role in the introduction and expansion of cash transfer programmes. The relative weight of transnational and domestic ideas may vary depending on the relative leverage of international actors and how their ideas fit with domestic interests and ideas. Likewise, whether policy-makers will respond chiefly to normative or cognitive ideas may also vary between cases. However, we suggest that normative ideas are likely to carry greater weight in terms of defining programme scope and preference for universalism. We also note the importance of different levels of ideas and how higher-level ideas such as those related to the role of the state help to frame policy-level choices and the scope of interventions. The drawing of political frontiers between different stakeholders may also be important in terms of framing and legitimisation of policy options pursued.

iv) Conclusion

In this chapter, we first analysed the potential role of economic factors in shaping the introduction and expansion of social protection and the role of economic institutions related to the capacity to mobilise resources and capture rent to expand social policy expenditures in a natural resource dependent context. We noted the importance of fiscal space as an enabler for sustainable social policy expansion, and then demonstrated the challenges of domestic resource mobilisation in low and lower-middle income countries. However, we argued that the capture and hypothecation of natural resource rent provides an important opportunity for natural resource dependent countries to expand social policy. We then demonstrated the contingent role of IFIs and their influence during moments of fiscal constraint. Comparing Mongolia and Zambia, we showed how differing capacity to capture and hypothecate rent has an important bearing on the capacity to introduce and sustain large scale social assistance.

We then reviewed arguments for how political institutions shape commitment to expand social protection. We considered class-based explanations related to the strength of labour and civil society and how these forces are related to partisan politics. We argued that labour movement strength is more likely to play a role for certain forms of social protection such as social insurance, yet less important for social assistance such as non-contributory pensions.
and CCTs. Likewise, we argued that moments of crisis may provide opportunities for labour
unions and peasant organisations to channel their demands through left-wing political
parties, but we expressed doubts regarding the importance of partisan politics for the
adoption of CCTs. We then assessed the relative importance of political linkage strategies
and how the combination of linkage strategies employed may shape the scope of policy
choices towards universalism in Latin America. We showed how, under populist leadership,
programmatic and charismatic linkages both provide incentives for universalism.

Given the focus of scholarship on higher-income welfare states, we then reviewed recent
research on the political economy of social protection in sub-Saharan Africa for comparison
with lower-income countries outside the region. We focused on arguments for the potential
importance of elections and how different political settlement types may influence the
incentives to introduce and expand social protection. We argued that electoral competition
was not a necessary factor, but that cash transfers may aid political branding, particularly for
populist leaders seeking to bolster their legitimacy. We found similarities between sub-
Saharan African cases and other low-income countries such as in the role of the President
and the bolstering of commitments during electoral periods. As regards political settlement
types, we affirmed the importance of negotiating control over rents and that perceptions of
electoral threat may provide an expedient (Lavers and Hickey, 2015; Hickey et al. 2018).
However, these aspects appear to cut across political settlement types. Comparing Zambia
and Uganda and then Peru and Bolivia, we argued that (vertical) political linkage strategies
between the executive and lower-level factions may be at least as important as the type of
settlement in explaining policy expansion.

Finally, we considered the importance of ideas. We argued that global initiatives such as the
social protection floor initiative have played a weak role and we agreed with the contention
that conditionalities from IFIs are rarely an effective disincentive for policy expansion
(Weyland, 2006). However, we showed through the case of Mongolia that this may be
temporarily effective at times of severe fiscal constraint. We disagreed with Weyland’s
(2006) assessment regarding the importance of normative concerns and suggested that
these may be very significant when they are domestic rather than international. We found
Lavers and Hickey’s (2015) argument in favour of ideational fit to be persuasive and that
higher-level ideas are likely to play a key role in framing and signification of policy options,
and this entails closer attention to paradigmatic ideas and nodal points (Lavers, 2016a;
Miorelli, 2017, 2018). While transnational ideas may be employed at the level of policy
instruments, we suggest that higher-level societal values and norms may be more important
in influencing the scope of benefits and this is key to understanding the drive towards universalism.
Chapter 2: Cash Transfers and Socio-political Effects

The previous chapter outlined the potential drivers for the introduction and expansion of social protection. We saw how different political linkage strategies and normative ideas may constitute key factors driving universalism. However, different political linkage strategies and ideas may also contribute to particular effects in citizen-state relations.

In this chapter we will first consider different notions of social contracts and how these relate to different approaches to social protection. We will then reflect on how different ideas regarding the role of the state and citizenship may lead recipients to view their entitlements differently. Thirdly, we will consider the argument regarding cash transfers as rightful shares of natural resource wealth or as patronage.

We will then review scholarship related to potential outcomes in line with notions of rights-based social protection. We will assess the importance of legal guarantees and accountability processes. Finally, we will review evidence of citizens' perceptions of programmes across different contexts and modalities, reflecting on potential reciprocity effects between recipients, political parties and leaders.

\textbf{i) The Role of the State and Citizen-state Contracts}

We saw in the previous chapter that transnational actors may play an important role in the introduction or expansion of social protection in some contexts. However, with regards to citizen-state relations, political commitment for social protection is ‘best understood in terms of a “contract” between states and citizens that emerge in response to domestic political interactions rather than relationships with external actors (Hickey, 2009: 474 – 5).’ Hickey (2011) asserts that social protection is a means of extending the “social contract” to the poorest groups in society, and the notion of a social contract ought to ‘relocate social protection within a project of redistributive justice that is arguably required to underpin a long-term challenge to chronic poverty (Hickey, 2007: 9).’ However, as Hickey (2011) notes, there are various conceptions of the social contract, and these imply different relationships between citizens and the state, underpinned by different societal visions and goals, as the table on the following page shows:
The following two sections will detail key differences between interest-based and rights-based contracts from the table above. We will look at how these relate to the different approaches to social protection, and how they may potentially contribute to different outcomes in citizen-state relations.

a) **Interest-based Social Contracts and Co-responsibility**

The notion of an interest-based social contract emerges from the work of Thomas Hobbes (1959 [1651]), who advocated that men (and women) laid down their natural liberty as a means to secure stability and political order (Freeman, 2009). The Hobbesian view is argued to be morally agnostic and grounded in antecedent individual interests (Gauthier, 1997; Freeman, 2009). David Hume (1969 [1740]: 547) argued the contract was a temporary state rather than ‘eternal, immutable, and universally obligatory (Hume, 1969 [1740]: 547; 1983: 23, 34),’ and that a ‘sense of justice’ arises on teleological and consequentialist grounds when the ‘distribution of scarce resources must be negotiated (Hume, 1983 [1742]: 21; Nozick, 1974).’ Economic liberals, like Friedrich Hayek (2006 [1960]), have appropriated a Hobbesian position, underlining how the “coercive” nature of the state undermines personal liberty, and this led other scholars to hail the “minimalist” character of Hobbes’ ‘radical contractarianism (Gauthier, 1997: 135),’ which entailed a reduced role of the state.

These ideas partly inform a minimalist and temporal understanding of social protection. Norton, Conway and Foster argue that the term ‘social protection’ should cover only action to protect ‘those who fall temporarily or persistently under levels of livelihood deemed acceptable (2001: 4 in Marcus and Wilkinson, 2002: 2).’ Within this conception, social protection most commonly provides ‘small palliatives [designed] to contain the symptoms [of poverty] rather than addressing the root causes (Marcus and Wilkinson, 2002: 5).’ This

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**Figure 1. Different Types of Social Contract**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberal / Interest-based</th>
<th>Rights-based (negative)</th>
<th>Rights-based (positive)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Proponents</strong></td>
<td>Hobbes, Hayek, Nozick, Gauthier</td>
<td>Locke, Hume</td>
<td>Rousseau, Rawls, Habermas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Societal vision</strong></td>
<td>Liberal, individualistic and meritocratic notions of justice</td>
<td>Individualistic</td>
<td>Commonwealth, equality-based notion of justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social contract goal</strong></td>
<td>Protection, stability, order</td>
<td>Protecting existing property rights</td>
<td>Promoting social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agents</strong></td>
<td>Rational, utilitarian, individualistic, and selfish</td>
<td>Rights-holders protecting personal interests</td>
<td>Impartial and cooperative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adapted from Hickey, 2011: 8*
perspective is known as a “safety net” approach and has generally been associated with the World Bank’s Social Risk Management (SRM) framework (Holzmann et al., 2003). The framework was informed by social assistance measures designed to cushion the transitional costs of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s and learning from the East Asian crisis of the late 1990s. From this perspective, social protection was designed to fill temporary gaps in private social security provision which were seen to be the result of minor market distortions. It emphasised the role (and shared responsibility) of various actors beyond the state.

As we saw in chapter 1, IFIs commonly emphasize that social assistance should be provided based on need. However, various scholars have also noted the importance of “co-responsibility;” a mutual agreement between recipients and the state (Rawlings and Rubio, 2005, cited in Hickey, 2011: 10). Co-responsibility finds clearest expression through CCTs. States have a duty to offer social assistance to vulnerable groups and these groups must meet certain conditions in order to receive transfers. As the World Bank notes, social protection is 'a vehicle for implementing social contracts, securing people’s rights, and fulfilling their obligations (World Bank, 2012: XIV).' In this, citizens’ duties and rights go together. Maxine Molyneux expressed it thus:

‘Co-responsibility is formalised through a quasi-contractual understanding that in return for the entitlement proffered by the programme, certain obligations have to be discharged by the two parties (Molyneux, 2007: 26).’

However, the discharge of obligations may not be equivalent between both parties, and as Molyneux’s (2006) reading of Mexico’s Oportunidades programme suggests, women were perceived to be at the “service of the state,” rather than the state serving mothers and their children as citizens. Indeed, the very notion of behavioural conditionalities has led some scholars to suggest that through CCTs:

‘The state is not structuring a civil society relationship and its presence is not constant but contingent. People do not become its beneficiaries by becoming members of anything (Mahon, 2009: 6 – 7).’

Entitlements which are contingent upon behavioural conditionalities may not necessarily be understood by recipients as an entitlement. Notwithstanding, elite attitudes towards cash transfers may demand some form of conditionality, reflecting perceptions of the deservingness of recipients of social assistance (Graham, 2002). A recent study in Malawi,
for example, illustrates negative images of poor recipients as passive and dependent, and that redistribution may be considered unfair by elites (Kalebe-Nyamongo and Marquette, 2014). Thus, in some contexts, co-responsibility may be deemed necessary by decision-makers to ensure public approval for programmes and their sustainability.

As Armando Barrientos and Juan Miguel Villa (2013) point out, the tax-paying public may also care about whether programmes are effective. Behavioural conditionalities for recipients and rigorous programme evaluation may make cash transfers more palatable to taxpayers whose support is generally, but not always, needed to fund programmes (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009). In reviewing the case of Brazil, Lindert and Vincensini (2010) affirm that not only must governments announce the existence of conditionalities; these must be viewed as being credibly monitored and enforced. This thus relies on notions of a private contract regarding economic exchange (Habermas, 1996: 93) or a fiscal social contract related to taxes (Bebbington et al. 2008: 892) rather than a socio-political contract regarding social legitimation. Large revenue streams from the natural resource economy can overpower the government's ability to implement successful taxation systems which create a bargain between state and citizens, and as such a fiscal social contract may provide a weak basis to build social pacts between recipients and non-recipients or between social classes.

However, researchers from the Center for Global Development (CGD) have also advocated for cash transfers in oil-rich states as a means to promote co-responsibility between citizens and the state. Todd Moss, for example, argues that governments should provide a ‘resource dividend’ from oil income. The logic behind the argument is that citizens in oil-rich states presently ‘pay nothing and expect nothing… [They do not] feel like the money [from oil] was theirs to start with,’ and thus, ‘governments are released from their duty to be responsive to [citizens’] needs (Moss, 2011: 4, Segal, 2011).’ Introducing cash transfers is hypothesised to make citizens pay taxes and increase levels of scrutiny of governments who, in turn, become more transparent, accountable and legitimate (Birdsall and Subramanian, 2004; Gillies, 2010; Moss, 2011). However, they also express doubts in contexts such as Nigeria that ‘rather than democratizing control over resources, cash transfers [might] further democratize rent-seeking, and [could] broaden and deepen the already dominant focus on accessing state largesse which characterizes state-citizen relations (Sayne and Gillies, 2011: 19).’ If there is a preceding pattern of informal patronage, it seems likely recipients would assume the requirement of ‘reciprocity and expectations of continued loyalty (Hyden, 2006 in Harland, 2011: 3; Granvik, 2015).’ Based on the available evidence in these cases, it is by no means clear that cash transfers break this pattern.

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Therefore, in sum, an interest-based contract endorses a view of temporary assistance from a minimalist state with co-responsibility between citizens and states. When cash transfers are introduced under such a philosophy, it would seem they would be more likely to engender relatively shallow, transactional and transitory citizen-state relations.

b) Rights-based Social Contracts and Citizenship

By comparison, a rights-based approach to the social contract emerged out of the work of Jean Jacques Rousseau (1968 [1762]). Rousseau (1968: 7) argued that ‘all legitimate authority among men must be based on covenants’ and ‘the common good’ arises as a by-product of establishing civil societies, to reconcile the ‘conflict between private interests,’ and ‘harmony’ of interests forms a ‘social pact’ within civil society which ‘establishes equality among its citizens (1968: 26, 35).’ This perspective of equality is argued to be deontological rather than teleological (Habermas, 1996: 93).

John Rawls attempted to reconcile different notions of a social contract through his concept of ‘justice as fairness,’ which had two leading principles of liberty and equality (Rawls, 1971: 60). One key concern for the equality principle is the notion of a “social minimum (Rawls, 1971: 276),” which ‘applies to the distribution of income and wealth (Rawls, 1971: 61).’ Rawls considered that social and economic inequalities should be of the greatest benefit to the least advantaged members of society (Rawls, 1985: 32). Armando Barrientos (2013, 2016a) underlines Rawls’ assertion that the ‘theory of justice must regulate […] the inequalities in life prospects between citizens that arise from social starting positions, natural advantages and historical contingencies (Rawls, 2005: 268).’ The social minimum, which resembles a social protection floor, is guaranteed by the government through family allowances and employment and sick leave pay or other income supplements (Rawls, 1971: 243). Thus, Rawls’ focus is not on needs and co-responsibilities, but rather the exercise of basic liberties as equal citizens (Freeman, 2009). In this sense, Barrientos (2013) argues that Rawls’ view is developmental, rather than compensatory.

A rights-based social minimum also partly reflects the ILO’s 1942 definition of social assistance as ‘a service which provides benefits to persons of small means as a right in amounts sufficient to meet minimum standards of need and financed from taxation (ILO in Guhan, 1994: 46).’ Guhan (1994: 38) argued that protective measures are insufficient, and that social protection should also encompass preventive and promotional measures which are also developmental:
• **Protective** or safety-net measures that are specific in their objective of guaranteeing relief from deprivation;
• **Preventive** measures that seek more directly to avert deprivation in specific ways, and;
• **Promotional** measures that aim to improve endowments, exchange entitlements, real incomes and consumption and investment in human capital.

This scope was later expanded to encompass “transformative” measures which include policies to tackle power imbalances in society that encourage, create and sustain vulnerabilities, and to support equity and empowerment (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2007).

As per definitions of the welfare state, a social minimum was expected to consist of entitlements based on citizenship, not charity (Wilensky, 1975: 1). Citizenship is considered both as a constitutive element and an outcome of social protection. Following T.H. Marshall (1950), Leisering and Barrientos (2013) argue that social assistance can also help to generate “social citizenship.” For Marshall (1950: 18, 15), citizenship is a status of equal membership of a community. He divided citizenship into civil, political, and social components, and argued that these needed to go together, but since the English Poor Law, minimum rights were detached from citizenship status as recipients of this assistance forfeited their rights to enter workhouses. This generated a sense of stigma for those who depended on the state to support their livelihood. Citizenship implies ‘universalistic claims (Leisering and Barrientos, 2013: 3)’ based on equality, and for Leisering and Barrientos (2013), social assistance can allow recipients greater opportunities to participate in their community and society, enabling them to gain legal recognition, to participate in their community, and to receive economic support as a full member of that community.

Therefore, in sum, a rights-based contract endorses a view of citizenship-based assistance from a protective state which seeks to enfranchise and support equity and empowerment. Where social assistance is introduced under such a philosophy, it seems likely that it would create deeper, more stable citizen-state relations. Yet, more radical arguments have been made regarding how active citizens may claim their rights to social protection.

**ii) Cash Transfers and Rightful Shares**

Following Ranciere’s (2010) notion of a ‘share of the shareless,’ James Ferguson (2015) contends that recent campaigns for Basic Income Grants (BIG) in Southern Africa may be viewed as claims for ‘rightful shares’ based on citizenship. For Ferguson, the demand is not
for equality, nor a right to a share, but for the share itself – the material good. He argues that such a direct claim is more forceful than the affirmation of legal abstractions such as rights (Ferguson, 2015: 48 – 51).

Ferguson’s argument may be of particular import for natural resource dependent economies. He suggests that ‘there is something especially compelling about the idea of a rightful share when the wealth in question derives from precious substances that almost magically emerge from within the earth (Ferguson, 2015: 57).’ As Paul Collier notes, ‘natural assets have no natural owners (Collier, 2011: 17),’ and are not viewed as income in the same way as income from working is. Collier thus suggests natural resources are susceptible to rent-seeking. Yet, Ferguson argues that:

‘Distributive claims [for cash transfers] are rooted in a conviction that citizens […] are the rightful owners of a vast national wealth (including mineral wealth) of which they have been unjustly deprived through a historic process of racialized dispossession – a conception that provides a very different, and much more politicized justification for cash payments than is available in the usual framework of “social assistance” as generous help for the needy (Ferguson, 2015: 26).’

Therefore, Ferguson draws a direct connection between resource nationalism and a distributive claim for social assistance. In the case of South Africa’s Post-Apartheid settlement, there may be such a politicised justification, where transfers are constitutional entitlements and seen to be legitimate across class and race divides (Seekings, 2008). Ferguson (2015: 196) suggests that cases such as Mongolia and Bolivia may also fit the same mould but does not elaborate further.

On one hand, Ferguson argues that a paradigm of the gift is the wrong way to think about cash transfers. It ought neither to be a reciprocal exchange for labour (wages) nor good conduct (the premise of conditional cash transfers) nor as an unreciprocated gift (assistance, charity, a helping hand) but instead as a share, a ‘rightful allocation due to a rightful owner (2015: 178).’ However, Ferguson acknowledges that:

‘Social assistance is specified in the South African constitution as a right. But it is, in practice, widely understood as fundamentally motivated by a kind of generosity. In this way, it is often implicitly styled as a kind of unreciprocated gift – “assistance” or “help,” “granted” to the needy and unfortunate, motivated by such things as kindness and compassion (Ferguson, 2015: 175).’
Therefore, recipients ought to view themselves as rightful owners of natural resource wealth, and they ought to make a claim for a share through cash transfers, or the right to cash transfers, and ought to view the transfer as an entitlement. Yet, as the Bolivia case will demonstrate, evidence of claim-making is rare, and it is unclear that cash transfer recipients necessarily view cash transfers as entitlements.

How programmes are presented to the public by leaders and the normative ideas that frame programmes are not only an important drivers of policy change, they are also likely to shape perceptions regarding the meaning of provisions. African National Congress MP Julius Malema’s demands in South Africa for a “share of the cake (Ferguson, 2015: 170),” Mongolia’s Democratic Party’s campaign promise for a “share of the treasure (Fritz, 2014: 55)” and Bolivian Finance Minister’s calls to “increase the cake for all Bolivians (Arce, in ERBOL, 13/2/10)” all leverage the language of universalism and express a wide desire to share the benefits of natural resource wealth with all citizens. While each of these cases express resource nationalist sentiments and emancipatory goals, a share of the cake or treasure has an uneasy association with rights and entitlements.

Ferguson (2015: 162) himself suggests that the ‘state may well appear to the citizen not principally as a protector of equal rights but as a material benefactor or even patron.’ He reveals that a majority of South Africans agreed with the Afrobarometer survey question: “people are like children, the government should take care of them like a parent (Afrobarometer, 2009, 4).” Therefore, even in South Africa, cash transfers partly constitute a paternalistic form of reciprocity rather than a rightful claim. From their multi-country research programme in sub-Saharan Africa, Hickey et al. (2018: 16) suggest that social assistance may more readily form part of the politics of patronage than a politics of rightful claims. In this thesis we will argue that such an interpretation most likely also applies to countries which rely on natural resource rent.

iii) From Patronage to Entitlements

Notwithstanding these reservations, a growing literature has made the claim that under certain conditions social protection may strengthen rights-based social contracts (Hickey, 2011; Barrientos and Pellissery, 2013; Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2017; Ayliffe et al. 2018). This suggests that some countries have transitioned from patronage-based relations to rights-based relations. In order to assess this potential progress, we will review recent scholarship focused on legal guarantees, citizen-state interface, and how these may translate into
citizens’ perceptions of programmes. The table below illustrates potential indicators of differences between cash transfers seen as entitlements or patronage:

**Figure 2. Entitlements or Patronage**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Entitlements</th>
<th>Patronage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal guarantees</strong></td>
<td>• Programmes underpinned by laws</td>
<td>• Programmes enacted by presidential decrees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• States enforce legal standards (regular, predictable, durable provision)</td>
<td>• States do not enforce legal standards (irregular, unpredictable, temporal provision)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information</strong></td>
<td>• Citizens well informed about rights and entitlements and how to claim these</td>
<td>• Citizens poorly informed about rights and entitlements and how to claim these</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participation</strong></td>
<td>• Citizens actively participate in programme decision-making or oversight</td>
<td>• Citizens passively participate in programme decision-making or oversight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mobilisation</strong></td>
<td>• Citizens have the confidence to complain, and make collective claims</td>
<td>• Citizens do not have the confidence to complain, and make collective claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Response</strong></td>
<td>• States consistently provide answers and address concerns related to programme delivery</td>
<td>• States rarely provide answers and address concerns related to programme delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceptions</strong></td>
<td>• Recipients consider targeting to be fair</td>
<td>• Recipients consider targeting to be unfair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Recipients consider programmes to be entitlements</td>
<td>• Recipients consider programmes to be help, favours, gifts, or charity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Recipients feel recognition and solidarity</td>
<td>• Recipients feel stigmatised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Citizens trust the state</td>
<td>• Citizens do not trust the state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own construction, drawing on Jones et al. 2013; Barrientos 2013; Barrientos and Pellissery, 2013; Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2017; Ayliffe et al. 2018

For a rights-based programme, we might assume that there would be formal guarantees enshrined in law with clear, enforceable standards. We would assume that citizens would be well informed regarding their entitlements, they would actively participate in programme oversight and have the confidence to complain and make collective claims to improve programme provisions. We would also expect service providers to address recipients’ complaints and provide timely answers to programme delivery challenges. The following sections will assess the state of evidence on legal guarantees and accountability which may shape citizens’ perceptions of programmes, and therein test the plausibility that cash transfers may contribute to rights-based citizen-state relations.

**a) Legal Guarantees**

Legal guarantees are noted to be a cornerstone of social protection’s contribution to rights-based citizen-state relations (Barrientos and Pellissery, 2013; Leisering and Barrientos,
2013; Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2017; Ayliffe et al. 2018). However, few cases are presented as having fully embraced rights-based social contracts. The most oft-cited cases are post-Apartheid South Africa, post-authoritarian Brazil, and India in the wake of a serious drought in the state of Rajasthan. The acquisition of legal guarantees is presented as a long struggle of civil society and states attempting to forge new political settlements, offering some form of reparation for past injustices (Hickey, 2011).

Constitutions define state responsibilities towards their citizens, and the services they are entitled to receive from the state as a citizen. Barrientos and Pellissery (2013) define the constituent assembly discussions in Brazil as a ‘single event social contract [...] (2013: 7),’ arguing that these discussions in 1988, a few years after democracy was re-established, provided an opportunity for the state to include the right to social protection based on citizenship, as opposed to the contributory principle which dominated the development of social insurance (Sugiyama, 2016: 1202; see also Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2017). In India, Barrientos and Pellissery (2013) argue that sustained efforts from social movements in the 1990s culminated in a Public Interest Litigation in 2001, which implicated the Indian state in drought and starvation of rural inhabitants in Rajasthan. This gave rise to a “Right to Food” campaign, a coalition between activists, academics and poor citizens, who lobbied for an entitlement-based Employment Guarantee Act. Thus, change was partly demand-driven.

The act of extending benefits to enfranchise marginalised or excluded groups, in itself, may also contribute to perceptions of recognition as citizens and a sense of inclusion. Hickey’s (2011) example of South Africa’s enfranchisement of veterans, mineworkers, white working-class voters, and then black citizens in the wake of apartheid rule demonstrates how a rights-based social contract has been extended. He suggests that efforts under black-majority rule aimed at reversing previous discrimination and brought millions more citizens within the contract as part of a wider move by the new regime to forge a new political settlement. Equally, in Bolivia, the introduction of the Bonosol social pension to include older persons without a contributory pension has been argued to have contributed to a sense of citizenship by pensioners, as pensioners were said to feel included for the first time (Skinner, 2006).

By comparison, in Peru, the Juntos CCT was first launched in the isolated district of Chuschi which had suffered under Shining Path guerrillas. The programme was presented as a ‘claim for inclusion’ (reclamo de inclusión)18 with the phrase ‘Chuschi is also Peru’ from a

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18 “Reclamo” also means ‘complaint’ or ‘protest,’ but it is typically used in the sense of ‘reclaiming rights.’
population that was ‘systematically marginalised from national attention (Arroyo, 2010: 29).’ President Toledo changed the name of the programme from “Pro-Perú,” which shared the initials of the incumbent political party, to Juntos (Together). Notwithstanding, inclusion was seen as a process of patronage (empadronamiento) of help (ayudas) from the government which launched the programme seven months before national elections. Those interviewed in Chuschi believed the programme would be a one-time payment (abono económico extraordinario) (Arroyo, 2010: 49) rather than a durable benefit based on citizenship and rights. Evidence from various sources in Peru points to recipients’ submissive attitude and prevailing sense of stigma. Transfers were commonly associated with an act of patronage and co-option (Jones et al., 2007; Molyneux and Thomson, 2011). Given this concern, the programme website later underlined explicitly that ‘the social work that is carried out in the name of the state has no link to political organisations, nor promotes candidates of any type (Peruvian Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion, 2014).’

It is also possible that different types of legal guarantee, such as laws and decrees, may entail a different depth of political commitment and different perceptions from recipients regarding their rights. As Bolivia had a constituent assembly in the period of study and there are differences in the legal status between the social pension and CCTs, we may test whether these differences provide different opportunities for citizens to claim their rights.

b) Citizen-state Interface

Various notions of rights-claims demand not only that there are legal entitlements, but that citizens are able to participate in and actively contribute to how programmes are managed. As Jones et al. (2013: 46), note:

‘While social protection can make a critical contribution to the development of state-citizen social contract, this contribution is likely to be limited unless adequate provisions are made for accountability, citizen feedback and independent oversight of programme operations.’

Following Cornwall and Gaventa (2001), Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2017: 19) argue that citizen-state interface is crucial to building social contracts through social protection, and that social accountability may play an important role in moving towards justice-based social protection. While social accountability remains a contested concept and its scope is disputed, with particular disagreement regarding whether citizen participation in policy-making is included (Bukenya et al. 2012; Joshi, 2014), citizen-state interface is typically at the centre; understood as two-way interaction between
service users and providers (Malena et al. 2004; Gaventa, 2006; Grandvoinnet et al. 2015). There remains disagreement regarding the balance between state-driven and citizen-driven action in definitions. However, there is a high level of agreement regarding the inclusion of the following features: the expectation that citizens demand information or explanation and enforcement of legal standards, monitor the quality of services, and may hold demonstrations or protest. State actors are expected to provide information, enforce legal standards, and improve the provision of services, addressing grievances, abuse or corruption (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012; Joshi, 2014; Grandvoinnet et al. 2015).

Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2017) argue that different types of interface enable different forms of citizenship outcomes. Following Gaventa (2006), they highlight differences between closed spaces where programme decisions are made behind closed doors, invited spaces which are driven by states, and claimed spaces which social movements create (Gaventa, 2006). Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2017) suggest that closed spaces make citizens “consumers” of state services whereas invited spaces make citizens “users and choosers” and created spaces make citizens “makers and shapers” of government policies (Cornwall and Gaventa, 2001: 1). This latter category, in particular, might be argued to help relocate social protection within a ‘broader political project of rights and justice as opposed to patronage [or charity] (Hickey, 2011: 2).’ While Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2017) offer a helpful means to distinguish the potential quality of interaction between citizens and states, the empirical record appears to offer few examples of citizens as “makers and shapers” in social protection reform. While we might anticipate a greater sense of citizenship and rights-claiming in contexts which have citizen-driven spaces, a recent literature review suggests these are rare in social protection (Ayliffe et al. 2018).

On the “consumer” end of the spectrum, when limited information is provided, such as on programme eligibility requirements or conditionalities, programmes may be poorly understood and thus lack political legitimacy. In Mongolia’s CMP, for example, Jackson et al. (2011: 25) claim that ‘politicisation’ rushed programme rollout. The handing out of voucher books which could not be redeemed until after the 2004 election also likely contributed to this image (Schafferer, 2005). Moreover, ‘programme [conditionalities] were rarely clearly communicated to the beneficiary households, [and this] may have limited understanding of the responsibilities of caregivers to invest in their children’s human capital needs (Jackson et al. 2011: 25).’ A lack of communication with the community around the issue of targeting was
considered a primary reason why there were high exclusion errors, and these errors were argued to have made the targeted programme deeply unpopular (Hodges et al. 2007).

Jones’ et al.’s (2013, 2016) Transforming Cash Transfers study of five Unconditional Cash Transfer (UCT) programmes in Kenya, Uganda, Mozambique, Palestine, and Yemen\(^{19}\) found that cash transfers may play a role in (re)building trust in public institutions in fragile states, thus supporting a rights-based view of the citizen-state contract. However, such an outcome was argued to be contingent on a number of factors. Jones’ et al. (2013) showed that where recipients had good knowledge and understanding of the programmes (e.g. eligibility criteria, targeting process), where formal grievance and complaint mechanisms were clearly in place and functioning, and where local programme implementers had not been “excessively politicised” or mediated by local brokers, recipients were likely to see targeting as fair. This was broadly judged to be the case in Uganda and Kenya.

However, in Yemen, Palestine and Mozambique, recipients were considered more likely to view the programmes as political tools linked to political affiliation and patronage (Hamad and Pavanello, 2012; Bagash et al. 2012). Firstly, recipients had low levels of knowledge and understanding of the programmes and grievance mechanisms were largely ineffective. Secondly, in Mozambique, the programme’s *permeantes* (community volunteers) were seen to be a negative influence, leading recipients to view the programme as a ‘gift from government [with] no sense of entitlement (Selvester et al. 2012: 3, 10).’

Based on a review of social pensions in Nepal, Kosovo and Timor Leste and cash transfers in Sierra Leone and Kenya, Wale Osofisan (2011a; 2011b) argues that cash transfers may potentially contribute to state legitimacy, foster social cohesion and re-establish public trust in the state. However, no testimonial evidence is provided to support the contention for social pensions and the evidence presented in Sierra Leone and Kenya offers negative perceptions of the role of local brokers and programme staff. Even though Kenya’s Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) had an explicit “rights component” which included civic education, a service charter and rights’ committees, as Tessitore (2011: 12 –13) notes, outsourcing of various aspects of the programme meant that accountability was argued to be between NGOs and communities; ‘bequeathed from above by a foreign power,’ rather than between citizens’ and the state. Osofisan (2011a) acknowledges that there were numerous

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\(^{19}\) Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme (PNCTP), Social Welfare Fund in Yemen, Senior Citizen Grant in Uganda, Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable children (CT-OVC) in Kenya and the Basic Subsidy Programme in Mozambique
complaints related to ineffective targeting and problems with mediation by agents responsible for payment. In Sierra Leone’s Social Safety Net (SSN) he also mentions that there were high levels of distrust due to mediation in beneficiary targeting by chiefs, leading him to conclude that the SSN contributed to mistrust between communities and the state.

Many of the cases presented above lack the participation of public authorities, and citizen-state interaction is thus primarily with service providers. However, a recent experiment in Tanzania’s Social Action Fund (TASAF) across 80 study villages suggests that when local leaders actively participate, more positive outcomes may be possible. Evans et al. (2018) argue that under such conditions cash transfers can significantly increase trust in leaders. Households in treatment villages were 4 percentage points more likely to report that trust in leaders had improved. For villages with a higher number of meetings, trust in leaders was 7 percentage points higher and recipients were 7 percentage points more likely to report an improvement in trust during the course of the programme.

Ayliffe et al.’s (2018) literature review of social accountability in the delivery of social protection explicitly set out to bring about fundamental shifts in state-citizen relations. El Salvador’s CCT Red Solidaria/Comunidades Solidarias Rurales’ was highlighted as the only case in which the promotion of citizenship was a key programme goal and included a wide variety of state and civil society representatives in the process (see Adato et al., 2016). In Uganda’s Senior Citizen’s Grant (SCG) and Kenya’s CT-OVC, even when targeting was seen to be fair, and while it was judged there were high levels of transparency and formal grievance and complaint mechanisms in place, the programmes were still largely seen as gifts, either from political leaders or from God (Jones et al., 2013: 9). This suggests that transparency and accountability mechanisms are insufficient to generate a sense of entitlement.

Similar to Sabates-Wheeler et al’s (2017) delineation of forms of interface, Ayliffe et al. (2018: 40) also make a distinction between “thick” and “thin” forms of accountability. Thin activities, similar to closed spaces, are those which are non-discretionary and easily verified such as payment. Depending on the mechanism of targeting, this can be “thin” or “thick,” with different degrees of mediation by service providers or civil society and different opportunities for recipients to hold service providers and public authorities to account. Thicker forms of accountability are those which entail a significant degree of interaction with service providers, such as public forums (invited or created). Yet, as we saw above, with
thicker forms of interaction in state-driven forms of accountability, even where civil society organisations play a prominent role, there is potential for various negative externalities, if not managed appropriately.

Making accountability claims is a way of expressing citizenship (Newell and Wheeler, 2006: 29), yet such claims rely upon recipients’ knowledge and understanding of programmes and opportunities to engage with the state and their capacity for civic mobilisation and collective action. As Hickey and King (2015: 29) note, the fact that cash transfers offer private rather than public goods, may undermine the effectiveness of civic mobilisation and collective action. Even in Brazil and South Africa, where there are constitutional entitlements and awareness of rights and entitlements are judged to be high, citizen-driven channels were considered to be weak (Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2017; Aslam, 2018). In South Africa, Aslam (2018) notes that citizen-driven accountability interventions made no observable difference to the state-society relationship, arguing that government struggled to convey key information and citizens did not feel safe to participate.

Partly due to such limitations, Hickey and King (2015) suggest that citizen-led forms of accountability (claimed spaces) will emerge as citizens come to see cash as entitlements, and the:

‘continued presence of social protection itself becomes the main driver of higher levels of accountability as recipients become used to receiving transfers and start to see them as entitlements for the long-run rather than temporally limited handouts associated more with a politics of patronage than rights (2015: 24).’

The problem, however, is that it is difficult to judge what duration programmes need to be in place for recipients to begin to consider transfers as entitlements. Even after over a decade in place, recipients of Mozambique’s cash transfer still viewed it as an instrument of patronage (Selvester et al. 2012). Conditionality, unpredictability and impermanence of payments may all be associated with perceptions of a contingent relationship (Mahon, 2009). On the contrary, the provision of regular, predictable and durable benefits should contribute to programmes being perceived as entitlements (Hickey, 2011). However, the available empirical evidence suggests that these are insufficient and therefore hints that citizens’ perceptions may be shaped more by how citizens interact with the state and with their perceptions of the political uses of programmes.
c) Citizen Perceptions and Reciprocity Effects

In analysing the politics behind non-contributory pensions in Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa, Larissa Pelham (2007) argued that a bond had been built between citizens and the state in fostering social solidarity and a sense of citizenship, entrenched in expectations of the citizenry of the state’s role in providing welfare. While plausible, Pelham’s (2007) account, like various others which make such a connection lacks recipients’ testimony to evidence such claims (see Leisering and Barrientos, 2013). Mia Granvik draws attention to a potential ‘reciprocity effect of introducing a cash-transfer to a vulnerable population group (Granvik, 2015: 24)’ in Lesotho, yet this is not necessarily based on a sense of citizenship.

The most common form of reciprocity effect mentioned in scholarship is an electoral return for leaders and political parties that introduce or expand programmes. While incumbent governments may use cash transfers to maximise political returns, the design specifications and delivery mechanisms of CCTs are often highly technocratic, and this makes them more resistant to political mediation through local brokers than other forms of social assistance. It has even been argued that CCTs are not clientelist, by design (Bohn, 2011; Tafolar, 2015; Daieff, 2015). CCT eligibility criteria, selection methods, conditionalities, disbursement channels and oversight mechanisms may all play a role in reducing opportunities for clientelism:

- **Eligibility criteria:** CCTs are formula-based and typically target populations based on standardised demographic or vulnerability criteria (income proxies, employment status, dependency ratios, orphanhood). Child grants and social pensions similarly define eligibility based on age. However, most vulnerability proxies are inaccurate, and variable choice can be skewed to favour some populations over others (see Fox, 2012);
- **Selection methods:** Where countries have good quality data systems, CCTs often have a unique beneficiary registry which specifies who meets the established demographic or vulnerability threshold. However, where data systems are weak, vulnerability specification and beneficiary identification often rely on community-based structures such as through village chiefs who have significant scope for discretion (see MacAuslan and Riemenschneider, 2011; Osofisan, 2011b);
- **Conditionalities:** The behavioural conditionalities for CCTs are formally linked to the use of specific social services (education, health), but informal behavioural conditionalities are sometimes introduced by service providers, who themselves may be subject to clientelist pressures (see Molyneux and Thomson, 2011);
- **Disbursement channels:** In areas where technology and banking systems work well, CCTs may be paid directly into bank accounts (and may even be cross checked with biometric identification), but beneficiaries may incur additional costs informally (e.g. cost of photocopies in Bolivia’s Bono Juana Azurduy), and in their absence cash may be distributed directly by village chiefs (see Osofisan, 2011b; Castro, 2011);
• **Oversight mechanisms**: Checks and balances may be exercised through programme oversight structures. In Brazil, Social Control Councils verify beneficiary inclusion in the *Bolsa Familia* programme from the Cadastro registry, and in Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme, Kebele Appeal Committees (KACs) were established for grievance redress related to exclusion errors, although these proved ineffective in practice (see Wiseman *et al.*, 2010). In Peru’s *Juntos* programme, Monitoring and Transparency Committees were established, but *madres comunitarias* (community mothers) also imposed unofficial sanctions for beneficiaries such as cleaning tasks to receive benefits (see Molyneux and Thomson, 2011).

The above shows that there are weak points which politicians, local brokers and service providers can exploit. Indeed, like any form of assistance, cash transfers may involve a quasi-personalistic relationship in which a patron has seemingly monopolistic control over a specific inducement (Diaz-Cayeros *et al.*, 2007), asymmetrical relationships between patrons and clients are also likely, and they may form part of an iterative effort which goes beyond a single bribe of vote-buying (Stokes, 2005; Swamy, 2016). Hence, a binary distinction between programmatic and clientelistic forms of exchange in relation to cash transfers is more problematic than often assumed. While cash transfers may exude various programmatic characteristics, even universal programmes are susceptible to the ‘uses and misuses’ of political leaders (Miorelli, 2016).

Scholarship on the politics of cash transfer programmes in Latin America is divided on whether cash transfers deliver political returns to leaders. On one hand, there is some evidence to suggest that cash transfers may develop a stronger preference for political parties implementing and expanding programmes, and they may increase the likelihood of voting for incumbents, as the table on the following page shows:
Figure 3. Electoral Effects of CCTs in Colombia, Mexico and Brazil

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Colombia (Familias en Acción)</th>
<th>Mexico (Oportunidades)</th>
<th>Brazil (Bolsa Familia)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased voter registry</td>
<td>Beneficiaries were more likely to be registered to vote in the 2010 presidential elections (Baez et al., 2012).</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased voter turnout</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>Substantially increased voter turnout for the 2000 presidential elections (De la O, 2012).</td>
<td>No data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased incumbency approval and vote</td>
<td>Beneficiaries expressed a stronger preference for the political party that implemented and expanded the programme (Baez et al., 2012).</td>
<td>Beneficiaries were substantially more likely to vote for the incumbent candidate (Díaz-Cayeros, et al. 2007).</td>
<td>Bolsa Familia receipt increased the probability of voting for the incumbent by 30% and 43% among respondents in the two lowest brackets of income (Zucco, 2008).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Vanderbilt University’s Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) conducted a survey to assess the effects of social assistance mechanisms on Presidential elections in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico and Uruguay. Without exception, they found greater political support from social assistance recipients than non-recipients, and they argued that effects were greater where the President claimed ownership of the programme. This was strongest in the left-populist regimes of Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador (Layton and Smith, 2011).²⁰

While Barrientos and Villa (2014) acknowledge that cash transfers deliver electoral effects over the short term, they argue that these effects were not necessarily predicated by clientelistic practices such as those previously prevalent in the region. The short-term effects, they suggest, can instead be interpreted as increasing political support for pro-poor governing coalitions. They contend that poorer areas which have a higher incidence of transfer coverage in Brazil, Colombia, and Argentina may instead be explained by socio-economic variables (i.e. the natural voting preferences of the poor). In Mexico, the evidence is equivocal regarding electoral effects in favour of incumbents between 2000 and 2012 (De la O, 2012; Filipovich et al. 2017). Indeed, electoral returns were shown to be higher for programmatic redistribution than clientelistic redistribution (Díaz-Cayeros, Maglioni and Estevez, 2016). The debate in

²⁰ The greatest difference is found in Venezuela (23.3pp), Bolivia (17.3pp) and Ecuador (12.6pp).
Brazil is also inconclusive. The evidence shows electoral effects for incumbents, but it is less clear that increased programme coverage can be exclusively explained by political rather than socio-economic criteria (Hunter and Power, 2007; Hall, 2008; Zucco, 2008, 2010; Zucco and Power, 2013; Bohn, 2011; Fried, 2012).

Even if socio-economic criteria partly explain the difference, there does appear to be sufficient evidence to suggest some form of short-term reciprocity effect from cash transfers for political leaders. As Mahon argues:

‘It is quite likely that the political loyalties created by programs will be relatively shallow, limited to voting patterns… Beneficiaries of social protection and conditional transfers turn out be poor defenders of democratic rules (Mahon, 2009: 6 – 7).’

This shallow loyalty may stem, in part, from the mediating role of local brokers as evidenced in Sierra Leone, Peru and Mozambique (Osofisan 2011a; Arroyo, 2010; Selvester et al. 2012). However, with few exceptions such as in Brazil (Daieff, 2015), testimonial evidence links cash transfers with party-political affiliation across a wide variety of contexts and programme modalities, including where local brokers play a very limited role (Kligsberg and Novacovsky, 2015; Miorelli, 2016).

Evidence from Kligsberg and Novacovsky (2015) in Argentina’s AUH, Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2017) in Ghana’s LEAP CCT programme, and Awortwi (2017) in Kenya’s OVC-CT all point to similar perceptions of cash transfers as instruments of political patronage, despite exhibiting quite different formal characteristics. In Ghana, Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2017: 35) note that many beneficiaries still see the programme as a ‘favour from the government, not a right to which they are entitled.’ In Kenya, survey evidence showed that over half of recipients saw the transfer as an act of sympathy rather than a right, and 87% of beneficiaries felt obliged to be more loyal to the government in return for the support they received (Awortwi, 2017: 40). Hence, Awortwi (2017: 16) contends that cash transfer programmes ‘associate the support with the politics of patronage rather than as their constitutional entitlement.’ In Argentina’s AUH, survey data from a sample of 1,755 households in 2013/2014 showed that only 3 in 10 respondents considered the AUH as a right, whereas 7 in 10 saw it as “help.” Revealingly, 74% of recipients associated the programme with the national government, rather than the state (Kligsberg and Novacovsky, 2015: 260 – 261). While there is mention of rights from their focus groups, these are typically

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21 The formation of municipal civic councils may be one unexplored reason why 73% of Daieff’s (2015) 22 interviewees viewed the programme as a right rather than a gift/favour/help.
conceived as rights given by the President or by the government, so these rights are still underpinned by a sense of patronage.

This finding from Argentina’s AUH is particularly relevant because as a universal programme which was announced publicly as a right and deliberately avoided local brokers, we might expect recipients to view benefits as entitlements. That recipients did not view the cash transfer as such suggests that the style of communicative discourse from leaders and their political linkage strategies to appeal to citizens may be more important factors than legal guarantees and the regularity, predictability and durability of benefits in shaping perceptions of programmes.

iv) Conclusion

In this chapter we assessed debates related to the potential socio-political effects of social protection. We first considered different notions of social contracts and how these relate to different approaches to social protection. We showed how interest-based forms of contract endorse a view of temporary assistance from a minimalist state whereas a rights-based view embraces a notion of citizenship-based social assistance and a protective state. We suggested that where cash transfers are introduced with interest-based contracts they are likely to develop relatively shallow, fragile and transitory citizen-state relations, whereas rights-based contracts seem more likely to foster deeper, more stable and trusting citizen-state relations.

We then assessed Ferguson’s (2015) argument regarding the potential for cash transfers to represent ‘rightful shares’ of natural resource wealth. In general, we expressed scepticism regarding this potential and agree with the assessment in sub-Saharan Africa that the cash transfer introduction and expansion is more likely to represent the politics of patronage than a politics of rightful claims (Hickey et al. 2018). We argue that this is likely to extend far beyond the region.

We then assessed the importance of legal guarantees, accountability through citizen-state interface, and evidence of citizens’ perceptions of programmes across different contexts and modalities. We argued that legal guarantees may be a fundamental pillar for rights-based social protection and the act of extending benefits to enfranchise marginalised or excluded groups may potentially contribute to an increased sense of citizenship, but that perceptions of patronage may well be deeply entrenched in various contexts. Furthermore, we suggested that different forms of legal guarantees may trigger different forms of citizen-state relationship.
This then led us to consider an emergent literature on the role of citizen-state interface in social protection. We argued that citizen-state interface may constitute an important intervening variable, shaping citizens’ perceptions regarding the meaning and value of programmes, the appraisal of their entitlements, and the role of the state which provides these benefits. We saw Sabates-Wheeler et al.'s (2017) argument that different forms of interaction between states and citizens may enable different forms of citizenship to be theoretically persuasive. However, we noted numerous practical impediments to a full exercise of citizenship through social protection. We argued that rights-claims are likely to depend on citizens’ knowledge and understanding, the functionality of accountability mechanisms and whether programmes were perceived as having been politicised. In general, state-driven accountability processes are often thin and citizen-driven processes are rare. Unless accountability processes are robust and provide meaningful opportunities for engagement between citizens, service providers and public authorities, we would not anticipate programmes to strengthen rights-based citizen state relations.

We then considered whether the introduction of cash transfers may deliver electoral returns in Latin America. While findings were mixed, we argued that some form of reciprocity effect was likely. We then reviewed citizen perceptions and potential reciprocity effects and found that cash transfers were more commonly perceived as instruments of patronage rather than rights. As these findings cut across regions, political settlement types, regime types, and different modalities of cash transfers, we suggest there is likely a high degree of external validity, and that rights-based perceptions may be an exception to the rule rather than the norm.
Chapter 3: Methodology

In this chapter we will first explain our criteria for case selection and the definition of a natural resource dependent country. We will then lay out the analytical framework and highlight which features we intend to prioritise in the analysis. This will be followed by an explanation of the thesis’ methodology, including research objectives, research questions and hypotheses. We will then detail research methods; the approach, data sources and collection techniques and field study sites. Finally, we will describe the study process, outline the thesis’ main limitations, and explain how informed consent was handled.

i) Case Selection

While the fact that Cardoso and Faletto (1979) failed to establish criteria to define enclaves presents a methodological challenge (Conning and Robinson, 2009), the notion of an enclave economy which struggles to appropriate economic surplus from rent-generating sectors remains an important point of departure for case selection. Hinojosa et al. (2010: 2) note that the definition of a “mineral-rich” country is also unclear, but they consider a 10 per cent share of the mineral sector in total exports as an agreed upon threshold. However, this thesis is not concerned merely with cases that are mineral-rich, but with those whose fiscal space depends heavily on mineral and hydrocarbon sectors, as this implies differential constraints and opportunities for policymaking autonomy.

Using United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) data, we find that 72 countries have commodity exports in excess of 10% of GDP. This would be too large a sample to draw any meaningful conclusions, and in order to account for short-term fluctuations, we propose to set a threshold at 15% of GDP between 2009 and 2015. This thesis is particularly concerned with commodity dependence on hydrocarbons and minerals, so a threshold was set at 50% of exports, and this reduces the potential sample to 30 countries. However, such a range in economic development between upper middle-income and lower-income countries makes meaningful comparisons in social policy challenging (see Huber and Stephens, 2011; Pribble, 2013). Following the debate regarding domestic resource mobilisation in chapter 1, consumption per capita under US$2,000 per year emerges as an important threshold of fiscal viability (Ravallion, 2009; Hoy and Sumner, 2016).
Focusing on low and lower-middle income countries (GNI per capita <$3,256) which straddle this point reduces our sample frame to 19 potential cases. This is more manageable and offers greater scope for potential comparison. However, many countries within the sample also experienced armed conflict during the period under study, which has a significant effect on fiscal space. If we exclude cases which experienced armed conflict registered during the period (2005 – 2014) to control for such exogenous shocks, this reduces the sample frame to 8 cases (Pettersson and Eck, 2018). Given the above, a natural resource dependent country will be defined as low or low-middle income with commodity dependence in excess of 15% of GDP, and where more than 50% of exports are from mineral or hydrocarbon sectors.

To help understand the level of overlap with the dependent variable, the introduction of and scale up to universal programmes, the thesis aims to focus on programmes which have achieved national coverage. According to Help Age International's (2018) database, 16 low- or middle-income countries have introduced state-funded universal social pensions. Of our potential cases, only Bolivia introduced a nationwide scheme. Bolivia, Mongolia, and Zambia also introduced or scaled up to national cash transfer programmes during the proposed period of study (2005 – 2014). These comprised universal child benefits, targeted social cash transfers and conditional cash transfers.

As mentioned in chapter 1, Bolivia, Mongolia and Zambia were identified by the ILO as the only three countries financing such programmes directly from taxes on mining and gas (Ortiz et al. 2015) and three other countries (Ecuador, Ghana and Venezuela) were identified as linking rent taxes in a less direct way (Mosley and Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai, 2016). The table on the following page shows a selection of Latin American countries and regional comparators with high dependence on hydrocarbon and mineral exports, but of varying levels of per capita GDP and poverty headcount ratios for comparison:

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22 Angola, Libya, Iraq, Nigeria, Congo, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Yemen, Guinea, Mongolia, Zambia, Bolivia, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, Mauritania, Lao, Mali, Myanmar, Guyana.

23 Congo, Guinea, Mongolia, Zambia, Bolivia, Papua New Guinea, Lao, and Guyana


The exclusion of upper-middle income countries from the sample means that Chile, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru were not considered eligible for direct comparison.\textsuperscript{26} We may see that mineral exports make up a significant proportion of Chile’s GDP, yet income levels are nearly five times higher than Mongolia and ten times higher than Zambia, and as such the potential for fiscal space is not meaningfully comparable. Peru and Ecuador do offer some scope for comparison, as we have done in chapters 1 and 2, yet with double the level of per capita income and 10 percentage points lower dependence on commodity exports, comparisons need to be carefully bounded.

Ghana was a lower-middle income country at the beginning of the study period, however its level of dependence on hydrocarbons and minerals when the LEAP programme was introduced in 2009 was at least three times lower than in Bolivia, Zambia or Mongolia. Moreover, mining revenues in Ghana are not set aside for specific development investments\textsuperscript{(de-Graft Aikins et al. 2016). Thus, fiscal comparisons are also challenging. Significantly higher levels of poverty in Zambia mean that the relative costs to introduce social protection are much higher. While estimates were not available for 2005, data from 2013 suggests that reaching a minimum income of US$1.90/day might require 7% of GDP in Zambia, compared to 2.1% in Mongolia and 0.9% in Bolivia (Bierbaum et al. 2017). Given this, while overall fiscal capacity remains comparable, the need is significantly greater, and we would anticipate a far greater role for donors in meeting such a challenge. Defining these economic parameters for comparison thus allows the thesis to focus on the institutions, interests and ideas of political regimes within this fiscal context.

\textsuperscript{26}Venezuela would also be excluded as it fell below the dependence threshold in 2014-15 as a result of an economic crisis.
ii) **Policy Selection**

In term of policy selection, our interest is chiefly in universal cash transfers. The thesis understands universalism in terms of coverage – benefits reach most people, and equity – benefits do not discriminate by group (see Martínez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2016: 7). Given the proposed period of study, which is designed to cohere with the first two administrations of Evo Morales (2005 – 2014), the thesis will primarily focus on two CCTs which were introduced during the period:

- **Bono Juancito Pinto** (Juancito Pinto Grant), a conditional cash transfer of Bs.200 (US$29 per year) which was introduced on the 28th October 2006 as an incentive for enrollment, retention and completion of the school year for boys and girls in the first five years of primary (Supreme Decree 28899) and has since been expanded to all school grades;
- **Bono Juana Azurduy** (Juana Azurduy Grant), a conditional cash transfer of up to Bs.1,820 (US$265) which was introduced on the 3rd April, 2009 and designed to guarantee the exercise of the fundamental right to life and health (Supreme Decree 0066) for pregnant mothers and children less than 2 years of age.

Focusing on the two CCTs allows the thesis to consider both design and expansion. However, it is also helpful to assess the adaptation of a universal social pension to understand universalism over a longer time horizon and to make comparisons between different forms of cash transfer:

- **Renta Dignidad** (Dignity Grant), a universal social pension of up to Bs2.400 per annum (US$342) which was introduced on the 1st February 2008 and was designed to ensure non-contributory social security for all persons over 60 years of age (Law 3791) as a continuation of the Bonosol social pension.

iii) **Analytical Framework**

As we have argued in preceding chapters, the relationship between ideas, interests and institutions is at the heart of the political economy of social protection. Political economy is defined in this thesis as how the intersection of ideas, interests and institutions shape agents' behaviour and are negotiated through political processes which influence, and are influenced by, the production and distribution of resources (Leftwich, 2008: 6; Hudson and Leftwich, 2014: 6; Hickey, Sen and Bukenya, 2015: 5).

To understand the political economy of social protection, it is first important to consider the drivers of fiscal space for social protection which shape opportunities and constraints (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007; McGuire, 2010; Huber and Stephens, 2012). This encompasses an
assessment of shifts in external factors such as commodity prices and negotiation of economic institutions related to foreign direct investment and financing arrangements which shape rent accumulation, influence fiscal policy conditionality and tax arrangements related to the capture and hypothecation of natural resource rent (Weyland, 2006; Hujo, 2015; Mosley and Abdulai, 2016).

Secondly, we will consider how the exchange of ideas influences policy choices. We find important complementarities in the use of discursive institutionalism which we argue can be profitably combined (Lavers and Hickey, 2015; Miorelli, 2014, 2016, 2018). We propose to analyse the interplay between cognitive and normative ideas and how these are articulated and framed in coordinative discourse among policy actors and in communicative discourse by policy actors to persuade the public (Schmidt 2002, 2008; Miorelli, 2014, 2016, 2018).

An analysis of how political frontiers are drawn and antagonisms between “insiders” and “outsiders” are created is also considered helpful to understand why the policy proposals of different actors are included or excluded (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000), alongside moral aspects of communicative discourse employed by populist leaders (Miorelli, 2016), as this ought to have an important bearing on how citizens view programmes. We believe it is important to analyse different levels of ideas and how policy level ideas fit within discursive struggles over programmatic or paradigmatic narratives, including the crystallisation of discourse through nodal points, which help connect different levels of ideas (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 100; Lavers, 2016a; Miorelli, 2016, 2018).

Thirdly, as regards political institutions and processes, we will assess different forms of political linkage strategies, how these are combined or blended by politicians to appeal to political constituencies, helping shape which ideas gain political salience and also how these strategies are framed in communicative discourse (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Pribble, 2013; Resnick, 2014). We assume that policy design and scale up will be chiefly driven by political society rather than civil society (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007; Hickey, 2011; Cherrier, 2013). However, as civil society pressure has been argued to be a central causal factor in enabling fiscal space and passing social policy legislation in Bolivia (Carnes and Mares, 2014; Anria and Niedzwiecki, 2014; Daroca Oller, 2016; Paz Arauco, 2018), we will critically examine how civil society mobilisation and elections may contribute to policy design and the expansion of programme scope and provisions. Evidence of bottom up appeals is also crucial in determining the credence of arguments regarding “rightful shares,” as ‘direct [distributive] claims (Ferguson, 2015: 48, 26)’ are a necessary component.
These vertical linkage mechanisms within communicative discourse have an important bearing on how cash transfers may influence citizen-state relations. Beyond politician-citizen linkages, the influence of cash transfers is mediated through legal guarantees. Significant attention has been given to formal institutions and the enactment of legal guarantees is presented as a key means to contribute to rights-based citizen-state contracts and reverse past discrimination (Hickey, 2011; Barrientos and Pellissery, 2013; Cecchini and Nieves Rico, 2015; Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2017; Ayliffe et al. 2018). An analysis of the formal rules and differences in formal rules is therefore essential.

It is also important to consider how citizens experience programmes and interact with service providers and public authorities through citizen-state interface (Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2017; Ayliffe et al. 2018). This includes how the state provides programme information, how citizens understand and interpret this information, how citizens participate and provide feedback, and how state actors provide answers and respond to feedback. While the evidence to date suggests these processes are generally weak (Ayliffe et al. 2018), if cash transfers are to contribute to rights-based citizen-state relations, the quality of accountability ought to play an important role.

The efforts of the state to legitimise programmes through communicative discourse and interact with recipients translates into outcomes in citizen-state relationships. This requires that we consider citizens’ perceptions of programmes. Surprisingly little attention has been given to eliciting citizens’ perceptions to support arguments related to claims of inclusion and fairness, entitlements, and trust. So, this will be a key area of enquiry.

iv) Methodology

To understand the political economy of cash transfers in Bolivia the thesis employs a three-fold methodology: process tracing, discourse analysis, and survey methods.

Two key features of process tracing are particularly useful for analysing a policy-making process. Firstly, process tracing focuses on key intervening events (or “mechanisms”) that comprise a chain of temporally ordered necessary conditions (George and Bennett 2005; Bennett and Checkel, 2015; Mahoney, 2016). Thus, the logic of process tracing is set-theoretic and generative, rather than variable oriented in nature (Mahoney, 2016). This is important because this thesis means to argue in favour of conjunctural causation; a package of necessary and complementary conditions, rather than for one single factor playing a decisive causal role. Secondly, in process tracing, while triangulation is necessary, what
matters is not the frequency of observations of evidence within a case that fit a particular explanation, but the likelihood of observing specific items of evidence necessary for confirming a particular explanation versus the likelihood of finding this evidence if an alternative explanation were true (George and Bennett 2005; Mahoney, 2016). In particular, we may cast doubt on alternative explanations if either expected evidence for these is not found or if evidence is found which is unique to our proposed explanation and leaves signature traces (Beach and Peterson, 2013).

While configurational methods have been employed productively to analyse the political economy of welfare states in Latin America more generally (Segura-Ubiergo 2007), contexts which rely heavily on natural resources (Venezuela, Bolivia and Peru) did not fit variable-based explanations within Segura-Ubiergo’s (2007) Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). This suggests the potential value-added of generative methods like process tracing to provide a more granular assessment. This value added is evidenced by process tracing’s increasing popularity in recent years (Pribble, 2013; Lavers and Hickey, 2015; Martinez Franzoni and Sánchez-Ancochea, 2016). Moreover, with regard to our dependent variable of introducing universal programmes in our chosen context, there are too few cases in which the outcome has materialised to employ configurational methods profitably, and this presents similar issues for statistical methods (Morgan, 2016).

It seems likely that certain economic variables such economic growth or fiscal constraint are likely to be important, yet fixed quantitative cut off points such as GDP or debt sustainability framework thresholds are unlikely to be fully explanatory. The same is likely to be true for broad political variables analysed through statistical methods such as the number of years of democracy or strength of organised labour (see Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; Huber and Stephens 2001; 2012). These may be helpful to explain medium to long-term spending patterns over a large number of cases but not the specific reasons for particular social policy choices at key moments.

Comparisons are made with Mongolia and Zambia to strengthen claims of external validity for a particular typology. However, when comparisons are made, the thesis does not assume full unit homogeneity. Variables are not expected to work in an entirely uniform fashion in different countries and across different time periods, despite contextual similarities (Morgan, 2016).

Process tracing is a strong method for observable evidence of policy change. However, it is a weaker method for interpreting perceptions and meanings. Given the thesis’ concern with
citizen-state relations, it is considered fruitful to combine process tracing with methods better suited to this task. To achieve this, we will employ a combination of discourse analysis and survey methods.

Discourse analysis assesses the ‘patterns of people’s utterances in and across statements’ and regarding which statements are accepted as meaningful and true (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 21). ‘Discursive struggles’ concern which narratives and representations of reality are included (dominant or ‘hegemonic’) and which are excluded (Panizza and Miorelli, 2012). Discourse analysis will be used alongside process tracing to help understand the coordinative function of discourse in terms of the framing of key ideas and type of political linkage strategy. However, the main emphasis of this analysis will be on communicative discourse between politicians and citizens. This emphasis is also due to the stylistic aspects of political linkage in left-populist administrations like Bolivia under President Evo Morales, including imagery, coded gestures, and mis-en-scène (see Moffit 2016; Ostiguy, 2017). The choice of discourse analysis fits with an emerging ideational turn in analysing the politics of social protection (Miorelli, 2014, 2016, 2018; Lavers and Hickey, 2015). So, we believe it will be highly complementary.

Survey methods were chosen to help understand citizens’ perceptions related to the cash transfer programmes, alongside qualitative interviews. Initially, the thesis considered conducting a large number of semi-structured interviews. However, this was reconsidered for empirical and practical reasons. Simply increasing the number of interviews has diminishing returns in terms of revealing new qualitative information. It has been argued that saturation may be reached between 6 and 12 interviews (Guest et al. 2006), and it is recommended to limit interviews to 15 participants in order to make data handling practical (Brinkmann, 2013). So, these parameters have helped guide the scale of data collection.

The thesis aims to build on past interview data from Castro (2011) on Bono Juana Azurduy and Marco Navarro (2012) on Bono Juancito Pinto which hinted that cash transfer recipients and their peers might not view cash transfer programmes as entitlements, and that their knowledge of the purpose and meaning of the transfers might be poor. Neither study was explicitly geared towards this area of enquiry, and both studies had small samples of respondents which referred to such perceptions. However, our scoping interviews with community members conducted in early 2014 in El Alto reflected these findings, with respondents demonstrating very low levels of knowledge and not viewing programmes as

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27 A full copy of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 1.
entitlements (BO12, 19/02/14; BO14, 30/01/14; BO15, 04/02/14). The suggestion that these findings may be more common therefore provided justification for a survey rather than simply conducting more interviews. While some authors have rightly pointed out the limitations in uncovering discourses through isolated questions and statements within surveys alone (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002: 121), the goal of conducting a survey was not discovery of new meanings, but rather to test whether citizens' perceptions from interview data may hold more generally.

The choice of survey methods was also due to practical impediments at the time of study. Census data from 2012 should have been available in 2014, but this was not released until February 2015. District level data was not available, and remains officially unavailable, due to political sensitivities over budgeting allocations (BG19, 17/04/14). It was therefore not possible to recover demographic data regarding the conditions of the study population in peri-urban El Alto. Thus, conducting a survey was considered helpful to understand more about the challenges this population faced, the salience of cash transfers in meeting those challenges, their perceptions related to the programmes, including their demands and expectations regarding the role of the state in providing social protection.

a) Main Research Objective

The thesis aims to understand the key political economy drivers in natural resource dependent countries that explain the introduction of universal cash transfer programmes, and the degree to which the introduction and expansion of programmes strengthens or undermines citizen-state relations in this context.

b) Sub-research Objectives

We have divided this objective into three sub-research objectives:

- **Sub-research objective 1**: To identify the economic constraints and opportunities for natural resource dependent countries to implement universal cash transfer programmes.
- **Sub-research objective 2**: To identify the critical ideational, political and institutional drivers that influence the design, adoption and expansion of programmes.
- **Sub-research objective 3**: To understand citizens' perceptions of the cash transfers and their relationship with the state.
c) Research Questions and Hypotheses

Main research question: What key political economy factors drive the introduction and expansion of cash transfer programmes in natural resource dependent countries? And, to what degree do cash transfers strengthen citizen-state relations in this context?

Hypothesis: In natural resource dependent countries, the introduction and scale up of cash transfers will be primarily driven by three factors: shifts in fiscal space linked to natural resource rent, the political salience of redistributive ideas, and the combination of political linkage strategies employed by politicians to appeal to citizens. We assume that the loosening of fiscal constraints will be a key driver for spending (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007; Haggard and Kaufman, 2008) and this will be facilitated, in part, by government’s capacity to capture natural resource rent (Hujo, 2015) and harness price windfalls. Shifts in the political salience of redistributive ideas will be a key enabler for the introduction of large-scale programmes, and domestic ideas will likely trump transnational ideas in determining programme scope. Contrary to Pribble’s argument (2013), we suggest that left-wing charismatic parties and linkage strategies may hasten progress towards universalism, potentially amplified by high levels of social mobilisation and periods of electoral competition. However, if programmes are chiefly tied to a patron, and if accountability mechanisms are weak, the introduction of universal cash transfers is unlikely reflect a politics of “rightful shares (Ferguson, 2015)” or strengthen rights-based citizen-state relations.

Sub-research question 1 – Fiscal space: To what extent do shifts in external factors shape fiscal space to implement universal cash transfer programmes in natural resource dependent countries?

Sub-research hypothesis (SRH) 1: During a commodity boom, fiscal space is likely to be facilitated primarily by harnessing commodity price windfalls, and this will depend, in part, on the effectiveness of rent taxes (Hujo, 2015; Ortiz et al., 2015; Mosley and Abdulai, 2016). While conditionalities from IFIs are unlikely to block policy expansion (Weyland, 2005; 2006), debt-relief from IFIs should constitute an important supportive factor, lessening liquidity constraints and reducing IFIs’ bargaining power to impose policy options. With increasing commodity prices, we would expect domestic pressure for rent capture to increase, and while not a necessary explanatory factor, this may be expedited and accentuated by moments of crisis which trigger social protest and increased social demands for redistribution (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008; Hickey, 2009; Daroca Oller, 2016).
Sub-research question 2 – Universalism: What explains the choice to introduce universalistic rather than targeted cash transfer programmes in natural resource dependent countries?

SRH 2: The decision to introduce universal programmes is likely due to three core factors: increased fiscal capacity, growing political salience of normative ideas for egalitarian benefits, and shifts in the political linkage mechanisms employed by leaders to appeal to constituents. Fiscal capacity should be a key enabling factor (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007; Haggard and Kaufman, 2008), and in a natural resource dependent context this is likely to be driven by state capacity to harness commodity price windfalls. Contrary to Weyland’s (2006) assessment, we suggest that normative ideas regarding egalitarian redistribution are likely to be key to universalism, and the reframing of these ideas through the protective role of the state may also be significant (see Miorelli, 2018). Programme scope is also likely to be influenced by the type and combination of political linkage strategies between politicians and citizens. Contrary to Pribble’s (2013) argument, we suggest that charismatic linkage may favour universalism, at least over the short term.

Sub-research question 3 – Citizen-state relations: What is the effect of introducing universal cash transfers on citizen-state relations in a natural resource dependent context?

SRH 3: The socio-political effects of introducing universal cash transfers are likely to be influenced by how state actors appeal to constituents through communicative discourse and how service providers and public authorities interact with programme recipients (Pribble, 2013; Lavers and Hickey, 2015; Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2017). Contrary to previous claims (McGuire, 2013; Ferguson, 2015; Postero, 2017), we suggest that, if communicative discourse is strongly influenced by a charismatic linkage strategy and if accountability mechanisms are weak, we would not anticipate cash transfers to be constitute “rightful shares (Ferguson, 2015)” or strengthen rights-based citizen-state relations.

d) Data Sources and Collection Techniques

(i) Research Populations

The above research objectives and questions relate to the following research populations:

- **Policy-makers**: To understand how and why particular policies were adopted and designed as they were, it is vital to consult people involved in their construction.
- **Civil servants/bureaucrats**: To understand the political and institutional context for design and delivery, it is necessary to consult government social protection bureaucrats.
- **Non-state actors**: To corroborate the veracity of information from official sources, it is useful to consult non-state actors from universities, research institutes,
foundations, the press, multinational agencies, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs).

- **Periurban residents:** To understand the effects of the cash transfers and how the programmes are seen by recipients we need to consult them directly.

(ii) **Desk Research**

An extensive secondary data review was conducted which included documentation from the following:

- **Party political media:** Electoral campaign documents, public speeches on TV, and press briefings;
- **Sectoral policy and programme documents:** Policies, decrees, plans, and reports of the cash transfers;
- **Academic studies:** Studies on programmes within the social protection sector and those related to fiscal, institutional, and political issues;
- **Public surveys:** Censuses, household surveys, health and demographic surveys, and public perception surveys;
- **Newspapers:** News stories and comment articles from national newspapers on fiscal and social policy.

(iii) **Field Research**

At national level, semi-structured interviews were conducted with a total of 46 people. We conducted interviews with 26 Bolivian government representatives in La Paz, including ex-government ministers, high-level bureaucrats, and social protection consultants. Interviews with government were complemented by 20 interviews with representatives from universities, think tanks, multilateral organisations and journalists. These interviews aimed to elicit explanations for how policy-making decisions were made in the cash transfer programmes (*Juancito Pinto, Juana Azurduy* and *Renta Dignidad*). In this respect, these interviews correspond to all three sub-research questions on fiscal space, universalism, and citizen-state relations.

At sub-national level, a household survey, semi-structured interviews and a focus group were conducted, comprising a total of 202 El Alto residents. For the household survey, the thesis employed non-probability sampling. The survey consisted of an approximately fifteen-minute face-to-face questionnaire, administered by a trained surveyor who went door-to-door in poor peri-urban neighbourhoods. We chose not to use a telephone survey, given the likelihood of low response rate, and that this would not have yielded adequate coverage of the population of interest (low income peri-urban households). While census data later revealed that 78.3% of people in El Alto have cell phones (INE, 2015), as some of the
questions proposed were relatively sensitive, gaining the trust of residents through face-to-face interaction was key to ensuring more valid responses. Equally, it was considered that allowing local government or civil society organisations to select particular households might bias responses. For this reason, the research determined to interview participants in their homes, rather than invite them to public venues such as neighbourhood squares or municipal buildings.

In general, the survey asked about respondents' demographic backgrounds, the challenges they faced related to income, access to social protection, perspectives on what the cash transfers programmes meant to them, the impact of the programmes on their lives, and their perspectives related to the state. For demographic data, the survey instrument was adapted from the Bolivian census and Bolivia’s annual household survey. For perceptual information, questions were adapted, in part, from past research in ODI’s Transforming Cash Transfers project (see annex 1).

e) Survey Sampling and Field Study Sites

In the general elections of 2005 and 2009, the department of La Paz was the strongest voting block for the incumbent party, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), which gained 66.6% and 80.3% of the vote respectively (Bolivian Vice Presidency, 2010: 24). Opinion surveys from IPSOS-APOYO in April 2009 suggested that the city of El Alto had the highest presidential approval rating of all Bolivia’s largest cities at 84% (Villar, 2010). It was thus deemed an appropriate location to test core voter expectations and preferences.

The sampling frame for the study included periurban residents. The reason for choosing peri-urban residents was two-fold. Firstly, the MAS had a strong voter base in both rural and urban parts of the department of La Paz. Recent in-migrants to the city of El Alto were thus likely to be core voters. Secondly, urban populations have higher levels of dependence on wage income, thus cash transfers were expected to be particularly valued by this population. Research developed in preparation for the fieldwork using Bolivia’s 2011 Household Survey demonstrated that young urban households were particularly vulnerable and measuring for level of income and income diversification they were, in fact, the most vulnerable group in the country (Andersen, Aston and Cardona, 2014).

At the time of the survey, no up-to-date census data was available. So, it was not possible to estimate with any accuracy the potential level of error. We chose to focus on district 7, which lies on the main road between La Paz and Copacabana. District 7 divided into two in 2010,
so we also chose to include a sample from district 14, which until that date was part of district 7. Projections from the 2001 census suggested that there were 26,587 people between the two districts in 2008. 2012 census data was not available until February 2015, but the census showed that annual growth rates across El Alto between censuses was 2.4%. If the northern zone of El Alto had comparable demographic growth, by 2014, the population ought to have been just over 30,000. However, we were later able to gain access to local census data, and the total for both districts was 92,447. This represented 10.8% of El Alto’s population (INE, 2015).

In the absence of census data, two neighbourhoods were visited in district 14: Mariscal Sucre B and Mariscal Sucre C. Population size was gauged from estimates by members of neighbourhood committees, who suggested that there were between 500 and 800 households in each neighbourhood (BO11, 22/01/14). In district 7, we chose to focus on the Urbanización San Simon which aggregates several neighbourhood clusters, and which likely comprised around 500 households (BO13, 16/04/14). Based on the assumption that the two neighbourhoods likely consisted of approximately 1,000 households, we selected a sample of 160. 157 households were interviewed, consisting of 352 household members.

The sample focused on adults, without discriminating by age. Only one respondent was interviewed per household, but the topics covered were relevant to the respondent him/herself, other members of the household and the condition of the household in general. The unit of observation was the household. There were few refusals to answer questions. As much as possible, abstract concepts were avoided in the survey in order to avoid confusion. The surveyor made clear that he was not affiliated with government, nor had any decision-making power over the provision of social benefits. While a sample of interviews was shadowed at two different points during data collection, following piloting, more limited involvement of a foreigner was judged to minimize potential biases.

The household survey supported data collected from semi-structured interviews with 37 residents: 2 civil servants, 8 service providers, 4 community-based organisation representatives and 23 cash transfer recipients. Service providers consisted of officials in sub-mayoralty offices in charge of social services, and frontline providers in health centres and schools.

Cash transfer recipients were generally asked to consider the quality of public services, how they viewed the government that implemented the cash transfers, what the cash transfers meant to them, what they considered the objectives of the programmes to be, the
improvements that could be made, whether they believed the distribution to be fair or not, what the priorities of political parties ought to be and what they look for from the government.

We also included a focus group discussion (FGD) with 12 women from El Alto’s district 1. The aim of the focus group was to help provide a control for the two targeted districts which would help validate or challenge the findings from survey and interview data in districts 7 and 14. Participants were encouraged to respond to questions such as why they believed the government implemented the cash transfer programmes, what the cash transfers meant to them, how they felt on receiving the cash transfers, perceptions of change, whether they considered the distribution fair or not, what they believed the major problems with the programmes were, and how they viewed the state in light of introducing the programmes.

f) Study Process

The study began in September 2011 with a preliminary literature review and development of a draft conceptual framework. From this, preliminary research questions were developed. To help define the scope of the study a basic survey was sent to 10 key informants in September 2012. The responses provided input to shape the general parameters of the study. In November 2012, a proposal was presented to colleagues and staff at the Development Planning Unit (UCL) where further feedback was received on the study. These inputs were used to refine the emphasis of the study, research questions and hypotheses. To sharpen preliminary hypotheses, interviews were conducted in La Paz with 13 key informants in March 2013. Throughout this period, preliminary desk research of secondary data took place.

The majority of primary data collection took place between September 2013 and May 2014. Between September and December 2013, the focus was on policy makers, technocrats and key non-state informants. Non-state informants were generally interviewed first. This provided useful supplementary information to focus interviews with civil servants. Although the intention was not to employ a snowballing methodology, non-state interviews were crucial for stakeholder mapping and determining who to interview in the capital. Over the same period, interviews were conducted to refine fieldwork plans for El Alto. Shortly after the New Year, planning for data collection through the household survey took place.

In March 2014, preliminary findings were presented to an audience at Bolivia’s Central Bank. Feedback from the presentation from various state agencies and multilateral stakeholders was a helpful check on the veracity of findings in interviews.
Between March and May, the survey and interviews in chosen districts began in earnest. In May a focus group was conducted with a local CSO to help corroborate the information elicited in the survey and interviews. Data processing and analysis took place between June and December 2014. Writing up the thesis took place between December 2014 and September 2017. Following the viva in January 2018, further revisions were made.

\textit{g) Study Limitations}

There are two main limitations of the study. The first limitation is related to access. While we were able to interview a large number of influential policy-makers in key ministries, direct access to the President, the Vice President, Minister of Finance or Minister of Foreign Affairs was not forthcoming. These are ministers known to have played a role in cash transfer policy-making, and their unavailability to participate means the thesis relies on testimony of senior civil servants, consultants or ex-ministers involved in decision-making and what could be recovered from publicly available speeches. It should be noted that some of the publicly available information is contradicted by key informant interviews, and thus the credibility of interviews with the Presidency and Vice-Presidency, in particular, might well have been questionable. Notwithstanding, had they been able to participate, a fuller picture of coordinative discourse might have been achieved.

As was discussed at greater length above, the second main limitation of the study is related to the sample size of the household survey. As mentioned previously, the goal of the survey was to complement interview data, and without census data, it was not possible to estimate with any accuracy the potential level of error. This uncertainty and considerations over costs thus materialised into the choice of a smaller sample. Also, given the demographic characteristics of the study sites in El Alto, while older persons were represented proportionally, there were low numbers of them included in the survey. This limits the confidence we can have in claims of representativeness beyond study sites with a higher proportion of older persons, and this has some implications in comparisons that can be made between citizens’ perceptions of the three cash transfers. As such, caveats are made regarding claims regarding the perspectives of older persons.

\textit{h) Informed Consent}

In term of individual consent, the purpose of the research and its use were clearly explained, underlining that participation in the research was voluntary and that participants had the right to withdraw from research or data concerning them at any point without fear of penalty.
Interview, focus group, and survey data were also anonymised, and for those in study sites in El Alto first names were changed where they are used in the text. Efforts have also been made to abstract content where it was judged to be sensitive in order to avoid potential reprisals for civil servants or civil society actors. In terms of participation, where possible, particular efforts were made to include the perspectives of women and socially excluded groups, both through sampling choices and study site selection criteria (see DFID, 2011).

Study site access was achieved through a researcher from the Universidad Mayor de San Andrés who worked for a foundation in district 7 and had previously worked in district 14. This researcher made an introduction to a neighbourhood committee leader who recommended where to conduct surveys and interviews and offered valuable information about the neighbourhood. Contact was then made with the person in charge of census data for the neighbourhood and he was hired as an enumerator. This was considered to be an appropriate choice that would marry good knowledge of local context, but still achieving a degree of independence from participants. Issues of cultural sensitivity were discussed with the enumerator and he was then asked to pilot the survey and provide feedback on the appropriateness of survey questions and on questions that respondents felt difficult to answer or were unwilling to answer. With some minor adjustments to the more sensitive questions related to electoral preferences, the enumerator went on to complete the survey.

In district 7, the same foundation was approached for advice on where it would be best to conduct research. In this case, rather than approaching civil society representatives directly, we visited the sub-district office to consult relevant staff members, both to interview them and to ask their recommendations for interviews. Staff at the sub-district office recommended we approach school and health service providers directly. Consent was thus solicited from the head doctor at the health centres to conduct interviews with other doctors and patients. For the local school, the headteacher was approached and made a connection with the head of the school board.

Recognising the limited responses from Renta Dignidad beneficiaries (given demographic composition in selected districts), and with no coverage from organisations such as Help Age International, additional efforts were made to locate older persons. Our enumerator uncovered that there was an old people’s home in district 14, so we approached those in charge of the facility with due care to interview residents that were willing and able to respond to questions. In this case, questions were kept especially short and simple.
In district 14, we approached the sub-district office to speak with the official in charge of education and health. He was also the head of the parent-teacher association at the preferred school. He provided an introduction to the head teacher and head doctor at the school and health centre. Their consent was solicited to interview cash transfer recipients.

For the focus group, efforts were made to replicate a similar format employed in a previous study on the *Bono Juana Azurduy* in 2010 under a team led by Maxine Molyneux. We approached the Centre for Information and Development of Women (CIDEM), a women’s organisation, which has an office in El Alto. CIDEM was training women to become community liaison officers, and these were the participants in the focus group. The background for the research was clearly explained to participants. To reduce potential transaction costs, we reimbursed CIDEM for the drinks and snacks and offered to cover transportation costs for all participants. Some accepted and others graciously declined this offer. In terms of what was given back to participants, presentations and relevant unsensitive secondary data were shared with doctors and teachers interviewed, and also with CIDEM.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter we explained our criteria for case selection and cash transfer policy selection. We then explained the analytical framework, methodology, key arguments that will be defended throughout the thesis, field study sites, the study process, limitations and issues of informed consent.
Chapter 4: Bolivian Context

This chapter aims to explain the economic, political and discursive context which the Morales government inherited in 2005. We will first consider the origins of resource nationalist discourse in Bolivia’s colonial and post-colonial history, including crises and contestation with transnational interests and narratives related to the capture of economic surplus and redistribution. We will then assess social protection under the period of structural adjustment (1985 – 2000), focusing on fiscal constraints, rent hypothecation, and the competing ideas and interests underpinning the introduction of Bolivia’s social pension. Thirdly, we will assess the potential influence of political competition and the emergence of social protection policies in political platforms. Finally, we will consider the role of IFI conditionalities and institutional crises in reigniting resource nationalist pressures for rent capture and redistribution (2000 – 2005) and provided an economic platform for the Morales government.

i) Capturing the Surplus for All

When the Spanish arrived in South America, a major aim was to take advantage of mineral deposits such as gold and silver. The colonists established “extractive institutions” which enabled a small foreign elite to maintain power and control over mineral rents for over three centuries (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). With the discovery of some of the largest silver deposits in the world in Potosí in 1545, Bolivia became a mining power. George Gray Molina (2005) argues that while Bolivia has changed its development model numerous times, it failed to change its pattern of development, which was invariably linked to natural resource extraction and the distribution of these rents. Denise Humphreys Bebbington and Celina Huber (2017) suggest there have been five periods of political settlement in Bolivia since 1899. However, three features stand out across different settlements: the centrality of natural resource rent and ideas regarding the ownership of these resources, shifting ideas regarding the role of the state, and conflicts over rents which in turn triggered crises, settlement transitions and realignments of class interests.

The Federal Revolution of 1899 was chiefly a dispute between the traditional silver mining elites in the constitutional capital of Chuquisaca, supported by the Conservative party, and the Liberals, who won the war, and established a new administrative capital in La Paz. In 1900, just as international silver prices began to fall, Simón Patiño discovered the La Salvador (The Saviour) mine, the richest tin mine in the world. A boom in tin prices from
1922 came to a swift halt in 1929 following the Wall Street Crash in the United States. Concurrently, the oil and gas sector saw increasing competition among a group of multinational oil companies, known as the “seven sisters,” which were looking to expand the sector (Fundación Jubileo, 2012). Disputes between the Standard Oil Company and the Royal Dutch Shell subsidiary, Union Oil Company, over petroleum concessions are widely believed to be a primary cause of the Chaco War (1932 – 1935) between Bolivia and Paraguay. At the time, Standard Oil was fighting a court case with the Bolivian state over unpaid taxes and it was argued to be exploiting petroleum illegally for Paraguay’s benefit (Lechin, 2005: 74).

The Chaco War was a critical juncture which triggered an increase in resource nationalist sentiments. In November 1936, Colonel David Toro and Germán Busch led a coup d’état under the guise of “military socialism.” By March 1937, Standard Oil’s assets had been expropriated and the first state hydrocarbons company, Bolivian Fiscal Petroleum Deposits (YPFB), was formed. This was the first nationalisation in Latin America (Klein, 2003). Tin mining remained the most important sector of the economy. Yet, strikes in the Patiño family’s Catavi mine in 1943 led to a massacre. Shortly thereafter, the Union Federation of Bolivian Mine Workers (FSTMB) was established in 1944 and published the Pulcayo Theses in 1946 which promoted class struggle against the bourgeoisie (Humphreys Bebbington and Huber, 2017: 18). Initial efforts made under President Gualberto Villarroel to increase state control of the mining economy and thwart the ambitions of mining oligarchs was short-lived and largely ineffective.

The newly-formed National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) party won the elections of 1951. However, in response, the incumbent government established a military junta which triggered a coup d’état and started the process known as the National Revolution. One key act of the revolution was the nationalisation of the mines of tin oligarchs (Patiño, Hochschild and Aramayo families), and in the same year, the Bolivian Workers Central Union (COB), the largest labour union was founded, with initially close ties to the MNR government. While the revolution was led by urban middle-class reformists confronting oligarchic elites, it espoused the redistributive slogan ‘mines to the state and land to the people (Hylton and Thomson, 2007: 77)’ from Tristán Marof’s La Justicia del Inca (Inca Justice), and this became a touchstone in Bolivia’s resource nationalist discourse thereafter.

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28 Standard Oil, Gulf Oil, Exxon, Socuz Vacum, Texas Oil, Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum
Despite the ambitions of the Victor Paz Estenssoro government, Bolivia depended heavily on US aid and in 1956 a Plan for Economic Stabilisation was drafted. This plan, known as the Davenport Code, as it was written largely by a US diplomat of the same name, prohibited the Bolivian government from investing in mining and hydrocarbons sectors as a precondition for receiving international aid. This condition led to the rise of the Gulf Oil company. Like Standard Oil before it, Gulf Oil was accused of tax evasion. So, in 1969, General Alfredo Ovando carried out a second nationalisation, expelling Gulf Oil (Klein, 2003; Hylton and Thomson, 2007).

Following the agrarian reform of 1953 which promoted universal basic education, there was an increase in Aymara students from the Altiplano (High Plain) pursuing university studies in the capital city of La Paz. By the Sixth National Peasant Congress in 1971, some of these students formed a group known as the Katarists. Katarism was an Aymara political movement whose ideational origins come from Túpac Katari, who raised an army of around 40,000 and laid siege to La Paz in 1781. Katari and his consort, Bartolina Sisa, set up an alternative court in El Alto and was remembered as a hero by the Katarist movement. Following the Tolata massacre of 13 Quechua peasants in 1973, the Katarists issued the Tiwanacu Manifesto which critiqued the economic exploitation and political oppression under colonialism and a dozen military dictatorships during the 1960s and 1970s (Klein, 2003).

In 1979, these ideas influenced the new Trade Union Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers (CSUTCB) as its first executive secretary, Genaro Flores, was a Katarist. Katarist discourse espoused notions of popular sovereignty. Indigenous groups were encouraged by Katari’s promises that ‘they would be left as the ultimate owners of this place, and of its wealth (Hylton and Thomson, 2007: 41).’ The Manifesto positioned a “them” and “us,” whereby, miners, factory, construction, and transportation workers, were explicitly pitted against politicians (Casen, 2012). Politicians were accused of failing to implement the emancipatory aims of the National Revolution and of conspiring with mining oligarchs and foreign mining companies who were considered to have ‘swindled the surplus (Montenegro cited in Molina, 2011: 84).’ This resonated with the anticolonial dependency theory arguments elsewhere in the region at the time (Frank, 1971; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979).

The ‘resource nationalism’ which the Katarists espoused was an explicitly normative position, as the recovery of sovereignty was conceived as a means to restore ‘national

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29 The dictatorships were those of René Barrientos, Alfredo Ovando, Juan José Torres and Hugo Banzer, Juan Pereda, David Padilla, Alberto Natush, Luis García Meza, Cesar Torellio and Guido Vildoso.
dignity (Montenegro cited in Molina, 2011: 84).’ This entailed an increasingly statist posture, as the state was seen as the only ‘social subject able to correctly administer the resources in the name of all (Molina, 2011: 50).’ This connection between resource nationalism and statism was most clearly expressed by René Zavaleta in his influential book Lo Nacional-Popular (People’s Nationalism). Zavaleta referred to the ‘grievance of surplus’ and argued that the very ‘history of the construction of the state is the production, distribution and application of surplus (Zavaleta, 1985: 42).’ According to Zavaleta, the ‘state’s [primary] mandate… [was] capturing the surplus (ibid, 1985: 28).’ As we will see in the following chapter, capturing the surplus was the central idea of the first Morales administration.

The Katarist movement and its resource nationalist ideas also had a strong connection to the key social institution in Andean agrarian society, the ayllu (Klein, 2003). The ayllu is a community structure found in both Aymara and Quechua groups, the two largest ethnic groups in the country. The legitimacy of leaders within the ayllu was maintained through a mutually reinforcing relationship between two communitarian values: reciprocity and redistribution. Reciprocity was exercised through kinship networks and comprised of mutual obligations between group members and entailed a hereditary right to work and contribute labour to community production. There was no formal ownership of land. Instead, those living within the boundaries of the ayllu received land loans to sustain themselves and their families (BG11, 21/03/13). Redistribution chiefly took place through the provision of food and clothing by the mallku (the male leader of the ayllu). Roxana Liendo (2009: 72) argues that under the ayllu, kinship groups were bound by strategic alliances, rather than a tax relationship. Liendo points out that labour could be obliged only where there was security of redistribution (Liendo, 2009). Leaders were required to give back to communities in order to maintain their position, and given the tight connection between reciprocity and redistribution, social prestige was argued to be valued more highly than material reward (Lazar, 2008: 81; Liendo, 2009: 330).

Carmelo Mesa-Lago (1978: 17) points out that ayllus were also the first social protection structures in the American continent. Under Inca rule, ayllus offered a form of community insurance and social assistance. The crops that were produced collectively for the community were put into a communal fund to help the aged, widows, orphans, disabled persons, and the sick. However, these community structures and support systems were undermined by the forced drafting of community labour in silver and tin mining across the Andes under the colonial encomienda system (Klein, 2003). As Sian Lazar (2008) notes, the ayllu therefore represents a different form of social contract between leaders and the people,
based on communitarian values and affiliations, rather than Western liberal notions of individual citizenship and formal legal entitlements. While it is possible for both notions to coexist, this perspective creates incentives for leaders to promote egalitarian and universalist rather than targeted forms of social assistance in order to appeal to Aymara and Quechua constituents. However, these ideas remained dormant throughout the period of structural adjustment.

**ii) Social Assistance under Adjustment**

Following twenty years of profligate dictatorships, in 1981, the IMF and World Bank decided to stop lending to the Bolivian government, and private banks followed their example. These credit cuts forced the new democratic government of Hernán Siles Zuaso to resort to money printing to meet its public spending commitments. Bolivia was particularly affected by the Debt Crisis in 1982 because it took on an enormous volume of petrodollars from private creditors – in 1980, 42% of its external debt was to private creditors. Foreign debt increased from US$500 million in 1971 to US$3.8 billion by 1982 (Fundación Jubileo, 2012). Money printing meant that inflation rose rapidly over the period; by 1985, it reached over 8,000% - one of the highest rates the world has ever seen (Morales, 1999).

A technical team led by President of the Senate, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, with support from Jeffrey Sachs, designed the New Economic Policy (NEP) which was introduced by Supreme Decree 21060 on the 29th August 1985. This structural adjustment policy was designed to restore macroeconomic stability amidst inflation, debt, and balance of payments problems. It proposed a reduction in the fiscal deficit by freezing wages, a rapid increase in gasoline prices, introducing an exchange rate relative to the dollar, free hiring practices, market liberalisation, tax reform and reduction in the size of the state. The NEP’s introduction of a flexible exchange rate with the dollar meant that the price of oil rose by a factor of seven overnight (Dunkerley 2007: 154). As a direct result, oil was restored as one of the most important sources of government revenue. While the NEP was effective in achieving economic stability, the social cost was significant. The most visceral and contentious change was the privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), particularly those of the mines. Combined with a large fall in tin prices, privatisation resulted in 20,000 miners losing their jobs in the first year. This provoked a march from Oruro to La Paz by more than 10,000 workers. By 1986, real wages had fallen to two-thirds of 1985 levels (Crabtree et al., 1987, in Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 61).
This great employment fracture caused many miners to migrate to major cities in search of job opportunities, but few jobs were forthcoming. The Victor Paz Estenssoro administration (1985 – 1989) recognised that there was need for employment creation programmes to buffer the effects of structural adjustment. Bolivia was the first country in the world to introduce a Social Emergency Fund (FSE) in 1986, through Supreme Decree 21137 (World Bank, 1990). The FSE consisted of public works programmes to build infrastructure, social assistance and credit for productive activities. The fund was designed to be temporary and was jointly financed by the United Nations, the World Bank and the Bolivian Treasury. By 1990, the FSE had reached 1.5 million people. 97% of beneficiaries were men (44% were construction workers and 21% unemployed miners). This targeting was a deliberate effort to appease those most affected by the structural reforms, but targeting was not necessarily progressive. One study found that the poorest 20% of Bolivian households supplied only 6-8% of workers employed within the FSI (Tendler, 2000, in McGuire, 2013). In 1991, the FSE became the Social Investment Fund (FSI) which supported job creation by building schools and health centres.

As Mónica Loayza (2006) shows, fiscal constraints in the 1980s meant a challenging period for Bolivian social policy in both absolute and relative terms. Total social spending reduced from $US402 million in 1980 to $US164 million in 1985; decreasing proportionally from 7 to 3% of GDP, and from 14 to 9% of total public spending. Notably, health spending fell from $US135 million to only $US23 million. Loayza argues that at the beginning of the 1990s, social policy assumed the guise of a “social debt” to compensate for the effects of the economic crisis. In 1991, the Bolivian Social Strategy aimed to shift the emphasis of social policy to building human capital. This entailed a rise in social spending, which nearly tripled between 1990 and 1997 (from US$348 to US$974 million and from 34% to 46% of government spending). Over the same period, domestic financing nearly tripled from $US316 million to US$870 million and so too did external financing, which increased from $US32 million to US$104 million (Loayza, 2006).

The Jaime Paz Zamora administration (1989 – 1993) saw economic recovery as an opportunity to consolidate structural reforms through the Privatisation Law of 1992 in which 100 state businesses were privatised (La Razón, 2005: 24). His successor, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1993 – 1997), continued this process with the Capitalization Law of 1994. This was the economic heart of Sánchez de Lozada’s government programme. The political heart was the Law for Popular Participation (passed on the 20th April 1994) which established 311 municipalities and granted legal recognition to rural and indigenous
communities for the first time through Territorial Base Organisations (OTBs), allowing them to play a role in the management of municipal resources and of infrastructure services such as education, health, sports, sanitation and roads.

The Capitalization Law included an international invitation to tender for 51% of shares in the six largest State-owned Enterprises: Bolivian Fiscal Petroleum Deposits (YPFB), National Foundries Company (ENAF), National Electric Company (ENDE), National Railways Company (ENFE), National Telecommunications Company (ENTEL), and Lloyd Aero Boliviano (airline). “Capitalization,” which was a form of privatisation, was deeply unpopular (Kohl and Farthing, 2006; Jemio, 2008, Webber, 2009). One major reason why such a deal was struck is because the government’s hand was forced. The IMF stipulated that Bolivia could not invest in SOEs as a condition for their loan commitments, but with delays in the privatisation schedule, the IMF considered the country non-compliant, so it withdrew structural adjustment loans, and the World Bank followed suit (Kohl and Farthing, 2006).

Between 1985 and 1996, revenue from Bolivian Fiscal Petroleum Deposits (YPFB) constituted the primary source of state income. The company was often presented as being on the verge of bankruptcy. Yet, as Claire McGuigan (2007: 21) argues, the problems YPFB had were generally linked to a lack of state investment rather than inefficiency. However, privatisation provided important incentives for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the oil and gas sector. One report from the Bolivian government from showed that BP-Amoco and Repsol YPF benefited from the lowest production and exploration costs in the world; five times lower than the average (Hylton and Thomson, 2007: 102). As the name suggests, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s administration believed that capitalization would provide much needed financial capital for investment in oil and gas exploration. The MNR’s manifesto in 2002 estimated that privatisation would bring a further US$210 million each year in tax revenue for the following 15 years (MNR, 2002).

However, there was a trade-off between increased FDI and fiscal liquidity. Oil companies did not have to pay taxes directly. To obtain the 51% stake, investors only had to bring new capital that could be added to the existing assets. For new reserves, they had the freedom to choose what level of profits to reinvest and what level to declare as dividends each year. As a result, there was a decline in state income from the sector. McGuigan (2007) demonstrates that for the six years prior to privatisation the average annual transfer to the state was US$298 million, and for the six years after privatisation it was US$206 million (McGuigan, 2007).
At the same time as the push to privatise SOEs, the government was also reviewing options for pension reform. The two reforms became increasingly intertwined. Pension reform was designed to replace the old pay-as-you-go system with one of individual contribution and would be administered privately. Before the reform, the system was based on a publicly administered fund (*Fondo de Pensiones Básicas*, FOPEBA), which covered 43% of those that had a pension and a system of complementary funds (FONCOMs) administered privately, which covered the other 57%. Low pension coverage, an ageing population, low contribution levels, and high administrative costs led to insufficient reserves in the pension system, and thus made pension reform necessary (Jemio, 2008).

By the early 1990s, the Unified Union Confederation of Peasant Workers in Bolivia (CSUTCB) had become the most important group within the Bolivian Workers’ Central (COB), and CSUTCB leaders advocated for universalisation of social security. However, the COB generally resisted pension reform and was hesitant over proposals for expansion that would include non-contributors (Klein 1992: 276, in Carnes and Mares, 2014: 15). The Paz Zamora administration organised a commission to reform the pension system towards the end of his term, producing a plan initially modelled on Chile’s privatisation. However, Paz Zamora was hesitant to push for radical pension reform, given initial resistance from the COB and the fact that any political benefits would only be reaped by his successor (Weyland, 2006). The COB leadership lost interest in expanding the pension when it was realised that expansion might dilute members’ existing benefits (Gray Molina, Pérez de Rada and Yañez, 1999; Weyland, 2006; Carnes and Mares, 2014). This forced the government to re-evaluate funding arrangements that would allow them to carry out pension reform without reducing benefits.

The roll out of the *Bonosol* social pension shortly before elections in 1997 has led various scholars to argue that the introduction of a universal rather than means-tested pension was a matter of ‘political calculations’ and ‘pragmatic choices’ linked to the promise of ‘electoral payoffs (Weyland, 2006: 120; Müller, 2009).’ However, while electoral incentives came into play, Sánchez de Lozada’s proposals reflected strongly-held cognitive ideas about how to solve Bolivia’s structural problems and a keen awareness of what would be deemed socially acceptable.

Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada lost the 1989 elections to Paz Zamora, despite winning the most votes. He created a right-wing think tank, *Fundación Milenio* (Millennium Foundation), in 1992 which under the leadership of Roberto Laserna made wide-ranging reform proposals, and this materialised into the Plan for All (*Plan de Todos*), Sánchez de Lozada’s
electoral platform in 1993 (Pearson, 1998). The Plan for All reflected a clear Polanyian “double movement” to make the ‘process of economic improvement… socially bearable (Putzel, 2002: 3),’ but was also a means of incorporating lower-level factions into the political settlement through “popular participation.” Meredith Pearson (1998: 8) notes that Sánchez de Lozada ‘believed strongly in the necessary interconnectedness of economic and social reform.’ And as the Bolivian journalist Fernando Molina points out, the proposal to provide concrete and immediate benefits from the capitalization to all Bolivians was intended from the beginning. It was explicitly part of a wider programme called “social capitalization (Molina, 2007).” As an ex-Hydrocarbons Minister explained, the Bonosol was always part of the “privatisation package,” and always “tightly linked to the performance of the hydrocarbons sector (BG8, 28/11/13).” Social capitalization became a programme-level nodal point (or focusing idea) for Sánchez de Lozada.

Within a month of Sánchez de Lozada taking office on the 25th August 1993, the COB went out on strike to protest against the Plan for All. This sharpened government attention to the need for explicit links between capitalization and social benefits. Most versions of the Plan for All made no reference to pension funds or pension privatisation (Müller, 2009). However, article 7 of the Capitalization Law (1544) passed on the 21st March 1994 stipulated that Bolivian citizens would benefit from the transfer of shares through pension funds. In October, this translated into a General Economic and Social Development Plan which specified that each citizen would receive a shares package (Gray Molina, Pérez de Rada and Yañez; 1999: 43 – 44).

While Sánchez de Lozada’s ideological commitment to universalism may have been relatively shallow, he was deeply concerned by what would be considered acceptable by ordinary Bolivians, and keen to demonstrate that he ‘was listening’ as his motto was “Goni listens” (Goni eschucha) (Sánchez de Lozada and Fauget, 2014: 12). The Bonosol has been presented as a strategy to make pension privatisation politically acceptable (Weyland, 2006: 121; Müller, 2009). In this sense, while generally not acknowledged by scholars, leaders’ interpretation of what was perceived to be legitimate was a key factor. As in the two CCTs which followed, the source of rent meant that justifications for a narrowly targeted programme were not strong, and as the Capitalization Law legislated that hydrocarbons were owned by all Bolivians as citizens, targeted benefits would likely have been met with considerable resistance.

Various neoliberal policymakers argue that the other main reason the Bonosol was universal, alongside electoral incentives, was to avoid corruption (BG8, 28/11/13; BG25,
25/10/13). Roberto Laserna (2007), who helped design the Plan for All, affirmed that universality avoids problems of corruption, nepotism, clientelism and reduces the administrative burden and cost for a state with low bureaucratic capacity (Laserna, 2007). Policymakers interviewed stressed Sánchez de Lozada’s concern with corruption, given that he ran on an anti-corruption platform in the 1997 elections. Likewise, the enormous challenges of controlling corruption in a targeted pension meant that little money would likely have been saved (BG8, 28/11/13; BG25, 25/10/13). Therefore, while largely forgotten, early on in Sánchez de Lozada’s administration we see that there were strong normative ideas related to corruption and the acceptability of targeting, and technical justifications related to administrative capacity and effectiveness which underpinned the universal policy scope. What was less clear was the specific funding arrangements, policy instrument and operational modalities.

Roberto Laserna (2007a) points out that the original idea in the Plan for All in 1993 was to create a foundation, Fundesol, which would administer shares for all Bolivian citizens and invest in development projects for social benefit. It was considered that the shares and their dividends might be distributed directly to around 3.5 million beneficiaries. The idea of distributing shares to all citizens was later rejected because of the logistical issues in handing out shares, and the risk of wealth concentration that this scheme could reproduce, as many of the poorest beneficiaries might sell their shares to wealthier investors (Jemio, 2008). President Sánchez de Lozada considered the Bonosol his “beautiful idea (Sánchez de Lozada and Fauget, 2014: 45),” so he was very much committed to it. But, concrete plans for social benefits could not materialise without financing from hydrocarbon privatisation. Opposition to reforms grew and following months of strikes by the COB protesting against Capitalization, the government declared on the 18th April 1995 a state of emergency for six months. In order to overcome opposition from the labour movement, the Pensions Secretariat carried out 200 seminars and conferences in the first 6 months of 1995 (Gray Molina, Pérez de Rada, and Yañez, 1999). However, strikes against pension reform returned on the 6th November 1995.

For Laserna (2004: 68), Bolivia was caught in a ‘populist trap,’ in which Bolivians ‘continue[d] grasping at the conviction that there is no wealth outside that which can be found in nature and no other way to resolve poverty except through its distribution.’ Yet, he acknowledged that natural gas was ‘the only source of resources that could give material sustenance (Laserna, 2004: 6)’ to social demands. Rent capture from the hydrocarbons sector was a pre-requisite to deliver on social reforms. As Gray Molina, Pérez de Rada and Yañez (1999:
argue, there was ‘direct dependence.’ The New Hydrocarbons Law passed through congress on the 30th April 1996, and only after this point do we begin to see real progress.

Meanwhile, the government also began to quietly introduce a series of non-contributory health insurance schemes. The aim of these programmes was to eliminate cost barriers for mothers and infants to receive health services and to help increase institutional birth coverage. On the 24th May 1996, through Supreme Decree 24303, the National Insurance for Maternity and Childhood (SNMN) was created. This was adapted in 1997 as part of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) through Basic Health Insurance (SBS).

Despite perceptions that Bolivia was under the thumb of foreign interests, Kurt Weyland (2005, 2006: 76 – 77) shows that loan conditionality by IFIs was unable to stop the government introducing universal benefits. The World Bank, IADB and USAID all provided resources to employ Chilean consultants to replicate Chile’s pension privatisation and one tranche of the World Bank’s capitalization programme adjustment credit was conditional on passing pension reforms. However, evidence from key informants involved in the decision-making process showed that Bolivia resisted IFI proposals to use the proceeds from privatisation to pay off existing pension entitlements and insisted upon part of privatisation resources being used to fund a social pension (Weyland, 2005, 2006).

Dividends that came from the other 49% of the capitalization sale were reserved for a social pension for all Bolivian citizens who were 21 or older on the 31st December 1995, once they reached the age of 65. The social pension was called the Bono Solidario or Bonosol (Solidarity Grant). Six months after the Hydrocarbons Law, on the 29th November 1996, the Pensions Law was passed. The Bonosol was designed to last for 70 years, and for the first five years the amount was set at Bs.1,800 (US$248). This sum would come from the profits of the capitalized enterprises administered by private pension funds (Willmore, 2006).

\[iii\) \textit{Elections, Fiscal Constraints and Social Assistance}\]

On the 5th May 1997, just one month before national elections, the Bonosol was paid for the first time. This was hailed by the La Razón newspaper as ‘historic and the start of a new era, a day with a taste of justice and in which a poor country discovered its capacity for solidarity (La Razón in Aponte, 2007: 51).’ Historic though it was, the social pension had fiscal issues from the very beginning. Beneficiary numbers were estimated based on projections from the 1992 census at 294,500, yet in the first year there were as many as 364,000 recipients (Laserna, 2007a). Dividends accruing to the capitalization fund amounted to an average of
around US$44 million per year, far from the US$100 million a year required for the *Bonosol* (Willmore, 2006).

When the social pension was launched, opinion regarding its merits was divided. The presidential candidate for the Revolutionary Left Movement Party (MIR) Samuel Doria Medina called the *Bonosol* “absurd and demagogic. [He argued] it is the worst form of wasting the capitalization resources (Aponte, 2007: 57).” Wenceslao Argandoña, President of the National Pensioners’ Confederation (*Confederación Nacional de Jubilados Rentistas de Bolivia* – CONAJUREB), supported the *Bonosol*, arguing that it was a “right that the people had acquired because the capitalized companies are owned by all Bolivians, the *Bonosol* is not a gift of the government, a shame that it is used for electoral gain (Aponte, 2007: 55).” The *Bonosol* was fundamental to the President’s electoral platform, and in response, all of the largest political parties agreed to guarantee the social pension in their election campaigns, as the table below shows:

*Figure 5. Declarations about the Bonosol in the 1997 Election*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIR (Jaime Paz Zamora)</td>
<td>“We will pay it from age 60.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCS</td>
<td>“We will pay it more than once a year.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADN (Hugo Banzer)</td>
<td>“We will pay the <em>Bonosol</em> in a more just and improved way. In rural areas, we will pay the benefit to those of 55 years, in the intermediate cities 60, and in capital cities 65. The amount will be the same; that is, earlier for the poorest. This is the truth and the rest is pure lies.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONDEPA</td>
<td>“We will increase it to US$700.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNR (Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada)</td>
<td>“Only we can guarantee it; the rest will get rid of it.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adapted from Aponte, 2007: 24*

This demonstrates that the social pension was central to electoral campaigns, yet this led to accusations of clientelism (Doria Medina in Aponte, 2007: 35). Even though the programme was presented as part of a programmatic linkage strategy to citizens as “shareholders,” we also find evidence of the social pension being used as a clientelist linkage strategy. This was best captured in the case of a television advert during the campaign by the opposition Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) Party, in which a *Bonosol* beneficiary declared: “I’ve got my *Bonosol*, but my vote is for the opposition.” The following week, the man’s pension was taken away (BG8, 28/11/13).

In 1997, the private Pension Fund Administrators (AFPs) faced a financing shortfall. At this point, the Treasury was running a fiscal deficit of around US$200 million per annum and bridged the gap by borrowing from commercial banks at an annual interest rate of 11%. On
the 10th December 1997, Futuro de Bolivia and AFP Previsión BBV S.A., the Collective Capitalization fund managers, relayed to the government’s Pensions Superintendent that ‘for January we will not have sufficient liquidity to meet our obligations to pay the beneficiaries of the capitalization (Aponte, 2007: 61).’ There was not enough money in the accounts to pay 380,000 cash transfers. The cost was estimated at US$106 million, but in 1997 the dividends had fallen to only US$35 million (Aponte, 2007). On the 10th January 1998, only eight months after the first payment of the Bonosol, the pension fund managers suspended payment. This shows that with reduced levels of income from hydrocarbons, the pension funds were unable to cover the costs, and with a growing deficit and pressure from multilateral lenders, the government was unwilling to ask for further loans to cover the shortfall, as Mongolia did a decade later.

The opposition Nationalist Democratic Action Party (ADN) led by the ex-dictator General Hugo Banzer won the election. Banzer’s view was that “only people with lower income should receive the Bonosol (Hoy, 12th December 1997, in Aponte, 2007: 62).” Although Banzer argued he would maintain the same amount of the transfer during his electoral campaign, the social pension was not a priority, and there were competing demands both to balance the budget and use the capitalization proceeds for productive investment. Importantly, Banzer’s opposition was not only fiscal, but also due to his productivist beliefs. It was argued that Banzer viewed the social pension as a poor use of limited public funds and that “social investment” should be focused instead on public works (see Martinez, 2004; BG25, 25/10/13). These works could also be targeted to particular groups and geographic areas on clientelistic lines, as was common under his dictatorship in the 1970s.

Six months after rescinding the Bonosol, on the 22nd June 1998, President Banzer’s new government coalition with the Revolutionary Left Movement Party (MIR), Solidarity and Civic Union Party (UCS) and Nationhood Awareness Party (CONDEPA) passed the Property and Popular Credit Law. This law was in line with Banzer’s neoliberal leanings and productivist beliefs, as it prohibited the accumulation of additional debt. It established that 70% of the capitalization would be sold as shares to finance road projects and the remaining 30% would fund a reduced pension scheme called Bolivida (Boli-life). This was limited to adults 65+ who were aged over 50 by the end of 1995, and the amount was reduced from Bs.1,800 (US$248) to Bs.395 (US$56) (Molina, 2007).

Despite this retrenchment, in the same period, the Banzer government approved Medical Insurance for Older Persons (SMGV) through Law 1889 on the 14th August 1998. The policy was aimed at uninsured pensioners over 60 years of age and was co-financed by the
treasury (60%) and municipal governments (40%). The insurance was modest, and coverage was limited. It thus received limited public attention.

On the 3rd August 2000, older persons from the National Pensioners’ Confederation marched in Santa Cruz in opposition to the government’s proposal to reduce benefits. Marchers claimed that what was offered was ‘rubbish, a joke for old people, an offence.’ They noted the shame that older persons felt in requesting alms from the church as they were not being paid the Bonosol (Noticias Fides, 2000). It is unclear that the government heeded these concerns, but in late December 2000, the Bs.420 (US$60) Bolivida was paid to all adults 65 and older. It also included retroactive payments from 1998 and 1999, making the annual payment US$120, and in 2001 a second payment of US$120 was made retroactively for 2000 and 2002 using dividends from the Collective Capitalization Fund (Martínez, 2004). However, in 2002, Bolivida was not paid due to insufficient liquidity in the fund. Banzer had stepped down due to ill health and his Vice-President Jorge Quiroga assumed office on the 7th August 2001 and carried through Banzer’s mandate until the elections.

Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s core electoral pledge under the focusing idea of social capitalization in June 2002 was to reinstate the Bonosol, and when he returned to power, this was his first major legislative initiative (Müller, 2009; 2016). At this point, for the first time, the Bonosol was referred to as a right (Law 2427, article 1). The original payment amount of Bs.1,800 (US$257) was reinstated. This was a risk because it far exceeded what was considered a sustainable amount from the Collective Capitalization Fund of around Bs.700 (US$100). Ramiro Gamboa of UDAPE argued that the amount of Bs.1,800 (US$257) was an electoral promise rather than a costed one, because resources would need to double to meet the commitment (Gamboa, 2006). Sánchez de Lozada was thus argued to be gambling with the Bonosol, using it to shore up his own political continuity and the legitimacy of otherwise unpopular neoliberal economic reforms (BG8, 28/11/13; BG9, 11/11/13). Less prominent proposals in the MNR platform included improvements to maternal and infant health insurance and targeted education and health conditional cash transfers for poor rural families (MNR, 2002: 3).

On the 21st November 2002, Law 2426 was promulgated to introduce the Universal Infant-Maternal Health Insurance (SUMI).30 The SUMI consisted of a package of 500 essential

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30 This was replaced by the Comprehensive Health Services Benefits Law in December 2013, which brought all public health insurance schemes together. This was funded by 5.5% of total Tax Co-participation municipal funds, or the equivalent from municipal Hydrocarbons Direct Tax funds (Vidal, 2016: 8).
maternal and child health services, free of charge to beneficiaries, funded by municipal funds (10% of total Tax Co-participation funds) and up to 10% of the National Solidarity Fund (Vidal, 2016). Yet, this was not well received. On the 25th November 2002, senators and deputies from the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party joined the marches by the Bolivian Workers’ Central (COB) against the Bonosol. Santos Ramírez Velarde, for example, affirmed that:

“MAS senators and deputies have left our job as parliamentarians to join the workers and march against the government because you can’t allow a precarious majority in Congress to do as they please with the people’s money.”

Ramírez Velarde saw both the Bonosol and SUMI as means designed to “shut up the protest” and felt that there were other uses of public money that should be prioritised (Noticias Fides, 25/11/02). While it is not clear these complaints were well founded, we find that between 1999 and 2003 the social protection budget nearly tripled from $US77.8 million to $US224.5 million, rising from 2.6 to 7.5% of total public spending (World Bank, 2006). So, there was a substantial increase in fiscal commitment to social protection under two right-wing coalition governments.

The MNR electoral platform inspired technocrats in UDAPE to design a conditional cash transfer programme to reduce school desertion. UDAPE’s original proposal, Beca Futuro (Future Scholarship) in the first half of 2003, was to be focused on the poorest municipalities. UDAPE cite Rainer Thiele’s (2001: 39 – 40) recommendation of ‘scholarships for very poor students’ for the ‘whole of the primary cycle’ to ‘reduce dropout rates.’ According to bureaucrats within UDAPE, the proposal was rejected by the MNR government due to a “lack of funds (BG6, 26/02/14).” However, the Mayor of El Alto, José Luis Paredes, was inspired by the proposal (BG6, 26/02/14) and on the 18th September 2003 he introduced the Bono Esperanza (Hope Grant), which paid a cash transfer of Bs.50 (US$7) each month for four months to every first-grader in all El Alto’s public schools.

Legal justification came with the Dialogue Law 2235 of 2000, in which article 10 established that Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative resources could be used to invest in incentive programmes to counteract primary school desertion. Article 2 of Supreme Decree 26912 of the 3rd January 2003 further stipulated that these incentives could be monetary (Loza, 2007). On 19th September 2003, obscuring the programme’s origins, Paredes told a reporter:
“No one asked me for it. We promised the Bono Esperanza, I offered it, and here it is. We're paying this benefit in a poor municipality with a budget one-fifth the size of that of La Paz. We're making the effort because to invest in education is a social investment and an investment in the future (Paredes cited in McGuire, 2013: 10).”

After being re-elected in 2004 as Mayor of El Alto, Paredes ran for governor of the Department of La Paz as a candidate of the centre-right PODEMOS party. In his gubernatorial campaign, Paredes mentioned El Alto's Bono Esperanza at every turn. Jorge Quiroga, the PODEMOS presidential candidate who came second to Evo Morales in the 2005 election, also campaigned, promising if elected, to pay the Bono Solidario (Bonosol) for senior citizens and the Bono Esperanza for children (McGuire, 2013). An education-linked CCT programme was thus invoked in the December 2005 presidential campaign, but not by the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS).

In March 2005, the Law of Older People was passed by Congress. With continued concerns regarding fiscal constraints, this aimed to replace the Bonosol with a means-tested monthly pension of 440Bs (US$50) for all those not covered by the public or private pension system. However, as 74% of older persons would have been eligible for the pension, the cost was estimated at US$100 million, so the government would not save much money, and this sent the government into retreat. Equally, coverage of Medical Insurance for Older Persons (SMGV) remained poor. By 2005, only 105 of 326 municipalities provided the insurance (Skinner, 2006). In December 2005, a decree passed all responsibility to municipal governments which were compelled to earmark resources from the newly created Direct Hydrocarbons Tax (IDH). The SMGV became the Older Persons Health Insurance (SSPAM) through Law No. 3323 which was passed under President Eduardo Rodriguez Veltze on the 16th January 2006, just days before Morales was sworn into office.

**iv) Competition, Clientelism and Caudillos**

As Gray Molina, Pérez de Rada and Yañez (1999) point out, before Evo Morales came to power in 2005, political parties and Congress played a more important role in policy formulation. Coordinative discourse around policy preferences was slightly thicker as coalition governments became the norm. Since the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 1985 and up to 2005, traditional political parties gained a smaller share of Congress, with increasing fragmentation as the graph on the following page shows:
From 1985, the Revolutionary Nationalist Party (MNR) formed a coalition with the right-wing Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN) party, named Pact for Democracy \textit{(Pacto por la Democracia)}. Despite losing the election in 1989, Jaime Paz Zamora of the centre-left Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) made another deal with ADN, known as the Patriotic Accord \textit{(Acuerdo Patriótico)}, and thus became President for a second time between 1989 and 1993. While MNR candidate Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada won 43\% of the popular vote in 1993, he decided to form a coalition with Solidarity Civic Union (UCS) and the Free Bolivia Movement (MBL) in order to control 61.8\% of congress. Holding a majority allowed Sánchez de Lozada to push through the Plan for All \textit{(Plan de Todos)}.

Most of the political leaders of the period were argued to be firmly from the elite class of property owners and business dynasties (Lavaud 1990: 279, in Orellana Aillón, 2006). Partly due to the negative perceptions of this image, Sánchez de Lozada made Victor Hugo Cárdenas Vice-President. Cárdenas was the leader of the Revolutionary Liberation Movement Tupaq Katari (MRTK) Party, a university professor and Aymara Katarist. Making him Vice-President was thus seen as a savvy plan as part of a multicultural project that would ‘include the excluded (Hylton and Thomson, 2007: 99),’ and would bolster the legitimacy of Sánchez de Lozada’s administration.

The alliance system, which ensured governance during the 1990s, began to run out of steam around the turn of the millennium. The high degree of vote dispersion made it increasingly difficult to form a coherent coalition, since it became necessary to include a greater number
of parties across the political spectrum to attain congressional control. For the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), Patriotic Awareness (CONDEPA) and Solidarity Civic Action (UCS) parties which had proposed anti-neoliberal measures, to join the coalitions they effectively capitulated their own ideological positions. Jemio, Candia and Evia (2009) carried out an analysis of voting patterns for different political parties between 1985 and 2005. They defined systemic and anti-systemic parties and demonstrated that the vote for anti-systemic (populist) parties, i.e. MIR, CONDEPA, UCS and NFR collapsed due to their participation in government coalitions. The fall in support was clear evidence that these parties were punished by their constituencies.\footnote{The exception was UCS which in 1997, after having participated in a government coalition between 1993 and 1997, increased their vote because of the death of its leader just before the 1997 election.}

An ex-Central Bank director argued that many of Bolivia’s political parties were (and are) intrinsically weak because they lacked a party structure and coherent government policies, and thus were generally based on the figure of a caudillo (a “big man”) (BG9, 30/11/13). Given this, personalities mattered greatly in ensuring political legitimacy, and this was an issue for President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada who grew up in the United States, spoke with an American accent (commonly referred to as \textit{El Gringo} – the American), and owned one of the largest mining companies in the country. Evo Morales embodies his antithesis; of Aymara ethnicity from a poor rural area, and a coca trade union leader. Morales' party, the MAS, is not merely the “Movement towards Socialism.” Its full title is “Movement towards Socialism – Political Instrument for Peoples’ Sovereignty (MAS – IPSP),” and at least until 2006 was argued to represent the interests of various social movements beyond political party lines (BO19, 22/03/13). The graph on the following page demonstrates the exponential rise in political support for the MAS as the political parties of the great coalitions fragmented and withered:
The MAS partly inherited the vote of populist political dynasties, particularly CONDEPA and UCS (Stefanoni, 2010), and this was particularly the case in the city of El Alto (Lazar, 2008). CONDEPA was founded by Carlos Palenque, a famous musician who turned to politics in the 1980s after he started a radio show called The Free People’s Tribune (*La Tribuna Libre del Pueblo*). In 1997, Palenque died of a heart attack, and under his daughter support for the party dwindled. UCS was founded by Max Fernández who rose from humble roots to own Bolivia’s national brewery. After his death in 1996 in a plane crash, leadership passed onto his son Jhonny, and support also declined (Lazar, 2008).

While neither party had great success nationally, both had some success at local level in the city of El Alto. CONDEPA held the mayoralty of El Alto throughout the 1990s (1989 – 1999). Under CONDEPA, there were various corruption scandals which led to the resignation of one mayor after another. The MIR candidate, José Luis Paredes, ran as an anti-corruption ticket in the 1999 municipal election and won (Lazar, 2008). In an attempt to distance himself from MIR’s ties with President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s administration, Paredes created his own political party in 2002 called Progress Plan (*Plan Progreso*), yet still won the election. He later became the first Prefect of La Paz under the PODEMOS party in 2005.
CONDEPA, UCS, and MIR employed clientelistic and charismatic linkage strategies to varying degrees. Redistributive programmes were a key part of this, and this was intertwined with a personalised relationship with the patron (Lazar, 2008: 94). In Andean society, the godfather figure (compadre) is a key patron. CONDEPA employed what Pablo Stefanoni (2010) refers to as a “prebendalist” democratisation in which a godfather (compadre) redistributes resources through jobs or material assets. Works (obras) are ‘tangible evidence of political activity (Lazar, 2008: 112).’ It might also be argued that Paredes attempted to forge charismatic linkages as a godfather of graduating class through the Bono Esperanza. Godfathers (padrinos de promoción) are supposed to pay for the party, showing that they are a generous person in their community.

From the late 1990s, alongside political parties, social movements and trade unions regained momentum as a block of anti-institutional sentiment. The Bolivian Central Workers Union (COB – constituted in 1952), the Neighbourhood Associations Federation in El Alto (FEJUVE – constituted in 1979), the Unified Syndicate Confederation of Peasant Workers in Bolivia (CSUTCB – constituted in 1979), the National Confederation of Rural Indigenous Women (“Bartolina Sisa” – constituted in 1980) the National Council of Ayllus and Maarkas of Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ – constituted in 1997), coca farmers, and rural indigenous social movements came to the fore around the recovery of hydrocarbons and in opposition to the sale of natural gas to Chile.

This critical mass of social movements heralded a shift from “institutional democracy,” based on traditional political parties to “street democracy,” based on marches, blockades and protests (Dunkerley, 2007). Humphreys Bebbington and Huber (2017: 14) suggest that Bolivia’s current political settlement, which emerged out of the Gas War, is a dominant party settlement, chiefly grounded in power-sharing arrangements between social movements. Importantly, diverse “indigenist” groups such as CONAMAQ, CSUTCB, and Bartolina Sisa and organised labour groups such as the COB which had been historically disconnected were able to find common ground between 2000 and 2005 (Hylton and Thomson, 2007).

In terms of internal party organisation, the MAS has been argued to be made up of three factions united under the personal leadership of Evo Morales (Laserna, 2010; Postero, 2017), as we can see on the following page:

1. An “indigenist” group, led by Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca, which is chiefly concerned with decolonisation and promoting Andean cultural values;
2. A leftist group led by Vice-President Álvaro García Linera, which promotes the strong role of the state in the economy, and;
3. A populist group which unites urban neighbourhood associations and rural peasant associations, led by President Evo Morales, which emphasises local organisations and redistribution.

Together, these three blocks combine demands for indigenous recognition, a strong role for the state, and redistribution, binding together previously disparate groups under a common platform. The leaders of these three factions were also important. Most notably, the so-called “Evo-Álvaro” formula of President and Vice-President was said to espouse cultural identity and intellectual capacity and enabled the MAS to present itself as both revolutionary and respectable at once and was popular across classes. While the Vice-President was key to middle-class support, working-class support was connected to President Morales (Orellana Aillón, 2006). As early as February 2006, the Vice-President referred to the movement as Evismo. He argued that:

‘Evismo is fundamentally a strategy of power… a form of political-statist self-representation of poor society. [And] in practice, the economic bases of this new project come from the recovery of natural resources, nationalisation, and where all increases in rights means a redistribution of wealth (García Linera, 2006: 25).’

This unorthodox syncretism thus blends resource nationalism, statism, and universalism. It is at once collective and personalistic, rights-based and patrimonial.

As we will see in the following section, the transition to a dominant party settlement dominated by social movements with resource nationalist sentiments meant that the traditional mining elites and landowning elites from the east (Media Luna) were increasingly excluded from the settlement (Humphreys Bebbington and Huber, 2017: 15). The predominant emphasis of deals within the political settlement was increasingly between politicians and their bases rather than between elite factions. This shift in the balance of power was triggered by a series of crises related to the capture and distribution of natural resource rent.

v) Conditionalities, Crises and Resource Nationalism

Bolivia’s great crises, the Federal Revolution (1899), the Chaco War (1932 – 1935), the National Revolution (1952), and the Gas War (2003) might be considered ‘focusing events (Kingdon, 1984)’ that announced the collapse of projects designed to link Bolivia’s primary export economy to global markets (Orellana Aillón, 2006: 13). Each of these crises was triggered by contestation over the ownership and distribution of rents from primary
commodities (silver, oil, tin, and gas respectively). Each crisis spurred an increase in resource nationalism and triggered a critical realignment between elites and labour and peasant organisations (see Humphreys Bebbington and Huber, 2017). The period immediately preceding the first Morales government was especially unsettled, as the table below shows:

**Figure 8. Economic, Environmental and Political Shocks (1997 – 2005)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997, 1998</td>
<td>Coca Zero programme</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Fall in coca production provoking a strong economic contraction, reducing growth significantly, and a rise in social protests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>El Niño</td>
<td>Natural</td>
<td>Reduction in agricultural production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Russian and Asian crisis</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Fall in exports and foreign financing contracts, except FDI in the “capitalization.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Devaluation of the real and Brazilian recession</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Fall in non-gas exports to Brazil, appreciation in the real exchange rate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000, 2001</td>
<td>Argentinian crisis and devaluation of the peso</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>Fall in non-gas exports, appreciation in the real exchange rate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 – 2005</td>
<td>Social unrest, ungovernability (coca protests, water war, gas war)</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Uncertainty; instability; capital flight from bank accounts; low investment; projects to export gas to the USA stalled.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Seoane Flores and Wanderley, 2012: 148

The effects of international economic crises began to be felt by the Bolivian economy from 1999 onwards in the form of reduced growth and higher unemployment (BO3, 21/03/13). The poorest parts of the population, which were affected most acutely by the crises, blamed the structural reforms and, more generally, the negative effects of the market-oriented model for triggering internal crises (BG9, 11/11/13).

During the economic downturn, IFIs increased conditions on loans such as privatisation, deregulation and reduced government spending. In June 1997, the World Bank established privatisation as a prerequisite for credit. As Jim Shultz (2008: 15) points out, ‘Bolivia’s President returned from a meeting with Bank officials in Washington and declared that US$600 million in foreign debt relief, much of it from the Bank, was also dependent on privatising Cochabamba’s water.’ In October 1999, the Drinking Water and Sewerage Service Law was passed. This culminated in the privatisation of water distribution systems in some periurban zones of the city of Cochabamba in 2000 to the Bechtel Group Inc., operating under the name “Aguas de Tunari (Beltrán et al. 2010: 44).” Poor families with access to water only a few hours per day were paying as much as 20% of their incomes for
water (Shultz, 2001, in Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 165). The increase in rates was met with considerable resistance from residents who formed the Water Coordinator (*Coordinadora de Agua*) which demanded a rollback in water rates and the repeal of the Water Law. Residents stopped paying their water bills and were joined by coca farmers from the Chapare region and together they carried out a blockade of the city on the 11th January 2000, known as the “Water War.” Soon afterward, Bechtel’s position was deemed untenable and their contract was rescinded (Beltrán et al. 2010).

Galvanized by public discontent, union and social movement power once again rose to prominence, and this was reflected in the 2002 elections on the 30th June, where the political parties of Evo Morales of the MAS and Felipe Quispe of the Pachakutik Indigenous Movement (*Movimiento Indígena Pachakutik*) party who headed the Bolivian Peasant Trade Union Confederation (CSUTCB), together earned 27% of the vote. Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada won 21%, just one percentage point more than Evo Morales.

President Sánchez de Lozada consistently referred to the “economic crisis” as an external phenomenon the government was fighting against in his 2002 presidential campaign (MNR, 2002). The Contract with Young Bolivians: Works with Jobs (*Obras con Empleos*) constituted Sánchez de Lozada’s second most important social assistance policy in the election after the *Bonosol*. To receive funds from the IMF in 2003 required to finance the Works with Jobs programme, Bolivia was obliged to reduce its fiscal deficit. The programme formed part of a narrowly targeted and short-term clientelist linkage strategy to meet the problem of the day: unemployment, which was close to 9% in urban areas at the time (Loayza, 2006). The proposal was quickly put together before the election in order to engage young urban out of work Bolivians, promising “jobs, jobs, jobs (Noticias Fides, 08/07/02).” The Central Bank director at the time explains that under President Sánchez de Lozada there was also a great deal of pressure from European governments to introduce an income tax (BG9, 11/11/13). As Santiago Daroca Oller (2016: 5) notes, the government aimed to reduce the deficit by 3 percentage points. To achieve this, it needed to raise US$240 million. Sánchez de Lozada’s government proposed three policy measures:

- Increase the Special Tax on Hydrocarbons and Derivatives (IEHD) to raise US$80 million;
- 10% reduction in government spending to save US$70 million;
- Reintroduction of a progressive income tax from double the minimum salary (Bs.800), on a rising scale of 1.5% to 12.5% which was expected to contribute US$90 million.
Until 1986, Bolivia had a personal income tax, but tax recovery was extremely low. UDAPE recommended a progressive income tax (for the top 4% of earners) to help resolve the balance of payment problems. However, this would only have generated US$20 million in revenue. This was considered insufficient to convince the IMF to disburse funds (BG8, 28/11/13), so Sánchez de Lozada proposed that the tax be expanded to middle- and lower-income groups to generate US$80 – 90 million. The tax was levied on monthly incomes as low as Bs.880 (US$4 per day), as little as twice the legal minimum wage (Daroca Oller, 2016).

Two weeks before the income tax was introduced, an increase in the IEHD was announced. This was partly to send a signal that foreign companies were paying their way (BG9, 11/11/13). The reintroduction of income tax was announced by the President on the evening of the 9th February 2003. In the announcement, President Sánchez de Lozada addressed the nation on television, noting that the country was at a “crossroads,” and explained that increased government income through new taxes was a quid-pro-quo for donor support to fund the Works with Jobs programme (Sánchez de Lozada, 2002).

This new tax became known as the impuestazo, – “super-tax.” George Gray Molina of UDAPE argued that the policy was a terrible error of politics and of economics. Given that the proposals were poorly explained to the public and there was a generalised sense of mistrust, the impression given was that the government was balancing the budget on the backs of the working poor (Gordon and Luoma, 2008: 13). A survey by the UNDP in April 2003 showed that 94% of respondents across all income quintiles disagreed with the introduction of the impuestazo, especially those in the bottom quintile where 98% disagreed, even though they would not have to pay it themselves (UNDP, 2003 in Daroca Oller, 2016: 7). Shortly after the introduction of the tax, crowds set fire to the municipal government’s building, the Vice Presidency, Ministry of Labour, and headquarters of the MNR, MIR, and ADN political parties. Between the 12th and 13th February, as many as 35 people died and more than 200 injured in confrontations with the police (Our Brand is Crisis, 2005).

On the 8th September, around 3,000 peasants marched from Batallas to the city of El Alto to request the application of the 72 points that were previously signed by the CSUTCB in 2001 but not addressed by the government. On the 19th September, drivers in the city of La Paz carried out a 24-hour strike expressing their rejection of the income tax and the proposed export of gas through Chile. The President was convinced that any form of consultation with the public regarding the exportation of gas would be “irresponsible,” and was a complicated question that could only be resolved by specialists (Our Brand is Crisis, 2005). Shortly after
the proposal was announced, the city of El Alto was paralysed by a strike. Rural teachers joined the strike alongside widows of those who died in the Chaco War. On the same day, the MAS held a protest march to reject the government's position on the sale of gas, and the slogan “no to the sale of gas to the US” began to spread like wildfire (Webber, 2009, 2011).

On the 20th September 2003, the Omasuyos march culminated in a confrontation at Warista. The blockades trapped around a hundred tourists in the town of Sorata, putting pressure on the military to break the blockade to rescue them, and four protestors died in the process. The news that the military had killed citizens in the name of foreign tourists fanned the flames of the narrative that the Sánchez de Lozada administration did not care about the interests of Bolivians (Mesa, 2013). In response to the blockades, the President passed Supreme Decree 27209 on the 11th October declaring a “time of war and national emergency” for 90 days.

According to Jeffrey Webber (2009), gas became a collective action frame for social movements, as COR-El Alto and FEJUVE-El Alto managed to unite community-level struggle for basic services with the wide-reaching political demands of the city’s indigenous working classes. By the 13th October, Vice-President Carlos Mesa had resigned. On the 15th October, it was estimated that close to 500,000 people marched in the capital, La Paz (Mesa, 2013). The “October Agenda” for which the crowds were marching proposed to call a referendum on exporting gas, revising the hydrocarbons law, introducing a constitutional assembly, a change in the rules of party-political democracy, and increases in social spending. This all demonstrated a desire for more direct democracy, a greater role of the state, and resource nationalism. The banners were aimed at President Sánchez de Lozada himself (Goni). They included: “The gas is ours, damn it” (¡El gas es de Bolivia carajo!), “Goni is a traitor (Goni es un traidor),” “our fight is for Bolivia (Nuestra lucha es por Bolivia) (Orellana Aillón, 2006).”

Notwithstanding all of this, on the 16th October President Sánchez de Lozada declared that he would not resign, invoking the sanctity of his constitutional mandate. According to Carlos Mesa (2013), President Sánchez de Lozada considered there to be a stalemate between two diametrically opposed, irreconcilable ideological forces vying for dominance. In total, 67 people died and around 400 people were injured in the violence. In the wake of this, President Sánchez de Lozada fled the country on the 17th October 2003.

When Carlos Mesa assumed the presidency on the 17th October 2003, he recognised that to pacify the situation, he needed to visit El Alto and respond to the October Agenda (Mesa,
Mesa later proposed a constitutional assembly and a gas referendum which was held on the 18th July 2004. The referendum consisted of 5 questions:

1. Should the previous law on hydrocarbon be revoked?
2. Should the state recover the property of hydrocarbons at wellhead?
3. Should YPFB be revived?
4. Should hydrocarbons be used as a diplomatic tool to gain sovereign access to the Chilean coast?
5. Should a new tax be created of up to 50% of production value, encourage industrialisation and ensure local supply?

As the table below shows, despite their supposed rhetoric, the MAS had a moderate stance on nationalisation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MAS</th>
<th>PODEMOS</th>
<th>UN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalisation and industrialisation without confiscation by rebuilding YPFB and changing the country's contractual relationship with foreign firms.</td>
<td>Nationalise the benefits of gas, increasing exports but not infringing investor security.</td>
<td>Repurchase shares, not expropriation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 9. Party Stances on Nationalisation in 2005 Election*

The IMF on the other hand, was a strong critic of nationalisation. In the run up to the referendum, it warned the government that their financial assistance depended on the implementation of a viable strategy for hydrocarbons and a no vote on the referendum. The US ambassador also threatened that a revision of the hydrocarbon regime would mean “serious problems” for the country and would “have consequences (Kohl and Farthing, 2006: 179).” The impression that foreigners were meddling likely contributed to the approval of the referendum by 67%.

**vi) Conclusion**

In this chapter, we first considered the origins and evolution of resource nationalist discourse. While these remained latent under neoliberal administrations, we argued that normative ideas regarding sovereignty and surplus within Katarism and egalitarian notions within the ayllu provided important ideational signposts for the Morales administration, which will be discussed in the following chapter. Crucially, these key normative ideas stemmed from the MAS' core constituency in the rural highlands.

We then assessed social protection under the period of structural adjustment, focusing on fiscal constraints, rent hypothecation and the competing ideas and interests underpinning
the introduction of a social pension. We saw how natural resource rent, privatisation and social protection became increasingly intertwined as a package. We argued that while political incentives played a role, the introduction of the universal social pension was also due to normative concerns regarding the appropriate distribution of natural resource rent and concerns over corruption. Neither IFI conditionalities nor pressure from civil society played a significant role, as these actors both opposed universalism. Retrenchment was also argued to be partly due to differences between the productivist ideas of President Banzer and shareholder ideas of President Sánchez de Lozada, alongside fiscal constraints.

We then considered the importance of elections and political competition in shaping social protection reforms and the rise in support for Evo Morales. We showed how increasing party-political fragmentation and coalition politics led to a resurgence of caudillo politics and we argued that Evo Morales inherited the vote of populist parties.

Finally, we reconsidered the role of IFI conditionalities and institutional crises in raising resource nationalist pressures for rent capture and redistribution. We found that conditionalities from IFIs forced Sánchez de Lozada’s to introduce a super-tax (impuestazo) as quid-pro-quo to fund the targeted Works with Jobs (Obras con Empleos) programme. This, in turn, led to a resurgence of resource nationalist, statist and universalist ideas and a gas referendum, which established the economic platform for the Morales government.
Chapter 5: Redistributing the Surplus

This chapter aims to reappraise the role of discourse in relation to the introduction of cash transfers in Bolivia under the first Morales administration. We will first review past scholarship looking at the political economy of social protection, focusing on electoral incentives, civil society pressure, and transnational policy diffusion. We will then assess the key factors which explained shifts in fiscal space and provided the enabling conditions for policymaking in the social protection sector. Thirdly, we will consider how cash transfers were framed in electoral campaigns at the beginning of the study period, comparing the ideas of left and right-wing platforms. We will then reflect on changes in higher-level ideas and reframing justifications for social protection and coordinative discourse over policy options. We will focus on negotiations between bureaucrats and the political executive over policy ideas, changes in institutional arrangements and funding sources. We will also review how arrangements with international actors and political linkage mechanisms with civil society may have played a role in the process.

i) Elections, Civil Society Pressure, and Policy Diffusion

The vast majority of research on Bolivia’s cash transfers focuses on their economic and human development effects. Most studies which have considered the political economy factors shaping cash transfer design and expansion have focused on the Bonosol social pension, with limited appraisal of the two conditional cash transfers, Bono Juancito Pinto and Juana Azurduy. However, it is possible to identify three lines of argument: (i) electoral incentives, (ii) civil society pressure, and (iii) transnational policy diffusion.

Various scholars highlight President Sánchez de Lozada’s use of the social pension as a central part of his electoral platform in both 1997 and 2002, which suggests that incentives for vote-winning was the key factor (Gray Molina, Pérez de Rada and Yañez; 1999; Aponte, 2007; Müller, 2009). Electoral incentives were also judged to be key to Mayor José Luis Paredes and President Evo Morales, as both were eager to claim credit for reform (Müller, 2016: 7, Vaughan, 2010; McGuire, 2013). While electoral incentives may provide an impetus, as policy changes were not confined to electoral periods, this is a relatively weak explanation in itself. Moreover, with such a focus on political interests, these accounts

33 This is also reflected in Layton and Smith’s (2011) survey data on electoral effects and credit claiming.
generally fail to explain why the government chose universal rather than targeted programmes.

The second line of argument emphasises civil society pressure from labour and peasant movements as a primary driver for the introduction and expansion of cash transfers. Research from the aforementioned UNRISD programme asserts that social protest was key in mobilising domestic resources for social protection (Daroca Oller, 2016; Paz Arauco, 2018). While Daroca Oller (2016: 3) highlights important moments during Morales’ first administration (e.g. super tax, gas war and referendum, hydrocarbons law), citizen-state agreements are referred to as ‘implicit’ and ‘informal,’ given a loose connection between social movements and specific policy proposals. Relatedly, it has been argued that movements played a decisive role in passing legislation to introduce the *Renta Dignidad*. It is suggested that the incorporation of rural social movements in the central labour union (COB) and marches from pensioners were crucial (Anria and Niedzwiecki, 2014; Carnes and Mares, 2014). However, the fact that the COB generally opposed the universalisation of the social pension suggests their role in pushing forward legislation is highly questionable.

The third line of argument is transnational policy diffusion (Weyland, 2005, 2006; McGuire, 2013). We find disagreement regarding the importance of IFIs’ efforts. While Weyland (2005: 24, 2006) argues that IFIs and policy conditionality played only a limited role in the introduction of pension reform, McGuire (2013) argues that the World Bank played a significant role in the policy design of the two CCTs. Thus, IFIs may have had varying levels of influence over different policy instruments. We might also infer that different combinations of incentives (e.g. aid conditionality vs. funding and expertise) employed by IFIs may have had varying degrees of success. However, in general, the efforts of IFIs seem confined to recommendations of specific policy instruments, with little evidence of influence over programme scope.

Cutting across these lines of argument are changes in fiscal space. McGuire (2013) argues that securing domestic funding sources was key to the universalism of the two CCTs, and various scholars emphasise the earmarking of hydrocarbons taxes for the *Renta Dignidad* social pension as the key factor (Ortiz *et al.* 2015; Mosley and Abdulai, 2016; Durán-Valverde and Barbero, 2016). These accounts are largely accurate in identifying this as a causal factor, but mostly misattribute the source of impetus. The change in fiscal space is

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34 Ortiz *et al.* (2015) refer to debt restructuring, tapping into fiscal reserves, and a more accommodating macroeconomic framework.
narrated elliptically as the result of domestic initiative, with no serious consideration given to crucial international factors such as FDI, commodity prices or debt relief.

Finally, the potential causal role of ideas remains underexplored in Bolivian scholarship. While the policy diffusion argument is partly based on the diffusion of transnational ideas, scholars' chiefly point to the importance of domestic interests rather than normative concerns either for international or domestic legitimacy (Weyland, 2006). McGuire (2013) argues that neither partisan identity nor ideological orientation of the government in office were significant factors. As both neoliberal and left-wing governments supported cash transfers, partisan politics does not appear to be a key explanatory factor. However, various scholars inadvertently conflate partisan politics, ideology and norms, and we suggest this may have obfuscated the role of normative ideas in the legitimisation of policy options under both neoliberal and left-wing governments.

ii) Fiscal Space for Social Protection: Harnessing Windfalls

This section will assess the key facilitating factors which increased fiscal space for cash transfers under the first two Morales administrations. As the choice of the study period coincides with a commodity boom, commodity prices and taxes to harness price windfalls will be a key area of concern. Past scholarship downplays the role of international actors (Weyland 2005, 2006; Ortiz et al. 2015; Durán-Valverde and Barbero, 2016; Mosley and Abdulai, 2016), and we suggest that these actors' efforts merit greater attention. We will focus on three key areas where international actors may have played a role: foreign direct investment (1997 – 2002), debt relief (1997 – 2015), and international commodity prices (2003 – 2014).


Foreign capital has been fundamental to Bolivia's export-oriented growth since its independence in 1825. The recent gas boom was, in large part, the product of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the late 1990s mentioned in the previous chapter (BG8, 28/11/13). The Capitalization Law of 1994 and New Hydrocarbons Law of 1996 generated significant incentives for gas exploration by transnational corporations. Between 1996 and 2004, investment flows to the sector amounted to US$5.8 billion as the graph on the following page shows:
In President Evo Morales’ annual address (2012: 106), the first part of the above graph was omitted in order to imply that investment fell under neoliberal administrations and grew under the MAS administrations. However, what the government’s own data clearly demonstrate over the period is that FDI increased shortly after a policy change which offered tax breaks to transnational corporations in 1996. These large inflows resulted in the discovery of several important natural gas fields, many containing reserves in excess of 10 Trillion Cubic Feet (TCF). The most important fields discovered include Margarita, Ipati, San Alberto, and Sábaló. Initial estimates from the DeGoyler and McNaughton Company were that there were 24.6 TCF, making Bolivia the second largest gas power in the region, after Venezuela (El Diario 11/02/11).

In February 1999, Presidents Hugo Banzer and Fernando Henrique Cardoso inaugurated a gas pipeline. According to an ex-Hydrocarbons Minister, the fall in investment was partly attributable to the fact that the gas duct to Brazil was completed in 1999, but also due to a perception of a declining investment climate for transnational corporations, particularly following the “Water War” of 2000 (BG8, 28/11/13). The steep decline from this point may thus be partly attributed to companies’ fear of resource nationalism (Kohl and Farthing, 2012).

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35 The data under the Morales administration’s tenure is also misleading as it includes recurrent spending alongside investment (BG8, 28/11/13).
36 A later study by Ryder Scott estimates 8.35 TCF, and thus volumes may have been inflated in order to boost investment in the late 1990s and early 2000s (El Diario, 11/02/11).
b) International Debt Relief (1997 – 2014)

Foreign debt has been a crucial factor in shaping fiscal space throughout Bolivia’s history. Bolivia was born into debt to its neighbour Peru on the 6th August 1825, as Peru footed the bill for its War of Independence. Since then, its fiscal history has been punctuated by conditional loans, debt crises and defaults. The most notable of these, mentioned in the previous chapter was the Debt Crisis of 1982. Between 1985 and 2005, Bolivia paid its creditors an average of US$270 million per year (Buxton, 2008). Between 1985 and 1996, rent from the state hydrocarbons company was the largest contributor to state coffers, and privatisation caused a shortfall of close to US$100 million per year (McGuigan, 2007). The costs of economic reforms was high, and by the turn of the millennium there was a gap of around US$1 billion that had to be financed domestically as the table below shows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Fiscal Cost</th>
<th>External Funds Committed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education reform</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil service reform</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension reform</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Child Development Project</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitalization</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,440</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adapted from Fundación Jubileo, 2012: 14*

Around three quarters of the cost was for pension reform and capitalization, and no funding was earmarked for pension reform from international aid, even though this was a key condition for structural adjustment loans. In 1997, external debt reached US$4.5 billion (57.2% of GDP) and the cost of debt servicing in that year was US$ 443 million (Fundación Jubileo, 2012), close to double the average for the period and higher than the total cost of pension reform. Despite this enormous fiscal constraint, the Bonosol social pension was launched in 1997, at the cost of US$67.6 million. Yet, as we saw in the previous chapter, only months later the government argued it was unable to pay for the pension and service its debt at the same time and chose to reduce the cost of the pension to US$18 million (BG9, 30/11/13; Bolivian Pensions Authority, 2014).

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37 Over the first decade of the 21st century, bilateral aid saw a declining trend. Between 2008 and 2012, donations averaged around $US220 million per year. International aid declined chiefly because Bolivia passed from low to medium income status, and because major donors such as Spain were hit hard by the global financial crisis (Fundación Jubileo, 2014).
However, in the late-1990s, Bolivia became eligible for a series of debt forgiveness initiatives. Bolivia was deemed eligible for the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative by the World Bank and IMF in September 1997 and met the prerequisites in September 1998. The first round, HIPC I, began in 1999 and was worth around US$788 million. This relief was specifically aimed to help the government free up resources for rural education, health and infrastructure. However, there was no specific plan and no clear mechanism linking the relief with poverty reduction (BO3, 21/03/13). HIPC II was agreed in February 2001, and in June of that year the amount agreed was US$1.77 billion. This programme was linked to poverty targets through a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) stipulated by the World Bank in March 2001. The HIPC II proposed to focus relief on municipalities based on poverty indicators, and on rural areas. Resource distribution was prescribed as 20% to improve the quality of education services, 10% for public health, and 70% for infrastructure. In the same month, Bolivia became eligible for the “Beyond the HIPC” initiative and would relieve a further US$629 million (Fundación Jubileo, 2012, 2013).

In July 2005, the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) was also approved. This proposed cancelling 100% of debt to HIPC countries with the IMF and World Bank to support the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDRI was similar to the HIPC but had further policy conditions attached related to institution building, macroeconomic stability, fiscal transparency, legal frameworks and reducing impediments to private investment. The IMF approved debt relief of US$232.5 million two days after elections on the 21st December 2005. The World Bank agreed to pardon US$1.5 billion on the 30th June 2006, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) agreed to forgive US$1.17 billion on the 15th June 2007. The total was US$2.9 billion (24% of GDP). These figures included the HIPC II, so the new amount was around US$2.3 billion (Fundación Jubileo, 2012, 2013).

Contrary the claim by Ortiz et al. (2015) that the Bolivian government actively restructured its debt, having met the conditions of multilateral banks, its debt was pardoned by IFIs. In the MAS Programme of November 2005, we find a relaxed position on international debt. The proposal was merely to ‘consolidate the announced debt forgiveness by cancelling 100% of debt from the World Bank and IMF (MAS, 2005b: 37).’ It is thus clear debt relief was driven by external rather than internal actors. Bolivia’s debt relief amounted to around $US150 million per annum when Morales took office, as the graph on the following page shows:
This relief alone constitutes more than the loss of hydrocarbon income to the Treasury in 1998 which caused the suspension of the *Bonosol*. It is also noteworthy that the US$256 million freed up in 2010 was equivalent to annual debt repayment on debt interest and principal for the period 1985 – 2005 which made Bolivia eligible for debt relief in the first place. Had this amount been relieved in 2003 rather than being phased, there would likely have been no need to introduce the *impuestazo* to mobilise US$90 million.

Debt relief made a significant dent in the overall amount of external debt. This hit a peak of US$5.1 billion in 2003 and fell sharply to the lowest point of US$2.2 billion in 2007 (Bolivian Ministry of Finance 2014b). Proportionally, foreign debt reduced from 64% of GDP in 1998 to 17% in 2013 (García Linera, 2014), significantly below the 40% threshold of the Debt Sustainability Framework (DSF). Indeed, debt service as a proportion of exports was 2.3% in the same year, well under the threshold established by the HIPC of 15 – 20% (BO18, 21/01/14).

**c) International Commodity Prices (2003 – 2014)**

By far the most important factor which shaped Bolivia’s fiscal space for social protection was the increase in international commodity prices. Prices had historically been a more important factor than production volumes. Bolivia has two main markets for natural gas exports: Argentina and Brazil. Following the completion of the gas pipeline in 1998, natural gas exports to Brazil commenced under a 20-year contract which established the pricing of Bolivian gas exported to Brazil based on the cost of a basket of alternative fuels, which was
adjusted periodically (Andersen et al., 2006). As the graph below shows, there was an unprecedented increase in the price of natural gas between 2000 and 2009:

**Figure 13.** Natural Gas US$ per Million Metric British Thermal Unit (1991 – 2016)

As other countries such as Zambia have shown, higher commodity prices do not automatically translate into fiscal space which can be allocated for social protection (Simpasa et al. 2013). “Rent capture” may be a pre-requisite for sustainable increases in social policy expenditures on any significant scale in countries which rely heavily on natural resources (Hujo, 2015). Yet, the cases of Mongolia and Zambia both suggest that this may also depend on the type of taxes that are introduced and the timing of introduction in order to harness price windfalls. In Bolivia, the passing of the natural gas referendum compelled Hormando Vaca Diez’s interim administration to adopt Law 3058 of the 17th May 2005 which was entitled ‘the execution and fulfilment of the referendum of the 18th July 2004.’ The Law formally introduced the Direct Hydrocarbons Tax (IDH) which augmented the existing 18% royalty with a further 32% on hydrocarbon production. Given that the global average effective tax rate for the 62 largest oil and hydrocarbon companies between 2011 and 2013 was 31.3%, (PwC, 2015), this made Bolivia an outlier.

With the finding of new gas reserves, one would assume production volumes would increase. In fact, they fell during Morales’ first term from 49,496 barrels per day in 2005 to

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38 In Zambia, the introduction of a windfall profits tax in 2008 was not effective. It was only when royalties were increased from 3 to 6% in 2010 that the government saw any significant benefits (Simpasa et al. 2013).
44,362 in 2011 (Hidrocarburosbolivia.com, 29/04/12). As the graph below shows, despite little variation in production volumes, natural gas doubled its share of total exports between 2003 and 2013 from 25% to 50%:

**Figure 14. Natural Gas Exports US$ Millions and % Exports (2003 – 2014)**

Data from INE Gutiérrez on request, 2014

In 2006, natural gas exports alone were higher than total Freight on Board (FOB) exports in 2003. With the IDH, average natural gas revenue in 2005 – 2006 was nearly three times higher than in 2003 – 2004. The main driver of increased exports revenue was the sale price. The average price of natural gas sold to Brazil and Argentina rose from around US$1/barrel to US$10/barrel (1.46 to 8.77 and 0.88 to 10.15) between 2002 and 2013 (Bolivian Ministry of Finance 2014a). Increased tax revenue was thus chiefly the result of a “price effect (Jemio, 2013; Bolivian Ministry of Finance 2014b).”

With an increase in commodity prices, the IDH contributed a further US$1.2 billion on average per year, making up 23% of the tax take between 2006 and 2013. The Special Tax on Hydrocarbons and its Derivatives (IEHD) contributed a further 7.5%. Increased prices from the Argentinian market alone were estimated to accumulate an additional US$110 million per month in 2006 (Hylton and Thomson, 2008: 136).

Together, the two most important hydrocarbon taxes made up an average of 30% of all tax receipts over the period, as the graph on the following page shows:

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39 Bolivia also benefited from more favourable terms of exchange between the Boliviano and the Dollar. Between 2000 and 2003 the average ratio was 7:1. This increased to 8:1 between 2004 and 2007, and then fell again to an average of 7:1 thereafter (Bolivian Ministry of Finance 2014b).

40 The Bolivian Ministry of Finance (2014b) estimates that over half of increased GDP growth and tax revenue over the period was simply due to the price of exports.
Rent taxes continue to be at the centre of Bolivia’s tax regime. In 2017, Bolivia had a tax take of 26.6% of GDP, significantly higher than the regional average of 20.1%. Yet, according to the Ministry of Finance, without the IDH, this would have been only 20.4% (Página Siete, 19/04/18). So, despite being a lower-middle income country, high prices and additional revenue from the IDH allowed Bolivia higher than average tax revenues for an upper-middle income country (IMF, 2011 in Moore, 2013). Bolivia achieved fiscal surpluses every year between 2006 and 2013 (averaging 1.8%) and contributed to a seven-fold increase in international reserves – from US$3 billion to $14 billion (Bolivian Ministry of Finance, 2014c). According to the Vice-President, commodity prices and debt relief were the two key reasons for increases in government revenue (García Linera, 2014).

As we saw in the previous chapter, given low hydrocarbon rent, the Bonosol was suspended in 1998 because the pension fund operators could not raise US$67.6 million (Bolivian Pensions Authority, 2014). In its first four years (2009 – 2012), the new fund for the Universal Pension Fund (FRUV) generated an average of US$304 million per year from the IDH alone (Escobar et al., 2013: 38). So, while the ex-Hydrocarbons Minister’s assessment that “it’s just that there wasn’t money before (BG8, 28/11/13)” is not entirely accurate, it is certainly true that these predominantly external factors provided a markedly different context.

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41 Companies must also pay royalties (18%), of which 6% goes to the treasury. They pay two types of value added tax (IVA and RC-IVA), consumption tax (ICE), transaction tax (IT), corporation tax (IUE), foreign sales tax (IRUE and ISAE), import taxes (GAC and GAC), a furniture tax (ITGB), and a surtax.
for social policy choices, providing the opportunity for more ambitious and sustainable social policies.\textsuperscript{42}

### iii) Discursive Framing in Electoral Campaigns

Having established the key economic drivers that shaped the fiscal parameters for political choices between 2005 and 2014, the following sections in the chapter will assess the policy-making process for the design of the two conditional cash transfers and adaptation of the social pension. We will first analyse the discursive framing of social protection in the political campaigns of the two largest political parties in the 2005 elections, the MNR and MAS.

#### a) The MNR Platform: Technocratic, Individualised, Targeted

The MNR electoral manifesto, which was first drafted in 2002 and also employed in 2005 elections, was highly technocratic and replete with statistics. Its main thrust was focused on creating a good business environment and followed a compensatory logic for social assistance. Its vision of poverty was one of misfortune and poor education. Equality of opportunity was seen to be the only way to close inequality gaps, and education and health were seen to be the most effective tools in the fight against poverty. The programme aimed to invest gas rent in human capital and advocated that the country should ‘sow gas to harvest development (2002: 3).’ So, rent hypothecation was recognised as key to social policy ambitions.

The manifesto advanced that the government would reinstate the Bonosol and that this constituted the ‘social dimension of capitalization… the payment from capitalization’ and referred to all Bolivians of eligible age as ‘shareholders (MNR, 2002: 81).’ As we saw in the previous chapter, social capitalization was the programmatic nodal point (or focusing idea) under the Sánchez de Lozada administrations. However, this shareholder logic also emphasised that financing was ‘exclusively private and would add nothing to public finances (\textit{ibid}).’ It was not framed as a state duty nor referred to as a right of all citizens, despite rights-based language in Law 2427.

The manifesto noted the importance of ‘equity… and equality of opportunities,’ and ensuring ‘all compatriots have a basis… to freely exercise their rights (2002: 76, 53).’ The MNR

\textsuperscript{42} Under Morales, social spending as a proportion of total government expenditure decreased from 33\% in 2006, to 28\% in 2013 and further to 25\% in 2014 (Gutiérrez, 2014). Social spending as a proportion of GDP was flat, with little difference between administrations. In 2003, social spending comprised 18.1\% of GDP and this fell to 16.7 (2006) but then recovered to 18.9\% in 2010 (Paz Arauco, 2014).
proposed a social protection fund and the establishment of a social protection network for the groups most affected by the economic crisis. The aim was to create a basic social protection floor (piso social básico) so that the poorest could ‘contribute to growth (ibid).’ This language reflects shifts in transnational policy debates at the time (see Deacon, 2013), however the focus was on targeted and temporary social assistance towards only those in greatest need, rather than as a right for all citizens.

We also find the proposal of an emergency employment scheme, the Emergency Employment Plan (PLANE) (MNR, 2002: 2). In its technocratic guise, the fund of US$150 million per annum was to be administered by a team of ‘top professionals and executives’ that would report directly to the President. Ministers and senior bureaucrats argued that President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada revered technical experts and considered himself to be one (BG8, 28/11/13; BG10, 23/01/14; BG5, 13/01/14). Sánchez de Lozada later argued that he was ‘respected [for his] competence (Sánchez de Lozada and Fauget, 2014: 11).’ Bolivia’s previous Social Policy Analysis Unit (UDAPSO) reported directly to the Presidency, but under President Morales UDAPE reports to the Ministry of Planning. The government aimed to target projects to municipalities with highest levels of poverty and unemployment. A small unemployment insurance programme (US$24 million per annum) was also proposed; arguing that the state had the duty to do this, but the proposal underlined that the creation of an unemployment solidarity fund would not entail any additional burden on businessmen or workers, nor transfer additional resources to the state (MNR, 2002: 2).

The proposal underlined high levels of school desertion as a critical problem and proposed an education cash transfer to incentivise attendance and completion of girls from first to sixth grade of primary school. Conditional on the completion of each grade, Bs.100 (US$14) would be provided to all girls in rural areas and low-income groups in urban areas. The programme was expected to reach 350,000 girls at a total cost of only US$5 million per year. In the health sector, the MNR proposed to increase the coverage and package of maternal and infant health insurance. The aim was universalisation of coverage. They also proposed a health cash transfer for those in homes with low resources to cover basic spending, contingent on medical check-ups for mothers and children. Each child would receive Bs.25 (US$3.50) per check-up (Bs.50/year), and the transfer was designed to benefit around 400,000 children per year at the cost of US$2.85 million (MNR, 2002: 3).

So, while education and health were formally referred to as rights and access to public services was intended to be universal, social assistance was targeted, temporary, modest in scale and was geared to the needs of only the most vulnerable.
In their 2005 campaign, the MAS presented a markedly different ideological frame and approach. While the MNR proposal was adamantly technocratic, the MAS was proudly ideological. The MAS platform included ‘50 Proposals to End the Crisis (2005a),’ a ‘Government Programme (2005b)’ and accompanying ‘21 Ideological Principles (2005c).’ The MAS Government Programme (2005b) was primarily a proposal focused on regaining economic and political sovereignty. The core goal was the ‘distribution of wealth generated by the capture of hydrocarbons for social development with equity (MAS, 2005a: 1).’

During the electoral period (November 2005), and following the election (April 2006) social policy was not a priority. However, there was one central critique that marked an ideological turn, and which reflects the normative underpinnings mentioned in the previous chapter. In their Government Programme the MAS argued that past governments:

> ‘cancelled the universalist state and replaced it with a reactive neoliberal state, whose social policies focused on the poorest population with the objective of getting them out of it. Other sectors had to solve their social demands through their own means as the market allowed (2005b: 10).’

We find a pronounced narrative of “insiders” and “outsiders” throughout the policy proposals, critiquing ‘Western culture’ and ‘colonial elites (MAS, 2005c: 2),’ including various warnings regarding the threat of privatising health and education services (MAS, 2005a, 2005b), designed to delegitimise the policy ideas of neoliberal governments. The MAS critiqued the individualistic nature of the pensions system and the higher retirement age of 65, and lamented the fact the Treasury had to subsidize individual pensions.

While paradigmatic ideas and ideological principles related to a universalist state were relatively clear, policy-level ideas often contradicted these higher-level ideas. On one hand, we find strong support for redistribution and universalism. Health, adequate nutrition and education were argued to be ‘human rights that no-one can take away (MAS, 2005a: 1)’ and were ineluctable state obligations. On the other hand, at policy level, we find a mixture of universal and targeted approaches, proposing to extend essential health services to the whole population, with preferential attention for poor peripheral zones (i.e. targeting the poorest population) and increasing pensions through a graduated scale to favour those with least income. Furthermore, we find social assistance was not referred to as a right and proposals were still focused primarily on ‘increas[ing] the purchasing power of the poor

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43 This was previously 55 for men and 50 for women.
This would be achieved through targeted employment schemes such as PLANE and focused towards deprived rural areas where farmers had lost their harvest.

The proposal for a new pensions system was based on principles of solidarity and universalism, and the new government advocated recovering the shares of privatised companies for the state yet guaranteeing the payment of the Bonosol pension (MAS, 2005b). The MAS also advocated for Universal Public Health Insurance to reach the 74% of the population which was not covered by social security. We find the promotion of institutional birth delivery through a food subsidy and a commitment to increasing health spending to 2% of GDP. In education, emphasis was on a new Law Bill Elizardo Pérez y Avelino Siñani, with emphasis on intercultural bilingual education, eliminating illiteracy, and other programmes targeted at working and disabled children, a national programme for school breakfast and lunch, and a national scholarship programme. There was mention of a national plan for school access and pupil retention (MAS, 2005b: 47). However, we find no mention of either a health or education cash transfer.

The table below presents a synthesis of the party platforms:

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<tr>
<td>Discursive framing</td>
<td>Technocratic</td>
<td>Populist</td>
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<td>Economic model</td>
<td>Leader-follower</td>
<td>Pre-distribution</td>
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<td>Vision of poverty</td>
<td>Misfortune</td>
<td>Injustice</td>
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<td>Role of the state</td>
<td>Compensatory</td>
<td>Promotive</td>
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<td>Social assistance focus</td>
<td>Progressive targeting</td>
<td>Progressive targeting</td>
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<td>Programmatic proposals</td>
<td>CCTs, school feeding</td>
<td>Invest in education and health</td>
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<td></td>
<td>programmes, emergency employment programmes</td>
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The two platforms represented different normative perspectives regarding the appropriate economic model, vision of poverty, and proposed role of the state. However, there were not significant differences in the focus of social assistance at policy level or regarding who should benefit from social assistance, as both platforms proposed to target only the poor.

Both platforms revealed contradictions between paradigmatic and policy-level ideas. For the MNR proposal, the outlier policy was the Bonosol. While it may be argued that the notion that Bolivians were shareholders was an instrumental embrace of universalism (see Müller, 2009), the policy still did not fit the MNR’s preference for targeted, minimalist and residual
social assistance. On the other hand, while the MAS proposal of targeted social assistance responded to their poor rural and urban constituency base, this was inconsistent with their paradigmatic universalist ideas related to natural resource ownership or their egalitarian and collectivist ideas related to social insurance. It was this central tension that the MAS wrestled with in the middle of 2006.

Meanwhile, Bolivia’s Social and Economic Policy Unit (UDAPE) had been working on new policy ideas for social assistance since early 2003 with Beca Futuro (Future Scholarship) (BG6, 26/02/14). Just days before the presidential election on the 13th December 2005, UDAPE’s Executive Director, Gabriel Loza presented a proposal of a social protection network to the Minister of Popular Participation. The social protection network would consist of existing programmes for Universal Infant Maternal Health Insurance (SUMI), the National Programme for Health Extension (EXTENSA), the Nutrition Programme (PAIS) and education (Bono Escolar) and health/nutrition conditional cash transfers (Loza, 2007). Loza (2007: 189) clearly expressed that ‘resources should be focused towards the poorest, especially the poorest in rural areas.’ There was no mention of a “social protection floor” in the proposal, and while universality and rights were briefly referenced, focus was on progressive phasing from rural to periurban areas and to select school grades of highest levels of school desertion. This prioritisation was based on an analysis which showed that the 1st grade and 6th grade had by far the highest levels of desertion. Hence there was a strong empirical argument to focus resources on specific grades. Loza’s proposal for a first phase of a cash transfer had a modest total cost of $US6.4 million, only US$1.4 million higher than in the MNR platform. The modesty of the proposal was argued to reflect institutional memory within UDAPE of the rejected Beca Futuro proposal (BG6, 26/02/14).

Concurrently, in January 2006, Ramiro Gamboa published a paper for UDAPE reviewing the financial sustainability of the Bonosol. He argued that the pension would only be sustainable if the capitalized firms doubled their profitability. In May 2006, Larry Willmore also published a study for ECLAC reviewing the social pension, and suggested that unless the resource envelope changed, the government ought to reduce the level of the benefit, limit the beneficiary population (geographically), introduce income or assets tests, or deny the benefit to those with benefits under social insurance. Willmore (2006: 28) argued that ‘so few elderly Bolivians receive other pensions that this [test] would produce little in the way of fiscal savings.’ He suggested it would be preferable to increase the age of entitlement from 65 to
70. Thus, the technocratic line of argument in early 2006, akin to that of the MNR, was to economise and target, rather than to expand.

The following section will look at how social assistance was progressively re-framed in relation to the universalist and redistributive ideas at the heart of the MAS platform.

**iv) Re-framing: Redistributing the Surplus**

As chapter 4 showed, resource nationalist and redistributive ideas were reawakened in the water and gas wars of 2000 and 2003. The central organising idea (or nodal point) which later found expression in the National Development Plan to Live Well (2007) and New Political Constitution (2009) was the redistribution of surplus (*redistribución del excedente*).

We argued that this arose out of the synthesis of two normative ideas: the resource nationalism of Katarism and the communitarian distributive logic of the *ayllu*.

Katarism gained political salience through its association with three highly influential politicians in the 1990s and 2000s – Vice-President Victor Hugo Cardenas, presidential candidate Felipe Quispe, and Vice-President Alvaro García Linera. García Linera, in particular, acknowledged the strong influence of René Zavaleta’s ideas (García Linera, in International Viewpoint, 2005) and we see this reflected in the similarity of language regarding the call for “sovereignty” over natural resources and to “capture the surplus,” which echoed resource nationalist calls during the Gas War of 2003 (Kohl and Farthing, 2012).

Zavaleta’s focus on the ‘production, distribution and application of surplus (Zavaleta, 1985: 42)’ was clearly reflected in the National Development Plan, passed by Supreme Decree on the 12th September 2007, which affirmed that the ‘generation, control and distribution of surpluses produced by renewable and non-renewable resources’ was the ‘solution to the country’s economic and social problems (Bolivian Ministry for Development Planning, 2007: 4).’

Finance Minister Luis Arce referred to this as ‘a policy to increase the cake for all Bolivians with the policies of nationalisation to increase national income and a policy of redistribution of this cake that benefits more those that had no income before (Arce, in ERBOL, 13/2/10).’ This mirrors the resource nationalist framing in South Africa and Mongolia to “share of the cake” and “share of the treasure.” Redistributing the surplus was thus both a rights-based programmatic appeal based on notions of the right to sovereign resources but was also designed to appeal to the corporatist pressure of specific social movements among the
urban poor (the COB and FEJUVE) which embraced Katarist ideas of resource nationalism during the Gas War.

Prior to elections on the 20th December 2005, Garcia Linera argued that the MAS project could not yet be described as ‘communitarian (International Viewpoint, 2005).’ However, building this narrative and connecting to the MAS core constituency base in the highlands was key to gaining acceptance for their government programme in 2006. Efforts were made to reflect the views of rural social movements from the Andean heartlands such as CSUTCB, CONAMAQ and Bartolina Sisa which espoused the communitarian ideas of the ayllu. Prior to becoming President, Morales’ communicative discourse underlined a communitarian vision of universal social protection, as we can see below:

“We cooperate in a framework of solidarity, reciprocity, and fundamentally the network of redistributing wealth. In Bolivia, there is wealth, production, but poorly distributed… Bolivia has to be a socialist communitarian country, based on the community, because in my birthplace there is no private property, it’s communitarian… It’s not enough that I become a rich guy (ricachón), but that health, education and social security are guaranteed… to live in community is to live in equality (Morales 2005 in Liendo, 2009: 331).”

This communitarian framing was consistently repeated in Morales’ public speeches. In one speech to Congress, Morales affirmed: “we want equality because only between equals can we live in peace (BS1, 22/01/08).” This matched the emerging moralising discourse from the Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca which appealed to rural communities through the notion of vivir bien (to “live well,” or suma qamaña in Aymara) which, like Katarism, stemmed from Aymara roots. 44 Here we see an appeal to constituents on programmatic lines, yet also on charismatic lines, given Morales’ effort to identify personal affinities which underpinned this moral framing.

According to vivir bien scholar Xavier Albó (2011: 139), Choquehuanca was the most vociferous promoter of the vivir bien concept within the Bolivian constitutional assembly discussions. On the 7th July 2006, Choquhuanca (2006: 33) asserted that “we don’t want anyone to live better. Living better accepts that some can be better off than others.” Appeals to egalitarianism, wrapped up with a populist othering of individualistic capitalists, was central to communicative discourse within the first few years of Morales’ administration. The synergies between the vivir bien concept, ayllu communitarianism and Katarist ideas of

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44 Qamaña means “to live with someone.” It is the word used to mean “protection from the wind” built from a semi-circle of stones (Albó, 2011: 134).
sovereignty provided compelling normative ammunition to promote universalism of both ownership and distribution.

When asked why the cash transfer programmes were made universal, numerous government representatives interviewed referred to the “redistribution of surplus (BG11, 21/03/13; BG8, 28/11/13).” As one senior advisor in the Bono Juana Azurduy technical unit put it: “the philosophy? All from the surplus. That's the root of everything (BG2, 24/02/14).” In the following section we will show how policy-level choices related to programme scope increasingly aligned with this nodal point.

\[v\] \textit{From Targeting to Universalism: Reconciling Ideas and Policy Options}

Redistributive and statist ideas did not immediately translate into policy. In early 2006, the policy ideas for CCTs and their focus on targeting to the poorest areas did not fit the MAS’ higher-level communitarian and egalitarian ideas. In this section, we will see that the reconciliation of these different levels was chiefly due to two factors: the accumulation of an economic surplus following an increase in fiscal take, which meant the government could afford to introduce a national-scale programme, and the application of a ‘universal view’ of social assistance, linked to the redistribution of surplus (García Linera, 2015).

On the 1\textsuperscript{st} May 2006, Evo Morales passed Supreme Decree 28701 which proclaimed the “nationalisation” of hydrocarbons. The decree was entitled \textit{Heroes del Chaco} (Heroes of the Chaco [War]); troops were deployed to occupy natural gas fields; Bolivian flags were hoisted upon the hydrocarbon companies’ buildings and slogans proclaiming gas the “property of all Bolivians” were fixed upon petrol stations (\textit{El Mundo}, 02/05/06). This fanfare was designed to suggest that hydrocarbon resources had been nationalised. In fact, the government simply proposed to negotiate a majority stake for the state hydrocarbon company, YPFB. While the government renegotiated contracts with 12 petroleum companies to achieve a majority stake, it created an additional tax levy through the decree for 180 days of 32\% and of 82\% for 180 days for fields in 2005 certified as producing more than 100 million barrels a day to YPFB, namely San Alberto and San Antonio (Petrobras and Repsol). These two fields would pay tax at 82\% on their total output at the wellhead until new contracts were signed with the government. This surtax was more than double the global average (PwC, 2015).

It is important to note that while these changes decreased potential profits, the reaction from governments (Brazil, Spain, USA) and petroleum firms (Petrobras, Repsol, BP-Amoco,
Shell) was not strong. Quite unlike Mongolia and Zambia, where resistance from transnational firms was vocal, the response in Bolivia was muted. President Morales immediately offered assurances that companies’ assets were not threatened (El Mundo, 02/05/06) which, unlike the case of Mongolia, offered some reassurance. However, ultimately, most firms had significant sunk costs, having already made substantial investments in the late 1990s, and with high international prices and lower production costs relative to other Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Argentina, and Mexico, Bolivia remained an attractive market. As one of Repsol’s directors, Roberto Mallea, mentioned, ‘for every dollar invested in Bolivia, the return is ten dollars (Mallea in Aresti, 2016: 15).’ Moreover, there were guaranteed long-term external markets to Brazil (2020) and Argentina (2027). So, despite a reduction of profit margins, high sunk costs, high prices, low production costs, and guaranteed markets meant there were significant incentives for firms to acquiesce.

Just days later, on the 4th May 2006, the MAS published its Government Programme (2006a). No mention was made regarding the introduction of conditional cash transfers nor changes to Bolivia’s social pension. Social policy was still not a political priority. The 10-point plan also failed to mention any specifics regarding social assistance (MAS, 2006b). Indeed, on promulgating Supreme Decree 28711 on the 13th May 2006, Vice-President Álvaro García Linera declared that ‘the Bonosol should not go to rich people, they will use it simply for tips, but exclusively to the poor (García Linera in Molina, 2007: 38).’

We find that the Vice-President’s ideas evolved over time, as he attempted to reconcile competing positions regarding progressive and redistributive social protection, based on notions of social justice, and of universality, based on notions of equality (see García Linera, 2006: 25). As an academic, García Linera intuitively favoured cognitive arguments to justify the cash transfers, arguing they had two functions: ‘to lower levels of poverty… and increase internal demand and [thus contribute to] growth (García Linera, 2009).’ For the second function, reflecting this view, a representative from UDAPE referred to “redistribution” as being part of a “macroeconomic logic,” rather than “socioeconomic distributive patterns (BG4, 20/01/14).” In later speeches, García Linera emphasised a “universal view,” where the costs were borne by the rich, but the MAS “always strove to… propose a policy that benefits all, nationalise benefits for all… it benefits all Bolivia (BS6, 06/11/15).” We can see that the Vice-President’s own struggle to reconcile progressive and universal logic contributed to a change of position from a potential blocker to a promoter of universal social assistance.
One further, relatively minor, impetus at the time was the call for autonomy from regional
governments in the Media Luna which opposed the MAS government. In an attempt to
thwart regional autonomy, on the 2nd July 2006, a referendum was called to ask voters
‘within the framework of national unity’ to give the Constitutional Assembly the binding
mandate to establish a regime of departmental autonomy. 58% rejected the proposal. On the
6th August 2006, the Constitutional Assembly was inaugurated in the constitutional capital
Sucre. This moment thus provided incentives for the Morales government to consider more
overtly programmatic linkage strategies that would reflect goals of national unity, rather than
clientelistic strategies aimed exclusively at core constituents such as the rural poor in the
Andes. Furthermore, as the “nationalisation” of gas was in the name of all Bolivians and gas
resources came from the Media Luna, programmes that spread benefits were likely to be
more politically acceptable (see McGuire, 2013).

Between May and September, the political executive discussed the potential of a conditional
cash transfer in education with UDAPE. Efforts were made to “technically structure the cash
transfer in line with the social protection framework,” however it was argued that these were
“very slow” and with the end of the school year approaching, by September 2006, the
“President was tired of waiting and called a cabinet meeting and decided ‘we are going to
provide a cash transfer and it will be Bs200 (BG10, 23/01/14).’” Technical discussions with
the Presidency were considered relatively shallow. The policy idea of a CCT was accepted,
but there was little concern regarding technical specifications such as the cost of the transfer
or the details of attendance thresholds (BG6, 26/02/14; BG10, 23/01/14).

The table below compares the proposals made by bureaucrats in UDAPE and the decision
taken by the President between December 2005 and October 2006:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Technical proposal</th>
<th>Policy choice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conditionality</td>
<td>Attend at least 90% of classes.</td>
<td>Attend 80% of classes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount</td>
<td>Bs.200, until the appropriate amount to incentivize attendance found.</td>
<td>Bs.200, not index-linked to inflation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>Target rural and then periurban areas.</td>
<td>National and universal, without differences by sex or geography.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grades</td>
<td>Target the school grades with the highest levels of school desertion.</td>
<td>No targeting or differentiation by grades (first 5 grades of primary).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Own construction using Loza, 2007 and Supreme Decree 28899*

This shows that on three key components of the transfer (conditionality, coverage, and
school grades) the political executive did not heed bureaucrats’ advice. While normative
reasons chiefly explain differences in scope (coverage and grades), various key informants pointed out that there were poor data on which to base technical decisions, limited evidence of what did and what did not work, and little interest from ministers to invest money and time to get good information (e.g. establishing baseline, studies, diagnosing quality). A number of bureaucrats explicitly underlined a lack of capacity in line ministries to carry out effective targeting, and this weakened their potential leverage to promote a poverty-targeted programme in this period (BG10, 23/01/14; BG26, 03/02/14).

The President’s own explanation for the creation of the *Bono Juancito Pinto* was that ‘on the 1st May 2006 we nationalised hydrocarbons. When we revised the economic data, there was a surplus of economic resources, so we decided together to create the *Bono* (Morales in Caracol Radio, 11/10/08; BS4, 15/10/14).’ Morales claimed he “talked through [the idea] with brother Álvaro García (BS1, 22/01/08).” While this underplays the role of bureaucrats, various key informants in government noted the importance of a central group of senior Ministers which represented the three core bases of the MAS party – indigenist, populist, socialist (BG7, 18/03/13; BO9, 12/01/14). These were Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca (indigenist), the President Evo Morales (populist), Vice-President Álvaro García Linera (socialist).45 As the *Bono Juancito Pinto* was passed by Supreme Decree, rather than by law, Congress and the Senate played no direct role. According to one head of the programme implementation unit, decisions on policy scope, and later adaptations, were typically signed off by this small group of senior ministers, including the Finance Minister (BG3, 24/02/14).

In mid-September, the President told officials that the *Bono Juancito Pinto* ‘payment would commence within only one month to coincide with the end of the school year (BG6, 27/02/14).’ *Bono Juancito Pinto* was first mentioned publicly on the 20th October 2006 by presidential spokesman Álex Contreras on Canal 7 and Erbol (Caracol Radio, 26/10/06). In what appeared to be a conscious effort to bind constituents to the President, the programme was officially launched on Morales’ birthday by Supreme Decree 28899 of the 26th October 2006. At the time, as the programme was linked to an exceptional fiscal surplus, the government was still debating if the transfer would be a one-off payment or a more regular government programme (McGuire, 2013).

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45 Only the President, Vice-President, Finance Minister and Foreign Minister remained in cabinet between 2006 and 2014.
Morales’ reference to economic surplus is well supported by the fact that by mid-2006 the IDH had accumulated around US$700 million. Additional royalties from the surtax on the two largest fields, San Alberto and San Antonio, brought in $32 million per month (Hylton and Thomson, 2008: 136). One month of royalties was sufficient to cover the costs for the first year of the programme (Pacajes, 2014: 50). So, alongside the increased political salience of universalist ideas within cabinet and the urge for national unity through the Constitutional Assembly, the only other major change in the period was an exceptional resource windfall, which Morales directly acknowledged as a primary driver. Between May (MAS government programme) and September (Bono Juancito Pinto approval), high gas prices had generated hundreds of millions of dollars of new revenue the government could use to expand its ambition from a narrowly targeted programme in select rural areas to a national scale programme.

Despite some inspiration for the policy ideas stemming from the Oportunidades programme in Mexico (Loza, 2007), international organisations played no significant role in the design of the Bono Juancito Pinto. While the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are referenced in the Supreme Decree 28899, key informant interviews with the UNDP (which tracks MDG commitments) and UDAPE (which writes an annual report on MDG achievements) reveal that while the programme goals and those of the MDGs cohered, international commitments were not considered important in the decision-making process (BG5, 13/01/14; BO7, 25/02/14). One senior official suggested that universalism was related “to universalist human rights tendency… which sits very well in the political discourse. There is opposition to targeting (priorización) from Morales (BG4, 20/01/14).” Thus, rather than the UN directly influencing the scope of the programme, the language of human rights was argued simply to fit with the President’s personal (normative) preference regarding programme scope (BG5, 13/01/14).

Despite Morales’ reference to the fight of social movements in nationalising hydrocarbon resources in public speeches (BS2, 09/11/08), there was no evidence of social movements’ direct involvement in the policy-making process for the Bono Juancito Pinto. One key governmental informant with close ties to the Vice-President suggests that social organisations had been progressively marginalised from the debate since 2006 (BG7,18/03/13). Recognising this marginalisation, efforts were made by the government to more explicitly reincorporate their voice in policy decisions.

On the 22nd January 2007, the National Coordinator for Change (CONALCAM) was formed. CONALCAM included 20 social organisations, foremost among them were CSUTCB,
CONAMAQ, CIDOB, and Bartolina Sisa. Morales himself announced the creation of this body, stating that “this will be the maximum decision-making body, above the cabinet (La Razón, 24/01/13).” Jorge Viaña (2011) argues that this group had only a symbolic presence in the decisions of the executive. Their main goal was to put the President at the centre of decision-making, and to bolster his personal appeal and connection with social movement bases. One might therefore argue that the goal was to strengthen charismatic political linkages rather than more participatory decision-making.

President Mesa’s administration had established a Social Protection Network under Supreme Decree 27331 on the 31st January 2004. However, the network was not functional during Morales’ first year in office. In July 2007, the Minister of Development Planning, Noel Aguirre, received a request from the President to redesign the network. A consultant involved in the design argued that it was put together “overnight (de noche al día) (BO5, 19/03/13).” Again, we see that the President’s impatience was the key reason for expediting policy. On the 22nd August 2007, Morales passed Supreme Decree 29246 to reintroduce the Network for Social Protection and Integral Community Development. One key reason behind this acceleration was the imminent roll out of the National Development Plan, which was introduced through Supreme Decree 29272 on the 12th September 2007. This concretised the aforementioned focusing idea for Morales’ first term, stating that the key aim was to ‘guarantee the redistribution of wealth (Bolivian Ministry of Planning, 2007: xiii).’

The contents of the plan were written chiefly by officials within the Ministry of Planning, but with substantial inputs from the Vice-Presidency (BO5, 19/03/13). The main component of importance for social protection was called Dignified Bolivia (Bolivia Digna). The plan continued to represent the uneasy tension between higher-level ideas and available policy options. Despite the plan criticising a “neoliberal” approach to social policies as “palliatives” to meet “unsatisfied basic needs” and improve “human development indicators” through a “Social Protection Network (2007: 6),” the MAS government’s own social protection network and the policy proposals within the plan were virtually identical. The social protection component “Urgent Bolivia… Solidarity Bolivia” aimed to eradicate extreme poverty in the 80 municipalities with the lowest levels of consumption (ibid: 32). It was thus targeted only to the poorest areas of the country. The Strategy for Generating Opportunities and Social Assets was targeted at populations with the highest levels of poverty, and this comprised the following programmes:

- **Jóvenes en Acción, Mi Primer Empleo Digno**, an employment programme aimed at increasing labour participation for poor young men and women who have finished
high school in periurban areas to improve their employability in the market, through training and internships;

- *Desnutrición Cero*, a programme aimed at improving nutrition and the holistic care of children under five years of age and pregnant mothers, within the framework of the policy for food security and sovereignty in the National Development Plan (2007: 56).

The sole exception to this targeted orientation included in the plan was the *Bono Juancito Pinto*. Thus, there remained a difference in vision between bureaucrats and the political executive. Shortly after the plan’s approval, on the 24th October 2007, having made a request that the state mining company (COMIBOL) contribute funds (BG10, 23/01/14), Morales expanded the cash transfer from fifth grade to sixth grade of primary school through Supreme Decree 29321. The transfer was paid on the 25th November 2007.

Immediately after the National Development Plan was approved in September 2007, the World Bank, which had been championing CCTs elsewhere in the region (Sugiyama, 2011, Pena, 2014), started reformulating a loan programme to support Bolivia’s Social Protection Network, approved on the 7th February 2008. Following the proposal from UDAPE (Loza, 2007), the Bank endorsed the idea to introduce a CCT to reduce chronic malnutrition, targeted at families with children under 2 years of age living in the municipalities with the highest levels of nutritional vulnerability. The proposed programme aimed to benefit 45,000 families living in the 52 most vulnerable municipalities.46 The size of the transfer would be 10% of the mean consumption of households in the poorest 20 percent of the Bolivian population. No means-testing was envisioned because each of the 52 municipalities had a poverty rate above 90% (World Bank, 2008). One senior analyst in UDAPE judged that, particularly in rural areas where the agrarian economy predominates, poverty levels were so high that targeting would have been a waste of effort (BG5, 13/01/14).

At this point, there was a very close relationship between UDAPE and the World Bank and clear resonance of technical ideas. UDAPE had made plans to prepare a diagnostic study of the supply of health and nutrition services in 10 municipalities to complement the World Bank’s Adaptable Loan Programme (ALP) III (BG1, 20/03/13).47 The World Bank envisioned carrying out a process evaluation of the pilot before moving on to a further 42 municipalities

46 The conditionalities proposed were the use of basic health services, periodical pre-and post-natal check-ups, regular monitoring of children’s height and weight, and pertinent counselling about feeding practices, exclusive breastfeeding, hygiene practices and knowledge about illness alerts.

47 The World Bank had financed the ALP since 1999. It was aimed at improving access to and enhancing the quality of public health, with emphasis on maternal-child health, and its phase three was planned to operate in 85 priority municipalities, including the 52 in its loan supporting the cash transfer programme. At the request of the Bolivian government, the IADB complemented the same areas of intervention, through the expansion of coverage to 33 additional rural municipalities not covered by the World Bank (IADB, 2011).
Thus, for UDAPE, by 2008, the aim was to pilot the health CCT in 52 municipalities, and then to increase coverage progressively to 161 (UDAPE, 2008, in Castro, 2011: 11). According to one of the consultants who designed the programme, the primary focus was initially on mothers. Mothers and children were intended to receive the same amount for health check-ups. However, the programme was repositioned as a programme for infants, in part, it was argued, because the President was most keen to support the next generation of Bolivians (BG23, 01/10/10).

In parallel, the executive was revising its plans for the Bonosol. With the “nationalisation” of hydrocarbons in May 2006 there was a funding problem, given that article 6 of the Hydrocarbons Law guaranteed the financing of the Bonosol (Law 3055). On the 28th April 2007, Finance Minister Luis Arce labelled the Bonosol “unsustainable,” but promised to cover any funding shortfall (La Razón, 28/04/07). Officials within the Ministry of Finance continued to revise the value of the transfer; however, they did not propose to restrict the beneficiary constituency (BG4, 20/01/14). While there was strong economic growth throughout 2007, no additional funding source had been agreed to make good on legal guarantees. Ministerial staff considered reducing the amount to Bs.1200 (US$190), but it was believed that lowering the amount would ‘would generate immediate rejection and social conflict (Gonzales, 2010: 49).’

On the 15th October 2007, President Morales announced the abolition of the Bonosol and presented a law bill to Congress for what became known as Renta Dignidad (Dignity Grant). The original proposal stipulated a pension for all people older than 60 years of age (article 1) and would offer Bs.2,400 (US$343) to those without a contributory pension, Bs.1,200 (US$171) for those with a pension (article 5). The Direct Hydrocarbons Tax (IDH) was identified as the funding source, hypothecating 30% of this revenue (article 8) which at the time was allocated to municipalities (Noticias Fides, 16/10/07). The Senate proposed a revised bill on the 23rd November 2007, including five alternative sources of funding, and thus leaving the transfers from the hydrocarbon taxes to departmental governments untouched (Anria and Niedzwiecki, 2014: 24).

George Gray Molina and Ernesto Yáñez (2009) suggest that a possible reason for choosing the IDH as the source of funding for the Renta Dignidad social pension was to disempower opposition governors in the Media Luna and reduce their discretion over social spending. This strategy thus resembles Ansell and Mitchell’s (2011) argument of “bossist” clientelism in Brazil. Morales’ reference to “problems” in passing the Renta Dignidad speaks to governors such as Santa Cruz Prefect Rubén Costas who opposed the policy. In his
address to Congress on the 22nd January 2008, by which time the policy had already been approved, President Morales referred directly to the conflict with mayors and governors:

“I want to ask of you before continuing the debate around the IDH, we are losing money, there is no confiscation of economic resources for the Treasury, if it’s confiscation, it’s confiscation for the pensioners of the same department, yes it’s confiscation for the mayors, and the mayors these last two years have been asking for redistribution of the IDH, it’s no-one’s invention, it’s not designed to affect anyone… we only comply with a mandate, I’m sure it’ll be understood, not by the mayors, but by all our pensioners (BS1, 22/01/08).”

This therefore suggests that disempowering opposition leaders provided an incentive, however it seems this was only a supportive factor. One ex-Minister argued that ‘choosing the IDH was a means to weaken [the opposition] politically,’ but that the IDH was the ‘only fiscal option available (BG8, 28/11/13)’ at the time. There was seen to be no alternative.

According to a survey by Apoyo Opinión y Mercado in October 2007, just under three quarters of Bolivians agreed that the Renta Dignidad should be funded through IDH resources. 83% of those in the Altiplano and 57% of those in the Media Luna agreed with the proposal. Pro-autonomy stakeholders who opposed the Renta Dignidad such as Rubén Costas and the Pro Santa Cruz Committee (Comité Pro Santa Cruz) were out-of-step with their own constituencies (see Paz Arauco, 2014, and Daroca Oller, 2016). Morales sought to leverage this division by visiting Santa Cruz on the 6th November 2007 to launch the proposal for the Renta Dignidad. An estimated 50,000 people saw the President speak (Europa Press, 06/11/07). His appearance fitted a common strategy to promote unmediated and uninstitutionalised support from ordinary Bolivians, with a mixture of programmatic and charismatic appeals. The President noted that the pension was “an obligation for the Bolivian state, for Evo Morales, for our ministers, and all authorities to attend to these demands... you are authorising me, if they don’t approve the Renta Dignidad in the Senate, we’ll apply it through decree (Europa Press, 06/11/07).” This speech clearly demonstrates a discursive moral positioning of “insiders” and “outsiders,” invested with elements of social justice and gestures of transgression with his threat to break the rules if the will of the people were questioned.

Anria and Niedzwiecki (2014) argue that social movements played a key role in pushing through the bill between October 2007 and February 2008. They show that various social
movements within the CONALCAM,\textsuperscript{48} the Federation of Neighbourhood Boards-El Alto (FEJUVE-El Alto) and the Pensioners’ Confederation (CONAJUREB) expressed their support. On the other hand, the Central Union of Bolivian Workers (COB), and municipalities in the \textit{Media Luna} through the Municipal Association Federation (FAM) were initially against the bill. The COB opposed the proposal because it rejected different benefit levels for those with and without a contributory pension, and municipalities in the \textit{Media Luna} opposed the decision to use municipal funding.

Anria and Niedzwiecki (2014) claim that 8 days of marches in the capital were crucial to passing the bill. Yet, we find this line of argument to be unconvincing. Their own research reveals that the COB switched sides because President Morales agreed to increase the amount of the transfer for those with a contributory pension to 75\% (rather than 50\% as originally proposed) and the Municipal Association Federation (FAM) agreed to support the proposal following the government’s move to take funding from universities and governors’ budgets rather than municipalities. The mobilisation itself was unremarkable. Estimates of the marchers’ numbers from Caracollo to La Paz numbered between 2,000 and 5,000 (TV3, 23/11/07). Those marching against the pension also numbered in the thousands. So, it seems highly unlikely Senators from the \textit{Media Luna} were swayed by moderate levels of social mobilisation from social movements in the highlands.

The only moment at which civil society mobilisation may have played a supportive role was when pensioners threatened not to let opposition senators inside the building on the day of the vote on the 28\textsuperscript{th} November 2007 (\textit{La Razón}, 28/11/07). However, this level of mobilisation and style of intimidation was extremely common in La Paz at the time,\textsuperscript{49} and was thus unlikely to have made a significant difference. Ultimately, high levels of public support and the fact that the MAS had 72 of the 130 congressional seats and 12 of the 27 seats in the Senate, and Morales’ credible threat to carry through the policy by decree, meant that threats by opposition Senators to block the policy carried little weight (see also Müller, 2016: 8).

Morales’ charismatic appeal to broad constituencies and his goal to enfranchise all pensioners fits with the aforementioned normative position on universalism. The pensions

\textsuperscript{48} Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB), the Bolivian Syndicalist Confederation of Colonizers (CSCB), the Unique Confederation of Rural Laborers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), Regional Labour Federation-El Alto (COR-El Alto)

\textsuperscript{49} Fundación CERES (2016) shows that Bolivia was the most conflict-affected country in the region, with an average of 54 conflicts per month. 2007 – 2008 was the period with the lowest number of conflicts under the Morales administration (Fundación CERES 2011a, 2011b).
chief at the time, Marcelo Gonzales (2010: 56), wrote an article for the ILO on Bolivia’s contribution to the global social protection floor initiative, explaining how the *Renta Dignidad* relied on a dual logic of inclusion, without exclusion. He argued that:

‘The main idea behind this distinction [between those with a contributory pension and those without] is to prioritise, through a higher payment, the segment of the population that has no old-age pension whatsoever (guaranteeing a social protection floor) without neglecting the universal right to one (2010: 46 – 47).’

This compromise thus reconciled President Morales’ universalist position and Vice-President García Linera’s preference for progressive benefits, consistent with the graduated benefits proposed in MAS’ electoral programme (MAS, 2005b). As with the *Bono Juancito Pinto*, the direct influence of the UN remained weak. An ILO country coordinator acknowledged that pension reform was not a priority for the ILO at the time, instead their focus was on labour relations with unions and child labour (BO20, 02/04/14). So, the social protection floor narrative was thus more a means to reframe and reposition policy internationally than as an influence on policy direction or scope.

Having secured 30% of IDH funding, the *Renta Dignidad* was introduced on the 1st February 2008. The social pension lowered the eligibility age from 65 to 60 and introduced a difference in amount provided to those with a contributory pension (Bs.1,800 or US$257) and those without (Bs.2,400 or US$343). Three quarters of this funding came from the IDH in the first four years of the programme between 2009 and 2012, and this share grew each year, as the table below shows:

*Figure 18. Universal Pension Fund (FRUV) Income US$ Millions (2009 – 2012)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct Hydrocarbons Tax (IDH)</strong></td>
<td>235</td>
<td>250.1</td>
<td>296.3</td>
<td>436.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dividends from state companies</strong></td>
<td>131.1</td>
<td>114.5</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>73.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net Universal Pension Fund (FRUV) income</strong></td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>371.9</td>
<td>368.7</td>
<td>382.7</td>
<td>518.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adapted from Escobar et al., 2013: 38*

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50 Increasing the amount for both those with a contributory pension and those without by Bs50 (US$7) per month in May 2013 to Bs.2,400 (US$343) and Bs.3,000 (US$429) respectively in May 2013. The pension was increased again by Bs.50 per month on the 1st May 2017 using surplus funds from the IDH.
Despite this progress to expand benefits and beneficiaries, support from the COB was shallow. Increased funding for those with a contributory pension temporarily placated their opposition, and with the opportunity of wider pension reform in July 2008, the COB advocated that the government reduce the eligibility age from 60 to 55, return to an integrated fund with no private insurance firms and argued that these changes should be funded entirely through the Individual Capitalization Fund, thus confiscating all private pension contributions (Los Tiempos, 22/07/08). This proposal was debated by Congress’ Social and Economic Commission from the 1st August (Noticias Fides, 01/08/08). By the 19th August, the COB had withdrawn their proposal and had suspended marches without a positive outcome (Noticias Fides, 19/08/08). Thus, once again, we see that direct influence from social movements in proposing policy ideas was weak.

As only 54% of funding for the Bono Juancito Pinto came from YPFB in 2007, there was increasing pressure on the executive to achieve increased contributions. On the 9th April 2008, Morales passed Supreme Decree 29503 to claim back resources from the state oil and gas firm, YPFB, which the previous year was covered by the Treasury through the Central Bank. As one Central Bank board member noted, when hydrocarbon revenue to the Treasury was low, Bolivia’s Central Bank monetised international reserves to achieve fiscal liquidity (BG10, 23/01/14). However, by the middle of 2008, the Central Bank were concerned and called a meeting with the President to explain their concerns.

Various Vice-Presidents at the Central Bank made the case to the President not to expand the cash transfer to new school grades in 2008 because, at the time, funding sources for the programme were undefined. While the government had sufficient fiscal space to fund the programme without donor support, the initial source of revenue, the state oil and gas firm, did not have stable incomes due to fluctuations in natural gas revenue. One Vice-President argued that those present believed that Morales had been convinced that expansion would be unwise under the circumstances. Yet, at the end of the meeting, seemingly censorious, the President defiantly proclaimed: “so we’re going up to eighth grade (BG21, 10/12/13).” This decision would thus ensure all primary school students from public schools would receive the transfer. Shortly thereafter, the President passed Supreme Decree 29652 on the 23rd July 2008. This was a few months ahead of the previous year, and one reason for this might have been so that the President could announce the increase before the vote of confidence referendum on the 10th August 2008, which he won convincingly with 67% of the vote.
The great majority of resources for the Bono Juancito Pinto came from hydrocarbon revenue either directly through the state hydrocarbons' company, YPFB, or indirectly through the Treasury (TGN), and 2008 was the year when YPFB was not able to make any contributions at all, as the graph below shows:

*Figure 19. Bono Juancito Pinto Funding Sources % (2006 – 2015)*

![Graph showing Bono Juancito Pinto funding sources](image)

*Own construction with data from Pacajes, 2014; Supreme Decree 2141; Supreme Decree 2506*

One Central Bank board member argued that funding for the Bono Juancito Pinto was “almost entirely linked to the Bank” during Morales’ first two terms (BG10, 23/01/14). As we can see, over half of the funding came from the Central Bank through the monetisation of international reserves.

The Bono Juancito Pinto was paid to all state school students up to eighth grade of primary school on the 12th November, 2008. At this point, as McGuire (2013) notes, priming for the constitutional referendum vote in January 2009, Morales proclaimed that the “Renta Dignidad and Bono Juancito Pinto [were included in the new constitution to support the] most abandoned children and older persons [and that failing to pass the constitutional vote, these] might be taken away (Morales in Caracol Radio, 10/11/08).” Though baseless, this presentation of external threat was entirely consitent with earlier remarks regarding perceived “outsiders” such as governors or trade union representatives.

The Constitutional Referendum took place on the 25th January 2009 and passed convincingly with 61% of the vote. This provided another opportunity for the Morales government to position the cash transfers through a programmatic and rights-based lens. The specific legal guarantees in the constitution will be discussed in more detail in chapter 7,
but the focusing idea expressed in the National Development Plan remained consistent. The Constitution declared that the state will ‘ensure the equitable redistribution of economic surplus through social policies, health, education, culture and reinvestment in production (Bolivian Constitutional Assembly, Article 306, V).’

The official narrative for the origins of the *Bono Juana Azurduy* cash transfer, like the *Bono Juancito Pinto*, according to Health Minister Ramiro Tapia stemmed from the President’s “particular concern for the problems of Bolivia’s single mothers (Chávez, 2010).” We find an almost identical explanation in a key conversation between the Vice-President Álvaro García Linera and President Evo Morales within which the policy idea was argued to have emerged (Chávez, 2009). However, as we saw above, the ideational and institutional origins lay within the MNR proposal of 2002 and policy design specifications stemmed from UDAPE, which proposed the idea in December 2005 and later re-emerged within the framework of a World Bank project, the Adaptable Loan Programme III.

The World Bank declared its Investing in Children and Youth Project effective on the 13th February 2009. Shortly after this, representatives from UDAPE presented their policy idea of a targeted infant-maternal health cash transfer to the President. However, when officials presented the proposal, the President “liked the idea and was enthused, but he said it should be national… the President doesn’t like targeted things, and he’s said so publicly (BG5, 13/01/14).” Sources within UDAPE and the *Bono Juana Azurduy* implementation unit both cited Morales’ behind closed doors comment that the benefit should be “for all or for no-one (BG1, 20/03/13; BG5, 13/01/14).” These comments and the consistency between public and private statements demonstrate the importance of Morales’ own normative preferences, which by his own appraisal, stemmed from universalist communitarian ideas and their expression through what officials perceived as a “genuine desire to impel greater inclusion (BG1, 20/03/13).” This also appealed to the values expressed by the indigenist wing within the MAS, led by Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca.

*Bono Juana Azurduy* was approved on the 3rd April 2009 through Supreme Decree 0066, and the programme implementation unit was established on the 20th May through Supreme Decree 133. The cash transfer was introduced on Mother’s Day on 27th May 2009 and was initially planned to last for five years. Similar to the *Bono Juancito Pinto*, on three key components of the transfer (coverage, phasing, and transfer amount) the executive overruled bureaucrats’ advice to narrowly target and phase benefits, as the table on the following page shows:
However, it is not clear that Morales was simply following what he believed to be popular to win votes, as has been suggested previously (McGuire, 2013). A survey conducted by Marketing SLR for the UNDP in December 2008 asked a sample of 3,800 Bolivians “if you were President and you had to decide how to spend gas revenue, what would you choose?” 44% of respondents believed that gas revenue should be distributed to the poorest and 42% believed it should be distributed equally (Paz Arauco and Ocampo, 2009: 7). While an overwhelming majority agreed that hydrocarbon rent should be redistributed, there remained disagreement on whether programmes should be targeted to the poor or as benefits for all Bolivians. So, as in Mongolia, we see significant division in public opinion regarding how hypothecated funds should be spent and who should benefit.

The abrupt change of strategic direction from a narrowly targeted programme in only the poorest rural municipalities to a national programme was justified in the Supreme Decree by reference to the fundamental right to health and development in the constitution, the fact that 75% of Bolivians did not have access to social security, and that these issues affected rural areas the most. This was recognised as a post hoc justification (BG10, 23/01/14), and the shift was a shock and a source of consternation for officials (BG5, 13/01/14). As key informants within the programme’s implementation unit mentioned, the pace of programme roll-out was also a huge surprise (BG2, 24/02/14). While UDAPE proposed the programme be methodically phased over the course of three years, like the Bono Juancito Pinto, the President wanted the programme to be rolled out in a few months. The national programme coordinator was said to have remarked: “so how do we do this (BO7, 25/02/14, interviewee’s emphasis)?”

While the World Bank played a role in initial programme design, their preference for targeting was not heeded. The national rollout was not considered to be within their mandate, and
they were thus not prepared to offer support beyond targeted districts in extremely poor rural areas. The Bank initially offered to provide funding through their Adaptable Loan Programme and the IADB also offered funding through their Programme of Support to the Eradication of Extreme Poverty (Castro, 2011). However, together, the two multilateral banks allocated only 10% of the funds required for the national programme and these funds were only disbursed from the third year of programme implementation (Platform for Access to Public Information, 2017).

In response, as the programme’s director noted, the “Finance Minister gave his strong commitment to ensure financing of the other municipalities not covered by the World Bank (BG1, 20/03/13).” Similar to the Bono Juancito Pinto the year before, where YPFB funding was not forthcoming, the majority of the funds in the first two years were provided by the monetisation of international reserves through the Bolivian Central Bank through the Treasury (BG24, 03/02/14). This shows that tapping into fiscal reserves from hydrocarbon rent was a key strategy over the period, and far more important than considered previously (Ortiz et al. 2015). With international reserves accumulated in excess of US$14 billion by 2013, the average annual cost of the programme for the first five years of US$97 million could be funded without any difficulty (BG5, 13/01/14). The graph below shows how the distribution of funding for the programme changed during the first six years:

![Figure 21. Bono Juana Azurduy Funding Sources % (2009 – 2015)](image)

Own construction with data from Platform for Access to Public Information, 2017

When the Bono Juana Azurduy was first launched, staff turnover was also a serious problem. There were 4 health Ministers in the first 2 years of programme implementation (Ramiro Tapia, Sonia Polo, Nilda Heredia, and Juan Carlos Calvimontes). There were also
changes in the Ministry of Planning, and this filtered down to how the programme itself was structured. As Ministers have the mandate to staff units, the *Bono Juana Azurduy* had 5 technical leads over the same period (Ramiro Carrasco, Gonzalo Calderón, Freddy Zanabria, Nelson Hurtado, and Emira Imaña). The reasons why there was turnover reflect the politicisation of the programme. Gonzalo Calderón was replaced for being staff of the ex-Minister Ramiro Tapia, Nelson Hurtado was fired for announcing payment problems with the transfer and Freddy Zanabria was replaced with no reason provided (FM Bolivia, 2010).

The technical unit had to draw up contingency plans to handle the registration challenge for tens of thousands of expected beneficiaries. To manage this, on the 3rd June 2009 President Morales passed Supreme Decree 152 to recruit 800 “doctors on call” as surge capacity at a cost of around US$3.7 million. Passing Supreme Decree 269 on the 26th August also provided funding for free birth certificates and identify documents. However, according to those in the programme’s implementation unit, there were never 800 doctors. Within a month, this ambition was rounded down to 620, by 2011 to 540, and by 2014 this was further reduced to 400 (BG2, 24/02/14).

There was also no coordination between different government agencies and programmes. Representatives from the National Council on Food and Nutrition (CONAN) and the implementing unit for the *Bono Juana Azurduy* programme noted that doctors from the Zero Hunger (*Desnutrición Cero*) programme and the cash transfer never coordinated actions (BG22, 20/03/13; BG2 26/02/14). As a result of these staffing and coordination challenges, payments were often not received in a predictable and timely manner. This led to many complaints and various women leaving the programme as a result, as will be discussed in chapter 7.

The *Bono Juana Azurduy* was introduced seven months before national elections, and this caused some members within the programme’s implementation unit to argue that the timing, the speed of programme roll-out, and its coverage reflected “political pragmatism and preservation of a power block (BG6 26/02/14).” In numerous speeches which will be analysed in chapter 7, Morales strenuously denied that his government responded to electoral incentives. However, two members of the *Bono Juana Azurduy* implementation unit claimed that the acceleration of programme roll-out was due to “imminent re-election in 2009… and [that the programme] would likely run at least until the 2014 elections (BG1, 20/03/13).” During the 2009 campaign, one of the team was asked to provide “daily information to the President directly.” They argued that “in that period, it was his ‘star programme (BG2, 24/02/14),’” and mentioned it at every opportunity on the campaign trail.
The billboard below from the motorway between the capital La Paz and adjacent city of El Alto shows the President's "star programme" in the immediate run up to the 2009 elections. This demonstrates a clear effort to bolster the President's personal brand through the programme:

**Figure 22. Billboard Three Months before Morales' Re-election**

![Billboard](image)

*Vaughan, 2010: 42*

The President is the protagonist in the billboard, and the viewer is thus encouraged to believe that the President himself is offering “an opportunity for life (una oportunidad para la vida).” So, while the programme’s universal character may stem from ideational foundations and political linkage strategy designed to appeal to a broad constituency, the timing of the programme, the daily use of programme data during the campaign, and billboards during an electoral period demonstrate that the programme was used, in part, to support electoral objectives. Morales increased his vote share, winning the national election with 64% of the popular vote on the 6th December 2009.

**vi) Conclusion**

In this chapter we reappraised the role of discourse in Bolivia’s policy-making process to introduce universal cash transfers and the interplay of discourse with the political and economic context. We first assessed the key factors that explained the shifts in fiscal space and provided the enabling conditions to introduce universal programmes. We found that higher levels of FDI enabled the finding of new reserves. Then we argued that an increase in commodity prices was the most important factor enabling greater fiscal space. Effective capture of a price windfall through new rent taxes was also an important subsidiary factor
(Durán-Valverde and Barbero, 2016; Mosley and Abdulai, 2016). This windfall was further shown to influence a change in policy scope in 2006 for the Bono Juancito Pinto programme. We noted that debt relief was an important supportive factor, both in terms of loosening fiscal constraints and in reducing the bargaining power of multilateral banks to impose policy conditionalities. We also showed how rent hypothecation, including through the monetisation of international reserves, became indispensable to the sustainability of the cash transfer programmes thereafter.

While fiscal capture was a necessary condition for the sustainable introduction of universal cash transfer programmes, domestic ideas were also a crucial component overlooked by the literature. The role of cognitive ideas and the empirical arguments of bureaucrats on specific details such as targeting was relatively weak, but normative ideas regarding the appropriate use of resources and who should benefit from these resources were key. Resource nationalist ideas of Katarism and egalitarian ideas within ayllu institutions coalesced in a nodal point of “redistributing the surplus,” which provided justification for universalism in the programmes and underpinned the logic of rent hypothecation upon which fiscal capture relied.

Given the President’s strategy to pursue unmediated links with broad and loosely organised constituencies via charismatic linkage, coordinative discourse with parliament and civil society was limited, and we argued that policy design was primarily an exchange between officials and the political executive, with minimal support from the World Bank. As CCT legislation was passed exclusively by decree rather than by law (as in the case of the Renta Dignidad), there was more limited scope for Congress and the Senate to play a role in policy design. However, contrary to previous accounts (Vaughan, 2010; McGuire, 2013; Müller, 2016), we argued that electoral incentives, in themselves, were not a strong explanatory factor in the design phase of the two CCTs or the re-design of the social pension. We showed instead, that cash transfers were merely used by the President to legitimise his inclusive credentials and brand.

Transnational policy diffusion was considered to be a less significant factor than argued previously for the adoption of universal cash transfer programmes (McGuire, 2013). We showed that the input of multilateral actors was limited to offering the inspiration for the policy ideas (Loza, 2007) and providing a small proportion of the funding in only one of the programmes. We showed that, as in the Bonosol previously (Weyland, 2005; 2006), decisions on policy scope for universalism were determined by the political executive, largely on normative rather than empirical grounds.
Social mobilisation was also judged to be only a minor contributory factor in the adoption of universal programmes. Given Bolivia’s high degree of social mobilisation, we would expect to find direct claims for a share of natural resource wealth and that civil society would play a clear role in influencing social protection policy (Ferguson, 2015; Postero, 2017). While the Gas War in October 2003 constituted a crisis providing a catalyst for rent capture and generic claims for a share of natural resource wealth, contrary to previous scholarship (Carnes and Mares, 2014; Anria and Sara Niedzviecki, 2014; Daroca Oller, 2016), we showed that this did not clearly translate into policy. Social mobilisation and civil society pressure played an unclear and contradictory role in influencing the re-design of the social pension and played no discernible role in the design of either CCT.

While electoral incentives and social mobilisation were not considered to be key drivers in policy design, the following chapter will consider how these factors may have become more important in expanding beneficiary groups and increasing benefit amounts between May 2009 and December 2014.
Chapter 6: Cash Transfer Policy Expansion

In this chapter, we will assess the expansion of cash transfer programmes during President Morales’ second term. Building on our focus on fiscal space, normative ideas and political linkage strategies, we will appraise increases in civil society pressure to claim a share of natural resource rent and how institutional differences between the two CCTs and social pension in terms of legal guarantees and mobilisation capacity of programme recipients may have had a bearing on programme expansion. Focusing on the 2014 election, we will then consider how elections may have helped accelerate political commitments to increase programme beneficiaries and transfer amounts, and then compare commitments over a longer period (1997 – 2019). Finally, we will reflect on the risks of policy retrenchment and shifting narratives in response to changes in fiscal context due to a fall in commodity prices.

i) Mobilisation for Entitlements or Bonuses?

Having convincingly won the 2009 election, 2010 was the only year that the Morales government made no improvements to any of the cash transfer programmes, either in expanding beneficiary groups or increasing benefit amounts. However, in Morales’ second term (2009 – 2014), we begin to see greater divergence in pathways between the two CCTs and the social pension. Six important policy changes took place between October 2011 and November 2014. No changes were made to expand the beneficiary population or increase the cash transfer amount since the original design of the Bono Juana Azurduy in 2009. For Bono Juancito Pinto, while the transfer amount did not increase, coverage was expanded four more times over the following four years, reaching all school grades by the 9th October 2014. For the Renta Dignidad, while the beneficiary population remained the same, the amount of the cash transfer was also increased twice on the 16th May 2013 and the 15th November 2014.

Despite no changes to the three cash transfers in 2010, the government passed the Pensions Law 065 on the 10th December 2010, benefitting the 29,745 Bolivians with contributory pensions. The law also introduced a Solidarity Fund (Fondo Solidario) to increase the pensions of those with the lowest contributions, and this was established for 10 years (Article 180). By the end of 2014, half of Bolivians with a pension benefited from the fund (Bolivian Ministry of Finance, 2017).

With a precedent from the Bonosol before it, on the 28th November 2007, article 5 of the Renta Dignidad Law 3791 established that the amount of the transfer would be revised every
These provisions provided a rallying point for a highly mobilised core group of older persons with a contributory pension in the National Pensioners’ Confederation to hold government to account. In 2011, the government offered a 5% increase of Bs.50 (US$7), but this was rejected, as marchers demanded 6.5%. Starting on the 28th April, around 2,000 pensioners marched 190km from the department of Oruro to La Paz, arriving in the capital on the 16th May 2011 (La Razón, 16/04/11). The government rejected their demand, and Vice-Minister Mario Guillén explained that many pensioners left the march after hearing that the new pensions law would, in fact, improve their income by 6.5% through the Solidarity Fund (Bolivian Ministry of Finance, 2011). By this point, only a few thousand people benefited from the fund (Bolivian Ministry of Finance, 2017), however this explanation appeared sufficient to temporarily demobilise resistance.

Meanwhile, without a national associational base, there is no clear evidence of civil society mobilisation to demand improvements for either the Bono Juancito Pinto or Bono Juana Azurduy during Morales’ second term. Given that all changes in the period were passed by Supreme Decree, rather than by Law, Congress and the Senate also continued to play no significant role.52 As such, as in the design phase for the two programmes, the main stakeholders for expansion continued to be multilateral banks, government bureaucrats and the executive.

Multilateral banks, bureaucrats and the executive continued to disagree regarding the scope of the two CCTs. While the executive’s position had been made clear on universalism, bureaucrats continued to develop plans to prioritise and target programmes in accordance with need. In 2009, Bolivia received a donation from the South-South Exchange Service at the World Bank to share experiences in fighting poverty, which included a focus on CCTs. The first video conference between Bolivia and Mexico took place on the 8th December 2009 and technical teams met again in June and August 2010 (World Bank, 2011). Bolivia also exchanged experiences on CCTs with ECLAC in May 2011. Two of Bolivia’s representatives pointed out that a major focus of their exchanges was on effective targeting (BG6, 26/02/14; BG11, 21/03/13). One of the presentations revealed that by the 30th May 2011, ‘expansion [of the Bono Juancito Pinto] to new grades was not foreseen due to funding restrictions (Meave, 2011: 15).’

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51 This was reaffirmed once more in May 2017 (Página Siete, 05/05/17).
52 Supreme Decree 1016 on the 19th October 2011, Supreme Decree 1372 on the 5th October 2012, Supreme Decree 1748 on the 2nd October 2013, and Supreme Decree 2141 on the 9th October 2014
By this point, the primary goal expressed by bureaucrats was not to target the poorest, but to screen out the richest. Akin to Gonzales’ (2010) explanation of “inclusion without exclusion,” Erik Meave (2011: 8) of UDAPE emphasised “equality and non-discrimination,” and yet referred to “inclusion error” estimates based on poverty levels. As another senior analyst for the Bono Juana Azurduy asserted, “in urban areas it may be worth coming up with proxies of exclusion as many people do not need the benefit (BG5, 13/01/14, interviewee’s emphasis).” This was reflected in the view of another senior analyst for the Renta Dignidad:

“The bad thing is the political decision: [the] instructions from the President [were] that it be universal. It’s not to reduce poverty. Nobody put it to themselves to question or justify. The policy is that it’s the same for all, without considering that we’re not all equal... There is fragile political will (voluntad politica) in this period... It is true that political will improved. That’s evidenced by the financing. But, it’s also due to availability. Good fortune... While there is [gas], yes [it’s possible], with the other cash transfers [the CCTs] there isn’t [political will] (BG3, 03/02/14).”

Senior bureaucrats across all three cash transfers shared the view that there should be some form of poverty-targeting. Yet, they suggested that political commitment to the two CCTs was more fragile than for the social pension. Indeed, the fact that both CCTs were entirely approved by Supreme Decree, whereas the Renta Dignidad was underwritten by Law, implies that commitments were more deinstitutionalised (or personalised) and this may reflect a difference in the potential durability of political will, as Pribble (2013) argued in the case of Argentina. While bureaucrats acknowledged the origins of universalist ideas from the President stemmed from a desire to redistribute the surplus and to ensure all Bolivians benefited (BG11, 21/03/13; BG8, 28/11/13), they consistently complained that the rationale for programme scope was normative, not empirical (BG3, 03/02/14; BG5, 13/01/14).

Bureaucrats had to reconcile the tension between the ideas of the President, who advocated for universal transfers, and multilateral development banks, who believed programmes should benefit only the poor. While the cash transfers are referred to as universal, each programme had exclusion or deduction criteria. By 2012, these criteria meant that the programmes mostly screened out or reduced the benefits of the top one or two deciles of the population, as the table on the following page shows:
Notwithstanding these accommodations, in a similar fashion to Mongolia, but to a lesser extent due to more favourable fiscal circumstances in the period, there was pressure from the World Bank and IADB to more effectively target the poor. On the 5th July 2011, inspired by practice from Peru and Colombia, the IADB provided a loan of US$5 million in order to develop a Single Registry of Beneficiaries (RUB). Almost identical to the World Bank’s view in Mongolia (Anderson, 2015), referring directly to the three cash transfers, the document lamented that ‘most social policies are explicitly universal and not targeted to the poor (IADB, 2011: 1).’ The IADB established poor household identification within the RUB as a key performance indicator for the evaluation of the loan (IADB, 2011: 7). This was a key priority for bureaucrats within UDAPE in Morales’ second term (BG5, 13/01/14).

By this point, it was clear that UDAPE and multilateral development banks had limited influence over the expansion of the Bono Juancito Pinto programme. Just four months after UDAPE claimed there would be no programme expansion and to their surprise (BG6, 26/02/14), on the 19th October 2011, Morales passed Supreme Decree 1016 and expanded the programme to the 2nd grade of secondary school. On the 5th October 2012, once again, Morales passed Supreme Decree 1372 to expand the programme to the 3rd grade of secondary. Both of these expansions coincided with the natural rhythm of the school year and constituted an emerging pattern in which the President declared his intentions publicly on payment day and then the following year expanded commitments through decree with limited consultation. Each year, ¾ of the funding for the programme came from the Treasury via the monetisation of international reserves, rather than YPFB, as originally planned (Pacajes, 2014). In 2012, the Minister of the Presidency, Carlos Romero, said that “the transfers were sustainable provided economic growth, the economic surplus and reserves remained stable (Romero in Cambio, 01/02/12).” So, while increases remained contingent
on natural gas rent, steady growth in the period and Morales’ mandate to expand coverage by decree meant that the programmes and increases were relatively predictable.

In early 2013, organisations within the labour movement asserted that “social security had not been fundamentally reformed, with various underlying factors to be addressed and [there was] increasing pressure on ‘productive’ salaried workers (BO1: 22/03/13).” In this period, we begin to see increasing schism between salaried workers affiliated with the COB and pensioners, and between pensioners with and pensioners without social security. Five years on from the first payment of the *Renta Dignidad*, the National Pensioners’ Confederation mobilised to lobby for an increase in the amount. On the 26th February 2013, the Vice-Minister for pensions Mario Guillén said that there would be no increase in the *Renta Dignidad*, but on the very same day the Bolivian Information Service (ABI) announced that the government would increase the amount, contingent on income from YPF projected in 2012 (*La Razón*, 30/04/13). So, this reflects a consistent pattern of the Presidency overruling ministers and technocrats when they made negative remarks publicly.

On the 23rd April 2013, representing Bolivians with social security, the National Pensioners’ Confederation were set to march in the capital asking for an 8% increase in their benefits, rejecting the 4.79% increase initially offered by the government. The National Pensioner’s Confederation Executive Secretary, Mamerto Goyochea, affirmed that if their demands were met, the marches would be suspended. At 9am, following a proposal from the President, the marches were suspended. Goyochea pointed out: “he [President Morales] offered us 1% more.” Once more, demonstrating Morales’ efforts to generate unmediated links with constituents, Vice-Minister for pensions Mario Guillén did not participate in the meeting, and thus when asked by *La Razón* for comment he was unaware of the agreement. At this point, the impression given was that decisions only got made through an audience with the President. The much smaller National Association of Older Persons of Bolivia (ANAMBO), which represented Bolivians without a contributory pension and which had made their own request for a 30% increase, met with the Minister of Finance Luis Arce the same day to see if they too would benefit, as they had been excluded from these discussions, and had received no answer from the President (*La Razón*, 24/04/13).

Finance Minister Luis Arce confirmed an increase in the *Renta Dignidad*. The government would provide an equal increase of Bs.50 (US$7) for both those with and without a contributory pension. This was the same amount offered by the government but rejected by pensioners in 2011, thus demonstrating the limited leverage of pensioners at this time. The Minister noted the increase would be funded through savings from the IDH and fell within the
30% already hypothecated, rather than asking for additional contributions from regional governments or the Treasury (La Razón, 30/04/13). On passing Law 378 on the 16th May 2013, and echoing previous statements made in 2008 criticising the COB, President Morales underlined that the increase came from “the IDH, from state funds, we now have a protective state… our policy will always be in favour of those who earn little (BS7, 16/05/13).” Thus, we see the provision of equal benefit increases, but with a renewed emphasis on progressivity which came from the government rather than the labour movement.

This decision triggered additional demands from the COB, which took to the streets on the 21st May to protest the functioning of the Fondo Solidario enacted in 2010 (Carnes and Mares, 2014: 18). By December 2012, 19,334 pensioners benefited from the Fondo Solidario (Bolivian Ministry of Finance, 2017). However, once again, COB leaders who had social security considered that the fund reduced the amount of their pension. This prompted the Vice-President to criticise union leaders for “losing their proletarian spirit (El País, 21/05/13).” On the 5th May 2013, Morales argued that the sustainability of the Fondo Solidario was key, and it was necessary to prioritise the benefit for those with lowest contributions. Once again responding to corporatist (and regressive) pressure, the government was able to appease the COB on the 20th May 2013, reaching an agreement to set top and bottom limits for solidarity pensions (Bolivian Ministry of Finance, 2017).

On the 20th November 2013, President Morales passed Supreme Decree 1802 for the Double Christmas bonus (doble aguinaldo), known as “Effort for Bolivia” for all public and private sector workers, contingent upon there being “in excess of 4.5% GDP growth (Article 1).” The new leader of the National Pensioners’ Confederation, Irenio Rivera, met with the President on the 23rd November. The following day, the President announced that the double Christmas bonus would not be paid to pensioners, that it would be irresponsible, would create a fiscal deficit and that the bonus was a recognition for the efforts of “active workers (EjuTV, 24/11/13).”53 On the 29th November 2013, Rivera argued that “we ask for equal treatment with the payment of the double Christmas bonus,” but that they were open to “other forms of compensation (EjuTV, 29/11/13).” Thus, we begin to see the rise in demands by the National Pensioners’ Confederation to receive the same benefits as employed public sector workers.

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53 The following month, on the 30th December 2013, the SUMI and SSPAM were combined into the Comprehensive Health Services Benefits Law 475. Funding levels increased to 15.5% of Co-Participation municipal funds, 10% from the Dialogue Funds from the HIPC or the equivalent from municipal IDH funds and a national compensation fund (Vidal, 2016).
Since the 2009 election, we found no evidence of civil society mobilisation beyond local level for either CCT to increase benefits or to expand programme coverage. Once Bartolina Sisa left their oversight role for the *Bono Juana Azurduy* in late 2009, there was no civil society platform to aggregate demands in either CCT beyond local level. Indeed, although initial claims by pensioners for an increased share of rent were based on legal entitlements, pensioners’ calls for increases after November 2013 were not based on entitlements enshrined in any statute, nor were demands made in accordance with notions of solidarity or equality. On the contrary, the demands of both the COB and National Pensioners’ Confederation reflected clientelist-corporate interests, and treated pension provision as a zero-sum competition between those with and those without contributory pensions.

Moreover, as the following chapter will illustrate, Christmas bonuses had historically been a customary means of state patronage. So, while these are claims, it is not clear that they are rights claims in the sense expressed by Ferguson (2015). There is no specified connection with natural resources in these demands, and while there is a request for “equal treatment,” those who already had a pension were asking for discretionary annual bonuses rather than what was due to them in accordance with legal guarantees.

ii) *Electoral Windows of Opportunity*

The increasing volume of demands from pensioners led some key non-governmental informants to argue that government decisions were “based on marches, rather than data (BO2, 11/11/13; BO4, 15/03/13).” Interviews with bureaucrats took place during the same period as these policy changes between March 2013 and February 2014, and at this time bureaucrats were increasingly frustrated by the way in which political decisions were made. As UDAPE reported to the Ministry of Planning rather than the Presidency, their positioning to lobby the Presidency was weaker than in the past. It was argued that the practice at the time was to “take a political decision first and then look for a technical justification… and that technical [considerations were] a mere accesory (BG10, 23/01/14).” The President’s passing of Supreme Decrees clearly illustrates this. Another senior bureaucrat argued that “many within the government (referring to the Foreign Minister and President) don’t believe in data. They consider it to be a neoliberal thing (BG8, 28/11/13).” Whether true or not, this illustrates a perception of diminished bargaining power of bureaucrats with the Presidency. There was little demand for data-driven arguments, as decisions were considered to be based more on “ideology and resource availability (BG3, 03/02/14).” Such resignation therefore attests to the fact that bureaucrats had been increasingly marginalised from the decision-making
process for programme changes. In the case of the Bono Juancito Pinto, the programme
director considered they were isolated from decisions even within the Ministry of Education,
and mentioned that the unit played no part in decisions related to programme expansion
(BG3, 24/02/14).

On the 2nd October 2013, President Morales passed Supreme Decree 1748, increasing the
Bono Juancito Pinto up to the 4th grade of secondary school. On the payment day of the 25th
October 2013, the President declared: “I have a great desire that it [the cash transfer] reach
sixth grade (EjuTV, 25/10/13).” This was a desire expressed each year, entirely consistent
with Morales’ aims since the beginning of the programme to ensure that all schoolchildren
would benefit. Although national elections were nearly a year away, the payment day for the
transfer coincided with the early launch of the MAS campaign for presidential elections the
following year. 14 Ministers were dispatched to the 9 departments to distribute the transfer
(La Razón, 26/10/13), and this was immediately criticised by the President of the Supreme
Electoral Court, Wilma Velasco, for contravening electoral rules (EjuTV, 27/10/13).

As national elections approached, in theory, there were increasing political incentives for the
government to expand benefits. On the 4th July 2014, the MAS formally launched its
electoral manifesto, merely confirming it would guarantee the three cash transfers and that
increases would depend on economic growth (MAS, 2014: 65). So, no firm proposal was
made to improve programmes.

Opposition political parties saw cash transfers as more of an opportunity during the 2014
election. The centre-right Christian Democrat Party (PDC) of ex-President Jorge Quiroga
claimed that they would provide school, health and nutrition cash transfers, underlining that
cash transfers were their idea in 2005, but the policy was ‘copied poorly’ and argued cash
transfers should go only to poor families in rural areas (PDC, 2014: 12 – 13). The centre-
right National Unity Front (UN) Party’s platform criticised the government’s cash transfer
position. They acknowledged that ‘by being “universal” [the cash transfers] avoid the political
favouritism that marks the MAS social policy,’ such as the Evo Cumple programme in which
the President personally hands over cheques to build infrastructure. However, they noted
that this allowed a ‘significant amount of money to go to social groups that do not live at risk
and who… do not need help from the state (UN, 2014: 18).’ They proposed to maintain the
three cash transfers and offered their own cash transfer, Bono Futuro (Future Grant), which
would provide Bs.350 per month to 500,000 poor families – ‘the most vulnerable’ at a cost of
Bs.300 million (US$43 million) and would be paid for through the Renta Dignidad fund (UN,
2014: 50 – 51).
As a presidential candidate for the Revolutionary Institutional Movement (MIR) in the 1997 elections, we may recall that party leader Samuel Doria Medina criticised the Bonosol as “the worst form of wasting the capitalization resources (Presencia, 22/05/97 in Aponte, 2007: 35).” Yet, the popularity of the Bono Juancitio Pinto had seemingly convinced him of the potential electoral salience of cash transfer programmes. Both main centre-right opposition parties said they would maintain the universal programmes, but in line with their own normative ideas, would introduce additional programmes of their own targeted to the most vulnerable, rather than to all.

Although no mention was made in the MAS electoral manifesto regarding a Christmas bonus, two months before elections and unprompted by pensioners, on the 7th August 2014, President Morales presented a law bill to Congress to pay a Christmas bonus to recipients of the Renta Dignidad (La Razón, 07/08/14). This triggered a renewed demand on clientelist-corporatist lines from the National Pensioners’ Confederation on the 15th September when around 3,000 pensioners marched to demand the double Christmas bonus provided to public sector workers (La Razón, 18/09/14). On the 18th September 2014, the National Pensioners’ Confederation agreed to suspend their marches to meet with President Morales on the 10th October, just two days before Presidential elections. Just three days before the election, in line with the rhythm of the school year and thus on more programmatic grounds, Morales also passed Supreme Decree 2141 to increase the coverage of Bono Juancito Pinto up to the 6th grade of secondary school.

Morales won the 2014 elections with 61% of the vote. Just three days after elections, on the 15th October, the President reaffirmed that the pension was paid not by the sale of state assets but through the profits from natural resource rent. He proclaimed on Bolivia TV: “this year pensioners will receive a Christmas bonus (aguinaldo) (BS4, 15/10/14).” On the 23rd October 2014, Morales passed Supreme Decree 2152 which, with funding from the pension fund (FRUV) would expand the ‘right to a Christmas bonus to all those of 60 years or more (Article 3).’ Such efforts by the President to make commitments to improve benefits for pensioners just days before the election shows how elections helped accelerate and amplify cash transfer commitments. Yet, there is no evidence of a credible electoral threat. Morales won the 2009 elections with 64% of the vote and the 2014 elections with 61% of the vote. In both elections, the next largest party won only a quarter of the vote.54 However, the

54 Plan Progress for Bolivia – National Convergence won 27% in 2009 and National Unity won 24% in 2014.
Christmas bonus did appear to reflect an effort to match cash transfer promises from the electoral platforms of other political parties.

Regarding bottom-up pressure, for the two CCTs where there was no mobilisation at national level, expansion was top down, and relied entirely on presidential decrees. During Morales’ second term, as pensioners received increases on two occasions following mass mobilisation, we might assume social mobilisation helped secure bottom up change. However, there is limited evidence that either the frequency of marches or the scale of these marches increased significantly over the period. We find that the most important marches numbered between 2,000 and 5,000 pensioners, with limited variation between electoral and non-electoral periods, with success and failure from both low and high levels of mobilisation (TV3, 23/11/07; Eju! TV, 02/04/11; El Día 19/12/13; La Razón, 18/09/14). So, while some degree of mobilisation and collective action at national level appears to make some difference, distinguishing the CCTs and social pension, there is no clear dose response from bottom-up mobilisation. This suggests that elections themselves were a more important amplifier than social mobilisation.

To show how effective electoral periods may have been, it is helpful to put cash transfers and elections in perspective over a longer period. Of the 19 occasions where new policies were introduced, expanded, or benefit amounts increased between 1997 and 2019, only 6 were during electoral years (Bolivian Gazette, various years). However, each year there was a national election under both Presidents’ Sánchez de Lozada and Morales, we found either the introduction of a new programme or an increase in benefit amounts in at least one of the cash transfer programmes. Arguably reflecting perceptions of electoral threat, under President Sánchez de Lozada, changes took place exclusively during election years.55 Having won the election and with only one term in power, under President Banzer, policy retrenchment took place exclusively during non-election years.56 Under President Morales, three-quarters of changes took place during non-election years.57 The graph on the following page shows increases in transfer amounts to illustrate how elections focused attention, at least for the social pension:

56 Bolívida introduction (1998) and increase in benefit amounts (2000)
57 During non-election years 2006 and 2008, Bono Juancito Pinto and Renta Dignidad were introduced, beneficiary groups for the Bono Juancito Pinto were expanded in 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2013 and in 2008 for the Renta Dignidad, and benefit amounts were increased for the Renta Dignidad in 2008, 2013, 2017. During election years, Renta Dignidad increased benefits in 2014 and this is also expected for 2019.
Figure 24. Cash Transfer Amounts in Bolivianos per Recipient (1997 – 2019)

Except in 2005, each election year saw either the introduction of a new transfer (1997, 2009) or an increase in the transfer amount (2002, 2014, 2019), and in 2014 the Bono Juancito Pinto included an additional school grade. As we saw in chapter 4, all the largest political parties (MNR, MIR, UCS, ADN, CONDEPA) declared support for the Bonosol social pension in the 1997 election (Aponte, 2007: 24). However, fiscal constraints and President Banzer’s own productivist beliefs prompted a reduction of benefits and the introduction of Bolivida in 1998. As Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s “beautiful idea,” the Bonosol was the key electoral pledge in both electoral manifestos in 1997 and 2002 (see MNR, 2002). In the 2005 elections, despite being in Jorge Quiroga’s PODEMOS electoral manifesto, the policy idea of cash transfers was not taken up by the MAS until mid-2006. However, in the 2009 and 2014 elections, we see clear evidence that the MAS used all three cash transfers as a part of their campaigns to bolster Morales’ brand (see also chapter 7).

In 1997, 2009, 2014 and 2019, new programmes or payment increases were announced, on average, six months before the election. Payment days took place, on average, three months before elections, and on three occasions either announcement, decree, or payment happened the same month as national elections (see pp.208 – 209). Therefore, there is a very high level of consistency across elections and across the political spectrum. What differed was administrations’ fiscal capacity to take advantage of resource windfalls and ideas regarding who should benefit from cash transfers. With regards to fiscal capacity, both
Sánchez de Lozada and Banzer faced significant challenges. Low commodity prices and international reserves, high debt payments, recurrent fiscal deficits and the sale of the government’s most lucrative source of income made the sustainable introduction of universal programmes a great challenge, whereas, for Morales, between 2005 and 2014, the opposite was true.

In terms of political ideology, we find that the most right-wing presidential candidate (Banzer of ADN) held productivist beliefs and was opposed to the Bonosol. He was also the only President who decreased benefit amounts. Quiroga (ADN/PODEMOS/PDC), Sánchez de Lozada (MNR) and Doria Medina (MIR/UN) changed their political allegiance from right to centrist political parties, and thus despite maintaining a general preference for targeting, their position against universal programmes softened. The stated reasons for supporting or maintaining universal programmes in electoral campaigns was consistent between Sánchez de Lozada, Quiroga and Doria Medina; each agreed on normative grounds that universalism was a means to reduce potential for corruption and clientelism (MNR, 2002; PDC, 2014; UN, 2014).

In President Morales’ case, none of the three cash transfers were introduced, or relaunched, within six months of an election (see pp.208 – 209). There is also no consistent evidence that left-wing parties offered more cash transfer programmes or more generous programmes than right-wing parties during electoral periods. Only the Christmas bonus was launched within formal electoral periods and the Bono Juancito Pinto expanded beneficiaries during the same election. In fact, MNR, PODEMOS/UN, and PDC parties all offered (numerically) more cash transfer programmes than the MAS in the 2002, 2005 and 2014 elections (MNR, 2002; PDC, 2014; UN, 2014). Indeed, were electoral incentives a strong motivation during periods of high political competition, the MAS ought to have embraced them in 2005, like their rivals PODEMOS and MNR. The difference was that UN and PDC supported targeted programmes to the poor, whereas the MAS advocated universal programmes. As we argued previously, this difference related to universalism stems chiefly from normative rather than electoral roots, but it also reflects the political linkage strategy of the populist left (UCS, CONDEPA, MAS) to provide programmes to broad, largely unorganised, political constituencies (see Aponte, 2007: 24).
iii) Fiscal Constraint and Rationing the Surplus

In their 2014 electoral manifesto, the MAS asserted that they would guarantee the three cash transfers, but that increases would depend upon a particular threshold of economic growth (MAS, 2014: 65). From 2015 onwards, despite economic growth consistently surpassing the stipulated threshold of 4.5% of GDP (Página Siete, 06/10/18), due in large part to lower commodity prices, the Morales government ran deficits of US$2 billion per year (5% of GDP) on average. As a result, international reserves, which were a key source of revenue for the two CCTs, fell from US$15 billion in 2014 to US$9 billion in 2017. Bolivia’s stock of external debt also more than doubled from US$4.2 billion in 2012 to US$9 billion in 2017 (Jemio, 2018). Given these fiscal constraints, Morales’ narrative began to change. On the 5th September 2015, he said:

“I want to tell you… in the last cabinet meeting we looked for an austerity policy for next year. We families who know what living in poverty is like, when we don’t have much money, sometimes we say we have to tighten our belts (Página Siete, 09/10/15).”

Yet, on the 16th October 2015, Morales affirmed that “the Bono Juancito Pinto is guaranteed not with foreign money, nor with international reserves, but with our money. The Renta Dignidad is guaranteed… and the Bono Juana Azurduy… Evidently, the fall in petroleum prices affects in some way, but it does not decide our future. No cash transfer will be withdrawn because prices fell (La Razón, 16/10/15).” As he explained in 2018, “this cash transfer and the social programmes are possible to provide when the economy grows (Página Siete, 23/10/18).” However, quite unlike what happened under the Sánchez de Lozada administrations with the Bonosol, the Universal Pension Fund (FRUV) had a projected surplus of over US$687 million at least until 2017, despite the fall in commodity prices, given the fiscal take during the windfall period (Página Siete, 08/07/14). The stability of funding for the social pension was thus never in serious doubt.

No further improvements were made to either CCT after the 2014 elections. However, since passing the double Christmas bonus in 2013, the National Pensioners’ Confederation insisted each year that they should also receive this extra bonus. By 2016, the decline in the economy was consistently used by Ministers to reject requests for improvements to social assistance provisions. On the 21st March 2016, a few hundred disabled persons protested for over 140 days and traversed 380km from Cochabamba to La Paz to present a demand for a monthly cash transfer of Bs.500 (US$72) rather than their annual grant of Bs.1,000 (US$143). They were met by more than 100 riot police with water cannon on the 25th May.
The Minister of Planning, René Orellana, explained that the state of the national economy would not allow for such a payment (El Día, 19/04/16). On the 28th June on UNITEĽ TV, the Vice-President also declared “at times of international crisis, there will be no new cash transfers… We will guarantee that no-one loses their cash transfer… when things improve in a few years, we’ll sit down and talk about how we can improve new cash transfers.”

However, in keeping with a pattern or overruling ministers and bureaucrats, in February 2017, President Morales announced a bill for the Labour Insertion of People with Disabilities. This ratified the monthly payment of a cash grant for seriously and very seriously disabled persons but providing a cash transfer of Bs.250 (US$36) per month rather than Bs.500 (US$72). Importantly however, the central government charged municipalities with the responsibility to fund the programmes rather than central government (Erbol, 13/02/17). On 11th August 2017, Law 072 was approved. According to the Minister of Labour, Héctor Hinojosa, it was anticipated that 8,250 people would benefit from the benefit and the annual cost would be only Bs.24,750,000 (roughly US$3.5 million) (El Día, 11/08/17).

So, the government tried to restrain other social assistance expenditures, but legal guarantees within the Rentá Dignidad provided a framework to increase the amount of the transfer. On 5th May 2017, in line with the 3-year rule to revise benefit amounts, Congress approved a revision of the Rentá Dignidad law which increased transfer amounts by a further Bs.50 (US$7) and this was announced on live television on the 26th May 2017 (Abya Yala Televisión, 26/05/17). Resisting corporatist pressure once more, on the 9th November 2018, President Morales rejected calls for a double Christmas bonus (El Deber, 10/11/18). However, only a month later on the campaign trail for the 2019 election, on the 7th December 2018 in Villa Tunari (Cochabamba), Morales announced that from June 2019 the Rentá Dignidad would increase. Following two face-to-face meetings with the Pensioners’ Confederation, in line with all past increases, on the 18th January the President agreed to increase the Rentá Dignidad by Bs.50 (US$7). The President explained that the proposed increase was due to economic growth, and Law 119 was approved on the 27th June 2019 (El Deber, 27/06/19).

iv) Conclusion

In this chapter we assessed the expansion of cash transfer programmes during President Morales’ second term. We argued that the three core features mentioned in the previous chapter (fiscal capture, the political salience of redistributive and egalitarian ideas, and a
blending of charismatic and programmatic linkage) remained the most important factors which underpinned expansion.

We found that the influence of multilateral banks and government bureaucrats advocating for targeted programmes further declined over the period. Yet, we argued that institutional differences between the two CCTs and the social pension had a bearing on expansion. We showed that in the social pension there were clearer formal rules which allowed pensioners to claim their rights in line with legal guarantees, and their greater mobilisation capacity allowed them the opportunity to do so. Partly as a result of sustained pressure from pensioners organisations, the *Renta Dignidad* increased the amount of the cash transfer twice in the period. While we found that pensioners mobilised collectively to make claims, division among pensioner organisations and appeals for bonuses suggest that appeals were based as much on corporatist patronage as they were on legal entitlements. The Bolivian case therefore offers weak support for the argument that labour unions and pensioners associations are necessarily a force for either solidarity or progressivity, as has been argued elsewhere (O’Connor and Olsen, 1998).

However, as the CCTs were introduced and expanded by decree, expansion was formally connected to the President, and thus had a less secure institutional basis for expansion. Without an organisational basis for recipients of either CCT to make claims collectively for higher benefits, increases chiefly relied on normative considerations and the charismatic linkage strategy employed by the President. The *Bono Juana Azurduy* was universal on introduction in 2009, it was less politically salient, and no improvements were made. On the other hand, by Morales’ second term, the *Bono Juancito Pinto* did not cover all school grades. Morales’ normative commitment to universalism and the popularity of the *Bono Juancito Pinto* provided incentives for the government to expand the programme four more times over the following four years to reach all school grades by the 9th October 2014.

As in policy design, we found that there was not a strong correlation between cash transfer improvements and elections, as changes took place during both electoral and non-electoral periods. However, we showed that elections were ‘focusing events’ which did provide loose political “windows of opportunity,” yet not in the full sense of multiple streams (Kingdon, 1984: 24). We showed that each election year, except 2005, saw either the introduction of a new transfer or an increase in the transfer amount, and efforts accelerated in the three-month period prior to national elections themselves. However, agenda-setting, problem framing, and policy selection was generally top-down, and this was only partly aided by
social mobilisation or lobbying by interest groups, as neither the frequency of marches nor the scale of these marches increased significantly over the period.

We found that commitment to cash transfers was made quite consistently across the spectrum of political parties. As right-wing political parties made more commitments than left-wing parties, there seems to be weak support to suggest left-wing party affiliation was a key factor for commitment during elections. What differed between political parties was their stance on the scope of programmes, as more right-wing parties favoured targeting, whereas more left-wing parties favoured universalism. Behind this, as noted in the previous chapter, lay different normative stances of key actors on who should benefit, alongside charismatic linkage strategies which incentivised the provision of benefits to all.

Finally, despite high sensitivity to commodity prices, we found that fiscal constraint did not trigger policy retrenchment, due to accumulated savings from the pension fund and international reserves. However, fiscal constraints did appear to restrict programme expansion in Morales’ third term between 2015 and 2019, with the return of an austerity narrative.
Chapter 7: Rightful Shares and Patrimonialism

In the previous two chapters we expressed doubts regarding the nature and extent of rights claims through social mobilisation for cash transfers. In this chapter, we will assess citizens’ perceptions of the cash transfers and rights, and how programmes may have contributed to socio-political effects.

We will first review recent Bolivian scholarship regarding claims that cash transfers are seen as entitlements, and for effects linked to a sense of citizenship, political stability, and public approval. We will then assess key aspects of Morales’ communicative discourse, reviewing how cash transfer policy choices were legitimised through public speeches, advertisements and billboards. Thirdly, we will briefly review legal guarantees in place for the programmes. We will then use survey and interview data from the city of El Alto to assess how peri-urban Bolivian citizens viewed the cash transfer programmes and their entitlements, considering potential differences between elites and programme recipients. Fifth, we will review evidence of citizen-state interface between programme recipients, service providers and public authorities in peri-urban districts of El Alto. We will consider how this interaction may amplify or dampen citizens’ perceptions of trust. Finally, combining national and local survey data, we will assess the potential effects of the programmes in terms of perceptions of fairness, presidential approval, voting preferences, and trust in the state.

i) Rightful Shares and Entitlements, or Clientelism?

Relatively few studies have addressed the socio-political significance or effects of cash transfers in Bolivia. Following Ferguson (2015), the boldest claim is that Bolivians view cash transfers as “rightful shares.” Nancy Postero argues that:

‘Instead of thinking of cash transfers as gifts or social assistance based on generosity, many people consider them as part of social transfers, as rightful shares that are due to citizens who should benefit from the vast national wealth. This is certainly the way the programs are characterized in Bolivia, and part of the reason why they are so popular (2017: 15).’

James McGuire (2013: 23) also argues that Bolivia’s high level of civic participation means Bolivians are more likely to have a sense of ‘ownership’ over the cash transfer programmes, and that ‘programs are no longer considered a temporary public benefit, but rather an acquired human right, which means that the population will demand that these programs are continued at any cost (2013: 23).’
However, neither McGuire (2013) nor Postero (2017) present any empirical evidence of their own to support these claims. McGuire’s contention relies on Flavia Marco Navarro’s (2012) evidence from 12 interviews with students in two state schools in urban and peri-urban Santa Cruz. Yet, these interviews do not support McGuire’s claim. Reviewing Marco Navarro’s (2012: 48) interview data reveals that only one student referred to the cash transfer as a right, and all other students referred to the transfer as either a “help,” a “prize” (premio) or a “gift” (regalo) associated with the President. Equally, interview evidence (n=15) with young mothers from Molyneux and Thomson’s (2011) study, which took place in four health centres in urban and rural La Paz and Potosí, suggested that the Bono Juana Azurduy was considered a “gift” or a “help” from the government or the President (Molyneux and Thomson, 2011; Castro, 2011: 34). Andrés Vaughan’s (2010) interviews with 38 cash transfer recipients in El Alto just prior to elections in 2009 showed that 21% of respondents directly referred to the programmes as clientelist, and no recipient mentioned rights. This evidence therefore suggests that it is more likely citizens do not view programmes as entitlements, but more evidence is required to demonstrate this clearly.

Emiliana Skinner (2007: 227) argues that the Bonosol social pension had a significant impact on older people’s citizenship rights and participation in society. Her argument is based on the acquisition of legal identity documents, the establishment of older-persons’ groups and an assumed sense of trust. However, very limited testimonial evidence is presented to support this. Castro’s (2011) evidence from the Bono Juana Azurduy programme suggests that poor information related to entitlements, onerous bureaucratic processes to acquire identity documents and delays in payment may instead increase distrust in the state. Such obstacles may thus undermine a sense of citizenship.

Paul Mosley and Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai’s (2016) survey evidence from a sample of 48 citizens in La Paz and El Alto from 2014 offers an uncompelling picture of citizens’ perceptions of the cash transfers related to political stability. Their claims that cash transfers contributed to political stability are not supported by their interview evidence and the available quantitative evidence is contradictory. Mosley and Abdulai (2016) contend that conflicts decreased under the Morales administration and take this as a proxy for increased political stability. In fact, the frequency of conflicts increased under President Morales. It is not clear that conflicts are a good proxy to demonstrate the effects of social assistance (Fundación CERES, 2016), and their own survey evidence from poorer Bolivians mostly

58 Data from Fundación CERES’ Conflicts Observatory (2011a, 2011b, 2016) demonstrates that the number of conflicts each month under President Morales was higher than for any other President since records began in
undermines their conclusions, as manual workers referred to the cash transfers as “palliatives” and “purely symbolic (Mosley and Abdulai, 2016: 23).”

Aliza Durana’s (2010) research offers a more promising line of argument. Drawing on Max Weber’s explanation of charismatic authority and based on an analysis of Morales’ speeches in 2008 and 2009 and a public opinion survey from 2009 (Layton and Smith, 2011), she suggests the value of the cash transfers lies in their ‘symbolic value as a charisma-granting act,’ and reaffirms Morales’ ‘authority as a moral leader (2010: 64, 73).’ She argues that programme legitimacy is intimately tied to the ‘credibility of Evo (Durana, 2010: 69),’ as he ‘bless[es] each child with the gift of an education and a future (2010: 73).’ While the portrayal of charismatic authority is theoretically persuasive, Durana does not present any empirical evidence of citizens’ perceptions of the transfers, which would be necessary to test such an explanation. This chapter will help to fill this gap.

ii) Presentation and Programme Legitimisation

This section of the chapter will focus on the communicative function of discourse, whereby the Morales administration sought to persuade the public chiefly regarding the appropriateness of cash transfer policies (Schmidt, 2002). We will look at how the transfers were framed through a discourse of rights (Miorelli, 2018), consider links to narratives of redistributing the surplus (redistribución del excedente) as a “nodal point,” and how Morales drew frontiers between “insiders” and “outsiders” in his speeches (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), including imagery, coded gestures, and mis-en-scène at payment ‘ceremonies (Grigoli and Sbarna, 2011: 4; Moffit 2016; Ostiguy, 2017).’ Four speeches were chosen for analysis due to their temporal proximity to the launch of the three cash transfers and to national elections in 2009 and 2014.

a) Rights and Redistributing the Surplus

As Nancy Postero (2017: 15) suggests, the overt presentation of cash transfers in Bolivia is of ‘rightful shares that are due to citizens who should benefit from the vast national wealth.’ Morales’ speeches throughout the period consistently connect the cash transfer programmes with the nodal point of redistributing the surplus, the mobilisation of social movements, and notions of rights and universalism.

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1971 at an average of 60 conflicts per month. Many of the conflicts were not directed towards the central government, but rather towards local government such as mayors that were perceived to be corrupt. Thus, conflicts which include marches and protests seem a poor proxy for the political legitimacy of the Morales regime.
Morales’ (BS1, 22/01/08) Presidential Address to congress on the 22nd January 2008 shortly after the *Renta Dignidad* Law passed in late-November 2007 was broadcast live on television. The President asserted: “I want to tell you that after the nationalisation of hydrocarbon resources we created this *Bono Juancito Pinto* (BS1, 22/01/08).” Later that year, during the *Bono Juancito Pinto* payment ceremony on the 9th November 2008, Morales underlined “if it had not been for the fight of our social movements to reclaim the hydrocarbons, and their nationalisation, then *Bono Juancito Pinto* surely would not exist (BS2, 09/11/08).” In 2014, just three days after the national elections on the 12th October, Morales affirmed:

“*In the 1990s, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 we fought, we marched … to recover the homeland (patria)… our natural resources…. They gave me the job of nationalising natural resources… On the 1st of May 2006 we nationalised hydrocarbons… Now we had more money, not like before (BS4, 15/10/14).”*

Each of these speeches clearly connects the cash transfers to hydrocarbon rent and “the fight of [their] forefathers [and] social movements (BS2, 09/11/08)” to reclaim natural resources, and growth in hydrocarbon rent is cited as the reason which enabled the government to provide cash transfers, rather than “relying on debt (BS4, 15/10/14).” Thus, we find clear evidence of a resource nationalist discourse as the basis for the cash transfers.

Morales conveys a discursive moral position, consistently denouncing accusations that the cash transfer programmes are used to support political objectives:

“It’s not with political intentions, nor posturing, nor to generate loyalty from the young… we never think of political ends, or personal ends, but thinking of the people that need [something] from us… It is not from the President, not from the Prefect, not from the Mayor, it is not the gift of anyone, only when we build infrastructure we give back to the people, and now it will be through the *Renta Dignidad*. You don’t have to thank me, there’s no reason to be having a party (BS1, 22/01/08).”

Later that year, during the payment of the *Bono Juancito Pinto* on the 9th November, Morales reaffirmed his position:

“It is not that Evo Morales, or the national government, is gifting money (*regalando dinero*) … It is not Evo Morales’ money, it’s the money of the Bolivian people (BS2, 09/11/08).”
Likewise, during the launch of the *Bono Juana Azurduy* programme on the 27th May 2009 (Mothers' Day) at a stadium in the city of Santa Cruz, Morales asserted:

"After guaranteeing two social benefits, we now have the *Bono Juana Azurduy de Padilla*… complying with the new Bolivian state political constitution… women should be well informed so that they can demand that we the government, the Prefect, the Mayors comply with the new Bolivian state political constitution approved by public vote… In section 2, article 21, paragraph 15, of the new Bolivian state political constitution where it says… women have the right to a safe maternity… this cash transfer is complying with the new Bolivian state political constitution (BS3, 27/05/09)."

Morales consistently affirmed that the “money is not from Evo but from the Bolivian people (BS4, 15/10/14),” and the transfers reflect Bolivian citizens’ rights, underpinned by constitutional guarantees. This reflects an overtly programmatic narrative, which ostensibly supports the interpretation that transfers are “rightful shares (Ferguson, 2015).” However, the fact that Morales so emphatically and consistently defends the position that the *Bono Juancito Pinto* is “not a gift from Evo (Página Siete, 23/10/18)” suggests that he is invoking his exceptional sanctity (see Weber, 2012) and doubts the general public believe this claim. Morales’ frequent use of apophasis – “not with political intentions,” “not a gift from anyone,” “not Evo Morales’ money” is an important rhetorical device to encourage his audience to overtly reject such notions, claiming the moral high ground, yet covertly claiming credit.

**b) Insiders, Outsiders, and Charismatic Leaders**

At the heart of Morales’ communicative discourse is moral positioning and anti-elite rhetoric which clearly presents “them” and “us,” suggesting that others used the cash transfers electorally, whereas his administration did not:

“The so-called *Bonosol*… was managed electorally… In 97 […] we lost the whole year fighting for *Bonosol* or *Bolivida* and you hear they didn’t pay it as there wasn’t money. Also, we remember that the *Bonosol* was invented in the last year of the President’s term to use it electorally, neither the *Bono Juancito Pinto*, nor the *Renta Dignidad* are we using electorally, we’re not interested in that, what we’re interested in is serving and getting to this people that sometimes don’t even have enough [money] to eat (BS1, 22/01/08).”

“Them” is the traditional elite, referring to neoliberal administrations of the past under Presidents Sánchez de Lozada and Banzer and opposition governors like Rubén Costas who complained that their IDH resources were being “confiscated” by the national
government. In chapter 5 we saw how Morales declared to a crowd in Santa Cruz “you are authorising me (Europa Press, 06/11/07)” and that “we [the government] only comply with a mandate (BS1, 22/01/08).” This mandate comes from an “us” which consists of social movements and “people that live in the countryside, in the poorer parts of the towns (BS1, 22/01/08).”

In this speech, Morales also pointed to a threat from outsiders: “now I want to tell you that surely on the 1st February [the day of the first Renta Dignidad payment] we’re gonna have some problems, to pay almost 700,000 old people each month (BS1, 22/01/08).” These problems did not relate fiscal liquidity, as in the Bonosol, but rather the risk that governors in the Media Luna would try to block payment. We also find this positioning against the COB leadership in May 2013 on the promulgation of Law 378 to increase the Renta Dignidad. Like Vice-President García Linera, President Morales claimed union leaders lacked solidarity with poorer pensioners whereas his administration was “always fighting thinking of the Bolivian people and some only think of privileged groups within the COB, in pursuit of more privileges. And what does the government do? Defend the rights of workers, of the majority of workers (BS7, 16/05/13).” Morales thus presents himself as the hero through his charismatic linkage strategy, cutting out local brokers.

Morales also made efforts to create a sense of empathy and closeness between himself and his bases; an unmediated relationship with the majority of Bolivians. As Durana (2010) notes, Morales’ use of the singular and plural first-person narrative and third person narrative (“we give back to the people,” “the only thing Evo Morales has done”) breaks down interpersonal barriers. In his speech to Congress, Morales made a connection between the cash transfers and his own personal experience of rural poverty through a vignette:

“I’m sure many parliamentarians who come from rural areas know this reality […]. Sometimes there is no money to buy a book, sometimes the community, the ayllu has to buy it, worse when the child is an orphan, the community has to raise the child, or the child has to go house to house in order to eat, and sometimes there is no education. This issue inspired us to create this Bono Juancito Pinto… Particularly as I come from the communities, from the syndicates. I remember perfectly, my mother sold more or less one sheep per month, and this I talked through with brother Álvaro Garcia (BS1, 22/01/08).”

This is a personal story designed to represent all poor rural communities; it is conceived as a shared experience, and this was reflected in Morales’ 2009 election campaign which
transformed the 2005 campaign slogan “I am Evo” into the more inclusive “we are all Evo (Molina, 2010: 281).” In 2013, with the increase of the Renta Dignidad, Morales said: “I understand very well… in rural areas when one ages, even the child doesn’t know us… I have seen it (BS7, 16/05/13).” Morales’ mention the ayllu is a clear expression of communitarian notions of solidarity and universalism, but this is also a discursive strategy with charismatic linkage to bind Morales to his audience. In 2014, just three days after the national elections on the 12th October, Morales imagined himself as a cash transfer recipient:

“I’d like to be a child and receive the Bono Juancito Pinto… I would have dropped out because there wasn’t an incentive. Now I’d like to be the best student (BS4, 15/10/14).”

Affirmations that the President comes from the communities, that he remembers the experience of poverty, that he would have dropped out, and that he talked things through with brother Álvaro to create the cash transfers mean that the programmes are intimately tied to the President and his own personal experience in the rural Altiplano. Morales downplays his role in the third person: “the only thing Evo Morales has done as President is to return the money of the people, back to the people, through Bono Juancito Pinto (BS2, 09/11/08).” So, the audience is encouraged to believe that Morales is one of them, that he is giving back to the communities, and complying with a mandate, but that without him, the money would not return to the people. Moreover, his cabinet frequently used public platforms to remind the public who to thank for their cash transfer. During the distribution ceremony of the Bono Juancito Pinto on the 16th October 2012, Vice President Álvaro García Linera said to students:

“I only ask that you never forget two things: never forget that the cash transfer is thanks to the nationalisation of our companies and that President Evo decided it (García Linera in Eju!TV, 16/10/12).”

On the 6th November 2015, García Linera gave a speech at the Universidad de la República Oriental del Uruguay at which he used a vignette of a 10-year old Quechua boy he supposedly met in northern Potosí called Ricardo. For García Linera, this child embodied Juancito Pinto himself, who was a drummer boy in the Chaco War from northern Potosí. Linera emphasised to his audience that the child was:

“a peasant, an indigenous Quechua, from a far-away community, and surely his father and mother also peasants, and his grandfather and great grandfather also peasants, who worked for a master, and worked for free for the mining bosses… and had a marked destiny (BS6, 06/11/15).”
Linera asked the child: “What will you do with this cash transfer that President Evo gave you?” His reported response was that: “I’m going to save and I’m going to prepare to be like Evo Morales, also President (ibid.).” During the payment ceremony in the city of Cochabamba, surrounded by flags and posters with the words “long live President Evo Morales,” the MAS governor of Cochabamba Ivan Canelas also asked children present:

“Who was that child of five years old that walked three kilometres and at eight years twelve kilometres? Who was it? Evo. Who? Evo. Why don’t you shout Evo, Evo, Evo? Children, you should never forget this story (EjuTV, 17/10/16).”

There is thus an unmistakable attempt to portray the programme as being at the behest of the President. It is his example and generosity that is argued to transform the destiny of Bolivia’s rural and urban poor.

Even though Morales consistently affirmed that the cash transfers were not gifts, he explicitly associated the cash transfers with bonuses. The word used for cash transfer (bono), also used in Ecuador, refers to a both a voucher and a bonus. The cash transfers are linked to other bonuses in the public sector such as the Christmas bonus (aguinaldo). In 2014, just three days after the national elections on the 12th October, the following was broadcast on Bolivia TV:

“In 2006, there was a surplus of money. No-one had to lend me money to pay Christmas bonuses (aguinaldos) so we said with my brother Álvaro what shall we do with this money? There was a surplus. We decided to implement Bono Juancito Pinto…. This year pensioners will receive a Christmas bonus… Some parents say I have to give a gift (regalo) to my children at Christmas, but they now receive their Christmas gift from the government (BS4, 15/10/14).”

Morales thanked parents for “their vote,” “their support,” and the “campaign they did for President Evo,” pointing out that their “vote will not be in vain (BS4, 15/10/14).” The fact that the decree for Bono Juancito Pinto was passed on the President’s birthday (26th October) in both 2006 and 2009, in the latter only two months before elections, also contributes to an association between cash transfers and gifts. Morales thus presented the cash transfers as a Christmas present and a bonus provided in times of economic surplus.
c) Ceremony, Imagery and Campaigns

Three of the speeches analysed above took place at what Francesco Grigoli and Giocomo Sbarna (2011: 4) refer to as “nationwide ceremonies.” Each year, the Bono Juancito Pinto is distributed across all state schools by the armed forces, accompanied by various Ministers, and these ceremonies are broadcast live on television each year.

The annual payment of the Bono Juancito Pinto has been viewed as a “political act from the very beginning (BG10, 23/01/14).” We find a resemblance to an electoral branding exercise found in various parts of sub-Saharan Africa (Hamer, 2015a; Grebe, 2015; Siachiwena, 2017), Argentina (Miorelli, 2018), and Mongolia (Fritz, 2014). Yet, in Bolivia as these are annual payments, this branding process goes beyond electoral periods, echoing Conaghan and de la Torre’s (2008) notion of a “permanent campaign,” whereby governing and campaigning become inseparable. Where Hugo Chávez in Venezuela used a weekly television show, “Aló Presidente,” and Rafael Correa in Ecuador had the “President Dialogues with his Constituents,” Evo Morales has the annual payment ceremony of Bono Juancito Pinto.

The distribution of the Bono Juancito Pinto on the 23rd October 2013 coincided with the early launch of the MAS campaign for the 2014 elections. This ceremony and the media narrative offer us insights into some of the imagery and *mis-en-scène* which form a key part of communicative discourse. The ceremony was covered by the regional newspaper *Diario Nuevo Sur* (2013) which recounts the scene at the José Manuel Ávila School in Tarija.59 Inside was the school’s tricolour, but outside supporters of the MAS brandished the signs and blue, white and black of the MAS party’s flag, awaiting the arrival of Finance Minister, Luis Arce to inaugurate the payment. It is also extremely common to have large banners with the President as a backdrop (or stage set) to the payment ceremony, as the photo on the following page shows:

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59 Evidence from the *Los Tiempos* newspaper of the payment of the transfer on Morales’ birthday on the 26th October 2009, six weeks before Presidential elections on the 6th December, presented by McGuire (2013) offers a similar perspective.
Straight after the above ceremony, the Ministry of Communication interviewed children about their receipt of *Bono Juancito Pinto*. One young girl proudly held up her two hundred Boliviano notes, gestured to the camera and said: “Mr President Evo Morales, thank you for gifting us *(regalandonos)* our 200 Bolivianos (Bolivian Ministry of Communication, 2013a).”

This image of an unmediated exchange with the President echoes the very first television advert for the *Bono Juancito Pinto* in October 2006 which showed a child from primary school arrive at the Presidential Palace. Ushered in by the President, the boy enters the President’s office and, smiling, shakes the President’s hand. The advert ends with the MAS slogan “Evo delivers” – *Evo cumple* (Bolivian Ministry of Communication, 2013b). Another advert produced by the Bolivian Ministry of Communication in 2013 to explain the formal eligibility requirements to receive the *Bono Juancito Pinto* begins with children in a stadium chanting “Evo, Evo, Evo,” and the advert ends with the same chanting to the backdrop of a cartoon of Evo Morales carrying a child (Bolivian Ministry of Communication, 2013c). Therefore, there is a consistent messaging campaign which seems designed encourage gratitude to the President. Arguably, this is an attempt to build a ‘thread of identification with and commitment to a political proposal’ as in Argentina (Miorelli, 2018: 7), yet this is a proposal which is inexorably linked to the President.

Efforts to contribute to this personalised affective relationship were also commonly found on billboards during electoral periods. As in the billboard presented in chapter 5, the photo of
the billboard below comes from the 2009 election campaign. It shows the dates of Morales’ first term and the cumulative number of programme beneficiaries. Morales is the protagonist in the photo. Written above him is the tagline “the change is yours,” yet Morales is personally reviewing the old lady’s identity documents:

**Figure 26. Billboard Three Months before Morales’ Re-election**

![Billboard](image)

*Vaughan, 2010: 42*

As with the first campaign advert for the *Bono Juancito Pinto* in 2006, the exchange is directly with the President. There are no brokers. For the *Bono Juancito Pinto* on the 2012 payment day Morales was even captured on national television handing over a Bs.200 note in person (*Red PAT Bolivia*, 2012). The coherence in messaging between cash ceremonies, adverts and billboards therefore suggest a common populist strategy to bind recipients to the President.

Overall, therefore, we find a contradictory picture of how the cash transfers were presented to the Bolivian public. On one hand, we find evidence of rights-based discourse which suggests that the cash transfers are “rightful shares” of natural resource wealth. On the other hand, we find ample evidence of both electoral strategy and highly personalised exchange through the cash transfers. Vice-President Álvaro García Linera explained that:

> “Today patrimonialism is more democratic… Patrimonialism is a republican legacy, but there is a high level of acceptance under a common transformational perspective: gas is for all Bolivians in the interest of the people, a general logic of appropriation, but if the gas is for all, why not for me, if I have fought. And what role has the
leader in this context in the aim to build a state in a universalist sense? Does Evo Morales no fulfil this role in putting himself above particularism?... It’s no longer a caste-based privilege, a surname or a family inheritance, it is instead assumed as the right of all, but it continues to be a populist patrimonialism (*patrimonialismo popular*) (Linera, in Svampa and Stefaoini 2007: 7).

This unorthodox mix of rights claims and patrimonialism, embodied through the President, helps to explain why there is disagreement in scholarship regarding whether cash transfers are considered as entitlements or gifts, as programmes reflect a complex amalgam of programmatic and personalistic appeals.

**iii) Legal Guarantees**

Legal guarantees are a pre-requisite for the institutionalisation of rights-based social contracts (Barrientos and Pellissey, 2013; Sabates-Wheeler *et al.* 2017; Ayliffe *et al.* 2018). So, we will briefly review the formal guarantees in place before assessing citizens’ perceptions in relation to these. Two of Bolivia’s cash transfers preceded the approval of the new constitution on the 9th February 2009. According to Supreme Decree 28899 of the 26th October 2006, the *Bono Juancito Pinto* is formally an incentive for enrolment, retention and completion of the school year of boys and girls in the first five years of primary and refers to the right to receive the transfer. The *Bonosol* universal social pension was enshrined as a right on the 28th November 2002 for all residents who were 21 years old on the 31st December 1995 when they reached 65 years of age (Law 2427). Under the *Renta Dignidad* Law, on the 28th November 2007, this was expanded to all those over 60 years of age (Law 3791).

Comparing the 2004 and 2009 constitutions, there are no dramatic differences regarding basic guarantees to education, the right to health and social security, with similar affirmations of the principles of universalism, solidarity and the duty of the state to defend human capital and protect the health of citizens (Bolivian Constitutional Assembly, 2004: Articles 7, 158, 177). However, we do find that the new constitution is more explicit in its use of rights-based language in relation to health, education and social security, and there is more explicit mention of specific provisions, such as an old age pension, as the table on following page shows:
**Figure 27. Health, Education and Social Security Constitutional Entitlements**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rights</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Social Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Right to health and safe</td>
<td>• Right to education (Articles 17, 77-90)</td>
<td>• Right to quality and dignified old age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pregnancy (Articles</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Articles 67 – 69)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18, 35-39, 45)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obligations and</td>
<td>The state has the duty to guarantee and sustain</td>
<td>The state will guarantee access to universal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantees</td>
<td>the right to health (Article 37)</td>
<td>health insurance (Article 36)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The state will guarantee the inclusion and</td>
<td>The state will provide an old age pension</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>access to healthcare of all persons, without</td>
<td>within the framework of full social security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>exclusion or discrimination (Article 18)</td>
<td>(Article 67)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women will enjoy special support and protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>during pregnancy, birth and in pre and post-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>natal periods (Article 45)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Own construction based on 2009 constitution*

The *Bono Juana Azurduy* was approved shortly after passing the new constitution on Mother’s Day the 3rd April 2009. As a result, there was a more explicit reference to the state’s duty to ‘guarantee the exercise of the fundamental right to life and health (Supreme Decree 0066).’

Therefore, formal policy coheres with Morales’ rights-based discourse. If these guarantees are well understood and considered credible, then citizens’ perceptions ought to match McGuire’s (2013: 23) contention that Bolivian citizens view the cash transfers as ‘an acquired human right’ rather than patronage. In the following section, we will consider Bolivians’ knowledge and perceptions of the programmes in La Paz and El Alto.

**iv) Knowledge and Perceptions of the Cash Transfers**

We will first consider elite perceptions of the cash transfers in La Paz and then compare these with the perceptions of programme recipients in El Alto through interview and survey data collected in 2014.

**a) Elite Perceptions of Cash Transfers**

Interview evidence from elite actors tied to the political opposition such as ex-ministers and right-wing economists generally interpreted cash transfers as transactional political instruments. Various interviewees referred to the “populist motives (BO5, 19/03/13)” of the
transfers by “a populist government (BO9, 24/10/13)” underpinned by a “political rationale” which was displayed at “electoral moments (BO1, 24/01/14),” and cash transfers were viewed a form of “buying by the state (BO19, 22/03/13).” Performative aspects were also noted through the “present[ation of] an image of change (BO10, 24/10/13)” to bolster presidential patronage. This was well expressed by one university professor who argued that:

“Bono Juana Azurduy is clearly welfarist (asistencialista)...So too is the Bono Juancito Pinto. Look at who is distributing it and how they are being distributed and the image and meaning this creates [referring to the President and the armed forces] (BO8, 21/03/13).”

Bolivia’s Education Policy Observatory also labelled the Bono Juancito Pinto ‘welfarist’ and argued the transfer generated an inevitable ‘sense of dependency’ on a ‘paternalistic state’ which ‘infantilised recipients (Murillo et al., 2011: 98 – 99).’ A consultant who helped design Bolivia’s social protection system drew attention to these paternalistic linkages in their characterisation of the Bono Juancito Pinto programme: “It's Chavez’s child, Evo’s child. That's what he's [Morales] trying to do with the transfer (BO5, 19/03/13).”

Thus, we see emphasis of the President’s central role in the cash transfers and efforts to generate unmediated links with recipients.

Some government officials also shared this critical view. One key informant with close ties to the Vice-President argued that “most Bolivians see social assistance as a favour, not a right. Cash transfers are simply palliative measures for the poor (BG6, 26/02/14).” However, technocrats who led the operating units or had close connections with programme operations at national level were keen to emphasise formal goals and normative motivations, which reflected a “universalist human rights tendency (BG4, 20/01/14).” Actors less aligned to past neoliberal administrations presented a more complex interplay between formal goals and informal practices within the programmes. This was best explained by a well-respected Bolivian journalist:

“The cash transfers are a substitution of social security, but they give a life certainty that is otherwise absent for people who are unable. However, the cash transfers are also a mechanism of state coercion, to quell discontent and build state legitimacy. In this sense, the social

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60 This matches the testimony of a woman from Batallas in the department of La Paz in Castro’s study: “The children feel like Evo has bought them, that’s how it seems to be he tells me… Evo says that… and for this reason that money is like buying them, as if he [the son] wasn’t mine (Interview 07/10/10, in Castro, 2011: 20).”
contract is key. These transfers provide some legitimacy to the state apparatus (BO3, 21/03/13)."

Thus, while there is mention of security, legitimacy, and the social contract, this is not necessarily grounded in notions of rights, but rather reflects normative ideas associated with charity and a pragmatic strategy of state coercion.

Non-elites who were non-recipients echoed many of the negative stereotypes and social stigma found in Castro’s (2011) research on the Bono Juana Azurduy. One focus group participant in El Alto noted that the Bono Juancito Pinto "cash transfer is an incentive for the kids, from not having anything [before]." Another participant argued that many recipients of the Bono Juana Azurduy were “people who don't have a house; the majority of whom live in rural areas and have many kids” or “young single girls, who make a mistake.” One participant, referring to her father, said: "he spends it on his vices - biscuits - it's just for him [Renta Dignidad] (FGD1, 03/04/14)." These views therefore do not reflect the notion that recipients are rights-holders, but rather give the impression that they are poor and needy people that made poor life choices.

b) Recipients’ Perceptions of Cash Transfers

Survey data collected from the northern zone of El Alto in 2014 from 157 households showed that recipients' knowledge and understanding of the cash transfers was poor.61 52% of respondents (n=82) were a recipient of one of the cash transfers and 45% of recipients (n=37) said they did not know what the objectives of the cash transfer programmes were.62 Two thirds of respondents who claimed to know (n=24) presented objectives different from those of the programmes. Response options were left open, and the most common responses were variations of "a gift for the needy," "help the [most] needy" or "help [to] the poor." Other responses suggested the transfer they received was a "prize," a "present" and a "political campaign (Household Survey, February – March 2014)."63 Only two respondents identified objectives one could categorise as entitlements or made any direct connection to natural resource wealth, which would thus support the notion of ‘rightful shares… of national wealth (Postero, 2017: 15).’ One respondent referred to the cash transfer as "redistribution

61 Further information on the characteristics of survey respondents may be found in annex 2.
62 This question had a 91% response rate from recipients. The finding is consistent with Vaughan’s evidence which showed that less than half of respondents (n=14) knew or alluded to the source of funding of the transfers as being from natural gas (Vaughan, 2010: 29).
63 The president of Bartolina Sisa, Justa Cabrera, echoed remarks that the Bono Juana Azurduy was used by the MAS as a campaigning tool (Los Tiempos, 26/05/10).
of what belongs to all of us." Another referred to "redistribution of the country's earnings (Household Survey, February – March 2014)." Yet, these views were a tiny minority.

When recipients were asked what the transfer represented to them, nearly half of respondents (49%) said it was a “gift” (regalo). 33% believed it was a “help” (ayuda), and only 17% of respondents saw the transfers as a “right” (derecho), as the table below shows:

*Figure 28. Meaning of the Cash Transfers El Alto Northern Zone*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Right</th>
<th>Gift</th>
<th>Help</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>District</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Responses</strong></td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage</strong></td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (n=75)</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total %</strong></td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Household survey (February – March 2014)*

These responses therefore contradict assertions that Bolivian citizens view cash transfers as entitlements (McGuire, 2013; Postero, 2017). Given that El Alto is a core voter stronghold and has high levels of social mobilisation, one might anticipate that a strong rights-claiming culture would translate to social assistance, as McGuire (2013) asserts. However, the data better reflect the view that cash transfers were perceived as ‘gifts based on generosity (Postero, 2017: 15).’ While redistributive views are in evidence, they do not typically find expression through a discourse of rights.

Recipients interviewed outside the survey that explicitly mentioned the meaning of programmes most commonly viewed cash transfers as a gift (n=6) or a help (n=4). None referred to the cash transfers in a way one could categorise as an entitlement. One mother receiving her second health check-up as part of the Bono Juana Azurduy programme noted: “I see this as a support; a favour. It helps me (EAR10, 16/03/14).” Another young mother said: “[It’s] an extra help. It's good. I'm grateful (EAR6, 04/03/14).” A father and neighbourhood leader whose family received both CCTs affirmed: “with this government, with brother Evo, it has changed; there weren’t programmes before. So, it’s good that he’s helping the children with these little gifts (regalitos) (BO11, 19/02/14).” One neighbourhood committee leader interviewed asserted that “[children are] always happy to receive it… They think it's from the President (BO12, 19/02/14).” This view was echoed by a headteacher who suggested that: “children in primary school see the cash transfers as a gift from Evo: ‘Evo

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64 This question had a 91% response rate.
has given it to me,' they say.” However, in secondary school, the children were argued to be more circumspect, “they say that someone has recognised that they mattered (BG14, 06/05/14, interviewee’s emphasis).”

These sentiments match other testimony from parents interviewed on television in Yacuiba (Tarija) in 2008 whose children received the Bono Juancito Pinto, in which the majority (5 out of 7) expressed their unsolicited gratitude directly to the President (Sur Noticias Web, 2008). The perspective also matches testimonies in Castro’s (2011) research from mothers receiving the Bono Juana Azurduy in 2010. Sabina’s husband, for example, questioned: “by any chance is it our money and should we should ask so much? [But] he tells the children “it’s good that they’re gifting us this money (Sabina in Castro, 2011: 15).” All of these testimonies suggest the patronage of a generous godfather (compadre) of infants or students of the graduating class (padrino de promoción) providing a present, gift, or support. This perception of personalised gratitude is inconsistent with a sense of entitlement.

However, the proposed difference in perceptions between primary and secondary school children implies that recipients with higher levels of knowledge are less likely to consider the transfers as gifts. This distinction was hinted at by Navarro (2012) and reflects Castro’s (2011: 34) hypothesis that well-educated and informed urban recipients might be more likely to claim the cash transfers as entitlements, if it came from their taxes, than rural recipients who saw the cash transfers as a “benefit from the government.” Yet, Castro (2011: 34) points out that these respondents ‘did not know where the money to pay for the benefits came from.’

Although service providers themselves often argued that the cash transfers should be considered entitlements, they generally argued that this was not how recipients viewed the programmes. The head doctor at one health centre asserted that: “the women believe that it’s a gift from Evo Morales. For me, it’s a political ploy (BG14, 17/04/14).” Another young doctor asserted that “the women think that Evo Morales is gifting them money (regalando dinero). I explain to them that it’s theirs – the Chaco War (BG17, 06/05/14, interviewee’s emphasis).”

This allusion to the Chaco War connects the cash transfer to the failed attempt to sell gas to the USA through Chile. It hints at the notion of cash transfers as “rightful shares.” However, only a handful or respondents across survey, interview and focus group data made such a connection. These respondents, with only one exception, were highly educated and very well informed about the precise entitlements within the CCT programmes and the specific
sources of funding (senior economist in UDAPE, two doctors, a retired headteacher, and a carpenter).

Given the demographic composition of the northern zone of El Alto,65 fewer responses were elicited from older persons. Thus, there is less we can confidently say about recipients' perceptions of the Renta Dignidad social pension. We might anticipate that a programme which had been written into law and that, with minor interruption, had lasted for close to two decades at the time of study should mean that recipients would view the social pension as an entitlement, as has been argued elsewhere (Hickey, 2011; Barrientos and Pellissery, 2013). However, little empirical evidence from past research in Bolivia supported such a view, and the limited evidence presented was ambiguous (Skinner, 2007; Mosley and Abdulai, 2016).

Despite a small sample of older persons in the survey and interviews (n=9), no evidence was recovered that clearly supported the perspective that the pension was viewed as an entitlement, even when respondents were directly prompted. One recipient of the Renta Dignidad, shrugging as he responded, said: “It's a help. Good to receive. We should receive it; it's always needed (EAR14, 05/03/14).” So, we find entitlement (“should”), need (“it’s always needed”) and gratitude (“good to receive”) in one. When pressed further to comment on his peers, he merely expressed his personal gratitude to the President. A similar direct expression of gratefulness to the President was made by two other respondents (EAR11, 03/03/14; EAR13, 04/03/14).

Another recipient, a retired headteacher, was more circumspect: “it’s a show… In my case [referring to the Renta Dignidad], it’s a help, but it’s not much, and who knows how long it will continue (EAR17, 02/03/14)?” Her comments thus allude to the memory under the Banzer administration when the Bonosol was suspended amid fiscal constraints, but also as she knew about the link to hydrocarbon revenue, she considered the sustainability of the cash transfer to be potentially under threat. At the time of the interview, gas revenues were beginning to decline; 2014 marked the first fiscal deficit, following eight years of fiscal surplus.

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65 Only 6% of El Alto residents were aged 60 years or older (INE, 2012), and this is likely to be lower in peri-urban districts with higher levels of in-migration. 5% of our survey respondents were aged 60 years or older.
The noun “gift (regalo)” and the verb “to give away (regalar)” were frequently used to refer to the cash transfers (43 respondents directly used the terms). Many more expressed their gratitude directly to the President, which suggests they too viewed the cash transfers as a gift. A high proportion of respondents also used the term “help.” Ostensibly, “help” sits between an entitlement and a gift. However, when recipients were asked to explain further, they most commonly associated the cash transfers with a gesture of kindness, and also often referred to the President. So, both responses better fit a sense of paternalist gratitude or a ‘helping hand (Ferguson, 2015: 178)’ rather than an entitlement.

While data collection was limited to peri-urban El Alto, there is likely external validity to these findings across Bolivia’s poor urban populations, as findings are consistent across both Marco Navarro (2012) and Castro’s (2011) CCT research in the departments of La Paz, Potosí, and Santa Cruz. While neither study explicitly focused on understanding Bolivians’ perceptions of the cash transfers’ meaning, 28 interviews made some reference to perceptions of the cash transfers. Reconstructing the interview data, the most common response was that cash transfers were a help (n=11), followed by a gift (n=10), and the least common response was that the cash transfers were a right (n=7). Again, we find that well-informed service providers, and especially policymakers, were more likely view the cash transfers as a right (n=4), whereas recipients most commonly saw the cash transfers as a help (n=11) or a gift (n=6). Only two recipients’ responses could be categorised as a right across both studies.

In summary, therefore, we found that recipients’ programme knowledge was generally poor. We showed that recipients rarely saw the programmes as entitlements and more commonly perceived them as either gifts or help. There was frequent mention of a connection to the President, which thus implies that a charismatic political linkage strategy conveyed through Morales’ communicative discourse was key to shaping recipients’ perceptions.

**v) Local-level Citizen-state Interface**

The finding that recipients’ programme knowledge was generally poor suggests that information provision by service providers and public authorities was inadequate. Under such circumstances, citizens may mobilise collectively to demand information and claim their

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66 26 survey respondents who received the Bono Juancito Pinto selected gift. However, the proportion of respondents who considered the transfer a gift was almost identical to the overall proportion at 47%. This suggests that the perception of gratitude and patronage extends across programmes.

67 It is also consistent with testimonies from the department of Tarija in which 5 out of 7 of those interviewed thanked President Morales personally for the cash transfer (Sur Noticias Web, 2008; Diario Nuevo Sur, 2013).
entitlements (Grandvoinnet et al. 2015). However, mirroring Hickey and King’s (2015: 29) assessment, as one university professor expressed:

“collective action is important, in seeing gas subsidies and gas resources as a right, but this may not be the case for the cash transfers, in part, because they’re individual benefits (BO8, 21/03/13).”

As individual benefits militate against collective action and citizen-led forms of accountability tend to emerge only once citizens come to see cash transfers as entitlements, citizen-state interface is likely to be initiated by service providers and other local state actors (Hickey and King, 2015; Ayliffe et al. 2018). While civil society mobilisation was a supportive factor for the expansion of the social pension after 2013, in the previous chapters we saw that in the case of both CCTs decisions were made without public consultation, and we would thus assume that citizen-state interface would also likely be top-down.

Attempts have been made by government to introduce accountability mechanisms into each of the three cash transfer programmes. Article 241 of the 2009 Constitution declares that civil society will participate in the design of public policies and carry out social control (control social) at all levels of the state and on the quality of public services. While the three programmes shared this overarching legislative apparatus, each employed different mechanisms for top down checks such as impact evaluations, audits, and corruption control, and bottom up forms of beneficiary participation, oversight, feedback and complaints.

At the time of the study, in the Northern Zone of El Alto there were exceptionally high levels of social mobilisation through neighbourhood associations (juntas vecinales) and Parent-teacher Associations (PTAs). In district 7, for example, there was a “loyalty pact” between these two groups to lobby for improved infrastructure and more teachers, and in district 14, there was an agenda to purchase computer equipment and fund teachers’ salaries across various schools (BO12, 19/02/14; BO13, 16/04/14). More widely, in district 14, between August and December 2013, hundreds of neighbours marched to complain about various infrastructure projects which had not been delivered, and a march in December deposed the district mayor, Néstor Yujra, who was accused of corruption (Radio Pachamama, 20/08/13; Página Siete, 19/12/13). On visiting the district Mayor’s office, we found a sign which stipulated that the office no longer tolerated corruption. This context ought to have provided an ideal platform for claimed and created spaces for accountability in the two CCTs and the social pension.
a) Bono Juancito Pinto Accountability

In Supreme Decree 28899 which created the Bono Juancito Pinto cash transfer, the government proposed the creation of social control mechanisms through PTAs. The main platform was thus an institutionalised and invited space, as per Gaventa’s (2006) definition, where parents were invited to participate by the authorities. UDAPE later clarified that PTAs were expected to 'supervise the payment, support the armed forces in payment, help to verify the information, make timely complaints for false payments or misuse of funds, ensure that guardians really live with the child, and help ensure that on the payment day that sellers or shops do not provide alcohol or other vices (Meave, 2011: 4).’ The emphasis was thus as much on PTAs being corruption watchdogs as they were an entity to support citizens' rights. The technical unit for the programme also established a hotline which was designed to respond to beneficiary feedback and manage complaints centrally (BG3, 03/02/14).

However, as the Bono Juancito Pinto is paid only once per year by the armed forces, there is very limited scope for oversight, and citizen-state interface is likely to be thin (as per Pritchett 2014, in Ayliffe et al. 2018). Interviews with headteachers and PTA heads in two schools in district 7 and district 14 revealed that either attendance had not been measured in the past or was not measured at all (BG15, 06/05/14). In one school, students’ attendance was not measured until 2012, so it would have been impossible to check which children had met the condition for attendance (BG16, 04/05/14). At the time of study, the district 7 office had no up-to-date school attendance data and kept records by hand (BG19, 17/04/14). District 14, on the other hand, had excellent records, and was willing to share these publicly (BG19, 17/02/14). However, the failure to monitor attendance at school level meant the programme was only quasi-conditional.

Neither PTA representatives nor headteachers interviewed had organised specific meetings with parents regarding the cash transfer. The focus of headteachers and PTAs was instead on improving infrastructure and purchasing basic school materials such as desks and chairs (BG15, 06/05/14). As one PTA head asked, “what’s the point in receiving a cash transfer to go to a school where you don't even have a chair to sit on?” (BO13, 16/04/14) This lack of face-to-face meetings for the cash transfers was likely reflected nationally. Likewise, none of the recipient families interviewed had attended such a meeting. In 2010, while there is no mention of sample size, the Bolivian Education Policy Observatory found that 9 out of 10 parents surveyed nationally had not been to a workshop or meeting at which the programme
was explained (Murillo et al., 2011). In general, as the survey data above suggests, citizens were likely to be poorly informed about specific entitlements.

One PTA head in district 7 asserted that their primary role was to check for inclusion errors, but he acknowledged that the PTA had “no powers to enforce anything,” as he considered it to be “mostly the job of the school and the military (BO13, 16/04/14).” Another PTA head in district 14 was more positive about the links between the PTA and the municipality and the potential for oversight (BG19, 17/02/14). However, he was also the senior official for education in the municipality, so this was likely an exception to the rule.

Individual engagement by parents or students making complaints about the programme was also not judged to be common. In Navarro’s (2012: 47) study in Santa Cruz, for example, one teacher interviewed said they had not received complaints related to the cash transfer because “at the end of the day it’s a gift that the state gives to them.” However, it is also likely that the low level of complaints was due to the fact that there were few exclusion errors. One headteacher in district 14 judged that exclusion errors were extremely rare. However, she noted that inclusion errors were more common, stating a number of examples of children who moved from school to school to collect more than one payment (BG15, 06/05/14).

At national level, the Bono Juancito Pinto implementation unit played a very minor role in oversight. They did not regularly visit schools or supervise payments and considered themselves to be an isolated unit within the Ministry of Education, struggling to coordinate with other parts of the Ministry. The programme director noted that they only tracked school desertion rates (BG3, 24/02/14). While a complaints hotline was established and was administered by the unit, they acknowledged that it was rarely used. Indeed, neither headteacher interviewed was aware of the hotline number (BG15, 06/05/14; BG16, 04/05/14). So, this suggests that national level oversight was also weak.

Overall therefore, we found little evidence of citizen-state interface within the Bono Juancito Pinto programme in the Northern Zone of El Alto, either through invited or claimed spaces, and what interaction there was between state providers, PTAs and other local residents was shallow. So, it was not possible to clearly demonstrate the effects of citizen-state interface in terms of building confidence or trust in the state.
b) **Bono Juana Azurduy Accountability**

For the **Bono Juana Azurduy**, we found significantly greater potential for both thin and thick forms of accountability, and greater potential for claimed spaces arising from common sets of concerns. Rather than an annual payment, recipients collected around 5 payments on average over the course of 2 years (BG5, 13/01/14).

Regarding programme knowledge, the 2012 Health and Nutrition Survey, which had a sample of 8,433 households, showed that 13.1% of women of reproductive age had not heard of the cash transfer. Of those that had heard of the programme in urban areas, 57.4% were informed through the television, and in rural areas the main source of information was the health centres themselves (52.5%). 57.1% knew where to sign up; 63.7% knew where to get paid. 27.3% of women correctly reported the amount for the prenatal check-up, only 23.3% knew the amount for the child’s check-up and as little as 8.8% knew the amount for the institutional birth delivery and post-natal check-up (Vidal *et al.*, 2015). So, as we found in our household survey, overall programme knowledge was quite poor.

Given that the initial design focused on rural areas, through the National Food and Nutrition Council (CONAN), the government charged the National Confederation for Indigenous Peasant Women, Bartolina Sisa with oversight for the **Bono Juana Azurduy** in 2009. Bartolina Sisa sits in the National Coordinator for Change (CONALCAM), and therefore they were potentially a powerful actor to challenge the government to improve programmes, engaging recipients through an invited space for programme oversight. However, the choice of Bartolina Sisa appeared to be as much a political gesture as an effort to ensure independent oversight (see Castro, 2011).

Bartolina Sisa’s role was defined by CONAN in an unpublished document which established that their duties were to provide information to potential beneficiaries about eligibility, conditionalities, where to apply and where the cash transfer would be paid, and to help report problems in healthcare centres and at municipal level, to report issues of non-payment, if the process is too bureaucratic for doctors, or provides poor quality attention, or if the municipalities are non-transparent or present cases of corruption. It was also asked to organise social control committees in each municipality organising women in each area (CONAN, 2009). 300 members of Bartoliona Sisa were trained to carry out oversight. The IADB provided US$560,000 in targeted rural municipalities to promote monitoring by community organisations. However, no such funding was provided by the government for the
national programme and in urban areas, where Bartolina Sisa had a more limited presence, so there they played a less meaningful role (Castro, 2011).

Interviews with members of Bartolina Sisa in the departments of La Paz and Potosí in 2010 showed that many women complained about the programme, particularly related to concerns over registration problems, lack of respect from service providers and the poor quality of services offered. However, Castro’s evidence suggests that many women had received no information about the programme and were unaware of their entitlements (Castro, 2011). Interviews with leaders of the confederation highlighted members’ concerns regarding the lack of clarity of their role and capacity constraints. As a result, after only 6 months, Bartolina Sisa renounced their role as they “could not exercise a real social control for women’s benefit (Interview, 29/09/10 in Castro, 2011: 8, 31).”

Despite the absence of social oversight, a complaints hotline was established in 2011 (BG2, 24/02/14). Three doctors were hired specifically for the programme in the northern zone of El Alto. Two of these were interviewed and neither was aware of the hotline (BG17, 06/05/14; BG18, 06/05/14). A key informant within the programme’s central unit acknowledged that the hotline was little used (BG2, 24/02/14). So, it seems likely many doctors were unaware. Furthermore, representatives from UDAPE acknowledged that there were few spaces for citizen participation in the programme. By 2011, no invited spaces had been re-established, with no specific social control functions in place beyond the hotline (Meave, 2011). This had not changed by the time of study in 2014 (BG6, 26/02/14).

Focus group participants in El Alto’s district 1 argued that many women were not receiving the transfer due to a lack of identity documents or birth certificates (FGD, 03/04/14). This was acknowledged by programme staff in both study districts to be a minor impediment across both CCTs in both districts (BG19, 17/04/14; BG20, 05/05/14). Yet, as one doctor noted, the programme had a “bad reputation” due to the onerous bureaucratic process to receive payments (BG14, 17/04/14). In district 14, for the first two years of the programme, women had to satisfy an additional informal condition to register themselves at the district Mayor’s office. This was seemingly done in good faith, but the condition was later dropped in response to mothers’ complaints. The district office therefore had no information on how many women actually benefitted from the transfer (BG18, 06/05/14; BG19, 17/04/14).

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68 As late as 2016, we find evidence of nascent efforts to raise awareness in members of Bartolina Sisa in the department of Oruro, as mothers were not previously informed (La Patria, 18/06/16).
69 Presently, there are 9 regional offices, each of which has telephone lines, and even a phone application where recipients can check for payment (Bolivian Ministry of Health, 2019).
Both interviews and our focus group revealed a considerable number of complaints regarding the quality of health services. One participant acknowledged they had the “right to complain... and if we don't complain, [the services] will never improve (FGD1, 03/04/14).” However, another participant noted: “[There are] a limitless number of problems there [the health centre], and the people don't know where to complain (ibid).” As participants were unaware of feedback mechanisms, such as the hotline, and invited spaces were defunct, complaints were made on an individual basis to service providers themselves. All doctors interviewed in study districts acknowledged that women still complained every week due to problems of the beneficiary registry system, which caused long delays in payment of two to four months (BG13, 17/03/14; BG14, 17/04/14; BG17, 06/05/14; BG18, 06/05/14).

In the early years of the programme, there was a significant overhang in payments between years due to administrative problems, and many women complained about not being “in the system (BG2, 24/02/14; BG5, 13/01/14).” Across the country, there were various inefficiencies in data management systems which meant that many women and their children did not appear on the list, and those that did appear on the list could not be paid (BG2, 24/02/14) even after more than five years of programme operation. Lucy, who had tried and failed to get paid, complained: "I'm not in the system - it doesn't register - it is delayed for 4 months...The doctor is not there, he's only there Monday and Tuesday (EAR9, 12/03/14)." Guillermina pointed out:

"Many women don't receive it because of the system...In vain I go, in vain I wait in line... and [then again] I come and it's closed, and they don't attend to us... It wasn't even open the days [it's supposed to be open] (EAR7, 16/03/14)."

Women also complained about a lack of medical staff and that no-one was available to receive and address their complaints (EAR3, 12/03/14). While in the waiting room, on each of the four occasions interviews were conducted in health facilities, mothers asked questions or complained about the waiting time or problems with registration because they did not know where or how to complain to resolve problems.

One doctor concluded: “there’s a lack of programme credibility. The irregularity of payments has made a big impact on the women (BG17, 06/05/14).” Many women were fatigued and would try and fail to register and soon after gave up. Some of those interviewed had even dropped out of the programme in frustration at having waited too long to receive payment (EAR16, 16/04/14; BO14, 30/01/14). This was reflected nationally, as new beneficiaries
registering for the programme slightly declined over time in the first 5 years of the programme, as the graph below shows:

**Figure 29. Bono Juana Azurduy Beneficiaries (2009 – 2016)**

Contrary to Evans et al.’s (2018) findings in Tanzania, the involvement of local leaders in the programme in Bolivia was generally seen to be problematic. The involvement of MAS party representatives was considered to be an impediment to service provision. Doctors in both health centres acknowledged that originally, doctors were hired five days per week (BG13, 17/03/14; BG14, 17/04/14). One doctor pointed out that a MAS representative visited the health centre and decided that this was unnecessary, reducing attendance to three days per week, and later to 2 days per week, thus accentuating the above concerns over staffing. Relations with the local neighbourhood committee were also tense. In one of the facilities, the committee had managed to find resources for a birthing house to be made adjacent to the centre. Yet, medical staff were told “don’t involve yourself in the building’s design; it’s not your business.” Limited cooperation meant the facility was not deemed by doctors to be fit for purpose (BG14, 17/04/14).

Therefore, as with the Bono Juancito Pinto programme, there was limited evidence of formal citizen-state interface. As recipients and doctors were typically unaware of formal complaints mechanisms and invited spaces were non-functional, complaints that were made were on an individual basis. Given onerous bureaucratic processes, registry problems and staffing shortages, there were payment delays and complaints about poor treatment at services. As these complaints were often not addressed in a timely manner, it even forced some women to drop out of the programme altogether. None of this offers any confidence that
mechanisms for citizen-state interface, such as they were, had contributed to an increased sense of confidence or trust in the state.

c) Rentan Dignidad Accountability

Unlike the Bono Juancito Pinto, as over half of Rentan Dignidad beneficiaries were receiving payments monthly (Bolivian Pension Fund Administrator, 2014), in theory, there were regular opportunities for pensioners to engage with the state. However, in practice, because the pension is not linked to services, citizen-state interface is limited to the acquisition of identify documents and payment at denominated banks or insurance providers, managed by the pensions and insurance company La Vitalicia until 2019.  

Emiliana Skinner (2007: 232) argues that various older persons’ groups had been established linked to the Bonosol social pension, and that pensioners would protest, march and blockade the roads of the capital. Given the high level of mobilisation from the National Pensioners’ Confederation nationally, there was surprisingly little evidence of local level organisation among pensioners in either study site. While we found some evidence of mobilisation at national level, with a few thousand pensioners regularly marching roughly once a year to increase transfer amounts, none of those interviewed in El Alto were members of an older person’s group or had marched to advance their rights in the adjacent capital. Given that marchers typically represented between 0.01 and 0.5% of programme recipients (Escobar et al. 2013), low affiliation might, in fact, be expected. Despite a small sample of respondents, this casts some doubt on claims of solidarity and collective action and suggests that national pensioner’s organisations may have quite uneven representation across peri-urban El Alto.

No evidence was recovered of citizen mobilisation for claimed spaces, nor was evidence found of the use of invited spaces. At the time of study, Citizen Attention Centres had very recently been established (2013), including one in the centre of El Alto. No respondent mentioned use of the centre. However, unlike the Bono Juana Azurduy, none of those interviewed mentioned problems with payment, except for very minor concerns about waiting times in banks (EAR13, 04/03/14; EAR15, 05/03/14).

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70 Since the time of study, greater effort has been made to improve programme accountability. The programme now has a hotline in three languages, an email called “citizen action” and the Bolivian Pension Fund Administrator – AFP has 30 “Citizen Attention” offices across the country (APS, 2019).
Unlike the *Bono Juana Azurduy*, which had numerous problems of exclusion error and caused women to exit the programme, the social pension historically had problems with corruption and fraud. As mentioned in chapter 4, one of the key reasons for introducing the *Bonosol* social pension as a universal programme was to avoid the potential for corruption. Fraud has been reported since the origins of the *Bonosol* in 1997. Many Bolivians under the age of 65 claimed the *Bonosol* through fraudulent identity documents (BG8, 28/11/13; BG25, 25/10/13). Two reasons were suggested. On one hand, access to identity documents was handled by the police. The police filing system was on paper, and this offered various opportunities for fraud. From 2011 onwards, there was a new office for identification (The General Service for Personal Identification and Driving Licences – SEGIP) and the introduction of biometric identification by the Ministry of Finance, and transcription onto digital records began in only 2014 (BG4, 20/01/14). Secondly, it was argued that "people receive the payment 2 or 3 times because it's very easy to get an identity card. [It was asserted that] the party hands out 5,000 identity cards and they use it for that (BG8, 28/11/13)."

While we cannot substantiate this particular claim, there is evidence of widespread fraud in both the *Bonosol* and *Renta Dignidad* social pensions. For example, between 2003 and 2011, one person was convicted of using 20 false identities, accumulating Bs.300,000 (US$42,857) (*La Razón*, 14/02/12). In the department of La Paz, members of Departmental Electoral Court were accused of being involved in a network using false identity documents to receive the *Renta Dignidad*, costing US$10.5 million (*La Razón*, 30/04/10). Nationally, there were over 200 reported cases of persons convicted of fraud, presenting themselves as being under the eligible age of 60 between 2008 and 2010 (*El Día*, 29/07/10). Widespread corruption and fraud should therefore diminish perceptions of trust in state. Government and civil society actors in the capital noted this was a concern (BG4, 20/01/14; BG8, 28/11/13), but no testimonial evidence from beneficiaries was recovered to demonstrate concerns of corruption at local level.

Between the three programmes, we found limited evidence of citizen-state interface. Well-functioning citizen-state interface which allows significant scope for citizen participation and power-holder responsiveness should contribute to increased perceptions of confidence and trust in the state. However, when interface mechanisms are either absent or thin, as in this case, their potential to contribute to increased confidence and trust in the state and local authorities is much diminished. A lack of visibility and awareness of these mechanisms demonstrates that they were not effective in study sites. Indeed, in the only programme
where there was consistent engagement (albeit not as a formal mechanism), testimonial
evidence suggests low responsiveness may have even weakened citizens’ trust in local
service provision.

\textit{vi) Cash Transfers and Reciprocity Effects}

With cash transfers so frequently referred to as a “personal transaction with the President
(BG9, 23/01/14),” cash transfers ought to contribute to electoral success and be important
contributors to presidential approval.

Vanderbilt University’s Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) investigated the
effect of social assistance on presidential elections in December 2009. Participants were
asked: ‘if they received a cash transfer (\textit{Juancito Pinto, Juana Azurduy, or Renta Dignidad})’
and ‘if there were presidential elections, would you vote for the President?’ 70.5% of cash
transfer recipients would vote for the President, versus 53.2% for those that were non-
recipients, and credit claiming by Presidents was considered to add to this effect across
cases in the region (Layton and Smith, 2011: 2). President Morales did not claim credit
himself, invoking a sense of ‘exceptional sanctity (Weber, 2012: 347).’ However, MAS
representatives did on his behalf, and our survey and interview data show cash transfers
were commonly perceived as being presidential initiatives.

Regarding expectations from the state, when asked ‘what do you expect from the state?’
77.3% of respondents in our survey in El Alto (n=109) chose financial support, double the
response for services or subsidies, as the table below shows:

\textit{Figure 30. Expectations from the State El Alto Northern Zone}

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
            & Financial & Services & Subsidies & Political & Other & \\
District   & support    &          &           & representation &    & \\
Number     & 14         & 14       & 14        & 14          & 14 & 14    \\
Responses  & 37     & 16       & 12        & 5           & 5  & 13    \\
Percentage & 56.0    & 24.2     & 18.2      & 7.6         & 8.0 & 19.7  \\
Total       & 109       & 49       & 53        & 11          & 13 &        \\
Total %     & 77.3      & 34.8     & 37.6      & 7.8         & 9.2 &        \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Household survey (February – March 2014)

\footnote{This question had an 89% response rate (n=141). Respondents were able to choose more than one option. The “other” response in district 14 is predominantly jobs (n=9).}
While one would expect a survey on cash transfers to increase the likelihood that respondents would choose financial support, this preference is nonetheless compelling, and a good indicator of the cash transfers’ relative popularity.

Our survey findings also demonstrate a positive trend regarding perceptions of fairer income distribution, with 88.6% of respondents (n=133) stating that income distribution had improved, as the table below shows:

**Figure 31. Perceptions of Income Distribution Improvement El Alto Northern Zone**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Income distribution improved under this government</th>
<th>Income distribution not improved under this government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>91.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=150)</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td><strong>88.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Household survey (February – March 2014)*

While significantly higher overall, likely because of the high proportion of MAS voters in El Alto, this increase is broadly consistent with Latinobarómetro (2015: 44, 46) survey data at national level which also shows that perceptions of just income distribution had improved slightly after 2011, as the graph below shows:

**Figure 32. % Population Believe Income Distribution is Fair or Very Fair (2007 – 2015)**

*Own construction with data from Latinobarómetro, 2015: 46*

Consistency in the trend of national and sub-national data implies a connection between expectations of financial support from the state through cash transfers and perceptions of

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72 This question had a 96% response rate.
facer income distribution under the Morales government. We might also reasonably assume that, together, these would contribute to presidential approval. Between October 2006, when the Bono Juancito Pinto was introduced and the national elections in October 2014, the Morales government made 11 important changes to cash transfer policies. These changes are presented alongside presidential approval data on the following page:
Figure 33. Morales' Approval Ratings in Major Cities and Policy Changes (2006 – 2014)

Own construction using IPSOS-MORI, Villar, 2010; Ejú TV, 2011c; El País, 02/09/06; La Prensa, 01/12/07; El Mundo, 22/01/07; La Razón 06/12/10, 08/08/13; BioChile, 15/12/13; Telesur, /05/04/14; Opinión, 25/12/14; HispantV, 26/12/14
The first thing one can observe from the graph above is that the moments of highest popularity were around national elections, and when the President “nationalised” gas. The moments of lowest popularity were when unpopular policies triggered mass mobilisations in the capital. The two most important policies that triggered marches in protest were the removal of the petrol subsidy on the 26th December 2010, known as the (second) “gasolinazo” and opposition to the construction of a highway through a national reserve, the Indigenous Territory and National Park of Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS), arriving in the capital on the 18th October, 2011 (Deheza, 2012).

Transfer payment days are more visible to the public than formal policy changes through laws and decrees, which makes them a better indicator of reciprocity effects.73 Taking survey data at the nearest point after the payment date which coincides with transfer introduction or expansion, we find that in nine out of eleven occasions there is a potentially positive effect on presidential approval, with an average increase of 4 percentage points, as the table below shows:

**Figure 34. Cash Transfer Expansions and Presidential Approval in Major Cities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cash Transfer Policy Change</th>
<th>Difference in President’s Approval (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Bono Juancito Pinto</em> introduced (26 October 2006)</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bono Juancito Pinto</em> expanded to 6th grade, primary (24 October 2007)</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Renta Dignidad</em> introduced (1 February 2008)</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bono Juancito Pinto</em> expanded to 8th grade, primary (12 November 2008)</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bono Juana Azurduy</em> introduced (3 April 2009)</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bono Juancito Pinto</em> expanded to 2nd grade secondary (30 October 2011)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bono Juancito Pinto</em> expanded to 3rd grade secondary (16 October 2012)</td>
<td>+13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Renta Dignidad</em> amount increased by Bs.50 for all (16 May 2013)</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bono Juancito Pinto</em> expanded to 4th grade secondary (25 October 2013)</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bono Juancito Pinto</em> expanded to 6th grade secondary (24 October 2014)</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Renta Dignidad</em> includes a Christmas bonus of Bs.200 for those with a contributory pension and Bs.500 without one (15 November 2014)</td>
<td>+4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own construction using data from IPSOS-MORI

73 There is a slight difference if we compare the announcement of the decree and the payment date. The payment date has a stronger effect on two occasions (-2 to +6 in 2007 and -10 to +1 in 2008). This implies that visibility matters.

74 Measured at the next available month in IPSOS-MORI surveys.
IPSOS-MORI (*Ipsos Apoyo, Opinión y Mercado*) also asked respondents why they supported the President. In 2009, the most common response for approval was because Morales helped the poor (30%), because of the cash transfers, especially *Bono Juancito Pinto*, and other help in general (13%) (*La Razón*, 05/01/09). Likewise, in 2010, on two separate occasions the most important reason given by respondents was the three cash transfers (*La Razón* 31/06/10 and 06/12/10). In January 2011, IPSOS-MORI found that half of respondents approved of the President because of the *Bono Juancito Pinto*. The second reason was the *Renta Dignidad* (47%) and in fifth place was *Bono Juana Azurduy*, with 34% (*Eju! TV*, 2011a). This shows how the popularity of the programmes increased over time and became the most important stated reasons for presidential approval. We argue this was intimately tied to Morales’ charismatic political linkage strategy. President Morales was able present himself to constituents as a generous godfather of the poor, a patron who, unlike his political opponents (e.g. Samuel Doria Medina) “knows what poverty is (BG7, 28/11/13),” and even as “the saviour of public goods (BO4, 15/03/13).”

At national level, Santiago Daroca Oller (2016: 28) and Verónica Paz Arauco (2018: 14) point to Latinobarómetro survey data which suggests that general levels of confidence in the state to resolve citizens’ problems increased between 2005 and 2010. However, while Latinobarómetro’s data shows that respondents who said that the state could resolve all problems increased from 18% to 29% between 2005 and 2007, this declined to 13% in 2009; lower than in the crisis of 2003 (Latinobarómetro, 2007, 2009). Indeed, Latinobarómetro data on government and presidential support slightly declined between 2005 and 2013, as the graph on the following page shows:

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75 IPSOS-MORI was not prepared to release the whole data series between 2006 and 2014, therefore the data presented is a composite of data provided directly by IPSOS-MORI and this data reported through the media.
76 By April 2012, an opinion survey by IPSOS-Apoyo showed that 51% of Bolivians also approved of the state management of pensions (*IPSOS-Apoyo in Carnes and Mares, 2014: 21-2*).
Figure 35. Support for Government and President (2005 - 2013)

Latinobarómetro, 2018: 46; IPSOS-MORI, various years

As Latinobarómetro refer to the President by name in the question, it is difficult to decouple support for government and President, hence government support very closely resembles average annual presidential approval from IPSOS-MORI data. Claims that resource mobilisation had a positive effect on citizen-state relations may hold for the period 2003 – 2005, prior to the Morales administration, as support for government increased from 24% to 60% (Latinobarómetro, 2018: 46). However, as support and approval slightly declined in Morales’ first two terms (2005 – 2013), claims regarding positive effects on citizen-state relations across the period using this metric appear weak (Daroca Oller, 2016; Paz Arauco, 2018).

Moreover, while the cash transfers are popular and appear to have made some contribution to presidential approval, it is not clear this dividend translated to local authorities. Reviewing subnational electoral data, we find significant differences between party-political voting in national and local elections. While President Evo Morales maintained a clear majority throughout the period, in both municipal and mayoral elections the MAS party and its mayoral candidates struggled to gain comparable public approval. In 2015, the MAS had fewer assembly members than the centre-right UN party which won 58% of the vote, and UN candidate Soledad Chapetón won the mayoral vote with 55%, ahead of MAS incumbent Edgar Patana (28%), as the table on the following page shows:
Figure 36. MAS Vote Share in National and Sub-National Elections (2005 - 2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Elections Department of La Paz – Evo Morales</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal – MAS party</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayoral El Alto Edgar Patana</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Zegada Claure, 2010; Directorate for Citizen Participation Bolivian Vice-presidency, 2011; Bolivian Electoral Commision, 2016

Such variation in results suggests that El Alto citizens were not voting for a government programme, but likely based on a mixture of ideological preferences, preferred individual candidates, and on local issues such as concerns with corruption and service delivery. This decoupling was also found in preferences elicited from our household survey. The majority of responses (n=121) to what El Alto residents believed should be the priorities of political parties referred to local issues such as improved security (19%), infrastructure (19%) and public services such as health (16%) and education (12%). Thus, while cash transfers may have been important in sustaining Presidential popularity, this was less clear for local authorities which are not so clearly associated with the programmes.

Moreover, as per the national data above, it is not clear that cash transfers themselves had noticeable effects on perceptions of trust in the state. The majority of respondents from our household survey had some (37.5%) or little (36.5%) trust (confianza) in the state, as the table below shows:

Figure 37. Trust in the State El Alto Northern Zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Complete</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>None</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number Responses</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total (n=104) | 2 | 24 | 39 | 38 | 1 |

| Total %       | 1.9 | 23.1 | 37.5 | 36.5 | 1 |

Household survey (February – March 2014)

77 MAS Mayor Edgar Patana was jailed in 2017 for corruption.
78 This question had a 66% response rate.
Furthermore, we found that perceptions of trust had not changed markedly. The majority of respondents said that their confidence in the state to resolve their problems were either the same or slightly worse, as the table below shows:

**Figure 38. Change in Trust under Morales Government El Alto Northern Zone**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Much better</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Worse</th>
<th>Much worse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>District</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Responses</strong></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage</strong></td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (n=97)</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total %</strong></td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Household survey (February – March 2014)

These data suggest the cash transfers were not sufficiently important to make a substantial difference at local level. There are two likely reasons for this finding. Firstly, if there is an assumed connection between the provision of cash transfers and trust in the state, this may be significantly impeded by the fact that the programmes are so closely associated with the President and his perceived generosity rather than the local state apparatus *per se*. Secondly, the connection between citizens’ positive views of cash transfers provided by national authorities and trust in the (local) state apparatus appears weak. It seems likely the effects of the cash transfers were partly crowded out by other issues of local governance, such as concerns with corruption and a failure to build key infrastructure. These were more immediate concerns at the time.

**vii) Conclusion**

In this chapter we argued that while there is abundant evidence of the connection between distributive claims for national wealth and notions of unjust deprivation in President Morales’ speeches, we did not find strong support for the argument that cash payments might constitute rights-claims (Ferguson, 2015: 26). Contrary to McGuire (2013) and Postero’s (2017) contention, we showed that Bolivians generally did not view cash transfers as entitlements, but rather as gifts, help or assistance granted by a generous, kind and compassionate patron (Ferguson, 2015: 162, 175). To use Ferguson’s terminology, Morales was at once ‘protector of

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79 This question had a 62% response rate.
equal rights but [also] material benefactor (Ferguson, 2015: 162)’ and redistribution was at once democratic and patrimonial, to use the Vice-President’s language (García Linera, in Svampa and Stefanoni 2007: 7).

We showed how President Morales’ blending of programmatic and charismatic linkage strategy expressed through communicative discourse displayed a language of rights, and a careful presentation of “outsiders” allowed him to position himself a “moral leader (Durana 2010: 69).” Vignettes of personal experience, rhetorical devices, use of imagery and mis-en-scène all generated a sense of empathy and closeness with the President. The connection with bonuses and the President’s birthday further associated programmes with gifts, despite a language of rights and legal guarantees.

We presented interview evidence on elite perceptions of cash transfers which suggested programmes were considered presidential patronage based on charity rather than entitlements. We then presented interview and survey evidence of recipients’ perceptions. We saw that peri-urban citizens in El Alto generally had poor knowledge of their entitlements and programmes were not commonly viewed as rights. We showed these findings were also consistent with perceptions recovered from secondary data in urban areas across other parts of the country.

We then considered the potential role of citizen-state interface to strengthen citizen-state relations. Despite high levels of civil society mobilisation more generally, we found little evidence that this had translated into a collective rights-claiming within the cash transfers in the northern zone of El Alto. Opportunities for citizen-state interface were very limited, and these were mostly through poorly functioning invited spaces. Most citizen-state interaction was shallow and informal, so we found little evidence to substantiate claims regarding active citizenship exercised through social protection, as has been argued elsewhere (Marshall, 1950; Barrientos, 2013; Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2017; Ayliffe et al. 2018).

We found the potential for solidarity and collective action was also limited across programmes, as non-recipients viewed programmes more as charity than rights and recipients in the sample did not act collectively to make complaints and claim their rights. As per Mahon’s (2009: 7) assessment, we found no clear sense of membership. While predictable and durable programmes in which local leaders are responsive may build confidence and trust in the state (Hickey, 2011, Ferguson, 2015; Evans et al. 2018), we found little evidence of this in the case. Public authorities failed to actively participate and provide information or answers. Citizens
generally did not know how to complain, and problems were resolved slowly and ineffectively. Under such circumstances, we found little evidence of confidence and trust in the state engendered through cash transfer provision.

Survey evidence demonstrated that cash transfers were popular and likely contributed to citizens’ increased expectations of financial support from the state and perceptions of fairer income distribution. These perceptions ostensibly support the principles of equality within a rights-based social contract (Rawls, 1971, 2005). We showed that cash transfers also contributed to citizens’ approval of the President and likelihood to vote for the President (household survey February – March, 2014, IPSOS-MORI, various years; Layton and Smith, 2011).

However, neither national nor local-level survey data showed clear improvements in terms of support for government or trust in the state. As citizens mostly viewed cash transfers as help or gifts, we saw that ‘reciprocity effects (Granvik, 2015)’ were largely restricted to the President. Given this, citizens’ perceptions and preferences were more likely based on the President’s charismatic linkage strategy rather than programmatic politics and notions of rights. Therefore, we conclude that there is little evidence to support the contention that cash transfers represented “rightful shares” or made a significant contribution to rights-based citizen-state relations.
Conclusion

The thesis has assessed the political economy drivers which explain the introduction and expansion of cash transfer programmes in Bolivia under the administrations of President Evo Morales (2005 – 2014). We argued that the push towards universal cash transfers was primarily driven by three factors: shifts in the capture of natural resource rent, the political salience of redistributive and egalitarian ideas, and the type and combination of linkage strategies employed by political leaders to appeal to citizens.

We argued that fiscal capture of natural resource rent was a key pillar for the introduction of universal cash transfers in the case, and this appears also to have been the case in other low and lower-middle income countries which rely heavily on natural resources. Capturing gas rent enabled greater domestic policy-making autonomy for more ambitious programmes. However, fiscal space achieved through rent hypothecation is an insufficient condition to introduce universal cash transfers. The factor which had the strongest bearing on the decision to introduce universal cash transfers in the case was the salience of redistributive and egalitarian ideas in the political executive. We argued that to understand the introduction of universal programmes, more attention should be paid to the influence of domestic ideas. We showed that paradigmatic normative ideas and legitimacy considerations with constituents were highly significant, especially as these ideas emerged from core constituencies. REDistributive and egalitarian ideas generated incentives to pursue charismatic and programmatic political linkage strategies which both appealed to broad constituencies, thus reinforcing the drive towards universalism.

Policy expansion continued to rely on stable fiscal capture and the political salience of redistributive and equalitarian ideas, and the limited traction of clientelist linkage strategies. We showed that social mobilisation and elections partially contributed to policy expansion. Yet, pathways to expansion varied between the social pension and CCTs, given differences in legal guarantees and the mobilisation capacity of pensioners to make demands on the state.

We judged that the adoption of a universal cash transfer will not necessarily strengthen rights-based citizen-state relations in a natural resource dependent context. Despite Bolivia’s high levels of social mobilisation outside of programmes, rights-based language, and legal guarantees, we found little evidence to support the contention that cash transfers represented
“rightful shares” of natural resource wealth. If a charismatic linkage strategy is at the centre of political appeals and if citizen-state interface mechanisms are weak, as was the case in Bolivia, we found that programmes will not be interpreted by citizens as rights or contribute to improved perceptions of trust in the state. We therefore conclude that the introduction and expansion of universal cash transfers did not strengthen rights-based citizen-state relations, but rather, largely reinforced patronage-based relations.

We will first summarise findings in the thesis’ seven chapters and then consider the wider implications of the thesis for the political economy of cash transfers in similar contexts. We will end with recommendations for further research.

In chapter 1, we considered the fiscal, institutional, political and ideational factors which shape the political economy of social protection. We first argued that fiscal space was key to the sustainable expansion of social protection. We showed that a social protection floor of around 2% of GDP was achievable in the vast majority of countries, but we noted that capacity for redistribution varies greatly and we noted particular challenges for countries with consumption per capita under US$2,000 per year (Ravallion, 2009). We found the argument that natural resource rich countries may have greater autonomy over social spending to be persuasive (Barrientos and Pellissery, 2013; Ulriksen, 2013). However, we noted that autonomy depends on state capacity to capture and hypothecate surplus from natural resource rent for social policy expenditure (Frank, 1971; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Hujo, 2015; Mosley and Abdulai, 2016).

We then reviewed scholarship regarding how political institutions shape commitment to social protection. In considering class-based explanations, we argued that labour power was a better explanation for changes in social insurance than social assistance. However, we noted the potential importance of crises in recalibrating political incentives to appeal to excluded groups. We also found that left-wing regime type was not crucial for the adoption of CCTs in Latin America, but we noted a potential connection to preferences for universalism. Following Pribble (2013), we then assessed the importance of politician-citizen linkage strategies and how these influenced the scope of policy choices towards universalism in Latin America. We showed that both programmatic and charismatic linkage strategies generate incentives for universalism. We then made comparisons between lower-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, focusing on the potential role of elections, presidentialism, and political settlement types. While we judged the debate on electoral effects was inconclusive, we argued that
elections may be a contributory factor within a causal package, helping to bolster the level of political commitment, and we agreed that higher levels of electoral threat may also increase incentives for expansion (Hickey et al. 2018). However, we suggested that the politician-citizen linkage strategies employed within political settlements may be a better predictor of policy choices than settlement types themselves.

Finally, we reviewed ideational explanations for the introduction and expansion of social protection. We argued that global initiatives for a social protection floor and policy conditionalities from IFIs did not play a significant role in driving national commitments. Normative appeals of global actors were not likely to compel governments (Weyland, 2006), yet we argued that normative appeals and legitimacy considerations from domestic actors likely provide a stronger impetus to introduce universal programmes. We also found the arguments for ideational fit and regarding the importance of higher-level ideas to frame policy options to be persuasive (Lavers and Hickey, 2015; Lavers, 2016a; Miorelli, 2018).

In chapter 2, we assessed scholarship related to the potential socio-political significance and effects of social protection. We first considered different notions of social contracts and how these relate to different approaches to social protection. We suggested that where cash transfers are introduced with interest-based notions of the contract, they were likely to develop relatively shallow, fragile and transitory citizen-state relations, whereas rights-based contracts were more likely to foster deeper and more stable citizen-state relations. We then assessed Ferguson’s (2015) argument regarding the potential for cash transfers to represent “rightful shares.” We found the notion theoretically appealing and noted that natural resource dependent countries were important to study. However, we cast doubt on the judgement that cash transfers would be viewed as entitlements or rightful claims in this context. We suggested instead that they were more likely to reflect a paternalistic form of reciprocity, matching recent conclusions in sub-Saharan Africa (Hickey et al. 2018).

We then reviewed scholarship related to the importance of legal guarantees, accountability through citizen-state interface, and evidence of citizens’ perceptions of programmes across different contexts and programme modalities. We argued that extending benefits through legal guarantees was a key means to entrench a sense of citizenship through social protection, but that such guarantees were insufficient. We then considered the role of citizen-state interface in social protection. We agreed that different forms of interaction and depth of interaction may
shape citizens’ perceptions of programmes (Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2017; Ayliffe et al. 2018). However, we found limited evidence of a clear exercise of citizenship through accountability mechanisms in cash transfer programmes. We finally considered the potential electoral returns from cash transfers in Latin America. We noted mixed results but judged that some form of reciprocity effect was likely in many cases. Reviewing evidence on recipients’ perceptions, we found that cash transfers were more likely to be perceived as instruments of patronage than entitlements in the majority of cases reviewed.

In chapter 3, we explained our criteria for case and policy selection, analytical framework and methodology. We believe that the methods employed were an effective combination. Process tracing enabled us to provide a finely-grained account of decision-making processes and to appraise the relative importance of key moments at which different actors negotiated change and the political leverage of those actors. In line with other recent scholarship (Pribble, 2013; Lavers and Hickey, 2015), we believe we have helped demonstrate the relative advantages of process tracing over configurational, statistical or experimental methods. Discourse analysis further allowed us to reflect upon differences between the public presentation of motivations and how these were interpreted by citizens. We suggest that combining two strands of discursive institutionalism helped provide a richer picture regarding the positioning of ideas and the relative power of different actors to shape public and policy dialogue (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Schmidt, 2002). We found that perception-based evidence from citizens through survey and interview data helped ground claims regarding citizen-state relations. While we acknowledge shortcomings of sample size, we believe this still demonstrated some advantages over simply employing small samples of interviews and focus groups, as has been more common practice.

In chapter 4, we provided an assessment of the political, economic and discursive context the Morales government inherited in 2005. We reviewed the origins of resource nationalist discourse related to the capture of economic surplus. We showed that there was a consistent relationship between struggles with transnational actors to capture rent and crises which, in turn, triggered transitions between political settlements and realignments of class interests. We argued that Katarist discourse and ayllu communitarian social norms provided a macro-frame for the introduction and expansion of cash transfers under President Morales. We then considered the introduction of emergency social assistance via job creation initiatives under structural adjustment and assessed the links between privatisation of the gas sector and the introduction of a universal social pension. We emphasised the increasing interdependence of
gas rent and social protection, expressed through the programme-level nodal point of “social
capitalization.” We showed how President Sánchez de Lozada resisted loan conditionalities
from IFIs by introducing a social pension, but also resisted pressures from the labour movement
which opposed pension reform, noting that normative concerns regarding how dividends were to
be shared were more important than previously acknowledged.

We then assessed the use of the social pension in elections and how fiscal constraints and
opposing normative ideas drove policy retrenchment. We considered the bureaucratic origins of
targeted CCTs and showed that these failed to materialise as national programmes partly due to
fiscal constraints. We then examined how increased political competition contributed to a
resurgence of caudillo politics and populism. Finally, we reappraised the role of IFI
conditionalities and institutional crises in raising resource nationalist pressures for rent capture
and redistribution. We found that conditionalities from IFIs forced President Sánchez de Lozada
to introduce a super-tax (impuestazo) as quid-pro-quo to fund the targeted Works with Jobs
programme, which, in turn, led to the re-emergence of resource nationalism and a gas
referendum which laid the economic foundations for the MAS administration.

In chapter 5, we reappraised the role of discourse in the policy-making process towards
universal cash transfers under President Morales. We argued that three factors were key to the
introduction of cash transfers: a natural resource windfall providing fiscal space, a shift in the
political salience of domestic ideas related to universalism and redistribution, and a populist
appeal to broad, largely unorganised, constituencies. We found that debt forgiveness
significantly diminished the influence of IFIs, and a price windfall enabled fiscal space to expand
programmes nationally. We saw how resource nationalist and egalitarian ideas from the MAS
heartlands coalesced into a nodal point of redistributing the surplus (redistribución del
excedente), which provided the key frame to justify universalism and rent hypothecation for all
three cash transfers.

We showed that the role of IFIs and bureaucrats was limited to putting policy ideas on the table,
and civil society pressure played a surprisingly restricted role. While civil society pressure was
important to rent capture prior to the Morales administration, contrary to past scholarship (Anria
and Niedzwiecki, 2014; Daroca Oller, 2016; Paz Arauco, 2018), we showed that civil society
played no clear role in advocating for the hypothecation of rent for cash transfers or in policy
design or approval. Alongside rent capture and the political salience of redistributive and
egalitarian ideas, the universal scope of programmes is also explained by Morales’ blending of programmatic and charismatic linkage strategies to appeal to broad, largely unorganised constituencies, within a framework of national unity.

In chapter 6, we examined the expansion of cash transfer programmes during President Morales’ second term. We found that the influence of IFIs and government bureaucrats declined further during the period of programme expansion, but civil society influence on the social pension from unions increased slightly. We argued that institutional differences between the two CCTs and the social pension had a bearing on expansion, as clearer formal rules allowed pensioners to claim their rights in line with legal guarantees, and their greater mobilisation capacity allowed them the opportunity to claim these rights. On the other hand, as the CCTs were introduced and expanded by decree, expansion was directly linked to the President and his personal conviction, and thus had a less secure institutional basis for expansion, and a weaker organisational platform to make rights-claims. However, contrary to the power resources literature (O’Connor and Olsen, 1998), we found weak support for the argument that unions were necessarily a progressive force, with claims driven as much by corporatism as a push for equal rights. Comparing commitments across a longer period, we did not find a strong connection between elections and cash transfer improvements. However, we showed that elections did provide some impetus to increase commitment, aided in part, by social mobilisation in the case of the social pension.

In chapter 7, we considered the socio-political effects of Bolivia’s universal cash transfer programmes. Despite a language of rights in the President’s communicative discourse, our survey and interview evidence showed that cash transfer recipients had poor knowledge and understanding of their entitlements and commonly associated transfer provision with a patron. Morales’ charismatic linkage strategy involved substantial efforts to present himself as a moral leader and benefactor (Stefanoni 2007; Durana, 2010). As a result, Bolivians more commonly viewed programmes as gifts, help or assistance granted by a generous, kind and compassionate leader rather than as rights or entitlements.

Despite high levels of citizen mobilisation more generally, we found little evidence that this had translated into collective rights-claiming within the cash transfer programmes through citizen-led forms of accountability, with poor evidence of solidarity either among beneficiaries or between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. State-led forms of accountability were weak and
unresponsive citizen-state interface contributed to low levels of confidence in the provision of state services. Socio-political effects were generally disappointing. Survey evidence showed that programmes may have contributed to increased expectations from the state for financial support and an increased sense of fairness in the distribution of income. This ostensibly reflects a principle of equality (Rawls 1971; Rawls, 2005). However, we found that the political dividends of the programmes accrued chiefly to the President and there was limited evidence that programmes made a difference to levels of confidence and trust in local authorities and service providers. As such, the thesis casts serious doubts on readings that cash transfers constituted “rightful claims” for the distribution of natural resource wealth (McGuire, 2013; Ferguson, 2015; Postero, 2017) or that cash transfers have made a strong contribution to rights-based citizen-state relations in this case.

The findings in this thesis have wider implications for the political economy of cash transfers in similar contexts in relation to fiscal constraints, domestic ideas, political linkage and the meaning of cash transfers. In the following section we will draw out these implications, revisiting comparisons between the Morales and Sánchez de Lozada governments and also with Mongolia and Zambia over the same period.

i) Re-examining Fiscal Constraints

Fiscal constraints and opportunities remain a key factor for the expansion of social policy commitment (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007; Haggard and Kaufman, 2008), and this is particularly the case in natural resource dependent countries where there is greater sensitivity to fluctuations in international commodity prices, especially when rents are hypothecated to social policy interventions. We argued that in Bolivia an increase in the price of gas exports was the most important factor that enabled fiscal space, this was harnessed through rent taxes (Mosley and Abdulai, 2016), and supported by debt relief (Fundación Jubileo, 2013). We argued that price windfalls were not merely a facilitating factor, but directly influenced a change in policy scope towards universalism when the Bono Juancito Pinto was designed in mid-2006. Hypothecating hydrocarbons rent became the primary means to fund the three cash transfers thereafter, and the relative stability of this revenue under Morales’ administrations helped to explain why the scale of expansion was possible and also sustainable. Indeed, the instability of hypothecated gas revenue due to lower taxes and low commodity prices alongside high foreign debt
payments helps to explain why the national scale social pension was not consistently sustained under Presidents Sánchez de Lozada and Banzer.

Variation in rent capture may partly explain differences in policy adoption, expansion and retrenchment in natural resource dependent countries (see Hujo, 2015; Mosley and Abdulai, 2016). Comparing Mongolia and Zambia, we find similar efforts to hypothecate natural resource rent for social policy expenditures, but with more erratic price fluctuations in copper than natural gas and less effective tax collection than in Bolivia, we find more unstable outcomes. In Mongolia, under pressure from multilateral banks, a steep fall in copper prices in 2009 triggered a proposed reintroduction of targeting in the CMP in 2010 and 2018 (Fritz, 2014; Kidd, 2018). We showed that it also relied on mining companies pre-paying royalties, an IMF bailout, and a recovery of copper prices before a universal programme could be reintroduced in 2010 (Ortiz et al. 2015; Yeung and Howes, 2015). In Zambia, with lower rent capture due to less effective tax recovery and a fall in copper prices, the potential role of hypothecation was less significant (Simpasa et al. 2013). Social protection spending increases overall were proportional and did not increase until after the recovery of copper rents (Chikwanda, 2012–2015, Mutati, 2016), which suggests these rents helped change the landscape of affordability even during an economic downturn (McCord, 2009: 4; Habasonda, 2009; Siachiwena, 2017).

Applying proxies of fiscal constraint such as changes in foreign debt levels or budget balance as a proportion of GDP helps to explain medium to long-term changes in welfare effort (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007; Haggard and Kaufman, 2008) and the Bolivia case shows that commodity prices and foreign debt relief had a direct influence on the fiscal balance and foreign debt. However, given the volatility of revenue, medium to long-term trends are less important than short-term commodity price shocks or windfalls which trigger shifts in the bargaining power of national and international stakeholders to influence policy choices. While in Bolivia, price windfalls provided a window of opportunity to scale up coverage and ignore the recommendations of IFIs to target cash transfers, in Mongolia price declines provided a window of opportunity for multilateral donors to pressure the government to scale down coverage (Fritz, 2014; Kidd, 2018). Therefore, we argue it is important for scholars to take a closer look at these moments of acute fiscal contraction to help explain policy shifts in other similar contexts.
**ii) Reappraising Domestic Ideas**

Secondly, the thesis argued that greater attention should be paid to domestic ideas in understanding the adoption and scale up of cash transfer programmes in a natural resource dependent context. We argued that paradigmatic normative ideas may be especially important and not simply within the context of aspiring developmental coalitions which have greater latitude to promote national values (Lavers, 2016a, 2016b). We showed that effective rent capture enables greater policymaking autonomy and more ambitious programme scope, but proposals must also be considered appropriate and desirable by policy-makers and their political bases.

Various scholars have advanced the argument that transnational ideas and actors play a major role in social protection reform (Leisering, 2009; Lavers and Hickey, 2015; Pruce and Hickey, 2017; Hickey and Seekings, 2017) and have helpfully drawn attention to the potential importance of transnational policy coalitions. However, Bolivia’s relative fiscal autonomy under Morales, achieved largely from hypothecating a gas price windfall and debt relief, provided a context for domestic ideas to flourish.

Comparing the Sánchez de Lozada and Morales administrations shows that differences in fiscal liquidity and normative ideas regarding how rent should be distributed and to whom were the two factors which had the most significant bearing on whether cash transfers were adopted and sustained. Previous Bolivian scholarship failed to acknowledge the role of ideas, even as part of a causal package, with some scholars arguing that normative ideas and concomitant legitimacy considerations were simply unimportant (Weyland, 2006: 9 – 11, 39). While normative appeals from international actors were not persuasive for either administration, we demonstrated that normative ideas and legitimacy considerations from domestic actors were vital. Indeed, while we acknowledge the need for fit between normative ideas and empirical evidence for how to address specific problems (Lavers and Hickey, 2015), the Bolivia case clearly shows that normative considerations of politicians were far more important than technical arguments of bureaucrats in making decisions regarding the scale and scope of benefits. The fact that bureaucrats themselves acknowledged their limited capacity to promote targeting demonstrated this clearly.
Our evidence showed that paradigmatic normative ideas of domestic origin related to redistribution and equality through the nodal point to redistribute the surplus (redistribución del excedente) was a key driver of change under President Morales. This framed calls for universalism and justified rent hypothecation both at programme level in the National Development Plan and at policy level. A shift in the political salience of these ideas in the first year of Morales’ administration was argued to be the missing link to explain why Bolivia adopted universal rather than targeted cash transfer programmes. We also found that the introduction of the universal social pension under President Sánchez de Lozada was partly due to normative considerations regarding who should benefit, and to concerns related to corruption from targeted programmes. What differed were ideas of citizenship and ownership. President Sánchez de Lozada saw constituents as ‘shareholders (MNR, 2002: 81)’ whereas President Morales saw Bolivians as owners of natural resource wealth.

In Zambia, we saw that there was a strong transnational policy coalition supporting the scale up of the SCT (Pruce and Hickey, 2017) and in Mongolia there was a strong transnational policy coalition against the scale up of the CMP (Fritz, 2014). Domestically, we saw that the normative ideas of Zambian Finance Minister Ng’andu Magande were consistently argued to be a key impediment to the expansion of the SCT, but a targeted vision cohered with the ideas of other political elites (Harland, 2011; Cherrier, 2013; Siachiwena, 2016; Pruce and Hickey, 2017). While the role of societal values in Mongolia remains underexplored, the available evidence suggests that normative ideas of universalism shaped the scope of the CMP, and that the government was most open to the cognitive policy ideas of IFIs in favour of targeting only when facing severe fiscal constraints (Fritz, 2014; Yeung and Howes, 2015). The durability of these universalist ideas also helps to explain why subsequent governments may have maintained a universal child benefit, even while under severe pressure from IFIs to target benefits during an economic downturn (Hodges et al., 2007; Gelders, 2015; Kidd, 2018).

**iii) Reconsidering Political Linkages**

The fact that two strongly contrasting political regimes in Bolivia both introduced universal programmes presents a challenge for scholarship. Under President Sánchez de Lozada, we found a right-wing party ideology and a competitive clientelist political settlement. Under President Morales we saw a left-wing party ideology and a dominant party-political settlement. Sánchez de Lozada faced significant electoral competition and Morales faced few credible
electoral threats. The default position to explain Bolivia’s choice therefore has been to assert that leaders simply responded to electoral incentives, which were seen to cut across party ideology and regime type (Gray Molina, Pérez de Rada, and Yañez; 1999; Aponte, 2007; Müller, 2009, 2014; McGuire, 2013).

We argued that higher levels of political competition and concomitant electoral incentives may contribute to programme expansion. However, these were complementary rather than central factors in the design phase of the two CCTs or the scale up of the social pension. We found evidence that cash transfers were used as instruments of political branding in electoral periods under both Sánchez de Lozada and Morales administrations, as has been documented in a variety of contexts (Hamer, 2015a, 2015b; Grebe, 2015; Miorelli, 2016; Fritz, 2014; Siachiwena, 2017). Yet, in Bolivia, electoral periods acted more as punctuation marks than triggers in themselves, as we showed that the majority of changes, and many of the most significant changes, happened during non-electoral periods.

Presidents Sánchez de Lozada and Morales both hypothesized the same source of rent. Both appealed to broad and loosely organised constituencies through the provision of universal programmes. Yet, they referenced different normative ideas and notions of citizenship to justify universalism. While other social assistance programmes such as Work with Jobs entailed a narrowly targeted clientelist linkage strategy to temporarily appease the urban poor, in presenting Bolivian citizens as shareholders of capitalized resources, President Sánchez de Lozada was obliged to deliver benefits to all, as dividends. Thus, the Bonosol social pension relied at least, in part, on a programmatic linkage strategy which was also designed to bolster the image of the MNR as fighting corruption and on charismatic lines (in reverse) to help Sánchez de Lozada shed his negative image.

President Morales’ electoral platform focused on redistributing the surplus from hydrocarbons, and through a resource nationalist lens, Bolivian citizens were presented as the owners of natural resource wealth. This was underpinned by communitarian ideas of universalism, which meant that Morales also had significant incentives to distribute benefits to all. Cash transfers were a means to deliver on promises of egalitarian redistribution and to bolster the Presidents’ positive image as a moral and generous leader. So, both Presidents shifted away from clientelist linkage strategies towards a synthesis of programmatic and charismatic linkages. This shows that what matters is not simply the predominant linkage strategy employed (Pribble,
2013: 33), but changes in the combination and balance of appeals to different political constituencies.

When comparing findings with other natural resource dependent countries which scaled up cash transfers, we saw that populist strategy was a common feature during the period of study (Hunter et al. 2010; Resnick, 2014; Fritz, 2014). However, we saw differences in the combination of political linkage strategies employed and a shift between strategies employed. In Zambia, we found that the FISP scandal, which was underpinned by a clientelist linkage strategy, generated incentives to use the SCT as part of a programmatic linkage strategy to appeal to the population as a whole but in a way that was also designed to bolster President Sata’s image and that of his successor as generous leaders (Siachiwena, 2017). On the other hand, in Mongolia we saw that electoral competition generated incentives to pursue short-term clientelist linkage strategies through cash transfers, yet in non-electoral periods, programmatic linkage strategies and a concomitant commitment to universal programmes predominated. This therefore suggests that both programmatic and charismatic linkage may, in fact, be associated with the continuation of programmes over the medium term, whereas clientelist strategies remain associated with short-term and impermanent commitment (Pribble, 2013: 36).

iv) Rights or Patronage?

For the study period (2005 – 2014), Bolivia had exceptionally high levels of social mobilisation and public protest and a left-wing government in office. It should thus be a case most likely to have seen the materialisation of claims for “rightful shares (Ferguson, 2015).” However, the evidence presented in this thesis shows that the introduction and expansion of cash transfers continue to reflect a politics of patronage more than a politics of rights.

Past scholarship has focused on legal guarantees as a proxy for rights-based social protection (Barrientos and Pellissery, 2013; Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2017; Ayliffe et al. 2018). While these are a necessary component for rights-claims, they are only important for citizen-state contracts insofar as citizens know and understand their rights and entitlements. The Bolivia case demonstrates that this should not be taken for granted.

While social mobilisation is also an important proxy of rights-claims, we argue that its influence as a progressive force was poorly founded in this case. Bolivia had exceptionally high levels of social mobilisation, and under the Morales administration there were tight links between the
government and labour and peasant organisations. This ought to have translated into a prominent role for civil society both in securing resources and policy design, as had been argued previously (Anria and Niedzwiecki, 2014; Daroca Oller, 2016; Paz Arauco, 2018). However, we found that civil society played a very minor role in the design of the cash transfer programmes, and contrary to Ferguson’s (2015) suggestion, we found little evidence of civil society actors making rights claims for a share of natural resource wealth by advocating for cash transfers, only an implicit understanding stemming from general redistributive appeals from the Gas War in 2003. We showed that introduction and expansion of universal cash transfers was not an inevitable outcome from this crisis.

Civil society organisations were either absent or played an ambiguous role in policy design. In the two CCTs, we found no evidence of social mobilisation or collective action from civil society nationally to claim their rights to social protection. This was partly because recipients did not evidently see themselves as ‘members of anything (Mahon, 2009: 7),’ and as the CCTs were introduced by presidential decree, many recipients associated programmes with Presidential grace rather than as legal entitlements. In the social pension, while we did not find strong evidence to support claims regarding the role of civil society beyond resource mobilisation (Daroca Oller, 2016), social mobilisation and collective claims for higher benefits increased towards the end of Morales’ second term, many years after legal guarantees had been put in place. Variation in outcomes related to programme improvements between the social pension and CCTs demonstrates that differences in legal guarantees and levels of social mobilisation appear make a difference in terms of whether citizens make collective claims for improved benefits.

However, we found that claims made by labour organisations were not universalistic or clearly based on notions of a “social minimum” geared towards the benefit of the least advantaged members of society to equalise social starting positions, as per notions of a rights-based contract (Rawls, 1971; Rawls, 1985: 32; Rawls, 2005; Leisering and Barrientos, 2013). Instead, claims for pension improvements were typically corporatist and often regressive. Progressive proposals for a social minimum arose from the Morales government rather than the labour movement. This therefore ought to trigger reflection regarding the role of the labour movement in promoting inclusive and equitable social assistance.
Citizen-state interface through accountability mechanisms should constitute a mediator to build trust in the state, such as service providers and local authorities (Ayliffe et al. 2018). In Bolivia, not only did citizen mobilisation fail to translate into a strong role for civil society in cash transfer policy design or expansion, it also failed to materialise through citizen oversight of the cash transfer programmes which might contribute to the exercise of citizenship through full programme participation (see Marshall, 1950; Leisering and Barrientos, 2013). In general, we found that Bolivian citizens were poorly informed about their rights and entitlements, they did not participate actively in programme decision-making or oversight and feedback mechanisms were ineffective. State-led forms of accountability were thin and weak, and the unresponsiveness of thicker forms of informal accountability processes may even have led to a decline in levels of trust in the state. We therefore suggest that accountability mechanisms have a limited effect on citizen-state relations, except where citizenship is an explicit goal and where considerable efforts are made to ensure these mechanisms are responsive to citizens’ concerns (Adato et al., 2016; Ayliffe et al. 2018; Evans et al. 2018).

The potential for cash transfers to improve citizen-state relations is significantly impeded when programme provision is closely associated with a patron (Ferguson, 2015: 26, 162). While we agree that political commitment for social protection ought to represent a contract between states and citizens, extended to the poorest groups in society as part of a project of redistributive justice (Hickey, 2007, 2009, 2011), the evidence uncovered in this case suggests that politician-citizen linkages superseded state-citizen linkages. In Bolivia, articulated commitment to rightful ownership, redistribution and social justice through the President’s communicative discourse was insufficient to convince recipients, as they struggled to disentangle impersonal rights from personalised presentation of these rights. As a result, we saw that the political dividends from the programmes failed to extend beyond the President and thus did not translate into wider effects such as an increased trust in local authorities and service providers.

Extending Durana’s argument (2010), we demonstrated that citizens’ perceptions of cash transfers in Bolivia appeared to be driven more by affective associations with a charismatic leader than by formal rules and entitlements within programmes. While we found evidence the cash transfers may have contributed to increased expectations from the state and perceptions of fairness related to the distribution of income, this distribution was not viewed through the lens of entitlement. Cash transfers contributed to Presidential popularity and voting preferences.
(Household Survey, 2014; IPSOS MORI, 2006 – 2014; Layton and Smith, 2011). Yet, they were rarely perceived in a way that could be categorised as ‘rightful allocation due to a rightful owner (Ferguson, 2015: 178).’ Instead, we found consistent evidence that Bolivians were more likely to view cash transfers as generous help or gifts, associated with relations of patronage. Plausible claims have been made that cash transfers are perceived as generous help or gifts rather than rights in both Mongolia and Zambia (Fritz, 2014; Yeung and Howes, 2015; Pruce and Hickey, 2017). So, it seems likely that these perceptions represent the default position, rather the exception to the rule in this context.

**v) Implications for Further Research**

These findings have a number of implications for further research. Firstly, in line with recent developments employing discursive institutionalism (Lavers and Hickey, 2015; Miorelli, 2017), we believe that there is a need for further research employing an ideational lens to unearth the potential role of discourse as a causal factor for the introduction and expansion of social protection. For natural resource dependent countries such as Mongolia, on one side of the debate, an overwhelming emphasis on political interests obfuscates the role of ideas (Fritz, 2014; Yeung and Howes, 2015). On the other side, accounts which reference the role of societal values have failed to substantiate these empirically (Hodges et al., 2007; Gelders, 2015). Employing a more explicit ideational lens may help show more clearly how such values may have influenced policy choices.

These shortcomings also point to a gap in comparable cases to empirically substantiate claims related to the perceived meaning of programmes. While the claim that cash transfers are perceived as gifts rather than rights is plausible in both Mongolia and Zambia (Fritz, 2014; Yeung and Howes, 2015; Pruce and Hickey, 2017), given the primary unit of analysis of this scholarship, such claims are unsupported by perception data from programme recipients. In Mongolia, this data gap has contributed to a schism between scholarship which labels the CMP clientelistic (Fritz, 2014; Yeung and Howes, 2015) or rights-based (Hodges et al., 2007; Gelders, 2015) over the same period. This perception-based data might be gathered through the adaptation of household surveys (e.g. Sant Maral Foundation, 2009 – 2016) and also through a larger sample of focus group and interview data.
It would also be fruitful to compare perceptions across different contexts where different political linkage mechanisms have been employed, as Pribble (2013) has done in upper-middle income countries in Latin America. This would allow us to make more explicit connections between citizens’ perceptions of programme meaning and recipients’ propensity to support governments (see Layton and Smith, 2011; Kligsberg and Novacovsky, 2015; Jones et al. 2013, 2016). Where political linkage strategies are clientelistic and are perceived by citizens to rely on voting reciprocity, such as in the early years of Mongolia’s CMP (Jackson et al. 2011; Fritz, 2014), Yemen’s Social Welfare Fund (Hamad and Pavanello, 2012), the Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme (Bagash et al. 2012), Kenya’s OVC-CT (Awortwi, 2017) or Ghana’s LEAP CCT (Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2017), recipients did not view programmes as entitlements. Where programmes rely heavily on local brokers such as in Sierra Leone’s SSN (Osofisan 2011a), Peru’s Juntos programme (Jones et al., 2007; Arroyo, 2010; Molyneux and Thomson, 2011) or Mozambique’s Basic Subsidy Programme (Selvester et al. 2012), citizens typically viewed programmes as being politicised, potentially contingent, and requiring reciprocity. While this suggests an emerging trend, the quality of this data is mixed and more comparable perception data across cases would allow scholars to ground judgements more effectively.

A third area for further study is related to social accountability mechanisms. So far, scholarship has focused predominantly on theory-building (Hickey and King, 2015; Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2017; Ayliffe et al. 2018), and we suggest there is need for further empirical study. The thesis found that citizen-state interface was weak in each of the cash transfer programmes in Bolivia and thus had an ambiguous effect on citizens’ sense of trust in public service provision and on citizen-state relations. Efforts have been made recently to identify positive outlier cases which show more promising effects on citizen-state relations (Adato et al., 2016; Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2017; Evans et al. 2018). It is worth identifying programmes which stress citizen-driven efforts for accountability, and the role of donors to support these efforts. The governments of the Dominican Republic (Progresando con Solidaridad), Tanzania (TASAF), El Salvador (Red Solidaria) and Egypt (Takaful and Karama), for example, all received substantial technical and financial support from the World Bank to introduce more comprehensive accountability mechanisms in cash transfer programmes. This seems a promising line of enquiry to help understand the degree to which these more comprehensive mechanisms may have promoted greater state responsiveness and thus greater potential to increase citizens’ sense of trust in the state.
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(05/10/12). Supreme Decree 1372.
(02/10/13). Supreme Decree 1748.
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BS4. (15/10/14). “Presidente Evo Morales comenzó con la entrega del Bono Juancito Pinto-Bolivia,” available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lx-sLHSD_w0 [accessed 02/04/15].

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BS6. (16/05/13). “Evo Morales Promulga Ley 378 en Beneficio de Adultos Mayores,” available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=byze_ni1a0I [accessed 09/05/18].

Interviews Conducted

Government Representatives

BG1: Director, Bono Juana Azurduy Technical Unit, La Paz, 20/03/13.
BG2: Senior Advisor, Bono Juana Azurduy Technical Unit, La Paz, 24/02/14.
BG3: Director, Bono Juancito Pinto Technical Unit, La Paz, 24/02/14.
BG4: Senior Analyst, Renta Dignidad, UDAPE Technical Unit, La Paz, 20/01/14.
BG5: Senior Analyst, Bono Juana Azurduy, UDAPE Technical Unit, La Paz, 13/01/14.
BG6: Senior Analyst, Bono Juancito Pinto, UDAPE Technical Unit, La Paz, 26/02/14.
BG7: Senior Researcher, Vice-presidency, La Paz, 18/03/13.
BG8: Hydrocarbons Minister, La Paz, 28/11/13.
BG9: Director, Central Bank, La Paz, La Paz, 11/11/13.
BG10: Board Member, Central Bank, La Paz, 23/01/14.
BG11: Director, Extreme Poverty Programme, La Paz, 21/03/13.
BG12: Decentralisation Minister, La Paz, 20/03/13.
BG13: Director, Health Centre, District 7, El Alto, 17/03/14.
BG14: Director, Health Centre, District 14, El Alto, 17/04/14.
BG15: Headteacher, District 14, El Alto, 06/05/14.
BG16: Headteacher, District 7, El Alto, 04/05/14.
BG17: Doctor, District 7, El Alto, 06/05/14.
BG18: Doctor, District 14, El Alto, 06/05/14.
BG19: Senior Official, Sub-Mayoralty, District 14, El Alto, 17/02/14.
BG20: Senior Official, Sub-Mayoralty, District 7, El Alto, 05/02/14.
BG21: Vice-President, Central Bank, La Paz, 10/12/13.
BG22: Director, National Food and Nutrition Council, La Paz, 20/03/13.
BG23: Consultant, Bono Juana Azurduy, La Paz, 01/10/10.
BG24: Senior Analyst, Central Bank, La Paz, 03/02/14.
BG25: Treasury Minister, La Paz, 25/10/13.
BG26: Statistics Expert, National Statistics Institute, La Paz, 03/02/14.

Organisations (NGOs, CSOs, think tanks, universities, multilaterals)

BO1: Think Tank Representative, La Paz, 24/01/14.
BO2: Think Tank Representative, La Paz, 11/11/13.
BO3: Journalist, La Paz, 21/03/13.
BO4: Think Tank Director, La Paz, 15/03/13.
BO5: Consultant social protection system, La Paz, 19/03/13.
BO6: Consultant *Bono Juana Azurduy* programme, La Paz, 07/10/10.
BO7: Senior Researcher, United Nations, La Paz, 25/02/14.
BO8: University Professor, La Paz, 21/03/13.
BO9: Think Tank Representative, La Paz, 24/10/13.
BO10: Think Tank Representative, La Paz, 24/10/13.
BO11: Think Tank Director, La Paz, 22/01/14.
BO12: Head, Neighbourhood Committee and *Bono Juana Azurduy* and *Bono Juancito Pinto* recipient household, District 14, El Alto, 19/02/14.
BO13: Head, School Committee and *Bono Juancito Pinto* recipient household, District 7, El Alto, 16/04/14.
BO14: University Researcher, District 14, 30/01/14.
BO15: NGO Representative and *Bono Juana Azurduy Pinto* recipient, District 7, El Alto, 04/02/14.
BO16: Think Tank Representative, La Paz, 11/11/13.
BO17: University Professor, La Paz, 19/03/13.
BO18: Multilateral Donor Representative, La Paz, 21/01/14.
BO19: Think Tank Representative, La Paz, 22/03/13.
BO20: ILO Country Coordinator, La Paz, 02/04/14.

**El Alto Residents**

EAR1: *Bono Juana Azurduy* Recipient, District 7, El Alto, 16/03/14.
EAR2: *Bono Juana Azurduy* Recipient, District 7, El Alto, 04/03/14.
EAR3: *Bono Juana Azurduy* Recipient, District 7, El Alto, 12/03/14.
EAR4: *Bono Juana Azurduy* Recipient, District 7, El Alto, 04/03/14.
EAR5: *Bono Juana Azurduy* Recipient, District 7, El Alto, 16/03/14.
EAR6: *Bono Juana Azurduy* Recipient, District 14, El Alto, 04/03/14.
EAR7: *Bono Juana Azurduy* Recipient, District 14, El Alto, 16/03/14.
EAR8: Bono Juana Azurduy Recipient, District 14, El Alto, 04/04/14.
EAR9: Bono Juana Azurduy Recipient, District 14, El Alto, 12/03/14.
EAR10: Bono Juana Azurduy Recipient, District 14, El Alto, 16/03/14.
EAR11: Bono Juana Azurduy Recipient, District 7, 16/04/14.
EAR12: Renta Dignidad Recipient, District 7, El Alto, 05/03/14.
EAR13: Renta Dignidad Recipient, District 14, El Alto, 04/03/14.
EAR14: Renta Dignidad Recipient, District 14, El Alto, 05/03/14.
EAR15: Renta Dignidad Recipient, District 14, El Alto, 05/03/14.
EAR16: Renta Dignidad Recipient, District 7, El Alto, 03/03/14.
EAR17: Renta Dignidad Recipient, District 14, 02/03/14.

FGD1: Focus Group (x12), including 3 recipients of Bono Juana Azurduy and 7 recipients of Bono Juancito Pinto, El Alto, 03/04/14.

El Alto Survey Respondents
Household Survey (February – March 2014), 157 respondents.
## Annex 1: Survey Instrument

### Demographics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>1. What is your name?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Area       | 2. a. Where do you live?  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. How long have you lived here in the district?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1. In the district  
| 2. In another district/municipality (specify)  
| 3. Outside the country |
| 1 2 3 4 5 5+ years |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>3. Do you consider yourself male or female?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Male       | Female  
| Other      |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>4. What is the first language you learned to speak in childhood?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Spanish  
| 2. Quechua  
| 3. Aymara  
| 4. Guaraní  
| 5. Another native language (specify)  
| 6. Foreign language |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>5. How old are you?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil status</th>
<th>6. What is your civil status?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[for those above 12 years of age]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1. Single  
| 2. Married  
| 3. Cohabiting  
| 4. Separated  
| 5. Divorced  
| 6. Widowed |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family structure</th>
<th>7. Do you have any children? If so, how many children do you have?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Total           | Male  
| Female          |

| Education level | 8. a. Do you know how to read?  
|-----------------|-------------------------------|
|                 | b. What was your highest level of education?  
|                 | c. If you have children, do they attend school regularly? (e.g. 4/5 days a week)  
|                 | d. If not, why? |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literate</th>
<th>Attends regularly (4/5 days):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Yes      | No  
| 1. None  
| 2. Literacy training  
| 3. Pre-school (1 – 2 years) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old system</th>
<th>Why not:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Lack of money</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Basic (1 – 5 years)</td>
<td>2. Due to work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Intermediate (1 – 3 years)</td>
<td>3. Illness/accident/disability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Medium (1 – 4 years)</td>
<td>4. Distance from school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Primary (1 – 8 years)</td>
<td>5. Lack of interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Secondary (1 – 4 years)</td>
<td>6. Housework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current system</strong></td>
<td>7. Other (specify)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Primary (1 – 6 years)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Secondary (1 – 6 years)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Adult education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Higher education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Issues</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concerns</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. What are the main challenges your family has faced in the last few years?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(max. 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Low income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Health issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Accidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Other (specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Coping strategies</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10. a. What do you do when you have financial problems?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Who do you go to if you have financial problems?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Go into debt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sell goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Eat less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Take kids out of school to work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Seek access to credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Other (specify)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Grandparents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Uncles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Lender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Other (specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Health insurance</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11. Are you registered under any of the following health insurance schemes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. SUMI (Universal Maternal Infant Health Insurance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. SSPAM (Older Persons’ Health Insurance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. CNS (National Health Insurance/Private Bank Insurance/State Bank/COSSMIL/University Insurance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Government Health Insurance/ Departmental or Municipal Health Insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Private insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Other (specify)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Social security</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12. Do you contribute to a pension (AFP)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes [ ] No [ ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Employment</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment status</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. a. In the last week, did you work for at least one hour?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. If so, what was your occupation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes [ ] No [ ]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Income</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level and sources of income</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. a. How much income do you receive?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. What are your most important sources of income? (max 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15. Do you have a written contract?

**Contract:** Yes ☐  No ☐

**Cash transfers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
<th>16. In the last 12 months has your family benefitted from Renta Dignidad, Bono Juana Azurduy, or Juancito Pinto?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Renta Dignidad ☐</td>
<td>Bono Juana Azurduy ☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Meaning**

17. If you received a cash transfer, what does it mean to you?

|------------------|---------------------------------------------|

**Objective**

18. a. Do you know the objective(s) of the cash transfers?  
    b. If so, what are they?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>1. Right 2. Gift 3. Help 4. Other (specify)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Changes**

19. How is your situation after receiving the cash transfer?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Changes</th>
<th>Much better</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Worse</th>
<th>Much worse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Impact**

20. a. What contribution does the cash transfer make to your family?  
    b. Approximately, what proportion of your monthly income does the cash transfer represent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Very much</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Little</th>
<th>Very little</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Proportion:** %

**Use**

21. What do you spend the money on?

|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------|

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>22. The [cash transfer] amount is enough to…?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------|

**Improvements**

23. How do you believe the cash transfers should be improved?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Improvements</th>
<th>1. Increase the amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
2. Improve connection with other services
3. Introduce reference systems
4. Hiring social workers
5. Others (specify)

### Citizenship and cash transfers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State legitimacy</th>
<th>24. a. What do you expect from the state?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. What priorities should political parties have? (top 3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Financial support
2. Services
3. Subsidies
4. Political representation
5. Other (specify)

### Trust in the state

| 25. a. How much confidence do you have that the state will respond to your interests? |
| b. Do you think this has improved or not under this government? |

- Complete
- A lot
- Some
- A little
- None
- Much better
- Better
- Same
- Worse
- Much worse

### Social mobilisation

| 26. Are you part of a union, collective other civic group? |
| Organisation: |
| Yes | No |

### Income distribution

| 27. a. Do you think income distribution in this country is fair? |
| b. Do you think this has improved or not under this government? |

- Fair:
- Yes
- No
- Improved:
- Yes
- No

### Discrimination and social exclusion

| 28. a. Do you think discrimination and exclusion is a problem in the country? |
| b. Do you think this has improved or not under this government? |

- Problem:
- Yes
- No
- Improved:
- Yes
- No
Annex 2: Characteristics of Survey Respondents

This annex examines key characteristics of the survey respondents, comparing them with census data on five demographic indicators most closely related to cash transfer programmes:

**Figure 39. Characteristics of Survey Respondents El Alto Northern Zone**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>2012 Census (El Alto)</th>
<th>2014 El Alto Sample (n=157)</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literacy (n=157)</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>+1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language (n=155)</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed (n=154)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>+3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social security (n=142)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child school attendance (n=89)</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>-9.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Bolivian National Statistics Institute (2012); household survey (February – March 2014)*

For many key demographic indicators (literacy, ethnic identification, employment, and school attendance) our sample is very similar to the census. Higher literacy levels can be explained by a slight oversampling of teachers (10.1% of respondents vs. 7.5% in the census). Lower levels of Spanish language can be explained by periurban location and higher than average levels of migration from the department of La Paz. We would anticipate higher levels of unemployment and lower levels of social security coverage in poorer periurban neighbourhoods. Likewise, lower school attendance is likely explained due to a difference in the question asked. The main demographic difference is an over-sampling of men. 70% of respondents were men. Men are typically household heads and are thus more likely to speak on behalf of households. To account for this oversampling in the survey, we focused interviews on women. Of the 23 semi-structured interviews conducted with cash transfer recipients, 15 were with women.

74% of respondents in the survey (n=96) believed a lack of income was their most important problem. Thus, cash transfers were likely to be considered important. 55% of respondents (n=86) were part of cash transfer recipient families. The majority of these (n=80) were recipients of the *Bono Juancito Pinto*. Six respondents were recipients of the *Bono Juana Azurduy*, and three respondents received the *Renta Dignidad*. Across El Alto, using census data, we can

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80 Spanish first language
81 *Caja de Salud* (CNS, COSSMIL, others) or private
82 89 respondents had children of school age.
83 The census asked: “Do you currently attend school?” and our survey added the qualification “regularly.”
estimate that 32% of residents were eligible for the *Bono Juancito Pinto*, 29% were potentially eligible for the *Bono Juana Azurduy*, and 6% were eligible for the *Renta Dignidad* (Bolivian National Statistics Institute, 2012). The great majority (77%) of recipients in both districts felt that their situation was better after the cash transfers, though most respondents felt they made only a small difference; constituting less than 5% of their income (Household Survey, February – March 2014).

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84 This takes the proportion of women between 15 and 40 years rather than the proportion that are pregnant, which is not available from census data.