Part One

Conceptualizing Deleuze
Deleuze’s *Proust and Signs*: The Literary Partial Object

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While Gilles Deleuze infamously described his early work in the history of philosophy as “a sort of buggery,” “making a child behind the back” of other thinkers by using their own words to produce a new and monstrous thought, his 1964 study of the novelist Marcel Proust, *Proust and Signs*, departs from this intraphilosophical procreation to embrace the uniqueness of literary thought. Instead of one philosopher rereading another, a philosopher engages with a novelist to bring out the philosophical implications of literary thought. Deleuze was one of the first readers of Proust to follow the logical chain of thought of *In Search of Lost Time*, arguing that the novel is not about memory or madeleines, but about the apprenticeship of signs. *Proust and Signs* and Proust’s appearance in Deleuze’s subsequent works suggest philosophy’s debt to literary practice, especially related to style, perspective, and a certain violence that “forces us to think” (24).

The first *Proust and Signs*

Deleuze’s fourth book, after *Empiricism and Subjectivity* (1953), *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1962), and *Kant’s Critical Philosophy* (1963), the first edition of *Proust and Signs* proposes a reading of the monumental *In Search of Lost Time* as a complex Bildungsroman. It also, more subtly, offers a new conception of the “sign” that differs radically from the structuralist fashion of the period. Most importantly, *Proust and Signs*, like Deleuze’s previous books, invents its conceptual framework by ventriloquizing another thinker—here this means not reactualizing outdated concepts but inhabiting a complex literary style. At times, *Proust and Signs* approaches Proust’s own level of well-wrought sentences and elaborate metaphors. In the words of Tom Conley, “There is no way of getting around the fact that to consider [Deleuze’s] corpus in the light of literature means that he has to be read as literature, and that time and again the reader must work through the writing with the eye of an artist and the ear of a poet.” The poeticality of *Proust and Signs*, if we follow its own argument, saves Deleuze’s thought from the “abstraction” of philosophical intelligence and introduces a more “profound truth” based on an encounter with another text (25).
Deleuze distinguishes in Proust’s novel four types of signs, each different in content and in kind: the signs of high society, of love, of impressions, and of art. The narrator experiences his apprenticeship of signs over the three-thousand-page novel before he is ready to become a novelist. Only by learning how to read and interpret in succession the empty signs of high society and the deceptive signs of love can he arrive at the understanding and ultimately the creation of art signs, which encompass all the others and lead to a perception of the workings of time. While the vast majority of Proustian criticism focuses on the notion of involuntary memory (a subset of impression signs), and some recent criticism attempts to read Proust against the grain of the novel’s own claims, it remains surprising that the champions of reading Proust’s novel for the narrative it in fact tells would be two philosophers, Deleuze, but also Paul Ricoeur, who brings to the fore Proust’s innovations in narrative time, echoing in many ways Deleuze’s work. Instead of tracing the source of Proust’s ideas and then separating them out of the literary text, Deleuze shows how Proust’s elaborate literary machine produces thought.

Signs in *Proust and Signs* have nothing to do with Saussurian linguistic signs—they are not composed of an arbitrary dyad that could then be confused with the novel’s own writing, as text, or distanced from sensory perception, which escapes language. Instead of a clear presentation of an alternative to semiology, however, Deleuze structures his work as an initiation rite, or perhaps a quest for truth, mirroring Proust’s novel. Truth, Deleuze’s Proust affirms, cannot be reached by disinterested and abstract pondering, but only by the involuntary force of thought, which comes from the passion of encountering difference. The reader, it follows, must also be led by desire, slowly deciphering the signs given by Proust/Deleuze, until the final revelation of the nature of signs only at the end of *In Search of Lost Time* and *Proust and Signs*. Each revelation, about love, time, and essences, leads to the next, and yet the structure relies on the imbrication of specific signs, which cannot be extracted from the text without becoming nearly incomprehensible. Similar to Deleuze’s taxonomy of signs, the “general laws” found scattered throughout Proust’s novel serve as necessary steps in the narrator’s artistic apprenticeship, but often seem unintelligible when taken out of context, leading less diligent readers to conclude that Proust was a poor thinker.

Signs, the reader must infer and accept near the beginning of Deleuze’s work, are simply what call to be interpreted and deciphered—the ability to see the world as made up of signs is a “gift” (37). This open and, at the beginning of the text, implicit definition allows Deleuze to include extralinguistic signs, since anything can provoke the desire to be interpreted. But the trick is that we have to be motivated to distinguish a sign and then want to interpret it. Signs, in this sense, can only be subjective and personal, losing their meaning when communicated to others. Individual signs cannot be objects of philosophical debate, which must focus only on the different categories of signs and how they function. Proust’s novel, by developing the narrator’s sensibility and inviting the reader to share in his interpretation of subjective signs, creates both specific fictional signs and the possibility of understanding their universality.

Proust’s narrator, in his journey from needy mama’s boy to budding novelist, passes through four stages of his apprenticeship, as each new type of sign, or new world of
signs, teaches him about a different aspect of time and subjectivity. While the narrator encounters all four types of signs throughout the novel, Deleuze orders them according to a precise hierarchy, calling them a “dialectical movement” or “dialectique ascendante” after Plato (108). The signs of high society constitute the bottom rung, as they are empty of meaning. A certain surface criticism of Proust and his novel often focuses on snobbery, on an elitism related to what some perceive as the novel’s obsession with high society. Deleuze shows, however, that high society is a unique world of signs (“le monde” meaning both high society and the world) based on exclusion and inclusion. The young apprentice/narrator must learn the secret why an exclusive society admits one person over another. The world of high society turns around itself, emitting ever more signs at an astonishing pace in order to bind together the “ins” and keep the “outs” from cracking the code. The signs of high society take the place of action and thought; they are place holders that project meaning and constancy in order to mask their own emptiness and transience. While these signs are empty, they serve a necessary purpose in the narrator’s apprenticeship because of their “ritual perfection, like a formalism” (13).

Love signs form the second world, or “circle,” of signs. Like the signs of high society, love signs depend upon inclusion and exclusion. The loved one emits signs about a world that lies necessarily outside the perception of the lover, who wishes to understand this world through the interpretation of signs. Falling in love involves “individualizing” someone by the signs they emit by picking the person out of a group or as representative of a place. To love would entail unfolding this secret world through a long deciphering of all the signs offered by the love object. The loved one cannot choose to make the lover part of the world they embody without destroying what crystallized the love in the first place, and so all love signs are necessarily lies. Proust’s novel abounds with examples of this cynical view of love, elaborately explained by Deleuze as stemming from the inevitable separation of the sexes.

The majority of Proust’s readers have mistaken the third type of signs, impressions, or sensitive signs, as the key to the novel’s meaning. The famous madeleine scene, where the taste of a cake dipped in herbal tea causes an intense joy leading to the recovery of childhood memories, overshadows other meaningful nonmnemonic impressions and prevents the narrator (and many readers) from understanding its true significance. Occurring barely 30 or 40 pages into the novel, the madeleine scene can only hint at the final revelation, and so it is not the ultimate truth of the novel. Just as love signs use the love object as a stand-in for a world outside of the lover, the intense pleasure derived from impression signs leads the narrator to search for the origin of the impression in another object. While the madeleine is an involuntary memory that recalls the past of the narrator, not all impression signs relate to the past. The earliest example in the novel occurs when the narrator writes down his impressions of the steeples of Martinville as he rides in a coach. While impression signs lead us to turn toward the object, the truth behind the impression lies within us: “Each sign has two halves: it designates an object, it signifies something different” (PS, 37). Since the object causes the physical sensation of pleasure, our intelligence focuses on this “objectivity” of signs, then compensates by relating it to subjective experience, but the sign points to something greater than either the subject or the object—the “essence.”
Essences only manifest themselves in art signs, because they alone are “immaterial” and thereby exist beyond subject and object (51). All the other signs retain at least a foothold in an object, whereas the sign emitted by a work of art surpasses whatever matter contains it. Art is therefore superior to life in that all signs encountered in life are rooted in the material world, while only art provides access to the “spiritual” (53). Deleuze thus explains Proust’s oft quoted and often misunderstood declaration in _Le Temps retrouvé_ that “true life, life finally discovered and understood, the only life consequently fully lived, is literature.” Literature, and art in general, allow intersubjectivity (PS, 55), a way to live life outside of the “wasted time” or “lost time” of experience as seen through the other three types of signs. The purpose of worldly signs, love signs, and impression signs would be to make us aware of how time is lost, preparing us to search for and create art signs as the only way to escape death: “the only proof [of immortality], the only hope, is esthetic” (57). Essences, as exposed by art signs, allow us to find time in its “pure state,” as eternal, and distinct from the “time regained” of impression signs such as the madeleine, which are only recovered from our own past (59).

Essences, as revealed in art objects, are differences, “the ultimate and absolute Difference” (53). Essences individualize subjects, but are not equivalent to them, since essences express themselves as the common quality between two different objects (61). They envelop themselves in matter, they complicate being, in a manner which Deleuze likens to Leibniz: “In this, Proust is Leibnizien: essences are veritable monads, each one defining itself by the point of view in which it expresses the world, each point of view referring back in turn to an ultimate quality at the heart of the monad” (54). Deleuze continues by explaining that for Leibniz, the point of view is difference itself, having “neither doors nor windows,” an enigmatic phrase that only becomes clearer at the beginning of his book _Leibniz and the Fold_ when he talks about the allegory of the Baroque House, where the soul is enfolded in matter as light from the upper floor of a labyrinthine Baroque building filters down to the lower floor.

While art signs are the only signs capable of teaching the apprentice about essences once this discovery occurs, essences can then be seen incarnated in the other types of signs, akin to the lower floor of the Baroque House. Deleuze brilliantly demonstrates how differences emerge from the “series and groups” of our love objects and society cliques. Art signs, by recuperating time in its pure state, salvage our experiences, even the “emptiness” of high society, from our lost past and uncover, hidden within them, a timeless essence. Thus _In Search of Lost Time_ is not turned toward the past but rather to the future, specifically the future of the narrator as writer.

_Proust and Signs_ in its initial form leads the reader through the same stages of apprenticeship or initiation as the novel’s narrator, in order to argue for a truth in art, especially writing, that would offer us the “image of thought.” Deleuze often uses orientalist metaphors to describe this initiation, such as calling the narrator an “Egyptologist” and the sign a “hieroglyph”; while this terminology points to the mystical aspect of the “search,” it also emphasizes the play of the readable and the visible in all forms of knowledge, as is most apparent in hieroglyphic figures. As an initiation rite Deleuze’s book reproduces the modernist meta-literary trope of the _Bildungsroman_

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The text above is a natural representation of the document, without any hallucinations. It focuses on understanding Deleuze’s views on modernism, particularly through the lens of Proust and his _Le Temps retrouvé_. The document explores how art signs transcend materiality to provide a spiritual dimension, contrasting with the other types of signs that are rooted in the material world. It also delves into the concept of essences, their individualizing properties, and their relationship to Leibniz and the Baroque House allegory. The text further discusses how Deleuze’s approach to art and literature parallels the Bildungsroman narrative structure, using orientalist metaphors to articulate the initiation process.
of the artist, though here it might be more apt to say the “portrait of the philosopher as a young artist.” Proust’s novel allows Deleuze a certain freedom to create concepts outside of philosophy, though subsequent editions as we shall see pulled Proust back into Deleuze’s philosophical preoccupations.

The second *Proust and Signs*

Six years after the first edition of *Proust and Signs*, Deleuze added a new section, entitled *The Literary Machine*. This new section clarifies the arguments of the first edition, such as distinguishing Proust from Plato, and explores in depth the production of signs in the novel. While the first edition catalogued the types of signs and their relationship to essences and time, Deleuze’s addition argues for the diversity of signs themselves, their proliferation, and disruptive function.

Proust’s system of signs, according to Deleuze, acts as an “antilogos,” in a series of oppositions that set “Jerusalem” versus “Athens.” Against the philosophical totality of Platonism, Proust composes his novel through fragments and breaks that put into question the consensus between “friends” which is at the foundation of philosophy. According to Platonic thought, intelligence always comes first since it presupposes a single Idea or Essence from which must follow a series of inferior material copies. Philosophical camaraderie consists in agreeing upon terms for these ideas without descending into the differences between the copies. In Proust, by contrast, the essence is difference; it individualizes each quality in time, with intelligence coming only after involuntary perception. The essence makes subjects and objects possible, since it is a “superior point of view” beyond the individual (133). While Plato starts with the external world and moves through consciousness to attain the objective realm of the Idea, Proust’s essences are “transcendent” and creative: “So much so that the whole problem of objectivity, like that of unity, finds itself displaced in a way that can only be qualified as ‘modern,’ essential to modern literature” (134). While Plato famously banished art from the Republic for disseminating copies of copies, Proust’s thought, as “modern” literature, depends on the creation of ever more signs that explode meaning beyond the narrow confines of language and of material art objects, since art would not be a “copy” of an Idea, but the container of an essence that surpasses both art and observer in “pure” time.

Having established the necessity of the proliferation of art signs in Proust’s work, Deleuze sets about exploring the textual mechanisms that produce series of signs, the Proustian response to Plato’s simulacra. Deleuze finds in Proust’s novel two recurring images that figure different ways of disrupting continuity and totality within a series: boxes and vases. Open boxes (“boîtes entrouvertes”) hold too many qualities to fit within a single container, and so overflow their volume. The narrator’s great love, Albertine would be the emblematic “open box” as she contains countless unstable identities with no other connection than that they all exist under a single name. The madeleine may be the most famous “open box,” as it contains within its ephemeral flavor the incommensurable selves of the narrator that remember all the different
aspects of Combray—all of Combray emerges from a tea cup. Sealed vases or vessels ("vases clos"), on the other hand, cannot communicate with their surroundings, like a moment in time out of sync with the place it occupies. The structure of the novel itself embodies the idea of sealed vases, since it is divided into two opposing “Ways,” “Swann’s Way” and the “Guermantes Way.” Each “Way” connects to the others in space, as the character Gilberte Swann reveals to the narrator at the end of the novel, yet they remain separate essences. Several famous spatial approaches to Proust, such as Georges Poulet’s *L’Espace proustien* and Gérard Genette’s “Métonymie chez Proust,” break down, according to Deleuze, when they reject the importance of time in order to insist that Proust’s metaphors are almost always spatial: spatial contiguity bears no relation to essences since they are irreducible to a seamless whole.

This fragmented and broken world is not without partial communication and temporary groupings or assemblages. Between sealed vases there can be “transversal” connections that link parts of the past to the present and future; multiple identities can be unfolded, explained, and explicated from an open box. Both vases and boxes participate in a “system of non-spatial distances . . . distances without intervals” (156)—this system is time itself, which connects all spaces without forming a pregiven Whole (157).

Since there is no totality or identity, fragments can be grouped together in “sets” ("ensembles") in which only worth is “statistical” (162), meaning that there are always conflicting forces within any given series. Deleuze uses the example of Proust’s representation of love to explore the complexity of “sets” functioning between three levels of complexity, depending on how closely you inspect the elements of the set—heterosexual love, homosexual love, and the presence of the other sex within the self, with which we cannot communicate. The play of these three levels ensures the continued multiplication of love signs.

But there can also be forced or arbitrary bridging of distances between the parts of the missing Whole. Without a Logos to order the world, the “law” (Proust’s “general laws”) forces connections between sealed vases, mixing qualities from different worlds, all the while exposing the immense distances between the fragments. If the image of thought, as he claimed in the first edition, is born of the violence of an encounter that “forces us to think,” the law would be this thought-provoking violence, and this image of thought would be telescopic. As Deleuze claims, the *Search* functions as a telescope, not a microscope, bringing into the same field of vision elements that are very distant from each other.

The novel does not simply describe signs, laws, or telescopes, it invents them. For Deleuze, *In Search of Lost Time* "produces the truth [that is] looked for" (178). However paradoxical this might seem, it follows logically from the idea of an art that reveals essences by inventing links between qualities. Art stakes out a territory, as Deleuze says in *L’Abécédaire*, and here Proust’s territory is the realm of involuntary memory, of time lost and regained.10 Readers of Proust can use the laws and telescopes he invented, in the territory he staked out, to experience their own worlds differently. Far from being caught up in an illusion, these readers have understood the nature of literary truth (*PS*, 184–5).
Proust's novel has three separate “machines” for “producing” signs, just as love existed across three separate levels: (1) the singularity of reminiscences and essences that produce time regained, (2) the partial objects of desire and pain formed by love and high society and that produce lost time, and (3) the inescapable, universal signs of aging and death that produce catastrophe or the threat that the narrator might not complete his novel, all the while driving him to write (178–9). While the movement of the novel leads toward a final “revelation,” each of these machines functions separately, without being canceled out by the others. Deleuze insists on a mechanical, as opposed to aesthetic, vocabulary in order to draw a distinction between artistic “creation” and the “production” of truth—the literary machine “works,” it produces essences that function beyond the narrow scope of the narrator and his reminiscence and correspond with readers and other texts. The novel’s truths, produced by impersonal and chaotic machines, can now be reproduced and multiplied beyond the book.

Deleuze, after an elaborate catalogue of signs, levels, and series in Proust, poses the question of what can unify so many fragments and pieces. While Deleuze's work argues for rupture and against totality, the ingenuity of his argument points toward a desire for totality. Following Proust, he proposes that the unity of a work of art comes in the form of “style,” but this unity comes afterward as a product of the machine, just as intelligence comes after reminiscence. Balzac's Human Comedy would be the model of a totalizing style, an artistic unity, which only comes after the fact of writing dozens of volumes but which projects this unity backward toward an invented origin (197). Zola, too, would imitate Balzac, inscribing an imaginary origin to the family at the heart of his novel series The Rougon-Macquart, though the fictional genealogy developed and changed throughout the course of the writing of the 20 novels. But the heterogeneity of Balzac, Zola, Proust, and other modern writers implies that there can be no unified “style” inherent to the author, only an effect produced afterward by the structure of the work itself (novel of Parisian society for Balzac, genealogy of a decadent family for Zola, the apprenticeship of a writer for Proust). The stylistic unity of Proust and Signs itself must necessarily be an aftermath, as its three parts were each written years apart, with the conclusion upsetting the unity of the whole.

A new conclusion

The final edition of Proust and Signs in 1973 contains a strange new conclusion, called enigmatically “Presence and Function of Madness the Spider.” As the forward to the third edition notes, the conclusion was taken from another text published in a collective volume of Saggi e ricerche di Letturatura Francese of the same year. The methodology, vocabulary, and philosophical foundations differ radically from the rest of Proust and Signs, yet the subject matter is unmistakably Proustian and the philosophical concerns completely Deleuzian. This rupture within the text reaffirms the modernist aesthetic of fragmentation, while at the same time revealing more subtle aspects of Proust's work that escape a systematic approach to the novel.
Unlike the rest of *Proust and Signs*, which followed Proust’s thought, Deleuze declares that he is not concerned with the problem of art and madness in Proust, but rather with the presence of madness in the novel and how this presence functions. In other words, madness may be a secondary effect of the textual machine, not a machine itself. Deleuze focuses on two complementary characters, Charlus and Albertine, whose madness is related to sexuality. Charlus’s folly comes from the fact that he is “master of Logos,” of language signs and discourse, but he runs off the rails when objects confront discourse, when the unconscious interferes with his rational mastery (214). Albertine’s madness stems from her problem of individuation, from the impossibility of deciding who she might really be.

The supposed madness of Charlus and of Albertine resonates in the actions of the narrator, leading Deleuze to propose that the narrator himself is mad. Arguing that the narrator-hero is not a “subject” but a “machine de la Recherche” (perhaps “search engine” would be today’s equivalent), Deleuze suggests that the narrator might best be qualified as a “spider”: blind, a giant Body without Organs (218). While the image of the spider hardly appears at all in the novel (four times in thousands of pages), the idea of the narrator as a schizophrenic spider playing the other characters as marionettes reframes the notion of the narrator as rational apprentice of signs. Since the narrator orients the movement and rhythm of the novel, turning it toward the future when he will become a novelist, the novel risks becoming totalized by his all-encompassing vision. In the second edition of *Proust and Signs*, Deleuze insists that the unity of Proust’s style can only come afterward in a sort of “non-style,” but he never addresses the problem of the narrator. By proposing, perhaps tongue-in-cheek, that the narrator is a mad spider, Deleuze reintroduces rupture into the novel, with the narrator’s madness producing ever more “delirious” signs.

**Forever Proust**

If the Proustian narrator be a mad spider spinning an elaborate web to catch and interpret signs, we may well consider whether Deleuze himself shows signs of madness, or even becoming-spider, as his *Proust and Signs* adds layer upon layer, level upon level of complexity onto his interpretation of an almost never-ending novel. Certainly Deleuze’s book multiplies points of view onto the Proustian world rendering a definitive reading of the novel impossible and undesirable. But just as Proust hoped his novel would serve as an instrument for readers to understand the novel and themselves, we can use *Proust and Signs* to read Deleuze and his work.

*Proust and Signs* serves as a virtual introduction to the key concepts of Deleuze’s thought, except that these concepts are enveloped in a Proustian vocabulary and context. The notions of essences that individualize points of view and “the image of thought” prefigure a more elaborate development in *Leibniz and the Fold*. The open boxes and sealed vases rehearse the “sets” and “wholes” of *Cinema I and II*. The distinctions between lost time and pure time anticipate *Bergsonism*. The disciplinary territories...
more or less harmoniously staked out in *What is Philosophy* are more productively set against each other in the book on Proust. And the entire project of *Essays Critical and Clinical*, as the epigraph from Proust’s *Contre Sainte-Beuve* suggests, stems from the unique problems of writing and understanding posed so well by Proust.

Deleuze’s concepts manifest themselves as though in series and groups, materialized in each book, yet every instance different from the others, making an amalgamation of *Proust and Signs* with the other books impossible. Tracing the development of these concepts chronologically or insisting on the relevance or irrelevance of Deleuze’s thought to *In Search of Lost Time* and Proustian criticism misses how Deleuze himself, as reader of Proust’s novel, becomes a seeker of truth, an interpreter of signs, and quite possibly falls in love with the literary work. In his chapter on the “Levels of the Search” in *Proust and Signs*, Deleuze argues that at the profoundest level of the individual in Proust there coexist fragments of both sexes as “partial objects” that do not communicate between themselves (164). Statistically we are one sex but we contain fragments of the other sex within us and seek in the object of our love the possibility of completing those fragments: “the individual globally determined as male would fertilize his feminine part by partial objects that could be found just as well in a woman as in a man” (164–5). Love is the “transversal” between the sealed vases of our masculine and feminine parts, which cannot communicate between themselves without a third partial object.

Deleuze the philosopher needs *In Search of Lost Time* as a “partial object” that could, in the “vegetal” vocabulary so dear to Proust, pollinate the literary writer within. Proust’s novel gains from the encounter too, as the wide range of its concepts becomes visible, “fertilized,” even as it critiques a totalizing Logos. While Deleuze describes his rewriting of other philosophers as “buggery” (corresponding perhaps to the second level of love in *The Search*, the level of a “global” homosexuality, but also of guilt and of a statistical, social identity), his encounter with literature occurs at the deepest level of difference, revealing the fragmented selves within the “self,” the irreducible multiplicity of Deleuze as thinker. Far from being a “monstrous child” of a forced philosophical consensus, *Proust and Signs* continues to bear fruit, complicating and diversifying the ways we read Deleuze.

**Notes**


4 For an overview of Proustian criticism see Roger Shattuck, *Proust’s Way: A Field Guide to In Search of Lost Time* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 2000). Popular writing on Proust, such as that by Jonah Lehrer in *Proust was a Neuroscientist*
(Boston and New York: Mariner Books, 2008), but also writing that takes on a supposed interdisciplinary approach, obsesses over the madeleine and involuntary memory. Since the mid-nineties, a current of Proustian criticism has argued that Proust’s own thought is deficient or misleading, see Vincent Descombes, *Proust: philosophe du roman* (Paris: Éditions de minuit, 1987) and Richard Terdiman, especially chapters 5 and 6 of *Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).


While Colombat sees Deleuze’s unique conception of signs as setting up an eventual and definitive break with the work of Jacques Derrida, we can see in the redefinition of signs, the emphasis on difference, the rejection of binaries, a great affinity with the early Derrida. André Pierre Colombat, “Deleuze and Signs,” in *Deleuze and Literature*, eds. Buchanan and Marks (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 14–33.

In *Foucault*, Deleuze writes, “All knowledge goes from a visible to an expressible, and vice versa; and yet there is no common totalizing form, nor even conformity or bi-univocal correspondence.” See Deleuze, *Foucault* (Paris: Minuit, 2004 [1986]), 46–7.


For Christopher M. Drohan, oddly, the density of *Proust and Signs* and its Proustian vocabulary suggest an incomplete development of Deleuze’s concepts: “As one of his earlier books, it contains a good number of half-finished concepts and ideas that only a comprehensive reading of his whole life’s work could clarify.” See *Deleuze and the Sign* (New York and Dresden: Atropos Press, 2009), 5.