Global campaigns for girls’ and women’s education, 2000-2017:
insights from transnational social movement theory

Author: Dr Rosie Peppin Vaughan, Centre for Education and International Development, UCL Institute of Education. rosie.peppinvaughan@ucl.ac.uk.

Rosie Peppin Vaughan is a lecturer at the Centre for Education and International Development, UCL Institute of Education, and conducts interdisciplinary research around the topics of gender, education, and global governance.

Abstract

Recent decades have witnessed a growing number of global campaigns on girls’ and women’s education, including major global policy initiatives such as the MDGs and the SDGs. While scholars have critically analysed the conceptualisations of gender, equality and development in such campaigns, and their significance for national level policy and practice, less has been written about why and how girls’ education came to be such a high profile feature of international policy frameworks. This paper draws on perspectives from transnational social movement theory, which has been used by gender scholars to explore the activities and significance of non-governmental organisations for agenda-setting at the global level. In this paper these perspectives are applied to the field of global education policy, through an analysis of evidence from international conferences, data on aid flows and interviews with key policy actors, to explore the factors behind rise of the global agenda on gender equality in education. In doing so, it suggests that the current dominant framing around girls’ education, access and quality, may be explained by the relatively weak involvement of non-governmental women’s groups in proportion to the strong involvement of multilaterals, bilateral agencies, national governments and more recently, private sector organisations.

Keywords: gender, education, social movements, United Nations, international women’s movement, Sustainable Development Goals, civil society

Introduction

Gender equality in education has become a high priority for international development as part of several global initiatives in the last two decades, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the ‘Education for All’ (EFA) campaign, and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Alongside distinct goals relating to gender equality and education, substantial financial and organisational resources have been deployed towards this goal since 2000. An impressive range of campaigns have driven this momentum. Recent examples include the World Bank launching a 5-year, $2.5 billion initiative in 2016 for adolescent girls; the UK’s Girls’ Education Challenge (GEC), which has committed £500 million to girls’ education in its second phase up to 2025 (World Bank, 2016; DFID, 2018); and a commitment from the G7 in 2018 to spending $3.8 billion on girls’ education.
A key question, however, is why gender equality in education has risen to become such a high profile policy issue on the international agenda in this period. Further, while there has been an overall rise in policy attention, we can examine specifically how ‘gender’ and ‘education’ have been defined. Critical scholars have examined the ways in which terms such as gender, equality, development and empowerment have been framed; in particular, how girls’ education, and access to primary schooling has been a dominant concern, and how certain issues such as women’s education and the complex relationships between different gendered inequalities have not been addressed (Aikman & Unterhalter, 2005; Stromquist, 2015).

More broadly, the last several decades has seen certain other gender issues highlighted in global policy. Authors such as Joachim (2003, 2007, 2013) and Friedman (2003) have used analytical concepts from social movement analysis to explore how and why international agendas on particular gender issues emerge. Joachim’s work, in particular, has explored how women’s NGOs have had a significant role in the emergence of, and shaping of, global agendas on gender based violence and reproductive rights. It is therefore possible to apply such analytical concepts to the field of global campaigns on gender and education, to gain insight into how girls’ education come to be so high on the international agenda; and whether we can see the same level of involvement of women’s organisations in the field of education. A number of authors (Maber, 2016; Stromquist, 1998, 2015) have identified how women’s NGOs can play a distinctive and significant role in national education policy, so we can also ask whether such groups have been a part of the global agenda-setting processes.

In this paper, I apply concepts from social movement analysis to explore the reasons for the emergence of girls’ education as a global campaign issue, and the role of national and international women’s organisations in this. The first section examines the trajectory of the growing global significance. In the second section, the paper explores ideas and concepts from transnational social movement analysis, particularly studies on the rise of global campaigns on other gender issues, and specifically at the concepts of political opportunity, mobilising resources, and framing. In the final section, these concepts are applied to the global agenda on gender and education, with the analysis drawing on literature on transnational social movements, documents from international conferences, and data on aid flows. The analysis is also informed by a series of exploratory interviews conducted in 2016-17 with actors in a number of international and national organisations addressing girls’ and women’s education. Finally, I reflect on whether Joachim’s analytical model is adequate for explaining the rise of girls’ education as a campaign issue.

The emergence of a global agenda on girls’ education

In the second half of the twentieth century, with the growth of international organising and multilateral organisations, came the evolution of global education campaigns and policy frameworks (Chabbott, 2003; Jones, 2007; King, 2007; Mundy, 2006). These began to take a more distinct form after 1990, with the launch of the ‘Education for All’ (EFA) campaign at the World Education Forum in Jomtien.

Within the rise of international campaigns for education, girls’ and women’s education has risen to be a high priority within policy agendas. While gender equality in education was addressed in a relatively limited way in the goals and targets from the 1990 EFA Jomtien conference, it featured
much more prominently in both the EFA goals set out at the second EFA Forum in 2000 in Dakar, and in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the same year. Moreover, after 2000, a number of international campaigns on gender equality and education were launched, organised by a diverse group of actors including private foundations, bilateral aid agencies, international NGOs, philanthropic initiatives run by businesses and public-private partnerships. These include the UN Girls’ Education Initiative (UNGEI), launched at the Dakar EFA Forum in 2000; a range of initiatives at the World Bank; and the launch of Unesco’s Global Partnership for Girls’ and Women’s Education in 2011. Noticeably, many of these focused specifically on girls’ education (rather than girls and women, or gender), with high profile campaigns including the Girl Effect (Nike and UN Foundation); Because I am a Girl (Plan International); and the Girls’ Education Challenge (DfID). The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), launched in 2015, made further global commitments to gender equality in education, with goals that looked to gender parity in a number of areas beyond just access. In April 2018, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in London launched the Platform for Girls’ Education, committing to help secure 12 years of quality education for all girls by 2030.

Authors have identified particular framings around gender, equality, rights, and development in these international campaigns. For example, taking a long-term perspective, Unterhalter (2016) identifies three phases in which distinct agendas are apparent. In the first phase, from the late 18th century up until around 1990, ideas centred on ‘women’s rights’, fostered by the development of rights instruments, the transnational women’s rights movement, and growing arguments about education’s role in economic development (Ferree & Tripp, 2006; Peppin Vaughan, 2013; Unterhalter, 2016).

In a second phase, in the period around 1990-2010, the dominant concern was to “get girls into school”. The Dakar Framework (2000) offered a broader perspective on gender equality in education than that articulated by the World Bank or the Jomtien Declaration, although the framing in the MDGs was more narrowly associated with access (Unterhalter, 2016: 118-119). Global policy initiatives since 2000 have largely maintained this focus, prioritising increasing gender parity in enrolment, particularly at primary and secondary level; and more recently a focus on gender parity in learning outcomes. The rationale has often been instrumentalist, drawing heavily on human capital perspectives concerned with the economic significance of getting girls into school, particularly in terms of poverty reduction (Aikman & Unterhalter, 2005; Unterhalter & North, 2011). Finally, since around 2010 we have been in a third, “beyond access” phase, characterised by some acknowledgement of additional concerns such as school-related gender-based violence, and limited attention to intersecting inequalities (Unterhalter, 2016).

Critical authors and activists (for example, Aikman & Unterhalter, 2005; Stromquist, 2015), argue that these dominant approaches that prioritise access or specific learning outcomes may be ineffective or even counter-productive: attending school may make little difference to gender inequalities in society or even may reinforce them, if there are strong gendered elements in the educational institutions themselves. Critics point to the fact that other gender inequalities remain in education, such as the ongoing marginalisation of certain groups of girls and women from accessing education, and the conditions girls face within school. Such critical perspectives argue that attention needs to be paid to the complex ways in which gender operates within educational institutions, curricula and pedagogy, and that dominant approaches to gender rights in education need to be challenged in order to properly change how schooling relates to gender inequalities in the labour market, political participation, and levels of violence against women (Unterhalter & North, 2011). Applying this critical lens to global policy agendas, for example, has led authors to
question whether the MDGs represented a narrowing of gender equality issues to instead be more narrowly focused on girls’ education, particularly in terms of access, and later on, a narrow definition of learning outcomes; and that other issues have been neglected, such as how access to education can reinforce gender stereotypes and exposure to harmful gendered ideas, behaviours and gender-based violence (Stromquist, 2015). Unterhalter and North (2011: 2) have identified that the narrower agenda of girls’ access may constrain any ‘advance of larger feminist concerns about the multidimensionality of gendered exclusion, exploitation, and subjection to violence in interconnected sites, or the development of visions of gender justice, equality, or empowerment’.

These concerns give weight to the need to understand better how such global agendas are set, and lead us to ask questions about how and why gender equality in education came to be such a high profile issue, and how the current framing came to be dominant. In the next section, I explore some key work on transnational social movement theory, with the possibility that it may offer new insights into the emergence and current of global agendas on gender and education. Transnational social movement theory examines how collective, contentious action from typically non-governmental groups can play a significant role in agenda setting at the global level, and identifies key concepts which can be used to understand why some movements are able to make the ‘scale shift’ from national level activism to a social movement of global reach (Tarrow, 2005). The following section begins by introducing the key components of this perspective, and then moves on to discuss how this has been applied to the issue of gender in global policy.

**Global gender campaigns: perspectives from transnational social movement theory**

Transnational social movement theory developed as a branch of social movement theory, an interdisciplinary field studying contentious collective action, articulated by authors such as Tarrow (2005, 2011) and Della Porta (1999). With globalisation and the growth of international governance structures and institutions, groups campaigning at the national level are no longer restricted to country level but have access to international fora where they can ‘encounter others like themselves, and form coalitions that transcend their borders’ (Joachim, 2013; Tarrow, 2005). Work in this field therefore seeks to explore the dynamics behind the development of global campaigns and movements around specific issues, and to conduct research on how policy agendas are set at the international level.

A number of studies have highlighted the significant role of global civil society in international campaigns such as EFA, but also the uneven and shifting terms on which NGOs are able to participate (Jones, 2007; Mundy & Murphy, 2001; Verger, Novelli, & Mundy, 2012). Tikly’s recent study (2017) sees EFA as a complex regime in which consensus and collaboration between different groups of actors has become possible to some degree, but that there are significant tensions and contradictions around decision-making, affecting the extent to which civil society has been able to participate. It is notable that work in the field of political science on gender and international agendas has tended to focus on issues such as gender-based violence, peace and security, economic empowerment, migration, and international law, but has rarely included analysis of education agendas.

Concepts from social movement theory has been used to explore the successes and challenges that various groups within the international women’s movement have faced, particularly in the most
recent decades. Authors examining the trajectory and effectiveness of the global women’s movement have drawn on social movement theory and the concepts within this (for example, Friedman, 2003; Joachim, 2013; Keck & Sikkink, 1998), to identify groups with contentious claims and agendas, and to explore the dynamics of how and when such groups are able to engage with and influence political structures and policy at the global level.

Joachim (2007, 2013) explores the relationship between local and global women’s campaigns from 1900 to the present, using three concepts central to social movement theory: political opportunity structures; mobilising resources; and framing of issues (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996). Joachim notes that these concepts have been applied most frequently to movements at the international level, and have been particularly useful in understanding the successes and challenges of the transnational women’s movement: the political opportunity structures in which women’s activism can occur; the mobilising resources available to organisations and networks; and the framings of issues, which reflect how organisations and networks understand problems, solutions and strategies.

Joachim argues that identifying ‘political opportunities’ recognizes that the ability of NGOs to have an impact is determined to a significant extent by the political and institutional environment in which activists operate, and their effectiveness is therefore highly context-dependent. These factors will include the structures of the political system such as the presence of elite allies, or openness to external influences (Magrath, 2015). Joachim (2007) identifies three dimensions that are particularly important at the international level: access to institutions that actors are seeking to influence; influential allies; and political alignments or conflicts. First, she argues we must consider access to institutions, and in particular the occurrence of ‘focusing events’ in the broader environment (which can be extra-institutional, such as the end of the cold war, or institutional, such as specialised conferences). These can facilitate changes in institutional discourses; and also changes in institutional rules and procedures. Second, influential allies are important for the amount of reach a cause can have. Joachim identifies two extra-institutional allies: foundations (including those related to profit-making corporations), who may provide financial support, and the media, who can reach significant sections of the population quickly; and two institutional ones: UN secretariats, who may rely on NGOs for input, and governments, who may themselves lead on particular issues, and may also include NGOs in delegations or support their involvement in international policy processes. Third, Joachim identifies that political alignments and conflict are an important factor in political opportunities. For example, shifts in different voting blocs within the UN can create opportunities for NGOs; conflicts between such blocs can be beneficial for NGOs if their framings can provide a bridge for consensus between divided parties. Conflicts within blocs can also be useful to NGOs, as it can mean bloc members are more open to new ideas. However, changes in political alignments and conflicts can be impediments to NGOs: for example, individual blocs may use the ideas of NGOs to further their own interests; or tensions can result in stalemate or deadlock; or changing alignments may preoccupy actors, making them less open to new ideas.

In contrast, mobilising structures are the organisational resources and networks available to NGOs and cover a variety of factors that support a movement internally, ranging from cultural to physical (McAdam et al., 1996). They determine the ideas, energy, people power, information and expertise available. They also determine the frames and facilitate how they can be circulated. According to Joachim (2007), three components are particularly important for mobilising structures at the international level: organisational entrepreneurship; international constituency; and knowledge and expertise. All three are dynamically related to each other, for example, as the presence of one
can strengthen another. The concept of organisational entrepreneurship aims to capture how individuals with friendships and networks can be useful in mobilising other individuals and groups, and may also bring new strategies and tactics to a cause. They can facilitate contact with policymakers (and are sometimes termed “linking pins”, or “activist brokers”). However they run the risk of getting caught in crossfire of different expectations, or losing credibility through aligning with different groups. The international constituency of a movement consists of both mobilised, active members, and un-mobilised members who simply pay their fees or are engaged in a less overtly active way. A heterogeneous constituency provides strength through the ability to raise the credibility of frames; and if there are members at different levels spread around the globe, this can broaden the ‘repertoire of contention’ and help an NGO to exert pressure at a number of different levels (local / national / international). Yet there are also particular challenges relating to constituency at the international level, such as mobilising consensus; communication and organising logistics across language differences and geographic distance; and different underlying ideologies.

For Joachim (2007), a final component of mobilising resources is the different forms of knowledge and expertise available to a movement. One type is ‘scientific’ expertise or technical information for proving the existence of a particular problem or solution. Testimonial knowledge is a different kind, which is effective in campaigns, and can facilitate the mobilisation of diagnostic frames. Finally, it can be important for movements and organisations to have procedural knowledge relating to how to navigate institutional structures and processes (such as within the UN).

Lastly, the concept of framing captures the ways in which ideas are articulated and how people create shared understandings that motivate action (McAdam et al., 1996). Joachim (2007) argues that the mobilisation of support for new ideas involves three different framing tasks: diagnostic framing, prognostic framing and motivational framing. Diagnostic framing involves diagnosing the problem and attributing blame or causality; to persuade people that something is unacceptable – particularly in terms of structural conditions rather than individual deficiencies. In contrast, prognostic framing involves the identification of particular solutions, from technical fixes to legal instruments. This can also help in the development of strategies, and can have a close relationship with diagnostic framings in terms of which solutions are seen as appropriate. Finally, motivational framing offers a reason for people to be involved and take action on a particular issue.

Having identified key concepts relevant to agenda-setting on gender at the international level, in the next section of this paper I apply these to global agendas on gender and education, in order to analyse both its rise and current form. For this analysis, I drew on a range of sources, including the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database on funding to projects (using the gender marker); documentary evidence relating to major international campaigns and fora on education and gender (including the EFA Forum in Dakar in 2000; and in Incheon 2015; annual sessions of the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW)); as well as a number of semi-structured interviews conducted in 2017 with civil society actors on gender and education. I also drew on secondary analyses of international aid to education and gender, in particular around gender and the SDG processes.

**International agenda-setting: the case of gender and education**

In this section, I apply the concepts from transnational social movement theory to the question of why gender equality in education, and specifically girls’ education, has become a high profile policy
issue in development agendas. Further, I examine the ways in which particular political opportunities and features of the mobilising structures may have combined to result in the dominance of certain framings around gender equality and education over others.

a) Political opportunity structures

The first dimension to consider is the political opportunities for gender and education to become part of international agendas, particularly in terms of Joachim’s (2007) dimensions of access to institutions, influential allies and shifting political alignments.

Access to international institutions has been facilitated through a number of focusing events in the last two decades, both extra-institutional and institutional, which have provided conditions for raising and promoting the issue of gender and education at the international level. First, a series of international conferences and fora on education have been potentially significant focusing events. Most prominently have been the ‘Education for All’ fora in 1990, 2000 and 2015, and related meetings including the UN Girls’ Education Initiative ‘E4’ conference in 2010, as well as discussions relating to education in development frameworks such as the MDGs and SDGs. These have provided opportunities to network and lobby, both at the meetings themselves but also in the build-up and preparatory meetings.

In the education sector overall, Magrath (2015) perceives that political opportunities have grown for civil society organisations under EFA, partly because such organisations have become more widely seen as crucial for delivering educational services laid out in the EFA Framework, and partly because the inclusion of civil society groups in policy discussions is increasingly seen as an important legitimizing factor in global governance (Mundy, 2006). Tarrow (2011) argues that political opportunities are not static and unchanging, but can be influenced by civil society actors themselves; Magrath (2015) points out that this happened under EFA as key lobbying groups opened the way for greater civil society participation (including ActionAid and the Global Campaign for Education). Menashy and Shields (2017), using social network analysis, argue that in the field of education, CSOs have network centrality, alongside bilateral donors and international organisations (in comparison to private businesses, universities, and recipient governments). However, these studies do not comment on women’s groups specifically.

Over time, therefore, it appears that there have been increasing opportunities for non-governmental groups to participate in global agenda-setting, and this certainly seems to have been the case in the build up to the SDGs. While the MDGs were noted for a lack of engagement with women’s civil society, some authors perceive that civil society engagement on the issue of gender in the SDG formation processes up to 2015 was more substantial (Gabizon, 2016). First, there was a two year open consultation process before the SDGs were launched, involving the active engagement of civil society groups alongside member states; and civil society participation in the Women’s Major Group was extremely important in some of the progressive results that came out of the negotiations within the 17 themes (Gabizon, 2016). Gabizon sees this as standing in contrast to the lack of women’s voices and feminist movements in the annual reporting on MDG progress, and notes that participation in the Women’s Major Group grew from 200 women’s and feminist groups in 2012 to over 800 groups involved in the email information lists in 2015-16. Further, the SDG negotiations also saw the creation of an alternative civil society alliance on gender, the Post 2015 Women’s Coalition (now the Feminist Alliance for Rights).
Examining the groups attending two of the most significant education conferences in the period, the Dakar World Education Forum in 2000 and the Incheon World Education Forum in 2015 (Table 1), there was an increase in presence from UN organisations specifically concerned with education and gender. Notably, while UNIFEM did not attend the Dakar Forum in 2000, the Incheon meeting in 2015 was attended by both UN Women¹ (6 delegates) and the UN Girls’ Education Initiative² (1 delegate).

Interestingly the number of non-governmental campaigning organisations primarily concerned with gender and education doesn’t change significantly during the period. At the Dakar Forum in 2000, there were 9 non-governmental organisations in attendance with a specific concern around gender, or gender and education, with a total of 22 delegates between them (Table 1). Similarly at the 2015 Forum at Incheon, 9 such groups attended, with a total of 20 delegates between them. At one of the main international forums focusing on gender and education, the UNGEI E4 conference in Dakar in 2010, there was a low representation from civil society, women’s organizations, and locally based groups, and a strong representation of UNICEF and certain governments (UNGEI, 2010: 35). It can be problematic to directly make inferences about the frequency and depth of the interactions and networking that might have occurred, based on numbers of delegates; for example, particular individuals or groups with substantial influence may be able to exert significant leverage (Chabbott, 2003; Prugl & Meyer, 1999). Yet while international meetings have provided opportunities for access and discussion, these figures suggest this does not seem to have been matched by a growth in non-governmental involvement in UN processes around gender and education.

We might also consider a number of extra-institutional focusing events in the same period. For example, a number of authors have pointed to the end of the Cold War as significant in paving the way for a subsequent decade of global conferences on rights and development, which may have also been a significant factor in making the UN more accessible to civil society actors (Friedman, 2003; Joachim, 2007; Unterhalter, 2016). As part of this and building on three decades of global women’s conferences, a broader receptiveness at the international level around women’s rights may also have paved the way for easier access to institutions for NGO actors on gender and education. The events of 9/11 and subsequent military campaigns may also have impacted on bilateral funding, with education increasingly seen as part of the battle for hearts and minds in conflict areas and women’s rights as a legitimizing tool, which some authors suggest has specifically affected the way in which gender equality is framed (de la Cruz, 2009; Novelli, 2010).

Further, a range of influential allies appear to have been willing to support issues relating to gender and education. First, both governments and foundations have demonstrated considerable support in the last few decades, evidenced in increasing funding being available for gender and education. The OECD’s data on official aid flows shows a substantial increase in the levels of funding allocated, with the amount of education aid that was screened and marked as either having a principal or significant gender component rising from $951.4m in 2002 to $4,206.6m in 2016. As a proportion of total screened aid to education, aid with a principal or significant gender component rose from 36.1% in 2002 to 56.9% in 2016³. Interestingly, other sectors also saw a rise. For example in health,

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¹ UNIFEM was merged into UN Women in 2011, along with the International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) and the UN Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW).
² The UN Girls’ Education Initiative (UNGEI) was launched at the 2000 Dakar Forum.
³ Analysis using data from the OECD’s CRS database, accessed April 2019. Figures are in 2016 USD million. Note that these figures cover only aid that has been screened and marked for specific purposes (such as gender); here I have chosen to report the allocated amount as a proportion of total screened aid only, to give a clearer picture of shifts in
there was also a rise in the amount marked with a principal or significant gender component, although by proportionately less, from $879.1m in 2002, to $3,724.7m in 2016. As a proportion of total screened aid to health, aid with a principal or significant gender component rose from 49.8% in 2002 to 52.8% in 2016. In other sectors there was a similar rise in the amount of aid marked with a gender component; for example aid for water (30.2% in 2002, to 40.6% in 2016) and aid to production sectors (27.4% in 2002, to 60.0% in 2016). There has been a rise in the amount of funding allocated to women’s equality organisations and institutions during the same period, from $139.9m in 2002 to $471.1m in 2015, representing a change in the proportion of total screened aid to governments and civil society from around 2.2% in 2002 to 2.9% in 2016; in comparison, the proportion allocated to human rights shifted from 6.8% to 5.3% in the same time period. This significant increase in the amount of aid allocated specifically to gender and education could be seen as an important part of an increased political opportunity for activist groups. Although much aid may go directly to governments, the increase in the overall level of resources available may suggest a shift in political will and receptiveness towards change in gender and education⁴.

Moreover, in addition to being highlighted in the MDGs and SDGs, a wider range of organisations have launched initiatives to address gender and education, demonstrating commitment within UN agencies. These include the UN Girls’ Education Initiative (UNGEI), the World Bank, Unesco’s Global Partnership for Girls’ and Women’s Education; the Fast-Track Initiative (now Global Partnership in Education); DFID Girls’ Education Challenge; the Commonwealth’s Platform for Girls’ Education; as well as partnerships with private organisations such as the ‘Girl Effect’; and Girl Rising. Most recently, in June 2018 the G7 made an unprecedented commitment to the issue through the Charlevoix declaration on quality education for girls, adolescent girls and women in developing countries, and committed to spending $3.8 billion to sending the world’s poorest girls to school. Particular countries have strong bilateral commitments to gender and education; for example, countries that have led CSW side events on gender and education in 2011 and 2014 (when education featured as a CSW theme) include France, Sweden, Bangladesh and Nordic Council of Ministers.

The media, particularly in donor countries, has at times been an important influential ally, receptive to promoting the importance of girls’ access to school; for example, groups such as ‘Girl Rising’ have used this effectively in campaigns; and the devastating attack on Malala Yousafzai, and her continuing activism have been widely reported in the media.

Another potentially important aspect of political opportunity structures can be shifts in political alignments; and we can identify a number of such factors which may have facilitated the rise of an international agenda on gender and education. First, authors have noted that, especially as a result of an acceleration of lobbying around women’s rights in the second half of the twentieth century, by the 1990s and 2000s there was an increased receptiveness around gender issues in international fora (Friedman, 2003; Gabizon, 2016; Joachim, 2003, 2013), evidenced in a number of new institutional alignments and mechanisms such as gender mainstreaming, as well as an overall rise in bilateral aid allocation and philanthropic funding to gender since 2000 (OECD, 2018, 2019). ‘Gender equality’ is now widely accepted as a goal in development, despite the range of meanings attached to the term.

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⁴ One example of this could be seen in DfID’s Girls’ Education Challenge, where in Phase 1 resources were largely directed towards non-governmental groups.
A further consideration is the adoption of particular regimes of measurement and data collection in conjunction with international goals (King, 2007). Under the MDGs, for example, the selection of certain targets and measurements for education and gender equality resulted in the adoption of educational targets and data, as well as increased pressure for countries to focus on gender and education in particular ways (Unterhalter, 2014; 2017).

Overall, therefore, alongside a series of distinct focusing events around gender, and education, at the international level, there has also been a range of influential allies in the last two decades – funding agencies, international organisations, new forms of non-governmental actors, and the media - who have been receptive to, and promoted, the general cause of improving education for girls and women. It is possible that some shift in alignments at the international level have also created opportunities for the agenda to become more prominent.

b) Mobilising structures and resources

The concept of ‘mobilising structure’ refers to the organisational infrastructure that supports a movement internally (McAdam et al., 1996). This can include regional or transnational networks focused on particular issues, cross-national strategy coordination, enabling communication and action across national boundaries, and also in intergovernmental institutions (Friedman, 2003).

Joachim (2007) identifies three components: organisational entrepreneurship, international constituency, and knowledge and expertise. As discussed above, organisational entrepreneurship around gender and women’s rights in general at the international level has been strong during this period. Authors have examined how non-governmental groups have been effective in organising, networking, arranging new strategies and brokering with policy makers quite effectively around a range of gender issues (Ferree & Tripp, 2006; Garner, 2010; Jain, 2005; Moghadam, 2015). This has occurred both within and outside of the UN. Writing about Latin America, for example, Alvarez (2000) identifies three reasons why local gender activists can see value in seeking engagement internationally: for strategic bonds of solidarity and to strengthen marginalised identities; to contribute to cross-border work on securing legal rights and reforming public policy; and because there may be shared legal conditions that they face across borders. Sikkink (2005) notes that activists are more likely to reach out to international networks if they are encountering resistance at the domestic political level.

In gender and education, NGOs working at the national and sometimes regional level have played an important role in leading initiatives and interventions, raising awareness, lobbying for change, and supporting research. For example, in India, the NGO Nirantar takes an explicitly feminist approach to rural women’s marginalisation from education and economic activity, addressing this through literacy programmes. The Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE) has headed some pathbreaking initiatives on gender and education at national and regional level. It is important to note that both the particular issues around gender and education, and the policy contexts in which such groups operate, vary by context. However Stromquist (2015) highlights the particular significance of ‘women-led NGOs’ at the national level, as opposed to the wider grouping of civil

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5 Moghadam (2015) reports that some authors differentiate between professionalised women’s lobby groups / women’s INGOs, and ‘grassroots’ local women’s groups, although she argues it is more useful to view an overall movement which is diffuse and diverse.
society organisations that focus on gender, identifying the importance of the contentious agendas and alternative perspectives that such organisations can offer.

In terms of entrepreneurship and co-ordination at the global level, as we have seen, there has been leadership from international NGOs and other organisations around access to and quality in education. However, leadership specifically around more substantive, critical approaches to gender and education at the international level, and for a perspective that moves ‘beyond access’, has been less evident or visible in international discussion forums. It has been noted by a number of authors (DeJaeghere, Parkes, & Unterhalter, 2013; Stromquist, 2015) that global campaigns have largely been led by intergovernmental and bilateral agencies and private foundations. Unterhalter (2016: 117-120) identifies that in particular the period between 1990-2010 was one of the ‘elite circulation’ of policy ideas, frameworks and resources, clearly driven by UN organisations, in which selected global NGOs were able to participate.

As DeJaeghere et al (2013) state, there is a notable absence of engagement with women’s movements on the question of gender equality and education; and campaigning by non-governmental groups at the global level takes place often with limited support from civil society in many countries. This is particularly striking in comparison to other issues in which there have been co-ordinated civil society-led campaigns at the global level with close links to national campaigns, such as the environment; animal rights; and gender-based violence and women’s health, for example, where there are active transnational groups of non-governmental actors such as the Women’s Global Network for Reproductive Rights and the International Women’s Health Coalition.

As already discussed, at national level, there has been considerable activity from individuals and organisations pursuing a more substantive agenda and there is potential for international consensus on such an agenda; however in terms of networking and coordinating transnational campaigning, there appears to have been less of an internationally active constituency. The national-level NGO activity on gender and education appears to have not undergone a ‘scale shift’ (Tarrow, 2005) to a movement coordinated at the global level, with less collaboration across national borders between groups broadly taking such critical perspectives and in some way contending or challenging the positions in the dominant global policy agenda on gender and education as it has emerged.

In terms of an global constituency, international mobilisation around gender and women’s issues has been built on a widespread and substantial foundation of activists, NGOs and groups. As discussed in the previous section, there is also widespread support for the issues around gender and education, with a range of influential and powerful allies. However, while there potentially is a constituency who are concerned about pushing for a more substantive approach to gender equality in education, there are also significant challenges to mobilising consensus, and the logistics of communication and organising at the global level.

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6 It is important to note that the international women’s movement is characterised by diversity and political heterogeneity. Divisions in international women’s organising were deeply apparent during the cold war due to the East-West divide (de Haan, 2010; Garner, 2010; Laville, 2002). Disagreements between feminists in the North and South came to the fore in the UN Decade for Women (1975-1985); with many Northern feminists prioritising legal equality and reproductive rights, and Southern feminists emphasising underdevelopment, colonialism and imperialism as obstacles to women’s advancement. Many have voiced concerns about how effectively and realistically feminists can work together internationally, overcoming huge divisions both at the national level and between the North and the South, and negotiating the unwieldy structures of the UN (Basu & McGrory, 1995; Spivak, 1996). However, it is also widely recognised as achieving many successes; for example, Friedman (2003) examined how the transnational women’s movement was able to effectively lobby for change in various areas of global policy in the 1990s.
One important factor affecting the international constituency of actors on gender and education is resources. While more financial resources through development assistance to gender and education have been available in the last 15 years, this does not necessarily translate into stronger mobilising structures across all groups, and it is important to consider which specific agendas, actors and projects have been able to access these resources. Particularly since the financial crisis, women’s rights organisations are struggling for resources, affecting their ability to engage with global structures, and this is something which is affecting groups focusing on education. In interviews with NGOs in India and the UK working on gender and education, lack of resources in terms of time and money was frequently cited as a reason for not engaging more with similar groups for lobbying at the global level. One respondent from an NGO in India reported,

“Funders also like to give to big international organisations, not the small organisations. Earlier, it was very different, the funders used to come... to give us the funds. But now they won’t cooperate, they want the larger funders who can operate a larger labour”.

Similarly, respondents in some high level organisations emphasised that grassroots organisations increasingly don’t have the time or money for international engagement, and their primary focus remains dealing with issues on the ground. While overall aid to gender and education has increased, respondents suggested that the presence of more substantial, better-resourced organisations lobbying on education at the global level, such as the Global Campaign for Education, and the Global Partnership on Education, may increasingly mean that smaller organisations education are not able to compete and claim space and mobilise resources.

Therefore, this may lead to difficulties for NGOs pursuing such agendas in international networking and engaging. Two shifts identified by Magrath (2015) may be part of the reason for this: an increasing reliance on NGOs as service providers, and at the same time, a move towards including civil society groups in discussions. First, some authors have raised concerns that the increasing reliance on NGOs as ‘service providers’ has meant that the terms on which civil society groups engage with education donors and agencies are changing (Mundy, Haggerty, Sivasubramaniam, Cherry, & Maclure, 2010). Women’s NGOs are shifting roles, from being outside critical agents demanding action and recognition of issues, to that of partners and service providers, developing frameworks and principles for implementing initiatives – a process which has been termed ‘professionalisation’ or ‘NGO-isation’ (Joachim, 2013: 8-9). Nazneen and Sultan (2014) perceive that through this process, activist practices and discourses can become depoliticised, and women’s organisations involved service delivery risk co-option to donor or state agendas, simultaneously muting their capacity for critique and advocacy. In education, these new arrangements with governments and private sector organisations may have led to the defusing of political opportunities and co-option away from more radical agendas such as questioning the gendered content of education, and towards agendas relating to state deregulation and the community provision of welfare services (Mundy et al., 2010).

Second, we can examine the ways in which non-governmental groups are able to engage in global policy processes in practice. While there has been an overall trend towards visible consultations and engagements with non-governmental groups, the assumption implicit in the shift towards greater consultation in the SDG processes, for example, is that by ‘sitting at the table’, more marginalised groups will be able to bring changes to the power structures of the global economic system (Esquivel, 2016). However critical perspectives have called the nature of this representation into question (Magrath, 2015). For example, Vavrus and Seghers (2010) argue, using the case of Tanzania, that attempts to incorporate the ‘voice of the poor’ usually do not actually constitute actual representation, as the power of framing and interpreting such ‘voices’ is usually in the hands
of the powerful policy-makers and organisations, rather than the local people themselves who have no control over how such evidence is used.\footnote{Magrath (2015) also warns that we need to be aware of the power relations that are often exerted through the commissioning of education advocacy research which may privilege Northern NGOs and INGOs at the expense of southern civil society groups. Similarly, Menashy and Shields (2017) explore how power manifests and works in networks on education and aid, and how partnerships perpetuate rather than transform the existing unequal power relations between North and South, ‘under the ideological guise of apolitical or consensual relationships’. Other studies, such as Auld et al (2018) have examined how the increasing involvement of organisations such as the OECD in education in low and middle income countries may be bringing regimes of governance that are less receptive to local agency.}

Another factor likely to affect the international constituency is the emergence of new actors at the transnational level, who have become involved in campaigns on gender and education. In particular, the last decade has seen a growing number of transnational public private partnerships (PPPs), with quite different leadership and constituents. For example, the Girl Effect collaborated with DFID; Girl Rising have worked with USAID and were present at the SDG launch. They are highly visible and have a presence at global events and links with established development organisations, and therefore to some extent have a ‘voice’ in global policy; it is notable that the participants list for the 2015 Incheon Forum contained a section for private sector participants, which was not featured in the 2000 Dakar Forum. It is not clear whether such new transnational actors, especially transnational PPPs, present a new opportunity for grassroots engagement, or conversely, may be channelling resources in new ways, away from local activist groups. Both Girl Rising and Girl Effect, for example, invite people to sign up to their ‘movements’; and they present a number of other opportunities for participation e.g. film and TV screenings, activities for young people, also partnering up with government bodies in target countries. However, the agendas of these have been critiqued by feminists for encouraging ‘othering’ and simplistic representations of poverty, gender and education, and they are not typically regarded as being part of the transnational women’s movement (Bent, 2015; Moeller, 2014). Priorities have tended to be more concerned with spreading support for the existing agenda (i.e. access) rather than challenging it. Smith et al (2017) and Fraser (2013) regard these as potential areas of ‘dangerous liaisons’ between feminists and neoliberal capitalism.

In campaigns for gender and education specifically, Khoja-Moolji (2016) has examined how grassroots voices can be used to convey legitimacy to an organisation or initiative without any real shift of power, and calls into question both how the girls’ voices have been positioned, and the extent to which they are listened to. While the use of girls’ voices can give an appearance of legitimacy and greater weight to campaigns, she argues that they serve to ‘re-amplify the already-established consensus around possibilities and limitations for girls in the global south, and often serve to reinforce the solutions/programmes already in place’ (2016: 746). This can be linked to ‘protest simulacra’; when campaigns have the appearance of participation and mass demands. While certain political opportunities may appear to be present through listening to ‘voices’, whether this constitutes genuine representation is contested. Writing more generally on power and transnational social movements, Smith, Plummer and Hughes (2017: 7-8, 17) argue that ‘elite efforts to co-opt social movements take the form of appropriating movement discourses and using civil society groups to resource elite projects to create illusions of access to power’. In this way, the presence of voices of girls, or women’s organisations may not represent increased political opportunities in practice.
The final significant dimension of mobilising structures that Joachim identifies is knowledge and expertise. In global campaigns on gender and education so far, certain forms of scientific knowledge have been developed and used. There has been significant improvement in the collection of data to monitor educational disparities along gender lines, which suggests particular solutions in terms of access and completion. In 2000, Unesco launched the annual Global Monitoring Report, giving regularly updated educational data on a range of issues. Moreover, this has been accompanied by theoretical and empirical analyses. A seminal work by King and Hill (1993), containing empirical studies of the economic benefits of girls’ schooling, was followed by a substantial body of econometric analyses around the negative economic and social effects of such disparities, resulting in a persuasive body of knowledge around improving access, retention and quality. Moreover, authors have argued that in some cases these processes of knowledge production and intervention can be based on particular epistemological approaches to ‘third world girls’, at the same time enabling organisations such as the Nike Foundation to present themselves as experts within the international development community (Moeller, 2014).

So far, however, there has been proportionally more research on the expansion and improvement of girls’ education, and less on the links between this and gender equality within and beyond schools, as well as how these might be monitored, and addressed through policies. This point was highlighted in a recent rigorous literature review for DfID; pointing out for example how moving towards a more gender-focused research agenda could help regions like Latin America, which has an educational gender gap in favour of girls, yet experiences ongoing gender inequalities and challenges in removing these (Unterhalter et al., 2014: 53-58). Developing a more extensive body of knowledge around these issues could form an important part of a mobilising structure for a movement around more substantive issues in gender and education. Moreover the relationship is two-way, as women’s NGOs have a potentially crucial role in the construction of new ‘mental frames’ and creating types of knowledge able to challenge inequalities (Stromquist, 2015). Specifically in the field of quantitative information, feminist critique of official data from the 1970s onwards has been crucial in improving gender statistics, with NGOs playing an important role in the international arena through what De Rosa (2014) terms ‘gender statactivism’. This has yet to flourish in the field of gender and education, although Unterhalter (forthcoming, 2019) highlights the importance of civil society mobilisation in the potential generation of new and improved indicators in this area.

A further crucial dimension of mobilising resources is the procedural knowledge of institutions, structures and processes required for effective lobbying. The dominant global campaigns on gender and education exist within or in close proximity to UN organisations. However it is interesting to note that evidence suggests weak links between organisations working on gender and education, and the international women’s movement. Interviews with individuals working on gender and education within larger global organisations revealed a sense of a lack of bridging, which was seen as surprising, but also something which has been difficult to change. One official termed it a “mystery” as to why there were not stronger links; another recounted that, “in the education community, we have not broken into the gender lobby group, or the gender sustainable development goal... that whole piece of work was closed to us. We wrote, I don’t know how many emails, I did everything we knew how to do, to be able to engage with that community, and we were blocked out”.

Looking again at the groups attending the Dakar 2000 and Incheon 2015 meetings (Table 1), 5 out of the 9 groups attending in 2000 were NGOs focusing on women’s rights, as opposed to only 2 out of the 9 groups attending in 2015 (not counting UN organisations). This suggests a decreasing
involvement of women’s rights organisations in the field of education, possibly as the international agenda on education itself has grown. It is also notable that Gabizon’s (2016) account of the activities of the Women’s Major Group in the lead-up to the SDGs covers a wide range of issues including women’s health, women’s rights, but education isn’t mentioned a single time as a campaign issue, and is absent from the thematic focus areas of the regional organising partners (2016: 106). The Post-2015 Women’s Coalition commissioned two policy briefs relating to gender and education in the build-up to the launch of the SDGs, and since it subsequently became the Feminist Alliance for Rights, maintains a working relationship with Education International, but gender and education does not currently feature as a major area of activity, relative to other issues.

The relative lack of attention to education within the international women’s movement is also apparent in the events held at the sessions of the Commission on the Status of Women. For instance, the 59th Session of CSW in 2015 (‘Beijing+20’), which reviewed progress towards the implementation of the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, included 12 days of parallel NGO events led by the CSW NGO Forum. Of the 417 events during this time, only 13 had education as a main focus, and a further 8 featured education in relation to another issue. However, 35 events focused on health, and over 90 focused on gender-based violence (NGO CSW, 2015). Moreover, education was selected as one of the annual CSW themes in 1997, but not again until 2011 (and in relation, as a review theme in 2014). Overall, the lack of bridging to the women’s movement can be seen as a knowledge and resource deficit, with less opportunity for sharing of tactics for international lobbing and engagement. These weak connections may well have affected the mobilising resources around a more substantive agenda at the international level.

Considering mobilising structures overall, organisational entrepreneurship has been strong around access to and quality of girls’ education agendas, which is linked to the production of substantial bodies of knowledge around these issues. However, networking and leadership for groups pushing for a more substantive agenda have been weak; an international constituency appears to have been less able to mobilise, which may well be due to resource constraints and weak links to the women’s movement.

c) Framings

The concept of ‘framing’ aims to capture the strategic processes through which actors develop shared understandings of their concerns and goals; the causes of and solutions to contested issues (Friedman, 2003). This can be more challenging in international settings because of the need to reach collective understanding across diverse cultural contexts.

The ‘issue’ of gender and education in development has been framed differently in campaigns. The dominant framing in global campaigns centres on improving access and quality of girls’ education, and the social and economic benefits that will flow from this. Applying Joachim’s three types of framing tasks discussed earlier (2007), it could be argued that in the dominant global campaigns, the diagnostic framing is based on a growing amount of quantitative data on gender disparities in access, attendance, completion and achievement. There is a clear prognostic framing on how to resolve these issues too: increasing the numbers of girls in school, and addressing gender barriers to this. The motivational framing is persuasive; as discussed earlier, a strong body of knowledge has

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8 Beijing +20 was held in New York from 9th-20th March 2015.
9 The total of 417 events does not include caucus meetings, or morning briefings.
been produced, based on human capital analyses that argue the benefits of gender equality in education for society, the economy and families. As a result, strong prognostic framings in global policy structures have emerged around women’s economic empowerment, and assumptions of an automatic link between gender equality and economic growth (Esquivel, 2016). Authors have identified the formation of a ‘business case’ for gender equality, and the incorporation of a gender perspective into human capital and neoliberal approaches; specifically in relation to gender and education, authors have highlighted how the linking of rights and economic growth has clearly become a dominant framing at the global level, led by some of the most powerful and resource-rich organisations (Roberts, 2014; Stromquist, 2015; Unterhalter, 2007). Unterhalter (2016) argues that UN organisations in the 1990s and 2000s couched girls’ education in terms of the beneficial effects on health, population rates, economic growth and political engagement specifically to help build consensus among member states around a common education agenda. Combined with the political opportunities available over the past two decades at international level, and strong entrepreneurship around girls’ rights to education, this may go some way to explaining the dominance of this framing in the current international policy agenda.

Framings that draw on a more substantive approach to gender equality in education could be substantially different, as explored by feminist authors such as Stromquist (2015) and Unterhalter (2007). A diagnostic framing requires more nuanced data around how gender operates in and around educational environments; prognostic framings around solutions are more challenging, requiring reflection on how educational processes (including curricula, school management practices, teacher behaviour etc) can either reinforce or transform ideas and gendered norms beyond the education system. Such framings are apparent in many national level organisations across the globe (for example, as explored by Stromquist in Latin America), and also in some initiatives at the global level (for example, in some of the activities of UNGEI and Unesco). However, while the underlying motivational framing may be strong – more substantive equality for all – it is notable that such a critical framing has not emerged as strongly as a campaign focus at the global level so far.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, can transnational social movement theory adequately explain both the rise of a global agenda on gender and education; and the particular form that the agenda has taken? In the first instance, the issue of gender equality in education benefitted from a range of advantageous focusing events and influential allies, alongside the availability of resources. As much of the activity has been within the UN and large international organisations, transnational social movement theory alone may be inadequate to explain the rise of this agenda. In particular, shifting international relations after the cold war, a growth of empirical studies around the perceived social and economic benefits to education, and the longer term discursive shifts in policy around gender, may have also played an important role in paving the way for greater policy receptiveness on gender and education at the international level.

However, transnational social movement theory can help us to reflect on the dynamics behind the particular agenda that has been adopted so far. Joachim (2007: 22) states that whether frames ultimately become accepted and legitimised is contingent on the dynamic interaction of the first two dimensions examined above: the political opportunity structure in which NGOs are embedded, and the mobilizing structures that NGOs have at their disposal. Reflecting on the discussion above,
we can speculate on a number of possible reasons why a more powerful, broadly-held, contentious global framing has not emerged or gained broader support so far.

First, there are weaknesses in mobilising structures, despite some political opportunities. These are less open for groups working on more substantive agendas: despite focusing events, there is less funding available for more transformational approaches (both in terms of lobbying, and funding the creation of scientific knowledge i.e. research on ‘beyond access’), fewer allies, and weak links to the women’s movement may have affected international constituencies ability to mobilise, and strategic knowledge. Such weak links may well be affecting the strength of the mobilising resources and structures that could underpin the emergence of more transnational activity.

The climate for civil society actors has become more challenging for a number of reasons, and there are implications for substantive collaboration between women’s rights activists transnationally, including the extent to which they are able to engage with the UN, and for the terms on which they engage with other types of policy actors.

A number of authors have highlighted how international collaborative activity is growing in complexity, and that multilateral institutions increasingly bypassed by private and semi-private global initiatives (Savedoff, 2012; Severino & Ray, 2010). It is possible that there are narrowing political opportunity structures for activists with contentious gender and education agendas; and instead we are seeing increasing levels of ‘NGO-isation’ and NGOs being used as service providers rather than agents who can take autonomous action in global policy structures.

Second, we can consider the sheer strength of the existing global ‘framing’ as part of the MDGs and EFA, where girls’ and women’s education is framed more as an education issue, often in terms of economic growth, rather than as an issue for women’s rights movements.

Alongside this, education has generally been mostly dominated and directed by governments at the national level, which may have made it seem to be an issue more ‘off limits’ to civil society organisations.

Third, the emergence of an alternative framing may have been hindered by the diversity of challenges relating to gender and education across world. In the first instance, there are huge differences in levels of enrolments and completion, but also ideas around women’s and girls’ education can be very nationally grounded, culturally located and there are differences in understandings of how girls’ and women’s education should relate to roles in society. Indeed, there is no overall agreement on what gender equality in education is, how it should be conceptualised and measured. In addition to this, the growth and diversity of NGOs may be hindering the achievement of outcomes (Hughes, Krook, & Paxton, 2015). Overall, the dominant policy framings around gender, education and economic development, along with the diversity of challenges to be addressed in relation to gender and education, may further be hindering the development of a coherent, shared, contentious frame that could motivate a higher level of transnational collaboration.

These findings are significant given how other studies have highlighted the importance of global social movements in global policy and campaigns, particularly in the field of education (Tikly, 2017; Verger et al., 2012). Given the trajectory of other strands of the international women’s movement, national-level women’s advocacy groups in theory have the potential to contribute to the current
and future global development framework on gender, education and rights, particularly in terms of presenting key feminist concerns and ideas about measuring and monitoring. Kabeer (2005: 21-25) argues that we need to increasingly think of global, ‘horizontal’ citizenship in which the relationship between global citizens is as important as the traditional relationship between the citizen and the state, to enable greater collective action and mobilisation at the global level; solidarity on gender equality across national boundaries. The UN has a unique and critical role to play in mediating and acting as a conduit and meeting-place for such ideas, and particularly in ensuring women’s rights globally, especially at this point in time (Durano, Francisco, & Sen, 2009), and to take advantage of what could be an opportunity for re-thinking existing frameworks.

The formation of new ‘transnational identities’ may be one way in which such differences can be replaced with agreement on common problems and actions to address these collectively – and such transnational identities may be fostered through more frequent contact and interactions between different groups, leading to greater mutual trust and understandings (Abbott, 2004). Moreover, increasing use of digital technology may have some role in fostering links between groups with similar agendas when resources are stretched, but authors have also expressed concern that they are not an effective substitute for in-person meetings and conferences (Stromquist, 2015: 69-70), especially as, this appears not to have happened so far in relation to education.

While this paper has drawn on a variety of different sources, further studies with more in-depth interviews with a range of different actors could enable a closer focus on the relationships between specific groups over time, and how key events have played a role. Another consideration for future investigation is the changing global power balance, and the implications of the agendas of new and emerging donors on transnational campaigns. Finally, there are also some features of current and emerging movements that may not be easily incorporated by Joachim’s framework. For example, the last decade has seen new, more contentious and oppositional strands of activism around gender (from both left and rightwing agendas), that may seem less concerned with engaging in genuine dialogue and collaboration to build new understandings and ways forward. Such strands of activity may potentially present challenges to the further development of global campaigns and framings around gender and education, but the ways in which it might do so is not yet clear and needs to be taken into account in future studies.

10 This may not be restricted to the issue of gender; in her study of the Global Partnership on Education, Menashy (2017) found that these had not developed, and identifies a number of factors affecting groups working together within the Global Partnership on Education.
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Table 1: Non-governmental groups primarily concerned with gender attending the 2000 and 2015 World Education Forums

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2000 Dakar</th>
<th>2015 Incheon</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gender and education organisations:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Gender and education organisations:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Fédération Internationale des Femmes Diplômées d’Universités (FIFDU) – 4 delegates</td>
<td>• Bunyad Foundation – 1 delegate</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE) – 9 delegates</td>
<td>• Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE) - 4 delegates</td>
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<td>• Plan international – 2 delegates</td>
<td>• Graduate Women International- 1 delegate</td>
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<tr>
<td>• World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts (WAGGGS) – 1 delegate</td>
<td>• Mothers’ School Society - 1 delegate</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gender organisations:</strong></td>
<td>• Plan International – 8 delegates</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Association du Sahel d’Aide à la Femme et à l’Enfance (ASSAFE) – 2 delegates</td>
<td>• Red de Educacion Popular entre Mujeres- 2 delegates</td>
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<tr>
<td>• ORGENS Senegal (Observatoire des Relations du Genre, Senegal) – 1 delegate</td>
<td>• Malala Fund - 1 delegate</td>
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<td>• Soroptimist International – 1 delegate</td>
<td><strong>Gender organisations:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• SYNERGIE – Femmes – Burkina Faso – 1 delegate</td>
<td>• Women Thrive Worldwide - 1 delegate</td>
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<td>• WOTCLEF Nigeria – Women Trafficking and Child Labour Eradication Foundation, Nigeria – 1 delegate</td>
<td>• Women and Society Association (Egypt) - 1 delegate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 22 delegates

**Total** 20 delegates

*Sources: (UNESCO, 2000, 2015)*