


BACKGROUND PAPER

**GOVERNANCE *and* THE LAW**

# **Governance in Service Delivery in the Middle East and North Africa**

**Program on Governance and Local  
Development**

University of Gothenburg



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*Background paper for World Development Report 2017*

# **Governance in Service Delivery in the Middle East and North Africa**

**PROGRAM ON GOVERNANCE AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT  
UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG<sup>1</sup>**

## **ABSTRACT**

This paper examines the clientelistic equilibrium that remains prevalent in much of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region during the post-independence period, undermining service delivery and creating inequality in access. Political institutions and social practices that shape incentives for policymakers, service providers, and citizens create what can be called a potentially tenuous, “clientelistic equilibrium.” Service delivery is influenced by political institutions that allow for the capture of public jobs and service networks, and by social institutions that call upon individuals to respond more readily to members of their social networks than to others. The result is poor quality service delivery (e.g., absenteeism, insufficient effort), difficulties in access (e.g., need for bribes, connections), and inequalities in the provision of services.

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## **I. The Context of Service Provision in the MENA: The Social Contract**

*MENA states that emerged after independence have been characterized by the consolidation of governments with politically captured bureaucracies and clientelistic social contracts. The exchange between citizens and incumbents was one of “bread for freedom,” or the provision of jobs, services, and development in exchange for political loyalty and obedience. Throughout this report, we employ the term “political clientelism” to capture these quid-pro-quo exchanges of material goods and personal services for political support. Clientelism was coupled with, and reinforced by, the expectation that an individual’s primary loyalties are to kin, friends, and others in his or her social network, rather than to the broader polity. The result is that “wasta”<sup>2</sup> or connections, play a strong role in shaping individuals’ behaviors, expectations, and demands in the MENA region.*

1. Ruling elites in the MENA have historically exchanged access to services (e.g., free education, healthcare) and employment in return for popular support. Before independence, Ottoman and European rulers exploited social divisions (e.g., tribes, large families, religious sects) in MENA communities, building alliances and brokering agreements between disparate groups. The leaders of these groups were rewarded for their loyalty with land grants and political power (Yousuf, 2004, p. 14-15; Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef 2009; Brixi et al, 2015, p. 107, 125; Barnett et al, 2013, p. 44; Alon 2009). As Sally Cummings and Raymond Hinnebusch (2011, p. 14) explain, “Western Empires in MENA were established and maintained through some combination of coercion and co-optation of periphery elites.... To give local elites a stake in the imperial order, the metropolises encouraged their private appropriation of collective patrimony -- land, oil -- thus, turning tribal elites into great landlords or rich rentiers, and tribesmen and peasants into an agricultural proletariat.”

2. With the dismantling of the colonial empires after WWII, this exchange was cemented within the burgeoning political bureaucracies created to govern the nascent states of the region, and in the establishment of authoritarian regimes. Sustained in part by revenues from oil sales and support from external actors—particularly given the strategic importance of the region during the Cold War period (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2004 p. 36-37)—incumbents stabilized their rule by doling out access to public goods and services in return for political support, rather than doing so on a meritocratic basis (Alon 2007, p.7; Ayubi 1995; Jabar 2001; Sakai 2001; Shryock and Howell, 2001). Incentive structures (e.g., promotions, bonuses, and other rewards) promoted political loyalty over effective service (Fernandez and Weinberg 1997; Al-Ramahi

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<sup>2</sup> “Wasta” is known by different names in different countries across the Arab world. For example, Tunisia, it is “aktaf”. Outside of the Arab world, it is also prevalent (e.g., guanxi in China, kudziwana in Malawi.) However, the concept remains the same across contexts.

2008; Pankani 2014). As John Entelis (2011, p. 663) explained with regard to Algeria, the bureaucracy is “deeply influenced by political interests with various departments often housing the supporters of different ‘strong men,’ and is infused by clan and tribal factionalism, which in turn undermines notions of promotion based on merit.” Bloated bureaucracies in which age and connections, not merit, drive promotion are prevalent across the Arab world (“Aiwa (Yes) Minister” 2015).

3. These political institutions are coupled with social institutions (ranging from social norms to the rules governing communities in tribal councils, *diwaniyya*,<sup>3</sup> or religious courts) that strongly differentiate between individuals’ obligations to and expectations of those within and outside of their social networks. People generally feel obligated to respond more quickly and effectively to those associated with their immediate social networks than to other citizens, and fully expect that other individuals do the same. In the Tunisia 2015 LGPI survey, we find clear evidence that people view their obligations to friends and family very differently from their obligations to others. Nearly 85 percent of Tunisians felt “very obligated” to help an immediate family member, even if it cost them a day’s wages, while only 53 percent felt this obligated regarding a member of their extended families. This figure drops to 30 percent regarding neighbors and 11 percent regarding residents of their town or village who are not neighbors. Many also trust family, tribe and other members of their social network more than non-members. The Arab Barometer III (Q103) finds that nearly 70 percent of all respondents say that, generally speaking, most people are not trustworthy. Similarly, the 2014 World Values survey in Jordan finds that 77 percent say that they do not trust people they meet for the first time, and 59 percent report that they do not trust people of another religion in the 2014 WVS survey in Jordan. Similarly, in the GLD Jordan 2014 survey, among the 76 percent of respondents who identify as a member of a tribe, 85 percent agree or strongly agree that one should worry about being cheated when interacting with people outside of one’s family or tribe. The practice of *wasta* is deeply embedded in societies throughout the MENA (Robbins and Jamal 2015, 15; Cunningham and Sarayrah 1993)<sup>4</sup> and group members feel obligated to provide favorable assistance to others in the same group (Barnett et. al. 2013).

4. This shapes engagement in the public sphere. People believe that government officials, including parliamentarians, respond more to individuals in their social networks than they do to ordinary citizens (Brixl et al, 2015, p. 240). For instance, nearly 80 percent of Jordanians


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<sup>3</sup> *Diwaniyyas* are spaces where Arabs meet with their friends and family members to socialize and discuss issues. Tribes or notables often build structures called *diwaniyyas* in the Middle East and establish a regular schedule for gatherings there. The word for *diwaniyya* may vary across the different dialects in the region, but the concept remains similar across contexts.

<sup>4</sup> According to a 2013 Gallup Poll, over 60 percent of those surveyed in 15 countries in the MENA region agree that, “knowing people in high positions is critical to getting a job (Wasta)”. See Figure O.3 in <http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/wasta-hampering-arab-youth-chances-dignified-life>

surveyed in 2014 believed that members of parliament respond more quickly to friends and family members than they do to ordinary citizens. The distinctions were less stark in Tunisia (2012) and Egypt (2011). This may be partly explained by the timing of the surveys, which were conducted in the aftermath of political ruptures, when expectations of change were high. Nevertheless, even in the heady days after the fall of long-standing leaders, a sizeable proportion of the population believed that parliamentarians responded more quickly to one in their social network than they did to voters who supported them. (See Figure 1 and Table D.1<sup>5</sup>.)

**Figure 1. Parliamentarians’ Responsiveness to Political Supporters or Personal Connections**




Source: Egypt 2011, Jordan 2014, and Tunisia 2012 survey data.

5. Moreover, the public often turns to elected officials for access to personal services rather than for effective policymaking or public sector oversight (Brixi et al, 2015, p. 150-152; Kao 2015, ch. 3). This occurs because people recognize that clear bureaucratic procedures do not drive access to state resources and public services, and the legislative role of elected officials is constrained in authoritarian regimes, and thus they seek what they most need and expect that politicians can provide: access to jobs and services. In household surveys conducted in Algeria and Morocco in 2007, slightly less than one in five respondents believed that contacting a local government official or MP would be the most effective way to obtain services. Nearly 1 in 10 would consider taking an issue to an MP in Morocco and Libya, and up to 30 percent would consider doing so in Algeria (Benstead 2015).

<sup>5</sup> Tables underlying the figures can be accessed at [gld.gu.se](http://gld.gu.se).

More generally, people often believe that parliamentarians should provide individuals with services (i.e., selective goods). This is particularly true in Egypt and Jordan, where nearly one-third and one-quarter of respondents, respectively, believe that MPs primarily provide selective services. (See Figure 2, Table D.2.) Furthermore, when asked what primary role parliamentarians *should* play, the same percentage said that they should provide individual services such as helping citizens obtain licenses, find jobs, or educate children.

**Figure 2. The Public's View of Parliamentarians' Roles**




Source: Egypt 2011 and Jordan 2014 survey data.

6. The system is difficult to reform. Elected officials, who might be expected to play a role legislating reforms that promote stronger political institutions and accountability, have incentives to spend their time and energy meeting constituents' individual or community needs, rather than formulating legislation and political reform on a national level. Voters elect those whom they believe would be willing and able to provide services, as opposed to following their party's program or voting according to national interest (Sakai 2001, Lust 2009, Cammett 2009, and Kao 2012). We find evidence for this in Jordan and Tunisia, where more than 80 percent of respondents said that they would vote for a person who provides services in their area. They also prefer to vote for individuals from their village or neighborhood, which often serves as a catalyst for social connections. These figures are lower in Egypt and Libya, but it is important to keep in mind that until very recently, elections have not inspired high levels of mobilization as they had in Jordan and Tunisia (In Egypt, the voter turnout was in the 20 percent range during the pre-2011 era.). In addition, there are differences in question wording between the surveys--the

Egyptian and Libyan versions, on the one hand, and the Tunisian and Jordanian ones, on the other--that make it difficult to make cross-country comparisons with regard to these questions. (See Figure 3, Table D.3.)

Moreover, electoral systems are often structured to favor clientelistic exchanges between constituents and their parliamentarians, and elected officials are best able to respond to their constituents' needs if they have a cooperative relationship with the ruler and his inner circle (Lust 2009, Kao 2015; Blaydes 2010). There is some limited demand for a parliament that governs; in Jordan 2014, for instance, 15 percent of respondents believe that parliamentarians should legislate. Yet, conditions make it difficult for them to do so. Often, people view parliamentarians primarily as personal service providers rather than lawmakers, and elected officials find themselves hamstrung in pushing for legislation and reforms that would improve national services at the expense of the ruler and his cronies (Lust-Okar 2005 p. 76-79).

**Figure 3. Reasons that Voters Support Candidates: Roles of Service Provision and Connection**



Source: Egypt 2012, Libya 2013, Jordan 2014, and Tunisia 2012 survey data.

7. Administrative reforms are also often difficult to enact. Certainly, domestic champions for reform and external actors have engaged in efforts to reform public administration mechanisms in an attempt to allow resources to be used more efficiently (cf. OECD 2010). Yet, transparent, effective rules governing bureaucracies, service providers, and other state institutions failed to develop fully, with reforms often stymied by entrenched stakeholders.

8. The political and social institutions structuring state-citizen interactions are resistant to change, despite the social, economic and political pressures that emerged in the last two decades

across much of the region. The ability of MENA states to uphold their side of the clientelistic bargain deteriorated as fiscal crises led states to retract promises of employment, reduce social safety nets, and pare back state service provision (Brixi et al, 2015, p. 112-117; Yousef, 2004, p. 16-17). With their lavish welfare state benefits for citizens, the oil-rich Gulf States, and particularly those with small populations, were the only ones in which this social contract remained fiscally sustainable (Brixi et al, 2015, p. 16, 111; World Bank, 2013, p. 20). Yet, even this sub-region has not been free from challenge (witness, Bahrain) and may be on the brink of change now as oil prices continue to experience downward pressure. Despite the instability and tensions, however, the MENA region has not yet seen the establishment of a new social contract (“Aiwa (yes) Minister” 2015; Devarajan 2015).

## **II. Importance of Social Connections in Obtaining Services**

*Two expectations among citizens, service providers and politicians shape service provision in the MENA: first, that access to positions and public services are given in return for political support, and second, that social norms according to which individuals are obligated to respond more quickly and fully to members of their social network than to others, shape service provision in the MENA. Individuals seeking services thus call upon both political and social connections to gain access: turning, for instance, to parliamentarians and other officials whom they both support politically and are also socially connected to in order to gain access to jobs and services. Both social and political connections are important, and they are often intertwined. They are also important for obtaining both jobs and services, although there is some limited evidence that more people believe them to be critical for obtaining government jobs than for gaining access to health, education or other services.*

9. MENA citizens rely on a mix of both public and private sector service providers. Regarding healthcare, for instance, we find that in Egypt 2011, 73 percent of respondents have turned to a public hospital or clinic for health care, 75 percent turned to a private clinic or hospital, and 22 percent sought care at a mosque clinic in the past. This suggests that in many cases, individuals use both public and private health care providers. Regarding education, the majority of citizens turn to public providers, although often supplemented by private tutoring. In Tunisia 2015, we find that while the vast majority of students are in public school, nearly 70% of parents employ private tutors (See GL 2015a.).

10. In the private sector, social connections (*wasta*) and political clientelism often shape access to jobs and services much as they do in the public sector. There are two reasons for this. First, there is often little effective and unbiased oversight over the private sector. Those with close connections to the ruling regime were afforded the opportunity to establish private

universities, hospitals, and other services, while others are often excluded (World Bank 2014a). Second, many turn a blind eye to public sector workers who amplified their income by referring patients to private clinics or students to special tutoring studies (Allin, Davaki, and Mossialos 2006; Mossialos and Karokis 1992). Patterns of cronyism within the public sector thus spill over into the private sector, blocking the formation of a healthy, competitive private market.


11. Charitable associations that expanded to fill the large gaps in service provision as the state became unable to fulfill its end of the bargain may alter the clientelist equilibrium only to some extent; and they may reinforce it in some cases. The medical clinics, schools, welfare organizations and other services provided by non-state actors, sometimes linked to social movements and political groups (e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood, Hizballah) often seek to provide services to those outside of their social networks (Clark 2003, Cammett and Issar 2010, Cammett 2014). They also are arguably less dependent on connections with state actors than are private, for-profit providers and the public sector. However, it is also possible that charitable associations *reinforce* the existing equilibrium, for three reasons: first, they are a relatively small proportion of the service providers; second, they relieve pressure on public services and thus may help to stabilize the state; and third, they are at the mercy of the state, and thus are subject to the same political dynamics as other sectors (Brixi et al, 2015, p. 217; Brooke 2016).

12. Before turning to the role of political clientelism and social connections in the distribution of jobs and services, it is important to note that these are often interlinked. For instance, an MP's access to state resources, or a constituent's access to the MP's assistance, are often given in response to political loyalty. In Jordan, an MP who vehemently criticizes the system quickly finds that he or she is unable to open doors to jobs or access state coffers. At the same time, the expectations that individuals are more obligated to assist those in their social networks mean that constituents both elect and turn to those in their own networks (e.g., tribe, extended family, village). That is, both the social and political institutions shape the behavior of constituents and providers (Lust-Okar 2005).

We find that high percentages of those who seek assistance from a MP turn to the MP with whom they have personal connections. In Jordan 2014 and Libya 2013, we find that those who went to the MP were more likely to do so because they had personal connections with the MP or they were a member of their tribe or family. In Jordan, 38 percent (N=564) tried to contact an MP for help at least once in the past five years, and of these, 44 percent (N=246) contacted a member of their own tribe (See Table D.8.). In Libya 3.8 percent (N=1,116) tried to contact MP for help at least once, and of these 31 percent (N=42) were members of own tribe. Moreover, multivariate analyses of the Jordan 2014 survey data reveal that there is a positive correlation between having a tribal connection elected to parliament in the past and self-reported turnout in elections. Analysis of MP casework logs also demonstrates that the majority of parliamentarians favor their tribal members with services (Kao 2015).

13. In the absence of effective merit-based hiring systems, many in the MENA region perceive access to jobs as requiring personal and/or political connections (Brixi et al. 2015, p. 154, 224). A large proportion of citizens believe that connections trump merit when it comes to obtaining a government job. The percentage of respondents who believe that connections are more important than merit when it comes to obtaining a government job reaches 50 percent in the Egypt 2012 survey. A high percentage of respondents also expressed this belief in Tunisia and Jordan. A sizeable proportion of individuals also see these networks as equally important as merit and qualifications. The majority of citizens in the countries studied here see social and political networks as playing an important role in obtaining a government job (See Figure 4, Table D.4.).


**Figure 4. The Role of Political Affiliations, Personal Connections, and Merit in Obtaining a Government Job**



Source: Egypt 2012, Jordan 2014, Libya 2013, and Tunisia 2015 survey data.

14. Looking at subnational variation in the extent to which family and tribal affiliations, political affiliations, and personal networks are believed to impact access to government jobs reveals that the extent to which each of these factors has influence varies greatly across localities. In Egypt, for instance, we find that in Damietta, Dakhily, and Luxor, approximately seven in ten respondents believed that tribal and family affiliations were more important than qualifications; in Assiut, Sohag and Fayoum, fewer than three in ten held this view (See Figure 5a.). In many of these same governorates, political affiliations and personal networks also were seen as playing an important role in obtaining government jobs (See Figures 5b and 5c.). This suggests that individuals' use of such networks, and likely the networks themselves, are often overlapping. It also highlights the importance of gathering fine-grained subnational data to reveal significant variations at the community level and motivates further research into why such variations exist.

**Figure 5a. Importance of Family and Tribal Affiliations in Obtaining a Government Job, Compared with Experiences and Qualifications, by Egyptian Governorate**




Source: Egypt 2012 survey data.

**Figure 5b. Importance of Political Affiliations in Obtaining a Government Job, Compared with Experiences and Qualifications, by Egyptian Governorate**



Source: Egypt 2012 survey data.


**Figure 5c. Importance of Personal Network in Obtaining a Government Job, Compared with Merit and Qualifications, by Egyptian Governorate**



Source: Egypt 2012 survey data.


15. The Tunisian 2015 LGPI survey allows us to examine variation in respondents' beliefs regarding the importance of tribe and family, personal networks and political affiliations for obtaining a government job at the municipal level. Overall, we find that individuals report that such affiliations are more likely to trump qualifications and experience in some areas of Tunisia than others. For instance, approximately 50 percent of respondents in Bizerte and Menzel Jamil believe that family and tribal affiliations matter, compared to less than 20 percent in Ksour Essaf and Monastir. (See Figure 6a.) As in Egypt, we find that more than one type of affiliation (i.e., tribe or family, political affiliation or personal network) often is seen as playing an important role in distributing government jobs. (See Figures 6b and 6c.) This suggests that these are often closely related and again, perhaps overlapping. Moreover this fine-grained data highlights the need for further research into why such variation occurs between localities, demonstrating that previous research presenting national level data overlooks important differences between communities.

**Figure 6a. Importance of Family and Tribal Affiliations in Obtaining a Government Job, Compared with Experiences and Qualifications, by Tunisian Municipality**




Source: LGPI Tunisia 2015.

**Figure 6b. Importance of Political Affiliations in Obtaining a Government Job, Compared with Experiences and Qualifications, by Tunisian Municipality**



Source: LGPI Tunisia 2015.


**Figure 6c. Importance of Personal Network in Obtaining a Government Job, Compared with Experiences and Qualifications, by Tunisian Municipality**



Source: LGPI Tunisia 2015.

16. Connections play an important role in navigating the bureaucracy and obtaining services as well. When asked about the importance of *wasta* for obtaining government jobs and services, we find that one-third of Tunisian, nearly half of Egyptian and more than half of Jordanian respondents believed that connections were essential or very useful for obtaining services or navigating the bureaucracy to obtain a building permit, driver’s license, school registration, etc (See Figure 7, Table D.5.).


**Figure 7. Importance of *Wasta* in Navigating the Bureaucracy and Obtaining Services**



Source: Egypt 2011, Jordan 2014, Tunisia 2012 survey data.

17. In some cases, citizens also believe that informal payments, or bribes, are necessary to obtain services (Brixi et al, 2014, p. 154). We find that more than 40 percent of respondents in the Tunisia 2012 survey believed that informal payments were essential or very useful to obtain services, and another 38 percent claimed that they were moderately useful. In Egypt, approximately 30 percent of individuals expressed this view. This figure drops to 16 percent in Jordan 2014. (See Figure 8, Table D.6.)


**Figure 8. Percentage Reporting that Informal Payments are Essential or Very Useful for Navigating the Bureaucracy and Obtaining Government Services**



Source: Egypt 2011, Jordan 2014, Tunisia 2012 survey data.

18. Citizens’ perceptions of the importance of *bribes* appear to vary across service sectors and jobs. When asked the extent to which they agree with a series of statements about the need to pay bribes to obtain a land title, receive medical treatment in district hospitals, gain better education for primary school students, or obtain a government job, the majority of Egyptian respondents in the Egypt 2011 survey agreed somewhat or completely. The percentage of respondents agreeing with these statements was higher with regard to government jobs and land titles than health and education. Nearly 70 percent of Egyptians also agreed with the following statement: “In my local municipality, officials receive kickbacks in exchange for approval of construction permits.” (See Figures 9, Table D.7.) The finding that people believe bribes are more important for obtaining government jobs, compared to other services, mirrors the finding that *wasta* is more important for obtaining government jobs than for other services. One explanation for this difference may be that citizens feel that government jobs and land titles are more valuable (on average) than health and education services (See Figure 7, Table D.5.).

**Figure 9. Percentage Agreeing with Statements that Bribes are Necessary for Obtaining Jobs and Services, Egypt 2012**




Source: Egypt 2012 survey data.

19. The analyses here do not permit us to explore fully the relationship between the use of informal payments and *wasta*. The three cases suggest an inverse relationship between the use of bribes and *wasta* when viewed at the national level. *Wasta* is viewed as most useful in Jordan, where fewer report that informal payments are essential or very useful. Tunisia is at the other extreme: a smaller proportion of respondents view *wasta* (or *aktaf*) as useful for navigating the bureaucracy or obtaining services, but a larger proportion of Tunisians view bribes as essential or very useful, when compared to Jordan and Egypt. (See Figures 7 and 8, Tables D.5 and D. 6.) However, individual-level analyses in each country suggest a weak, and often positive, relationship between the perceptions of the necessity for *wasta* and informal payments in obtaining government jobs and services. (See Appendix C.)

20. *Perceptions* of the use of *wasta* and bribes and *experiences* with them are not necessarily the same across countries. The Tunisia 2015 LGPI suggests that perceptions and experiences are positively correlated, although not identical. Comparing indices comprised of individuals’ reports of *experience* with corruption and *perceptions* of it across 18 municipalities, we find that some municipalities are characterized by both high levels of *experienced* and *perceived* corruption (e.g., Moknine, La Marsa),<sup>6</sup> or low levels of both experience and perceived corruption (e.g., Jbel Jloud, Ksour Essaf). In some cases, however, respondents state that corruption is low but are more likely to report having used connections or bribes to access services (e.g., Sfax ville, Siliana ville).

<sup>6</sup> It should be noted that Bourada has a high percentage of missing responses on these questions.

**Figure 10. Experiences with and Perceptions of Corruption, by Municipality in Tunisia 2015**



Data: LGPI Tunisia 2015

### III. Inequalities in Service Provision


*The role of ‘wasta’ and bribes helps explain inequalities in access to government jobs and services. As demonstrated above, wasta and informal payments play an important role in accessing services. Yet, individuals are not equally endowed with connections and resources. We find that citizens from very different demographic groups (e.g., age, education, urban/rural, gender) tend to hold similar views on the importance of wasta and bribes. Yet, not all have the same ability to use wasta or bribes to obtain jobs and services. The poor and less educated, for instance, appear to have more difficulty accessing jobs and services. This may help explain high levels of frustration with, and poor evaluations of, services and the state in many MENA countries.*

21. Citizens generally believe that *wasta* and bribes are useful in accessing services. Multivariate analyses do not find that most demographic groups (e.g., young/old, urban/rural, women/men) differ systematically and consistently in regard to their belief that *wasta* and bribes are important. (See Appendix.)

22. Many do not have the necessary connections or resources to obtain services. For instance, in the Egypt 2011 survey, we find that only 11 percent of respondents believed that they had the appropriate *wasta* to receive help when they needed it. Adding to this disparity of connections, citizens are not equally endowed with financial resources to pay bribes.

23. There are thus important differences in access to quality services across income levels. The Tunisian 2015 LGPI survey finds class to be an important driver in determining the quality of education services that respondents report. Higher SES scores are associated with better quality of education. (See Figure 11.)

**Figure 11. School Quality Index (Including Infrastructure) and SES in Tunisia 2015**




Note: School quality is measured only from respondents with children in school, including questions on whether the classrooms are crowded, teacher favoritism is present, there are multiple shifts, and there is teacher absenteeism. The SES score is compiled from a PCA on questions of asset ownership, including: 1. Car/truck/van, 2. Flat screen TV, 3. Cable TV, 4. Scooter/Motorcycle/Moped, 5. Telephone, 6. Mobile Telephone, 7. Air-conditioner, 8. Radio, 9.

Fridge, 10. Camera, 11. Computer, 12. Computer Tablet, 13. China dish set, 14. Vacation home/beach home (second home).

24. Moreover, we find that individuals seeking health care at public clinics (which tend to cater to the poor) appear more likely to use connections to obtain service. Looking at the marginal differences of impact of service type on the likelihood of using *wasta* to obtain health services, as reported in the Tunisia 2015 LGPI, we find that using public clinics for health care is associated with a 19 percentage point increase in the reported use of *wasta* to obtain health services, as compared to those who seek care at the private clinic.<sup>7</sup> The same analysis reveals that those who seek healthcare in public clinics are 27 percentage points more likely to report use of *wasta* to obtain healthcare than those who went to an "other" provider. Only military hospitals appeared to more likely to require *wasta* in order to gain access, with respondents 22 percentage points more likely than those who went to a private clinic or doctor to say that they used *wasta*, and 29 percentage points more likely than those going to an 'other' provider to report using *wasta*. This likely reflects the need for connections to military personnel in order to access services that are generally reserved for the military. (See Figure 12 and Appendix.)

**Figure 12. Percentage Point Difference in Likelihood of Reporting Using Wasta to Obtain Healthcare, by Healthcare Provider Type in Tunisia 2015**




Source: LGPI Tunisia 2015

25. Those turning to public healthcare also appear more likely to pay bribes. Looking again at the percentage point differences between service types on the likelihood of paying a bribe to obtain health services, as reported in the Tunisia 2015 LGPI, we find that using public healthcare

<sup>7</sup> Analyses are detailed in the Appendix. They include demographic variables (i.e., age, education, self-reported social class, urban/rural), and type of clinic. The dependent variable is dichotomous: the use of *wasta* (1) vs. no use of *wasta* (0).

is associated with a 15 percentage point greater likelihood in reporting paying informal payments, compared to those who seek care at the private clinic.<sup>8</sup> The same analysis reveals that those who seek public healthcare are 7 percentage points more likely to say that they used *wasta* to obtain healthcare than those who went to an “other” provider. (See Figure 13, Appendix) The marginal effect of service providers on the use of bribes is smaller than that of service provider on the use of *wasta*. Importantly, however, respondents are much less likely to report using bribes than *wasta*. This may be due to the fact that citizens less frequently employ bribes than take advantage of *wasta*, particularly among the poor. It also may be because social desirability bias is greater with regard to bribes than *wasta*. The evidence does not allow us to adjudicate between these explanations.

**Figure 13. Percentage Point Difference in Likelihood of Reporting Using Bribes to Obtain Healthcare, by Healthcare Provider Type in Tunisia 2015**




Source: LGPI Tunisia 2015.

26. Lower class households – in a self-reported measure - are more likely to report that they have health care needs that are currently unmet than are middle and upper class households. Among the lower class, respondents reporting that he or she, or one of their family members, have unmet health needs is nearly 80 percent; this falls to approximately 10 percent for the upper and middle classes. (See Figure 14, Analyses in the Appendix.)

<sup>8</sup> Analyses are detailed in the Appendix. They include demographic variables (i.e., age, education, self-reported social class, urban/rural), and type of clinic. The dependent variable is dichotomous: payment of bribe (1) vs. no payment of bribe (0).

Figure 14. Unmet Healthcare Needs by Self-Reported Class in Tunisia 2015




Source: LGPI Tunisia 2015.

27. There are also important differences in the delivery of services across areas (e.g., municipalities and regions). Analysis of the LGPI data collected in Tunisia finds, for instance, that a citizen's locality has a significant influence on the quality of health and education that citizens can expect to receive, even when other factors are taken into account (GLD 2015b). Figure 15 illustrates this with regard to the quality of public and private health care. In some areas (e.g., Jbel Jloud, Gaffour, Menzel Jamil), the gap between public and private health care quality is narrow, while in others (e.g., Mahdia, Sekiet Eddayer) the gap is quite large.<sup>9</sup> Similar results are found with regard to education. (See Figure 16.) Some of the variation across municipalities is the result of socio-economic differences, but these do not fully explain the difference in access to quality services.

<sup>9</sup> It is also important to note that this figure illustrates the gap between private care (which more endowed citizens can access) and public care (which often is used by the poor.) This suggests that the quality of health care for those with lower incomes is often inferior to the quality received by the wealthy. Unfortunately this often has life or death consequences.


**Figure 15. Quality of Public and Private Medical Care, by Municipality**



Source: LGPI Tunisia 2015.

Note: Health quality is determined by responses to questions regarding a clean bathroom, doctor present, reasonable costs, reasonable wait time, treated with respect, and availability of medication. These questions are asked only of those who have attended the clinics.

**Figure 16. School Quality Index by Municipality, Taking into Account Infrastructure**




Source: LGPI Tunisia 2015.

Note: School quality is measured from responses only of those with children in school, including questions on whether the classrooms are crowded, teacher favoritism is present, there are multiple shifts, and there is teacher absenteeism. Higher values indicate higher school quality.

28. There also appears to be an urban-rural divide in the use of *wasta* and bribes for obtaining jobs and services, although the nature of the relationship is not straightforward. Multivariate analyses find that rural areas are often less likely to report using *wasta* than urban areas, perhaps because individuals in rural areas already know each other and are less likely to seek a third party intermediary. Despite this, however, we find evidence that rural residents are more likely to put a premium on candidates who are from their social network. In Jordan, for instance, a marginal effects analysis of a multivariate model (with other variables held at their means) reveals that rural respondents are 6 percentage points more likely to respond that having a candidate from their village or neighborhood is an important consideration when voting for an MP (See Appendix). Coupled with the demands that MPs provide services, it appears that although rural residents do not think of *wasta* as an important factor driving service provision, the social networks do matter. The difference between rural and urban dynamics may simply be that in rural areas such relationships are more ubiquitous, and in urban areas, they need to be established.

Likewise, access to service provision is mediated by membership in specific social or ethnic groups. For example, in Jordan, access to *wasta* often depends on being a member of a prominent tribe. This is driven by the social obligations, discussed above, that call upon individuals to privilege tribe and family members over others. While tribalism has deep roots in the country’s history, it is not seen as the cause of clientelistic relationships based on social networks. Tribalism simply provides an easily accessible apparatus for the establishment of clientelistic *wasta* networks, but many clientelistic relationships and *wasta* networks throughout the Middle East do not rely on tribalism to function. Returning to the example of elected officials as sources of *wasta*, more than a third of Jordanians ranked, on a scale of importance from one to ten (10 being the most important), having a member of their tribe elected to parliament as a ten, and another 55 percent of respondents ranked having a tribal MP between seven and ten in importance. Multivariate analysis of a question in the GLD Jordan 2014 survey reveals that members of tribes are 12 percentage points more likely to say that knowing a candidate personally is an important factor in deciding whom to vote for in elections (See Figure 17, Appendix).

**Figure 17. Importance of Having a Personal Connection with the Candidate in Elections in Jordan, by Tribal Membership**




Source: Jordan 2014 survey data.

Note: Points represented the probability of supporting a candidate because one knows him/her personally. Each point is accompanied by its 95% confidence interval.

29. Finally, there are important variations across localities in the extent to which women access services. Abdel Samad and Benstead (2016) find, for example, that while women are no less likely to access services from parliamentarians in Tunisia as a whole, variation exists across electoral districts. Results from the 2012 Tunisia survey reveal gender gaps in access to services ranged from districts in which men were more likely to receive services, such as Sfax 2, where 22 percent of men and 10 percent of women have received help with a problem, to districts in which women were more likely, such as Manouba where 16 percent of men and 29 percent of women had received services. Controlling for district developmental level, district magnitude, and urban population, districts with a higher number of women parliamentarians are less likely to have a gender gap in access to services (See Figure 18).

**Figure 18. Percentages of Tunisians who have asked a Parliamentarian for Assistance**




Source: Tunisia, 2012 survey data.

30. Given the importance of connections and bribes – combined with the dearth of these for many citizens – it is not surprising that many in MENA countries believe it is difficult to access services (Brixi et al, 2015, p. 45). The Arab Barometer II found that more than half of the citizens in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen (pooled, N=12,787) who responded to the question of how easy or difficult it was to access medical care at the nearest clinic or government hospital, based on their own experience, stated that it was difficult or very difficult (See Table D.9).

31. Moreover, when citizens are unable to receive services or have rights violated, they find it difficult to seek redress. When asked to assess how easy or difficult it was to file complaints, based on their own experience, the Arab Barometer (Waves II and III) found that majorities in Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Algeria and Morocco said that it was difficult or very difficult to file a complaint when their rights were violated (See Figure 18, Table D.10).

**Figure 19. Difficulty of Filing a Complaint, by Country**



Source: Authors' elaboration on data from the Arab Barometer Wave III

32. In sum, the extent that public sector services are distributed in a clientelistic manner has led to discrimination in some settings. Individuals from particular subregions, classes or backgrounds, are more able to access services at the expense of citizens without these linkages. At the same time, those who are unable to obtain services find it difficult to file complaints and press for their rights. Arguably, this in turn reinforces the clientelistic nature of the social service provision system, and maintains inequalities.

## Conclusion

33. We conclude by returning to where we started, highlighting the difficulties that citizens face in obtaining high-quality services, and the coping mechanisms they use to overcome this obstacle. Despite the focus on service provision at the hands of elected officials, we can see that there is great variation in the quality of services people receive from the government. For

instance, the Tunisia 2015 Local Governance Performance Index finds that many people in certain areas of the country do not receive high-quality services for education or healthcare. Non-state actors are an important source of assistance in both providing citizens with assistance, but their assistance does not overcome the need. It is also very plausible that non-state actors face some of the same problems of clientelism, *wasta*, and bribery as their state counterparts. Nor is it the case that non-state service provision will improve trust in the system. Where the state fails to ensure that the services of the non-state actors are distributed impartially without discrimination, as Cammett and her colleagues have shown, citizen's trust in the state decreases (Cammett 2014; Cammett, Lynch and Bilev 2014).

34. As explained above, people also believe that they lack the ability to right wrongs in the system on their own. The perceptions of the difficulty in seeking redress when services are not provided (as described above) not only reflect citizens' experience and view of the system, but they also shape how they attempt to access services. Those who believe that it is difficult to access services are less likely to do so, even when in need. Those who believe that *wasta* is necessary for successfully obtaining services will seek and use personal connections, thereby reinforcing the clientelistic equilibrium.

35. Consequently, an unfortunately large percentage of the populations in the MENA believe that they have no one to turn to in the case of need, while others point to family and friends. We find, for instance, that in the 2007 surveys in Algeria and Morocco nearly 1/3 of the respondents sought assistance from friends and family. In Tunisia, we find that individuals facing difficulties in health, education or accessing other services seek assistance primarily from those around them – friends, family members, and neighbors. In fact, across the 18 municipalities sampled, people asked for assistance from members of extended community, neighbors, tribes, and to a lesser extent, CSOs and religious actors. This highlights again that personal networks in the MENA provide the main source of a social safety net for citizens, in place of weak states that are riddled with corruption. State institutions reinforce rather than diminish this reliance on *wasta* and clientelistic relationships, perpetuating the equilibrium.

36. The current dynamics further undermine trust in the state, arguably making it more difficult to establish a new social contract. Surveys across the MENA region find a strong correlation between both dissatisfaction with the provision of education and health services, as well as belief that corruption is pervasive, and a lack of trust in the national government (Bixi et al. 2015, 221). It is particularly telling that the youth are the most likely to believe that personal connections are more important in obtaining a government job than merit. For example, in Jordan multivariate analysis highlights that a twenty year old is 12 percentage points more likely than a 60 year old respondent to believe that *wasta* is essential in obtaining a public sector job.

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## Appendix

### A. DATA OVERVIEW

#### 1. Sources of Data

This paper draws upon existing studies and surveys (e.g., the Arab Barometer) of service provision in the MENA, but it relies primarily upon findings from surveys that researchers affiliated with the Program on Governance and Local Development (GLD) have conducted in Egypt, Jordan, Libya, and Tunisia since 2011. These sources are outlined in Table 1. Further information on the sampling design and methodology of these studies is found in Appendix A.

**Table 1. Primary Surveys Examined in the Study**

Country	Date	Reference Code	Sample Size
Egypt	October 2011 - November 2011	Egypt 2011	2,315
Egypt	November 2011 - January 2012	Egypt 2012	4,471
Jordan	April 2014	Jordan 2014	1,499
Libya	November 2013	Libya 2013	1,110
Tunisia	October 2012 - November 2012	Tunisia 2012	1,202
Tunisia	May 2015	Tunisia 2015	3,559

### GLD Survey Sampling Descriptions

#### Egypt 2012 Post-Election Survey

The 2012 Egyptian Post-Election Survey was developed by Ellen Lust (Professor of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg), Gamal Soltan (Professor, AUC), and Jakob Wichmann (JMW Consulting). The survey was implemented in collaboration with Al-Arham Center for

Political and Social Studies and the Danish-Egyptian Dialogue Institute, with funding from the Danish-Egyptian Dialogue Institute

The purpose of the study was to assess political attitudes and behaviors among the target population of Egyptian citizens of voting age (18) or older, following parliamentary elections (People's Assembly of Egypt), held from November 28, 2011 to January 11, 2012, and the first and second round of presidential elections, held on May 23-24 and June 16-17, 2012, respectively.

After a 5-day interviewer training program, the face-to-face multi-topic survey was administered on paper by 40 interviewers supervised by 5 supervisors in the field between 29 October and 14 November 2012 to a nationally-representative sample of 4,080 eligible Egyptian voters, with each interview taking approximately 50 minutes to complete.

A stratified multi-stage clustering random sample was used with census blocks, each of 1,000 households, as the primary sampling unit. Egypt's top-level administrative geographic areas consisted of 27 governorates (Wilayat). Census blocks were randomly selected from the different governorates using a probability-proportional-to-size method. Also, census blocks selected from the different governorates are proportionate to each governorate's rural/urban composition. All population and demographic information were obtained from 2006 census reports.

The resulting multi-stage stratified clustered sample consisted of 41 of 46 electoral districts in 22 of 27 governorates. Only the 5 lightly populated border governorates were not included in the sample. The data provides designation of the electoral district in which the respondent is located. In 2011, a proportional representation system was in place in 46 electoral districts and a majoritarian system in 83 districts. The 46 electoral districts of proportional representation were used to identify the electoral district to which residential blocks belong.

Interviewers recorded detailed sampling and refusal information on coversheets completed for up to three visits to each residence. The response rate of 75.18% is based on a total of 5,427 residences visited, of which 2,742 interviews were completed during the first three visits, with a response rate of 67.2%.

Unfortunately, Don't know and Refuse to Answers were coded as missing in the data, making it impossible to recover fully the percentage DK/RA vs. missing data. The analyses presented here treat all missing values as 'missing.'

## **Jordan 2014**

The 2014 Jordanian Post-Election Survey followed the country's 2013 parliamentary elections and was developed through collaboration between Professor Ellen Lust (University of

Gothenburg), Professor Lindsay Benstead (Portland State University), and Post-Doctoral Research Fellow Kristen Kao (University of Gothenburg), funded by the Moulay Hicham Foundation and Yale University. Local partnership with an experienced and highly reputable survey implementation firm, Middle East Marketing Consultants lead by Tony Sabbagh, facilitated the translation of the questionnaire into the local Arabic dialect, the creation of a complex sample design suitable for the needs of the study, the recruitment and training of a total of fifty enumerators and supervisors, and the swift and careful implementation of the survey in the field. Data collection was carried out from April 21, 2014 to April 28, 2014 employing tablet computers in face-to-face household interviews. The enumerators and supervisors<sup>[4]</sup> were trained for two days prior to the implementation of the survey, after which they were sent out into the field in teams of five (four enumerators to each supervisor). Every attempt was made to have data uploaded to the main database in Amman every evening over Internet, and Kristen Kao analyzed the results each evening to check for errors or inconsistencies.

The purpose of the study was to assess political attitudes and behaviors following parliamentary elections in 2013 among the target population of Jordanian citizens of voting age (18) or older. To ensure sampling of adequate numbers of respondents eligible to vote in either multimember or single-member electoral districts as well as adequate representation of rural,<sup>[5]</sup> tribal populations under-counted in conventional probability-proportional-to-size sampling, a purposive multistage stratified sampling design was used with electoral district as the primary sampling unit. Jordan's 45 electoral districts were stratified by region (north, central, and south),<sup>[6]</sup> size (small and large), and district type (multimember single non-transferable vote or single member plurality).<sup>[7]</sup> Twelve districts were selected, within which 25 households were randomly selected from blocks enumerated in the 2004 census. (See Table A.)

Once in the field, interviewers were instructed to stratify selection of respondents to obtain approximately equal numbers of male and female respondents, and to select newer buildings in all replacement interviews in an attempt to gain representation of respondents who live in buildings constructed after the 2004 census. Kish tables were used to select one eligible individual within each household at random. Due to the sampling design, results are likely to show clustering in responses. Attempting to weight the data based on inferences implying national representativeness are not recommended given the purposive sampling design, however data analyses should take stratification variables into account.

Interviewers recorded detailed sampling and refusal information on coversheets completed for up to two visits to each residence. Incomplete surveys in the dataset are the result of a variety of issues. Refusals, in which either the person answering the door or the participant selected by the Kish table refused to participate, make up one type of incomplete survey in the dataset. A survey in which the participant decided to stop participating halfway through the questionnaire constitutes another example of an incomplete interview. Towards the end of fielding, it became apparent that some of the surveys took 20 minutes or less for enumerators to complete. The

researchers conducting the project and the local partner concluded that these surveys were too short to be considered to be realistic, thus part of the final two days of the survey was spent replacing these surveys.[8]

A response rate of 79.8% is based on a total of 1,879 residences visited and 1,499 completed interviews. Among these visits, 7.3% interviews are incomplete due to empty, closed, or non-residential units; ineligible respondents; or other reasons. Another 13.6% are incomplete because respondents refused to participate in the survey. Finally, 12% of the interviews were marked incomplete because they fell short of the 20-minute threshold established to verify that the interviewer did not rush through the interview, so as to call the validity of the interview into question.

**Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics for the Electoral Districts in the Survey**

District	Region	Sntv	Seats	N Sample	% Sample
Ma'an 2	South	1	1	119	7.9
Tafileh 2	South	1	1	118	7.9
Ma'an 3	South	1	1	127	8.5
Tafileh 1	South	0	3	136	9.1
Zarqa 3	Central	1	1	127	8.5
Balqa 2	Central	1	1	124	8.3
Amman 4	Central	0	3	132	8.8
Amman 1	Central	0	5	114	7.6
Irbid 1	North	0	5	124	8.3
Ajloun 2	North	1	1	124	8.3
Irbid 8	North	1	1	128	8.5
Jerash	North	0	4	125	8.3

## **Libya 2013 “Second National Survey”**

The 2013 Libyan Post-Election Survey was developed by Lindsay Benstead (Associate Professor of Political Science at Portland State University), Ellen Lust (Professor of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg) and Jakob Wichmann (JMW Consulting). The survey was implemented on behalf of the National Democratic Institute by Diwan Market Research. The survey was funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Elections to the Libyan General National Congress were held on July 7, 2012. The purpose of the study was to assess political attitudes and behaviors among the target population of Libyan citizens of voting age (18) or older prior to parliamentary elections originally scheduled to be held in 2013. Elections to another interim parliament were held in 2014 instead (Inter-Parliamentary Union), but this is the second of three surveys that proceeded in 2013 as planned, despite postponement of the election.

After the interviewer training program, the face-to-face multi-topic survey was administered on paper by 159 interviewers supervised by 59 supervisors/controllers in the field between October 5 and October 23, 2013 to a nationally representative sample of 1112 eligible voters.

A multi-stage sampling design was used. Libya has 13 electoral circonscriptions and 75 sub-circonscriptions. At the first stage of selection, electoral districts were grouped according to population size, first stratified by Libya’s four regions, and selected with PPS, with the exception of oversampling to ensure sufficient subsamples in the Southern Region. The number of interviews within each of the 13 large circonscription was allocated to cities, of which 21 were selected, some rural and some urban. All population and demographic information were obtained from 2006 census reports. The units of the second stage of sampling were Libya’s 1,500 smallest administrative units, or mahallat (communes or neighborhoods), also selected by PPS. The midpoint of each Mahalla selected as the starting point, and interviewers in urban areas identified the first house on the street to the right, the fifth house on the second street, and so on, until respondents in ten households were interviewed, while in rural areas, one household was selected from each mahalla in the rural areas (cities) selected. Kish tables were used to select eligible individuals within households at random. Interviewers of either gender proceeded to interview the randomly-selected respondent, whether male or female. Interviewers recorded detailed sampling and refusal information on coversheets completed for up to seven visits per household, after which substitutions were made using the same method.

## **Tunisia 2012**

The 2012 Tunisian Post-Election Survey was developed by Lindsay Benstead (Associate Professor of Political Science at Portland State University) and Ellen Lust (Professor of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg). The survey was implemented in collaboration with Dhafer Malouche (Ecole Supérieure de la Statistique et de l’Analyse de l’Information), who

served as the survey manager, and Kaouther Ben Bchir, Imen Ben Khalifa, H la Mallek and Ibtihel Rebhi, who served as field supervisors. The survey was funded by generous contributions from the United States National Science Foundation, Portland State University, the Whitney and Betty MacMillan Center for International Studies at Yale University, the Luce Foundation, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the Center for Maghrib Studies in Tunis (CEMAT), and the Project on Middle East Political Science at George Washington University.

The purpose of the study was to assess political attitudes and behaviors among the target population of Tunisian citizens of voting age (18) or older at the time of fielding, in September 2012.

After a two-day interviewer training program, the face-to-face multi-topic survey was administered on paper in the field between October 7 and November 30, 2012. The survey team included sixty interviewers supervised by five controllers. They surveyed a nationally representative sample of 1,099 eligible Tunisian voters. Each interview lasted approximately 40 minutes.

Multi-stage sampling was used with electoral district (2011 boundaries) as the primary sampling unit (PSU) using the probability-proportional-to-size method (PPS). Tunisia's top-level administrative geographic areas are 24 governorates (Wilayat), represented by one electoral district, with the exception of three governorates with more than 630,000 inhabitants, each of which are divided into two electoral districts (Tunis I and II, Nabeul I and II and Sfax I and II). At the first stage of selection, electoral districts were grouped according to population size, stratified by the six economic regions of the country (Northwest, Northeast, Centralwest, Centraleast, Southwest, Southeast), as designated by the Ministère de l'Equipement, de l'Habitat et de l'Amenagement du Territoires.<sup>[1]</sup> All population and demographic information was obtained from 2004 census reports. The resulting random stratified sample consisted of 16 of 27 domestic electoral districts. The units of the second stage of sampling were Tunisia's 2,073 smallest administrative units, imadayat (*imada*, singular), or sectors (Bargaoui et al), which were first stratified by urban, or "non-communal" areas, made up of cities and medium-sized towns (75%), and rural, or "communal" (15%), areas, to maximize the precision of the sample within a PSU. Using PPS, 53 urban and 20 rural imadayat were selected. The third stage of selection was that of 2004 census blocks, also selected using PPS, aiming for an average cluster size of 15 residences. Within each block, interviewers selected a starting address at random from which to begin a random walk pattern to select households. Kish tables were used to select eligible individuals randomly within households. Interviewers of either gender proceeded to interview the selected respondent, whether male or female.

Interviewers recorded detailed sampling and refusal information on coversheets completed for up to three visits to each residence. The minimum response rate of 57.08% is based on a total of

2,106 residences visited, with 29.82 percent not completed due to empty, closed, or non-residential units; ineligible respondents; or other reasons and 13 percent refusal to participate (e.g. refusals). A comparison of the distribution of gender, age, level of education, and income in the sample with national estimates provided by the Tunisian census bureau indicates that the respondent pool is representative of the Tunisian population. Results reported are drawn from the data, weighted by demographic characteristics.

### **Tunisia 2015 Local Governance and Performance Index Survey (LGPI)**

The 2015 Local Governance Performance Index (LGPI) survey was developed by Lindsay Benstead (Assistant Professor of Political Science at Portland State University), Pierre Landry (Professor of Political Science at NYU-Shanghai) and Ellen Lust (Professor of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg). The survey was implemented in May 2015 as part of the Program on Governance and Local Development at Yale University, with funding from the Moulay Hicham Foundation and Yale University. Dhafer Malouche (Ecole Supérieure de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information) served as the survey manager, working in conjunction with MAZAM.

The purpose of the study was to assess governance and service delivery at the local level. It targeted Tunisian citizens of voting age (18 or older). The survey team was composed of 6 supervisors and 42 interviewers.

After the interviewer training program, the face-to-face multi-topic survey was administered in the field in May 2015 to a nationally representative sample.

A multi-stage sampling design was used to first select six governorates (Wilayat) by probability of selection proportional to size (PPS). Within governorates, the “delegation” that is the seat of the governorate was selected as a self-representing unit, while two other delegations were selected at random, also by PPS. We thus obtained a set of 18 municipalities/delegations as secondary sampling units (SSUs). Given the lack of updated census information below the SSU level, the selection of TSUs (defined as square half-arcminutes from a spatial grid) was conducted by gridding each municipality with the latest nightlight-data from the DMSP-OLS series. The light intensity of each pixel on the remote-sensing image was used as proxy for the relative population density within the municipality. Ten TSUs (and a backup unit) were drawn within each SSU. Finally, the enumerators were sent to 20 randomly selected coordinates within each TSU. Taking those as starting points and using instructions to conduct a random walk, enumerators reached and contacted the corresponding households. Within each household, computer tablets were used to select a final respondent through a “Kish grid” in order to select eligible individuals randomly within households. Interviewers of either gender proceeded to interview the randomly selected respondent, whether male or female and then administered the entire questionnaire using the tablet. This process resulted in 3,559 completed interviews.

## B. Operationalization of Demographic Variables

**Table B.1. Operationalization of Demographic Variables**

	<b>Weights</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Urban/Rural</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>Age</b>
Egypt	Egypt 2011: Not weighted  Egypt 2012: Weighted with wgt_normal and svy	Male/Female	Urban/Rural	<HS/>=HS  Recoded from scale 0-9 (No formal education - Higher education (Master's, PhD))  0-5 recoded as <HS 6-9 recoded as >= HS.	LOW: 1-30 HIGH: 31+
Libya 2013	Weighted	Male/Female	Urban = Large city, or Suburb of a large city  Rural = Rural or agricultural area	<Secondary />=Secondary	LOW: 1-30 HIGH: 31+
Tunisia	Weighted Tunisia 2012 Tunisia 2015	Male/Female	Urban/Rural	<HS />=HS	LOW: 1-30 HIGH: 31+
Jordan 2014	Not weighted	Male/Female	SNTV variable (Single Non-Transferable Vote)	Highest level of education completed.  LOW = 1. Never studied up to 7. Did not finish secondary school  High = 8. Completed secondary school up to 14. Completed a graduate degree	LOW: 1-30 HIGH: 31+

## **C. Correlation of Bribes and Wasta**

### **Tunisia 2015**

Q807. How useful are bribe payments to government officials to:

1. Obtain a job in the government sector
2. Obtain a job in the private sector

We find that the correlation between wasta and bribe usefulness for obtaining a job in the private sector to be 0.6593, and for obtaining a government job to be 0.7128.

### **Libya 2013**

Q507. How useful is wasta for you in dealing with government officials to:

1. Navigate the government bureaucracy (obtaining building permit, drivers' license, school registration, obtain medical treatment, avoid a fine etc.)
2. Obtain a job in the government sector

We find that the correlation between wasta and bribe usefulness for navigating the bureaucracy to be 0.2329 and for obtaining a government job to be -0.0421.

### **Jordan 2015**

Q801. Is wasta not useful at all, slightly useful, moderately useful, very useful, or essential in obtaining: [Read categories 1 to 5]

1. A building permit, drivers' license, school registration, etc.
2. A job in the government sector

Q802. Is making informal payments to government officials not useful, slightly useful, moderately useful, very useful, or essential in obtaining: [Read categories 1 to 5]

1. A building permit, drivers' license, school registration, etc.
2. A job in the government sector

We find that the correlation between wasta and bribe usefulness for obtaining services to be 0.3450 and for obtaining a government job to be 0.2716.

## D. Tables Underlying Figures Presented

**Table D.1. Parliamentarian Responses based on Voter Allegiances**

Percentages saying Parliamentarians Respond to...										
Country	Question	Overall	Male/Female		Urban/Rural		Low/High Education		Age 30-/30+	
<b>Egypt 2011</b>	Those who vote for them	39%	38%	39%	36%	42%	41%	38%	38%	39%
	Friend or family member	58%	57%	58%	57%	59%	60%	57%	53%	60%
<b>Jordan 2014</b>	Those who vote for them	53%	53%	52%	50%	55%	48%	56%	53%	53%
	Members of tribe or family	74%	77%	71%	76%	73%	71%	76%	74%	74%
	Friend	75%	77%	74%	75%	75%	71%	78%	77%	74%
<b>Tunisia 2012</b>	Those who vote for them	31%	30%	32%	32%	18%	33%	30%	34%	30%
	Members family or friend	35%	33%	37%	34%	22%	38%	33%	37%	35%

Note: The remaining %s include DK/RA as well as those who disagree completely or disagree. The wording for the questions in each country was as follows.

### Precise Question Wording for Questions Presented in Table D.1:

In Egypt: Please tell me on a scale of zero to ten, where zero is you do not agree at all and ten is agree completely, with the following statement: a parliamentarian responds more quickly to someone who is a friend or family member than to an ordinary citizen in the district. The response is coded as “agree” if it is an 8, 9 or 10 on this scale.

In Jordan: Would you say that you strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree with the following statements: 1. A parliamentarian responds more quickly to someone who voted for him/her than to someone who did not vote for him/her. 2. A parliamentarian responds more quickly to someone who is a member of his or her asheerah (tribe) or a'ilah (family) than to another citizen. 3. A parliamentarian responds more quickly to someone who is a friend than to another citizen.

In Tunisia: 1. For the following statements, please tell me whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree: A parliamentarian responds more quickly to someone who is a friend or family member than to an ordinary citizen in the district. (Would you say you strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree?) 2. For the following statements, please tell me whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree: A parliamentarian responds more quickly to someone who is a friend or family member than to an ordinary citizen in the district. (Would you say you strongly disagree, disagree, agree, or strongly agree?) The respondent answers were coded as interesting if they answered agree or strongly agree on the question.

**Table D.2. The Public's View of Parliamentarians' Roles**

<b>Which task is most important for Deputies/MPs to devote the largest amount of time and energy to?</b>										
<b>Country</b>	<b>Question</b>	<b>Overall</b>	<b>Male/Female</b>		<b>Urban/Rural</b>		<b>Low/High Education</b>		<b>Age 30-/30+</b>	
Egypt 2011	Provide services	30%	26%	35%	23%	38%	38%	24%	33%	29%
	Legislate	33%	38%	27%	37%	28%	24%	40%	32%	34%
	Public/Club goods	33%	32%	34%	35%	31%	36%	32%	32%	34%
Jordan 2014	Provide services	24%	26%	22%	26%	23%	26%	22%	26%	22%
	Legislate	15%	15%	15%	15%	15%	14%	16%	13%	16%
	Public/Club goods	30%	28%	32%	30%	30%	28%	31%	29%	31%

Precise Question Wording for Questions Presented in Table D.2:

In Egypt: Here is a list of some activities that occupy members of the People's Assembly as part of their jobs. Please tell me which of the five tasks is most important for deputies to devote the largest amount of their time and energy. 1) To obtain funds to finance projects in your electoral constituency, for example, funds for hospitals or schools. 2) To legislate, modify, propose or discuss proposed laws. 3) To provide services to citizens of the electoral constituency. 4) To

inform citizens of their legislative work and their work in the district. 5) To organize meetings with members of the parties. 6) Country stability. 7) Consider high prices and work to reduce it. 8) All the above.

In Jordan: Which of these activities do you think MPs of your district should spend the most time on? Should they spend most of their time on: 1. Organizing meetings with members and leaders of their parties 2. Obtaining funds for projects in your electoral constituency (e.g., hospitals or schools), 3. Legislating or discussing laws 4. Providing individual services to citizens of the electoral constituency (e.g. obtain licenses, find jobs, educate children, etc.). 5. Informing citizens of their work in the legislature and their districts. Don't know/Refuse to answer was 14%.

**Table D.3. Reasons that Voters Support Candidates/Party in the Recent Election?**

What was the most important reason you voted for this candidate/Party in the recent election?										
Country	Questions	Overall	Male/Female		Urban/Rural		Low/High Education		Age 30-/30+	
<b>Egypt 2012*</b>	Candidate is focused on religion	20%	19%	21%	19%	20%	20%	19%	19%	20%
	Friends and family voted for the Candidate	15%	9%	24%	12%	17%	23%	9%	14%	16%
	Candidate provides services to my area	11%	12%	9%	11%	11%	11%	10%	9%	12%
	Candidate is from my area	10%	11%	10%	8%	12%	12%	9%	11%	10%
<b>Egypt 2012*</b>	Party is focused on religion	29%	28%	30%	26%	31%	31%	27%	29%	29%
	Friends and family voted for the party	14%	7%	23%	12%	15%	21%	7%	12%	15%
	Party provides services to my area	4%	5%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%
	Party is from my area	4%	4%	3%	3%	4%	4%	3%	4%	4%
<b>Libya 2013</b>	Party is focused on religion	12%	14%	10%	12%	13%	4%	14%	12%	12%
	Friends and family voted for the party	11%	11%	10%	12%	6%	7%	11%	9%	12%

	Party provides services to my area	14%	16%	13%	15%	14%	9%	16%	15%	14%
	Party is from my area	10%	12%	9%	10%	11%	7%	11%	11%	10%
<b>Jordan 2014</b>	Candidate is supported by your local religious leader or imam	61%	57%	65%	63%	60%	63%	60%	60%	61%
	Family or tribe voted for the candidate	72%	70%	73%	69%	74%	74%	70%	72%	71%
	Candidate provides services to my area	89%	89%	90%	88%	90%	90%	89%	89%	90%
	Candidate is from my village or neighborhood	64%	63%	64%	59%	67%	67%	62%	63%	64%
<b>Tunisia 2012</b>	Candidate/party connected to Islamic party	54%	54%	54%	53%	49%	61%	46%	58%	52%
	Friends and family voted for the party/candidate	36%	27%	44%	34%	44%	45%	26%	34%	37%
	Party provides services to my area	82%	82%	82%	83%	89%	84%	79%	84%	81%
	Party is from my area	40%	38%	41%	40%	50%	49%	30%	38%	41%

Note: In Egypt the respondents could chose only one reason but in the other surveys they were allowed to choose multiple options.

#### Precise Question Wording for Questions Presented in Table D.3:

In Egypt there were two questions, one about party and one about candidate. The question were: What was the most important reason you voted for this party in the recent People's Assembly elections? 1. I like the party's program 2. The party is focused on religion 3. My family/friends vote for this party 4. Party is close to or supported by powerful family or big man (kibir) in the area 5. Party leader has personality/charisma 6. List contained candidate from my village or neighborhood 7. List contains candidate that provides services to my area 8. Party organization is able to get things done. 9. The party represents the clear break with the past and will guard against return of old regime 10. Party will help assure Egypt's strong role in the international community

In Egypt, What was the most important reason you voted for this candidate in the recent People's Assembly elections? I like the candidate's platform 1. The candidate is focused on religion 2. My

family/friends vote for this candidate 3. Candidate is close to or supported by powerful family or big man (kibir) in the area 4. Candidate has personality/charisma 5. The candidate is from my village or neighborhood 6. Candidate supports my area/provides services to my area 7. The candidate is able to get things done. 8. The candidate represents a clear break from the past and will guard against return of old regime 9. The candidate will help assure Egypt's strong role in the international community 10. The candidate is supported by political parties that I trust.

In Libya, On a scale of 1 to 9, 1 being completely unimportant and 9 being very important, how important were the different elements in shaping your opinion of which party to vote for? 1. I like the party's program, 2. The party is focused on religion 3. My family/friends vote for this party, 4. Party is close to or supported by powerful family/tribe in the area, 5. Party leader has personality/charisma, 6. List contained candidate from my village or neighborhood, 7. List contains candidate that provides services to my area, 8. Party organization is able to get things done, 9. The party represents the clear break with the past and will guard against return of old regime, 10. Party will help assure Libya's strong role in the international community. An answer between five and nine is coded as important. Don't know/Refuse to answer was 2: 18%, 3: 24% 7: 19%, 6: 20%. Note: Coded as important if respondent answered 6-9 on the nine-point scale.

In Jordan: Which of the following factors do you consider when deciding to vote for 1. Candidate is supported by your family or tribe, 2. Candidate is someone you know personally, 3. Candidate is from your village or neighborhood, 4. Candidate provides services to your area, 6. Candidate is supported by your local religious leader or imam. Don't know/Refuse to answer was: supported by family or tribe: 2% the candidate is from my area 2 %. Candidate provides services to your area 1% and candidate is supported by your local religious leader or imam 4 %. 6. Was interpreted as a candidate focused on religion.

In Tunisia 2012: For each of the following, please tell me whether it is a factor when you consider which party or candidate you vote for in parliamentary elections: 1. Candidate/party is connected to an Islamic party, 2. My family/friends vote for this party or candidate, 3. List contained candidate who provides services to my area, 4. List contained candidate from my village or neighborhood.

**Table D.4 Percent Saying Each Factor is More important than Experience and Qualifications in Obtaining a Government Job**

Percent Saying Each Factor is More important than Experience and Qualifications in Obtaining a Government Job											
Country	Question		Overall	Male/Female		Urban/Rural		Low/High Education		Age 30-/30+	
Egypt 2012	More important	A person's political affiliations	30%	32%	27%	27%	32%	31%	29%	28%	31%
		A person's personal network, relation to influential people	50%	52%	48%	51%	49%	49%	51%	50%	50%
		A person's family or tribal affiliation	43%	45%	40%	43%	43%	43%	42%	42%	42%
Jordan 2014	More important	A person's political affiliations	26%	24%	27%	24%	27%	28%	24%	24%	327%
		A person's personal network	48%	48%	47%	44%	46%	49%	51%	47%	48%
		A person's family or tribal affiliation	42%	43%	42%	40%	44%	41%	44%	41%	44%
Libya 2013	More important	A person's political affiliations	20%	20%	20%	20%	19%	14%	22%	17%	23%
		A person's personal network, relation to influential people	26%	25%	27%	26%	26%	18%	28%	27%	26%
		A person's family or tribal affiliation	20%	21%	20%	20%	22%	12%	22%	17%	23%

#### Precise Question Wording for Questions Presented in Table D.4:

In Jordan: In obtaining a government job in Jordan, is a person's professional qualifications and experience more important, equally important, or less important than 1. A person's political affiliations 2. A person's family or tribal affiliation 3. A person's personal network. Don't know / Refuse to answer: 1.=7% 2.= 5% 3.=5%. 36% answered "as important" on "A person's political affiliations", 34% on "A person's personal network, relation to influential people", and 29% on "A person's family or tribal affiliation".

Libya: What is the importance of a person's professional qualifications in obtaining a government job in Libya relative to other factors? Please indicate whether each is more important, equally important, or less important as a person's experience and professional qualifications? 1. A person's political affiliations 2. A person's personal network, relation to influential people 3. A person's family or tribal affiliation. Don't know / Refuse to answer: 1.=2% 2.= 3% 3.=3%. In Libya 2013a, age is 35 years and less/36 years and more. 25% answered "as important" on "A person's political affiliations", 26% on "A person's personal network, relation to influential people", and 21% on "A person's family or tribal affiliation".

In Tunisia: What is the importance of a person's professional qualifications in obtaining a government job in Tunisia relative to other factors? Please indicate whether each is more important, equally important, or less important as a person's experience and professional qualifications. 1. A person's political affiliations 2. A person's personal network, relation to influential people 3. A person's family or tribal affiliation Don't know / Refuse to answer: 1.=0% 2.= 0% 3.=0%. 19% answered "as important" on "A person's political affiliations", 25% on "A person's personal network, relation to influential people", and 23% on "A person's family or tribal affiliation".

In Egypt 2012: What is the importance of a person's professional qualifications in obtaining a government job in Egypt relative to other factors? Please indicate whether each is more important, equally important, or less important as a person's experience and professional qualifications. 1. A person's political affiliations 2. A person's personal network, relation to influential people 3. A person's family or tribal affiliation. 14% answered "as important" on "A person's political affiliations", 13% on "A person's personal network, relation to influential people", and 14% on "A person's family or tribal affiliation".

**Table D.5. Percentage Saying “Wasta” is Very Useful or Essential in Obtaining Services and Government Jobs**

Percentage Saying “Wasta” is Very Useful or Essential in Obtaining Services and Government Jobs										
Country	Question	Overall	Male/Female		Urban/Rural		Low/High Education		Age >30/<30	
Egypt 2011	Government Services*	44%	43%	44%	44%	43%	43%	45%	42%	44%
	Government Job	46%	45%	48%	46%	45%	44%	47%	45%	46%
Jordan 2014	Government Services	53%	55%	50%	53%	53%	50%	55%	55%	52%
	Government Job	66%	68%	64%	65%	67%	63%	68%	70%	63%
Tunisia 2012	Government Services	36%	37%	36%	39%	30%	39%	30%	38%	35%
	Government Job	37%	38%	38%	40%	31%	37%	38%	38%	36%

\* Question included several answers that are correlated ( $r > .90$  for all pairwise correlations in Egypt), so we report here the percent who say that wasta is very useful or essential in all areas.

Precise Question Wording for Questions Presented in Table D.5:

In Egypt: How important is wasta for your obtaining: Building permit, drivers’ license, job in gov’t sector, resolve a problem in the health or education system. In Libya: How useful is wasta for you in dealing with government officials to: (1) Navigate the government bureaucracy (obtaining building permit, driver’s license, school registration, obtain medical treatment, avoid a fine etc.). (2) Obtain a job in the government sector.

In Tunisia 2012: How useful is wasta for you to: 1. Navigate the government bureaucracy (obtaining building permit, driver’s license, school registration, etc.) 2. Obtain a job in the government sector. Answer categories were: 1. Not useful 2. Slightly useful 3. Moderately useful

4. Very useful 5. Essential 96. DK 97. RA. The answer was coded as important if the respondent answered very useful or essential.

In Jordan: Is *wasta* not useful at all, slightly useful, moderately useful, very useful, or essential in obtaining 1. A building permit, driver's' license, school registration, etc. 3% DK/RA 2. A job in the government sector. DK/RA 4%

**Table D.6. Importance of Informal Payments/Bribes**

<b>How Useful are Informal Payments in Obtaining Services?</b>										
<b>Country</b>	<b>Question</b>	<b>Overall</b>	<b>Male/Female</b>		<b>Urban/Rural</b>		<b>Low/High Education</b>		<b>Age 30-/30+</b>	
Egypt 2011	Bribes very useful or essential	30%	29%	30%	28%	31%	27%	31%	29%	30%
<b>Jordan 2014</b>	Bribes very useful or essential	16%	18%	14%	18%	14%	16%	16%	18%	15%
<b>Tunisia 2012</b>	Bribes very useful or essential	38%	39%	37%	39%	45%	34%	44%	36%	38%

Precise Question Wording for Questions Presented in Table D.6:

In Jordan: Is making informal payments to government officials not useful, slightly useful, moderately useful, very useful, or essential in obtaining 1. a building permit, drivers' license, school registration etc.? 2. a job in the government sector? If answer was either very useful or essential, they are coded as "Bribes very useful or essential". Don't know and Refuse to answer in the merged variable was 7%.

In Egypt: How useful is it for you to make informal additional payments to government officials to obtain. 1. Building permit 2. Driver's license 3. A job in the government sector 4. Resolve a problem in the health or education system. Answers were on a Essential, Very useful, moderately useful, slightly useful, not useful DK and RA scale.

In Tunisia: I am going to read several statements about events that occur sometimes. When I read them to you), please think about your own experience and tell me whether you agree completely, agree, disagree or disagree completely? 1. People like me have to pay **bribes** for medical treatment in the local clinics and hospitals. 2. Parents have to pay bribes for their children to be

enrolled in the best public primary or secondary schools 3. In the municipality, officials receive kickbacks for construction permits. 4. In order to get a job in the government in this area, people have to pay a bribe. Don't know and Refuse to answer in the merged variable was 4%.

**Table D.7. Importance of Informal Payments, Egypt 2012.**

The Need to Pay Bribes in Egypt 2012									
	Over all	Male/Female		Urban/Rural		Low/High Education		Age 30-/30+	
To get land	69%	69%	69%	69%	69%	67%	71%	69%	69%
To get health care	64%	64%	64%	66%	63%	63%	66%	64%	64%
To get better education	60%	60%	60%	64%	58%	60%	61%	60%	60%
To get a gov't job	72%	72%	73%	73%	72%	70%	74%	72%	72%
In my municipality, officials receive kickbacks from construction permits	70%	71%	70%	73%	69%	68%	73%	70%	71%

Precise Question Wording for Questions Presented in Table D.7:

In Egypt: I am going to read several statements about events that occur sometimes. When I read them to you, please think about your own experience and tell me how much you agree with each statement. That is to say, you agree completely, you agree somewhat, you disagree or you disagree completely. 1. People have to pay bribes in order to obtain a land title 2. People like me have to bribe to receive medical treatment in the districts' hospitals. 3. Parents have to pay bribes to teachers for their children to be better attended at the primary school nearest to my house. 4. In my local municipality, officials receive kickbacks in exchange for approval of construction permits. 5. In order to get a job in the government, people have to pay a bribe

**Questions used in Indices of Experiences with and Perceptions of Corruption**

Questions incorporated into the additive, normalized index on corruption experiences included 1) Did any politician or representative offer you gifts, money, or access to services for your vote? 2) Agreement with "I paid a bribe in order to get a better treatment" for patients of municipal clinics or doctors, 3) Have you been a victim of corruption by a local government official in the past year? 4) Has anyone else in your immediate family been a victim of corruption in the past year?

Questions incorporated into the additive, normalized index included 1) Do many of the politicians in your community try to buy votes with gifts, money, or access to services? 2) Would you say there are none, a few, or many families eligible for government subsidies/assistance in this municipality that are unable to obtain it? 3) Do you believe that there households that receive subsidies but who are not poor? Would you say there are none, a few, or many such cases? 4) How useful are bribe payments to government officials to obtain a job in the government sector? 5) When there is a corruption case going on in your governorate, how serious do you think the government deals with the case?

**Table D.8. Reasons for Choosing the MP to Turn to for Assistance**

Reason for Contacting Specific Deputy										
Country	Question	Overall	Male/Female		Urban/Rural		Low/High Education		Age 30-/30+	
Jordan 2014	A member of your tribe or family	41 %	43%	40%	37%	44%	38%	44%	43%	41%
	A member of the party you support	12%	9%	16%	17%	10%	14%	11%	14%	10%
	Someone you knew through a previous connection	36%	40%	31%	39%	34%	36%	35%	37%	34%

Note: These are percentages only of those who contacted an MP, and thus the Ns are small.

Precise Question Wording for Questions Presented in Table D.8:

In Jordan the question reads: Why did you contact this deputy specifically (speaking of the most recent time)? Was it because he/she is: 1. A member of your tribe or family 2. A member of the party you support 3. Someone you knew through a previous connection (e.g. friend, business, association, etc.)? In Jordan, the N=564 and the Don't know/Refuse to answer for each question is 1: 1%, 2: 2%, 3: 1%.

**Table D.9. The ability to obtain Service, wave II**

Ability to obtain certain services: Appropriate medical treatment in a nearby clinic or public (government) hospital	Number of cases	% Total
Very easy	1 64	12.8%
Easy	3 968	31.0%
Difficult	3 453	27.0%
Very difficult	1 79	14.0%
I have not tried	467	3.6%
I don't know	57	0.4%
Declined to answer	20	0.2%
Missing	5	0.0%
Not asked	1 388	10.9%
(N)	12787	100%
<i>Selected Samples: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen (12787)</i>		

**Table D.10. The ability to file a complaint, wave III**

"I will ask some questions about your ability to obtain certain services. Based on your actual experience, how difficult or easy is it to Access the relevant official to file a complaint when you feel that your rights have been violated"													
Answer/ Country	Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Sudan	Tunisia	Egypt	Yemen	Total
Very easy	1%	7%	6%	14%	9%	4%	5%	3%	6%	7%	1%	4%	6%
Easy	15%	25%	23%	20%	47%	16%	12%	14%	21%	14%	7%	11%	18%
Difficult	25%	25%	24%	17%	23%	24%	19%	29%	20%	18%	23%	17%	22%
Very difficult	29%	16%	16%	23%	6%	35%	24%	23%	33%	20%	31%	28%	24%
I have not tried	27%	27%	28%	26%	15%	20%	37%	28%	20%	40%	34%	37%	28%
Don't know	2%	1%	3%	1%	1%	1%	2%	3%	1%	1%	4%	3%	2%
Refuse	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

**Table D.11. The ability to get help from the Police, wave III**

"I will ask some questions about your ability to obtain certain services. Based on your actual experience, how difficult or easy is it to obtain Assistance from public security (the police) when needed."													
Answer\ Country	Algeria	Palestine	Iraq	Jordan	Kuwait	Lebanon	Libya	Morocco	Sudan	Tunisia	Egypt	Yemen	Total
Very easy	26%	14%	14%	44%	36%	11%	5%	6%	18%	9%	1%	6%	17%
Easy	51%	45%	44%	28%	48%	25%	14%	28%	36%	20%	8%	20%	30%
Difficult	5%	13%	14%	6%	11%	21%	20%	30%	17%	15%	31%	21%	17%
Very difficult	1%	6%	5%	4%	2%	23%	16%	16%	13%	14%	26%	18%	12%
I have not tried	15%	21%	20%	18%	3%	20%	44%	19%	15%	41%	32%	35%	24%
Don't know	1%	1%	2%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%	1%	3%	1%	1%
Refuse	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

## **E. Multivariate Analyses and Results**

### **Multivariate Regression Analysis**

In this appendix we present multivariate regression analysis to supplement the analysis presented in the main report. We report these results by country. For each set of analyses, we briefly discuss the main findings. For all analyses, we include as independent variables the following key demographic variables: gender, age, household income, education, and rural/urban. The precise way in which variables are measured varies across countries due to different question wording and/or data availability. Wherever possible we ensure that the same variables are included (at least conceptually) in each model. These models are not intended to present causal relationship; given that none of the data is identified, these models present correlations rather than predictions.

### **Egypt 2012**

For Egypt, we ran a series of logit analyses. First, we find that the only significant correlate of the (perceived) effectiveness of partisanship, networks, and tribal identity for obtaining a government job is gender: men are significantly more likely to believe these factors are important for obtaining a government job. See Table 1. In terms of party preferences, we find that men are significantly less likely to support a party because their family and friends support it, but that they are more likely to support a party if the party is from their area. Those with less than a high school education are significantly more likely to support the party that their friends and family support. See Table 2. In terms of candidate preferences, we find that men are once again significantly less likely to support the candidate that their friends and family support. Those from rural areas are more likely to support their friend and family's candidate and to support a candidate from their area. Once again, those with less than a high school education are more likely to support a candidate that their friends and family support. See Table 3.

We find that the most robust correlates of believing a bribe is important are education and income. Those who have less than a high school education are significantly less likely to believe that bribes are important in order to obtain land, health care, kickbacks, or a job. Those who make less than LE600 are significantly less likely to believe bribes are important for obtaining land, better education, kickbacks, or a job. In addition, those from rural areas are less likely to see bribes as important in education. See Table 4.

Table 1: Logit Regressions: Usefulness of Partisanship, Networks, and Tribe/Family for Obtaining a Government Job

	Political Affiliation	Networks	Tribe/Family
Male	0.265** (0.112)	0.180** (0.082)	0.216** (0.096)
Rural	0.262 (0.157)	-0.076 (0.102)	-0.038 (0.095)
Less than High School	0.141 (0.090)	-0.048 (0.090)	0.075 (0.086)
30 and Younger	-0.081 (0.078)	0.058 (0.079)	-0.021 (0.076)
Income $\leq$ 600 LE	-0.167 (0.141)	-0.061 (0.105)	0.067 (0.105)
Constant	-1.109*** (0.158)	-0.046 (0.095)	-0.438*** (0.097)
N	3288	3436	3363

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Dependent variables = 1 if respondent believe the relevant factor is important and 0 otherwise.

Table 2: Logit Regressions of the Party Characteristics that Correlate with Party Vote Choice

	Religious	Friends Support	From My Area	Provides Services
Male	-0.049 (0.104)	-1.198*** (0.114)	0.571** (0.281)	0.160 (0.260)
Rural	0.209* (0.112)	0.132 (0.180)	-0.036 (0.292)	-0.159 (0.282)
Less than High School	0.153 (0.117)	1.290*** (0.174)	0.331 (0.281)	-0.132 (0.314)
30 and Younger	0.050 (0.106)	0.063 (0.184)	0.039 (0.267)	0.004 (0.261)
Income $\leq$ 600 LE	0.080 (0.123)	0.160 (0.151)	-0.017 (0.265)	0.186 (0.250)
Constant	-1.143*** (0.131)	-2.234*** (0.166)	-3.812*** (0.318)	-3.121*** (0.243)
N	2348	2348	2348	2348

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Dependant variables = 1 if the respondent said the relevant factor was important, 0 otherwise.

Table 3: Logit Regressions of the Characteristics that Correlate with Candidate Vote Choice

	Religious	Friends Support	From My Area	Provides Services
Male	-0.083 (0.118)	-1.071*** (0.161)	0.195 (0.175)	0.265 (0.170)
Rural	0.119 (0.135)	0.302** (0.138)	0.362* (0.212)	-0.003 (0.148)
Less than High School	-0.013 (0.140)	1.067*** (0.191)	0.242 (0.182)	0.168 (0.166)
30 and Younger	-0.118 (0.145)	0.170 (0.123)	0.069 (0.219)	-0.211 (0.200)
Income $\leq$ 600 LE	0.074 (0.128)	0.095 (0.136)	-0.006 (0.192)	0.031 (0.179)
Constant	-1.428*** (0.170)	-2.054*** (0.155)	-2.635*** (0.246)	-2.293*** (0.184)
N	2124	2124	2124	2124

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Dependant variables = 1 if the respondent said the relevant factor was important, 0 otherwise.

Table 4: Logit Regressions: Bribe Usage

	Land	Health	Teachers	Kickbacks	Job
Male	-0.011 (0.082)	0.004 (0.089)	-0.001 (0.081)	0.020 (0.086)	-0.032 (0.094)
Rural	-0.006 (0.151)	-0.121 (0.128)	-0.253** (0.124)	-0.159 (0.144)	-0.034 (0.143)
Less than High School	-0.198** (0.097)	-0.155* (0.092)	0.014 (0.087)	-0.190* (0.106)	-0.190* (0.104)
30 and Younger	-0.066 (0.084)	-0.075 (0.072)	-0.038 (0.073)	-0.098 (0.080)	-0.044 (0.069)
Income $\leq$ 600 LE	-0.240* (0.138)	-0.164 (0.134)	-0.223* (0.121)	-0.244* (0.143)	-0.258* (0.146)
Constant	1.041*** (0.152)	0.849*** (0.142)	0.667*** (0.118)	1.208*** (0.158)	1.228*** (0.144)
N	3448	3520	3527	3482	3499

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Dependant variables = 1 if the respondent said that bribes were important in the relevant area, 0 otherwise.

## Libya 2013

The majority of the analysis uses ordered logit because the dependent variables are ordinal scales. However, the analysis reported in Table 9 uses basic logit. In Table 5, we find that the only variable that significantly correlated with perceptions of the usefulness of *wasta* is rural context. We find that those from rural areas are significantly less likely to believe *wasta* is important for obtaining services.

In Table 6, we find fairly consistent effects for the correlation of a number of variables with the usefulness of partisanship, networks, and tribal identity for obtaining a government job. We find that compared to the lowest income bracket (less than LD500), those who make between LD500-999 are significantly less likely to believe that these three factors are important for obtaining a government job. However, those who have at least a secondary education are significantly more likely to view these factors as important for obtaining a government job, when compared to those who have a primary education or less. Finally, those with an income between LD1000-1999 are significantly less likely to believe that partisanship matters for obtaining a government job, when compared to those in the lowest income bracket.

Considering bribes, we find that compared to the lowest income bracket, those who make between LD500-999 are significantly less likely to view bribes as important for obtaining services. Women are significantly more likely to believe that bribes are important for obtaining services. In terms of obtaining a job, we find that those with at least a secondary education are significantly more likely to view bribes as important in order to get a job, when compared to those with only a primary education or less. And finally, the rural are significantly less likely to view bribes as important in the job market. See Table 7 (note that dependent variables in this table increase in the importance of each with regards to using bribes to obtain the target good, either services or a job).

Now turning to vote choice, we only find that income matters and that income only correlates with preferences for one of the five candidate characteristics: tribe. The results show that those who earn between LD500-1999 are significantly less likely to rate a candidate's tribe as important for their vote choice, when compared to those in the lowest income bracket. See Table 8 for these results. It is important to note that each dependent variable in Table 8 increases in the importance that respondents place on each characteristic of a candidate when decided how to vote.

And finally, we used logit regression analysis to obtain a demographic picture of which type of people seek help from an MP and who is most likely to contact an MP because that MP is a family member<sup>10</sup>. See Table 9. We find that the higher educated are more likely to seek help from an MP, and women are significantly less likely to do so. We find no significant effects correlation regarding who is more likely to contact an MP who is a family member.

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<sup>10</sup> We do have data on a variety of other reasons regarding why an individual sought help from an MP, but the N for all other reasons is too small to conduct reliable multivariate regression analysis.

Table 5: Ordered Logit Regressions: Usefulness of Wasta

	Services	Job
Age	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.006)
LD 500-999	-0.285 (0.255)	-0.290 (0.230)
LD 1000-1999	-0.160 (0.293)	-0.256 (0.239)
LD 2000-2999	0.353 (0.337)	0.257 (0.277)
Rural	-1.060** (0.398)	-0.440 (0.346)
Secondary Education	0.288 (0.225)	0.286 (0.243)
Bachelor's Degree or Higher	0.106 (0.258)	0.168 (0.267)
Female	0.149 (0.158)	0.204 (0.143)
N	921	1035

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Dependent variables increase in the importance of wasta.

Table 6: Ordered Logit Regressions: Usefulness of Partisanship, Networks, and Tribe/Family for Obtaining a Government Job

	Political Affiliation	Networks	Tribe/Family
Age	0.006 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)
LD 500-999	-0.598*** (0.181)	-0.493** (0.174)	-0.421* (0.196)
LD 1000-1999	-0.543** (0.229)	-0.112 (0.217)	-0.333 (0.219)
LD 2000-2999	-0.324 (0.336)	0.293 (0.366)	0.238 (0.322)
Rural	-0.260 (0.298)	-0.225 (0.342)	-0.054 (0.320)
Secondary Education	0.747* (0.376)	0.831* (0.396)	0.678* (0.368)
Bachelor's Degree or Higher	1.130** (0.421)	0.967* (0.464)	0.957** (0.433)
Female	-0.052 (0.159)	0.071 (0.147)	-0.098 (0.159)
N	892	888	871

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Dependent variables increase in the importance of each with regards to obtaining a government job

Table 7: Ordered Logit Regressions: Bribe Usage

	Services	Job
Age	0.006 (0.006)	-0.002 (0.007)
LD 500-999	-0.369* (0.197)	-0.098 (0.195)
LD 1000-1999	-0.253 (0.217)	-0.127 (0.241)
LD 2000-2999	0.298 (0.267)	0.089 (0.198)
Rural	-0.247 (0.420)	-1.050** (0.378)
Secondary/Diploma	-0.168 (0.246)	0.289 (0.167)
Bachelors Degree or higher	-0.228 (0.249)	0.564** (0.211)
Female	0.280* (0.151)	0.033 (0.164)
N	998	741

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Table 8: Ordered Logit Regressions of the Characteristics that Correlate with Candidate Vote Choice

	Religion	Tribe	Friends Support	From My Area	Provides Services
Age	0.003 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.007 (0.009)
LD 500-999	-0.066 (0.277)	-0.446** (0.176)	0.222 (0.256)	-0.007 (0.350)	-0.386 (0.324)
LD 1000-1999	-0.055 (0.263)	-0.476* (0.265)	-0.064 (0.357)	-0.169 (0.432)	-0.065 (0.319)
LD 2000-2999	0.119 (0.281)	-0.439 (0.304)	0.104 (0.415)	0.559 (0.503)	0.409 (0.396)
Rural	0.733 (0.464)	0.469 (0.282)	-0.659 (0.404)	0.381 (0.512)	0.716 (0.737)
Secondary/Diploma	0.019 (0.237)	-0.245 (0.300)	0.110 (0.396)	-0.080 (0.297)	0.290 (0.312)
Bachelors Degree or higher	-0.012 (0.287)	-0.442 (0.300)	0.147 (0.431)	-0.232 (0.276)	-0.306 (0.328)
Female	-0.013 (0.219)	0.234 (0.194)	0.153 (0.246)	-0.157 (0.267)	0.151 (0.252)
N	356	701	333	349	352

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Table 9: Logit Regressions: MP Engagement

	Seek Help from MP	Contact Family MP
Age	0.014 (0.011)	-0.136 (0.074)
LD 500-999	-0.557 (0.539)	-0.468 (1.054)
LD 1000-1999	-0.847 (0.699)	0.000 (.)
LD 2000-2999	0.485 (0.452)	-1.258 (1.410)
Rural	-0.509 (0.525)	0.000 (.)
Secondary/Diploma	3.104*** (0.975)	1.413 (1.033)
Bachelors degree or higher	3.360*** (1.037)	0.000 (.)
Female	-0.719* (0.373)	2.625 (1.484)
Constant	-6.161*** (1.200)	2.493 (2.763)
N	925	27

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

## Jordan 2014

The analysis below is mostly composed of ordered logit, but a few models are run using logit. Once again, we use ordered logit because many dependent variables are ordinal scales. Regarding wasta, we find that older individuals and middle income individuals are significantly less likely to see wasta as important in obtaining services or a job. In addition, the upper income bracket is less likely and tribal members are more likely to see wasta as important for obtaining a job. See Table 10.

The results in Table 11 regarding the usefulness of partisanship, networks and tribe/family in obtaining a government job are mixed. Those in the middle income bracket are more likely to see networks and tribe/family as important for obtaining a government job. Tribal members see political affiliation and networks as important. Those with an associates degree are more likely to see networks as important while those with a university degree or higher are less likely to feel that way. Finally, older individuals are more likely to see tribe/family as important for obtaining a government job.

While a large number of demographic variables correlate with vote choice, a few stand out as key. First, those with at least an associates degree are less likely to see tribe/family, origin of candidate, and knowing the candidate personally as important for their vote choice. Further, tribal members are significantly more likely to see those factors and the religiousness of the candidate as important to their vote choice. See Table 12.

We find that demographic variables do not tend to correlate with whom respondents feel parliamentarians are most likely to respond. However, we do find that those in the middle income bracket, those with an associates degree, and tribal members are more likely to believe that parliamentarians are more likely to respond to supporters (those who voted for the candidates). See Table 13.

Finally, we turn to bribes in Table 14. We find that older respondents are less likely and tribal members are more likely to report that bribes are important for obtaining both services and jobs. In addition, those in the middle income bracket place a higher degree of importance on bribes in order to obtain a job.

Table 10: Ordered Logit Regressions: Usefulness of Wasta

	Services	Job
Age	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.017*** (0.005)
Income: Middle	-0.206** (0.101)	-0.294** (0.135)
Income: Upper	-0.233 (0.216)	-0.317* (0.186)
SNTV	-0.062 (0.128)	-0.125 (0.128)
Middle School	-0.200 (0.265)	-0.127 (0.259)
High School	-0.009 (0.274)	-0.083 (0.265)
Associate Degree	0.040 (0.231)	-0.115 (0.169)
University of higher	0.062 (0.236)	-0.125 (0.188)
Tribal Member	0.114 (0.100)	0.199** (0.097)
Male	0.171 (0.130)	0.068 (0.124)
N	1412	1412

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Dependent variables increase in the importance of wasta.

Table 11: Ordered Logit Regressions: Usefulness of Partisanship, Networks, and Tribe/Family for Obtaining a Government Job

	Political Affiliation	Networks	Tribe/Family
Age	0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.008*** (0.003)
Income: Middle	-0.133 (0.115)	0.204** (0.097)	0.182** (0.091)
Income: Upper	-0.237 (0.176)	0.152 (0.121)	-0.206 (0.159)
SNTV	0.196 (0.127)	0.112 (0.121)	0.087 (0.168)
Middle School	0.124 (0.192)	0.113 (0.158)	0.135 (0.113)
High School	0.002 (0.152)	-0.015 (0.171)	0.161 (0.127)
Associate Degree	-0.248 (0.160)	0.456* (0.247)	0.113 (0.199)
University of higher	-0.154 (0.120)	-0.270* (0.158)	0.002 (0.133)
Tribal Member	0.420*** (0.155)	0.257** (0.105)	0.188 (0.162)
Male	-0.203** (0.088)	-0.038 (0.087)	0.011 (0.106)
N	1353	1380	1391

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Table 12: Logit Regressions of the Characteristics that Correlate with Candidate Vote Choice

	Religious Religious	Tribe/Family Support	From My Area	Provides Services	Know Personally
Age	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.011** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.005)
Income: Middle	-0.019 (0.103)	0.135 (0.134)	0.079 (0.099)	-0.164 (0.196)	0.389*** (0.124)
Income: Upper	0.162 (0.144)	0.017 (0.239)	-0.256 (0.231)	-0.713*** (0.223)	-0.292 (0.196)
SNTV	0.218** (0.107)	-0.152 (0.107)	-0.289** (0.138)	-0.337 (0.206)	-0.155 (0.101)
Middle School	-0.076 (0.305)	-0.270 (0.216)	-0.136 (0.207)	-0.129 (0.293)	-0.013 (0.239)
High School	-0.220 (0.242)	-0.477*** (0.159)	-0.237 (0.165)	-0.059 (0.317)	-0.370** (0.163)
Associate Degree	-0.334 (0.356)	-0.626*** (0.171)	-0.508*** (0.161)	-0.238 (0.367)	-0.820*** (0.225)
University of higher	-0.519** (0.259)	-0.864*** (0.242)	-0.415* (0.241)	-0.027 (0.326)	-0.366** (0.166)
Tribal Member	0.355*** (0.096)	0.443*** (0.143)	0.411*** (0.125)	0.209 (0.315)	0.336*** (0.118)
Male	-0.373*** (0.129)	-0.103 (0.120)	-0.030 (0.196)	-0.161 (0.217)	0.208** (0.089)
Constant	0.690** (0.333)	1.596*** (0.326)	0.771*** (0.271)	2.494*** (0.433)	0.365 (0.293)
N	1403	1432	1432	1434	1426

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Table 13: Ordered Logit Regressions: To Whom Parliamentarians Respond

	Supporters	Tribe	Friends
Age	0.000 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)
Income: Middle	0.230* (0.121)	-0.033 (0.146)	0.184 (0.116)
Income: Upper	0.161 (0.190)	-0.012 (0.194)	-0.028 (0.220)
SNTV	-0.071 (0.142)	0.080 (0.130)	-0.180 (0.115)
Middle School	0.049 (0.142)	-0.095 (0.174)	-0.177 (0.227)
High School	0.133 (0.122)	-0.015 (0.170)	0.039 (0.180)
Associate Degree	0.427*** (0.137)	0.294 (0.196)	0.390 (0.239)
University of higher	0.183 (0.178)	0.020 (0.224)	0.199 (0.203)
Tribal Member	0.330*** (0.104)	-0.261 (0.175)	0.030 (0.109)
Male	-0.017 (0.093)	0.236*** (0.088)	0.047 (0.093)
N	1370	1402	1377

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

**Table 14: Ordered Logit Regressions: Bribe Usage**

	Services	Job
Age	-0.008* (0.005)	-0.014*** (0.005)
Income: Middle	0.051 (0.108)	0.225** (0.105)
Income: Upper	0.054 (0.305)	0.262 (0.238)
SNTV	-0.025 (0.139)	0.058 (0.173)
Middle School	0.201 (0.145)	0.064 (0.184)
High School	0.175 (0.146)	0.151 (0.172)
Associate Degree	0.187 (0.226)	0.037 (0.249)
University of higher	0.174 (0.216)	-0.082 (0.238)
Tribal Member	0.208** (0.095)	0.229** (0.099)
Male	0.110 (0.097)	0.048 (0.102)
N	1342	1328

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

### Tunisia 2012 and 2015

The analysis below is mostly composed of ordered logit, but a few models are run using logit. Once again, we use ordered logit because many dependent variables are ordinal scales. Tables 15 to 18 use the 2012 data, and Tables 19 and 20 use the 2015 data. We find that the lower middle class and the upper class are significantly more likely (compared to the lower class) to believe that *wasta* is important for navigating the bureaucracy and obtaining a government job. See Table 15. None of the demographic variables are significantly correlated with the importance of partisanship, networks, and friends for obtaining a government job. See Table 16.

The most consistent results are that those with more than a primary education are significantly less likely to vote for a candidate that has the following characteristics: Islamist, family and friends voted for or endorse the candidate, the candidate is from their area, and if they know the candidate personally. We also find that the middle class are more likely to prefer candidates who are Islamist and who provide services to the respondent's area. Further, men are less influenced by their family, compared to women, when deciding for whom to vote. See Table 17. Finally,

none of our demographic variables significantly correlate with who respondents believe parliamentarians respond to most readily. See Table 18.

Table 19 reports the correlates of unmet health needs in Tunisia. The dependent variable takes a value of one if the respondent or a family member have health needs they are unable to meet. We find that women and those with at least secondary school are less likely to have unmet health needs. All class categories are significantly less likely than the lower class to have unmet health needs.

Finally, Table 20 reports the correlates for bribe and wasta use in order to obtain medical care. Note that when analyzing bribe usage, military clinics were excluded because of small N and "other" clinics are the base category. For the wasta model, military hospitals are the reference group. We find that individuals are more likely to pay bribes in public clinics and that those over age 30 and in the upper middle class are less likely to pay bribes. Relative to military clinics, individuals are less likely to use wasta in private and other clinics. The upper class are also less likely to use wasta in order to access medical care.

**Table 15: Ordered Logit Regressions: Usefulness of Wasta**

	Bureaucracy	Job
Age	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.005)
Urban	0.367 (0.292)	0.417 (0.251)
Secondary	-0.055 (0.161)	-0.022 (0.139)
Tertiary	0.175 (0.212)	0.066 (0.221)
Lower Middle Class	0.663** (0.264)	0.475 (0.274)
Middle Class	0.520 (0.308)	0.229 (0.318)
Upper Middle Class	0.606 (0.393)	0.442 (0.359)
Upper Class	1.194** (0.458)	0.826 (0.530)
Male	0.024 (0.164)	-0.028 (0.159)
N	1130	1129

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Dependent variables increase in the importance of wasta.

Table 16: Ordered Logit Regressions: Usefulness of Partisanship, Networks, and Tribe/Family for Obtaining a Government Job

	Political Affiliation	Networks	Friends
Age	0.000 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.003 (0.006)
Urban	-0.396 (0.265)	-0.109 (0.274)	-0.381 (0.396)
Secondary	-0.097 (0.165)	-0.116 (0.185)	-0.228 (0.199)
Tertiary	-0.280 (0.225)	-0.240 (0.147)	-0.281 (0.160)
Lower Middle Class	-0.301 (0.463)	-0.367 (0.428)	0.114 (0.369)
Middle Class	-0.044 (0.485)	-0.466 (0.347)	-0.357 (0.382)
Upper Middle Class	0.466 (0.510)	-0.181 (0.411)	-0.239 (0.457)
Upper Class	-0.208 (0.579)	-0.659 (0.553)	-0.478 (0.459)
Male	0.017 (0.205)	0.019 (0.235)	-0.040 (0.179)
N	1097	1112	1099

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Table 17: Logit Regressions of the Characteristics that Correlate with Candidate Vote Choice

	Islamic	Family Support	Family Endorse	From My Area	Provides Services	Know Personally
Age	-0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)	0.002 (0.006)	0.006 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.006 (0.004)
Urban	-0.042 (0.198)	-0.068 (0.244)	0.218 (0.292)	0.256 (0.336)	0.354 (0.387)	0.250 (0.296)
Secondary	-0.568*** (0.164)	-0.679*** (0.145)	-0.601*** (0.126)	-0.760*** (0.146)	-0.194 (0.217)	-0.689*** (0.137)
Tertiary	-1.142*** (0.253)	-1.472*** (0.201)	-1.477*** (0.231)	-1.396*** (0.202)	-0.569* (0.304)	-1.229*** (0.190)
Lower Middle Class	0.164 (0.520)	-0.179 (0.328)	0.235 (0.339)	0.211 (0.266)	0.896* (0.427)	0.390 (0.231)
Middle Class	0.887** (0.363)	-0.029 (0.248)	0.304 (0.301)	0.235 (0.315)	0.548* (0.284)	0.158 (0.247)
Upper Middle Class	0.380 (0.388)	0.308 (0.376)	0.637 (0.437)	0.544 (0.389)	0.315 (0.407)	0.582 (0.366)
Upper Class	0.054 (0.519)	-0.765 (0.446)	-0.291 (0.531)	-0.343 (0.554)	-0.297 (0.570)	-0.151 (0.467)
Male	0.104 (0.165)	-0.645*** (0.162)	-0.576*** (0.103)	-0.030 (0.105)	-0.049 (0.152)	-0.000 (0.137)
Constant	-0.028 (0.390)	0.056 (0.428)	-0.246 (0.473)	-0.567 (0.428)	1.180** (0.540)	-0.577 (0.436)
N	1069	1150	1127	1108	1143	1114

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Table 18: Ordered Logit Regressions: To Whom Parliamentarians Respond

	Supporters	Friends
Age	0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)
Urban	-0.142 (0.353)	0.018 (0.348)
Secondary	0.186 (0.167)	0.235 (0.156)
Tertiary	0.292 (0.232)	0.326 (0.212)
Lower Middle Class	-0.265 (0.604)	-0.216 (0.618)
Middle Class	-0.579 (0.496)	-0.559 (0.537)
Upper Middle Class	-0.416 (0.487)	-0.567 (0.537)
Upper Class	-0.589 (0.635)	-0.630 (0.660)
Male	0.104 (0.150)	0.126 (0.168)
N	1130	1137

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Table 19: Logit Regression: Unmet Health Needs

	Health Needs
Age 30 and older	0.265 (0.210)
Female	-0.280** (0.089)
Rural	0.302 (0.324)
Education: At least Secondary	-0.777** (0.232)
Lower Middle Class	-1.608*** (0.308)
Middle Class	-2.925*** (0.553)
Upper Middle Class	-3.586*** (0.654)
Upper Class	-2.653** (0.968)
Constant	1.677** (0.460)
N	3603

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%

Table 20: Logit Regressions: The Use of Bribes and Wasta for Medical Care

	Bribe	Wasta
Public Clinic	2.794** (1.055)	-0.117 (0.508)
Private Clinic	1.589 (0.976)	-1.465** (0.459)
Other Clinic		-3.570*** (0.734)
Age 30 and older	-0.766** (0.235)	-0.101 (0.225)
Female	0.200 (0.346)	0.001 (0.371)
Rural	0.013 (0.490)	-0.329 (0.246)
Education: At least Secondary	-0.533 (0.349)	0.523 (0.298)
Lower Middle Class	-1.159 (0.675)	-0.251 (0.589)
Middle Class	-0.239 (1.046)	-0.357 (0.427)
Upper Middle Class	-1.731* (0.711)	-0.565 (0.300)
Upper Class	-0.404 (0.733)	-0.942** (0.330)
Constant	-3.848** (1.432)	-0.622 (0.500)
N	2259	2290

Significance levels: \*: 10% \*\*: 5% \*\*\*: 1%