UCL Institute of Education

PhD Thesis

Democratization during the Post Mao era
An Analysis of Citizenship Education in Chinese Universities

Jing Kun Bai
Declaration

I Jing Kun Bai confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

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Contents
Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 8

Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1. Research Aim .......................................................................................................... 11
1.2. Theoretical Framework for This Research .............................................................. 15
1.3. The Research Questions and Analytic Approaches .................................................. 17
1.4. Personal Motivation in this Research ...................................................................... 20

Chapter 2. Literature Review: Democratization and Citizenship Education
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 22

2.1. Democracy and Democratisation ............................................................................ 22
   Democracy .................................................................................................................. 23
   Democratization ........................................................................................................ 25
   Working Definition of Democracy and Democratization in this Study ............... 27

2.1.1. Liberal Democracy ............................................................................................ 30
   Modernisation Theory and Democratisation ............................................................ 32
   Modernisation theory and Democratisation in China ........................................... 35

2.1.2. Illiberal Democracy and the East Asian Values ............................................... 37
   Civilisation Theory .................................................................................................. 38
   East Asian Model and East Asian Values ................................................................. 40
   Confucianism and East Asian Confucian Culture ............................................... 43
   East Asian Values and Democratisation .................................................................. 46

2.1.3. Marxist Idea of Democracy and Democratic Centralism ................................. 50
   Marxism and Authoritarianism ............................................................................... 52
   Marxism and Democratisation in (post) Communist Countries ........................... 54

2.1.4. Marxist Ideology and Democratisation in China ................................................. 56

2.2. Citizenship Education ......................................................................................... 58

2.2.1. Citizenship and Citizenship Education ............................................................. 59
2.2.2. Citizenship Education in Democratic and Authoritarian Countries .............. 62
2.2.3. University and Democratization ..................................................................... 63
2.3. Summary ........................................................................................................66

Chapter 3. Research Methods

Introduction ........................................................................................................69
3.1. Research Aims and Theoretical Approaches ..............................................69
3.2. Data Collection and Analytic Approach .....................................................76
3.2.1. University Textbooks Selection ..........................................................77
3.2.2. University Textbooks Analytic Approach ...........................................79
3.3. Fieldwork, Ethical Issues and Analytic Approach .....................................81
3.3.1. Sampling ...............................................................................................83
3.3.2. Classroom Observations ......................................................................84
3.3.3. Semi-structured Interview ..................................................................86

Chapter 4. Overview of Citizenship Education and the Curricula in China

Introduction ........................................................................................................88
4.1. The Development of Political Education and Curriculum in Chinese HE ...90
4.1.1. Political Education and the Curriculum in HE (1949-1977) ..................91
4.1.3. The 85 Program (1985-1997) ..............................................................96
   Patriotic Education .....................................................................................99
4.1.4. The 98 Program (1998-2004) ..............................................................103
4.1.5 The 05 Program and Chinese Nationalism (2005-2012) ......................106
   Chinese Nationalism .................................................................................108
4.1.6. Xi Jin-ping era ....................................................................................112
4.2. Political Education in Chinese Higher Education .....................................115
4.2.1. Management of Political Education in Universities .........................115
4.2.2. Political Counsellors and Class Tutors ..............................................117
4.3. Compulsory “Politics” curriculum in Chinese Higher Education ..........118
4.3.1. Structures of the Compulsory “Politics” curriculum .......................119
4.3.2. Subjects of the Curriculum ..............................................................122
4.3.3. Syllabus of the Compulsory “Politics” Curriculum ..........................125
4.3.4. Production of Textbooks and Reading Materials .............................127
4.3.5. Teachers of the Compulsory “Politics” Curriculum .........................129
4.3.6. Assessment and Examination ...........................................................130
4.4. Discussion and Summary .........................................................................131

Chapter 5. Analysis of Textbooks (1978-1990)
## 5. The Officially Promoted Ideology

### 5.1. Marxism

- Introduction...........................................................................138

### 5.1.1. Leninism

- Introduction...........................................................................142

### 5.1.2. Maoism

- Introduction...........................................................................144

### 5.1.3. The Chinese Regime

- Introduction...........................................................................148

#### 5.1.3.1. The People's Democratic Dictatorship

- Introduction...........................................................................148

#### 5.1.3.2. The People

- Introduction...........................................................................149

#### 5.1.3.3. "Democracy"

- Introduction...........................................................................151

#### 5.1.3.4. "Dictatorship", Violent Revolution and Class Struggle

- Introduction...........................................................................153

### 5.2. Understandings on Democracy and Values

- Introduction...........................................................................155

#### 5.2.1. Democratic Practices and the CCP

- Introduction...........................................................................156

#### 5.2.2. Democratic Practice of the Communist Parties in Europe

- Introduction...........................................................................159

#### 5.2.3. The Reforms

- Introduction...........................................................................161

### 5.3. Discussion and Summary

- Introduction...........................................................................162

## 6. Textbooks Analysis (1990-2006)

### 6.1. The Officially Promoted Ideologies

- Introduction...........................................................................169

#### 6.1.1. Dengism

- *Socialism with Chinese Characteristics*.................................171
- *The Primary Stage of Socialism*...........................................173

#### 6.1.2. Three Represents

- Introduction...........................................................................174

### 6.2. The Political System in China

- Introduction...........................................................................175

#### 6.2.1. The People's Democratic Dictatorship

- *The People*........................................................................176

#### 6.2.2. The Structure of the Political System

- *The People's Congress System, Democratic Centralism and Election* ...179
- *The Political Consultation System*........................................181
- *The Ethnic Minority Autonomous Region System*......................183
- *Special Administrative Region*...........................................185

### 6.3. Socialist Democracy and Values

- Introduction...........................................................................186

#### 6.3.1. "Patriotism"

- Introduction...........................................................................187

#### 6.3.2. Anti-individualism

- Introduction...........................................................................191

Introduction ............................................................ 213

7.1. The Officially Promoted Ideologies .................................. 214
7.1.1. Marxism and Scientific Development Concept ................. 215
7.1.2. Xiism ................................................................ 216

The Powerful Socialist China ......................................... 217
Firmly Grasping Ideology ................................................. 219
The Leadership of the Party ............................................. 220

7.2. The Chinese Regime ..................................................... 222
7.2.1. “The Enemies” and Class Struggle ................................ 222
7.2.2. The Grassroots Autonomous System .......................... 225
7.2.3. One Country, Two Systems ....................................... 227

7.3. Socialist Democracy and Values .................................... 228
7.3.1. Rule of Law .......................................................... 229
7.3.2. Socialist Democracy, Freedom and Human Rights ........ 233
7.3.3. Chinese Version of “Patriotism” Nationalism ............... 238
7.3.4. Chineseness Morality and Confucianism ....................... 239

7.4. Discussion and Summary .............................................. 242

Chapter 8. Analysis of Classroom Observations and Interviews

Introduction .................................................................... 246

8.1. Features towards Democratisation ................................. 247
8.1.1. Obtaining Different Views from Others ........................ 247
8.1.2. Classroom Discussion ............................................ 249
8.1.3. Teachers Expressed Their Own Opinions .................... 253
8.1.4. Using Non-official Teaching Materials ......................... 258
8.1.5. Discussions of Politically Sensitive Topics ................... 259

8.2. Features against Democratization ................................ 262

8.3. Discussion and Summary ............................................ 267
# Chapter 9. Discussion and Conclusion

Introduction ......................................................................................................................................271

9.1. Discussion of Chinese Higher Education and Democratisation ..........272

9.1.1 Periodization of Political education .................................................................274

9.1.2. Traces of Democratic Pedagogies at the Classroom level ................278

9.1.3. Chinese Higher Education and Democratisation.................................279

9.2. Discussion of Portrayal of Democracy ...............................................................283

9.2.1. Analysis of University Textbooks .................................................................284

9.2.2. The Officially Promoted Ideologies ...............................................................285

9.2.3. The Chinese Political System .................................................................289

*The Self-definition of the Chinese Regime* .................................................................290

*Rights of Citizens* ...........................................................................................................292

*The Power of the CCP* ...................................................................................................293

*The Political System* .......................................................................................................295

*The Rule of law* .............................................................................................................298

9.2.4. Understandings of Democracy and Values ..................................................299

9.3. Theoretical Perspectives and Democratization in China .........................304

9.3.1. Modernisation Theory and Democratization in China .........................305

9.3.2. Civilization Theory and Democratization in China .................................308

9.3.3. Long Term Process of Democratization .......................................................309

9.4. Conclusion -- Chinese Version of Socialist Democracy .........................315

9.4.1. Development of Chinese Version of Socialist Democracy .....................316

9.4.2. Characteristics of Chinese Version of Socialist Democracy .................322

*Chinese Version of Socialist Democracy and the East Asian Values* ..........323

*Chinese Version of Democracy and Leninist Governance* .........................326

*Chinese Version of Socialist Democracy is an Illiberal “Democracy”* ......328

Abbreviation .........................................................................................................................331

Bibliography ........................................................................................................................332

Chinese documents used in this study (English, Chinese) .................................345

Appendix ...............................................................................................................................353

Ethics Application Form: Research Degree Students ........................................364
Abstract

This study explores whether citizenship education in Chinese higher education has developed traces of a democratic political culture during the post Mao.

Since China instituted reforms from 1978, it has made great achievements in terms of economy and education. These achievements are known in the literature to facilitate democratization, but China remains an authoritarian regime. Studies regarding China's democratisation show highly contrasting views. Scholars suggest that China has shown inklings of democracy as part of a third wave of global democratisation; some claim that democratization has emerged with characteristics of East Asian values; others consider that the China has not yet developed democracy.

I analysed themes of the officially promoted ideologies, definitions of the regime, and political reforms with particular relevance to the shaping of values, identity and citizenship contained within 39 university textbooks of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum from 1978 to 2018, and official political education documents, plus fieldwork undertaken at 5 Chinese universities.

This study identifies how political education in Chinese higher education has changed since 1978, especially in terms of the periodization and portrayal of democracy.

The study suggests fluctuating developments in political education in higher education during three broad periods during the post Mao era. Each period has distinct features. The first period is the 85 Program reforms during the 1980s when
the Chinese government adjusted the relationship between developing the economy and learning in Chinese higher education. Cultivating higher level technicians and skilful scientists for the needs of economic development became the primary task of Chinese higher education. The second period is the “98 Program Reform” from the early 1990s to 2003 during which the Chinese government developed a clear policy of marketization of Chinese higher education with firm political control. The third period is “the 05 Program Reforms” which started from 2003. The curriculum for political education in higher education was completely and systemically centralized, and patriotic education which had begun in 1990 developed into Chinese nationalism. Notably, after, Xi Jin-ping became the leader of the CCP in 2013, Xiism has led China towards increasing militarism, authoritarianism and xenophobic nationalism. These features of political education at university level may suggest the start of a new era.

The study also demonstrates a range of contradictory relationships between higher education and democratisation. The Chinese government firmly controls political education in order to train university students to become the kinds of citizens the CCP requires. However, Chinese intellectuals, textbook authors and university students have potential to make contributions to democratisation when the Chinese regime less control universities.

In this study, I speculatively propose that China has developed a Chinese version of socialist democracy, and that democratisation has fluctuated at the level of official discourse during the post Mao era. Economic development, Chinese culture and Marxist-Leninist ideology have shaped processes of democratisation. This unique combination has resulted in a form of illiberal democracy in China known as democratic centralism, wherein elections are held at different levels, and there are
multiple participants in the regime, but not all people have equal rights or life chances, and top-down political reforms control democratic development.
Democratization in the Post Mao era

An analysis of citizenship education in Chinese universities

Chapter one: Introduction

Since China instituted reforms for achieving modernization from 1978, it has made great achievements in terms of economy, society and education. Currently, China boasts the world’s second–highest Gross National Product (Nathan, Diamond, Plattner, 2013), and more than 90 per cent of the population are able to read and write. These structural changes are known in the literature to facilitate democratization (Shin and Tusalem, 2009), but China remains a one-party authoritarian regime. Regarding China’s democratisation during the post Mao era, studies have shown highly contrasting views. Some scholars suggest that China is on a road towards a democracy as part of a global wave of democratization (Nathan, 1990; Ogden, 2002; Hutton, 2008); some claim that democratization in China emerged with characteristics of an East Asian model of democracy (Neher 1994; Shin and Tusalem, 2009). Others suggest that China has not yet developed democracy (Nathan, 1985; Potter, 2014). Also, existing studies of democratisation have largely focused upon China’s politics, economy, culture and society whilst ignoring the role of citizenship education (hereafter abbreviated CE).

1.1. Research Aim
The aim of this study is to explore whether CE in HE in China has developed traces of a democratic political culture during the post Mao era from 1978 to 2018. In order to conduct this research, I analysed the themes of officially promoted ideologies and definitions of the regime, political reforms with particular relevance to the shaping of values, and identity and citizenship contained within the 39 textbooks of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum, as well as official documents focusing upon Chinese Political Education and fieldwork undertaken at five Chinese universities.

The links between CE and processes of democratisation are complex and nuanced by specific features of the higher education (hereafter abbreviated HE) system. CE texts may not be treated as if they are a straightforward reflection of broader political changes, but CE can show signs of change in a country. CE is believed to stimulate greater political interests and discussions of basic facts about government and social norms (Mattes & Luescher-Mamashela, 2012). Some scholars (e.g. Crick, 2000) suggest that CE policies, the curriculum and teaching content can directly reflect some features of democratisation within a country. Existing research into Chinese CE places an emphasis upon policies, curriculum structures and guidelines, concentrating more upon primary and secondary education, single schools or subjects. There have not been many comprehensive studies of Chinese CE and the curriculum, particularly regarding the compulsory “Politics” curriculum and the textbooks used for the course at university level.

In Western conceptions of citizenship, the concept not only includes political dimensions, but also social and cultural dimensions. In the Chinese context, political education is a part of national citizenship education; therefore, social and cultural aspects are part of the “political” dimension. Broadly, CE is a nationwide political task with a unified plan purposely carried out by the CCP in order to cultivate the ideology
and values desired by the Chinese government. CE includes different topics at different periods, but the main tasks of CE are to spread the CCP’s ideology, to disseminate the policies of the Chinese government and the definitions of the regime from the CCP’s perspectives, and to publicize the official values (MOE, 2010). The political curriculum is a particular part of national CE established within the national curriculum at all levels. The compulsory “Politics” curriculum is a stand-alone course of political education, especially established for primary, secondary and higher education. The Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter abbreviated, PCCP) and the Ministry of Education (hereafter abbreviated, MOE) directly manage the curriculum in terms of individual course setting, syllabus, teaching hours, recruiting teachers, textbook publications and so on. Therefore, the main tasks of the curriculum in primary, secondary and universities are the same, but the content of political education in universities is broader and is dealt with in greater depth than in primary and secondary schools.

Researching democratisation by analysing university textbooks of political education in China is an appropriate analytical strategy. Although universities may not represent broader political changes, universities can offer opportunities to investigate democratisation. According to a number of researches, universities have been regarded as key institutions in processes of social change and development and universities have a role in buttressing political regimes, be they liberal democratic or authoritarian (Harkavy, 2006). Practically all universities have an educational mission to prepare students to be responsible citizenship in order to serve society (Castells, 2001). Because of this function, universities can either contribute to democratic progress (Brennan, King and Lebeau, 2004), or directly serve state interests (Yan, 2014).
In China, universities are part of the state apparatus. The government has always paid great attention to higher education. University students are perceived by the central government and Chinese society as the main force of national development for the future (MOE, 1985, 2010). The government funds universities’ projects which serve as both motors of economic development and as mainstays of authoritarian rule (Perry, 2015a). Simultaneously, officially promoted political education seeks to develop university students into model citizens as envisaged by the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter abbreviated CCP). Scholars have found that ideological indoctrination in Chinese universities has helped the Chinese regime to generate stability and suppress political dissent (Hayhoe, 1993, 1996). The compulsory “Politics” curriculum and the textbooks can be seen as an explicit statement of the Chinese government’s official ideological line at any particular point in time (Vickers, 2009). Therefore, the content of particular themes in the textbooks, relating to the shaping of values, identity and citizenship, can indicate processes of democratization which are reflected in political education in Chinese universities. Tracing the narratives and explanations of the officially promoted ideologies, the definitions of the regime and the official understandings of democratic values in the textbooks of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum can tell us whether the CCP regime has developed elements of democracy within the confines of this course during the post Mao era in China.

Notably, I clearly acknowledge that what the Chinese government claims to be democratisation in political education in universities may not represent what can in fact be considered as democratisation in Chinese society. In this study, the signs of democratisation from the empirical analysis only represent the signs of
democratisation as reflected in the university textbooks, and these signs do not represent all of the processes of democratisation occurring within China as whole.

This study is valuable in this field. For western researchers, it is difficult to explore how the compulsory political course has been taught in Chinese HE. For non-Chinese speakers, it may be difficult to analyse textbooks at the university level because this requires a high level of understanding of Chinese language and literature. Meanwhile due to the politically sensitive nature of CE and democratisation in China, few Chinese scholars’ research CE, and even less are concerned with CE as an indicator of democratisation in contemporary China.

1.2. Theoretical Framework for This Research

This research explores process of democratisation in the context of economic development and political authoritarianism in post Mao China. Considering the contrasting outcomes of research on democracy and democratisation, together with my research questions, the literature review in chapter 2, addresses a range of theories concerning developments of democracy across the world.

Modernization theory suggests that the process of economic development leads to democratization around the world (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). The constitutional rule of law, the protection of individual liberties, and the use of free elections to choose and change governments are common norms in liberal democratization processes (Parsons, 1964; Fukuyama, 1992; Sen, 1999; Boli, 2005).

However, theorists who reject the hypothesis of a convergence in the direction of liberal democracy support a pluralist view that, historically, the route to the democratic world has not been singular but has comprised a number of pathways.
(Lijphart, 2012), and that different types of social development do not predict a universal process of democratization, or movement towards the same democratic political culture (Eisenstadt, 2000; Crick, 2008). At the level of institutions, democracy has been formed differently. Some political administrations can be classified as democracies, but, compared with classical liberal democracy, they lack characteristics of civil society, such as wider practice of, and respect for basic economic and political rights. They also lack a free media and other forms of institutional accountability (Huntington, 1993). Scholars have suggested distinctive styles of illiberal democracy (Zakaria, 2003), and a democratic model based on East Asian values which is influenced by Confucianism in East Asian countries (Friedman, 1995; Tu, 2002). A Marxist conception of democracy has also been suggested as being a “direct form of democracy” (Held, 2006, p115) or “People’s Democracy” (Parry, 1995, p1283). In theory, in a direct form of Marxist democracy, the commune structure is essentially the machinery of the state. The smallest communities administer their own affairs and elect delegates to larger administrative districts, and elect candidates to higher levels of administration—the national delegation. In practice, “People’s Democracy” is a term used by those who wish to claim that the one-party states of the Soviet Union, its former Eastern European satellites, and the People’s Republic of China constitute a type of democracy.

These theories provide contrasting possibilities for China as a one-party regime with strong Marxist ideology, to develop towards democracy or towards totalitarianism during the post Mao era. I discuss this further in the next chapter.

Democratisation is a long-term endeavour and it is a fluid process for achieving democracy (Dahl, 2000; Ogden, 2002). Developing democracy in a non-democratic country, such as China may take a long time. The signs of democratisation I explore
in this study concern the processes through which inklings of democracy emerge within a party-state dictatorship with strong officially promoted ideology in the context of rapid economic growth. This study does not examine all of the features of China’s political and democratic development, since the findings are limited to analytical studies of the university textbooks and the findings from fieldwork involving a small sample of teachers and students, so it is important not to over-generalise the findings beyond this context. However, the study can inform scholarly work regarding the changing themes and features within citizenship and political education in China through the reform period to the present day, and what these changes can provisionally tell us about processes of democratisation in China.

1.3. The Research Questions and Analytic Approach

Based on existing studies and my own understanding of democracy and democratisation, I identified ideal-typical characteristics of democratic and authoritarian regimes (see chapter 3, table 3-1) as indicators for empirical analysing the themes from the textbooks and assessing the empirical evidence from the fieldwork.

The main research question is: to what extent can democratization be seen in citizenship education at university level during the post Mao era in China?

There are four sub-questions which refer to three themes for analysing universities textbooks and the fieldwork in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. The three themes are: the officially promoted ideologies, the structure of the Chinese political system and democratic values.
Sub-question 1. What were the features of the HE politics curriculum and how did they change from 1978 in China?

Sub-question 2. How are the officially promoted ideologies represented in the textbooks? To what extent do these representations reflect processes of democratization?

Sub-question 3. To what extent can features of democratization be seen in the descriptions of the Chinese regime in the textbooks at different periods of the reforms?

Sub-question 4. How are democracy and democratic values described in the textbooks? To what extent do these descriptions reflect processes of democratization?

Sub question 5. How are the texts of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum taught in classrooms? How do teachers and students respond to the Compulsory “Politics” curriculum?

Qualitative content analysis is the main research method used in this study (chapter 3). The research approach examines political education and the curriculum in Chinese HE, particularly with an emphasis on the themes of officially promoted ideologies, policies, institutional reforms, and democratic values described in the textbooks of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum during the post Mao era. These themes have been purposely defined and implemented by the Communist regime in China, and introduced to universities students. An additional analysis has been conducted from the empirical data collected via fieldwork in order to understand how
the texts were used in classrooms and how teachers and students responded to the curriculum and texts.

Chapter 3 also explains how indicators of democracy and authoritarianism have been used in the empirical analysis, and how and why I collected universities’ textbooks from the compulsory “Politics” curriculum, official ideological books and Chinese official education documentation.

The empirical analysis in chapter 4 provides a systematic overview of political education and curriculum development in China during the post Mao era. This analysis includes the aims, policies and management of political education; the analysis also includes the compulsory “Politics” curriculum setting, syllabus, guidelines, textbook design and publishing, subject teachers, teaching methods and learning resources and forms of assessment.

Chapters 5 to 7 provide empirical comparative analysis of three key themes from 39 Chinese universality textbooks from 1979 to 2018. These themes are the officially promoted ideologies, the CCP’s definitions of the regime, the official understandings of democracy and democratic values, as well as opinions regarding these themes derived from the authors of the textbooks. I compared the differences and similarities of description of the key themes in these textbooks. The textbooks are divided into three groups in chronological order. The 1978 to 1990 textbooks are analysed in chapter 5, the textbooks from 1990 to 2006 are analysed in chapter 6, and chapter 7 provides the textbook analysis between 2008 and 2018.

Chapter 8 presents discussions of the findings from the fieldwork, which consisted of classroom observations and interviews with teachers and students at 5 universities in China.
All of the findings related to indicators of democratisation and key theories evaluated in the literature review are discussed in chapter 9. Finally, I posit a view of a Chinese version of socialist democracy reflected in the findings and provide suggestions for further research in this field.

1.4. Personal Motivation in this Research

I was born and grew up in China. After I graduated I worked as a history teacher at a university and as a journalist in the media. I experienced some important educational developments, social reforms and conflicts, such as political education changes from primary school to university, the Cultural Revolution, Tiananmen Square students’ protests, economic development and divisions within Chinese society.

I was not born in a working class family. Three generations of my family suffered for many years after the Communist Party came to power. Almost every Chinese New Year, my parents talked about how their relatives were cruelly treated by the CCP’s local government officers. Some of our relatives were killed, others imprisoned. When I was five years old, I and my two-year-old sister lived with my mother in a labour camp. All of my sisters were discriminated against at school during the latter years of the Cultural Revolution. The most recent example occurred in 1991 when a member of the family who had taken part in student protests in Beijing was jailed for three years. Fear, hate, anger and hope had mixed effects on my everyday life. These made me question why China has developed in such a way. Is there another path China can follow in the future? Also, from my experience, I deeply believe that violent revolution would not benefit China but would create more fear, hate and divisions in Chinese society; China needs to modernize and develop a high standard of political and social civilisation.
As a researcher, I am aware that personal issues, such as life experiences, personal motives and the goals of the researcher can create bias - especially in qualitative studies where interpreting data objectively is paramount to producing valid and unbiased findings (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2008).

For some people, hope for a better world and a better future motivates what they do. Because we have hope, we can see the future, and this can encourage us to continue working towards our goals. I personally have a strong desire to see China develop a democratic political system and become a free society in the future. I hope to identify positive changes and identify the progress that China has made during the post Mao era. During this research I have remained aware that this personal desire could influence me to focus more upon positive changes, and neglect negative factors in Chinese development, particularly when choosing and analysing the data. In order to avoid my personal emotions, attitude, values, and beliefs biasing the research, I have endeavoured to analyse and present all of the data collected in a fair objective and balanced way. I have avoided making generalisations from my observations of university textbooks to wider developments in Chinese society as a whole.

I am a natural Chinese speaker, my fluent understanding of Chinese language and culture provides an interpretive advantage over non-Chinese researchers. I have also lectured on the compulsory Politics curriculum within a Chinese university. My first hand understanding of the course enables me to select the most important features that are relevant to the research questions in this study. I contribute to the literature by providing a detailed analysis of a large number of original textbooks across the post Mao era. My translations of the original textbooks and the findings from this research can be used for further studies in this field.
Chapter 2. Literature Review: Democratization and Citizenship Education

Introduction

The aim of this study is to explore whether CE in HE in China has developed traces of a democratic political culture during the post Mao era. In order to provide a range of indicators for the analysis of democratization in China, it is important to understand the concept of democracy and democratization in literature and practice in the world. It is also important to know how CE in universities can be used for assessing democratisation.

In this chapter, I begin by reviewing debates regarding definitions of democracy and democratization. I also present a working definition of democracy and democratization for the analysis in this study. I then briefly discuss democratisation in relation to modernisation theory, East Asian Values and Marxist ideas of democracy, as well as discuss the differences between these theories. In the second section, I discuss contrasting views concerning global trends in, and multiple forms of CE development and world culture theory, I also discuss characteristics of CE in democratic and authoritarian regimes and the role of universities in democratisation. These discussions provide the basis for the identification (in the next chapter) of a range of indicators for the analysis of democratization in China in this research.

2.1. Democracy and Democratisation

Democratisation is the process of achieving democracy. A literal definition of democracy is “rule by the people”. However, this abstract statement does not give
any indication about how the people are meant to rule. Political theorists and advocates of a political cause perennially contest what this ideal means in practice. The concept of democracy has been subjected to widely differing interpretations with scholars emphasizing different aspects (Rose, 2009, p10).

**Democracy**

Although scholars have disagreed on some of the details for defining and measuring democracy, the criteria for democracy proposed by Robert A. Dahl in his well-known “Polyarchy” still command “widespread support” and is seen as “effective and widely quoted” by many scholars (Lijphart, 2012, p46; Morlino, 2009, p204). Based on Dahl’s definition of democracy, scholars identify similar general characteristics of modern democracy in their work, such as Brady, Collier and Box-Steffensmeier (2011, p1013), Crick (2002, 107-08), Bernhagen (2009, p27), Berg-Schlosser (2009, p43), Haerpfer, Bernhagen, Inglehart and Welzel (2009, p2), Rose (2009, p13), Gibson (2011, p409), Paxton (2009, p146), Moravcsik’s (2011, p724) and Held (2006, p271).

According to Dahl (2000), at the level of institutions, democracy is a political system or a form of government. Lijphart (2012, p47) summarises eight criteria for democracy based on Dahl’s definition:

1. The right to vote;
2. The right to be elected;
3. The right of political leaders to compete for support and votes;
4. Elections are free and fair;
5. Freedom of association;
6. Freedom of expression;
7. Alternative sources of information;
8. Institutions for making public polities depending on votes and other expressions of preference.

According to Harber (1997, p2), democracy also exists at the level of civil society. At this level, democracy concerns people actively participating in society and political institutions. It is a political culture, which is composed of,

“procedural values, attitudes and behaviours underlying democracy which uphold values of tolerance, diversity, civility, peacefulness and mutual respect between individuals and groups. This also includes a respect for evidence in forming political opinions, a willingness to be open to the possibility of changing one’s mind in the light of such evidence and the possession of a critical stance towards political information”.

Under democratic political culture, people treat others as equal citizens regardless of ethnicity or gender (Almond & Verba, 1989).

Historically, the idea of democratic government has been complex and marked by conflicting conceptions. A large number of researchers have suggested that democratic governments consist of different types. David Held (2006) sets out four classic models of democracy: the classical idea of democracy, the republican conception of a self-governing community; liberal democracy in two variants, that of protective democracy and developmental democracy, and the Marxist conception of direct democracy; as well as five more recent models of democracy: competitive elitist democracy, pluralism, legal democracy, participatory democracy and deliberative democracy. Crick (2002) also suggests four historical usages of democracy that still leave their traces in modern democratic developments. For Dahl (2000, p36), democratic countries have adopted “many different constitutions or forms of governance”. Bernhagen (2009, p25) and Zakaria (2003) also suggest that democracy has been practiced differently in the establishment of intermediate
regime types, such as “delegative”, “illiberal”, “electoralist”, “competitive”, “electoral” or “contested”.

In Lijphart’s (2012) systematic comparison of the types of democracy and the democratic performance of thirty-six countries from 1989-2010, he suggests that a democracy can be organized as the legislature and courts, political party and interest group systems as formal governmental institutions, or government by the people or government by the representatives of the people. Parry (1995) also suggests a number of types of democratic governments. Freedom House (2008) classifies countries into the groups of “free”, “partly free” and “not free”. Regimes are also classified as democracies or totalitarian, and other common types in between, such as “competitive authoritarian” or “semi-authoritarian” regimes, and “electoral” or “contested” autocracies. These widely different conceptions of regimes suggest complex processes of forming democracy—democratisation.

**Democratization**

Democratisation is the long-term fluid process for developing democracy. The route to the democratic world has not been singular, but has comprised a number of pathways (Held, 2006). According to Dahl (2000, p25), democratisation does not “proceed in a regular and linear way”. It has seen “ups and downs” in its development. Democratization has “a long-term momentum when linking with intergenerational population replacement processes” (Haerpfer, Bernhagen, Inglehart and Welzel, 2009, p377). Scholars also see democratisation as a developmental task that “requires broadly coordinated, long-term strategies to initiate far-ranging processes of human empowerment through which ordinary people
acquire the means and the will to struggle to attain and sustain democratic freedoms” (ibid).

As a long-term development, Welzel (2009, p5) claims that processes of democratization may take “a three-stage sequence: the emergence, the deepening, and the survival of democracy”. The first stage is democratic emergence in a non-democratic regime. Democratization gives more resources to the people which “empower their capabilities, enabling people to practice freedom”. This gives rise to freedom of expression and equality of opportunities as part of “the deepening of democratic qualities of given democracies”. In the second stage, people are motivated and willing to practice freedom. This is also suggested as a shallow democracy and a short-term process by Inglehart (1997). Democratization moves along the path from shallow to deep democratization and from short-term to long-term processes. Deep democratization involves “the development of empowering ambitions and skills among large segments of a society” (Inglehart, 1997, p5). This is also suggested as the third stage of democratization in that people are “legally entitled to practice freedom and democracy survives and thrives” (Welzel, 2009, p5).

In summary, the conceptions of democratic government are complex, and democratisation involves a long-term fluid process at various stages. A democratic government in one country may be not the same as that found in other countries. In order to trace democratisation in China within a short period from 1978 to 2018, some forms of measurement are required to determine how democratic a political system is, or whether it is democratic at all. Because democracy cannot be straightforwardly observed, indicators have to be used to enable measurement. For this reason, I provide a working definition of democracy and democratisation for the empirical analysis.
Working Definition of Democracy and Democratization in this Study

Undoubtedly, China is an authoritarian country. In this context, democratisation can be understood as a process of developing a non-democratic political system to become democratic. In this study, I am not seeking to describe a fully developed democratic political system with most of the characteristics of democracy, as scholars have suggested. Therefore, the indicators I use to measure processes of democratisation in China may only represent the degree to which the emergence of democracy is happening in China. Also these signs of democratisation from the empirical analysis are limited to observations from the university textbooks. I do not claim that these signs represent democratization in Chinese society as a whole. Again, what the Chinese government claims to be democratisation in political education and found in the university textbooks is not fully representative of China’s development towards democratisation.

For this study, I adopt a broad definition of democracy at both institutional and social levels that most scholars agree upon. This definition includes: rule by the people either directly or through representation, a multi-party government which allows ordinary people a say in political decision-making through a representative legislature; Various political parties or movements vying for people’s support, citizen have rights to vote and to be elected, citizens also have rights to organize pressure groups or political parties; Regular free and fair elections, separation of powers, a set of checks and balances consisting of an independent media, an independent parliament and judiciary, freedom of expression, and the rule of law which protects individual rights and freedoms, tolerance to others, and democratic citizenship education. These key features are developed as a framework of indicators in chapter 3. By adopting this broad definition of democracy I am able to
assess consistencies, inconsistencies and variations among democratic ideas found in official Chinese Government policies as presented within the curriculum and textbooks of CE in Chinese HE.

Based on this definition, liberal democracies include most features of democracy, the orthodox Marxist version of democracy is much less democratic, and illiberal forms of democracy only show some democratic features. Among these, an illiberal democratic political system also consists of a multi-party government with a popular vote, but the rule of law is weak and civil liberties are severely curtailed (Zakaria, 2003). A state constitution and elections are the essence of illiberal democracy. If a country holds regular elections, which allow people to vote representatives into office, and the state or other organizations are governed by a constitution and not by religious rules or those of a monarch, then I would claim that it is essentially “democratic”. Even though governments produced by elections may be “inefficient, corrupt, short-sighted, irresponsible, dominated by special interests, and incapable of adopting policies demanded by the public good. These qualities make such governments undesirable, but they do not make them undemocratic” (Huntington, 1993, p10). This is the definition for illiberal democracy. My understanding is that countries which are just beginning to develop democracy, but have not yet achieved the full features of democracy, may possess a combination of features of democracy and authoritarianism. If countries are developing toward democracies, these countries could be identified as illiberal democracies. By contrast, if in countries, “decision makers are not chosen through elections, and are simply a façade for the exercise of much greater power by a non-democratically chosen group, then clearly that political system is not democratic” (ibid, p11).
Marxist ideas of democracy have been widely developed by scholars and practitioners. In theory, Marxist ideas of democracy can be termed a “People’s Democracy”. This democracy is the genuine rule of the people (Parry, 1995, p1283). It is a kind of “direct democracy” (Held, 2006, p96). In practice, orthodox Marxism has been described as “socialist democracy” as practiced in many communist countries. It has emerged as the principle of “democratic centralism” in China. However, many orthodox Marxist forms of democratic government turned into dictatorships, such as in the Soviet Union, China and some East European countries. I would suggest that these orthodox Marxist socialist democracies are not democratic because there is no free competition between various parties and in such polities because only the communist party is allowed to exist.

It can be suggested that the theories and practices of liberal democracy, illiberal democracy and orthodox Marxist democracy provide diverse possibilities for China to develop democracy or to strengthen its authoritarianism in the context of economic growth and a one-party political system with a strong ideology and traditional culture. Therefore in this study, I will be looking for signs of democratisation relevant to the catalogues of liberal democracy, illiberal democracy and orthodox Marxist “socialist democracy”, as reflected in the university textbooks at the level of Chinese official discourse.

Democratisation is a long-term fluid process of developing democracy. Democratisation in a non-democratic country, such as China, would first show “inklings of democracy” as noted by Susanne Ogden (2002), and as Welzel (2009) has suggested, these would emerge during the first stage of democratisation. For example, there are elections at national and local levels in China, but they might not
be fair. There are multiple participants in the Chinese regime, but not all people have equal rights or chances. The extent of citizen participation or government control is an important factor in measuring the democratic process. If the Chinese government gave the Chinese people more rights and room to participate in politics, I would take it as a sign of moving towards democratisation. By contrast, if the Chinese government took back their power and strengthens its control, I would suggest these are signs of moving towards authoritarianism.

Further explanations of using indicators to measure democratisation in China can be found in the subsequent chapter. In this section, the following discussion focuses on those theories and practices of particular types of liberal democracy, illiberal democracy and orthodox Marxist ideas of democracy which are relevant to shaping processes of democratisation in China.

2.1.1. Liberal Democracy

Liberal democratic government, as a classical form, developed in west European countries and North America. According to Fukuyama (1992, p42), liberalism and democracy are “separate concepts” while closely related. Liberalism argues that human beings have certain natural rights and that “governments must accept a basic law, limiting its own powers, to secure them” (Zakaria, 2003, p20). Liberalism consists of three rights; civil, political and social rights. According to Marshall (1950, pp10-11), civil rights are composed of individual freedom—liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to “conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice”; political rights are the right to participate in “the exercise of political power... The corresponding institutions are parliament and councils of local government”; Social rights are the rights to “share fully one’s social
heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society”. In a liberal government, individual liberty and the rule of law recognize individual rights or freedoms from government control. Historically, Hong Kong had one of “the highest levels of liberalism in the world but was not a democracy prior to the Chinese takeover” (Zakaria, 2003, p21).

Ideally, if a democratic government has fully achieved these three rights, government can claim to be a liberal democratic regime. Based on Dahl’s definition of democracy, Crick (2002, pp94-98, 107-08) identified similar general characteristics of modern democracy in his “Democracy: a very short introduction”. These features of liberal democracy include: a fairly stable political class which shares powers with business, intellectuals and other social elites. Citizens are voluntary and individual participants in a representative government and citizens have freedom to organize pressure groups and to establish political parties. The judiciary system is independent. Laws are made by a representative parliament. The congress or parliament is a division of political power. Elections are regular, fair and free. A democratic constitution is essential to control the limits of each branch of government. The constitution also protects freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of religion and freedom from arbitrary arrest. Policies are debated in public and in a multi-party system. Knowledge is seen as contested and open to public debate. Educations’ main task is to equip citizens with the knowledge and skills to lead a successful, useful and flourishing life. Usually, there is official patronage of independent centres of learning and of the dissemination of knowledge. There is a diversity of mass media. People have access to information and know how the state is run.

Historically, many countries have developed liberal democracy while experiencing an absence of some of the full rights attributed to liberalism. Michael Mann (2005, p70)
calls this absence “the dark side of democracy”. In his studies of democratisation in the 19th century, the most liberal countries recognized themselves as “civilized” and were “divided into diverse interests and classes, and their political parties represented this diversity amid liberal institutions”, but these descriptions did not include “Natives”, “Savages” and “Orientals” or the so-called “lower races”. The United States and Australia are other examples which “amounted to the most successful murderous cleansing of out-groups while developing liberal democracy” (Mann, 2005, p139). This study suggests that during the process of democratisation, countries may not achieve all elements of democracy for all people. By the same token, in my study, if democratisation has appeared in China during the post Mao era, China might develop its own version of democracy with a few features of democracy, but these are unlikely to represent an ideal and fully developed democracy.

Modernisation Theory and Democratisation

To achieve a liberal democracy, economic issues are often considered by modernists. The theory of modernization suggests that modernity conceives three inseparable dimensions: market economy, democratic polity and individualism. This theory is based on the assumption of convergence, that modernization would “minimise cultural, institutional and structural differences and, if unimpeded, would lead to a uniform modern world” (Tu, 2002, p216).

According to the leading theorists in this field, “Lipset (1959), Rostow (1961), and Dahl (1971) argued that economic development leads to democracy” (cited from Inglehart, 1997, p160). Inglehart, (1997, p161) suggests that modern economic development brings “social mobilization, facilitating mass participation in politics,
which helps prepare the way for democracy”. In Inglehart’s view, “economic development is conducive to democracy not only because it mobilizes mass public participation, but also because it tends to give rise to supportive cultural orientations”. Welzel and Inglehart (2005) claim, modernization increases the probability of transitions to democracy. They provide a comprehensive framework for this by linking socio-economic development and cultural prerequisites for democracy. In their views, modernisation is a process that increases economic and political capabilities through industrialization and bureaucratization of society. During the process of industrialization, economic development becomes “the dominant societal goal”; economic development also creates “a large middle stratum of property owners who typically seek education, autonomy, personal freedom, property rights, the rule of law and participation in government” (Inglehart, 1997, p330), which “thereby provides the cultural prerequisites for democracy”.

Modernization brings class coalitions and therefore leads to cultural changes that make the masses more likely to want democracy and to become more skilful at getting it. They argue: “the major effect of modernisation…increases ordinary people’s capabilities and willingness to struggle for democratic institutions” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, p136). They also shed light on the role of ordinary people in the democratisation process by (a) explaining how citizens adopt values that push for and are conducive to democracy, and (b) by explaining how these democratic mass orientations translate into effective democratic institutions. Here they argue that socio-economic development, for instance through rising levels of education and occupational differentiation, increases social complexity, making people cognitively more autonomous and socially more independent. They also suggest that economic, cultural and political changes go together in coherent patterns and in predictable
ways. Once a society has embarked on industrialization, a whole syndrome of related changes is “likely to occur” (Inglehart, 1997, p5). In this sense, when specific economic changes are known to be taking place, “one can make predictions about future cultural and political changes” (Dahl, 2000, p331).

To support the view that economic development influences democratization, Robert A. Dahl (2000) explains why market-capitalist economy favours democracy. He suggests in “On Democracy” that “in the long run market-capitalism has typically led to economic growth; and economic growth is favourable to democracy” (ibid, p167).

He gives two reasons to support his opinion:

In a market-capitalist economy, the economic entities are either individuals or enterprises that are privately owned by individuals and groups, and not...by the state. Those who manage the enterprises can be guided solely by self-interested incentives. And because markets supply owners, managers, workers, and others with much of the crucial information they need, they can make their decisions without central direction...markets serve to coordinate and control the decisions of the economic entities...

Market-capitalism...creates a large middling stratum of property owners who typically seek education, autonomy, personal freedom, property rights, the rule of law, and participation in government. the middle classes...are the natural allies of democratic ideas and institutions...by decentralizing many economic decisions to relatively independent individuals and firms a market-capitalist economy avoids the need for a powerful, even authoritarian central government (ibid, pp167-168).

In Mousseau’s (2000) view, democracy and market economy are simply two different aspects of freedom, because a widespread market economy culture encourages individualism, negotiations, compromise, equality and respect for the law. These are the key features of democracy. Bernhagen (2009, p113) also claims that capitalist
economic development creates “immense opportunities” for democratization by “political openness and self-regulation”.

Shin and Tusalem (2009) recognize the importance of the middle class in the processes of democratisation. They consider that following economic development, the rise of the middle class and shifts in cultural values favour democratic rule. In East Asia, the growth in civil society groups has produced a balance of power between authoritarian rulers and democratic opposition. Civic movements originating mostly from the urban middle class were the most decisive and powerful force that drove authoritarian rulers in a democratic direction in the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand and South Korea. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) also suggest that economic development and social equality go together to influence democratization. In a highly unequal society, wealthy and powerful elites may prevent democratization to limit the redistribution of wealth and power. Democratization is more likely to emerge in egalitarian societies, where the middle class comprises a substantial body of citizens. The middle class, as intermediate wealth holders, can exert a stabilizing influence on democratic development.

*Modernisation theory and Democratisation in China*

Based on modernization theory, many scholars claim that socio-economic modernization has given rise to democratization in China. Hutton (2008, p121) observes that China’s economic reforms during the post Mao era have taken a similar direction as the West had in the past. He says:

“In China, a constitutionalism is emerging that tries to maintain the predictable rule of communist law, even if in practice the most predictable feature is that the party gets its way...The communist party accepted private and individual business as an important component of China’s future and was enlisting
entrepreneurs as members...the CCP is becoming an amalgam of a contemporary Confucian elite upholding and developing the Chinese rule of law and a typical Asian nationalist party experimenting with the first elements of Chinese democracy”.

For Ogden (2002), a corporatist form of civil society has emerged in China and this is shown by the openness of Chinese media, supporting village elections, increasing the power of the National People’s Congress and developing a more independent legal system. Law (2006, p601) describes how China has started democratisation, in that “the framework for the PRC's socialist citizenship has gradually shifted from an exclusive, to an accommodative orientation...the new framework comprises of a wider opening of the nation to the world”. Rachel Murphy (2014, p4) examines the individual liberties of the rising urban middle class and suggests that large numbers of people are joining civic groups as disparate as sports clubs, ecological activists or religious sects which may “create greater public space and individual freedoms”. Potter (2014, p5) also suggests that China has increased the professionalization and training of lawyers, relatively strengthened the courts, and various mechanisms for citizens to “petition the government for redress”. Laws on property, contracts and commerce have been promulgated. China's integration into the international economy has had a “salutary and largely positive effect”, as China has adopted many global practices, norms, rules and laws for international investment and trade. Domestically, the Arbitration Law and Labour Law allow for “protection of (limited) rights and avenues for redress against state malfeasance”.

Moreover, it has also been suggested that China is developing toward a civic society as a consequence of globalization in the educational field. According to Mitter (2005), China has been influenced by Chinese modernization and global economic integration, CE increasingly encourages the development of law and human rights
nationwide. Jones (2005) notes how history education promotes independent study and creative consciousness. Students are not required to be politically correct in their analysis of historical events. Zhao and Fairbrother (2004) studied a number of Chinese scholars’ articles regarding citizenship and moral education in the context of the economic reforms. They suggest that CE has moved away from ideological indoctrination to a more democratic pedagogical practice. Chinese educators have largely combined traditional Chinese culture with western democratization, in ways that have retained political loyalty to the CCP, whilst accepting more civic capacity into teaching practices. They conclude that Chinese education reform in the late 1990s and early 2000s consisted of a variety of new pedagogies and teaching practices that entailed a more open classroom climate, learning by doing and attention to students “own thinking, imagination, participation, curiosity, creativity, and analytical and communication skills” (ibid, p40). They believe that when the CCP has consolidated its power, it is able to give educators more freedom to practice their teaching.

2.1.2. Illiberal Democracy and East Asian Values

In scholars' discussions of the democratization of the countries in the contemporary world, civilisation theory is as compelling as modernization theory. One of the key points of modernization theory as mentioned above is that economic development of market capitalism promotes democratic development. But civilisation theory argues that the determining factor that affects a country's development is civilisation, not economy. That is to say, economic development is an important factor in democratization but not a determining factor. Therefore, civilisation theory infers that some cultures such as Confucianism may not develop democracy. Some scholars studied the processes of modernisation and democratisation in East Asian industrial
societies—including Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore from the 1960s (or earlier) to the 1990s. They have summarised the characteristics of the development in these societies, and formed the East Asian model theory based partly upon modernization theory and civilisation theory.

To comprehend the East Asian model, there needs to be an understanding of not only the characteristics of modernization in East Asian industrial societies, but also the differences between Chinese Confucian culture and East Asian Confucian civilization. Moreover, we should grasp civilisation theory and the relationship between Confucian culture and developing democracy.

**Civilisation Theory**

As I discussed earlier in the chapter, modernisation theory has suggested that the process of modernization is a process of universalization and globalization, and proposes that the differences between cultures will gradually be eliminated in the process of modernization. However, this view has been critiqued by "cultural relativists," who argue that modernization theory is Eurocentric and does not take account of the diversity of ends dictated by the world’s different cultures (Fukuyama, 1995, p21).

According to Samuel P. Huntington (2002, pp41-43), a civilization is a “cultural entity”. Civilization and culture both refer to the overall way of life of people, which involves “values, norms, institutions and modes of thinking”. Huntington highlights three important points in civilization theory. Firstly, the nature of civilization in all nations or countries is “unique and of particular essence” (p43). Western, Confucian, Islamic, African and Japanese civilizations are all individual and unique phenomena rooted in different historical and religious traditions. These differences will not soon disappear,
but rather will continue and become “a trend of development” in the world in the future, because the ideals and values of a civilization are “very long-lived”. Secondly, civilizations are not political entities. In the modern world, most civilizations contain two or more nation-states. A civilization may thus contain one or many political unities. Thirdly, civilization is a fundamental force shaping the values, attitudes and behaviour of a country and certain cultures are more conducive to democratic values than others. Additionally, Huntington (ibid) claims that Confucianism and democracy cannot be unified with one another, because classical Confucianism is antidemocratic, especially it gives precedence to the group above the individual, its family-oriented, patriarchal traditions, and its absence of a legal framework that stands above the state. Other scholars, who support civilisation theory, such as Almond and Verbaet (1989) suggest that a certain civic culture is necessary for the survival of democracy. Typically, liberal culture is “best suited” to democracy, with other cultures portrayed as containing values which make for different forms of government. For them, Confucianism lacks support for individualism and law, therefore, there is no social condition for developing democracy.

Yet, some scholars disagree with the view that Confucianism and democracy are incompatible. Scholar of Confucianism Tu Wei-ming (1997) distinguishes between what he calls "political Confucianism" which legitimates a hierarchical political system, and the "Confucian personal ethic" which regulates day-to-day life. In his opinion, in China, political Confucianism was very much tied to the imperial system and its supporting bureaucracy of gentlemen-scholars. Tu argues that in fact the more important legacy of traditional Confucianism is not its political teaching, but rather the personal ethic that regulates attitudes toward family, work, education, and other elements of daily life that are valued in Chinese society. Francis Fukuyama
(1995) goes even further; he accentuates the aspects of Confucianism that support democracy, emphasizing the value it places upon education, which in modernization theory is viewed as supportive of democracy. Education brings about a turn from economic thinking to political thinking and the associated desire to participate in political decision-making.

Many scholars studied the processes of modernisation and democratisation in East Asian countries from the 1960s (or earlier) to the 1990s, they have contributed a theory of East Asian model which characterizes East Asian values.

**East Asian Model and East Asian Values**

The East Asian Model is a combination of social science theory, cultural assumptions and political aspirations (Kennedy, Rozelle, Shi, 2004). In this study, the East Asian model refers to a development model of East Asian industrial societies—including Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore from the 1960s to the 1990s. This theory holds that the path of economic development and democratization of industrial East Asia are different from those of the West, and have their own characteristics, and that the determining causes of this difference are the unique culture shared by East Asian societies—East Asian values—a Confucian civilization that originated in China, but this is different from the Chinese Confucian tradition. Meanwhile, a number of pro-democracy supporters of East Asian Values have suggested that the East Asian model can be extended to other East Asian countries such as China, Vietnam, and North Korea which are influenced by Confucian culture but have not yet developed or completed democratization.

In detail, the development paths of East Asian societies are different during the 1960s to the 1990s. These societies have their own individual characteristics in
terms of political and economic strategies and organizations. These characteristics are significantly different from those in the West. Unlike the liberal market capitalist route to development in the West, the states in East Asia played a more powerful role. For example, South Korea is exactly the opposite of Taiwan. Taiwan started decentralized, which allowed people to develop free, small and medium-sized enterprises instead of developing heavy industry; while South Korea focused on the development of heavy industry, especially establishing large companies. The South Korean government has provided hundreds of millions of South Korean dollars, from loans, to help these companies to develop heavy industry, shipbuilding and automobile industries. Meanwhile, the Hong Kong government adopted a free economic strategy that is completely decentralized. In politics, Japan developed democracy; while Taiwan and South Korea were experiencing a transition from authoritarian regimes to political authority and towards democracy; Singapore has fairer elections of one person, one vote, but the ruling party, the DAP has been the one-party majority and controls politics all the year round.

Despite the unique development of East Asian societies having their own individual characteristics during modernisation, these societies have shared the same characteristics in terms of government, education, family and society. These characteristics are significantly different from those in the West (Tu, 1997, p352). In East Asian society, it is widely believed that the government is responsible for the stability, prosperity, peace and development of society. People demand that the government should have both authority and ability. Therefore, the people always expect the government to find solutions to any problems in society. Additionally, the relationship between governments and enterprises are not counterbalanced, and the business community often uses its influence with the government in order to develop,
especially when it comes to international competition. In East Asian societies, political powers are above economic rights, so that the combination of power and money is extremely close. Once a person enters the government, he/she can enter the upper echelons of society, which is different from the hereditary composition of the upper class in the West.

East Asian societies also have a unique examination system. This system is not available anywhere else in the world. Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and mainland China all have a centralized examination system to determine what kind of school children can attend (Tu, 1997, p353). There is no introduction letter, consideration of family background and success in extracurricular activities required for entering a school. The only decisive factor is the results of tests or examinations. Exams determine the fate of millions of East Asian youths. Test scores have become an important criterion for judging the future social status of a person. East Asian countries have tried to change this examination system. Once, this system was completely destroyed in the mainland during the Cultural Revolution. However, when Mao died, the examination system was immediately restored. This is an example of the power of culture. The influence of the examination culture not only reflects the educational development of these countries but also its value as recognised by ordinary people. In these societies, in order to create good educational conditions for younger generations, many families sacrifice their careers, properties and marriages. This situation cannot be easily understood by non-East Asian societies.

In East Asian societies, the notion of “family” is deeply rooted in their culture. Fukuyama (1995, p26) suggests that, intense familism (家庭主义) takes
precedence over all other social relations, including relations with political authorities. That is, “Confucianism builds a well-ordered society from the ground up rather than the top down, stressing the moral obligations of family life as the basic building block of society. According to Tu (1997), in East Asia, family not only becomes a factor in the emotional maintenance of societies, but also plays a big role in the process of modernisation. The concept of family is diverse and is distilled into various social relationships, such as classmates, town-mates or village-mates, comrades, fellowship and friends. These relationships are a social combination that are not subject to the law but are based on credit from and to each other. This relationship has had a great influence in the rise of industrial East Asia. For example, in Chinese gathering places in many countries around the world, especially in East Asian countries, some Chinese financial organizations can mobilize large amounts of funds to support Chinese. These organizations are unofficial, ultra-international, and regionally-sound credit communities. They are not private, but are maintained by a variety of complex interpersonal relationships.

Fukuyama (1995, p26) notes that beyond the traditional Chinese family, there are lineages and larger kinship groups; the state and other political authorities are seen as a kind of family of families that unites all Chinese into a single social entity”.

In short, East Asian societies share a similar structure in terms of government, education, family, and social forms. These similarities are based on “isomorphic cultural resources” (Tu, 1997, p356). These “isomorphic cultural resources” formed a unique model of modernisation— the East Asian model. Also, these “isomorphic cultural resources” originate not from the government’s designs, but from the spiritual culture—“Confucian civilisation” of East Asia (ibid).
Confucianism and East Asian Confucian Culture

According to Tu (1997, p348), East Asian society has a common historical background - the pre-modernization era. Confucian ethics are one of the most important factors in the social structure, political organization, economic power and cultural orientation of Korea, Japan and China during this era of development. Confucian culture stemmed from Confucianism in the Song dynasty and Ming dynasty in the 13th century (possibly earlier) in China, and played an influence in Korea in the 15th century and in Japan in the 17th century (ibid, p368). During this era, Confucian culture has changed from being the mainstream of Chinese culture to a part of a complex East Asian civilization. Strictly speaking, “Confucianism is not a religion, nor is it equivalent to Chinese culture” (ibid, p345). Confucianism has a narrow connotation, while Chinese culture has a broad connotation. Confucianism is a part of Chinese culture. However, Confucianism as a spiritual culture has a greater scope than Chinese culture. Chinese culture contains introspection and Confucianism emphasizes the philosophy and practice of introspection and self-cultivation of the person. Equating Chinese culture with Confucianism is inaccurate and one-sided (ibid, p36). Confucianism is the embodiment of East Asian civilization.

Tu (2002, pp205-206) illustrates some of the features of Chinese traditions which relates to Confucianism: (1). The law provides the minimum conditions for social stability, but law alone cannot generate a sense of duty to guide civilized behaviour. (2). The family is the basic unit of society and a microcosm of the state, therefore family affairs are of public interest rather than a private matter. The dyadic relationships within the family, society and the state are differentiated by age, gender, authority, status and hierarchy. (3). Education as "social capital" provides character building and the acquisition of knowledge and skills, as well as emphasizes ethical
and cognitive intelligence. Self-cultivation is the common root of the regulation of family life and the governance of state, civility is the normal pattern of human interaction. In short, Chinese tradition insists on “the importance of equality rather than freedom, sympathy rather than rationality, civility rather than law, duty rather than rights, and human-relatedness rather than individualism” (ibid, p199). The Confucian tradition, especially “Confucian ethics, is an important part of the spiritual culture which is deeply embedded in the way of life” in China’s development (Tu, 1997, p349).

Other East Asian societies also have different spiritual traditions which influenced their modernisation. For example, Buddhism has had a great influence on Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. In Japan, Shintoism is also a very complex ideological tradition and spiritual civilization that goes deep into Japanese folklore and society. The Japanese often embody the spiritual qualities that are combined by Shintoism and Confucianism. South Korea has a shamanism tradition. Christianity also has great influence in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. Confucianism is one of spiritual traditions in all these societies. Huntington (2002) describes Confucianism as being an essential doctrine that unifies the political and social spheres and legitimates the state’s authority in all areas of life. Lee (2004) observes that some East Asian countries focus more upon moral virtues than civic values, and public values rather than personal values. Also, Confucian principles have been interpreted as reinforcing norms such as self-denial and obligations to the group and to those of higher social status.

In summary, although East Asia has different spiritual civilizations, from the perspective of its overall value orientation, Confucian ethics is one of the foundations for the development of East Asian civilisation. Although American culture and
Japanese influence as well as crisis awareness are the positive factors that enabled modernisation in East Asia, industrial East Asia represents a development model which is different from Western modern capitalism in the 20th century (ibid). The culture and values based upon Confucianism have played a role in economic development, government operation, teamwork and the development of collective spirit in the formation of the East Asian model. During the process of modernisation, these countries share ethical norms, economic culture, family values, soft authoritarianism, group spirit and consensual politics. These governments are seen as a positive force for social stability, maintaining law and order, providing the basic necessities of life, leadership of a market economy and education. The people also share certain key traits, such as group solidarity with an emphasis on the political unit, great organizational skills, a strong work ethic and a tremendous drive for education.

**East Asian Value and Democratisation**

Developments in East Asian countries provide a challenge to the view of convergent global democratization. In theoretical terms, scholars suggest that democracy can be constantly shaped by a variety of cultural forms rooted in distinct traditions. For Friedman (1995), the Confucian faith provides rich cultural resources for East Asia to develop its own distinctive styles of democracies. For Im (2004), Confucian values shape the formulation and implementation of political order and national security, which are major sources of declarative democracy with a concentration of powers. According to Robinson (1996), Confucian notions of good government and leadership in terms of harmony and virtuous examples, are likely to have motivated the older generation of political leaders to embrace the notion that democracy brings chaos. These notions are also likely to have dissuaded leaders from accommodating
citizens' demands for democratic regime change and for expanding partial democracy into full democracy. As Tu (2002) summarises, democratization with Confucian characteristics is imagined as an evolving process compatible with bureaucratic meritocracy, educational elitism and particularistic social networking in East Asia.

Notably, research indicates a trajectory toward illiberal democracy in East Asia during their development during the 1960s to the 1990s. Shelley (2005) claims that illiberal democracy theory best describes democratisation in East Asia. He argues that there is no regional organization promoting democracy and human rights in East Asia, because the East Asian region is geographically distant from the clusters of powerful democracies in the West. Also, Confucian civilisation leads to a powerful authoritarian state resisting the spread of democracy; while the illiberal conceptions of democracy and good governance among both citizens and political leaders result in their unwillingness to submit to the democratic norms of pluralism and diversity. For this reason, democracies in East Asia may never resemble the liberal democracies of the West. In other words, all new democracies in East Asia have failed to become effective liberal democracies.

The most prominent proponent of an East Asian democracy has been former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. Singapore under Lee developed a model of what might be called a "soft" or paternalistic form of authoritarianism, which combined capitalism with an authoritarian political system that suppressed freedom of speech and political dissent while intervening, often intrusively, in its citizens' personal lives. Lee has argued that this model is more appropriate to East Asia's Confucian cultural traditions than is the Western democratic model. Neher (1994) observes that Lee placed the peace and prosperity of the community above the
rights and freedom of its individual citizens in Singapore. Bell (2015, pp31-32) in his book “The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy” also observes that, Singapore has democratic elections, but they are severely constrained: “ballots are numbered, the media is far from free, open, and balanced”, there are strict constrains on the freedom of association, “voters are threatened with retaliation, and opposition candidates have been subject to severe retaliation”.

Freedom House data (2008) suggests a similar phenomenon was found in South Korea and Taiwan during the early days of transition from authoritarianism to democratisation. The Presidents of South Korea, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung who although democratically elected, often failed to obey the basic laws and rules of democratic politics. In Taiwan, the KMT has ruled as a one-party state for nearly four decades until it lifted martial law in 1987 and provided elections in the national assembly in 1992 and a presidential election by direct popular vote in 1996.

In Shin and Tusalem’s (2009, p374) view, those leaders in East Asia “equated democracy with benevolent or soft authoritarian rule” and defended it as a viable alternative to western liberal democracy. They further predict that over the next two to three decades, East Asia is not likely to develop liberal democracy. Instead, this region will still be characterised by economic progress and illiberal patterns of democratization from the perspective of East Asian values. The democratic transformation of authoritarian regimes and the enrichment of illiberal democracies will continue to evolve very slowly and in different ways in the various nations of East Asia. Democratization will depend upon how political leaders and the mass citizenries understand and perceive democratic politics and how they interact through democratic institutions.
The theory of East Asian values suggests a possibility for China to develop democracy by sharing common features with other East Asian countries. Tu Weiming and Wm. Theodore de Bary (1989) suggest in their book “Confucianism and Human Rights” that Confucianism could combine with principles of democracy and human rights in China’s democratization process. Nathan (1990) compares democratisation in China with other countries in his work "China Crisis". He states that China shares a traditional political culture with Taiwan; therefore it may be possible for China to pilot democracy in a similar way to Taiwan. Vickers (2007, 2009) claims that China is following the strategies of development of post-war Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. Jones (2005) also suggests that Chinese social development shares similar values in its moral education and political socialisation as other Confucian societies of East Asia, which strengthens national narratives in history education. Zhao and Fairbrother (2004, p44) interpret Confucianism in education as “a desire-based dialogue pedagogy” which is used to enhance “students’ independent thinking, autonomous learning and problem-solving”.

Alternatively, Civilisation theory provides the possibility for China to develop a unique form of democracy. Scholars who research China’s development from cultural perspectives suggest that China is developing a unique path of democratisation. In Bilik’s (2005, p226) view, China shows a unique “culture, values system, social consciousness and world view”. During the post Mao era, the CCP regime has always taken western conceptions, such as Marxism, Leninism and other western ideas, and combined them with Chinese culture and values to develop a unique process of modernization. The Chinese government shares the view of Bilik that China is taking western ideas to develop a unique Chinese version of socialist democracy. Many official documents call for “use western for China”, which means
that Chinese culture and values are essential, China only needs technology and science from advanced western countries to accelerate its modernization. Shih (1999) also suggests that China is following its own path towards what is officially termed “democracy with Chinese characteristics”. Wang Li-xiong (2006) in his work “The Progressively Democracy” and Yu Ke-ping (2006) in “Democracy Is a Good Thing” both claim that China lacks the same historical and cultural foundations as Western countries to develop democracy, but China can progressively increase its electoral system to build democracy and civil society in a Chinese way.

2.1.3. Marxist Ideas of Democracy and Democratic Centralism

Marxist ideas of democracy were devised by Karl Marx (1818-83) and Friedrich Engels (1820-95). Since then, Marxist ideas of democracy have been recognised by scholars and practiced by a large number of countries. In China, Marxism is the core ideology of the CCP; the regime uses the term “Democratic Centralism” to describe its political system and uses the term “Marxism with Chinese characteristics” to describe Maoism, Dengism and Xiism as officially promoted ideology. The main task of CE in China has always contained the officially promoted ideology. This is a key theme for analysis in this study.

Marx and Engels did not produce an adequate political theory of democracy, but they described a “free and equal society” (Held, 2006, p121). According to Held (2006) in his “Models of Democracy”, the Marxist idea of democracy-the free and equal society- is a “direct socialist democracy” (ibid, p115). It is a type of liberal democratic politics, which could be achieved through “two stages of communism” (ibid, p103). Lenin (1870-1924) referred to these two stages as respectively “socialism” and “communism”. Held (2006, p115) summaries the broad characteristics of a “free and
equal society” as: public affairs are regulated by Communes or councils organized in a pyramid structure. In this structure, “the smallest communities would administer their own affairs and elect delegates to larger administrative districts or towns, which would, in turn, elect candidates to higher levels of administration-the national delegation”. Among these, the commune structure is “essentially the machinery of the state”. There are frequent elections for “government personnel, law officers, and administrators, who hold mandates from their community”.

For Parry (1995, p1283), Marxist ideas of democracy can be termed a “People’s Democracy”. In theory, this democracy is “the genuine rule of the people”, which implies control of government and the economy by the working class. This class consists of “the poor masses, the emancipatory and revolutionary class”. Mann (2005, pp318-19) concludes that, rule by the people and ideological power are the features of this genuine democracy. These two features come together “in the notion that the workers themselves would control the means of production and so make a genuine democracy possible”. Przeworski (1988, pp11-12) underlines that participation in Marxist terms of democratic politics is necessary. He explains that “capitalism is a particular form of social organization of production and exchange…capitalists are able to seek the realization of their interests in the course of everyday activity within the system of production”; therefore “workers must organize as participants” so as to be able to “conduct other forms of struggle including direct confrontation with capitalists”.

Historically, Marxist ideas of democracy have been widely developed by practitioners and political reformers. Among these, Lenin developed orthodox Marxism. His practice in the Soviet Union has been suggested as Leninism. According to Meyer’s (1995, p754) studies of “Leninism”, Lenin’s conception of democracy “affords all
citizens structured and limited participation in the discussion of issues and the choice of representatives”; It also means “rule by policies benefiting the masses or the poor”. Meyer (1995) defines the broad characteristics of Leninist theory of governance as the dictatorship of the proletariat. First, the state is strongly unified. The government combines citizens’ organizations, legislative and executive functions, and is controlled by a single party. This party claims to represent the working class and all other parties are outlawed in political life. The party’s decisions will not be weakened by any checks and balances. Second, “democratic centralism” provides the principles in all its functions that the ruling party are to adhere to. Under this formula of democratic centralism, pending issues can be debated freely by the party membership. Once a decision is made, members have to accept it without further questioning. Third, citizenship stresses duties instead of rights and the interests of the collective rather than those of individuals.

**Marxism and Authoritarianism**

Some scholars have argued that there is a fundamental problem with applying orthodox Marxist ideas of democracy in practice. The main problem is that such regimes cannot accept any serious political opposition from individuals or groups. As Held (2006, p121) warns, without an institutional protection of public discourse and individual autonomy, a Marxist government could be granted almost “limitless power”. Parry (1995, p1284) also claims that “the rule of the people” in Marxist terms of democracy may not be exercised directly in practice; because “the rule of the people” is often exercised through the agency of the Communist Party since the Party claims to possess knowledge of the people’s interests. From this perspective, only the party’s interests can be pursued, not individual’s interests.
Mann (2005) studied Stalin’s USSR, Mao’s China and Pol Pot’s Cambodia. He suggests that in these communist regimes, “the people” are seen as an “organic conception” existing in a “singular ethnic nation or a single proletarian class,” and other interest groups are not allowed to exist. The state is seen as “the bearer of a moral project to cleanse the proletariat of its enemies” (ibid, p350). Rule by the people is actually “rule by the vanguard party of the proletariat” (ibid, p318). Hannah Arendt (1966, p312) identified the Soviet Union as a totalitarian government in her work “the Origins of Totalitarianism”. She suggests that the Soviet Union practiced majority rule rather than their constitutions. Huntington (1993, p111) also summarised some common features among Central and East European communist countries, wherein the party effectively “monopolized political, economic and military power”. Access to power was “through the party organization and the party legitimated its rule through ideology”. This system often achieved a relatively high level of political institutionalization which “suppressed both competition and participation”. In my understanding, this type of orthodox Marxism, in practice, equals authoritarianism rather than democracy.

Social scientists have classified the characteristics of authoritarian governments. Huntington (1993, p12) suggests that authoritarian regimes have a single party, that are usually led by one man, that they have a highly developed “ideology setting forth the ideal society”, and that government controls mass communications and all or most social and economic organisations. Harber (1997, p3) summarise the characteristics of an authoritarian regime as: there is no free political choice, no genuine elections, and no guaranteed human rights; the final power to remove a government is not in the hands of the voters; the government is free to do what it wants. Citizens have little say in how the country is run and rule is by edict; the role
of the people is to obey and do what they are told; those who do not obey the rules or who oppose the system are punished accordingly.

Crick (2002, p95-98) also claims that in authoritarian countries, “an ideology effects politics and citizens' lives”, the class system is based on “political and bureaucratic office-holding”, and the ruling elite is “usually self-perpetuating and exclusive” within a single party or military rule; the government is “neither representative of the people nor accountable to the people for its actions”. Communication is top-down and hierarchical. The ideal citizen is one who respects authority and does not ask any questions. Law is regulated by personal favours or interventions. Law is interpreted by the general intentions of the ideology, not in the literal meaning of statutes. Knowledge is seen as either propaganda or a unified instrument of political power that is shared by the ruling elite, and this is not to be questioned or debated publicly, all knowledge is seen as either propaganda or as secrets of the state. Full information, regular discussion and tolerance of a range of viewpoints are not the characteristics of this type of regime. Diversity, critical thought and democratic participation are not encouraged or are actively suppressed.

Marxism and Democratisation in (post) Communist Countries

Many communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe experienced a transition from authoritarianism to democratisation during the third wave of global democratization during 1989-90. As Held (2006, p218) suggests, these countries underwent “dramatic and unexpected transformations of the state socialist system”.

According to Huntington (1993, pp111-16), democratisation in communist countries share some common characters, such as large numbers of properties belonging to the party were transferred to the state or to private companies, the party militias were
disbanded or brought under government control, and the regular armed forces were depoliticized. In Poland, all army officers had to be members of the Communist party until 1989. Polish army officers lobbied parliament to prohibit officers from being members of any political party. In Nicaragua the Sandinista People’s Army was converted into the army of the state. Importantly, these communist countries reformed the ideology of the party. Commonly, the ideology of the party defined the identity of the communist state; this communist ideology was not essential to defining the identity of the country, and this ideology was imposed by the Soviet Union. Therefore, establishing another identity for the state is a necessary condition for legitimizing opposition to the party. In Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria, when the communist parties rejected communist ideology, these countries redefined themselves from “people’s republics” to “republics”, and re-established nationalism rather than ideology as the basis of the state. In the Soviet Union, the ideology of the single party defined the nature of the state and its geographical scope, as well as provided the ideological legitimacy for multinational states. When this ideology was rejected, the basis for the state disappeared and each nationality legitimately claimed its own state. In East Germany, communism provided the ideological basis for a separate state and when this ideology was abandoned, the rationale for an East German state disappeared.

Other scholars (Haerpfer, Bernhagen, Inglehart, Welzel, 2009, p378) note the role of opposition leaders during democratisation in these communist regimes. They suggest that democratization required accepting different interest groups as “legitimate participants” in politics and transited to democracy through “negotiations, compromises, agreements, campaigns, elections and the nonviolent resolution of differences”. In 1989, Solidarity and the Communist party in Poland negotiated the
Round Table agreements; in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, wherein governments and opposition leaders negotiated for democratisation.

2.1.4. Marxist Ideology and Democratisation Research in China

In China, democratic centralism is the principle of the state and the Party (Chinese Constitution, 1982; the CCP Constitution, 2012). According to the Constitutions, democratic centralism is practiced through the Congress system. The Party is the only ruling leadership. The Party members are subordinate to the party organization, the minority is subordinate to the majority, and lower strata organizations are subordinate to higher organizations. The party organizations and members are subordinate to the Party's National Congress and the Central Committee. The leaders of the Party are elected at all levels. The party's parent organizations often listen to the opinions of the lower organizations, the masses and the party's members in order to promptly resolve problems they raise. “Democratic centralism” is based upon the principle that democracy is achieved through the processes of decision-making. In principle, the centralist aspect is asserted via the subordination of all lower bodies to the decisions taken by higher ones. Democracy consists in the fact that the highest body of the Party is its congress to which delegates are elected by local organizations. Therefore, there is room for democratic input in pre-congress discussions and elections.

Scholars interpret this Chinese version of democratic centralism and practice during both Mao's era and the post Mao era differently. Pye (1988) views the Chinese communist regime as a Leninist autocratic system. Held (2006, p118) suggests that Mao and Deng are both orthodox Marxists. Mao took Marx idea of class struggle to "envisage a socialist system with a proletarian dictatorship”. Deng used Marx’s
theory of “the economic base determining the immaterial superstructure” to prioritise economic development. Currently, Xi Jin-ping inherits ideas partly from Maoism and Dengism and may develop China into an economic and military power with an authoritarian political system (see ch.7). Brodsgaard (2014, p2) observes that the CCP is a highly institutionalized organ that “permeates all elements of party-state”, services and society from top to bottom. Potter (2014, p4) appropriately suggests that the party-state still remains “the final arbiter of conflicts” over legal rights and interests within Chinese society. China's legal system still remains a system that practises the “rule by law” rather than the rule of law.

In contrast to the views given above, some scholars suggest that it is possible for China to pilot democracy under Marxist ideology. Nathan (1990) compares democratisation in China with the Soviet Union in his work "China Crisis". He states that in terms of political and cultural backgrounds, China shares Leninist political culture with the Soviet Union. Russia has developed a constrained multi-party system and with elections; economic and political reform in China will become unstoppable once the political elders in the CCP die. China will change in the same way as Eastern European communist countries and will develop democracy. They both suggest that the CCP leadership is the key factor which will determine future change.

Orville Schell in "Disco and Democracy" (1988, p376) claims that Marxism and Maoism have been discarded as the legitimating ideology of the CCP. Theories of “dialectical materialism”, class struggle and proletarian dictatorship are represented at a highly theoretical level as “objective and scientific approaches” to Chinese national strength. Maoism is a “powerful weapon of anti-reform”. When the advocates of modernization or reform go too far or too fast from Mao's revolutionary
theory, or social polarization between rich and poor becomes too obvious, or young people request westernization or democracy, leftists would immediately use Maoism as a weapon against them. Vickers, (2007, 2009) also suggests that the CCP uses patriotism to justify rapid economic modernization and strengthens Han-centred nationalism. Nationalist morality has become a core task in Chinese schooling. A strong and united nationalism in patriotic education works against further subversion from students, while “socialism” has become merely a slogan leaving social equity, democracy and human rights very much on the back burner.

Notably, scholars recognise that China may need a long historic period to develop democracy. According to Barrington Moore (1970) historically, countries lacking a growing urban commercial middle class, which includes China, have found it harder to develop democratic institutions.

2.2. Citizenship Education

Citizenship education cultivates ideas about citizenship that countries and societies expect or require their citizens to know and practice. CE provides discussions of the ideology of the state, political systems and social values, and “controversial social issues and community affairs, political literacy, critical skills and cultural knowledge” (Crick, 2002, p114). Commonly, governments use CE to educate citizens in ways that are compatible with a particular regime. In an authoritarian regime, the citizen needs to have certain qualities, such as dedication, unconditional loyalty and self-sacrifice. If the regime is democratic, the citizen needs to possess qualities such as being tolerant of different views, participating in politics, holding the government to account and critical thinking. Thus, CE development can indicate some characteristics and tendencies of democratization in a country. Researching CE and
the citizenship curriculum has also been influenced by democratisation theories. The same debates regarding institutional structures, political ideologies, social values and individual attitudes can be seen in CE research.

In this study, I explore democratisation by analysing political education in Chinese HE during the post Mao era. Particularly, I analyse the themes of the officially promoted ideologies, the political reforms and the structure of the regime with particular relevance to the shaping of values, identity and citizenship as contained in the textbooks of the “Politics” curriculum. These themes have been defined and promoted by the Chinese government in China, and are purposely introduced to university students. I am interested in whether these officially promoted ideologies, policies, and institutional reforms contribute to the development of democracy and whether there is a distinct version of democracy in Chinese practices. I am also interested to explore whether people’s substantive rights are growing, how the government control these processes and how people’s participation has changed and in what ways. This analysis enables me to trace processes and features of democratisation in authoritarian China. Notably, this study is not about tracing the formation of a fully developed democratic government or culture, or civil society, nor individual attitudes; it is concerned with assessing the emergence of some democratic elements and values within the authoritarian regime through an analysis of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum. Therefore, the findings from the analysis do not necessarily represent democratisation in China as a whole.

2.2.1. Citizenship and Citizenship Education

Citizens are identified as members belonging to a particular society or nation or groups of people, who are accepted legitimately in the state within which they live.
Therefore, citizens have both social and political memberships. In political theory, citizenship refers to the rights and duties of the members of a country.

It is important to understand and improve upon conceptions of citizenship. In the Western concept of citizenship, the concept now not only includes the political dimension, but also social and cultural dimensions. In the Chinese context, political education is a part of national citizenship education; therefore, the social and cultural dimensions are also part of the “political”. In this study, I take Marshall’s definition of “citizenship” which was suggested in his famous ‘Citizenship and Social Class’ (1963 edition). Mann (1987, p339) claims in his “Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship”, that Marshall’s definition of Citizenship has continued to seem true and important by number of major sociologists such as Reinhard Bendix, Ralf Dahrendorf, Ronald Dore, A. H. Halsey, S. M. Lipset, David Lockwood and Peter Townsend.

Marshall identified three stages of the attainment of citizenship: Civil, political and social. Civil citizenship emerged in the 18th century. It comprised “rights necessary for individual freedom – liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice.” Political citizenship emerged in the 19th century:” the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body”. The third stage, social citizenship, developed throughout the 20th Century and containing: “the whole range of rights, from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share the full social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society.: this is what we now mean by the Welfare State and social democracy (quoted from Mann, 1987, p339).
Citizenship is most commonly experienced at local level, while it can exist at supranational levels. On the one hand, citizenship is often closely associated with nationality. This means that nationals and non-nationals living within a state can exercise citizenship. Citizens can participate in the economic, social and political life of their community. At this level, citizenship is a governing strategy. citizens are required to have the necessary knowledge and skills to meet political needs and to cultivate specific virtues, and to live responsibly in the nation as good citizens (Heater, 1990; Arthur, 2008). On the other hand, citizenship can be viewed as a free standing and independent concept at supranational levels, such as European citizenship, or global citizenship. In this context, citizenship is a globalizing strategy for instilling certain values and conduct in order to achieve global integration (Arthur, 2008).

The institution “most closely connected with citizenship is the educational system” (Marshall, 1950, p11). Education has been seen as an important means for furthering the aims of the state. According to Green (2013, p85), education is essential for providing “the trained cadres for government bureaucracy and the military”, and has an important role to play in “generating the skills needed for the fledgling state’s projects”. Also, education is recognized as a powerful instrument for promoting political loyalty amongst the people and for creating a “cohesive national culture after the image of the ruling class”.

Formally, CE is associated with schooling in national curriculum. The CE curriculum can be delivered through three main approaches: (1). as a stand-alone subject; (2). as part of other subjects or areas of learning, such as history, geography, language, political study and moral education; or (3). as a cross-curriculum dimension. In practice, a combination of these approaches is often used, and sometimes involves
all school subjects and activities (EURYDICE, 2005). The citizenship curriculum covers a comprehensive range of topics including theoretical knowledge, fundamental principles of societies, political awareness, national history, contemporary societal issues and international dimensions (ibid).

2.2.2. Citizenship Education in Democratic and Authoritarian Countries

In western countries, liberal democratic citizenship is commonly associated with democratic regimes. It promotes citizens' participation in political and social life based on democratic values, which recognize human rights, freedom and individual autonomy (Frazer, 2008). Liberal democratic citizenship stresses the notion of equal respect and dignity. It also acknowledges the right of individuals to organise themselves politically and culturally to pursue their interests (Lange, 2012).

Democratic citizenship aims to prepare people to live in a multicultural society and to deal with difference knowledgeably, sensibly, tolerantly and morally as well as to strengthen social cohesion, mutual understanding and solidarity (Starkey, 1995).

Liberal democratic CE introduces knowledge of basic democratic concepts including an understanding of major social developments both past and present, political processes and governmental structures (The Council of Europe, 1998, Crick, 1998). It also addresses cultivating students’ critical thinking and communication skills, which aims to develop students’ abilities and willingness to participate constructively in the public domain and in decision-making processes through voting, as well as to develop students’ sense of belonging to society at various levels, and to equip them with respect for diversity (EURYDICE, 2005).

In contrast with liberal democracy, in an authoritarian country, citizens are required to be law abiding and to participate in military service as a citizenship duty (Arthur,
Commonly, the function of CE is the same as political education within a highly centralized education system designed to meet the requirements of an authoritarian regime (Mann, 1987). Governments promote a sense of national identity and consensus, a united language and single culture and political and moral values in schools. Governments also provide political ideology and policy guidelines and support to individual schools (Morris and Sweeting, 1991). CE focuses upon instilling appropriate kinds of knowledge, conduct and character as understood by the government and ruling elites of the state. Ideology is presented as the truth. Independent thinking is discouraged. CE also stresses citizens’ duties and responsibilities and downplays the rights of citizens. Hence, there is no emphasis on the specific skills of problem solving and critical-analytical abilities. Tolerance towards others, being open to different ideas and multiculturalism are not fostered (Bell, Jayasuriya, Jones, 1995).

According to the studies above, we can assume that if democratic patterns emerge in Chinese CE, this would indicate a development towards democracy in Chinese higher education. Although universities may not represent broader political changes in a country, universities can offer opportunities to investigate democratisation. Universities have been regarded as key institutions in processes of social change and development.

**2.2.3. University and Democratization**

Democratisation implies some fundamental changes in the core institutions of state. Universities have been regarded as key institutions in processes of social change and development. Universities not only train a skilled labour force and carry out research to meet perceived economic needs, but also have roles to encourage and
facilitate new cultural values (Castells, 2001; Plantain, 2002; Matsuda, 2013). Western scholars such as Lipset (1959) have stressed the importance of higher education for the emergence and endurance of liberal democracy. Shils (1989) also observes that universities owe a great deal to liberal democracy, and that liberal democracy owes a considerable part of its successful functioning to universities.

Historically, according to Harkavy (2006), in industrial societies, universities are essential for producing significant democratic progress. University student movements in Europe and America during the 1960s and 1970s led to emancipation and more direct and responsive forms of government (Burns, Schlozman and Verba, 2001; Dee, 2004). Research in Europe and Latin America (Dalton, 2008a, b) show that HE predicts citizens’ qualities in terms of interest in politics, newspaper readership, political knowledge, interpersonal trust, tolerance of political opponents, and a wide range of forms of political participation, such as contacting elected leaders, joining community associations, attending community meetings and other political activities. Studies in Africa showed that HE provides advantages in various measures of democratic citizenship and leadership, such as providing information gathering skills and levels of political knowledge, offering opinions and critical perspectives on politics and the economy as well as practicing democratic values and democratic action. An analysis of Afrobarometer data based on attitudes and values measured across 18 African countries in 2005-2006 demonstrated similar outcomes (Mattes & Luescher-Mamashela, 2012).

Nevertheless, universities can be both important supporters of old regimes as well as providers of protected space for critique and opposition (Brennan, King and Lebeau, 2004). State support for universities proves politically successful not only for democratic regimes but also for authoritarian regimes. A mutually beneficial
relationship between authoritarian regimes and modern universities in some countries has challenged influential theories that associate the flourishing of such educational institutions with democratization (Perry, 2015a).

In China, the government always plays a central role in sponsoring and stratifying institutions of higher education in order to directly serve state interests. The Chinese government funded “the 211 Project” from 1990, “the 985 Project” from 1998 and “world-class” universities from 2015 in HE. These projects served both as motors of economic development and as mainstays of authoritarian rule (Perry, 2015a). Simultaneously, a large number of professors at universities benefitted from these projects in terms of personal income and professional prestige. These have also enhanced the nexus between the regime and scholars, thereby becoming part of the central pillar of authoritarian regimes. As Yan Xiaojun (2014) observes, a crucial element for political control in authoritarian regimes is the generating of compliance incentives. The CCP systemically promotes policies that focus on the bestowing of benefits and privileges to universities in exchange for political compliance and conformity. Scholars and the Chinese regime become partners in a concerted effort to boost the international standing of Chinese universities. Ruth Hayhoe (1993) finds that ideological indoctrination practiced in the name of “moral education” in universities, has helped the Chinese regime to generate stability and suppress political turbulence.

The East Asian “tigers” that share a culture of Confucianism also have a “state-scholar nexus”—according to Perry (2015a, p2), it is the Confucian examination system, which “served for centuries as a mechanism to attract, evaluate, and enlist intellectual talent for government service”. In this system, as Ashton (1999) suggest, scholars in higher education provide special importance in the development
strategies of those societies. The survey of World Bank (1994) also points out, in Singapore, the government designed higher standards of HE infrastructure, and this development of HE has clearly contributed to economic benefits while not unravelling the authoritarian political structure. Moreover, Russia as an authoritarian regime under the leadership of President Putin, promoted the “Program 5-100” in HE in 2013. This program aims to enhance national growth and international competitiveness through state support of the leading Russian universities with the explicit intent of catapulting at least five of them into the top 100 in the global university rankings (Perry, 2015a).

The theory and research above suggests that the development of HE can be an important source for research into traces of democratisation. Analysis of political education at university level in this research is therefore important. Although indications of democratisation in political education at the university level may not be generalizable to other social domains, they can be seen as signs of democratisation in relation to liberal democracy, illiberal democracy and Marxist ideas of democracy. Also, existing research has provided two different perspectives concerning relations between the development of HE and democratisation, with one claiming that HE is a forerunner of democratization and the other claiming that HE can be co-opted and corrupted by authoritarian governments. In China, the university is considered by the CCP and Chinese society to be the best place to cultivate successors for China’s future. My study can be seen as a test of these two different perspectives.

2.3. Summary

The aim of this study is to explore whether CE in HE in China has developed traces of a democratic political culture during the post Mao era. In order to provide a range
of indicators for the analysis of democratization in China, I have discussed debates regarding definitions of democracy and democratization that refer to modernisation theory, East Asian Values and Marxist ideas of democracy, as well as their applications. I have also presented my own working definitions and understandings of democracy and democratization, and distinguished characteristics of ideal-typical democratic and authoritarian regimes for the empirical analysis. Moreover, I have reviewed contrasting views concerning global trends in, and multiple forms of CE development and world culture theory, I also discuss the role of CE in researching democratisation regarding institutional structures, political ideologies, social values and individual attitudes. I defined the characteristics of CE in democratic and authoritarian regimes and the role of universities in democratisation.

Analysis of this literature has provided a conceptual map with which to orientate this thesis to explore processes of democratisation in China. Since China started the reforms in 1978, China has largely developed a modern economy. However, China remains a one-party state with a strong officially promoted ideology. China also developed nationwide nationalism and Confucianism. We can assume that China may develop some patterns of democracy during the post Mao era, but China as an authoritarian regime, is still far from a fully developed democracy. At the same time, due to cultural differences, China may take an East Asian route to democratisation, or may even create its own unique form of democracy, or China may develop further towards authoritarianism.

This literature review also provides the basis for the identification (in the next chapter) of a range of indicators for the empirical analysis and discussion in subsequent chapters 5 to 9. Notably, in this study, I am not seeking to describe a fully developed democratic political system with most of the characteristics of democracy; therefore,
the indicators I use to measure processes of democratisation in China may only represent the degree to which there are signs of the emergence of democracy in China. Also signs of democratisation from the empirical analysis are limited to observations from the university textbooks, and I do not claim that these represent democratization in Chinese society as a whole. Again, what the Chinese government claims to be democratisation in political education, as found in the university textbooks is not fully representative of China’s development towards democratisation.
Chapter 3. Research Methods

Introduction

This study employs a thematic analysis to analyse data from a range of important
official written sources, including official policies of the Chinese Government
regarding political education, the curriculum, university textbooks and other
educational documents relevant to the research questions. The fieldwork enabled
analysis of data from classroom observations and interviews with teachers and
students at five Chinese Universities.

Qualitative Content Analysis is the broad research method used in this study.
Qualitative content analysis can “seek better understanding of the meanings of the
text from the point of view of the producer and the specific social and historical
context” (Bryman, 2001, p189). This method allows me to track longitudinal changes
in the texts over time. Also, the coding from original texts and the sampling
procedures employed can be used by other follow-up studies (ibid).

This chapter presents the research aims and the theoretical approaches used to
identify processes of democratisation. This is followed by an explanation of data
collection methods and describes the analytic approach employed to evaluate the
contents of education documents and university textbooks. The final section
discusses the application of qualitative content analysis to classroom observations
and interviews as well as the ethical issues encountered during the fieldwork.

3.1. Research Aims and Theoretical Approaches
This research aims to explore processes of democratisation during the post Mao era in the context of economic development and the one-party political system in China, by analysis of the themes represented in the university textbooks of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum. These themes consist of: (1). the officially promoted ideologies; (2). the official definitions of the Communist regime and Chinese political system; and (3). democratic values as understood by officials and the authors of the textbooks. By analysing the narrations of these themes, I was able to evaluate whether, how far and in what ways these descriptions reflect processes of democratization at the level of official discourse in China.

The textbooks used in this study were all written in accordance with the unified syllabus of the politics curriculum which have been issued and approved by the MOE for use in universities. Since 1998, the Propaganda Department of the CCP and the MOE have organized and compiled unified textbooks for use in all Chinese universities. Therefore, these themes are official policies and opinions which have been purposely introduced to universities students. However, I acknowledge that what the Chinese government claims to be democratisation, and what can in fact be considered democratisation, may be different in reality. Sometimes, the authors of the textbooks express their own opinions in the textbooks. In the analysis, I distinguished between the official points of view and individual author's views.

Based on literature studies of democracy, democratization and CE, I have adopted a broad definition of democracy (see previous chapter) to inform the framework of indicators for empirical analysis. Using this definition, liberal democracies are the most democratic and orthodox Marxist “democracies” least so, with illiberal “democracies” scoring somewhere in the middle. Later in this section I explain how
to use the indicators for analysis of an ideal-typical illiberal and Marxist form of democracy.

Table 3-1 shows ideal-typical characteristics of liberal democratic and authoritarian regimes. It must be noted that I do not present these as real phenomena that can be observed in a country. Instead I understand them as “ideal-typical” in Weber’s sense, i.e. as idea-constructs that assist in the building of a coherent description of complex social reality (Burger, 1976).

**Table 3-1. Ideal-typical Characteristics of Liberal Democratic or Authoritarian Regimes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Liberal Democracy</th>
<th>Authoritarianism</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of citizen</td>
<td>D1: Respect individual rights, personal autonomy and equality(^8), Freedom of organizing groups and participate in a multi-party government(^{14}); the right to vote, the right to be elected(^{16})</td>
<td>A1: National interests over individual(^2), obligation to group(^4). No free political choice(^{14}). People are to obey authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political culture</td>
<td>D2: Political debate, Pluralism. Politics is recognized as a conciliatory public activity aimed at or involving compromise(^{14})</td>
<td>A2: No free access to full information and tolerance to others(^{3}). Politics is limited to the privacy and the inner party(^{14})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value, ideology</td>
<td>D3: Democratic values, Pluralist choices by individuals(^{11}). Individual rights and freedoms(^2), belief in human dignity and equality(^{15}); tolerance to others(^{15})</td>
<td>A3: Ideology given by authority, collectivist virtues(^{1,6}), national values over individual interests(^2), prophetic of the course of history(^{14})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social structure</td>
<td>D4: A stable political class (elites and middle class) share power with other social elites(^{14}). Diverse groups</td>
<td>A4: A class-system based on political and bureaucratic office-holding(^{14}). Self-perpetuating and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>D5: Freedom of expression\textsuperscript{10}; Freedom of association; Public debate, a multi-party government represents the interests of many\textsuperscript{14}. Elections are free and fair\textsuperscript{16}; The right of political leaders to compete for support and votes; Institutions for making public polities depend on votes and other expressions of preference\textsuperscript{16}</td>
<td>A5: A monolithic power composed of and serving the interests of the few or one group only. State power over subordinate social groups\textsuperscript{4}. Single party system\textsuperscript{1}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy, reform</td>
<td>D6: Focus on quality of life, a free market economy\textsuperscript{14}, reforms benefit individuals\textsuperscript{2}</td>
<td>A6: Focus on economic growth, reform benefits the state\textsuperscript{1}, modernization\textsuperscript{2}, industrialization\textsuperscript{14}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>D7: Independent judiciary\textsuperscript{10} Law is enforced by rules and impartial judges\textsuperscript{14}. Rule of law; Laws allow a maximization of private life\textsuperscript{14}.</td>
<td>A7: Law is regulated by personal favours or interventions, law is interpreted by the general intentions of ideology, not in the literal meaning of what is written\textsuperscript{14}.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge, understanding</td>
<td>D8: Knowledge is open to public debate\textsuperscript{14}. No predetermined answers\textsuperscript{9}. Make a reasoned argument\textsuperscript{15}; knowledge of diversity, dissent and social conflict\textsuperscript{15}; knowledge of legal and moral rights and responsibilities of individuals and communities\textsuperscript{15}; willingness to be open to changing one’s opinions and attitudes based on evidence</td>
<td>A8: Knowledge is a unified instrument of political power as propaganda or as secrets of state. Official knowledge is not to be debated\textsuperscript{14}, official guidance for teaching\textsuperscript{1}, controlled school textbooks\textsuperscript{1}. Single narratives are presented as absolute and unquestionable\textsuperscript{5}, language accompany with strong normative...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The purpose of developing such an elaborate framework of indicators in this study is to better measure detailed changes regarding democratisation reflected in the universities’ textbooks. The approach of using indicators is a useful method in this study. “Identification of suitable indicators is facilitated by the recognition of its dimensions” (Bernhagen, 2009, p31). Using indicators can identify variations in the degree of democracy. I acknowledge that this approach does pose problems with the weighting of indicators. There is no real world political system that is ever likely to correspond perfectly to ideal‐typical properties. However, most of the existing distinctions that define “the various sub‐types of democratic and autocratic regimes” can be “subsumed into certain categories” (Bernhagen, 2009, p38). Also, if “a country lacks one or several conditions that favour democracy, there is still a possibility of achieving democracy” (Dahl, 2000, p163). Therefore, if the analysis suggests similar patterns in the indicators of democracy, I would take them as signs of democratisation.
As the literature discussion suggests, political systems differ in the details of their construction. Democratic political systems can be formed as liberal democratic, illiberal democratic and orthodox Marxist socialist democratic governments. The approach of using indicators can better serve the purpose of this study, in which I trace processes of democratisation in the context of economic growth and a one-party political system with a strong ideology and traditional culture in China. My concern is that, as an application of modernisation theory, if China developed democracy during the post Mao era, there would be a chance for China to develop some patterns of liberal democracy due to China’s economic achievements. It can be seen from the table that the measures of liberal democracy arise from combining indicators of citizens’ rights, elections, and restrictions on political parties, freedom of the press, values and other criteria.

It must be made clear here that signs of democratisation which emerge during the transition from a non-democratic regime to a democratic one, do not necessarily represent the full establishment or development of democracy. These signs are beginning points or inklings of democracy in the authoritarian Chinese regime; or, these signs show willingness or attempts to develop democracy from the CCP or the authors at a particular period and at the level of official discourse. For example, if the narratives of citizens’ rights in the textbooks support individual rights of participation in the regime (indicator, D1), this is indicative of democratization, but this does not mean that China has developed a liberal democracy. In contrast, where citizens’ rights are represented with collectivist interests exalted above individual interests or whereby citizens do not have free political choice (indicator, A1), this indicates a sign of authoritarianism.

The rule of law is also an indicator of liberal democracy (indicator, D7). When the
rule of law was promoted by the CCP in the 1999 textbooks, I interpreted this as an indication of democratization. Notably, this neither means that China has developed a liberal democracy, nor might China continue to implement the rule of law in the same ways in the future. It can be concluded that through such indicators, China attempted to implement the rule of law at that time, and had purposely introduced this policy to university students. Again, congress elections and multi-party elections are features of liberal democracy (indicator, D5). The textbooks discuss these as parts of the Chinese political system. I took these discussions as indications of democratization at the level of official statements, and these alone do not suggest that China has developed or was developing a liberal democracy in reality.

I also consider that there are elements of illiberal democracy in China’s democratisation due to non-democratic social conditions and the influences of Confucianism. Illiberal democracy also consists of a multi-party government with a popular vote, but the rule of law is weak and civil liberties are severely curtailed, elections are rarely as free and fair as in the West today, but they do reflect a degree of participation in politics (Zakaria, 2003). I view that illiberal democracy is a mixture of democracy and authoritarianism which lacks most patterns of liberal democracy and has features of hard authoritarian regimes. The CCP established an authoritarian regime. If China holds regular elections which allow people to vote representatives into office and to participate in decision-making, I take this as a sign of democracy. However, if China developed democracy, but significant characteristics of liberal democracy are absent such as freedom of the press and an independent judicial system, I would take China’s case as an illiberal democracy.

Furthermore, the ruling party--the CCP, has followed the orthodox Marxist principle--Leninism, to govern the state and other organization since the PRC was established
in 1949. An ideology provides a guide to action and criteria for ruling regimes, so as to reflect official doctrines of government (Crick, 2002). Therefore officially promoted ideology can contain significant signs of democratization in a country. I consider the possibility that during the post Mao era, there is a greater chance for China to continue orthodox Marxism, which has been described as “socialist democracy” and practiced as authoritarian regimes in communist countries. I classify many patterns of orthodox Marxist democracy as indications of authoritarianism, such as the government combining citizens’ organizations, legislative and executive functions and being controlled by a single party; all other parties are outlawed in political life; national interests reign over individual interests, and ideology is given by authority and other criteria shown in the table above. Under this working definition, if the evidence from the textbooks analysis shown that the CCP adheres to the principle of the single-party’s leadership in Chinese politics, and the Chinese political system resembles orthodox Marxist ideas of democracy, I would take that as signs of authoritarianism.

3.2. Data Collection and Analytic Approach

In this research, data for analysis includes political education documents, policies, syllabuses and universities textbooks of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum.

I collected the textbooks in three ways. One textbook I used when I was a course teacher at a university in China; five were given to me by my previous university colleagues who are currently teaching the curriculum; but most of the books were bought from second hand book shops and Chinese online shopping www.kongfz.com.
Official documents, including those openly published documents of the CCP, the MOE annual reports and national education conference documents, were almost all collected from official websites, such as the website of the Communist Party of China: http://cpc.people.com.cn/ and the website of the Ministry of Education: http://www.moe.edu.cn/. I also bought the book “Selected Important Documents of Political Education in Universities from 1978 to 2014” (2015). This book consists of a large number of official political education policies, guidelines and syllabuses contained within the Chinese Higher Education curriculum. I also selected teaching schedules from the curriculum to use as additional materials for analysis. These data were collected through the websites of individual universities. The teaching schedules and guidelines included specific lesson plans and these offer more background to the teaching and make the textbook authors’ intentions clear (Pingel, 1999).

3.2.1. University Textbooks Selection

According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, during the post Mao era, the number of Chinese universities has increased from 598 in 1978 to 2,263 in 2018. The university compulsory “Politics” curriculum has changed many times (see Chapter 4 for details). It was not possible for me to collect and analyse all of the universities’ textbooks given the limited time available to complete this study. Therefore, I only selected textbooks for comparative analysis that have been in continual use in universities for at least 10 years. Textbooks which were only used for a few years were not included for analysis. Also, where the texts are very similar, such as “Political Economics”, “the Communist Morality” and “Marxist Philosophy”, I only chose “Marxism” (also called “Marxist Philosophy”) for a detailed analysis and
noted others for reference. These selections may not represent all possible relevant textbooks of the CE curriculum and this can limit the findings.

The sample of selected textbooks is considered sufficient and appropriate for conducting a comparative analysis of the changes contained in the narratives of the textbooks. I mainly considered four aspects when I was selecting textbooks:

(1). Publications from specific time periods. I collected the textbooks dating from the beginning of the reforms in 1978 to the end of the study in 2018. The textbooks cover the period before and after the “85 Program” reforms (1985), the 1989 student movement, “98 Program” reforms (1989) and “05 Program” reforms (2005) until 2018 (see Chapter 4 for details).

(2). Representative. Chinese higher education institutions (hereafter abbreviated HEI’s) are divided into national and local levels, and into universities with degrees and colleges without degrees, as well as into the types of university, such as comprehensive universities, scientific and technological universities, adults and self-study institutions. In order to ensure that the sample used is broadly representative of the different types of HEI’s, and to ensure that the findings derived from the data collected therein can provide some generalizable conclusions, I selected the textbooks that were always used by a large number of universities and colleges, or even all HEIs (further explanations in chapters 5, 6 and 7).

(3). Officially promoted textbooks. The 1978 to 1988 versions of the textbooks selected were edited in accordance with the unified syllabus issued by the MOE. For example, B5-3 (1985) specifically states in its introduction that this textbook was prepared in accordance with the syllabus of “Divisional Materialism and Historical Materialism”-- (for Science, Technology, Agricultural and Medicine HEIs) issued by
the MOE in 1983. B5-8 (1988) was also written in accordance with the syllabus of “the History of Chinese Revolution” issued by the MOE in March 1988. These textbooks were approved for use by the MOE or the provincial authorities. Since 1988, the MOE (1988, 1998, 2006, 2013) has repeatedly required HEI’s to use the textbooks recommended or specified by the MOE. The textbooks I selected from 1988 to 2006 are widely representative of those in use in HEIs. After 2008, all HEI’s across the country used the same unified textbooks. The textbooks I have selected represent the textbooks that have been used in all Chinese higher education institutions.

(4). Textbook types. I collected textbooks from four key modules of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum, and those which have been in use continually during the post Mao era. Political and ideological textbooks include “Marxism”, “Maoism”, “Dengism” and “Maoism and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”; History textbooks consist of “Chinese Revolution History”, “Modern History of China” and “The History of the International Communist Movement”; Moral and legal education textbooks include “University Students Morality Training”, “Law Basis” and “Morality and Law Basis”. Further justifications for selecting individual textbooks for the analysis follow in chapters 5, 6 and 7.

I recognize that the textbooks used to analyse the early reforms were very limited, even though they were written in accordance with the syllabus of the MOE. This limitation is also reflected in that I did not collect textbooks from the same university at different times for comparisons. In order to reduce a possible bias from these limitations, I referred to the syllabus of the MOE when I was analysing the textbooks.

3.2.2. University Textbooks Analytic Approach
The subjects for comparative analysis are the main themes which are the compulsory learning programme for Chinese university students. I compared the differences and similarities of description of the themes in 39 textbooks. These themes consist of the officially promoted ideologies, the main political and economic policies of the CCP during specific periods, the structure of the regime, and the official and individual textbook authors’ attitudes toward democracy, freedom, human rights, individualism and westernization.

For analysis, I selected 39 textbooks covering 4 modules of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum from 1978 to 2018. These four modules are: politics/ideology, history, morals and law. Among these, politics textbooks contain official ideology and lay the foundations for forming attitudes and opinions regarding social development, in particular regarding democratic values. Politics textbooks also tend to depict the relevant political institutions, such as describing the structure of the political system and processes of decision-making in government. They also denote the status and roles of well-defined groups of people in society and in ruling regimes (Pingel, 1999). In the analysis, I address the officially promoted ideologies, the official definitions of the Chinese regime, and the roles of participants in the regime and Chinese official and individual textbook authors’ attitudes towards democracy, human rights and individualism, so as to investigate processes of democratization as reflected in these themes in the textbooks.

History textbooks contain notions of national self-image and comparisons with “others”. They often consist of statements glorifying their own nation and disparaging others, glorifying the ruling groups and disparaging so-called minority groups within one nation or society (Pingel, 1999). In this research, in order to establish whether there are democratic values of tolerance of others, respect for diversity and critical
thinking in Chinese CE, I examine whether there is a clear in/out-group narrated and how others’ opinions are described in the textbooks and recognised in the classrooms.

Morals textbooks introduce the officially promoted roles of citizens, the norms and values of society, national culture, ideals, beliefs, and rules of conduct in society. Analysis of the morals textbooks can reveal the attitudes, values, and ethical-moral norms that are being promoted in the textbooks as general rules and principles, as well as which roles of citizens and features of morality are emphasised by authority. In this study, I analyse the rights and duties of citizens, Chinese culture, and understandings of democracy, human rights, individualism and liberalism by officials and the authors of the textbooks, to explore whether and to what extent democratic values are reflected in these themes.

Basic Law textbooks introduce the constitution, basic knowledge of laws, the rules and norms of society in legal terms, and the structures of the regime. Analysis of these themes can reveal which official attitudes are expressed in the textbooks relating to the constitution, laws and other legal principles. In this study, I analyse the roles of the participants of the regime in policy making, legal knowledge and official definitions of the regime and explanations of the political system, so to explore whether and how far democratic elements and values are reflected in these themes.

3.3. Fieldwork, Ethical Issues and Analytic Approach

The main empirical study in this research is the analysis of the universities’ textbooks. However, I was also interested to examine how the texts were being taught within a classroom setting, and how students responded to the texts and the taught curriculum. In order to do so, I selected a small sample of teachers and students
from five universities for the fieldwork. I acknowledge the limitations of this in terms of the small sample size, which does not allow for wider generalizability of the findings. Therefore, the data analysis of classroom observations will not be used as the basis for contributions to the literature.

The fieldwork consisted of classroom observations and interviews. I undertook fieldwork from the 3rd March to 22nd March 2016. Democracy, human rights and citizenship are politically sensitive topics in China. I approached the observations and interviews by only focusing on pedagogical issues, such as how interviewees obtain their teaching/learning materials, how they organized class teaching and learning and how they discuss course issues in class. I also avoided mentioning any sensitive terms such as democracy, human rights and censorship that could compromise or embarrass teachers or students. When some teachers and students asked sensitive political questions, I returned to and focused on my pedagogical questions immediately. Therefore, risks to participants and the researcher were minimized. Also, I used the “compulsory course” to replace the sensitive words of “citizenship education” or “political education” on the information sheet and consent forms. The “Politics” course is a part of the compulsory courses at Chinese universities. I only visited the “Politics” classrooms and interviewed teachers and students from the “Politics” courses.

All participants were teachers and students at Chinese universities. I briefed the participants on the aims and purposes of the study and clearly asked them whether they would volunteer for the research and sign consent forms. Information sheets, consent forms and interview questions were provided to participants in both English and Chinese (See appendices). All participants in the research were assured of confidentiality and all names were anonymized in the findings. All research data was
stored safely using passwords, and emails relating to the research are subject to password protection and email encryption. Participants were assured that data from the research will not be shared with third parties.

3.3.1. Sampling

I visited five universities in four cities. These universities are Capital University (3rd, March) in B City, Timothy University (17th, March) and Financial University (17th, March) in T City, Normal University (16th, March) in X City and Technology University (4th and 11th, March) in Y City. Among these, B city is a well-developed region in China; economic development in T city is at the middle level of development; and X City and Y City are located in under-developed areas. The purpose of choosing these uneven economic development areas was to explore whether economic development levels affect the democratic consciousness of teachers and students.

Besides these, Capital University and Technology University are first class universities in the league tables published by the MOE; Timothy University and Financial University are second class universities, and Normal University is listed as third class. The aim of choosing these universities is to examine whether education levels impact on the opinions of teachers and students. In total 24 participants from these universities took part in the fieldwork. Table 3-2 (below) shows the universities I visited and the participants at each university. All names of universities and participants have been changed to protect confidentiality.

Table 3-2. Participants of Classroom Observation and Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University and Location</th>
<th>Teacher</th>
<th>Student</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital University in B City</td>
<td>Peter. W.</td>
<td>B-14, B-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timothy University in T City</td>
<td>Helen. W.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial University in T City</td>
<td>Racheal. R.</td>
<td>C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-5, C-6, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-10, C-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology University in Y City</td>
<td>Lucks. L.</td>
<td>L-12, L-13, L-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal University in X City</td>
<td>Jo. Z and Lee. L</td>
<td>X-17, X-18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two male and four female teacher participants are lecturers of the compulsory ‘Politics’ course at the five universities. Jo. Z is Professor of political studies for the compulsory curriculum and the remaining five participants are Professors of history for the compulsory curriculum. The purpose of sampling five teachers from similar teaching backgrounds was to compare whether teachers teaching the same course taught the same way or differently.

There were eighteen student participants, consisting of three males and fifteen females. When I was conducting interviews at the Financial University, many female students joined the interviews voluntarily, so that the gender of participants in the interviews is uneven, but this is not thought to bias the findings. Because the main empirical studies in this research focus on an analysis of university textbooks, the purpose of undertaking a small sample of classroom observations and interviews was to enable me to observe how the texts of “Politics” were being taught within a classroom setting, and how students responded to the texts and the curriculum. The findings from the limited fieldwork cannot be generalised to all Chinese university contexts or to other periods.

3.3.2. Classroom Observations
Classroom observation is a supplementary method employed in this research. A major advantage of observation as a research technique is its directness (Bryman, 2001). Through observing class teaching, I can assess whether democratic values are being used and encouraged in the classroom. Generally speaking, the aim of democratic learning objectives is to develop students’ abilities to argue, to evaluate and to form rational opinions. It also encourages students to understand and to critically examine different perspectives (Pingel, 2010). In contrast, the purpose of authoritarian teaching objectives is to train students to accept official knowledge as the given truth.

The classroom teaching observations sought to establish:

- How many students attended the course?
- Were students interested in the course?
- Did students ask questions in the classes? If they did, what questions did students ask?
- Did teachers only follow the textbooks or use primary sources for their teaching?
- Did teachers give different opinions compared to official Chinese ones?
- Did teachers organize classroom discussions? If they did, how? And regarding which subjects/topics?
- Did teachers encourage students to express their own opinions?

Through observing teachers’ lectures and interactions in the classroom, I was able to examine how teachers selected and chose the teaching topics and teaching materials and how far teachers conformed or deviated from the given texts. I analysed how teachers stated “the facts”, and which methods teachers used to investigate “history”, and whether the teachers presented a variety of evidence evaluated from different viewpoints, or gave the officially sanctioned view. By
observing these features of teacher practice, I was able to examine whether and how far democratic values of pluralism and tolerance towards others were understood by both teachers and students. I was also able to assess whether and how far critical thinking skills were encouraged and practiced in the classroom.

I conducted six classroom observations at five universities. These observations consisted of five classes of “History of Modern and Contemporary China” and one class of “Maoism and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”. Each observation lasted two hours.

3.3.3. Semi-structured Interviews

Semi-structured interviews are an additional data collection method used in this study. Interviewing as a research method can cover a wide range of research questions (Bryman, 2001). This method provides a unique window through which to capture what people say and think (Robson, 2003). The purpose of the semi-structured, face to face interviews was to explore the views of teachers and students regarding learning tasks, teaching methods and the effectiveness of the compulsory ‘Politics’ course in universities, so as to explore whether there are democratic values, such as critical thinking, pluralism of teaching and tolerance of others in the classroom and wider university life.

I interviewed 24 people. The sample consisted of 6 teachers and 18 students. Interviewing was time-consuming. It took half to one hour for each interview. The interview questions analysed several aspects of the compulsory ‘Politics’ course:

- how teachers and students obtained and used the textbooks and other reading materials
- how teachers prepared lessons and set homework
- the topics for classroom discussions
- teachers’ and students’ expectations and behaviour when asking and answering questions
- how teachers and students achieved high scores on the course
- the methods of assessment
- the reasons teachers and students gave for liking or disliking the course

During the observations and interviews, I took notes and used a voice recorder. Qualitative data analysis was then conducted based on individual observations and interview transcriptions (see chapter 8).
Chapter 4. Overview of Citizenship Education and the Political Education Curriculum in China

Introduction

Citizenship Education in China differs to western forms of CE. In the Western concept of citizenship, the concept now not only includes the political level, but also the social and cultural levels. In the Chinese context, political education is a part of national citizenship education; therefore, the social and cultural levels are also part of the “political”. Chinese CE is organised by the Chinese government with clear political goals, supporting policies and plans. As Gregory Fairbrother (2004, p157) observes, throughout the history of the People’s Republic of China, schools, among other societal institutions, have been called upon to shape citizens’ knowledge, attitudes, and behaviour toward society, the nation, and the state through political education. All officials and employees who work for government organisations or state companies must spend one afternoon every week, to discuss political tasks/issues or take part in officially arranged political activities. For example, according to the official document “Implementation of Citizen's Moral Construction” (CCPO, 2001, No.15), in order for people to learn what is right, what is wrong, and what people can do and say, all citizens in China must take moral education. For the CCP organizations, local governments and resident’s communities, moral education refers to a set of moral tasks which aim to civilize cities, towns and villages. For employees, moral tasks consist of professional ethics and daily behaviour norms. This moral goal is reinforced by the state-run
media to ensure that the “correct” thoughts and opinions are presented to the public (CCPO, 2001, No. 15).

CE at school is a part of wider political education in the country. The role of schools in the formation of students’ political attitudes has been made in the name of ideological-political education (思想政治教育), moral education (品德教育，德育), and patriotic education (爱国主义教育). The topics of CE penetrate all aspects of schooling. The compulsory “Politics” curriculum for political education was purposely established by the Chinese government in the Chinese national curriculum. All schools, including private and state schools, colleges, universities, workers’ training centres and farmer’s evening schools must carry out political education. The targets and purpose of the political curriculum are the same at primary, secondary and HE levels. The MOE plans the compulsory “Politics” curriculum to suit the different ages of the students. The content of the curriculum at primary and secondary school is simpler and less detailed than CE for Chinese higher education (CCPO, 2001, No. 15). Also, the Chinese authorities have established many organisations in schools, and in particular, at universities to ensure that students have the correct political attitudes and values from the perspectives of the government (MOE, 1980; CCPO, 2001, No.15).

The compulsory “Politics” curriculum at university has been changed many times during the post Mao era. However, some of the main themes have never changed. The themes include officially promoted ideologies, national values and citizenship, the official definitions of the regime and explanations of the government’s policies and the structure of the political system. These themes directly reflect government’s policies and social values. Therefore, researching these themes at
university level can suggest a degree of democratisation in China, at least at the level of official discourse.

In this chapter, I first discuss developments within political education from 1949 to the present day in order to present a full picture of political education since the CCP came to power. I then discuss political education management and the roles of political counsellors and class tutors within HE. In the second section, I analyse the structures of the compulsory “politics” curriculum in HE. This consists of curriculum modules, teacher training, the syllabus and production of teaching texts and other materials and course assessments. The final section concludes the analysis.

4.1. The Development of Political Education and Curriculum in Chinese HE

Since the CCP established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China has experienced significant social changes and educational reforms. 1978 is suggested as the turning point in the PRC’s history (CCPO, 1981). 1949-1977 refers to the years before the post Mao era, and after 1978 is known as “the post Mao era” or “the reform and open up era” (改革开放时期). This research is focused upon the post Mao era from 1978 to 2018. In this thesis, I also use the term “the reform” when I discuss the changes of the CCP’s policies.

In order to better understand the connections between the different strands of development in political education in China, I discuss the development of political education in both periods.

The Chinese education system consists of four parts: comprehensive education, vocational education, HE and adult education. Nine-years of comprehensive
education consist of six-years of primary education and three-years of secondary education (also called junior high school). Senior high school (secondary), senior vocational education, HE and adult education are not comprehensive. CE exists at all levels and types of schooling. According to official documents, CE for schools has been called “Political education”, “Ideological work”, “Moral Education”, “Thought, Politics and Theory”, “Marxism-Leninism”, “Compulsory Curriculum”, “Compulsory Politics Curriculum” and “Two Courses” during different time periods. Currently, the official names of the CE curriculum are: “Thought and Morals” for primary schools; “Thought and Politics” for secondary schools and “Thought, Politics and Theory” for higher education. In this research, these curriculum titles will be mentioned with reference to specific education documents and features of the national curriculum.

CE for schools includes a particular stand-alone compulsory “Politics” curriculum. CE topics are involved in all national curriculum and school activities. These address the role of citizenship in students’ everyday lives. The content of CE has changed many times during the history of the PRC. In order to focus on those changes of particular relevance to the shaping of values, identity and citizenship in Chinese higher education, I use the term political education instead of CE in the following discussion.

4.1.1. Political Education and the Curriculum in HE (1949-1977)

When the CCP came to power in 1949, the CCP introduced the model used by the Soviet Union into Chinese education (Qin Yue, 2013). Universities had a degree of autonomy to teach some knowledge of democracy, such as the course, “the New Democracy Theory” which consisted of 100 teaching hours. However soon, the
MOE began to introduce ideological education in HE. This aimed to firmly embed socialist and communist ideologies in students (MOE, 1952). The MOE established a “Marxism-Leninism” course consisting of 136 teaching hours, and changed the name of the curriculum from “New Democratic Theory” to “Chinese Revolutionary History” (Liu Mei, 2006). The MOE jointly administered the new course with the Central Committee of the CCP to develop new textbooks and course syllabus for political education for HE. By 1956, all universities had established systematic ideological education under the leadership of the CCP Committee. A large number of political teachers, caucus cadres, political counsellors and other politically associated teams gathered as full-time political workers in universities (MOE, 1957-1, 1957-2). The central government was directly involved in the management of the political curriculum in HE, and this has become the model used from then on.

From 1958 to 1976, China adopted more rapid ways to realize Communism. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution affected the educational system most severely (Hayhoe 1996). During the Great Leap Forward movement, all universities established a former curriculum of productive practice for the purpose of training students to hold positive attitudes toward the working class, the collective and the dialectical materialist beliefs of Marxism-Leninism. “Exercising class struggle” became a core course for all professional subjects of study. Military training and practice in factories and farms were officially included in the teaching program for 20 weeks per year (MOE, 1964). Learning materials for this course consisted of articles from Mao, Marx and Lenin as well as the CCP’s documents. Assessment of the curriculum was through open exams, wherein students decided the exam questions, or wrote of their learning experiences (Li Xiao-hui, 2007). The aim was to demonstrate ideological and political faith in socialism and in the
Communist Party. These were the most important criteria for employing teachers and evaluating students.

During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (无产阶级文化大革命) from 1966 to 1976, the purposes of education aimed to serve proletarian politics and to cultivate the successors of the proletariat, therefore education was comprehensively politicized. Mao alleged that the bourgeoisie, who were aiming to restore capitalism, had infiltrated the government and society at large. He insisted that these “revisionists” which included university principals, teachers and academics, should be removed through violent struggle. Scholars and professors were labelled as “bourgeois reactionary academic authority” and were often publicly humiliated, beaten and forced to leave schools or were transported to labour camps (Li Xiao-hui, 2007). Political education focused upon class struggle, and all subject textbooks became “revolutionary teaching materials”, including political pamphlets glorifying Mao (Qin Yue, 2013). This system continued until 1976 when Mao died.

During the Mao era, the Chinese education system and the national curriculum were entirely replaced by radical political education. As some Chinese scholars have observed, the Cultural Revolution destroyed educational faith completely, so that education became a tool for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Yang Dong-ping (2008) claims that the independence of universities and intellectuals was greatly weakened and universities were no longer a place for freedom of thought. Liu Mei (2006) suggests that the politics curriculum displayed a subjective and single view with political preaching; the nature of political subjects was distorted and replaced by political propaganda. The dictum that “the Party leads education” established
during this period is still in use today (Qin Yue, 2013). Western scholars, such as Pye (1988), suggest that “the Cultural Revolution” led to two conflicting consequences for official policies, one which encouraged economic reforms, whilst ignoring democratic political reforms. The Chinese government lost control during the Cultural Revolution and were frightened of the CCP leaders and they became very sensitive to any threats which could lead to a decentralization of their power. The CCP and its leaders wanted to further China’s modernization, but they would not allow any political freedoms. As Fewsmith (1995, p208) suggests, the Cultural Revolution marked an important new phase that would provide “the shock troops for China’s contemporary democratic movement”.


The Chinese Communist Party conference document “The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh” published by the CCP in December 1978 marks a historic turning point. Economically, China had started to shift away from a planned economic system to develop four socialist modernizations—modernising agriculture, industry, defence and science and technology. Ideologically, Maoism, in particular the doctrines and policies which had applied during the Mao period, such as the primacy of mass movements and class struggle were removed from the Party’s ideology and from public life.

During the beginning of the reforms, the main task of education was the re-introduction of national examinations and the redevelopment of curriculum, including re-writing teaching materials and textbooks at all levels. The national curriculum was heavily weighted towards disciplines deemed essential to nation-building and industrialisation. Deng called for rejuvenating the nation with science
and technology in order to restore the importance of higher education in the process of modernization. Specifically, Deng (1993) suggested that HE should be reopened to develop talents in economics, as well as in Marxist political theories. The Party ensured that ideological change was effectively controlled through political education throughout the 1980s. The “Four Cardinal Principles”-of Marxism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Communist Party leadership and “the Socialist Road” were promulgated by Deng in 1979 and reaffirmed in the PRC Constitution in 1982. The MOE established the compulsory “Politics” curriculum of “Marxism-Leninism” in universities. This curriculum included three modules for all students and two additional modules for social studies students (see details in table 4-1). "Class struggle" which had long been a core teaching task, was removed from the textbooks. In 1983, the MOE established the “Curriculum and Teaching Materials Research Institute”, with its own committees responsible for specific school subjects. It reasserts the principle of one national syllabus and one textbook (一纲一本) of political education for all schools in the country. Orthodox socialist messages featured in textbooks, and laudatory references to the senior leaders were retained (Vickers, Zeng, 2018). However the politicisation of textual content was diluted and the emphasis in the textbook started to shift towards the inculcation of personal and civic morality (Jones, 2005).

These changes to political education can be viewed as a reflection of the emergence of basic democratic movements occurring within Chinese society during the early period of the reforms. In the spring of 1978, a discussion on "practice as the sole criterion of truth" was orchestrated nationwide. This discussion was designed to loosen the ideological strictures of the Party and pave the way for more pragmatic leaders (Fewsmith, 1995). In this more relaxed ideological
atmosphere, the democracy movement emerged which consisted of the availability to the public of inside information from the Party as well as more open sharing of public opinion (Fewsmith, 1995). People pasted their essays, poems and articles on a “Democracy Wall”, as it was known in the centre of Beijing. Democratic activists began exploring previously forbidden topics in a variety of new journals. Also, divisions emerged within the Party. Some people felt that a measure of political liberalisation would be needed to enforce official accountability and guard against the abuse of power (Wei Jing-sheng, 2016). All these led to the new state constitution adopted in 1982, and later to reforms of political education in HE, known as “the 85 program” reforms.

4.1.3. The 85 Program

From the mid-1980s, the Chinese government issued a series of documents (CCPO, 1985; MOE, 1984, 1985, 1986 and 1987) to adjust the relationship between developing the economy and learning in HE. These policies resulted in a number of reforms in political education in HE which was named “the 85 Program” reforms. Cultivating higher level technicians and skilful scientists for the needs of economic development became the primary task of Chinese HE. The Central Committee of the CCP (1985a, p38) required universities “to reform educational ideas, content, teaching methods for socialist modernization…university students must show enthusiasm for the reforms, and prepare to devote their lives to achieving socialist modernization with Chinese characteristics ... and strive to be a master of modern scientific and cultural knowledge”. Following the requirements of the CCP, the compulsory “Politics” curriculum in HE was changed and renamed as “Thought, Morality and Political Theory” (see table 4-1). All universities were
required to add discussions of current events, political literature and arts education in classrooms as extra-curricula activities.

The new curriculum no longer required students to establish communist ideals and outlooks on life. Instead, the reforms emphasized the opening of students’ minds by discussing issues of political economy and international relations in the contemporary world. Students at universities were encouraged to think about the meaning of life, ideals and moralities (MOE, 1984). This was the only time that the role of political preaching in political education diminished in colleges and universities. Also, Marxist theories were largely reduced in the new curriculum. For instance, the 1981-1983 edition of “Marxist Philosophy” contained 16 chapters, but in the 1985 edition this was reduced to 10 chapters with only materialist dialectics from Marxist theory remaining in the text.

Textbook publications for the curriculum show a trend towards de-centralization during this period. Since the reforms started, although the compulsory “politics” curriculum was regulated by the central government, individual universities and press houses were permitted to prepare and publish their own textbooks. Therefore, there are some differences in the detail of the narratives of the officially promoted ideology, the definitions of the regime and the reforms in the textbooks due to the disparity of understandings among individual authors (further analysis in chapter 5). After 1985, writing and publishing textbooks became more open. The MOE published guidelines with several syllabuses for individual publishers. Many colleges and universities published their own textbooks (Liu Mei, 2006).

The 85 program reforms envisaged greater institutional autonomy. This autonomy replaced previous centralised manpower planning which had allocated students to
courses and graduates to jobs. There was increased focus on developing students’ economically relevant skills linked to more open labour market policies. According to Vickers and Zeng (2018, p48), liberal beliefs had animated many Chinese intellectuals, and universities had become places that were not just “nurseries of scientific talent, but also potential hotbeds of bourgeois liberalization”. Meanwhile significant demands for democracy emerged in both the party and Chinese society. According to Fewsmith (1995, p210), some party intellectuals tried to reinterpret Marxism in terms of humanism, and others began exploring democratic theory and institutions. “Prominent intellectuals”, who were ousted from the Party, “criticized the totalitarian power of the CCP”.

Simultaneously, the 85 Program reforms unleashed societal expectations and anxieties and stimulated a new generation of students to take to the streets to protest. Such liberalizations finally led to a large protest movement in 1989. Students demanded that the regime recognize an independent, autonomous student organization and hold a dialogue on an equal basis with the student leaders. However, although the movement demanded democracy, the content of its demands differed significantly from the aims of the democratic movements in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, as well as from Western understandings of democracy (Fewsmith, 1995). The 1989 movement protested against the corruption and bureaucracy that made the regime unresponsive to public opinion, rather than pushing demands for individual rights, which are usually seen as the basis for Western democracy (ibid).

The student movement in Tiananmen Square seriously challenged the Communist Party’s monopoly over political affairs and social organization. The 85 Program reforms ended in universities. Martial law was declared and the student protests were repressed by the People's Liberation Army. At the same time, the collapse of
communist countries in Eastern Europe greatly shocked the CCP and the Chinese people. The CCP and the leftists considered that the liberal policies of ideological and political education during the early decades of the reform were “the biggest mistake” which resulted in the university student movement and caused social instability. Deng (1993, p138) wrote:

“Over the years, some of our comrades … did not care for political dynamics. They did not pay attention to the ideological work either… There are still many weaknesses in ideological and political education in schools. As a consequence, political turmoil occurred in the spring and summer of 1989. It brought serious harm to the country and the people”.

In response to these events, the 85 Program reforms were replaced by ideological education work, which was stepped up in the name of “moral education” (德育) in order to generate stability in HE institutions and suppress political turbulence (Hayhoe, 1993). A set of behavioural rules for HEIs were listed as the first and most important rule of university students’ lives.

**Patriotic Education**

In 1990, the central government required education to deeply review the teaching of the modern history of China, the national situation, loyalty to the CCP, and socialist beliefs at all levels of schooling. Political education was quick to tap strains of xenophobic patriotism nationwide. Patriotic education has been designed to fulfil several functions. Fairbrother (2004, p158) summarised four functions of patriotic education in China thus:

1. patriotic education contributes to the maintenance of territorial integrity, national unity, and national pride,
2. patriotic education is a vehicle for transmitting knowledge and appropriate attitudes about international relations.
3. patriotic education fulfils a function of maintaining the socialist system and state legitimacy;
4. patriotic education performs a progressive function, encouraging contributions to China’s programme of development and modernisation.

Generally speaking, patriotism has been defined as love of one’s country or to agree to the defence of the interests of one’s country. Patriotism also signifies attachments of loyalty to a territorial community. According to Grosby (2005, p16) patriotism accepts varying and differing conceptions of the nation held by members of the nation. Patriotism provides “the basis for working out the differences, involving reasonable compromise, between the individual member of the nation and their differing conceptions of what the nation should be out of a concern for promoting that well-being”. In contrast to patriotism, there is also the ideology of nationalism. Grosby (2005) suggests that nationalism rejects compromise; it seeks to sweep aside the many complications of life. Tamir (1995, p876) also claims that nationalism is a political doctrine, which “regards the nation as the primary object of loyalty and advances a cultural, social, political and moral point of view in which nations play a central role.”

The Chinese government promoted nationwide patriotic education from the 1990s, through geography and history lessons and in particular, the compulsory “politics” course at schools. Textbooks are the most important tool of the CCP used as propaganda to stir up “patriotism” in order to strengthen a central focus on the themes of Chinese patriotic education: Chinese tradition and history, national unity and territorial integrity. Nationalism through “patriotic education has also been reflected in history education. Chinese history was used to enhance “national
situation education” (国情教育) for the masses and Party cadres, and students. The CCP leader Jiang directly ordered establishing the module “Modern Chinese History” as a part of the compulsory “politics” curriculum from kindergarten to university in order to “resist capitalist erosion and decadent feudal ideas, so as to establish correct ideals, beliefs and values” (MOE, 1991, p118). The MOE integrated the CE curriculum by centralized planning across primary, secondary and HE as a whole. In HE, “the aim of the patriotic curriculum is to guide students using the Marxist view and method to resist bourgeoisie liberalization and all other exploiting classes’ decadent ideas” (CCPO, 1994, p140). Political education entered a period where anti-individualism and anti-Westernization became the central tasks of teaching. The goal of patriotic education was to “train a group of advanced people with communist consciousness” whose prerequisite was to “love the motherland, support the party and diligently study” (MOE, 1995a). This also included “activities to develop general knowledge of Minzu (nationalities, 民族)” with the aim of promoting a national consciousness for China, consisting of a “multi-ethnic country and fostering inter-ethnic solidarity”. The textbooks increasingly celebrated the history, legends and heroes of the ethnic Han majority and in particular, focusing upon China’s historic glory and the subsequent “hundred years of humiliation,” through repeated submission to foreign powers that began with the First Opium War in the nineteenth century. This also aimed to instill in Chinese youth the vision of Tibet, Xijiang, Taiwan and other disputed islands, including the Diaoyu Islands, as inseparable Chinese territories (further analysis in chapters 6, 7 and 8).

The text and language used in some of the textbooks were largely changed back to imitate the style of the Cultural Revolution (further analysis in chapter 5). All of the political courses were given a unified title: “Thought and Politics” (MOE, 1992). A
converged syllabus for the politics curriculum, with a clear division of the various stages of progressive content, was established across primary, secondary and higher education. The textbooks were specially designed to meet the needs of students’ psychological characteristics at different ages. For example, the compulsory “Politics” textbooks for primary school children consisted of pictures, stories, examples and common sense, which were much easier for younger children to understand. The content of texts for junior high school included psychological, legal and political education. In HE, the aims and main content were the same as in primary and secondary schools, but the total teaching hours devoted to the politics course was 280 hours for natural science students and 350 for social studies students (see details in table 4-1). The new politics curriculum shifted away from a “notionally class-based socialist identity” towards a “more ethno-cultural vision of nationhood and this posed particular challenges for relations between Han Chinese and various minority nationalities” (Vickers and Zeng, 2018, p58).

Simultaneously, the new politics curriculum consisted of patriotic activities in and outside of schools, in the humanities, social sciences and natural sciences. A large number of museums and memorials were designated as bases for patriotic education, and the media, arts and cultural policies, festivals and public holidays, were also required to reflect patriotic content. Important anniversaries of China’s wars, such as the Opium war, the Sino-Japanese War and Anti-Japanese War were all used to implement patriotic education.

In summary, through “patriotic education”, Chinese youth has been infused with the ideal of safeguarding territorial unity. Nationalist morality has become a core task of this so-called “patriotic education”. As Vickers, (2007, 2009) suggests, the CCP uses patriotism to justify rapid economic modernization and to strengthen nationalism.
Notably, the full range of scholarship regarding Chinese nationalism takes on different meanings for various scholars at different junctures in Chinese history. In this study Chinese nationalism denotes xenophobic, unconditional loyalty and political devotion to China and the CCP. The “patriotic education” during the 1990s was at the stage of forming Chinese nationalism which focused on propaganda and teaching. Later in the first decade of the twenty-first century, Chinese nationalism was developed into nationwide actions-- a large number of young people went into the streets to protest. I discuss this further in later sections.


At the same time as promoting “patriotic education”, the Chinese regime also developed a clear policy that focused upon economic development with firm political control of the CCP into the future. In 1992, Deng published his significant speech “Southern Tour” which called for “more courage in the pursuit of reform and opening” regarding the economy and that “to get rich is glorious”; at the same time, he “defiantly reaffirmed his faith in Marxism” (Deng, 1993). China entered a transition era of “developing capitalism with Chinese characteristics” (Vickers and Zeng, 2018, p53). Soon, this policy led a further boost to the development of the country’s most developed regions, whilst leaving many of the poorest areas to stagnate.

In education, the emphasis on the development of high-level talent was renewed. The MOE issued “Framework of Educational Development in China” (Framework, 中国教育发展纲要) in 1993 in response to Deng’s speech. The “211 Project” for Chinese HE was launched by the government. It aimed to create 100 "high standard" universities for the twenty-first century. These universities were the only ones for which central government had direct responsibility and were to gain the bulk of its
education budget. Other universities which had not obtained financial support from the central government were required to self-fund. This signifies the beginning of marketization of Chinese HE. As a consequence, diversification and uneven development started to occur between HEIs and these were reflected in the diversity of their teaching materials.

In political education, the patriotic education campaign launched in 1990 was in full swing. In order to implement the “Framework”, the MOE (1994) called for instruction in modern history, stressing China’s long struggle against foreign invasion and oppression, eventual liberation, and the crucial role of the CCP. In HE, “Quality Education” (素质教育) was created for improving students’ quality. Chinese HE started “building world-class universities” (ST, 1999a). Many universities merged to secure strong academic standing domestically and overseas. At the same time, the central government issued several documents to adjust political education, and the compulsory “politics” curriculum was re-named as “Two Courses” (MOE, 1998b). The State Council (1999) reduced the emphasis on rote learning and cultivating generic skills became the central objectives of Quality Education. This later developed a contradictory reform which reinforced political control through moral and patriotic education, whilst attempting to nurture critical and creative thinkers for the knowledge economy (Vickers and Zeng, 2018). All these together are known as the “98 Program reforms” in Chinese HE.

The 98 Program reform contains some important contradictory changes in political education. First, the ideology of the CCP changed. The CCP created a theory of “Marxism with Chinese characteristics” (马克思主义中国化) as a new form of Marxism in Chinese practice. “Dengism” and the theory of Three Represents were identified as
“Chinese Marxism” and seen as a new historical stage of the development of Maoism in the Fifteenth Congress of the CCP in 1997. Marxism began to be withdrawn from ideological training in schools and Chinese work places. Critiques of Marx and Lenin towards capitalism were almost all deleted from the university textbooks. Maoism was incorporated into the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics. “The Four Cardinal Principles” were removed from curriculum examinations. Dengism provided a theoretical basis for developing a capitalist economy in China, and the Three Representatives provided a theoretical basis for changing the proletarian nature of the CCP. In 2002, the central government made the decision to allow “capitalists” to become members of the Chinese Communist Party.

Second, the modules of the compulsory “politics” curriculum were expanded to seven, but the teaching hours were largely reduced (see table 4-1). Also, the concepts of citizen, citizens’ rights and duties, the structures of the political system of China and legal knowledge were introduced into the curriculum for the first time. The new curriculum emphasises the Party’s pivotal role in achieving socialist modernisation and making the country strong. Collectivist values were the central ethical outlook promoted through moral education. Collective loyalty was directed towards family, school, community, the nation and the “Great Chinese National Family”. Nevertheless, official guidelines after 2001 called for both greater international understanding and tolerance, and heightened patriotism from China’s civilizational legacy, determined to resist external threats. History education became more global, with some Chinese traditions “depicted as essentially autocratic and Western civilisation is suggested as essentially democratic” (Vickers and Zeng, 2018, p136).

Third, increasing centralization of the political curriculum by the regime started to gather pace. Individual universities including private and self-study HE institutions
were no longer allowed to compile their own teaching materials for the compulsory “Politics” courses (MOE, 1998b). The MOE standardised the textbooks, teaching materials, syllabus and assessment standards. However for “Quality Education”, many universities called for more “integrated” subject content and “student-centred” methods for higher learning. University textbooks for non-political subjects produced since 2001 have tended to feature many optional units and supplementary materials.

The 98 Program Reform is not only a reflection of the changes to official Chinese policies, but is also a reflection of Chinese international development. During the 1990s, the CCP purposely made efforts to develop relations with Western countries in terms of improving the image of China’s human rights, as well as developing the economy. In 1997, the Chinese government signed “the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”. In 1998, the CCP announced that it would sign “the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” (the Chinese National People’s Congress has not yet signed it). China entered a period of being more open to the world. China also joined the World Trade Organisation in 2001. The Chinese economy was experiencing double-digit annual growth. China seemed well on the way to achieving world power, international status, prosperity and stability.

4.1.5. The 05 Program and Chinese Nationalism (2005-2012)

In 2003, the curriculum for political education in HE was completely and systemically centralized. From 2004 to 2005, the Central government led the MOE to issue a series of documents to substantially modify political education in universities (ST, 2004). This is called the “05 Program reforms”. During this reform, patriotic education developed into Chinese nationalism.
Under the 05 Program, the Chinese government tightly controlled political education in universities in terms of management, teacher training, syllabus and assessments. The new requirements for political education became more specific and this allowed less opportunity for varying the content of the programs and students were not able to choose their courses on their own. At the same time, “Political Quality” was launched for all students with a stress on political ideology in order to perpetuate a legacy of strong moral and political socialization (Zhang, Donghui, 2012). The compulsory “politics” course was merged into four modules and its size increased by two credits in all universities for obtaining a degree (see table 4-1). A unified textbook for each module was used across the whole country.

From 2007, the MOE promoted “Tongshi” (通识) education in order to strengthen political education in HE. The MOE guided university leaders and their executive offices through school-level leaders and their officers, down to the faculty and students, to ensure that officially promoted tasks were being implemented in HE (Yan Xiaojun, 2014). These features of the 05 Program continue to the present day. For example, in 2015, the MOE re-edited the textbooks of the politics curriculum in order to include Xi Jinping’s “China’s Dream” into the teaching, whilst almost all of the content of the textbooks remained the same as found in the 2005 editions. The MOE (2015, No. 169) required that all universities and colleges in the country must use the unified textbooks published by the HE press.

Through “the 05 Program” reforms the Chinese government strengthened control of HE. This program reflects changes in Chinese society and official policies. After three decades of reforms, economic development and marketization had brought significant tensions and inequality in China. Chinese society was divided. Although
the country has seen increasing wealth, the growth has seen the strengthening of some provinces and a neglect of underdeveloped areas, and this has also led to educational diversities. On the one hand, all of these changes brought new pressures for democracy from Chinese people but on the other hand, social issues such as the migration of peasants into cities, questions of law and order, the decline of state-owned enterprises, and the threat to the CCP’s authority are generating anti-democratic pressures from within the CCP (Fewsmith, 1995).

**Chinese Nationalism**

Built on thirty years of economic reforms and opening to the world, China’s remarkable economic growth boosted national confidence to an unprecedented level to underpin a new era of Chinese nationalism.

As a consequence of patriotic education and China’s exceptional growth, Chinese youth increasingly took pride in China’s growing status and felt a strong obligation to defend China from hostile external forces.

Meanwhile, new technology such as the internet has become widespread in China and has changed Chinese people’s daily lives. The internet is a new form of communication. The number of Chinese internet users expanded to over six hundred million in 2014. The Internet has become a virtual community for China’s younger generation. Internet users developed civic engagement and opened new channels for the circulation of ideas through BBS, blogs, Weibo, Tencent QQ, and other social media. A large number of Internet users (known as Netizens, 网民) have used the Internet to “voice political opinions, form social connections and coordinate online collective actions” (Perry and Xiao, 2013, p249). The internet has become “a quasi-public space where the dominance of the CCP is constantly being exposed, ridiculed,
and criticized by waves of jokes, videos, songs, poems, jingles, fiction, sci-fi, code words, satire, and euphemisms” (ibid, p250). The Internet has become a communication center, an organizational platform, and implementation channel for people to express their causes, in particular against foreign pressures and for forming grassroots nationalism.

Michel Oksenberg (1986) described Chinese nationalism as a “confident nationalism,” patient and moderate, rooted in the assurance that China could eventually regain its greatness through economic growth. Zhao (2004) attributed the rise of Chinese nationalism to the state’s construction. The CCP regarded “patriotism” as an “official nationalism” or a “pragmatic nationalism,” anchored in a patriotic ethos that looked to the CCP as the guardian of the national interest. Dittmer and Kim (1993) noted that by using Japan and the United States as reference groups of shared enemies, the CCP aroused xenophobia in nationalism to consolidate the communist regime. Moreover, a shared enemy provides a common cause for national unity. The Japan-US alliance has been seen as intended to contain the rise of China, and which threatens not only China’s rise but its national dignity (Chen, 2017). Chinese official propaganda encourages younger Chinese to believe in a strong China with the idea that “China can say no” to US hegemony and assert itself against other countries attempting to dominate China. According to Chen (2017) research on the “Strong Nation Forum,” a handful of posts attacked the United States and Japan with derogatory words. They called Americans foreign devils (洋鬼子) and added the new term “mi-guo”, insinuating a “rotten country.” They also called the Japanese “dogs,” “little Japan,” “devils”, and mostly “dwarf bandits” (倭寇), all of which are extremely pejorative ethnic slurs.
Xenophobic nationalism began in 1999 when the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was bombed by the USA. This continued to develop during the China-US aircraft collision in 2001, the Beijing Olympics in 2008, and the disputes over the Diaoyu Islands (referred to as the Senkaku Islands by Japan) in 2012. During these events, an enormous number of university students and young people participated in massive rallies and took to the streets with violence, vandalism, and arson in as many as a hundred cities in China and across the world.

Among these events, protests over the disputed Diaoyu Islands are the most important sign of xenophobic nationalism. In fact, the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands was not new. In 1972, when the United States turned over administrative rights of Okinawa to Japan, the Japanese government resumed its administration of the Diaoyu Islands, while both the CCP in Beijing and the KMT in Taiwan held tenacious views that the Diaoyu Islands was part of Taiwan. Since 2000, the Japanese government has increased police patrols of the disputed Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands (Okuda, 2014). For China, reasserting its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands became directly related to China’s claim to Taiwan, and vice versa. Hence, many internet users viewed the Diaoyu Islands as a vital part of the motherland and demanded tougher actions to defend China. Under the Chinese government’s acquiescence and toleration, internet users launched a widespread campaign on the Web to boycott Japanese products. On the streets, young protesters shouted, “Never forget national humiliation” and “Protect China’s inseparable territory,” even venting their anger at the Chinese government, blaming it for being “shamefully weak,” and urging it to “take Japan down.” Although the movement started with peaceful demonstrations in China, this soon turned to vandalism, Japanese products and
shops were destroyed. Xenophobic nationalism spread more swiftly and epidemically than ever in large Chinese cities.

At the same period of increasing xenophobic nationalism in China, there was another dramatic movement of democratic demand starting from the early 2000s. Lawyers and intellectuals initiated a “New Citizens Movement” (新公民运动). This movement promoted civic awareness, protected the rights of citizens, and promoted the peaceful transition of the country to constitutional and civil society. Specific activities of the movement included: (1). The Dinner Meetings. Netizens who live in the same city held spontaneous dinners on the last Saturday of each month to discuss unlimited topics such as social issues and people's livelihoods; (2). Education and Equal Rights. This aimed to reduce and eliminate inequities in the distribution of educational resources, to guarantee normal operation of schools for migrant children in urban areas, and to eliminate the restrictions on college entrance examinations; (3). Property Publicity. This aimed to urge government officials to announce their ownership of property in public; and (4). Human Rights Movement. A number of human rights lawyers used legal provisions to force the judiciary to handle cases in accordance with the law and protect the procedural rights of appeals in order to defend citizens in accordance with the law.

These activities spread many other Chinese cities. Netizens went out into the streets to protest their claims (Zhang Donghui, 2012). These activities contain many signs of democratisation, such as equal rights for access to education and promoting the rule of law. The New Citizens Movement was suppressed by the government from the very beginning, but serious suppression began from 2005. A large number of activists from the New Citizen Movement were arrested. When Xi Jinping took over the
leadership in 2013, China began a new era with strengthened nationalism and authoritarianism and political education in HE changed.

4.1.6. Xi Jinping era (2013-)

Since China entered the Xi - era, the Chinese government has adjusted its policies in universities. On the one hand, the Chinese government invests heavily in key universities in order to encourage these universities to become “world-class universities” and to build a twenty-first-century “knowledge-based economy” (i.e., particularly to improve and extend the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics). The MOE urges universities to “globalize” by engaging in a wide range of international academic programs and exchanges, as well as encouraging universities to cultivate critical thinking in the humanities and social sciences. On the other hand, they are cautious regarding encouraging any liberalizing thinking and activities which may rise alongside the process of establishing “world-class universities”. Communist Party committees firmly control universities in terms of management, structuring curriculum, producing textbooks and assessment (more detailed discussion in the next section); students and faculty staff are encouraged to lodge denunciations (举报) against anyone suspected of political or ethical impropriety. The MOE also prohibits universities from adopting textbooks tainted by “Western values” (He 2015).

As a consequence of these contradictory developments, Chinese universities have indeed been rising steadily in the global rankings of research universities (Kirby 2014) while college campuses have remained uncharacteristically quiet (Perry 2014).

In terms of political education in Chinese universities, the “Politics” curriculum has developed towards centralization and authoritarianism. The curriculum and the textbooks have been completely unified and are controlled by the regime. It has
achieved “One Curriculum (the compulsory “Politics” curriculum), One Textbook” (一纲一本) (four unified textbooks of “the Modern History of China”, “Marxism”, “Morality and Law Basis” and “Maoism and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”) for all universities.

The MOE launched a new task -- “core socialist values” (社会主义核心价值观) into political education in HEIs. According to the official Party newspaper “People’s Daily” (2014) and newly edited textbooks, the so-called “core socialist values” (社会主义核心价值观) are the main pillars of Xi Jinping’s “China Dream.” These values include the four national goals of prosperity, democracy, civility, and harmony (富强,民主,文明,和谐); followed by four societal goals of freedom, equality, justice, and the rule of law (自由,平等,公正,法治); and four individual values of patriotism, professionalism, integrity, and friendship (爱国,敬业,诚信,友善). Xi Jinping insists that the cultivation and development of all twelve core values must be firmly based on “Chinese splendid traditional culture” (中华优秀传统文化) (Xi, 2014, 163–64).

Xi Jinping’s “China Dream” is at the heart of “core socialist values”. Xi proclaimed that “realizing the great revival of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream of the Chinese people in modern history” (Global Times 2012; Xinhua 2012). The CCP was re-orienting its propaganda to showcase the glories of the ancient civilization that it now claimed to be representing and reviving (Perry 2013). “Chinese splendid traditional culture” is officially explained as Chineseness morality and Confucianism, which have been used to strengthen nationalism. “China Dream” envisions the rise of a powerful and wealthy nation and is presented as the Party’s response to the collective yearning of the Chinese people. Xi Jinping is following in the footsteps of Mao to
preserve populist sentiments in China. Xi appears more committed than ever to the perpetuation of CCP rule. He announced “the four comprehensives” (四个全面) of governance—building a moderately prosperous society, deepening reform, governing the nation according to law, and being strict in governing the Party. This was later developed into Xiism by the Chinese Communist theorists.

From 2016, the CCP started promoting Xiism nationwide. Xiism provides theoretical and political guidance for the Chinese government to make internal and international policies. Xiism is leading China towards stronger authoritarianism. Xiism is focused upon developing the economy with careful plans in order to develop China into a superpower nation in the world. The Chinese government has made a clear plan known as the “Hundred-Year Marathon” to seek to place China at top of the global hierarchy (see textbooks analysis in chapter 7). Internationally, the Chinese government promotes the “one belt and one road’ policy in order to re-structure current international economic relations and establish a new world order favorable to China. Internally, Xiism emphases firm control of ideology for all Chinese people, to strengthen the leadership of the CCP-- as the only legitimate political power in China, and to modernise the Chinese military force into a world - class army in order to be ready to win wars. Nationalism has increased. “Patriotism” is defined as a social ideology, nationalist morality and norms of behaviours which serve the purpose of unifying the nation against all opinions and behaviours related to “Taiwan independence”, “Tibetan independence” and “Xinjiang independence”.

Xiism has become the most important task of political education at university level since 2018, while the CCP is no longer exploring the possibility of “socialist democratic politics with Chinese characteristics”. Discussions of concepts of
"democracy", "capitalist democracy", "socialist democracy", "freedom", “the rule of law” and "human rights" which were specifically addressed in previous political education, have been removed from the 2018 textbooks.

Overall, since Xi Jinping became the leader of the CCP, China has changed from following a trend of economic development with soft authoritarianism into a direction consisting of increasing militarism and with stronger features of authoritarianism.

4.2. Political Education in Chinese Higher Education

4.2.1. Management of Political Education in Universities

Since “the 05 Program reform”, the MOE has established a model of management for political education. According to central government document (ST, 2004), political education in HE is controlled through a systemic pyramid-structured bureaucracy:

1). At the top is the CCP and its propaganda department which directly organises “Higher Education Work” (高教工委). This produces policies and requirements for political education for the whole country, and directly manages the Party secretariat at key national universities;

2). The sub-top layer consist of provincial Higher Education Work which manages the Party secretary at each university and provides particular tasks for the universities based on the policies of the CCP.

3). The middle layer consists of the Party secretaries whom directly manage the Communist Committee in each subject department within universities, and whom devolve these tasks to student communities.
4). The sub-middle layer consists of the Communist Committee within each subject department which directly manages the Communist Youth League (CYL) and student Party branches in each class.

5). At the bottom of this pyramid structure, each university funds the CYL, the student Party branch and students unions for arranging political learning and activities (CCYL, MOE, 1980). The CYL organises political, cultural and sporting activities, and arrange seminars and conferences at university campuses. The CYL also guides class meetings, student campus life and campus networks. The head of the CYL must be a teacher and Party member. The student Party branches are established in each senior class and comprise all of the student party members in a unit. This is the most powerful self-regulating agency of students. The student Party branch represents the authority of the Party-state, and it is in charge of recruiting new Party members, conducting regular political reviews of ordinary students, recommending candidates for student cadre appointments, collecting information on students and trends of thought (思想动态) (Yan Xiaojun, 2014).

The CYL and student party branch regularly report to the Party at high level via class tutors and political counsellors--regarding the ideological situation of students; class tutors and political counsellors reporting to their departments; the department reports to universities; universities report to the authority of provinces--Higher Education Work (ST, 2004). Through this pyramid structure of political education, the central government closely controls political education and teachers' and students' lives in universities (Yan Xiaojun, 2014).

Beside these, university administration, student unions and teacher unions all contribute to the management of political education. All colleges and universities are
required to celebrate various national and political festivals, such as “Youth Day”, “Party Day”, “National Day” and the opening ceremonies of universities, graduation ceremonies as well as scholarship ceremonies and so on. The students are also required to use universities’ mottos and songs, and to wear university badges. Campus culture is seen as a part of political education. Classrooms, libraries, arts halls, crafts and sports halls, university publications, campus networks are all required to conform to standards set by government for promoting “patriotism”—(rather than nationalism), collectivism and socialism (ST, 2004).

The Party, local governments, social organizations, enterprises and institutions as well as resident communities and families also cooperate in the political education of university students (ST, 2004; PCCP, MOE, 2005a). Various museums and the martyrs’ cemeteries are used for patriotic education. The media are required to focus on positive publicity in order to guide students into having correct political or ideological points of view. At the same time, certain entertainments, such as restaurants or relaxation places around universities campus are seen as negative forces that interfere with university teaching and student life, and are banned.

4.2.2. Political Counsellors and Class Tutors

All university students in China today are organized into a quasi-military structure that extends from the basic-level in classrooms (班级), to the year cohorts (年级). Political counsellors (政治辅导员) and class tutors (班主任) are employed to manage political education at the bottom level in universities. Each class has a tutor. A political counsellor manages 200 students (MOE, 2006). Political counsellors and class tutors have a dual identity as both teacher and Party-state cadre; they are the primary working force for the moral and ideological education of university students.
and fully manage students’ daily study and life at university. Normally, class tutors and political counsellors are selected from Party members with some recruited from among MA or PhD students (MOE, 2005a). Their work mainly includes:

- Regular meetings with students once a week to discuss their work.
- Face to face interviews with individual students twice a term.
- Visiting students’ dormitories twice a week to assess whether students comply with school rules and dormitory management requirements.
- To publish and make assessment results public.
- Having classroom discussions with students twice a month.
- Attending classes twice a week to check students' attendance and teachers’ teaching.
- Contact with parents when students are believed to have a political problem, or fail to comply with universities’ rules.

As Yan Xiaojun (2014) observes, by maintaining daily contact, surveillance and control over the students, the political counsellors, class tutors and the student Party branch and basic-level cadre-teachers constitute the backbone of Chinese university control apparatus.

4.3. The Compulsory “Politics” Curriculum in Chinese Higher Education

The compulsory “politics” curriculum is the main channel for the political education of Chinese university students (ST, 2004). It is also an important part of the HE curriculum. The management of the curriculum is the same as the management of political education as discussed earlier. The Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (PCCP) and MOE jointly manage the curriculum in terms of the principles and tasks of the curriculum, classroom teaching and teacher employment and training.
4.3.1. Structures of the Compulsory “Politics” Curriculum

As I discussed above, the compulsory “Politics” curriculum has been changed many times during the post Mao era. Table T4-1 below shows the major changes to the curriculum from 1978 to the present day.

**T4-1 Changes to the compulsory “politics” curriculum**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Modules of the Curriculum</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Learning Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C=HE without a degree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Dialectics of nature (1978)</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>70 = natural science subjects (NS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>History of the Chinese Communist Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>70 of each module = all students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Politics and Economy Studies</td>
<td></td>
<td>105 = social studies and art subjects (SS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism (1978), Marxism (1980)</td>
<td></td>
<td>70 = all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>History of International Communist Movement or The Scientific Socialism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thought and Morality (1982)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marxism</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>105 = NS 20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Revolutionary History of China</td>
<td></td>
<td>80 = language study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socialist Construction in China</td>
<td></td>
<td>70 = SS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Politics and Economy in the World and International Relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Situation and Policies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideological Training of Undergraduate Students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philosophy of Life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Professional Ethics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marxism</td>
<td>2y, C</td>
<td>70 = 2y,C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Revolutionary History of China</td>
<td>3y, C</td>
<td>140 = 3y,C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course</td>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Credits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Construction in China</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>210 = BA, NS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics and Economy in the World and International Relations</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>315 = BA, SS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation and Policies</td>
<td>2y, C</td>
<td>University decided</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laws Basis</td>
<td>3y, C/BA</td>
<td>30 = all</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific Sociological Theory and Practice</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>36 = all</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected Classics Marxist Articles</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>70 = SS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction to Dialectics of Nature</td>
<td></td>
<td>54 = NS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxism and Contemporary Social Views</td>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>200=SS (50 taught)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern science and technology revolution and Marxism</td>
<td></td>
<td>200=NS (50 taught)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxism</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxist Political Economy</td>
<td>3Y, C</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maoism</td>
<td>3Y, C</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td></td>
<td>36=NS; 30=SS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dengism</td>
<td>2Y, C</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy and Politics in Contemporary World</td>
<td></td>
<td>36=SS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thought and Moral Cultivation</td>
<td>2/3Y, C</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law Basis</td>
<td>2/3Y, C</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific Sociological Theory and Practice</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction to Dialectics of Nature</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected Classics Marxist Articles</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern science and technology revolution and Marxism</td>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>54 = SS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxism and Contemporary Social Views</td>
<td></td>
<td>54 = NS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxism</td>
<td>BA</td>
<td>48, (3 Credits)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>Maoism, Dengism and the Important Thought of the Three Representatives (it is called Maoism and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics from 2008-)</td>
<td>2/3Y, C</td>
<td>BA 54, (4 Credits)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5520</td>
<td>Modern History of China</td>
<td>BA 70, (6 Credits)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0200</td>
<td>Morality and Law Basis</td>
<td>2/3Y, C</td>
<td>BA 48, (3 Credits)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3500</td>
<td>Situation and Policies</td>
<td>BA 48, (3 Credits)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0110</td>
<td>Research of theory and practice of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (from 2012)</td>
<td>2/3Y, C</td>
<td>MA 32, (2 Credits)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Marxism with Chinese Characteristics and Contemporary (from 2012)</td>
<td>BA 16, (1 Credits)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Marxism</td>
<td>BA 48, (3 Credits)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0118</td>
<td>Maoism and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics</td>
<td>BA 70, (6 Credits)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>008</td>
<td>Modern History of China</td>
<td>BA 32, (2 Credits)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>008</td>
<td>Morality and Law Basis</td>
<td>BA 48, (3 Credits)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this study, in order to make it easier for readers to remember and compare the names of different modules and textbooks of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum, I have simplified the titles of some modules and textbooks. These simplified titles have been commonly used by teachers and students in universities. For example, “Marxism” is a simplified name for the course and the textbooks which have been named as “Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism” (1978), “Teaching on Marxist Philosophy” (1985), “New Edition of Teaching on Marxist Philosophy” (1990), “A Concise Teaching on the Principles of Marxist Philosophy” (2003-2006), and “Introduction to the Basic Principles of Marxism” (2015, 2018). By the same token, “Dengism” and “Maoism” are also the simplified names of the course and the textbooks relating to these themes.
It can be seen from table 4-1, that the compulsory “Politics” curriculum has undergone significant changes during the post Mao era. This curriculum has expanded from undergraduate level and now includes all levels of study in HE. These levels include HE without a degree, BA, MA and PhD courses. Also, the compulsory “Politics” curriculum has been extended from state colleges and universities to all kinds of HEIs, including private HEIs, foreign cooperation universities and further education as well as for workplace and adult education and lifelong learning.

Since 2005, all HEIs use the unified standards for the curriculum, such as the syllabus, textbooks, course credits equivalent to a degree and teaching hours and so on (PCCP, MOE, 2005a). For example, an undergraduate requires 144 credits for a degree; the compulsory “Politics” curriculum is accredited at least 15 credits--this is more than ten percent of the total credits (PCCP, MOE, 2005a). The compulsory “Politics” course contains four modules: “Marxism”, “Maoism and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, “Modern History of China” and “Morality and Law Basis”.

4.3.2. Subjects of the Curriculum

Although the compulsory “Politics” curriculum has been changed many times during the post Mao era, the aims of the curriculum regarding values, identity and citizenship have never changed. Ideology, politics, morals and history remain the most important subjects of the curriculum.

As discussed earlier, after 1978, ideological, political and moral education shifted away from overtly revolutionary and communist messages. Among these, moral education has developed towards collectivist values inculcating personal and civic values such as collectivism, discipline, and nationalism. The Confucian teachings are
celebrated as the epitome of civilised Chinese ethics. The regime has increasingly sought to draw upon the resources of traditional Chinese ethical thought to buttress its legitimacy. However, the emphasis and choice of exemplary figures of morality has shifted to loyalty to the family, to the Party, the nation and the Great Chinese National Family.

From the 98 Program Reforms, ideological education has also developed from explaining orthodoxies of Marxism to a combination of Marxism with Chinese Characteristic: Dengism, the theory of Three Representatives, Scientific Outlook of Development and Xiism. These new officially promoted ideologies have been used to provide legitimacy for the CCP regime by emphasising the CCP’s pivotal role in achieving socialist modernisation and making the country strong. These ideologies are also used to explain the structure of the Chinese political system, the policies of the regime and the roles of citizenship.

The purpose of the compulsory “History” course in the curriculum is to use the past to control the present (Jones, 2005). This compulsory “History” course is different compared to undergraduate degree studies of “History” in universities. The degree course “Chinese history” is told through a narrative of progress in Marxist terms, in that modernization is achieved through inevitable historical stages-from primitive communism through slave society, feudalism and bourgeois capitalism to communism. The compulsory “History” course focuses on how China endured a century of humiliation by foreign imperialists after the first Opium War in 1840 and the triumph of the Communist Party after the First World War. The length of the “History” course has continued to expand to cover the present day. However, the emphasis of the compulsory “History” course has changed. During the 1980s, “History” heavily emphasised the glories of traditional Han culture and civilisation,
national unity premised on the inviolability of borders bequeathed by the Qing Empire and contributions of the Party to the establishment of the PRC. After the “98 Program reforms”, the “History” course removed criticism regarding the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, and turned to emphasise China’s humiliation and victimisation by foreign powers. This point of view has also been repeatedly alluded to in the courses of “Morals” and “Politics” to exhort students to ensure that this is never repeated (Vickers, 2009).

“Situation and Policy” and “Social Practice of University students” are also compulsory texts which aim to help students to understand major internal and international events, and to understand the responses and policies of the Chinese Central Government to these events. The key teaching points of these two courses change every year. Before the spring and autumn semesters start, the MOE and PCCP write the syllabus and teaching materials for these courses for universities to follow. For example, the syllabus and teaching materials of the courses in 2004 were “Current Affairs Reports for University” and “Current Affairs” (PCCP, MOE, 2004).

The desired social practices of university students also form part of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum. This aims to enable students to improve their ideological and political awareness of “patriotism”–rather than nationalism, collectivism, revolutionary heroism and organizational discipline (CCYL, MOE, 2005). The practices include: (1). Three months military training for all first year undergraduates; (2). A social survey. All college students and all BA and MA students, must visit revolutionary monuments, museums, memorials and the martyr’s cemeteries or economic well-developed areas and write a report; (3). College students and undergraduates need to work at a village or local community for two weeks in order to develop their professional ethics. These social practices are taken into account for
the award of “the Certificate of Quality of Students”, which forms part of the assessment for gaining a degree (ibid).

4.3.3. Syllabus of the Compulsory “Politics” Curriculum

As I discussed earlier in the chapter, the MOE has been responsible for publishing the syllabus of the compulsory “politics” curriculum from primary school to PhD degrees in HE since 1979. Since the compulsory “Politics” curriculum became centralised in 2003, the PCCP and the MOE established a teaching model for each HEI to follow. They publish syllabuses for each module of the curriculum and the compulsory “Politics” department in each university organizes the teachers of the courses to prepare lessons together and establish a unified teaching schedule for each teacher to follow (see Chapter 8 - interviews).

In order to assess how centralised and uniform the politics course is in its implementation, I selected part of the teaching schedules of the “Marxism” module from two universities’ websites to compare the syllabuses published by the MOE. These two universities were randomly selected. They may not represent others, but they show an example of the comparisons between text teaching in universities and the syllabus published by the MOE. Table T4-2 is “Introduction” to “Marxism” is used as an example here. This shows the comparison of teaching plans used by The Institute of Marxism of Ceramic University of Jingdezhen” and of Guizhou University of Ethnic Minority, alongside the syllabus published by the PCCP and MOE (2005).

T4-2. Comparison of Teaching Plan and Syllabus: Introduction of “Marxism”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Published by</th>
<th>MOE</th>
<th>Institute of Marxism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ceramic University of Jingdezhen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Topic</strong></td>
<td>Marxism is a science about the liberation of the proletariat and humanity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Teaching hours</strong></td>
<td>48hs</td>
<td>48 = 40hs taught + 8hs practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Teaching content</strong></td>
<td>1. What is Marxism?</td>
<td>2. The emergence and development of Marxism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Key teaching points</strong></td>
<td>1. Marxism and Marxist basic principles; 2. the development of Marxism; 3. the distinct characteristics of Marxism; 4. conscientiously study and apply Marxism.</td>
<td>1. Scientific connotation of Marxism 2. Inevitability of Marxism in the 1840s; 3. the unity of scientific and revolutionary of Marxism; 4. development stage and theoretical achievements of Marxism 5. Marxism: the scientific system, essential characteristics and innovative development phases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Assessment</strong></td>
<td>Exam</td>
<td>70% final exam + 30% usual assessments (= taking notes + attendance + class discussions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Textbooks</strong></td>
<td>Key Textbook of Marxist Theory Research and Construction Project, An Introduction to the Fundamentals of Marxism, Higher Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questions</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. What is Marxism?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How to understand the historical necessity of Marxism and contemporary value?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How to learn Marxism?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It can be seen from table T4-2 that these two universities almost completely follow the syllabuses published by the MOE. These similarities include topics, teaching content, assessment and textbooks. Only the amount of reading materials and teaching hours in Guizhou University of Ethnic Minority is slightly different compared with the other two, but they are all within the range of the requirements of the MOE.

4.3.4. Production of Textbooks and Reading Materials

The preparation and publication of the textbooks of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum in HE is regarded as “a political work, scientific, authoritative and serious” (PCCP, MOE, 2005a). Generally, the PCCP and the MOE and the General Administration of Publication issue directives together for the preparation and publication of the textbooks. For example, the authorities (PCCP, MOE, Publication Administration, 2006) issued specific requirements for all aspects of the curriculum within "the Notice of Strengthening the Management of the Compulsory ‘Politics’ curriculum". The PCCP and the MOE then jointly publish the syllabus, textbooks, and reading materials for all HEIs to use.
In the early days of the reforms, universities and provincial education authorities were allowed to publish their own textbooks, but they had to follow the syllabus issued by the MOE. Since 1998, HEIs and individual authors have not been allowed to publish textbooks and reading materials without approval from the PCCP, the MOE and Publication Administration (1998; 2006).

Before the start of a new university term, the MOE issues a document regarding the requirements for using the textbooks of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum. For example, in 2006, the MOE issued “Document No.1” to all levels of education authorities and HEIs. This document clearly requires that from the beginning of term 2006, colleges and universities must all use the unified “Key Teaching Points of Marxist Theoretical Research and Construction” which was prepared by the PCCP and MOE and published by the HE Press. These key teaching points form the syllabuses of the curriculum. If content or modules of the curriculum changed, the PCCP and MOE would issue a set of related documents to instruct HEIs to transit to new courses. For instance, when “Dengism” or “China’s Dream” was added into political education, the PCCP and MOE modified the textbooks. At the same time, the MOE (1998, 2006) issued a set of related policies—“Transition of the Curriculum and Credits”, “Transition of Teaching Schedules”, “Teacher Training” and “Transitional Management” to guide HEIs to implement the changes.

Education authorities at provincial levels are responsible for checking the usages of the textbooks and other teaching materials. If educational institutions or individual teachers were found using teaching materials without authorization, they could be punished (MOE, 2013).
4.3.5. Teachers of the Compulsory “Politics” Curriculum

The Party committee at each university is responsible for employing the teachers of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum. The MOE establishes the composition and standards of the teachers for the curriculum, which include the number of teaching posts, the work tasks and assessments standards. According to the MOE (2005), the compulsory “Politics” teachers are seen as special advocates of Marxism and the Party’s policies as well as communicators of socialist ideology; therefore, the teachers are required to have the correct political views and ideological beliefs. They are also required to maintain a high degree of agreement with the Party on major political issues in order to resolutely safeguard the interests of the Party and the state, and promote stability at universities. If they do not adhere to these, they risk losing their jobs and would not be employed for political education in the future.

The teachers of the curriculum consist of both full-time and part-time teachers. Since the 1980s, full-time teachers are required to have a degree (MOE, 1984a). They teach the four key modules such as “Marxism”, “Modern Chinese History” and so on. Part-time teachers take roles as political counsellors or class tutors whilst teaching.

Before each semester begins, the PCCP and the MOE train the curriculum teachers at national key universities. Local education authorities train the teachers at local colleges and universities (PCCP, MOE, 2004). Training methods include: full-time, part-time or on-the-job training (MOE, 2005a). Teacher training focuses upon understanding the syllabus and becoming familiar with the teaching materials and methods that are published by the MOE.

Provincial governments and Higher Education Work regularly assess the teachers. Assessment themes include: whether they have followed correct political principles,
political stance and political direction; whether they are engaged with the Party’s decisions and policies. If they are not, these teachers will be forced to leave the job. Assessment results also relate to rewards, punishments and promotions (MOE, 2005b).

In addition, the three posts of course teachers, political counsellors and class tutors are inextricably linked. If a full-time teacher is promoted to a higher post, in principle, this teacher should have experience as a class tutor. The person who is selected to become a cadre of the Party or manager at a university, must have experience of being a political counsellor (MOE, 2005a).

Universities also hire local Party leaders, government leaders, well-known entrepreneurs, the community’s advanced figures as special rapporteurs to give talks to the students on the curriculum. The curriculum teaching and seminars are not allowed to contain any (so-called) wrong views or to promote “harmful cultures” or “decadent lifestyles” (ST, 2004). Also, religion in universities is strongly prohibited (ST, 2004). Universities often organize large-scale conferences, seminars, or meetings during major national festivals, commemorative days and for major domestic and international events. Various educational websites and campus websites must contain an area for discussions of the CCP’s policies based on the CCP’s requirements (PCCP, MOE, 2004).

4.3.6. Assessment and Examination

Assessment of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum depended on individual universities during the early period of the reform (see discussion above). Since 1998, the MOE has published standards of assessment for the curriculum. According to the official documents (PCCP, MOE, 1998b; 2004), universities arrange the annual
examination of the curriculum, but these must conform to the standards published by the MOE. These assessments consist of a final exam and assessment of performance, which includes attendance, homework, performance in classroom discussions and learning notes. Assessment methods include: written examination, oral examination, open examination, 1+1 mode, 2+1 mode, 4+1 mode, and so on. For example,

- Written examination methods include closed and open questions selected from the textbooks.
- Oral examinations are conducted in class. These consist of classroom discussions, scenario simulation cases, reading reports and knowledge contests.
- 2 + 1 mode includes daily assessment, social practice and a final exam.
- 4 +1 mode takes the usual test scores, mid-term test results, practice reports and reward scores together, plus the final exam result.

The assessment grading scheme consists of: excellent, very good, good, pass, and fail. Students who achieve outstanding performances for moral quality and theoretical learning do not have to take the curriculum examinations. Students who fail the exams have a chance to retake them. If students fail the re-examination, they will be forced to retake the course, or leave university without a degree.

4.4. Discussion and Summary

The overview of political education and the compulsory “politics” curriculum in HE suggests that the reform of HE was part of broader reforms to China’s socio-economic policies, and that political education contains the CCP’s officially promoted ideology, values and policies, the official definitions of the regime and the political system. These themes can indicate processes of democratisation. The
developments in political education and the compulsory “politics” curriculum in HE during the post Mao era are summarised below:

(1). The CCP and the Chinese government firmly control political education and university students’ lives. This includes the curriculum, the textbooks, reading materials and teacher training. The CCP has its own pyramid structure organization from the top of the government to the basic level of universities in order to manage political education, and to directly manage students’ campus life and study. In this way, the Party's requirements are communicated directly to every single student at university.

(2). Political education serves to build a strong, technologically advanced Chinese state, with a citizenry unquestioningly loyal to the Communist authorities. Political education in HE contains almost all of the same themes as citizenship education for Chinese people. The function of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum is to represent the officially promoted ideology, to promote the legitimacy of the CCP’s regime and to explain the policies of the regime. The purpose of the curriculum is to train university students to become ideal citizens from the CCP’s prospective. Ideological, political and social changes have influenced key shifts in curriculum policy throughout the developments of political education in China’s higher education.

(3). The political curriculum in China is especially designed to suit students’ ages and psychological characteristics. It is continued and integrated throughout the Chinese education system. The objectives of the curriculum are consistent and coherent at different levels within the same historical period. The guidelines, modules, syllabus and teaching hours, even the names of the curriculum are all formally published by the central government (Yang Dong-ping, 2008). The compulsory “Politics”
curriculum in HE is an extension and continuation of political education in primary and secondary schools. Each time the central government changes the compulsory “Politics” curriculum, the MOE issues particular directives on its implementation to primary and secondary schools and universities. In this sense, the textbooks analysis at university level in this study is broadly representative of the whole of CE and political education in the Chinese education system at the level of official discourse.

(4). All of the modules of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum in HE are interconnected. Each module uses a different thematic angle to elaborate on the officially promoted ideology and policies of the government. All modules of the curriculum have the same political purpose which is to ensure the correct ideology is inculcated in students so that they have a better understanding of the world and behave according to the CCP’s requirements.

(5). the fast-growing educational system in China goes further to promote a common discourse of nationalism. Although education produces a better-informed and more open-minded generation, increasing their ability to scrutinize the authenticity of information and question authorities; however, education also cultivates loyalty to the state and the ruling party, and creates ideas of national unity. Patriotic education stimulates “patriotism”—a form of Chinese nationalism in young people. Patriotic education from the 1990s was initiated to fill the ideological vacuum, caused by increasing weakening of Chinese socialism due to China’s social transition. Two dominant themes have emerged: Chinese tradition and history, and national unity and territorial integrity – which have risen to the surface in the search for a new ideology. Through patriotic education and educational reforms, Chinese university
students have grown up embracing a commitment to safeguarding Chinese sovereignty and to defending territorial integrity.

In summary, the compulsory “politics” curriculum at university is an important part of political education led and managed by the CCP in China. The development of the curriculum during the post Mao era reflect the changes in the ideology of the CCP, the policies and structures of the Chinese government, as well as reflecting changes of social values. These changes can indicate signs of democratisation and reveal features of emerging democratization or continuing authoritarianism in China at the level of official discourse.

The following four chapters I analyse the detailed narratives of four key themes in the textbooks from 1978 to 2018, and present a summary of the findings from fieldwork including classroom observations and teacher and student interviews at a sample of Chinese universities during 2016.
Chapter 5. Analysis of Textbooks (1978-1990)

Introduction

This chapter provides an analysis of the themes in the compulsory “Politics” textbooks at university level from 1978 to 1990. I use the indicators shown in chapter 3 to conduct this analysis and to explore processes of democratization reflected in these themes.

China is an authoritarian country. In this context, democratisation is a process of developing a non-democratic political system to become democratic. In this study, I am not seeking to describe a fully developed democratic political system with most of the characteristics of democracy—as suggested in the table of indicators. Also, the indicators I use to measure processes of democratisation may only represent the degree to which the emergence of democracy has occurred in China. Again, signs of democratisation from the empirical analysis are limited to observations from the university textbooks. I do not claim that these signs represent democratization in Chinese society as a whole, and that what the Chinese government claims to be democratisation in political education, as found in the university textbooks, cannot fully represent China’s development towards democratisation.

I selected nine textbooks for analysis in this chapter. See Table T5-1.

T5-1: Nine textbooks for analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Used year</th>
<th>the Textbooks</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Used by</th>
<th>Published by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B5</td>
<td>1982-</td>
<td>Marxist Philosophy</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>HE institutes of</td>
<td>Gansu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>Ministry of Machinery Industry</td>
<td>Education Press</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5-2</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Marxist Philosophy</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14 HE institutes of Hubai province</td>
<td>Hubei Renmin Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5-3</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Dialectical Materialism And Historical Materialism</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Science, engineering and medical study in HE</td>
<td>Fujian Renmin Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5-4</td>
<td>1979-83, Vol.1</td>
<td>Chinese Revolutionary History</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Social science study in HE</td>
<td>China Renmin Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5-5</td>
<td>1980-83, Vol.2</td>
<td>Chinese Revolutionary History</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>All self-study of HE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5-6</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Chinese Revolutionary History</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>All self-study of HE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5-7</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>History of International Communist Movement</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10 HE institutes nationwide</td>
<td>Jiangsu Renmin Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5-8</td>
<td></td>
<td>Chinese Revolutionary History</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6 HE institutions in Shanxi province</td>
<td>Shanxi Renmin Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5-9</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Marxist Philosophy</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>HE institutions in Shanxi province</td>
<td>Zhishi Press</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table B5 represents the textbooks used for analysis in chapter 5; 1 represents the first textbook, and 1982-83 refers to textbooks which had been used at universities from 1982 to 1983. By the same token, B5-2 represents the second textbook used in this chapter, and B5-3 is the third textbook and so on.

During the period 1978 to 1990, universities were allowed to publish their own textbooks, which resulted in a large number of different textbooks being used. However, these textbooks were required to follow the syllabus that the MOE published for the curriculum (MOE, 1980, 1985).
For the purposes of this research, I only selected textbooks from the “Marxism” and “History” modules. These textbooks had been formally published and were used in many different types of universities; therefore these textbooks cover a large range of HE institutions, such as universities which were managed at national and provincial levels, comprehensive universities, technology universities, and so on.

The earliest textbooks I selected were the 1979 editions, and the latest, were the 1990 editions. This is because when the Chinese government started the reforms in 1978, most university professors gradually returned to their teaching posts, with new versions of the textbooks written from 1979. The compulsory “Politics” curriculum was dramatically changed after the Tiananmen students’ movement in 1989. However, it took some time for the government to publish a new syllabus for re-editing the textbooks. I found that some universities continued using the previous textbooks in 1990. Therefore, I used a 1990 edition for analysis in this chapter.

The authors of the textbooks consist of the course teachers, scholars and political officers. They were selected by the MOE and universities and vetted by government. For example, the textbook of “Chinese Revolutionary History” (B5-8) pertains to the “History” module of the compulsory “Politics” course. According to the textbook, the editors, Ren Mao-tang and Li Jing-wen were history professors at Shanxi University; Zheng Xing-shun was a political officer from government and Zheng Jing-zhi was Professor of Politics at Shanxi University. Because a number of authors contributed to writing each of the textbooks, I do not show their names in the table.

The textbooks contain a large amount of text. I focused primarily on the themes dealing with officially promoted ideologies, the officially defined nature of the regime, the understandings of democracy and values by the officials and authors. By
analysing these themes with the indicators of democracy, I trace processes of
democratisation in China during the period 1978 to 1990. The analysis is comparative
between the textbooks in order to evaluate similarities, differences and changes to
the narratives in the treatment of these themes during this era.

5.1. The Officially Promoted Ideology

I used four textbooks to compare and analyse the narratives of the official promoted
ideology in this section. These textbooks were widely distributed among Chinese
HEIs. B5-1 was used in the HEIs which were managed by the Ministry of Machinery
and Industry, B5-2 was used by 14 HEIs in Hubai province, B5-3 was used in all the
HEIs within science, engineering and medical studies, and B5-9 was the textbook
used for all HEIs in Shanxi province. Although a large number of textbooks were
used at other universities during this period, due to the limited time available for this
research, I could only select a limited number of textbooks. However, the textbooks
that I selected all followed the same syllabus published by the MOE. In this sense, it
can be said that these textbooks are partly representative of Chinese HE.

Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Marxism, Leninism and Maoism were
official defined as the guiding ideologies of the CCP and the Chinese government
(B5-9, 1990). These officially promoted ideologies still played an important role in
political education in HE during 1978 to 1990.

5.1.1. Marxism

In the textbooks, Marxism is divided into two parts. The first part concerns
“Dialectical Materialism”, “Historical Materialism” and “Dialectics”. These are mainly
based on Engel's book “Dialectics of Nature” with a few quotations from Marx, Lenin,
Stalin and Mao. The first part takes up two thirds of the textbooks. The second part of the textbooks concerns the theory of state formation, social development and class struggle. This also contains discussions of the Chinese political and economic system, social development and the ideology of the CCP. These discussions represent the official definition of the Chinese regime. I will discuss these definitions in the next section.

Comparing these four textbooks, I concluded that in places, Marxism is explained differently. For example, Book 5-1 focuses on the point that Marxism can be practiced and developed, so as to prove that Leninism is the result of practical Marxism in the Soviet Union, and Maoism is the result of practical Marxism in China; Book 5-2 emphasises that Marxism is the theoretical basis of communism, but the main task of China, is to achieve the four modernizations for economic reform; Book 5-3 advocates the view that Marxism is an ideology of the proletariat in order to prove the correctness of Marxism as the theoretical basis and guiding ideology of the CCP, and that students should have a communist worldview. Book 5-9 stresses the idea of “the inevitable collapse of capitalism and the inevitable victory of socialism and that this is an objective law of social development” (p21), so as to strengthen students’ belief in Marxism.

These differences regarding Marxism among the textbooks can be treated as indicative of underlying ideological differences or differences of opinions’ among the authors. Yet, it does not reflect a democratic value of pluralism. The authors edit the textbooks based on the same syllabus for the Marxist theory course, as issued by the MOE. These textbooks do not have such democratic characteristics as shown in indicators D3, that in democratic education, diversity means pluralist choices by
individuals, and indicator D8 that pluralism suggests that knowledge can be open to public debate and there are no predetermined answers.

The three textbooks (B5-1, 2 and 3) share many similarities. The structure of the texts and descriptions of “Dialectical Materialism”, “Historical Materialism” and “Dialectics” are almost the same. Marxism was used as a distinctive instrument of ideological education to correct the ideology of university students. The textbooks use radical language to describe Marxism as an unchallengeable “truth” and a “scientific and revolutionary” philology which requires university students to have faith in Marxism. The textbooks state:

“The fundamental principles of Marxist philosophy are universal truths of all … it is a guide for revolutionary actions… Marxism provides an ideological weapon for all… and provides only correct thinking for all practice, scientific research … and specific science (具体科学)...Scientists and technicians should strive to be conscious dialectical materialists and ‘red experts’” (B5-1, 1982-1983 p11, p16; B5-2, 1983, p15; B5-3, 1985, p14).

There is no disagreement concerning Marxism, nor any reading materials referring to non-Marxists. This narrative suggests a feature of authoritarianism. This feature is in keeping with indicator A2, that in an authoritarian regime, there is no free access to full information and tolerance towards others; and indicator A3, that knowledge is not to be debated and is given by authority. There is official guidance for teaching using controlled school textbooks, as indicator A8 suggests, single narratives are presented as absolute and unquestionable.

Moreover, Marxism is used to support the legitimacy of the CCP in terms of gaining power through a violent proletariat revolution and establishing socialism. This is reflected in the narratives of the legitimacy and the correctness of the CCP in
choosing Marxism as its ideology, and the inevitability of the realization of socialism in China. The textbook states:

“The socialist system is an inevitable trend of human development and the inevitable result of class struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie in capitalist society... the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the essence of Marxist theory of the state” (B5-1, 1982-83, p265, p287).

As some scholars have suggested these narratives use Marxism to confirm the necessity and legitimacy of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat rather than other forms of government in China (Fairbrother, 2004; Vickers, 2009); Marxist ideologies play a significant role in China through the 1980s (Mitter, 2005). These narratives also suggest the features of authoritarianism suggested in indicator A8, that knowledge is a unified instrument of political power as either propaganda or as secrets of the state.

In summary, the officially promoted narratives of Marxism in the textbooks during the early 1980s reflect authoritarian features of political education.

After the 85 Programs reform in HE, the main task of HE changed to cultivating students’ scientific and technical knowledge in order to serve the goals of economic reform as part of the four modernizations. The “Politics” courses began to be de-politicized. The teaching of Marxism changed. For example, absolute language was removed from explanations of Marxism and university students were not required to be faithful to Marxism as found in previous textbooks. The 1990 text uses Einstein and other well-known scientists as examples to illustrate that non-Marxists can also greatly contribute to human progress. The textbook states:

“Although some scientists are not Marxist believers, their views of the world often contain a native materialism and dialectical thought. Their achievements
are a consequence of using—consciously or unconsciously—materialism and dialectics.” (B5-9, 1990, p16).

This statement implies that university students do not have to be dialectical materialists and “red experts” as before. The main task of university students has changed from being politically correct to learning scientific and technical knowledge. This also indicates that political education in Chinese HE has slightly moved away from strong control of student’s ideology. More significant changes within ideological education are found within explanations of Leninism and Maoism.

5.1.2. Leninism

Leninism is another guiding ideology of the CCP. However, the textbooks seldom explain it. B5-1 only states: “Lenin and Stalin inherited and developed Marxism to a new stage—Leninism—during their leadership of the proletarian revolution in Russia and international workers movement” (1982-83, p14). There are no dates given in the text for Stalin or Lenin’s works. B5-1 lists some important articles from Lenin and Stalin, such as Lenin’s “Criticism of Materialism and Experience”, “Philosophical Notes”, “the State and Revolution”, and Stalin’s “Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism”, “Marxism and Linguistic Problems”, and “the Socialist Economic Structure in the Soviet Union”. However, the textbooks hardly introduce any of the content from these. Differently, B5-2, B5-3 and B5-9 introduce Leninism without mention of contributions from Stalin. Compared with the large amount of explanations of Marxism, Leninism seems unimportant in the textbooks.

Remarkable changes regarding Leninism are seen in a 1988 textbook “The History of the International Communist Movement”. Stalin is condemned and heavily criticised in great detail in terms of his political, economic, cultural and diplomatic polices, as
well as his leadership of the international communist movement. For example, a textbook (B5-7, 1988) accuses Stalin of entering into an “evil collusion with Hitler” for the purpose of occupying neighbouring countries. The textbook summarizes the Soviet Union system as containing “various defects of a highly centralized leadership”, and negatively narrates these:

“Stalin’s policies caused serious disorders in the economic structure of the Soviet Union. In cities, industrial raw materials and fuel were very scarce; factories were closed down and there were large numbers of unemployed. Production declined significantly. The workers’ livelihoods could not be guaranteed and many strikes occurred” (B5-7, 1988, p212)…

“There was only a single form of ownership and a highly centralized management system in the Soviet Union… a planned economy system… The power of the party and the party leadership was highly centralized. The cadres of the party and the state were always top-down. This resulted in a lifelong system of leadership, privileges and bureaucracy… Cultural and educational institutions were centralized too… The party leaders interfered directly with schools textbooks at all levels; the leader himself drew an outline for school textbooks so that teaching materials and textbooks followed the same pattern and lacked individual characteristics… The central committee of the party interfered with academic research by administratively endorsing certain academic views. This kind of intervention causes difficulties for free debates. Ideology was rigid and dogmatic and public culture was monopolised in the Soviet Union” (ibid, pp268-272).

This systematic criticism of Stalin’s policies, inform readers that Leninism, Stalin’s policies and the Soviet model have failed in practice in the Soviet Union. By criticising the Soviets along these lines, the authors seem to be advocating some space for debate within the socialist system in China. Many suggest that the CCP largely borrowed policies from the Soviet Model (or Stalin Model) from the 1950s (Liu Mei, 2006; Li Xiao-hui, 2007; Yang Dong-ping, 2008; Qin Yue, 2013). The features of the
Soviet political system have also been found in China, such as “a single form of economic ownership, the highly centralized political system and a lifelong party leadership” as well as “the Party interfered directly with schools textbooks and academic research” (ibid).

Furthermore, it is suggested that Stalin’s policies caused “difficulties for free debates… Ideology was rigid and dogmatic and public culture was monopolised” (B5-7, 1988, p272). Compared with the absolute unchallengeable normative terminology of Marxism–Leninism in the early 1980s editions, the authors of B5-8 were open to critical thinking in the ideological field. Critical thinking is a feature of democratic education. It is in keeping with indicator D8 which tolerates alternative views. Notably, these narratives are the authors’ own ideas, because the textbooks are using subtle ways to express criticism rather than direct discussion or using official documents to support their opinions. This textbook was used at 10 universities. Hence, the official sanction of these textbook in universities suggests that these critiques of Stalin’s policies were allowed by the Chinese authorities.

5.1.3. Maoism

As I discussed in chapter 4, Mao was the leader of the CCP, and Maoism is the officially promoted ideology of the CCP and the Chinese regime; Mao and Maoism were not allowed to be challenged during the Mao era. Following the denial of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution by the Chinese government in 1981, the narratives of Mao, Maoism and the CCP’s policies in the textbooks of the three modules, “Marxism”, “Chinese Revolutionary History” and “International Communist Movement” show great differences.
In B5-1 (1982-83) and B5-2 (1983), Mao as a person and Maoism as an ideology are separately delineated; B5-3 (1985) highly praises Mao as the most outstanding Marxist in China and as the founder of Maoism:

“Mao profoundly expounded and enriched Marxist epistemology and dialectics, comprehensively and systematically expounded the dialectical relationship between practice and cognition as well as the dialectical development of cognition. Mao emphasized that the basis of cognition is the masses’ practice…He put forward the brilliant idea of correctly handling the contradictions among the people and new theoretical elements to Marxist philosophy” (p17)…

“Mao contributed the only correct guiding principle of the CCP–Maoism… the socialist revolution has achieved a great victory under the leadership of the Party and Mao” (p292).

This textbook positively narrates that Mao was the creator of the PRC, the CCP and Maoism. There is no criticism on Mao as a leader nor is there any critique of Maoism, as the ideology of the CCP when the textbook mentions the Cultural Revolution.

In contrast, B5-9 (1990) does not mention Mao’s contribution at all, nor does it refer to what Maoism includes. B5-2 (1983) lists three articles of Mao which explain Maoism for students. Interestingly, two textbooks (B5-8, 1988 and B5-7, 1988) directly criticises Mao, the CCP regime and Maoism. For example, the texts state:

“Mao gradually became conceited. His subjectivist and personal arbitrary interests gradually took precedence over the party. The political life of the party, the collective leadership of the state and the principle of democratic centralism were weakening or even destroyed” (B5-8, 1988, p359)…

“The CPP was not able to institutionalize and legalise democracy for the inner-party. Although laws were established, they did not have proper authority. The power of the party and the state were too centralised. Personality worship and
personal arbitrariness meant it was impossible for the Party to prevent or stop the Cultural Revolution” (ibid, p360)...

“Maoism serious hurt the enthusiasm of peasants and caused great damage to agricultural productive forces (ibid, p351)...

“According to the personal opinions of Mao, the Party implemented Mao’s ‘left’ (左) theory of ‘Class Struggle of the Socialist Society’ and rashly launched the Great Leap Forward and the People’s Commune Movement. Exaggerated plans, whims, impracticable policies and communist ideas were the main features of these movements...The Cultural Revolution was wrong. It has brought a serious disaster to our nation through civil war” (ibid, p352, p359)

“This so-called ‘Revolution’ was initiated and led by Mao. The Cultural Revolution has resulted in the worst setback and loss to the Party, the state and people since the PRC was formed. The Cultural Revolution largely denied Marxist and socialist principles. It also denied a large number of correct policies of the Party and achievements of all the people. The Cultural Revolution seriously weakened and broke the people’s democratic dictatorship and the Party, so that the state was facing a serious political crisis... The Cultural Revolution has caused great damage to the economic development of China. According to statistics, the economic losses reached 500 billion Yuan during the ten years of the revolution, which is worth more than 30 years of the total fixed capital assets of the whole of China. This loss has led to national economic collapse. The Cultural Revolution is a disaster of “left” ideology (左倾思想), and destroyed the good morality of the Party and Chinese society. It also caused an unprecedented catastrophe in the ideological and cultural fields.” (B5-7, 1988, pp449-450).

The textbook clearly points out that the Communist leaders neither investigated deeply, nor scientifically analysed the situation in China. The textbook states:

“The main leaders of the Central Committee of the party overestimated the situation at that time, and wrongly supported the movement. Thus, they created violent large-scale class struggle within the masses. A large number of
intellectuals, patriots and cadres of the Party were improperly defined as 'the rightists' (右派). The anti-rightist's movement caused a social crisis” (B5-8, 1988, p349).

These narratives deny Mao’s revolution theory and Mao’s practices in the PRC. In other words, most of Mao’s policies after 1949 are heavily criticised. This criticism is in keeping with the political changes within the CCP in the 1980s. According to the CCP’s document on 27th June, 1981, “Resolution on Several Historical Issues of the Party since Founding of the PRC”, Mao was identified as a great leader before the PRC (1949), while Mao’s personal behaviour, his policies during the Great Leap Forward, the people’s commune movement and the Cultural Revolution are all denied.

These different narratives of Mao and Maoism suggest distinct thinking among the authors of the textbooks. As I discussed above, textbook B5-1 (1982-83) and B5-2 (1983) delineate both Mao as the leader and Maoism as an ideology. In contrast, B5-3 (1985) highly praises Mao’s contributions; but B5-9 (1990) does not mention Mao’s contribution at all; and B5-7 and B5-8 deny Mao’s policies. Publishing these distinct opinions in the textbooks indicates signs of pluralism in terms of the diverse opinions included in the publication of the textbooks.

Following those criticisms, the authors of the textbooks directly call for democracy by suggesting the leaders of the CCP;

“Must be modest and prudent in carrying out the principles of democratic centralism and fully develop democracy within the party. The CCP absolutely cannot treat criticism and suggestions of the people as opposition against the party or the socialist system. The CCP must strictly respect the difference between academic debates and political attitudes. The CCP must not treat
This suggests that one purpose of criticising Maoism, from the perspectives of the authors, is to promote freedom of expression.

5.2. The Chinese Regime

Generally speaking, essential elements of democratic citizenship include explanations of political, economic and legal systems at local, national and international levels. Analysis of the narratives of the officially defined nature of the regime in the textbooks can tell us whether democratic elements such as elections, pluralism and freedom of expression are tolerated within the Chinese regime, and whether Chinese officials attempt to develop democratic politics. In this section, I analyse the narratives of “the People’s Democratic Dictatorship” and participants of the Chinese regime. In particular, I analyse four themes: “the people”, “the enemy”, “democracy” and “dictatorship”.

5.2.1. The People’s Democratic Dictatorship

Since the CCP founded the PRC in 1949, the CCP has always called the regime “the People’s Democratic Dictatorship” or “the Dictatorship of the Proletariat”. As I mentioned early in the chapter, the explanation of the regime is one of two parts of the textbook “Marxism”. Therefore, I examine the narratives of the regime in the same four textbooks as above.

The four textbooks identify the Chinese regime as being the same as the people's democratic dictatorship. Namely, the regime is led by the working class based on the alliance of workers and peasants (B5-1, 1982-82, p287; B5-2, 1983, p288; B5-3, 1985, p288; B5-9, 1990, p257). This definition is also the same as the Chinese
constitution. However, the detailed explanations of the regime, such as “the people”, “democracy” and “dictatorship” are described and explained differently between the four books. I summarise these three themes in table 5-2 below.

**T5-2. The Definitions of the Chinese Regime**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Text Book</th>
<th>The people</th>
<th>Democracy and Dictatorship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B5-1, 1982-83</td>
<td>Democracy perfects the state constitution and laws so that it becomes an inviolable force that must be strictly observed by everyone. Dictatorship abolishes all democratic freedom and protection in order to abuse power for authoritarian personal interests (pp288-290)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5-2, 1983</td>
<td>Working class</td>
<td>Legally, each race, gender and citizen has equal rights; Politically, in democratic centralism, the people have equal political rights based on democratic principles, the people have rights to manage the state and society at different levels (pp291-293).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5-3, 1985</td>
<td>Proletariat</td>
<td>Democracy is a unity of democracy and centralism, freedom and discipline within the people. At the same time, individuals obey collectives, the minority obey the majority, the lower obey the higher authority, the local obey the central government, the centralized and unified leadership of the CCP (p260, p268)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5-9, 1990</td>
<td>majority working people</td>
<td>the People’s Congress system (p259)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**5.2.2. The People**

It can be seen from the table that the range of the participants of the regime was expanded. According to the constitution of China, the participants of the regime are “the people” (人民). “The People” refers to a particular political group of Chinese
people. This group does not contain all people. “The People” are defined as the working class in B5-2 (1983) and the proletariat in B5-3 (1985). In the 1990 edition, “the people” are expanded to include the “majority of working people” which includes: “the working class, the peasant class, intellectuals, self-employees and private business owners” (B5-9, 1990, p248). This expansion indicates a more extensive conception of political participation.

Among these, intellectuals are the most important group of people added into the regime. As I discussed in chapter 4, intellectuals were not a part of “the people” before the reforms and they were not allowed to participate in any decision-making of the country before the reforms. This change is shown in descriptions of the role of intellectuals thus:

“In a classed society, intellectuals are not a class; they are a special social stratum (社会阶层) which belongs to different classes… (In China), intellectuals are parts of the working people (劳动人民) … intellectuals have shifted from their previous stratum which was attached to the bourgeoisie to become a part of the working class because the production and labour remuneration of intellectuals is the same as the working class…Intellectuals have advanced knowledge of science and technology; they are an indispensable and important force for achieving the four modernizations” (B5-9, 1990, p247).

The textbook does not classify intellectuals as an independent class. Intellectuals, workers and peasants are all seen as working people (劳动人民) due to the different characteristics of “modes of production”. In this sense, intellectuals are included into “the people” as participants in the regime. This expansion can provide conditions to develop pluralist participation in Chinese politics. Chinese intellectuals, as Ogden (2002) suggests, have an important role in shaping China’s values and ideas. In the
early reform era, as I discussed in chapter 4, intellectuals expressed their democratic aspirations, such as the “April Fifth Movement” in 1976 and the discussion of "practice as the sole criterion of truth" in 1978. These expressions loosened the ideological strictures of the party and paved the way for more pragmatic leaders (Fewsmith, 1995). Intellectuals also contributed to the democracy movements in 1989. It can be said that recognising intellectuals as participants of the regime is a sign toward democratisation at the level of official statements. It is in keeping with indicator D1, that in a democratic political institution, citizens, businessmen, intellectuals and other social classes share power.

“Democracy”

According to the Chinese Constitution, “democracy” forms part of the definition of the Chinese regime, however “the people's democratic dictatorship” is described differently among the textbooks. Some textbooks concentrate on how to develop democracy, such as B5-1 (1982-83) which suggests “perfecting the state constitution and laws so that it becomes an inviolable force that must be strictly observed”. This can be understood to mean that the authors are suggesting that the rule of law is the main condition for the regime to achieve democracy. For B5-9 (1990), establishing the People Congress system is a guarantee that the regime will become a democracy.

The contrasting narratives concerning “democracy” are shown in textbooks B5-2 and B5-3. There is an important section concerning “socialist democracy and the socialist legal system” in textbook B5-2. The authors state that:

“Establishing a higher level socialist democracy (through the rule of law) is our final goal and essential task” (1983, p290).
The authors also emphasised equal legal rights among citizens, ethnic minorities, and gender to explain what democracy means in the regime (ibid, p292-293). They particularly suggested that:

“The Party must act within the framework of the Constitution and laws. From the central government to the local level, all the Party organizations and Party members must strictly abide by the Constitution and laws, and cannot contravene laws and cannot violate the law... Citizens should be treated equally by laws, and no organization or individual is allowed to have the privilege of transcending the constitution and the law” (ibid, p293).

In contrast to the narratives above, textbook B5-3 draws a clear line between “the people”, citizens and masses. Among these, only “the people” are the participants of the regime. “Democracy” is suggested only within “the people”. It seems that other citizens or masses are not identified as a part of “the people”; therefore, they may not have the right to enjoy democracy. When the authors discussed “democracy as a unity of democracy and centralism, freedom and discipline”, they (B5-3, 1985, p268) emphasised the point that “individual must obey collectives, the minority obey the majority, the lower obey the higher authority, and the local obey central government”. After all, the CCP has a “centralized and unified leadership”. Perhaps, this is the nature of the regime as understood by the authors. Yet, this narrative suggests features of authoritarianism. In an authoritarian regime, national interests take precedent over those of the individual, people are to obey authority (indicator, A1); the state is a monolithic power composed of and serving the interests of the few or one group (indicator, A5). The narratives of “democracy” in textbook B5-3 are in keeping with the authoritarian catalogues of indicators A1 and A5.

In summary, the authors of the textbooks have diverse understandings regarding the definitions of the Chinese regime, democracy and the rule of law. In agreeing to
publish these textbooks for teaching in universities the Chinese authorities have sanctioned a degree of tolerance in terms of textbook publication.

5.2.4. “Dictatorship”, Violent Revolution and Class Struggle

These four textbooks hardly discuss the meaning of “dictatorship” within the regime. Only B5-1 uses quotes from Lenin to explain “dictatorship” as serving “to abolish all democratic freedom and protection in order to abuse power for authoritarian personal interests” (1982-83, p290). The textbooks largely discuss violent revolution and class struggle.

In the textbooks, violent revolution and class struggle are interpreted differently for the needs of the regime. On the one hand, violent revolution and class struggle are seen as necessary for the CCP to maintain power. The text says:

“Class struggle is the direct motive force of social development. The state is a political military organization, which is the machine wherein one class rules another class… Socialism must go through a revolution of the proletariat. Marx and Engels pointed out: since the primitive commune disintegrated, all history is the history of class struggle between the exploited and the exploiting classes, and between the ruling class and the ruled class at all levels of social development. In a classed society, the class struggle is inevitable... the working class cannot simply control and use a ready-made state machine for their purposes. Therefore, the working class must violently destroy and smash it (the old state), and replace it with a dictatorship of the proletariat’ … Mao also pointed out: ‘revolution and a revolutionary war is inevitable, otherwise it will not complete the leap of social development. The class struggle is the decisive force shaping a classed society’. ” (B5-1, 1982-83 Pp266-278).
On the other hand, the texts claim that “the class struggle” was no longer needed once the CCP had gained power:

“Classes can only exist in a certain historical period. The dictatorship of the proletariat led by the theory of class struggle is just a transformation period for destroying the bourgeoisie and developing into a proletariat society. The class struggle is not primordial and does not last forever...

The main contradictions in a socialist society are between socialist production forces and production relationships, between economic foundation and superstructure, and between the people’s growing needs for material goods and culture and backward social productive forces … These contradictions are non-antagonistic, therefore, it can be gradually resolved through conscious application by adjusting and reforming the socialist system...

The class struggle is not the main conflict in socialist society ... It would be completely wrong if one class overthrew another … It will seriously harm social stability and unity, and damage the development of socialism if some artificially manufactured struggle between classes, continued to emphasize class struggle…

In a socialist society, the scope of the class struggle is different compared with the past… It is against the ideologies of all types of exploiting classes and non-proletarians; it is the fight against corruption, gambling, theft, bribery and smuggling in the economic field (B5-1, 1982-83, Pp271-281).

These narratives suggest that violent revolution and class struggle are used to prove the legitimacy of the CCP, in which violence was necessary for the CCP in order to take power from the KMT, while it is no longer needed since the CCP had gained power.

Differently, textbook (B5-9, 1990) suggests a new concept of Mao’s style of class struggle. The text explains:
“The class struggle in a socialist society is a special form of class struggle, which is different compared to the conflicts between two classes in an exploiting class society. The class struggle is no longer a priority…There are very few domestic hostile forces who attempt to overthrow the socialist system…and the exploiting class has been destroyed in our socialist society…Thus, it is unnecessary to continue this previous style of class struggle, which was used in the past, such as the Land Reforms (土地改革), the Suppressing of Anti-revolutionaries (镇压反革命), the Sanfan (三反), and the Wufan (五反)” (B5-9, 1990, P248).

As is well known, these movements were all cruel violent revolutions that were led directly by Mao and the Party. These movements also reflect extreme authoritarianism. Identifying this style of class struggle as “the previous style” can be understood as “Mao’s style class struggle”. These descriptions suggest that the CCP have attempted to give up violent revolution and “class struggle” politics. This provides the basic social conditions for developing equal rights for all citizens to participate in government. Citizens having equal rights of participation are an essential condition for establishing a democratic regime (Indicator, D-1).

5.3. Understandings of Democracy and Values

As I discussed in last section, the textbooks of “Marxism” are dominated by narratives which explain the officially defined Chinese regime and the CCP’s policies in order to prove the legitimacy and correctness of the CCP. For the same purpose, the “History” textbooks of the curriculum explain the modern history of China from 1840 to 1949 (B5-6, 1987; B5-8, 1988) or the history of the CCP from 1919 to 1949 (B5-4, 1979-1983) from official Chinese perspectives.

In this section, I analyse the themes of democracy and values represented in the compulsory “History” textbooks. These themes include descriptions of the democratic
practices of the CCP when the KMT was in power, and the democratic practices of other communist parties in the world in order to explore how Chinese officials and the authors understand democracy and values, to show how these understandings reflect processes of democratisation during this period at the level of official statements.

5.3.1. Democratic Practices and the CCP

There are clear differences in the descriptions of the practices of the CCP during its early revolutionary era between the compulsory “History” textbooks. For example, three textbooks mention the revolutionary movements of 1922. Among these, Book B5-4 (1979-1983, p141) narrates how the CCP called for “free speech, absolute freedom of assembly and publication, freedom of workers organizing trade unions and strikes … as well as …political freedom, legal equality, general elections, labour legislation and freedom of residence”. Books B5-6 (1987, pp206-208) and B5-8 (1988, p123-124) only briefly mention these movements but without further description of this action by the CCP.

Textbook B5-4 also outlines the views of the CCP regarding a democratic political system in the Second Congress of the Party in 1922:

“The CCP put forward concepts of a democratic republic state: establishing an autonomous system in three regions of Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang; unifying China into a democratic republic state with free federal systems; establishing a parliamentary Council in cities and an election system for all people. Workers and peasants, men and women all have the right to vote in the parliaments at all levels. There is also absolute freedom of speech, and of the press, freedom of assembly and association” (B5-4, 1979-1983, Pp84-85).
Furthermore, this textbook discusses the democratic government established by the CCP in the 1930s:

“The CCP established a workers-peasants government and a democratic system in 1933. All representatives of city and township were elected directly by the people. For example, more than eighty percent of voters took part in elections in the central areas under the CCP’s control in 1932 and 1933. The democratic government ensured that people have freedom of speech, press, assembly, association and religion. In terms of ethnic minorities, the government stated that minorities have full rights to self-determination (自决权) and freedom to develop ethnic cultures and languages in ethnic minority areas for those who were Mongolian, Hui, Tibetan, Miao and Korean” (B5-4, 1979-1983, pp363-364).

Textbook B5-6 discusses Mao’s article “On the People's Democratic Government”, and suggests that it is a theory of the CCP for establishing a democratic government in China. This article explains the democratic political system and economic system which were written in the first Chinese Constitution, such as: “The nature of socialism consists of state-ownership, private-ownership, and capitalist ownership and capitalist state ownership” (B5-5, 1980-83, p785). Importantly, textbook B5-6 suggests nationalization of the military (军队国家化). “Nationalization of Military” (军队国家化) is a process of transferring military ownership from a political Party to the state. Since China became a republic state in 1912, armies have always belonged to political parties or warlords. When the KMT ruled China, the KMT had the largest military force. Since the CCP came to power in 1949, the military has always been under the direct control of the CCP. Armies are only loyal to the Party or the party leaders. The textbook points out that the “Nationalization of Military” was the suggestion of the CCP in 1945:
“The CCP advocated two principles for democratization of the state (国家民主化) and nationalization of military (军队国家化), namely, it must implement democracy to abolish the dictatorship of the KMT, and establish a joint democratic government and democratize the military (军队民主化)” (B5-5, 1980-83, p663).

Textbook B5-8 describes the democratic ideas of the CCP further to emphasize multi-party politics against a one-party dictatorship, and introduces democratic elections and the coalition government which was established by the CCP in 1940, 1943 and 1949:

“In 1940, a triangle type of democratic government (三三制) was set up by the CCP in the liberated areas (解放区) in China. Each of the Communists, representatives of non-partied and intermediate (local) people took one third of seats in this government (B5-8, 1988, p251)…

“In 1943, Mao suggested that China must abolish the one party dictatorship (means KMT), and combine with representatives from all parties and non-partied together to form a democratic coalition government' (ibid, p256)…

“In 1949, there were 662 delegates whom attended the first session of the People’s Political Consultative conference. These people represented the CCP, other democratic parties, personages without party affiliation, the People’s Liberation Army, ethnic minorities and overseas Chinese. About 63 members were elected into the Central government. Mao was elected as the chairman of the PRC” (ibid, p313).

It can be seen from these narratives that the authors demonstrate a clearly articulated version of the key features of a democratic regime, which includes freedom of expression and assembly, legal equality, general elections, a representative government and a state controlled military (Crick, 2002).
In summary, the analysis above show differences in the descriptions of practices of the CCP during its early revolutionary era between the compulsory “History” textbooks. These differences suggest distinct interpretations and understandings of Chinese politics and democracy between the authors, and between the authors and the Chinese authorities. This diversity among the textbooks indicates a sign of democratic values, of diversity and tolerance to others, which is in keeping with the principle of indicator D3. However, we must notice that this sign does not necessarily mean they are a measure of the actual progress of democracy. These narratives only reflect the thinking or wishes of the authors. The authors did not put forward their own opinions of democracy in the textbooks. They reinforced the early policies of the CCP in order to show the CCP’s favourite conceptions of democracy. This suggests that the authors and universities did not have complete freedom to decide the content of the textbooks.

5.3.2. Democratic Practice of the Communist Parties in Europe

“The History of the International Communist Movement” (1988) was one of two “History” modules of the compulsory “Politics” course during the period 1978 to 1990. The textbook largely discussed the democratic achievements of the communist parties in European countries. These discussions indicate the authors’ understandings of democracy. The textbook states:

“European communist movements in contemporary developed capitalist countries were part of the international communist movement. Some proposed a socialist theory and established a socialist system through a democratic and peaceful path based on their analysis of social and historical conditions and research of socialist models in their own countries (B5-7, 1988, p472)…”
“In many western capitalist countries, the parties which have received a ruling position through a campaign were not only bourgeois parties, but also workers’ parties (工人政党), such as the Socialist Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Labour Party…These ‘workers parties’ could be in power for a long time. Some of them have obtained a considerable number of seats in parliament. This success can be seen as an inspiration for other communist parties who want to establish a socialist system by democratic and peaceful elections” (ibid, p473).

Here, the authors inform readers that other so-called communist parties have become successful political actors in their countries through democratic paths. These parties had “democratised the existing state machines” and “reformed the structures of the national machine” (B5-7, 1988, p476). The authors viewed this path as the future of socialist development. They further suggest that the Chinese Communist Party should be democratic with “full democracy and freedom of ideological debate in the Party” (ibid, p477). They suggest that this full democracy should include: 1). a multi-party political system; 2). a legal system to protect the right to existence of different political parties and free speech; 3). a government should be formed through elections, and the political parties should be separate from state power. 4). people should directly participate in decision-making and economic management. 5). Government should not implement any particular national ideology or religious ideas.

In particular, this textbook suggests that establishing a socialist system does not have to follow the Soviet Union that “seized the Winter Palace”, because most people are “generally against violence, dictatorship and wars, they do not advocate the achievement of a socialist system by spilling blood” (ibid, p473). Also “Leninism was only suitable for Russian historical conditions” (ibid, p476).
Considering the other textbooks discussed early, it can be seen that the authors not only use the practices of the CCP in its early days to represent their democratic ideas, but also use successful democratic practices from other communist parties in Europe to strengthen their suggestions of creating a democratic regime.

5.3.3. The Reforms

Reforms are commonly seen as signs of significant change to economic and political polices in a country. China started the reforms in 1978 when the central task of the CCP shifted from political class struggle to economic development. However, the reforms were seriously challenged within the CCP. This challenge was shown in the textbooks. Book B5-1 (1981-1983, p272) which represents the view of “the left” (左派) against the reforms:

“(We) can never be separated from the national condition of our country, and we must not overtake these blindly without a realistic possibility of achieving these so-called reforms”.

In contrast, B5-7 (1988, p496) repeatedly stresses the necessity of the reforms:

“The reforms have met many difficulties, because there are rigid thoughts which imprison the mind of people, so that some are not willing to accept new things. They are even against the reforms. Reform is a complex system, so none can give a perfect scheme of the reforms”.

Textbook B5-9 provides two different views of the reforms:

“The reforms in China are persisting in a socialist system, reforming relations of production and superstructure which are not suitable for development of production forces. (We) consolidate and develop the socialist system through adjusting and changing the system…the reforms must be planned step by step in an orderly manner under the leadership of the proletariat party…without the leadership of the Party, the reforms will deviate from the socialist road…”
The essence of socialist reforms is an adjustment between rights, responsibilities and benefits among people. It seeks an optimal form that suits the developmental level of productive forces and the benefits to the state both at the collective and individual level” (1990, pp236-237).

The first paragraph suggests the official Chinese opinion that the purposes of the reforms are to develop the economy; and in the second paragraph insinuates that these reforms should include democratic values including individual rights.

Textbook B5-8 (1988, p268) also states that the reforms should develop a high degree of political democracy in that, “it must reform the (political) system and law, so as to firm up a democratic construction, and then gradually achieve democratization of national political life, economic and cultural management and social life”. Textbook (B5-7, 1988, p494-496) highly praises the political reforms of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union for expanding socialist democracy, developing individual autonomy and providing local elections.

It is clear that the authors put forward different views on the reforms in China: some are opponents of reforms; the official view is to develop the economy under the CCP leadership without political reforms; some authors suggested that political system reforms are needed and others present comprehensive reform ideas. These narratives suggest signs of tolerance towards other views by publishing textbooks containing diverse opinions in the curriculum. This is in keeping with indicator D3 that democratic values include diversity of opinion and tolerance towards others.

5.4. Discussion and Summary
This chapter analysed the themes of the officially promoted ideologies, official definitions of the regime and understandings of democracy by the authors in the 1978 to 1990 textbooks. The findings can be summarised in four aspects:

(1). The findings suggest that political education functions with authoritarian characteristics to correct students’ ideology. The textbooks only present the officially promoted ideology, such as Marxism, Leninism and Maoism. Also, the discussions of Marxist theory or social development consist of a few citations from Marx or Lenin or Mao without any consideration of other sociological theories. This not only reflects the absolute authority of Marxism in the ideological field, but also suggests that Marxism teaching was not designed for the purposes of demonstrating knowledge. This course was for correcting students’ ideology. This is in keeping with the authoritarian indicator A3 that ideology is given by authority. Scholars also claim that in an authoritarian regime, CE meets the requirements of the regime (Mann, 1987); governments promote a political ideology and policies and guidelines to individual schools (Morris and Sweeting 1991).

(2). Political education in this period functions to provide legitimacy to the CCP regime. The textbooks, in particular “Marxism”, largely apply language from Marx, Lenin and Mao to demonstrate the superiority of socialism and the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Also, the narratives of the officially promoted ideology changed to suit the different purposes and needs of the CCP. For example, Marx theory of violent revolution and class struggle was interpreted as a necessary process in order to gain power from the KMT--but it was no longer needed for the CCP to rule China. These narratives reflect a feature of authoritarianism. It is in keeping with indicator A8 that knowledge is a unified instrument for ensuring the
political power of the state, knowledge is not to be debated and single narratives are presented as absolute and unquestionable.

(3). In contrast to the above, the findings also show some evidence of developing processes towards democratization during 1978 to 1990 at the level of official discourse. For example, in the narratives of the officially promoted ideology, Marxism was identified as “absolutely correct and the only truth” in the early 1980s’ textbooks; but in the later editions, Leninism and Maoism were heavily criticised. These criticisms suggest distinct thinking among the authors compared with Chinese officials. Publishing these distinct opinions in the textbooks indicates encouragement of challenge against official opinions. Further evidence for this is shown in depictions of the participants of the regime. The range of “the people” was expanded from workers and peasants in the 1980s to include intellectuals and private owners in the 1990s. This expansion provides conditions to develop more inclusive participation in the Chinese political system. It is a sign towards democratisation. It is in keeping with indicator D1, that in a democratic political institution, citizens, businessmen, intellectuals and other social classes share power.

(4). There are some significant developments in the understandings of democracy among the textbook authors. In the early 1980s, the authors showed their understandings of democracy through their advocacy of free speech; in the later 1980s, the authors’ understandings of democracy further developed to emphasise establishing multi-party government, representative systems and elections. There are different descriptions of the practices of the CCP during its early revolutionary era between the textbooks, and distinct views concerning the criticism of the policies of Stalin and Mao, Maoism and the CCP as well as four views of “the reforms”. These developments indicate a tolerance of diversity in the sanctioning of textbook
publication. These are also a sign of movement towards democratisation, which are in keeping with indicator D3 democratic values of diversity and tolerance to others.

These changes to the content of the textbooks also relate to the “85 program” reforms as discussed in chapter 4, regarding the de-politicisation of the political curriculum. Scholars, such as Ogden (2002, p331) claim that allowing diverse opinions of intellectuals to be expressed in schools and the diversity of perspectives among intellectuals are signs of inklings of democracy in China. Hence, developing democracy is a long-term endeavour (Dahl, 2000). In a non-democratic regime such as China, the first stage, concerning democratic emergence, is that democratization gives more resources to the people which empower their capabilities to practice freedom (Welzel, 2009). If people have knowledge of democracy, they may have the capability to practice democracy (Harber, 1997).

(5). A new version of socialist democracy had been explored in the textbooks during this period. This exploration started with the denial of Maoism—Mao’s revolution theory and Mao’s policies of the Great Leap Forward, the people’s commune movement and the Cultural Revolution. As I discussed in chapter 4, Mao as the leader of the CCP and Maoism as the ruling ideology of the regime, were not allowed to be challenged during the Mao era. It can be said that the denial of Maoism means a denial of Mao’s practice of “democracy” in China. The criticism of Mao’s policies in the university textbooks was in keeping with the political changes of the CCP during the early reforms, in which Mao’s theory and policies were all officially denied in the CCP’s document “Resolution on Several Historical Issues of the Party since the Founding of the PRC” in 1981.
Following these criticisms, the authors of the textbooks directly called for democracy by suggesting the CCP carry out the principles of democratic centralism, and to fully develop democracy within the party. Also, the authors discussed many democratic practices of the CCP during the early days of the revolution, and suggested developing democratic values such as individual rights, as well as highlighting successful democratic practices which had been adopted by some communist parties in European countries. All of these narratives indicate that the authors have a desire to develop democracy in China. Nonetheless, it must be noted that these narratives reflect the authors’ wish, and the signs of democratisation in these findings do not necessarily mean actual progress of democracy. The authors and the universities did not have complete freedom to decide what they could include in the textbooks. Developing democracy was not the Chinese official plan for the reforms. There is no evidence in these textbooks to suggest that the Chinese government officially supported democracy nor are there indications of this in the official documents. In fact, after the students’ protests in 1989, the Chinese government strongly criticised individualism and westernization. These criticisms became the focus of the textbooks after the 1990s.
Chapter 6. Textbooks Analysis (1990-2006)

Introduction

This chapter analyses themes of the officially promoted ideologies, the official definitions of the regime, and understandings of democracy and values in the university textbooks of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum from 1990 to 2006, so as to explore processes of democratisation reflected in these themes.

I selected 18 textbooks from 1990 to 2006 for analysis (see table T6-1). Concerning changes in the textbooks after the 1989 Tiananmen students' protests, I selected six textbooks from the early 1990s. These six textbooks were used by different types of universities at national and provincial levels, but from a narrower range of regions due to limited resources. In order to reduce these limitations, I referred to the syllabus of the MOE when analysing the textbooks. Also, in order to trace the changes after the “98 Program” reforms in political education, I selected twelve textbooks from 1999 to 2006. Of these, five are standard textbooks, which were used by all HEIs. According to MOE (1998, p186), the standard textbooks are “edited by the authors, whom are appointed directly by the MOE, or the textbooks are reviewed and recommended by the MOE for all HEIs”. Therefore, these standard textbooks represent the teaching content approved by Chinese officials. Seven further textbooks from individual universities were used for the purposes of comparison in this period.

T6-1

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This chapter consists of four sections. The first section discusses the officially promoted ideologies in the textbooks. The second section analyses official definitions of the Chinese political system in order to assess whether the Chinese regime contains elements of democratic government. The third section examines narratives of socialist democracy and values as understood by the Chinese authority and authors of the textbooks. The last section discusses the findings and conclusions.

6.1. The Officially Promoted Ideologies

The officially promoted ideologies in the 1990 to 2006 textbooks show some dramatic changes. The analysis in the last chapter posits that narratives of Marxism in the textbooks shifted from unchallengeable ideology to a theory of social development during the 1980s, whilst developing a tendency toward de-Leninism and de-Maoism. After 1989, the Chinese government proposed the idea of “socialist spiritual civilization” into political education. Marxism was “the dominant ideology and
the theoretical basis of social spiritual civilization” (B6-5, 1990, p286). The “Marxism” course returned to the same themes as seen in the early 1980s editions. For example, Marxism was often interpreted by using the views of Lenin and Mao (B6-5, 1990, p277).

After the “98 Program” reforms, Marxism is interpreted as “methods of working and thinking” (B6-12, 2003-04, p31); or an open theoretical system that is “incompatible with any rigidity and dogmatism, and it is not a self-enclosed theory” (B6-12, 2003-04, p32), “Marxism has developed over time” (与时俱进) (B6-13, 2003-06, p22; B6-17, 2005, p14). In order to support this claim, the textbooks introduce many Chinese and international philosophers, such as Chinese Confucius: Laozi, Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming; Western theorists: Immanuel Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach, Darwin, Jacques-Nicolas-Augustin Thierry, Jacques Migne and François Guizot, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Bergson (ibid, p23). This is the first time that the curriculum provides a wide range of learning resources for students, and depicts Marxism as one of several potential ways of understanding the world.

Apart from “traditional Marxism”, a new concept of “Marxism with Chinese characteristics” (马克思主义中国化) was introduced to university students during this period. This concept includes “Maoism”, “Dengism” and “Three Represents”. Among these, “Maoism” explains the development of Maoism from 1921 to 1956. It aims to influence university students to believe that “without the Communist Party, there would be no new China” and “only socialism can save and develop China” (B6-9, 1999, p29). Because my research is focused on the post Mao era, I shall not discuss “Maoism” further here.

“Dengism” refers to the economic policies of the CCP and developments within the Chinese political system during the Deng era from 1978 to 1992; “Three Represents”
addresses the developments of the Party during the Jiang era from 1993 to 2003. In this section, I assess the content of “Dengism” and “Three Represents”, which relate to particular relevance to the shaping of values, identity and citizenship.

6.1.1. Dengism

Dengism (also known as Deng Xiaoping Theory, 邓小平理论) was put forward at the Twelfth Congress of the CCP in 1982. Dengism as the guiding ideology for the reforms and modernisation in China was introduced in the CCP’s Constitution in 1997 and into the compulsory “Politics” curriculum in 1998. Dengism is described using similar terms and repeated in the textbooks of “Dengism”, “Marxism”, “Maoism” and “The History of the Chinese Revolution”.

Dengism consists of the major political and economic policies of the CCP during the early reform era. It focuses mainly on a theoretical explanation of socialism and socialism with Chinese characteristics, the reforms to the economic system and the Chinese political system as well as social values. This is also named as “the primary stage of socialism”.

*Socialism with Chinese Characteristics*

The socialist system in China has been confirmed by the Chinese Constitution and the CCP constitution. However, the definitions of “socialism” in the textbooks differ. The 1980s textbooks focus on a theoretical explanation of the relationship between the socialist economic base and the superstructure. The 1999-2000 textbooks (B6-9, 1999-2000, p163) state that “Socialism” in the Mao era is the “complete elimination of private ownership”. This means that privately owned lands and companies were forced to change to state or public ownership. Also, the national economy is unified and planned by the central government in order to achieve the Marxist idea of
“national capitalism”. According to the statistics of the textbook of “The History of the Chinese Revolution”, during 1953 to 1956, the Chinese government changed private ownership from 71.8% to less than 0.1% of the total economic ownership. In other words, public ownership in China increased to 99.9% from 1956 until the reforms (B6-4, 1995, p282). “Socialism” in the Mao era is similar to the first stage of the communist system designed by Marx and practiced by Lenin.

Other textbooks define “Socialism” as “socialism with Chinese characteristics” in that:

“Socialism is a system of public and private ownership of production, a coexisting distribution system of re-numeration according to work with some people becoming rich first, and a coexistence of a planned economy and market economy (B6-7, 1999, pp34-35; B6-8, 1999, pp57-58).

This description means that China has dual economic systems of socialism and capitalism at the same time, and that production can be owned by the state and private businesses. A small group of people do not have to follow the state distribution system and can earn much more than others. The state has a planned economy while also developing a market economy. In short, “socialism with Chinese characteristics” in Deng’s era, suggests the beginnings of the coexistence of socialism and capitalism in China. In this case, socialism--in orthodox Marxist terms--has significantly changed since implementing Dengism.

At the level of official statements Dengs’ encouragement of private business and a market economy provided possibilities for moving toward democratisation. According to indicator D6, a free market economy and reforms benefiting individuals are the features of a democratic country. As Mousseau (2000) suggests, democracy and market economy are simply two different aspects of freedom, because a widespread market economy culture encourages individualism, negotiations, compromise,
equality and respect for the law. These are the key features of democracy. Bernhagen (2009, p113) also claims that capitalist economic development creates immense opportunities for democratization by promoting political openness and self-regulation.

**The Primary Stage of Socialism**

“The primary stage of socialism” is an important part of Dengism. It begins with an explanation of socio-economic conditions in China. According to the textbooks, this primary stage began in 1956 when China completed programmes of public ownership and continued until China completed modernisation. “It is a unique period and an inevitably stage of socialist development in China due to the conditions of poor productivity and an underdeveloped commodity economy... This stage may not be experienced by other countries in the world.” (B6-7, 1999, p39; B6-8, 1999, p72-73). The features of the primary stage of socialism can be summarised as:

1). A small number of people work in modern industry with 80% of the population working in agriculture.
2). A few well-developed cities contrast with a large number of under-developed regions.
3). A small number of well-educated people and a quarter of the population who are illiterate or semi-literate.
4). A state planned economic system consisting of natural and semi-natural economic activity and undeveloped commodity markets.
5). A socialist political system—-the people's democratic dictatorship and a guiding ideology of Marxism combined with feudalist and capitalist ideas and influences (B6-6, 1999, Pp42-44; B6-7, 1999, Pp72-73).

These narratives suggest that Dengism recognises a wide range of uneven developments in China, and that it will take a long time for China to achieve
modernisation. As the textbook suggests, “it may need at least a hundred years” for China to become fully modernised (B6-7, 1999, p39). This hundred year development period is the primary stage of socialism. Notably, Dengism is the official ideology guiding the policies of the CCP throughout the reforms. Developing the economy is seen as the priority task for China and is the key claim of Dengism. Based on this theory, the CCP created the theory of Three Represents.

6.1.2. Three Represents

In 2000, the CCP leader Jiang Zemin put forward the theory of “Three Represents”. This theory was added into the textbooks in 2003 and into the CCP constitution as the guiding ideology of the Party and the state in 2004.

This theory has been officially identified as “Marxism with Chinese characteristics”. This contains the policies that the CCP used to reconstruct the Party. According to Jiang (2001, p2) and the textbooks, “Three Represents” mean that:

“the CCP is representative of advanced social development forces, and is representative of the developmental direction of an advanced culture, and is in the people’s fundamental interests” (B6-12, 2003-04, p43; B6-15, 2003-06, p27).

The theory of Three Represents signified a significant development within the CCP. This theory suggests that the CCP is not only the leader of Chinese social development, it also represents the most advanced culture in the world, incorporates modern ideas of politics and governance, and represents all of the people’s interests, not just those of workers and peasants. This explicitly describes the Party’s changing nature in that the CCP has developed from a proletarian party of workers and peasants into and including most of the people. This change indicates a change in
the ideology of the CCP from the “vanguard of the revolution to affirm the Party’s responsibility for governing” (Ogden, 2002, p262), to the CCP becoming more representative and adopting a political platform with much broader appeal.

The establishment of Three Represents provides a possibility to encourage diverse groups of people to take part in decision-making. From then on, a large number of private business owners, rich people and intellectuals joined the Party and become participants in the regime. Broadly, it indicates a form of democratisation at the level of official discourse. It is in keeping with indicator D4 that diverse groups of people from different social backgrounds are included in the regime, and indicator D5, that government represents the interests of many.

6.2. The Political system in China

According to the Chinese Constitution in 1999, the Chinese regime is “the People's Democratic Dictatorship”. Its political system consists of the National People's Congress (NPC), the Political Consultative (CPPCC), the Ethnic Minority Autonomous Region (EMAR) and the Special Administration Region (SAR). Examining the official definitions of the regime, and tracing structural changes to the political system can tell us whether democratic elements are contained within institutional systems and what the level of democratisation is.

Since knowledge of the Chinese regime became an important feature of political education after the “98 Program” reforms, the focus of explanations of the political system in the textbooks differ. The textbook “Marxism” provides a theoretical justification in order to demonstrate the superiority and correctness of China’s political system based on Marxism. The “History of the Chinese Revolution” textbook focuses on criticisms of the political opinions of other political parties during Chinese
modern history; the textbooks of “Maoism”, “Dengism” and “Laws basis” emphasize official explanations of the structure of the political system.

6.2.1. The People’s Democratic Dictatorship

In the textbooks, the people’s democratic dictatorship is defined in Marxist terms, as a proletarian dictatorship. According to Parry (1995, p1283), a Marxist idea of democracy is “the genuine rule of the people”, which implies control of government and the economy by the working class. This class consists of “the poor masses, the emancipatory and revolutionary class”. In Chinese political education, although the narratives of the regime have been added to, or moved around from one textbook to another, the key elements of the regime are similarly narrated:

“The people’s democratic dictatorship is a type of proletarian dictatorship. It is the Chinese regime at the primary stage of socialism with Chinese characteristics. It is established by the CCP based on Marxism. It is the system under the leadership of the working class based on the alliance of workers and peasants. The people’s democratic dictatorship includes two functions: to practice democracy within the people and dictatorship to enemies” (B6-5, 1990, p257; B6-6, 1996, p200; B6-7, 1999, p218; B6-14, 2003-05, p88).

This definition divides Chinese people into “the people” who can participate in the regime, and “the enemies” who are not allowed to take part in the regime.

The People

“Participation of working class in the regime is necessary” in Marxist terms of democratic politics (Przeworski, 1988, p11). Since China began the reforms, the range of “the people” included in the regime has continued to expand. In 1990 “The people consists of the working class, the peasant class, the urban petty bourgeoisie
and national bourgeoisie” (B6-5, 1990, p258); in 1996 the people included “other labourers and all those social forces that support and participate in the progress of socialist development” (B6-6, 1996, p201). By 1999, “the people” included “all the classes, social strata (阶层) and groups who agree with, support and participate in socialism”, in particular the People’s Liberation Army of China as an “important force of socialist construction” (B6-7, 1999-2000, p287; B6-8, 1999, p263; B6-9, 1999-2000, p125; B6-15, 2003-06, p234). This continuing expansion of participants has changed the self-definition of the Chinese regime from a single party worker-peasant alliance, to an inclusive government of more people from different social backgrounds. This suggests the development of a more expansive and pluralist conception of the party.

Among “the people”, a significant change concerns the depiction of intellectuals, who were subjected to being re-educated and were listed in the groups of enemies (B6-8, 1999, p213). When the reforms started, the social classification of intellectuals immediately changed to be seen as belonging to part of the working class and was then included in “the people”. After an absence from the textbooks from 1989, intellectuals were highlighted for their political status and their significant role in China’s modernization in the 1999 textbooks:

“Intellectuals largely determine the rise or fall of modernization and the Chinese nation ... It is impossible to develop industry, agriculture or others...if these are separated from intellectual creative work. The important role of intellectuals is irreplaceable in terms of promoting socialist democracy, the legal system, theoretical exploration and institutional innovation ... Intellectuals are needed not only in education, art, media, publishing, broadcasting, film and television undertakings, but also in the ideological field ... Without intellectuals’ hard work and explorations of philosophy and
social sciences, it is absolutely impossible to combine Marxism with the practice of contemporary China, and it is impossible to study new situations, solve new problems, conclude new experiences and explore new theoretical areas...Dengism is certainly a recognition of intellectuals’ hard work in the philosophy of social science” (B6-7, 1999-2000, p285-286; B6-8, 1999, p213, p215; B6-15, 2003-06, p234).

These descriptions at the level of official statements, not only reflect a new focus for education with which to respond to the demands of modernization, but also indicate that since the reform the CCP’s has recognised, that “intellectuals have been and can be responsible for remarkable development” (Ogden, 2002, p263). It can also be argued that bringing intellectuals into the regime may help to develop the CCP so that it represents broader national interests. This increased political participation may be interpreted as reflecting a form of democratization. It is in keeping with indicator D5 that multiple participants in government can represent the interests of many. Notably, as I defined the specific framework of “democratization” for this study in chapter 2, the “democratisation” that I explore concerns the processes through which inklings of democracy emerge within the party-state dictatorship, although it cannot trace the formation of a fully developed democratic government or culture, or civil society, or individual attitudes. The signs of democratisation can be seen in the emergence of some democratic elements and values within China’s authoritarian regime.

6.2.2. The Structure of the Political System

Since knowledge of the political system was introduced to university students in 1999, the explanations of the system are slightly different between the textbooks. Some suggest that the systems of the PC and the CPPCC are concrete
manifestations of the socialist democratic system in China. Others include the ethnic minority autonomous system as a part of socialist democratic politics.

**The People’s Congress System, Democratic Centralism and Election**

The PC is defined as the highest authority of the state in the Chinese constitutions (1984, 1992). The PC has been held 13 times by the CCP from 1949 to 2016. However, before the “98 Program”, the textbooks only introduced the PC system as a historical event or as a state system without substantive content. For example, the textbooks (B6-6, 1990, p259; B6-7, 1994, p275) describe how “the PC is the political organization of the regime, in which the people exercise the states’ power through the people's congress at national and local levels”, but the books do not explain this further.

From 1999, the PC system was discussed differently in several textbooks. The textbook “Maoism” (B6-9, 1999-2000, p131) stresses that, “the PC system is the basic form for achieving socialist democracy” in which:

> “The people of all nationalities directly or indirectly elect delegates to the PC at national and local level. The delegates act on behalf of the people to administrate power of the state. The elections are based on certain principles, procedures and methods…and masses at grassroots level have autonomous rights to self-manage according to the laws”.

“Dengism” (B6-7, 1999, p223) and “Law Basis” (B6-14, 2003-05, p88, p91, p92, p108) address “the principle of democratic centralism which is the highest authority within the PC system” as:

> “The principle of the PC system is democratic centralism. The deputies of the PC are directly and indirectly elected by the people. The state administrative organizations and judicial institutions are produced by the PC elections every
five years. The national PC votes or dismisses the leaders of the state, and
decides major political issues in the country...Major national affairs must be
discussed collectively by the representatives of the people's congresses in
order to fully promote democracy, and then the representatives make
decisions in accordance with the principle of the minority obeying the majority.
The decisions will be handed over to the executive authorities and other state
agencies for implementation...This not only ensures that the people enjoy a
wide range of democracy and rights, but also guarantees a centralized and
unified state power”.

At the level of official statements, some features related to democracy can be
discerned from the above narratives, such as elected PC members and processes of
decision-making. In this system, the party's leadership reflects “centralism’ and the
elections are a manifestation of “democracy” in which the deputies of the PC are
selected through elections. The different views of the deputies represent a form of
“democracy”, and the final decision is unified by the CCP which represents
“centralism”. Here, “elections” are a key feature of being democratic. According to
the textbooks, the deputies of the PC in counties and towns are elected directly
by voters; the deputies at national and provincial levels are elected by lower level
deputies. “Citizens, who are 18 years old and above ... have the right to vote
and stand for election, except the people who have been deprived of political
rights” (B6-14, 2003-2005, p93). This system indicates commitment to
democratic participation at the local level, but combined with centralist Party control.
As the textbooks clearly point out “the rule of the PC system is that it resolutely
orders subordinates to obey their superiors, that local (organizations and congresses)
obey the central party’s leadership over state affairs” (B6-9, 1999-2000, p133) and
“the PC is under the leadership of the party in which local governments are following
a centralized leadership” (B6-14, 2003-2005, p88). These descriptions suggest that
although the PC system contains the democratic feature of elections, these elections are very limited.

Arguably, Ogden (2002, p251) claims although delegates to the National People’s Congress are not elected directly, and it does not necessarily represent the people’s interests, but “this national legislative body is assuming a larger role in democratising China”. As I discussed in chapter 4, the National People’s Congress have passed many laws to protect China’s citizens against the power of the state and to make China’s leaders more accountable to the legislature.

**The Political Consultation System**

The political consultation system (CPPCC) is “the system of multi-party cooperation and political consultation under the leadership of the Communist Party of China” (B6-7, 1999, p225). Currently, there are eight so-called democratic parties in China apart from the CCP. According to the constitution (1992), state policies are made by the CCP through democratic consultation with other political parties. If this is the case, democracy will emerge in the processes of decision-making of the CPPCC system.

The CPPCC system was established in 1949. Yet, in political education in Chinese universities, the CPPCC system has only been narrated briefly as a historical event for the past two decades (B6-3, 1994; B6-4, 1995). After the “98 Program”, this system was introduced to university students for the first time in some of the textbooks. Two textbooks B6-8 (1999-2000) and B6-15 (2003-06) did not mention this system. B6-7 “Dengism” (1999, p225-227) and B6-14 “Law Basis” (2003-05, p94) identify the system as:

“Multi-party cooperation and political consultation is the basic political system in China…it is an important form of socialist democracy… the
democratic parties are involved in the exercise of state power by consultation on major policies with the state leaders, participating in management of state affairs, execution of national laws, regulations and policy...The CCP generally consults with these democratic parties to recommend the main members of the PC, the judiciary of permanent institutions and administrative bodies at all levels”.

B6-9 “Maoism” (1999-2000, p133) explains:

“The CPPCC system is the socialist party system with Chinese characteristics... However, this party system is essentially different compared with multi-party or two-party systems in western capitalist countries. It is also different from a one-party system in other socialist countries, such as the Soviet Union. It is unlike a coalition government in the traditional sense”.

These different definitions suggest there are diverse perspectives regarding the CPPCC system that exist among the textbook authors and Chinese officials. These perspectives reflect distinct views on developing democratic politics in CE in HE. Certain books, (B6-7; B6-14), claim that developing political consultation is the basic political system, whilst others (B6-9) suggest developing this system into a multi-party system. Notably, B6-9 and B6-14 are the standard textbooks which were edited and published by the education authority. This suggests that the Chinese authority allowed the authors to discuss their own versions of political consultation. This can be interpreted as reflecting a form of democratization in developing a Chinese version of socialist democracy within CE.

This Chinese view of socialist democracy, as suggested by Chinese officials, is different to western versions of democracy and the Soviet Union model. I interpret it as an officially designed form of “democratic centralism”. This form
does not allow for much democratic activity outside the jurisdiction of official party-controlled channels by others. As the textbooks clearly show:

“The relationships between the CCP and other democratic parties are friendships...the CCP is the ruling party... There is no competition between the ruling party and the opposition parties. The constitutions of those democratic parties all recognize the leadership of the CCP...The democratic parties cannot form a government” (B6-9, 1999-2000, Pp134-135; B6-7, 1999, p227).

This Chinese version of democracy has also been reflected in explanations of other parts of the officially promoted political system.

**The Ethnic Minority Autonomous Region System**

Ethnicity has always been an important issue in the Chinese regime. Whether this system constitutes the basis for a plurality of identities and a structure of mutual toleration may indicate a degree of democratisation.

According to the 5th National Census statistics in 2000, there were 56 ethnic groups in China. Han comprises the largest ethnic population. 55 other ethnic groups account for only 8.41% of the total population, but they live in 64% of the total land in China. The Chinese government implements a system of ethnic minority autonomy in ethnic minority areas.

This system has been presented in varying ways since China became a republic state. Inner Mongolia was the first autonomous region established by the KMT in 1947, and continued by the CCP. The CCP also established the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in 1955, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region in 1958, and Ningxia Hui (Muslim) Autonomous Region and the Xizhang (Tibetan) Autonomous Region in 1965. The political status of autonomous regions was
identified by the "Law of Ethnic Regional Autonomy of the People's Republic of China" in 1984. By 1990, there were about 159 ethnic autonomous regions in China, including 5 autonomous regions at provincial level, 30 autonomous prefectures and 124 autonomous counties (B6-8, 1999-2000, p138-139).

The EMAR system is a highly politically sensitive topic in China. The textbooks said nothing about this system for the first two decades of the reforms. After the "98 Program" reforms, the textbooks explain this system for the first time:

“The EMAR system is an important national political system...agencies with autonomous power are established in minorities' areas within the PRC. The EMAR governments are the local governments of the state...under the unified leadership of the CCP and the Central Government. These autonomous governments do not have separate powers and cannot deviate from national unity” (B6-9, 1999-2000, p138).

These narratives suggest that the EMAR system is almost the same as non-autonomous local governments in China. However, this system is explained further in textbook B6-14 (2003-05, p95, p110):

“The EMAR system includes autonomous governments and the PC system at different levels to manage internal ethnic affairs ... under the unified leadership of the state. Local autonomous governments exercise authority as general governments with a broad ethnic autonomous power... If the decisions or orders from higher-level governments are not suitable for local situations, the autonomous government can change these policies after they are approved by higher state organizations. The autonomous governments can formulate autonomous and separate regulations, and independently manage local finance, economic construction, education, technology, culture development and even organize police forces to protect social security".
It can be seen from the narratives above that the EMAR is suggested as a devolved political system with autonomous rights, in which ethnic minority governments can “manage local finances and independently arrange economic and educational causes” even “organize local security forces”. This definition reflects a pluralist development in the Chinese political system. However, the EMAR system does not enable ethnic minorities to self-govern. The textbooks do not explain how to determine minorities, who decides whether or where one could establish an autonomous region, Readers would not know how such national autonomous systems work. Also this so-called ethnic regional autonomy is the same as other local governments in that they are all under the unified leadership of the CCP and central government at least at the level of official discourse.

**Special Administrative Region**

The Special Administrative Region (SAR) is called “the Government of the Hong Kong/Macao Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China”. Hong Kong and Macao governments have their own political system which is different compared to mainland China. The SAR system was discussed in the textbooks for the first time in 1999. According to the textbooks, the SAR system is an important part of Dengism and the political system in China. This system has been officially defined as “one country two systems” in that:

“Within a unified China, the main system in the country is socialist, but with a capitalist system and life style in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan...except for foreign policy and defence, which are affairs under the control of the Central Government. The SAR regions enjoy a high degree of autonomy, executive administration, legislative and independent judicial system and final adjudication rights...the existing laws, and the current socio-economic system and way of life in Hong Kong remain basically unchanged. Hong Kong SAR
retained its status as a free port and a separate customs territory. It also maintains the status of an international financial centre and remains financially independent…The SAR government legally establishes its own policies and economic and cultural relationships with other countries, regions and relevant international organizations” (B6-8, 1999, pp246-247; B6-7, 1999, pp266-277; B6-15, 2003-06, p205).

These descriptions suggest two important perspectives. One is that the SAR system includes some important democratic elements, such as “a high degree of autonomy, executive administration, legislative and independent judicial system and final adjudication rights”. This is the first time in CE in HE that Chinese officials accepted a dual political systems in China since the CCP came to power. In this sense, the SAR system represents a localized selective and bounded toleration of democracy in Chinese specific political cases. The SAR system, as a particular practice of Dengism provides an ideological condition to develop a pluralist government in China. As the textbook suggests, “Deng’s theory of One Country Two System is based on the Marxist theory of state formation which proposes that a state can be formed with a single system or a compound system” (B6-7, 1999, p272). The textbooks also claim that “One Country Two Systems is a political system with Chinese characteristics. This means that in “a unified socialist state under the unified leadership of the central government ... some areas preserve their current systems, which are different from rest of the country” (B6-8, 1999, p243; B6-14, 2003-05, p95; B6-15, 2003-06, p205).

These are signs of accommodations made towards democratic participation within a centralised political system in China during 1999-2006. This accommodation also reflects official understandings of socialist democracy.

6.3. Socialist Democracy and Values
Democracy is a sensitive topic in China. During the early days of the reforms, only the compulsory “History” textbooks narrated some democratic practices of the Party as historical events (see chapter 5). Other textbooks did not discuss democracy at all. After the crackdown on student protests in 1989, patriotic education, anti-individualism and anti-westernization became an important task of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum which aimed to pacify university students’ behaviour and instil Party ideology. After the “98 Program” reforms, the Chinese government promoted a “socialist spiritual civilization” into the curriculum which consisted of “patriotism”, collectivism and socialism. The CCP also created a new concept of “socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics” with narratives of political reform, citizens’ rights, the rule of law and human rights in the textbooks. These themes are important to analyse in order to gain a better understanding of democratisation as conveyed through political education during this period.

6.3.1. “Patriotism”

Patriotism is love for one’s country and loyalty towards it. This attachment can be a combination of many different features relating to one’s own homeland, including ethnic, cultural, political or historical aspects. Also, patriotism implies a commitment to the well-being of one’s country (Grosby, 2005, p16). Patriotic education may contain some signs of democratization. Patriotism can be described within democratic values, such as a range of freedoms and choices for individuals, a belief in human dignity and equality, and tolerance to others (Indicator, D3).

Conversely, patriotic education can also be imposed by authority, and focus on collectivist virtues over individual interests and the ideology that is provided by authority (Indicator, A3). In this way, “patriotism” turns into an ideology of
nationalism. Patriotism accepts varying and differing conceptions of the nation held by members of the nation, but, nationalism repudiates civility and the differences in visions of what the nation has been and should be. Any particular nation will contain differing views about its character; thus, for any nation there will be different and competing beliefs about it. Some may view their nation as standing for individual liberty, while others may be willing to sacrifice that liberty for security. According to Grosby (2005, p5), nationalism refers to a set of beliefs about nation, in which “the nation is the only goal worthy of pursuit—an assertion that often leads to the belief that the nation demands unquestioned and uncompromising loyalty. When such a belief about the nation becomes predominant, it can threaten individual liberty”. In the view of Tamir (1995, p877), “nationalism and democracy can coexist only if the nationalist ideal is redefined in terms of state and nation, that will draw a sharp distinction between the state and nation, with the former seen as a political organization and the latter as a cultural group that shares a common history, tradition, language, sometimes religion, and national consciousness. This conceptual redefinition will imply that the democratic ideal of self-rule, seen as the right of individuals to participate in decision-making processes, and the nationalist ideal of national self-determination, seen as a desire to retain an active and lively national life, should not be used synonymously”. Examining the narratives of “patriotism” in the textbooks can indicate signs of democratization.

Patriotic education has always been an important task of political education at all level of schooling in China since the reforms. However, the focus of patriotic education has changed in different periods. According to the Chinese authority (PCCP, 1983; MOE, 1983), patriotic education in the 1980s focused on primary
and secondary schools by teaching children to respect the national flag, the National anthem and emblem. In the early 1990s, “patriotism” was related to an important political principle for university students (MOE, 1991). The textbooks strengthen the view that loyalty to the motherland, the CCP and socialism are linked together:

“Seeing the great motherland like a mother is the correct relationship between us and our country. We all belong to the motherland. Without our country we would not have anything ... We as children, should not be concerned with how much mother—motherland owes us, we should only think about whether we contribute to mother or not...Without the efforts of the CCP and the Chinese communists, China would not be able to achieve independence and liberation, industrialization and agricultural modernization” (B6-1, 1989-1991, p244, p246).

These narratives suggest authoritarianism in keeping with indicator A8 that, in an authoritarian country, knowledge is a unified instrument of political power as either propaganda or as secrets of the state; it rejects differing conceptions of the nation, it is not to be questioned or debated publicly, and students are expected to accurately reproduce this knowledge from the textbooks. These characteristics suggest adopting nationalism.

After the “98 program” reforms, “patriotism” was largely linked with collectivism against individualism in a series of textbooks. “Patriotism” contains the following features:

1. Patriotism is a social ideology regarding people’s feelings, thoughts and consciousness of loyalty and love to the motherland. It is also the basic norm of political and moral values and balances the relationship between individual and the nation;
2. Love for the motherland also includes love for the CCP and socialism; to have emotional respect for and pride in the brilliant achievements of the motherland… accepting full responsibility for the country… willing to give one’s life for the independence, unity and prosperity of the motherland;

3. Collective interests are above personal interests. People should unconditionally sacrifice personal interests to safeguard the collective interests…the existence and development of the motherland is the basic premise for individual existence and development. Individuals can only survive if they rely on the motherland;

4. National unity as a representation of patriotism is the Chineseness (中华民族) traditions. The notion that “we are all in a family” presents a unified nation that provides a stable national psychological and cultural tradition … For thousands of years the Chinese people from all nationalities have developed the motherland together and created a splendid Chineseness civilization as well as formed Chineseness” (B6-7, 1999, p252; B6-8, 1999, p204; B6-16, 2003-06, Pp86-96; B6-13, 2003-06, p100, p184).

It can be seen from these narratives, that the officially promoted patriotic education at university has been designed to inculcate a “correct” ideology of collectivism against individual interests among the students. This can be seen as antithetical to the pluralist values that are associated with a democratic culture (Grosby, 2005). Also, patriotic education encourages a strong nationalist sentiment and the primacy of national unity aimed to counter further subversion from students (Vickers, 2007, 2009). This is in keeping with indicator A3 that patriotic education is imposed by authority and focuses on collectivist virtues over individual interests.

From 2003, patriotic education was supported by both the authors and the Chinese government. The evidence shown in the textbooks comprises many patriotic stories, wherein the people are loyal to government and sacrifice their personal interests and
lives for the nation, as well as using provocative and emotional language to describe the motherland, so that readers are hooked immediately. For example:

“Our motherland has vast territory…

Our motherland has rich resources…

Our motherland has magnificent mountains and rivers…

“The cultural landscapes in our motherland can be called a miracle in the world… How could this not motivate us to praise it from our hearts?” (B6-13, 2003-06, Pp88-89).

This demonstrates consistency in the views of the officials and the textbooks’ authors.

6.3.2. Anti-individualism

Individualism is broadly viewed as ideas emphasizing the importance of the individual and the individual’s interests. As a political term, it represents the fundamental rights of the individual against the incursions of the state and of political power (Grosby, 2005). In China, “Individualism” as the opposite of collectivism was discussed for the first time in 1990. Before that, the textbooks hardly mention individualism. For example, the textbook B5-1 (1981-1983, p323) only mentioned the concept of “personal” as an “idealistic conception of history” or as “a few heroes” or “superman” or “saviour” in contrast to “the people who are the subjects of social practice, the true creators of history”. The texts of B5-3 (1985, p287) criticizes existentialism (存在主义) as a western philosophy dominated by a narcissistic ideal, and “an idea of self-value, individual design, self-achievement to pursue absolute personal freedom” (个人绝对自由).
After 1989, the textbooks demarcated “individualism” as characteristic of bourgeois values against collectivism, and heavily criticised it:

“Individualism is the ideology and values of the bourgeois class. It is also the basic principle of capitalist morality. Individualism is fundamentally opposed to collectivism... Individualism always evokes people’s desires to continue to expand. It always causes a separation between the individual, the collective and the nation, and it always isolates the individual from society. Eventually, individualism becomes egoism. Individualism permeates all areas of economic, political, cultural and philosophical life... Undoubtedly individualism is harmful to the state, the nation and our society, as a consequence personal interests need to be curtailed” (B6-1, 1989-1991, pp184-185).

The textbooks use overlapping vocabularies with the same meanings to strengthen the argument against individualism, such as “self-desires”, “egoism”, “self-centred”, “personal interests only”, “all for personal needs”, “selfish”, “I am the centre”, “advantage myself” and so on. The textbooks also link individualism to immoral behaviour, and even criminality, such as:

“(Individualism) is contrary to national economic policies, treats money as everything. Individualism encourages corruption, bribery, cheating, fraud, robbery, even murder for money. In terms of politics, (individualism) performs as a form of bourgeois liberalization and serious anarchism against the Four Fundamental Principles. Within an organization, (individualism) serves small groups and causes sectarianism, such as cliques and gangs. In terms of ideology, (individualism) represents self-centeredness without any consideration of national interests” (B6-1, 1989-1991, p185).

Further, the textbooks link individualism with university students’ lives such as:

“The students who are influenced by individualism are selfish and narrow-minded. These students are preoccupied with personal needs, and lack social responsibility and compassion for others... Politically, they lack a firm and
correct political orientation but have an anarchist interest. They are likely to be captured by bourgeois liberalization. In terms of their study, they do not have clear learning goals or correct attitudes. They are weary, arrogant, complacent and muddling along…

“These students are happy to find a job after graduating from universities and having a steady life. They have forgotten the national goal of higher education and their responsibilities to the country. In daily life, they are non-compliant with discipline, not caring for other students. They have no feelings for the collective. They are unwilling to take part in social work and public affairs. In terms of social behaviour, they show a liberal inclination. They do not care for public property; they waste food, water and electricity” (B6-1, 1989-1991, Pp185-186,188,189).

These descriptions do not provide any evidence to support these assertions. Anti-individualism is the Chinese official view against liberal democracy. In the textbooks, individualism is critiqued as a political term as a “serious anarchism against the Four Fundamental Principle”, and as an ideological term against collectivism as well as an economic term “contrary to Chinese national economic policies, including economic crimes”. These critiques represent authoritarianism and oppose democratic principles of individualism.

Importantly, the textbooks extend the critique of individualism to a critique of civic associations that lay outside the realm of the state, in particular the student movement:

“The small-group-ism (小团体主义) is the expansion of individualism. It is based on the narrow interests of small groups. These small-groups may be a group of family or a business, a group of people from the same region, or the same class or ethnicity. They often emerge as a ‘community’ in the name of ‘collective interests’. They place the interests of their own groups above the
interests of whole society and other communities. This small-group-ism is extreme individualism...

“In the summer of 1989, a small number of people who were affected by individualism, despised school discipline, rules and regulations. They despised society, the state and the government. They ignored laws and the Constitution. They did not consider how to contribute to society. In contrast, they showed a keenness to pursue their personal ‘absolute freedom’, and treated personal responsibility to the community as dreaded ‘shackles’. Thus, individualism corrodes people’s souls and affects the realization of personal and social values. Individualism is also an important ideology guiding people to embark upon crime.” (B6-1, 1989-1991, pp187-188).

These descriptions take criticisms of individualism much further to include group associations and political protests and describe these as illegal and immoral behaviours. The overbearing approach of this writing direct tramples upon democratic values. Freedom of association and expression are the fundamental conditions of democracy (Dahl, 2000; Crick, 2008). These narratives of individualism within CE suggest a clear sign that the Chinese government was against all forms of individualization seen in liberal democracies and intolerant of democratic activities.

6.3.2. Anti-Westernization

After 1989, the textbooks increased criticism of “Westernization”. The people who advocated learning from the West were identified as “the people who stubbornly insist on bourgeois liberalization”. The textbooks use abusive language to describe such people:

“In recent years, some Chinese have become a handful of scum in the nation (民族败类). They completely deny Chinese traditional culture, the great
Chineseness and patriotism. They are traitors. These people obstinately insist upon bourgeois liberalization. They claim that Chinese traditional culture has failed... In their view, China can only develop if China starts westernization. They believe that everything is good in the West. It seems that the foreign moon is brighter than the moon in China... they rely on imperialism as a patron to promote capitulationism... to achieve westernization.”

“They suggest that the Chinese people need to be disintegrated. (China) needs to import a prime-minister, or to implement three hundred years of colonialism. In their view, colonization is wonderful, because the colonists have carried the colony into the modern world... These people, who stubbornly adhere to bourgeois liberalization, lashed their motherland to curry favour with imperialism. They even suggest betraying national independence for a refuge in imperialism. They throw away national sanctity and personal dignity. According to the logic of these people, the Chinese people should appreciate ‘the kindness’ of the colonist … and we should hand over our motherland to the colonists. This is genuine, downright traitorous! These people have a shameful fate, they must be cast aside by the people of the whole nation” (B6-1, 1989-1991, P249-251).

The arguments above demonstrate an authoritarian political education. These are in keeping with indicator A8 that the content is presented as absolute within a single narrative.

After the 98 Program reforms, the textbooks introduced concepts of “western forms of democracy” and “socialists form of democracy”, and then turned to oppose westernization with a particular focus which argues against the western political system of the separation of powers and the parliamentary system. The textbooks state:

“Deng suggests that democracy in capitalist society is a bourgeois democracy, in which the proletariat has no right to restrict the bourgeois rulers. A socialist democracy is the democracy of the majority of the population, which belongs
to the workers, peasants, intellectuals and other labourers... The socialist democracy has two advantages that western ones do not have. Firstly, we are able to concentrate the force of all people across the country to do bigger things while western democracy causes serious internal frictions... Secondly, socialist democracy has overall high efficiency, while Western democracy lacks it. Therefore, (China) cannot copy western style democracy with multi-party systems and with a separation of powers.” (B6-8, 1999, p177; B6-7, 1999, p214-215).

“The separation of powers system (in Western countries) emphasizes legislative, executive and judicial powers as parallel powers, but isolated from each other. China stresses that the people exercise state power through the PC system. Administrative and judicial system are the subordinate organizations and subject to legislative oversight of the NPC. Therefore the separation of powers system does not comply with the nature of state power in our country. Also, the separation of powers system is contrary to the fundamental principles of the CCP’s leadership in our country. In bourgeois states, this system is based on the conditions of two parties or multiple-parties sharing state power. In our country, the CCP is the only ruling party... this principle cannot be shaken and changed. This is the fundamental principle established by our Constitution. The two parties or multi-party system, or, separation of powers cannot be implemented in our country” (B6-14, 2003-2005, p92).

These statements suggest that the CCP has no wish to give up its position of being the only ruling party in Chinese political life, and that there is no desire to establish a Western style liberal democracy in China. The textbook uses faster processes of decision-making to demonstrate that China's political system is better than those of Western countries. In a fully democratic regime, the regime is pluralist, party politics is tolerated, politicians share power with other individual participants and policies can be debated (Indicators, D1, D2, D4, D5). In this sense, processes of decision-making may take a longer time in fully developed democracies. By contrast,
in an authoritarian regime, a single party has power over subordinate social groups, politics is limited to the inner party and not debated in public (Indicators, A8, A2); critical thought and democratic participation is not encouraged (Harber, 1997). Therefore, the processes of decision-making in an authoritarian regime may be quicker. Anti-westernization at the level of official statements suggests that Chinese officials hold negative attitudes towards liberal democracy.

6.3.3. Socialist Democracy

“Socialist democracy” as a new concept, is presented in opposition to western democracy and it is explained differently in the textbooks. “Law Basis” (B6-11, 2002) does not mention socialist democracy. “Maoism” (B6-9, 1999-2000, p184) only introduces Mao’s terms for “democracy” which include anti-bureaucracy, strengthening the supervision and legal systems, but with no further explanations. Textbooks B6-10 (1999-2000, p25) and B6-14 (2003-04, p52) claim that “socialist democracy is a political condition of the socialist rule of law”. Other textbooks largely describe “socialist democracy”. These descriptions reflect a Chinese version of socialist democracy. These descriptions can be summarised as:

“Socialist democracy is established upon the condition of smashing the capitalist state machine and denying capitalist democracy”. (B6-7, 1999, p212).

“Socialist democracy means that the working class lead the people to become masters of the country through a democratic form of political organization … in which the majority of the people enjoy a high degree of democracy and a very small number (of enemies) are under dictatorship” (B6-7, 1999, pp213-214; B6-8, 1999, pp172-173)

“(In this socialist democracy), more people are taking part in politics… there is an increasing equal relationship between the people and the masses, as well
as between democratic centralism and the leadership of the CCP”. (B6-7, 1999, pp212-213)

“Socialist democracy is different from despotism and anarchism. It should also be strictly distinguished from bourgeois democracy and individualism, it is the co-existence of democracy and centralism, democracy and the rule of law, democracy and discipline, democracy and the party's leadership” (B6-8, 1999, p173).

“Democratization in our country is to change the political system, to strengthen the PC system, and multi-party cooperation under the CCP leadership, and to improve the political consultation system, the EMAR system, as well as actively develop the grass-roots democracy of villagers and urban residents committees” (B6-15, 2003-2006, p163, p176).

“Developing socialist democracy means improving the system of the people's congress, and requires multi-party cooperation and to use the political consultation system under the leadership of the CCP. At the present stage, the construction of democratic politics is to strengthen the legal system... to rule the country by laws. Among these, the rule of law is that the people manage state affairs in accordance with the constitution and the laws...the state system and laws should not be changed if leadership changes, or if the leaders' opinions or attentions change” (B6-8,1999, p179).

From these descriptions above, I interpret “socialist democracy” as a Chinese version of socialist democracy. This version is similar to the official definition of the regime—the people’s democratic dictatorship I discussed early. It is also an official articulation of the principle of democratic centralism. This Chinese version of socialist democracy includes the rule of law under the CCP’s leadership, decision making goes through a process of democratic discussion at low levels and making decisions at the top levels of government. This version also has the features of Marxism. Smashing the capitalist state machine in order to establish a proletarian dictatorship
is a theory of Marx. The Chinese version of socialist democracy is not the same as that found in western capitalist countries.

The textbooks also show a strong wish to develop democracy by using language derived from Marx, Lenin, Mao and Deng in order to prove the necessity of developing democracy in China. Such as:

“The inevitable trend of developing socialist modernization in China is that the people want to enjoy a richer material and cultural life. This requires a high degree of achievement in social and political democracy. Marx and Engels pointed out in the Communist Manifesto that ‘the first step in a workers’ revolution is to raise the proletariat to become the ruling class and to be a democracy’. This indicates that ‘democracy’ is the state system of the dictatorship of the proletariat... Lenin also claimed that democracy is a form of the state. Mao emphasized that socialist democracy is ‘implementing democracy among the people’... Deng proposed that ‘without democracy, socialism would not exist and socialist modernization would not be achieved.” (B6-8, 1999, p176)

Some textbooks highly affirm the effects of implementing democracy in China’s contemporary history:

“Socialist democracy, as an important political condition, accelerates economic and cultural modernization. Developing socialist democracy will be of benefit in resolving a variety of social contradictions so to promote stability and unity of (the country) at the primary stage of socialism; socialist democracy will be of benefit to the people who effectively inspect the regime (governments) and (the CCP) cadres so as to reduce and overcome bureaucracy. Socialist democracy will be conducive to the scientific decision-making of the party and the government, so the policies and implementation of the party and the government will be better understood and supported by the people...
“Historical experiences have proved that socialist democracy is an important part of the socialist system and an important guarantee for developing socialism. When socialist democracy was emphasized, socialism developed forward ... On the contrary, when socialist democracy was neglected or abandoned, socialism appeared lost or even regressed... In 1958 (the Great Leap Forward), the democratic life in the Party and the government ... witnessed autocracy laying down laws, in which major decisions were made by one person. Especially during the Cultural Revolution, socialist democracy and the legal system suffered severe damage”. (B6-8, 1999, Pp173-175)

The discussions above reflect some democratic elements within CE in HE. First, the CCP officially recognizes democratic political reforms, such as improving the PC, CPPCC, and EMAR systems and establishing the rule of law. Second, the textbook authors have strong wishes to promote a Chinese version of socialist democracy. They mention holding the regime to account if the regime violates laws which citizens should be protected from. They explain the advantages of implementing democratic politics for the country. They relate democracy and modernisation together and suggest that democracy is a revitalizing force within socialism. Third, teaching this knowledge of democracy to students may cultivate students’ abilities to participate in social affairs democratically in the future.

6.3.4. The Rule of Law

As I mentioned above, the 1999 textbook (B6-8) suggests developing socialist democracy by ruling the country by laws, but with no explanations. The idea of the rule of law was largely developed in 2003. The new textbooks explain the rule of law by describing the sublime legal and political status of the constitution:

“The Constitution provides the most fundamental and important principles of the state, the regime, the basic national policy, national institutions and other organizations and their competences. The constitution has the highest legal
status in our country’s legal system...It provides the legal safeguards to respect and protect human rights...

the Constitution is the most basic form of institutionalized and standardized procedures of democracy...the constitutional system comprehensively formulates fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens in terms of political, economic, cultural and social life” (B6-14, 2003-2005, Pp82-83, p110).

“The rule of law is an important goal of socialist modernization and political reform by properly using the rule of law to protect citizens...it is the basic strategy of the Party leading the people to manage the country and an important component of Dengism” (B6-15, 2003-2006, p162, p178).

These textbooks (B6-8, B6-14 and B6-15) which I used for the analysis are the official standard textbooks for all universities. Officially introducing the concept of the rule of law to university students reflects some democratic elements. A strong legal system is essential both to further economic development and to guarantee civil rights. The development of a legal system in China has been hindered not just by the fact that “it served as a tool of the state”, but also that both law-making and judicial decisions were subject to intervention from the CCP (Ogden, 2002, p232). In China, only criminal cases tended to be adjudicated by the courts. The idea that the legal system should be engaged in dispute resolution, promote justice and rights, and treat all equally before the law, is a product of the reform period. As the textbooks narrate, “since the NPC (1997) put forward the rule of law for five years, there were 90 new laws and related legal rules and 142 new administrative regulations issued by the State Council” (Ibid, p178), and the number of lawyers grew from 2000 in 1979 to 100,000 in 1997 (Ogden, 2002). This development has changed the situation of having few laws to follow in the past. Also, the many new laws and legal regulations have strengthened the rights of China’s people and further protect citizens’ rights.
The rule of law is a criterion of democratization in the establishment of civil society (Freedom House, 2008; Dahl, 2000). Law is enforced by rules and impartial judges (indicator, D7). An independent judiciary (indicator, D5) is the key feature of the rule of law in democratic government. In China, the CCP is the dominant ruler, the arbitrary power that is exercised through centralised party control often overrides the rule of law, and there is not an independent judiciary. However, promoting the rule of law and establishing many new laws is a significant starting point for developments that could move China towards democratization, at least at the level of official discourse.

6.3.5. Rights of Citizens

The rights that citizens have in a country are a key dimension of democracy. According to Freedom House (2008), all people should have equal social and political rights as human beings. The civil liberties dimension encompasses freedom of expression and belief, associational rights and individual rights (indicators D1 and D3). In China, citizens’ rights have been a politically sensitive subject for a long time. After the “98 program” reforms, the textbooks of “Law Basis” started to discuss citizens’ rights for the first time. Notably, definitions of citizens and “the people” are presented. Citizens “are the people who have the identity of the People's Republic of China” (B6-10, 1999-2000, p50; B6-11, 2002, p71); and “the people” are the participants of the regime. According to the textbooks, citizens’ rights include:

1. Citizens have equal legal rights which mean that no individual or organization has the privilege of being above the constitution and laws. If a citizen breaks the law, they should be equally investigated and punished by law; citizens cannot be arrested by persons who are not policemen or without the approval of court.
2. Citizens who are 18 years old or above have the right to vote and to be elected regardless of race, sex, occupation, family background, religious belief, education, property status, or length of residence; citizens also have the right to inspect their elected representatives, and to dismiss as incompetent those who are not good at their jobs.

3. Citizens have rights to exercise their freedom of assembly, procession and demonstration.

4. Laws protect freedom of communication and the privacy of citizens. The Constitution prohibits unlawful detention and other means of deprivation or the restriction of citizens' personal freedom and prohibits unlawful searching of citizens' bodies. Personal dignity of citizens is inviolable. It is prohibited to insult, slander or to make false accusations of citizens. It is prohibited to illegally search or intrude into citizens' houses" (B6-10, 1999-2000, pp50-53; B6-11, 2002, p71-73).

Textbook B6-10 particularly draws attention to freedom of association and explains why China needs this freedom:

"Freedom of association is an indispensable part of social and democratic life. It is a sign of the democratization of social life. Allowing a variety of academic discussions and seminars, a variety of research groups and social groups can improve democratic life…

The existence and development of various associations in our country has its historical inevitability. Because there are differences between urban and rural areas, workers and peasants, manual and academic occupations, incomes, hobbies, habits, ethnicity, culture and psychology. In October 1998, the State Council promulgated the "Regulations of registration of Social Organizations". This formulates that the State protects activities of social associations/groups. There are detailed regulations in terms of registration for establishing a social association, supervision and management of associations which provide the specific legal basis for citizens to exercise freedom of association…
Associations can play an important role in terms of national political democracy, invigorating the economy and providing personnel training. These social associations are important channels for people to exercise their management of national affairs and social rights. Some associations can solve some social affairs and welfare issues which the government cannot take on immediately. Associations, as representatives of different groups, generate beliefs for the needs of different groups. Associations play a role of intermediary between the State and the broad masses, they actively reflect the voice and requests of the masses to the State, and communicate national policies to the masses” (B6-10, 1999-2000, pp52-54).

These descriptions are indicative of an explicitly defined form of democratisation within CE in HE. “Equality of all citizens” is a democratic value (indicators D1); the texts suggest that all Chinese people should be equally treated. Elections are the basic conditions of the democratic system (indicators D5); the textbooks clearly described citizens’ rights to vote and to be voted for. Freedom of association is an essential condition of democracy (indicator, D4 indicators D3); the texts state that citizens have freedom of assembly, of procession and of demonstration. Also, the texts repeat that the Constitution formulates citizen rights, particularly by explaining what laws can protect individual persons from arrest, from being illegally searched and other unlawful detentions. This is knowledge of the rule of law. Allowing universities to teach this democratic knowledge to students reflects a more participatory version of socialist democracy at the level of official statements.

From 2003 onwards, the narratives of citizens’ rights in the textbooks emphasized the legal duties of citizens rather than citizens’ rights. When the textbooks explain rights of citizens, these are always followed by the duties that citizens must fulfil. For example, citizens have religious freedom, but citizens “cannot use religious activities to disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens and interfere with the educational
205

activities of the state” (B6-14, 2003-2005, p101). Citizens have freedom of speech,
assembly and protest, but they “cannot abuse these rights and freedoms to carry out
any activities which harm public order and social stability”. In particular, “if college
students exercise their freedom of assembly, they should follow the provisions of
“the law of assembly”, otherwise, it is illegal. If students exercise the rights of
association, they can only be allowed to carry out these activities after registration in
accordance with the provisions of “the Regulation and Registration of Social
Associations” and as approved by the communist committees in school. Otherwise,
“the activities are illegal, the associations are illegal organizations, which are banned”
(ibid, p103, p106).
Furthermore, the 2003 textbook developed the legal duties of citizens to protect
Chinese national unity. The textbooks say that: “safeguarding independence of
national sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity is the supreme legal duty
of citizens” (B6-14, 2003-2005, p106). Compared with the 1999-2000 textbooks,
some important citizens’ rights, such as freedom of speech, assembly and the right
of citizens to protest were removed from the textbooks in 2003 after which the
Chinese government increased control of the activities of students at universities and
of citizens in society more widely.
6.3.6. Human Rights
Human rights are seen as an essential condition of democratization. The United
Nations (UN, 1948) proclaims a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
includes civil and political rights to “life, liberty and security of person”, “freedom
of movement”, “a nationality”, “freedom of thought, conscience and religion”,


“freedom of peaceful assembly and association”, and “freedom of citizens to take part in government”.

“Human rights” were introduced to university students for the first time in the 2003 textbooks of “Law Basis” which explains them as:

“The fundamental rights and freedoms that every individual should enjoy based on their personal nature and dignity under certain social and historical conditions. Human rights include the rights to freedom, equality, property, survival and development”. (B6-14, 2003-2005, p98)

This statement is not much different compared to the definition of human rights from the UN. This suggests that the textbook authors hold positive attitudes towards human rights.

Interestingly, the textbook specifically illustrates “the Chinese government's views on human rights”. These official views can be summarised as:

1. Human rights are a product of historical development. These rights are restricted by historical, social, economic and cultural conditions of countries.
2. Human rights in one country are different in another country. In China, human rights are not the rights a person is born with; basic human rights are a unity of individual and collective rights, a unity of universal principles and of national conditions, a unity of rights and duties.
3. Human rights include individual civil and political rights, but also include collective economic, social and cultural rights.
4. Survival and development are the most important human rights.
5. The sovereignty of the country is higher than individual human rights.
It is clear that there are two definitions of human rights in the textbooks. One is the understanding of the authors that human rights are “the basic rights and freedoms that everyone should have”. This explanation suggests that human rights are a natural right and all human being should have from birth. Another is the Chinese official view that human rights are “not a general form of rights, not the rights given when people are born. Human rights are obtained through struggle and determined by economic and cultural conditions” (ibid). The existence of these two different points of view within the textbook reflects specific understandings of rights relating to specific local versions of socialist democracy.

6.4. Discussion and Summary

In this chapter, I have analysed the particular themes of the officially promoted ideologies, the official definitions of the regime, and descriptions of democracy and values in the university textbooks of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum from 1990 to 2006, so as to explore processes of democratisation reflected in these themes. The findings suggest a fluctuating form of democratisation occurring in CE in HE during this period.

After the 1989 student protests, the Chinese regime moved towards hard authoritarianism. This change is largely reflected in patriotic education. In the textbooks, “patriotism”—rather nationalism is repeated as a political norm wherein there is unconditional obedience to the CCP regime, as well as an imperative to sacrifice personal interests to safeguard collective interests. A trend initiated by the CCP against liberalism can also be evidenced from the narratives of anti-individualism and anti-westernization. These narratives suggest an official negative attitude toward liberal democratic values of tolerance towards others and western styles of liberal democracy. Anti-individualism and anti-westernization with a
particular focus against the western political system of the separation of powers and the parliamentary system has become a major policy of the Chinese government since then.

Patriotic education in the early 1990s suggests a strong authoritarianism. It is in keeping with indicator A3 that, patriotic education is given by authority and focuses on collectivist virtues over individual interests; it is also in keeping with indicator A8 that, in an authoritarian country, knowledge is a unified instrument of political power as either propaganda or as secrets of the state; it rejects differing conceptions of the nation, it is not to be questioned or debated publicly, and students are expected to accurately reproduce this knowledge from the textbooks. As scholars (Bell, Jayasuriya, Jones, 1995) suggest, in an authoritarian regime, political education focuses on instilling appropriate kinds of knowledge regarding the content and character of the government, and there is no encouragement of critical thinking and there is widespread intolerance towards other opinions.

Soon after 1992, China moved towards developing political culture with procedural and substantive rights in the regime, which can be seen as an officially endorsed version of Chinese socialist democracy. In terms of the officially promoted ideology, “Dengism” from 1999 and “Three Represents” from 2003 replaced traditional Marxism. “The primary stage of socialism”--from Dengism, can be seen as a “China model” (Bell, 2015), in which developing the economy is the central task whilst insisting upon the legitimacy of leadership from the CCP. Dengism has confirmed that China has begun new policies of multiple forms of ownership, less economic planning, decentralized administration and developing a market economy. The economic mode of production in China has changed from Mao’s egalitarianism to Deng’s pragmatism (Bell, 2015).
At the level of official statements, the theory of the Three Represents allows people from different backgrounds to join the party, so that a stable political class has been established to share power with the elites of the CCP. This suggests a change in the nature of the CCP from a single group or proletarian party to a party for the many. As the textbooks show that “the people” has increased from the working class, the peasantry class, the urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie to include intellectuals, red capitalists and other people who support socialism. These people represent different groups and social interests. This expansion of participants reflects a more participatory version of socialist democracy. Participation of diverse groups of people with different social backgrounds is a feature of a democratic government (indicator D4). As Ogden (2002, p262) suggests, the Three Represents “explicitly states the Party’s changing nature”. The Party’s role has moved from “beyond serving as the vanguard of the revolution, to affirm the Party’s responsibility for governing”. By increasing the range of “the people” in the Chinese regime, the CCP has embraced a more participatory version of socialist democracy. This signals a more pronounced official commitment to political pluralisation (Indicator, D2). As Ogden (2002, p275) suggests, political pluralisation began the process of legitimising the expression of diverse and even conflicting interest groups in China.

In terms of the institutions of the regime, the differing explanations of the political system between the textbooks suggest there is diversity among perspectives regarding political reforms. It also suggests an official attempt to develop democratic elements in the Chinese political system, such as establishing an elective PC system, multi-party participants for the CPPCC system and more autonomous power within the EMAR system, as well as implementing “one country with two systems” and the rule of law. These are in keeping with democratic indicators D1 and D5, that of multi-
party participation in government and an elective congress. Among these, increasing the legitimacy and power of the National People’s Congress has resulted in “a far more proactive role for its delegates” and “in democratising China” (Ogden, 2002, p252). Also, this clearly determines the highest authority to be the Constitution and established the rule of law, which suggests signs of democratisation at the level of official discourse. As the textbooks state, a large number of new laws and legislation has been published since then. This enhances the legal rights of individuals against the state and clarifies the rights of “one private individual vis-à-vis another, continue to be promulgated”. It can be said that the implementation of laws provide a legal foundation on which to “erect a more democratic system” in China (Ogden, 2002, p251).

Moreover, the official standard textbooks include many detailed discussions of democratic knowledge, such as citizens’ rights and human rights, and highlight the advantages of political democracy. These narratives suggest signs of movement toward democracy. For example, the explanation that all Chinese people should be equally treated is in keeping with indicators D1 and D3 regarding the equality of all citizens and a belief in human dignity and equality. Also, the statements that citizens have freedom of assembly and rights to vote and to be voted for are in keeping with indicator D3 that support individual rights and freedoms.

Furthermore, the findings in this chapter suggest that democratisation in China was developing a Chinese version of socialist democracy within CE in HE. As the textbooks suggest, it is socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics at a primary stage of development. This Chinese version of socialist democracy reinforces economic development as the central task and the nation’s priority, rather than
political reform, and the commitment to democratic principles has always been under the auspices of centralised Party control.

The Chinese version of socialist democracy has been heavily influenced by parts of Marxism and modernisation theory. Marx suggests that the economic base determines the immaterial superstructure; modernisation theory claims that the process of economic development leads to a successive modernisation, and “democratisation moves beyond the processes of modernisation” (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, p8). The Chinese official belief is that China must develop the economy first in order to build the conditions for superstructure development and reform of the political system.

The Chinese version of socialist democracy is a form of illiberal democracy. Its political features include democratic centralism with limited elections and some local autonomy, and certain citizens are invited to participate in discussions about government policies, whereas elites within the CCP regime design political reform and control policy-making (Perry, 2015b). The official Chinese view and policy continues to highlight collectivism, citizens’ duties and anti-individualism against Western style liberal democracy in terms of the separation of powers and the parliamentary system during this era. All these indicate that China may never resemble a Western liberal democratic regime (Ogden, 2002, p379), but it contains some similar features of democracy in East Asia, that promotes, as Tu (2002, p199) illustrates, “the importance of equality rather than freedom, sympathy rather than rationality, civility rather than law, duty rather than rights, and human-relatedness rather than individualism”.

During this period, although some democratic patterns have emerged within CE in HE, China remains an authoritarian state. Those democratic signs are inklings of democracy in a long term process of democratisation in an authoritarian society at the level of official discourse.

Introduction

After the 05 Program Reforms to political education, the compulsory “Politics” curriculum in universities was unified completely. Chinese officials (PCCP, MOE and Publication Administration, 2006; MOE, 2008) issued a series of documents which required all HEIs in China to use the unified textbooks for the four modules of the curriculum. By 2008, all HEIs were using the unified textbooks published by the Higher Education Press. Although the textbooks have been re-edited a few times since then, the key aims of the curriculum were not changed until 2018. For example, in 2015, the textbooks were revised in order to add “Xiism” into the course, but the revision was based on the syllabus which was published in 2005 (MOE, 2015). Also, a “Textbook Review Board” was established with a large number of members appointed by the MOE to check the textbooks from 2008. There were 30 review members in 2008 and 47 members in 2018 (see table T7-1). These people were almost all from the MOE, the PCCP and universities. They review and decide the content of the textbooks together.

For this chapter, I selected 12 textbooks published from 2008 to 2018 for comparative analysis in order to trace changes to political education in Chinese HE, so as to explore the processes of democratisation reflected in these changes. Among these, eight textbooks were taken from the four modules of the curriculum published in 2008, 2010 and 2015. These three versions of the textbooks are almost the same as each other, according to the syllabus of the MOE.
T7-1 the 12 textbooks selected for analysis for chapter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Used in</th>
<th>Textbooks</th>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Reviewers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B7-1</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Maoism, Dengism and the Three Representatives</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B7-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Maoism and Socialism with Chinese characteristics</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B7-3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Modern Chinese History</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B7-4</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Maoism and Socialism with Chinese characteristics</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B7-5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Morality and Law Basis</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B7-6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Modern Chinese History</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>B7-7</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Modern Chinese History</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B7-8</td>
<td></td>
<td>Marxism</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B7-9</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Marxism</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>B7-10</td>
<td></td>
<td>Modern Chinese History</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B7-11</td>
<td></td>
<td>Morality and Law Basis</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>B7-12</td>
<td></td>
<td>Maoism and Socialism with Chinese characteristics</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>47</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All textbooks were published by the Higher Education Press and are used by all HEIs in China.

I continued the analysis of key themes in the textbooks including the officially promoted ideology, official definitions of the Chinese political system and understandings of democratic values.

7.1. The Officially Promoted Ideologies

As I discussed in chapter 6, Dengism and the theory of Three Representatives are the officially promoted ideologies to guide all policies-making in China. Since then, the Chinese government has continuously proposed new theories of “Scientific
Development Concept” and “Xiism” (also called “Xi Jing-ping’s thoughts on socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era”) into the state constitution and the textbooks of political education in universities. These officially promoted ideologies all are called “Marxism with Chinese characteristics” (马克思主义中国化) and are designed for ideological indoctrination of university students.

I discussed Dengism and the Three Representatives theory in the last chapter. I shall not repeat those here. In this section, I briefly discuss “Marxism” and “Scientific Development Concept”, and then focus on an analysis of “Xiism” in order to trace the changes to the officially promoted ideologies within CE in HE in order to assess processes of democratisation reflected in these changes.

7.1.1. Marxism and Scientific Development Concept

The unified textbook of “Marxism” consists of Marxist theories of dialectical materialism, historical materialism, political economy, socialism and communism. It gives prominence to the political tools of the course. “Socialism” and “Communism” have been expanded to comprise two chapters out of a total of seven (B7-8, 2015; B7-9, 2018) These two chapters explain the practices of Marxism in the world in order to prove that socialism with Chinese characteristics is the only type of socialism that suits Chinese development. The text states:

“There are multiple routes of socialist development in the world…if different countries try to develop in the same way or use the same model of socialism, they would be a failure. Developing socialism in China neither copies from the model of the Soviet Union nor western capitalism”. (B7-8, 2015, p267; B7-9, 2018, p285)

These explanations suggest that Marxism is used as a theoretical tool in order to strengthen the point that China can only have a socialist system.
“Scientific Development Concept” is a new officially promoted guiding ideology. This theory was promoted by the Chinese leader Hu Jin-tao. It was added into the Party constitution in 2007 and into the textbooks of the curriculum in 2008. This concept includes three parts: “development”, “based on individualism” and “sustainable development”. All the textbooks explain this theory the same way:

“‘Development’ is a Marxist term for developing a social force...‘Based on individualism’ means based on the essential interests of the largest number of people...‘Sustainable development’ means that the central government plans overall policies with consideration of environmental protection (B7-1, 2008, p31-32; B7-2, 2008, p30-31; B7-4, 2010, p36-37; B7-12, 2018, p152).

Central to this “Concept” is developing the economy and modern industry which is the priority task for China, but that this should be done in a sustainable way in order to conserve resources and protect the environment. In this concept, there is not room for political reforms.

7.1.2. Xiism

Xiism is a summary of the policies of the CCP since Xi Jinping became the Chinese leader in 2013. It is also the guiding ideology for the CCP in formulating current and future policies. As described in the textbook (B7-12, 2018, p192): “Xiism is the guiding ideology that the Party and the state must adhere to for a long time...Xiism is the program of action for building a socialist modernized country and for achieving China’s dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. This China’s dream was increasingly viewed by scholars as a bastion of authoritarianism which is intent upon exporting its undemocratic practices in a calculated bid to displace the United States and its democratic way of life (Perry, 2015b). Xiism seeks to restore China to its proper place at the top of the global hierarchy by establishing a new world order
favourable to China (Pillsbury, 2015). It can be said that Xiism indicates a new era of authoritarian development in China.

China has just revised the constitution and removed the term limit of the state chairman which is held by Xi Jinping. This revision has made it possible for Xi Jinping to serve as lifelong chairman. It can be predicted that Xi Jinping, as the leader of the Party and China, will have an important influence on the future development of China. Analysing expositions of Xiism in the textbooks enables me to compare the changes in the ideology and major policies of the CCP, and hypothesise regarding the future development of China, especially with regard to the process of democratization.

Xiism was added into the textbook of “Maoism and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” in 2018. There are 14 chapters in the textbook, 7 of which are used to discuss Xiism. This shows the importance of Xiism in the curriculum. According to the textbook, Xiism involves all aspects of China’s development. However, for the purpose of this study, my analysis only focuses on the particular themes of relevance to the shaping of values, identity and citizenship. These themes include: the policies of comprehensive economic development in order to achieve a powerful socialist country; the Party strongly controls ideology; and strengthening the leadership of the party.

**The Powerful Socialist China**

Developing the economy and building China into a powerful socialist country is the primary task of Xiism. The textbook explains plans, policies, methods and tasks for achieving this purpose. For example, the Chinese government has set clear goals for economic development: by 2020, "to develop China into an economy-centred
modern country”; then “to complete a well-to-do (小康) society—socialist modernization” from 2020 to 2035; finally, to “develop China into a modern, powerful socialist nation” from 2035 to 2050 (B7-12, 2018, p203). “Powerful” includes “hard powers such as economic power and military power, and soft powers such as values, ideology and culture” (Ibid, p230). "Modern and powerful nation" means that "China will have a high degree of material civilization, China’s core competitiveness ranks among the top countries in the world, economic aggregates and market size surpass those of other countries” (Ibid, p205).

There is no plan to develop democratic politics within this vision of building a powerful socialist China. In other words, a powerful socialist China does not include democracy. To vigorously develop the economy has always been an important policy objective since the reforms began. Dengism put forward four modernizations to allow some people to get rich first; Jiang who was in power from 1989-2002, called for developing the economy for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation; and Hu Jintao (2003-2013) proposed economic plans for sustainable development. Xiism has not only continued to emphasise economic development, but also positioned the goal of this development to develop China into the powerful socialist nation in the world.

Xiism also includes the economic (and/or diplomatic) policy of “One Belt and One Road” which refers to the idea of “big country diplomacy”. This policy aims to promote economic globalization in a Chinese way, so as to “establish new international relations in order to change the current pattern of international relations” (B7-12, 2018, p288). Among these, “Belt” refers to “an economic development zone dominated by landlocked countries in Central Asia; “Road” refers to special relations between China and the countries that can be reached through the oceans of the
world. "One Belt and One Road" aims to achieve a re-balance of the world economy through “cooperation in trade and investment ... cooperation in production capacity and equipment manufacturing, and by deeply taking part in global governance and international issues. By doing these, China attempts to actively guide changes to the international order.” (ibid, p 293, p295)

**Firmly Grasping Ideology**

Firmly grasping ideology is an important part of Xiism. Its purpose is to advance the soft powers of China in terms of ideology, culture and values into the world. According to the textbook, ideology in Xiism is seen as "a major factor relating to the road of national development, national political security and the direction of cultural development." It is also the key to a strong cohesive socialist culture with Chinese characteristics which will lead all people to be “united in the fields of ideals, beliefs, values and morality" (B7-12, 2018, p223). For these reasons, Xiism suggests that the CCP must firmly control ideology.

Firmly grasping ideology is a task for all Chinese people. For adults, the media implements public opinion orientation and network space. For school students, this is to be achieved through classroom teaching and teaching materials. According to the textbook:

> “the party firmly grasps the leadership of ideological works... then to construct a philosophy and social science with Chinese characteristics... and then all the branches of the government which relate to ideological work, gather together to manage teaching materials in education... to guide media... to control network space. Achieving this will consolidate the guiding position of Marxism in the ideological field... promoting the core values of socialism and fine traditional Chinese culture... as well as clearly rejecting various erroneous viewpoints" (B7-12, 2018, p223-226).
Firmly grasping the ideology of Xiism reflects the characteristics of autocracy. It is in keeping with the catalogue of indicator A3 that ideology is given by authority and is a feature of authoritarianism. Scholar (Huntington, 1993, p118) has suggested that in a one-party system, the ideology defines the identity of the state. The Chinese regime staunchly adheres to its ideology which indicates the authoritarian nature of the regime.

**The Leadership of the Party**

The CCP’s leadership of the regime has been widely mentioned throughout all of the textbooks for the purpose of providing legitimacy and loyalty to the CCP. After the 05 Program, the textbooks address the point that the CCP is a “workers’ party” and the necessity of this leadership in China. By 2018, strengthening the leadership of the CCP has become one of the most important features of Xiism. “One party dictatorship” is clearly emphasised in the textbook for the first time:

“The CCP is at the core of leadership of socialism with Chinese characteristics…it is the highest political leader…with authority and unified power… The CCP determines all major decisions, deployment and implementation…These consist of all aspects of reform, development, stability, internal affairs and diplomacy, national defence, governing the parties, the state and ruling the military”…

"Every party organization, every party member must protect the authority of the central government, obey the centralized and unified leadership of the CCP, and take the CCP's will as the general will… The actions (of the party organisations and members) must follow the same orders of the Party… The Party's ideology is unified; "(B7-12, 2018, p303, pp305-306).

This official statement of strengthening the leadership of the CCP under Xiism suggests strong authoritarianism. It is in keeping with indicator A1 that there is no
free political choice and people are to obey authority, and indicator A2 that there is not tolerance to others and politics is limited to the inner party, and indicator A3 that ideology is given by authority, as well as indicator A5 that a single party system with a monolithic power is comprised of and serves the interests of an elite ruling group, and with a regime which has power over subordinate social groups.

Xiism attempts to bolster the powers of the CCP through managing the government and controlling large numbers of party organizations and members. According to Party statistics, there were around 89 million Communist Party members and 4.518 million organizations for the Party throughout the country in 2016 (Chui Jing, 2017). These 89 million members are the most important social force that the CCP regime relies upon to enact its policies. As I discussed in chapter 4, the Party Secretary at each Chinese university is in charge of the university. The Party organization is not only established in the management of universities, but also in all departments and classes (Yan, Xiao-jun 2014). In addition, the Party organizations are also located in each factory, village, trade union and peasant associations, and even in foreign enterprises and overseas student unions.

Moreover, the party has absolute leadership over the army, namely “the Party commands guns (military force)” (B7-12, 2018, p268) in order to fully build the Chinese army into a world-class army to ensure that the military "can fight and win". This is one of the important parts of Xiism. This also suggests authoritarianism. Huntington (1993) suggests that in a one-party state, depoliticizing the regular armed forces is a necessary condition for democratisation. But in China, strengthening the leadership of the Party’s command of the military may work against developing democracy.
Promoting Xiism indicates a new era of development toward authoritarianism in current China.

7.2. The Chinese Regime

Tracing the officially promoted structural changes within the regime can tell us what elements of democracy are contained in institutional systems and what the level of democratisation is.

Since the 1999 textbooks introduced the political system of China to university students, this task has been continually developed in the textbooks of “Maoism and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” and “Morality and Law Basis”. In the 2008 and 2010 editions, the Chinese political system included: the People’s democratic dictatorship, the PC system, the CPPCC system and the EMAR system (B7-1, 2008, p188-198; B7-2, 2008, pp193-205; B7-4, 2010, p220; B7-5, 2010, p206). These textbooks share the same narratives describing the Chinese political system, which are similar to the 1999 and 2003-06 editions. I shall not repeat these here.

However, there are three notable changes in the 2008 and 2010 textbooks which are related to democratisation. (1). Expanding the narratives of “the enemies” and class struggle; (2). The addition of the grassroots autonomous system into the Chinese political system, and (3) a re-definition of “one country two systems”. The 2018 textbooks changed the narratives of the regime again. This section comparatively discusses how these themes are expounded in the textbooks between 2008 and 2018.

7.2.1. “Enemies” and Class Struggle
In previous chapters it was noted that the Chinese regime was defined as the “People's Democratic Dictatorship”. After the 05 Program Reform, the textbooks resume the language of class struggle by using Marxist terms:

“Dictatorship of the proletariat is democracy among the people and dictatorship against enemies... Its main task is to defend the socialist system and to implement dictatorship to hostile and reactionary forces... class struggle within the country will exist for a long time. Sometimes, class struggle can be very sharp” (B7-1, 2008, p190; B7-2, 2008, p195; B7-4, 2010, p220; B7-4, 2010, p222; B7-5, 2010, p206).

The texts define the range of “enemies” and “hostile and reactionary forces” as including:

“All kinds of criminal activities, sabotage and infiltration of hostile western forces, the political conspiracy to subvert the CCP leadership and socialist system, ethnic separatists, violent terrorists, serious criminal offenses against the safety of people’s life and property, serious corruption” (B7-1, 2008, p192; B7-2, 2008, p197; B7-4, 2010, p224; B7-5, 2010, p208).

These descriptions suggest that many ideological or political dissidents, such as so-called “ethnic separatists” and “insurgents” who subvert the CCP are defined as “the enemies”. Compared with previous years, the range of enemies was largely expanded in the 2008 and 2010 textbooks. This expansion suggests a step backward in terms of tolerance toward others. Intolerance towards people who have different views is an indicator of authoritarianism.

The 2008 and 2010 textbooks use the term “working class” to replace “the people” and discuss the basic political rights of workers:

“The internal structure of the working class has significantly changed since the reforms. The proportion of intellectuals within the working class has greatly
increased; the migrant peasants, who are working in cities, have become industrial workers. The working class includes all types of labourers who are employed in state-owned and non-state owned economic organizations…”

“It must safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of all workers, including migrant peasants. It must effectively protect the democratic rights of workers, such as rights to know, to participate, to express and to supervise. It should actively organize employees to participate in social affairs. The workers union at all levels should highlight the protections of employment, income, distribution, social welfare, occupational safety, health and other economic interests. The workers union should focus on solutions of living problems encountered by migrant peasants and unemployed and poor workers. Especially, when the state-owned enterprises reform significant policies which relate to the interests of workers, (these policies) must be reviewed and approved by the Workers Congress” (B7-1, 2008, p206; B7-2, 2008, p211; B7-4, 2010, P338; B7-5, 2010, p222).

This is the first time that the textbooks accurately describe the real situation of the working class. Since China began economic reforms, the gap between the rich and poor has become greater, so that social conflicts have increased and become more serious. Millions of workers, who worked for state companies, lost their jobs, and peasants lost their land and have left villages for work in the cities. The basic rights of these people, such as being employed, getting paid on time, having occupational safety and health care, are often encroached upon. Their poor situation has been seen everywhere in China and reported in the media. Discussing these issues in the textbooks reflect a more realistic understanding of the working class. However, in the 2018 textbook, there is no further discussion of these participants in the regime. Instead, the textbooks emphasize the leadership of the party.
7.2.2. The Grassroots Autonomous System

The grassroots autonomous system (基层自治, GA) was official enacted in 1998 when the National People’s Congress Standing Committee issued the Provisional Law on village committees. This law requires that all villages hold competitive elections for their village committees, and all candidates are to be nominated by villagers aged eighteen or older. Nomination of candidates must be made directly by registered voters and the elections must be competitive. Later in China, experiments with direct elections have occurred at the township and other high levels of civil administration on a selective basis.

This system was explained for the first time in the 2008 textbooks and was continued in the 2010 editions as:

“China has established a rural villagers’ committee, urban residents committee and Workers Union Congress (职工代表大会) as the democratic grassroots autonomous system ... This autonomous system manages public affairs and welfare ... includes people’s mediation, public security, public health...mediating civil disputes, maintaining public order and reporting people’s views, and the requirements and recommendations to the local government ... among these, villager autonomy means that peasants directly exercise their democratic rights by self-management.... Democratic elections, decision-making, management and supervision are the major contents of villagers’ self-government ...Urban resident committees ensure that urban residents directly exercise self-management ...The workers Union Congress is the basic system to ensure workers’ democratic management of enterprises and institutions (B7-1, 2008, p198-199; B7-2, 2008, p203-204; B7-4, 2010, pp234-235; B7-5, 2010, p211).

These statements suggest developments towards democratisation at the level of official discourse. At that time, China experimented with competitive elections at the
lowest level of its civil administration nationwide. According to statistics from the textbook (ibid), in 2007, there were about 610,000 village committees and 150,000 professional farmers’ cooperative economic organizations. The total members of farmers in these organizations reached 23.63 million. There were also more than 80,000 city residents’ committees. Although the proportion of these grass-roots organizations in the total population is very small in China, and although this system exists under the party's leadership, they may be important starting points for democratization. As the textbooks suggest “the grassroots self-organization is an important political system for people to exercise their democratic rights” (ibid). Scholars also suggest that in a democratic society, all people have equal social and political rights for expressing their preferences through the process of making decisions (Freedom House, 2008; Dahl, 2000). In China, elections in villages, work units and urban districts encourage more democratic procedures and thereby increase local self-governance in villages and cities, therefore, it is “an important step toward democratisation” (Ogden, 2002, p182).

Yet, we must notice that there are limitations to the grassroots election system. This is because the government allocates resources to the work unit, villages’ election and associations, and trade unions. These associations are not bound together for pursuing common interests. Workers identify with their own work unit, not with broader categories of people in the same position that “would be represented in an association or interest group” (Ogden, 2002, p292). These grassroots units are not independent from the government.

In the 2018 textbook (B7-12, 2018, p217), the grassroots system of self-organization is only mentioned as part of the political system in China, but without any further explanation. The 2018 textbooks have also largely changed the narratives of the
political system and the regime. The textbook “Morality and Law Basis” no longer discusses the political system. The textbook (B-12, 2018, p216) “Maoism and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” summarises the regime as working to “improve the institutional system in which the people are the masters of the country”. The textbook only mentions the names of the political system, such as; “the PC system is the fundamental political system, and the CPPCC, the EMAR system and the grassroots autonomous system are the essential political system”, but without further explanations.

Compared with previous textbooks, there are largely reduced explanations of the structures of the regime in the 2018 textbook which reflect a move backward from democratisation. This is in keeping with the authoritarian indicator A8 that knowledge is a unified instrument of political power and as secrets of state, official knowledge is not open to public debate.

7.2.3. One Country, Two Systems

In the last chapter, I discussed the narratives of “One Country Two Systems” as a part of Dengism in the 1999 textbooks and as a national political system in the 2003-2006 textbooks. After the 05 Program Reforms, the narratives of “One Country Two Systems” have been largely changed to “one of two policies for unifying Taiwan in peace or by armed force” in terms of “unifying the motherland” (B7-1, 2008, p256; B7-2, 2008, p262; B7-4, 2010, p300). The 2018 textbook develops this further. “One Country Two Systems” is suggested as “the best policy for solving the historical problems of Hong Kong and Macao” (B7-12, 2018, p219, p221). The 2018 textbook uses strong language against opinions which are different from those of the central government, such as:
“We will be strongest against any kind of ‘Taiwan independence’… strongest to protect national sovereignty and territorial integrity. (We) will never tolerate the separation of the nation…we have a firm will, full confidence and sufficient ability to frustrate any form of Taiwan independence…We will never allow anyone, any organization, or any political party to split any piece of Chinese territory from China at any time and in any form” (B7-12, 2018, pp222-223).

These narratives reflect a swing away from democratization compared with the previous textbooks. It is in keeping with the authoritarian indicator A8 that single narratives are presented as absolute and unquestionable, and the language is strongly normative and emotive. “One Country Two Systems” is no longer seen as a part of the political system as before; it has become a scheme to unify Taiwan with mainland China. This change indicates that the Chinese government has given up on the idea of having dual political systems, that featured in the 1999 and 2003 textbooks. This may obstruct the possibility of promoting a multi-system or a pluralist political system in China in the future.

### 7.3. Socialist Democracy and Values

After the 05 Program Reform, the Chinese government proposed "socialist core values" as "socialist ideology" (B7-1, 2008, p200; B7-2, 2008, p193; B7-4, 2010, p220). These values have been described in all of the textbooks of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum. These values consist of the officially promoted ideology, “the rule of law”, “citizens' rights”, “socialist democracy, freedom and human rights" and “patriotism”. However, the focus of the explanation of these values in each textbook is different. Some (B7-1, 2, 4 and 12) mention “socialist core values” as slogans; some (B7-3, 6, 7 and 10) focus on their use in the dissemination of Marxism in modern China; some textbooks (B7-5 and 11) explain this value as a "faith"; and in others (B7-8 and 9) as theoretical explanations of Marxism. For example, “the
national spirit with patriotism” is one of the core socialist values. The textbook of “Morality and Law Basis” explains this value as providing the norms of behaviour for citizens and undergraduates; the textbook “Maoism and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” explains this value as ideology and morality.

The narratives of “socialist values” in the textbooks are also different. The 2008 and 2010 textbooks display further understandings of democracy, but the 2018 textbook withdraws these understandings. This section discusses the socialist core values of the “rule of law”, ”citizens’ rights and duties”, ”socialist democracy, freedom and human rights" and “patriotism”, so as to explore the extent to which these conceptions reflect processes of democratization at the level of official statements.

7.3.1. Rule of Law

Theoretically, according to Fukuyama (2014, p23-24), the rule of law can be defined as including simple laws, property rights and contract enforcement, and the modern Western understanding of human rights. Sometimes, the rule of law is distinguished from what is referred to as “rule by law”. In the case of “rule by law”, “law represents commands issued by the ruler but is not binding on the ruler himself”. In other words, “rulers can change the law to suit themselves, but those laws are applied uniformly to the rest of society”. A rule of law is usually embodied in a separate judicial institution that can act autonomously from the executive. Rule by law is also “institutionalised, regular and transparent, under which conditions it begins to fulfil some of the functions of rule of law by reducing the ruler’s discretionary authority”.

Commonly, the highest law in a country is the constitution. The constitutional arrangements can be crucial to the success of democratisation in many ways.
According to Dahl (2000, p125), a constitution might help to provide stability for basic democratic political institutions and ensure all the necessary rights and guarantees that the basic political institutions require. A constitution might protect majority and minority rights; a constitution could maintain neutrality among the country’s citizens, and help citizens and leaders to develop an informed consensus on laws and policies. The constitution could be designed to enable citizens to hold political leaders accountable for their decisions, and so on. However, if the constitutional arrangements do not apply to the ruling class, the rule of law does not exist; it is rule by law against democracy.

In Chinese political education in universities, when the textbooks introduced the concepts of “rule of law” to university students for the first time in 1999, this concept was not explained. The Chinese government was focused on creating new laws. After the 05 Program reforms, “the rule of law” became an important task in the textbooks of “Maoism and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” and “Morality and Law Basis”, but the explanations of this concept are different among the textbooks. Some explain “the rule of law” as:

“The masses are under the leadership of the Party and are governed by the provisions of the Constitution and laws, they manage national and social affairs, and economic and cultural affairs...to achieve the institutionalization and legalization of socialist democracy...it is important that the democratic system and laws do not change whenever the leadership changes, or whenever the leaders change their views and attentions" (B7-1, 2008, p201; B7-2, 2008, p206; B7-4, 2010, p236).

The textbook “Morality and Law Basis” (B7-5, 2010) explains the scope of “laws” which include: substantive and procedural laws, such as civil and commercial law, administrative law, economic law and civil litigation law and so on. Although the
interpretations of these laws in the textbooks are relatively simple, the main principles and contents of the laws are explained. For example, “civil and commercial law” is the law that has the most direct and closest relationship with people's daily activities, therefore, the textbooks explain nine aspects of these laws (ibid, pp218-225). The textbook specifically explains “copyright”, “patent rights” and “trademark rights” (ibid, pp224-225). The textbooks also point out the notion of legal equality, in that:

“Legal equality of citizens requires that all citizens must equally abide by the laws, and equally access and exercise their legal rights. It does not recognize any citizens who can enjoy privileges and exemptions from legal obligations. It requires the state administrative organizations and judicial organizations to apply laws and to treat citizens equally...to ensure that all law enforcement must comply with laws in a way people can see, and, people can feel democracy” (B7-15, 2010, pp189-190).

“The laws should be strictly enforced and violators prosecuted” (B7-5, 2010, p238).

These narratives suggest signs towards democratisation. The purpose of establishing the rule of law in China, as the textbooks state, is to ensure the institutionalization and legalization of socialist democracy, and that the system and laws do not change whenever the leadership changes or whenever the leaders change their views and attentions. This indicates that the Chinese government is attempting to establish a constitutional arrangement in Chinese society at least at the level of official discourse. Constitutional arrangements can be crucial to the success of democratisation in many ways. As Dahl (2000, p125) suggests, a constitution might help to provide stability for democratic political institutions and ensure all the necessary rights and guarantees that political institutions require.
The textbooks explain many substantive and procedural laws that can protect citizens’ rights. Introducing a large amount of legal knowledge to students is a sign toward democratisation. It is in line with indicator D8, that knowledge of legal and moral rights and responsibilities of individuals (citizens) and human rights are taught in democratic citizenship. Again, the textbooks address the importance of legal equality among individual citizens. This is in accordance with the democratic indicator D3, belief in human dignity and equality.

Furthermore, implementing the rule of law and publishing many new laws in China means, at least officially, that the regime has accepted the values embodied in these laws, and these laws provide new standards for protecting individuals. As Ogden (2002, p251) suggests, new laws and legislation that “enhance the legal rights of the individual against the state and clarify the rights of one private individual vis-à-vis another, continue to be promulgated. To the degree they are implemented, China will have a stronger legal foundation on which to erect a more democratic system”.

Notably, “the rule of law” that has been introduced in the textbooks is at the beginning stages of establishing constitutional arrangements. Although these arrangements indicate signs of democratisation, the rule of law in China reflects a meaning of “rule by law”. The textbooks clearly state that the rule of law is under the leadership of the CCP. This indicates that the rule of law in China is not embodied in a separate judicial institution. This corresponds with the claim of Fukuyama (2014, p24), that the “rule by law is institutionalised, regular and transparent, under which conditions it begins to fulfil some of the functions of rule of law by reducing the ruler’s discretionary authority”.

The 2018 textbook largely reduces the descriptions of the rule of law, in particular specific laws. For example, “the Patent Law" appeared once as a name without any explanation (B7-11, 2018, p155). The new textbook stresses the importance of strengthening the legal system for serving the state and leadership of the Party over the legal system. This change reflects retrogression in the description of the rule of law compared with the 2010 textbook.

7.3.2. Socialist Democracy, Freedom and Human Rights

Since the reforms, the textbooks of the “Politics" curriculum often mention “democracy”, which I discussed in the last two chapters. After the 05 program reforms, the 2008 textbooks specifically discussed the concepts of “democracy” “freedom”, “Human rights”, “socialist democracy” and “socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics” for the first time. Interestingly, the textbooks contain differing views between Chinese officials and the authors of the textbooks. Analysing these descriptions provide evidence with which to assess the Chinese officials’ understandings of democracy, freedom and human rights, as well as their views regarding socialist democracy. These descriptions may indicate processes of democratisation in China.

The textbooks state the officials’ views concerning democracy as:

"Democracy is synthesized by the words ‘people’ and ‘rights’. ‘Democracy’ means “the people’s political power’ that is the same meaning as ‘the people being the masters of the country’. Freedom usually refers to political freedoms, which are citizen’s rights to participate in the country’s political life within the law. Citizens’ political rights are given by the constitution… Democracy is a form of constitutional power…Human rights refers broadly to personal freedom and other democratic rights. They mainly include the rights to life, of
development and economic and political rights. The freedom and democratic rights that citizens should have in politics are generally called ‘human rights’…

Democracy is diversity (多样的), there is no uniform standard democracy... capitalist democracy is based on the private ownership of production... and socialist democracy is based on the public ownership of production...Regardless of capitalist or socialist democracies, it is to safeguard the rights and interests of the ruling class. It does not allow anyone to shake the existing system and will not give democracy to any subversive power...

Democracy as a national institution and a superstructure, its nature is determined by economic development...Democratic construction is a historical process of gradual development. We must concentrate our efforts on the development of the economy at this stage...China is in the primary stage of socialism. China’s economic and cultural development is backward, so that the economic and cultural conditions for socialist democracy, freedom and human rights are very subtle. Developing socialist democracy needs to proceed from our national situation in the line with Chinese current and historical social conditions, step-by-step, under the leadership of the party...China should never copy the Western model of political systems...China can only develop a socialist-style democracy” (B7-1, 2008, p206, p208; B7-2, 2008, p211, p213; B7-4, 2010, p242, p244).

It can be discerned from these descriptions that: (1). Chinese officials attempt to explore democracy. The official Chinese view divides democracy into a capitalist style and a socialist style, and puts forward some exploratory viewpoints on China’s future development as “socialist democracy”; (2). Socialist democracy is not the same as western style liberal democracy; (3). Chinese socialist democracy serves to maintain the interests of the ruling class; therefore, it does not include everyone. As the textbook says, “democracy” is for “the people” and dictatorship is for “the enemy”; (4). Chinese officials describe “democratic government” as “the people being the
masters of the country”; (5). Chinese understanding of political democracy is deeply influenced by Marxism. These influences can not only be seen from the definition of Chinese socialist democracy--the people's democracy or democratic centralism--which is similar to that suggested by Marx, (Meyer, 1995), also the textbooks often use Marx theory which claimed that the economic foundations of a country determine the development of its superstructure, and to further explain that China has not yet developed the conditions for democratic politics.

From these textbook descriptions, it can be seen that Chinese officials' understanding of democracy is restricted. This restriction indicates that the official view of Chinese socialist democracy is limited. According to scholars, democracy refers to both a political power and a social culture (Harber, 1997). A liberal democratic regime has some common characteristics, such as indicator D1, freedom to organize groups and multi-party government, and indicator D3 tolerance to others and pluralist choices by individuals, as well as indicator D5, an independent judiciary and free speech. The textbooks do not discuss these common characteristics. This suggests that the form of Chinese socialist democracy recognized by the CCP does not contain the features of liberal democracy.

It also can be seen from these descriptions that Chinese officials have narrow views on liberalism, freedom and human rights. The textbook defines “liberalism” as "freedom" and the rights of citizens to participate in the country's political life. The textbooks also suggest that human rights are the political rights of citizens. Human rights are seen as an essential condition of democratization. Human rights specify the minimum conditions for human dignity and a tolerable life. The United Nations (UN, 1948) proclaims a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which includes civil and political rights to “life, freedom and security of person”,
“freedom of movement, thought, conscience and religion” as well as “freedom of peaceful assembly and association” and “freedom to take part in government”. This is a much wider range of human rights than is seen in the textbooks. Instead of discussing these issues, the textbooks focus on a narrow definition of human rights, such as “basic human rights refer to survival and development of life. Without the right to life, there would be no other human rights” (B7-4, 2010, p242). The textbook also emphasizes that the rights of individuals are the same as collective, political, economic, social and cultural rights and civil rights. The textbook suggest that the most important achievement of human rights in China is that the Chinese government organizes poverty alleviation and has solved the needs of food and clothing for millions of people (ibid). This suggests that the CCP has a narrow view of human rights.

Furthermore, the above descriptions suggest that the Chinese government believes that “social stability and economic development are the fundamental condition to achieve democracy”, and that China as a poor country has not achieved the economic conditions to develop political human rights. China should focus on economic development first in order to provide “food and clothing for people”. This view is highly consistent with Dengism.

Simultaneously, the textbooks explain why China has not yet achieved political democracy. These can be summarized as:

- The PRC (China) was born out of a semi-feudal society, so China has not completely eliminated traces of feudal autocratic traditions. It is difficult to instil democratic habits among citizens in a short time.
- China has an under-developed market economy therefore China is not ready to develop democracy in this incomplete economic condition.
- General backwardness and imbalanced levels of cultural and educational developments have limited the depth and breadth of democratisation.
- The Communist regime did not actively develop democracy.
- There is not a robust legal system to protect people's democratic rights (B7-1, 2008, p206, p208; B7-2, 2008, p211, p213; B7-4, 2010, p242, p244).

These descriptions are the views of the authors, the textbooks clearly state that "the Communist regime did not actively develop democracy, and China does not have a robust legal system to protect the people's democratic rights." This is a direct criticism of the Chinese regime.

The views of Chinese officials and the authors are both influenced by modernization theory. Modernists suggest that economic development drives cultural changes and leads to successive modernisation and democratisation (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, p8); economic, cultural and political changes go together in coherent patterns and in predictable ways. Once specific economic changes are known to be taking place, one can make predictions about future cultural and political changes (Dahl, 2000, p331). The Chinese officials believe that economic development is the fundamental condition to achieve democracy and the authors see that an under-developed market economy is one of the reasons that China is not ready to develop democracy.

Although the descriptions of democracy, human rights and freedoms in 2008 and 2010 show certain limitations, they reflect an important indication of attempts to explore democracy from within both the official and authors’ perspectives.

By 2018, the textbooks have very little discussion of "developing socialist democracy" except that there is repetition of the point, "never copy political systems from other countries" (B7-12, 2018, p215). The concepts of "democracy", "capitalist
democracy", "socialist democracy", "freedom" and "human rights" which were specifically addressed in previous textbooks, have been removed from the 2018 textbooks. Descriptions of "citizens' rights and duties" that were discussed in the 1999 and 2003 textbooks and were continued in the textbooks after the 05 Program, are deliberately removed from the 2018 textbook. The title of “Citizen’s Basic Rights and Duties” in the previous textbook is replaced with “Exercise Rights and Duties According to Law” (B7-11, 2018, p215). All of these changes in 2018 strongly suggest that the CCP is no longer exploring the possibility of “socialist democratic politics with Chinese characteristics”.

7.3.3. Chinese Version of “Patriotism” – Nationalism

The suppression of the student movement in 1989, patriotism has become one of the main tasks of political education in Chinese universities. Some contents regarding patriotism in the textbooks have remained the same, such as: love the motherland, love the Chinese nation, and love the Chineseness’ culture, love socialism and the CCP. However, the key points of patriotism have been changed to suit needs of the regime. Firstly, love for the motherland in the 2003 textbooks provided detailed explanations of love for the motherland and the relationship between patriotism and the motherland, but the 2010 textbook addresses the direct requirements of political loyalty to the CCP.

Secondly, patriotic education in Chinese universities has always had a prominently political function to serve the Chinese regime. This function was focused on anti-individualism and anti-Westernization in the 1990s. After 2005, this focused upon narratives against opinions and behaviours related to “Taiwan independence”,

“Tibetan independence” and “Xinjiang independence” to protect national unity. The 2010 textbook states:

“A man of divine mission and duty bound safeguards national unification, ethnic unity and opposes separations, to uphold the principle of one-China against Taiwan independence and ethnic division…Every Chinese citizen should put the security, honour and interests of the state above all else...any attempt aimed at splitting the country, damaging national sovereignty and territory will be firmly combated’ (B7-5, 2010, pp40-41).

Thirdly, the core task of patriotic education in 2003 was to inculcate nationalist morality, but the 2010 textbook emphasises this as a purely political task for correcting students' ideology.

Fourthly, the 2010 textbook explained “Socialist Harmonious Society” (社会主义和谐社会) as one of the main contents of “patriotism”—rather nationalism. “Socialist Harmonious Society” was the idea of Hu Jintao who was the Chinese leader 2003-2013 (B7-5, 2010, pp52-56); the 2018 textbook removed “Socialist Harmonious Society” and replaced it with “China’s Dream”, which was suggested by the current Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

Notably, although only two textbooks were used for the analysis here, these textbooks are uniformly used by all universities in China. From this point of view, the ideas contained in these two textbooks represent the views of the Chinese government at the level of official discourse.

7.3.4. Chineseness Morality and Confucianism

From 2003 onward, the textbooks have introduced the concept of “Chineseness” (中华民族) instead of Chinese. This concept has been described in almost the same
ways in the textbooks from 2003 to 2018. “Chineseness” is a political conception. It is a general name for all ethnic groups in China. In the textbooks, Chineseness is based on Han Chinese and Han dominated regimes, with Confucianism having a dominant position in Chineseness traditions or Chinese culture. The textbooks explain that:

“The good Chineseness moral traditions refers to Confucian ethics, which were created by Confucius, Mencius and the various ethical thoughts, such as Confucianism, Mo (墨), Taoism, Fa (法) and ‘Mind’ (心性) theory of Buddhism. These theories together formed unique Chineseness ethical traditions” (B6-16, 2003-2006, pp107-108).

The textbooks introduce many classic Chinese literatures to explain Confucianism. I summarize these literatures in four points: (1). “Yi (义)” as “the spirit of collectivism and patriotism”—rather nationalism is “the ethical principle of "loyalty" throughout Chinese traditional morality”; (2). "Benevolence (Ren 仁)” as the principle of interpersonal harmony which concerns notions of "love (爱人) and concern for others… in interpersonal relationships, family and society”; (3). “Filial piety (孝)” as ethical values and morality is “charity to parents, being faithful to others and being devoted to the country”; and (4). The highest spiritual achievement is that individuals contribute to others and society without asking anything in return (B6-16, 2003-2006, pp108-124; B7-5, 2010, pp95-98, B7-11, 2018, pp96-98). These narratives suggest that Confucianism is the centre of Chineseness morality from official perspectives.

After 2010, the textbooks reinforce the notion of “one family one nation” as a part of Chineseness in that:

“Chineseness is fused together by a multi-ethnic society. Han and other ethnic minorities have made contributions together to the prosperity and
development of Chineseness. Han itself is the integration of the many ethnic groups in the process of historical development. All ethnic groups have provided many great contributors for the country and nation” (B7-5, 2010, p45).

Moreover, collectivism is encapsulated in the principles and norms of political life, and is intended to guide the moral life of a person. The textbooks repeat that “national interests and the state interests come first, and a person has responsibilities to society, the nation and the state” (B7-5, 2010, pp95-98, B7-11, 2018, pp96-98).

The narratives of Chineseness in the textbooks are in keeping with some catalogues of nationalism. Some scholars (Tamir 1995; Grosby, 2005) have observed that nationalism has made much of the fact that traditions undergo modification, drawing attention to examples of variations or transformations of how the past is selectively appropriated, such that they speak of the “invention” of tradition. According to Tamir (1995, p877), nationalism is a political doctrine that regards the nation as the primary object of loyalty and advances a cultural, social, political and moral point of view in which nations play a central role…a political norm is established to foster the belief in the legitimating principle of politics and state. Nationalists are interested in homogenizing their population: “they intervene in their population’s language, interpretation of history, myths and symbols, or more broadly in their cultural, linguistic, and sometimes religious unification. Their attempts to build a nation lead to the oppression of national minorities.” In China’s case of political education at university level, whatever the conceptions and explanations of “Chineseness”, “Confucianism” or “Confucius tradition”, the textbooks suggest applications of nationalism.
The narratives of Chineseness are in keeping with some catalogues of East Asian Values. According to Tu (2002, p204), East Asian countries, which are influenced by Confucianism, share common characteristics of ethical norms, economic culture, family values, soft authoritarianism, group spirit and consensual politics. These governments are seen as a positive force for social stability, maintaining law and order, providing the basic necessities of life, leadership of a market economy and education.

7.4. Discussion and Summary

This chapter comparatively analysed 12 textbooks of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum after “the 05 Program Reforms” in Chinese HE from 2008 to 2018. The findings indicate that political education in Chinese universities and the “Politics” curriculum has gradually developed towards authoritarianism. The curriculum and the textbooks have been completely unified and are controlled by the regime. It has achieved “One Curriculum (the compulsory “politics” curriculum ), One Textbook” (一纲一本) (four unified textbooks of “the Modern History of China”, “Marxism”, “Morality and Law Basis” and “Maoism and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”) for all universities. This is in keeping with indicator A2, that there is no free access to full information and tolerance to other teaching materials and reading resources. It is also in keeping with indicator A8, that knowledge is a unified instrument of political power as either propaganda or as secrets of the state, official knowledge is not to be debated, official guidance for teaching is via controlled school textbooks, single narratives are presented as absolute and unquestionable. These are features of authoritarianism.
The findings also indicate significant changes to political education. These changes reflect fluctuations of democratization in China during this period. Xi Jinping becoming the leader of China is the turning point. Before that, China continued the trend of economic development with an exploration of soft authoritarianism. After that, Xiism is leading China towards increasing militarism and authoritarianism. In the ideological field, the 2008 and 2010 textbooks continue the trend of de-Marxism from 1999, and developed a Chinese style Marxism: Dengism, Three Representatives and the Scientific Development Concept. These theories provide theoretical support for economic development in China. In terms of political reforms, the 2008 and 2010 editions discuss serious issues of “unguaranteed democratic rights and legitimate rights of the working class” (B7-4, 2010, p338). This suggests that the authors have a better understanding of democracy in terms of the roles of citizens and that individual political and social rights should be protected by laws (Indicator D1, D7). The textbooks also positively affirm the grassroots election system. This system allows individuals at low levels of society to participate in decision-making. Compared with no introduction of this system in the previous texts, these additions suggest important progress towards democratisation. Also, narratives of the rule of law in the 2008 and 2010 textbooks suggest signs of progress towards democratisation by providing more detailed explanations of individual laws. Legal justice is a major step towards democratization. Teaching students’ knowledge of the laws can be seen as a step towards developing democracy.

In contrast, the findings from the analysis of the 2018 textbooks suggest a reversal of social development in terms of democratisation. Xiism has become the most important task of the curriculum. Xiism provides theoretical and political guidance for the Chinese regime to make internal and international policies. Xiism is leading
China towards stronger authoritarianism. Firstly, Xiism is focused upon developing the economy with careful plans in order to develop China into a superpower. Internationally, the Chinese government promotes the “one belt and one road” policy in order to re-structure current international relations so that China becomes the “biggest” country taking part in international affairs. Internally, Xiism emphases firm control of ideology for all Chinese people, to strengthen the leadership of the CCP--as the only legitimate political power in China, and to modernise the Chinese military force into a world-class army in order to be ready to win wars. These features are in keeping with authoritarian indicator A1, that there is no free political choice, and people are to obey authority; and indicator A3, that ideology is given by authority; and in regard to indicator A6, the focus is on economic growth, modernization and reform which benefits the state, and indicator A5, that a single party system with monolithic power is composed of and serves the interests of the few or one elite group only.

Secondly, the narratives of “one country, two system” in the 2008 and 2010 textbooks suggest a trend away from democratization compared with previous textbooks. The idea of “One country, two systems” now focuses upon unifying Taiwan and controlling Hong Kong and Macao. Given Xi’s current use of “One country, two systems” it may prove impossible to promote a multi-system or a pluralist political system in China in the future.

Thirdly, the 2018 textbooks substantially reduce descriptions of the rule of law and no longer explain specific legal content, so university students cannot obtain legal knowledge through this curriculum as before. Compared with the 2010 textbook, the 2018 textbook reflects retrogression in the descriptions of the rule of law.
Fourthly, the 2018 textbook has very little discussion of "developing socialist democracy". The terms "democracy", "capitalist democracy", "socialist democracy", "freedom" and "human rights" which were specifically addressed in previous textbooks, have been removed from the 2018 textbooks. This change reflects retrogression in democratization. This also suggests that the CCP is no longer exploring the possibility of “socialist democratic politics with Chinese characteristics”.

Finally, patriotic education continues to develop towards nationalism and politicisation against democracy. From 2008 onward, “patriotism” has been defined as a social ideology, nationalist morality and norms of behaviours serve the purpose of unifying the nation against all opinions and behaviours related to “Taiwan independence”, “Tibetan independence” and “Xinjiang independence”. Also, Chineseness morality and Confucianism have been used to strengthen nationalism for the same purpose of patriotic education. This is in keeping with the authoritarian catalogues of indicator A4, wherein the country is seen as a homogenous entity and the importance of national unity.

Overall, the findings from 2008 and 2018 at the level of official statements suggest that the CCP has the central power to influence processes of social development as well as democratisation in China, and that the processes of democratization tend to fluctuate during this period. Xi Jingping becoming the leader of China is the turning point. China has changed from following a trend of economic development with soft authoritarianism into a direction consisting of increasing militarism and with stronger features of authoritarianism in the era of Xi.
Chapter 8. Analysis of Classroom Observations and Interviews

Introduction

The main empirical evidence for the findings in this study has been deduced from an analysis of university textbooks. I also collected data from observing Chinese university teaching of political education, in particular the compulsory “Politics” courses. This enabled me to observe how the texts of the “Politics” course were being taught within a classroom setting and how students responded to the texts and the teaching. However, the fieldwork covers only a small sample of teachers and students from five universities. I acknowledge the limitations of this in terms of the small sample size, which does not allow for wider generalizability of the findings. Therefore, the data analysis of classroom observations will not be used to contribute to the literature.

The fieldwork was conducted from 3rd March to 22nd March 2016. I undertook 6 classroom observations and interviewed 6 teachers and 18 students at five universities in China. These universities are at higher, middle and low positions in the university league tables published by the MOE. These universities are located in three areas: a highly economically developed city, a city at the middle level and in an under-developed region respectively. The purpose of choosing these universities in unevenly developed regions was to see whether education levels or economic development levels impacted on the opinions of teachers and students regarding the politics courses among these universities. I acknowledge that this small sample size cannot generalize the findings to all Chinese university contexts, nor represent features of democracy in China as a whole.
In this chapter, I discuss findings from the observations and interviews which reflect features of democracy; I also examine evidence which suggest features against democratisation. The final section is the discussion and conclusion.

8.1. Features towards Democratisation

The findings from the observations and interviews suggest some features which reflect basic elements of democratic values of tolerance, critical thinking and diversity. These features are: 1). All participants showed a strong interest in understanding the world outside China and obtaining different views from other countries. 2). Teachers organized classroom discussions and encouraged students’ critical thinking. 3). The teachers expressed different views compared with those found in the textbooks. 4). The teachers discussed sensitive topics and advocated free speech. 5). The teachers used independently sourced teaching materials.

8.1.1. Obtaining Different Views from Others

During the interviews and classroom observations at five universities, teachers and students showed interest in my research and in obtaining different views from others. When I asked the students who were sitting around me in the classroom, whether they would be willing to participate in my research at B and C universities, many students were happy to do so. At the Normal University, a teacher introduced me as an outside researcher from the University of London; immediately, 11 students volunteered to join the interviews. Also, all of the participants had no hesitation in signing the consent forms. During the interviews, I repeatedly stated that participants could withdraw from my research at any time, but none did. Again, quite a few students and teachers requested my contact details. They clearly showed that they had intentions to keep in touch with me in the future, so that they could gain
information from outside China. They desired to learn and gain understandings from the outside world.

Teachers and students also showed an interest in gaining more understanding of different perspectives regarding the education system, the political curriculum, teaching methods and the issues contained in the textbooks. The history department of the Normal University organized a group discussion with teachers in order to compare political education and history teaching between the UK and China. The discussion was almost entirely focused on the teachers’ questions. These questions covered a large range of political topics, such as how political courses are being taught in European countries, how teachers teach patriotic education in Britain (Teacher Lee L and Peter W). How English schools teach the Opium Wars and Hong Kong issues. They also asked questions relating to contemporary politics in the UK. Teacher Jo Z asked the question: “the British government is elected and different political parties take turns in power. How do they solve the “cohesion” issue of loyalty of the people to the country and to the government?” It is clear that because I am a researcher based in the UK that this impacted upon the direction of the discussion.

Students’ interests were focused upon gaining different perspectives regarding the content of the political curriculum. When they were asked what they thought of the course, their answers can be summarised in 5 aspects:

1. Students did not want to learn what they had already learned in their high school (students C-3) nor the material in the textbooks (students C-7, C-10).
2. Students were more interested in learning unknown knowledge, particularly different opinions from outside of China (students C-6, C-8).
3. Students also preferred to know teachers’ opinions (students C-3, C-7).
4. Students liked to have class discussions which related to current life (student C-4), so as to expand their thinking (student C-7).
5. Students wanted the learning content to be thought-provoking and to make them curious and encourage their critical thinking (student C-5), such as why certain events happened, and how people responded (student C-8) they wanted more historical background information (student C-9). For example, why was China invaded by Japan in the Sino-Japanese war? And how has China dealt with historical events? How has the world responded to these? How have these historical events affected China today and how will China develop in the future (student C-11). These answers clearly suggest that these students have developed some critical thinking skills and are willing to learn from different perspectives.

8.1.2. Classroom Discussion

The findings from classroom observations and interviews suggest that both teachers and students were positive toward classroom discussions. For many students, “discussion can lead to brainstorming and diversifying of knowledge” (student B-15), and “can broaden and deepen our thinking” (student B-16). In particular, Student C-2 said that “discussion allows us to learn different points of view from others”, and “lets us know whether someone shares our opinions or disagrees with us” (Student C-1).

For teachers, “students’ opinions are quite distinctive” (Lucks. L). “Many teachers organised classroom discussions in the university” (teachers Lucks and Helen). Teacher Lucks. L introduced the flipped learning method for organizing classroom discussions:

“I give a discussion question to students a week early so they can prepare their answers. In class, I teach first, and then lead the discussion questions. Generally, discussion panels are divided by groups of living quarters, because the same students who live in the same room together are willing to talk openly. There are about 7 or 8 students in each group. Sometimes,
discussion panels are divided by the common interests of students… A team leader is responsible for recording and representing discussions”.

The most commonly employed classroom discussion method used was that teachers asked questions first, and then students raised their hands to answer. Normally, teachers did not say anything about the topic that they were going to discuss. The students reported. “Teachers listened to us first, and then they expressed their views” (Students X-17, X-18). Sometimes, “students make their own PowerPoint to present learning from the texts in the classroom and some students stood up and discussed it” (student, X-18).

A large number of themes in the textbooks have been discussed, such as the relationship between “matter and consciousness” (Student X-17), the activities of the CCP and the KMT during the Sino-Japanese War (Lucks. L). Students give different answers compared to the textbooks (Student X-17). For example, student X-18 stated:

“When we discussed the issue of whether the Qing government was forced to sign the "Treaty of Shimonoseki"… students had a variety of perspectives. I remembered that two students affirmed the treaty as humiliating; another boy discussed domestic issues in Japan caused by the signing of the treaty. He explained how this treaty had affected China and Japan more widely…I also answered, but my method of answering was not the same as others. Others discussed it based on the results; my opinion was based on a comparison. The teacher said that this was a good method to answer the questions. Since then, I always answer a question by comparing two points of views”.

The classroom observations also suggest that students have distinctive opinions. During two hours teaching of “The History of Modern and Contemporary China” at Timothy University, teacher Helen managed a discussion about politicians Lin Zexu and Li Hongzhang as well as their political activities during the Qing Dynasty. This
question has been argued over for many years in China. According to the official views in the textbook, Lin Zexu is a patriot. “His destruction of opium in June 1839 in Guangdong was an action to completely safeguard the national interests and national dignity” (B7-7, 20165, p11); Li Hongzhang is a national traitor. He is “an agent fostered by the capitalist-imperialists (资本-帝国主义) who wanted to control Chinese politics and turn the Chinese government into their docile tool” (B7-7, 2015, p26).

Before the discussion, teacher Helen explained the contrasting views concerning Lin and Li. The criticisers suggested that Lin should be held responsible for the outbreak and consequences of the war, because he misunderstood the situation at that time, so he acted in wrong and arrogant ways. Lin and others' intransigence led to the outbreak of the war. By contrast, others claimed that Li was a hero who protected national interests.

Teacher Helen encouraged students to consider questions regarding “which views make sense? Do you agree with this or not?” The classroom discussion went well. Students stood up and expressed their views one by one. Earlier in the class, many students did not pay attention to what the teacher was teaching. Many students were playing with their phones, reading magazines or even talking to each other. However, when the students themselves were expressing their opinions, the class became very quiet. All of the students were trying to listen.

Students’ opinions on Li Hongzhang and Lin Zexu were different. Some students agreed with the textbook, others disagreed. For example, a student commented on the Chinese official judgement on Li that:
“I do not agree with the evaluation of Li. Li did sign a lot of unequal treaties, but he also resisted foreign aggression. He was born in that particular era. He did not have another choice (to solve the problem). The Qing government was defeated in these wars, but the Qing was afraid to admit this and take responsibility. Each time, Li was sent out to clean up the mess…”

“Li might be misunderstood by us. For example, during the naval battle in the Sino-Japanese war (甲午海战), Li’s Northern Navy (北洋海军) was annihilated. We only see that he begged those countries, such as Britain and America to mediate between China and Japan; we only see that he surrendered to the Japanese, we have not seen how difficult it was to manage the Northern Navy. At that time, Weng Tonghe, who was trusted by the Emperor, was in charge of finance. Weng did not give the Northern Navy a penny for five years. As a consequence, Li could not even afford to buy shells, so that a large amount of shells contained sand…”

“Placing the blame on him is not right. Li visited many countries. He introduced a lot of advanced western technologies to China, such as iron shell warships. At that time, Western diplomats called him East Bismarck because of his strong character. After his death, the evaluation of him remains controversial. I think that it is not fair to call him a capitulator. I disagree to simply classified Li as a capitulator.”

Teacher Helen did not use the official answer in the textbooks to correct students. Instead, she encouraged them: “to love reading is a good habit to adhere to”.

Teachers also showed respect for students’ opinions. Teacher Helen said: “students describe things from different angles, they have unique perspectives”. Teacher Rachael was more open to students, she said:

“I ask questions in the class, because I want to know students’ opinions. They have their views, I have mine. Sometimes I also talk about other academics’ opinions. By doing this we broaden everyone’s horizons ... I certainly hope that students can accept my opinions. If what I say makes sense, then they
will be able to accept it; but if I say something unreasonable, they might not accept it”.

Furthermore, students were encouraged to take part in classroom discussions by being given higher scores in their assessments. Teacher X said: “if a student takes part in a discussion in class, I’ll write this student’s name down as a credit for the student’s achievement. At the end of term, I'll give this student a higher score than the others who have never taken part in classroom discussions”. This method was also used by teachers Racheal, Helen and Lee. Notably, whether students gave “correct answers” in the discussion or not, this did not affect their gaining of credits. Teachers considered awarding credits on the basis of whether students took part in discussion or not. In this way, students were encouraged to express their opinions during discussions, which truly encouraged students’ critical thinking skills.

8.1.3. Teachers Expressed Their Own Opinions

Teachers did not accept all of the opinions in the textbooks. They have thought about the issues independently and expressed different opinions in their lectures in several ways. Teacher Jo. Z at the Normal University explained:

“Textbooks are written in a simple language, which students can easily understand. I think that it is not helpful for students. If I only repeat the content of the textbooks students will not appreciate me as a teacher. I have always considered to what extent the teaching in the textbooks can be extended? Nowadays, we live in an era in which information is exchanged very fast. By accessing the Internet, students can learn a lot of things and gain opinions, which are different from the official print media and Chinese Central Television (CCTV). If I were to repeat the same points of view as given in the print media, students might not want to learn, they would fall asleep”. 
“Texts in the textbooks are often contradictory, such as the Three Confidences. The textbook shows that (we are) self-confident, while the reforms suggest we have entered a crucial phase of development. If we are confident, that means that this system is the best, so we do not need reform and more crucially; if we are being reformed, it means there is something wrong with the system. See, there is contradiction here. Is our system right or wrong? Also, the principles of Marxism are introduced earlier in the textbooks but are not explained in the same manner later in the books.”

Some teachers directly expressed their own opinions. When teacher Rachael at the Financial University taught Chinese modern history regarding the war against eight countries in China in 1900, she commented that Li fully demonstrated his political wisdom, in which Li combined with many ministers in southern China to implement “the South-East Protection” (东南互保) and refused to fight those eight countries. Therefore, teacher Rachael concluded: “Li and his followers played a significant role for achieving social stability in China at that time”. This opinion is in opposition to the negative views regarding Li’s role contained in the textbook. This teaching method not only expanded students’ ideas, it also inspired the students’ critical thinking abilities.

Teachers also used existing research to refute official statements in the textbooks. For example, teacher Helen at Timothy University gave a lecture concerning the Opium War--covering the section referring to “the invasion of foreign capitalism and semi-feudal society of modern China” (B7-7, 2015, p10). She emphasised the positive influences that the war brought to China. She said:

“The aggression of capitalist - imperialists brought advanced technology to the colonies... Some people suggest that the advanced countries promoted positive impacts in backward countries. We also recognize this point of view. If we see things from the perspective of world history, we would know that
development of countries in the world can be faster or slower. Britain developed capitalism first, France developed capitalism later than Britain. Russia and Germany developed later than France. This phenomenon suggests that even in the West, the speed of capitalist development varied. It can be said that those backward countries were positively affected and pushed by the countries which promoted capitalism earlier. These affections (learning from advanced countries) can be peaceful exchanges, but most times, it is intense struggle (between countries)... We claim that the advanced countries aggression against the backward countries is a driving force for the backward country to catch up”.

“We” in this statement means that teacher Helen endorsed this view. This is different from the official Chinese view of the Opium War, which according to the textbooks:

“from the 18th century ... in order to hasten capitalist development in the West, Western powers promoted colonialism by exploitation, plunder, oppression, and enslavement in Asia, Africa, Americas and Oceania ... the purpose of western colonial forces in Oriental countries ... was to make this region colonial and semi-colonial, as well as to become their economic and political vassal ... so that China was facing a profound crisis of survival” (B7-7, 2015, p10).

It can be seen from the textbook that the Chinese official opinion of the Opium War was that, a particular form of colonialism by Western powers caused China “a profound crisis of survival”. This is in contrast to the analysis of teacher Helen that western countries “bring advanced technology to China”. (The Opium War) and become a driving force for China to catch up”. This teaching shows a diversity of views on this subject, which can inspire critical thinking in students.

Teachers often discussed teaching texts related to other issues. For example, Teacher Rachael extended criticism from the Boxer Rebellion (义和団) to other behaviour which related to history and to current China. She said:
“Objectively speaking, the Boxer Rebellion has an ignorant and brutal side. They killed foreign people, but they killed many more Chinese people, who were in contact with westerners, such as businessmen and religious followers. It was also a very cruel killing. They picked out babies from mothers’ wombs. Should we oppose this behaviour? We should… In the Diaoyu Island incident, the action of smashing Japanese products was wrong...

Some people suggest that the phenomenon of the Boxer Rebellion movement (义和团运动) was a religious controversy. It is a dispute between the Taoism of the Boxers and Christianity. Others believed that internal power struggles of the Qing government resulted in the growth of the Boxers...

Chinese traditional culture advocates violence. Sui Hu《水浒》 is an example. We are happy to see bad guys killed, but we do not see that violence is against law. This should not be encouraged. We want a law-based society, we should follow the rule of law and respect for the law...

I wonder why Chinese people hate foreign churches so much. I have read a lot of articles. There are many misunderstandings about the church. Some people believe that Chinese infants were killed in church. Is it right? As we know, the church has many functions, one of which is adopting abandoned children. In the past, many women gave birth but they did not or could not bring them up. So, they sent these babies to a church. Some of those infants were sick or disabled. If an infant was outside of a church all night, cold, hungry and ill and if the church did not find the baby in time, there might be a great chance that the baby would get sick or die. It can be imagined that some sick infants did die in church. So misunderstandings of the roles of foreign churches are understandable.”

Furthermore, teachers used heuristic teaching methods to elaborate their opinions. Teacher Lucks at Technology University said: “I give students open answers. I do not want to tell them what is right or wrong. I let them think for themselves”. In the classroom, teacher Lucks encouraged students:
"You will not gain definite answer from me. When you have become university students, you should not look for easy answers. The era of teachers telling you a definite answer in high school has gone forever. You should ask a few whys before you answer a question."

In another classroom at Normal University, teacher Rachael questioned the texts of the official teaching materials. According to the textbooks, the war against the eight countries was positively narrated as that: “in the previous wars against foreign aggression, patriotic soldiers performed bravely with indomitable fighting spirit. They had won some battles. When the eight allied forces (八国联军) invaded China in 1900, the Boxers Rebellion (义和团) and the Qing soldiers waged a desperate battle” (B7-7, 2015, p33). Teacher Rachael questioned:

“I do not know where the confidence of Empress Cixi (慈禧) (the head of the Qing Government) came from to win this war. As we know, we had just lost the Sino-Japanese War with Japan. We were a large country, but we lost to such a small country – Japan. How could we win against eight western countries?”

Commonly, China is believed to be one of four ancient civilizations in the world.

“Following the Nile Valley civilization, Mesopotamian civilization and the Indus Valley civilizations, Huaxia civilization (the same as Chineseness civilization) appeared in China... China is one of the most ancient civilizations in the world” (B7-3, 2008, p1). This is the text of the “Politics” course in high school. This statement is developed in the textbook of the universities into: “ancient China's economic development and science and technology have been ahead of the world for a long-time” (B7-7, 2015, p7). Teacher Lucks rejected this argument. He asked students: "are there really four ancient civilizations in the world? No. This formulation was suggested by Liang Qichao (a reformer in the Qing government). His purpose was to arouse national
pride, so he put forward the statement of four ancient civilizations ... During developmental processes of human history, each region has its own civilization ... I do not think that one is better than another ... Mediterranean civilization and our civilization are not the same, but none are better than others”.

Teacher Lucks also raised objections to the “history of 5,000 years of Chinese civilization” (B7-7, 2005, p7). Teacher Lucks asked:

“Has Chinese civilization had a history of 5,000 years of civilization? I tell you, Chinese civilization is 3,500 years old. This is not what I said. It is shown in China’s propaganda materials for foreign readers. Research history should be based on facts. Oracle (甲骨文) is the earliest writing found in China, it described the history of the Shang Dynasty. Shang started roughly from 1600 BC, plus 2,000 years AD, so it is about 3,500 years old. Where does 5000 years of civilization come from?”

It can be seen from the narratives above, that teacher Rachael and teacher Lucks challenged the official Chinese opinions in the textbooks. This method of teaching by giving multiple-answers inspires students’ critical thinking immediately. I observed that after teacher Lucks explained Chinese civilization, none of students give the definite answer which they had learned in their high schools.

8.1.4. Using Non-official Teaching Materials

During the classroom observations at the five universities, teachers almost always taught the first two chapters of the textbooks of “Modern Chinese History”. All teachers also used teaching materials which were not appointed by Chinese authority in the classroom. According to the textbooks, 7 reading materials and 4 extended reading literatures in chapters I and II were approved (B7-7, 2015, p20, p42).
In the classroom, no teachers mentioned these readings to students. They all used other materials in their classes. For example, teacher Peter at Capital University cited the "Shuo When Jie Zi" 《说文解字》 and Qian Mu: (1938) the "Outline of Chinese History"; teacher Jo. Z at Normal University quoted Ren Zhongyi: "Political Reform Requires more Courage" and "Deng Xiaoping Chronicle" (1975-1997); as well as western works: "Silent Spring", (1962), "Only One Earth" (1972) and the United Nations "The Limits to Growth", a movie "The Little Mermaid", Manchester Rees "Third Century of Economic Development"; teacher Helen at Timothy University cited Li Huaguo "Talk About Modern History"; teacher Lucks at Technology University cited British scholar’s opinion of four great inventions of China and Liang Qichao’s ideas regarding the four ancient civilizations.

Using outside materials in class teaching can be of benefit to students. Through these extended reading materials, students obtain more information and new knowledge, which are different compared with the textbooks.

8.1.5. Discussions of Politically Sensitive Topics

During the interviews and classroom observations, teachers discussed politically sensitive topics. These topics included freedom of expression and social justice regarding economic development during the post Mao era.

Within the five universities where I observed, the Normal University was the only one located in an underdeveloped economic region. It is also classified as a third class university on the university league tables published by the MOE. In the classroom, teacher Jo gave a lecture about the officially promoted ideology: “Dengism” and “Three Representatives”. She quickly read these theories from the textbook without much explanation. I was not sure whether the students understood these theories or
not, but I noticed that very few students listened to her or read the textbook. Then, the teacher spent a lot of time talking about freedom of speech. I noticed that students then became more interested in what she was saying. She said:

“Free speech is a right guaranteed by the Constitution. I may not agree with you, but I defend to death your right to free speech... The former Premier Wen Jiabao asked: ‘How can a person live with dignity?’ He said that ‘to live upon the constitutional basic rights of people, which are personal freedoms and human rights’...

You can also see different views concerning human rights from the internet. Some people advocated human rights and free speech, but others denied them...For example, when President Xi was visiting CCTV and other media he said that the media belongs to the Party. Some people disagree with this, such as Ren Ziqiang. Ren said that ‘the media should not belong to the party; it should belong to the people’. Four newspapers, Xinhua News, Youth Daily, Denon and Renmin strongly criticized Ren on their websites without any evidence, using language from the Cultural Revolution. However, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission suggested that ‘everyone has the right to speak, and everyone should have freedom and human rights’...

President Xi also said that ‘people are not allowed to eat from the party, and then smash the pot of the party’. I think this is a little bit vulgar, because it suggests that the party has special interests and privileges, as if only the party has food. Many students are party members. You vow under the party’s flag that you will work hard for life for communism; none of you would say that the purpose of joining the party is for the food of the party. Joining the party for food is too vulgar. Also, if the party has food, then, who gives the food to the party? Party members do not create it, especially not the top members of the party. The party members do not create anything, people do. During the two sessions recently, a reporter from Bloomberg News asked: ‘where does the party’s funding come from?’ The spokesman finally admitted that this comes from national funding, which means from all the taxpayers”.
Freedom of expression is seen as a basic element of democracy (Crick, 2002). The right of “citizens to freedom of speech” is confirmed in the Chinese constitution and in the textbooks of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum. However, the current Chinese government requires that media must express the same views as the party. The new teaching guidelines for the course also require teaching students the same notions as the party. To deal with this contradiction, teacher Jo used the party leaders’ speech, and the former Primer When Jiabao, or the constitution, to justify her advocating the right of free speech.

Social justice is an important feature of democracy. According to Veugelers (2011), democracy is a form of living together in society. It focuses on equal political and social relations that aim for social justice. In my observations, I noticed that some teachers considered and talked about social justice in their classroom. For example, teacher Jo at Normal University exemplified many social issues in her class in order to illustrate the point that everyone should benefit from the outcomes of economic development. The teacher discussed some current social conflicts issues, such as Shuangyashan miners’ processions, the Tonghua event and the recent Nanping School killings. These events were caused by social injustice and rich-poor divisions. For example, 80,000 miners in the Shuanyashan coal mine worked for four months without any pay. At the same time, the boss of the mine has become very rich. The local government not only ignored the requests of the miners, but also lied to the media. In March 2016, thousands of miners protested in the streets to demand payment.

Teacher Jo suggested students think about the questions: “who should enjoy the fruits of economic development? Whether there is common prosperity?” It can be
said that teacher Jo not only highlighted important democratic elements of social justice, but also developed students’ critical thinking skills.

Another teacher, Lucks. L at Technology University criticised a common phenomenon in universities, that of using serious research to serve politics. He said: “saying that we have five thousand years of civilization is a patriotic and a political statement. I hate how some talk about historical issues based on “patriotism”. It seems that if someone saying Chinese civilization is older, this person is a patriot; if someone is saying Chinese civilization is not that old, this person would be seen as not having love for the country. If I say that China has 8000 years of civilization, does this mean that I love the country more than the person who says China has 5,000 years of civilization?” This way of teaching can also develop students’ critical thinking skills.

Generally speaking, there is a political risk if teachers discuss sensitive events in China, teachers would be very careful to avoid expressing any politically sensitive opinions. During the classroom observation in Jo’s class, I was told that this teacher often said something “radical”, which means the school already knew that this teacher discussed politically sensitive issues in the classroom, but the school let her continue teaching in this way. This suggests that this school has a more inclusive learning environment and the school is more tolerant towards teachers, and these teaching methods also encouraged the students to explore events more critically.

8.2. Features against Democratization

The findings from the classroom observations and interviews show some features which can be interpreted as being against democratic development in China. These
features include a centralized CE curriculum and negative impacts of the curriculum on students and teachers.

The findings from the classroom observations and interviews suggest that the compulsory “Politics” curriculum is heavily centralised and controlled by the government. This centralised education system consists of curriculum design, teaching methods, classroom management, homework, assignments and enrolment management. This system shows the features of an authoritarian style CE with three aspects.

1. The compulsory “Politics” curriculum is unified and set by the central government with strict course management. In the interviews, all almost participants clearly stated that schools, teachers and students have no power to withdraw from this course, they must take it. In addition, there are always planned schemes of work for the courses. Teachers all use a unified teaching schedule and prepare lessons together (Interviewees, Helen, Lucks, Racheal, Lee, Peter and Jo).

The compulsory course “Modern Chinese History” was taught at all five of the universities where I observed classes. The courses all started on the same date 29th February 2016. The first week of teaching the course was an induction and was the same at all of the universities. All teachers talked about why the university established this course, and what the students would learn. They also explained the examinations, the attendance requirements, credit calculations and the serious consequences for students who were absent or failed the course. In the third week, four universities I visited all followed the scheme of work and lesson plan to teach “Chapter I, the Struggle against Foreign Aggression” in the classroom.
(2). Textbooks and teaching materials are specified by the state. The compulsory “Politics” curriculum is an ideological and political course established by the Political Bureau of the Central Propaganda Department and the Central Organization Department. “The Ministry of Education cannot decide matters affecting this course. Both Universities and teachers do not have their own textbooks … The textbooks and teaching guidance are unified … 70 million teachers and students in the country use the same one book as well as reading materials” (Teacher Lucks and Lee). “For students, the textbooks are provided by the school”. “Students rarely buy books or other readings for the course”. (student X-17)

(3). The compulsory “Politics” curriculum has specific learning aims and teaching methods that are directly required by the MOE. At Normal University, teacher Jo Z described the aim of the course (Maoism and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics) “is to train students to be qualified successors of socialism. So we are trainers … I convey (this aim) to the students according to the textbooks”. Teacher Lucks. L at Technology University also agreed that: “the course (Modern and Contemporary History of China) contains political and ideological missions. If students show different opinions from the textbooks, I would give more reasons to put them right. We cannot allow students to enjoy their own opinions; we will try to achieve this purpose in our teaching”.

The Classroom observations also confirmed that indoctrination is used as a teaching method. Indoctrination consists of two aspects, firstly repeatedly giving similar texts to students without discussion and argument. For instance, the courses of “Modern Chinese History” and “Marxism” or “Dengism” have been established at junior high school, senior high school and university. The themes of these courses are similar, and the details in the descriptions are the same. The purpose of the course is to
force students to accept official opinions regardless of whether teachers and students agree or not. As teacher Lucks said: “I do not know whether students accept what we teach or not, we just constantly teach the same things in the classroom until they accept them”.

When teacher Jo was giving a lecture about “Dengism” and “the Three Representatives” in the classroom, she did not give any explanation or other reading materials or discussion. She only read the textbook word for word. For this boring and dry teaching method, Jo explained: “I believe that the purpose of the course is to indoctrinate the official aims to students ... It is ok if I just indoctrinate the purpose of the party to students”.

Some teachers avoid discussion in the class on purpose. Teacher Jo said:

“I do not organize classroom discussions, because discussions may cause political trouble. I also cannot give answers to students... we should have discussions, teachers should not give students any final conclusions. We should allow students to speak freely. However, the reality is that whatever the students say in a discussion, (we) finally have to return to the official answer given in the textbooks. It does not make sense to have discussions. Therefore, I do not organize any discussions”.

The analysis above suggests that the compulsory “Politics” curriculum may negatively affect students' psychological and personality development. As the analysis shows, the compulsory “Politics” curriculum has been repeated at different levels at primary and secondary education, so that “all college students are very familiar with the contents of the curriculum” (interviewee Lucks, Peter). However, students have to learn this course again at university regardless of whether students like it or not and need it or not. During the classroom observations, except for a few students, who sat in the front of the classes, almost all students did not take any
notes. They were talking, playing with mobile phones, reading other books or having
day dreams. Students did not read textbooks or other materials for this course after
school (student X-18). It is clear that indoctrination by teaching the same official texts
without any discussion disgusted almost all of the students. As student B-16 said
that “the course is so tiring, very boring and dry”.

Nonetheless, the “Politics” course has significant impacts on “correcting” students’
thinking and behaviours. Students acknowledge that “indoctrination is very powerful”
(student, B-16). Although students disliked this course, they take it seriously.
Students spent a lot of time preparing all of the official answers for the exams,
although privately they may disagree with them. They also write the official answers
on their exam papers, because, as student C-2 explained “the exam’s results are
very important for us in order to get our degrees”.

As a consequence, this course narrows students’ minds and restricts their critical
thinking abilities. Students have been trained to give the same answers as Chinese
officials. Student X-18 said: “we have been educated for more than ten years. We
have become accustomed. When we are answering questions, (we) give a definite
answer first, and then tell our own opinions. I would feel unsafe without this
affirmative answer”. Here, “give our opinions” does not mean that they give their own
opinion; it means that they provide the definite answer from the textbooks. As
student X-17 said: “(we) give a definite answer about whether this question is right or
wrong, and then narrate a justification for our answers”. It can be said that many
years of the compulsory “Politics” learning, students are deeply aware that accepting
and using the officially provided opinions and answers is the safest way to conduct
their studies at university and to progress on to getting a job, and even to live safely
in China. This is the power that the “Politics” curriculum has over students’ lives.
Furthermore, this course negatively affects teachers in terms of free speech. Teachers are afraid to express their own opinions openly, such as teacher Jo. Z, who had prepared many slides of a Power Point for her teaching, but was “afraid to use them”. Teachers are also afraid to talk about current situations if these are politically sensitive. There were some inconsistencies within the tasks they were teaching in the classroom. For example, on the one hand, teacher Helen at Timothy University suggested that backward countries, such as China would be “bullied” by advanced countries; on the other hand, she also claimed that advanced countries brought positive impacts to backward nations. Teacher Jo. Z taught students that: “Maoism, Dengism and the important thought of Three Representatives are in the same strain of Chinese Marxism”. In contrast, later in the interview when we discussed the differences between Leninism and Marxism, she gave a contrasting opinion compared with that given in her class. She said:

“China always says that the October Revolution in Russia brought Marxism to China. Essentially, it brought Leninism to China. There are about 20 million words of Marx writings, but how many Chinese people carefully read these writings? Very few. Democratic socialism is also Marxism. Marxism in Eastern Europe and in our country is not the same.”

Here, she was telling me that Marxism is not the same as Maoism. This is different compared with what she had said in the class. This phenomenon of different opinions regarding the same topic suggests that she was afraid to express her real opinions in public.

8.3. Discussion and Summary

The findings from the analysis of classroom observations and interviews show varying and conflicting phenomenon concerning the compulsory “Politics” curriculum.
On the one hand, the findings suggest some patterns towards the development of democracy; on the other hand, the findings indicate strong characteristics of authoritarianism. As I discussed in the literature review, a fully democratic society entails a political culture that promotes values of tolerance, diversity, civility and mutual respect between individuals and groups (Freedom House, 2008); citizens have freedom of expression and access to alternative, independent sources of information (Dahl, 2000). By contrast, in an authoritarian society, the government employs arbitrary power. There is no tolerance of a range of viewpoints; diversity and critical thought are not encouraged. The role of people is to obey and do what they are told to do. Communication is top-down and hierarchical (Harber, 1997).

The analysis of classroom observations and interviews suggests some traces of a democratic political culture. For examples, some teachers and students want to increase their knowledge and understandings from sources outside China. Although the Chinese government strictly controls education, particular political education, however, teachers have found their own ways to express themselves and to cooperate with outsider researchers. The teachings and discussions in the classroom show some understandings of democratic values, such as social justice that everyone should be benefit from economic development, and tolerance towards other ideas and freedom of expression. In the classroom, teachers talked directly from their own points of view which were different from those in the textbooks; they also cited other scholars' opinions and used extracurricular materials. The teachers openly discussed politically sensitive topics and criticized the Party leader's instruction that the media should belong to the party. All of these methods of teaching encouraged open dialogue and debate, although these could not be used for students' examinations, but they can inspire students to think more critically. In
addition, these findings suggest that at these five universities, whether located in an advanced political, economic and cultural area or not, teachers are ready to extend their understandings and practice of democracy.

The findings also share some similar results discussed in chapter 4, that the Chinese government is the dominant power in political education, and that the compulsory “Politics” curriculum in universities is an important part of higher education and plays a significant role in implementing the will of the CCP. Political education is highly centralized, including curriculum content and classroom management, textbook design and learning evaluations. Classroom teaching schedules are uniform and regulated. Teachers and students are subject to the provisions of the CCP on the key issues of teaching and learning.

Moreover, the finding suggests that the “Politics” curriculum has a profound impact on teachers and students. As I discussed in chapter 4, political education in universities in China is closely related to the real lives of teachers and students. The “Politics” curriculum has been established at all universities. For teachers, whether they agree or disagree with opinions in the textbooks, they teach most of the content from the textbooks; for the students, whether they like the courses or not, they have to attend all of the courses and carefully prepare for the course exam, giving the approved answers from the textbooks. As one interviewee noted “the exam for the course and the evaluations of student’s behaviour during the course are significant factors for assessing student awards and to obtain scholarships, as well as to obtain the necessary credits for their degree” (teacher Lucks. L). This indicates that the authoritarian powers of the Chinese government deeply impact upon the behaviours of teachers and students. Whatever the teachers and students practice in terms of discussions, debates or critical thinking in the classrooms, they are all well aware
that they have to meet the requirements of the government in order to gain their degrees. In fact, the interviewed students always represented the unified and approved answers as given by authority in all their examinations.
Chapter 9. Discussion and Conclusion

Introduction

The aim of this study is to explore whether CE in HE in China has developed traces of a democratic political culture during the post Mao era from 1978 to 2018. In order to provide a range of indicators for the analysis of democratization in CE in China, I have discussed debates regarding definitions of democracy and democratization that refer to modernisation theory, East Asian Values and Marxist ideas of democracy, as well as their applications. I have also presented my own working definitions and understandings of democracy and democratization, and distinguished characteristics of ideal-typical democratic and authoritarian regimes for the empirical analysis.

The empirical analysis consists of the themes of officially promoted ideology, the official definitions of the regime and the political system, and the official and authors’ understandings of democracy and values that are represented in the textbooks of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum at Chinese universities. In order to make connections between democratisation studies and the empirical analysis, I have discussed multiple forms of citizenship education development. I have also discussed developments in political education in Chinese higher education and the role of universities in democratisation. Moreover, I identified broad periodization of political education in Chinese higher education from 1978 to 2018. This periodization consists of the “85 Program reforms”, the “98 Program Reform”, and the “05 Program Reforms”. Beside these, political education changed remarkably in early 1990s and after Xi Jin-ping became the leader of the CCP in 2013. Each period of political education has distinct features.
I am now in a position to assess the developments of political education in Chinese HE, and to assess the processes of democratization in CE in Chinese HE which are suggested by the analysis of the key themes, with application of relevant theories.

9.1. Discussion of Chinese Higher Education and Democratisation

In this study, I identified periodization of political education in Chinese higher education and how this has changed from 1978. I also summarised distinct features of each period of political education shown in the table below.

**T-9-1. Periodization and Features of Development of Political Education in HE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Main task</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Textbooks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978 - early 1980s</td>
<td>re-establish national exam system, curriculum, textbooks</td>
<td>Towards disciplines for needs of nation-building and industrialisation with developing science and technology.</td>
<td>effectively controlled</td>
<td>Marxism-Leninism The “Four Cardinal Principles”-- of Marxism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the CCP leadership and the Socialist Road; Removed the concept of “Class struggle” and shifted towards the inculcation of personal and civic morality</td>
<td>one national syllabus and one textbook</td>
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<tr>
<td>The 85 Program mid-1980 - 1990</td>
<td>adjust the relationship between economic needs and education</td>
<td>Cultivating higher level technicians and skilful scientists for modernisation</td>
<td>Loosely controlled</td>
<td>Largely reduced Marxism. Discussions of political economy, international relations, and current events. No longer required students to have communist outlooks on life.</td>
<td>Towards decentralisation. Official guidelines with several syllabuses for individuals to</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Textbooks Produced</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>Generated stability in HE. Deeply reviewed the Chinese modern history and the national situation.</td>
<td>A converged syllabus; individuals could produce textbooks, but some were largely changed back to the style of the Cultural Revolution</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Using Marxist view to resist liberalism, individualism and Westernization. Loyalty to the CCP, and socialist beliefs.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Started centralization across primary, secondary and HE ..</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Patriotic education, territorial integrity, national unity, and national pride; knowledge and appropriate attitudes about international relations, socialist system, state and CCP legitimacy, a national consciousness of China.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Patriotic activities outside of schools, which involved museums, memorials, media, arts, festivals and public holidays.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The 98 Program</td>
<td>Establish world-class universities. Marketization of HE;</td>
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<td>1993 - 2003</td>
<td>Quality Education. Against foreign invasion. Beliefs in crucial role of the CCP</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Increasing political control whilst attempting to nurture creative thinkers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>The 05 Program</td>
<td>Strengthen control in HE</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perpetuate a legacy of strong moral and political socialization</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Completely and systemically centralized</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Knowledge of citizens’ duties and laws, the structures of the government. Collectivist values. Faith in territorial integrity, national unity, and national pride, socialism,</td>
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9.1.1. Periodization of Political Education

This study suggests that developments in Chinese political education in HE fall into three broad periods during the post Mao era.

The first period is “the 85 Program” reforms from 1978 and throughout the 1980s. Political education in Chinese higher education developed towards decentralisation and de-politicisation at the level of official discourse. During the early days of this period, the MOE focused upon re-establishing the political education and curriculum. The CCP effectively controlled political education to suit the different purposes and needs of the CCP. The political curriculum only presents the officially promoted ideology, such as Marxism, Leninism and Maoism which were described as “the only truth” to demonstrate the superiority of socialism and the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The purpose of the curriculum was to correct students’ ideology, and to provide legitimacy to the CCP regime. However, political education had some significant developments after “the 85 Program” reforms. Different descriptions
appeared between the textbooks, such as distinct views concerning criticism of the policies of Stalin and Mao, Maoism and the CCP, and four different opinions on “the reforms”; in particular, the concept of "class struggle" which was removed from the textbooks. These developments indicate a tolerance of diversity in the sanctioning of political education. As Jones (2005) suggests, during the 1980s the politicisation of textual content was diluted and the emphasis in the textbook started to shift towards the inculcation of personal and civic morality. Also, teaching of Marxism was largely reduced, students were no longer required to have communist outlooks on life; political economy, international relations, and current events were discussed in the classrooms.

Notably, political education changed after the Tiananmen “democracy movement” in 1989 for a couple of years. The central government implemented patriotic education, and reviewed the teaching of the modern history of China, the national situation, loyalty to the CCP, and socialist beliefs. The text and language were largely changed back to imitate the style of the Cultural Revolution. “Patriotism” was repeated as a political norm wherein there is unconditional obedience to the CCP regime, as well as an imperative to sacrifice personal interests to safeguard collective interests. A trend initiated by the CCP against liberalism can also be evidenced from the narratives of anti-individualism and anti-westernization. Although this period is short, however, anti-liberalisation, anti-individualism and anti-westernization with a particular focus against the western political system of the separation of powers and the parliamentary system became a major task of political education in Chinese universities since then.

The second period is the “98 Program Reform” from early 1990s to 2003. Soon after Deng’s “South Speech” in 1992, China moved towards developing political culture
with procedural and substantive rights. The MOE adjusted the relationship between developing the economy and learning in HE. Cultivating higher level technicians and skilful scientists for the needs of economic development became the primary task of Chinese HE. The Chinese government also developed a clear policy of marketization of Chinese HE with political control of universities. Political education largely changed. “Dengism” from 1999 and “Three Represents” from 2003 replaced traditional Marxism as the main task of political education. At the same time, a large amount of new knowledge, such as concerning the structures of the Chinese political system were introduced to universities students. There are also the differing explanations and perspectives regarding political reforms in the political textbooks, such as establishing an elective PC system, multi-party participants for the CPPCC system and more autonomous power within the EMAR system, as well as implementing “one country with two systems” and the rule of law. Moreover, the official standard textbooks include many detailed discussions of democratic knowledge, such as citizens’ rights and human rights, and highlight the advantages of political democracy.

The third period “the 05 Program Reforms” started from 2003 until 2013, when the political curriculum in HE was completely and systemically centralized. Patriotic education which had begun in 1990 further developed into Chinese nationalism. Political curriculum and the textbooks in Chinese universities were completely unified and controlled by the regime. It has achieved “One Curriculum (the compulsory “politics” curriculum ), One Textbook” (一纲一本) (four unified textbooks of “the Modern History of China”, “Marxism”, “Morality and Law Basis” and “Maoism and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”) for all universities. However, the content of political education almost continued unchanged. For example, the officially promoted
ideological education continued the trend of de-Marxism from 1999, and developed a Chinese style Marxism: Dengism, Three Representatives and the Scientific Development Concept. These theories provide theoretical support for economic development in China.

After, Xi Jinping became the leader of the CCP in 2013, Xiism has lead China towards increasing militarism, authoritarianism and nationalism. Xiism provides theoretical and political guidance for the Chinese regime to make internal and international policies. Xiism is focused upon developing the economy with careful plans in order to develop China into a superpower. Xiism emphasises firm control of ideology for all Chinese people, to strengthen the leadership of the CCP--as the only legitimate political power in China. Xiism has become the most important task of political education in universities. “One Curriculum, One Textbook. There is no free access to full information and tolerance to other teaching materials and reading resources. Official guidance for teaching is via controlled textbooks and curriculum management, single narratives in the textbooks are presented as absolute and unquestionable. Moreover, The terms "democracy", "capitalist democracy", "socialist democracy", "freedom" and "human rights" which were specifically addressed in previous textbooks, have been removed from the 2018 textbooks. The concept of the rule of law was no longer explained with specific legal content. Patriotic education continues to develop towards nationalism and politicisation against democracy. “Patriotism” has been defined as a social ideology, nationalist morality and norms of behaviours which serve the purpose of unifying the nation against all opinions and behaviours related to “Taiwan independence”, “Tibetan independence” and “Xinjiang independence”. Also, Chineseness morality and Confucianism have been used to strengthen nationalism for the same purpose of patriotic education. These features
of political education in HE may suggests the start of a new era in current Chinese history.

Overall, political education in Chinese universities fluctuated from 1978 to 2018 at the level of official statements. The CCP has the central power to influence the developments in Chinese universities, political education and the compulsory “Politics” curriculum. China has changed from following a trend of economic development with soft authoritarianism into a direction consisting of increasing militarism and with stronger features of authoritarianism in the era of Xi.

9.1.2. Traces of Democratic Pedagogies at the Classroom level

The main empirical study used in this research is the analysis of the universities’ textbooks. However, I was also interested to examine how the texts were being taught within a classroom setting, how students responded to the texts and the taught curriculum, and whether there are any traces of democratic teachings at classroom level. In order to do so, I selected a small sample of teachers and students from five universities for the fieldwork. I acknowledge the limitations of such a small sample size, which does not allow for wider generalizability of the findings. Therefore, the analysis of classroom observations will not be used to contribute to the literature.

The findings from observing and interviewing teachers and students at the five Chinese universities I visited during the fieldwork, suggest that these universities at the classroom level do play a positive role in encouraging and facilitating new cultural values, such as critical thinking, tolerance to others and human rights. The findings show that both teachers and students have better understandings of critical thinking. They were interested in knowing the world outside China and gaining opinions from
different perspectives. The students liked to have class discussions which related to current life, so as to promote their critical thinking. In classrooms, teachers talked directly from their own points of view which differed from the textbooks. They also cited other scholars’ opinions and used extracurricular materials. The teachers openly discussed politically sensitive topics and criticized the Party leaders. A number of teachers organised discussions and encouraged students to consider a range of possible answers to questions. All of these teachings contain democratic values. These are in accordance with the catalogues of indicator D8 that democratic citizenship encourages open questions or having no predetermined answers. These practices can inspire students to think and to develop critical thinking skills. Although these findings came from a small sample, which cannot represent political education in China as a whole, it was evident from these findings that the interviewees within these universities displayed some capabilities for acting democratically.

The fieldwork with interviewees also showed positive attitudes towards human rights and revealed a degree of tolerance to others. The teachers not only used the Chinese Constitution to explain the right of free speech (teacher Racheal), but also directly called for freedom of expression. Evidence of a citizenry becoming better informed of human rights and freedom of expression can be seen as part of a political culture that is supportive of democracy. As scholars (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, p128, p143) suggest, “if citizens and leaders of a country strongly support democratic ideas and practices, democracy is more likely transmitted”. The findings indicate that, at least at that time and at these universities, these Chinese intellectuals have developed capabilities to practice democracy.

9.1.3. Chinese University and Democratisation
Democratisation implies some fundamental changes in the core institutions of the state. Universities have been regarded as key institution in processes of social change and development. Existing research has suggested that universities can be important supporters for both democratic regimes or for authoritarian regimes. In some countries, universities have roles of encouraging and facilitating new cultural values and liberal democracy (Lipset, 1959; Shils, 1989; Harkavy, 2006); but in other countries, the relationship between authoritarian regimes and universities is mutually beneficial (Perry, 2015a).

In China, higher education institutions are the part of institutions of the state. The Chinese government always firmly controls political education in order to train university students to become the right kinds of citizens from the CCP’s perspective. The CCP has its own pyramid-structured organizations ranging from the top of the government to local level in universities by managing political education and students’ campus life. As Yan Xiaojun (2014) observes, by maintaining daily contact, surveillance and control over the students, class tutors, the student Party branches and basic-level political counsellors, constitute the backbone of Chinese university control apparatus. Therefore, some fundamental changes in universities, in particular within political education, can reflect processes of social change such as democratisation.

The findings in this study demonstrate a contradictory relationship between the developments of higher education and democratisation in China. Throughout the post Mao era from 1978 to 2018, Chinese HEIs played a role to serve as both motors of economic development and as mainstays of the CCP’s rule. On the one hand, the Chinese authority continually increased numbers of university students to serve the function of cultivating higher level technicians and skilful scientists for the needs of economic development. Modernisation theory suggests that rising
education levels and developing the economy are fundamental to building the conditions to develop democracy. Also, throughout political education, teaching knowledge which relates to democratic values, such as the differing explanations of the political system, citizens’ rights and law, as well as exploring democratic politics were introduced to university students. These teachings opened students’ minds and cultivated students’ abilities to apply democracy. As Ogden (2002, p252) observes, increasing the legitimacy and power of the National People’s Congress has resulted in “a far more proactive role for its delegates” and “in democratising China” Also, introducing legal knowledge has enhanced the legal rights of individuals against the state. It can be said that the implementation of laws provide a legal foundation on which to “erect a more democratic system” in China (Ogden, 2002, p251).

Scholars highly approve of the contributions of intellectuals and university students to democratisation during the post Mao era in China. Hayhoe (1993) claimed that Chinese universities were among the vanguards of the reforms in the late 1980s. The Tiananmen Students Movement in 1989 was the most well-known event. Some participants in the movement were those “who want to accelerate privatisation and market liberalisation, and those who want western—style democracy” (Hutton, 2008, p27). Ogden (2002, p329) also observed that HE writers in China frequently express attitudes that implicitly criticize the Chinese regime, one-party rule and suggest reforms. Recently, students from a number of universities nationwide associated with other groups in support of Shenzhen Jiashi (佳士) workers and the Worker’s Union to promote their rights in 2018.

On the other hand, Chinese universities, particular political education have significant roles in encouraging and facilitating authoritarian values of the CCP
against democracy. Political education in China is a part of national citizenship education, which includes the social and cultural levels. The Western concept of citizenship, according to Mann (1987) has been identified in three stages: civil, political and social. Among these, civil citizenship comprised rights necessary for individual freedom – liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice; Political citizenship concerns rights to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body”. The third level is social citizenship, which relates to social democracy which includes the whole range of rights, from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share in the full social heritage of a country and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society.

In the Chinese context, political education consists of almost all of the content of citizenship education, which involves civil, political and social knowledge. Chinese higher education institutions have been called upon to shape universities students’ knowledge, attitudes, and behaviour toward society, the nation, and the state through political education. As Hayhoe (1993) observed political education in China includes ideological indoctrination in the name of “moral education” and patriotic education. At universities, political education includes not only explanations of ideologies, the Chinese political system, economic and cultural policies, but also citizens’ rights, laws, as well as social values, norms of behaviours of citizens. However, unlike western citizenship education which focuses on demonstrating democratic values, citizenship education in China emphasizes Instilling the officially promoted ideas and knowledge.
During the post Mao era, the CCP and state organs have regularly issued directives on citizenship education. The Party has attempted to demonstrate its strong leadership in the political and moral development of Chinese younger citizens. In universities, political education has been adjusted many times to reflect changes in central government policies. The officially promoted patriotic education has contributed to the maintenance of territorial integrity, national unity, and national pride. Patriotic education has also fulfilled a function of maintaining the socialist system and state legitimacy. The compulsory “Politics” curriculum in HEIs has been used to explain officially promoted ideologies, the policies of the CCP and knowledge of the regime, so as to theoretically prove the correctness of the CCP and the legitimacy of the regime. Political education is an important part of higher education, as Hayhoe (1993) suggests, this has helped the Chinese regime to generate stability and suppress political turbulence.

The developments in Chinese universities during the post Mao era share some features of higher education development in other societies. In Singapore, according to the survey of World Bank (1994), the government designed an outstanding HE infrastructure that has clearly attributed to its economic benefit while not unravelling its authoritarian political structure; In Russia, according to Perry’s (2015a) research, the authoritarian regime promoted a special program within HE which aimed to enhance national growth and international competitiveness, but not to develop democracy.

**9.2. Discussion of Portrayal of Democracy**

The aim of this study is to explore whether CE in HE in China has developed traces of a democratic political culture during the post Mao era from 1978 to 2018. The
empirical analysis consists of the themes of officially promoted ideology, the official definitions of the regime and the political system, and the official and authors’ understandings of democracy and values that are represented in the textbooks of the compulsory "Politics" curriculum at Chinese universities.

9.2.1. Analysis of University Textbooks

The findings in this study suggest that in China, the authoritarian regime’s control of political education has led to the phenomenon whereby changes in political education in HE have often been slower than policy changes of the CCP. Political education in Chinese HE is a form of political indoctrination designed for the benefit of the CCP and Chinese government. Scholar (Li, 1990) claims that changes in political education are a reflection of changes in political leadership and policies. In other words, the Chinese government issues a new policy, and then education authorities interpret the policy, and add these interpretations into the re-edited unified textbooks. For example, the Chinese government implemented economic reforms from 1978, but the textbooks of political education confirmed self-employees and private business owners as belonging to the people from the 1990s; the theory of Three Represents was officially announced in 2000, but first appeared in the textbooks in 2003; Xi Jin-ping became the leader of China in 2013, but changes to Chinese official policies were not seen in the textbooks until 2018. Although textbooks of political education have been checked and re-edited every year, however it takes time for the leaders of the CCP to produce and publish textbooks which reflect policy changes. As I discussed in chapter 4, when Deng Xiaoping was in power from 1978 to 1990, new textbooks containing major changes to the content were published in the 85 Program reform in 1985; Jiang Zemin was the leader of the CCP from 1990 to 2002, the education authority produced the new textbooks in the
98 Program reforms in 1998. By the same token, the textbooks of political education were largely reedited in the 05 Program reform in 2005 when Hu Jintao was in power (2002-2012) and in 2018 after Xi became the leader of the CCP (2013-to the present). As a consequence, the findings from my analysis of the textbooks at university level do not always reflect contemporary political and social developments in real time. For example, a large number of activists belonging to the “New Citizens Movement” faced a crackdown from the authorities in 2013, and human rights lawyers were arrested in 2015. These events suggest significant signs of government resistance against democracy, but the evidence of retreating democratisation did not appear in the textbooks until 2018.

9.2.2. Officially Promoted Ideologies

Ideology exists in a political culture. An ideology provides a guide to action and criteria for ruling regimes, so as to reflect official doctrines of government (Crick, 2002). Therefore officially promoted ideology can contain signs of democratization in a country. In a democratic society, there is tolerance of diverse doctrines and no officially promoted ideology. Individuals have a choice regarding what they believe (Crick, 2002). Democratic values and human rights are essential values (Indicator D3). In contrast, in authoritarian countries, there are often officially promoted ideologies. Individuals are expected to embrace the ideology. Also, collectivist virtues and national values take precedent over individual interests (Indicator, A3). In one-party systems, the ideology defines the identity of the state (Huntington, 1993). Establishing an alternative ideology for the state is a necessary condition to legitimize opposition to the party, so as to promote democratisation.
The officially promoted ideology in China consists of Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, Dengism, the Three Represents, Scientific development concept and Xiism. The findings suggest a fluctuation of developments within these ideologies, and these reflect fluctuating processes of democratization within CE in HE during the post Mao era at the level of official discourse.

The first fluctuation of democratisation seen in the universities textbooks reflects changes to officially promoted ideology from 1978 to 1990. In the early 1980s, Marxist theories of class struggle and violent revolution were the founding principles of the Chinese regime. Marxism-Leninism was in a dominant position in the political curriculum in Chinese universities. Marxism was introduced as an unchallengeable truth and universal law regarding social development in the world. Marxism was used to confirm the necessity and legitimacy of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat rather than other forms of government in China. Marxism was also used to provide a theoretical justification for the necessity of economic reform, developing private business while remaining a centralized social system with egalitarianism. These findings suggest that the Chinese government promoted this ideology in Chinese universities to serve the purpose of indoctrinating the official principles into students, so that their behaviour does not directly threaten the CCP’s order and safety in the future. These findings also reflect features of the Chinese regime, which are in keeping with indicators A3 and A8—in authoritarian regimes individuals are expected to embrace officially promoted ideology and knowledge as a unified instrument of political power and is not to be questioned.

The officially promoted ideology changed after the 85 Program” Reforms. Stalinism and Leninism were condemned and heavily criticized. These criticisms reflect a comprehensive denial of the Soviet Union model, which had been adopted by the
CCP since the founding of the PRC (Qin Yue 2013). Also, Maoism, it suggested, largely denied Marxist and socialist principles and seriously weakened the people’s democratic principles in the Party, and destroyed good morality in China (B5-7, 1988, P359, B5-8, 1988, p449). Openly discussing Leninism and Maoism provides pluralistic ideas and learning resources for students and encourages students to develop their critical thinking skills. At the same time, Marxist theories of class struggle and revolution were removed from political education. These changes suggest a shift towards democratization at the level of official statements in CE. It is in accordance with the democratic catalogue of indicator D8 that knowledge is debatable.

The second fluctuation of democratisation reflects changes to the officially promoted ideology in political education from 1990 to 2006. Marxism teaching was adjusted in universities in 1990 after the student protests in Beijing. Marxist theory was often interpreted by using the views of Lenin and Mao, criticisms of Stalin and Mao which were found in previous textbooks were removed. Chinese HE returned to an ideology which was similar to that seen in the early 1980s which showed features of authoritarianism. This officially promoted ideology changed again when the “98 Program” reforms introduced Dengism and Three Represents into political education. A new concept of “Marxism with Chinese characteristics” replaced the dominant status of Marxism-Leninism. These new officially promoted ideologies were more in favour of open development in and of society. These changes also suggested that the CCP moved away from radical single perspective Marxism-Leninism—at least at the level of official discourse. Dengism encouraged private businesses and a market economy which provided further possibilities for China to move toward democratisation. This is in accordance with the catalogue of indicator
D6 that a free market economy and reforms benefiting individuals are features of a democratic country. Scholars (Mousseau, 2000; Bernhagen 2009) suggest that democracy and a market economy are linked together; a widespread market economy culture encourages key features of democracy such as individualism, negotiation, compromise, equality and respect for the law. Economic development also creates opportunities for democratization by promoting political openness and self-regulation.

The theory of the Three Represents is a significant development within the CCP. Its manifestation within CE in HE reflects some democratic elements. The textbooks show that this theory redefines the CCP as representatives of an advanced culture in the world, incorporating modern ideas of politics and governance and representing all of the people’s interests. This claim has changed the self-definition of the CCP from a proletarian party of workers and peasants into and including most of the people. This change indicates a shift of ideology within the CCP from the “vanguard of the revolution to affirming the Party's responsibility for governing” (Ogden, 2002, p262). It is in keeping with indicator D4 that society is composed of diverse groups of people from different social backgrounds, and indicator D5, that a government represents the interests of the many.

The shift toward democratisation since the 98 Program Reforms also continued throughout the 05 Program Reforms, until Xi Jin-ping became the leader of China in 2013. Yet, this ideological shift is not shown in the textbooks until much later in 2018. Xiism suggests a third wave away from democratisation in China. As the official statements in the textbooks illustrate, Xiism continues to place emphasis on economic development, but positions the goal of developing China into a powerful socialist nation in the world. Stronger leadership of the CCP over economic plans,
military development and political affairs are key features of Xiism. This officially promoted national policy indicates an absolute autocracy. It is in the light of the catalogues of indicator A5 that a single party system with a monolithic power, composed of and serving the interests of an elite ruling group, and with a regime which has power over subordinate social groups, are features of authoritarianism.

In summary, changes to officially promoted ideology in CE in Chinese universities during the post Mao era in China have not been linear, but fluctuated. This reflects a fluctuating process of democratisation at the level of Chinese official discourse within HE.

9.2.3. The Chinese Political System

Democratic political systems can be formed differently, such as liberal democracies, illiberal democracies and Marxist ideas of democracy. According to indicators D1-D8, democratic political institutions provide institutional safeguards against dictatorship, and a multi-party government which allows ordinary people a say in political decision-making through a representative legislature that is based on the rule of law, which protects individual rights and freedoms. Citizens are individual participants in a multi-party government; citizens also have freedom to organize pressure groups; there are regular elections; policies are debated and knowledge is open to people to discuss; laws are made by a representative parliament and the judiciary is independent. As scholars suggest, in theory, a liberal democratic regime contains these elements of democracy.

Scholars also suggest that a democratic system does not always contain all of these features nor guarantee equal participation and rights. Countries vary in the extent to which their political systems meet these criteria, or democratisation may often
experience an absence of some criteria. Mann (2005) suggests that historically there have been “dark sides” of democratic development within each model, but democracy can still be developed. Illiberal democratic political systems also consist of multi-party governments with a popular vote, but the rule of law is weak and civil liberties are severely curtailed (Zakaria, 2003; Tu, 2002). Marxist ideas of democracy give prominence to the two features of rule by the people and ideological power (Held, 2006, Mann, 2005). However, orthodox Marxist ideas of “socialist democracy”—as seen in communist ruled countries in practice, has almost always been associated with features of authoritarianism rather than democracy.

In this study, the criteria that I used to measure the developments of democracy in China are based on a broader definition of democracy. Under this definition, liberal democracies are the most democratic and Marxist “democracies” least so, with illiberal “democracies” scoring somewhere in the middle. The empirical analysis of the themes used to measure developments of democracy consist of the officially defined knowledge of the regime presented in the textbooks of the compulsory “Politics” curriculum in Chinese universities. These themes include: the self-definition of the Chinese regime, citizens’ rights, the power of the CCP, the political system, and the rule of law. As stated earlier, the findings revealed fluctuations towards and away from democratisation during the post Mao era. The following analysis explores themes that reflect a wave towards democratisation in China. Subsequent sections will summarise findings regarding fluctuations where China has moved away from democratisation towards authoritarianism.

_The Self-definition of the Chinese Regime_
During the early days of the reforms, the Chinese regime was presented as the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is in keeping with almost all of the authoritarian catalogues of indicators from A1 to A8. The proletariat was seen as being the same as the working class, which was based on the alliance of workers and peasants, and was the major social force that the regime could rely on for support. Therefore only a limited section of the population was defined as participants in the regime. These participants are also called “the people”.

From the 1980s, the range of groups included in “the people” was expanded from workers and peasants to include intellectuals; In the 1990s, “the people” expanded to include self-employees, private business owners, other labourers and all those social forces, which support and participate in the progress of socialist development. By 1999, “the people” includes all of the classes, social stratum (阶层) and groups, who agree with socialism. Even, the term “working class” was replaced by “labourers” in 2010.

This continuing expansion of participants in the Chinese regime reflects a more participatory version of socialist democracy, in which expanded members of the party not only represent the needs of different social groups, but also changed the essence of the Communist regime from a single participant group—the proletarians’ regime—to a multi-participant regime. Self-employees and private business owners, socialist builders and patriots and other groups within Chinese society became part of “the people”. This signals a more pronounced official commitment to more participatory versions of socialist democracy. This signified a shift towards a more inclusive and diverse understanding of citizenship as well. It is in keeping with the catalogue of indicator D4 that in a democratic regime, the political elites share power with other
social groups. Scholars also consider that the growth of civil groups in China challenges repressive regimes and demands democratic regimes (Shin and Tusalem, 2009), and group or class coalitions can make democratization happen (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). At the level of official statements reflected in CE, it can be said that the changes to the definitions of “the people” reflect official commitments to socialist democracy during the reforms.

**Rights of Citizens**

“Citizen” is a relatively new concept in political education in Chinese HE. It is different compared with the notion of “the people” in the Chinese regime. Discussions of citizens’ rights in the textbooks represent changes in the conceptualisation of citizenship and in the extended range of participants included in the regime from official perspectives.

Citizens’ rights are the political, social and economic rights that each citizen has by virtue of being a citizen, and which are usually upheld by law. Citizens’ rights were introduced to Chinese university students for the first time in 1999. The textbooks list eight basic rights of citizens that are protected by the Constitution, including political rights, to vote and to be voted for, free speech and freedom of publication, freedom of assembly, of procession and of religion. These are democratic political rights. These are in keeping with the catalogue of indicator D3 that individual rights and freedoms are essential values of democracy. Importantly, citizens’ personal rights have been explained in detail, such as: a citizen cannot be arrested without a court order; it is prohibited to illegally search citizens’ bodies and intrude into citizens’ houses; freedom of communication and the privacy of citizens are legally protected; citizens’ legal ownership of income, savings, houses and other properties are protected.
In political education from 2003 onwards, Chinese authority has reinforced the duties of citizens over their rights. The legal rights and freedom of citizens are required not to be used to harm national, social and collective interests, nor negatively affect other citizens’ legitimate freedoms and rights. For example, the textbooks state that citizens have religious freedom while citizens are not allowed to hold religious activities, because the Chinese authority believes that religious activities disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens and interfere with the educational activities of the state. Also, citizens’ rights to free speech, assembly and protest have been limited by applying other laws, such as the law of assembly and other rules to restrict people exercising these rights. The 2010 textbook conflates the legal duties of citizens with national unity, which aims to safeguard the independence of national sovereignty preserve territorial integrity and reinforce national unity, and these become the supreme legal duty of citizens. All of these are in accordance with authoritarian catalogues of indicators A1 and A3 that national interests and collectivist virtues take precedent over the individual, and that people obey authority and are obligated to the group, and Indicator A4 that the State views society as a homogenous entity, stressing the importance of national unity, as well as indicator A8 that knowledge is a unified instrument of political power and is the official guidance for knowledge teaching.

**The Power of the CCP**

The CCP is the vehicle of leadership for the Chinese regime. Usually, the CCP is mentioned widely throughout political education in Chinese universities. From the 1990s, patriotic education has emphasised consolidating the power of the CCP. Loyalty to the CCP becomes the unquestioned duty of university students. A Chinese version of patriotism has been identified as a social ideology regarding
people’s feelings, thoughts and their loyalty, love and service to the motherland—the Chinese nation, the CCP and the socialist system. “Patriotism” is also seen as the basic norm of political and moral life and as a means to adjust the relationship between the individual and the nation. Political loyalty to the CCP is the focus of “patriotism”. Patriotic education addresses the point that love of the people's government is the attitude every citizen must have. The motherland has been used symbolically to represent the CCP regime. The textbooks note that “the motherland creates conditions and provides stages for personal development”, therefore, “the relationship between the individual and the country is that persons are dependent on the motherland” (B7-13, 2010, p40-41). These official statements clearly suggest that if people do not support or are not loyal to the CCP, they will not be protected by the regime. This is a particular feature of authoritarianism in which in an authoritarian regime, knowledge is a unified instrument of political power which is used as either propaganda or as secrets of the state (Indicator, A8), and students are expected to accurately reproduce this knowledge from the textbooks during their examinations (indicator, A5).

Consolidation of the leadership of the CCP is also seen in the official explanations of the state political system. The CCP has dominant leadership over the PC system, the CPPCC and EMAR system; the CCP has power over state organizations and subordinate social groups. This suggests that the Chinese regime does not represent the interests of the many. The CCP regime is in keeping with the authoritarian catalogue of indicator A5 that a monolithic power is composed of and serves the interests of the few or one group only, and state power consists of a single party which rules over subordinate social groups.
These findings suggest that although there are many signs of democratisation shown in CE in HE, China has not changed the authoritarian essence of the one-party system. China is still an authoritarian country. Consolidation of the leadership of the CCP reflects fluctuations in democratisation at the level of official discourse during the post Mao era.

**The Political System**

Introducing official knowledge of the political system in political education in Chinese universities reflects changes in official discourses regarding political participation in China during the post Mao era.

From 1978 until the 98 Program Reforms, the textbooks say very little about the Chinese political system. This suggests that the CCP was not willing to let people know how the regime worked at least at the level of universities. This feature is in keeping with the authoritarian catalogue of indicator A8 that knowledge is a unified instrument of political power controlled by authority. However, this situation largely changed in the 1999 textbooks. There were numerous official explanations of the Chinese political system. A new concept of “socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics” was created to describe the Chinese political system.

According to the textbooks the Chinese socialist democratic political system, consists of the PC and CPPCC system, the EMAR system and the SAR system. This structure contains some important elements of democracy, such as elections. For example, the elected PC system is the highest authority of the state. In this system, all delegates of the PC are elected directly or indirectly at national and local level; the delegates act on the behalf of people to administrate power of the state. Elections are also a key feature of the grassroots system. The masses, at grassroots level, directly
exercise their legal rights, manage local public affairs and welfare and implement self-management.

Developing an elective congress and grassroots system is an essential step towards democratization. Elections are essential conditions in order to develop democratic political systems (Indicator D4). Although the PC election system in China has not reached the level whereby all people are equally qualified to take part in regular fair and free elections as seen in fully democratic regimes, the Chinese PC system and grassroots system contain primary elements of elective principles. As Lieberthal (2004) notes, the NPC in China has played a greater role in policy deliberation, and the people's congresses, at various levels, have become increasingly competitive and independent as their delegates have been allowed to assert their own views in deliberating local policy matters. Odgen (2002) also claims that supporting village elections and increasing the power of the National People’s Congress is an emerging corporatist form of civil society.

Meanwhile, the CPPCC system was interpreted differently as the basic political system or as a multi-party system among the textbook authors and Chinese officials. These interpretations reflect distinct views on developing democratic politics in China. Also, according to the textbooks, ethnic minorities have more autonomous powers in the EMAR in 2003 than they had in 1999. Ethnic minority governments can manage local finances and independently arrange economic and educational causes, even organize their own local security forces. The EMAR--as the basic political system containing more autonomous rights, reflects a pluralist development in the Chinese political system. Again, the SAR system also includes some important democratic elements, such as a high degree of autonomy for executive administration, legislative and independent judicial systems and final
adjudication rights. This is the first time that Chinese officials accepted a dual political system in China since the CCP came to power. In this sense, the SAR system represents a localized selective and bounded toleration of democracy in specific cases. The SAR system as the particular practice of Dengism provides an ideological condition in China to develop a pluralist government.

Yet, these developments within the political system that reflects democratisation processes during the post Mao era are not linear. They have fluctuated since the 05 Program Reforms. For example, the PC system was defined as the “supreme organization of state power” in 2003, but this was changed to “national authority” in 2010; the CPPCC system was described as “one of the basic political systems” and an important part of the development of political democratic reform in 2003, but this system has not been supported in the texts since 2010; the SAR system was described as a “political system with Chinese characteristics” in 2003, but the 2010 textbooks restored it to being a part of Deng’s “One Country Two Systems”.

The definition of the regime was also revised back to “the dictatorship of the proletariat” in 2010. Class struggle was revived by the regime to defend the socialist system and to implement dictatorship to hostile and reactionary forces. The range of “enemies” was expanded to include “all kinds of criminal activities, sabotage and infiltration of hostile Western forces, the political conspiracy of subverting the CCP leadership and socialist system, ethnic separatists, violent terrorist activities, serious criminal offences, safety of people’s lives and property, serious corruption which harms the interests of the country and the people” (B7-12, 2010, p224). In this definition, many ideological or political dissidents, who subvert the CCP, are defined as “the enemies”. Treating these so-called “enemies” as a part of the class struggle can harm democratic values of inclusiveness. Compared with the
broader range of people tolerated in narratives in the 2003 textbooks, narratives within the 2010 edition suggest a step backward for democratization in terms of tolerance towards others.

Since Xi Jinping became the leader of China, authoritarianism has largely increased while democratization has reversed further. This is illustrated in narratives of the regime in the 2018 textbooks, wherein there are no discussions of the participants of the regime and no explanations of the structure of the political system and the rule of law. Instead, the textbooks emphasize the leadership of the Party in Chinese political life.

**The Rule of Law**

“Rule of law” is seen an important sign of democratization during the post Mao era in China. Laws not only protect citizens’ rights, but also allow a maximization of private and commercial life (indicator D7). The notion of “rule of law” was introduced to university students from the 98 Program Reforms. The constitution was defined as having the highest law and political status in Chinese society. The textbooks particularly stressed the notion of fairness, the legal equality of all citizens, and equal access to legal rights. State administrative organizations and judicial organizations apply laws and treat citizens equally, so people can see and feel democracy. Even the CCP was required to obey laws.

Promoting “the rule of law” has built an important condition for democratization in China at least at the level of official discourse. As official statement show, during five years of implementing the rule of law, “about new 90 laws and legal rules and 142 administrative regulations of the State Council” have been issued in China (B7-13, 2010, p178). This has changed the situation of having no laws to follow in the past.
Also, implementing laws and rules has protected (to a limited extent) citizens’ rights and increased the professionalization and training of lawyers, strengthening the courts and various mechanisms for citizens to petition the government for redress (Potter, 2014). As a consequence, protest activities in China have changed from protecting and safeguarding consumers' rights to defending the constitutional rights of citizens. More citizens have taken up legal rights to defend their individual rights; lawyers are increasingly prominent in human rights activities; the media are increasingly supporting these activities. Civil rights movements have developed from a small number of elites to mass groups. As Shin and Tusalem (2009, p366) consider, the growth of groups in civil society alone “produced a balance of power between authoritarian rulers and democratic opposition”.

Furthermore, establishing laws and rules has also provided legal protections for the market economy. The textbooks confirm that “the nature of socialism consists of state-ownership, private-ownership, capitalist individual ownership and capitalist state ownership” (B5-5, 1979-1983, p785). As Potter (2014, p5) observes, as China adopts many global practices, norms, rules and laws for international investment and trade, China's integration into the international economy has had “a salutary and largely positive effect on processes of democratization” at this particular period of the reforms.

In summary, the findings from the analysis of the narratives of the structure and function of the regime in the textbooks, suggest complex and fluctuating processes of democratisation during the post Mao era in China.

9.2.4. Understandings of Democracy and Values
Democratization is the process of establishing democracy, which includes establishing structures of democratic political systems and culture. As a political culture, democracy is composed of procedural values and attitudes underlying democracy which uphold values of tolerance, diversity, civility and mutual respect between individuals and groups (Harber, 1997). The findings suggest a fluctuating process of democratisation regarding the narratives of democratic culture presented in the textbooks.

In the period of the reforms from 1979 to 1990, there is an increasing understanding of democratic politics shown in the textbooks. This understanding is reflected in the narratives concerned with democratic ideas and practices of the CCP during its early development. These understandings focus upon the democratic values of free speech, the political system of assembly, rights of association and the right to vote. The textbooks recognise that “the people's democracy” is wherein “all the people have the right to enjoy managing the state, economy, culture and other events as well as other democratic rights” (B5-1, 1981-1983, p288). In the later 1980s textbook, understandings of democracy are widely concerned with multi-party politics against a one-party dictatorship, calling for democratic elections and control of the military under the state rather than the Party as well as peaceful paths and transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. These discussions reflect commitment to a more fully-fledged democratic political system.

However, after the Tiananmen student movement in 1989, anti-individualism and anti-westernisation became the main task of political education. This change suggests a turn away from official views regarding democratic culture. Broadly, individualism is a set of ideas emphasizing the importance of the individual and the individual’s interests. Individual human rights and freedom to organise political
groups is a feature of democracy (Indicator D1). In Chinese political education, individualism is seen as a western value and as an ideology working against collectivism. The textbooks employ extreme language to criticise individualism. Many immoral behaviours and crimes are identified as individualism, such as corruption, bribery, cheating, fraud, robbery and murder; individualism is also viewed as bourgeois liberalization and a serious anarchism against the Four Fundamental Principles of the CCP. In addition, individualism is defined as a representation of self-centeredness without any consideration of national interests in order to serve small groups and which causes sectarianism, such as cliques and gangs. Social groups and protest activities are defined as being motivated by individualism, such as the Tiananmen student movement in 1989 (B6-1, 1989-1991, p188). These definitions of individualism not only lead to a misunderstanding of individualism among university students, but also indicate an official policy against liberal democracy. In a democratic society, citizens have personal autonomy and associational rights (Indicator D2). But in an authoritarian regime, national values take precedence over individual interests (Indicator A3), and people obey and do what they are told to do (Indicator A1).

Anti-Westernization reflects another sign of the official view against democratic culture. Westernisation is a process whereby societies come under or adopt modern western culture in areas such as language, separation of spiritual and temporal authority, rule of law, social pluralism, representative bodies and individualism (Huntington, 2002). In Chinese political education, westernization means copying from the West. The findings suggest that there are official intentions to resist western liberal democracy since the suppression of students’ protests in 1989. The people, who advocated learning from the west, were called “traitors”, and “a handful of scum
in the nation” (民族败类) and “the person who lashed their motherland to curry favour with imperialism”. Westernization was seen as “relying on imperialism as a patron and promoting capitulationism” (B6-1, 1989-1991, Pp249-251). Such extensive use of language against westernization demonstrates strong authoritarianism. It is in keeping with the catalogues of indicator A8 that knowledge is a unified instrument of political power that is not to be questioned or debated, and indicator A6 that the content is presented as absolute with single narratives, as well as indicator A4 that strong language accompanies appropriate kinds of knowledge.

There are contradictory and fluctuating periods of democratisation reflected in the narratives of understandings of democratic values from the late 1990s to 2006 within CE. On the one hand, there are a number of signs toward democratisation that are reflected in the textbooks such as discussions of “human rights”, “democracy”, and “socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics”. The protection of individual human rights is an essential element of democracy (Indicator, D3; Plattner, 1995). Human rights include the rights to life, liberty and security of person, and freedom of movement, nationality, thought, conscience and religion, as well as freedom of peaceful assembly and association and the freedom to take part in government (UN, 1948). The 2003 textbooks introduce fundamental knowledge of human rights to university students, such as equality, property rights, the rights to survival and development, as well as personal rights under certain social and historical conditions (B7-4, 2003-2005, p98). These align with democratic catalogue of indicator D1 wherein the state respects individual rights and freedom to organize groups. Interestingly, the same textbooks also provide an official view regarding human rights. The official view is that human rights are not the rights a person is born with, they are obtained through struggles; basic human rights are a unity of individual and
collective rights, a unity of the principle of universality and of national conditions, a unity of rights and obligations (B7-4, 2003-2005, p99). These narratives are different compared with previous descriptions. These contrasting views on human rights within the same textbook suggest differences of opinion exist between the views of officials and those of the authors of the textbooks. These distinct views indicate the democratic value of diversity in textbook publication. After the 05 program reforms, the textbooks specifically discussed the concepts of “democracy” “freedom”, “socialist democracy” and “socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics”. Chinese officials attempted to explore a socialist style of democracy that is not the same as western style liberal democracy. All these descriptions directly indicate a process of democratisation at the level of official discourse.

On the other hand, there are also narratives against democratisation reflected in teachings regarding “patriotism” and national unity from 2003. “Patriotism” has always been defined as love of one’s country. It often “stimulates and informs nationalism”. Nationalism refers to a set of beliefs about the nation. For some, a nationalist belief means that the nation is the only goal worthy of pursuit, and that “the nation demands unquestioned and uncompromising loyalty” (Grosby, 2005, p5). In most autocracies, “loyalty is also a duty, the state and its rulers being seen as part of a divine order” (Crick, 2002, p95). Since China implemented patriotic education nationwide from 1990, “patriotism” has not only been used to explain the legitimacy of the CCP regime, but also to meet the need for consolidation of the CCP’s power and to reinforce notions of national unity. Since 2003, patriotic education has developed towards nationalism and emphasises national unity. The Motherland has been suggested as not only being the region wherein Chinese ancestors lived and the state in which Chinese people are living, but also contains its
natural resources, territory, the national residences, common economic life, language, culture, social psychology, history, traditions and the political institutions. Love for the motherland means accepting full responsibility and the fate of caring for the future of the country, and “willing to give one’s life for the independence, unity and prosperity of the motherland” (B7-6, 2003-2006, Pp89-94). The concept of Motherland is also given a political meaning to include “social and community order, national security, sovereignty and stability”. “National unification, ethnic unity and opposing separations” is explained as “unique Chineseness ethical traditions” and the notion that “we are all in a family” is emphasised as the concept of a unified nation which provides “a stable national psychology and cultural tradition” (B7-6, 2003-2006, p91; B7-13, 2010, p46). This official statement of “patriotism” contains authoritarian features. Nationalism becomes the belief that the nation is the only goal worthy of pursuit. Thus, such beliefs can “threaten individual liberty” (Grosby, 2005, p5). It is also in keeping with indicator A3 that in an authoritarian regime, the nation is presented as one of national unity and a collection of national communities.

Notably, the textbooks use provocative and emotional language to describe “Our Motherland”, so that readers are hooked immediately. This demonstrates consistency in the views of officials and the textbooks’ authors, which suggest that nationalism has become a strongly held belief among the officials and the textbook authors. These developments are indicative of a shift away from democracy.

In summary, the large number of descriptions of democratic culture and values contained in the textbooks reflect signs of a fluctuating process of democratisation within CE in HE during the post Mao era in China.

9.3. Theoretical Perspectives and Democratization in China
Democratization is the process of developing democracy. The working definition of
democracy for this study includes a broad definition of democracy at political
institutional and social level. As a form of political system, democratic governments
can be formed as liberal democracies which contain most features of democracy,
orthodox Marxist ideas of socialist democracy include much less, and illiberal
democracies lie in the middle. Scholars (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) claim that
democracy can exist at a shallow level of democratization, such as establishing a
democratic political system in a non-democratic regime such as China, or at a higher
level of democratic civil society, such as developing democracy in democratic
regimes in western countries. At a shallow level of democratization, a democratic
political system can be established by social elites through reform from top to bottom.
Elections are necessary, but may not be fair. There are multiple participants in the
regime, but not all people have equal rights or chances. Consequently, such a
democratic political system is likely to be unstable, and may not contain full elements
of democratic government. However, “if a country lacks one or several conditions of
democratization, this country still has chance to develop democracy” (Dahl, 2000,
p163).

Considering the theories of democracy and democratisation previously discussed
and taking into account the findings from the data analysis of citizenship education in
Chinese HEIs in the context of economic development and social change, the
evidence, at the level of official statements, suggests long term developments of
democratisation broadly relating to modernisation theory, civilisation theory, and
world cultural theory. These are discussed below.

9.3.1. Modernisation Theory and Democratisation in China
Modernization theory suggests that economic development leads to democracy (Lipset, 1959; Rostow 1961; Dahl, 1971; cited from Inglehart, 1997). Welzel and Inglehart (2005) claim, that modernization increases the probability of transitions to democracy. In Inglehart’s (1997) view, modern economic development brings social mobilization, facilitating mass participation in politics, which helps prepare the way for democracy. Many scholars claim that developing a market economy culture encourages the spread of key features of democracy, such as respect for the law, civil society and contributes to political openness and weakens anti-democratic alliances (Mousseau, 2000; Bernhagen, 2009; Crick, 2000). Developing the economy also supports an expanded middle class which can shift cultural values in favour of democratic rule by producing a balance of power between authoritarian rulers and democratic opposition (Shin and Tusalem, 2009, p370). Tu Wei-ming (2002, p198) claims that “modernization is homogenization; the trend towards democratisation seems unstoppable”.

Since China started the reforms in 1978, China has achieved remarkable economic development. Currently, China is the third largest trader in the world. It holds more than US$1.4 trillion in foreign currency reserves and boasts the world’s second–highest Gross National Product (Shin and Tusalem, 2009; Nathan, Diamond and Plattner, 2013). As shown at the level of official statements within CE, economic growth has resulted in significant changes in the structures of the Chinese political system, particularly, that this has led to a continuing expansion of participants in the regime in the officially promoted ideologies taught during Chinese higher education, as well as being reflected in social structures and individual understandings of democracy.
Scholars researching Chinese social developments suggest that large numbers of Chinese have joined civic groups. Capitalists and middle class groups have been co-opted into the process of one-party rule and have become “red capitalists” (Murphy, 2014, p4). These new social groups create greater public space for the expression of individual freedoms, and are the leading agents of democratic regime change (Gilley, 2007). The CCP also created the Three Represents theory to confirm these expansions. Consequently, the Chinese Communist Party has re-identified itself from being the vanguard of the proletariats to governing on behalf of Chineseness. Although the CCP regime is still an authoritarian regime, increasingly, participants from all levels of society have established the basic conditions to change the authoritarian regime towards a democratic one. As Tu Wei-ming (2002, p208) claims, the "reform and open" policy of the CCP has propelled China into a fully-fledged developing state through a deliberate strategy of modernization. This will provide the conditions to develop democracy.

In the field of education, the Chinese government has emphasized cultivating higher level technicians and skilful scientists in universities to meet the needs of economic development. The authority (CCPO, 1985) called for “education modernization” to reform educational content and teaching methods. Materialistic motivations have become the central goal of national development and the main task of Chinese HE since the reforms. As modernization theory suggests materialistic motivations are one of the central characteristics of modernization, and modernization increases the probability of transitions to democracy (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). The politics curriculum in Chinese universities has developed from its single function as political education to now include multiple purposes, such as cultivating higher level scientists at the level of official discourse. This suggests that economic development
has significantly influenced the processes of democratisation in China. This partly supports modernization theory.

However, economic development is not the only or essential force for democratic development, because democratisation suffered fluctuations during the post Mao era, whilst the economy has continued to grow. For example, the early 1990s shows the first fluctuation wherein the textbooks largely used irrational language to describe single official views of patriotism, anti-individualism and anti-Westernization; and the 05 Program Reforms in political education also reflect partly fluctuating movements of democratisation, and this has accelerated during the Xi era.

9.3.2. Civilization Theory and Democratization in China

China’s case of democratisation partly supports civilization theory. According to Huntington (2002), the nature of civilization in countries is individual and unique, because culture is rooted in different historical and religious traditions. Culture is a fundamental force shaping values, attitudes and behaviour. Also, cultural differences will not soon disappear, but rather will continue and become a trend of development in the future. Other scholars (Sen, 1999; Tu, 2002) claim that Confucian values of collectivism have significantly influenced views on the form of democracy that China might develop.

Chinese government officials and the authors of the textbooks were all in favour of collectivism and Confucian traditions. The findings suggest that the Chinese government has successfully combined a Chinese version of “patriotism”—rather than nationalism and Confucian traditions together since China began patriotic education from 1990 and advocated Confucian culture after 2000. For example, in the textbooks, Yi (义) - from Confucianism was interpreted as “the spirit of
collectivism and patriotism”; “Benevolence” (仁) and “Filial Piety” (孝) were considered along with the principle of harmony and the ethical value to love and to be faithful and devoted to the nation (B7-6, 2003-2006, Pp108-124); personal interests can only exist within collective and national interests, and individuals should unconditionally sacrifice their personal interests to safeguard collective interests (B6-1, 1989-1991, p182, p184).

The findings also suggest that some Chinese traditions, such as loyalty to the nation, support for good government, respect for elders and those of higher social status have been supported by the Chinese authorities, the authors of the textbooks, and by the teachers and students in the universities I visited. The CCP regime champions collectivism and plays a dominate role in social developments. These repeated implantations of Confucian tradition and the Chinese version of “patriotism” in political education has led to a Chinese version of political development, which may result in a unique form of government. By the same token, if China developed democracy, the Chinese version of democratic government may not be the same as those found in western liberal societies. As Shin and Tusalem (2009) suggest China’s modern development is focused upon law and order, morality and ethics, which stem from an Asian value system that places a high premium on collectivism and a preference for the greater communal good-- rather than western values of individualism and liberalism. Shelley (2005) argues that the illiberal conceptions of democracy and good governance among both citizens and political leaders result in their unwillingness to submit to the democratic norms of pluralism and diversity as shown in liberal democracies.

9.3.3. Long Term Process of Democratization
Democratization is a broad process involving political, economic, social, historical and cultural factors. Democratisation is also a long-term fluid process of developing democracy. In historical terms, national culture and historical factors play major roles in forming a democratic state (Huntington, 2002; Green, 1997). Democratization in any given country is a gradual and long-term historical process (Inglehart, 1997). The route to the democratic world has not been singular but has comprised a number of pathways (Held, 2006). According to Dahl (2000), democratisation does not proceed in a regular and linear way. It has seen ups and downs in its development. Other scholars see democratisation as a developmental task that “requires broadly coordinated, long-term strategies to initiate far-ranging processes of human empowerment and democratic freedoms” (Haerpfer, Bernhagen, Inglehart and Welzel, 2009, p377). As a long-term development, Welzel (2009, p5) claims that processes of democratization may take a three-stage sequence: “the emergence, the deepening, and the survival of democracy”. Democratization at the first stage, gives more resources to the people which empower their capabilities, enabling people to practice freedom. This is also suggested as shallow democracy and a short-term process by Inglehart (1997). Democratization moves along the path from shallow to deep democratization and from short-term to long-term processes.

The findings from the official statements in CE show a process of democratisation in HE in China at the level of official discourse, but that democratization seems very slow and fluctuating. China may take a much longer time to fully achieve democracy due to the levels of historical, political, cultural and social development in China. During the forty years of developments from 1978 to the present day, democratization in China has appeared at the starting point of the first stages. At this stage, according to scholars, democratic emergence begins in a non-democratic
regime (Welzel, 2009); democracy is a tactical matter at a shallow level. The process of achieving democracy involves making the political system more democratic through electoral processes and pluralist participation of government. Citizens are given more resources to empower their capabilities to practice freedom (Bernhagen, 2009). During the post Mao era, China established some components of a democratic political system in the non-democratic CCP regime, such as China has established an electoral congress system and grassroots system, and the participants of the regime have been expanded to include people from all social backgrounds. Knowledge of citizens’ rights and human rights has been introduced to university students. All these indicate progress of democratisation in China.

However, as discussed previously, democratic developments in China have been very limited and democratisation has experienced fluctuations. Also, what the Chinese government claims to be democratisation in political education and what can in fact be considered democratisation in reality may be quite different. China is still an authoritarian one–party state under the dictatorship of the CCP. According to scholars, a fully developed democracy includes a large middle class and a fairly stable political class; the congress is equal and fairly elected; policies are debated in a multi-party parliament and laws are made by a representative congress (Crick, 2002). All people have equal social and political rights; tolerance, diversity, civility and mutual respect for individuals and groups become more salient as civic culture spreads in society. Human rights and social justice are protected by law. The whole of society is involved in the processes of democratization and democracy continues developing without impediment (Dahl, 2000). This is the third stage of democratization wherein people are legally entitled to practice freedom and democracy survives and thrives (Welzel, 2009). The findings suggest that the
features of democracy that have occurred in China are far from a fully developed democracy. The democratic developments in China do not share characteristics of liberal democracies.

In political terms, scholars suggest that one-party regimes usually have a strongly institutionalized power base and an ideological mission that inspires their existence and provides legitimation. It generally takes longer and is a bigger challenge for potential opposition to erode the ideological basis of one-party regimes (Haerpfer, Bernhagen, Inglehart and Welzel, 2009). The findings suggest that China is a one-party state and the CCP regime has significantly influenced the processes of democratization. There is no evidence to suggest that the CCP is willing to develop democracy in the short-term. In order to avoid the fate of the Soviet Union, the CCP leaders continue the “political order and crackdown on political dissent and independent associations rather than supporting people’s popular participation in the regime” (Yang, 2007, p251). It is highly unlikely that the Chinese people will soon be allowed to choose their political leaders on the basis of free and competitive multi-party elections (Fewsmith, 2004). China has not achieved equal and fair elections and a multi-party system. The one-party dictatorship is “not likely to be transformed into a fully electoral democracy in China anytime soon” (Shin and Tusalem, 2009, p370).

In social terms, the Chinese regime cannot promote democratic reform without solid support from a large number of the middle class. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) suggest that democratization is more likely to emerge in egalitarian societies, where the middle class comprises a substantial body of citizens, who are of intermediate wealth and whom can exert a stabilizing influence, allowing democracy to flourish. The findings from the official statements suggest that there has only been one short
period during which the Chinese government officially encouraged the middle classes to take part in Chinese politics after the theory of the Three Represents was established. The middle class in China is not yet large enough to be able to influence the decision-making of government.

Additionally, there is a low level of popular demand for democratization in China, because “both the elites and the masses lack basic knowledge of democracy” (Shin and Tusalem, 2009, p371). The findings suggest the demonstration of a restricted conception of democracy among the CCP leaders. These leaders believe that “the economic and cultural conditions in China are not ready for achieving socialist democracy, freedom and human rights” (B7-12, 2010, P245). In their opinion, the fundamental way to achieve democracy, freedom and human rights is by achieving social progress, social stability and economic development first. The findings have also showed consistency in the similarity between the views of the authors of the textbooks and Chinese government officials towards nationalism since 1990 when patriotic education was emphasized in opposition to individualism for the purpose of fostering a collective spirit. Continuing official narratives against individualism could potentially threaten democratic developments in China. Also, the promotion of Confucian values such as political stability and loyalty have resulted in acceptance of and even a preference for authoritarian rather than more liberal and democratic modes of governing. As a consequence, Chinese political culture remains highly unfavourable to regime change. As Nathan (2013) suggests, given this low-level equilibrium and its proven ability to adapt to various predicaments, China appears to see little need to transform the authoritarian regime into a democracy.

In historical terms, researchers suggest that democratisation in China needs a long time to develop due to historical factors. China has never experienced democracy
during its four thousand years of civilization (Fukuyama, 2015). From the perspective of modern Chinese history, China has endured many major man-made disasters, such as anti-imperialism and civil wars since the Opium War (1839), so there have been few opportunities for China to develop democracy (Tu, 2002).

In summary, at the level of official statements in CE, firstly, there are increased references to democracy in terms of ideological shifts within the CCP, and references to the structural changes within the regime, including more emphasis on democracy and citizens’ and human rights, the rule of law, and tolerance towards others. All of these can be construed as the signs of what Ogden (2005) refers to as “inklings of democracy” appearing in China during the post Mao era. Secondly, democratization shows characteristics of short-term fluctuations rather than a linear development. These fluctuations have shown contradictory movements across indicators. Thirdly, China is still an authoritarian regime. The CCP regime has dominant power in decision making and implementation of policies, so that reforms have always been top-down. The CCP is not willing to develop liberal democracy in the foreseeable future. Strengthening national unity, consolidating the power and ideology of the CCP and developing the economy as well as continuing anti-westernization, are the features of current political and citizenship education. Fourthly, lack of solid support from a large number of the middle class encouraged by Confucian values of political stability and loyalty and collectivism have influenced the nature and speed of democratic development. Taken together these features—at least at the level of official discourse—indicate that China’s democratisation is a long term process. Finally, political education in Chinese higher education functions with certain features of authoritarianism. The official authorities have always been directly involved in the management of the political curriculum, including modules, contents,
syllabus, teaching hours and assessments. In addition, there are always officially approved schemes of work and teaching plans for the curriculum. All teachers have used a unified teaching schedule to prepare lessons since 2005. Political education in Chinese universities reflects dominant authoritarian political cultures.

9.4. Conclusion--Chinese Version of Socialist Democracy

During the period of the post Mao era from 1978 to 2018, the Chinese government often mention a concept of “socialist democracy”. In the view of Suzanne Ogden (2002, p256), China has developed some elements of democracy, “China has long had a form of elections as well as the notion of political parties, and with judicial, legislative and executive branches of government, and a well-developed civil service.” Chinese propaganda describes its political system as “socialist democracy,” “Chinese-style democracy,” and “people’s democratic dictatorship’ among other locutions” (Xinhua News, 2014). How should we interpret the Chinese state’s frequent use of the term “socialist democracy” to characterize its own political system? Is this Chinese version of "democracy" just obfuscating rhetoric? Or is this “democracy” an authentic aspiration for the future of China’s political system?

This study has suggested a fluctuating democratization which cannot be said to lead linearly to liberal democracy in China. If China is not adopting a liberal democracy, how should its political system be characterised? I speculatively propose that China’s political system can be characterised as a Chinese version of socialist democracy. This Chinese version of socialist democracy is different to Western versions of liberal democracy and to Marxist ideas of democracy, but shares some features of democratisation of East Asian societies before the 1990s and the Soviet Union’s model of socialist democracy.
9.4.1. Development of a Chinese Version of Socialist Democracy

The empirical analysis in this study suggests that the content of China’s version of socialist democracy has changed throughout the post Mao era. These changes can be summarised and characterised in the table below.

T-9-2 The periodization and content of the Chinese version of socialist democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Main content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978–1990</td>
<td>exploring different forms of democracy</td>
<td>Officially denied Mao’s revolutionary theories and Mao’s policies, and remained some political principles of Marxism-Leninism. The authors explored democratic practices of the CCP during its early days of the revolution and some communist parties in European countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–2002</td>
<td>A new version of “democratic centralism”</td>
<td>Implemented through the Congress system in the Party and country. Exploring “One country two system”, the rule of law, citizen’s rights, and “socialist democracy”. Dengism and the theory of Three Represents replaced Maoism;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi’s era 2013-</td>
<td>Hard authoritarian -ism</td>
<td>The Congress system and grassroots elections in the Party and country. Promoted Xiism -- firm control of ideology, stronger leadership of the CCP. Modernising the Chinese military force into a world -- class army. Chinese nationalism becomes social ideology, morality and norms of behaviours against all opinions and behaviours related to “independence”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It can be seen from this table, I roughly identified five periods of development of Chinese version of socialist democracy.

During the 1980s, a new version of the Chinese term for “socialist democracy” was explored in the textbooks. This exploration started with the denial of Maoism—Mao’s revolutionary theories and Mao’s policies of the Great Leap Forward, the people’s commune movement and the Cultural Revolution. It has been suggested that Maoism is a form of Leninist governance—the dictatorship of the proletariat (Meyer, 1995, p754), in that the government combines citizens’ organizations, legislative and executive functions, and is heavily controlled by a single party, and that all other parties are outlawed in political life. During the Mao era, China was a closed society run by the Communist Party. China’s leaders tried to make equality an operating principle of “socialist democracy” in China (Ogden, 2002, p32). As I discussed in chapter 4, Mao as the leader of the CCP and with Maoism as the guiding ideology of the regime were not allowed to be challenged. It can be said that the critiques of Mao and denying Mao’s policies reflected opposition to centralised, autocratic versions of Chinese communist rule.

The authors of the textbooks emphasised more participatory versions of Chinese socialist democracy by highlighting democratic practices of the CCP during the early days of the revolution and emulating the democratic practices of some communist parties in European countries. The authors also called upon the CCP to fully develop democracy within the party by developing democratic values such as individual rights. These discussions indicate that the authors were exploring different versions of democracy for China’s development. Among this exploration, individual rights which reinforce individual freedom and full participation of citizens in political life had been emphasised once. Wei Jing-sheng, a lecturer of a university and the leading person
for the democracy movement in China in 1978-79, defined China’s democratisation in terms of promoting “maximum individual freedom and non-Marxist socialism” (Ogden, 2002, p34).

However, the understanding of “democracy” among these Chinese intellectuals is not the same as the Western view of an institutional definition of democracy that requires the selection of political leaders via competitive elections. Perry (2015b) suggests that it is “populist democracy” which preceded not only the 1989 student movement, but also the Cultural Revolution. A Chinese student who was in Tiananmen Square during the “Democracy Movement” told an American reporter that, in his understanding, “democracy” was “more in terms of Rousseau and the model of direct participation” (Calhoun 1997, pp243–44). Political theorist Benjamin Schwartz (1970, pp158–60) noted shortly after the onset of the Cultural Revolution that the ideological underpinnings of Mao’s tumultuous campaign bore more than a passing resemblance to Rousseau’s doctrines of “civic morality” and “general will”. In this populist view, the goal of democracy is not to restrain government, but to empower it through the active political participation of the citizenry. In Perry’s (2015b) view, this Chinese version of democracy is a radical understanding of democracy which indicates a more populist conception of democracy than competitive elections. Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo offers a stinging critique of the mass protests during the 1989 Tiananmen movement. He called this “Democracy Movement” an undemocratic movement that unwittingly reproduced many of the worst features of Chinese Communist revolutionary practice and culture:

Most of the resources and methods we made use of to mobilize the masses were ones that the Communist Party had used many times before … just as if
we had reverted to the time of the Cultural Revolution ...Our voice became the only truth (Liu Xiaobo 1994, p315, p318).

Notably, the desire to develop individual freedom is the authors’ wish and some Chinese intellectuals’ demand. There is no evidence to show official support for developing individual freedom in the textbooks and official documents. In fact, after the student protests in 1989, the Chinese government strongly condemned individualism and westernization. For Chinese leaders, such as Deng, the Tiananmen democratic movement was a new kind of Cultural Revolution which was viewed as “an excess of democracy” and which leads to anarchy, violence, and the demagoguery of mass politics. Deng recalled:

“During the Cultural Revolution, we had what was called mass democracy...in those days people thought that rousing the masses to headlong action was democracy and that this would solve all problems. But it turned out that when the masses were roused to headlong action, the result was civil war. We have learned our lesson from history” (cited in Schell and Delury, 2013. p303).

Based on this cognition of “democracy”-- as promoting maximum participation in Chinese political life, the Chinese regime has rejected developing a Western style liberal democracy—individual rights and freedom. Since then, the Chinese version of socialist democracy has shifted from an exploration of different forms of democracy to a form of “democratic centralism” with characteristics of Leninism for a short period. As the university textbooks show, strengthening the one-party leadership and ideological control as well as cultivating collectivism was the main focus of political education in this period.
After the 98 Program reforms in political education in Chinese HE in 1998, a new officially promoted version of “democratic centralism” was explained in universities’ textbooks. “Democratic centralism” is practiced through participation of the people in decision-making within the regime by the People Congress system in the Party and country and Political consultation system, as well as expansion of ethnic autonomy. Political practice of “one country two system” in Hong Kong and Macao was officially considered as a part of the Chinese political system. Also, the new officially promoted ideology, Dengism in the 1990s and the theory of Three Represents in the 2000s replaced Maoism, and became the ideology of the CCP and the Chinese state. Dengism encourages private businesses and a market economy, so that these provide possibilities for China to move toward democratisation. The theory of Three Represents redefines the CCP as representatives of an advanced culture in the world, representing all the people’s interests in China. This claim has changed the self-definition of the CCP from a proletarian party of workers and peasants into and including most of the people. The establishment of Dengism and Three Represents indicates a continuing shift of ideology within the CCP from the “vanguard of the revolution to affirming the Party’s responsibility for governing” (Ogden, 2002, p262). Meanwhile, citizens’ rights and the rule of law became part of Chinese political reforms. This period of development of “democratic centralism” suggests soft authoritarian governance.

Nevertheless, this soft authoritarian governance shifted again. At the level of the official statements, after the “05 Program” reforms in political education in Chinese HE in 2005, the Chinese government officially developed “democratic centralism” in a contradictory way. “Democratic centralism” as previously explained in the universities’ textbooks was continually implemented through the congress system in the Party and
country, and with Dengism and Three Represents continually playing a major role in the CCP’s ideologies. Differently, nationwide grassroots elections became officially promoted a part of the political system, while “one country two system” was taken out. Nationalism has been purposely developed by strengthening Chineseness consciousness, the ideal of safeguarding territorial unity and with a collectivist morality. “Socialist democracy” or “Chinese-style democracy” was identified by the CCP as that rooted in Chinese traditions (Nathan, 2015, p161).

Soon after Xi Jinping became leader, China has entered a new era of development. The Chinese Communist Party openly declared a hundred-year plan of democratization. In November 2012, Xi Jinping—as new general secretary at the 18th Party Congress of the CCP promised that, “within one hundred years after the founding of New China (i.e., by the year 2049), to build a socialist modernized country that is prosperous, democratic, civilized, and harmonious” (Xi, 2014). This commitment was soon replaced by Xi’s China’s dream—of “core socialist values”, and developed into a new Chinese official ideology—Xiism. According to the university textbooks, Xiism provides theoretical and political guidance for the Chinese government to make internal and international policies.

Xiism is leading China towards stronger authoritarianism. Xiism is focused upon developing the economy with careful plans in order to develop China into a superpower nation in the world. Xiism emphases firm control of ideology for all Chinese people, to strengthen the leadership of the CCP—as the only legitimate political power in China. Also, Xiism modernises the Chinese military force into a world-class army in order to be ready to win wars. Nationalism has increased. “Patriotism” is defined as a social ideology, nationalist morality and norms of behaviours serving the purpose of unifying the nation against all opinions and
behaviours related to “Taiwan independence”, “Tibetan independence” and “Xinjiang independence”. In the era of Xi, China has changed from following a trend of economic development with soft authoritarianism to a direction consisting of increasing militarism and with stronger features of authoritarianism.

9.4.2. Characteristics of Chinese Version of Socialist Democracy

As discussed above, the Chinese version of socialist democracy has developed and changed during the post-Mao era. Clearly, the Chinese version of democracy refers to something quite different from what Western social scientists generally describe as democracy. According to the empirical analysis of universities’ textbooks in this study, I compared some characteristics between the Chinese version of socialist democracy and non-western liberal democracies. This comparison can be considered in the table below.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese version</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>The Regime</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selected Confucian traditions</td>
<td>Soft authoritarianism. Significant leadership for social stability and in politics, economy and education. An incomplete electoral system. No direct elections of leaders at national and provincial levels. Selected elections of people congresses and grassroots. Limited citizen’s rights.</td>
<td>Mixed socialism and capitalism</td>
<td>Collectivism Nationalism, Confucian values</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asian Values</td>
<td>Confucian traditions</td>
<td>Soft authoritarianism. A leadership in politics, economy and education, and positive force for</td>
<td>Capitalism</td>
<td>Collectivism Confucian values</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Leninism | Authoritarianism | Socialism | Nationalism
--- | --- | --- | ---

One-party state. The state is strongly unified. The government combines functions of organizations, legislative and executive. A single party claims to represent the working class, and all other parties are outlawed in political life. The leaders of the Party are elected.

**The Chinese Version of Socialist Democracy and the East Asian Values**

The Chinese version of socialist democracy contains some characteristics of East Asian Values. According to scholars’ research, the processes of democratisation in East Asian societies before 1990s had been influenced by Confucianism. Im (2004) suggests that Confucian values shaped the formulation and implementation of a political order and national security which are known as the major source of declarative democracy with a concentration of powers. Tu Wei-ming (1997, 2002) also claims that East Asian societies shared common characteristics of capitalism, soft authoritarianism and collectivism. The governments were seen as a positive force for social stability by maintaining law and order, providing the basic necessities of life, and providing leadership of a market economy and education.

From a cultural perspective, social development in China has been influenced by officially sanctioned Confucian traditions from the 2000s to the present day. Democracy, like science, is explicitly acknowledged by the CCP to be a key element of modern governance (Xi, 2014). However, in the Chinese official view as show in the universities’ textbooks, the goal in embracing democratic values is not the
flourishing of individual liberties but the flourishing of the Chinese nation—
“Chineseness” (中华民族). “Chineseness” is a political concept and ethno-cultural
construction. The term “Chineseness” designates a form of ‘supra-nationality’ among
Chinese people. This includes and transcends the Han majority along with the fifty-
five minority nationalities. As Perry (2015) suggests, this expansive ethno-cultural
construction is intended to appeal not only to domestic Chinese people, but also to
overseas Chinese who are expected to identify culturally and sympathize emotionally
with the rise of the motherland.

The Chinese official understanding of “democracy” partly derives from the Confucian
traditions’ political principle of “the primacy of the people” (以民为主). China’s official
news agency, Xinhua (新华社 2014) interprets, that the term “democracy” is not
purely an institutional or operational definition which stresses competitive elections,
majority rule, or popular checks on central government power, “democracy” has a
broader and deeper meaning based upon a collective agency. The principle of
“democracy”--“is the primacy of the people” this is explained thus; “the people are the
sole foundation of the state; when the foundation is firm the state is peaceful” (民惟邦
本，本固邦宁), and “the people are most important, the country comes next, the ruler
is the least important” (民为贵，社稷次之，君为轻) (B6-16, 2003-2006, pp108-124;
B7-5, 2010, pp95-98, B7-11, 2018, pp96-98). According to the textbooks, the Mass
Line (群众路线) of Maoism and Xi Jinping’s contemporary Mass Line Education are
both rooted in this Chinese traditional political thought. This has also be interpreted
as a Chinese tradition of “populism” (民本思想) (Liu Chuansheng and Wei Zhimin
2013a, pp34–36; 2013b, p31).
Collectivism is a feature of the democratisation of East Asian societies. Collectivism has also been emphasised in the development of China from the 1990s onwards. The analysis of universities’ textbooks in this study shows that a spiritual virtue is made of patriotic education to establish collectivism among university students. The notion that “a unified nation provides physical, psychological and cultural traditions for a stable national security and personal development”, and that “we are all in a family”, and that “collective interests are above personal interests, and people should unconditionally sacrifice personal interests to safeguard collective interests, has been repeated in the textbooks over time (B6-7, 1999, p252; B6-8, 1999, p204; B6-16, 2003-06, pp86-96; B6-13, 2003-06, p100, p184).

Soft authoritarianism had been a feature of political culture in East Asian societies during their processes of democratisation before the 1990s. China also experienced a period of developing soft authoritarian political culture before Xi came to power. After 1992, the CCP developed towards political culture with procedural and substantive rights in the regime at the level of official statements. The officially promoted “Dengism” from 1999 and “Three Represents” from 2003 confirmed that China had begun to implement new policies such as multiple forms of ownership, less economic planning, decentralized administration and developing a market economy. The economic mode of production in China changed from Mao's egalitarianism to Deng's pragmatism (Bell, 2015). This significant change indicates less control by the CCP in the economic field. China has successfully combined capitalism with authoritarian rule. Developing a market-capitalist economy and private ownership have been the key features of China's economic reforms. According to Robert A Dahl (2000, p167), “market-capitalism typically led to economic growth, and economic growth is favourable to democracy”. Although China has not experienced
“the long run” market-capitalist economy as Dahl suggested, however Capitalists and their employees, private business owners and others have become part of “the people”—the participants of the CCP regime. This largely expanded the range of participants in the Chinese regime. As a result of allowing people from different backgrounds to join the party, a stable political class has been established to share power with the elites of the CCP. This suggests a change in the nature of the CCP from a single group or proletarian party to a party for the many. As Ogden (2002, p262) suggests, the Three Represents “explicitly states the Party’s changing nature”.

Moreover, the CCP officially attempted to develop democratic elements in the Chinese political system, such as establishing an elective PC system, more autonomous power within the EMAR system, “one country with two systems” and the rule of law. Also, the official standard textbooks include many detailed discussions of democratic knowledge, such as citizens’ rights and human rights, and highlight the advantages of political democracy. Among these, increasing the legitimacy and power of the National People’s Congress has resulted in “a far more proactive role for its delegates” and “in democratising China” (Ogden, 2002, p252). As the textbooks state, a large number of new laws and legislation has been published since then. This enhances the legal rights of individuals. All these features indicate that the CCP has embraced a more participatory and soft form of authoritarianism.

In summary, soft authoritarianism and a developing market capitalist economy, Confucian political values of “the primacy of the people” and collectivism are key features of the Chinese version of socialist democracy. These features are also shown in the process of democratisation in the East Asian societies before the 1990s.

**Chinese Version of Democracy and Leninist Governance**
Since the Chinese regime promoted patriotic education nationwide from 1990, it also promoted anti-westernisation, anti-individualism and collectivism as important national polices and norms of political life for university students. In this context, at the level of official statements regarding CE, the Chinese version of socialist democracy--"democratic centralism"--shows similarities to the Leninist principles by which the ruling party adheres to all its functions. According to Meyer (1995, p754), under a Leninist formula of democratic centralism, pending issues could be debated freely by the party membership. Once a decision was made, members have to accept it without further questioning. The party's decisions will not be weakened by any checks and balances. Also, the state is strongly unified. The government combines citizens' organizations, legislative and executive functions, and is controlled by a single party. This party claims to represent the working class, and all other parties are outlawed in political life. According to the explanations of the CCP's Constitution in the textbooks, participants in the Party are subordinate to the Party organization and the minority is subordinate to the majority, as well as subordinate organizations are subordinate to the higher organizations. The Party organizations and members are subordinate to the Party's National Congress and the Central Committee. The leaders of the Party are elected. The Party's parent organizations often obtains opinions on decision making from lower organizations, the masses and the Party's members in order to promptly resolve problems as they arise. In this way, democracy is achieved through the process of policy making; the centralist aspect is asserted via the subordination of all lower bodies to the decisions taken by higher ones. Democracy consists in the fact that the highest body of the Party is its congress to which delegates are elected by local organizations. In this sense, the Chinese version of democracy shares many characteristics of Leninist governance.
Chinese Version of Socialist Democracy is an Illiberal “Democracy”

China is still an authoritarian state. The Chinese version of socialist democracy is an illiberal democracy with many serious limitations compared with Western liberal democracy.

Firstly, the Chinese political system is an incomplete electoral system. There are no direct national elections of the country’s leaders and no general elections of Mayors at provincial level. Also, there are limitations to citizen’s rights to be elected. As the textbooks show, the elected deputies of the PC must come from certain age, gender, and occupational groups and be members of the Party (Chen & Li, 2014). More importantly, a higher-level government decides the candidates who can be elected at lower levels. If the deputies in a particular constituency do not meet the needs of the CCP, the government can disqualify candidates. It can be said that the PC electoral system is an incomplete electoral system. It is more like a selective election system, in which selected candidates must go through the electoral process to be legitimized.

Secondly, the functions of the CPPCC as a politically consultative organization are very limited. As the textbooks show CPPCC members are not elected or free to join. They are almost all appointed by the CCP or internal parties. Also, the CPPCC members cannot be elected to become the deputies of the PC, neither attend the PC sessions. They are only allowed to observe “the same level PC’s meetings and discuss the PC’s reports” (B7-4, 2003-2005, p94). The CCP appoints leadership for the democratic parties in the state organizations at all levels. There are also conditions for the existence of these political parties that are “supporting the leadership of the CCP” (ibid). These official statements suggest that the CPPCC is not involved in decision-making. It acts as a consultative agent without political power.
Thirdly, the rule of law in China is also very limited—at least at the level of official discourse in CE. The officially promoted rule of law is not same as liberal democratic conceptions of the rule of law. The Four Fundamental Principles which are based on the leadership of the CCP remain the guiding principle of laws and the legal system. Chinese judicial institutions are produced by the NPC, and the NPC is under the leadership of the Party. In practice, the CCP strictly controls decision-making over the government and legislature. “No one has authority to modify the constitution other than the Party” (Fukuyama, 2014, p364). Law remains an instrument of rule, and not an intrinsic source of legitimacy. As Potter (2014) claims, China’s legal system still remains a system that practices the “rule by law” rather than the “rule of law”, and that the party-state still remains the final arbiter of conflicts over legal rights and interests within Chinese society and among government officials. It can be concluded that implementing “the rule of law” has not changed the nature of the authoritarian regime in China.

After the 05 Program reforms in Chinese HE, in particular after Xi Jinping became leader, the official statements in CE suggests a change in the Chinese version of socialist democracy, The CCP has developed to become the only ruling party and is solely responsible for the leadership of other parties and the state political system. As Suzanne Ogden warns (2002, p34), “Democratic dictatorship” in China has proved to be “far more dictatorial than democratic.” Currently, the CE textbooks represent the new policies of the Chinese government, in that strong control of the CCP under Xiism aims to develop China into a powerful “socialist country” in the world with stronger militarism and authoritarianism. As Huntington (1993, p6) suggests, “if decision makers are not chosen through elections, they are simply a façade for the
exercise of much greater power by a non-democratically chosen group, then clearly that political system is not democratic”.

In summary, during the post Mao era, a Chinese version of socialist democracy has been represented in CE in Chinese HE. This Chinese version of socialist democracy combines features of orthodox Marxist ideas of democracy--Leninism and East Asian values. It is an illiberal democracy. This Chinese version of socialist democracy has been changed often by the CCP so that democratisation during the post Mao era has been fragile and weak, and has fluctuated.
Appendices Abbreviations:

CCYL: Central Committee of Youth League of the Chinese Communist Party 中国共产党青年团中央
CCP: the Chinese Communist Party 中国共产党
CCPO: the Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party 中国共产党中央委员会
CE: Citizenship Education 公民教育
CG: the Central Government 中央政府
CPPCC: the Political Consultation 政治协商
EMAR: the Ethnic Minority Autonomous Region 少数民族自治区
HE: Higher Education
HEIs: Higher Education Institutions
MOE: Ministry of Education (also called the State Board of Education in different time) 教育部（也曾是教育委员会）
NPC: the National People’s Congress 人民代表大会
PC: the People’s Congress 人民代表大会
PCCP: the Propaganda Department of the Central committee of the Chinese Communist Party 中国共产党中央宣传部
PRC: the People’s Republic of China 中华人民共和国
QCA: Qualifications and Curriculum Authority
SAR: the Special Administrative Region 特别行政区
ST: State Council 国务院
Bibliography:


- Chen Li-ping, Li Xiang (2014), “the 60th Anniversary of the National People's Congress: China's Electoral System is Gradually Maturing”. Online: Legal


Chinese Official Documents Used in This Study


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教育委员会在“高等学校进一步贯彻《中共中央关于改革学校思想品德和政治理论课程教学的通知》的意见”


Students (1978-2014)”. Intellectual Property Publishing House. p. 335. 中共中央宣传部、教育部、新闻出版总署 (10 号) 《关于加强高等学校思想政治理论课教材出版管理的通知》．


Appendix

Information Sheet for Interviewees 为受访者提供的资料

Research Topic: Approaches to teaching and learning in the compulsory courses in Chinese universities

研究课题：中国大学公共课的教与学方法

Aims of Research 研究目的:

This work investigates the pedagogical issues of teaching/learning methods, resources, processes and effectiveness in classroom through classroom observation and interviewing teachers and students in six Chinese universities. The focus will be on the teaching/learning compulsory courses. These are a collection of courses that all students regardless of their field of study need to take. They include subjects such as “Chinese Modern and Contemporary History”, “Thought and Moral Cultivation and Legal Basis” and “Mao Zedong Thought and theoretical System of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”.

这项研究是通过观察六所中国大学的课堂教学，和访问教师和学生来了解教学论所涉及的教与学的方法，教学资源，教学过程和教学效果。重点放在公共课的教学/学习上，这些课程包括所有学生无论其专业领域是什么都需要学习的科目，即中国近现代史纲要，思想道德修养与法律基础和毛泽东思想与中国特色社会主义理论体系概论。

Research methods 研究方法:

Empirical work for the study will be conducted at six higher education institutions in Beijing, Taiyuan and Xinzhou. This includes two large general universities in Beijing, two large universities in Taiyuan and two medium-sized higher education institutions in Xinzhou. This study will analyse data from classroom observation and interviews undertaken with a sample of qualified HE teachers and students.
实地考察将在北京、太原、忻州 6 所高等教育机构进行。包括北京的两所普通高校，太原的两所大学和忻州的两所中等规模高等教育机构。这项研究将分析从课堂观察和受访的教师和学生中采集的数据。

**Dissemination 传播：**

All data collected during the research will be kept confidential as copy and intellectual property rights. The identities of participants in the research will be fully anonymized in the report, such as I will use ‘interviewee A or in the classroom B’ to represent participants. The report aims to contribute to the field of pedagogy in Chinese higher education. The main findings will be written up as an academic article to publish in an academic journal.

研究期间收集的所有数据将受到知识产权的保护。研究报告将用化名描述参与研究者，如我会用‘受访者 A，课堂 B’来代表参与者。该研究旨为中国的高等教育教学领域做出贡献，主要研究成果将写成学术文章发表在学术刊物上。

For queries or further information relating to this research please contact.

要查询与本研究相关的更多信息，请联系。

Jing-kun Bai 柏晶坤 信箱: jingkun@aol.com
Consent Form for Teachers 受访教师同意书

Dear Interviewee 亲爱的受访者：

I am conducting a research about teaching and learning quality of compulsory course in Higher Education in China. I am seeking teaching professionals to participate in the study. I will interview the participants. The research will be conducted during March 2016.

我正在进行的这项研究是关于中国高等教育公共课的教学质量。我希望从事教学的专业人士参与这项研究。我将访谈这些参与者。这项研究将在 2016 年 3 月开展。

This study complies with the guidelines of BERA-‘Revised Ethical Guidelines for Educational Research’ (2011). All participants are assured of confidentiality of intellectual property rights. Data provided will be stored in a locked cabinet while will not being directly used and will not be copied or recorded anywhere else. The research findings published in the final report will not be attributed to any named individuals or institutions.

这项研究符合 BERA--“2011 年修订的教育研究伦理准则”要求。所有参与研究者都将受到知识产权的保护。受访者所提供的数据将存储在一个上锁的柜子中，不会被直接使用，也不会被他人复印和复制。最终发表的研究结果将不会归属于任何指定的个人或机构。

You have the right to withdraw from participating in this study at any time.

你有权随时从本研究中撤出。

Signing the reply slip below will serve as your consent to participate.

下面签名的回执是您同意参与研究的证据。

The findings will be published in a final report after July 2016, and will be freely available to all participants. Any questions or queries about this research should be addressed to:
研究报告将在2016年七月后登出，并免费提供给所有的参与研究者。有关这项研究的任何问题或疑问请问我：Jingkun. Bai 柏晶坤

Email: jingkun@aol.com

手机：07752152999

The Institute of Education, UCL, University of London 伦敦大学教育学院，

20 Bedford Way, London W1H 2BT

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research 感谢你同意参加这项研究

Name 姓名: __________________ Work place 工作地点: __________________________

Email 信箱: __________________________

I consent to participate in this research. I understand I have the right to withdraw at any time.

我同意参加这项研究，我知道我有权随时从本研究中撤出。

Signed 签字: _______________________ Date 日期: _______________________
Interview Questions for Teachers 教师受访问题:

1. What is the exam board for the course you are teaching? Why?
   你所使用的课程考试模块是什么？为什么？

2. How do you obtain your teaching materials?
   你如何获得你的教材？

3. How do you prepare your lessons?
   你如何准备你的课堂教学？

   Do you use a planned scheme of lesson plan? Why?
   你按规定的教学计划教学吗？

   Do you use the given textbooks or teaching guilds? why?
   你使用学校发的教科书或教学大纲吗？为什么？

   Do you use your own teaching materials? why?
   你上课用自己的教材吗？为什么？

4. How many students are enrolled in this class?
   有多少学生选读你的课？

5. How are students recruited and selected for the course? why?
   学生们如何选择你的课？为什么？

6. How do you organise class teaching?
   你如何进行课堂教学？

   Do you organise group discussions? why?
   你在课堂上组织小组讨论吗？为什么？

   Do you give open question or given answer? Why?
   你给学生开放式的答案还是肯定式答案？为什么？

7. Do you ask students’ opinions in the classroom? If so
   你咨询学生的意见吗？如果是，

   How does this happen?
   为什么你要问？

   Can you give some examples of how you elicit the views of students in the class?
   你能举例说明你是如何引导出学生的观点？

8. How do you assess student’s learning?
   你如何评估学生的学习情况？

   What standards do you use to assess students?
   你用什么标准来评估学生？
How many students achieve high grades? How?
有多少学生能取得好成绩？如何取得？

Do any students fail this course? Why?
有学生不及格吗？为什么？

8. Which lessons do/not you enjoy teaching most?
哪堂课是你最(不)喜欢教的？为什么？
Consent Form for Students 受访学生同意书

Dear Interviewee 亲爱的受访人:

I am conducting a research about teaching and learning quality of compulsory course in Higher Education in China. I am seeking university students to participate in the study. I will interview the participants. The research will be conducted during March 2016.

这项研究符合 BERA--"2011 年修订的教育研究伦理准则"要求。所有参与研究者都将受到知识产权的保护。受访者所提供的数据将存储在一个上锁的柜子中，不会被直接使用，也不会被他人复印和复制。最终发表的研究结果将不会归属于任何指定的个人或机构。

You have the right to withdraw from participating in this study at any time.

你有权随时从本研究中撤出。

Signing the reply slip below will serve as your consent to participate.

下面签名的回执是您同意参与研究的证据。

The findings will be published in a final report after July 2016, and will be freely available to all participants. Any questions or queries about this research should be addressed to:
研究报告将在2016年七月后登出，并免费提供给所有的参与研究者。有关这项研究的任何问题或疑问，请问：Jingkun. Bai 柏晶坤
Email: jingkun@aol.com
手机：07752152999

The Institute of Education, UCL, University of London
伦敦大学教育学院
20 Bedford Way, London W1H 2BT

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research 感谢你同意参加这项研究

Name 姓名: __________________ Study place 学习地点: ______________________

Email 信箱: ___________________________

I consent to participate in this research. I understand I have the right to withdraw at any time.

我同意参加这项研究，我知道我有权随时从本研究中撤出。

Signed 签字: ______________________ Date 日期: _____________________
Interview Questions for Students

1. How do you obtain your learning materials (textbooks)?
   你如何获得你的学习资料（教材）？

2. How do you prepare your assignments/exams?
   你如何准备你的作业/考试？

Do you take class notes? Why?
   你做课堂笔记吗？为什么？

Do you use the given textbooks or learning guilds? why?
   你使用学校发的课本吗？为什么？

Do you use your own learning materials? why?
   你用自己找的教材吗？为什么？

4. How many students are enrolled in this class?
   有多少学生读你们的课？

5. Why do you take this course and how?
   你如何和为什么选这门课？

6. Do you have (group) discussion in the class? why?
   课堂上有(小组)讨论吗？为什么？

7. Do you give open answer or given answer if a teacher ask you a question? Why?
   你回答提问时是给开放式的答案还是肯定式答案？为什么？

8. How do you achieve high grades in this subject?
   你如何取得这门课的好成绩？

9. Which lessons do/not you enjoy learning most?
   哪些课是你最（不）喜欢学的？
Dear teacher 亲爱的老师：

I am conducting a research about teaching and learning quality of compulsory course in Higher Education in China. I am seeking teaching professionals to participate in the study. The participants will teach when I am doing classroom observation. The research will be conducted during March 2016.

我正在进行的这项研究是关于中国高等教育公共课的教学质量。我希望从事教学的专业人士参与这项研究。我将观察参与者从事的课堂教学，这项研究将在 2016 年 3 月开展。

This study complies with the guidelines of BERA- ‘Revised Ethical Guidelines for Educational Research’ (2011). All participants are assured of confidentiality of intellectual property rights. Data provided will be stored in a locked cabinet while will not being directly used and will not be copied or recorded anywhere else. The research findings published in the final report will not be attributed to any named individuals or institutions.

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Signing the reply slip below will serve as your consent to participate.

下面签名的回执是您同意参与研究的证据。

The findings will be published in a final report after July 2016, and will be freely available to all participants. Any questions or queries about this research should be addressed to:
研究报告将在 2016 年七月后登出，并免费提供给所有的参与研究者。有关这项研究的任何问题或疑问请问：Jingkun. Bai 柏晶坤，手机：07752152999

The Institute of Education, UCL, University of London 伦敦大学教育学院，

20 Bedford Way, London W1H 2BT

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research 感谢你同意参加这项研究

Name 姓名：________________ Work place 工作地点：________________________

Email 信箱：____________________

I consent to participate in this research. I understand I have the right to withdraw at any time. 我同意参加这项研究，我知道我有权随时从本研究中撤出。

Signed 签字：__________________ Date 日期：________________________
**Ethics Application**  
**Form: Research**  
**Degree Students**

All research activity conducted under the auspices of the Institute by staff, students or visitors, where the research involves human participants or the use of data collected from human participants are required to gain ethical approval before starting. Please answer all relevant questions. Your form may be returned if incomplete. Please write your responses in terms that can be understood by a lay person.

For further support and guidance please see Ethics Review Procedures for Student Research [http://www.ioe.ac.uk/studentethics/](http://www.ioe.ac.uk/studentethics/) or contact your supervisor or researchethics@ioe.ac.uk.

### Section 1 Project details

<table>
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<th>a.</th>
<th>Project title: An Analysis of Citizenship Education in China: what does this reflect democratization during the post Mao era?</th>
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<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Student name: Jing-kun Bai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Supervisor: Germ Janmaat, Edmund Waite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Advisory committee members:</td>
</tr>
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<td>e.</td>
<td>Department: Lifelong and Comparative Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>Intended research start date: 18th, February, 2016</td>
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<td>g.</td>
<td>Intended research end date: 30th March, 2016</td>
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<td>h.</td>
<td>Funder (if applicable): BAICE - British Association for International &amp; Comparative Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>i.</td>
<td>Funding confirmed? Yes</td>
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| j. | Country fieldwork will be conducted in: China  
*If research to be conducted abroad please check www.fco.gov.uk. If the FCO advice against travel a full travel risk assessment form should also be completed and* |
| k. | All research projects at the Institute of Education are required to specify a professional code of ethics according to which the research will be British Educational Research Association (2011) |
| l. | If your research is based in another institution then you may be required to submit your research to that institution’s ethics review process. If your research involves patients recruited through the NHS Has this project been considered by another (external) Research Ethics Committee? Yes [ ] No [ ] go to Section 2  
*If so, please insert the name of the committee, the date on which the project was considered, and*  
External Committee Name:  
Date of Approval: |

- If your project has been externally approved please go to **Section 9 Attachments.**
Section 2 Research Summary

Please provide an overview of your research. This can include some or all of the following: purpose of the research, aims, main research questions, research design, participants, sampling, data collection, reporting and dissemination. *It is expected that this will take approximately 200-300 words, and you may write more if you feel it is necessary.*

The planned fieldwork is part of my PhD project on traces of democratization which have emerged in the context of economic growth and the one-party political system in China during the reform era and possibilities that democratization may emerge in the future.

**Main research questions**: to what extent can democratization be seen in citizenship education during the reform era in China?

Seven sub-questions are referring to four themes for analysis: the ideologies of the CCP, the structure of the communist regime, democratic values and ‘others’.

The focus of this planned fieldwork is on the teaching and learning of citizenship education in higher education. Questions that will be explored are how teacher-led the lessons are, whether students can express their opinions in class, whether there are classroom discussions, and whether teachers and students use other materials in addition to the standard textbook. My questions will be as simple and neutral as possible. I will avoid mentioning sensitive terms such as democracy, human rights, and censorship that could compromise or embarrass teachers or students. Compulsory courses are parts of the collection of citizenship education that all students need to take regardless of their field of study.

**Research design**: (Sampling) six compulsory citizenship education classroom observations. Two will be located in Beijing, where the economy is well-developed, the other two are located in Taiyuan, a developing area, and last two are located in Xinzhou an under-developed area. I will take notes and voice recorder during the observations;

**Participants**: I will interview teachers and students face to face at these universities to assess whether democratic values of critical thinking, multi-culture, pluralism and tolerance are being used/encouraged in the classroom. Because this research topic is political sensitive in China, so my interview questions are only focused on pedagogical issues of teaching and learning methods, processes and effectiveness of the course, such as how interviewees obtain their teaching/learning materials, how they organize class teaching/learning, how they discuss course issues in class and so on.

Consent forms and interview questions will be shown to participants in both English and Chinese. I used ‘compulsory course’ to replace the sensitive words of ‘citizenship education’ in these forms.

Section 3 Security-sensitive material

Security sensitive research includes: commissioned by the military; commissioned under an EU security call; involves the acquisition of security clearances; concerns terrorist or extreme groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Will your project consider or encounter security-sensitive material?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
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☐ If you have answered Yes please give further details in Section 8 Ethical Issues.

Will you be visiting websites associated with extreme or terrorist organisations?

Will you be storing or transmitting any materials that could be interpreted as promoting or endorsing terrorist
### Section 4 Research participants
Tick all that apply

<table>
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<td>Primary School age 5-11</td>
<td>Advisory/consultation group</td>
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<td>Secondary School age12-16</td>
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<td>Adults please specify below</td>
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</table>

### Section 5 Research methods
Tick all that apply

- Interviews
- Focus groups
- Questionnaire
- Action research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Controlled trial/other intervention</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>study Use of personal records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systematic review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary data analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otherwise</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Section 6 Systematic reviews
Only complete if systematic reviews will be used

a. Will you be collecting any new data from participants? Yes □ No □

b. Will you be analysing any secondary data? Yes □ No □

### Section 7 Secondary data analysis
Only complete if secondary data analysis will be

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of dataset/s</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owner of dataset/s</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are the data in the public domain?</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes □ No □</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If no, do you have the owner’s permission/license?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are the data anonymised?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes □ No □</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Do you plan to anonymise the data? Yes □ No* □

Do you plan to use individual level data? Yes* □ No □

Will you be linking data to individuals? Yes* □ No □

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are the data sensitive (DPA definition)?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes* □ No □</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Will you be conducting analysis within the remit it was originally collected for?</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes □ No* □</td>
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</table>

Was consent gained from participants for subsequent/future analysis? Yes □ No* □

Was data collected prior to ethics approval process? Yes □ No* □

If you have ticked any asterisked responses, this indicates possible increased ethical issues for your research please give further details in Section 8 Ethical Issues
Section 8 Ethical issues

What are the ethical issues which may arise in the course of your research, and how will they be addressed?

It is important that you demonstrate your awareness of potential risks or harm that may arise as a result of your research. You should then demonstrate that you have considered ways to minimise the likelihood and impact of each potential harm that you have identified. Please be as specific as possible in describing the ethical issues you will have to address. Please consider / address ALL issues that may apply.

- Potentially vulnerable participants
- Safeguarding/child protection
- Risks to participants and/or researchers
- International research
- Sensitive topics

All participants are teachers and students at Chinese higher education institutions. There are no known potentially vulnerable participants or safeguarding/child protection involved. All participants will be briefed by the researcher on the aims and purposes of the study, and then they will be asked whether they will volunteer for the research and then those that do will sign consent forms.

Interview questions are focused on pedagogical issues, such as teaching and learning methods, processes and effectiveness, which do not directly relate to any sensitive topics, therefore risks to participants and the researcher are low.

This is international research. Although I am Chinese, there will need to be care taken with diplomatic and cultural engagement according to Chinese conventions. This particularly means negotiating and co-operating with Gatekeepers to gain access and gain sufficient data. All participants in the research will be assured of confidentiality and of anonymity in the findings. All research data will be stored safely using passwords, and emails relating to the research are subject to password protection and email encryption. Data from the research will not be shared with any third parties. Data will be managed according the Data Protection Act and may in part or in an amended form be used at relevant Comparative and Citizenship Education Conferences and workshops.

Section 9 Attachments Please attach the following items to this form, or explain if not

| a. Information sheet and other materials to be used to inform potential participants about the research. | Yes □ | No □ |
| b. Consent form | Yes □ | No □ |
| c. The proposal for the project, if applicable | Yes □ | No □ |
| d. Approval letter from external Research Ethics Committee, if applicable | Yes □ | No □ |

Section 10 Declaration

I confirm that to the best of my knowledge this is a full description of the ethics issues that may arise in the course of this project

Name Jing-kun Bai
Date 09.02.2016

Please submit your completed ethics forms to your supervisor/course administrator.
### Departmental use

If a project raises particularly challenging ethics issues, or a more detailed review would be appropriate, you may refer the application to the Research Ethics Coordinator (via researchethics@ioe.ac.uk) so that it can be submitted to the Research Ethics Committee for consideration. A Research Ethics Committee Chair, ethics representatives in your department and the research ethics coordinator can advise you, either to support your review process, or help decide whether an application should be referred to the Research Ethics Committee.

### Reviewer 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supervisor name</th>
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<td>Supervisor comments</td>
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<td>Supervisor signature</td>
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### Reviewer 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advisory committee member name</th>
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<tr>
<td>Advisory committee member comments</td>
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<td>Advisory committee member signature</td>
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### Decision

<table>
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<th>Date decision was made</th>
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<tr>
<td>Decision</td>
<td>Approved</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Referred back to applicant and supervisor</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Referred to REC for review</td>
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### Recording

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<th>Recorded in the student information system</th>
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Once completed and approved, please send this form and associated documents to the faculty research administrator to record on the student information system and to securely store. Further guidance on ethical issues can be found on the IOE website at [http://www.ioe.ac.uk/ethics/](http://www.ioe.ac.uk/ethics/) and [www.ethicsguidebook.ac.uk](http://www.ethicsguidebook.ac.uk)