The Rise of Rhizomatic Cultural Policies
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ABSTRACT

The cultural policy agenda has traditionally centered around the arts, heritage and crafts, however, since the 1990s public perceptions about what could be defined as culture started changing. The author uses Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the rhizome as a metaphor to describe the new model of cultural governance. The article argues that cultural policy is becoming increasingly rhizomatic branching out to other policy areas adding more items to its core agenda. The interaction between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department of Culture, Media and Sport in the UK is examined as an exploratory case to illustrate the argument.

KEYWORDS
Rhizome; rhizomatic governance; cultural policy

Introduction

The present conceptual article comes as a response to Per Mangset’s piece ‘The end of cultural policy’ published in the International Journal of Cultural Policy. It discusses the proposition that “it is not obvious that a sectorial cultural policy will persist in the future” (Mangset, 2018, p. 11). Mangset’s critique on the failure of post-war cultural policies to deliver on their promises is thought-provoking and paves the way for more critical reflections to surface on the changing nature of cultural policy regimes in postmodernity. This article argues that cultural policy is becoming increasingly rhizomatic branching out to other policy areas adding more items to its core agenda. It argues that while the internationalisation of the cultural policy agenda has introduced a new area of interest for cultural actors, the current ecosystem is governed by strict hierarchies grounded in older notions of how power can be distributed and how administrative practices should be organised across departments.

The first part of the article will revisit a series of key developments in the cultural policy field which unfolded during the past three decades to provide a context to the main argument. Next, the author will introduce the rhizome as a theoretical
framework to organise the group of arguments brought forward in this paper. The rhizome is the foundation of the work of two French philosophers, Deleuze and Guattari, who first introduced the concept in their book ‘A Thousand Plateaus’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, first published in English in 1987). The concept refers to a new form of organisational arrangement in which power is distributed uniformly across a network of actors. Power distribution is an important parameter that needs to be factored into how cultural administration systems are designed as cultural organisations are cocreators of public value and, thus, their contribution is key to the development of sustainable cultural policies. The third part traces instances of cooperation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department of Culture, Media and Sport in the UK using their interaction as an exploratory case study. The last part discusses the practical implications of this new organisational form to conclude that cultural policy will need to augment its regulatory space as the tendency to branch out and away from the traditional core agenda is likely to continue.

Background

Cultural policy, as Mangset (2018) accurately notes, has been an organised form of public policy for the past six or seven decades at best. Indeed, the structured and institutionalised cultural policies of the latter half of the 20th century constituted only a glimpse in the long history of how cultural affairs were dealt with. In Europe, the concept of cultural policy is bound to the tradition of welfarism which dominated the political imaginary of Europeans after the Second World War (Menger, 2010; Pratt, 2005). As the political will to support welfare frameworks subsides as a consequence of free-market neoliberalism today, cultural policy starts a journey of metamorphoses. For instance, when Zimmer and Toepler (1996) observed more than two decades ago that state authorities are retreating from the cultural field to make way for private actors, what they witnessed was only one symptom of a general surge in branching out and away from the centre of governance. The picture was not yet complete; it was indeed the coming years that would bring to the fore new modes of governmentality. The intense agencification movement of the 1980s in the UK brought about colossal changes in how power was understood and enacted (Gains, 2003). Funding and agenda setting started gradually to lose their primary function of securing acquiescence. Instead, evaluation rose to the status of the ultimate control mechanism (Belfiore & Bennett, 2008; Hoggett, 1996). As the article supports, evaluation brought to the limelight the pressing issue of public value and with it came the act of interlinking policy areas to harvest the maximum benefits for the people.
While it has long been accepted that culture, heritage and the arts constitute a domain whose concerns do not fall far from those of the media, sports and tourism (Evard & Colbert, 2000), scholars have overlooked the implications these interactions have on the macro-scale of cultural governance. For the most part, policy synergies with non-cultural actors have been interpreted as instrumental reinforcing the general scepticism against what is seen as an unrestrained diversification of the cultural and arts policy agenda (Gray, 2008). This ‘act of letting go’ from the traditional core activity happened gradually as a series of developments unfolded. As mentioned, the introduction of the New Public Management model in public administration in the 1980s changed the role of the central government and increased the interactions with the private and non-profit sectors but also decongested the core through the transfer of services to agencies (Brandsen & Pestoff, 2006; Walsh, 1995). Secondly, the production of knowledge around culture, heritage and the arts by extra-disciplinary experts such as economists and urban planners recalibrated the entire field by creating new domains for policy development such as the creative industries and culture-led urban and regional regeneration (Prince, 2014; Schlesinger, 2013). As a result, the cultural policy landscape has become more diverse and pluralistic as actors have been multiplying with a breath-taking speed. This has had a cascade effect on how culture is today understood, researched and regulated.

Cultural and non-cultural agents are positioned into the same ecosystem of institutions, they may compete and clash with non-cultural agents, but they can also be seen to collaborate with players who belong to adjacent plateaus of power (Vestheim, 2012; Wise, 2002). This new condition of interlinking institutions to work on crosscutting policy areas is what the author calls ‘rhizomatic governance’. The concept is gleaned out of Deleuze and Guattari’s work on psychoanalysis and refers to an open-ended network of connections which resists reification. In governance, the concept helps us imagine an organisational system which harbours incredibly diverse policy items without enforcing distinctions and assigning priorities. Although the intention to branch out from the traditional core of activity of a cultural policy stricto sensu has long been present, the article argues that administrative structures and policy frameworks have not adapted well enough to serve this differing intention. While departments and other non-departmental public bodies whose policy areas touch upon economics, planning, tourism, digital governance and foreign affairs constitute the vital space of a cultural policy sensu lato, cross-agency initiatives and interdepartmental partnerships still remain a secondary function of the government. Cultural governance is moving on paradigmatically from a sectorial and highly centralised structure toward a rhizomatous organisational form, however, the established networks still obey to asymmetrical linear relational rules where power rests primarily with one agent.
The rhizome as an organisational principle

The rhizome has been a popular idea since its inception in a number of disciplines, most notably organisational studies, urban planning and education research (for instance Linstead & Thanem, 2007; Semetsky, 2013; Wood, 2009), however, its application has not been sufficiently explored in cultural policy research (Wise, 2002). In this section, the author will analyse the concept of the rhizome, which lies at the heart of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical work, and will use it as a metaphor to describe the new model of cultural governance. The aim is to provide a robust interpretative framework that will assist analysts to conceptualise the new ecosystem of cultural action. French philosopher Gilles Deleuze and psychoanalyst Félix Guattari use the term ‘rhizome’ in their work to describe an ever-expanding network of nodes spreading towards different directions and levels. Despite the varied nature of the nodes, the connections are usually seamless forming an open-sourced system of interactions. The problem Deleuze and Guattari identify is that “[w]henever a multiplicity is taken up in a structure, its growth is offset by a reduction in its laws of combination” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 6). To this complication they respond with the rhizome:

[A] rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles
(Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 7).

The rhizome is an enabling concept emphasising the non-hierarchical nature of power relations where any node can be connected to any other in a given system and outside of it. The rhizome has, thus, no power base and is constantly trying to prevent the consolidation of power in one arena (or else plateau) (Pisters, 2001; Thanem & Linstead, 2006). Deleuze and Guattari juxtapose the quality of the rhizome with that of a tree which fixes a point staying forever attached to its roots. The rhizome, however, is not an enemy of organisation itself, it is against the idea of an orderly arrangement in which specific points are gaining more importance than others (Chia, 1999).

The fluidity that characterises the rhizome keeps it in a constant state of flux where new relationships can be formed at any point. The aim is to deterritorialize a relationship leaving it empty, leaving it only with lines of movement and not fixed points (Zourabichvili, 2012). By forming a rhizome, one is actually increasing his/her territory by increasing the laws of combination. By creating a fluid space, one is actually increasing the probabilities of interaction. The rhizomatic model of governance is, thus, a process which seeks to augment the regulatory space for policy organs to facilitate the connections of seemingly unrelated plateaus of power. Any encounter is possible so there is no reason to
refuse to redraw the boundaries (Zourabichvili, 2012). The act of interlinking is, nonetheless, accompanied by its own risks. Deleuze and Guattari (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 205) have warned against the incompatibility of links: “The composition of the lines, of one line with another, is a problem, even of two lines of the same type. There is no assurance that two lines of flight will prove compatible, compossible”. Therefore, even if policy areas and organs are stitched together there is no guarantee that the policy synergy will produce meaningful results for the actors involved.

The post-structuralist concept of the rhizome is commonly used as a metaphor to symbolise an organisational relationship that resists the closing off boundaries. Robinson and Maguire (2010) argue that the rhizome is a model that rejects the classic Aristotelian system of classification in which entities are grouped into mutually exclusive classes according to their individual characteristics. According to this system of thought, policy areas cannot override their jurisdiction and agenda items are, as a result, assigned to distinct authorities. The rhizome, on the contrary, connects ideas and objects without enforcing a distinction. Everything can be relevant and can come under the same umbrella. The rhizome, however, should not be seen as a proxy for a new system whose foundational laws obey to anarchy and chance (Lawley, 2005). Instead, resistance to stratification should be seen as a form of self-expression capable of bearing new creation. The rhizome is not trying to bring about chaos, but endorses the creation of a ‘third space’ away from the orderly and suffocating world of top-down control. Due to these notions, the rhizome has acquired a romantic reputation as it holds the promise of emancipation encouraging institutional reform (Wallin, 2010).

In the cultural sphere, the arts and heritage have stood at the heart of the policy agenda for the most part of the field’s life and have legitimised it as an area of governance with distinct focus and boundaries. Nonetheless, the ‘Deleuzian tree’, forever permanent in form and output, is now being grafted with input from other plateaus of power as the accountability crusade pushes public institutions to increase the value of their work. The distribution of power can generally move along two axes, one vertical and one horizontal. As established earlier, during the 1980s and 1990s the distribution of power concerned mainly the vertical axis. This is evident by a number of studies in cultural policy research analysing the efforts of policy actors to decentralise power in the cultural arena. These largely focus on outcomes by examining whether cultural provision has expanded and citizen participation has increased through devolution (Ahearne, 2003; Mangset, 1995; Zan, Baraldi, & Gordon, 2007). The struggle of the geographical and administrative periphery to gain power against the centre has monopolised research interest as the empowerment of sub-national actors and arm’s length bodies respectively has been seen as a sine qua non condition for the
democratisation of culture (Heiskanen, 2001). Yet, what researchers have largely failed to do is produce research that is moving along the horizontal axis with the intention to examine relationships between policy actors of equal standing. The following section will look at the relationship between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and will argue that while their relationship in its current form resembles a quasi-rhizomatic network, administrative obstacles in how power is distributed still persist.

Foreign cultural policy – an exemplar of the rhizome?

In the British context, it is generally accepted that the Next Steps review published in 1988 and the Creative Industries Mapping document published ten years later, in 1998, have been the two main drivers behind the expansion of the cultural ecosystem and the subsequent diversification of the cultural policy agenda (Belfiore, 2004; Cunningham, 2002). The first introduced broad spectrum changes in the public sector increasing the density of transactions between public and private actors through the creation of agencies. The second augmented the regulatory space for culture adding new policy items into the cultural remit which concentrated until then exclusively on the arts and heritage. They both assisted not only in redefining the cultural sector but also in reshuffling cabinet priorities. As the cultural sector was growing in size and monetary value, so was the interest of the government in liquidating the returns. Creative exports were seen as a key channel for revenue creation and a number of departments, agencies and offices were invited to participate at the end of the 1990s in consultations around the future of the sector. The first Creative Industries Task Force comprised of a complex array of ministerial and official representatives from the regional offices of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Department for Trade and Industry, HM Treasury and the British Council among others with the Department of Culture, Media and Sport leading the formation (House of Commons Debate, 1999). However, the co-creation of value by state institutions with different policy intentions and different relative position within the government has not always been a painless process with competition marking collaboration (Schlesinger, 2009).

The role of the Foreign Ministry in the equation is particularly interesting as the organisation traditionally lacks a domestic constituency from which it can draw legitimacy for its operations. In the British context, the FCO has been accused in the past of being a self-closed entity insensitive to domestic political priorities stemming from other government departments. Much of this changed with the rise of New Labour to power in 1997 as the FCO tried to become more engaged with an array of stakeholders from NGOs, consultancies and the industry to other
government entities (Hall, 2013). Indeed, Labour opened up horizontal channels of communication between the FCO and DCMS not only with the establishment of the Creative Industries Task Force as shown above but also with the creation in 2002 of the Public Diplomacy Strategy Board in which the FCO was the lead organisation (House of Commons, 2006). Another instance of cooperation has been the Sustainable Tourism cross-government working group which saw a number of departments coming together under the lead of DCMS this time to mitigate the environmental impact of tourist flows (Sustainable Development Commission, 2005). What these three networks demonstrate is that cooperation between the FCO and DCMS in all three areas (creative industries, diplomacy, tourism) was ordered by the central government and roles were assigned in a similar fashion.

Additionally, the FCO and DCMS, along with other government departments, are cooperating to provide strategic guidance to the UK’s most powerful soft power organ, the British Council. The British Council has been historically attached to the FCO since its inception in the 1930s with the then Arts Council Great Britain supporting its work only complementarily (British Council, 2016). A European study recently revealed that in an overwhelming majority public bodies such as the British Council report to Foreign ministries with other ministerial departments holding only auxiliary duties (European Parliament, 2016). The fact that the FCO is the principal agent for the British Council setting its agenda and targets shows how the foreign policy component is stronger than the cultural (and educational) dimension of the Council’s work. The instrumentalisation of its work has caused a legitimacy crisis within the organisation as it has repeatedly tried to reaffirm its independence by emphasising the non-diplomatic nature of its activities (Pamment, 2012). The case of the British Council demonstrates that organisations with a cultural/educational remit pay particular attention to their public image and any links to institutions driven by instrumental concerns are strongly resisted (Kizlari & Fouseki, 2018).

Drawing on the British experience, it can be argued that the relationship between Foreign ministries and Culture ministries has been generally forged by two factors. First, the temporal point when foreign cultural policy was formally acknowledged as a legitimate agenda item is key to understand why the field has been assigned to the FCO. In most countries, the creation of the Foreign ministry has preceded the establishment of all other ministerial bodies as its formation is usually seen as a crucial step by aspiring nations in their way to declare sovereignty. Consequently, foreign cultural policy became an agenda item for Foreign ministries long before Culture ministries could ever claim their stake. A series of examples reaffirm this phenomenon. In the United Kingdom, the position of the State Foreign Secretary had been established as early as the 18th century; the Foreign Office took its contemporary name and form in 1968 when
it merged with the Commonwealth Office creating a joint Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Hocking, 1999). By contrast, the Arts Council Great Britain was founded at the aftermath of the Second World War in 1946 while the creation of the DCMS, whose initial name was Department of National Heritage, would not come until 1992 (Gray, 2000). Likewise, in Greece, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established shortly after the creation of the modern state in the 19th century while the formation of the Ministry of Culture and Sciences would arrive more than a century later in 1971 (Zorba, 2009). Similarly, France, which had already established a Foreign Ministry since the 17th century, would not create an independent Ministry of Culture until 1951 (Ahearne, 2003). The institutionalisation of cultural policy after World War II challenged the traditional role of Ministries of Foreign Affairs as gatekeepers of the international cultural policy agenda. In fact, the role of the Foreign Ministry has been put into question in all policy matters related to external affairs as new actors started carving out their own space next to the official channels of control (Hocking, 1999).

The second reason why Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claim traditionally a larger stake in foreign cultural policy compared to Ministries of Culture (MoC) concerns their relative position within the cabinet. The size and political gravity of the Ministry of Culture plays a crucial part in whether the authority will be entrusted to assume a role outside the domestic frontier. Gray (2009) has pointed out to the fact that traditionally the MoC does not absorb more than 1–2% of the state budget making them the weakest policy organ in terms of spending power in the cabinet. In another study investigating the centrality of the DCMS within the British cabinet, Gray and Wingfield (2011) looked at a number of factors outside public spending such as press coverage and staffing and confirmed the marginal role of the department within the government. Therefore, size is an important indicator as to why Ministries of Culture may not be heavily involved with the internationalisation of the cultural policy agenda since they might be lacking in resources and capacities to support such an undertaking. Additionally, it seems that the setup of public administration systems impacts significantly the relationship between the two departments. For example, in Germany culture is seen as a competence of the federal states in direct contrast to foreign affairs which constitute a responsibility of the federal government in Berlin. As a result, the absence of a Federal Ministry for Culture has left the way open for the Federal Foreign Office to coordinate the internationalisation of the cultural policy agenda alongside an array of government agencies and non-governmental organisations (Görgen, 2009).

Both phenomena have largely contributed to creating an unequal relationship in which one agent always exerts by rule more power. This type of network relationship is commonly known in public management literature as a lead-organisation network (Provan & Kenis, 2008). While New Labour attempted to
break the silos of decision-making by including external stakeholders as shown earlier, the lead-organisation network remained the dominant form of how decision making is organised within the government. The author would like to advocate for the development of rhizomatic networks in cultural governance to facilitate horizontal cooperation. Rhizomatic networks have no particular centre of power within the constellation of organisations that take part in the relationship, so in this sense they resemble participant-governed networks. In this model, power is shared across the stakeholders and the network acquires gravity thanks to its collective power (Provan & Kenis, 2008).

Rhizomatic governance and network governance are complementary, but not entirely synonymous concepts. Much like the rhizome, “networks must be governed without benefit of hierarchy or ownership” (Provan & Kenis, 2008, p. 231). The article argues that rhizomatic networks are focused on building legitimacy and that is why members pay particular attention to two factors: the public image of other network members and the intention with which they enter the network. Since cultural organisations pay significant attention to the legitimacy of their operations and that of other network members (Kiitsak-Prikk, 2017), lead-organisation networks where the leader enters the relationship for purely instrumental reasons are inherently problematic in this sector.

The creation of rhizomatic networks is bound to meet resistance from these institutions which, in the current state of affairs, hold an advantageous position in the relationship. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office by rule retains the gatekeeper’s role ensuring that the country image is projected uniformly and communications in all policy areas are consistent with the strategic narrative devised by the government (Pamment, 2012). Its role is de facto instrumental aiming to maximise gains in all fronts. It occupies a plateau that is intentionally exclusionary and inaccessible to the “administrative others” despite the interconnected nature of its work. Next to systemic challenges, ideology may also rise as an insurmountable obstacle preventing the rhizome from being realised. A well-established stream of literature in cultural policy studies is questioning the instrumentalisation of culture rejecting its market-oriented approach (McGuigan, 2005). Through this prism, the Department of Culture, Media and Sports must demarcate a space that is not territorialised by any one other authority. Ministries of Culture and Arts Councils must occupy an exclusive plateau, one that is disconnected from adjacent plateaus representing, thus, a perfect Aristotelian category. A distinct area of jurisdiction is the only way for the cultural remit to remain pure. However, the rhetoric of instrumentalism may well be victimising cultural actors emptying them of their personal agency. It overlooks the fact that cultural actors may seek themselves to forge such partnerships and that their agency has the capacity to transform the relationship (Nisbett, 2013).
Discussion

It is impossible to locate a Litmus point to situate the start of the new era in cultural policy, however, if one accepts a metric system that counts in decades, it is probably safe to argue that the 1990s have been a transformative decade for the cultural policy sector (Bennett, 1995). It is around this time that the effects of alternative funding models (e.g. private sponsorship, fundraising through memberships) started challenging the role of Culture Ministries and Arts Councils as the absolute sponsoring mechanisms of the sector. At the same time, discursive changes like the shift from the democratisation of culture to cultural democracy demonstrated the need for governments to change their direction from rowing to steering. To summarise, two phenomena were observed during the 1980s, and predominantly the 1990s, in the western cultural sphere:

(i) interactions with the private and voluntary sector increased,
(ii) decentralisation through the delegation of duties to regional and local authorities as well as to arm’s length bodies was encouraged.

After the 2000s a third condition has been added:
(iii) horizontal synergies with other policy domains have been sought all the more.

It is this latest instance that is presenting major challenges. Cultural governance is becoming increasingly liquid shifting its core focus from a group of closely associated policy items to a series of loosely connected agenda items. Foreign cultural policy may have been examined as a case to illustrate how rhizomatic governance could materialise, however, a plethora of links with other departments merit also research attention. The links are neither symmetrical nor analogous across contexts. The Australian Heritage Council, for example, forms part of the Department for the Environment and Energy since 1998 (Department of the Environment, 1998); in Greece, the Ministry of Culture and Sports has merged in the past with the Ministry of Tourism to layer the tourist product with a cultural dimension (Hellenic Parliament, 2009) only for the merger to be disbanded three years later (Hellenic Parliament, 2012); in Spain, the Ministry of Culture and Sport has been glued to the Ministry of Education multiple times in its modern lifetime (Government of Spain, 1996, 2011); in an interesting move, the Department of Culture, Media and Sports in the UK is expanding its mandate to cover well-being. The core aim behind the DCMS’s vision is to build an evidential basis for the impact of the arts and heritage on well-being (DCMS, 2014), although the turn has problematised researchers about the assumed relationship between funding and associated outcomes through the measurement of subjective data (Oman & Taylor, 2018). Furthermore, in the latest instance, we have seen the DCMS adding to its agenda digital governance, an area whose
exclusive responsibility formerly belonged to the Government Digital Service of the Cabinet Office.

The change is neither definitive nor universal, nevertheless it is advancing steadily. The question is whether cultural policy research is willing to treat the ‘administrative others’ as allies and not enemies. Even those who stand at the outermost edge of cultural policy can still form part of the rhizome. In the case of foreign cultural policy multiple nodes dispersed in geographical locations around the world like embassies and consulates, state cultural institutions, international civil society organisations and their regional offices, local cultural producers, grassroots diaspora associations, art collectives and many more can form part of the rhizome. A range of exchanges are already taking place weakening the power of central departments which find themselves unable to monitor the channels of communication (Stevenson, McKay & Rowe, 2010).

Foreign cultural policy presents the opportunity to realise the rhizome in governance by shifting weight from key policy organs to a multi-agent network. After all, Deleuze and Guattari (Deleuze & Guattari, 2005, p. 21) remark that “the rhizome connects any point to any other point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature; it brings into play very different regimes of signs, and even non-sign states”. Foreign cultural policy is the locus where horizontal and vertical axes (multiple government departments and multiple levels of administration) meet, and even non-axial points (civil society, private sector) connect to the system forming a constellation of interactions.

It should not go unnoticed that the new model of governance, this quasi-rhizomatic administration, has won more critics than advocates. Cultural actors have been accused of being too eager to jump on the bandwagon of utilitarianism. The prioritisation of the extrinsic values of culture over its intrinsic qualities has made cultural analysts sceptical. However, as Belfiore (2012) has suggested, the dichotomy between intrinsic and extrinsic values in the arts and culture may well be artificial; it is perhaps an analytical construct fashioned to facilitate the understanding of complex discursive processes and institutional transformations. That being said, it should be more widely acknowledged that the critique that has been mounted against the instrumental use of cultural means to achieve noncultural outcomes is fierce and does not recognise that, for the most part, this fragmentary rhizomatous form of governance has lacked the intention of a grand scheme behind it. It has grown to acquire such form after utilitarian approaches have prevailed in the broad spectrum of public policymaking. From education and health to the arts and culture, there is greater societal pressure today for governments to provide robust evidence for the delivery of outcomes and to maximise gains for the citizenry (Brownson, Chriqui, & Stamatakis, 2009; Bunting, 2008; Gorur, 2014). Interlinking policy areas is the latest episode in a
series of changes in public administration and cultural policy offers an exemplar to study the transformations under way.

The problem with the current status quo is that the very concept of rhizomatic governance is elusive. It slips through the fingers of policymakers who may wish to operationalise it and of researchers who may wish to study it. However, it is worthwhile contemplating on the nature of policy solutions stemming out of a rhizomatic model of governance. New pathways are opening up ahead as efforts to create new governance regimes are continuously being made; for example, the past few years the introduction of a new type of organisation which can spin out of the public sector while keeping its public mandate, the so-called ‘public services mutuals’, has revolutionised power relations within the British civil service. While the new model is more commonly found in healthcare services, in the cultural sector it is gaining momentum in libraries and other local community cultural institutions (Social Enterprise UK, 2018). Such solutions point to the dynamic changes under way in the public sector of certain countries and invite researchers to explore the new organizational formations in the making.

Conclusion

The article brought forward the idea that cultural governance is becoming increasingly rhizomatic using as a case study the field of foreign cultural policy. It analysed the power play between two central actors, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture, and examined their interaction drawing mainly on examples from the British case. It suggested that lead-organisation networks are not compatible to the system of values and principles of the sector and supported the formation of rhizomatic networks in which members have shared responsibilities. While there have always been fragments of rhizomatic networks present in one way or another (artist collectives, film co-operatives, etc.), they have never surfaced as the core organisational principle structuring the relationship of central policymaking bodies. There is now the intention to branch out towards other policy areas, however, the administrative frameworks to serve this differing intention have remained fixed in older ideas of how public administration ought to be organised. The crisis, which Mangset aptly identified as the end of cultural policy (as we know it), is just another episode in a long series of changes observed in the public sector. These micro-instances in themselves are not extraordinary and it is unlikely that they will cause an immediate break and change in perceptions and practices. What they can do is gradually yet continuously erode and remould the original design of cultural policies. Rhizomatic governance is slowly becoming the default function of cultural governance as rigid sectorial boundaries collapse. Instead of accentuating jurisdiction, cultural policy lends itself to different fields by increasing its interactions with non-cultural
agents. This does not mean that it is losing power over its own matters rather that the channels of control are changing form once more. The structural means through which cultural policy is organised are continuously shifting, however, the political intention behind it remains unaltered.

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