WHAT’S NONVIOLENCE TO DO WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION?1

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Abstract

Nonviolence has an established tradition in several disciplines, including political theory, international relations and political science. But its potential for the European Union (EU) has not been appraised yet. Thus, we set out to explore nonviolence as analytical and normative framework for the study of the EU. At the outset, we introduce nonviolence and define our approach to this concept. We then apply our analytical and normative framework to three critical issues concerning the nature of EU power, the democratic deficit and the narrative of integration. We find that nonviolence re-defines the core dimensions of power and democracy, and imagines the EU in non-state-morphic ways, situating praxis at the roots of the integration process and its narrative.

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1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) is experiencing a phase of deep discontinuity. Unsurprisingly then, a leading journal like *Journal of Common Market Studies* has made at least two attempts to capture the theoretical nature of this discontinuity, as well as publishing empirical articles on new substantive issues. In one case JCMS addressed the challenges to the conventional wisdom(s) (vol.52/6). In another, a collection of papers aired dissenting, critical, and silenced theoretical voices on Europe and integration (vol.54/1).

Encouraged by these efforts to widen the peripheral vision of integration scholars, we contribute by suggesting a new research agenda grounded in nonviolence. We define nonviolence and then adopt it as analytical and normative framework for the study of the EU. We show how this agenda can tackle three research questions, that is: (a) what are the roots of EU power and what kind of power should the EU seek and promote? (b) How should we address and then solve the problem of the democratic deficit? and (c) how should we identify a nonviolent narrative for the EU and whether this narrative contributes to the debate on the finalité or telos of integration? In each of the three research questions, the first part is analytical and the second normative.

Nonviolence has an established tradition in several disciplines, but its application and relevance for the EU lie in relatively uncharted territory. In our journey through this territory, we first introduce you to nonviolence and explain our approach to this concept. Then, we point to some stylized facts on the presence of nonviolence within the EU. A presence that has not yet been noticed by the community of social scientists in the field of EU studies and not claimed by EU institutions. The three research questions about power, democracy and narrative/finalité are dealt with in separate sections – this is where we present and discuss the potential of nonviolence in the context of the current phase of EU politics. Within the context of power, nonviolence sheds light on the ambiguous and ultimately flawed connection between power and violence. It is nonviolence, rather than violence, that produces the type of power that may best serve European integration and provide a way forward to ‘normative power Europe’. The nonviolent approach to power refocuses on the power of each individual. But it also connects the individual, its moral responsibility, society and governance. This brings us to democracy: here nonviolence points towards omni-cracy, the power of...
all. Normatively, nonviolence heads towards an infinitely open society. On the third research question, nonviolence, perhaps to the surprise of some of our readers, does not offer its own teleology, grand narrative or ideal. In terms of final outcomes, it is silent. Yet, the nonviolent narrative of the EU has its own original way to explain how change is brought about - via a means-orientation to ends, without setting the objectives of change in advance. In the conclusions, we reflect on the implications of this research agenda and acknowledge the limitations of our exercise.

A caveat is in order. Although we draw on nonviolence as theoretical lens, with an analytical as well as normative component, we do not claim that this article provides a theory of integration. Our effort is a pre-condition for building a possible nonviolent theory of integration, but at this stage we do not have the sufficient causal explanatory leverage to claim ‘integration theory status’ for our propositions – this step forward will hopefully attract further research.

2. A concept and a framework

Before we show how nonviolence grapples with the three research questions, we must define the concept of nonviolence. Surely, ours is one of the possible pathways to concept formation (Mayton, 2009) (chp.3) although there is some convergence in the literature on definitional aspects (Atack, 2012; Jahanbegloo, 2014; Nagler, 2001; Vinthagen, 2015).

Our first step is the demarcation between the concept we have in mind and what the concept is not – otherwise we stretch it (Sartori, 1970). What is definitively ‘other than’, ‘the opposite of’, ‘NOT’ nonviolence? Conceptually, nonviolence is not the opposite of violence (Jahanbegloo, 2014; Prabhu and Rao, 1996; Atack, 2012). This is the reason why in the specialised literature the term is often spelled nonviolence instead of non-violence. Nonviolence has positive properties that go beyond the refusal of using violence (Vinthagen, 2015). Nonviolence is more concerned with limiting and avoiding harm than in the use of force against the will of others. In the literature, it is common to talk about a triadic relationship between violence, nonviolence and cowardice. If the choice is between addressing a violent action with another violent action or not doing anything, it is better to choose violence, because doing nothing means that there will be harm. In these cases doing nothing is cowardice (Prabhu and Rao, 1996).
The fact that nonviolence has its own distinctive properties that are not exhausted by the absence of violence is provided by the meaning of the Sanskrit word for nonviolence: _ahimsa_. _Ahimsa_ means non-harm or non-injury ‘to all living things in thought, word and deed’ (Atack, 2012: 5). Yet, in Sanskrit _ahimsa_ is not simply avoiding harm to living beings. It also means action: “none can renounce action out of a foolish attempt to avoid harm” (Klausen, 2014: 183). For our purposes, the best translation of _ahimsa_ is ‘the force unleashed when the desire to harm is eradicated’².

With Gandhi, this force evolved into a social and political praxis (Capitini, 1953; Pantham, 1983; Weber, 2001; Baldoli, 2019). _Ahimsa_ became ‘selfless action that aimed at actively minimising harm and suffering’ (Mantena, 2012a). It emerged in society in the many actions that are both without violence and against violence, as shown by Vinthagen (2015). Yet, we add to Vinthagen’s approach (focused on social movements and resistance) that nonviolence as praxis cannot be reduced to actions of protest by social movements. Its core is a constructive programme that starts with individual liberation and then proceeds at the level of society and governance to generate _swaraj_ (self-rule and self-government) and _sarvodaya_ (the uplift of all). This praxis evolved and spread from India to the US, from South Africa to South America and Europe (Weber, 2004). Resistance (which is the focus of authors like Vinthagen with an empirical reference to social movements) is a component of a wider approach to change, where (unjust) institutions are not just ‘resisted’, they are made irrelevant and atrophic, in a word they are overcome by praxis (Mantena 2012a).

This framework brings us immediately to power. The ‘force unleashed’ by nonviolent action is in line with the conception of power provided by Arendt (Arendt, 1970). Recall that Arendt argued that the opposite of violence is power. This power is socially visible when individuals create _together_ – this is another way in which nonviolence goes beyond resistance. It follows that nonviolence produces power, being action that takes into account the consequences of doing or not doing something for stable collective problem-solving and conflict resolution. This power can be granular: even just the power of one person – what Nagler calls ‘person power’ (Nagler, 2014). Person power occurs when an individual becomes independent, refuses to be obedient to unjust legal or social norms and walks a different path. But the ‘force unleashed’ can also

² See the definition of _ahimsa_ provided by the Metta Center: [http://mettacenter.org/definitions/gloss-concepts/ahimsa/](http://mettacenter.org/definitions/gloss-concepts/ahimsa/) (last accessed on the 12 June 2017).
generate power of many – what Gene Sharp would call ‘people power’ (Sharp, 1973). People power occurs when citizens adopt nonviolent techniques of action to fight together for change. The exercise of nonviolence empowers citizens. It is a form of ‘emergent power’ (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014); the bottom-up creation of new socially recognized competence and new governance. This kind of power achieves what Gandhi called swaraj, which means both self-rule and self-government (Gandhi, 1997).

Let’s now connect the dots: nonviolence is a kind of power which changes through action social and political relationships, forging a different citizenship. Indeed, person and people power open a precious pre-condition for democracy: the beginning of different relationships, of different practices among all the different actors involved in political and policy processes. This different relationship is described by Tully as ‘diverse citizenship’ (Tully, 2008), meaning a citizenship as praxis and not as a status. Nonviolence opens up a different approach to citizenship as the power of everybody to participate in the continuous ‘negotiation of practices’ of citizenship taking place at any level (Tully, 2014). Every person has the power to become citizen through participation, through the creation of new practices and mechanisms, regardless of the constitutional framework and privileges.

This new relationship is grounded in the acknowledgement of the consequences of our actions for others. It follows karma yoga, or selfless action, the practice taught by Krishna to Arjuna in the third book of the Bhagavad Gita. Physically responding to an act of evil may or may not be the best response, violence is of secondary importance in karma yoga. What matters is the karma of our action – the “spiritual or ethically operational residue of every act” (Nagler, 2007: 311) - whether we are trying to get some immediate personal benefit or we are acting responsibly towards the implications of our actions for others. This presupposes a strong empathy as well as profound respect for others’ lives and actions. It is what Gandhi called sarvodaya, meaning the uplift of all, or the progress of all in a given political community. Sarvodaya requires a change of practices in any field to empower and include the others, from education to economic relations.

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3 Sarvodaya is based on three the convictions that Gandhi drew from reading Ruskin’s Unto This Last: ‘the good of the individual is contained in the good of all’; ‘a lawyer's work has the same value as the barber's in as much as all have the same right of earning their livelihood from their work’; and finally that ‘a life of labour, i.e., the life of the tiller of the soil and the handicraftsman is the life worth living’.
The development of these new inclusive practices is at the basis of a project - a nonviolent narrative. The different human relations, grounded on a precise conception of power, liberate human beings from a condition of impotence and ‘force’ them to consider every actor in the construction – and governance – of their families, communities and countries. This creates a strong link to existing structures, but also a path for the future. In a few words, nonviolence adds to reality-as-we-know-it a *phronesis* (Baldoli, 2019), an evolving practical wisdom which does not quite separate ‘is’ from ‘ought to’ (see section 6 and (Mantena, 2012a; Mantena, 2012b).

*Analytically*, this framework allows us to see power, democratic governance (with the uplift of all as cornerstone), and narrative under a new light – this is why before we used the metaphor of the lens. Exactly because we adopt this lens, we can see processes that otherwise would be neglected by other lenses, and we can associate precise meaning to these processes. Nonviolence has also a *normative* quality. We hasten to say that the normative dimension is not a catalogue of what ought to be. True, nonviolence contains normative statements about appropriate action. And yet, the aim of these normative propositions is to add to, to contribute to, and ultimately to integrate a reality.

### 3. Nonviolence and Europe

This conceptual background should suffice to tackle directly the three issues of power, democracy and narratives. Before we do that, we need to justify the claim that nonviolence adds and integrates phenomena that already exist within the EU.

Nonviolence has already been present in the deep forces that led to integration in Europe. Neglected as it may have been, nonviolent practice has been a pillar of the European struggle for democracy for a long time. Even the war of liberation fought within the wider context of World War II contained important strands of nonviolence. Europe, indeed, provides endless examples of civil resistance to the Nazi and fascist dictatorships (Sémelin, 1993). For instance, Danish citizens engaged in nonviolent struggle by non-cooperation with the Nazis until the end of the war (Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994). Norwegian teachers resisted heroically against the Nazi takeover of education. The German women of Rosenstrasse managed to free their Jewish husbands from the Gestapo, preventing their deportation. A peasant, named Franz Jagerstatter from a small Austrian village, is now celebrated as a hero because he refused to take-up
arms for the dictatorship, paying with his life (Putz, 2009). Historians keep discovering similar examples of nonviolent struggle throughout Europe.

After WWII, nonviolence developed in many different directions. Indeed, the work of many European intellectuals and activists went hand-in-hand with nonviolent revolutions, from Portugal to Czechoslovakia, from Poland to the Baltic States and Eastern Germany (Roberts and Garton Ash, 2009). Even in the darkness of the violence and ethnic cleansing of the Balkan war, nonviolence-as-practice resonated with its Sanskrit meaning of ‘force more powerful’ with the Otpor Movement that ousted Milosevich (Popovic, 2015), and with the struggle in Kosovo (Clark, 2015). A few years later, the nonviolent revolutionary spirit moved eastwards, in particular, to Georgia and the Ukraine. In the Euromaidan movement, citizens died to remain anchored to the European project.

It is in this sense that we claim that nonviolence has been one of the most resilient pillars of the construction of the European integration project. But the story is not limited to movements and civil resistance. It can also be seen within institutional history. Indeed, the EP resolution of 8 May 2008 on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 2007 crafted by MEP Marco Cappato argued that ‘nonviolence is the most appropriate means of ensuring that fundamental human rights are enjoyed, upheld, promoted and respected to the full’ (European Parliament, 2008). One year later, the report ‘Nonviolent Civic Action in Support of Human Rights and Democracy’ expanded on the ways the EU can shape its external actions in a nonviolent way (European Parliament, 2009).

There is of course a large amount of literature on the case studies we have described, covering individual countries like Serbia or the Ukraine. This field is generally known as civil resistance (Roberts and Garton Ash, 2009). Yet, even though some theorists of nonviolence have occasionally dealt with the implications for integration in Europe (Galtung, 1973), the literature is silent on what this neglected history means. This is our task for the next three sections – to show how this stock of nonviolence tackles our research questions.

4. The question of EU power
Our first research question is concerned with power as capacity for purposeful action, as well as capacity to influence the behaviour of other players in a way consistent with one’s preferences. The EU seems incapable of producing the power needed to solve acute political puzzles and policy dilemmas, as well as incapable of generating sufficient legitimacy for this power once a goal is achieved. Consider how the EU institutions have tackled until now migration, foreign policy, and human rights: no-one can detect a distinctive and unambiguous capacity and quality - that is, power for what final goals?

In this section we argue that nonviolence turns the triad of military power, power as commodity, and power to destroy, into the triad of civilian power (bringing the intuitions of Duchêne and Manners to their natural conclusion), consent power and constructive power.

The conception of power as military still looms large (Schilde, 2017; Howorth, 2017), especially in debates on defence and security. Indeed, this seemed the key concern of the 2017 Rome Summit as expressed in point 4 of the Declaration (European Council, 2017). The lack of a European army has definitely been an issue since the 1954 rejection of the European Defence Treaty. There is no doubt that there are paradoxes involved in not having an army (Giumelli and Cusumano, 2014), as reiterated by French President Macron in his vision speech at the Sorbonne in September 2017. 4

However, the reduction of power to military is questionable. The crisis situations in which the EU is called for action cannot be solved by the military alone. The hybrid war in the Ukraine; the attempts of democratisation of the Arab Spring; the migration crisis; and even terrorism. All of these issues require a more complex response, and a different kind of power.

Nonviolence is not silent on issues of defence and security. Indeed, nonviolent techniques, tactics and strategies already represent the reality of modern conflicts – paradoxically they are embraced by a full range of actors, some of which do not certainly qualify as civilian powers (Bartkowski, 2015; Radin, 2017). They were deployed in the processes of decolonisation and democratisation all around the world, from Western Sahara to Egypt, from Tunisia to Georgia. Nonviolence played a key role.

in the abolition of slavery and the entry of women into politics (Howes, 2013). People are fighting ISIS nonviolently (Braley and Popovic, 2015; Popovic and Mimoun, 2016; Stephan, 2015). EU Member States like Lithuania official endorse civil disobedience as an effective way to defend the country (Miniotaite, 1996; Bartkowski, 2015). Recent research has corroborated empirically the claim that nonviolent struggle is more effective than violence in creating and strengthening democracies (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011).

These events point to a different kind of power. It is revealing that we find this power where we would not expect to find it, that is, in defence and security – as well as in more common domains like nonviolent participation to political life in democracies. And yet, what are the roots of this power? These roots cannot be reduced to a list of techniques, a menu. They lie in social and political relationships among human beings. For nonviolent theorists like Gene Sharp, power is not a monolith. It is plural, and it “is always based upon an intricate and fragile structure of human and institutional relationships” (Sharp, 1980: 24). There are many social loci of power: authority, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material resources, and sanctions. This conception of power certainly has limitations (Atack, 2012; Martin, 1989), but it brings attention to something other than military power. Iain Atack reminds us that power is not a commodity or an entity to be seized, controlled, or even owned, because, as we just said, it lies in human relationships. Thus, changing any kind of unequal and oppressive social practice is changing and exercising power (Atack, 2012).

Who are the key actors in this approach to power? This question links us to the second reduction of the present debate on EU power: the reduction of power to ‘the power of institutions’ (whether European or national). Institutions are certainly fundamental but they produce effects via human agency. It is reductive to see them solely as the channel for Market Power Europe (Damro, 2012) or even Liberal Power Europe (Wagner, 2017). Following Duchêne, institutions can serve the vision of civilian power Europe (Duchêne, 1973). Yet, Duchêne’s vision has captured the imagination of theorists of integration exactly because European institutions can influence other actors without military force. Less has been done on the civilian part of Duchêne’s programme: what European citizens can do to defend themselves and to represent the core of EU power abroad.
Yet again we need nonviolence to provide clarity on these civilian qualities. Tewes puts forward the idea that civilian means civil as non-state (Tewes, 2001). Civilian power includes democracy, it “refers to the rights of individuals and society vis-à-vis the state”, focusing on “rights, on legitimacy, and on the democratic values that come with them” (Tewes, 2001: 11). In 2006, Ian Manners, revising his own approach to normative power Europe, introduced what was missing in the 2002 article (Manners, 2002): the citizens. Unfortunately, he did not give free rein to the potential of such intuition (Manners, 2006: 184)\(^5\).

Nonviolence starts from the granular power of agency, of any human being. Every human being holds an important and yet underestimated power in any social and political relationship: the power to say “no”. Power is therefore anchored to consent theory: the power of X in a community depends not on military endowment or law, but on the consent attributed by other members of the political community to X. This is ‘power of the powerless’ (Havel, 1985). Let us scale this power up to an institutional level: we find that all governments depend on the voluntary assistance, cooperation and obedience of their citizens (Sharp, 1973; Atack, 2012).

This is not a new theory. La Boetie talked extensively about it already in the XVI century, in his *Discourse on Voluntary Servitude*. Yet, in contemporary politics the organisation, the potential and the consequences of this idea have become explicit. Consent theory is deployed to disobey a government; to defend a country against invasion; to empower citizens of other countries against oppression. As citizens can shake the foundations of any institutional project, they can also participate, monitor and support institutions that guarantee stable conflict resolution.

The focus on consent and citizens leads us to the third reduction – power reduced to destruction (*power over*). But power can also be exchange (*power with*) and power to project values, hence constructive. Since we cannot simply think that one day EU troops

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\(^5\) He rightly noticed that Duchêne referred in his chapter to Marion Dönhoff, who was part of the German Resistance Movement and later civil activist, and to her idea of political peace (against nuclear peace), to “the way in which every day acts and cultural example help to transmute conflict into peace through civil activism and collective action” p. 185. Yet, there is much more than this. Duchêne used Marion Dönhoff’s phrase on political peace *versus* technical peace of nuclear weapons. Yet, Marion is an example of much more. She fought against Nazism at university, for instance with leaflets, in a way that reminds of the Scholl siblings. She helped in the 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler, in the same group with Bonhoeffer. Later, she worked a lot for reconciliation between west and east, for peace. In other words, she represents that particular world which this article is trying to take into account.
would have the same destructive power of, say, US troops, this raises the question of the aim of power.

Some of our readers will be shocked by the granularity and basic simple truth of this statement, but for nonviolence the aim of power is to improve: to rise from passivity to freedom. Recall what we said about nonviolence ‘adds to’, hence it is constructive instead of destructive. A nonviolent change in rulership (Dallmayr, 2017: 124) does not immediately focus on creating a new institution. It creates a form of governance that Gandhi called swaraj, self-rule and self-government (Gandhi, 1997; Parel, 2016). Governance is learning to rule ourselves, abolishing not so much external threats, but, more fundamentally, our internal impediments. Governance becomes building up autonomous communities with their novel social and political practices. Nonviolent governance is about empowering and connecting these communities. Institutions come at the end of this causal chain, not at the beginning.

The above-mentioned Cappato report of the European Parliament has the merit of linking nonviolence to rights and the liberation of individuals and communities (European Parliament, 2008). Yet, there is more. Using nonviolence as normative framework, we argue for a widening of our peripheral vision to ‘multi-track diplomacy’ (Kavaloski, 1990), as well as diplomacy supporting civil resistance (Kinsman and Bassuener, 2008). Nonviolence offers a way to transform the very experience of waging conflict, enriching and changing the lives of those involved (Galtung, 1996). It supports a bottom-up perspective on fighting invasions (Sharp, 1985; Burrowes, 1996) and even terrorism (Ram and Summy, 2007; Popovic and Mimoun, 2016; Martin, 2002; Jackson, 2017). It fosters a different quality of peacekeeping (Nagler, 1997) and offers socially-robust ways to build bridges between parties in conflict.  

Indeed, someone has already written on the European Civilian Peace Corps (Barbiero, 2011; Gourlay, 2004; Robert et al., 2005), an evolution of the Gandhian idea of a peace army, called Shanti Sena. This vision was first proposed by MEP Alexander Langer in 1994. Yet, 12 years later Manners realised that the attempt to build civilian organisations, such as the European Peacebuilding Agency and the European Civil Peace Corps, had been largely ignored (Manners, 2006: 189).

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6 For instance, the EU is active in global health diplomacy. Health care diplomacy provides a powerful bridge between countries and people when its aim is to achieve the autonomy of people via infrastructures and networks.
The European Shanti Sena is only one aspect under the larger perspective. The EU has an enormous yet still undervalued power, the power of its citizens to engage in what Gandhi would have called swaraj, self-rule. This is the real ‘civilian power Europe’: the possibility of creating a self-determining EU based on the daily exercise of people power by its citizens. This is not just a vision, it entails an alternative experience of power, with citizens at the centre, learning day by day to rule themselves. It is this learning exercise and this experience that François Mitterrand evoked in his prophetic speech at the EP on 17 January 1995. He spoke of liberating Europeans from the tyranny of their past, their prejudices and their history: “What I am asking you here is almost impossible, because we have to defeat our past. And yet, if we don’t defeat it, it must be known that the following rule will prevail, Ladies and Gentlemen: Nationalism is War!”

5. From Democracy to Omnicracy

The second research question is about the exact conceptual identification of the democratic deficit and, turning to normative analysis, how it should be addressed by the EU. The problem of the EU democratic deficit is compounded by democratic backsliding (Kelemen and Blauberger, 2017). Thus, the multi-level challenge for democracy is twofold – it affects the EU and the Member States (Papadopoulos, 2013). How does our framework deal with this research question?

Nonviolence does not require the formation of a single EU demos. The power of the European citizens is immense exactly because they are different. Keeping the autonomy of Europeans is key for civilian power. Yet, the issue is how we might best differ not against one another, but for one another (Wang, 2013). Thus, no demos: a pre-political community sharing a certain culture, language, traditions and symbols is not a necessary condition. Citizens don’t have to share the same political institutions. Yet, at the same time, the relationship changes the different parts, the different demoi, which in a nonviolent turn begin working closely, with and for one another. Nonviolence does not unify the demoi with a doctrine.

Let us demonstrate these claims step by step, starting from nonviolent practice to support democratic institutions and to the ‘democratization of democracies’. Indeed, nonviolence provides a suite of tactics and strategies to protect democracy from the
return to authoritarian regimes as well as from deterioration. Given the present danger of illiberal models of democracy gaining support across the EU, nonviolence brings capacity and know-how to act. In extreme cases of democratic danger, civil disobedience is the revolutionary moment counting on the moral obligation to disobey to unjust laws. Further, nonviolence points to forms of collective action when there is a coup d’état (Sharp and Jenkins, 2003; Taylor, 2011), and even when subversive criminal organisations are in control of the territory (Beyerle, 2014). A fascinating and challenging question for EU theorists is how disobedience can find a place in EU governance (White, 2017).

Civil disobedience actually improves the quality of democracy when directed against well-defined cases of grave injustice (Rawls, 1971). Thus, civil disobedience is one of the “stabilising devices of a constitutional system” (Rawls, 1971: 383); it is the “Litmus test for the appropriate understanding of the moral foundations of democracy” (Habermas, 1985: 101). When there is strong disagreement, civil disobedience may empower citizens as ‘guardians of legitimacy’ against ‘authoritarian legalism’ and any abuse of the majority principle. This translates, for instance, in the grassroots movements against corruption grounded in nonviolent practices (Beyerle, 2014).

Beyond techniques and repertoires of action, nonviolence is also a framework of action, a praxis, which shapes and invents social and political practices. Nonviolence does not offer an ‘ethical glue’ for further integration (Bellamy and Warleigh, 1998: 456); it offers a ‘praxis glue’ grounded in nonviolent citizenship. This connects us with the EU democratic deficit. The treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam gave birth to EU citizenship, which is viewed by many as example of post-national or transnational citizenship (Habermas 2001; Linklater, 1998). Yet, this debate is dominated by the conception of citizenship as status, rightly portraying EU citizenship as incomplete and frozen (Warleigh, 1998).

Yet again, nonviolence allows us to look at the issue from a different perspective. Here, the key is the quality of citizenship, following Tully’s argument that nonviolence brings ‘diverse citizenship’ (Tully, 2008). Rights are corroborated, enacted by a praxis of, following Gandhi one more time, sarvodaya - ‘the uplift of all’.

To overcome the EU democratic deficit then, legal rights are only one dimension. When observed through the lens of nonviolence, the deficit does not lie in rules and
institutions. It lies in practices. We have seen a response to the deficit with nonviolent practices emerging in core areas of democratic life, such as education (Wang, 2013) health (Alter, 1996), economics (Ghosh, 2012; Schumacher, 1993) and science\(^7\).

This praxis is not destructive of existing institutions, but it is definitely the reason for continuous reform, even radical institutional change. Taking political parties as an example, the re-construction of democratic quality means radical critiques, such as Weil’s *On the Abolition of all Political Parties*, but also innovative experiments in political accountability, such as the ‘anti-political politics’ of Konrad and Havel in the East, leading to civic forums. Socially-grounded associations like the COS (Centres for Social Orientation) organised by Capitini (Capitini, 1950; Capitini, 1999) prefigured, in the 1950s, open popular assemblies organised to discuss administrative, political and social problems. Other examples of radical institutional change is the formation of nonviolent parties, such as the German Green of Petra Kelly (Kelly, 2001) and the Transnational Radical Party of Marco Pannella and Emma Bonino (Radaelli and Dossi, 2012).

Nonviolence also means further support to local and bottom-up forms of experimentation with varieties of deliberative approaches. There are already examples, not necessarily all successful - but they signal the direction: the attempts to improve relationship between science and politics, such as hybrid forums (Callon et al., 2009); participatory budgeting (Sintomer et al., 2008); the Icelandic experiment to re-write the constitution with citizens as drafters (Landemore, 2015); and the attempts to institutionalize bottom-up practice and meanings in EU fisheries policy (Carter, 2013).

For nonviolence to work (Nagler, 2001), the core remains the change towards a more inclusive society, with institutional design and governance reforms accompanying these changes. Behind these experiments and examples lie the effort to develop a new citizenship. The result of such diverse citizenship, of the praxis of nonviolence, is the creation *de facto*, in the actions (behaviour and practices) of everybody, of the *Omni*.

We are ready to draw our conclusions on democracy. The issue is not whether there is a demos or many demoi; it is neither an institutional reform nor an EU citizenship that resembles a national one. The issue is the development of a different praxis made of

\(^7\) On the relationship between nonviolence and science, the reference is The Seville Statement on Violence, http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/declarations/seville.pdf (last accessed on the 26 September 2016).
always more inclusive practices. In these practices, EU citizens are building up a new reality; these practices instantiate the power of everybody, of the omni. At its roots, this is an infinitely inclusive project. For this reason Aldo Capitini called this democratic project omnicracy, the power of all (Capitini, 1999; Baldoli, 2019).

6. Telos and Narrative

The third question is how to identify a nonviolent narrative for the EU and whether this narrative contributes to the debate on the finalité or telos of integration. This is the question of ‘European integration for what?’, or the teleological question on the finalité of integration. In 2013 the European Commission launched an initiative for the search of a new narrative for Europe (Barroso, 2013). Since then, there has been an intensification of studies on policy narratives, myths and historically situated national discourses on European integration (Manners and Murray, 2016; Lacroix and Nicolaïdis, 2010). Deep down, this third research question unveils the problem of connecting EU politics and policy to a set of causal ideas that resonate in the minds of citizens as proper historical project. During its founding years, the EU had a historical project of sorts: it centred on peace (Birchfield et al. 2012). Yet, what is/ought to be the historical narrative today, and how would a nonviolent lens contribute to defining it? A narrative has structural elements (the chronology, the actors and the plot) as well as a dimension concerning identity (Manners and Murray, 2016): we shall deal with both.

At the outset, consider the implication of Majone’s argument that the state-morphic vision of the EU is flawed (Majone, 1996). If the EU is not a ‘big nation-state’, then it is wrong to look for the fuel of European integration in culture, history or religion – or a blend of the three, in the name of a European narrative supposedly supporting the emerging ‘EU identity’. Strong federal projects are based on political values and rules, not on assumptions about culture and history. Nonviolence allows us to develop a narrative for Europe that is not state-morphic because it does not replicate the assumptions about history, culture and religion of nation-states.

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8 Here we turn upside-down People’s Europe as outlined in the latest State of the Union Speech. Indeed, Nonviolent Europe does not start from the rights (provisions of workers and workplace rights), and in particular it does not conceive of citizenship as a status. The key is to empower a new praxis, a citizenship not by stealth but by action.
And yet, where shall we search, in order to identify a proper narrative account? A prominent theme is the narrative of Europe as a peace project (Birchfield et al., 2017). There are studies that evaluate to what extent this has been true, both externally (Lavenex, 2017; Ludlow, 2017) and internally. Yet, this (perhaps temporary) success is already showing cracks: this peace purpose is less intelligible to younger generations, and it is less and less persuasive (Manners and Murray, 2016).

Hence the challenge for ‘Nonviolent Europe’ is: can this narrative go further than a peace project? Let us proceed step by step. To begin with structural elements, a nonviolent narrative connects liberation from totalitarian regimes across the current EU Member States, at different times in history - from Germany to Poland, from Portugal to Lithuania. It connects with the efforts to find stable conflict resolution in the wake of the fall of Communism and in troubled areas, as shown by the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. In this narrative structure the end point is not the EU federal state of the type envisaged by Spinelli. It is more similar to the horizon on the integral federalists built up of self-governing communities, open to the others. Diez (1997) recalls that during the Congress of the Hague (1948) the integral federalists aired the idea of a certain number of non-Europeans would participate in the formulation of European foreign policy. For Diez (1997: 288), a political horizon “connected with our daily practices” is the opposite of a concrete and deterministic model pointing to a final destination.

The nonviolent narrative actually proceeds from the individuals and their relationship with the other – karma yoga being about the consequences of an action for others, for the community, the environment, sentient creatures and so on. In this narrative, governance emerges from personal responsibility, not from a finalité. On this dimension of the ‘end point’, nonviolence does much less than the other narratives proposed by ardent Europeanists – from Altiero Spinelli to Jacques Delors. Yet – we argue – it achieves more.

To see this, we turn to narrative identity. Nonviolent Europe is not the narrative of small elites. It can be embraced by people of different ages and backgrounds. Memories of champions of this transnational vision, always rooted in individual liberation (not in the EU super-state) should be cultivated by educational projects – here is a mission for the EU funding programs. Among these champions we find politicians, as well as
exemplary figures of civil society, such as Capitini, Havel, Kelly, Jagerstetter, Palach, Pannella, Walesa, and Don Tonino Bello.

Educational models and the legacy of practices and spontaneous nonviolent experiments are the potential foundations for the development of a narrative. The latter could usefully embrace episodes arising outside the EU. Lego toys used to protest in Siberia against the Russian authority were seen as fastidious by the Russian regime, because the authorities cannot incarcerate toys (Popovic, 2015: 119; O’Flynn, 2012). They were quickly suppressed. But imagine if these Siberian Lego toys had been celebrated with an exhibition at the European Parliament! These practices embodying narratives should be celebrated and claimed by the EU institutions.

Finally, nonviolence as narrative provides an original account of how change happens. Following Gandhi, nonviolence looks at change through a means orientation to politics: the means are ends-creative (Mantena, 2012a). It is through an act of change that we express, embody, illustrate and build the final goal. This is the reason why swaraj for Gandhi was not the final outcome of independence for Britain. Swaraj was an act of personal transformation, the act of experiencing self-rule to the point of making British rule irrelevant (Mantena, 2012a). This personal and collective process of change was not something to be given or granted by the British. It was an objective incarnated in practices, grounded in actions of change – Mantena reminds us that for Gandhi the attempt to achieve swaraj was swaraj itself. Change is therefore brought about by means that creatively explore the possibilities for liberation, improvement and self-rule. Through this creative praxis-based process, goals emerge and are achieved.

7. Conclusion: Towards a nonviolent research agenda

We have claimed that nonviolence applied to the EU provides an analytical and normative framework to address the issues of power, democratic deficit and narrative. Admittedly, ours is only a sketch. Yet this framework has potential. The lessons drawn are as important for those involved in politics as they are for those who define the research agendas of the next stage of integration theory.

Concerning power, the current attention towards external impediments to EU action in the world and the military shadows the potential of citizens freed from internal impediments to forge a civilian power, bringing Duchêne and Manners’s intuitions to
their natural conclusion. Concerning the democratic deficit, the obsession with institutional issues and cultural-linguistic differences overshadows the opportunity to democratise the EU via day-by-day praxis and take the first steps towards the goal of omni-cracy. These steps do not presuppose a state-morphic notion of the EU, hence they are not entangled with the questions of whether the EU should become a confederation, a federation or a super-state. Finally, nonviolence is the springboard for a narrative linking past and future, models from different backgrounds and contexts, and change emerging from means that are ends-creative.

We wish to acknowledge the limitations of our contribution. First, ours is just one of the possible ways in which nonviolence can be identified and applied as analytical and normative lens. Other nonviolent approaches to the EU are certainly possible, and they may perform better than ours on the three research questions we addressed, or perhaps tackle a new set of research questions. Second, the debate on whether nonviolence ‘works’ and what we really mean when we say that nonviolence works is open (Attack, 2012; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Lehoucq, 2016; Nagler, 2001). There are risks involved in nonviolent actions, including what Gandhi called tapasya or self-suffering. More research is need on the medium/long-term effects of the use of nonviolence as opposed to violence (Nagler, 2001).

Besides, praxis may not lead to more integration. Self-rule, civilian power, liberation need to be accompanied by complementary institutional change. Nonviolent Europe may encounter resistance or degenerate into disintegration, if EU governance does not compose the preferences of empowered citizens and does not support the process of uplifting of all. We acknowledge the scepticism of those who find that the only feasible good governance in EU is not about ideals. It is about quiet mediation between conflicting interests and groups (Bellamy and Warleigh, 1998: 454).

Yet, it is worth taking the risk of nonviolent Europe. Following Bellamy and Warleigh (1998:466), this means liberty as civic achievement. The latter is provided by a type of democracy that protects against arbitrary rule and at the same time enables the educative engagement with others. The recent trend to foster integration through ‘emergency rule’ (White, 2015) has generated a deep and serious cleavage across Europe. Nonviolence offers a different path, or, as Diez (1997) once said, a horizon.
This horizon does not require billions from the EU budget. We believe that it would garner the mobilisation potential released by EU citizens during the crisis in their spontaneous search for change and responses to problems of democratic quality and governance. Further research is needed on how to assemble and scale up the empirical manifestations of nonviolence that we have documented, hopefully in the direction of a nonviolent theory of integration.

Reference List


