Nguyen, J;
(2016)
On the pragmatic equivalence between representing data and phenomena.
Philosophy of Science
, 83
(2)
pp. 171-191.
10.1086/684959.
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Abstract
Van Fraassen argues that data provide the target-end structures required by structuralist accounts of scientific representation. But models represent phenomena not data. Van Fraassen agrees but argues that there is no pragmatic difference between taking a scientific model to accurately represent a physical system and accurately represent data extracted from it. In this article I reconstruct his argument and show that it turns on the false premise that the pragmatic content of acts of representation include doxastic commitments.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | On the pragmatic equivalence between representing data and phenomena |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1086/684959 |
| Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1086/684959 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10072643 |
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