Regeneration Practices in Diverse Neighbourhoods: A Case Study of Garibong-Dong, South Korea

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ABSTRACT

This thesis aims at examining the construction of local communities in the Korean planning system and the resulting marginalisation of immigrant groups. This study has a particular focus on mechanisms that were used to involve communities in planning to investigate how local social groups were included or excluded. The case study explores a neighbourhood, which had a significant Korean Chinese population, who shared ethnicity with the Korean community but were located in disadvantaged positions as low-income immigrant groups. It investigates the complex dimensions of the unequal social status of the groups and its influence on their participation.

To explore the processes of participation, this thesis investigated how social capital is formed in neighbourhoods and how it operated in participatory planning. This thesis is based on mixed methods research, including document analysis, social network analysis, non-participant observation and in-depth interviews, in the Garibong-dong community-led regeneration project in Seoul, South Korea during the period 2015-2017. Particularly, the thesis integrates the concept of recognition within an analytical framework of social capital to investigate how wider social perception toward immigrant groups influences their formation of social capital. The thesis demonstrates that the formation of social capital in participatory planning is highly influenced by the social positions of participants. The social position of Korean Chinese groups as low-income workers appeared persistently in urban policies and contributed to multiple experiences of marginalisation over time. In this context, the uneven formation of social capital rather than strengthening community bonds reinforced social divisions through the practice of participation. Social capital provides a lens to help analyse the formation of networks and explore their mobilisation within planning. However, the study reveals that there are limitations and suggests a fuller engagement with pre-existing inequalities between groups is necessary otherwise participation can result in embedding negative social perceptions toward marginalised groups.
IMPACT STATEMENT

This thesis has demonstrated the processes of community participation within the construction of local communities in the Korean planning system and the resulting marginalisation of immigrant groups. This research has made visible the processes of decision-making in a diverse neighbourhood to cope with a regeneration project and provided implications regarding inclusive decision-making processes for academics and policymakers. By providing an example, the research of the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee could enhance an understanding of the diversity and lead to significant changes in how a policy understands the participation of immigrant groups in Korea and abroad.

The research contributes to building an understanding of the limitation of immigrant groups surrounding their participation in planning procedures. It can lead to considerations on devising an institutional arrangement for fairer decision-making processes in planning policies. Moreover, by shedding light on the multi-dimensional inequality which the immigrant groups have experienced in a specific geographical area, the study has illustrated the aspects which planning policies need to take into account to enhance the quality of life of marginalised immigrant groups. The research was introduced in a symposium ‘Global Garibong-dong Sang Sang Symposium’ in Korea on 26th October 2016 by the invitation of the Garibong-dong local committee (Lim, 2016). In the presentation, not only academics but also public officers, local residents and the media attended. In the discussion session, the public officers and planners agreed that showing a clear intention to include Korean Chinese groups in order to overcome their previous experiences of being excluded in planning policies could be important to involve them. Afterwards, a more active approach such as writing ‘we welcome Korean Chinese [to participate in Urban Regeneration education programmes]’ on a banner for recruiting participation was observed. The enhancement of social involvement of immigrant groups and the resulting improvement of their quality of lives can be possible when there are attempts to understand their existing problems and their contexts in more depth.
Furthermore, the study which investigated a Korean case would help to extend the knowledge in planning literature. It challenged the generalised participatory planning theory mainly built through the cases from the global North by providing an East Asian case. It showed many assumptions about the participatory mechanism, the inter-ethnic relations and the processes of building social capital were strongly contextual. In several presentations at international conferences, the discussions with other academics were focused on the importance of the understanding of these contextual differences which induce possibly different outcomes. By focusing on the Korean Chinese case in Korean society, which showed differing contexts with previous cases in planning, sharing the same ancestors but being located in differing social and economic positions, the case study elucidates that the social hierarchy between groups can be a significant factor in building relations and further participation of groups in decision-making processes. It could be an important implication for future research on community participation, inter-ethnic relationships and the formation of social capital.
Declaration

I, Hyunji Cho, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Word count

82518

Statement of use of the third party for editorial help

I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by Angela Cooper.

Note for the Romanisation of Korean

This thesis follows the McCune-Reischauer system when transliteration from the Korean alphabet was necessary. However, in some cases where there are common ways of Romanisation which had been used in official documents, for example, the name of places such as Seoul, Guro and Garibong-dong, the thesis follows them.
Acknowledgements

I would firstly like to thank my supervisors Dr Yasminah Beebeejaun and Professor Mike Raco. I am extremely grateful for their insight and guidance. This thesis and my PhD journey could not have been completed without the support of my family and especially my partner Matteo who always encouraged me. I also would like to thank my colleagues at the Bartlett for inspiring me. It was lucky that I was able to do my PhD with friends who were always willing to help each other and to share their thoughts whenever we have chances. I am grateful to my colleagues Dongho, Jueun, Jihyun, Yuqi, Matthew, Yao, Lisa, Joe, Chris and Ilwon. Especially, this research would not have been possible without participants who shared their experiences. I could not name them due to their guaranteed anonymity, but every single interview and observation was truly valuable. They did not only help my research but also transform my perspective. I hope that this thesis contributes to resonate with their voices.
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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This thesis explores the construction of communities in Korean planning and the resulting marginalisation of immigrant groups. The disadvantaged positions of immigrant groups in the planning system are intertwined with the dimensions of their economic, social and cultural status in society. This study examines how the governmental understanding of social groups was embedded in the Korean planning system and participatory mechanisms that may unintentionally reproduce this composition of communities in the decision-making consultation processes. The study focused on a recently designated community-led regeneration project, the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project in Seoul, a neighbourhood where a considerable number of Korean Chinese communities live.

In Seoul, previous government-led developments between the 1960s and the 2000s have been gradually replaced by community-led regeneration projects since the 2000s (see table 1.1). Previously, the huge influx of population from rural areas to Seoul catalysed the rapid growth of the city. The population of Seoul, which was 1.4 million in 1949, became four million after the Korean War and reached 10 million in 1990 (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2015b). The government delivered large-scale development projects aiming at an efficient expansion of infrastructures and residential areas during this period. In recent years, however, the previous developments were criticised for several reasons including the exclusion of residents in decision-making processes and the allegation of destroying local cultures by monolithic developments (Jang & Yang, 2008). In these criticisms, planning based on community participation, known as Maülmandülgi [Making Village, 마을만들기], started gaining attention as an alternative means from 2000

Table 1.1: Community-led plans in recent Korean planning policies (source: adapted from Tae & Park, 2010).

<table>
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<th>Level</th>
<th>Legislation</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>Special Law on Support and Promotion of and Support for Urban Regeneration</td>
<td>This law aims to improve the quality of life of citizens, for instance, rebuilding local communities, enhancing the competitiveness of cities, expanding the basis for the self-sustainable growth of cities by reinforcing the support and the role of the public sector in order to recover cities' economic, societal and cultural vitality.</td>
<td>Jan. 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local authority</td>
<td>Local ordinances about Maŭlmandŭlgi</td>
<td>The appearance of common elements in clauses: the spontaneous participation of residents (14), the formation of local communities (13), the utilization of local amenities (10), the improvement of local environment (10), the improvement of the quality of life (6)</td>
<td>Dec. 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seoul Regeneration Strategic Plan</td>
<td>The main agendas: 1) The citizen-centred developments considering Seoul’s identity, 2) the tailored management plans for maintaining local characteristics, 3) the active involvements of local residents throughout all the stages from the planning to its implementing, 4) the plans for the local governance focused on the building sustainable capacity, rather than short-term physical achievements</td>
<td>Jun. 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this movement from previous governmental large-scaled developments to the participatory planning model, the discourse surrounding ‘recovering community’

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1 Tae and Park (2010) analysed 26 Korean local ordinances. The numbers inside of the brackets are the number of clauses among the 26 ordinances which contained the sentences.

2 ‘Recovering community’ mainly emerged as a meaning of rebuilding communities which were assumed to be destroyed during the previous rapid urbanisation processes of Seoul (H.-R. Kwon, 2015). For example, the government understood recent urban problems such as local conflicts surrounding development projects and social segregation as a result of destruction of communities. In this narrative, recovering social relationships appeared as a way to solve urban issues. In the implementation of policies, the emphasis of recovering community did not specifically appear as the reconstruction or preservation of a certain
heavily emphasised (S.-M. Lee, 2008; W.-S. Oh, 2013; K.-S. Park, 2018; see chapter seven). The emphasis on community participation formed a narrative to explain existing urban problems and a solution for them. As the previous full-scale developments had catalysed the reconstruction of local residents, researchers pointed out potential urban problems induced by the disconnection among residential communities, for example, individualism, conflicts among residents and anonymity in urban areas (S.-N. Kim, Kim, & Ahn, 2011). In this sense, Korean planning policies placed emphasis on ‘recovering community’ as the main goal which needed to be achieved by participatory planning, and as a solution for the problems from the previous developments.

‘Recovering community’ has become a clear agenda within the Korean planning. The discourse of recovering community has been emphasised throughout the processes of participation. The voluntary participation was understood as a means to discover a local community, and the consultation process was considered as a process to foster this community (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2017). In this understanding, the normative ideal of community which needed to be achieved was observed, not considered only as a means of participatory planning.

*Maülmandülüi* in Seoul is not only to support the processes to become an active citizen but also to standardise the processes (for example, through the tone of ‘should’). In the policy of the Seoul Metropolitan Government, the community has duplicity. On the one hand, it is citizens who are fostered and promoted by the ruling system. On the other hand, it needs to be a voluntary process based on spontaneity.

(Y.-R. Kim, Kim, Chae, Bae, & Kim, 2017, p. 48)

The mechanisms to involve local communities, based on this idea, tended to embed several issues. The notable concerns about the procedure were that the understanding of local communities was based on an imagined ideal model of citizens, and it seems to be insufficient to deal with diverse social members who live in neighbourhoods (Kwan et al.,

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community, but rather emerged as mixed ways such as ‘building’ or ‘discovering’ communities (see chapter seven).
The government tended to understand local communities focusing on certain social groups such as middle-aged families, who are well educated and willing to participate in social issues by being motivated based on the education of their children and caring for families\(^3\) (S.-Y. Kim, 2011). The understanding of community in the Korean community planning seemed to have difficulties in engaging wider social groups. Community groups and researchers stressed that if the government pursues the specific images of community, it could be a suppression of marginalised groups (S.-H. Jung, 2011; J.-H. Park, 2013).

Particularly when it comes to the issues of immigrant groups, the possible marginalisation of the groups from this ideal model of communities seemed to be a significant issue. As argued, the ideal image of communities, which seemed to be difficult to include immigrant groups, tended to exist in the regeneration policies of Korean planning. Moreover, Korean society was understood as a closed society with low tolerance toward differences (I.-Y. Kim, 2006; I.-j. Yoon & Song, 2011). The immigrant policies in Korean government were still based on the philosophy of assimilation or exclusion with social relationships between long-established groups and immigrant groups strongly embedded in the economic, social and cultural hierarchy (H.-W. Cho, 2014; J.-G. Lee & Im, 2011; J.-S. Lee, 2014). The immigrant groups, particularly low-income immigrant groups, were understood as a group who need to be integrated into Korean society by being reeducated on Korean social norms (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2014c). Many pointed out these rigid attitudes shaping the divisions with a hierarchy between Koreans and immigrant groups that can be a significant barrier for the future of Korea which is promoting a multicultural society\(^4\) (S.-S. Lee, 2015; I.-J. Yoon, Kwon, Kim, Bae, & Song, 2015). While immigrant groups experienced their social divisions in Korean society, the

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\(^3\) In this understanding, the previous grass rooted examples of community building such as Sŏngmisan Village seem to be influential. It will be briefly discussed in the next section (also see chapter seven).

\(^4\) In Seoul, the population of immigrants increased more than five times in 2010 compared to 1995 (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2015b).
local neighbourhood planning agenda also did not seem to provide the means to involve the groups.

When considering the recent community-led regeneration projects targeting multicultural communities such as Garibong-dong in Seoul, developing a participatory planning model including minority groups in Korea is an important task. The thesis deals with how the current understanding of local community embedded existing social divisions, and how participants worked in this context.

1.2 The Emergence of ‘Community’ in Seoul Neighbourhood Planning

As the Regeneration Act [*Toshijaesaeng hwalsŏnghwa mit chiwŏne kwanhan t'ŭkpyŏlbŏp*, Special Act on Promotion of and Support for Urban Regeneration] was designated in 2015, urban projects based on community participation became one of the dominant means to promote the development of neighbourhoods (Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport, 2016). Even before community-led regeneration projects were expanded after the enactment of the law, the emphasis on communities had been observed frequently in processes searching for an alternative way of urban lives.

In the policies of Seoul such as *Maülmandülgi* in the early 2010s, the local communities were considered as alternative means to solve urban problems. Criticism about the previous large-scale development was at the root of the emergence of ‘community’ in policies of the Seoul Metropolitan Government. In the 2000s, the development of neighbourhoods such as the so-called ‘Newtown’, which was based on large-scale development after the overall demolition of areas, proceeded throughout Seoul. Between 2002 and 2008, the scale of Newtown projects in Seoul covered five per cent of the overall area of Seoul, with 35 districts of Newtown covering an area of 27.22 km² (W.-G. Lee, 2008). In the circumstances, speculative investments in housing were widely common among developers and residents (H.-B. Shin & Kim, 2016).
In this context, building communities was considered as a social movement to rebuild social values such as the sense of attachment and the quality of life, which is against the previous materialistic ways of lives (Gimm & Shin, 2016). The solidarity based on local communities emerged as a way to challenge the dominant social tendency which relied on the growth of land value (N.-N. Kim, 1999). Several grass-roots cases of urban communities, such as Sŏngmisan community, which successfully built a self-help group by running a child-care system and establishing a local co-operative, were introduced as an ideal model of urban communities (chapter seven). These cases challenged the pressure of developments through protests by being against Newtown projects and successfully maintained the areas through community activities without the previous method of overall development (S.-H. Jung, 2011; K.-S. Park, 2018). In this understanding, the communities did not only mean local residents but citizens who can build their systems for the sustainable maintenance of their neighbourhood.

The emphasis on local communities became more significant after Mayor Won-soon Park, who was the former leader of civic organisations, the Beautiful Foundation [Arŭmdaun chaedan, 아름다운 재단] and the Hope Institute [Hŭimangjejakso, 희망제작소] was elected in 2011. Community building projects were actively introduced by Seoul Metropolitan ordinances from the early 2010s. However, as can be seen in the previous discussion of emphasising of recovering community, understandings of this ideal model of communities encountered significant gaps when the community-led regeneration projects became a dominant means of urban planning. Park (2018) argued the gap between this ideal model of communities and real local inhabitants was notably observed:

5 The Beautiful Foundation, which was established in 2001, is an organisation focusing on fund-raising and donations. The Hope Institute, which was established in 2006, is a research institute with citizens and activists to collect ideas of citizens and provide policy implications.
How does the community become non-political, and in what practices and languages? Above all, the concept of community was in a discrepancy between discourse and practice. In building community, the community is incompatible with urban life, and it exists as an ideal, which is [located in] geography of imagination.

(p. 7)

The Seoul community-led regeneration projects seem to embed the ideal model of desirable communities. It is still questionable how local members were involved in this understanding of local communities which seems to be limited to an ideal model of active citizens. This thesis shows how the construction of communities which was embedded in the planning system understood minority groups, particularly focusing on immigrant groups.

1.3 Social Capital for Differences?

This thesis uses the concept of social capital as an analytical lens to explore how different social groups were involved in the processes of participation. The analytical frame examines the processes of the voluntary participation of local groups. This study particularly focuses on how these processes interact with the understanding of local groups in the Korean planning system.

The concept of social capital has received great attention in the planning literature as a concept to help understand participatory processes. Researchers pointed out that how the local relationships had been built in neighbourhoods which can provide important motivation for local residents to participate in consultation processes (Healey, 1998; Innes & Booher, 1999, 2004). The social capital has been understood as an important element which facilitated the participatory processes.

However, apart from the emphasis on the contributions of social capital in participatory planning, who are involved and who are not in the processes of forming social capital were rarely understood. The local communities were mainly understood as a single united
unit, and the studies did not pay great attention to the social divisions within the formation of social capital (Agger & Jensen, 2015; K.-H. Lee & Ahn, 2007). This thesis focuses on the functions of social capital in the context of diverse neighbourhoods. The processes of building social capital might not be evenly approachable for diverse social members in neighbourhoods. Recent empirical research has pointed out the formation of social capital which differs depending on the social positions of participants (Behtoui, 2006; Rivera, Soderstrom, & Uzzi, 2010; Smith, Menon, & Thompson, 2012). Uneven formation of social capital among local members seemed to be one of the plausible explanations for the exclusion and inclusion of groups in participatory processes.

By considering social divisions within local groups, the study explores possible inequality in the formation of social capital in participatory processes. This thesis seeks to add knowledge regarding marginalisation and inclusion of immigrant groups in participatory planning procedure by expanding the formation of social capital and how that was related to the social positions of participants.

1.4 Objectives of the Research

The overarching aim of this thesis is to address how wider social divisions shaped the participation of immigrant groups in the planning procedure through an examination of the formation of social capital in participatory planning. To do so, the research examines how the perceived social composition of communities influenced the processes of building social capital for immigrant groups. The study explores how local participants were mobilised in the processes of participation, and whether the current mechanism is helpful for diverse groups to develop social capital. The thesis demonstrates that discriminatory categorisation of social groups in participatory planning can influence the formation of social capital in planning processes and planning systems need to consider a better institutional setting for the participation of wider communities.
This study explores the case of Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project which commenced in 2015. The Korean Chinese groups in the Korean society have historically been located in a disadvantaged social position as low-income temporary workers (see chapter five and six). This thesis extends previous research considering ethnic minority and marginalised groups through a consideration of Korean Chinese communities in Seoul. In contrast to other studies which have considered immigrants or minorities as distinctively different based on perceived racial differences, this focuses upon immigrant groups who share ancestry with long-established groups. Nonetheless, they possess a stigmatised group identity. The thesis study seeks to add knowledge about group divisions embedded in the planning system by exploring how the groups, who were difficult to be differentiated by the essentialist viewpoint of ‘ethnicity’ but perceived by stigmatised identity, understood the divisions.

The Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project was planned to proceed for five years from 2016 until 2020 and incorporated one year of a consultation process with a local committee. The government allocated ten billion Korean won⁶ of budget in the project. The study focuses on the recruitment processes of the local committee (chapter seven) and the consultation processes in the early phase of the project (chapter eight). Along with the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project, the thesis also focuses on how the Korean Chinese groups have been situated in urban policies throughout the recent history of Garibong-dong. The urban policies which have been designated in Garibong-dong from the 2000s are analysed (chapter six).

The three research questions aimed at elucidating the complex layers of different social contexts of residents and their emergence in the processes of participation. This study deals with three different phases of the planning procedure.

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⁶ It is around 6.8 million British pounds (exchange rate based on 19th June, 2018).
RQ1. What mechanisms have been used to involve immigrant groups in Korean urban policies, and how does the recognition of these groups emerge within planning policy processes?

RQ2. How was social capital formed among participants located in different social contexts?

RQ3. How have social capital and ethnic differences been deployed by different actors within local planning participation?

Firstly, it focuses on the social positions of immigrant groups in local neighbourhoods to investigate how wider inequality has been experienced in everyday lives within the local neighbourhood. Secondly, it investigates representation processes in community-led regeneration by using the lens of social capital. The study examines the mechanism of social capital in the neighbourhood in the representative process. It involves the formation of social capital in the wider context of social members and how that emerged as the uneven opportunity to participate. The second question explores how the embedded social positions in local relationships have emerged in the processes of voluntary participation. Thirdly, the participatory processes have been further explored to trace the operation of social capital within the decision-making processes. It explains how the limited decision-making power of the immigrant groups can result in consequent marginalisation from the outcomes of the consultation processes.

The thesis is an exploration of social divisions between long-established groups and immigrant groups which had become embedded within planning mechanisms. By exploring the processes of participation, the impact of this institutionalised construction of communities in the participation of immigrant groups will be examined. The research draws on current theories of participatory planning and social capital to add to the understanding of immigrant groups in the literature.
1.5 Outline of the Thesis

The thesis focuses on the participatory mechanism and the emergence of a wider inequality in the processes. Firstly, chapter two contextualises the concept of social capital as an analytical tool to examine processes of voluntary participation. This chapter looks into the concept of social capital and its utilisation in the contemporary participatory planning literature. Particularly, this section explores the current discussions on intergroup social capital. As social capital studies expanded to the interests on inter-groups relationships, empirical studies have expanded knowledge about the social divisions of groups and the mechanism of social capital. The marginalisation of immigrant groups tends to relate to the recent domain of the studies of social capital, inequality of social capital. By including these debates, the study explores the impact of the unequal social contexts of actors in the formation of social capital in participatory planning.

Especially, the study seeks to include an in-depth understanding of the wider social exclusion of immigrant groups in the framework of social capital. The third chapter explores the social exclusion of immigrant groups by the concept of recognition. Even though some literature pointed out the impact of wider inequality in the formation of social capital, the studies on these influences were still insufficient (Behtoui, 2013; Ioannides & Loury, 2004; Rivera et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2012). By focusing on the participation of low-income immigrant groups, this study particularly explored how the social understanding of the group identities could be influential in their formation of social capital. Urban policies sometimes reflected the discriminatory categorisation of communities (Beebeejaun, 2012; Yeoh, 2006). It could be influential in the processes of building social capital among participants.

The fourth chapter will provide an analytical framework to examine the participatory processes of immigrant groups based on the literature review. The previous framework of social capital is adjusted in consideration of unequal recognition which different social
groups faced. It helps to illustrate how the participants interact with their wider social structure in the processes of social capital. The methods of analysis are discussed, especially, as a single case study in Korea, it sheds light on the particularity of this study as a case in East Asian countries. This study adds a case showing the differing mechanism of social capital in the theory which was mainly developed by studies on the Global North.

The research findings are delivered from chapter five to chapter eight. In chapter five, the background information of the case area is addressed. By providing the context of Garibong-dong and Korean Chinese groups in Korean society, this section introduces the socio-economic status of the Korean Chinese groups in Garibong-dong. Korean Chinese groups became a dominant immigrant group from the 1990s by being involved in the low-income industry in Korean society. Although Korean Chinese groups spread across different industries as they settled down in Korea, the Korean Chinese groups in Garibong-dong were particularly understood as an unstable social group even within Korean Chinese immigrants. In a dilapidated physical environment of the neighbourhood under a stalled development for ten years, the immigrant group agglomerated based on social organisations in Garibong-dong without sufficient governmental support. Until the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project was designated, Korean Chinese groups in the neighbourhood were considered as temporary inhabitants who would leave by the planned demolition.

Urban policies, which were implemented in Garibong-dong after the Korean Chinese group settled down in the area, are examined in chapter six. The urban policies including Seoul Metropolitan foreigner policies from the 2000s and neighbourhood planning including Garibong-dong Newtown project in 2003 and Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project in 2015 will be included. This chapter shows how the Korean Chinese groups have been understood in the urban policies such as in multicultural discourse, social cohesion and community participation.
Chapter seven and eight particularly focus on the processes of participation in the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project. Chapter seven deals with the recruitment processes of the resident committee of the Urban Regeneration project. It has a particular emphasis on the formation of local relationships throughout the history of the neighbourhood which has shown the constant marginalisation of the Korean Chinese groups. Chapter eight examines the consultation processes by focusing on how decisions have been made in the committee based on social capital among the participants. Conclusions and wider implications of the research are discussed in chapter nine.

1.6 Conclusions

This chapter has introduced the aims of research and the context in which it has evolved. The study has been formed from a question about the understanding of communities in the Korean planning system, with a particular concern about marginalisation and inclusion of immigrant groups. The formulated research questions explore whether the current mechanism of participation based on this limited ideal model of communities can genuinely produce fair consultation processes which are beneficial for wider residents.

This study emphasises reconsidering the categorisation of communities, which can be an important task for fairer participatory planning processes. By developing an analytical lens based on social capital theory to look into social relations among diverse groups, this thesis shows how the formation of social capital can be shaped by how the government understood groups in the planning system, and it consequently can result in uneven participation in planning procedures.
2.1 Introduction

While recent social capital studies have shown that the social status of actors is pivotal in the formation of social capital (Kwon & Adler, 2014), this dimension has not been fully considered within the participatory planning literature. To look into the impact of the policy framework in the mechanism of social capital, this chapter explores the relationships between the processes of forming social capital and wider social structure of participants.

In contrast to the previous blueprint developments based on the professional knowledge of planners, participatory planning has a greater emphasis on discovering common concern through the active involvements of citizens (Altshuler, 1965; Innes, 1998). Various approaches that can be identified as participatory planning have emerged, such as consensus building (Innes & Booher, 1999), collaborative (Healey, 2006), and deliberative planning (Forester, 1999). The involvement of communities in overall procedures, from discovering local issues and shaping common interests was emphasised under participatory planning agendas. The communities were encouraged to participate in making their voice heard in the processes, and this participation was mainly carried out on a voluntary basis.

Social capital, which means elements such as trust, social norms which were produced by social relationships among the members of networks, has emerged as a ‘soft infrastructure’ in participatory planning (Healey, 1998; Innes & Booher, 1999, 2004). The researchers
explained the processes of drawing participation and of building a basis of the agreement through the investigation of social capital among actors. However, the studies of social capital in participatory planning often overlooked complicated networks between differing groups within local actors. Although the recent research in participatory planning pointed out the importance of bridging social capital—in other words, inter-group social capital—to involve diverse groups, the studies on the mechanism of social capital with diverse communities are still limited.

This chapter firstly reviews the social capital theory. By looking into current debates regarding the concept of social capital and diverse communities, the second part of this chapter elucidates the challenges which the concept of social capital facing in the contexts of diversity. It will be discussed focusing on two dimensions, the possibilities of the uneven formation of social capital and mechanism between inner group relations and inter-ethnic relations. The section 2.3.3 also adds the current understanding of social capital in Korean literature and explores possible questions which can be formulated by including the considerations of diverse social members. The final section of this chapter reviews the understanding of the roles of social capital in participatory planning processes by contextualising social capital studies within participatory planning. By linking discussions surrounding the concept of social capital and diverse communities, the final section explores the possible impact of the social positions of groups in the formation of social capital and its results in participatory processes.

2.2 What is Social Capital?

Researchers have explored social capital in various fields. Before an American political scientist Robert Putnam popularised it, Loury (1977), Bourdieu (1984) and Coleman (1988) had all developed the concept of social capital. The detailed understanding of its mechanism and functions differ, but they mainly used the term ‘social capital’ to refer to elements such as trust and reciprocity which was produced in social relations which can help the members to pursue benefit by it.
Loury (1977) asserted that an existing social structure which marginalised ethnic groups had been overlooked in neoclassical economic theory by examining the concept of social capital as resources inherited within families or communities. On the other hand, Pierre Bourdieu developed the concept of social capital as ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition’ (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 286). His definition of social capital focused on the benefits produced by a certain network based on an identified homogeneity, and it is not naturally inherited but tacitly acquired through the bonds of solidarity (Grenfell, 2014; Siisiäinen, 2000; Sprigings & Allen, 2007). Coleman (1988) analysed the influence of social capital which has been developed in families and community organisations on the educational attainments of children (Hibbitt, Jones, & Meegan, 2001; James, 1990).

Social capital as the benefits of social networks has drawn huge interest after Putnam’s work, which was on the decline of social capital in American society, was published (Putnam, 2000). In his book *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (2000), he explained the social change of America by the decline of social capital. He provided a theory which was based on a narrative of collapse and revival of social capital. He argued that an idyllic ‘American community’ which had been built over thirty years collapsed from the 1990s, and it needs to be revived in the future through a renewed commitment to civic participation. His work gained attention because he provided an empirical analysis of the relations between community participation and civic engagement in the United States. He demonstrated that participation in local community organisations such as church and bowling clubs became rare, and along with that the social capital in the areas was declined. Also, the low social capital tended to link to the low level of happiness, high level of tax evasion and a high level of violent crime (see Putnam, 2000). Based on his data, he argued the social capital and civic culture need to be revived in the future by engaging citizens.
Putnam’s understanding of social capital was built upon the work of American sociologist James Coleman who defined social capital as the set of resources which were inherited by families and community organisations to explain the development of children (Coleman, 1988). Putnam’s concept of social capital is also influenced by American school of civic thought which emphasised civic society as a crucial part of American democracy including Alexis de Tocqueville, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verda (Putnam 1993). These academics perceived voluntary associations as a means for strong American democracy (Arneil, 2006). On the other hand, the contribution of Bourdieu to the development of the concept of social capital was largely ignored in the works of Putnam (Harriss, 2002).

With Putnam’s work, the concept of social capital was redefined and has become a highly influential source of the idea for community developments (Forrest & Kearns, 2001). In terms of social capital in the community, Putnam linked the previous works which dealt with the relationships between actors or individuals to the level of ‘civicness’ in communities such as towns, cities, and even nations (Portes & Landolt, 2000). He defined social capital as ‘features of social organisations, such as networks, norms and trust, that facilitate action and cooperation for mutual benefit’ (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1994, p. 35). Social capital in his concept can be ‘stocked’ by participatory behaviours in communities, for instance, memberships in voluntary associations (Chaskin, 2016; Portes, 1998; Putnam, 1993). Social capital has influenced works criticising individualism in modern society and promoted research on social capital, which suggested that civic society can be reconstructed through building social capital (Butler & Robson, 2016; Putnam, 1993; Wood, Giles-Corti, Zubrick, & Bulsara, 2013).

However, after his concept of social capital became a highly influential source in development studies and organisational studies, there were several criticisms of the concept. Particularly, there have been significant debates regarding the understanding of diverse social members including women and ethnic minorities in the processes of social
capital. The next section explores the recent literature in respect of social capital and diverse communities.

2.3 Social Capital and Diverse Communities

There were criticisms that social capital theory of Putnam is often conceptualised with little attention to complicated networks between different groups (see Harriss, 2002; Portes, 1998). Some pointed out that Putnam’s understanding of social capital, which could be interpreted as an over-reliance on the virtue of reciprocity and trust, tended to be based on civic organisations mainly focusing on ‘fraternal organisations’ with middle-class white males (Arneil, 2006) and has a danger of ignoring the disadvantages of bonded networks by reason of a close social structure being likely to hinder overall social benefits (Portes, 2014; Portes & Landolt, 2000).

In the contexts of diverse social groups, the questions have been raised in several different ways by involving both empirical and normative aspects of the concept of social capital. Firstly, in empirical aspects, the researchers pointed out whether the narrative of social capital, which has shown decline-revival through civic participation, can be applied as a ‘universal’ story to different social communities especially minority groups such as women or cultural minorities (Arneil, 2006). Whether the processes of forming social capital can be interpreted and expected in the same ways, and whether the function of formed social capital can be the same in society seemed to be an essential question to examine the hypotheses of Putnam in respect of diverse communities. Secondly, whether the existence of the social capital of a certain group can be positive for inter-group relations, and how the inter-groups relationships can be understood in the theory of social capital are still questionable. A number of studies examined the relationships between bonded networks and inter-groups relations after the work of Putnam regarding inter-ethnic relationships was published (Putnam, 2007), but studies still showed contested results (see next section). Finally, based on these questions regarding empirical studies of social capital, many raised questions regarding the normative position of the concept
of social capital which has been acquired by stretching the concept for the overall society (Hallberg & Lund, 2005; Harriss, 2002; Portes & Landolt, 2000; Portes & Vickstrom, 2015).

2.3.1 The Uneven Formation of Social Capital

Firstly, whether the ‘story’ of the processes of social capital can be applied to different social groups seems to be an important question to be examined. Portes (2014) claimed that Putnam’s social capital ‘consists of the excessive claims made on successful members of a particular community by others’ (p. 18407). Also, Arneil (2006) stated that the analysis of social capital in Putnam’s study which generalised the scenario of social capital seemed to overlook diverse types of communities. For example, the participants in civic organisations tended to show segregated memberships regarding genders and ethnicities, and women and ethnic minorities can more frequently rely on informal organisations. Aneil (2006) argued that these informal networks were not sufficiently included in the analysis of Putnam's studies regarding American cases.

Recent studies on social capital began to show the formation of social organisations can be different depending on the social contexts of participants. Empirical studies began to expand studies focusing on how the social position of actors influence the formation of social capital (Adler, Kwon, & Heckscher, 2008; Behtoui, 2006; Rivera et al., 2010). They showed that the access to the processes for building social capital, such as contacting other groups and participating in collaborations, is limited for minority groups, and it can result in the consequent marginalisation of the groups. In other words, the social structure of participants can be influential in the formation of social capital and the resulting decision-making power of immigrant groups.

The impact of the social status of actors in building social capital can be seen in the overall mechanism of social capital. Firstly, the opportunities to build social ties were not distributed equally to social members. Research showed that a relatively small number
of actors possess the majority of connections (Golder, Wilkinson, & Huberman, 2007; Rivera et al., 2010). Also, in studies of ethnic groups, researchers pointed out that immigrant groups tended to form segregated networks without connections with mainstream society (Castles & Miller, 2013; Savage, Warde, & Ward, 1993). Castles and Miller (2013) explained the segregated networks as a result of the lack of formal resources. In many cases, immigrant groups were marginalised from governmental support, and it tended to lead them to rely on their ethnic networks. Also, this structural limitation of social capital resulted in unequal benefits from the networks. Behtoui (2013) described the effect of unequal social capital in the process of stratification of young workers. He analysed young people of ethnic minorities in Sweden and showed that the ethnic groups had limited social capital compared to long-established groups. It resulted in unequal opportunities in job seeking processes and tended to limit the upward mobility of the ethnic groups (Behtoui, 2013). Kwon and Adler (2014) stated that ‘if social capital is about deriving benefits from social relations, one has to take seriously the high variance in actors’ social ties and the resulting inequality of social capital’ (p. 418). The uneven structure of social ties can be shown in the lack of representation of immigrant groups in consultation groups.

Secondly, even though there were contacts between groups, social ties were selectively activated based on the judgement about an expected benefit. Mariotti and Belibridge (2012) argued that the activated ties and latent ties need to be differentiated. Not every social tie was activated as social capital, and the social status of actors which can produce benefit is important in this judgement process. For example, Smith, Menon, and Thompson (2012) showed that the social status of actors influenced the decision to use social capital or not. Even if actors have weak social relationships with other members, the judgement of benefit in processes of activating those relationships as social capital is based on the social status of actors.

Thirdly, the impact of social capital could be different according to the social status of actors. The selective formation and activation processes seem to be based on this aspect.
The effect of social ties tended to be different depending on the social positions of actors. Lin (2001) stated:

*Return deficit* [emphasis in original] is the consequence of a process by which a given quality or quantity of capital generates a differential return or outcome for members of different social groups. For example, males and females, with a given quality or quantity of social capital, receive differential returns in status attainment—such as positions in organizations, occupational prestige, or earnings.

(p. 100)

Regarding the effect of social structure on this differing consequence of social capital, Lin (2001) pointed out the effects of structure in two ways. Firstly, the social structure of actors can be influential due to the original positions of the actor in the social structure. The benefit of social ties can be different depending on who are involved in the social ties. Secondly, the position of an actor in the formed networks also influences the effect of social capital. When considering that the actor, located in an advantaged position in society, tended to attract a greater number of ties, both aspects can function in a joint form. This aspect was not explained in depth in the social capital studies of Putnam, but he already showed that the function of social capital could be different depending on social groups. For example, his data of the memberships of civic organisations in the US showed that the number of associational memberships in which the participants were involved did not show a big difference in different races (Putnam, 1995). However, the social trust of the groups was significantly different. The black population showed less social trust (17%) than whites (45%) or other race populations (27%). Putnam suggested that the differing social trust could be induced by the experiences of social discrimination over many generations.\(^7\)

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\(^7\) However, without sufficient explanations on the differing effect of social capital, Putnam stated the importance of social capital in all the races. He pointed out that the effect of decline of social capital can be seen regardless of group categorisation (Putnam, 1995).
In this sense, Arneil (2006) argued that the function of social capital could be different depending on the social position of the groups. She pointed out:

Social capital, when you are in a position of power, is largely a positive thing aimed at solidifying trust and cooperation and reinforcing the shared norms of members of the already powerful group and community at large. If, on the other hand, you lack power, social capital [...] can be used for very different purposes. Those excluded from power, consequently, often do not see their goal as solidifying [emphasis in original] the existing status quo, but challenging [emphasis in original] the very foundations upon which the ‘community’, including its boundaries, membership and norms, is constituted.

(p. 18)

In other words, the arguments of Putnam regarding the contribution of social capital and enhanced solidarity of society can be an analysis focusing on the function of social capital of dominant social groups. The formation of social capital can show the differences according to the groups, and the effects of the existence of social capital also can be differing. The social position of actors can significantly influence the formation of social capital. It seems to be influential regarding the number of ties, forming motivation to build richer social ties. The consequent benefit from these social ties and these aspects were intertwined. The attempts to elucidate the concept of social capital in consideration of different social contexts of groups also have been found in the debates regarding the mechanism between intergroup relationships and inter-group relationships.

2.3.2 ‘Tolerance’ and Social Capital

The concern regarding the possible downside of bonding networks was raised in social capital literature as the concept of the social capital of Putnam became popular. To develop an understanding of the differences between inner group relations and extra community networks, researchers started to pay attention to the concept of bridging social capital which refers to the connection between heterogeneous groups.
To distinguish between social capital within a group and the connections between different groups, studies of social capital emphasised the relations between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital (Beugelsdijk & Smulders, 2003; Leonard & Onyx, 2003b; Putnam, 2000; Michael Woolcock, 1998; see table 2.1). While bonding social capital means dense and strong ties within a group, bridging capital is to refer to relationships across groups. Putnam defined bonding social capital as ‘ties to people who are like you in some important way’ and bridging social capital as ‘ties to people who are unlike you in some important way’ (Putnam, 2007, p. 143).

The explicit definition of bridging capital is still arguable, but according to Leonard and Onyx (2000), can be explored in three ways. The first is bridging demographic divisions such as ethnic groups and age groups (Portes & Landolt, 2000; Putnam, 2007). The second is to overcome structural gaps such as geographical distance (Burt, 1998). The third is the capacity to access resources such as information, knowledge, finance from external organisations (Michael Woolcock, 1998; Micheal Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). In the studies on ethnic diversity, the concept of bridging capital mainly dealt with the networks over demographic divisions. Ryan et al. (2008), for example, explained the connection between an immigrant group and a mainstream society by the concept of bridging capital. They used the concept of bridging social capital to explain the relations between Polish immigrant groups and long-established groups in London.

Much research on community participation and neighbourhood development insist upon the importance of bridging social capital in the context of consensus building including diverse interests (Holman & Rydin, 2012; Rydin & Pennington, 2000; Micheal Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). As Ha and Jin (2010) observed, bridging social capital can contribute to overcoming ‘social fences’ to help a broader community to access common resources. Rydin and Holman (2007) stressed that social capital, which is not limited to bonding social capital, can solve the collision of diverse interests by ‘build[ing] links between stakeholders with a view to generating a consensus on sustainable development’. Particularly, by pointing out the cases where a strong bondedness can hinder a broader
goal in consultation processes, such as cases so-called ‘NIMBYism (Not In My Back Yard)’, the participatory planning literature began to emphasise the role of bridging social capital.

**Table 2.1: A typology of social capital (source: adapted from Rydin & Holman 2004, p. 123).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Bonding Social Capital</th>
<th>Bridging Social Capital</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key metaphor</td>
<td>A kind of ‘glue’ used to bring people closer together and make them one entity</td>
<td>Bridges are built out to other people and places, often unknown different people and places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>‘lubricant’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of place and territory</td>
<td>Often group is territorially based</td>
<td>Less significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundaries involved</td>
<td>Central to defining who is within the groups to coalesce</td>
<td>Less significant; bridging can occur across several boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of network involved</td>
<td>Dense, relatively limited network</td>
<td>Extensive; lots of contacts not very dense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of norms and values</td>
<td>Common norms central to binding actors together</td>
<td>Given less emphasis than the network of linkages</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The research elucidating the concept of social capital has gained attention in recent years. Especially, the categorisation of bonding and bridging social capital shows the possibility of social capital as a tool to examine the relationships to investigate dynamics between different groups. However, despite the great interest in bridging social capital, there are still several issues that need to be elucidated in conceptualising bridging social capital.

In exploring two different dimensions of social capital in the context of multicultural society, one of the contested points is the relationship between bonding and bridging social capital. It is a question of the relationships between the bondedness within a group and the relationships with other social groups. This aspect is important in understanding social relationships among actors in participatory planning because participatory planning assumed that involving communities and building relationships, often without much consideration in ‘who’ were involved, can achieve benefits to wider local society (Beebeejaun, 2012). However, there was still a considerable number of different opinions whether building bonded relationships can be helpful for building relationships with other
groups. The debates can be seen in three different domains: contact hypothesis, conflict theory and constrict theory.

Firstly, some studies maintain positive relationships between bonding and bridging social capital based on the contact hypothesis. Recent studies have tried to look into the role of social capital as a mean to provide accessibility for minority groups. Researchers pointed out that social interactions in neighbourhoods with foreigners build social trust and feeling safe (Clayton, 2009; Matejskova & Leitner, 2011; Power & Willmot, 2007). Regarding building this weak social trust, bonding social capital can be helpful to build inter-group relationships. The research based on contact theory argued that bonded ethnic networks helped the members to learn new social norms and language to adapt mainstream society (Ryan, Sales, Tilki, & Siara, 2008; Weisinger & Salipante, 2005).

On the other hand, other studies showed that bonding social capital was not necessarily helpful for building bridging social capital. Some studies have shown that bonded inner group relations hindered extra relations or the entire society. Levine et al. (2014) demonstrated that excessive trust networks within an ethnically homogeneous group brought about a result of price bubbles, which refers to the situation when prices deviated from the asset's intrinsic value, impeding the entire economy. Also, Waldinger (1995) argued that accumulated benefits through a strong ethnic tie are inevitably based on the exclusion of other groups, and it resulted in the excluded other ethnic groups being forced to face disadvantages by the social closure. Apart from economic studies, Brough et al. (2006) focusing the characteristic of ‘identity’ which can be a mean of both exclusion and inclusion, posited that social capital in ethnicity needs to deal with the tension between bonding and bridging social capital more accurately.

Apart from that, Putnam suggested ‘constrict theory’ which means ethnic diversity possibly reduces both in-group and out-group relationships. Putnam (2007) stated that bonding and bridging capital are not inversely correlated, and rather positively correlated.
In other words, it is possibly easy to make connections with other groups for someone who succeeded in building strong inner group relations.

[…] we assume that bridging social capital and bonding social capital are inversely correlated in a kind of zero sum relationship… I believe that assumption is often false. In other words, high bonding might well be compatible with high bridging, and low bonding with low bridging.

(Putnam, 2007, pp. 143–4)

He claimed that solidarity in the same ethic group is not harmful to co-ethnic relations. Instead, Putnam suggested the constrict theory. For instance, Putnam stated that increased diversity could result in reducing the level of trust, altruism and community cooperation in the short to medium run.

The issue of building social capital in multicultural cities became more contentious after the work of Putnam. Even though he placed emphasis on the long-term advantages potentially generated from diverse populations, the criticism pointed out that his study could be a ground for supporting a neo-conservative perspective (Hallberg & Lund, 2005; Portes, 2014). Brough et al. (2006) stated that:

At worst there is the danger that research results showing lower levels of social capital in ethnically diverse populations will be used to support neoconservative renditions of inherent dysfunction in multicultural communities.

(p. 399)

Hallberg and Lund (2005) said that if diversity reduced social trust, which is an evidence of social disconnectedness, it needs to be questioned whether this social trust is for wider communities or a dominant population such as the white majority population as demonstrated in Putnam’s study.

The questions on the theory of Putnam remain to be answered. Firstly, there was an issue regarding the methodology of social capital in Putnam’s study. Some researchers pointed out that it did not provide clear cause and effect relationships in the measurements. Regarding constrict theory, for instance, Portes and Vickstrom (2015) argued other factors
in the neighbourhood such as level of income or education could show both high or low bonding and bridging social capital. In other words, bonding and bridging social capital can be a result of wider factors such as economic and cultural contexts of cases, rather than showing relationships between two types of social capital.

Secondly, the understanding of Putnam seemed to overlook the impact of broader social structures surrounding inter-ethnic relationships. As has been shown in the previous section, the formation of social capital can be different depending on the groups, and the social structure seems to be an important factor to understand it. On the other hand, the studies of Putnam explained social relationships between immigrant groups and long-established groups by the attitude of individual social members. Bonding social capital was understood to be positive for bridging social capital, and face-to-face interactions were emphasised in the process of building both types of social capital in the studies of Putnam. When it comes to the mechanism of forming inter-group relationships, Putnam (2000) emphasised the importance of physical encounters:

> The linkage between social capital and civic tolerance is even more positive at the community level.

(pp. 355-356)

This argument implied that interaction at the individual level could solve the social segregation which was induced by social structure. The understanding of Putnam regarding intergroup relationships is not free from criticism in regard to its lack of consideration of the outer contexts of actors. His perspective is criticised due to its limited acceptance of the importance of broader social relationships (Fine, 1999; Harriss & De Renzio, 1997; Miraftab, 2004). The studies based on Putnam’s concept tended to focus on the actors as atomised units without consideration for the social contexts of participants by emphasising interpersonal contacts (Portes & Landolt, 2000).
Contrary to the argument of Putnam, the individual’s attitude toward differences was not free from the social context such as the policies and history surrounding them. Hallberg and Lund (2005) pointed out the studies of Putnam largely overlooked these aspects.

In general, Putnam’s method – which relies largely on polling and surveying attitudes and behaviours, noting curious correlations and speculating on their significance – disallows a more rigorous approach to questions about diversity. Most of the proof behind Putnam’s diversity-social-capital matrix is reducible to the views that people have towards other people. But even these views are bereft of any historical and cultural content.

The ethnic groups were frequently located in disadvantaged social positions legally, economically and culturally, which influenced their skills in building social relations. Morris (2003) argued that the cultural ability of migrant groups could be under the control of the wider social context such as policies toward migrations and migrants’ rights empowered by their social status. Also, according to Berry et al. (1992), wider social attitude to immigrants can affect their accessibility and ability to associate with existing social groups. The empirical research of Onyx and Bullen (2001) also pointed out a wider social structure can influence attitude toward differences. They set a factor of ‘Tolerance of Diversity’ to distinguish bridging and bonding social capital in their study in Australia. Contrary to the study of Putnam, they found that the factor correlated with ‘Social Agency’ and ‘Feelings of Trust and Safety’, but least related with ‘Neighbourhood Connections’ and ‘Participation in Local Community’ (Onyx & Bullen, 2001, p. 15). It means that bonding social capital, assumed to be tightly linked to the territorial boundary of neighbourhoods and thick trust networks with inner-group members like ‘Neighbourhood Connections’ or ‘Participation in Local Community’, is not likely to be related to bridging social capital, which is ‘Tolerance of Diversity’ in this case. In other words, although bonding and bridging are not negatively related, the mechanism of bonding and bridging social capital can differ. Moreover, inter-group relations tended to be more affected by the wider social attitude toward the differences.
The inter-group relations had been dealt with also in other theories such as the contact hypothesis, not only in social capital theory. Contact hypothesis was based on the theory that contacts between groups can build social trust. However, the theory also pointed out the importance of social structure as conditions of the hypothesis. The studies on contact hypothesis pointed out the equal social status between actors can be important to see the positive effect of face-to-face contact (Cagle, 1973; Pettigrew, 1998; Riordan, 1978). When participants were located in unequal social positions, interactions can rather result in strengthening prejudice of long-established groups toward immigrant groups.

Thirdly, the ways that the researchers understood the concept of bridging social capital were still different depending on studies, and also the interpretations were different according to it. The different viewpoints regarding the relationships between bonding and bridging social capital are closely related to what the researcher specifically means when they refer to ‘bridging social capital’. For example, some researchers collected data about bridging social capital focusing on the degree of tolerance toward differences (see Onyx & Bullen, 2000; Putnam, 2000), and others considered the concept as the capacity to access resources from other groups (see Micheal Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). Bridging social capital as a weak trust and as a link to approach the benefit of other networks can be different, and the influence of a wider structure can also be different. The relationships between contact and weak trust such as civic tolerance also seemed to be still controversial, but forming bridging social capital as a link to resources of bonding social capital seems to be more challenging. When it comes to the correlation between bonding and bridging social capital, the studies tended to refer to ‘civic tolerance’, or ‘feeling safe’ (Power & Willmot, 2007; Putnam, 2000). These studies have a stronger emphasis on the ways of adapting to mainstream society by the change of the immigrant groups and overcoming cultural gaps as important means for the processes. In other words, bridging social capital in this sense tended to show how mainstream society showed tolerance toward differences, how society reduced tension by uniting immigrant groups focusing on mainstream society. In this sense, this viewpoint mainly deals with the differences between the groups as cultural differences such as language and social norms. Researchers who support contact
theory showed that interactions between groups could build weak trust, and it did not conflict with bonding social capital. Rather, in considering that bonding social capital of immigrant groups provided opportunities to intermingle with other groups by educating language or cultural norms, bonding social capital tended to be sometimes helpful for this weak trust.

On the other hand, the research argued that the exclusiveness of bonding social capital tended to focus on the existing structure of social capital and its transformation. As mentioned in the previous section, the researchers pointed out the benefit of the networks was not distributed to other groups (Glover, 2010; Lin, 2001). In these arguments, bridging social capital refers to the link between networks sharing resources which had been accumulated within a group. This type of bridging social capital seems to be more challenging to achieve. Even in the case when immigrant groups formed weak relationships with mainstream society, it does not necessarily result in sharing the benefit of networks.

The potentiality and limitation regarding inter-ethnic relationships through face-to-face contacts were also found in recent discussions regarding encounters in neighbourhoods (Piekut & Valentine, 2017; Valentine, 2008; Wilson, 2017). The studies similarly pointed out that weak contacts do not always build the long-term meaningful relationships (Valentine, 2008). Regarding these arguments, Wilson (2017) pointed out the effect of encounter is difficult to predict, although encounter for longer term might build ‘meaningful’ social trust between groups. Instead of undermining or over-interpreting the effect of encounters, she argued that the policy frame could be important for the effect of weak social relationships.

I contend that greater attention be given to questioning what implications these narratives have for how encounters are framed and mobilized within a variety of social and environmental projects.

(p. 452)
When it comes to questions whether bridging social capital helps immigrant groups to achieve benefit, the policy frame which understands these relations can be significant.

In short, there was a considerable number of studies which showed that bonding social capital might not always be helpful for inter-group relations. The differences in the understanding of relationships between bonding and bridging social capital seemed to lie on how the writers interpreted face-to-face interactions, and what was expected as the contributions from this process of building bridge relationships. The researchers who support contact theory showed that interactions between groups could build weak trust. However, the contribution of social capital was not only dealt with regarding reducing tension through weak social relationships, but also providing a link to approach limited resources such as occupation, health care or education. For researchers who focused on social capital as a source of benefit, bonding social capital still served to accumulate the resources within a group, not shared with other groups. This different view seems to be significant to understand the role of social capital in participatory planning (see later section).

2.3.3 Social Capital in Asian Cases and Diverse Communities

The debates about the concept of social capital and diverse communities formulated several questions regarding the mechanism of social capital. As reviewed in the previous section, firstly, the formation of social capital can be different depending on communities. The understanding of these differences and barriers of minorities in forming social capital was still limited. Secondly, it is still questionable whether bonded networks can be helpful for inter-groups relations, and if it is helpful, how the inter-groups relations can be imagined. These unanswered questions regarding social capital and diverse communities seem to be also important to look into a case of Korean planning.

Attempts to link the concept of social capital to traditional East Asian values have emerged in Korean research (H.-G. Chang, 2008; J.-H. Cho, Choi, Jang, Jung, & Park,
Regarding Asian social networks, Putnam referred to East Asia’s growing economics as ‘network capitalism’. He stressed that their dense networks within bonded communities reduced transaction costs and played an essential role in the economic growth of ‘the Four Asian Dragons’, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Putnam, 1993). It emerged as a way to revalue Korean traditional culture which emphasised reciprocity and was sometimes used to criticise individualism in the current modern Korean society in a similar sense to Putnam’s work which criticised modern US society (Putnam, 2000). The research particularly focused on the bonded relationship and reciprocity in the theory of social capital, and interpreted the concepts of In [patient, 인], Ui [loyalty, 의], Hyo [filial duty, 효], Ye [politeness, 예] and Hwa [homonyny, 화] in Confucianism as elements of social capital (K. Lee, 2014). Furthermore, the researchers also explored the means to cultivate citizenships through enhancing civic lives in contemporary Korean society (Yoo, 2014). This communitarian perspective, which was focused on developing the capacity of citizens to solve social problems, was largely observed in policies (H.-R. Kwon, 2015; also see chapter seven).

Recent studies on community planning have rationalised the emphasis on the sense of community as the process of building social capital (M. Ha & Jin, 2009; S.-N. Kim et al., 2011; W.-L. Kim & Koo, 2011; K.-H. Lee & Ahn, 2007; Y.-A. Lee, Byun, Ryu, & Choe, 2008). The concept of social capital of Putnam, as an important element for the overall level of social trust in society, tended to acquire its normative position in Korea. For example, social capital frequently emerged as the intangible outcome of participatory planning procedure (Innes & Booher, 1999). Social capital was expected to build community capacities to make the sustainable management of neighbourhood possible after consultation processes were finished. This concept has built a basis of the narrative of Korean community planning, which emphasised the building of a sense of community. In this sense, the advocates of social capital theory believed that social capital could be accrued by joining local groups and building place attachment, and consequently, the accumulated social capital can support the process of finding common concerns (Y.-A.
Lee et al., 2008). They have mainly dealt with the ways to measure social capital based on the previous studies of Putnam by the questionnaire survey method focusing on the relations among key stakeholders (H. Choi, Yoon, Seo, & Won, 2013; B.-M. Kim, 2010; W.-L. Kim & Koo, 2011; Yun-Geum Kim & Lee, 2003; K.-H. Lee & Ahn, 2007). In Korean literature, the concept of social capital mainly emerged as a way to support bonded networks by linking the concept with traditional Korean values. In this tendency, the expressions such as ‘caring’, ‘sharing’ and ‘reciprocity’ emerged notably in urban policies (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2014a).

However, applying the theory of social capital in Asian contexts did not seem to be a simple task. The understanding of social capital in Korean literature also cannot be free from the possible issues regarding social capital and diverse communities. Rather, many Asian researchers pointed out that the influences of social gaps between differences can be more significant than American cases (Fukuyama, 2010; Pye, 1999). They pointed out the understanding of social relationships in Asian culture tended to focus on small bonded networks such as families but the impersonal relationships such as interactions with strangers and differences in civic society were largely absent. This aspect in Korean society, strong bondedness based on homogeneity without in-depth consideration of differences, has been discussed in the studies with different focuses, such as a strong ethnic nationalism in Korea or a society working based on nepotism. For example, Chang (2008) criticises previous studies on social capital in Korea by defining Korean bonded networks as nepotism which means ‘behaviour patterns systematising competition and cooperation to pursue their own interest through private inter-personal networks rather than public institutions’ (p. 108). In this sense, he argued that Korean nepotism rather hinders the development of civic society contrary to the previous studies which aimed to link the bondedness of Korean society as a source of social capital. The recent research highlighted that the tendency in Korean society based on bonded interpersonal networks led to huge gaps between mainstream society and minority groups (Sang-Jun Kim, 2004; J.-H. Park, 2013).
Especially when it comes to ethnic minorities, the current understanding of social capital in Korea has more contentious issues. As the foreign immigrant population was growing, the discrimination against the immigrant people and a tendency toward xenophobia became social issues (Y.-S. Kim, 2014; see also chapter four). Kim (2014) pointed out that the influx of foreign communities showed ‘refusal of approval to the differences’ in the Korean society (p. 175). The strong ethnic identity of Korean such as the ‘pureblood’ custom and the society relying on bonding tie based on common identity built the basis for the exclusion of other immigrant groups (H.-W. Cho, 2014; Y.-S. Kim & Yoon, 2015).

In short, the case of Korea seems to be located in a context which highlighted the possible issues surrounding the concept of social capital and the formation of it with diverse communities. Korean cultural norms in building relationships tended to emphasise strong solidarity which was based on homogeneity in a group. Sometimes it emerged as ‘families’ or ‘Korean ethnicity’, and this also tended to be shown in the understanding of urban communities (Kwan et al., 2014). Social relationships with others tended to be shown as a form of assimilation or exclusion. In this context, social capital frequently was imagined as mechanistic solidarity, and the formation of social capital with diverse communities was largely overlooked.

2.4 Contextualising Social Capital and Diverse Communities in Participatory Planning

Even though there was a limited consideration regarding diverse communities, the contribution of the concept to the understanding of the mechanism of participation cannot be undermined. Social capital shed light on the active processes of local participants in the interactions between the institutional setting and actors. Also, the concept provided the analytical perspective to help to examine the mechanism in more systematic ways. However, the possible impact of social positions of members, which have been reviewed
in the previous sections, were rarely understood in the current theoretical framework of community participation.

Social capital emerged as an important concept to help understand voluntary participation processes. The concept of social capital has received great attention due to its possibility as a concept to interpret the social relations among actors in consultation processes. In the planning field, social capital has emerged as a ‘soft infrastructure’ to draw participation and to build a basis of agreement in participatory planning (Healey, 1998; Innes & Booher, 1999, 2004). The emergence of social capital in the participatory mechanism has been seen in two different ways. The first is the contribution of social capital in representation processes, and the second is the contribution of social capital to decision-making processes. The development of the concept of bridging social capital provided a richer understanding of these processes.

Firstly, regarding the recruitment processes of participatory planning, Rydin and Holman emphasised the role of social capital as a ‘soft sanction’ (Rydin & Holman, 2007). Latent social relationships which had been developed in neighbourhoods drew motivations for local members to participate in the planning procedure. It was believed to build responsibilities to participate in collective actions (Lewicka, 2005). Based on the emergence of the concept of bridging social capital, Weisinger and Salipante (2005) stated this type of social capital as ‘pre-existing social capital’ to distinguish from social capital which was newly formed through collaboration after participating. They argued that the latent social capital in the neighbourhood tended to be formed based on ethnic networks, in other words, as a form of bonding social capital. For example, social organisations based on ethnic groups can be important social networks to build capacity for immigrant groups. They focused on recruitment processes based on these built networks. In a similar sense, Cordero-Guzmán (2005) argued that the social networks of immigrant groups could play a role as a liaison between the government and other ethnic groups.
Secondly, social capital is considered as an important element in decision-making processes. The consultation processes were assumed as a process to build social capital among participants. This process of building social capital was considered an essential procedure for participatory planning (Healey, 1998; Innes & Booher, 1999, 2004). Drawing a common concern from participants through mediating the pre-existing interest of each member was understood to represent one of the main aims of consultation processes in participatory planning. Social capital, particularly bridging social capital, is believed as an element to help participants to build mutual understanding by overcoming their interests (see the next section).

The development of the concept of bridging social capital contributed to understanding these decision-making processes. To overcome different interests which participants held before participation, researchers emphasised the bridging social capital which was newly formed in mixed groups (Rydin & Holman, 2007; Weisinger & Salipante, 2005). Weisinger and Salipante (2005) argued that this type of social capital is essential to pursue an overarching goal involving different groups. This form of social capital was understood as a means to reduce tensions between different groups (Innes & Booher, 2004).

The developed conceptualisation of social capital based on the emergence of bridging social capital provided implications regarding the processes of participation for immigrant groups. Firstly, immigrant groups need to possess place-based social capital which had been built in local neighbourhoods among the groups to be represented. Secondly, the groups have to build bridging social capital through consultation processes to be involved in decision-making processes. Building newly formed bridging social capital over different groups can particularly important for consultation processes including immigrant groups. For example, the case study of Weisinger and Alipante (2005) demonstrated that, without building bridging social capital, ethnic groups tended to flock together even after participating and cannot actively transform group values. When it comes to participatory planning, building bridging social capital over different groups,
not only building bonding social capital, is essential to build common concern which involved diverse groups.

The table below is the summary of the characteristics of social capital in these two phases in ethnically mixed organisations. Weisinger and Salipante (2005) developed the framework based on three elements of social capital of Adler and Kwon (2002) and their case studies on Girl Scouts of Lake Erie Council (GSLEC).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>The categorisation of social capital</th>
<th>The elements of social capital</th>
<th>Opportunity</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Ability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enabling minority group to participate</td>
<td>Bonding social capital (preexisting ethnic social capital)</td>
<td>The opportunity of participating in the group</td>
<td>Normative commitments of the group that motivate minor groups to join</td>
<td>Skills and social confidence developed in thick bonded networks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transforming the ethnically diverse group’s structure</td>
<td>Bridging social capital (forming bridging social capital within the ethnically diverse group)</td>
<td>The opportunity of building bridging social capital: 1) the chance for contact through proximity and weak network ties, 2) strong network ties between racial bridging</td>
<td>Norms of trust and reciprocity with racially different others to engage in sustained association</td>
<td>A part of associability. Cross-cultural competence and knowledge to sustain interaction with each other to collectively define and enact their goals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When it comes to participatory planning, the contribution of social capital can be summarised below. As reviewed, the contribution of social capital were mainly understood from two phases of participatory planning processes: the first is the representation processes based on their latent social relations, and the second is decision-making processes after the participants formed the consultation committee. When it comes to the definition of social capital, the features of social relationships which produced the benefit for the members of networks, the benefit of social capital in participatory processes can be providing opportunity to participate and enhancing decision-making power of the members (see table 2.3).
Table 2.3: Conceptualising the function of social capital in participatory planning (source: author, based on Adler & Kwon, 2002; Holman & Rydin, 2012; S. Kwon & Adler, 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>The elements of social capital</th>
<th>Benefit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opportunity</td>
<td>Motivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representation process</td>
<td>Local friendships</td>
<td>Normative motivation such as place attachment or sense of community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Former and current local memberships</td>
<td>Instrumental motivation such as expecting benefit from a development project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making process</td>
<td>Pre-existing social ties and newly formed social ties</td>
<td>Reciprocity to sustain collaboration based on a common goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Trustworthiness about the members’ abilities and knowledge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Apart from the introduction of this theoretical framework, when it comes to ‘how’ participatory planning procedures provide these conditions for immigrant groups to participate and to make their voices heard, the studies are still limited. Empirical studies on these different forms of social capital are rarely found in participatory planning (see Colomb, 2017; Vervisch, 2011). Previous studies on the formation of social capital in participatory planning mainly dealt with local groups as a homogenous group (Agger & Jensen, 2015; Legacy, 2010). The differences within the local group were rarely understood in the planning studies. For example, as mentioned, the studies in Korea have mainly dealt with the ways to measure social capital focusing on inner-group relations among key stakeholders (Ahn, 2014; H. Choi et al., 2013; W.-L. Kim & Koo, 2011; Yun-Geum Kim & Lee, 2003; J.-Y. Koo, 2011; J.-J. Shin & Shin, 2008; J.-J. Shin & Song, 2010). These studies contributed to show how the relationships among actors were significantly important in consultation processes to reach agreements. Nevertheless, they were not able to show whether the social capital formed by including diverse groups or whether those participants represented different local members in neighbourhoods in forming collective voices.
When considering previous sections regarding the concept of social capital and diverse social members, the mechanism of social capital in participatory planning also seemed to have several aspects which need to be taken into account. Firstly, if the different communities have different stories and the functions of social capital, which characteristics of social capital or which groups’ social capital are deployed in participatory planning need to be questioned. As argues, the formation of networks can be different depending on the social positions of groups. If an actor possesses more ties, the person might have more opportunities to be represented and to draw participants who can collaborate than another actor who had fewer ties. Moreover, it can result in enhancing his or her bargaining power in decision-making processes based on the collective action of his or her network.

Secondly, the participatory planning needs to consider the meaning of the concept of bridging social capital in the processes. For example, there can be a question whether 'social trust' or 'tolerance' toward other groups based on bonded dominant groups can be a means to involve minority groups in decision-making processes. In other words, mere involving minority groups without reconsideration of the unbalanced social relations can result in embracing the minority groups within the social norms of dominant groups. It can be questionable whether this form of inter-group relationships can provide opportunities to include diverse members as equal members in decision-making processes. In this sense, how the form of bridging social capital was imagined through the participatory processes can be essential questions.

Finally, based on these questions, if empirical data do not always show the hypothesised effects, it needs to be examined whether social capital should be considered as ‘good’ in a normative aspect. Social capital can be elements which help members to work collectively; however, whether the outcomes of these collective actions are positive or not can be a different question. In participatory planning, it can be linked to the examination of the usefulness of the current over-emphasis of ‘building communities’ in Korean planning (see chapter one). It will help to understand, in neighbourhoods with diverse
social members, whether emphasising building communities can lead to inclusive participatory processes and resulting capacity building.

Therefore, the study examines the processes of social capital within the consideration of diverse communities. It elucidates the possible limitations of the current framework of participatory processes. The social structure surrounding immigrant groups is significantly influential in the processes of social capital, and it can result in the unequal participation of immigrant groups. Although interactions in consultation processes possibly formed weak social trust among actors, the expected social capital involving different groups seems to be difficult to achieve without considering redressing social positions of immigrant groups. If participatory planning does not provide this mediated institutional setting, social capital might function as a means to reproduce benefit of dominant social groups.

2.5 Conclusions

This chapter has illustrated the concept of social capital and its emergence in participatory planning studies. This chapter pointed out the possible influence of groups divisions in the formation of social capital. A significant number of studies showed that different social status such as economic, cultural inequalities between groups could be influential in the formation of social capital and the resulting unequal benefit of social capital. On the other hand, this aspect of inequality within local members, which might be influential in forming social capital, was rarely understood in participatory planning. Without much attention on this possible unequal processes of social capital, but by focusing on hypothesis of the social capital of Putnam —which emphasising positive processes of building bonding and bridging social capital through face-to-face interactions— Korean participatory planning system has considered building collaborative communities as the main method to draw participation of local members (see chapter one). When considering the possible reproduction of unequal access to resources through the uneven formation of social capital, as studies on the inequality of social capital asserted, there are unanswered
questions over how this frame shape forms of participation through social capital, and whether those practices of participation can exist amongst immigrant groups in Korean cities.

The next section explores how ‘unequal social positions’ of immigrant groups can be seen in the frame of participatory planning. As has been seen in this chapter, the inequality of immigrant groups can be influential in the formation of social capital. The following chapter examines how the inequality possibly embeds in the participatory planning procedure. It will highlight implications which the participatory planning need to consider a fairer institutional setting for diverse social members.
Chapter Three: The Concept of Recognition and Immigrant Groups

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, the concept of social capital has been explored from the perspective of the participation of immigrant groups. The notable gap in the previous social capital studies within participatory planning is that the framework seems to largely overlook the impact of the wider social position in which immigrant groups were located. As argued, the participatory planning procedure has been questioned in respect of the equal participation. For example, Fincher and Iveson (2008) argued that ‘planning procedure often fails to live up to theorized ideals of procedural fairness and uncoerced reasoning in the situations in which citizens are not really free and equal’ (p. 12). The understanding of dynamics between the participants within the different social contexts in the consultation process was still limited. Within this broader context, the study aims at looking into how these dynamics have been articulated in the processes of social capital. The wider impacts of social inequality which the groups experience in their social relationships seem to be necessary to be understood in more depth.

The immigrant groups faced stronger barriers than long-established groups to approach mainstream society. It was not only observed in economic inequality but also in social perception about the group identity of immigrants. The cultural meaning of groups frequently resulted in undermining the social participation of immigrant groups. Particularly, these social divisions due to contested group identities were not only influential in policies but also in interpersonal relationships. Social relationships, even if
those are informal relationships such as friendships and neighbourhood relationships, are largely involved with wider social recognition about groups.

To explore the obstacles of immigrant groups in social relationships induced by social structure, this chapter firstly looks into the cultural meaning embedded in the concept of ethnicity. Ethnicity is frequently assumed as pre-fixed natural attributes; however, many pointed out that the social meaning which has been formed in society articulates the identity of ethnic groups (Beebeejaun, 2012; Young, 1990). The ethnicity is the concept which is produced by ‘changing, complicated and uneven interactions between social processes and individual experience (Gunaratnam, 2003, p. 8)’. Ethnicity is a concept which is rather socially and politically formed. By elucidating the relational aspect of ethnicity, the first part explains the importance of awareness of the social and political pattern surrounding the meaning of ethnic identity to look into the social lives of immigrant groups. Secondly, this chapter explores the concept of recognition which helps understand how these disadvantaged group identities hinder the social participation of groups. Thirdly, based on these reviews, the final part of the chapter develops the conditions which the consultation processes need to consider to provide equal opportunities for immigrant groups, and how that links to the institutional setting for building social capital of immigrant groups in participatory planning.

3.2 Ethnicity as a Relational Concept

This section elucidates the complicated nature of the concept of ethnicity. As argued in the previous chapter, the understanding of group differences in social interactions still needs to be developed further in participatory planning literature. To look into how the wider social understanding of groups can affect the relationships surrounding immigrant
groups, the concept of ethnicity\(^8\), as a culturally and socially constructed concept, is reviewed.

Ethnicity is frequently assumed as a ‘natural product’ which is biologically given (An, 1992)\(^9\). People have different attributes such as gender, race, or age and those characteristics are assumed to have different qualities. For example, the characteristics as women, which are often associated with social codes such as ‘affective’ and ‘caregiving’, were considered naturally given according to sex in comparison with men through a binary categorisation (Beebeejaun, 2017; Fraser, 1998; Young, 1986). This essentialist understanding of groups was shown ‘when these characteristics are conceived as natural,\(^8\)

\(^8\) When it comes to a specific case of this study, Korean Chinese in Korean society, it is arguable whether the group can be explained by the concept of ‘ethnicity’ or not. This is because, from an essentialist viewpoint, Korean Chinese groups are considered as a part of ‘Korean ethnicity’ which shared the same ancestors. However, some writers argued Korean Chinese need to be considered as an independent group who have a distinctive history with Koreans or Chinese (Hwang, 2009a). Moreover, in Korean society, the group identity of Korean Chinese groups was frequently differentiated from the one of Korean long-established groups (see chapter five). The debates regarding the ethnic identity of Korean Chinese are still contested (Heo, 2012). The Korean Chinese as an identity was frequently explored by Korean Chinese writers. In the debates the ethnic identity of Korean Chinese was understood in three different ways. First, the Korean Chinese identity was frequently explored by Korean Chinese writers. The Korean Chinese as an identity was understood in three different ways. First, the Korean Chinese was considered as a part of Chinese nationality. Hwang (2009) emphasised the group identity as Joseonjok which has built its independent history. Even though Korean Chinese shared the Korean ethnicity, it was based on the imagined idea of ‘ancestor’, not related to the contemporary ethnic identity of Korean (Hwang, 2009b). The Korean Chinese identity has been built within the Chinese immigrant society. Second, some argued that Korean Chinese could not leave Korean ethnicity even if that is based on an imagined identity. They argued if the group loses the identity as Korean, the group will be integrated into other nationalities (Zheng, 1996). On the other hand, some argued that the multiplicity of the identity itself is the part of the identity. It showed the groups’ strategic positions throughout history, and this multi identity tended to show the identity as a transnational concept (J.-W. Kang, 2012; I.-J. Yoon, 2003). Regardless of whether Korean Chinese groups can be differentiated from Korean ethnicity or not, the debates themselves showed the complex group identity of Korean Chinese which is difficult to understand by the essentialist viewpoint of ethnicity.

\(^9\) The essentialist viewpoint to see ethnicity seems to be dominant in Korean society (see chapter five). The viewpoint was deeply influential as an ideology of ethnic nationalism. Shin (2006) argued that the Korean nation tended to be based on the idea of a single ancestor. In the education of history and political discourse regarding such as relations with North Korea, it was emphasised that all Koreans are the descendants of a single ancestor, Tan’gun. Single bloodline and Korea as the nation of a homogenous ethnic group were emphasised as a way to build solidarity in Korean society. However, in recent years, as coping with diverse ethnic groups in Korea became a challenging issue, the studies began to elucidate the limitation of the essentialist viewpoint and the characteristics of Korean multiculturalism (see K.-S. Oh, 2010; Woo & Woo, 2014). For example, the United Nations (UN) recommended not to use the term of ‘a single-race nation’ by reason that it can be a barrier to recognise Korea as a multiethnic society (Y. Lee, 2007).
necessary, and eternal realities (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 2011, p. 19)’. From this viewpoint, ethnicities were perceived based on bloodlines or races.

However, contrary to the essentialist view, many explained ethnicity as a socially constructed concept (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 2005; Omi & Winant, 1995). They argued that ethnicity is difficult to perceive as a fixed form which is inherited and the society where ethnic groups are included shaped their group identities. Anthias (1992) emphasised the relational nature of ethnicity as a collective identity that is constructed throughout history.

*Ethnic positioning provides individuals with a mode of interpreting the world, based on a shared collective positioning vis-à-vis other groups, often within a structure of dominance and contestation.*

(p. 424)

They explained that the relations which formed ethnicity could be seen from two sides, internally and externally. Firstly, shared territory, shared history and cultural attributes such as language and religion can internally construct groups. Secondly, on the other hand, the external constraints might constitute groups. For example, the ethnicization of certain industries formed a specific image of ethnic groups in society (Behtoui, 2006). When immigrant groups arrived in other societies, it is common to see a certain group of immigrant groups substitute a certain part of industries, like Filipinos as babysitters in Singapore (Ong, 2006), or Korean Chinese as home carers in South Korea. It formed a certain understanding of the groups in the countries and also built shared experiences among ethnic groups. Those groups existed as a reality by influencing members, but Anthia (1992) also pointed out that the memberships are not exclusive, and shifted in different contexts.

Contrary to the relational aspects of the concept of ethnicity, ethnic diversity was adopted as predetermined divisions defining different cultural characteristics in planning policies. Lees argued that ‘diversity of different ‘diversities’ is often under-theorised’ (Lees, 2003, p. 613). For example, the planning policies frequently used a tick-box method regarding
gender, race and ethnicity to understand the groups (Besemer, Matthews, & Besemer, 2015). Beebeejaun (2012) argued that ethnicity in planning tended to be based on this pre-fixed categorisation which frequently embedded discriminatory presumptions toward groups. She argued that ethnicity in planning needs to be understood as a socially constructed, contingent and contested nature of communities, rather than as a naturally culturally fixed group identity.

Adopting the concept of ethnicity as the pre-fixed form of identity as essential nature engendered several issues. Firstly, the viewpoint can lead to simplification of the different social groups within a group. While ethnicity or race is commonly presumed as naturally given group identities, Young (2000) warned about the danger of the failure to notice possible problems when ethnicity is considered as ‘a set of essential attributes that constitute its identity as a group’ (Young, 1990, p. 87). She pointed out that ethnicity was assumed as the same attributes and a common identity which were agreed upon as a group value and shared by every individual in a group, but it could be not equally significant to each member (Young, 1990). The essentialist viewpoint frequently resulted in simplifying group interest as shared and agreed upon by the members of a group, and overlooking the differences within a group. However, within a group, members are often located in different social contexts by holding different interests and opinions. For instance, the Korean Chinese, the case of this study, have been located in differing social situations depending on their legal and economic status (see chapter five). Consequently, the issues which social members faced were different. Carbado (2013) pointed out that the current understanding of group identity sometimes failed to look into a certain group of people who were located in a particularly more disadvantaged situation by examining the concept of intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1991). Sometimes, people were situated in ‘multiple markers of alterity’. Carbado explained this aspect with a case study about lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ) youth of colour (YOC) community in New York (Irazábal & Huerta, 2015).
By interrogating the interlocking ways in which social structures produce and entrench power and marginalization, and by drawing attention to the ways that existing paradigms that produce knowledge and politics often function to normalize these dynamics.

(Carbado et al., 2013, p. 312)

The essentialist viewpoint tends to enforce the presumed group identity, and by doing so, sometimes simplified the complexity within the group by failing to draw the in-depth understanding of differences within a group.

Secondly, dealing with ethnic groups according to their fixed identities tended to result in strengthening or reproducing existing social oppressions by reifying group boundaries (also see the next section). Immigrant groups were frequently located in disadvantaged social positions which hindered their social esteem to be equally respected. Glazer and Moynihan (1975) explained the oppressions toward ethnic differences in the host societies as a way to articulate status differences. They said that ‘(e)thnic groups bring different norms to bear on common circumstances with consequent different levels of success – hence group differences in status’ (p. 17). In other words, society has certain social norms, and different ethnicity was often implicitly assumed to hold different norms to be successful by the standards of the society. Also, Omi and Winant (1995) claimed that constructural constraint and power relations can reflect group identity of immigrant groups. Group attributes which were assumed as their natural characteristics sometimes emerged as a means to differentiate the group from the dominant social norms and values.

The social relations between long-established groups and ethnic minority influence in encountering the groups. Goffman (1963) explained the degraded social image associated with ethnic minorities as ‘stigma’. He stated that ‘on this assumption we exercise varieties of discrimination, through which we effectively, if often unthinkingly, reduce his life chances’ (p.5). The cultural assumptions frequently embed a discriminatory perspective, which occurred with a little of awareness in the ordinary lives of immigrant groups. Loury (2002) argued that ‘people attend to racial markers because they convey
social meaning, and not just social information [emphasis in original].’ (p. 35). The people implicitly gain the social meanings which were included in the ethnicity, when people interact with other ethnic groups (Behtoui, 2006). Interactions with other ethnic groups embedded a wider social meaning of the groups, even if the interactions were at an individual level. Social interactions with ethnic groups who are positioned in a disadvantaged location often delivered an implicit social meaning of the public image of that ethnic group.

The essentialist viewpoint involving ethnic groups in the pre-fixed composition can result in undermining differences within a group and reinforcing existing social ideas. The studies on the possible limitations of the essentialist viewpoint in dealing with ethnic groups were difficult to find in the planning field (Beebeejaun, 2012). Without questioning how this frame influenced immigrant groups, planning policies frequently relied on pre-fixed ideas in considering ethnic minorities. The next section discusses how this essentialist viewpoint can result in impeding the participatory parity of groups, and how the policy considers the remedies for them.

3.3 Recognition: Unequal Social Status Impeding Participatory Parity

As briefly argued, socially constructed group identities sometimes delivered unfair stereotypes. As the concern regarding ways of perceiving differences and the resulting inequality was growing, the studies on the social meaning of ethnic groups and attempts to link these issues to social justice emerged. The studies focused on how these problematic social identities of ethnic groups hindered their participation within the relations with dominant social groups.

Researchers explained cultural inequality where immigrant groups were located by the concept of recognition (Fraser, 1995; Honneth, 1996; Taylor, 1994). The concept of recognition in political theories overlapped but can be contrasted with the usage of recognition in the contexts of the rise of multiculturalism. The concept of recognition
widely emerged in multicultural discourse, but the purposes of uses of the concepts showed slight differences. For example, multicultural politics placed emphasis on identity politics focusing on the distinctive value of group identity and the group-specific right to protect their uniqueness (Calhoun, 2002). Taylor (1994) understood equal recognition as a requirement of the dignity of all individuals.

[O]ur identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognitions of others, and so a person or a group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm; can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.

(p. 25)

On the other hand, Fraser (2003) used the concept of recognition to understand the social status of groups to provide a normative condition for social justice. Both approaches focused on a damaged and distorted identity which harmed the dignity of some groups, but they showed differences in the understanding of the remedy of this misrecognition. While Taylor (1994) or Honneth (1996) focused on revaluing identities, Fraser (1995) shed light on the importance of a transformative remedy which softens group divisions. In this sense, Fraser criticised identity politics in multiculturalism politics by the reason that it can reify group categorisations.

Fraser (1995; also see Fraser & Honneth, 2003) argued that the issue of misrecognition was an issue of social justice by linking the recognition of a group with their impeded social status. Fraser (2005) focused on ‘participatory parity’ to examine social inequality by stating that ‘justice requires social arrangements that permit all to participate as peers in social life’ (p. 74). In other words, what makes people impeded from ‘full participation’ in the society was the main focus in her framework. She pointed out two dimensions of injustice: one is the ‘economic realm’ related to distribution, and another is the ‘cultural realm’ related to recognition. The economic structure can be an obstacle for participants to interact with other social members. On the other hand, ‘institutionalized hierarchies of
cultural value’ (Fraser, 2007, p. 20) can deny a participant’s requisite standing as a social peer. Fraser (2000) exemplified the misrecognition which was observed in the interaction regulated by an institutional pattern.

In each of these cases, interaction is regulated by an institutionalized pattern of cultural value that constitutes some categories of social actors as normative and others as deficient or inferior: ‘straight’ is normal, ‘gay’ is perverse; ‘male-headed households’ are proper, ‘female-headed households’ are not; ‘whites’ are law-abiding, ‘blacks’ are dangerous. [...] in each case, an institutionalized pattern of cultural value constitutes some social actors as less than full members of society and prevents them from participating as peers.
(p. 114)

The social meaning of group identities was reproduced in the relations with the other social members, and it emerged as the means of social subordination. In this sense, the misrecognition of groups is not only the issue of depreciation of group identity but rather related to social subordination impeding participants’ equal participation in social life. By linking misrecognition to the issue of social subordination, recognition is understood as the matter of social justice.

Fraser considered distribution and the remedy for misrecognition as a series of mediations. In Fraser’s viewpoint, an affirmative remedy is for redistributing material goods to existing groups. Although she contended that the importance of redistribution is to acquire equal social positions for immigrant groups, she pointed out the limitation of the affirmative actions. An affirmative remedy possibly generates misrecognition and moreover, reinforces the existing division of groups. On the other hand, a transformative remedy is for recognition issues in cultural discriminations by ‘restructuring of relations or recognition’ (Fraser, 1995, p. 87). The concept of recognition in Fraser’s frame was considered within the relations. For the possible institutional arrangements to resolve the injustices, she proposed a procedural amelioration.
Justice requires social arrangements that permit all members of society to interact with one another as peers. […] First, the distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure participants’ mutual independence and ‘voice.’ […] The second condition requires that institutionalized patterns of cultural value express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social esteem.

(Fraser, 2004, pp. 127–8)

However, it is questionable whether dealing with two aspects of inequality as separated issues is useful. Firstly, Young (1997) pointed out the division between two different aspects of inequality could be an oversimplified view because they are not clearly distinguished but affected by each other in reality. For instance, material consequences often resulted from the cultural discriminations which impeded the decision-making power of particular social groups.

Moreover, the affirmative remedy of Fraser still has limitations which can reify group divisions, which Fraser herself aimed to tackle by the concept of recognition. In this sense, the affirmative remedy of Fraser still has limitations as a distributive remedy which Young (1997) criticised. In her writing about the politics of differences, Young (1997) pointed out two issues in the distributive paradigm. Firstly, this paradigm tended to consider justice as ‘the allocation of material goods’ (p. 15). However, as argued, it often overlooked the social structure and institutional setting which often influence the decision to produce these distributive patterns. Secondly, theorists often argued the distributions of social goods, for example, the distribution of decision making power. However, unequal decision-making power, the division of labour and culture are productions from the function of social relations, not a static thing which can be distributed. The issue of decision-making power could not be reducible in a distribution issue but needs to be dealt with by transforming the relations between dominant and subordinated groups. In this sense, distributive remedies have limitations because they often could not be helpful for softening the group divisions by allocating the resources according to pre-fixed group categorisations.
Two separated approaches regarding distribution and recognition of Fraser to inequalities of immigrant groups seem to be based on criticism about multiculturalism. Fraser emphasised recognition as social status by contrasting her argument with the identity politics which emphasised such a ‘self-realisation’. For example, for Taylor (1994), recognition was considered as ‘a vital human need’. In this case, misrecognition is the matter of impaired subjectivity and damaged self-identity harming the people’s dignity. Some recent left critics mainly based on neo-Marxism criticised that the politics of recognition tended to ignore issues of economic maldistribution. On the other hand, Young (1997) asserted that it can be an exaggerated criticism. Even though some of the cultural movements sometimes tended to focus on the representation of the group as an end in itself by overlooking the question of distribution of wealth and resources, in many cases, the cultural movement for being recognised is a way to participate in decision-making and to mediate economic inequality (Cederman & Girardin, 2007; Weisskopf, 2004). In other words, even though there were some criticisms that multiculturalism tended to lead to the mere representation of cultural differences of groups by overlooking economic inequality, it can be a limitation of affirmative action toward groups focusing on their cultural specificity, not because the politics of recognition undermined the economic maldistribution.

In the institutional arrangement of community in participatory planning, the transformative remedy for misrecognition issues provided an important implication. When it comes to the inequality which immigrant groups faced, not only economic maldistribution but also the culturally constructed group identities often located them in oppressed positions compared to dominant groups. This arrangement of social groups cannot be challenged by distributing opportunities for participation, but need to be considered in relations between dominant groups and others. Also, this construction of participants can result in marginalisation of the resulting benefit of consultation processes. By introducing the politics of differences and the concept of recognition, the researchers recently began to shed light on this problematic categorisation in urban policies.
3.3.1 Institutional Setting for Recognition in Planning

As the inclusion of diversity in urban policies became challenging issues, Fincher and Iveson (2008) tried to contextualise the concept of recognition in planning. Particularly, they emphasised the status model of recognition based on the arguments of Fraser. They differentiated the status model of recognition as a ‘relational model of recognition’ from an ‘affirmative model of recognition’. As argued, the identity model of recognition which revalues the group identity sometimes results in strengthening the group boundaries.

The affirmative model of recognition, in other words, the representing groups based on their identities were observed in urban policies as multiculturalism gained attention. For example, Fincher and Iveson (2008) took an example of including immigrant groups based on their group identities such as a ‘checklist’ approach as the application of an affirmative model of recognition in planning. Also, cultural representative projects like Chinatowns could be an example of an affirmative model of recognition. The spatial projects on ethnic enclaves by representing their cultural attributes were understood as a means to involve immigrant groups and to ‘recognise’ the groups (T. C. Chang, 2000; M.-Y. Choi, 2014; Schmiz & Kitzmann, 2017).

However, as argued, the affirmative model of recognition reproduced the imagination based on their group identities (Fincher & Iveson, 2008). Through the process, the group identities were understood as their natural attributes based on the predetermined categorisations such as nationality and ethnicity, and it possibly results in reifying group divisions. The cultural representation projects such as Chinatown involves three different issues. Firstly, it raised a question who becomes an object in this understanding of multiculturalism (S.-H. Park, 2013). Yeoh (2005) explained this attempt can be understood as a way to promote the places by linking them to the global economy. By promoting the image of cities as a ‘global city’, the representation of immigrant enclaves often emerged as a means to draw foreign investors (see chapter six). Researchers contended that the discourse of ‘global city’ and ‘diversity’ frequently focusing on high-
skilled workers while excluded other low-income immigrant groups (Raco & Kesten; Yeoh). Immigrant groups tended to be polarised according to their cultural images (Yeoh, 2005). Secondly, it is questionable whether the planning attempt focusing on an ethnic enclave, as a site which is separated from the full range of other parts of the city, can provide a way to be recognized (Fincher & Iveson, 2008). Focusing on the case of Canada, Preston et al. (2006) pointed out that transforming the pre-existing norms about the ways of living needs to be considered in multicultural cities rather than separating differences. Thirdly, by emphasising cultural characteristics focusing on certain ethnic enclaves, the complexity within the immigrant groups is often simplified. The populations in neighbourhoods are not homogenous, but through attempts to represent urban spaces as certain ethnic places, the complexities within the areas were undermined.

Current efforts put into urban image-making and branding are both self-generating and somehow peculiar. Since every new market-message is contested by the pluralism of urban social life [...] there can never be a final, intersubjectively shared city image. [...] And, the more effort that is put into the diffusion of a dominant image, the more image-creation must actually overlook the authentic complexities of social life.

(Jansson, 2003, p. 478)

When considering the remedy for misrecognition required transformation of relations, the affirmative model showed the limitations as the remedy for misrecognition. It tends to enforce the presumed group identity, and moreover, sometimes simplified the complexity within the group by failing to draw the in-depth understanding of the groups.

From the normative viewpoints, Fincher and Iveson (2008) pointed out the importance of a ‘relational model of recognition’ based on Fraser’s status model to soften the group divisions. They took an example of self-organisation which established cross-group dialogues. Instead of approaching immigrant groups separately, including immigrant groups in dialogues with long-established groups or other immigrant groups was considered as an essential condition for this relational model of recognition. The
following table showed each approach and examples in urban planning by Fincher and Ivson (2008).

Table 3.1: The concept of redistribution and recognition (source: summarised from Fraser, 2003; Fincher & Iveson, 2008).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key concepts</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Differences of remedies</th>
<th>Examples in urban planning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Redistribution</td>
<td>Maldistribution</td>
<td>Distributing on fixed groups</td>
<td>Distribution of facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition</td>
<td>Misrecognition</td>
<td>Identity model (affirmative model of recognition)</td>
<td>Check-list Cultural representation project (e.g. Chinatown) Status model (relational model of recognition) Cross-dialogue in consultation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To involve immigrant groups without reifying their group boundaries, providing an institutional setting for interacting over groups, tended to be essential. However, as has been seen in chapter two, providing cross-group dialogues does not always lead to the transformation of relations. The next section explores how researchers understood the interactions between groups in a way to transform pre-existing group divisions.

### 3.3.2 Setting for Cross-group Dialogues

To understand the normative conditions of interactions between groups in consultation processes, the meaning of cross-group dialogues seemed to be necessary to understand in more depth. It involves multi-faceted dimensions of relations such as the misrecognised ethnic identity delivering social meaning beyond individuals and face-to-face interactions between members. Although the social divisions between dominant and subordinated social groups need to be mediated and eliminated, it seems to be difficult to achieve by merely ignoring group boundaries.

In order to build the understanding of the conditions for cross-group dialogues, the concept of social groups and its difference from the essentialist concept of ethnicity needs
to be revisited. The argument that emphasised eliminating group oppressions seems to lead to the statement arguing removing groups and treating them as individuals and allowing them freedom from the stereotypes surrounding groups. However, firstly, when considering these group divisions were shaped by the processes of functioning relations between dominant and other groups, group boundaries cannot be eliminated by deciding to do so. As argued through the discussions regarding the mechanism of social capital in chapter two, even if individual members were emphasised as an agent in forming relations, the members were located in the structure, and it impacts the relationships surrounding the members. Especially, it needs to be dealt with more carefully when the immigrant groups have experienced a strong social stigma. For example, Uitermark et al. (2005) took an example of Amsterdam’s diversity policy.

Since the diversity policy denies the validity of identities like ‘Moroccans’, ‘Turks’ or ‘Muslims’, the organizations that strive to represent the interests of those who are categorized as such are themselves marginalized. The ambivalence here is that the local government feels too much importance is granted to these categories and therefore seeks to select organizations that are not based on ethnic identities […] The result of this policy is to deny the identities that are of importance to many members of ethnic minorities.

(p. 632)

The social divisions were embedded, particularly in the situations where particular ethnic groups experienced social discrimination. The structural oppressions existed and reproduced systematically in media, ordinary interactions and cultural stereotypes. Fraser (2003) also argued that undermining group boundaries can result in the disadvantages of the groups becoming invisible. Gaining equal social esteem was not achievable by merely ignoring group divisions but by reducing the oppression through transforming the group relations between dominants and others.

Secondly, as argued, people feel a sense of belonging based on their common experiences and a particular sense of history, often associated with their ethnicity and the perception of society where they were located (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 2005; Yuval-Davis, 2006).
This collective sense of belonging exists and shapes the members of the groups, but it needs to be understood in a different way from the essentialist meaning of ethnicity. Young (1990) pointed out a social group is ‘not defined primarily by a set of shared attributes, but by a sense of identity’ (p. 44). Even though the groups to which the members belong is not always important in the same way and to the same extent to every member, feeling the sense of belonging and navigating themselves through these identifications are inevitable processes for social members. Also, group differences and the feeling of a special affinity by belonging the groups were inevitable and important aspects for social members even in the case where the immigrant hold stigmatised identity (Young, 1997). Isin (2002) mentioned that people in interactions with differences did not lose their contexts, and rather oriented their positions by encountering.

The city is not a container where differences encounter each other; the city generates differences and assembles identities.

(p. 283)

People in interactions with differences were not only individuals, but they also articulate themselves as a part of their social positions through encountering.

The interactions between groups, in this sense, tended to have a form of dialogues without undermining or removing group differences but not subordinating certain groups under the dominant social norms. Phillips (1994) said that understanding ‘group difference without thereby disciplining [emphasis in original] group members into a single authentic identity’ as the decision rule which needed to be established in the relational model (p. 82).

The understanding of participants in consultation processes in participatory planning, which has been reviewed in chapter one and two, can be reflected in these normative conditions for an institutional framework. The normative conditions for group interactions can be summarised thus: a) providing cross-group dialogues without separating groups according to their pre-assumed attributes, b) providing an institutional
setting involving social groups with equal social esteem, c) and respecting group differences without dissolving them into a unity or individualising members. On the other hand, the current framework of participation had little awareness of these contextual considerations. The social misrecognition of groups was rarely understood in the planning procedure (chapter two). On the other hand, the building relationship processes tended to be understood as the processes of individuals to form a newly formed united group through consultation processes (see chapter two).

By reflecting on the conditions for interactions, the reviews showed that the consultation processes need to provide an institutional setting for group interactions without subordinating immigrant groups into dominant social norms. The interactions in this setting need to be understood as groups to groups by reflecting their interests and experiences. The social members in the cross-group dialogues in consultation processes are inevitably located in their social groups, and it also needs to be respected. The relationships between groups, therefore, should be understood as an exchange of dialogues between differences, not as a way to include minority groups into other dominant norms.

3.4 Conclusions

This chapter has demonstrated the economic, social and cultural inequality which shaped the lives of immigrant groups. Not only the economic inequality of immigrant groups, group identities, which were sometimes simplified as natural attributes such as ‘ethnicity’, limited their participation by delivering the social meaning of inferior through the exclusion from the ideal model of normative social actors. Cultural misrecognition impeded the social status of immigrant groups as a member who can equally access decision-making processes by locating them as subordinated groups compared to long-established groups. In this sense, the social misrecognition of the immigrant group is a task which cannot be mediated by only redressing the misrepresented groups’ identity,
but it also required the transformation of dominant ideas about social participants, which sometimes limit the inclusion of immigrant groups.

Understanding the embedded social understanding of immigrant groups as a barrier to participation explained the importance of an institutional setting to include immigrant groups. As has been seen in this chapter, the writers who asserted the importance of recognition also place emphasis on the interactions between groups as can be seen in the studies on bridging social capital in consultation processes (see chapter two). Transformation processes were expected to be achieved through cross-dialogues upon the mediated institutional setting.

However, as Young (1990) argued and chapter two shown, merely prioritising face-to-face interactions, without redressing unbalanced social positions where immigrant groups were located, is rather the ignorance of politics, and providing institutional setting considering the members with equal social esteem is essential for the processes. In this sense, the social capital theory provided a frame to look into interactions at the interpersonal level to see this exchange of ideas, but with limited awareness of the wider setting of members. The concept of recognition helped build up a framework to examine interactions among members within a consideration of the structure of a policy frame.
Chapter Four: Research Methodology

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapters have dealt with literature to look into the possible inequality of social capital and its influence on the participation of immigrant groups in planning consultation processes. Chapter two reviewed the concept of social capital and its emergence in participatory planning. The concept of social capital has contributed to examining the mechanism of voluntary participation by helping to understand how local members participated in consultation processes and how they deliver their opinions in decision-making processes through their social networks. On the other hand, when it comes to the understanding of participation of immigrant groups, while the participatory planning studies have paid limited attention to how the social positions of members can be influential in this participatory mechanism, the recent studies began to show the unequal social positions of actors can result in the uneven formation of social capital. By looking into the concept of recognition, chapter three has demonstrated the relationships between long-established groups and immigrant groups cannot be free from the broader social perceptions toward the groups. The social divisions, which occurred in the relations between a dominant social group and ‘others’ who do not seem to share the social norms and value of this dominant group, were not only observed in the policy frames but also can be influential in informal social relationships of immigrant groups in neighbourhoods.

Following the importance of social divisions in the processes of social capital, this chapter sets out the methods to examine the formation of social capital in participatory planning within the consideration of the social positions of participants. The initial research question of the recognition of social groups in a planning system and its influence on the participation of immigrants draws upon a qualitative approach to look
into subtle power relationships between actors which were built through the cultural and historical contexts of groups. Along with a Social Network Analysis, a quantitative method which is used to show the structure of networks, qualitative methods including in-depth interviews and non-participant observation added information regarding contextual effects in the processes of forming social capital. Also, the Korean governmental understanding of immigrant groups was analysed by document analysis.

This chapter sets out the research questions, analytical frameworks and selected methodologies. Firstly, the importance of case study in planning studies is discussed particularly by shedding light on the potential contribution of the case of Korean Chinese as an Asian case in social capital theory, which had been studied mainly focusing on the global North. Section 4.3 problematises theoretical gaps by presenting the research questions of this thesis. Following the research questions, an analytical framework, which was devised to examine the processes of social capital in consideration of broader social recognition of the groups, is introduced. Then, the details of research methodology including document analysis, non-participant observation, Social Network Analysis, and semi-structured interviews are explained. Finally, the last section discusses the reflexivity of the researcher in qualitative research.

4.1 Research Questions

This thesis investigates the composition of community in the planning system and its influence in the participation of immigrant groups in planning consultation processes focusing on three key research questions:

RQ1. What mechanisms have been used to involve immigrant groups in Korean urban policies, and how does the recognition of these groups emerge within planning policy processes?

The exploration of this question demonstrates the understanding of groups in the Korean planning system and the embedded social perceptions toward groups within
the system. Also, it provides the context of the participants to investigate social capital in the participatory planning in the next questions. In order to answer this question, the study focuses on how immigrant groups have been understood in Seoul immigrant policies and Garibong-dong neighbourhood planning. As has been briefly introduced, the social relations between Korean Chinese groups and long-established Korean groups tended to embed cultural hierarchy. This research question investigates how these social relations have been shown in urban policies.

RQ2. How was social capital formed among participants located in different social contexts?

Social capital was assumed to draw the voluntary participation of local communities in the representation process of community-led regeneration. These social capital processes are analysed within a consideration of the wider social status of immigrant groups which is dealt with in the first research question. The analysis not only deals with the structure of social ties among local members but also involves the questions how the members understood the capabilities of themselves and others as participants in the framework of the Urban Regeneration project. As argued in chapter two, the understanding of the potential benefits that were based on the assumptions of the abilities of actors can be influential in the formation of social capital. The social positions of Korean Chinese groups in the planning system, which was analysed through the first research question, is reflected in this understanding regarding the expected capabilities of members. The second research question explores the formation of social capital among the local groups and its influences on the representative process.

RQ3. How has social capital and ethnic difference been deployed by different actors within local planning participation?

The third research question is an analysis of the decision-making processes in the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee. Followed the first question on the social recognition of groups and the second question on the formation of social capital, the third research question elucidates how this formation of social capital can influence
the decision-making processes. It places emphasis on why the examination of the social dynamics among the local community could be an essential issue in the participatory planning. It focuses on the decision-making power among actors and the processes of shaping ‘common concern’ in the consultation processes. By doing so, the study traces how the social understanding of groups leads to the reflections of their voices through the practice of participatory planning.

4.2 The Korean Chinese in South Korean Society as a Case

The case study was used as an important method to provide empirical data in the planning field with rich information including certain circumstances of neighbourhoods and cities. A single case study in a certain city could be a window to see the rise of new possibilities (Chen, 2010; H.-B. Shin, Lees, & López-Morales, 2016; Watson, 2016; Yiftachel, 2006). Flyvbjerg (2006) argued that ‘that knowledge cannot be formally generalized does not mean that it cannot enter into the collective process of knowledge accumulation in a given field or in a society’ (p. 227). In urban research, planning systems were strongly intertwined with the histories and cultures of cities (Sanyal, 2005). A close observation on the cases was considered as the way to provide rich discoveries on the context of the planning procedure.

Especially, Watson (2016) pointed out the contribution of the case studies in global South or East cities as the means to challenge theories, which used to be generalised based on the global North cases, through ‘the real-life planning events’. Particularly, when it comes to social capital studies, the case of Korean Chinese in Korean society is needed to be explained in the contexts as an example of an Asian case study. Even though the purpose of the case study of this thesis is not to provide generalised knowledge about Korean society, the context of the case, which possibly showed the different setting of the theory of social capital of Putnam which have been developed in American cases, needed to be introduced.

The particularity of the case of this thesis can be discussed in two different levels, the first is a case as an example of Asian countries, and the second is a specific context of the case of Korean Chinese in South Korean society. Both aspects highlighted a
question: whether interactions between ‘strangers’ in neighbourhoods, particularly contacts between long-established groups and immigrant groups, can have the same meaning in different cultures? As argued in chapter two, communities have a different narrative of the processes of building communities and the ways of building relationships can be significantly different in different cultures (see chapter two; Arneil, 2006)

Again, the purpose of the case study is not generalising the Korean cases, but as a case showed different contexts of building social capital examines the theory of social capital which was mainly based on the cases of global North. The context of the case put weight on the importance of examination of the impact which was induced by these dominant/subordinated relationships in the processes of forming social capital. In this context, where the divisions between subordinates and superiors existed in relationships, the formation of social capital can be different from the theory. As a case regarding intergroup relationships showing frequent physical contacts but with a strong social gap, the Korean Chinese case provides an example of a different possibility in the formation of social capital.

4.3 Analytical framework

The study links the concept of social capital with the wider social structure where the participants were located. The previous social capital studies in participatory planning used to focus on building social capital and transforming the governance structure by focusing on consultation processes without much consideration of the impact of the social positions of members (see chapter two). The study includes the influences of social recognition as the structural contexts of participants in the examination of the processes of participation.
Figure 4.1: Investigating the mechanism of social capital with diverse communities (source: adapted from Adler & Kwon, 2002, p. 23).
The analytical framework consists of two different theories to see both aspects, a wider social structure of participants and the formation of social capital in the interpersonal contacts in the consultation processes. The first part was based on the work of Fraser (2003), and the latter part was based on the analytical framework for social capital which was reviewed and summarised by Adler and Kwon (2002). Firstly, based on Fraser’s framework, the study deals with the social status of immigrant groups to examine the contextual limitation of the group to participate as a ‘full partner’ in participatory planning (see chapter three). Secondly, the influence of this social composition in the formation of social capital is reviewed in two processes of social capital, the representation process and decision-making process (see chapter two).

The social capital analysis in this study included both a qualitative aspect and a quantitative aspect. Without an analytical framework, social capital often tends to be dealt with as a ‘chaotic concept’ between the social relationships, contact and the cognitive aspect such as trust (Healey, Magalhaes, & Madanipour, 1999; Portes, 1998; see chapter two). To analyse the formation of social capital, the study uses social capital at an interpersonal level among local members by focusing on their utilisation in the committee processes. For example, the latent social relationships in neighbourhoods can be understood as a source of social capital, which showed opportunities to build social capital, but will be dealt with as a separated term from social capital (see the next paragraph). Also, in a similar way, the political usage of social capital such as ‘building local communities’ in urban policies will also be discussed in a separate way. The understanding of social capital in policy discourse influenced the formation of social capital, but it is different from the social capital which is analysed in this thesis.

The three resources of social capital are an analytical frame of social capital (see the picture 4.1). Alder and Kwon (2002; also see S. Kwon & Adler, 2014) provided the conceptual model based on the comprehensive reviews of the social capital studies of Loury, Burt, Portes, Fukuyama, Bourdieu and Putnam. Adler and Kwon (2002) narrowed down fundamental sources of social capital as motivation, ability and opportunity.
A prospective donor without network ties to the recipients, without the motivation to contribute, or without the requisite ability would not be a source of social capital. A lack of any of the three factors will undermine social capital generation.

(p. 27)

Firstly, regarding opportunity source, social capital includes the structure of social networks (Dudwick, Kuehnast, Nyhan Jones, & Woolcock, 2006). The structure of social relationships can show who have more opportunities to build social capital. The existence of social ties does not always result in the formation of social capital, but having dense social ties shows that high possibilities to use them as social capital for collective action. Regarding this quantitative aspect, Social Network Analysis (SNA, it will be discussed in the later part) can contribute to the social capital study by showing which members have higher possibilities to have social capital within the structure (S. Kwon & Adler, 2014).

Secondly, the qualitative sources such as motivation and ability were analysed through the interviews. The researchers who focus on the structure of social ties sometimes considered the structure of social relationships as social capital, but the existence of social ties could not necessarily be interpreted as social capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Even if someone has contacts with others, it does not necessarily mean that those social relations help them to collaborate for a common goal. As sources to activate existing social ties as social capital, Adler and Kwon (2002) pointed out motivation and ability sources. The motivation source in social capital refers to the willingness to sustain the ties to produce benefits (see chapter two; Adler & Kwon, 2002). In participatory planning, normative dimensions such as place attachment or a sense of community or more instrumental motivations such as an expectation of improved local facilities can motivate engagement (see chapter two). The interviews were conducted with participants in the committee, particularly focusing on the members who showed higher centrality in the SNA, in order to analyse what is the motivation source of social capital in the committee (see chapter eight). Also, the interviews also involved residents who had social ties but did not participate in the committee to analyse what

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10 As an example, we can think about a mailman in a neighbourhood. Regarding meeting frequency and the range of meetings, he possibly has a great number of social ties, but it does not mean that he uses those ties as a way to produce benefit for the networks.
was a barrier to activate the social ties as social capital which attracted participation. By doing so, the analysis was able to identify the relationships between the social contexts of members and the processes of social capital (see chapter seven).

Thirdly, the ability means the capability which is embedded in an actor. Because the concept of social capital refers to elements embedded in relationships, this aspect is often undermined; however, if the actor did not have the capability to produce benefits for networks, the networks could not produce social capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Also, this aspect is an important factor to draw the motivation of other members to build social ties (see chapter two). It is an essential element in completing the formation of social capital. In participatory planning, the capabilities of actors can be seen as local knowledge and the capacity to deliver their opinions such as knowledge regarding planning procedure. Also, the latent broad social relationships can be a part of the abilities of actors by showing their mobilising power in local society.

The data collection for the social capital analysis in the study was conducted in two different phases: the first included the questionnaire on the social networks for SNA and the second dealt with interviews to analyse the qualitative sources of the social capital particularly focusing on the key members identified by the SNA. Three resources of social capital in the processes of participatory planning were collected through the questionnaire and interviews.

4.4 Research Design

The overall research design involves a single case study with a mixed method including non-participant observation, Social Networks Analysis and in-depth interviews, as well as document analysis. There are three levels, planning policies, local neighbourhood and participatory planning process, to look into the social capital in the participatory planning procedure. The research will be conducted as in the following research strategy.
Figure 4.2: The research design (source: author).
4.4.1 Documentary Analysis

The documentary analysis is necessary to provide knowledge about the context of local history and policy backgrounds. The study used public records such as related urban policies and the documents of the previous consultation processes and the local historical data in the media including visual documents (see chapter five). The visual data such as photographs throughout the history of neighbourhoods provides illustration (Bryman, 2012). The photographs include sources from the media such as newspapers and books and also the data by the researchers as a part of field notes.

The study analysed the relevant planning policy papers according to the different scales, Seoul Metropolitan Government policies, and neighbourhood plans in Garibong-dong. The documents covered the middle of the 2000s to 2015 (see table 4.1). Among Seoul Metropolitan Government policies, the first Seoul foreigner policies in 2007 and the second foreigner policies in 2014 under two different mayors were included. The 2025 Seoul Urban Regeneration Strategy Plan in 2017 and the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration Promotion Plan (Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration Plan) in 2018 will be described. The key speeches and interviews of mayors and the head of the Seoul Metropolitan regeneration team in the media were analysed to elucidate the viewpoint toward the regeneration plan and community.

The methods for analysing documents are various, from formal coding to ‘close reading’. Bryman (2012) defined content analysis or computer coding as a systematic and a replicable manner by analysing the discourses into predetermined categories. Rydin (2003) distinguished the different approaches, coding and ethnographic analysis, and emphasised ‘close reading’.
What the analysis should do is become more aware than usual of how language is used and interpreted. If the ‘normal’ understanding of a policy discourse is at issue, then ‘normal’ but more reflective reading of that discourse is the appropriated research technique. What the social scientist can add to this human scientific method is an understanding of the social context of creating and understanding these discourses, for no text has an inherent meaning completely separated from its context.

(p. 183)

Table 4.1: The list of documents for analysing policies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Document titles</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Related laws and ordinances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant policy</td>
<td>The first Seoul foreigner policy</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>Seoul Global City Basic Plan [Seoul Global Toshihwa Kibon Kyehoek, 서울 글로벌 도시화 기본 계획]</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Ordinance on the Promotion of Seoul Global City [Seoul Global Seoul-t'ŭkpyŏlshi Global-toshi Ch'o'okchin Chorye, 서울글로벌 서울글로벌 도시 자본 조례]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul plan</td>
<td>Community plan</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Community White Paper; Seoul, People, and Lives [Ma'ułgongdongch'e Puksŏ ; Seoul, Saram, Sun, 마을공동체 벡사 서울, 사람, 삶]</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Ordinance on the establishment of communities in Seoul [Seoul-t'ŭkpyŏlshi Ma'ułgongdongch'e Mandâlgi Chiwŏn t'ange kwanhan Chorye, 서울특별시 마을공동체 만들기 지원 공해 관련 조례]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A Basic Plan for the Community of Seoul [Sŏul-si Ma'ułgongdongch'e Kibon'gyehoek, 서울시 마을공동체 기본계획]</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>National Land Planning and Utilization Act [kuk't'o'ii kyeahoeng min iyonge kwanhan p'anmyul, 국토의 계획 및 이용에 관한 법률]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul masterplan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>The 2030 Seoul Plan (Seoul basic city planning) [2030 Seoul toshihobon'gyehoek, 2030시도도시기본계획]</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Special Act on the Promotion of Urban Renewal [Toshijaejŏngbi Ch'o'okchinŭl</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The thesis analysed the data along with the social contexts of the discourse by close reading. Through analysing urban policies and related speeches, the thesis particularly focused on how the discourse understood ‘multiculture [tamunhwa]’, ‘global [global]’, ‘foreigner [oegugin]’ and ‘neighbourhood communities [maülgongdongch’e]’. By
looking into them, the discourse analysis showed the understanding of desirable participants in the policies.

4.4.2 Non-Participant Observation

Observations in the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee meetings provided data about decision-making processes. Observations covered Garibong-dong Master Plan meeting and community committee meeting (see chapter seven section three about the differences of meetings). The data were collected over three months. Attending the meetings was crucial to building rapport with the interviewees and helped to develop the in-depth questions in the interviews.

Contrary to participant observation, which is the researcher participate as a part of the activities, the researcher participated as an observer, not as a participant (Scott, 2014). The observation had a form of overt observation, and the purpose of observation was agreed with the members of the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee. The community meetings such as resident committee meetings and master planning meetings were not open to the public. I contacted the community coordinator who facilitated the meetings and the master planner who led the project before starting the fieldwork. Both of them were willing to participate in the research, and after asking about the intention of the committee, they introduced me to the local committee. I was introduced to the rest of the meeting as a PhD student from UCL along with handing out the information sheet to the members. The observations mainly focused on these aspects: how planners narrated the goals and values of the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project and community participation; how participants understand the goals and values of the regeneration project.

The observations were interpreted in the form of field notes, which consist of descriptions containing events, main actors, sites and the debates (see Appendix F).

11 However, regarding a specific meaning of non-participant observation referring to the observation which does not affect the participants, researchers pointed out that even if the researcher did not interact actively with participants, the activities of observation itself can be influential to the behaviour of participants (Scott, 2014). On the other hand, the researcher attempted not to show personal opinions regarding the Urban Regeneration project which can affect the meetings.
During the meetings, the researchers mainly used a pen and paper to describe the meetings often including direct sentences from the debates among the members (see figure 4.3). After observations, the researcher wrote journals every day to record the observation including personal impressions (see Appendix F). The notes helped to analyse the data by refreshing the contexts of observations and informal interviews during the processes of analysis (the next section 4.5).

![Figure 4.3: Example of field notes in a master planning meeting.](image)

### 4.4.3 Social Network Analysis

Social Network Analysis (SNA) was used to identify the core members of formal and informal networks. The structural aspects as the opportunity source of social capital were analysed along with the other qualitative sources based on the interview data with the core members by SNA. For example, after identifying who were the central actors, the motivation source, such as the reason why the participants have greater ties in the committee compared to other members, was dealt with in the interviews.

Building a questionnaire is an important part of SNA. Regarding the questionnaire of social networks, there were several considerations to build a better set of data. Firstly, the questions in the social network sometimes included sensitive or threatening questions (Sudman & Bradburn, 1983; Tourangeau, Rips, & Rasinski, 2000). The question like ‘who are you closest to?’ is related to the respondents’ personal life, so the respondent is possibly reluctant to answer it. Especially, if the question is about
conflict relationships, the non-response rate could be higher (De Lange, Agneessens, & Waage, 2004). Secondly, De Lange et al. (2004) pointed out an SNA questionnaire is more difficult and complicated for respondents to answer. For instance, in the case of a close network with 20~30 members, the respondent needs to recall each relationship with each member to answer the questions. Therefore, the design of a survey to make less complicated for the participants is particularly important in SNA data collection. To reduce the non-response rate, the SNA studies used to provide two different types of questions about factual and hypothetical questions. The hypothetical questions are about hypothetical situations such as ‘Suppose that you have found a solution for a work-related problem. To whom of the members of your research group would you go for confirmation?’ (De Lange et al., 2004, p. 358). The questions could help to minimise recall errors or the possibility of actual experiences which were hindered by other aspects rather than the relationship itself. The questionnaire was prepared by adapting the previous literature of De Lange et al. (2004).

The SNA questionnaire in this thesis was devised focusing on a close group, the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee with 31 members (see Appendix B and C). The questionnaire provided all the names of members to lead the participants to recall the members. The survey was often conducted based on the face-to-face survey with the researcher because the interactions with participants were not difficult due to the observations. Along with the face-to-face questionnaire, the researcher provided the questionnaire on an online website, SurveyMonkey\(^\text{12}\) for the participants who were not in the meetings. The researcher sent the digital links by which participants can approach. Among 31 members, 18 members were approachable including online participation. Regarding some of the questions about the network without directions such as friendships or meeting frequency, the non-response was filled in through the nominations by respondents. Even if one person did not answer, other participants sometimes provided the information about the relationships with that participant (Kossinets, 2006). However, the networks with directions such as advice networks were not mediated by non-response (see figure 4.4). On the other

\(^{12}\)https://www.surveymonkey.co.uk
hand, the researcher noticed that the main participants in consultation meetings were around 15 to 20 people whom the researcher approached based on the observation even though the list of committee members had 31 members.

![Example of networks with direct (the left, with arrows, an advice network)/ undirected degrees (the right, without an arrow, a friendship network, source: author, see chapter eight).](image)

The SNA questionnaire used here would include different types of relationships. The researchers focused on both dimensions of relationships, formal and informal dimensions. The formal relationships in the committee included advice and information networks about local issues and consultation processes. On the other hand, the informal relationships such as friendships and the comparison of the informal and formal networks could be the way to see the influences of latent local relationships.

In the analysis stage, the advice and information networks were mainly analysed focusing on the degree, betweenness and closeness centrality. Those centralities showed different meanings. Especially, in the networks that have directions, for example, who asked for information or advice to whom, the in-degree that shows how many actors nominated the node is important. The central member in the degree could be an ‘information hub’ (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). On the other hand, the betweenness centrality could show who is located between other actors. Depending on the structure of the network, the betweenness can be important by playing the role

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of a ‘gatekeeper’ (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). In terms of other centralities, SNA studies are used to deal with closeness centrality to show who is the closest to all the other actors. It means the actor can be more efficient to gain information (Borgatti & Everett, 2000).

Contrary to the advice networks having directed degrees, identifying the centrality of the friendship network and meeting frequency network having undirected degrees, eigenvector centrality seemed to be more useful. Eigenvector centrality shows the influences of nodes (Bonacich, 1987). A high eigenvector centrality means that the node is connected to many nodes which have higher centralities themselves, in the contrast the degree centrality only showed the relationships of nodes which directly connected to central nodes. In other words, even if an actor A has ties, if the nodes which are connected to the actor A do not have sufficient ties, it can be less influential than a node B who is connected to other nodes which have significant numbers of ties.

Finally, when analysing the structures of clustering, the study used the Girvan-Newman method which is based on the betweenness for the edges (Misra, Such, & Balogun, 2016). Other methods such as K-plex and K-core or Lambda set which are calculated based on the number of ties has the disadvantage of showing subgroups which have fewer edges within it. However, the Girvan-Newman method deals with the edges between the groups, so it can show the subgroups even the number of edges within the group is smaller than that of other groups. In the Social Network Analysis, RStudio 1.0.136 for mac was used.

### 4.4.4 Semi-structured Interviews

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13 Eigenvector centrality cannot be used in the directed network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

14 For example, one of the most popular examples showing the usage of eigenvector centrality is the Google search engine based on the Page Rank (Langville & Meyer, 2006).

15 Step 1: Calculate the betweenness for all edges in the network. Step 2: Remove the edge with the highest betweenness. Step 3: Recalculate betweennesses for all edges affected by the removal. Step 4: Repeat from step 2 until no edges remain (Girvan & Newman, 2002).
The study conducted semi-structured interviews with 44 participants (see table 4.2). The main aims of the interviews were different depending on the groups. Firstly, regarding the first research question, the data in respect of ‘how policies understood Korean Chinese groups’, and ‘how the Korean Chinese residents in Garibong-dong experienced the implementation of those urban policies’, needed to be collected in interviews. Secondly, regarding the formation of social capital, the questions about the qualitative source of social capital, which are ‘why they collaborate’, and ‘what aspects were considered as useful abilities in consultation processes’ needed to be asked. According to these different purposes, there were three types of participants.

The first type of interviewees were professionals including planners, researchers and public officers. Seven participants were interviewed regarding the Seoul Urban Regeneration projects, immigrant policies and Korean Chinese groups. The questions were involved with the understanding of local communities and the goal of the regeneration projects. For example, when it comes to the interview with planners, questions were about when the planners come to think about local residents as participants in the regeneration project, how they defined ‘community’ and how they imagine the inclusion of Korean Chinese people in the regeneration processes.

The second type of participants were the members of the committee. Thirteen participants were selected from the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee group. The interviewees were recruited through the committee meetings. Along with the observation, when I met the members of the committee, I asked their intention about being interviewed separately. At the end of the interview, each interviewee was asked whether they have any recommendable further interviewees in the local neighbourhood regardless of whether the potential participants are in the committee or not. Those participants were asked about their relationships in the regeneration project. For example, the questions were about why they participated in the committee, whether they knew other members who were involved in the project, and how they recruited others to join the project. In terms of the motivation and ability source for the social capital analysis, the questions were formulated about knowledge such as local knowledge, planning knowledge, and administrative knowledge and
associability with other members. The social relationships with Korean Chinese immigrant groups in the neighbourhood including their personal experiences and the understanding of the groups were also asked.

The last group was the Korean Chinese group in Garibong-dong. This interview group can be divided into the Korean Chinese members in the Urban Regeneration project, the actors in Korean Chinese local organisations and Korean Chinese residents. Firstly, there were some members who participated in the Urban Regeneration project as a member of the committee or advisory members. Secondly, there were local organisations that were established to help Korean Chinese immigrants. The community organisations helping the Korean Chinese groups were diverse from churches, local newspaper companies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Some of these groups were contacted directly by the researcher through the literature or online research, and some of them were recruited by the snowballing method through the committee members. Finally, local residents were interviewed. Particularly, members who were connected to the committee members, but did not participate were included as interviewees. They were asked about the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project to gain information about their knowledge about the project. The reason for their non-participation was dealt with as the main question. The relationships with other Korean Chinese organisations, the Korean Chinese residents, the local authority and the opinions about the Korean society including the experiences of personal contacts and social understanding toward them were asked.
Table 4.2: The list of interviewees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (anonymised)</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Nature of interview/contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Formal (recorded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Minji</td>
<td>Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration Committee (Committee), Korean Chinese organisation</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Minsu</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ilwon</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Jongdae</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Song</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Yoon</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Baek</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Nack</td>
<td>Committee, Garibong-dong merchant group</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Hee</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Bum</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Koo</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Yongil</td>
<td>Committee</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Yoonhee</td>
<td>Committee, Garibong-dong community association</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Gangil</td>
<td>Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration planning team (planning team)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Woong</td>
<td>Planning team</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Injoo</td>
<td>Planning team</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Gayoung</td>
<td>Planning team</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Seo</td>
<td>Guro council</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Myungsook</td>
<td>Guro council</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Chanhee</td>
<td>Guro council</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Hyunsoo</td>
<td>Seoul Metropolitan Government</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Taewoo</td>
<td>Garibong-dong Police</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name (anonymised)</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Ryu</td>
<td>Local Korean Chinese organisation, resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Sun</td>
<td>Local Korean Chinese organisation, resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Lee</td>
<td>Local Korean Chinese organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Sung</td>
<td>Local Korean Chinese organisation (church)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Myungjin</td>
<td>Local Korean Chinese organisation (church)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Myeong</td>
<td>Local Korean Chinese organisation (church)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Bae</td>
<td>Local Korean Chinese organisation (church), resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Hayoung</td>
<td>Local Korean Chinese organisation (civic organisation, supporting foreign worker)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Minjeong</td>
<td>Local Korean Chinese organisation (civic organisation, supporting international marriage female immigrants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>Youngmi</td>
<td>Local Korean Chinese organisation (civic organisation, supporting international marriage female immigrants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Yoonmi</td>
<td>Local Korean Chinese organisation (civic organisation, supporting international marriage female immigrants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Pill</td>
<td>Local Korean Chinese organisation (local newspaper)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36.</td>
<td>Ryong</td>
<td>Local Korean Chinese organisation (local newspaper)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Yong-gun</td>
<td>Local Korean Chinese organisation (self-policing team)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38.</td>
<td>Kwack</td>
<td>Local Korean Chinese organisation (supporting and educating Korean Chinese teenagers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name (anonymised)</td>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Nature of interview/contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minhee</td>
<td>Korean Chinese residents</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junghee</td>
<td>Korean Chinese residents</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunjeong</td>
<td>Korean Chinese residents</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoon</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ran</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jin</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Korean interview data were translated into English after generating themes. Some of the interviews were transliterated along with the explanation of meaning because translation seemed to lose part of the meaning. The Korean transcription sometimes more vividly showed the feelings of the participants compared to the English translation. Although the participants were often reluctant to talk about the relationships due to possible conflicts, they also sometimes cruelly talk about other people. Occasionally, it seems to be on purpose to show their higher positions by patronising others. It was easier to understand when it comes to Korean transcriptions because the Korean language has multiple ways to show politeness and respect, and on the other hand, rudeness and impoliteness. It was helpful to understand the dynamics among them for the researcher during the analysis. In consideration of these differences, when the understanding of implicit attitudes of interviewees seemed to be important, the researcher tried to include the explanations in the quotations. The interview data were transcribed and coded by the Nvivo 11.0.0 for mac.

The analysing interview data were conducted in both inductive and deductive ways. For example, the social capital studies have built a number of researches about the elements which form the social capital. As has been reviewed in the previous section about the analytical framework, the research focuses on the three different elements of social capital, opportunity, motivation and ability (Adler & Kwon, 2002). The interview data about why the local members participated and how they dealt with the planning procedure were analysed in deductive ways based on the framework. On the
other hand, the social recognition and experiences of the immigrant groups in the local area formed more exploratory processes. The history of Korean Chinese members such as how and why they moved in the neighbourhood and how they were involved in local activities had been coded in inductive ways. Particularly, regarding the questions why they do not participate in the Urban Regeneration project and what are the barriers they experienced, the participants explained them within a linkage of a longer history of their lives and experiences in Korean society, and they built rich information to explore.

All data collection and analysis will be in accordance with the ethical research guidelines of the British Sociological Association (The British Sociological Association, 2017) and Korea National Institute for Bioethics Policy [Kukka-saengmyŏngyulli-jŏngch'aegwŏn, 국가생명윤리정책원] in Korea. Consent forms containing the purpose of the research were handed to the participants, and respondents have notified the right to withdraw from the investigation at any time. Any information, which is possible to identify the respondent, is not provided for privacy and confidentiality. Ethical approval was obtained from the University College London Research Ethics Committee and also from the Public Institutional Review Board [Kongyong-gigwan-saengmyŏngyulli-wiwŏnhoe, 공용기관생명윤리위원회] which is established by Korea National Institute for Bioethics Policy (UCL Ethics Project ID Number: 7901/001 and 7901/002, Korean IRB number: 2016-0004-001, see Appendix A).

4.5 The Reflexive Researcher

Traditionally, academic research was considered as an activity based on objectivity. The researchers were expected to approach their study by being divorced from their own subjectivity. However, the approach has been questioned over recent decades regarding how the creation of knowledge could be entirely non-subjective and value-free. The feminist research approaches began to focus on marginalised and oppressed group members and aimed to provide a platform for them (Freire, 2017). The researchers began to consider studies as social and cultural constructions and point out
that there was not a fixed and unchanging ‘truth’. Based on this understanding, ‘critical reflexivity’ or ‘critical subjectivity’ emerged as an important perspective in representing the complexity of research as a production which was socially and culturally constructed (Etherington, 2013; Geertz, 1973).

In the exploration including the experiences in the field and writing, the position of the researcher blurred ‘the boundaries between the subjective experience and objective social inquiry’ as an insider and outsider (Ifekwunigwe, 1997, p. 135). This aspect of the subjectivity of the researcher could not be entirely removed. Particularly, in qualitative research which aims to provide in-depth knowledge regarding the contexts of cases, interactions between the researcher as a tool to explore the given situations and the case should be a core part of the research. Also, in the interviews with immigrant groups, these reflexive processes became more important not to limit the relationships between interviewer and participants into a single category such as their ethnic backgrounds. As argued in chapter three, the essentialist viewpoint about ethnicity frequently reproduced assumption about the ethnic groups. Without being aware of this limitation, approaching the participants based on their group categorisations also possibly reproduce the ideas about the groups in interview processes. Regarding this aspect, Gunaratnam (2003) argued that the relationships between the interviewer and participants should be a non-hierarchical and ‘the interviewer should be prepared to invest herself emotionally in the interview and to answer any personal questions asked by research participants’ (p. 87; see also Oakley, 2013).

The micro-social interactions with participants reveal multidimensional aspects of the social contexts where I was located and the participants located. During the fieldwork, I found myself as a peripheral subject in the process of forming a rapport with the participants by understanding how I had been accepted by the interviewees. In the interviews with different groups, the personal attributes including age, nationality, gender and current position as the overseas student affected building relationships. The participants from both groups frequently asked my backgrounds. ‘Are you Korean Chinese?’ was the most frequent question at the beginning in the interviews
from both groups, and as a Korean but as an overseas student in the UK, I identified myself in the conversations between two groups. As a Korean, I had to try to mediate and not to show my presumptions toward Korean Chinese groups which might be affected by the perception of Korean society. At the same time, I sometimes sympathised with Korean Chinese interviewees when they revealed their experiences and difficulties as immigrants. Some of the Korean Chinese interviewees understood me as a Korean but as a person who shared the life as an immigrant in another country. I also reflected not only my knowledge in the field but also my experiences as an immigrant in the interviews. Those interactions in building narratives throughout multiple categories have been built through informal interviews and observations.

The physical presence of the researcher and the conversations through the mutual understanding inevitably altered the tone and meaning of the interviews. These dynamics should not be discarded as a part of disturbing the objectivity of the study and rather need to be understood actively. The contacts with the participants provided a wealth of information by showing the attitude to answer the questions according to the relationships with the researcher. The analysis and writing process included the reflexive process of the practical experiences.

4.6 Conclusions

This chapter has provided the methodological consideration of the study. It demonstrated the link between the theoretical backgrounds in the previous chapters and the imperial data collection. The research strategy was built to understand the recognition of groups in policies and their impacts on the formation of social capital.

The single case study has been chosen to show the dynamics between two aspects, the social structure and social capital at the interpersonal level. The Korean Chinese provided richer information on the multi-faceted mechanism of social capital in the particular context. Korean Chinese frequently contacted long-established Koreans based on shared ancestors and a shared language, but they were located in a wider discriminated social position, not only regarding economic inequality but also by a stigmatised group identity. This characteristic would show different aspects from
previous social capital studies which mainly focused on racial differences but with limited awareness of social misrecognition toward immigrant groups.
Chapter Five: Introduction of the case: the Korean Chinese in Garibong-dong

5.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces Korean Chinese groups in South Korean society, and specifically in Garibong-dong. It provides background information to help understand their social positions in the society. The Korean Chinese groups in Garibong-dong were located in the social context as low-income and temporary workers. Although divergences into different social groups within the Korean Chinese society were observed as they began to be engaged in diverse occupations, the Korean Chinese groups in Garibong-dong were particularly understood as a group having unstable economic situations.

The neighbourhood was overlooked by the Korean government while Korean Chinese residents settled down during the 1990s and did not become a more attractive neighbourhood until a recent urban regeneration project commenced consultation in 2015. During this period, the social image of the immigrant groups as low-income immigrant workers was formed through the overlapping social contexts of the groups, such as the low-skilled immigrant workers and the residents who lived in the neighbourhood which was particularly perceived as a poor and dangerous area. The planned demolition and the composition of residents, Korean Chinese, who were marginalised in the society made the government overlook the groups in the neighbourhood for a long time.

After introducing the Korean Chinese groups in Korean society, this chapter will briefly deal with the history of Garibong-dong which became the context drawing the Korean
Chinese groups. Before moving to the introduction of the Korean Chinese groups in Garibong-dong, a brief history of the neighbourhood is necessary to be introduced. As this thesis deals with social relationships between social groups in a neighbourhood and its emergence in community participatory planning, not only the introduction of Korean Chinese groups but also how long-established Korean groups perceived them also need to be dealt with as long-established group understood the Korean Chinese groups within the change of demography of the neighbourhood. Finally, this chapter will describe the social contexts of Garibong-dong such as the low-priced houses and community organisations which were the reasons why the Korean Chinese groups agglomerated but also showed their situations as neglected low-income workers.

5.2 The Immigration of Korean Chinese

Korean Chinese, who are also called Joseonjok\(^{16}\), refers to Korean populations who moved to China. The Korean Chinese who came back to Korea formed a predominant immigrant group by serving mainly in low-income industries in the society. The Korean Chinese groups were considered as temporary low-skilled workers in Korean immigrant policies, and the legal status of the groups was unstable. In this context, even though they shared the same ethnicity with long-established Korean groups, the group experienced a discriminatory social perception (C.-W. Kang, 2015; J.-H. Lee, 2014; Seo, 2014; J.-E. 16 There were considerable debates on the name of the group. Many argued that referring to Korean Chinese groups as Joseonjok tended to show the understanding of them as “difference” when it is used in the Korean society because it is the way to refer to Korean Chinese as one of the ethnic minority groups from the viewpoint of the Chinese government (S.-H. Choi, 2016; J.-W. Kang, 2012). Some Korean Chinese people considered that the name conveys discrimination by not accepting them as a part of Koreans (M.-H. Kim, 2003; Toshiyöndae [Urban Action Network], 2017). On the other hand, Shin (2016) mentioned that Chungguktongp’o [Korean Chinese] showed the understanding of the group from the view oriented to Korea. Hwang (2009b) pointed out that Joseonjok have their own history which cannot be reduced into a part of Korea or China by applying the concept of ethnicity or nationality; therefore, he argued that it is proper to refer the group as Joseonjok as a meaning of an independent group. The thesis chose the Korean Chinese because it refers to the groups within Korean society, and ‘Korean Chinese’ was understood as a less contested name to avoid the discriminatory meaning of ‘Joseonjok’ in Korean society (Midri, 2010). However, there is not a consensus of opinions about the title among the researchers or among the Korean Chinese community. Even though it is not the focus of the thesis, it seems to be necessary to mention that a part of the viewpoint regarding the name of ‘Korean Chinese’ is still contested.
Yoon, 2008). The group has frequently been perceived as a low-educated, incompetent, lazy people and potential criminals in the media (Seo, 2014; Yang, 2010).

The Korean Chinese population was established since Korean people started to emigrate to China in the middle of the nineteenth-century. The Chinese government has approved of the Korean Chinese as one of their 56 minority races. The majority of Korean Chinese have been living in a region called Yanbian as keeping their cultural characteristics such as Korean language and food (I.-J. Yoon, 2003). The Korean Chinese population in China became smaller due to migration to other areas including South Korea. Due to economic difficulties in the 1980s and the 1990s in the Yanbian area, many Korean Chinese people moved to other cities to seek jobs. The Chinese Economic Reform in 1978 and diplomatic ties between South Korea and China in 1992 catalysed the emmigration of Korean Chinese people to South Korea. When the Yanbian was established, Korean Chinese consisted of 62 per cent in 1952, and 70.5 per cent in 1953 with around 538,200 people (S.-H. Kim, 2012; Tongbuga shinmun, 2007). As the population shrank due to the migration and lower birth rate, the population of Korean Chinese people reached 36.7 per cent of the overall population of Yanbian in 2012. According to Kwak (2013), the Korean Chinese group is the only one ethnic minority which showed the reduced number of populations among 56 ethnic minorities in China. By the outflow of population, the Yanbian faced the situation where it possibly loses its legal status as the autonomous region of the Korean Chinese ethnic group.

The legal status of Korean Chinese people in South Korea differs depending on related immigrant policies. Even though there were several minor movements from China to South Korea by travelling or visiting their relatives from the 1980s, the first main immigrant policy inducing a notable influx of Korean Chinese was an Industrial Skill Trainee Program. The Industrial Skill Trainee Program for Overseas-invested Firms [Haeoet'ujagiôm kisuryônsusaeng, 해외투자기업 기술연수생] commenced in 1991 to solve a lack of labour power in low-waged simple labour industries in South Korea. The policy aimed at inviting foreign low-skilled workers into the industries where the Korean people
avoided. It was expanded to an Industrial Trainee Policy [Sanŏbyŏnsusaengjedo, 산업연수생제도] in 1992 to include Korean small domestic enterprises in the trainee programmes. The number of Korean Chinese people who came to Korea as trainees rapidly grew. It was 2,184 from 1991 to 1993, and 4,317 in 1994 (Youn & Jin, 2011).

From the 1990s to the middle of the 2000s, the Korean Chinese society in Korea was unstable due to their legal status. The Korean immigrant strategy is based on the ‘two-foreigner strategy’ by including high-skilled workers actively based on the national interest and excluding low-skilled workers through strong controls (Jeong, 2009). On the one hand, the high-skilled workers and marriage based immigrants were understood as groups who need to be integrated. On the other hand, the low-skilled workers were considered as short-term visitors. In the understanding of them as a ‘use and discard’ philosophy (Yeoh & Chang, 2001), social services for their quality of lives in Korea and other means to provide opportunities to interact with them to the Korean society were barely considered. Under the strong control, the entry of the Korean Chinese group into the mainstream society was limited by a short duration of visa and the industries in which they can engage. They were only provided a short-term visiting visa from one to three years and had to serve in the companies to which they contracted (Ministry of Employment and Labour, 2018). Apart from the introduction of a Trainee Program, there was not an institutional mechanism to protect the foreign workers (Y. Piao, 2011). Exploitation and human rights violation of low-income immigrants frequently occurred in this period. The workers were not provided proper training from the companies as the policies had originally intended. Sometimes, they worked as much as normal workers, but with the wages around half of the ordinary workers (Y.-K. Kong, 2013; J.-Y. Koo, 2011).
The industrial trainee program was a kind of slavery. The policy didn’t allow workers to leave designated companies, there was no minimum wage, and no occupational health and safety insurance. [...] The illegal immigrants at that moment, as you know, they were not humans. There were so many bad employers. The exploitation of wage was nothing. Physical assaults and sexual assaults were staggering. There were a lot of deaths.

(‘Sun’, Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016)

Some of the Korean Chinese were forced into a corner to break the immigration law (Seo, 2014; Toshiyōndae [Urban Action Network], 2017). One of the main reasons was economic difficulties. A brokerage fee to come to Korea was extremely high, and they were not able to save enough money by being exploited as they expected to go back to their hometown (H.-K. Lee, Chung, Yoo, & Kim, 2006; J.-A. Shin & Han, 2016). An ambiguous hope of ‘the Korean dream’ was sometimes revealed as a failure. Lee (2010) argued that:

“The Korean Dream” operates in a similar fashion [with “the American Dream”]: the fantasy of “Korea,” consisting of images, stories, and commodities, that fuel migration is the very mechanism of interpellation and discipline by dissimulating and camouflaging the institutionalized racialized labor exploitation

(p. 214; also see J.-J. Koo, 2017; Jin-Kyung Lee, 2006).

A large number of workers chose to break away from the contracted companies and became illegal immigrants. In the period, the group images of the Korean Chinese as ‘criminals’ were produced (Y.-S. Kim, 2014; J.-A. Shin & Han, 2016; Y.-W. Shin & Ma, 2017). The arguments demanding the strong control for ‘illegal’ immigrants by the government were frequently observed in the media. Instead of understanding them as ‘unauthorised immigration’ in inevitable circumstances from the humanitarian basis (Cornelius & Salehyan, 2007), the unstable legal status of Korean Chinese displaced the group images as ‘criminals who can cause various social problems [emphasis original, translated]’ (J.-A. Shin & Han, 2016).

Dominant changes in the legal status of Korean Chinese occurred in the middle of the 2000s (see table 5.1). The Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of overseas Koreans
[Chaeodongp’oŭi ch’uripkukkwa pŏpchŏng chiwie kwanhan pŏnnyul, 재외동포의 출입국과 법적 지위에 관한 법률, in short, Overseas Koreans Act] was amended in 2004. A Visiting Employee Policy [Pangmunch’wiŏpche, 방문취업제] was commenced in 2007 along with that. Previously, when the Overseas Korean Act was enacted, it had excluded overseas Koreans who emigrated before 1948 when the South Korean government was established (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). Due to that, Korean Chinese and Korean Russians (or Koryo-saram, overseas Korean in CIS, Commonwealth of Independent States, Russian Commonwealth) who consisted of the largest part of overseas Koreans were not able to have the same rights as the overseas Koreans in other countries. The Overseas Korean Act brought a strong backlash from the Korean Chinese society. The Korean Chinese organisations and churches were against the act, and the National Human Rights Commission of Korea also mentioned that ‘the act might conflict with International human rights law and the Korean constitution’ (J.-E. Lee, 2013). The Overseas Korean Act was claimed in the Constitutional Court as a case of human rights violation. The law tended to be based on an attempt to differentiate the rights of overseas Koreans according to their economic status (Y.-S. Kim & Yoon, 2015; B.-R. Lee & Kim, 2011; J.-E. Lee, 2013; Seo, 2014; also see chapter 4). The Act was reformed in 2004 to include Korean Chinese and Korean Russians. After that, Korean Chinese also could apply with qualifications allowing them to stay in Korea as overseas Koreans (F-4 visa), and the number of the Korean Chinese immigrants grew.

Along with the expansion of the Overseas Korean Law, the Visiting Employee Policy expanded the short-term visiting working visa (H-2) for Korean Chinese before acquiring the F-4 visa. It was partly because the Korean government restricted the number of F-4 visas by the enforcement ordinance to control the number of immigrants. The government stated that if the visa becomes open to all overseas Koreans, there would be a great influx of cheap labour, and it can affect the Korean job industry. Due to that, the number of Korean Chinese groups who can apply for an Overseas Korean Visa was restricted, and they were able to apply as the Visiting Workers instead of that. The industries which the
H-2 visa holders can apply were limited to simple labour such as the delivery of food and newspaper, servers, or cleaners. On the contrary, the F-4 visa holders are allowed to do only office jobs except for unskilled labour (Korean Immigrant Service, 2018). However, due to that, Korean Chinese groups argued that they were still not equally treated with other overseas Koreans (C. Yoon, 2013). On the contrary to other overseas Koreans, such as people who lived in the US or Japan who did not have any restriction to stay in Korea, the Korean Chinese groups have been restricted to stay less than five years (Seo, 2014).

Table 5.1: Key changes of the immigrant policies (source: adapted from Youn 2011, p. 46).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direction</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>year</th>
<th>details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regulation relaxing</td>
<td>Overseas Korean benefits</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>With consideration of 1988 Seoul Olympics, the government allowed temporary travelling certification for overseas Koreans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation strengthening</td>
<td>Requiring visa issuance</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Due to smuggling, the Korean government required a visa for overseas Koreans and restricted the visiting relatives for people who are 55 years old and over.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation relaxing</td>
<td>Industrial training system</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>An industrial training program allowed immigrant groups to stay two years as trainees and one year as workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation strengthening</td>
<td>Reform of nationality law</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>To reduce the number of fake marriage cases, the Korean government required the two years of living together after getting married to get citizenships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation strengthening</td>
<td>The enactment of Overseas Koreans law</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>The government excluded overseas Koreans who emigrated before the establishment of the South Korean government in 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation strengthening</td>
<td>Revision of Overseas Koreans Law</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>The Act changed to include overseas Koreans who emigrated to other countries before 1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulation relaxing</td>
<td>Visiting Employee Policy</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Overseas Koreans without relatives in Korean were able to immigrate for between three and five years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the expanding policies about Korean Chinese, the number of Korean Chinese in Korea reached 590,856 people accounting for 33 per cent of the total number of foreigners in 2015 (Korean Immigrant Service, 2015). The Korean Chinese are a dominant group among people who are counted as foreigners in the Korean census currently (see figure 5.1).
As they formed the dominant immigrant group in Korean society, social interactions between Koreans and Korean Chinese were not uncommon. Especially they tended to work in central metropolitan areas with Korean people compared to other low-skilled immigrant groups. The concentration of Korean Chinese groups in the central areas was based on their preference in jobs. They have advantages in job seeking compared to other low-skilled immigrant groups based on their cultural attributes as a part of the Korean ethnic group. They tended to work as housemaids, babysitters, workers in construction sites, or restaurant servers which required communication skills with slightly higher wages compared to other low-skilled industries such as working in factories (also see the case of Indonesian maids in Singapore in Ong, 2006). Other low-skilled workers used to stay in the rural areas of Korea due to the locations of factories, but those works in which the Korean Chinese groups served were mainly concentrated on the metropolitan area. An interviewee mentioned that the Korean Chinese group is the immigrant group whom Korean people encountered most frequently.

Korean Chinese can speak the same language. They are mixed with Korean people. [...] Even though Korean Chinese live in certain enclaves, they live in the same culture and live with Koreans anyway. We often see Korean Chinese around. They are the foreigners whom we see most often.

('Jae’, Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016)
According to statistical data in 2016, 46 per cent of foreigner populations in Seoul were Korean Chinese. Compared to that around 18 per cent of other foreigners (excluding Korean Chinese) were living in Seoul, and 37 per cent of Korean Chinese groups chose to live in Seoul. When it comes to the Metropolitan area including Kyunggi-do\textsuperscript{17}, around 79 per cent of Korean Chinese people were living in the areas, compared to 46 per cent of other foreigners (Korean Immigrant Service, 2016).

5.3 The History of Garibong-dong with ‘Pŏlchip’

Even though the Korean Chinese groups mainly chose to live in the metropolitan area, the neighbourhoods where the groups lived were different depending on the economic and social status of the groups even within Korean Chinese communities. Garibong-dong has formed a Korean Chinese enclave from the 1990s as the first area with a significant number of Korean Chinese. It spread to nearby areas such as Daerim and Singil. In recent years, the Korean Chinese enclaves were concentrated in the southwestern part of Seoul, and Garibong-dong\textsuperscript{18} was understood as a less developed area even among those Korean Chinese communities (S.-H. Park & Lee, 2010).

Korean Chinese people, who particularly served in low-skilled industries, started to relocate in Garibong-dong from the 1990s. A predominant reason for their influx in Garibong-dong was low-priced houses, Pŏlchip, where factory workers previously lived in the 1970s. Reconstruction in the area was rarely observed in the 2000s due to the stalled development plan. As the houses from the 1970s remained in the area, the Korean Chinese groups were able to find places which they could afford. At the same time, the physical environment limited the groups such as the low-income workers and produced

\textsuperscript{17} The peripheral area of Seoul.

\textsuperscript{18} According to Pack and Lee (2010), the average rent fee of Garibong-dong was around 150,000-250,000 Korean won [around 105 pounds to 175 pounds] per month. The other enclaves such as Guro, Daerim, and Singil is around 200,000-300,000 [around 140 to 210 pounds]. The types of housing are also different. The housing type of Garibong-dong was mainly pŏlchip (see the next section) which means a small room for single household, but other areas showed the housing type of multiplex houses.
the image of the neighbourhood as a dangerous area by associating with the social perception toward the Korean Chinese groups.

5.3.1 The Provision of ‘Pŏlchip’ in Garibong-dong

Garibong-dong was formed as a residential area for migrant workers in the 1970s by providing the houses called *pŏlchip* [hive,벌집] or *tchokpang* [dosshouse,intValue]. *Pŏlchip* means the houses which were remodelled with larger numbers of rooms for renting by splitting the existing structures. In the 1970s, the surrounding areas of Garibong-dong developed as the factories focused on labour-intensive industries such as textiles or the wig industry (see figure 5.3). As the industry complexes attracted people from the rural areas, Garibong-dong started to supply the houses for the workers.

Figure 5.2: The location of Garibong-dong (source: author based on Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2018a).
In the 1960s, Guro area which is surrounding Garibong-dong was designated as the industrial complex by the Five Year Economic Development Plans [kerjaebal ogaenyŏn kyeohoe]. The construction of industrial complexes caused the result of the stronger inflow of population. The labour-intensive industry such as the textile or wig industry was based on cheap labour, and that attracted people from the rural area to Guro complexes (see the following figures). In three complexes, there were 117 fabricated metal, 78 textiles, 47 printing and 29 petrochemistry companies among a total of 284 companies (Seoul Museum of History, 2013). Among them, the textile industry led the growth in the export industry as showing average 51.3 per cent of the rate of annual growth in the 1970s. As the Guro industrial complexes were vitalised, the movement from rural to Seoul reached a peak in the middle of the 1970s.
After constructing the Export Industrial Complex 1, 2 and 3, Garibong-dong became the area in the middle of them. Garibong-dong functioned as a commercial and residential area for the factory workers in the middle of the industrial complexes. The housing for the workers was limited in Guro area. According to the Dong-A newspaper in 11th April 1988, the dormitory provided by the factories only accommodated around 25 per cent of the total number of workers. The workers had to rely on the private provision of houses. The house owners in Garibong-dong supplied rooms for the workers by dividing a house into several rooms which were called pŏlchip. In some cases, the number of rooms in a single building reached 50 different households (Seoul Museum of History, 2013). A
room was typically from 5m² to 10 m², and kitchens and bathrooms were usually shared (Yung-Gi Kim, 1983, also see the following figures).

Figure 5.8: The open area in the middle of pŏlchip, and the plan of the second floor of 136-35 Garibong-dong (photo: the Seoul Museum of History, 2013, pp.276-277, the explanation was translated by the author).
Figure 5.9: The plan of a unit in pŏlchip, the number 19 in 136-35 Garibong-dong (photo: the Seoul Museum of History, 2013, p. 281, the explanation was translated by the author).

Figure 5.10: The inside of the room (photo: the Seoul Museum of History, 2013, p.279).

Figure 5.11: The corridor in the building (photo: the Seoul Museum of History, 2013, p.274).

Figure 5.12: The inside of the room (photo: the Seoul Museum of History, 2013, p.280).
Even though Garibong-dong was the neighbourhood with young low-income workers, the long-established landlords remembered the period as when Garibong-dong was most vitalised. According to Kyeonghyang newspaper on 6th March 1975, Garibong-dong has the biggest number of population in Seoul. The neighbourhood was too crowded in the paydays with workers.

This area was the most expensive area in the Gangnam area until the 1970s, and the 1980s because the area was one of the most popular areas in the past. […] Before Gangnam was developed, the area played a role as the centre of all over the district, and the market was the biggest.

(‘Woong’, planner, interview, March 2016)

However, the Guro complexes began to decline in the 1990s. The reason for the decline seems to be a mixture of different aspects. Researchers mainly pointed out the higher labour price due to the labour movement in the late 1980s, the construction of other industrial complexes in the outskirts of Seoul with the low land prices such as Ansan, the change of the industrial structure toward Information Technology (Seoul Museum of History, 2013). The factories in the industrial complex started to move to other countries such as China and southeastern Asia countries to find alternative cheap labour.

After leaving the workers, as the plan for Guro Digital Industrial Complexes [Kurodanji ch'ömdanhwa kyehoek, 구로단지 첨단화 계획] was announced in 1997 in Guro area, the
industry changed from the labour-intensive manufacture to media and information technology. The factory buildings were replaced with high-rise buildings, so Garibong-dong gradually lost their residents and consumers (see figure 5.15). The empty pŏlchip had been replaced by immigrant workers, the Korean Chinese groups.

5.3.2 The Stalled Developments and Korean Chinese as New Residents in Garibong-dong

The type of housing called pŏlchip was still easily observed in Garibong-dong in 2016. Even though the exact number of pŏlchip was difficult to be estimated, it was known there were approximately 400 to 600 buildings taking up around half of the overall residential buildings\(^\text{19}\) in Garibong-dong (Moon, 2011). This type of houses was also observed in other areas in Seoul such as Donui-dong, Changsin-dong and Dongja-dong. However, according to the report in 2016, the number of pŏlchip in other areas showed less than the one in Garibong-dong\(^\text{20}\) (see table 5.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighbourhoods</th>
<th>The number of buildings</th>
<th>The number of rooms</th>
<th>The number of people who are living in pŏlchip</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donui-dong</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changsin-dong</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dongja-dong</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>873</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^\text{19}\) The overall number of residential buildings in Garibong-dong was 1,024 in 2016 (Toshijaesaenggwa chaesaengsaópt'ım [Guro gu Urban Regeneration Team], 2016).

\(^\text{20}\) Interestingly, when Seoul Metropolitan government mentioned about ‘five neighbourhoods with the largest number of pŏlchip or tchokpang’, Garibong-dong was not included, even though the number of pŏlchip in Garibong-dong is significantly high based on the data collected through this research. The government mentioned Donui-dong, Changsin-dong, Namdaemunno5ga-dong, Mullae-dong and Dongja-dong (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2015a). The Garibong Urban Regeneration planning team said that the number of pŏlchip in Garibong-dong had never been calculated before the Urban Regeneration project. Pŏlchip is included as ‘multiplex housing [Tasedaejut'aek, 다세대 주택]’ in the census data, so it is difficult to count without fieldwork in the sites. While the fieldwork of this research was being conducted, the Urban Regeneration team tried to count a more accurate number of pŏlchip, and they said that it can be more than 500 buildings.
The demolition and redevelopment of the neighbourhood were planned in 2003 but were not implemented. Due to the planned demolition, the old houses were neglected without refurnishing or rebuilding. The relatively low housing prices in the area attracted low-income temporary immigrant workers, Korean Chinese population.

Garibong-dong was designated as a Balanced Development Promotion District\(^{21}\), so-called Newtown, in 2003. The Newtown project used to refer to a government-led large development which was usually implemented by rebuilding after overall demolition focusing on a specific bounded geographical district in the 2000s. The Garibong-dong Newtown project aimed at building an Information Technology industry cluster, under the name of ‘Digital Business Centre’ (see figure 5.16). The plan included high-rise hotels and business centres, providing 26.4 per cent (75,773 m\(^2\)) of the residential area for the resettlement of the residents after the overall demolition (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2003). However, as the project operator, LH (Korea Land and Housing Corporation) went through a financial crisis due to the economic recession around 2008, the project was constantly postponed. The expected financial benefit was insufficient to meet the cost of the redevelopment including the cost of delay, and LH decided to cancel the plan in 2014 after 11 years of postponing. After the cancellation, the Urban Regeneration project was designated in the area in 2015 (see the next chapter).

\(^{21}\) The thesis will refer to the Garibong-dong Balanced Development Promotion District as the Garibong Newtown project. Even though the legal terms of Balanced Development Promotion District [Kyunhyŏngbalchŏnch'okchinjigu, 균형발전촉진지구] and Newtown [Nyut’aun, 뉴타운] are different, but they were commonly called as ‘Newtown’ in interviews.
Figure 5.15: Garibong-dong and Guro-dong. The photo shows the contrast between Guro-dong, a surrounding area which was recently reconstructed into high-rise industrial complexes, and Garibong-dong (Photo: Han'guk'yang'omunhwajŏnjadajŏn [The Digital Local Culture Encyclopedia of Korea], 2010).

Figure 5.16: The perspective view of the Garibong-dong Newtown plan (Sunjin Engineering & Architecture, 2004).
The Korean Chinese groups became dominant inhabitants in the area during the period. Workers from other countries such as Bangladesh and some Korean people who cannot afford the housing prices in any other areas in Seoul also found their home in Garibong-dong; however, the majority of residents consisted of Korean Chinese tenants since the 2000s. Officially, the Korean Chinese population, which was 0.5 % (92 people) in 2000, showed 18.2 % (4,134) in 2006 and reached more than 30 % (6,111) in 2010. As they formed the neighbourhood, the number of businesses for Korean Chinese groups in Garibong-dong reached around 150 stores (S.-J. Lee & Kim, 2015). By referring to the main street of Garibong-dong as *Yanbian* Street, a Korean Chinese enclave was formed.

### 5.4 The Agglomeration of Korean Chinese in the Negligence of the Government

In the 2000s, the Korean Chinese groups who settled down in the *pŏlchip* had been located in a poor physical environment, and it partly limited their social growth in the neighbourhood. The groups in Garibong-dong were particularly understood as low-income workers although the Korean Chinese have spread into various industries as their legal status became stable recently. A Korean Chinese interviewee pointed out the limitations of Garibong-dong from the poor housing.

> As the structural part of Garibong-dong, there were a lot of *pŏlchip*. It's hard to live with families. They were just people who work from day-to-day. People are changing, but the characteristics are not changing, so the neighbourhood itself is difficult to be developed. It's the most underdeveloped neighbourhood in Korean Chinese society.

> ('Sun’, Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016)

The Newtown project which began to proceed from early 2005 determinately influenced the local lives of Korean Chinese groups. As the demolition was planned, the governmental support was rarely observed in the area, and the social relationships between Koreans and Korean Chinese groups were hindered. In the early stage of agglomeration, from the 2000 to 2005, the social relationships between Koreans and Korean Chinese began to be built focusing on the activities of civic organisations even
though it lasted for a short period. For example, there were New Year festivals every year with cooperation of Korean shops and Korean Chinese residents.

Newtown was designated in 2003, and it was 2005 when the gu office made a rough sketch for the plan. […] I started the local activities from 2000. […] At the end of 2003, the Korean shop owners asked me to help because once the immigrant crackdown started, the local shops lost a lot of Korean Chinese customers. So we made a local committee together and held New Year festivals. The Chuseok [Korean Thanksgiving Day] event of 2005 was the last one which we held together. In fact, since 2006, the interest in building relationships has shifted away from Garibong-dong. They thought that Garibong-dong will be demolished. Back then, there was a common understanding among residents. They used to think that we cannot survive without Korean Chinese people. Now, this atmosphere disappeared.

(‘Pil’, Korean Chinese organisation, interview, March 2016)

The number of unauthorised immigrants was significant among Korean Chinese groups in the period, the Korean shop owners and Korean Chinese organisations protested together to argue the right to live and to be against the crackdown (see figure 5.17).

![Figure 5.17: The shop owner went down under the truck which tried to carry a Korean Chinese customer who was having a meal in the restaurant to resist against immigrant crackdown (Y.-P. Kim, 2006).](image)

On the other hand, from 2005, the neighbourhood was rarely maintained in the period of the stalled Newtown project. In the dilapidated environment, the Korean Chinese groups
were considered as gap-fillers who support the local economy with minimum maintenance. The government understood Korean Chinese groups as the people who will leave when the project is implemented.

The government policy for the Garibong-dong area is not clear. In fact, there is little policy support in Seoul or Guro District, and most of the support activities are in the hands of NGOs. [...] due to the planned redevelopment of the area scheduled for 2010, the government and the gu office are not paying any special attention.

(S.-H. Park & Lee, 2010, p. 94)

Not only the dilapidated housing but also the limited infrastructure of the neighbourhood became a problem of the physical environment of the neighbourhood. The community organisation leaders pointed out the limitation of the physical environment to deliver community activities. There were not enough parks or public spaces to get together in the neighbourhood, and public facilities such as a civic centre or schools were difficult to find (also see Ouyang, Wang, Tian, & Niu, 2017). One of the Korean Chinese organisation leaders pointed out the limitation of the physical environment as a reason why Garibong-dong was frequently excluded even in Korean Chinese society.

We [the organisation] did ‘Korean Chinese festivals with local communities’ this year and last year. However, there is not a space to do it in Garibong-dong. We will collaborate with ten other organisations this time. Garibong-dong is excluded again. Now we are doing those events in Daerim.

('Sun’, Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016)

In the central part of the neighbourhood, where Uma Street and Garibong market meet, the ruins of an old building, Panorama Shopping Centre [Phanolama Syop’ingsent’o], remained. Because the ruins were located in the core area of pedestrian routes, the residents mainly pointed out the burnt building as an example of the negligence of the government. The building which was a main landmark in the 1980s had been burnt down in the 1990s (see figure 5.18). On the one hand, the government mentioned that it was difficult to rebuild because a number of people collectively owned the building and some
of them were not reachable. On the other hand, the residents argued that there was several possible ways to rebuild it but the government simply did not pay enough attention. One of the interviewees argued that only Garibong-dong had its own dong [a unit for an administrative district, similar to the ward in the British system] office outside of the neighbourhood (interview with ‘Ilwon’, April 2016). He pointed that out as one of the evidence of the negligence of the government. The public services including public facilities, educations, parks and sports facilities were limited in Garibong-dong compared to other neighbourhoods (S.-H. Park & Lee, 2010).

Figure 5.18: The ruins of a burned market were located in the middle of the neighbourhood without any measure to maintain for 20 years (Photo: author, 2016).

In the absence of government support, the Korean Chinese groups were supported by civic organisations and Korean Chinese informal networks (S.-H. Park & Lee, 2010). As the Korean Chinese groups started to form enclaves, the neighbourhood provided social services for the communities. The neighbourhood formed commercial streets for Korean Chinese groups, and civic organisations, including local community newspaper
companies and churches, provided social services for the group. The number of local organisations supporting reached around ten. Compared to other Korean Chinese enclaves, Garibong-dong was the area for the newly arrived immigrant people. According to the research of Bhang and Kim (2012), the Korean Chinese residents in Garibong-dong mainly answered that they came from China (75.7%), compared to the other Korean Chinese enclave, Jayang-dong (32.9%). Along with the other reasons such as cheap housing and transportation connections, the agglomeration of Korean Chinese became the reason why other newcomers moved into the area.

If you ask about Korea in China, they [Korean Chinese in China] do not know about other parts of Korea but know about Garibong-dong. People who came to Korea for the first time just came here [Garibong-dong].

(‘Nack’, a shop owner in Garibong market, interview, March 2016)

The neighbourhood became an important pivotal point to gain information and support for newly arrived immigrant groups. The governmental social support for Korean Chinese groups was limited, and some of the Korean Chinese groups in the area sometimes had difficulties in managing their fundamental needs. The community organisations provided shelters, meal services, interpretation, medical services and childcare. The activities covered various social groups within Korean Chinese immigrants such as newly arrived immigrants, the workers without families, and the immigrant families who recently grew.

The Korean Chinese communities formed the distinctive scenery of Garibong-dong. The shops focusing on the Korean Chinese population were dominant in Garibong-dong. The research of Lee and Kim (2014) showed that the number of the shops for Korean Chinese reached 150 in 2013. The shops can be seen several different categorisations. For example, there were a number of stores selling or renting used appliances such as used refrigerators. An interviewee said that those stores were for the Korean Chinese people who temporarily stay in the neighbourhood (‘Ryu’, resident, interview, March 2016). The Korean Chinese people bought those commodities at cheap prices and sold them again at
those stores (see figure 5.19). There were also shops selling used boots and clothes for constructing work (see figure 5.20, 5.21, and 5.22). Job centres were one of the main businesses in Garibong-dong. The Korean Chinese workers used to find short-term work from those centres. Education centres for visa application were commonly observed in the street (see figure 5.23). Karaoke rooms, which were one of the most popular entertainments among Korean Chinese people were notable at night. One of interviewees said that the composition of shops itself represented the lives of the Korean Chinese, such as the kinds of work they are doing and the ways of enjoying their free-time (‘Gangil’, community coordinator, April 2016). Along with Chinese restaurants and grocery shops, those stores were easily observed on the streets in Garibong-dong.

Figure 5.19: An electric appliance consignment shop (source: author, 2012)

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22 The author conducted a small field research in 2012 focusing on the formation of the enclave. Some photos which are used in this dissertation were taken during that field work.
Figure 5.20: Used boots for construction works (source: author, 2012)

Figure 5.21: Clothes for construction works (source: author, 2012)

Figure 5.22: A price tag for the clothes saying ‘trousers, 3000KRW (approx.2 GBP)’ (source: author, 2012)

Figure 5.23: An education centre’s advertisement saying ‘Korean Chinese, H-2 visa to F-4’ (source: author, 2012)

Figure 5.24: A Chinese grocery shop (source: author, 2012)

Figure 5.25: A Chinese grocery shop (source: author, 2016)
In the middle of the 2010s when the research was conducted, Garibong-dong showed their particularities as low-income ethnic enclaves. In Seoul, the predominant foreign-born population was Korean Chinese groups (46 per cent, Korean Immigrant Service, 2016). The three neighbourhoods, Daerim-dong, Jayang-dong and Garibong-dong tended to be mentioned as Korean Chinese enclaves in Seoul (S.-J. Lee & Kim, 2015). Compared to Daerim-dong and Jayang-dong, Garibong-dong particularly showed a dilapidated environment as had been seen in the number of pŏlchips. In the recent research, Lee (2014) stated that Garibong-dong is the ethnic enclave which could evolve into an ethnic ‘slum’ in comparison with other Chinese enclaves such as Daerim. Koreans rarely visited the area, and due to that, the researcher from the Korean institute mentioned “Garibong-dong possibly can become the first slum in Seoul” (Field note in Master Planning meeting, 21st April 2016). A conversation between the coordinator in Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project and myself exemplified how she felt the atmosphere of Garibong-dong.

[…] I accidentally ran into Gayoung in the station. I said that ‘I couldn’t recognise you because you are wearing a coat.’ And she said ‘I kind of stick out like a sore thumb if I wore the coat in the neighbourhood. I feel that everyone looked at me and feel like that they are saying ‘where are you from’. That is the reason why I don’t wear the coat when I am working.’

(Field note, 25th March 2016)

The neighbourhood has a particular atmosphere with low-income workers and a dilapidated environment. Although there were still a considerable number of Korean people who are living and working in the shops in the neighbourhood, except for the population who already lived there, Koreans rarely moved into the neighbourhood. For example, during the field work, not many Koreans in other areas were aware of the current projects in Garibong-dong, and the majority of them have never been in the neighbourhoods. In the older generation, between 40s and 60s, Garibong-dong was considered as a neighbourhood with factory workers, and the younger generation, between 20s and 30s, had never heard about the neighbourhood or considered it as a
dangerous area which was shown in the recent criminal movies (see figure 5.26). During the interviews, many landlords showed concerns about that. One Korean landlord said that he let his daughter live in his house in Garibong-dong, but she refused after a month because it felt unsafe for her (‘Song’, member of the committee, interview, May 2016). Another landlord who had a building which was composed of his office and several houses for renting said that his tenants were not willing to stay longer and frequently asked him about CCTVs and security. His tenants were mainly Koreans because the building is newly refurbished and prices were not affordable for Korean Chinese (‘Bum’, member of the committee, interview, May 2016). His concern was how to remove the ‘unfavourable’ atmosphere of the area which was assumed to be built through the agglomeration of the Korean Chinese.

Figure 5.26: A scene of a movie, The Outlaws [Korean title: Pŏmjoedoshi, 범죄도시, which means ‘Crime City’], which was filmed in Garibong-dong and released in 2017 (Jeong, 2017)
This neglected physical environment tended to accelerate the unfavourable public image of Korean Chinese groups. Garibong-dong was frequently described as a dangerous place or as a base for criminals in movies and media. It strengthened the concerns among the Korean Chinese groups that the Korean society perceived them as criminals, or dangerous groups (N.-S. Kim, 2014; M.-J. Lee, 2014; S.-H. Yoon, 2014; Yuemei, 2016). The public image of the neighbourhood associated with the group image of Korean Chinese became a concern among Korean Chinese communities. For example, in the interview, a Korean Chinese organisation leader mentioned:

I don’t talk like this publicly, but tell people only when I meet them in private. I'm sorry for the Korean Chinese shop owners in Garibong-dong, but... I actually wanted Garibong-dong to be rebuilt. The image of Garibong-dong and Korean Chinese, which is shabby and dilapidated, was too strong. When I was young, I wanted those images to disappear altogether.

('Sun’, Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016)
Garibong-dong and the image surrounding it tended to be understood as strong stereotypes about Korean Chinese groups. In the interviews, the Korean Chinese members frequently argued that the neighbourhood was not dangerous as other people from other areas used to perceive, and the rate of crimes by the Korean Chinese groups was not higher than any other social groups. For example, regarding the movie focused on crimes by Korean Chinese with a background of Garibong-dong in 2017, the Korean Chinese communities protested to stop screening (Wi, 2017). It led to the formation of a self-policing and self-cleaning team through the voluntary participation of Korean Chinese to alter the public image of groups and the neighbourhoods.

The agglomeration of low-income Korean Chinese partly seemed to show the result of the lack of governmental support. The social exclusions operated as the basis for the clustering of immigrant groups (Castles & Miller, 2013; Savage et al., 1993). The Korean Chinese groups, as the low-income workers in Garibong-dong, were treated as foreigners and were not situated well in the national policies which mainly focused on multicultural families. The exclusion from social services and the governmental budget were observed.

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23 In the Korean policies which this study analysed, the term of ‘multiculture’ and ‘diversity’ emerged in two different contexts. As the national policy, multicultural families [Tamunhwagajok, 다문화 가족] refer to the families with foreigners who got married with Koreans. It mainly emerged in welfare policies which have been discussed in chapter five. On the other hand, in the policies of the Seoul Metropolitan Government, the high-skilled workers or immigrant from global North were more frequently described by ‘global [Küloból, 글로벌]’, ‘diversity [Tayangsŏng, 다양성]’ or ‘foreigners [Oegugin, 외국인]’ even though also often expressed by multiculture [Tamunhwa, 다문화] (see chapter six). This thesis translates each expression according to the usage of policies and uses ‘diversity’ when it referred the immigrant groups from global North to distinguish the expression of ‘multiculture’ in Korean context.
A foreign family is not a multicultural family, and their children cannot go to the nursery. [...] That's why we are working with “children's villages” that have not been approved as a nursery. The centre is for the children who are not recognised as multicultural families. [...] That's why Korean Chinese people settle in Garibong-dong. Now here are our free counselling service for foreigners, a free interpreting centre for foreigners, a free hospital for foreigners, free food centres, free shelters. There is no government support, so now they have to come near our centres to get support from private organisations.

('Sung’, Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016)

However, the networks had some limitations. The Korean Chinese networks did not seem to provide a link between Korean Chinese groups and Korean society, particularly in the sense of providing experiences of collaboration as equal social partners. The local organisations were understood as an important basis for the immigrant groups to provide an opportunity to link the mainstream society. Korean Chinese organisations in Garibong-dong also played important roles for Korean Chinese groups. The social services from the organisation were considered important social capital which supports the immigrant society. Furthermore, when there were significant issues such as the Overseas Korean Act as mentioned, the organisation became a centre to deliver the opinions of groups. However, a bridging role connecting immigrant groups with other social groups in the long-term was not observed in the Korean Chinese organisations (see chapter two). Particularly the Korean Chinese organisations in Garibong-dong seemed to be limited without providing further means to link to the other social groups. Although some Korean Chinese groups in Korean society began to be concerned about representing their political rights and groups issues (Seo, 2014; see chapter seven), it mainly focused on the elites among the Korean Chinese groups. The local organisations in Garibong-dong mainly served the social services. Moreover, the majority of groups was still mainly managed by Korean leaders of the groups rather than formed by the Korean Chinese

24 For example, Hector (2005) argued four important roles of community-based organisations for immigrant groups. Firstly, it provides advice and legal help for newcomers to enter the country. Secondly, it provides social services and community programs to adopt the mainstream society. Thirdly, it gives opportunities to represent the concerns of the groups in the urban levels, and finally, it serves as a liaison between the immigrant groups and other groups such as long-established groups and other immigrant groups.
groups. Due to that, Ha (2010) argued that even in the civic organisations, the Korean Chinese members were frequently marginalised in the decision making processes and remained as recipients.

This limitation seemed to be partly because of the governmental policy. As has been seen in the early part of this section, the Newtown project seriously influenced the social relationships between Koreans and Korean Chinese groups. The Korean Chinese groups who had been understood as symbiotic relations began to be considered as temporary residents who will leave soon when demolition started. Including Newtown project, the Korean government did not consider them as a significant social member in policies. The disconnection between the mainstream society and the Korean Chinese organisations was partly due to antagonism to the governmental policies which excluded the Korean Chinese groups. The antagonism regarding the policies rather than the interpersonal relationships such as human contacts with Korean groups seems to be a greater barrier for the Korean Chinese to approach Korean society (it has emerged as a significant barrier in participatory planning, see chapter seven).

Although the Law for Supporting Multicultural Families has recently been amended to include foreign families, the multicultural families mainly include the families who have Korean nationality. If you are a child in a multicultural family, one of your parents should have Korean nationality. […] Most of the Korean Chinese cases are both parents who are foreigners. Then, the children cannot be included in multicultural families.

('Sung’, Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016)

The population of Korean Chinese is 600,000 to 700,000, and the budget was ten million won [around 7,000 pounds] in 2013. The budget for multicultural families was 200 billion won at that moment. That is because there is not a law [about Korean Chinese in Korea].

('Sun’, Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016)

The multicultural families’ support team in Guro gu office only supported multicultural families which referred to the families with foreigners who got married to Koreans. The Korean Chinese groups in Garibong-dong were largely excluded from these social
supports. Apart from that, the organisations which formally supported immigrants in Garibong-dong was the centre of the foreign employee focusing on the industrial trainee programme. A large population of Korean Chinese in Korea held an H-2 visa as foreign employees, but the support from the centre of foreign employees was insufficient.

[In the Foreign Employees centre] The proportion of Korean Chinese visitors [compared to other foreign workers] tends to be around ten per cent. It doesn’t mean that the Korean population in Garibong-dong is ten per cent. The Korean Chinese in the area is about half of the population. […] Korean Chinese do not need to come here that frequently. Firstly, their language is Korean, and there is a strong community formed among them. Our knowledge of labour is already shared among them. […] Anyway, Korean Chinese are less likely to come here than they were in the early days.

(‘Ha’, Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016)

The governmental support was limited to a minimum regarding the low-income visiting workers. The services, the translation services and information about working places, focused on the operation of the system of the visiting employee policy (see Sassen-Koob, 1980). Any further social support to enhance their lives in Korean society was rarely considered in the policies. They used to be considered as temporary visitors who would go back home after saving some money. The planned demolitions by the Newtown project tended to strengthen the understanding of the immigrant groups in Garibong-dong as temporary residents. In the circumstances, the formal social support of Korean Chinese groups was rarely observed.

In response to the lack of support, the informal network among Korean Chinese based in Garibong-dong became stronger, and that partly helped to make the local government pay attention to the issues of Korean Chinese groups. However, it is difficult to stretch the meaning of the role of social organisations as the mediation of inequality. Apart from the positive understanding of the activities of social organisations (Cordero-Guzmán, 2005), the social networks among Korean Chinese groups were limited to fill the gap of governmental support, rather than to connect to the Korean society or to connect the greater resources, or provide better jobs. Even though the government indirectly
supported civic organisations, there tended to be the strong limitation of low-income workers. The emergence of NGOs tended to be understood in the lack of governmental support (Kornatowksi, 2017; Ong, 2006). The economic status was strictly limited by the wider legal status, and the social network among Korean Chinese rather resulted of the inevitable situations.

5.5 Conclusions

This chapter explained the contexts of the Korean Chinese in Korean society, and why they moved into Garibong-dong alongside the introduction of the history of the neighbourhood. The agglomeration of Korean Chinese communities was based on the low-priced houses and the Newtown project which was postponed for more than ten years. The Newtown project and the planned demolition detrimentally affected the physical environment of the neighbourhood, and it partly became a barrier to the cultural and social growth of the Korean Chinese communities in Garibong-dong. The social support from the government for Korean Chinese groups was rarely observed in this period. In the negligence of the government, the social services in the area were mainly based on the civic community organisations.

In the overlap of situations as the low-income immigrant workers and the residents in the neglected neighbourhood, the Korean Chinese groups in Garibong-dong seem to be particularly exposed to the unfavourable social perception toward the group. Chapter six will deal with how their social status might shape their inclusion or exclusion from urban policies.
Chapter Six: The Recognition of Korean Chinese Communities in Urban Policies

6.1 Introduction

The Korean Chinese groups in Garibong-dong are still understood as an underdeveloped community even among Korean Chinese in Korean society. The Korean Chinese in Garibong-dong were situated in the overlapped inequality as low-income temporary workers, as the residents in a dilapidated area, as a group with a contested identity which built upon the image of illegal immigrants (chapter five).

This chapter aims at looking into how the social perception of the Korean Chinese groups, in these social contexts, emerged in Korean urban policies. As introduced in chapter three, disadvantaged groups were often located in subordinated positions in institutionalised cultural patterns in policies in the relations with other dominant social groups. The Korean Chinese groups in Garibong-dong located in economically and culturally disadvantaged social positions. How these social contexts were mediated or reflected in urban policies will be examined.

The analysis included the first and second Seoul Foreigner policies which were commenced in 2007 and in 2014 respectively along with the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project in 2015. A notable factor was that in the interview drawn from Korean Chinese groups, Urban Regeneration policies had been understood in a linkage with their experiences of other policies such as a national welfare system and a visa system. The local participants understood the social recognition of the groups through these overlapped dimensions, and as argued in chapter two and three, these experiences
appeared as an important factor to build social capital (also see chapter seven). The data are demonstrated to examine the first research question: What mechanisms have been used to involve immigrant groups in Korean urban policies, and how does the recognition of these groups emerge within planning policy processes? After briefly introducing urban policies about immigrant groups, this chapter will show the experiences of social relations in the implementation of urban policies based on the interview data of the Korean Chinese groups along with the public document analysis. The urban policies which were implemented after the settling down of the Korean Chinese groups will be analysed.

6.2 Korean Chinese Group as Low-skilled Workers and Integration and Exclusion in the Urban Policies

This part looks into urban policies focusing on a specific case, the Korean Chinese group in Garibong-dong. Many have investigated both legal and economic status of a Korean Chinese group in Korean society (K.-O. Choi, 2016; T.-S. Kim, 2009; I.-J. Yoon et al., 2015); however, the studies on the group in the urban policies were insufficient. The urban policies are important for immigrant groups because the policies located the immigrant groups in a certain context by forming their everyday lives in the neighbourhood (S.-H. Park, 2011). Before examining the Korean Chinese group in Garibong-dong in depth, this part will briefly introduce the overall directions of Seoul urban policies. The urban policies which were related to the Korean Chinese groups in Garibong-dong can be seen in two different categorisations: the first was the Seoul immigrant policies and the second was the Garibong-dong neighbourhood planning. Both categorisations in urban policies tended to be divided into two different directions. The change of policies was based on two different Seoul mayors in the period. Contrary to the policies which were oriented to ‘urban competitiveness’ by Mayor Oh from 2006 to 2011, Mayor Park, who was elected as Seoul Metropolitan mayor in 2011, introduced community-oriented policies (see table 6.1).
Table 6.1: The urban policies after Korean Chinese groups settling down in Garibong-dong.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categorisations</th>
<th>Policies</th>
<th>Detail of policies</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
<td>National welfare policies</td>
<td>National Policy (labour law)</td>
<td>Operating foreign labour centre</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Policy (multicultural families law)</td>
<td>Supporting Multicultural families</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul immigrant policies</td>
<td>Global City Basic Plan</td>
<td>Building global centres</td>
<td>2007~2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multi Values Seoul Master Plan</td>
<td>Supporting foreign residents</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garibong-dong neighbourhood plan</td>
<td>Garibong-dong Newtown project</td>
<td>Building “Digital Business Centre” after the demolition</td>
<td>2003 (cancellation: 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project</td>
<td>Building a regeneration plan through community participation</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following sections discuss the appearance of immigrant groups in each policy in chronological sequence focusing on Seoul immigrant policies and Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project.

6.2.1 Seoul Metropolitan Foreigner Policies: From the Focus of Foreign Investors to Immigrant Groups as Residents

The local immigrant policies in Korea began to be created in the middle of the 2000s. The Korea Immigration Service [ch'uripkuk oegugin jŏngch'aek ponbu, 출입국·외국인정책본부] was formed in the Ministry of Justice in 2006. According to the introduction of foreign policies, the local authorities which showed a high number of immigrants in their populations such as Ansan, Suwon established the departments in the local governments corresponding to the central policies.

However, it is difficult to say that the support from Korean local authorities for immigrant groups was sufficient. The local authorities mainly focused on following the requirements of the national policies (S.-H. Park, 2011). As national policies mainly focused on the ‘multicultural families [Tamunhwagajong, 다문화 가족] who got married to Koreans, the immigrant groups who were not included in national policies like Korean Chinese groups were also frequently overlooked in the support from local authorities (see footnote 20 in chapter five). For example, as can be seen in the case of Guro where Garibong-dong is located, the support of the local authority had been limited to multicultural families and foreign workers (see chapter five). The main projects retained the social services such as translation and language education. The long-term projects such as building capacity or the building of relationships with the local society were rarely observed.

Along with the ordinance for multicultural families, another ordinance regarding foreign population in Seoul, ‘Ordinance on the Promotion of Seoul Global City [Sŏult’ŭkpyŏlshi Kūllobŏlto Shi Ch’okchin Chorye, 서울 특별시 글로벌도시 촉진 조례] was commenced in 2007 (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2007). The ordinance was a basis of the first foreigner basic plan, ‘Seoul Global City Basic Plan [Sŏul kūllobŏl toshihwa kibon kyehoek, 서울 글로벌 도시화 기본 계획]’ (2007-2012). The first foreigner basic plan mainly aimed at improving the competitiveness of Seoul as a global city. The Mayor Se-hoon Oh said about the Seoul Global City Basic Plan in an interview in the newspaper (J-K. Lee & Myung, 2008):

25 The terms to refer to an immigrant group were not clear in policies. For example, the policies in the early stage used to use ‘foreigner’ [Oegugin, 외국인], but in local policies that sometimes appears with ‘immigrants’, Even though this study used immigrant groups because it seemed to be less confusing to explain the Korean Chinese group, the study tried to translate original titles in the policy analysis.
Indeed, the knowledge-based creative industry is a business that is suitable for Seoul. For example, we are designing a ‘Global Zone’. The inconveniences of foreign companies coming to Seoul are communication and administration. [...] The city is playing a role in helping their businesses based on the ‘service mind’. As a means, we will select a site that can improve the convenience regarding communication as well as administration by building ‘Global Zones’ so that foreign companies do not have to worry about doing business in Seoul.

Urban competitiveness has been the main aim throughout the period of Mayor Oh (2006-2011) from the previous Mayor Myeong-Park Lee (2002-2006). Urban design and place marketing were understood as an important means to improve urban competitiveness. For example, the Mayor Sehoon Oh has emphasised that his main aim of urban policies was enhancing the rank of Seoul in urban competitiveness criteria (W.-J. Lee, 2011). The Global City Plan was mainly implemented by a department of the Seoul Metropolitan Government called ‘Competitiveness promotion office [kyŏngjaengnyŏk kanghwa ch'ujinbonbu, 경쟁력 강화 추진본부]’. The foreigners in the first basic policy tended to refer to the visitors or investors to raise the competitiveness of Seoul as a ‘global city’.

Create a global living environment where foreigners can live without inconveniences, provide high-quality service to foreigners, and "people want to come, want to live and want to invest" [...] It is expected to promote the goal of the Seoul Metropolitan government for the Top 10 Global Cities [...] (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2010)

The common expressions in immigrant policies of Mayor Oh can be seen as followed: ‘Global city Seoul where foreigners want to live, visit and invest’, ‘The city where creativity and diversity were respected’. ‘The improvement of the environment for foreign investors’, ‘global attractions’ (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2007). The immigrant policies of Mayor Oh were based on the discourse of ‘creative class’ which was emphasised by Landry (2008), Florida (2005), and Glaeser (2011). When it comes to the creative class discourse, the researchers argued that creativity is an impetus to recover and develop the economy of the cities. Especially, Florida (2005) focused on the conditions of cities to bring creative class and make them root down by explaining key factors such as 3Ts: technology, talent, and tolerance. Based on this argument, building the conditions
for innovation by bridging entrepreneurs and talented workers was frequently observed in the policies of Mayor Oh (see also Raco & Gilliam, 2012; Raco & Kesten, 2016; Yeoh, 2006). The immigrant groups from developed countries, the so-called global north or OECD (The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development26) countries were mainly dealt with in this policy (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2014c).

The understanding of immigrant groups focusing on OECD countries has been seen by not only promoting investments but also by spatial projects shaping the image of Seoul by implementing urban design projects. Park (2013) argued that the Seoul Global City Basic Plan largely aimed to build symbolic spaces based on place marketing and urban design by constructing such a landmark. The discourse of the creative class tends to consider the ‘culture’ as a consumable object. For example, Florida (2005) argued that ‘this unleashing requires an open culture. […] In this sense, culture operates not by constraining the range of human creative possibilities but by facilitating and mobilising them’ (pp.5~6). In this sense, foreign cultures in Seoul were considered as a resource to facilitate innovation (also see B.-D. Choi, 2013). The culture of immigrant groups was not considered in a wider sense referring to their ways of everyday lives, but the discussions focused on whether foreign culture is valuable to promote creativity. It frequently imagined as exotic and unique cultural places which draw new small businesses and the attention of people (S.-J. Lee & Kim, 2015).

The exclusion of low-income workers, including Korean Chinese groups, has been observed in the Global City Plan. It was revealed in the implementation of the policies because the project, Global Zones, which were implemented by the first policy mainly

26 OECD is founded in 1961 to stimulate economic progress and world trade. In Korea, the economic and social indicators which were investigated in the comparisons with these countries frequently used to understand the location of the country within so-called ‘developed countries’. The 34 OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
aimed at building touristic places by representing foreign cultures as attractions. In this sense, the policies were more focused on building the areas as a global attraction rather than supporting the foreign residents in the area. The promotion zones were concentrated on areas with foreign companies and residents who come from the OECD countries such as the US. The largest foreign population in Seoul, Korean Chinese, have lived in the southwestern part of Seoul including Garibong-dong; however, the Global Centres which were built by the Seoul Global City Basic Plan mainly have been located in the central areas where the foreign companies were concentrated such as Jongno, Gangnam.

When I asked about the specific prospects for the global zone, Mayor Oh said, "It will be a place where foreigners go to lots and places where financial and administrative services are well-equipped."

(J-K. Lee & Myung, 2008)

As has been seen, the marginalisation of Korean Chinese groups in this period was also seen in the structure of ordinances. During this period, immigrant groups tended to be divided into two different categorisations. The first is that the immigrant groups who were supported by ‘Ordinance on the Support of Multicultural Families in Seoul [Sŏult'ŭkpyŏlshi Tamunhwagajong Chiwŏne Kwanhan Chorye, 서울특별시 다문화가족 지원에 관한 조례]’ which mainly focused on the foreigners who got married to Koreans (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2011). The second is the immigrant groups who were supported by ‘Ordinance on the Promotion of Seoul Global City [Sŏult'ŭkpyŏlshi Kŭllobŏltoshi Ch'okchin Chorye, 서울특별시 글로벌도시 촉진 조례]’ on which the ‘Seoul Global City Basic Plan’ was based (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2007). In those two different categorisations, low-income temporary immigrants who did not have families in Korea, including the majority of Korean Chinese, could not be included in policies.

The categorisation of immigrant groups in Seoul policies reflected the national policies. The Korean government aimed to include high-skilled immigrant groups from the perspective of national interest, also embrace the overseas Koreans and marriage-based immigrants within the conception of Korean ethnicity. On the other hand, the government
tended to exclude low-income workers and unauthorised immigrant groups by strong control (Jeong, 2009). In national and Seoul policies which mainly focused on high-skilled workers and marriage-based immigrants, Korean Chinese groups who were overseas Koreans but also were located as low-income immigrants were frequently overlooked. The groups understood this invisibility in the policies as being induced by their complex identities formed in-between Korean and other foreign groups.

It's a complete blind spot. I mean, in Korea, the Korean Chinese are the fourth citizens. I think that Korean Chinese exist in the fog. There are around seventy million people. It certainly exists, but it seems not to exist or it is invisible. Or people don’t want to see it. People are at least interested in other groups of people [multicultural families]. [...] ‘Multiculturalism’ itself is fine. Good. However, when the government talks, we are multicultural, but when the government gives the budget, we are not included. [...] People as a representative of multiculture need to have a different face colour. Well. We don’t need a lot. We are just asking for some attention to us.

('Sun’, Korean Chinese community organisation, interview, April 2016)

The first Seoul Global Basic Plan was replaced by the second Seoul foreigner basic plan in 2014. The second Seoul Foreigner basic plan, ‘Multi Values Seoul Master Plan [Tagach’i Seoul Masterplan, 다가치 서울 마스터플랜]’, showed a different approach. The new plan included immigrant groups as a part of local neighbourhoods by emphasising the quality of lives for the foreign residents (see table 6.2). The two separated Seoul Metropolitan ordinances, ‘Ordinance on the Promotion of Seoul Global City’ and ‘Ordinance on the Support of Multicultural Families in Seoul’ were also integrated into ‘Ordinance on Support of Foreign Residents and Multicultural Families in Seoul [Sŏult’ŭkpyŏlsī oegugin min tamunhwagajong chiwŏn chorye, 서울특별시 외국인 및 다문화가족 지원 조례]’ (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2018b). By including the definition of ‘foreign residents’ as ‘foreigners and their children have been living in a Seoul Metropolitan area more than 90 days’, the ordinance provided a basis to include wider groups of immigrants.
Table 6.2: The change of the directions of immigrant policies (source: adapted from The Department of Gender Equality Family Policy 2014c, p. 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before 2013</th>
<th>After 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The growth of global competitiveness</td>
<td>The growth of global competitiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The promotion of cultural diversity and the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>improvement of the quality of life of foreign residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The building of infrastructures</td>
<td>The expanding of infrastructures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focusing on the foreigner form OECD (The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries</td>
<td>Including foreigners from other countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The top-down approach led by Seoul Metropolitan</td>
<td>Collaboration between the Seoul Metropolitan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Government, gu offices, and immigrant community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective and attractive immigrant policies</td>
<td>Universal and human right oriented policies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a change of direction, the awareness of the social issues surrounding immigrant groups among the citizens began to be taken into account. Like other plans which were implemented by Mayor Won-soon Park who emphasised the direct involvement of citizens, the second plan was built through community participation. Several meetings and surveys including the foreign residents were held by the government to gather the opinions about the foreigner policies (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2014c). According to the report, 84% of Seoul citizens said that the Seoul immigrant policies were necessary. The majority of citizens pointed out ‘the city securing human rights without discrimination’ as an important direction of Seoul foreign policies. On the other hand, 17.6% of respondents, which was the smallest amount, said that ‘the city for foreign investors’ was important (see table 6.3).
Table 6.3: The result of a survey in Multi Value Seoul Masterplan. The participants consisted of 500 of Koreans over 19 years-old who were living in Seoul and 700 of foreigner residents who had been living in Seoul for more than six months (source: The Department of Gender, 2014c, p. 8; translated by the author).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The future direction of Seoul city image (survey of Korean and foreign residents, plural response)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A city where foreigners are not discriminated against based on human rights</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A city where foreign residents can live easily</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities that pursue social integration based on cultural diversity</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A city where foreign companies can invest</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need for Foreign Residents Policy in Seoul (survey of Korean residents, plural response)</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Need</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not required</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discrimination of foreign residents (survey of Korean residents, plural response)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign workers</td>
<td>76% (of the respondents said that they are discriminated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Chinese</td>
<td>49 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married immigrant woman</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The urgency of foreign residents’ policy (survey of Korean residents, plural response)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human rights</td>
<td>50 % (of the respondents said that the agenda is urgent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>35 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>28 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It showed that Seoul citizens recognised the urgency of the necessity of policies dealing with the social issues surrounding immigrant groups. The survey also showed that the previous Seoul foreign plan was limited to cope with the large part of immigrant groups which were mainly engaged in low-income works. The citizens pointed out that discrimination issues were the predominant problem which immigrant groups met in their life. As argued, the exploration of foreign low-income workers occurred frequently in the
1990s (Y.-K. Kong, 2013; see also chapter five). The xenophobia\(^{27}\) became one of the concerns in the Korean society (Y.-S. Kim, 2014; Woo & Woo, 2014). The discrimination toward the foreigner groups, especially low-income minorities, has frequently been observed as can be seen in this survey result. While the antagonism toward the immigrant groups was frequently observed in the media or the internet (C.-W. Kang, 2015; Y.-W. Shin & Ma, 2017; Woo & Woo, 2014), the observation of those attitudes brought the concern about the discrimination, the violation of human rights and the lack of respect for low-income immigrant groups in Korean society.

Based on the response of citizens, the second foreign policy set the directions to encourage the recognition of the immigrant group as a part of neighbours, by saying that ‘foreign residents are not strangers, but our neighbours’. According to that, the Korean Chinese group, who formed the largest group of the immigrants, have been included as an important part of the policy. The notable factor in this period was that the emphasis of ‘capacity building’, which commonly observed in the policies of Mayor Park, was also observed in the understanding of immigrant groups (see chapter one). For example, when it comes to a means of enhancing the quality of lives of immigrant groups, becoming active actors in policies were emphasised.

“Beyond the existing policy of multicultural families, which focuses on immigrant groups as an object of support, now we plan to make immigrant groups can become actors in projects with long-established groups. We plan to make them spontaneously gather, solve their needs and feel their sense of belonging.”

(Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2018b)

\(^{27}\) The Hankyoreh Newspaper showed the result of World Value Survey (the NGO which consists of scientists and researchers in various countries) (Leeyu, 2013; World Values Survey, 2016). They included the question “could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbours?”, and one third of Korean people answered “immigrants/foreign workers”. It was higher than the UK where only less than 4.9% of people answered that they did not want immigrant groups as neighbours. France was 22.7%, which is the highest among the European Unions. Countries which showed a similar level of response with Korea were Egypt, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Vietnam, and Albania. Only three other countries, India, Jordan, and Bangladesh, showed a higher response than Korea.
The participation in the policies was understood as a way of encouraging the duties as ‘citizens’. Regarding Korean Chinese, the policies include education of Korean law and rules and the expansion of a foreign self-policing team regarding the Korean Chinese group. In the agenda of social cohesion, the main means to involve immigrant groups emerged as emphasising of building capacity. In this understanding, on the one hand, the policy emphasised adapting of immigrant groups in the society by learning social norms. On the other hand, the policy emphasised enhancing the public image of groups based on their spontaneous participation. However, the policy, which suggested cleaning the neighbourhood and organising a self-policing team by volunteering, still tended to be based on the pre-fixed ideas of Korean Chinese groups such as low-educated groups who need to be educated on the social norms and who were a source of unfavorable image of local environment.

6.2.2 The Introduction of Urban Regeneration Plan and the New Challenge of Community Cohesion

Apart from the Seoul Foreigner policies, the recent Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration Promotion Plan\footnote{In Korea, the ‘dosijaesaeng [urban regeneration]’ mainly referred to the Urban Regeneration Plan which was designated in 2015. This thesis specifies the project by referring ‘(Garibong-dong) Urban Regeneration’.
} \[Karibong toshijaesaeng hwalsŏngwha kyehoek, 가리봉 도시재생 활성화 계획\] also showed the change of direction in Seoul urban policies. As mentioned, the cancellation of the Newtown project began to be discussed from the 2010s, and it was necessary to find other means to solve the urban issues such as conflicts in the neighbourhood and the dilapidated environment which particularly became significant during the stalled plan. In the circumstances, the community-led regeneration emerged as an alternative to the government-led development.
Figure 6.1: The location of regeneration lead areas [toshijaesaeng sŏndojiyŏk, 도시재생 선도지역]. The number 27 indicates Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project (source: B.-S. Kim, 2016; translated by the author).

The community-led regeneration became one of the main methods of urban management plan from the 2010s. At the national level, the Special Action the Promotion and Support of Urban Regeneration [Toshijaesaeng hwalsŏnghwu mit chiwŏne kwanhan t'ŭkpyŏlbŏp, 도시재생 활성화 및 지원에 관한 특별법, or Regeneration Act] was introduced in April 2015. In Seoul, 301 Newtown districts among 638 were cancelled by the end of 2015 (S.-H. Kim, 2016), and 27 areas including Garibong-dong were designated as regeneration projects from March 2015 (B.-S. Kim, 2016, see figure 6.1).

The main difference of the Urban Regeneration was its emphasis on the preservation of cultural and social aspects in the designated areas. Instead of the Newtown project focusing on mainly physical enhancement after demolitions, the regeneration projects started to deal with the areas by preventing displacement of residents and preserving local culture. The National Regeneration Policy stated that the Korean urban planning policies
had to change their directions to deal with ‘the quality of lives’ rather than the quantitative expansions (see table 6.4).

Under the overall change of direction, the Garibong-dong regeneration project started to involve the residents including the Korean Chinese groups as an important part of the project.

We will promote the people-oriented regeneration with the multiculture. […] The area with the 30 per cent of Korean Chinese, so we decided the subject of the regeneration of the village living with the multiculture.

(Heesun Jin, head of Regeneration Department, press briefing for Garibong-dong regeneration project, 16th September 2014, Retrieved from http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/52728230)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.4: The differences between growing cities and mature cities (The Ministry of Land Infrastructure Transport, 2014; translated by the author).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Growing cities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Features</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Growing population and growth of economics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuously expanding society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The concern of quantitative expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distributing the resources into geographical division by the project plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing provider-oriented urban developments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prioritising the citizen’s primary needs such as food, lodging and clothes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The direction of policies</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By specialization and segmentalisation, implementing the departmental policies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Particularly, the important part of the Urban Regeneration project for the Korean Chinese groups was that the project aimed at building the committee including Korean Chinese groups. Contrary to the other policies, which approached the immigrant group separately focusing on their group-specific issues, the Urban Regeneration formed an organisation with mixed groups (this will be dealt with chapter seven). The Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration team prepared the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration Promotion Plan, which was announced in early 2017, with a consultation group which was formed with the residents (the consultation processes will be dealt with in chapter seven and eight).

On the other hand, the involvement of the Korean Chinese groups in the plan, which has been shaped through one year of consultation processes, did not seem to be significantly different from other policies such as Seoul Foreign policies. The sub-projects in the Urban Regeneration plan, focusing on the Korean Chinese groups, have been seen in two directions. One was revitalising the Korean Chinese commercial street, Uma Street, which has been involved with building a multicultural attraction drawing visitors. Another was social cohesion projects such as education programs and street cleaning campaigns which largely overlapped with the projects in the Multi Value Seoul plan (see the next section).

Throughout the policies which were introduced in this chapter, the mechanisms to involve immigrant groups appeared in three different ways in Korean urban policies. It emerged as (a) celebrating differences to promote foreign cultures as touristic resources, (b) building social cohesions by educating immigrant groups about social rules and norms, and (c) drawing participation in community-led regeneration on a voluntary basis. The table below is the summary of the urban policies which were implemented in Garibong-dong after 2000 when Korean Chinese groups started to move into the area. The participation of Korean Chinese groups was expanded particularly after 2012 when the mayor of the Seoul Metropolitan Government changed to Wonsoon Park. The policies seemingly expanded to include the immigrant groups more actively; however, except for the formation of a community committee in the Urban Regeneration project, the policies
tended to have limitations to provide cross group dialogues, which can be essential to transforming the pre-existing group divisions. The next section will discuss how the policies were implemented and how they worked in strengthening or transforming the recognition of the Korean Chinese groups.

6.3 Experiences of Korean Chinese Groups in Garibong-dong

As can be seen in the previous sections, the ways to involve the immigrant groups in Korean urban policies have emerged largely in multicultural and social cohesion discourse. The Korean Chinese groups in Garibong-dong, as described in chapter five, were particularity located in economic poverty. This section investigated how this approach of urban policies dealt with the groups as low-income immigrant groups with unstable legal and social status. Even though the main logic was different in each mechanism, the disadvantaged social position of Korean Chinese groups appeared persistently by undermining their participation. It formed multiple experiences of marginalisation over time.

6.3.1 Korean Chinese in the Discourse of ‘Diversity’

Firstly, this section investigates the position of the Korean Chinese within the discourse of diversity. The diversity as touristic resources emerged dominantly in the Seoul Global City Basic Plan in 2007, but its influences were observed in other neighbourhood development plans such as Newtown and the Urban Regeneration plan. Under this discourse, as argued in the previous section, the exclusion and inclusion in the immigrant policies seem to be strongly interrelated to the cultural representation of their group identity. The cultural attributes of the immigrant group were frequently examined for the image as a global city. The examination of the culture of Korean Chinese was observed over the projects focusing on Garibong-dong, in the Newtown project, the immigration policies and the Urban Regeneration project.
In the 2000s, Garibong-dong, where is the dilapidated neighbourhood situated with low-income immigrant inhabitants, was considered a place needing to be demolished (also see the Chinatown case in K. J. Anderson, 1991; Little India case in L. Kong & Yeoh, 1994). The Newtown which was based on overall demolition and rebuilding the neighbourhood was the main method of neighbourhood developments, and other measures for immigrant groups such as the Global City Basic Plan did not include this neighbourhood. The social perception of Korean Chinese tended to provide a rationale to consider the demolitions of the neighbourhood. Even though the methods of developments after overall demolitions were common when the Garibong-dong Newtown project was designated, the concerns about the preservation of old neighbourhoods also existed. However, this concern was rarely seen in the discussions regarding Garibong-dong. In this absence of a claim for the preservation of Garibong-dong, one of the main contentious issues was the cultural value of the Korean Chinese enclaves to be preserved.

It is true that the perception toward Korean Chinese people is not very favourable. This is because they worked mainly in simple labour, Korean low-income workers tend to have hostility toward Korean Chinese. Cultural differences also amplified this antipathy. Some argued that they are not worthy of being a 'multicultural resource' because they are not differing from Korean culture because they use the Korean language. In addition to the 'bad image' of the former industrial estate, there is a group of people who do not seem to be friendly and have no cultural diversity. It worked as a ground for the argument to build a new apartment complex after demolishing the area.

(K.-M. Kim, 2014)

The neighbourhood was known to the public as the places for poor factory workers in the 1970s and as a dangerous area with Korean Chinese ‘crimes’ in the 2000s. It was not considered as a place which has a value to be preserved. A large number of the Korean landlords also aimed at transforming the image of the neighbourhood through rebuilding

29 As mentioned in chapter five, the image of the neighbourhood was represented as a dangerous place in Korean media such as criminal movies. The crime rate in Garibong-dong became lower around 17% from 2016 to 2017 (Song, 2017). The crime rate by Korean Chinese was 3.2%, and it was not higher than the rate by Koreans (3.8%, in 2015).
after demolitions (see chapter eight). The cancellation of the demolition was understood as an inevitable choice in the financial crisis by the landlords after ten years of postponing, but it was not connected to the interest in the preservation of local culture and the set of residents. In the late 2000s, as criticism against the Newtown project was raised regarding the gentrification and resettlement rate, the planned Newtown area gained attention regarding the issue of social justice (S-J. Kim, 2005). On the other hand, the examinations of Garibong-dong Newtown project were mainly induced by the financial crisis of the developer, rather than by the interest in preserving the local communities. The Korean Chinese communities remained as the neglected low-income immigrant groups in the area.

Along with the planned demolition, the marginalisation of Garibong-dong also was seen in the Seoul Global City Basic Plan which was dominated by a discourse of a creative city. Even though the south-west part of Seoul, including Garibong-dong, showed the largest number of foreign-born population, the Global City Basic Plan did not include the area (see figure 6.1 and 6.2). As argued, the Seoul Global City Basic Plan tended to show an attempt to represent the image of Seoul as a global city, rather than to support the foreign residents who had already settled down in Seoul. The urban policies in the 2000s under Mayor Oh and Park emphasised the urban competitiveness in the globalisation through mega projects. Choi (2013) explained the cultural projects in the period as examples of the creative destruction of urban scenery in the competitions among Metropolitan cities in globalisation (Harvey, 2012; see 'cultural imagineering' in Yeoh, 2005).

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30 The Newtown was cancelled by the voting of the landlords. Among 1989 owners of lands and buildings in Garibong-dong, 617 (34%) people voted for the cancellation. The requirement for the cancellation was over 30%. However, according to the interviews in News 1, residents said that “the cancellation is because we lost trust in LH, but the cancellation of the Newtown doesn’t mean that we are against developments” (D.-S. Choi, 2014).
Figure 6.2: The foreign population in Seoul. Southwest part of Seoul including Garibong-dong has shown the concentration with a high number of Korean Chinese groups. (source: adapted from Statistics Korea, 2010).

Figure 6.3: The location of the planned Global zone in 2007 (source: adapted from The Seoul Research Data Service, 2007).
In building an urban image as a global city, the largest foreign population, Korean Chinese, did not draw any attention. The foreigners in the policy tended to refer to the potential entrepreneurs or travellers (S.-H. Park, 2013). The foreign-born population which represented entrepreneurship tended to be imagined as white high-skilled workers from the Global North, and it had formed a contrasting image with low-income workers from other less affluent Asian countries. Compared to high-skilled workers with professional knowledge in high-income industries, Asian low-income workers such as from Bangladesh, the Philippines and China used to be referred to as ‘oe-no-ja’ which is a short form of ‘oegugin nodongja’\textsuperscript{31} [foreign labourers], and it tended to have a meaning of demeaning the groups. Regarding this tendency, Shin (2017) stated that Korean society has three different categorisations to perceive the foreign-born populations: first, high-skilled workers from the Global North, second, low-income temporary labourers from the Global South, and third is the marriage-based female immigrants from other Asian countries. Heo-Oh (2018) mentioned that this division among immigrant groups seems to be embedded in the perception of Koreans by taking an example that Korean media used to refer to international marriages between a person from western countries with Koreans as ‘kŭllobŏl kajok [global families]’ and between one from less affluent countries with Koreans as ‘tamunhwa kajok [multicultural families]’. This understanding tended to emerge in the distribution of urban projects. As the number of Chinese tourists was growing, the Global Centre was built in Yeonnam\textsuperscript{32} where the people from China shaped

\textsuperscript{31} Nodongja [labourers] tends to have a slightly different meaning from kŭlloja [workers] or chigwŏn [employees] in the Korean context. Nodongja frequently refers to low-income, temporary or precarious workers. Some academics and politicians used the term of nodongja on purpose to emphasise economic inequality in the theoretical context of Neo Marxism.

\textsuperscript{32} The contested part of Yeonnam Global centre was that the residents in the area were actually overseas Chinese who were mainly born and raised in Korea. In other words, the administrative support from the Global centre such as translation or social education were not necessary in Yeonnam-dong. The main visitors in the centre were Korean Chinese (S.-H. Park, 2013). Therefore, the Global centre mainly aimed at building a touristic spot by supporting the planned Chinatown. On the other hand, the Chinatown in Yeonnam was cancelled by opposition from the residents. Overseas Chinese in Korea were also discriminated for a long time due to the closed immigrant policies of the Korean government. Park (2013) pointed out that the sudden affirmative gesture with a purpose to “utilise” the immigrant groups could not be successful.
the enclave along with a plan of Yeonnam Chinatown. However, the Korean Chinese enclaves did not draw attention as a cultural image for a global city.

In this struggle, promoting their culture tended to be welcomed among Korean Chinese as the way of revaluing their identity. As the demolition was cancelled, an attempt to reconsider the Korean Chinese groups started from the Urban Regeneration project. The attempts to improve the Korean Chinese commercial street, Uma Street project, in the Urban Regeneration plan was regarded as the opportunity to represent and revalue their culture (see figure 6.4).

![Figure 6.4: The location of Uma street project (the red line) (J.-H. Choi, 2017).](image)

I also discussed with the head of the *gu* office. I said, “if you think about the communal life between the two groups of residents [Korean Chinese and Koreans], how about setting up the symbolic thing in front of the neighbourhood.” He said that it was a good idea. On the other hand, Korean residents told us we do not need to show it [the village of Korean Chinese] visually.

(‘Lee’, Korean Chinese community organisation, interview, March 2016)
The Korean Chinese groups showed positive opinions toward the Uma Street project. This is partly because the Korean Chinese communities understood the cultural under-representation of their groups as the reason for the marginalisation of policies. The Korean Chinese groups expressed their difficulties induced by their positions in the gap between multicultural families, foreigners, and overseas Koreans. The Korean Chinese groups often showed their understanding of the attitudes of Koreans toward foreigner groups. They often mentioned that some of Korean people tended to show hostility or indifference toward Korean Chinese groups while Koreans showed compassion for the foreign wives and other foreign workers, and be friendly to the foreigners from Global North countries (interview with ‘Kwack’, Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016; also see Toshiyŏndaes [Urban Action Network], 2017). In considering the national policy systems which marginalised Korean Chinese, it is difficult to say that this argument did not have grounds.

However, the attempt to articulate and represent the group identity was rather revealed as ‘a vehicle for misrecognition’ (Fraser, 2000, p. 112). The pre-fixed understanding regarding a means to involve immigrant groups, which is as a touristic source, still dominated the process. The value of the group was persistently questioned as a means to ‘revitalise’ the neighbourhood. The devalued group identity tended to be reproduced in the discourse of diversity as the touristic source again. The differentiation of Korean Chinese enclaves from other foreign enclaves was shown in the Urban Regeneration project. A conversation with another researcher from Seoul research institute in the regeneration meeting showed the understanding of Korean Chinese enclaves as ‘diversity’.
The researcher asked me, "Why do you investigate Garibong-dong?" And then the researcher said, "But then, if diversity, it is more appropriate for the Haebangchon or Itaewon [the area with foreigners from the US]." The researcher said, "Itaewon is completely different from Garibong-dong. In the similar way that you consider Seorae Village [the area with foreigners from France] as a posh place, the foreigners have different social status. If those areas formed foreign commercials, Garibong-dong is a foreign worker’s village and a dilapidated area. Garibong-dong is, in other words, an extremely special case of a specific disease."

(Field note in Master Planning meeting, 21st April 2016)

In other words, the term of diversity in Korean urban planning implicitly referred to the high-skilled immigrants or the immigrants from developed countries as touristic resources. The Korean Chinese enclaves have been differentiated. The Korean Chinese group in Garibong-dong were stigmatised by multiple markers as low-income workers, as the residents in a dilapidated area, under a contested group identity such as in-between foreigners and Koreans. It has been understood as a ‘special case’ which could not be interpreted by the representation of diversity (Raco & Kesten, 2016; Yeoh, 2004, 2005).

Moreover, when it comes to the complicated identity of Korean Chinese as the ‘in-between’, the idea of cultural representation itself was problematic by involving the simplification process (see chapter three). Jansson (2003) argued that ‘the more effort that is put into the diffusion of a dominant image, the more image-creation must actually overlook the authentic complexities of social life’ (p. 478). The cultural characteristics of the enclaves showed in the complicated dimensions of Korean Chinese cultural identity. The culture of Yanbian where Korean Chinese inhabited in China, was not only based on Chinese culture but also different from the current Korean culture.

When I look at the road [Uma Street], I don’t think it is ‘Chinatown’. Daerim anyway decided to use the name of Chinatown. Uma Street is also similar to Daerim. But if someone asks me whether we need to emphasise the ‘Chineseness’ more by putting the title of Chinatown, I’m not sure. I think that the complex and in-between feelings on this street are its features.

(‘Injoo’, planner, interview, April 2016)
The complicated dimensions of Korean Chinese cultural identity were often overlooked in the processes. Throughout the history between two different societies, Korean and Chinese, the members of the Korean Chinese group sometimes strategically transformed their understanding of identity by showing a multi-identity. The ethnic identity of Korean Chinese was difficult to be represented as Koreans or Chinese either (see chapter three).

Articulating the group identities of Korean Chinese groups often led to the argument whether their culture can be represented by ‘Chinatown’ or not. In this pressure to simplify and represent the culture as a touristic source, the culture of the Korean Chinese groups was frequently interpreted as ‘Chinese culture’. It was observed not only in Garibong-dong but also another Korean Chinese enclave, Daerim. Daerim-dong located near to Garibong-dong is another Korean Chinese enclave which has been formed by the expanding of Garibong-dong in the 2000s. In 2015, the government proceeded with the China Town project in Daerim-dong. There were the conflicts about the name of the town because the government aimed to build ‘Chinatown’, not a Korean Chinese town.

The residents in Daerim preferred the name of Chinatown, and Korean Chinese preferred ‘Korean Chinese Town’.

(In, 2015)

The government was planning to attract Chinese performing arts centres, cultural centres and language schools in the Daerim-dong area and to make the tourist attractions that Chinese tourists would find by establishing the sculptures symbolising Chinatown.

(D.-H. Kim, 2015)

From the initial plan of the regeneration project which was commenced in 2018 after the consultation processes, the Uma Street project was planned with the symbolic gate in the front of the street with the name of ‘Uma Cultural Street’ rather than representing Korean

33 As a result of a long consultation for two years, Daerim-dong began to the tourism projects with the name of ‘Korean Chinese Cultural Street’ (H.-N. Kim, 2017).
Chinese communities. Other parts of the project were the small scaled improvements of physical environment such as cleaning up illegal sign postings.

The means to involve immigrant groups in the Korean urban planning model has been ossified into the diversity as touristic resources, and the social perceptions of Korean Chinese groups did not fit into that idea. The limited understanding of the immigrant group in the policy frame functioned as the means to simplify the complex reality of Korean Chinese groups. Fixed ideas of Korean Chinese identity led to two conflicting representations within the urban realm. Firstly, the celebration of abstracted ‘Chineseness’ as a touristic resource within the global city, and secondly, the experiences of everyday marginalisation and discrimination of Korean Chinese residents. Korean Chinese identities in the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project did not fit with the positive ideas of multiculturalism and thus created new challenges.

In urban policies, even though there was greater emphasis on the involvement of diverse social groups in participatory processes, the ethnic diversity was imagined in a certain way in the planning processes. Rather than reconsidering pre-existing ideas of immigrant groups through the interactions with local groups, attempts to fit the groups into the framework in a superficial manner was observed. In this process, the Korean Chinese groups which have shown complicated identity that is difficult to perceive as foreign groups which were supposed to be represented by their ‘authentic and distinctive’ culture was constantly examined their cultural values.

On the other hand, the strong local culture of Korean Chinese which was based on the agglomeration of civic organisations and commercials did not have opportunities to raise their voices to tackle this ossified framework. In terms of the capacity of mobilising voices, Korean Chinese groups had opinion leaders such as the local newspapers and organisations who frequently collaborated with Korean groups. In other words, the lack of language skills or lack of channels to discuss the local issues together were not a significant reason in the involvement of the Korean Chinese groups. However, there was
limited understanding of the importance of direct involvement of the groups and limited awareness of unbalanced social positions which had been embedded in the means of including immigrant groups in policies. As argued in chapter two, including planners, public officers and other local actors including ordinary residents, the individual’s attitude toward differences was not free from the social context such as the policies and history surrounding them. They did not perceive the formed social networks of the Korean Chinese as a means to build up the understanding of the groups.

The attempt of cultural representation was not helpful for the understanding of the immigrant groups but also for the further involvement of the local members in the decision-making process in the Urban Regeneration project. Particularly, it impeded building an inclusive committee which was anticipated to build a mutual understanding between members. The local issues regarding Korean Chinese groups were marginalised in the decision-making process in the Urban Regeneration committee by separating the group such as Uma Street committee (also see chapter seven and eight). Moreover, Korean Chinese residents, except for the shop owners in the Uma project, and other immigrant groups such as residents from Pakistan and Malaysia were also excluded by the processes.

6.3.2 Korean Chinese Communities and Neighbourhood Cohesion

Social cohesion began to be understood as an important task in Garibong-dong after the cancellation of Newtown. The policies introduced by Mayor Won-soon Park, the second foreign policy and the regeneration project emphasised social cohesion. With the introduction of the policies, the Korean Chinese group was included as an important part of the policies along with other immigrant groups such as multicultural families, overseas students, and foreign workers.

In the second foreign policy, the agendas related to the Korean Chinese groups can be seen as ‘accompanied growth’ and ‘capacity building’. In terms of accompanied growth,
the policies emphasised social responsibility as citizens. The projects in the agendas were ‘academy to become a citizen’, ‘enforcing tax payment’, and ‘expanding foreigner self-policing teams’. In the agenda of capacity building, the policies included the cooperation campaign to solve social disorders in Garibong-dong and Daerim-dong. The projects under the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration plan were based on similar approaches regarding the involvement of Korean Chinese groups. For example, the regeneration plan included the education programs to solve the social orders and street cleaning campaigns. The sub-projects focusing on the Korean Chinese groups appeared as projects with the titles of ‘making the neighbourhood without crimes’ and ‘making the neighbourhood without garbage’ (see the following figures).

![Image of Foreign Cleanup Volunteer Group](image)

**Figure 6.5:** ‘Foreign Cleanup Volunteer Group [Oegugin kkalkkũi pongsadan, 외국인 깔끔이 봉사단]’ in Garibong-dong. They have been working for cleaning up the neighbourhood from 2006 with more than 60 Korean Chinese members (source: J.-S. Jung, 2007).
Regarding the capacity building of immigrant groups, it is notable that the policies emphasised educating duties as citizens. Throughout the sub-projects from the ‘enforcing tax payment’ and campaign for reducing crime, the responsibilities of immigrant groups were emphasised. The immigrant groups were considered as groups who somewhat lacked the qualities as citizens. Learning Korean social norms, learning Korean tax system and building self-help groups to solve the social issues were emphasised in the policy.

The distinctions between long-established groups and immigrant groups were not challenged in the social cohesion agendas. They mainly deal with how the immigrant groups approach the mainstream society without questioning sufficiently how Korean society can alter their attitude to build a basis for the conversations with different groups. Although the policies expanded the boundary of immigrant groups from the high-skilled workers to foreign residents including low-income immigrants, the social hierarchy between the Korean Chinese groups and Korean residents was shown in the policies.

Particularly when it comes to the Korean Chinese groups in Garibong-dong, the social cohesion agendas tended to perceive Korean Chinese groups in the neighbourhood as the
sources of social disorder such as crime and the filthy environment, and focus on solving
the issues by emphasising the responsibilities as residents. Regarding the understanding
of Korean Chinese groups, the immigrant communities noted their discomfort about the
experiences of social campaign projects.

In Garibong-dong, the education program by the local Korean Chinese newspapers and
community organisations has been delivered for a long time. The education programs
were mainly about social orders such as sorting out the garbage or public order such as
jay-walking. For example, the Korean Chinese interviewees mentioned the differences in
the ways of sorting out the garbage in their hometown in China and Korea.

[In Korea, every ‘gu’ —which means boroughs in the UK— has their own specific
standardised plastic garbage bags. The residents need to buy the bags to sort out
garbage] We don’t have the system of standardised garbage bags in China. When
we think that we need to pay to buy them which did not seem to be necessary, it
was difficult to understand. The minister in the church showed an educational
video showing the processes of sorting out processes in Korea. Then, people can
understand the system better. People do [throw out the garbage in a different way]
just because they don’t know.

(‘Bae’, resident, interview, May 2016)

In China, there were huge garbage bins on every street. Also, there were cleaners
in every building including apartment buildings. In Yanji City, there were also
migrants who came from other areas where the economic situation was worse such
as from Shandong. They were paid to clean up, so they collected the bins when
we left them in front of buildings. I heard even in worldwide, it is not common to
see a country which has a strict system like Korea.

(‘Ryu’, resident, interview, March 2016)

The tensions due to the cultural differences occurred in the neighbourhood. The way to
sort out the garbage and the way to behave in public spaces were based on the different
social norms. However, in this encounter of tensions, the understanding of the differences
was not from both sides. The different social norms of Korean Chinese groups were
considered as the result of a lack of education and as the rough behaviour of working
groups. The Korean Chinese residents in Garibong-dong used to understand the necessity
of the programs to help people become adjusted to the neighbourhood, but expressed an uncomfortable feeling about the viewpoint in social programs. They point out the lack of understanding of their culture from Korean society. In the cultural gap, the cultural hierarchy was experienced in the neighbourhood.

This is a cultural difference. Cultural differences should be respected by each other. You know what, parliamentarians said that when they came to Garibong-dong “Do not speak Chinese, speak Korean in Garibong-dong.” [...] Be realistic. Ask something that made sense. If Korean Chinese people behaved like when they were in China, it is natural. As time goes by, Korean Chinese people can learn what Korean culture is. They [the government] even didn’t try to understand this aspect, and just blamed Korean Chinese.

('Yong-gun', the leader of Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016)

[By taking an example of a Korean husband and an immigrant wife] The Korean husband also needs to respect and learn her culture. The emphasis of this aspect [learning the immigrant culture]? It is zero. In any circumstances, immigrant people have to learn Korean culture, Korean language, and Korean habits. They [the differences in culture] are not vertical, but horizontal. I said that Korean people need to stop commanding immigrant people as if they command from top to bottom.

('Ryu’, resident, interview, March 2016)

They assumed that they were considered as the sources of social disorders due to the wider social perception toward the Korean Chinese groups. About the assumption about the Korean Chinese group as a low educated group inducing public disorders, the group argued that it is an unfair judgement. It was significantly observed in the interviews regarding the understanding of the group in the policies.

It is unfair. It is a cultural misunderstanding. Korean Chinese people didn’t throw away the trash more than Koreans. There was the evidence from the community organisations. We checked the CCTV. From four o’clock in the morning, the hundred people who threw away the trash bins on the street were Koreans. There was only one Korean Chinese person.

('Bae’, resident, interview, May 2016)
Along with the experiences, a significant theme which emerged in the interview was the gap of the social status which the group felt between the Korean society and the Chinese society. The Korean Chinese groups had differing social status in Chinese society. Even though they were categorised into the low-income immigrant workers in Korean society, they consisted of different people with differing previous occupations. The Korean dream in the 1990s drew a large number of Korean Chinese including farmers, housewives, sometimes teachers, or public officers. However, the groups were generalised as the less educated group under the understanding of the identity of the group in the Korean society. The Korean Chinese members frequently felt that they were not treated fairly with respect to in this simplified judgement about the groups.

The education programs and self-policing programs seemed to be based on the understanding of the Korean Chinese as the group needing to be guided. Korean Chinese people understood the necessity of education programs, but at the same time, feel uncomfortable about the viewpoint of Korean people who consider them as potential problems. Regarding the cultural understanding of the Korean Chinese group in the neighbourhood, it is difficult to see that the policy dealt with them as equal social members. The approach focused on reducing the inconvenience of Korean residents, and Korean Chinese groups felt the cultural hierarchy in a way that was directed by the vertical relationship. In other words, the social cohesion of the neighbourhood is pursued within the hierarchical relationships, dealing with Korean Chinese residents as the group lacked cultural knowledge, by making immigrant groups follow Korean social norms. The misrecognition as unequal treatment in social relations was embedded in the relationships between groups, and it emerged in the understanding of them as a part of residents (see chapter seven).

### 6.4 Conclusions

Policies seemingly expanded to include the Korean Chinese groups. For example, as the direction of policies changed toward community-oriented policies from around 2014, the
local facilities supporting Korean Chinese groups have been built. However, the restructuring of pre-existing social divisions was rarely tried. As argued in chapter three, the recognition does not only require the revaluing of group identities; the transformation of group divisions produced by the dominant idea about ‘desirable’ actors need to be considered. However, even in the cases where policies included the immigrant groups, the social recognition of the groups seems to be entrenched in the approaches of policies to deal with the groups.

For example, the ways to involve the immigrant groups have emerged as multicultural resources, social cohesion, and community as actors in consultation processes (this part will be dealt with in chapter seven). Each of these approaches was based on a certain idea about desirable communities. The immigrant groups were expected to have a cultural value which can draw visitors and foreign investors in the multicultural resources and to be educated as responsible citizens to be accepted by Korean society. These ideal models of communities frequently located the Korean Chinese groups as a group who lacked the qualities to be involved. Firstly, the diversity frame for the touristic resources could not include the Korean Chinese groups well. The culture of immigrant groups from global North such as France or America emerged as a source for a ‘global’ city to be promoted, but the culture of Korean Chinese enclaves was considered as ‘unfavourable image’ of low-income immigrants. In reexamining the space as a resource for revitalising the neighbourhood, the cultural judgement about the identity was persistent. In the disjunction between the pre-fixed idea about the multicultural resources and the stigmatised group identity such as low-income, incompetent, and low-educated groups, the groups tended to be represented as ‘Chinatown’. Secondly, social programmes are dealing with the groups as the residents who need to be re-educated following the Korean social norms, not providing the means to build a mutual understanding between both sides. To manage them as a part of the residents, the duties of the citizens were emphasised. The groups used to be simplified as a group who lacked the knowledge about social norms.
The pre-fixed ways in Korean urban policies to involve immigrant groups could not deal with Korean Chinese groups. The multiple makers of the Korean Chinese in Garibong-dong, which had an unfavourable image to become a touristic resource and who were understood as a reason for the filthy and dangerous image of the neighbourhood, made the inclusion of groups difficult. The involvement of immigrant groups within an ossified categorisation provided little room to transform the pre-existing perception of the group and was frequently attempted by simplifying the group identities to fit into the presumptions.

To sum up, Korean urban policies rather reflected the construction of immigrant groups, not shifted it. The social perception about the Korean Chinese groups was reproduced persistently in the examination of their enclaves. The predetermined frames were not challenged by investigating the neighbourhood. The policies rather overlooked or solidified the wider social perception toward the group. The stigmatised group identity was reproduced in the examination of the enclaves without a doubt. In the context, the committee in the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project provided an opportunity to share opinions within a mixed group including the Korean Chinese and other social groups, which was rarely observed in the planning process in Garibong-dong. However, even in the participation of the local committee, the means to redress this social division was not observed. With the existing social gaps which have been shown in this chapter, it is questionable if the mere emphasis on voluntary participation can work as a way to involve the participation of immigrant groups and to provide cross dialogues. The next two chapters will discuss how the committee was formed in these inequalities which the Korean Chinese encountered, and how the decisions made among the residents who are located in the unequal social positions.
Chapter Seven: Uneven Social Capital in Participatory Processes

7.1 Introduction

Chapter six has discussed the social status of the Korean Chinese group in urban policies. The local policies including the Urban Regeneration project have expanded their boundaries to include the Korean Chinese communities. However, in the implementations, the understanding of Korean Chinese communities still seemed to be influenced by the social perception toward them. Compared to other high-skilled immigrant groups, the Korean Chinese groups in Garibong-dong were understood as a group who was difficult to be considered as ‘diverse’. The culture of groups was judged from the perspective of touristic resources, and unfavourable image of Korean Chinese as low-income immigrant groups constantly emerged as a challenge to include them in planning procedure. Even when they were involved in the policies such as in social cohesion agenda, the understanding of the group, for instance, a low-educated group, a source of local conflict and dilapidated environment, appeared in the ways of involvement. In the experiences in the policies, which persistently locating the groups in subordinated positions, the Korean Chinese groups felt marginalisation over time. The planning mechanism did not provide a means to transform relations between the long-established groups and the immigrant. The mechanism which groups shaped a pre-existing understanding of the group rather than transforming it.
Chapter seven investigates the community representative group in the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project. Apart from the discourse of diversity and the social cohesion agenda, the Urban Regeneration project aimed to involve the Korean Chinese groups in the consultation processes of planning. The consultation committee has been formed focusing on the boundary of ‘residents’. Planning procedures including the Korean Chinese groups within a mixed group was rarely found except for the committee in the Urban Regeneration project. The open participation processes were assumed to build the capacity of residents, including the Korean Chinese groups, and to provide the interactions between the groups. However, as can be seen in chapter six, the Korean Chinese groups in the neighbourhood persistently experienced the exclusion and marginalisation of the urban policies. It is still questionable whether the consultation processes can include the group in these contexts.

The data are analysed within the framework of social capital in consideration of how the wider social positions of participants influenced the formation of social capital (chapter four). Particularly, how participatory planning approaches the pre-existing concepts of differences and how that understanding influenced the mobilisation of social capital are discussed. The social capital theory did not entirely ignore the influences of institutional setting of policies (Evans, 1996; Lin, 2000, 2001; Micheal Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). However, this aspect, the influence of social understanding of differences on the formation and utilisation of social capital, was rarely found in the participatory planning studies. By analysing social capital formation in the representation processes, the section will demonstrate the uneven formation of social capital in the neighbourhood and its emergence in the participatory planning. The analysis deals with not only individual social interactions but also the social perception embedded in participants. By analysing the formation of social capital within the consideration of wider social perception, it will show how the deeply rooted understanding of ‘community’ in Korean planning has been embodied in participants’ perception, and how that emerged in the practice of networks. This chapter will focus on RQ2. How was social capital formed among participants.
located in different social contexts? And RQ3. How have social capital and ethnic differences been deployed by different actors within local planning participation?

After discussing how the ‘community’ was understood in Urban Regeneration policy, the chapter will briefly introduce the structure of Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee. By analysing the processes of forming committee, the chapter shows how the members of committee were recruited in the consultation processes. Finally, by linking with the local experiences of social relationships between groups, the section examines how the understanding of community in policies influenced the social relationships in the neighbourhood and how that has been shown in representation processes.

7.2 The Understanding of Communities in Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration

In the formation of the committee, the understanding of ‘local community’ in the Urban Regeneration project was significantly influential. Although the policy direction of the Urban Regeneration project is to include residents without differentiating property owners, tenants, or immigrant groups, an attempt to involve the Korean Chinese groups was not particularly observed in the policy. The Korean Chinese groups were rarely observed as a significant issue in the planning field throughout history, and the understanding of them was still limited in the Urban Regeneration project. Without any particular attempt to include the Korean Chinese in decision-making processes, ‘communities’ in the Urban Regeneration project were still focused on Korean groups who were previously involved in the Newtown project with the aim of resolving the conflicts among residents.

Firstly, even though the Seoul Metropolitan Government mentioned the Korean Chinese groups as a part of the participants, the attitude has been seen as a lukewarm endorsement rather than an active attempt to rethink the groups. Since ‘local community’ was emphasised heavily in Mayor Park’s agendas as a way to differentiate from the previous governments, the Korean Chinese groups who consist of a large part of Garibong-dong were mentioned. However, apart from a mere emphasis on participation, further attempts
to understand the Korean Chinese groups were hardly observed. The recognition of groups, which frequently emerged as barriers impeding the groups’ social participation, was not questioned and uncritically reproduced. In the ambiguous attitude of the government, a wider understanding of ‘citizens’ was embedded.

When the government worked on a similar project in Daerim-dong, the project had some side effects. The government created a Chinese culture street in Daerim-dong because there were a lot of Korean Chinese people, but the government did not gain any political effects such as getting more votes [for the party]. We spent a lot of government budget, but they [Korean Chinese] do not even have the right to vote. The idea of investing in the Korean Chinese is something politicians don’t agree with. There is a logic that, “who are the priorities of the budget? It has to be the people with voting rights.” In fact, there were some confusions in the early stage of the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project. Some said that “we need to include the Korean Chinese groups”, but others said that “there can be a lot of conflicts. We need to focus on Korean groups in the beginning”. And some also said that “let's see what are the issues in the local and diagnose them first.”

(’Zoh’, government officer, interview, March 2016)

The Urban Regeneration project emphasised ‘residents’. The Seoul Metropolitan Government aimed to include residents without differentiating the groups by stating that ‘any residents of [area] have the right to pursue urban regeneration projects and participate in the regeneration project’ (Ministry of Land Infrastructure Transport, 2017, p. Article 3). The definition of residents seems to include all the local members of a group called ‘residents’ based on a geographical area. Due to that, Area Based Initiatives were frequently assumed as an umbrella organisation embracing diverse social groups (Agger & Jensen, 2015; Chaskin, 2016). However, as can be seen in the interview, the status of local members differed in the practice of an actual case. The participants were widely judged regarding qualities as ‘citizens’; who has the right to vote, who paid taxes[^34], and who has capacity and a sense of ownership. Again, the recognition of immigrants impeded the groups’ participatory parity by locating them in an inferior position within

[^34]: This boundary was largely experienced by the Korean Chinese groups. In the interviews, the participants frequently assert their social positions by emphasising that they paid taxes such as income taxes which were included in their wages.
the comparison with other social members. In this recognition, those dominant ideas producing group divisions seemed to be necessary to be questioned, rather than articulating minority groups’ identities. Anderson (2013) argued that,

The politics of immigration reveal the volatility of categories that are imagined as stable, including citizenship itself. Judgements about who is needed for the economy, who counts as skilled, what is and isn’t work, what is a good marriage, who is suitable for citizenships, and what sort of state-backed enforcement is acceptable against ‘illegals’, affect citizens as well as migrants.

(p. 2)

The judgements about who are proper participants not only defined the people who are involved but also define who are not. Although the government did not specify the definition of residents in the Urban Regeneration project, in the implementation, it was associated with the understanding of Seoul citizens for whom the government needed to serve. The immigrant groups were not assumed to be included in this group.

The gaps between the ‘residents’ in the policies and the actual composition of residents were observed in the recruitment of participants in the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee. It was partly induced by an ideal conception of ‘local communities’ in the agenda of the Seoul Metropolitan Government. An approach to rebuilding lifestyles of Seoul citizens has been shown through a nostalgic recourse to the traditional values such as reciprocity and mutual help which had been destroyed during the processes of developments. As has been seen in chapter one, Seoul Metropolitan Government under the Mayor Park considered the Urban Regeneration project as an alternative to the previous state-led development projects, called Newtown. Moreover, the community-led regeneration was an approach to rebuild lifestyles of Seoul citizens, rather than a mere replacement of the previous development projects. For example, the Newtown projects were heavily based on a pursuit of raised property value. Gimm and Shin (2016) refer to the ways of dealing with properties in Seoul as ‘developmental urbanism’. The developmental urbanism can be seen as a way to deliver developments based on the strategical approaches of the state, unbalanced development based on these
strategies, and the pursuit of land values by this practice (see also Akyüz & Gore, 1996; Gimm, 2013; N.-N. Kim, 1999; S. Y. Lee, 2017). The redevelopment of apartments—called ‘Newtown’ in the 2000s—seemed to represent those logics. The growth of land value by the redevelopment of the apartments and the pursuit of them was commonly observed among the Seoul citizens in these experiences. Shin and Kim (2016) argue that this tendency was largely observed in overall landlords, development companies, and the government by referring to this tendency as ‘speculative urbanisation’. The houses were embedded as a means of an investment based on these speculative judgements in the minds of residents in urban areas, particularly in Seoul, not as ‘habitats which are physical spaces connected to the neighbourhoods and cities’ (Gimm, 2013). In this major tendency, urban village movements emerged as an alternative lifestyle to this developmental urbanism. Rebuilding connections between their spaces of residence and social lives such as children care and collective works like cooperative unions were considered important. The Mayor Park emphasised those activities as a new model of the lifestyles of Seoul citizens (also see chapter one). For example, a Sŏngmisan community, which showed the experiments of alternative ways of living such as communal childcare and resistance to development intensively, was frequently mentioned as the good model of urban communities (M. Ha & Jin, 2009; I.-K. Park & Lee, 2012; Yoo, 2009, 2010).

In this understanding, the community-led regeneration was considered as a practice of rebuilding the lifestyles of Seoul citizens. In the discourse, building community groups was always desirable as a practice to build citizenship.

So, the regeneration process will be sublimated as a kind of activism [to build that].

(Jewon Lee, Seoul comprehensive regeneration plan, press briefing, 9th March 2015, retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZTpt91lyKFI)

Community participation became the means of the regeneration project and at the same times the goal of the project. The spontaneous participation seemed to apply in the same way to immigrant groups. Even though a specific mention about immigrant groups was not found in the Urban Regeneration plan, the Seoul village community white paper stated
as below. Participation itself became a movement to build civic rights and understood as an empowerment process, regardless of the context of agents.

Due to the increase of immigrants, our society has already entered a multicultural society. [...] In order to build the culture of inclusion and consideration for them, community activities by immigrants should be activated. In other words, when the immigrant group moved and self-organised, the solutions would come out.

(Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2012, p. 44)

However, this ideal model was based on only a small number of cases, like Sŏngmisan community as mentioned. The participation of citizens was constantly pursued in the Urban Regeneration project, but by exemplifying those ideal images of ‘citizens’ or ‘real residents’. Those were frequently represented by middle-aged families who are motivated to stay and to build ‘community’. The local communities in the understanding of Seoul Metropolitan Government were mainly based on the simplified construction, which consisted of a group who supports the developments, the Newtown, and another ‘real residents’ group who wants to stay.

On the contrary to this simplified understanding, the composition of the residents in Garibong-dong was more complex. Although there were conflicts regarding the Newtown project, it was difficult to see that the group who was against the Newtown project corresponded to the imagined good citizens in the Urban Regeneration project. The planner understood this gap by saying that “even the group who were against to the Newtown were the advocates of development” (interview with ‘Zoh’, government officer).

In the Garibong-dong case, although there was a group who were against the Newtown project, it was due to the predicted profit not meeting their expectation. It is difficult to say that it was connected to the place attachment35 or intention to keep their local lives.

35 The place attachment emerged in a complex way in the Garibong-dong case. In contested understanding of the residents between Korean committee members and the Korean Chinese groups, the place attachment appeared frequently through the interviews. The Korean Chinese groups pointed out that Korean landlords were not actually living in the area, and they were the groups who were living and working in the area. On the other hand, Korean committee members argued that they had spent a long time to save the neighbourhood from the development, and the Korean Chinese groups were people who will leave soon.
The majority of landlords were not involved in the neighbourhood lives as living in other areas. The memories of the neighbourhood were largely associated with their younger period when they lived in the area such as the experiences in the 1980s and the 1990s. In the period of Newtown, a large part of the committee members had left the areas due to the dilapidated environment by renting their houses to Korean Chinese groups. The community coordinator referred to the sense of community among the landlord as “the attachment of property” rather than “the attachment of place” (interview with ‘Gangil’, community coordinator, April 2016). Due to that, the Korean Chinese groups tended to argue that the Korean Chinese groups were the groups who made the neighbourhood operate well, by living, working, and consuming in the area. Due to this situation, the Seoul Regeneration Department frequently argued: “it [the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration] is the community-led regeneration without a community” (interview with ‘Gangil’, community coordinator, April 2016).

For people in their sixties [like the members of the Garibong-dong committee], the local issue is raising the property values. For them, the neighbourhood is one of their properties rather than real living spaces. On the other hand, the forties are not living in Seoul. They commute from other places. If we involved only old landlords and then say that ‘it’s community-led regeneration’, it’s not fit for the purpose of the project. The people who in their middle age need be involved.

(‘Gangil’, community coordinator, April 2016)

In the argument that “it is the community-led regeneration without a community”, the understanding of the Korean Chinese groups was embedded. Both of the main populations of Garibong-dong, the Korean landlords and Korean Chinese tenants, were not considered as desirable communities in the Urban Regeneration agenda. The people who lived and raised their children in the neighbourhood, as the government argued about ‘real residents’, were Korean Chinese communities. Although the Korean committee members were difficult to be perceived as ‘community’ in a sense referring to people who manage their lives in the neighbourhood, the Korean Chinese residents were not considered as a community either. Firstly, as mentioned, they were not considered to be in the boundary of citizens for whom the government need to invest the budgets. Secondly,
they were assumed as a group who will leave in the near future. Thirdly, they were perceived as a group who lacked the capacity as citizens like the Sungmisan community to build self-help communities showing alternative lives as Seoul citizens.

While the direct involvement of Korean Chinese was rarely observed in the decision-making processes, the dominant Korean groups utilised the emphasis of community in the governmental agenda to strengthen their positions (this will be discussed in the next section). The arguments that “we spent more than ten years to keep our neighbourhood”, and “it’s a community-led project” were frequently observed in the committee meetings (also in interviews with ‘Jongdae’ and ‘Song’, residents, March 2016). Without any counterpart, the committee was formed based on the groups who mainly were against the Newtown project, the former Emergency Measure Committee. Through the formation of the committee, delivering opinions and producing a meaning as ‘proper participants’, the social capital among the actors in the committee played an important role.

7.3 The Structure and Overview of Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration Governance

From the early stage of the regeneration project, a community group was recruited voluntarily. The group was called Village Workers [Maeurilkkun, 마을일꾼]. The initial number of members in the first meeting was 66 people on 5th February 2015, and it became 253 people by March 2016 (The data based on the interview with ‘Gayoung’, a community coordinator). The number of participants constantly expanded from the initial meeting in 2015 to the period of fieldwork, from March to May 2016. After forming the Village Workers, the committee with around 17 people was formed from the Village Workers voluntarily in September 2015. A leader and a deputy leader of the committee were elected within the committee. The committee was expanded to 31 people by March 2016.
While the Village Workers were used as a contact list to inform the events of the regeneration project to the residents, the committee has mainly worked for making decisions. Among the committee, the roles of the leader and the deputy leader were particularly important because they were able to participate in the Master Planning meeting as the representative of the committee (the formation of social networks focusing on the leaders will be discussed further in chapter eight). The master planner, the local authority, and the planning company, which was in charge of making the regeneration plan, participated in the Master Planning meetings. On the other hand, the committee meeting was held by the residents, the members of the committee, and led by themselves although local officers and the planner occasionally participated (see table 7.1). The leader and the deputy leader worked as a link between two types of meetings. They used to facilitate the committee meeting about the issues which were discussed in Master Planning meetings when the issues seemed to need the residents’ opinions.

Table 7.1: The structure of community groups in Garibong-dong regeneration project (Source: Author (based on the observations and interviews in the March to May 2016)).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Number of members</th>
<th>Meetings</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>The participants</th>
<th>The aims of the meeting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MP meeting</td>
<td>Approx. 6</td>
<td>MP meeting</td>
<td>Once per week</td>
<td>Leader and the deputy leader of the committee, the head of the regeneration centre (the master planner), the local officers in the regeneration department of Guro ‘gu’ [the administrative unit, the same with boroughs in the UK] office, and the person from the engineering company charging of preparing the Promotion plan</td>
<td>To discuss the local issues and to deliver the committee’s opinions which have been voted in the committee meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steering committee</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Steering committee meeting</td>
<td>Once per week</td>
<td>The members of the steering committee. The head of regeneration centre and local officers also participate to give the relevant information but were not involved in the discussions</td>
<td>To discuss and to vote on the local issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Workers</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>Not regular meeting, used as mailing list for announcing of the big events</td>
<td></td>
<td>The regeneration centre collected the applications in the centre or public events such as festivals, public hearings, or education programs</td>
<td>To share the information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.4 The Formation of the Committee based on Local Relationships

Through the formation of the committee, the social networks of long-establishes groups who participated in the Garibong-dong Newtown project played an important role. Among 31 members of the committee, the majority of the members of the committee were former Emergency Measure committee (17 people). The mechanism of the concentrated formation can be seen from two different aspects: Firstly, the approachable latent social relationships for the government were built focusing on the former Emergency Measure Committee. Secondly, the initial goal, which was established by the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration planning team, to encourage participation was not helpful for expanding participation.

Firstly, the latent social relationships which were concentrated on the long-established group, particularly the group who were against the Newtown project emerged in the participatory processes significantly. These social relationships were not only observed among local members but also seen in the relationships between the government and local communities. The government approached the Urban Regeneration project as an alternative of the Newtown project; therefore, dealing with the local issues which had
been postponed in the Newtown project was considered as an important task in the Urban Regeneration project. Dealing with the dissatisfaction of residents in the cancellation processes was one of the main concerns of the planning team. Accordingly, drawing the opinions from actors in the Newtown project was an initial approach of the Urban Regeneration project. In the procedure, the Korean Chinese groups were not included. The two main groups in the Newtown project, who supported and who opposed, were mainly observable in the planning processes. Even though some of the Korean Chinese groups already settled down in the neighbourhood before the designation of the Newtown, the Newtown plan mainly involved several significant landlords who represented the communities in its consultation processes. Some residents who were excluded from the Newtown committee had formed the Emergency Measure Committee to stop the project. Compared to those Korean groups, there was not a significant movement among the Korean Chinese communities in the period of the Newtown. The compositions of local communities in the Newtown project were continuously involved in the Urban Regeneration project.

Because of this, I got involved in the process of cancelling the Newtown. Accordingly, I participated in finding an alternative way after that cancellation. I was appointed in September, and it was three months earlier than an official cancellation. […] The members who participated in the Newtown project already knew the information about the Urban Regeneration project at that moment.

(‘Woong’, planner, interview, March 2016)

Although the Seoul Metropolitan Government expected to have an investigation about local communities such as research about the demographic characteristics of residents and local groups before forming committees, the processes were not observed in the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project. For the local planning team who needed to approach the local communities, the ties which were formed in previous activities were effective to initiate the project. The planners and the local authority approached them to gather

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36 The LH committee that was formed to represent the local residents to proceed the Newtown project were 15 people. The majority of them were Korean landlords who owned significant portions of the area.
opinions about the cancellation and the further methods to continue supporting the area. The actors who participated in the Newtown groups were able to access the information about the Urban Regeneration project earlier than other social members. In other words, even though the boundary of residents were expanded to include Korean Chinese by stating ‘a village with multiculture’, the social relations which had been built through the previous planning activities were still influential in the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project.

Furthermore, due to this initial approach, the residents understood the Urban Regeneration project as a follow-up measure of the Newtown. It facilitated the recruitment of participants based on the latent networks among the former Emergency Measure Committee. According to the survey, there were seven people who participated by the recommendation from the government and 21 people were drawn by the members who already participated in the meetings. There were only three people who started to participate without recommendations. Those participants who were involved by other social members were mainly former Emergency Measure Committee. They sometimes mentioned that “we won [over other social members such as LH committee who proceeded the Newtown project]” (field note in the committee meeting, 25th March 2016). The planner mentioned that the former Emergency Measure Committee considered the Urban Regeneration project as “an achievement of victory” (interview with ‘Zoh’, government officer, April 2016). In addition, the responsibility, interests in the local development procedure, and ‘shared destiny’ among them were a strong attraction to draw other members in the former Emergency Measure Committee (Rydin & Holman, 2007).

37 Among 31 members of the committee, 18 members responded to the survey. However, in terms of the introduction network, it was possible to collect the information about all of 31 members because the survey included the question about ‘Have you introduced someone in the committee?’ and ‘who did you recommend to participate among the participants?’. Regarding the missing data in the social network analysis, Kossinets (2006) argued that non-response can be balanced out by the reciprocal nominations (see chapter four).
On the other hand, the Korean Chinese groups were rarely involved. They rarely communicated with the planning department while they were living in the area. Although some local organisations had collaborated with the local authority, it was mainly limited to the Multicultural Policy Division or Local Autonomy Administration Division. The Korean Chinese member was included in the committee through the tie with Local Autonomy Administration Division after the concern about the concentrated formation of participants was raised.

When the dominant groups in the Garibong-dong committee showed the intention that they did not want to involve other members, the Seoul Metropolitan Government said ‘we will withdraw the project. We will not give a budget’. Then they quickly brought one Korean Chinese member, one person from the Korean Chinese Association. When we consider the population in Garibong-dong, the Korean Chinese population is twice that of those Korean participants. It’s not fit for the real local situation.

(‘Sun’, the leader of Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016)

The ties which were formed in the previous activities were effective social capital for former participants, but oppositely, became unequal opportunities for the Korean Chinese groups. As the Urban Regeneration team focused on the residents who already connected with them to draw the participation, the previous construction of the communities in the Newtown was carried over in the Urban Regeneration project.

Secondly, the goal of the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration planning team in drawing community participation did not focus on a wider involvement of local members. A concern of effectiveness of planning processes accelerated the formation of the committee, without much consideration as to who were involved and who were not. As has been argued in chapter three, as the goal of collective actions were not set for broader participants, the members of the committee and local societies tended to lose their motivations for connecting with broader members (see chapter three). This pursuit of effectiveness was partly influenced by competition among the Urban Regeneration projects over different areas in Seoul. There were eight different Urban Regeneration
projects in Seoul which were designated at the same time when the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project started. Drawing wider participants was not considered as an urgent issue in the early stage of the Urban Regeneration project compared to showing outcomes. The formation of a committee proceeded in the rationalisation of the effective procedure, and more than that, the Urban Regeneration team did not consider that the formation of the committee could be a possible barrier for further participation. The formation of groups and further strengthening of boundaries were influential in a subtler way than explicit group divisions. These invisible processes were not recognised well or ignored by the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration team. The limited participation due to the hasty formation of committees was not only observed in the Garibong-dong committee but also observed in other projects in other Urban Regeneration areas in Seoul.

[In the meeting with the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration team with Seoul Institute research team] The planner said, “At that time, there were a lot of opinions about it [forming the committee]. The local authority wanted to form a committee quickly, and the Seoul Metropolitan Regeneration Centre said that ‘in the current situation, which only a small number of people constantly involved in the meetings, we should not form a committee. We have to search the local resources from the bottom.’” The researcher said, “It is not helpful for the community participation if you create a committee too quickly. It is bad because it has an ‘armband effect’.” He added that “this is what we learnt from doing Regeneration projects for one year.”

(Field note in Master Planning meeting, 21st April 2016)

[When the researcher asked why the Urban Regeneration team rushed into forming the committee] Because as other Urban Regeneration areas of Seoul started the projects altogether, there was a tendency which we care for each other a little bit. We wanted to form a certain shape which looks like a proper procedure [to show a concrete achievement]. In fact, I cannot say that we did not feel pressure due to the other Urban Regeneration projects.

(‘Injoo’, planner, interview, April 2016)

As a result, the committee was formed based on the network of the former Emergency Measure Committee. Once the Urban Regeneration committee was formed, the involvement of the Korean Chinese groups was inevitably based on the understanding of
them from the Korean participants. The Korean Chinese groups were considered as subordinated groups to serve for the interests of the long-established Korean participants. The understanding of the Korean Chinese groups in the committee has been shown in two different ways; one is as actors in a commercial area in the neighbourhood, another is unfavourable neighbours in the area. Even though the Korean Chinese groups were understood as gap-fillers in the dilapidated residential areas until the Urban Regeneration project started, some participants expected to rebuild their buildings and filled the neighbourhood with other new residential groups instead of the Korean Chinese residents for the ‘prosperity’ of the neighbourhood.

In Garibong-dong, the Korean Chinese' position is sharply divided according to the areas within the neighbourhood. The participants consider that Uma Street, called Yenbian Street, is okay. The Korean Chinese pay rent well, and the business goes well. The only problem is that the street is messy, but the participants believe that it will be fixed if the landlords try. If they ‘scold’ [emphasised by the author] the tenants, they’ll throw the trash away in other areas. […] On the other hand, the participants think that we need to develop the areas near to the station. If the government approved the planning permit, the landlords would build new buildings. Then, the Korean Chinese groups will be displaced. These landlords want the regeneration based on redevelopment not based on preservation.

(’Zoh’, government officer, interview, March 2016)

As has been argued in the previous paragraphs, the expectation of raised land value among participants was persistently observed in development projects regardless of the types of projects, Newtown or Urban Regeneration (see figure 7.2 and 7.3). The understanding of the Korean Chinese groups was different depending on the interests of the Korean landlords. The participants in the committee understood Uma Street as a potential commercial area which can draw visitors from outside; therefore, promoting the street was partly accepted. However, the Korean Chinese groups in the residential areas were considered as a symptom of economic deprivation of the neighbourhood. The local issues of the Korean Chinese groups were separated into residential, and cultural-economic divisions. The Korean Chinese groups were simplified into a cultural-economic sector by forming the Uma Street committee with the shop owners in Uma Street, and the issues in
residential areas were dealt with in the Urban Regeneration committee focusing on the Korean landlords. As a result, the roles of the Korean Chinese groups as ‘residents’ in decision-making processes were limited.

Figure 7.2: The board Centre with a title ‘ask us anything’ which was prepared to collect the residents’ opinions in the Garibong-dong Regeneration centre. The majority of opinions were related to the residential development. From the top left: ‘Cleaning, Development of overall neighbourhood’, ‘The development of infrastructure, the development of neighbourhood environment’, ‘playground, refurbishing houses’, ‘Infrastructure, enlarging roads’, ‘Large-scaled development’, ‘playground’, ‘The improvement of residential environment’, ‘Real development for the village’, ‘Development, Cleaning!’, ‘Demolishing a ring road’, ‘Private development based on securing of profitability’, ‘Improving residential environment’, ‘Individual private development’ (23rd March 2016, some illegible posts have been omitted, source: author).
Figure 7.3: Another board that was used for community workshops. A Mindmap with a theme, ‘I hope our village becomes like this’. Some of the themes conflict with the Korean Chinese communities’ interests. From the top: ‘High: the village with high Floor Area Ratio’, ‘Small toilets: the village without small toilets’, ‘Beautiful young ladies: the village where the beautiful young ladies come back again [like young factory workers in 1970s]’ (16th March 2016, source: author).

Initiating the committee focusing on the long-established Korean groups resulted in locating the Korean Chinese groups in a subordinated position based on the dominant groups’ interests. The participants were not expanded, and the committee rather strengthened their boundedness. It further led to the formalising of groups divisions (this will be dealt with in chapter eight). Although the mechanisms were slightly different, the approaches to deal with the Korean Chinese groups emerged similarly with other immigrant policies, such as Uma Street with cultural representation and self-cleaning...
activities in social cohesion agenda. The marginalisation of the Korean Chinese groups in the Urban Regeneration project emerged by an indirect way through the involvement of the long-established Korean groups. The policies did not specify their viewpoints toward the Korean Chinese groups, but it emerged through ‘residents’ opinions’. Considering the Korean Chinese groups as an insignificant member in decision-making processes reinforced their discriminatory social position through the consultation processes.

7.5 Searching for the ‘Absent’ Social Capital

As has been seen in the previous sections, the urban policies did not provide a means to restructure group divisions. The Urban Regeneration project did not attempt to reconsider the understanding of groups in policy frameworks but and merely emphasised the spontaneous participation. Even though the participation was open to residents, this limited understanding of community in the policies was influential in the processes of participation. Nevertheless, this ‘absence’ of the Korean Chinese groups is questionable. Any attempt from the Korean Chinese communities to transform the governance structure was not observed. The easiest answer would be that the Korean Chinese groups do not have capacity to challenge it. On the other hand, it did not seem to be a sufficient answer because not only the social networks based on the local organisation (see chapter five), but also various social movements such as education programmes and political participation based on the Korean Chinese groups were observed in recent years. The following interview shows the recent activities of Korean Chinese communities.
In fact, the Korean Chinese community started to develop after 2008. […] So as the legal status stabilises, the family stabilises, and the economy stabilises, people gradually find peace of mind and cultural needs begin to emerge. […] We started to look at this kind of democracy. All the kinds of differences in politics. […] Many people are thinking about improving the image of the Korean Chinese society. They want to build up a link between Korean Chinese society to enter the mainstream society. So, there are a lot of organisations which have been formed to play a role in the relationships between Korean and Korean Chinese. […] Now, there were a lot of people who wanted to participate in the politics such as a political party. They pursued becoming a proportional representation in the party.

(‘Sun’, the leader of Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016)

The interviewer pointed out an attempt to link to the Korean society and political participation as the recent tendency of the Korean Chinese communities. Although the social participation of the Korean Chinese communities had a short history, it is difficult to say that the social basis of the Korean Chinese groups was so poor that they could not participate entirely. The absence of Korean Chinese communities in Garibong-dong committee has been seen as a result of the mixed layers of dynamics.

As has been explained in chapter four, the analysis of social capital focuses on three different sources: opportunity, ability and motivation. The resources to build social capital were not sufficient for the Korean Chinese groups, and it was closely related to the social divisions that were persistently reproduced in the policies. The participatory mechanism has been observed as processes of reinforcing the groups’ disadvantaged social position.

### 7.5.1 Social Gaps in the Local Experiences

The opportunities to interact with other social groups were significantly limited for the Korean Chinese groups in the committee. Firstly, it was related to the marginalisation of the previous policies. The Korean Chinese groups did not have sufficient social ties with the local government and long-established Korean groups.
As has been seen, the social relationships between the local government and Korean residents thorough Newtown project became important ties to attract the participation. However, the relationships between the local government and Korean Chinese groups were not strong compared to Korean groups. Moreover, even in the case that the Korean Chinese groups had social ties with the government, the relationships with long-established Korean groups tended to become a crucial part for participation as the committee initially focused on the Korean groups.

[In the Newtown project] The government did not ask anything to us. There was not any contact from the government or Newtown committee. They proceeded the Newtown only focusing on the landlords. […] These landlords are still controlling the [Urban Regeneration] committee. They know each other, but I do not know anyone. It makes it difficult to talk smoothly.

(‘Hae’, Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016)

Even local organisations, which have been working around 20 years in the neighbourhood, did not have strong social ties with the Korean committee participants. They were not involved in the Newtown project, and it was not easy to build social relations even after they began to be involved in the Urban Regeneration project. It was mainly because dominant opinions in the committee were occupied by the previous participants in the Newtown project. The strong social network among Korean people who shared the experiences in the Newtown project made Korean Chinese members feel isolated. For example, several Korean members who were working in Korean Chinese organisations occasionally participated in the committee by request from the local authority. However, they were reluctant to participate further, and the bonded networks among Korean members frequently emerged as the reason in the interviews.

Secondly, regarding Korean Chinese residents, the structural limitations inducing a lack of opportunities were observed in the participatory planning. As has been seen in chapter five and chapter six, many Korean Chinese members in the neighbourhood were engaged in low-income jobs. A Korean Chinese member in the committee pointed out difficulties due to different lifestyles for Korean Chinese residents to be involved in the committee
meetings. It was difficult to generalise for overall Korean Chinese members in Garibong-dong because the social and economic contexts of members differed even within the groups. However, for Korean Chinese low-income workers who consisted of a significant number of the Korean Chinese communities, it was not easy to have steady routines due to their irregular works. For example, some of the Korean Chinese workers got involved in construction sites by being paid daily wages (see the following figures). Every early morning, construction companies which were looking for workers gathered with small vans in Garibong-dong to pick up workers. For those workers, working hours were not fixed. If they are lucky, they need to work as much as they can; otherwise, meandering around the neighbourhood and playing the janggi [Korean chess] on streets are their daily lives. Without any room to seek other activities, their lives were exposed to great uncertainty. In this situation, opportunities to mingle with other social members were limited, and more than that, it was not their priorities compared to ‘surviving’.

Figure 7.4: Workers waiting for the morning job market, Namguro station, Garibong-dong, around 4 am, in 2012 (source: author).
Figure 7.5: A van filled with tools for working in construction sites, Namguro station, Garibong-dong, around 7 am, in 2012 (source: author). Figure 7.6: A worker negotiating with a guy who came to recruit workers, Namguro station, Garibong-dong, around 7 am, in 2012 (source: author).

Even among the Korean Chinese residents was interested in local participation, their working times were different from normal workers in many cases. The Korean Chinese member mentioned:

I invited around ten people from the Korean Chinese communities in the Urban Regeneration project. […] One of them had a lot of interest in the local activities. She participated well in other Korean Chinese activities such as a cleaning campaign. But it was difficult to participate in the meetings for her. She is working as a carer. She is working from seven to ten in the morning and six to ten in the evening. The meeting time is always for regular workers, around 7 in the evening. Even for the shop owners, that is the busiest time for restaurants.

(’Minji’, the leader of a Korean Chinese organisation, interview, March 2016)

On the other hand, those understanding the local systems were limited in the Urban Regeneration team. Instead of trying to build deeper knowledge about residents, the understanding of communities from the Urban Regeneration team was frequently based on the abstract idea about communities (see the section 7.2).
[Regarding ‘the middle-aged’ families] We need to listen to why they want to leave the place, why they do not want to stay. Then we need to set up the meeting time in the evening and weekends.

(‘Zoh’, government officer, interview, March 2016)

As argued in chapter six, even though the planning policies emphasised the involvement of diverse groups, the involvement was frequently imagined based on the preassumed understanding of desirable participants rather than diverse groups who were found in local neighbourhoods. In this consideration of involvement, the different social contexts and situations of immigrant groups were rarely understood. On the other hand, the difficulties to be included in consultation processes were often interpreted as a lack of interests or lack of capacity.

The limited understanding of the Korean Chinese groups was significantly observed in the Urban Regeneration project. When it comes to the Uma Street committee which focused on the Korean Chinese shop owners on Uma Street, the committee meetings were constantly postponed due to the lack of participation. The meeting times, which were evening times which is the busiest time for restaurant owners, had to be adjusted several times to morning, and afternoon.

For many of the Korean Chinese residents who were involved in low-income works, ‘meaningful’ social contacts in the neighbourhood were limited. They were engaged in the workplaces with Koreans which required communication skills38, but the social interactions as equal social partners such as friends, or partners in organisations were rarely found. The communication between Korean Chinese groups and Korean groups were observed in hierarchical relations such as landlords and tenants, or the owners of companies and employees. Overall in Seoul, a large part of Korean Chinese communities settled down in Korean society, but the Korean Chinese groups in Garibong-dong were

38 Due to that, an interviewee mentioned that even though Korean Chinese groups were engaged in low-income works, those occupations such as construction works, carers, or baby sitters were paid better than other occupations in which other foreigner groups were involved. Other foreigner groups who could not speak Korean tended to work in factories in rural areas.
still mainly located in the situations where the opportunities to build equal social relationships were limited. Moreover, the previous urban policies also did not provide opportunities to build mutual social understanding about each other (chapter six).

7.5.2 Taking Local Knowledge into Account?

Secondly, the ability source, such as the local knowledge, resources and competencies of Korean Chinese groups to draw other participants’ attention was also not developed. Theoretically, when it comes to the ability of participants to pursue a common goal in the participatory planning, it could be seen in several different ways: a capacity of a participant to raise and discuss his or her opinions in the consultation processes, a local influence of a participant to draw other participants or mobilise local opinions, local knowledge had been developed in the neighbourhood (see chapter two). However, the capacity of Korean Chinese did not work as a source of social capital in consultation processes. Firstly, it was also related to the marginalisation of previous policies. Secondly, it seems partly because of the lack of a broad goal to involve wider participants in the Urban Regeneration project.

Regarding other abilities, particularly the capacity to deliver the opinions, the lack of social ties with other Korean committee members was strongly related to the capacity of Korean Chinese members. The long-established Korean participants asserted their opinions based on their networks. The opinions were also shared and formed in informal networks among Korean groups not only in the formal meetings (chapter eight). In this capacity to mobilise the local opinions, the gap in the planning knowledge between long-established Korean groups and the Korean Chinese groups emerged significantly. The Newtown project, which did not include the Korean Chinese members, was the crucial experience for Korean committee members to build planning knowledge. The planning knowledge which had been built during the Newtown project became a notable tool to assert their voices for other Korean members in the Urban Regeneration project (it will be dealt with in chapter eight further). Moreover, the knowledge of the core network was
formed through the actors who were involved in the relevant field with planning. The occupations of members of the groups consisted of a professor, a lawyer, and an architect (see also 'professional activist' in Campbell & Marshall, 2000). The opinions of Korean Chinese groups were frequently dismissed without support. The gap of knowledge tended to become bigger compared to other Korean members who had strong planning knowledge, and the knowledge was not shared well under the different interests.

Also, even in the Urban Regeneration project, these knowledge gaps were not mediated. Although the Urban Regeneration project emphasised ‘the village with multiculture’, the Korean Chinese groups were not considered as an actor who needs to raise their own voices (see section 7.1), and their local knowledge was not taken into account in the consultation process. There was a strong system based on the neighbourhood which served for everyday lives of the Korean Chinese residents, but the tacit knowledge about those lives was not included as important information in the Urban Regeneration project. The local organisations had discovered the local issues of Korean Chinese which the government did not deal with in many cases. For example, in the duration of the field work, a local organisation began to work for building public toilets for the Korean Chinese workers. As has been described, the street was the place where the workers sought jobs, and free meal services for the workers were delivered in the morning. During those hours in the morning, the lack of public toilets was a significant inconvenience for the workers. Apart from that, as demonstrated in chapter five, welfare system such as pre-school and shelters were also relied on the activities of local organisations. The collaboration between these civic organisations and the Urban Regeneration project were rarely observed.

In the imbalance of knowledge, the Korean Chinese members could not act as the counterpart of Korean committee members. The knowledge or other ability of Korean Chinese members were not considered as a desirable ability for the Urban Regeneration team and other participants, and it did not build further motivation to build social ties with the groups. The knowledge gaps in the planning procedure between the Korean Chinese
group and Korean group were based on the wider context related to the recognition of the
groups. It was involved with the previous social status of Korean Chinese who have been
marginalised in the planning procedure. The lack of social ties in the previous planning
activities linked to the lack of capacity to be a significant member who can raise the
opinion, and it was not mediated in the Urban Regeneration project.

7.5.3 Mobilising the Networks based on Experiences of Being Accepted or Refused

Apart from the lack of social ties and lack of attention toward their capabilities, more
significant limitation in forming social capital was a lack of motivation—in other words,
social trust\textsuperscript{39} or shared destiny to persuade the members to associate with others. The
Korean Chinese groups were not willing to build social relationships with Korean groups,
and it was based on social distrust about Korean groups which have been built through
previous experiences. The Korean Chinese communities were aware of the social
understanding of their group through various experiences (chapter six). It became the
reason why they did not participate actively. In the interviews from the Korean Chinese
groups in the local neighbourhood, several themes related to social recognition emerged
as the reason why they did not participate in Urban Regeneration projects.

First of all, the Korean Chinese groups pointed out how the Korean groups view them.
The notable factor was that the interests of participation had been limited based on the

\textsuperscript{39} Social trust seemed to be necessary to deal with more carefully. Some studies which focused on inter-
group relations in the neighbourhood pointed out feeling safe as a part of weak social trust based on social
capital (Power & Willmot, 2007; also see Wang, Zhang, & Wu, 2017). Many participants argued in
Garibong-dong that the conflicts in the neighbourhood reduced as social campaigns and education
programmes proceeded. Also, some Korean Chinese residents mentioned about the experiences to get help
from Korean residents. Some Korean members showed strong opinions about the right of Korean Chinese
people to live in Korean society by emphasising the humanitarian aspect. When the researcher asked
Korean Chinese people about feeling about living with each other, such as feeling safe, preference for the
Korean Chinese communities as tenants, and experiences of helping each other, a large part of interviewers
responded positively. However, when it comes to the social trust as ‘social partner’ to equally participate
in the Urban Regeneration committee, it showed different dimensions (it will be dealt with in the next
section further).
Korean Chinese society. They differentiated the activities among Korean Chinese communities and the activities with long-established Korean communities.

That [the regeneration project] is not our business. It is not the thing that we can participate in. I said to other people [Korean Chinese] “don’t join the political party and don’t involve in claiming the right”. […] I don’t do even if I have a citizenship. It's the most convenient way.

('Yong-gun’, Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016)

In other words, they did not want to participate to avoid the conflicts with previous Korean dwellers. They understood if they argue their right in the situations when they were involved with other Korean social groups, it would induce conflicts. In this understanding, deeply embedded experiences were not accepted as equal partners in the neighbourhood. They used to say that Korean people do not consider them to be ‘genuine residents’.

Other residents used to think that we [Korean Chinese] will leave whenever we want, and consider us as half-residents. So, if I, a rolling stone from elsewhere, make a strong opinion, Korean people would react against that. […] Even though we are the majority in the neighbourhood, we don’t need to raise our voices because we are living with them together.

('Ryu’, Korean Chinese advisory member, interview, March 2016)

The arguments about the assumption about their right as citizens were also frequently observed. They sometimes asserted their acquired citizenships, or taxes that they have paid, and legal rights that are secured by the law. Those counter-arguments have been built through the experiences of encountering Korean citizens. This awareness of not being considered as genuine residents has been built in everyday life, including regarding the provision of and access to formal governmental services or local community activities. They were frequently refused access to formal welfare services. The local senior citizens’ centre, nurseries, or multicultural family centres did not provide social services for Korean Chinese groups. An encounter with Korean citizens at formal local services demonstrated this:
Do you know the centre for senior citizens? Now there is a separated centre for Korean Chinese funded by the ‘Gu’ [the unit for the administrative district, the same with ‘ward’ in the UK] office. But in the old days, those who have acquired Korean nationality went to the senior centre for Korean people. […] Then, do you know what other Korean people would say? […] They said that “Why do you use the facility without paying the tax?” and told them not to come.

('Ryu’, Korean Chinese advisory member, interview, March 2016)

Due to the experiences of not being welcomed by Korean citizens, Korean Chinese people mentioned that they would reconsider before going to public services. The groups sometimes ‘did not know about their rights’ even after the policies were expanded because of their attitude. It was similarly observed in the Urban Regeneration project. The participants in the project mentioned that they thought that the Urban Regeneration project did not include the Korean Chinese group since the Newtown project had excluded them.

Regeneration? At first, I did not have much interest in the regeneration project. I thought that I do not have the right to do anything here. We are all living here as tenants. […] It's a little bit wider now. Now, it is not redevelopment after demolishing; it is regeneration.

('Minji’, Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016)

Due to that, one Korean Chinese interviewer mentioned that the government needed to specify that “we welcome the immigrant groups” when the government hold the public events. He said that although there was not a specific restriction about the participants if the government did not specify that the immigrant groups were included, the groups would not participate out of fear of being refused. The ‘participants’ in the governmental activities were assumed as Korean citizens, and it was experienced on various occasions.

Some of the Korean Chinese people pointed out the experiences of ‘the exclusive Korean local groups’. They mentioned the experiences of being excluded from the local groups such as the president of a neighbourhood association or a merchant association. The exclusions were experienced by the local voluntary organisations, not only by the urban policies. An interviewee argued that these experiences were the reasons why Korean Chinese groups lost interest in the local activities with other Korean groups.
The Koreans are now in charge of the merchants' association. Now they hold all the positions and have registered, so we cannot even apply. From then, Korean Chinese people are not interfering at all. Korean Chinese people should participate because the majority of the merchants are Korean Chinese. But if Korean people want to involve them, they need to give some positions for Korean Chinese groups. But it is not working like that at all. They got together; they got their budget. It becomes discrimination, right now. It also has a lot of impact on the Urban Regeneration project [due to the experience, they do not want to participate in the Urban Regeneration project either].

('Minji’, Korean Chinese organisation, interview, March 2016)

The experiences in local activities based on the mixed groups with Korean members were not positive. Among Korean Chinese groups who have participated in the social activities, Korean groups pointed out the 'feeling of being mobilised'. As seen in chapter 6, they used to argue that the government mobilised them to show their achievements. Korean Chinese groups have been involved in many multicultural events because they were the largest foreigner group in Korea, but they used to be excluded regarding the funding or social support. The experiences of cultural subordination became the reason why they do not want to participate in the activities with Korean groups. The Korean Chinese people who have been actively working in the local activities related to the experiences.

It could be too bitter if I say so, but the events which Korean people lead, I mean, the event itself could be meaningful for Korean Chinese people. But at the same time, there were some other purposes for themselves such as to show their achievements politically.

('Ryong’, Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016)

There was also the local participation committee in Daerim. So, I am also attending foreign residents' representatives. When I went there, I felt there was not much right to speak as a Korean Chinese. […] Other Korean Chinese people also said they don’t want to be involved anymore because it feels like being sidekicks for them. I mean, the participation of Korean Chinese people was understood as a kind of non-essential element for the projects. In fact, they never aim for the neighbourhood where we can live well together. Never.

('Sun’, Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016)
The experiences have also been connected to the Garibong-dong regeneration project. The Korean Chinese participants argued that they were involved as little as possible because the government did not show a ‘sincere gesture’\(^{40}\). A member mentioned that the Urban Regeneration team included the groups only because it was impossible to entirely ignore the Korean Chinese groups, not because they wanted to reflect their opinions.

When they came to me to appoint me as an adviser, I guess it seemed that they did as a mere formality. People have guts. When people treat me sincerely, I treat my partner sincerely. Otherwise, it does not work.

('Ryu’, Korean Chinese advisory member, interview, March 2016)

Due to the experiences that they felt of being mobilised for the Korean groups’ purpose, rather than being fully treated as a partner, they tended to ‘choose to be independent’. The Korean Chinese interviewers considered it as the growth of the Korean Chinese group, not as the disconnection of the society.

We participated because there are no other ways, but later, when I keep thinking back, I felt that I was exploited. So now we do it with our own hands. [...] We can afford it now. We do not have a reason to go after the Koreans. It should be understood as the growth of Korean Chinese society.

('Ryong’, Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016)

The Korean Chinese organisations tried to contact the government through the activities rather than to be connected to other Korean organisations. They used to prefer to communicate with the local office directly instead of sharing opinions with other Korean members. There were a number of Korean Chinese organisations in the neighbourhood which had been working for more than ten years. Some organisations were led by Koreans, for example, a Korean Chinese local news company with a Korean editor-in-

\(^{40}\) This attitude toward the Korean groups was also observed in the interview. When the research recruited the interviewees, several members in the Korean Chinese communities were constantly recommended (see chapter four). Those core participants were interviewed frequently in research and media; therefore, the answers were sometimes constructed. However, as the interview was progressed and as rapport was built through the observation of the committee, some of the interviewees mentioned about their feeling about the Korean society in more detail.
chief or a Korean Chinese church with a Korean minister. Some of them owned their buildings and properties in the neighbourhood. In other words, they could not be considered as temporary low-income tenants, but long-established local members who had the capacity to raise their voices. However, they were not involved in the Urban Regeneration project, and as a reason, they pointed out that Korean participants did not welcome their participation and they had a different understanding of the Korean Chinese groups.

There was no one who contacted us in the Newtown project and in the early stage of the Urban Regeneration project. They invited us when the Seoul Metropolitan Government pointed out the exclusion of Korean Chinese as a problem of this project. We would not be invited if we don’t have our properties in the area. […] When we were involved, Korean landlords took control of the committee. We intervened in the middle of the process. […] Instead, I am close to the head of ‘Gu’ or ‘Dong’ [both are the units of the administrative district]. I have a good understanding with the mayor of Seoul, so I discuss it from the top. But I don’t think it is a desirable way. We have to create a bottom-up exercise by participating in voluntary discussions and make it together. I think this is a difficult part.

(‘Sung’, Korean Chinese organisation, interview, April 2016)

As mentioned earlier, it was difficult to say that the social networks among the Korean Chinese groups were not observable. The networks among the communities were also found in the interviews; however, it was not linked to the participation in the committee. In contrast, the negative opinions about social activities with Koreans tended to be shared through their networks. They chose not to be involved instead of being subordinated and to work independently because they did not expect to raise their voices.

A significant issue which was observed in the research was that, by understanding the groups in a simplified way which was associated with groups who did not have the motivation to participate or the capacity, the planning processes ignored the certain existence of Korean Chinese actors. Not only the Korean Chinese residents had short-term visa status but also some actors such as local organisations were not involved in the decision-making processes. There were some organisations who had been working for
the Korean Chinese groups and Korean Chinese business who settled down and owned their properties. They have been functioning as pivotal points of transient Korean Chinese residents and played a role as a representative for the groups. They were the main actors in local events and activities but rarely included in decision-making processes of the Urban Regeneration project. The Korean Chinese organisations were occasionally invited in the committee meetings, but it was rather to give opinions about the sub-projects such as Uma Street or street cleaning campaign according to the plan which was already made through the consultation.

The absence of the Korean Chinese participation tended to be a result of the strategical choice of the Korean Chinese groups, not because merely their social networks were too weak. In other words, the formation of social capital in the committee was not inclusive for the diverse local relationships. The visible social capital of the committee was framed and mobilised through the practice of participation (also see Wilson, 2016).

7.6 The Reinforcing of the Misrecognition of Korean Chinese in the Consultation Processes

The immigrant groups were in different situations due to the marginalisation in urban policies. The contested groups’ identity was not reconsidered in the urban policies throughout the local history, and uneven social capital of participants reproduced the construction of communities in the Urban Regeneration project. Moreover, the misrecognition of Korean Chinese groups’ identity also has been observed on the understanding of the groups from the Korean committee members. It is difficult to argue the causes and effects—whether the social attitudes of the committee members toward Korean Chinese became the barriers for the Korean Chinese to participate, or that misrecognition has been reinforced by the lack of participation of the Korean Chinese groups. However, the notable factor was that the Urban Regeneration project did not provide a means to mediate this gap and rather shaped.
7.6.1 Dissolving the Structure

The interviewees in the group of experts pointed out that providing opportunities for the immigrant group to be engaged in urban policies is important for future relationships. The large part of the limitations such as limited social capital between Koreans and the Korean Chinese group was considered as the result of unequal opportunities in the previous policies. However, the understanding from the Korean committee group was significantly different. They considered the incompetence of Korean Chinese residents as the groups’ natural attributes. It involved the assumptions about the Korean Chinese group’s cultural attributes and the comparison of them with Korean committee members’ own community identity. When it comes to the interviews of Korean committee members, they showed a complicated understanding of Korean Chinese groups. They used to ignore the structural limitation of Korean Chinese groups in which they were situated. They individualise the limitations by pointing out their motivation and capabilities and simplify that as their group’s natural attributes.

As has been argued, the marginalisation of the urban policies has exposed the Korean Chinese groups to greater limitations to participate compared to the former Emergency Measure Committee. On the other hand, Korean Committee members did not consider the lack of capacity as resulting from the social situation in which the Korean Chinese are located. The ignorance of the structural differences has frequently been observed in interviews. For example, an interviewee argued that Korean Chinese groups claimed their identity as a Korean Chinese group to justify their positions although there was not a disadvantage. He mentioned that the Korean Chinese social organisations tried to strengthen the group boundary to complain about their disadvantaged social status.
They argued that they are discriminated to justify their behaviours. It is not discriminations. [...] So, for example, we let Yong-gun [anonymous name] raise the voice too much. We gave a lot of benefit for them. They did act for the neighbourhood. But the local activities became the means for the purpose, not the purpose itself\(^{41}\). [...] Now, while Korean Chinese are living, there's not much trouble between the house owners and the tenants. But that organisation's voice is problematic. An unrealistic voice promotes social public opinions. [...] They keep making the boundaries. I am going to get rid of it.

('Jongdae', member of the committee, interview, May 2016)

The social disadvantages were understood as the assertion of the Korean Chinese groups, not as a factual situation. As has been seen in the previous section, the Korean Chinese groups tended to act based on their organisation to be independent, not to be subordinated. Those social activities became more observable in the recent years as the Korean Chinese society grew. On the other hand, it was understood as forming the boundaries by the Korean committee members. The group boundaries, which have been seen as the solidarity of the Korean Chinese groups, were understood to be the social conflicts which needed to be diminished\(^{42}\).

Social integration was assumed to be done by bringing over the Korean Chinese groups within the Korean society as subordinated groups without much consideration of the pre-existing unbalanced positions. In this sense, the understanding of the Korean Chinese groups as a part of neighbours in the planning agendas seems to be necessary to rethink. The Korean Chinese groups have been understood as a part of residents in the social cohesions agenda, but not as actors who needed to raise their own voices within the decision-making processes with other social partners (chapter six). The activities to adapt

\(^{41}\) The arguments seem to have a differing understanding of the upward movement of social capital. In the comparison of the social networks providing social services, the interviewee limited the social activities as the substitution of the government policies, but was not fond of the building capacity to raise the political opinions.

\(^{42}\) This interview showed a complicated understanding regarding a ‘deconstructive’ approach. Although the transformative remedy, which delivering blurring and softening group divisions, it should not be a means to ignore the structural inequality. The transformation of group boundaries needs to be based on the institutional setting to include the members with equal social esteem, not by making the wider inequality invisible (see chapter three).
to the Korean society were considered as partly unpleasant experiences which embedded social hierarchy for the Korean Chinese members. Also, not only in the policies but also within the understanding from the long-established Korean groups, superordinated-subordinated social relations were observed. Sorting out garbage well, going around in a patrol by participating in the self-policing campaign were understood as recommendable activities while raising the immigrant groups’ own opinions were understood as activities aggravating social conflicts.

On the contrary to undermining those limitations induced by the experiences of social subordination, the Korean committee members pointed out the individual motivations as the preeminent reason for the exclusion of Korean Chinese groups. Korean participants used to point out a lack of the sense of belonging as the reason why Korean Chinese groups did not participate.

Korean Chinese are living today and going back tomorrow. That’s all. Are they interested in the neighbourhood? [They aren’t]

('Kwon’, member of the committee, interview, May 2016)

The lack of a sense of belonging became the main argument to understand the reason why Korean Chinese groups did not participate. However, as has been demonstrated in the previous section, it was difficult to generalise the intention of the Korean Chinese groups. Although many parts of the communities had short-term visas, a certain number of people including the local organisations stayed in the neighbourhood for around 17 years by continuously keeping the social infrastructure for the Korean Chinese groups. Some of the Korean Chinese groups showed the sense of belonging by asserting they were the groups of people who are working and living in the neighbourhood.

Moreover, even if the Korean Chinese groups cannot claim their sense of ownership, it is questionable whether this is because their claims were not accepted or because they do not have interests or affections for the neighbourhood. The misrecognition of the group was influential not only to the social perception toward the groups but also to the members’
self-respect (Taylor, 1994). Without securing their staying and without welcoming their existences, generalising their tendency about the place attachment could be problematic. These complex feelings about the neighbourhood were frequently observed in the interviews with the Korean Chinese members. When the researcher asked them about the Korean Chinese groups in Garibong-dong, they used to say “Korean Chinese people don’t stay here for a long time”, or “they want to move to other places after earning enough money”. However, when the researcher asked about the personal history and the plan about settling down in Korea, they tended to mention Garibong-dong as their base. Although the reasons differed—jobs, place attachment due to the long history of local activities, social infrastructures such as social supporting or churches, the education of their children, friends who came from the same hometown, or housing prices—, they stayed in the neighbourhood between 5 years to 17 years, regardless of whether they want to leave or not. The place attachment can contribute to the active participation in the planning procedure (Anton & Lawrence, 2014; Lewicka, 2005; Manzo & Perkins, 2006), and the precarious situations of the Korean Chinese groups were not possibly helpful for building the sense of attachment. However, as argued, the collective sense of belonging is not only based on an individual sense of belonging but also built through political struggles (Antonsich, 2010; Yuval-Davis, 2006).

The Korean committee members used to point out the lack of sense of belonging of Korean Chinese groups as a reason of their lack of participation. In the arguments, the social inequality which Korean Chinese groups experienced were undermined, but the individual responsibility was emphasised. By emphasising the responsibility and motivation, the argument of the Korean committee member about their position as desirable participants were highlighted.

7.6.2 Claiming the ‘Genuine’ Participate

In comparison with other social members, the sense of responsibility about the neighbourhood was emphasised in the networks of the former Emergency Measure
Committee. The members seemed to share similar opinions about the local activities. For example, they had a sense of responsibility about the neighbourhood because they were aware that they contributed to the cancellation of the Newtown project.

Among around a thousand and nine hundred people [the landlords who were the main community group in Newtown], many thought ‘they [Emergency Measure Committee] saved our neighbourhood.’ […] That made us feel responsible. Anyway, from the viewpoint of “one who has tied a knot must untie it”, I think that we need to watch the later procedure, the regeneration project or whatever, so I began to participate. That is the reason why the proportion of the former Emergency Measure Committee became bigger in the regeneration committee. Their thoughts are all similar to me.

(‘Ilwon’, the leader of the committee and the former leader of the Emergency Measure Committee, interview, May 2016)

We have a kind of comradeship among us [Emergency Measure Committee] because we underwent a lot of difficulties for fourteen years. Well, it is somewhat intimacy, or a sense of kinship because we finally met the goal together. […] Around two-thirds of the members of the regeneration committee are the people whom I did protests with. We couldn’t leave the neighbourhood [because of the experiences].

(‘Jongdae’, the deputy leader of the committee and the former member of the Emergency Measure Committee, interview, May 2016)

In the discourse, the position of the core members as a desirable community became strengthened by understanding the limitations as the immigrant groups’ natural attribute. The committee members pointed out the lack of capacity of the Korean Chinese groups to participate in the Urban Regeneration project by considering it as a feature of Korean Chinese groups. They used to emphasise limited knowledge as their natural attributes.

Uh, in around 1982, 1983, by 1988, those who came here among Korean Chinese were intellectuals. But from 1993 onwards, the people who came here were the lowest class in Chinese society. (‘Song’, member of the committee, interview, May 2016)

The social and cultural differences of China also appeared to point out the group's limitations. The lack of experiences in the democratic procedure due to their culture in
Chinese society was frequently mentioned to indicate their limited capacity. The understanding of Korean Chinese people as a group lacked the knowledge which appeared frequently. The committee members understood it as the group attributes by associating their cultural backgrounds.

The experiences of the former Emergency Measure Committee in the Newtown project built a strong bonding among members, and it became social ties to draw the participants in the committee. On the other hand, by arguing their authenticities as responsible communities, it became a way to exclude other social members. Arguing their authenticities based on the networks itself is not necessarily harmful to the inclusive participation. Those bonding social capital can be a useful tool to draw other participants as a ‘soft sanction’ (Rydin & Holman, 2007), and it made the groups’ social issue observable for the government by linking the groups with the government (Weisinger & Salipante, 2005). However, in the Garibong-dong case, those bonded networks emerged as a social barrier for other members. Firstly, due to the previous conflicts in the Newtown project and the marginalisation of the Korean Chinese groups, social ties between different groups were difficult to find in the neighbourhood (Vervisch, 2011). Secondly, as has been seen in the interviews about the Korean Chinese groups, the arguments about the social positions of the core members were not only about their own groups’ characteristics but also have been emphasised through derogating other social members’ positions. The main drawback of the bonding social capital among the core members was induced that the members did not intend to include other participants. It was closely related to their shared understanding of a common goal of the Urban Regeneration project (see chapter eight). The decision-making power was concentrated on the former Committee members by electing the leaders within their networks and consisting of the majority of the committee. In these dynamics to occupy the decision-making power, the core members utilised the arguments of responsible residents as leverage based on their networks.
As Raco (2003) pointed out, emphasising the responsibilities of residents can result in the exclusions of others by only drawing a ‘deserving community’. Similarly, the ‘genuine residents’ having responsibility and the sense of ownership have been emphasised in the Urban Regeneration project.

Then, we think we need Joomin [residents, 주민] not only means Joomin in the sense of Joo as living [جو which means ‘living’], but also Joomin in the sense of ‘Joo’ as owner [جو, which means ‘master’, ‘owner’, or ‘host’]43.

(Jewon Lee, Seoul comprehensive regeneration plan, press briefing, 9th March 2015, retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZTpt91lyKFI)

By emphasising the responsibilities, the Urban Regeneration project encouraged the spontaneous participation of residents. The sense of ownership and responsibilities based on the strong networks became an important aspect of drawing participation. However, this spontaneity was highly contextual. The participants activated social networks as negotiating power in the participatory planning based on a possible achievement. In the contested interests, a certain network acquired the voice to assert the authenticity. Contrariwise, it undermined the structural limitations of other social groups by locating them as a group who lacked responsibilities.

The notable factor was that encountering in the neighbourhood and activities to improve social cohesion were not linked to the enhancement of the decision-making power of the immigrant groups. When it comes to the understanding of Korean Chinese in the regeneration project as a peer group, the recognition of them was significantly different from the understanding of them as local neighbours. On the one hand, the committee members asserted the positive aspects of Korean Chinese groups as neighbours, but on the other hand, they differentiated their own group and Korean Chinese communities by giving the reasons such as a sense of belonging and the capacity as citizens. As mentioned,

43 In Korean, the word ‘Joomin’ which means residents uses Chinese character ‘Joo’ as the meaning of living. However, there is another Chinese character which sounds in the same way ‘Joo’, but means owner. Jewon Lee used the other Chinese character to emphasise his argument.
this categorisation between Koreans and Korean Chinese sometimes was observed regardless whether the individual members had ownerships and the experiences of local participations. The Korean committee members did not consider the residents and the participants in the planning procedure in the same dimension. The social capital, which was based on the sense of responsibility and trust about each other’s capacity in the planning procedure, among them, built the distinctions of themselves from other residents as ‘a group who is more capable’. It showed clearer differentiation in comparison with Korean Chinese groups.

7.7 Conclusions

This analysis showed that those social ties were essential for participants to participate in the participatory planning. However, at the same time, this also indicated that lack of social capital for members of a certain group could result in unequal opportunities to participate in the participatory planning. Furthermore, as can be seen, the uneven formation of social capital among local members tended to be based on their wider social experiences in the local neighbourhood, which were largely effected by the urban policies throughout the history. The policies tended to embed dominant/marginalised relations (chapter six), and the segregated experiences were linked to the formation of social relations in the neighbourhood.

Through the close examination of the neighbourhood dynamics, this case study showed that the formation of social capital is influenced by the wider social recognition of the groups. The influences of social recognition have been shown in the degree of pre-existing social ties—how many or strong latent social ties had been built—, as well as in the processes how social ties have been activated in the practice of participation. These aspects regarding the influence of social recognition in the formation of social capital were rarely understood in social capital studies in the participatory planning.
This also showed that the current understanding of inter-group relations was limited, especially as social-political partners not only as neighbours. The weak social trust such as feeling safe in the neighbourhood sometimes was not lead to respecting each other as equal social members in participatory planning. Cultural differences such as language and social norms were also pointed out as the reason for the weak inter-group relations (Ryan et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2017). It became the ground to emphasise the physical contacts and shed light on social capital theory. However, it is difficult to say that the division between the Korean committee groups and the Korean Chinese group was solely induced by the lack of face-to-face interactions or language issue as seen in this chapter. The members showed that the weak social trust had been built through interactions in the neighbourhood, but those social relationships were not linked to the social capital to draw participation.

On the other hand, the social capital to include the immigrant groups as a partner in collaboration were rather affected by social recognition of the groups in the policies. The social recognition reinforced the social divisions between the immigrant groups and the long-established groups. The pre-existing social ties were uneven due to the marginalisation of the Korean Chinese groups throughout the history of the neighbourhood. They did not have opportunities to build experiences as an equal social partner with long-established Korean groups. Furthermore, as the Urban Regeneration project did not include the Korean Chinese groups as equally significant members with Korean residents, the groups did not find the further motivation to assert their right in the participatory planning processes. The social divisions which Korean Chinese groups experienced were strongly intertwined with their social, economic and cultural positions. It was not negligible that there were structural limitations which many Korean Chinese groups had due to their unstable economic status and citizenships, and furthermore, those existing divisions were strengthened through their embedded cultural images. The cultural hierarchies sometimes existed regardless of whether the individual members possessed citizenships or properties. As has been seen, the simplified understanding of
the groups even discouraged the motivation of Korean Chinese members who had played roles as local leaders. On the other hand, these domination-oppression relationships were not fully examined in planning processes. The ‘equal opportunity’ was only considered through distributing the right to participate voluntarily. This perspective was not helpful to understand the reason for the resulting marginalisation and even made the issues of unbalanced social relations obscure.

On the contrary, the Korean committee members actively utilised their social capital as the means for reproducing benefit for their networks by differentiating themselves and others (it will be discussed further in chapter eight). While they have built stronger social relationships in the Urban Regeneration committee, the participation of the Korean Chinese groups was separated. The local activities regarding Korean Chinese groups became sub-projects that have been influenced by the committee that mainly consisted of the long-established Korean members. The decision-making power of the Korean Chinese groups was not enhanced, and the opportunities to build social capital with other social members in the decision-making processes were limited. The groups fell into the subordinated positions in the divisions between groups who made decisions and other groups who were mobilised for the project. Even though the participation was open to all, social capital had been formed within the wider context of social exclusion, and it made differences in the representative process.

To sum up, the data showed that the formation of social capital in participatory planning was influenced by the understanding of communities in the policies. The members formed solidarities and exclusions based on their networks, but within the judgements about wider situations. These judgements were much more complex than a mere trust or favourable impression in interpersonal relationships. It involved the understanding of achievable goals by exerting power through the networks. Because of that, how policies have been observed the groups were crucial to becoming a social partner to pursue
common goals. The group dynamics were a significant aspect to understand the mechanism of social capital in participatory planning.
Chapter Eight: The Operation of Social Capital in Participatory Planning

8.1 Introduction

Through chapter seven, the mechanism of social capital in the representative process was discussed. The formation of social capital in the Garibong-dong committee was influenced by the social recognition of the groups in the urban policies. In the formation of social capital, how those pre-existing relations were framed through the practice of participation were significantly influential. The social ties among groups were considered differently depending on the contexts of the groups. Apart from whether the social groups actually had their networks to mobilise, the groups were not considered as equal members in the activities, and the member had differing capabilities to utilise their social networks based on the policy frames. By spontaneous participation processes, but without mediating the embedded oppressions toward the immigrant groups, the social capital in the Garibong-dong regeneration committee was strongly concentrated on a certain group.

This chapter demonstrates the possible drawbacks of the concentrated bonding social capital by examining outcomes of consultation processes. Chapter seven was about how the social capital in the members of the committee has been composed in the comparison between mainly two groups, the Korean Chinese groups and the long-established Korean groups, and chapter eight is about how this concentrated social capital was deployed in decision-making processes by focusing on the members of the committee. Limited decision-making power of the immigrant groups is not only the issues of their opportunities to build further capacity, but also it can result in consequent marginalisations from benefits of the planning practices (see chapter three).
This chapter shows how the powerless in the decision-making processes that occurred by misrecognition can result in further marginalisation of the outcomes.

The results from participatory processes were often based on the assumption that the consultation processes can transform the participants’ pre-existing ideas (see chapter two). The composition of the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee raised questions how the mediation and transformation can be achievable in the concentrated social members. Young (2002) argued that:

[D]emocratic theory does not often raise the question of whether the scope and memberships of the actual [emphasised in the original] polity dealing with specific problems corresponds to the scope of what the polity ought to be if the discussions are to include all those affected by decisions.

(p.27; also see Dussel, 2011)

Apart from the role of pre-existing social capital in enabling participation, many pointed out the importance of social capital in decision-making processes. The contributions of social capital in the participatory processes can be seen as the following: sharing knowledge, defusing the inter-group tension, and persuading the members in the governance to reach a common goal (see chapter two). This chapter examines the social capital among the member of Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee, in respect of those contributions of participatory planning, sharing knowledge, defusing tensions, and reaching common goals. After firstly showing how pre-existing social capital has been developed through participatory planning, this chapter discusses its emergence in the decision-making process.

8.2 The Emergence of Social Capital in the Decision-making Processes

As can be seen in the previous chapter, bonding social capital among the former Emergency Measure Committee members emerged significantly in the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee. The pre-existing bonding social capital among 17 members of the former Emergency Measure committee, which contributed to drawing participation, did not seem to be reconstructed through the committee processes. The Network Analysis showed that the structures of social networks in the
committee were focused on bonding social capital among the former Emergency Measure committee members.

8.2.1 Influences of Previous Memberships: Informal Networks behind Formal Networks

The social capital among the former Emergency Measure Committee formed significant sub-groups in the informal networks in the regeneration committee. The informal networks were analysed based on friendships, and meeting frequency (the questionnaire is attached in Appendix B and C). Even though the other previous memberships were not observed significantly, the maps showed the dominant clusters of the committee were formed based on some of the core members from the former Emergency Measure Committee (see the following figures, the red circles included the former Emergency Measure Committee).

Figure 8.1: The friendship clustering.  
Figure 8.2: The advice clustering.
The informal networks seemed more active than formal networks such as information and advice networks (see the next section), even though the regeneration committee was formed for a formal purpose. The friendships and collaborative relationships in the Garibong-dong committee have been seen in an intertwined way. The members of the committee used to show the friendships in the committee by referring to the members as “brothers” or “sisters”.

They used to call each other as Hyeong, Dongsang [the way to call a younger brother in a casual way, bro]. “Hey bro, did you have lunch?” like this.

(‘Gangil’, community coordinator, March 2016)

As described in the previous chapter seven, the members tended to show strong bonding with each other. They used to mention that they protested together days and nights. There were frequent collective actions such as collecting a budget for a lawsuit which was against the planning procedure. Some of the members emphasised that “we fought upon our life” (the interview with ‘Song’, a member of the committee, April 2016). As Adler and Kwon argued (2002), a shared destiny among the members
has built the strong social capital. The relationships have been connected to local friendships even after the cancellation of the Newtown project.

Regarding the centralities, the two core members of the Emergency Measure Committee emerged in informal networks. When the researcher asked, who is your friend in terms of spending time together such as hanging out for dinner and drinking tea, the respondents mainly pointed out Jongdae or Yongil [anonymous name]. The tendency was also similar in the other informal networks such as meeting frequency networks (see table 8.1 and 8.2).

Table 8.1: The centralities in friendship networks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informal network</th>
<th>Friendship (n=23⁴⁴)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eigenvector centrality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>node</td>
<td>value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yongil (node number 7)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jongdae (3)</td>
<td>0.9538194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.8331759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.7518361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.5777946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁴⁴ The total number of the members of the committee were thirty-one. However, the nodes did not participate in the survey and which were not nominated by other members were excluded in the analysis (see chapter four)
Table 8.2: The centralities of meeting frequency network (more than once per week).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informal network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meeting frequency (more than once per week, n= 22)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eigenvector centrality</th>
<th>Degree centrality</th>
<th>Betweenness centrality</th>
<th>Closeness centrality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>node</td>
<td>value</td>
<td>node</td>
<td>value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yongil (7)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jongdae (3)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jongdae (3)</td>
<td>0.9627495</td>
<td>Yongil (7)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.9289618</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.8008350</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>0.7821786</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The notable factor was that the core friendship networks seemed to have influences on a formal procedure by sharing information or planning knowledge. They have formed informal friendship groups to get together, but some parts of them also formed a group to discuss further measures after the cancellation of the Newtown project. Although the networks were based on informal contacts, the interviewees mentioned that information about planning procedure frequently emerged as a main topic in the conversations (interview with ‘Koo’, April 2016). When it comes to the central members, two core informal members had played crucial roles since the Newtown project as information sources. They had strong knowledge about the planning
process and had external relationships to gain the information about planning laws (See Burt, 1998; Leonard & Onyx, 2003a)

I was a lecturer in the training session for the Incheon [another region in Korea] urban development corporation. This is a textbook [as showing the book], and this is mainly about judicial precedents. This book [as showing another book] is about the development process. [...] When I wanted to understand redevelopment projects, I needed to know twenty-eight different laws in my mind. [...] I educated our residents about this contents. I didn’t know those things before 2003.

(‘Jongdae’, the deputy leader of the committee and the former member of the Emergency Measure Committee, interview, May 2016)

As soon as I sent the message to Yongil, I got a call from him. [...] He said that he has been working for a long time in a national alliance for the housing measure. He worked on several different projects as a low consultant. [...] He said that he was not only working in Garibong-dong but also working in overall Seoul.

(Field note, 9th May 2016)

In other words, the planning knowledge was embedded in the social capital in the committee. The Newtown project was an activity for them to build their knowledge. The networks were formed based on the previous planning activities, Newtown, rather than other social memberships such as hobby clubs. Although the networks emerged in an informal way, the relationships played a role as the information source and had the influence to mobilise people in the current committee. Even though they formed informal networks in the Urban Regeneration committee, their social relationships were not only based on intimacy but also based on information networks. To see the influence, the next part will deal with the formal networks.

8.2.2 The Centres in the Formal Networks

The formal networks showed a slightly different result, but the former Emergency Measure Committee still emerged significantly. Two informal centres tended to support the formal centre, not directly leading to the formal networks. In terms of formal networks, the study collected data about the advice and information networks. Contrary to the two core members in the informal networks, another member of the
former Emergency Measure Committee appeared as the centre in the formal networks. *Ilwon* [anonymous name] appeared as the central node (see table 8.3 and the following figures).

**Table 8.3: The centralities of an advice and information network.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal network</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advice</strong></td>
<td><strong>Betweenness centrality</strong></td>
<td><strong>Closeness centrality</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>In-degree centrality</strong></td>
<td><strong>node</strong></td>
<td><strong>value</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilwon (12)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ilwon (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jongdae (3)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Jongdae (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yongil (7)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yongil (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8.4: The map of an advice network.

Figure 8.5: The map of an information network.
The nomination of Ilwon as the central position seemed to be not a surprising result, in considering that he was the leader of the committee. As mentioned before, the roles of the leader and the deputy leader in the committee seemed to be significantly important as they transmit the information and opinions between the residents’ committee and the planning team. The survey was mainly conducted along with an interview with the member, and the members used to mention that “it’s [I chose Ilwon as a person to get advice] because he is the leader.” (‘Koo’, April 20016). In this case, the contributions of the latent social relationships in his central positions and his positions as the leader were closely related. His pre-existing relationships in the neighbourhood help him to become the leader. He was recommended to participate in the election of the leader by other members of the committee and was elected as a sole participant.

There were two different types of networks in his latent relationships. The first was his wide social networks extending over several local memberships, and the second was bonding social capital with the former Emergency Measure Committee. Ilwon had wide local relationships compared to the other members. He was included in the former Emergency Measure Committee but also participated in several different local memberships such as a church, the group of the representatives of the neighbourhood and an informal friendship group (see Appendix D). Also, Ilwon was supported by the bonded networks which had been formed based on the former Emergency Measure Committee. The other members of the former Emergency Measure committee, including the central actors in the informal networks, recommended him as the leader.

I said that “you do [lead] that [committee]” to Ilwon because he is better than me in the local neighbourhood.

(Jongdae’, the deputy leader of the committee and the former member of the Emergency Measure Committee, interview, May 2016)

In other words, the other informal centres were aware of the wide connections of Ilwon and recommended him as the leader strategically. Those three members, two informal centres and one formal centre who were all included in the former Emergency Measure committee, collaborated in the committee processes. Those relationships among three
members have significantly emerged in the Social Network Analysis and the interviews.

Even though the central member of the committee, Ilwon, had wider social ties, the social capital was still concentrated on the former Emergency Measure committee. Despite weak ties of Ilwon extending over different social memberships, the knowledge sources of the committee seemed to be still based on the former Emergency Measure Committee. As can be seen in the clustering in the advice networks (figure 8.2), the knowledge sharing was concentrated on the cluster of the former Emergency Measure committee. Due to that, the other social members from different memberships in the committee needed to access Ilwon to get advice. Ilwon has played a role as a gatekeeper and a provider in the information flow (Burt, 2001). Ilwon was able to reach different actors, not only local members but also the government through the master planning meetings. He played an important role for the other social members to transmit the information but also, on the hand, was able to select or block the information. The two informal centres played the roles in providing that information to Ilwon. For example, other social members, particularly the members from other networks such as the LH committee nominated Ilwon as the formal central node, but Ilwon nominated the other two members, Jongdae and Yongil as the information source (see figure 8.4). When it comes to the wider networks beyond the Garibong-dong committee, Yongil had been connected with other committees in other areas in Seoul. His involvement in the wide networks regarding the planning activities was developed from the Newtown projects. The other members such as Jongdae and Ilwon have shown their trust about his capacity to reach planning information.

The networks of the committee consistently concentrated on the former Emergency Measure committee, especially focusing on three core members. The newly formed relationships through the committee processes and the transformation of pre-existing networks were rarely observed. Providing and creating information relied on the members of the former Emergency Measure Committee focusing on the three members Ilwon, Jongdae, and Yongil.
8.2.3 ‘The Ties Which Can Be Mobilised’: Instrumental Motivation and Ability to Mobilise Opinions

The mechanism of strengthening bonding social capital was related to the shared goal among the core members of the committee. The mechanism of the bonding social capital in the committee was difficult to be understood without considering the local history. The Newtown project was heavily involved with the financial issues such as how the land value became higher after the projects, and how much we need to invest (chapter six and seven). The historical context of the latent relationships before participation considerably affected the current social capital (Vervisch, 2011). As argued in chapter seven, the understandings of the aim of the Urban Regeneration project were significantly different from the groups. The Korean Chinese members understood the Urban Regeneration project as a new way to maintain the neighbourhood by preserving the local environment (chapter seven). On the other hand, the members of the committee understood the Urban Regeneration project as an opportunity to actualise the raised property values by replacing the Newtown project (also see figure 7.2 and 7.3 in chapter seven). This understanding from the committee members was observed significantly in the consultation processes, and this collective goal appeared as a basis for strengthening the pre-existing bonding social capital. Even though the regeneration project has been introduced as an alternative to the Newtown project, the idea about urban projects, to make the maximum profit by raising the property value with the minimum investment, was embedded in the participants. The structures of the networks have been formed through the instrumental motivation to utilise the Urban Regeneration project for the raised property values, and focusing on the core members who have abilities to mobilise their ties.

Based on this collective goal, the instrumental motivation emerged importantly by strengthening the bonding social capital in the decision-making processes (Baker, 1990; Burt, 2000; De Graaf & Flap, 1988). The regeneration committee tended to be understood as the voluntary work for the common good (Rydin & Pennington, 2000). Due to that, the normative commitment for the public good has been emphasised as important sources of social capital to participate and sustain the activities in the
participatory planning (also see Inch, 2014). This normative commitment was also observed in the social capital in the Garibong-dong committee as can be seen in chapter 7. On the other hand, the instrumental motivation, which aimed to utilise the social ties for delivering their opinions and for the consequent rise of their property values, was also observed overtly in the committee. Regarding this aspect, an interviewee denigrated their place attachment by saying that it is “attachment about their property, not about the neighbourhood” (interview with ‘Gangil’, community coordinator, March 2016). The Seoul Metropolitan Government officer said that the motivation of the core networks was based on mutual interests.

The expression to describe the relationships among the core members seems to be difficult to find. It is not intimacy. It’s rather based on financial interests which are consistent. The Garibong-dong committee is based on a firm understanding of each other’s interest. So, they are not swayed by logic. You cannot appeal to them by human emotions. It is better to say that the committee is based on a common interest.

(‘Zoh’, public officer, interview, March 2016)

However, it was difficult to reduce their sense of ownership and attachment to instrumental motivation. This dichotomy between the place attachment and the pursuit of the property values seemed to be based on the simplified understanding of ‘good citizens’ who were against developmental pressure and others who pursued speculative benefits (chapter seven). On the other hand, those different types of motivations were not mutually exclusive in the social capital among the main members. The social capital of the former Emergency Measure Committee has shown multi-layered dimensions. In the hope of vitalising the neighbourhood, those different dimensions were not separated but observed together. The problematic part of the committee processes seems to be that this instrumental motivation was not mediated by sharing the new value of the Urban Regeneration project rather than the existence of the instrumental motivation itself. Instead of that, the Urban Regeneration team

Moreover, it is questionable whether searching for ‘real’ place attachment is possible. As can be seen in this case study, the personal sense of place attachment and the claim for it, and the ways to frame that by the government were not straightforward.
overlooked this aspect and sometimes even facilitated this motivation to draw active participation (this will be discussed in the later part).

On the other hand, this negligence of the Urban Regeneration team to mediate the shared understanding was also partly due to the pressure by the committee members. They exerted their power efficiently based on their social capital in the governance processes, and it was difficult to control by the local planning team. Based on instrumental motivation, the efficient delivery of the groups’ opinions based on their strong networks became important in the committee. In the decision-making process, the members who have administrative and planning knowledge to mobilise the groups’ opinions played central roles in the networks. Those abilities strengthened their networks for mutual benefit by working as a means to deliver their opinions to the government. The knowledge of the planning procedure among the core members became the way to put pressure on the government, the planning company, and the planner. The interviewee who observed the process described that.

They are the people who have been trained a lot through the process. They know how to utilise the information and civil complaints. So, if the Seoul Metropolitan Government acts perversely [to them], then they would file civil complaints. They filed the complaints to a public service centre, ‘nowadays government public officers, they are against the opinions of the residents by having an obsolete way of thinking.’ Then, there is nothing the public officers can do. There is no way to deal with.

(‘Gangil’, community coordinator, interview, March 2016)

The ability sources in their social capital, which made it possible to cope with the planning procedure, were significantly shown in the interviews. As has been demonstrated in the previous section, the members also networked with other Urban Regeneration projects in Seoul areas, and the information about other projects sometimes became a source to put pressure on the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration team. These practices of mobilising opinions contributed to building the converged network surrounding the former Emergency Committee members.

The processes of forming social capital in the committee were largely based on the shared understanding of actualising the benefit of the network. This goal was assumed
to be achieved more effectively when the committee was based on a small number of members who shared understanding. Out of this practical interest based on maximising the benefit and efficiency and minimising the cost, strategical choices about the ties were observed in the committee. As has been seen in the previous chapter seven, the Korean Chinese groups which seemed to have different interest as tenants could not be included in this network. Once the committee had been formed, the collective actions toward their benefit were accelerated. These closed processes induced several issues by hindering the advantages of community participation.

8.3 The Dark-side of Bonding Social Capital

The Garibong-dong committee strengthened their pre-existing bonding social capital throughout the committee processes. The bonding social capital among the core members showed exclusiveness for other participants in the decision-making processes. It became one of the reasons why the positive outcomes of participatory planning were hindered in the Garibong-dong Committee. The outcomes of the social capital among the core members can be observed in two results from the consultations. The consultation processes have altered the direction of the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project slightly, from the ‘community-led regeneration integrating multiculturalism’ (2014) to ‘energetic regeneration with G-Valley’ (2017) based on the understanding among the members of the committee. Furthermore, the committee formalised an exclusion of others by forming the regulations of the committee.

8.3.1 Shaping Common Concern Based on the Concentrated Network

Firstly, the forming common concern based on a certain group’s opinions resulted in reducing the broad mission of the regeneration project. The main directions of Garibong-dong regeneration slightly altered through the consultation process. For example, when the regeneration project was firstly announced, the proposed title of the project was ‘community-led regeneration integrating multiculturalism’ (Seoul Metropolitan Government Housing Policy Department, 2014); on the other hand, the
plan was changed to ‘energetic regeneration with G-Valley\textsuperscript{46}’ after two years of consultation (H. Lee, 2017). The social programs for immigrant groups became sub-projects by focusing on the Korean Chinese group separately (see chapter 6 and 7), not including them in the consultation processes. The tensions regarding two directions, the building social cohesions with Korean Chinese groups and the drawing potential consumers from the surrounding areas, called G-Valley, lasted during the consultation process.

In the seminar, the participant started to argue that the planner needs to consider the direction of multiculturalism again. He argued that multiculturalism had failed widely around the world, and two directions, multiculturalism and drawing the young workers from the Guro digital complexes cannot be implemented together.

(Field note in education seminar, 29\textsuperscript{th} October 2016)

Based on a pursuit of the ‘prosperity’ of the neighbourhood, drawing potential consumers from G-Valley was emphasised in the consultation processes. Compared to this aim, social integration with the Korean Chinese groups has been understood as a less significant issue. Furthermore, the Korean Chinese groups were rather considered as a tool for the aim of drawing G-Valley workers. As mentioned in chapter seven, the committee members understood the Korean Chinese groups as two different dimensions; one is the Korean Chinese shop owners in Uma Street as a possible source of economic enhancement for the area, and another is Korean Chinese residents as unfavourable neighbours who can live together by ‘educating’ the groups, but as one of the symptoms of the dilapidated neighbourhood. Drawing the people working in G-valley was emphasised in both understandings. The value of Uma Street was emphasised by asserting “nowadays the popularity of authentic Chinese foods among young people” (field note in Committee meeting, 25\textsuperscript{th} March 2016). On the other hand, replacing the Korean Chinese residents by drawing the workers in G-

\textsuperscript{46} G-Valley referred to the surrounding areas of Garibong-dong, Guro Digital Complexes (see chapter five). Guro Digital Complexes were previously Guro Industrial Complexes in the 1970s and 1980s before the redevelopment. The \textit{pŏlchip} where the Korean Chinese groups are currently living were formed to supply the houses for the workers in Guro Industrial Complexes in the 1970s.
valley as a new residential group was asserted as a blueprint for the future of the neighbourhood.

It is ideal for Koreans to live in the neighbourhood, not Korean Chinese. But it is not something that can happen just because I want and because “the residents” [emphasis added] want it. In the previous Newtown project, the displacement of Korean Chinese groups would inevitably have occurred. In this situation [in Urban Regeneration project without an overall demolishing] if the maintenance of the environment is done, the price of the houses will be raised, and the rent is going up. It can be a ‘post-Garibong-dong’. You know ‘the supply and the demand’. And then these people [Korean Chinese] will disappear naturally.

(´Song´, member of the committee, interview, May 2016)

These people [young workers in the G-Valley] do not live here. Now the committee members want the young workers to live here just like the past. In the past, G-Valley was the Guro industrial complex. Homeowners want to restore the neighbourhood as the supporting area for G-Valley like the past.

(´Gangil´, community coordinator, interview, March 2016)

The history of Garibong-dong with the female workers in the 1970s was frequently emphasised to support this argument (see chapter five). The prosperity of the neighbourhood in the 1970s significantly emerged in the interviews and the committee meetings. The members referred to the Newtown period as “the lost decade”. Losing the connections with Guro areas and the consequent replacement of residents by the Korean Chinese groups were understood as the side effect of the postponed development project.

The involvement of the Korean Chinese groups, particularly the Korean Chinese residents, in the decision-making processes was inevitably hindered under this understanding. The interests between two groups somewhat collided. The Korean Chinese member was occasionally involved in the committee meeting, and the shared understanding of the common goal was confirmed persistently.
And then she [the Korean Chinese member] said that “it doesn't make sense to attract industry workers in digital complexes to Garibong-dong.” She said, “In the past, the workers in the industrial complex in the 1970s were the people from rural areas. They did not have any basis in Seoul. [Therefore, they needed to stay in Garibong-dong.] Now, the worker in G-valley are the people who are commuting from other areas of Seoul. They don’t have any connection with Garibong-dong.” The other committee member refused her opinions. “It is also impossible for Uma Street to survive without drawing the people from G-Valley. The shops in Uma Street were also moved a lot to Daerim-dong recently.” And he added “there are so many advantages of the Korean Chinese. They are good at cooking” and also asked her “aren’t you naturalised to Korean nationality, are you?” [he did not mention anything more, but in the context, he seems to mean that ‘don’t you have buildings here? Then isn’t it good for you too, if the land value is raised?] She just nodded her head without saying anything. The guy said, “let’s ‘use’ [emphasis added] the Street by modernising”.

(Field note in Committee meeting, 25th March 2016)

It was not a surprising reaction that the Korean Chinese member lost her interest in the committee processes. The common goal was based on the pursuit of property values, along with undermining the Korean Chinese groups. It was not explicit in the Urban Regeneration plan but openly discussed in the committee meetings.

In the altered direction based on the ‘common concern’ of core members, the Korean Chinese groups have been marginalised. The public officer mentioned that there were strong opinions from the committee on this change. As has been seen in the ability source of their social capital, the capacity to deal with the planning process and administrative works became a tool to deliver their opinions.

Now, when we discussed the direction of urban regeneration, the question what urban community is coming up. Whether we make the plan with the immigrant groups as a subject or make the plan with the house owners by just letting them [immigrant groups] consider as an object. The two directions inevitably go in opposite directions. The latter one is focusing on ‘how we create added value in the area’. When the planner and the planning company set up the plan, the committee interrupted a lot. ‘Don’t do as you want. This is what we want. This is the opinions of residents. Why do you do as you want in the community-led project?’ They constantly push to include their opinions. So, as far as I know, the plans are now oriented in the direction as these residents wanted.

('Zoh’, public officer, interview, March 2016)
The members of the Garibong-dong committee tended to be particularly active to deliver their opinions. This capacity was frequently considered as a contribution of social capital in the literature, but it was difficult to be seen as a positive outcome in respect of assumed ‘common concern’ to persuade wider social members who can be affected by these decisions (Campbell, 2005, 2006). On the other hand, under this pressure, the Urban Regeneration team focused on making this procedure look like a proper consultation process, rather than searching for other alternative ways to mediate the processes. The involvement of social ties of the core members focusing on the number of participants was recommended by the planning team (field note, 14th April 2016). The other sectors understood that as a temporary remedy to deal with the project during the assigned period (interview with ‘Zoh’, public officer, March 2016). Apart from that, initiating the core groups was believed to be helpful for future sustainability and the expansion of further participation, and it was emphasised to rationalise the process in the planner’s argument (interview with ‘Woong’, planner, March 2016). Even though the pressure by the participants’ social capital was significantly observed, it was difficult to ignore that the planning team’s misunderstanding or negligence has contributed to this process.

The main members of the committee reproduced the idea of urban development to raise their property values through the participation, and they used their bonding social capital actively under this shared goal. Through the consultation, the directions of the regeneration altered to emphasise the relationships of the neighbourhood with the surrounding areas called G-Valley instead of the integration with the Korean Chinese residents. Based on this understanding, the Korean Chinese groups were categorised merely as actors in the sub-projects only focusing on the Uma project and social education programmes. The committee members were not willing to include the Korean Chinese groups in the decision-making processes. This intention was explicitly observed in the formalised regulation of the committee.
8.3.2 Formalising Exclusions through Regulation

The intention of the committee members to exclude other participants was explicitly observed in the regulations which they formed. The second example of decision making based on bonding social capital in the committee is building regulations. The main issue of the instrumental motivation among core members was that it became the reason to build a closed committee procedure. As decision-making processes proceeded, the participation of other social members became more difficult due to that shared understanding becoming more solidified.

The instrumental motivation for utilising the funding restrict participation to the only limited number of members. The researchers who examined the social capital based on the rational choice theory pointed out that the participants tended to try to maximise the benefit with the small number of members when there were the limited resources (Agarwal, 2001). The concerns about the limited resources to be utilised were frequently mentioned in the meeting and interviews. The local participants used to mention that “we need to use this funding wisely because the government would not give money again”, and “if we do well this time [in the Urban Regeneration project], probably there will be another chance by another project” (a field note in the master planning meeting, on 16th March 2016). The interviewee pointed out that it is partly because of the lack of understanding of the local communities from the government.

Based on the understanding to mobilise the governmental funding, the committee members were not willing to include members who had different opinions. The intention of the core members was observed in the regulation which they conducted and got approved. The committee drew up the regulation and submitted to the government.

(The government just bounded up the area with the regeneration projects before attempts to build the networks of residents. When the government showed the 10-billion’s funding, the government blocked off the way for other residents to participate. 10 billion (around six or seven million pounds) won is not that big, but not that little money either. When the government says “10 billion”, the local power immediately gathered. “That money is ours.”

('Gangil’, community coordinator, interview, March 2016)

Based on the understanding to mobilise the governmental funding, the committee members were not willing to include members who had different opinions. The intention of the core members was observed in the regulation which they conducted and got approved. The committee drew up the regulation and submitted to the government.)
The regeneration project didn’t have the regulations because it just started. We made the regulations and submitted to the Seoul Metropolitan Government, in the opposite way. We sent up to the government, such as an operational protocol of regeneration, and said ‘approve, quickly’.

(‘Jongdae’, the deputy leader of the committee and the former member of the Emergency Measure Committee, interview, May 2016)

They seemed to try to build a stronger barrier to participate in the committee by the regulations. For example, the regulations included the clear criteria about the requirement of the participation.

There was a section about the “requirement of the regeneration committee”. […] when the committee makes the regulations, they can include all the people regardless of the duration of living, or citiizenships, but the Garibong-dong regeneration committee was not a case like that. They wanted to form the committee around themselves as much as possible. They made really strict regulations. […] They blocked the ordinary citizens’ participation very clearly.

(‘Gangil’, community coordinator, interview, March 2016)

“The member” of the committee means that the owners of the buildings or lands in Garibong-dong, tenants, and the businessmen with the business registration over 19 years old. […] Tenants need to submit a copy of their residence registration […] [regarding the board members] A candidate needs to pay a deposit of a million won [around 600 pounds] to register as a candidate.

(The regulation of the committee, September 2015)

As has been seen in chapter six, the involvement of Korean Chinese groups was not actively discussed in the urban regeneration policies. The groups were located in an ambiguous position; the Korean Chinese communities were groups who are living, working and consuming in the neighbourhood, and they consisted of the majority of the neighbourhood. However, they were not perceived as desirable participants in the policies.

In the process of making the regulations, the networks of the former Emergency Measure Committee played an important role. The regulations became passed through the vote because the former members consisted of the majority of the committee. In an attempt to exclude the other members except for the core members, the regulations became a controversial part of the Garibong-dong regeneration process. Among the
members of the committee, the regulations became the way to put pressure on each other.

Minsu [an anonymous name] said at the last meeting “I have something to say. To become a board member, a member needs to participate in the regeneration education programs according to the regulation. […] His saying means that ‘don’t come here anymore’.

('Jongdae’, the deputy leader of the committee and the former member of the Emergency Measure Committee, interview, May 2016)

Jaeyong [an anonymous name] is rubbish. He wanted to be a board member of the regeneration committee. […] People asked him to pay the deposit of three million [around 1800 pounds]. ‘If you drop out of the vote, the money will be forfeited.’ People insisted that he needed to pay at least a million. There is only one person who paid, Ilwon. I persuaded Ilwon to pay. He paid a million, and Jaeyong even didn’t pay, so Ilwon became a leader as a sole candidate.

('Hee’, member of the committee, interview, May 2016)

The mechanism of regulations can be seen in the example of the elected leader. The regulation of the election was formed favourably to the member who had a wider network in the committee. By the majority rule, electing the leaders among the former Emergency Measure Committee seems to be an expectable result.

In the respect of social capital, which is defined as ‘features of social organizations, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate action and cooperation for mutual benefit’ (Putnam et al., 1994, p. 35), the social capital of the former Emergency Measure Committee was significantly effective to actualise their purpose. They actively drew the participation based on their networks and utilised the opportunities to raise their voices. The members were willing to spend an enormous amount of time for the regeneration project by preparing the documents, meeting separately to discuss the project. However, the outcomes of collaboration were far from the expected outcomes of the social capital in the participatory planning. The missions of the regeneration project were altered focusing on the main participants, and the wider participation was regulated by the core members.
8.4 Exclusions Impeding the Contributions of Community Participation

The decision-making process based on the bonding social capital showed the limitation of bonding social capital. As can be seen in the literature chapter, the researchers pointed out the contributions of social capital: knowledge sharing, defusing tensions, and persuading other members to see the missions of the organisation as the high priority (see chapter two). However, those positive contributions were seriously damaged by the bonding social capital in the Garibong-dong case.

In terms of its contribution to participatory planning, the social capital between groups seemed to be essential. In other words, not only the existence of social capital but also its structure regarding who have the social capital among the participants could be important. Weisinger (2006) pointed out several conditions for organisational culture facilitating the bridging social capital (also see Holman & Rydin, 2012).

The organisation possesses a mission, values, and practices that attract diverse members to the organisation. […] Initial interaction practices for mixed groups are characterized by no collective action that requires the stronger, bonding form of social capital […] no organizational activities that draw attention to or celebrate primary group differences.

(pp. 49-50)

The enhancement of the neighbourhood environment seemed to be understood as the broad mission to embrace the participants based on the geographical boundary (Agger & Jensen, 2015; Merrifield, 1993). However, the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee failed to attract the wider community from the beginning, and the mission of the regeneration project became restricted based on the small number of participants’ interest. The missions in the Urban Regeneration project were separated according to the groups, such as mobilising the budget in the committee and the Uma Street project. In considering those conditions which Weisinger (2006) pointed out, the separation of the participation of Korean Chinese groups from the committee processes did not seem to be positive to build relationships between members.
When it comes to each assumption of social capital’s contribution, the knowledge sharing in the participatory process also tended to be restricted without bridging social capital. In terms of sharing knowledge, it did not seem to be strategically helpful from the viewpoint of the Emergency Measure Committee. Ishihara (2009) argued that bonding social capital seems to contribute to creating the knowledge, and it is sometimes based on a rational choice. They pointed out creating knowledge is not sufficient for the collective action without bridging social capital sharing the knowledge.

Community members may tend to act collectively only when they can formulate a common knowledge that acting collectively creates benefits that outweigh the costs of such effort. […] While it is often assumed that in such cases social capital plays an important role in reducing transaction costs and thus facilitating collective action, we argue that if social capital is to be instrumental in this sense, it would be mainly through its ability to create common knowledge. […] For collective action to be successful it is not sufficient to create common knowledge but it has to be shared or internalised among the community members.

(pp. 1554-1555).

As has been seen in the Network Analysis, the knowledge flow was concentrated on the core members. They actively worked in the formation of common knowledge among the members. The core members collectively acted in producing the common goal of the regeneration project in order to create their benefit. Not only in the practical ways to deliver their opinions, but they also produced the symbolic meaning of their group as decent participants within their understanding of the Urban Regeneration project. The planning knowledge became a tool to exert power, and it worked based on the instrumental motivation for the Emergency Measure Committee.

In the restriction of knowledge sharing, the Korean Chinese groups were disconnected from the core group. The issues of Korean Chinese groups were marginalised in the committee processes. The issues were shifted to Uma committee’s responsibilities or undermined as individual interests. The Korean Chinese member raised several issues such as refurbishing the shops in Uma Street or the ways to communicate for the tenants in the shops with landlords. When the Korean Chinese issues emerged, the committee used to shift the topics to the Uma-street committee.
In addition, the staff of the gu office said that “when they organised the Uma-street committee, seventeen people are Korean Chinese and seven people are Korean.” And she said, “We cannot say about Korean Chinese issues, just let them work well, and we need to think about the residential areas to bring the young people from Guro.”

(Field note in the committee meeting, 25th March 2016)

In the consultation processes, the local participants, regardless of their backgrounds, frequently raised some issues which seemed to be related to their interests such as rebuilding the roads in the front of their houses or the locations of bins collecting the garbage. Those issues were not taken into account in the committee processes seriously as the main concern, but the public officers or the other local members sometimes provided suitable information for the member to deal with those issues. On the other hand, this process to gain and to share knowledge regarding the Korean Chinese groups’ issues was rarely observed. Firstly, the issues were less visible in the committee due to the lack of participation of the Korean Chinese groups. Secondly, the knowledge of the Korean Chinese groups to be provided was limited in the Garibong-dong committee. The local lives of the groups in the neighbourhood were largely based on the informal ways, such as job seeking, house hunting, and children education. The information about those issues would be the richest in the local organisations who had supported the immigrant groups for a decade. However, as argued in chapter seven, this knowledge was not included in the committee, and the consultation processes did not function as the arena to build knowledge for the Korean Chinese groups.

This limited formation of social capital, not surprisingly, was not helpful for defusing the tensions between groups. The process of the Garibong-dong committee became the reason why other social members lost motivation. In the interviews, a significant number of the members who were not included in the cluster with the core members mentioned the bonded networks among the core group as the reason for losing motivation. The participants acknowledged the formation of power in the meetings occupied by certain members. Apart from the formalised regulation, the involvement of other social members naturally reduced. The concentration of social relationships
became the reason why other social members did not participate except for the former Emergency Committee members as time goes by.

Furthermore, the consultation processes seemed to be difficult to persuade other sectors. The collaboration between different sectors was impeded by the exclusiveness of the committee. Other sectors such as the Seoul Metropolitan Government seemed to be concerned about the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project in terms of its publicity. Tensions between the Seoul Metropolitan Government and the local planning team including the committee occurred. Rydin (2007) argued that social capital can play a role in building links to persuade stakeholders to generate a consensus on sustainable development. However, in this case, bonding social capital harmed the broad mission of the regeneration project and impeded further building relationships with other sectors. There were differing understandings about community involvement from the different sectors, and it became a part of conflicts in the processes. In the process of building the strong closed networks based on the core members, the other sectors except for the Seoul Metropolitan Government, such as a planner, the gu local authority, and the planning company did not seem to work to mediate the process. That was partly because the ability of the core members in dealing with the hierarchical relationship (see the previous section), but as has been seen, the sectors also did not have a strong motivation to draw wider participation.

However, it [the close network of core members] is in agreement with the interests of the planners. The planners themselves do not want other residents’ participation that much. The more people participate the more problems that need to be solved. When the Seoul Metropolitan Government asked to expand the participation, the planner cannot be directly against it but avoided the expansion of participation based on the opinion of the residents. Even though the Seoul Metropolitan Government says "Let's engage more residents," they [the planner] say, "What is the resident's participation in the opposition of the residents?" It [Garibong-dong] is the worst case that the gu, planner, the residents all together are stepping on Seoul mayor's willingness for community participation.

('Zoh’, public officer, interview, March 2016)
They somewhat agreed on the mutual understanding of each other’s interests. The local team partly aimed to proceed with the project without many conflicts. The solidarity of the core members was difficult to deconstruct, and moreover, effective in the consultation processes in the sense that providing procedural fairness on the surface and collect shared opinions. Contrary to these sectors, the exclusiveness of the committee was considered as a defect of the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project from the point of view of the Seoul Metropolitan Government. In the meetings, it was not rare to observe tensions between the Garibong-dong governance and the Seoul Metropolitan Government surrounding the understanding of the activities of the committee.

The monitoring was held by the Seoul Research Institute. [...] Then, the Seoul Metropolitan Government Centre Officer said, ‘but it is a matter of who the residents are’ [...] He said “among the thirteen regeneration cases, Garibong-dong is very unusual, and this place seems to have a little NYMBY, and the dynamics of power are different.”

(Field note in Master Planning meeting, 21st April 2016)

The Regeneration Centre in the Seoul Metropolitan Government took the exclusiveness of Garibong-dong committee seriously. Due to that, the Seoul Metropolitan Government asked the Garibong-dong committee to involve more residents, and the regeneration process came to a deadlock.

They [the committee] cannot represent the inhabitants. And they have a certain propensity [as the former Emergency Measure Committee]. And they have a certain interest. We [Seoul Metropolitan Government] think that they cannot represent the neighbourhood in terms of publicity, so we need to increase participation to secure publicness. Therefore, now, conflict and friction occurred because of that.

(‘Zoh’, public officer, interview, March 2016)

However, as has been seen in chapter seven, when the Seoul Metropolitan Government argued the expansion of participation, the potential participants were mainly assumed in a vague understanding of local communities. They insisted the involvement of ‘real residents’, such as middle-aged families (chapter seven), and the Korean Chinese groups were not included in these residents, who are potential participants but did not
participate yet. In these pressures from both sides, from the committee and the Seoul Metropolitan Government, the local regeneration team frequently insisted that “there was not a community group in Garibong-dong” (interview with ‘Gangil’, community coordinator, March 2016). As a result, the committee processes were reduced as a means to draw opinions to be informed instead of direct participation of the communities such as citizen control or partnership (see Arnstein, 1969). For example, a public officer in the Seoul Metropolitan Government stated that “the only way to control the Garibong-dong committee was not to hear them” (‘Zoh’, public officer, interview, March 2016). As the concentrated participants became a significant drawback of the Garibong-dong committee, active participation of the current committee was partly rejected by other sectors such as the Seoul Metropolitan Government.

To sum up, the social capital among the participants in the committee was observed significantly, but it did not lead to the expected contributions of social capital. The formation of social capital in the Garibong-dong committee was limited as the bonded social capital among the core participants, and not expanded to further relationships. In this limitation, the bondedness itself was a significant issue. It hindered the expected contributions of community participation.

8.5 Conclusions

The analysis shed light on the influences of social capital in the decision-making process. The previous participatory planning literature mainly understood the social capital among local participants as the bonding social capital by assuming the local community as a united group (Agger & Jensen, 2015; Legacy, 2010; Rydin & Holman, 2007). However, restructuring the relationships among the local groups was essential regarding not only equal participation but also the other purposes of community participation, such as social learning, defusing tensions, and collaboration between different sectors.

The mechanism of social capital in the committee showed double-sided aspects. The strong bonding social capital facilitated autonomous participation. In terms of
successful delivery to make their voice heard by other sectors, the bonding social capital was a strong means to amplify their opinions. Bonding social capital among core members showed its efficiency in delivering opinions, sharing information within the group, and creating knowledge. However, other aspects which were assumed as the contribution of social capital such as sharing knowledge between groups with different interests and building the basis of collaboration between sectors were impeded by this bonding social capital. When it comes to capacity building for future sustainability which has been frequently argued in participatory planning literature, this study formulates the questions, whose capacity, and what that capacity means. The capacity to collaborate within the networks was significantly strong, and it was developed through the participatory processes. However, this capacity is difficult to be perceived as a democratic capacity as citizens as Putnam argued (Putnam, 1995, 2000), or capacity for sustainable community participation as the Korean community-led regeneration policies argued (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2017). Even though many researchers pointed out the possible downside of bonding social capital in participatory planning (Holman & Rydin, 2012; Vervisch, 2011), the empirical studies distinguishing these dimensions between bonding and bridging social capital are still limited, particularly in the participatory planning (Leonard & Onyx, 2003a). The contributions of social capital can only be achieved when it was formed through inter-group relationships.

The analysis of social capital in the Garibong-dong case provided implications for the aspects of social capital relating to its transformative power. The social capital which has been built through the consultation processes was assumed to transform the pre-existing structure, including pre-fixed ideas about planning and other social members. However, the participatory processes did not always form bridging social capital by linking different actors, and the transformation was not achievable by bonding social capital. In addition, these results tended to show the possible drawbacks of deliberative democracy in a wider context. As can be seen in this chapter, the deliberative processes did not always secure fairness and did not necessarily reach the outcomes for wider communities. The participants cannot be free from their wider social contexts from the representative processes to the deliberative processes, and it
seriously influenced their power to be involved in the decision-making processes. The lack of power of the Korean Chinese groups in the decision-making processes resulted in the marginalisation from the benefit of the Urban Regeneration project.

This chapter has investigated the mechanism of participation, and the limitation of the regeneration committee in the case of strong bonding social capital among core members. Again, the interactions have not necessarily built social capital. Therefore, mere frequent meetings or a large number of participants do not always show the possibilities of building new social capital. Moreover, it can result in strengthening the bonding social capital as can be seen in this case. The institutional design needs to more take into account the remedy for the transformation of the local relationships to secure the positive contributions of community participation.
Chapter Nine: Conclusions

9.1 Introduction

The previous three chapters addressed findings from the empirical section. The principal aim of this thesis was to examine the social and political construction of local communities in the Korean planning system and its connection to the marginalisation of immigrant groups. Especially, this study had a particular focus on mechanisms of planning which were used to involve communities in investigating how inclusion or exclusion of certain groups emerged within planning processes.

Numerous planning scholars continue to be critical of current participatory planning that fail to engage the local community especially regarding so-called ‘hard-to-reach’ groups such as ethnic minorities (Beebeejaun, 2006, 2012; Beebeejaun & Vanderhoven, 2010; Brownill & Carpenter, 2007; Coaffee & Healey, 2003; Fincher & Iveson, 2008; Vigar, Gunn, & Brooks, 2017). However, there are limited studies on how and why marginalisation occurred (see Beebeejaun, 2006). The research found social divisions between long-established groups and immigrant groups which had become entrenched within planning mechanisms. Korean urban policies showed the construction of local communities embedding social recognition of immigrant groups. By exploring the urban policies throughout the recent history of Garibong-dong, this study identified the Korean Chinese groups had been understood as a group who lacked capacity as social participants. The understanding of groups in urban policies have frequently shown that the ways of coping with the groups based on their preassumed, stigmatised group identity compared to other immigrants from global North, so-called OECD countries or long-established Korean groups (see chapter six). These unduly impacted immigrant groups who faced significant barriers to participating.
This chapter reviews the findings of this study. The research questions which explored the processes of participation are discussed. These lead to a set of theoretical implications to building a deeper understanding of the institutionalised composition of local communities in the planning system and their emergence in the processes of participation. There is a particular emphasis on how the wider social structure of participants related to their everyday lived experiences. It leads us to be cautious about the influence of pre-fixed group divisions in the formation of social capital. Practical recommendations will be discussed to contribute to an institutional framework that includes diverse voices. This final chapter also includes a review of methodologies used in this research to shed light on the complexity of intergroup relationships. Finally, this thesis concludes by pointing out the future research area for planning in a diverse society.

### 9.2 Addressing the research questions

The three research questions aimed at elucidating the complex layers of social relations within local residents and their emergences in the processes of participation. This study has dealt with three different phases of the planning procedure. First of all, it focused on the social positions of immigrant groups in local neighbourhoods to investigate how wider inequality has been experienced in the local neighbourhood. The second and third research questions particularly investigate the consultation processes of the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project. The second question is focused on the representation processes of the local committee, and the third question deals with the decision-making processes of the committee. The second research question investigated representation processes in community-led regeneration using the lens of social capital. This research question explores how the embedded social positions in local relationships have emerged in the processes of voluntary participation. Thirdly, the committee processes have been further explored to trace the operation of social capital within the decision-making processes. It elucidates how the formation of social capital resulted in the outcomes of the consultation processes.
RQ1. What mechanisms have been used to involve immigrant groups in Korean urban policies, and how does the recognition of these groups emerge within planning policy processes?

Through this question, the research has sought to understand how Korean urban policies underpinning assumptions about immigrant groups shape the construction of Korean Chinese residents. The findings set out in this thesis indicate that the social perception toward the immigrant groups was embedded in the composition of communities in the planning mechanisms. Chapter six examined the Korean urban policies focusing on the understanding of immigrant groups in the policies doing from the middle of the 2000s to the middle of the 2010s. The understanding of Korean Chinese groups can be seen in Seoul immigrant policies and Garibong-dong neighbourhood plans. The ways to involve the immigrant groups in Korean planning have emerged as (a) processes promoting differences as touristic resources, (b) building social cohesion by educating immigrant groups about social rules and norms, and (c) drawing participation in community-led regeneration on a voluntary basis (see chapter six section two). The policy directions were different depending on two different Seoul Metropolitan mayors, Mayor Se-hoon Oh (2006-2012) and Mayor Won-soon Park (2012-present). As the policies emphasised on cohesive local communities and community participation from the term of Mayor Park, Korean Chinese, which were largely overlooked in the previous policies, began to be involved in urban policies. However, the negative social perception toward the groups still emerged as barriers for the groups to be included in policies (see chapter six).

As has been seen chapter three, the misrecognition of immigrant groups is not only an issue of revaluing their contested identity but also a matter which needs to be considered by questioning those dominant ideas producing group divisions (Fraser, 1995; Young, 1990). Each approach was based on a certain idea about desirable communities. For example, the immigrant groups were expected to have a cultural value which could draw visitors; to be adopted to the social norms and be accepted by Korean society; and to have the capacity to participate spontaneously in decision-making processes as active citizens. These ideal models of communities frequently
perceived that the Korean Chinese groups lacked the qualities required to be involved in the policies. Even though the main logic which shaped the construction of communities was different in each mechanism, the social position of Korean Chinese groups as low-income workers from a less developed area appeared persistently by undermining their participatory parity, and it formed multiple experiences of marginalisation over time. The urban policies reproduced the social understanding of the immigrant groups, instead of shifting or restructuring them.

Firstly, when it comes to the discourse of diversity as touristic resources, the Korean Chinese groups who had an ‘unfavourable’ social image as low-income workers were rarely included in policies (to see how the social perception toward Korean Chinese groups, particularly regarding the groups in Garibong-dong, were built in the media and policies, see chapter five). The marginalisation of Korean Chinese groups in the discourse of diversity was more significantly observed in the earlier stage of Seoul immigrant policies when ‘Seoul Global City Basic Plan’, which was focused on attracting foreign investments, was announced (see chapter six section 2.1). However, attempts to utilise immigrant groups as local touristic resources were still observed one of main ways to involve immigrant recent policies such as Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration plan, and the cultural image of Korean Chinese groups were persistently discussed in the consultation processes.

In the 2000s, while the urban competitiveness was a dominant agenda of the Seoul Metropolitan Government, Garibong-dong did not draw any attention and neglected in a planned demolition. In the multicultural discourse, the immigrant groups were understood as a source of foreign culture which enhanced the image of Seoul as a ‘global city’. Yet, the cultural value of Korean Chinese groups was persistently undermined in the policies. Attempts by Seoul Global City Basic Plan to build touristic attractions based on foreign culture became more frequently observed rather than enhancing the local lives of foreign residents who settled down. In this understanding, the culture of immigrant groups was considered as consumable goods such as unique or authentic places drawing consumers (see chapter six). The Korean Chinese groups which was associated with social images such as low-income, illegal
immigrant workers were not understood as cultural resources which attract visitors and investments (chapter six).

Even after Seoul first immigrant policy, Global City Basic Plan (2007-2012) was replaced by the second immigrant policy, Multi Values Seoul Master Plan (2014-current), an attempt to utilise immigrant groups as touristic source was understood as one of the main mechanisms involving immigrant groups. In the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration plan which was announced in 2015, the Korean Chinese enclaves, mainly focused on the commercial street with Korean Chinese shops, Uma Street, began to be considered as an important place for revitalising the neighbourhood. The long-established Korean residents and Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration planning team perceived the cultural characteristics which were seen as representative of foreign cultures with Chinese foods as possible sources to revitalise the neighbourhood by attracting consumers from other areas.

However, the attempt of dealing with the immigrant groups as touristic resources engendered several issues. Firstly, it tended to simplify the complex cultural and historical contexts of Korean Chinese groups. For example, when it comes to representing the Korean Chinese enclaves as a touristic spot, the characteristics of Korean Chinese were mainly imagined as ‘Chinatown’. On the other hand, the understanding of the groups as ‘Chineseness’ seems to be a view which overlooked complex relations between Korean Chinese and Koreans. Korean Chinese are a part of overseas Koreans but frequently differentiated from other overseas Koreans due to their economic status as low-income workers, and it was partly linked that the groups often showed the antagonism when Koreans understood them as Chinese nationals, not a part of overseas Koreans (see chapter five). Their group-based struggles were often undermined when they tried to claim their rights. Their identity as Korean Chinese placed them in unfavourable positions compared to other non-Korean groups or multicultural families.

Even though the Uma Street project was proposed without naming ‘Chinatown’ or ‘Korean Chinese Town’ which is promoting specific group identity, the cultural value of Korean Chinese group as cultural resources often emerged as topics in the
comparison with other foreign cultures (see chapter six). The complex dimensions of group identity of Korean Chinese were rarely understood in the consultation processes.

Secondly, by understanding the immigrant groups as touristic resources, the Urban Regeneration committee dealt with the local issues in the divisions between the issues regarding Korean Chinese groups and regarding Korean groups. When it comes to the decision-making processes, the issues in residential areas such as infrastructure and residential buildings were mainly discussed among long-established Korean groups. The local issues regarding Korean Chinese groups were mainly included focusing on how the projects can utilise the Street with Korean Chinese shops, not focusing on how the local issues that Korean Chinese groups faced can be dealt with in the Urban Regeneration projects. The principal parts of their local lives which had been built throughout a decade, such as an informally developed system for job seeking, house seeking or social supports for Korean Chinese residents, were rarely mentioned in the consultation processes. The Korean Chinese groups faced wider exclusions as low-income workers, or the representation as ‘Chineseness’ in the ossified frames in Korean urban policies.

Regarding the social cohesion agenda, it was also incorporated specific viewpoints about Korean Chinese groups. As the first Seoul Metropolitan immigrant policy, ‘Seoul Global City Basic Plan’, was replaced by the second immigrant policy, ‘Multi Value Seoul Plan’, the social cohesion agenda was emphasised instead of focusing on immigrant groups as a source to attract foreign investment (chapter six section 2.1). While the Korean Chinese groups which were rarely discussed in the previous policy became an important part of the policy, the policy still showed a little awareness regarding how the wider social recognition of groups entrenched in the policy can become a barrier for the immigrant groups to be involved in the policy. Except for the Uma Street project, the Korean Chinese group in Garibong-dong were mainly included in the project such as organising a self-policing team to reduce crimes or participating in voluntary cleanup activities to enhance the dilapidated physical environment. Although the main purposes of the activities were described building capacity to build cohesive communities in the policies, the activities were mainly
focused on integrating the Korean Chinese groups into Korean social norms by reeducating the groups, and it seemed to be based on the understanding of the groups as a source of social disorders which occurred in the neighbourhood. The communities understood the plan as a part of assimilationist viewpoints which oriented Korean society by reeducating the immigrant groups (see chapter six section 3.2). The cultural hierarchy which has been observed in the policy rather built antagonism for the immigrant groups to be involved in policies.

Finally, although the government included the Korean Chinese groups in participatory planning procedure in Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project in 2015 by stating that ‘any residents’ had a right to participate, the group divisions were still observed in the participation processes (see the next section). When the Urban Regeneration team presumed potential participants, it was widely judged regarding the qualities as ‘citizens’ such as who has the right to vote and who paid the taxes (chapter seven). Although the Korean Chinese groups were emphasised in the Garibong-dong project, it was difficult to say that the Korean Chinese groups were considered as important actors with whom the government collaborate. The Urban Regeneration team showed rather an ambiguity of their positions by the reason that it was difficult to perceive Korean Chinese groups as citizens for whom the government need to serve and invest the governmental budget. While the attempt to involve Korean Chinese groups were rarely observed, the committee was formed focusing on the long-established Korean groups. Once the committee has been formed, the involvement of the Korean Chinese groups in the decision-making processes was limited due to the strong networks of the core groups (it will be discussed in the second research question). The positions of the Korean Chinese groups in the Urban Regeneration project have been seen as participants in sub-projects focusing on the immigrant groups, rather than partners in the decision-making processes.

In the understanding of the communities in the neighbourhood planning, the immigrant groups experienced social subordination through the group divisions. The group identity has been shaped by the specific history of immigrant groups along with their insecure legal and economic status (see chapter five). Those images such as
incapable, temporary, illegal, low-educated group emerged in urban policies, and it became the reason why they are marginalised as a less significant group. The Seoul Global City Basic Plan did not include Korean Chinese groups by only focusing on high-skilled workers and immigrant groups who come from the global North, and the Multi Value Seoul Master Plan included the groups but considered them as groups who lacked understanding of social norms. The antagonism among Korean Chinese groups which had been built through the history emerged in the formation of social capital, and it became a further barrier to be involved in decision-making processes in Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project (see the next section).

**RQ2. How was social capital formed among participants located in different social contexts?**

The second research question considers how local members have unequal opportunities to approach the consultation processes despite the voluntary participation mechanism seemingly provided opportunities opening to all. The data were analysed through the lens of social capital. The formation of social capital among local members in recruitment processes of Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee were examined along with how local experiences about interactions between local groups and the involvement in urban policies were reflected in this formation.

The uneven formation of social capital of the immigrant groups was in the representation processes in forming the committee. Throughout the processes of community participation in the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project, the latent social relationships which had built in the neighbourhood were crucial (see chapter seven). However, these social ties drawing participation were concentrated on the long-established Korean groups, and the networks of the Korean Chinese groups were rarely observed. This uneven formation of social relationships in the consultation processes was largely based on the disadvantaged social positions of the immigrant groups. Firstly, the Korean Chinese groups did not have sufficient opportunities to build social ties with Korean residents and the local government. As can be seen in the previous section, the groups were excluded in the urban policies for a long time,
particularly when the neighbourhood was under the plan of demolition due to the New town plan (see chapter five). Although interactions between Koreans and Korean Chinese in the neighbourhood were not uncommon, the social interactions as partners in collaborations such as in local activities were rarely found (see chapter seven).

Secondly, as can be seen in chapter two, the understanding of groups in policies influenced the ability and motivation source for forming social capital (see chapter two). The recent empirical studies of social capital showed that social ties do not necessarily link to social capital, and the expected benefits which were assumed based on the social positions of actors in social structure were influential in forming social capital (Lin, 2001; see also Mariotti & Delbridge, 2012). As can be seen in chapter six and seven, the urban policies still tended to embed the perception toward Korean Chinese groups. The policies did not consider the groups as active actors in decision-making processes. Moreover, as the committee was initially formed focusing on Koreans who had social ties with the local government, the opinions toward the Korean Chinese groups which were based on contested group identity about Korean Chinese members were often observed in the consultation processes. In the consultation processes, the opinions about the Korean Chinese groups which perceived them as group lacked the capacity to participate and collaborate were persistently emerged by the long-established Korean groups (chapter seven). By undermining the capacity of other social groups, the Korean groups who were involved from the early stage strengthened their positions as proper participants. The understanding of the Korean Chinese groups from the long-established Korean groups were significantly influential to the further involvement of the Korean Chinese groups. In this context, the Korean Chinese groups were not considered as important stakeholders in decision-making processes, and their local knowledge and experiences were undervalued. The further motivation to build social ties with the groups could not be developed.

Lastly, but most importantly, this social understating of groups which were also observed in the committee processes hindered the motivation for the immigrant groups to build social capital with long-established groups. The Korean Chinese groups
preferred to build solidarity focusing on their own groups rather than collaborating with Korean groups. They did not consider the Urban Regeneration project as an opportunity to raise their voices. The experiences throughout the history of Garibong-dong built awareness about their social position. They used to be marginalised in the urban policies, and even in the cases they were included, they frequently experienced the social subordination in the relations with long-established groups. The collaboration of Korean groups frequently ended up supporting the Korean groups rather than giving opportunities for Korean Chinese groups to be reconsidered as an equal partner. Based on these experiences, the lukewarm gesture of the Urban Regeneration project to involve the groups without reconsidering pre-existing the social understanding of the groups raised the groups’ concern about being rejected and or not welcomed. Due to the previous experiences, the Korean Chinese groups rather preferred to participate in other channels based on their own groups than participate in a mixed organisation.

To sum up, contrary to the understanding of the mechanism of participation in the policy, the social capital among residents, particularly between different groups, was not enhanced by mere emphasising the participation. Although the government emphasised the importance of community participation, the social divisions between Koreans and Korean Chinese groups which were observed in the participatory mechanism were rarely questioned. Without an attempt to mediate pre-existing ideas toward the groups which frequently limited them as incapable groups, the consultation processes were not considered by the Korean Chinese groups as an opportunity to participate as equal partners. Also, without a policy frame placing the importance on the immigrant groups as stakeholders, other social members could not find the motivation to build social capital with the groups. Furthermore, these implicit social barriers resulted in strengthened the contested group identity. Their lack of participation in a voluntary organisation tended to be understood as proof of pre-fixed idea about the group who lacked abilities and motivation to participate in local activities. However, the separation may not have been due to the Korean Chinese groups lacking capacity but because of misrecognition, which perceived them as ‘a group lacking the capacity’.
RQ3. How have social capital and ethnic differences been deployed by different actors within local planning participation?

The third research question returns to the processes of the participatory planning procedure. This is to explore whether the consultation processes in the contexts of uneven formation of social capital can reach common concern which is beneficial for wider society. This case study showed limited decision-making power of the immigrant groups can result in consequent marginalisations from benefits of the planning practices (also see Young, 1997).

The question focuses on the decision-making processes of Garibong-dong planning governance by analysing how social capital operated. The social capital held by the local participants was significantly influential in the decision-making processes by forming local opinions based on their networks. As has been demonstrated, the Urban Regeneration project was profoundly influenced by a group who had participated in the Newtown project. The informal and formal networks of the committee were formed through previous planning activities. The social capital among them did not only contain an abstract form of trust and social norms but embedded knowledge of planning which has been educated in the previous ten years of planning activities.

The concentrated social capital networks served for the benefit of the members of the group efficiently, but the consultation processes became further limited for Korean Chinese groups. Firstly, a goal of the Urban Regeneration project was slightly altered based on the opinions of the core members. The social capital among core members became a strong tool to deliver the opinions of the group but resulted in reproducing the deeply embedded idea about a development project. The planning project was still understood as a means to realise property value focusing on landlords. The participants reflected this idea, and it impeded values of a community-led project which was newly introduced in Urban Regeneration project. In the earlier stage of consultation, the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project was proposed as a neighbourhood project with multicultural communities. However, through the consultation processes, drawing young people working in a surrounding area, Guro, became more important goal of the Urban Regeneration project (see chapter eight).
As a result, the Korean Chinese groups were marginalised from a proposed plan shaped by the consultation processes. By altering the main aim of the Urban Regeneration project, the social integration between the Korean Chinese groups and the Koran groups was not considered as a shared goal of neighbourhood any more.

Secondly, the committee members not only built implicit barrier by occupying the decision-making processes but also formalised the exclusions by forming a series of regulations (see chapter eight section.3.2). By producing the regulations regarding the participation of the committee, implicit barriers between residents, who have right to participate and who do not have, were formalised. The regulations included the duration of living or running business and required the legal documents to prove them.

These two outcomes of the activities of the committee, the goals were shaped through the consultation processes and the regulation for participation, showed the dark sides of bonding social capital. The altered goals of the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project reflected the interests of the core members of the committee, and open participation was hindered by the formalised regulations. In these circumstances, the participants were not expanded but fixed focusing on certain groups who shared interests. The expected outcomes of social capital in participatory planning such as sharing knowledge and creating trust were only focused on the members of the narrow circle.

Again, in strengthening the shared goals among core members, the understanding of communities in Urban Regeneration project was influential. As can be seen in the previous section about the second research question, the involvement of wider communities such as the Korean Chinese groups was not considered as an important task in the project. The notable factor was that this concentrated social capital tended to be accelerated by the local Urban Regeneration team. The consultation processes were influenced by the committee members partly because they had a strong knowledge and networks to put pressure on the Urban Regeneration team. However, the local regeneration team did not attempt to search an alternative way to mediate this closed consultation process. The other local members, the Korean Chinese groups, were still remained as less desirable participants. On the other hand, the bonded core
groups were considered as an efficient way to draw agreements in the processes (see chapter eight). Drawing participation focusing on the social ties of the core groups was recommended by the Urban Regeneration team based on an attempt to efficient procedure. Without a significant counterpart, accepting the opinions of the committee members were shown as an unavoidable process.

As a result, the involvement of the immigrant groups tended to reproduce their subordinated positions which serve for the decisions of the dominant groups. The outcomes of the consultation shown as a way to utilise the immigrant groups as a touristic resource and to enhance the image of neighbourhood by voluntary participation of immigrant groups (see chapter six). The interactions which can contribute to reconsider the pre-existing understanding of the immigrant groups were rarely observed. The consultation processes of Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project were not a process to mediate the pre-existing idea and to reach a shared understanding, but instead of that, the deeply rooted social divisions were shaped through them.

9.3 Reflections on Community Participation and Immigrant Groups

The findings of this study provide insights for the understanding of immigrant groups in urban neighbourhoods and the mechanism to involve them in planning procedure. This thesis focuses on two-fold of the area of inquiry. The first is how the social divisions between long-established groups and immigrant groups have been shown in the composition of community in the planning system. The second is how social capital has been formed in those circumstances. The data illustrated that the understanding of community in Korean planning system embeds a discriminatory composition of communities by showing the division between long-established groups and the immigrant groups. The social capital in this setting tended to be only formed and serve for the dominant groups. It elucidates the emergence of group divisions in everyday lives in neighbourhoods and the uneven formation of social capital among participants in the different social contexts.
The analysis of social capital in the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee can be interpreted as two contrasting results according to the perspectives to see the theory of social capital. On the one hand, when it comes to the social capital among participants in the committee, the social capital among communities seems to facilitate the planning activities in Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project successfully (N.-Y. Lee & Ahn, 2017; L. Piao, 2017). The processes of the participation of core members showed the roles of social capital which were theorised in planning literature (Innes & Booher, 1999; Rydin & Holman, 2007). Firstly, the formation of social capital in the committee showed strong collaborative relationships among core members. They showed normative commitments such as a sense of place attachment, which had been built in the previous planning activities, and these ties led them to participate in the Urban Regeneration committee. Also, secondly, during the consultation processes, they successfully built networks for sharing knowledge and information. These networks functioned actively to deliver their opinions and interests in other sectors (see chapter eight).

However, on the other hand, when it comes to diversity in participatory planning, the results showed somewhat different dimensions. As has been seen in chapter two, the role of social capital in participatory planning is not only limited to the participation of a certain social group (Holman & Rydin, 2012). The researchers tried to explain collaborations between different social groups by the concept of bridging social capital (Rydin & Holman, 2007; Vervisch, 2011; see chapter two). The aspects about inter-group relationships showed other dimensions of social capital in participatory planning which was not able to analyse without considering group dynamics within local communities. Regarding the role of bridging social capital, which mediates pre-existing interests and builds broader goals to include diverse social members, the social capital among the core groups rather limited building bridging social capital beneficiary. The social capital was concentrated on the Korean landlords and was not expanded to other social groups through the consultation processes. In other words, even though strong networks seemed to be useful for facilitating processes as has been seen in the previous paragraph, it did not necessarily mean that this bonded social capital was able to achieve other expected outcomes such as the transformation of
existing interests and sharing understanding with other social groups in local neighbourhoods. The formation of social capital in the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee shows that social capital in participatory planning can be a double-edged sword. Bonded relations among participants can facilitate processes, but it can hinder the participation of other social members in consultation processes.

When it comes to ‘why’ and ‘how’ these social divisions can be seen in the formation of social capital, the data illustrated that the social structure of participants was influential for building social capital (see chapter two). Particularly, the institutional setting such as the recognition of communities in planning policies was important to understand the formation of social capital in participatory planning. The voices of minority social participants in participatory planning were sometimes undermined. As has been seen in chapter seven, this division between Koreans and Korean Chinese overlapped but cannot be entirely reduced into the division of their economic status. Although some Korean Chinese members who owned the properties in the area were not included in the decision-making processes in projects. The Korean Chinese groups were often located in disadvantaged social positions compared to other long-established groups in the planning practices. The desirable participants in the Urban Regeneration project involved a cultural judgement about local members whether they have right as citizens to become beneficiaries of governmental supports and have sufficient capacity as citizens showing autonomy (see chapter seven). In this judgement, the immigrant groups were not considered as important participants. The Korean Chinese were frequently understood as a group who do not have a sense of belonging, do not have the capacity to raise their own voices and do not have right to utilise governmental funding without citizenships (see chapter seven). This understanding of communities in urban policies resulted in reducing motivation and undermining abilities of immigrant groups to be involved in the collaboration. The limited social ties of Korean Chinese groups that had been built in the neighbourhood by the marginalisation from the previous local activities were not mediated but rather shaped further in the composition of communities in Korean planning system.
This results showed that the formation of social capital is not abstract but is strongly linked with the contexts of groups. This study points out that two different parts of social capital theory need to be distinguished: one is social capital as an analytical lens to investigate the formation of groups and the other is the functions of them. Although Putnam (2002) explained that the processes of building social relations-further civic participation and democratic capacity, this still remains as a hypothesis and many recent studies pointed out its limitation (see chapter two). The existence of social capital is not necessarily led to the participation of consultation processes. As Arneil (2006) stated, this hypothesis can possibly be the conclusion which was drawn through the data of dominant social groups. If the aims of local plans corresponded to the shared goals of groups, the social capital of the groups can contribute to facilitating the planning processes, but this cannot be applied to every social group as a universal way.

Nevertheless, this case study does not aim to undermine the importance of the concept of social capital in the understanding of the mechanism of participatory planning. The analysis of this case study regarding Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration showed that the concept of social capital can be a useful tool to see how the participants navigate themselves in the interactions with other participants. Social capital is a way to understand participants as active agents not only as passive subjects in policies. For instance, when it comes to the case of Korean Chinese, they rather chose to use their networks to interact with the ‘gu’ office or in other projects such as political participation like local elections. They responded to the policies by not to participate, within the consideration of the shared missions of the Urban Regeneration project and the core participants in the committee. The analysis of social capital showed that the lack of participation was not merely because the groups lacked capacity, but it was a result showing the responses of the groups when they were marginalised from the policies. In this sense, social capital can be a means to understand how different groups reflected their shared goals within their understanding of participatory planning procedure.
Regarding the use of the concept of social capital in participatory planning studies, the thesis pointed out the value of the concept as an analytical tool to look into the social dynamics among participants, particularly within the consideration of social structure surrounding participants. The analysis of social capital, as can be seen in this study, provided important knowledge about how social relations among participants shaped the participatory planning processes. The dynamics were difficult to be analysed by other concepts such as the concept focusing on only quantities aspect of social relationships such as social networks, or qualitative aspect such as place attachments. The operations of social relationships which were intertwined with both aspects produced power and benefits for members of the networks. In this sense, social capital is still an important concept to analyse the processes of social relationships in policies by showing the responses of participants, although the existence of social capital can show the different result in contexts and did not always produce benefits including other members who were not included in the networks of social capital.

By analysing the formation of social capital and elucidating the impact of social structure on this formation, this study showed how local social groups understood participatory planning processes and how they utilise their ties to deliver their interests based on their social contexts. The study emphasises that greater attention needs to be paid to how the urban policies perceive the ethnic groups and how that reflected to the capacity of local participants. Also, these findings provided wider theoretical understanding of social capital studies regarding inter-ethnic relations and the emergence of ‘community’ as a normative form in the planning field. The last part of this section about the theoretical reflection will deal with the implication of this study from the viewpoint of the politics of differences in the planning studies.

*Social Capital and Ethnicity*

This thesis attempted to shed light on the impact of wider social structure, particularly social recognition of immigrant groups in the planning system, on the formation of social capital. The influence of social understanding of immigrant groups in the processes of forming social capital which this thesis demonstrated provides important implications for social capital studies on inter-ethnic relations. This study points out
that Putnam’s influential contributions to social capital largely overlooked the relational aspect of ethnicity, such as dominant or oppressive relations between ethnic groups. This omission led to a simplification of complex dimensions of inequalities that immigrant groups face in their everyday lives.

Ethnicity in Putnam’s social capital studies was frequently dealt with as racial categorisations. It focused their differences based on essentialist viewpoints such as differences associating physical attributes, or cultural differences like languages or social norms. This assumption of ethnicity in social capital studies led us to find a solution for inter-group relationships by simply extending group boundaries through human interaction. On the other hand, differences in ethnicities include wider social meaning, which has been embedded in the society, not only language or social skills which individuals can develop. The social meaning of ethnicity involved cultural hierarchy in relations such desirable or undesirable, ordinary or inferior social members (see chapter three). These judgments about the qualities formed group boundaries, and immigrant groups experienced the group divisions not only in formal dimensions such as laws or policies but also in informal ways in neighbourhoods and interpersonal relationships.

The understanding of relational aspects of ethnicity can be significantly important because it possibly shed light on the different possibilities to interpret the results of social capital studies. For example, as has been seen in chapter two, the study of Putnam (2007) explained the reduced trust as the result of growing diversity. However, the data of this case study pointed out that there was missing link in the explanation. What the social trust specifically means and why the reduced trust was shown? Firstly, social trust, as has been pointed out, can have different meaning depending on settings. It can be a form of solidarity to ‘mechanically’ include diversity into the dominant social norms as Garibong-dong social cohesion agenda showed, or respecting differences in the decision-making processes. Moreover, the cultural norms to build the social relationships can be diverse in the different societies. The meaning of social trust in the globalised societies needed to be reconsidered in the relations between different ethnic groups.
Secondly, because of that, the reasons of reducing trust can show complicated dimensions than the dimension such as ‘fear’ induced by differences (Putnam, 2007). As this thesis showed by the case of Korean Chinese, the prejudice toward the groups has been formed through the media and policies. If the diversity tended to contribute to social mistrust as Putnam argued, the possible areas to study is not only limited to the studies on face-to-face encounters between different groups but also how the policies understood differences as a context of encountering. In other words, the social mistrust can also be the mixed results with policies which the lack of consideration of their roles in social divisions, not the mere result of growing diversity.

The case study of the Korean Chinese group, who shared the ethnicity but were located in differing social positions showed that the tensions between the groups were induced by contested group identities rather than the lack of contacts. The formation of social capital under the policy frame delivering discriminatory categorisation of groups did not overcome or challenge existing understanding of immigrant groups’ identities but reflected and reproduced them. The studies on the social capital of interethnic relations need to consider the wider social context of the formation of social capital (see the next section about methodology). When a group experienced a strong social division, this unequal structure can re-emerge in interpersonal relationships rather than interpersonal contacts mediated the structure.

‘Building Community’ in Korean Planning System

The findings of the case study of the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project address a question regarding the discourse of building community in Korean planning policies. ‘Rebuilding community’ was emphasised in Korean planning policies as main means of involving residents in planning procedure (chapter one). The rebuilding community has been observed as a way to build the capacity of local communities, including disadvantaged social members such as low-income residents and immigrant groups (see chapter six and seven). In this sense, building community was considered not only as a means to facilitate the participatory processes but also as a goal of participation. The planning policies understood community participation as a practice of building community, which consequently built capable communities to
raise their own voices and to find a creative way to solve their local issues actively (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2017; also see chapter seven).

The current understanding of capacity building has been supported by the concept of social capital, particularly based on the concept of Putnam (see chapter two). Social capital was frequently understood as an outcome of participatory planning not only as a source to facilitate the processes. The studies of Putnam emphasised the social capital as a concept which can be accumulated by activities in civic organisations. The social capital which has been built through community participation is believed to be stored in neighbourhoods, regions and even in countries throughout the history. The outcomes such as building the capacity of the participants were assumed to help further local activities by performing for sustainable management for the neighbourhood (Yun-Geum Kim & Lee, 2003). As can be seen in chapter two, in this normative understanding of social capital, the Korean social capital literature tried to explain the ways to build capable communities by building experiences of civic organisation, and community participation was emphasised uncritically as a practice to build social capital (also see chapter seven).

The processes of the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee illustrated that the normative position of ‘building community’ engendered several issues. Firstly, it is questionable whether social capital which was formed in participation always plays a positive role in neighbourhoods. The findings demonstrated that the processes of building social capital might be only beneficial for a certain dominant social group in decision-making processes. Even though the social capital built through participation tended to be considered as a ‘good’ for neighbourhoods regardless who were involved, as can be seen in the previous chapters, the groups who can be benefited by the utilisation of the social capital were limited.

Secondly, pursuing building local relationships in the understanding of community in Korean planning system tended to be used as a way to eliminate differences. The mechanism to build social capital among local participants were often imagined as the processes of community building including differences within a homogenous form of social norms (chapter one; also see Adler et al., 2008). The form of social capital in
Korean literature was imagined as solidarity, reciprocity and trust in bonded collaborative relationships (see chapter two and seven). In this understanding, the differences such as differing interests, priorities and also a different level of knowledge were considered as conflicts which need to be minimised in building community solidarity (see chapter seven). The embedded cultural hierarchy between groups, which seems specifically strong in the Korean society, were rarely understood in the processes of building community (chapter two; see Pye, 1999). As the analysis chapters showed, building relationships without respecting differences tended to focus on the dominant social groups, and the other minority were included as subordinated positions according to the understanding of dominant groups or marginalised.

Thirdly, the case study of the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee showed that placing a high value on community building rather limit the consideration of institutional design for fairer consultation processes. The emphasis on building local relationships became a factor to uncritically emphasise the involvement of communities by turning attention from institutional shortcomings. Particularly, the lack of attention on institutional design tended to be more significant. In the current framework of Korean planning, building social capital was mainly believed to achieve through face-to-face interactions although some literature pointed out that policies were significantly important on building social capital (Micheal Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). The community involvement was considered as a panacea for solving conflicts and building capacity of citizens. The other issues were which involved in community participation such as marginalisation of minority groups and shaping broader goals which can provide benefit for diverse social members tended to be assumed by the involvement of communities in the current Korean planning policies (also see Beebeejaun, 2012).

The Politics of Differences in Participatory Planning

This study showed unequal decision-making power due to the social positions of participants through the formation of social capital. The inequalities in decision-making are not newly emerging issues, and rather had been central parts in planning studies. Writers stated that the right to raise a voice tended to focus on the ‘elites’ in
planning practices and discussed the inequality of power mainly focusing on their social classes (McConnell, 1966; Harvey, 1997). The power dynamics and the cultural positions of actors lead us to revisit the issue of equal rights and the destruction of the relations of domination and oppression which had been mentioned in chapter three.

As argued in chapter three, this dissertation aims to shed light on the social inequalities which were not only engendered from economic divisions but also from the cultural meaning of ethnicities. However, it does not mean that the cultural categorisation needs to entirely replace the perspective to see the social inequality instead of the division of economic status. The social divisions (economic or cultural) –possibly more than those two dimensions– are mutually constituted but do not collapse into each other (see Crenshaw, 1989; Yuval-Davis, 2014). The notable point which this research elucidated is that, the consideration of economic division is not enough to understand barriers for immigrant groups to participate, and moreover, to mediate the barriers induced by cultural hierarchies, different remedies were required. While the planning studies heavily focused on the discourse of distribution, the embedded cultural hierarchies were rarely questioned.

By using the lens of the concept of recognition, the study showed that the unbalanced social positions due to their cultural meaning existed and influenced the participation of certain social members. As a perspective to perceive the unequal decision-making power of participants, the relational understanding of social groups is necessary. As this study showed, mere arguing the distribution of opportunities does not necessarily lead to the distribution of power. Perhaps, some might argue that those unequal social positions can be induced by the economic status of Korean Chinese groups as tenants. However, firstly, in a broader perspective, their limited positions as low-income temporary tenants were not separated from their ethnic categorisation of ‘Korean Chinese’ as described in chapter five. The understanding of China and Russia acted as boundaries of a selective exclusion among overseas Koreans, and it formed the meaning of the groups. Secondly, in the case of Garibong-dong, the ethnic group categorisation had operated as a barrier sometimes regardless of the legal and economic status of the individuals (see chapter seven). As mentioned, this case study
does not argue that the arguments of the distribution of opportunities need to be replaced by remedies for transformation. However, the distribution cannot mediate all those complicated dimensions of inequality and the distributive remedy tended to obscure the inequalities which occurred from cultural hierarchies. The affirmative solutions need to be complemented when it comes to the culturally marginalised groups.

Alongside discussing the participatory planning from the perspective of the politics of recognition, this study also would like to clarify the limitations and potentialities of the scale of neighbourhoods. Those social inequalities—economic maldistribution and cultural marginalisation—are certainly produced from broader processes. It is not only about the national policies but also about the global processes of labour divisions and cultural imperialism (Harvey, 2000; Sassen, 1999). However, it does not mean that it is not a local planning issue. When we consider that one of the purposes of local neighbourhood planning is enhancing the lives of inhabitants in the area, investigating the limitation of the current mechanism of participatory planning in involving diverse social members should be a part of planning studies. For example, when it comes to the right to inhabit and to maintain their neighbourhoods, the neighbourhood planning still certainly can provide better opportunities in which immigrants can participate.

In other words, although involving the immigrant groups in local planning procedure cannot solve the wider existing inequalities, the local planning could, and needs to, try to mediate these inequalities produced by their wider social positions.

On the other hand, this research is cautious to argue that these local practices can ‘scale up’ as a solution for broader issues. As mentioned, the situations of immigrant groups in local neighbourhoods are linked in broader contexts and these structures need to be dealt with more directly at both national and global levels. In some cases, the local practices might be helpful to enhance the political power of immigrant groups, for instance, the participation in parliaments, but drawing assumptions about such a wider contribution of local participation is not the aim of this study. For example, we had observed that participation in the local voluntary events were not linked to the decision-making in participatory planning.
Rather than overemphasising the role of local neighbourhood, this research would like to shed light on the potentialities of the studies focusing on local neighbourhoods in terms of investigating those intertwined pictures in more depth. As had been seen, the motivations and barriers of Korean Chinese groups had been formed through a particular history. Without understanding them, the assumption of their situation frequently failed to mediate the issues. The investigation of these micro-dynamics are needed to analyse the problematic system which sometimes unintentionally produced existing inequalities. Possibly, the attempts to build a totalising explanation might have overlooked those specific situations which cannot be analysed without inductive investigations in the field of planning studies.

This study tries to build an awareness that merely providing opportunities to participate does not necessarily lead to mediate the unequal decision-making power among the participants, and rethinking the pre-existing social relations among the members can be an essential part of participatory planning processes. Although the social perception toward group identity of immigrant groups which might reinforce the social divisions exists, the planning policies lacked the awareness of these issues of group categorisation. This complex dimension related to the recognition of groups in urban policies and the consequent marginalisation of immigrant groups needed to be examined further to build an in-depth understanding of the social barriers which immigrant groups experienced in the urban planning system.

9.4 Reflections on Planning Practice

The current understating of communities in Korean planning embedded the group divisions. On the other hand, there was little awareness of the inequalities among participants in the participatory mechanism. This thesis pointed out that the current Korean participatory planning system did not provide an institutional design which can build respect for the members equally. Then how can a better system be imagined? As argued, a set of scenarios to apply to other cases can be difficult to be provided when considering the complicated nature of cultural domination and oppression. The dimensions of oppressions cannot be simplified, and moreover, we need to be aware
that the politics of recognition and wider feminism theories were partly developed from the critics about the previous universalised theories which frequently overlooked each cases’ situatedness. Therefore, instead of providing a new framework by generalising the Garibong-dong case, this study will discuss the conditions might worsen the given discriminatory categorisations or might help to reconsider the existing divisions in participatory planning processes.

As mentioned in chapter three, Fraser (2004) suggests a set of decision rules in the processes.

Justice requires social arrangements that permit all members of society to interact with one another as peers. [...] First, the distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure participants’ mutual independence and ‘voice.’ [...] The second condition requires that institutionalized patterns of cultural value express equal respect for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social esteem.

(Fraser, 2004, pp. 127–8)

Furthermore, in the interactions between the groups, she points out the two conditions: cross-redressing and boundary awareness. It can be summarised thus: a) providing cross-group dialogues without separating groups according to their pre-assumed attributes, b) providing an institutional setting involving social groups with equal social esteem, c) and respecting group differences without dissolving them into a unity or individualising members.

When it comes to the case of planning it could be interpreted in various ways according to the scales. Firstly, regarding the distribution, it might be understood as distributions of government budgets and development projects over geographical areas by balancing central cities and local areas. Or, specifically regarding ethnic enclaves, it could be considered as investing budgets to slums where ethnic minorities inhabited. When it comes to the micro-politics in participatory processes within the neighbourhoods like this study investigated, the distribution could be interpreted as equal rights to participate in planning within the given situations. In other words, the planning procedure needs to ensure equal rights to participate for diverse social members regardless of their economic status such as the divisions between landlords.
and tenants. In consideration of the current system of majority rules, the involvement of diverse social members itself seems to be important to protect the independent voices of minority groups. Secondly, regarding the second condition, after involving them, the opinions of participants should not be undermined due to their cultural contexts. For example, the local issues should not be prioritised through the pre-fixed ideas about the groups. In addition, local participants should not be required to ignore their identities or oppressed to become ‘one of us’.

The case of Garibong-dong showed that marginalisation can appear when the conditions were not met. Both conditions were not respected in the Garibong-dong case. Even though the Urban Regeneration policy stated equal rights to participate regardless of tenants, landlords and commuters, in the case of Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration, it was not pursued in a linkage with the legal status of Korean Chinese groups as ‘foreigners’. The second condition was also overlooked in the Garibong-dong committee. For example, the Korean members frequently argued that Korean Chinese members emphasised their ethnicity to strengthen their positions as a ‘victim’ (see chapter eight). Furthermore, sometimes a Korean Chinese committee member was required to follow a united opinion because ‘you are one of landlords and naturalised Koreans’ (see chapter eight). Those situations which harmed two conditions appeared significant barriers for the Korean Chinese in participatory planning.

A notable point which had been found in the case study is that those two conditions could not be understood in a consecutive order. As argued in the previous section, when it comes to the specific situation of the groups in the local, the maldistribution and cultural marginalisation were separated and not cause and effect relations. As has been seen, if the equal social esteem was not considered, arguing equal rights did not link to the resulting equal involvement. In this sense, both aspects, involving diverse members regardless of their economic status and not prioritising the local issues according to the cultural meaning of the groups need to be pursued together.

In addition, there were some more specific findings regarding the conditions for the inter-group interactions in the consultation processes. In the planning practices, the
following points need to be considered for the inclusion of immigrant groups. Firstly, the findings showed that including immigrant groups separately was not means to involve the groups in decision-making processes with other social groups. Specifying the immigrant groups by separating their involvement focusing on certain projects, as can be seen in Uma Street project, rather limited their involvement as stakeholders in other local issues. The immigrant groups need to be involve in the decision-making processes such as utilising budget and operating the committee and need to interact with other groups on the same decision-making table.

Secondly, collective actions which were based on limited resourced tended to strengthen bonding social capital by excluding other members. Some collective actions such as utilising limited funding tended to be understood as an activity which needs to keep advantaged positions with the small number of participants from the viewpoint of minimising cost and maximising benefits. Bonding social capital is not necessarily harmful to bridging social capital. For example, forming visible groups based on the bonding social capital before participation was essential to get opportunities to interact with other groups. However, when the aims of projects were understood as a collective action for limited resources, participants tended to form exclusive groups.

Thirdly, due to that, establishing broad goals to draw various social groups and persuading participants to pursue common concerns was crucial. Finding broad missions to attract diverse social members and avoiding collective actions strengthening bonding social capital seemed to be important as the roles of planners (Holman & Rydin, 2012).

To sum up, the conditions for mediating unequal social relations in participatory processes can be seen as follows. Firstly, the equal opportunities to participate need to be ensured for local members without distinguishing the groups according to their economic positions. Secondly, planners and the governments should not prioritise the local issues according to the pre-existing perception toward the cultural values of groups. Those two conditions need to be pursued together. Furthermore, according to the second condition, the roles of groups should not be pre-fixed in participatory
processes, a collective action with limited resources which enhances small bonded
groups needs to be reconsidered, and finding a broad mission bringing all the parties
together needs to be sought.

9.5 Reflections on Methodology

As argued in the previous sections, the close examination of contexts in social capital
studies was significantly important to understand the formation of social capital. The
social positions of participants influenced the composition of social capital. It
involved with the culture and history of a society which was embedded in planning
policies. As a means to avoid overlooking these contexts, this thesis emphasised the
importance of qualitative approaches in social capital studies and the necessity of case
studies in other countries than in the global North.

Firstly, this part pointed out the importance of qualitative studies in social capital
research. Many social capital studies were based on quantitative research (Murayama
et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2017). Putnam’s social capital studies collected the data by
focusing on the racial categorisation (Putnam, 1995, 2007). However, when it comes
to the social contexts of immigrant groups, this approach focusing on pre-fixed racial
categorisation can result in simplification of groups’ differences. For example, the
study of Putnam (2007) was based on racial categorisation in census data, but instead
of understanding how categorisations entailed social meaning in relations, the studies
tended to rely on assumptions of pre-fixed ethnic differences. However, as the study
showed, the members of immigrant groups could not be simplified in specific ways
such as ethnicity, physical or cultural attributes. The social understanding about the
groups was a significant barrier for immigrant groups to approach other groups.
Simplification of group attributions by statistical categorisation would overlook a
myriad of unfair cultural judgements in group divisions by understanding them as pre-
fixed differences.

Moreover, by undermining what the group boundaries mean in group categorisations,
the previous studies often did not explain ‘why’ inter-groups relationships were or
were not developed. Many studies tried to prove a hypothesis about inter-groups
relationships in Putnam’s research, which assumed that bonding social capital contributed to bridging social capital (Alesina & Ferrara, 2005; Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 2008; Uslaner, 2011). Those studies, however, often failed to prove the theory by showing contradictory results. The studies which were based on quantitative research sometimes could not interpret why different results have been shown (Iwase et al., 2012; Murayama et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2017). The studies often suggested a hypothesis about the reason why the group differences had been shown. For example, Iwase et al. (2012) pointed out the different result of gender in Japanese case can be a result of gender gaps which were deeply embedded in the society. The empirical studies on the dynamics of social capital due to the group difference which were entrenched in culture were difficult to find. The inter-group relationships have been built through historical and cultural contexts. As can be seen in this case, even though the Urban Regeneration project started recently, the attitudes toward the groups have been understood in the general experiences such as legal system, media, previous planning procedure, and local lives. The embodied experiences became a basis for cultural judgements toward each other and for building trust as a social peer. The quantitative studies were not sufficient to deal with these qualitative aspects.

This limited understanding of the contexts of participants was also observed in the social capital studies in participatory planning. While local communities tended to be understood as a group who shared similar backgrounds such as economic and social status, communities consisted of different social members who are located in differing social contexts. It tended to be shown more notably in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods, but not only ethnic diversity but also diversity such as ages, occupations, economic status or political interests can be unavoidable characteristics in urban neighbourhoods (Forrest & Kearns, 2001). These differences and social hierarchy embedded in the differences were often overlooked in social capital studies in participatory planning. The explanation regarding the contexts of actors can be an essential part in elucidating the processes of social capital.

Secondly, the examination of the mechanism of social capital in different cultural contexts such as global South and East is important to expand the knowledge of social
capital which mainly had been developed focusing on Anglo-American literature. As has been mentioned in chapter four, the cultural norms of social relationships were different in societies. In the Korean Chinese case in participatory planning procedures, the ways of building social relationships showed differences from the other cases in various ways. Firstly, the ethnic relationships between Koreans and Korean Chinese groups showed differences as argued. The specific context of Korea with strong ethnic nationalism and social hierarchy between Koreans and Korean Chinese can be seen as factors which influenced the relations. Secondly, the understanding of relationships within consultation groups was also differing from other cases. As argued, the emphasis on solidarity with homogenous members was commonly observed in the discourse of community in participatory planning policies, and the case of Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee (chapter seven). The understanding of local participation in policies tended to be differing in cultures, and it built the frameworks of participation. This overall procedure can be influential in the formation of social capital. Again, as argued, the case study of the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project does not purport to provide a generalised knowledge about Korean cases, but as the case showed different contexts of from the global North, the study contributed to challenging the theory of social capital which generalised mainly focusing on the cases of global North.

As seen in this study, these historical and cultural aspects regarding ethnicity were significantly influential in the formation of social capital. On the other hand, the study examined these contexts were not sufficient to understand how different cultural norms and policy contexts can be theorised. As argued in the section regarding social capital and ethnicity, the understanding of contexts can provide new insights to interpret the result of inter-group social capital. The studies in different social contexts and close examination of their impact along with the analysis of social capital are required.

**9.6 Contributions of the Study**
The findings from this study contribute to the current literature by examining the formation of social capital in the interactions between wider social recognition of groups and everyday practice. The recognition of groups emerged in the local neighbourhood, and social capital in the context reflected and potentially strengthened stigmatised group identities, instead of changing them through face-to-face interactions. This study makes contributions to planning and urban study disciplines in the following ways.

Firstly, the study is one of the first qualitative studies on unequal social positions of immigrant groups and its emergence in the formation of social capital in Korean participatory planning. The extensive investigation into social inequality and its appearance of neighbourhoods provide the insights regarding the social participation of immigrant groups. The result suggests that the disparity of immigrant groups needs to be examined with more considerable attention to how policies framed the everyday lives of immigrant groups and how that appeared in local neighbourhoods. The members of urban communities experienced unequal relationships induced by the recognition of group identities. Not only regarding the social capital studies but also in urban studies, diverse neighbourhoods were also frequently imagined as the promising places for the diversity (Calhoun, 2003; Harvey, 2000; Valentine, 2008; Wilson, 2016). It was also observed in the studies focusing on the group identities of immigrant groups. In the growing tensions of inequalities between segregated social groups, the cities were expected as the place for encountering, transforming the relations, destroying the divisions by amplifying the differences (Young, 2002). On the other hand, the economic and cultural inequalities sometimes appeared in an intertwined way in the urban physical space. For disadvantaged groups who did not have enough choices like low-income immigrant groups, it has more significant impacts. The housing prices and negligence of governmental supports became unavoidable circumstances for the agglomeration of Korean Chinese, and the neighbourhood was understood in an interconnected way with their damaged cultural identity.
Secondly, these empirical results contribute to existing knowledge of social capital by providing a deeper understanding of ethnicity. This study shed new light on the impact of recognition on interpersonal interactions which have been overlooked in the theory of social capital. The previous social capital studies tended to assume the differences between ethnicities in the neighbourhood as the cultural differences inducing tensions and fear. Based on this understanding, the physical contacts were emphasised as the means of feeling safe and building social cohesions. However, the linear scenario of contact, cohesion, and further participation was not always observed. As this study specifies the case with Korean Chinese who shared ethnicity but was exposed to stigmatised group identity, this research elucidates the social meaning of ethnic group divisions and its impact on social capital. Ethnicity is not pre-fixed essential differences but a relational concept, and it sometimes delivered social meanings impeding a certain groups’ social position. This wider cultural hierarchy influenced significantly the processes of building social capital between different groups, and it was not overcome by interpersonal physical contacts even within shared neighbourhood spaces.

Thirdly, this new understanding helps to improve the institutional design for equal participation. This study identifies that institutional design to transform prefixed relationships can be significantly important. The considerations to redress the balance between different social groups to be equally respected in the participatory planning need to be explored further. By suggesting an analytical framework of social capital which integrated with recognition, this study provides the means to investigate how participatory planning design interacts with participants to reinforce or transform their group boundaries.

Finally, the study contributes to the methodological considerations to explore social capital and ethnicity. Ethnicity is not an essential feature differentiating the groups, but rather the social meaning of group identities embedded in ethnicity creates a barrier to build intergroup relations. Previous social capital studies did not consider these complex dimensions of ethnicity and conducted the research based on racial categorisations such as in consensus data. These studies could not explain why the
social capital was built or not built. It was merely based on the abstract understanding of ethnicity involving physical and cultural differences but failed to link the social capital to social structure. As seen in the study, the social inequality which the immigrant group experiences was composed of the history and cultural attitude of society, and it was not able to be dealt with by racial categorisation.

9.7 Areas for Further Research

The relational aspects among the residents and their impact on the participatory planning helped us understand the emergence of inequality in the planning process. In the growing concern about diverse social members and equality in cities, challenging the current planning frames unintentionally reproducing the inequality, remained as an essential task in the planning field.

Social capital has been understood as the way to transform institutions by building understanding between actors, but the empirical data showed that the transformative mechanism was limited by the prefixed categorisation of communities. Before emphasising capacity building through interactions, the means to redress the unequal social positions needs to be explored. The transformation of the social subordination by softening group divisions are required to tackle unequal participation. Only, in this case, social capital can be formed between the groups by bridging the resources and reducing the tensions.

Also, this raises ongoing questions about the processes of participatory planning. This is because the procedures which are frequently observed in participatory planning such as fostering the core groups, specifying group issues based on the categorisations tended to be based on the pursuit of the efficient processes. The attempts to simplify participants as manageable units for the efficiency of planning tend to overlook the importance of the recognition of differences. These attempts hindered the long-term positive outcomes of participatory planning. Exploring mechanisms to recognise groups that do not embed social hierarchies, even if unintended, will provide further insight into inclusive planning.
The study highlighted a critical area for the further attention of planning studies. The direct involvement of communities has been understood as a means to provide legitimacy by securing democratic processes; however, this study showed that the planning mechanism sometimes did not challenge deeply embedded inequality, and rather reflected it. This study can help to build a new theoretical framework of community participation, which provides how institutional setting shaped the social relations of participants and how the participants reacted to the construction. Emphasising the involvement of communities is a starting point, but planning processes still need to reconsider how they can provide opportunities to challenge deeper inequalities and reach participants who remain marginalised within wider society.
APPENDIX A

Ethics committee approval

UCL RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE
ACADEMIC SERVICES

27 November 2015

Dr Yasminah Beebeejaun
Bartlett School of Planning
UCL

Dear Dr Beebeejaun

Notification of Ethical Approval
Project ID: 7901/001; The contribution of social capital in transforming participatory planning: the role of bridging social capital for ethnic minority in collective decision making process, Garibong-dong community-led regeneration of Seoul, South Korea

Further to your satisfactory responses to my comments, I am pleased to confirm in my capacity as Chair of the UCL Research Ethics Committee (REC) that I have approved your study for the duration of the project i.e. until December 2016.

Approval is also subject to the following conditions:

1. You must seek Chair’s approval for proposed amendments to the research for which this approval has been given. Ethical approval is specific to this project and must not be treated as applicable to research of a similar nature. Each research project is reviewed separately and if there are significant changes to the research protocol you should seek confirmation of continued ethical approval by completing the ‘Amendment Approval Request Form’ at: http://ethics.grad.ucl.ac.uk/responsibilities.php

2. It is your responsibility to report to the Committee any unanticipated problems or adverse events involving risks to participants or others. The Ethics Committee should be notified of all serious adverse events via the Ethics Committee Administrator (ethics@ucl.ac.uk) immediately the incident occurs. Where the adverse incident is unexpected and serious, the Chair or Vice-Chair will decide whether the study should be terminated pending the opinion of an independent expert. The adverse event will be considered at the next Committee meeting and a decision will be made on the need to change the information leaflet and/or study protocol.

For non-serious adverse events the Chair or Vice-Chair of the Ethics Committee should again be notified via the Ethics Committee Administrator (ethics@ucl.ac.uk) within ten days of an adverse incident occurring and provide a full written report that should include any amendments to the participant information sheet and study protocol. The Chair or Vice-Chair will confirm that the incident is non-serious and report to the Committee at the next meeting. The final view of the Committee will be communicated to you.

On completion of the research you must submit a very brief report of your findings/concluding comments to the Committee, which includes in particular issues relating to the ethical implications of the research.

Yours sincerely

Professor John Foreman
Chair of the UCL Research Ethics Committee

Academic Services, 1-19 Torrington Place (8th Floor),
University College London
Tel: +44 (0)20 3108 6216
Email: ethics@ucl.ac.uk
http://ethics.grad.ucl.ac.uk/
24th May 2017

Dr Yee Min Lee
Bartlett School of Planning
UCL

Dear Dr Lee

Notification of Ethical Approval
Re: Ethics Application 7961/009: The mechanism of social capital in the participatory planning with diversity. The foundation phase of Garibong-dong Community-led regeneration of Seoul, South Korea

Further to your satisfactory responses to my comments, I am pleased to confirm in my capacity as Chair of the UCL Research Ethics Committee that I have ethically approved your study until 16th December 2018.

Approval is subject to the following conditions:

Notification of Amendments to the Research
You must seek Chair’s approval for proposed amendments (to include extensions to the duration of the project) to the research for which this approval has been given. Ethical approval is specific to this project and must not be treated as applicable to research of a similar nature. Each research project is reviewed separately and if there are significant changes to the research protocol, you should seek confirmation of continued ethical approval by completing the ‘Amendment Approval Request Form’:
http://ethics.org.uk/research/ethics/who

Adverse Event Reporting – Serious and Non-Serious
It is your responsibility to report to the Committee any unanticipated problems or adverse events involving risks to participants or others. The Ethics Committee should be notified of all serious adverse events via the Ethics Committee Administrator (ethics@ucl.ac.uk) immediately the incident occurs. Where the adverse incident is unexpected and serious, the Chair or Vice-Chair will decide whether the study should be terminated pending the opinion of an independent expert. For non-serious adverse events, the Chair or Vice-Chair of the Ethics Committee should again be notified via the Ethics Committee Administrator within ten days of the incident occurring and provide a full written report that should include any amendments to the participant information sheet and study protocol. The Chair or Vice-Chair will confirm that the incident is non-serious and report to the Committee at the next meeting. The final view of the Committee will be communicated to you.

Final Report
At the end of the data collection element of your research we ask that you submit a very brief report (1-2 paragraphs will suffice) which includes in particular issues relating to the ethical implications of the research, i.e. issues obtaining consent, participants withdrawing from the research, confidentiality, protection of participants from physical and mental harm etc.
With best wishes for the research.

Yours sincerely

Professor Michael Heinrich
Interim Chair, UCL Research Ethics Committee

Cc: Hyunjoo Cho
결과통지서

2016년 02월 05일에 접수된 장학계획의 별로 과정에 있어서 사회자문의 기여: 장단위 의사결정과정 내 소수민족 집단을 위한 교육적 사회자문의 역할, 서울시 구로구 가리봉동 주민센터 도시재생사업을 대상으로하여 공공기관 행정출연위원회에서 심의하여 다음과 같이 결정하였음을 통지합니다.

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<tr>
<td>연구책임자</td>
<td>성명, 조경지, 소속, University College London, 직위</td>
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| 심의대상 | 연구계획서(신청) & 연구계획서(시정/보완) |
| 심의일자 | 2016-02-17 |
| 심의위원대 | 보건복지부 지정 공공기관행정문화위원회 |
| 심의결과 | 승인, 수정후승인, 수정후신청결의, 보완, 반려, 거부/보류 |

본 통지서에 기재된 사항은 보건복지부 지정 공공기관행정문화위원회에 기록된 내용과 일치함을 증명합니다.

본 통지서에 기재된 사항은 공공기관행정문화위원회의 공정한 판단과 결정을 바탕으로 삼습니다.

본 연구에 참여한 (Conduct of Research)에 따른 원칙에 위반한 경우 연구에 심각한 폐질을 초래합니다.

본 통지서의 사항은 공공기관행정문화위원회에서 보완합니다.

ver3.3 (Apr 2014)
상기 관대의 연구계획서 및 제출된 서류를 신속히하여 검토한 결과 '수정 후 승인'으로 결정하였습니다.

1. 연구계획서
   1) 사회자문이 우려를 의미하는지에 대한 설명을 기재해주시키 바랍니다.
   2) 참고문헌 내용을 출처하여 인용해주시기 바랍니다.
   3) 비상이 발달한 연구자가 참여하고 이를 방지하였다고 하였는데, 이에 대한 세부 내용이 부족합니다. 전과제 검토자들은 발안을 논의하여 분석하는 것인지, 어떤 내용을 구체적으로 기록하는 것인지에 대한 보충 설명을 기재해주하시기 바랍니다.

2. 성명문 및 동의서
   1) 사회자문이 우려를 의미하는지에 대한 설명을 기재해주시키 바랍니다.
   2) 연구 설정 및 목적에 대한 설명을 연구대상자가 쉽게 이해하도록 문에서 기재해주시키 바랍니다.

3. 지도교수의견서
   - 지도교수의견서가 기재된 지도교수의견서를 제출해주시기 바랍니다.

<참고사항>
- 지역 사회사업에 참여하는 이론자와 연구자 소속자 직원에 대한 의견을 묻는 질문들이 많습니다. 연구자가 대담을 유도하기 위해 반담내용을 부적절하다는 점을 지적하고 대담내용을 간결하고 간명하게 가이드를 주으시기 바랍니다.

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본 문서에 게재된 내용은 보건복지부 지원 공고기록_Counting-up의 기록에 가중치가 없지만 중요하지 않습니다.
본 연구의 학술적발표에 따른 연구결과 및 할평가에 따른 발전을 위한 연구를 추천합니다.
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1) 송인된 계약서에 따라 연구를 수행하여야 합니다.
2) 의료요소를 만든 동의서를 사용하여야 합니다.
3) 환자와 동의자가 아닌 연구대상자들에게는 송인된 동의서를 연구대상자의 보호어로 인증된 복사본을 사용할 수 있으며, 이러한 동의서 복사본은 보호어의 사전 승인을 받고 수행하여야 하며 연구대상자의 보호를 위해 취재된 어떠한 동영상이나의 변경도 즉시 위원회에 보고하여야 합니다.
4) 연구전단에 있어 연구대상자를 보호하기 위하여 불가피한 경우로 연구의 이익이 돕는 위험의 사전 승인을 받고 수행하여야 하며 연구대상자의 보호를 위해 취재된 어떠한 동영상이나의 변경도 즉시 위원회에 보고하여야 합니다.
5) 의료요소에서 송인된 계약서에 따라 동의된 아래의 사항, 대상자에 대한 사망, 입원, 상시적 질병에 대하여는 의료요소에 사면으로 보고하여야 합니다.
6) 연구 또는 연구대상자의 안전에 대해 유의할 만한 영향을 미칠 수 있는 어떠한 새로운 정보도 즉각적으로 연구심의위원회에 보고하여야 합니다.
7) 의료요소 요구가 있을 때는 연구의 진행과 관련된 보고를 의료요소에 제출하여야 합니다.
8) 의료요소 심의회에 대해 조사 및 감독 사항에서 현상심사를 실시한 시 절차에 관한 절차 및 절차에 의한 연구는 의료요소의 관련된 시류를 순차적으로 보고하여야 합니다.
9) 환자사항의 설명서가 시험실에 있을 때에는 사용자에 대한 보호를 받아야 합니다.
10) 동의는 성체 혹은 부상한 영향이 없는 상태에서 공론의 이익에 두고하여 수행하여야 하며, 절차적인 연구대상자에게 연구에 참여해도를 고려할 수 있도록 명확하게 기록을 제공하여야 합니다.
11) 연구의 활동에 의해 발생할 수 있는 연구자에게는 고생이나 손해, 상상적 목적으로 사용할 수 없습니다.
12) 의료요소의 심의회에 대한 사항을 모집하거나 연구를 진행할 수 없습니다.
13) 의료요소가 사전 및 보고를 요구한 경우 사전 보고 제출을 1개월 이내에 본 의료요소에 제출하여야 합니다.
14) 의료요소가 사전 보고 제출을 1개월 이내에 본 의료요소에 제출하지 않은 경우 심의회가 휴면될 수 있습니다.
15) 의료요소에 의한 시험 실시 중간 보고서를 제출하지 않은 경우 심의회가 휴면될 수 있습니다.
16) 의료요소의 심의회에 의한 시험 실시 중간 보고서를 제출하지 않은 경우 심의회가 휴면될 수 있습니다.
17) 의료요소의 심의회에 의한 시험 실시 중간 보고서를 제출하지 않은 경우 심의회가 휴면될 수 있습니다.
18) 의료요소의 심의회에 의한 시험 실시 중간 보고서를 제출하지 않은 경우 심의회가 휴면될 수 있습니다.

2016년 02월 17일

보건복지부 지정
공용기관생명윤리위원회

본 조치사항에 기재된 사항은 보건복지부 지정 공용기관생명윤리위원회에 기초된 내용과 일치합니다.
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ver3.3 (Apr 2014)
APPENDIX B

Questionnaire in English

Title: Social relationship in the neighbourhood and its contribution to regeneration projects

This is a case study for my PhD research which aims to identify the contribution of social capital in the process of participatory planning. Social capital means the benefits from the social relationships such as friendship or advice network in the neighbourhood, and the study will examine the social relationships is important in the participation of the regeneration project. The study will collect the data about social relationships among the members of the regeneration committee and the residents in Garibong-dong.

Detail of the study

The survey focuses on the members of the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee.

Before you decided it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what participation will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not. If you do decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.

The survey will take around 20 - 25 minutes. The questions will be about the social relationships with other participants in the committee.
Questionnaire

1. What is your name? [short answer question]

2. How many times did you participate in Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration project meeting? (including committee meeting, consultant meeting, and master planning meeting) [under three times – more than three times under five times – more than five times under ten times – more than ten times]

3. Why did you decide to participate in the committee? [I was recommended from the Seoul Metropolitan Government/ recommended from the Guro-gu office / recommended from the other members of the committee / I participated without any recommendation after knowing the information such as by the banners or local newspapers by the chance]

4. (If you answered that you were recommended from the other members of the committee in the third question) Who was the member who recommend you to participate of the committee? [multiple choice question: dummy]

5. Suppose that you are confronted with an issue in the regeneration project, for which you couldn’t find a solution yourself. To whom of the members of your research group would you go for advice? [multiple choice question: dummy]

6. Consider all regeneration issues you had from the beginning of regeneration project and for which you couldn’t find a solution yourself. How often have you been for advice to each of the members of the committee? [Five-point scale: daily – sometimes a week – sometimes a month – sometimes a year – never]
7. Suppose that you are in the situation in which you needed information about the regeneration project. To whom of the members of your research group would you go to gain the information? [multiple choice question: dummy]

8. Consider all situations of the past year in which you needed information about the regeneration project, but you didn’t possess it yourself. How often did you obtain this information with the help of each of the members of your research group? [daily – sometimes a week – sometimes a month – sometimes a year – never]

9. Suppose that you are confronted with problems in your private life (e.g. relational problems, children education, family issues). With whom of the members of the committee would you discuss these problems? [multiple choice question: dummy]

10. How often does it happen that you do a social activity outside the work context with the members of the committee (e.g. going for dinner, doing sport, going to the movies, etc.)? [attention: activities that are organised by the regeneration project itself, such as regeneration school or field trips do not belong to this type of social activities] (daily – sometimes a week – sometimes a month – sometimes a year – never)

11. How many times do you contact with each member of the committee? The contacting includes not only meeting in person but also texting or phone call (daily – sometimes a week – sometimes a month – sometimes a year – never)
12. If there are people who you can refer to as ‘friends’, who are they? [multiple choice question: dummy]

13. Are there people whom you knew before participating in the committee? [multiple choice question: dummy]

14. (Among the people you chose in questions 12) which description will be suitable to the relationship with each member? [no relationship: we didn’t work together or meet in the friendship networks, but knew each other’s face/ sharing information: we shared information when the information was useful for each other/ collaboration between the organizations: the organizations in which we participated sometimes worked together / cooperation in the same organization: we had experiences to achieve the same goal in the same organization / friendship: we were close personally in the neighbourhood or in social groups]

15. (Among the people you chose in questions 12) How long have you been knowing each other?

Thank you for your participation.
APPENDIX C

Questionnaire in Korean

안녕하십니까?
바쁘신 중에 귀한 시간을 내주셔서 대단히 감사합니다.

본 설문지는 지역협의체의 사회적 관계망을 파악하기 위해 실시하는 것입니다.
선생님께서 답변해 주신 내용은 모두 익명으로 처리되며, 이 자료는 오직 연구 목적으로만 활용될 것입니다. 그러므로 가급적이지만의 감정에 솔직하게 답변해 주시기를 부탁드립니다.

질문은 총 두 가지 종류로, 현재 협의체 내의 관계에 대한 질문들과 그 이전의 사회적 관계망에 관한 질문입니다. 총 소요시간은 약 15분입니다.
설문에 응해 주신 것에 대해 다시 한번 감사드립니다.

1. 귀하의 이름을 적어주세요.

2. 귀하는 현재까지 총 몇 번 정도 가리봉동 재생사업 관련 회의에 참여하였습니까?
   (운영위원회, 마을일꾼, MP회의 등 관련회의 모두 포함)
   [3번 미만 / 3번 이상 5번 미만 / 5번 이상 10번 미만 / 10번 이상]

3. 귀하가 제일 처음 운영위원회로 가입하게 된 계기는 무엇입니까?
   [서울시에서 연락을 받았다. / 구로구에서 연락을 받았다. / 현수막 등 동네에서 홍보를 통해서 정보를 알게 되었다. / 기존에 재생사업에 참여하던 주민에게서 권유를 받았다.]
4. (3번 질문에서 기존에 재생사업에 참여하던 주민에게서 권유를 받은 경우) 그 주민은 누구입니까? 아래에서 선택하세요. (가나다 순)

[전체 참여자 명단 제공]

5. 재생사업에서 협의해야 할 사안이 있고, 귀하의 의견이 확신이 가지 않아 누군가의 조언이 필요하다고 가정해 보시다. 누구에게 조언을 구하시겠습니까? (가나다 순)

[전체 참여자 명단 제공]

6. 지난 2015년부터의 운영위원회 활동을 모두 되돌아 보았을 때, 실제로 재생사업 사안에 대해 다른 운영위원회 주민에게 조언을 구한 일이 있습니까?

[5점 척도: 일곱 번 이상 (7회 이상) / 대여섯 번 (5~6회) / 세 네 번 (3~4회) / 한두 번 (1~2회) / 전혀 없음]

7. 재생사업에 관련된 정보나 자료가 필요하네요 귀하가 가지고 있지 않다고 가정해 보시다. 누구에게 부탁하여 그 정보를 얻으시겠습니까? (가나다 순)

[전체 참여자 명단 제공]

8. 지난 2015년부터의 운영위원회 활동을 모두 되돌아 보았을 때, 실제로 재생사업 사안에 대해 다른 운영위원회 주민에게 부탁하여 정보나 자료를 구한 일이 있습니까?

[5점 척도: 일곱 번 이상 (7회 이상) / 대여섯 번 (5~6회) / 세 네 번 (3~4회) / 한두 번 (1~2회) / 전혀 없음]

9. 귀하의 개인 사생활에 문제가 생겼다고 가정해 보시다 (가족문제나 직장문제 등등). 운영위원회 주민 중 누구와 그 고민을 상의하시겠습니까? (가나다 순)

[전체 참여자 명단 제공]

10. 공식적인 운영위원회 활동 외에 얼마나 자주 운영위원회 내의 주민들과 사교 모임을 가집니까? (점심, 저녁식사, 취미, 운동 모임 등) [참고: 운영위원회 내에서 공식적으로
조직된 활동, 예를 들어 마을 축제나 세미나는 이런 사교 모임에 포함되지 않습니다]

[5점 척도: 매일 1회 이상 / 주 1회 이상 / 월 1회 이상 / 월 1회 하 / 전혀 없음]

11. 공식적인 운영위원회 활동 외에 레크로 얼마나 자주 각 인물들과 연락을 주고 받습니까? 연락이라고 함은 직접 만나는 것 뿐만이 아니라 전화, 문자나 메신저 대화를 포함합니다.

[5점 척도: 매일 1회 이상 / 주 1회 이상 / 월 1회 이상 / 월 1회 하 / 전혀 하지 않는다]

12. 친구, 교우 관계라고 할 수 있는 인물이 있다면 운영위원회 주민 중 누구가 있습니까? (가나다 순)

[전체 참여자 명단 제공]

13. 가리봉동 재생사업 운영위원회 참여 이전부터 알고 있던 사람이 있습니까? 아는 사람을 모두 체크해주세요. (가나다 순)

[전체 참여자 명단 제공]

14. 각인물과의 관계에 대해서 어떤 설명이 적합한가요? (복수 선택 가능)


15. (13번 질문에 체크한 사람에 한해서) 재생사업 이전에 각 인물들을 알고 지낸 지는 얼마나 됨니까?

[5점 척도: 4년 이상 / 3년 이상 4년 미만 / 2년 이상 3년 미만 / 1년 이상 2년 미만 / 1년 미만]
Local memberships and attributes of the members of the Garibong-dong Urban Regeneration committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Node</th>
<th>Former memberships in the Newtown project</th>
<th>Current local memberships</th>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Centrality of networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>church</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>LH committee (LH)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Emergency Measure Committee (EMC)</td>
<td></td>
<td>informal centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>new comer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>commission of self-government</td>
<td>Korean Chinese association</td>
<td>Korean Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>EMC</td>
<td></td>
<td>informal centre</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>EMC</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>EMC</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>EMC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>‘Brother group’ (informal friendship network)</td>
<td>tenant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>EMC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>EMC</td>
<td>church</td>
<td>‘Brother group’</td>
<td>Group of Representatives of Neighbourhoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>LH</td>
<td>church</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>EMC</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
new comer

EMC

EMC

EMC

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EMC

EMC

Garibong-dong Merchant groups

LH

EMC
APPENDIX E

The sample of field notes (translated in English)

25th March 2016

The weather was a bit chilly

For the first time, I participated in the committee meeting.

Participants: two people from Guro council, five residents who arrived at seven pm (Ilwon/a middle-aged female person who came as the first time/ Bum/ Minji/ Yoon), two more people who arrived during the meeting, the coordinator (Gayoung)

Seven residents among ten people

I left the university around five pm and arrived at the centre around half past six. When I arrived, probably that was the time for people to finish their jobs. There were a lot of people around Nam-guro station. At the front of the station, there were a huge number of people who are taking off the vans after finishing their constructing works. They were walking along the Uma Street. I also followed them to reach the Regeneration Centre. Uma Street was full of lights from the neon signs although it was not late night.

There was not anyone in the centre yet, so I walked around the centre and dropped by the self-policing centre to ask Yong-gun about the interview. He swayed his head and said if I was interested in the Regeneration project, the members of the committee might know better. I said that I was more interested in Korean Chinese groups and other people whom I met always recommended Young-gun. He smiled and said ‘there is no one who is doing community works among Korean Chinese’. I felt somewhat proudness from his saying. I said that I would visit again and he said ‘today I don’t feel good, so come the next time’. I said that ‘nowadays I come here every day so see next time’, and he changed his face which had seemed to be a bit grumpy and said
'yes yes come again’. I thought that it seems to be better to wait rather than rushing into the interview.

Around a quarter to seven, I went to the Regeneration centre. There were Ilwon and another middle-aged woman who I saw for the first time. Ilwon was introducing the project while walking around the centre. I approached her and introduced myself and my research. She was trying to find someone who was familiar with in the photos on the wall in the centre. She pointed out several people from the former Emergency Committee in the photos and told me ‘we fought more than ten years’. And repeatedly said ‘we won’. Ilwon said ‘she did a lot of voluntary works when we protested together’. She said ‘that was what I did because I did not want to be taken over my property.’

After a while, Minji arrived. I provided a green tea for her and greeted. She did not seem to have personal relations with Ilwon. Other people talked about their personal lives when they arrived, but she stayed quiet. And then, Bum arrived. I approached and explained my research, and he said ‘there is someone whom I know in UCL’. And he introduced himself as an architect. He began to talk about rebuilding regulations with Ilwon. Ilwon said that already with residents he proceeded to submit a complaint about the height regulation. Bum said ‘if the government got civic complaints, they should reply,’ and asked how they answered to the residents.

After waiting a while, the meeting proceeded. The coordinator said she got messages from other members that they could not participate today. She mentioned generally there were ten people. Ilwon said that five people do not reach a quorum, but today’s topics are not urgent matters to decide. The officers from Guro council said once a week is too frequent to make people come regularly.

The meeting was led by Ilwon, but the public officers were often involved if the members of the committee needed information. The first issue was whether it is better to separate Uma Street committee and the economic-cultural part of the committee. […] The second issue was about the Anchor facility. […]
Fortunately, today Minji participated, so I was able to see how they discussed in the meetings. She had some accents, but it was not difficult to understand at all. Rather, her logic was clear. And also she was well-known as a successful business in the local area, so it made her saying persuasively. In particular, when she mentioned that the relationship between Guro Industrial Complex and Garibong-dong, other people tended to agree with her argument. But she tended to presume the reaction of Korean people. Even before Korean residents mentioning, she said ‘the image of Korean Chinese groups is a bit cheap and shabby, so Koreans don’t like, but…’ I felt that she seemed to be a bit uncomfortable and careful not to make conflicts in the committee. It was somewhat different when I visited her for the interview when she was surrounded by Korean Chinese workers as a leader of the organisation.

On the way back, I passed the Uma Street. The street was not crowded. I accidentally ran into Gayoung in the station. I said that ‘I couldn’t recognise you because you are wearing a coat.’ And she said ‘I kind of stick out like a sore thumb if I wore the coat in the neighbourhood. I feel that everyone looked at me and feel like that they are saying ‘where are you come from’. That is the reason why I don’t wear the coat when I am working.’ There was a reason why she wore the same jumper every day. She said ‘there were not many people who are on the radical side in today’s meeting. There was some noise, but the members were not conflicting with Minji compared to my thoughts’. I asked her why she thought there would be conflicts between Korean members and Minji. But I felt she did not want to mention specifically, and she said ‘just I guess’. We were able to talk about the committee processes during the journey.
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