Ethnic and religious diversity in the politics of suburban London.

David Gilbert, Claire Dwyer and Nazneen Ahmed.

David Gilbert is Professor of Urban and Historical Geography, Royal Holloway, University of London.

Claire Dwyer is Professor of Human Geography, University College London.

Dr Nazneen Ahmed is Research Associate in the Department of Geography, University College London.

Abstract

The notion of ‘suburbia’ is increasingly useless as a singular, simple description of place, identity or political culture. Focusing on ethnic and particularly religious diversity highlights the intensely differentiated nature of outer London. The tropes of ‘Metroland’, and ‘leafy suburbia’ deflect from recognition of this diversity, and the broadly-found expectations about patterns of migration, suburbanization and cultural change loosely associated with the Chicago School of urban sociology have less and less applicability to modern London. Religious and ethnic diversity in suburbia poses significant challenges for political parties. In particular, Labour’s difficulties in appealing to different constituencies, often expressed geographically in terms of the differences between inner London and the white working-class areas of post-industrial Britain, are also present in the micro-politics of adjacent areas of outer London. New forms of religion, and particularly the development of large new worship spaces, increasingly common in outer London, also have significant consequences for the local politics of suburbia.

Keywords

Suburbs Religion Ethnicity London Metroland ‘Chicago School’

Time to forget Metroland?

Suburbia, and perhaps particularly London’s suburbia, is as much a place in the mind as a place on the map. There is a academic cottage industry (or perhaps a semi-detached-house industry) in cultural studies, sociology, history and cultural geography grouped loosely into what is sometimes called the ‘new suburban studies’, all pointing to the complexity of suburban culture and society; this has had limited effect on the wider popular imagination.¹ The trope of the ‘leafy suburb’ is still remarkably pervasive, as is a set of assumptions about suburban values and suburban political identities. From the late-Victorian satire
of the Grossmith’s *Diary of a Nobody*, through mid-twentieth century castigation (for example by George Orwell and Ian Nairn) and John Betjeman’s romanticisation of ‘Metroland’, to the gentle mockery (sometimes affectionate, sometime just plain smug) of 1970s and 1980s TV sit-coms, there are variations in place and tone, but also a strongly embedded cultural positioning of suburbia as a place of small-‘c’ conservative values, of ‘home’ and a certain kind of Englishness.

There is also a lasting expected relationship with Conservative politics. One of the great successes of the inter-war Conservative Party was to recognize the significance of growing suburbs and new suburban identities as a new core constituency. Later Conservative leaders developed different aspects of their connection with the suburbs, whether in Margaret Thatcher’s emphasis on home-ownership, privatized individualism and the rhetoric of good-housekeeping and domestic budgets, or John Major’s initially highly successful projection of his suburban ordinariness. In her short honeymoon period before the disastrous 2017 election campaign, a laudatory *Economist* pen-portrait of Theresa May was illustrated with a privet-hedge topiary of the silhouette of the Prime Minister, representing a supposed return to the values of ‘middling folk’ in contrast to the mixture of metropolitan and establishment elitism of the previous administration.2

Built into these approaches to suburbia are not-very-hidden expectations about what ordinariness or middling folk might look like. Whenever there is a sense of suburbs as places undergoing significant change, challenging these stubborn assumptions, this often gets treated as a category error. In 2002, the then London Mayor Ken Livingstone described Southall as suffering ‘inner-city stress’ and being not at all suburban.3 Our own recent research work focuses on religious faith and practice in the London Borough of Ealing in a project called ‘Making Suburban Faith’; a regular response from the faith groups that we work with, at public events, and even from academic colleagues and referees, is to question whether Ealing is ‘really suburban’ or is ‘still suburban’.4 This is partly about architecture and built form as well as a more general sense of changing consumption cultures and increasing ‘busyness.’ While Ealing still has many thousands of Edwardian terraces and inter-war semis as well as the Victorian villas near the Common that earned it the sobriquet ‘The Queen of the Suburbs’, recent developments have tended to be large-scale, high-density developments of apartments concentrated around the tube and rail stations (given an additional stimulus by the prospect of CrossRail). But in large part, this is about racial, ethnic and religious diversity. Despite the work of the ‘new suburban studies’ in showing the longevity of the Black and Asian presence even in the most archetypal of Metroland suburbs, there is still buried in the term ‘suburban’ some lasting expectations of cultural homogeneity. John Carey once wrote that elite culture of the mid-twentieth century used the term ‘suburban’ as a distinctive combination of ‘topographical with intellectual disdain.’5 In the late twentieth and twenty-first century this has been inflected by the meanings of the terms ‘inner city’ and ‘urban’. Both these terms have pulled together topographical positioning and ideas of race and identity; ‘inner-city problems’, or
‘urban music’ both have clear connotations, but also indirectly establish what suburbia is not expected to be.

The suburbs of London have become not just more ethnically and religiously diverse, but also remarkably complex social and political spaces more generally. Much of the commentary on the results of the 2016 Brexit referendum focused on the difference and distance between the metropolitan Remain vote, and the rural and deindustrialized Leave heartlands, between Islington and Boston, Manchester and Stoke, or Bristol and Cornwall. Yet look at a different scale, and the referendum geography also tells of much more fine-grained difference in London’s outer suburbs. Follow the borderlands between outer London and the Home Counties (according to taste, round the hard-shoulder of the M25 or the route of Iain Sinclair’s psychogeography London Orbital), and the journey through the referendum geography shows how differentiated these places have become. Kingston (23% Remain majority) borders Sutton (7% Leave major), which in turn borders Croydon (9% Rema major) , and Reigate & Banstead (1% Leave major). There were marked contrasts along the western stretches of the M25 – Spelthorne (20% Leave majority), abuts Richmond (39% Remain major), Windsor & Maidenhead (8% Rema major) and Elbridge (20% Rema major). While the strong Leave vote in outer East London and Essex was expected, other outer London areas also showed significant variations; for example, to the north of London, Waltham Forest and Enfield voted strongly to Remain, but a few miles away around the M25, there were very big majorities for Leave in Epping Forest (25%) and Broxbourne (33%).

What the referendum results pointed to is that the idea of suburbia is increasingly useless as a singular, simple description of place, of identity, or indeed of political culture. Outer London in the twenty-first century is both a patchwork of different kinds of place, and the product of overlapping geographies of class, commuting patterns, housing tenure, education, migration, ethnicity, and religious identity. Within outer London and its wider hinterland in South East England there are places with widely contrasting integration into the metropolitan, European and global economy. It was telling that much – but not all – of the so-called Surrey ‘Stockbroker Belt’, including Guildford, Woking, Mole Valley, and Epsom & Ewell, leaned strongly towards Remain. By contrast, right across outer London, wards with relatively poor white-working class populations voted strongly for Leave, such as the Cray Valley wards in Bromley and the New Addington and Fieldway wards in Croydon. The referendum data for individual wards highlight the patchwork geographies of suburban London. For example, data for Hounslow and Ealing indicate a pattern where affluent, well-educated, majority white areas voted very strongly for Remain, majority white, working class areas with lower education attainment voted strongly for Leave, and wards with higher proportions of Asian voters tended to be more evenly split.6

Time to forget the ‘Chicago School’?
Suburbia is becoming increasingly complex in the twenty-first century. Ethnic and religious diversity may be the most visible manifestation, but there are also marked differences in other indicators, including social class, housing tenure, age-profiles, educational attainment and commuting patterns. What we are seeing is the disruption of established understandings of the geography of English cities, and of London in particular. For a long time, understanding of London’s geography, and particularly the relationship between metropolitan core and suburbs, seemed to sit within what might be described as an Anglo-Saxon model of city structure. The fullest expression of that model was associated with the work of Robert Park and Ernest Burgess, members of the so-called ‘Chicago School’ of urban sociology, writing in the 1920s and 1930s.

The Chicago School drew upon the geographies of their city, one of the shock cities of the age, to suggest emergent features of modern urbanism. In Burgess’s work, the key feature in the distinctive spatial structure to cities was the famous concentric zone model (for many years a staple subject for O level and GCSE Geography examination questions.) Outside a central business district, Burgess suggested that there would be ringed zones of housing, each successively more affluent, from slums and working-class housing near the urban core, out to affluent low-density housing in the distant commuter suburbs. This view of urban spatial structure was combined with understandings of migration and cultural change in the city. The inner zones were associated with recent migration, and strong conflict and competition between different migrant groups for control of urban space and access to urban resources. Park argued that over time, different groups moved from periods of conflict, through phases of accommodation, towards cultural assimilation. This was simultaneously a social and spatial process: migrant groups lost their distinctiveness as they became more affluent and as they moved to the suburbs, also becoming more socially and politically conservative in the process.

There is a long list of criticisms of the Chicago School approach. Prominent among these are the way that it generalized from the experience of early twentieth century US cities, as well as the way that it saw the fundamental dynamic in urban systems as being a kind of ecological competition for territory and resources between different groups, ignoring the importance of labour and housing markets and the role of the state the production of urban inequalities. The Chicago School approach has also been criticized for its use of a simplistic binary distinction between migrant groups and an undifferentiated ‘host’ society. However, a loose version of this analysis has often informed how London’s geography has been understood. The powerful associations of suburbia with a particular construction of Englishness combine with expectations about the initial inner-city location of migrant groups, and the cultural changes associated with suburbanization.

The Jewish history in London provided a powerful archetype of this pattern. Between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries the East End of London was marked by a distinctive and intense Jewish culture, associated particularly with migration in response to persecution in central and Eastern Europe. By the inter-war period the East End’s Jewish population was around
150000, but the 1930s and particularly the post-war period saw rapid out-migration and suburbanization, particularly to Golders Green, Barnet, Hendon and Edgware in north west London, and later to Barkingside and Clayhall in north east London. While these moves were not associated with the simplistic model of ‘assimilation’ suggested in the Chicago School models – suburbanization was associated with some measure of secularization, but distinctively Jewish religious, political and cultural institutions and cuisine remained as characteristic elements of these new suburban cultures – there were significant changes, notably in the almost complete disappearance of Yiddish as an everyday language.

A variation of this narrative has become a common interpretation of the changing spatial patterning of diversity in London. Writing recently about the increasing ethnic diversity of London’s suburbs, commentator Hugh Muir interpreted change in exactly this way: ‘There is an inevitability about diversity in the inner cities. Poorer Britons of all origins live there. Migrants looking for jobs and cheap housing gravitate there. But it is not surprising that minorities should want a piece of Metroland.’ For Muir, this ‘black flight’ is associated with the growing affluence of some ethnic groups, and changing assumptions about their political geography. There are complex effects in some outer London constituencies. The politics of Harrow West constituency has changed dramatically with changes in its ethic composition particularly the migration of upwardly-mobile British Asian voters to classic Metroland territory. It was a very safe Conservative seat up to the 1997 general election; Labour took the seat with a swing of over 17% in 1997, and has held the seat since. By contrast the neighbouring constituency of Harrow East, also an area of characterised by a large British Asian middle class, was recaptured by the Conservatives in 2010, and did not experience the strong London swings to Labour in 2015 and 2017. A significant factor in the Conservatives’ relative success has been the increasing propensity of middle-class Asian voters, particularly Hindus and Sikhs, to vote Conservative.

The Chicago School model of urban structure and change is often contrasted with a European model. Unlike the affluent, sprawling suburbs of the Chicago School, the European model identifies an urban structure in which geographical marginality is closely associated with social and political marginalisation. The most obvious example is Paris, with its elite historic core within the ‘Peripherique’ contrasted with the banlieus beyond, characterised by state housing projects, relative and absolute poverty, and concentrations of some ethnic identities and recent migration. This polarisation between banlieu and city has been a central theme in recent French politics, with tensions over migration, religious extremism and the place of Islam in French culture mapped into its urban geographies.

Although there are some concentrations of deprivation in outer London, the city is a long way from this European model; nonetheless the structure of London is becoming more hybrid, and in some ways less Chicago School and more ‘European.’ Firstly, internal migration is becoming less about upward mobility and more about the consequences of housing inflation, inner-city
gentrification, and other factors that have seen lower income groups increasingly excluded from central areas of the city. London is extreme, if not unique in these patterns, as the transformation of old industrial and working-class inner districts has been a feature of many major cities. In twenty-first century London, this has been exacerbated by the continuing decline of social housing, particularly in more central districts, by the revival of an aggressive private rental market, and also by changes to government welfare and housing support policies, most notoriously the so-called ‘bed-room tax’. In some wards of outer London, migration from inner London is not associated with upward-mobility, but with patterns of exclusion.

The second feature of twenty-first London that complicates the relationship between centre and suburb, is that the geography of immigration has become more complex. While the Chicago-style pattern of migration to poorer inner-city areas followed by suburbanization may have fitted both the Jewish experience and some of the main movements of the post-war period, international migration directly into outer London areas is now much more common. This is in part connected to the hyper-capitalisation of central and inner London; relatively affordable places to live in London are much more likely to be found outside its core areas. It is striking that while the share of the population born outside the UK increased for all boroughs between the 2001 and 2011 censuses, the rate of growth in that share was much higher in outer London; the sharpest growth was in Barking and Dagenham, followed by Havering, Bexley, Greenwich, Hillingdon and Sutton. By contrast, Hackney, one of the most significant destinations for post-war migration, but a borough experiencing rapid gentrification and property inflation, saw the lowest rate of increase in the share of its population born outside the UK.8

There is also a reinforcing effect from the growing diversity of outer London. Family reunification migration follows this geography, but there is also an increasing concentration of gateway institutions that support new migrants in suburbia, including particularly mosques, temples, churches and gurdwaras. The sociologist Wei Li has written of the development of ‘ethnoburbs’ in the USA and Canada.9 While London’s suburbs do not have all the features she identifies, they are increasingly plugged into transnational networks through digital communication and transport networks. For many people in outer London, family, business, social and religious networks connect their suburban locations directly with distant places.

Suburbia and the changing political geographies of faith

Religion is a perhaps surprising element of this new suburban diversity, as suburbanization has often been connected to secularization. The suburban growth of London before the First World War and in the inter-war period, was seen by the established churches as a threat to religious life. Suburbanization was supposedly associated with turn to materialism and a loss of associational culture. If the great challenge for organized religion in the nineteenth century was the dislocation and supposed demoralisation associated with
industrialization and urbanization, in the early twentieth century the geographical focus of concern broadened to include the spiritual welfare of the new suburbanites. In the Edwardian period, there were panics that gardening, tennis and golf were eroding the suburban Sunday. After the First World War Church of England initiatives such as the London Diocese ‘Forty-Five Churches Fund’ and the ‘Twenty-five Churches’ campaign by the Southwark Diocese attempted to build new churches and establish new parishes across semi-detached London. After the Second World War, while there was significant church building in outer London, particularly by the Roman Catholic Church, the decline in regular church attendance steepened. The materialism and social privatization of suburbia was regarded as one component of the loss of religious belief and observance.

However, the religious geography of London in the twenty-first century does not fit with the more general pattern of long-term decline in organised religion. Religion is just one aspect of the way that London’s culture and politics is becoming more distinctive, and less like other parts of England; this is not just a feature of inner London, but part of the way that outer London is also changing. The picture in Britain as a whole indicates a long-term shift away from organized religion, and particularly mainstream Christianity; regular Sunday attendance has declined in the Anglican Church (an estimated decline in England of 14% between 2000 and 2010), the Roman Catholic Church (-16%) and the Methodist Church (-39%). However, the steady decline in Christian worship has been slowed significantly by recent migration, particularly Catholics from Poland, Orthodox Christians from Romania, and Pentecostal Christians from West Africa. Outer London has been one of the main destinations for these migration flows, and new churches have been important gateway institutions for recent migrants. This has been complemented by the growth of distinctive elements of Christianity; for example, the evangelical wing of Anglicanism has been particularly successful in suburban London and the Home Counties where some of its biggest and most successful churches and networks are to be found.

At the same time, non-Christian worship is an important feature of many parts of outer London. Newham, Harrow, Brent, Redbridge and then Slough were the five UK local authorities with the lowest rates of self-identification as having ‘no religion’ in the 2011 census. Nearly a third of Newham’s population is Muslim, while a quarter of Harrow’s population is Hindu. Other lesser well-known religious groups have also made a home in outer London; Britain’s largest Jain temple is just north of the M25, just outside Potter’s Bar. Irrespective of future changes and patterns in post-Brexit immigration policy (which might potentially affect the growth of Christian worship associated with migration from eastern Europe), the increasing significance of non-Christian religious identity is effectively locked in, as there is a markedly younger demographic profile to most of these populations.

The implications for the politics of outer London are complex. The national focus on fears of Islamic radicalisation and the emergence of UKIP and more extremist nationalist and racist politics, can be read onto the patchwork geographies of parts of outer London to suggest the potential development of
new intensely local and conflict-bound patterns of suburban politics. While outer London is unlikely to see the kinds of violence associated with the Parisian banlieues, in some places there are clear moves towards strongly polarized local geographies. In the past such tensions have drawn upon the cultural associations of suburbia with leafy Englishness, particularly as a way of mobilizing opposition to the developments of new mosques. In the early 1990s, a local campaign against the building of the Dahwoodi Bohra mosque in Northolt, drew upon the imagery of ‘an alien development’ in a what was rather ambitiously described as an English ‘Garden suburb’. Yet this kind of ‘out-of-place’ political rhetoric seems increasingly anachronistic, as religious diversity becomes the new normal in many parts of suburbia. New religious identities and buildings have become taken-for-granted elements of everyday life in outer London.

These changes do not have straightforward consequences for political parties. Older assumptions about the political affiliations of different religious and ethnic groups have been stretched, and there are not direct mappings of religious beliefs and principles into the agendas and manifestos of political parties. Changes to the nature of suburban culture have contributed to the greater fluidity of political affiliation that has been a feature of twenty-first century politics. What we suggest here are not predictions for the future voting patterns of different religious groups, but rather three wider observations about the relationship between religion and politics as they relate to suburban London.

The first of these is that religion is an important dimension of a particular kind of multicultural politics that is increasingly successful in places that were once dismissed as rather dull, and particularly those places that now mix elements of the suburban and the metropolitan. Rupa Huq’s ‘against the head’ 2015 capture of the Ealing Central and Acton constituency for Labour, followed up by a spectacular increase in her majority in 2017 is a good example of this. In such areas, the open promotion of diversity has been part not just of Labour’s campaigns in general elections, but has also been both a firmly institutionalised and relatively successful element of the work of the local state. This multiculturalism and religious pluralism is also an increasingly taken-for-granted aspect of everyday life in these places. A form of multicultural political culture often labeled simply as ‘metropolitan’ has a particular force in these places, and has a rather different inflection from the political culture of inner London areas.

As many have pointed out, Labour’s relative success in London in the present decade highlights tensions and even contradictions in its broad national coalition of support, that were obvious in its performance in the 2015 and 2017 elections. Those tensions are often expressed geographically in terms of the differences between inner London and the white working-class areas of post-industrial Britain, yet such tensions are also present in the micro-politics of adjacent areas of outer London. What works in Ealing or Harrow West may have consequences for the way that the Labour Party is perceived in Spelthorne or significant parts of Hounslow and Hillingdon. Examples of anti-Semitism in the Labour Party and the leadership’s mishandling of those scandals were a
significant factor in the Party’s failure to capture the local authority in the north London suburb of Barnet in the May 2018 elections (approximately 15% of the electorate in Barnet identify as Jewish). Beyond the specific circumstances of Labour’s failure to address hate-speech in the Party, this also points to the increasing salience of religious and ethnic identity, and of the resonances of international politics in the London suburbs. The politics of the Middle East, South Asia and elsewhere are likely to have increasing consequences for the policies and cultures of local politics in suburban London.

There are as many potential contradictions for the Tories in the growing complexity of outer London. The old certainties of semi-automatic suburban Conservative support are being replaced by a mosaic of different positions. These include not just very divergent Conservative attitudes to hard or soft Brexit, which are perhaps more acute than in other parts of Britain, but also different Conservative responses to the support of the local state for multiculturalism. There are notable contrasts between places where there is a significant British Asian representation as Conservative local councillors, and other places where the party has been competing with Labour and UKIP for white working-class voters.

A second observation relates more directly to the impact of religion on local politics, and particularly the politics associated with planning and the built environment. Our research has focused on the creativity associated with suburban religious faiths, often as expressed through the creation of new buildings. Faith groups often have significant advantages in their capacities for the development of new buildings and facilities compared with most other civil society organisations. The most dynamic churches in terms of membership, including Pentecostal ‘Black Majority Churches’ (BMCs), other Pentecostal churches, the evangelical wing of the Anglican church, and a wider set of churches and groups associated with the ‘new expressions’ movement, tend to have strong cultures and expectations of financial giving, providing resources to acquire new premises or to undertake significant programmes of work. This kind of financial commitment is matched in other faith groups, providing the resources for ambitious mosque, temple and gurdwara projects. In a context of severe cuts to local government funding, and the decline of many other civil society organisations, faith groups are often the only contributors to significant building projects other than commercial developers.

In the recent past new faith sites have often been temporary or converted premises, and there is a long history of the conversion of older commercial and industrial buildings, such as cinemas, offices and shops, into places of worship. In common with many parts of Britain, outer London has also seen the transformation of older churches and chapels into new faith spaces, reflecting changes in religious identity and belief. However, what is increasingly apparent is that as well as a continuing pattern of re-use and improvisation of existing buildings (most recently associated with BMCs connected to migration from West Africa particularly in inner south London and outer east London), that there are many more purpose-built and ambitious projects taking place, and that
These new developments are possible because of the availability of larger sites in outer London, and reflect the confidence and resources of newer religious communities. It is striking that these developments often draw upon increasing professional skills within faith groups, in architecture and design, in engineering, but also in law and planning. Older assumptions about the marginal position of such groups in relation to the local state and planning authorities are being altered; these larger scale developments shift the relationship between the local state and faith groups. This is in part about navigating through issues of access, congestion, noise and parking, but it is also about local politicians’ commitment to very visible expressions of diversity, and the opportunity for ambitious place-making through the creation of new landmarks.

Finally, the changing nature of faith communities in outer London highlights some of the limitations of the spatial organization of British democracy. The efforts made to bring religion to the new suburbanites during the mid-twentieth century worked on a very localized model. What the Anglican and Catholic churches were trying to achieve was an extension of the old parish model to new places, with a church at the heart of a new community. There was a relatively clear and straightforward relationship between local faith communities, particularly local faith leaders, and elected councillors. New faith developments increasingly have very different geographies, often with a dispersed community travelling significant distances for worship. Outer London has a British variant of a pattern that is common in North America, that can be conceptualised as ‘edge-city’ faith, where places of worship may be sited to suit ease of access as much as the needs of an immediate locality.

Where once a central metropolitan Cathedral may have served as a symbolic and spiritual focus for a city, in this more complex religious geography, significant religious hubs may be on the outskirts. Some of the major temples and gurdwaras in Southall for example, serve a population that ‘faith-commutes’ from across outer west London and beyond. In our research on centres of worship in Ealing, two of our case studies have this kind of stretched geography. The Elim Pentecostal Ealing Christian Centre, in a large converted cinema opposite Northfields underground station, pulls in worshippers well beyond Ealing, while the Sri Kanaga Thurkkai Amman Hindu Temple in a converted Baptist Chapel in West Ealing acts as a hub for Tamil-speaking Hindus from across much of London and the South-East. The most extreme example of this kind of ‘edge-city’ faith in the UK is probably the giant ‘Prayer City’ run by the Kingsway International Christian Centre (KICC) close to junction 3 of the M2, south of Chatham. This is a replacement for the large church in converted warehouses in Stratford that was vacated for the Olympics. A fleet of coaches brings worshippers from across east London and the wider region to Chatham, with congregations of up to 8000 attending each Sunday.

The Prayer City is an extreme example of a more common pattern. Whereas once religious organisations fitted into the ecology of British democracy (and of course the structure of civil parishes as the first tier of local government in many areas is a lasting echo of that relationship), the new...
geographies of religion place a strain on that system. It is hard for locally elected politicians to represent both the interests of their voters, and these kind of large, spatially-stretched faith communities. The British electoral system has always had a strongly entrenched culture of localism, which has often caused tensions between large-scale developments with national or regional importance, such as airports, prisons and waste-centres, and electoral success in individual wards and constituencies. 'Edge-city faith' turns religious worship into a kind of externality, and politics can all too easily become reconfigured around a defence of the 'local' against outsiders. In some parts of outer London, those stresses associated with congestion, noise and parking are seen as problems to be dealt with as part of the balance of interest in a broader political culture of diversity; in other places, the danger is that these tensions are easily recast into the politics of division and cultural essentialism.

---


3 Ealing Times, 7th March 2002.

4 See https://makingsuburbanfaith.wordpress.com This project is funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AH/M001636/1)


9 We Li, Ethnoburb: The New Ethnic Community in Urban America 2009 University Of Hawai’i Press.
