

## **Encouraging public reporting of suspicious behaviour on rail networks**

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### **Funding details/Acknowledgement:**

This project has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 608354.

## Encouraging public reporting of suspicious behaviour on rail networks

Ongoing targeting of mass transit networks and the challenges associated with policing these large open systems means that encouraging public vigilance and reporting on railways is a counter-terrorism priority. There is, however, surprisingly little research on motivations and barriers to cooperating with the police in this context. This paper contributes to this under-researched field by presenting the findings of a survey experiment which examined (1) the role of uncertainty as a barrier for reporting suspicious behaviour on rail networks, (2) whether drivers for cooperation established in the context of traditional crime hold for reporting suspicious behaviour at train stations, and (3) whether the UK ‘*See it. Say it. Sorted*’ campaign is effective in encouraging reporting. Data was collected in the UK and Denmark, national contexts with differing baseline attitudes towards the police and experiences of transit terrorist attacks, to assess the extent to which public vigilance campaigns need to be adapted to address local concerns. Results suggest that future public vigilance campaigns should address differences in lay and official definitions of suspicious behaviour to reduce uncertainty as a barrier to reporting. They also demonstrate that the influence of procedural justice on cooperation via its influence on social identification with the police holds beyond the context of community policing and reporting of traditional crime. However, other drivers are likely to be more important for determining reporting suspicious behaviour on rail networks, including perceived benefits of reporting. Theoretical and practical implications of cross-national differences and similarities in responses are discussed.

**Keywords:** procedural justice; social identity; cooperation; counter-terrorism policing

Ongoing targeting of public transportation systems by both terrorist groups and lone actors since the 2004 Madrid train bombings - for example attacks on buses and trains in London, Moscow, Minsk, Istanbul, Brussels, Madhya Pradesh and Saint Petersburg – coupled with the security challenges associated with policing these complex networks, means that mass transit systems remain a counter-terrorism priority (Loukaitou-Sideris *et al.*, 2006, Kappia *et al.*, 2009). Trains and major transport hubs are a frequent terrorism target due to their level of accessibility and the impracticality of implementing

airport-style security screening in these contexts (Riley, 2004, Kappia *et al.*, 2009, Donald, 2013, Carter *et al.*, 2016). Furthermore, crowded train carriages and subways maximise the number of potential casualties despite limited attack means (Jenkins and Trella, 2012), which is consistent with an increasing trend for terrorist groups to aim for mass casualties to provoke an emotional response from the public (Kappia *et al.*, 2009, Europol, 2018).

The scale of mass transit systems makes them a challenging environment for policing, as it is not possible to have police officers assigned to every station. Consequently, it is often passengers who will observe suspicious items and activities. Ensuring public awareness and willingness to report in this context is therefore an important aspect of rail security (Donald, 2013). Despite this, there has been reluctance in some countries, such as Spain and Denmark, to undertake large-scale vigilance campaigns due to concerns about scaring the public or receiving an overwhelming number of reports (Loukaitou-Sideris *et al.*, 2006, Parker *et al.*, 2017). Furthermore, counter-terrorism communication campaigns may also unintentionally contribute to stigmatisation of ‘suspect communities’ (Choudhury and Fenwick, 2011, Mythen, 2012, Parker *et al.*, 2017). Nevertheless, public outreach activities to encourage vigilance and reporting on rail networks are widely used in countries including France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States (Loukaitou-Sideris *et al.*, 2006, Jarvis and Lister, 2010). In the UK, which experienced extensive IRA attacks on rail infrastructure for nearly three decades, there has been a long-standing policy of encouraging the public to report unattended items or suspicious behaviour on railways. For example, the 2004 ‘*If you suspect it, report it*’ and the 2011 ‘*See anything suspicious*’ poster campaigns.

The most recent British Transport Police campaign to focus on protective security - '*See it. Say it. Sorted*' - was launched in November 2016. This campaign was designed by the UK government, police and the rail industry to raise awareness of the role of the public in keeping themselves and others safe. It echoes the language of the US Department of Homeland Security '*If you see something, Say something*' campaign, but builds upon this and on previous UK messaging by adding a 'sorted' element to reassure members of the public that the police will respond to reports. Reflecting a shift in terrorist tactics towards suicide attacks, it also provides greater emphasis than earlier campaigns on the need to look out for suspicious behaviours associated with hostile reconnaissance as well as unattended items. This is important, as people are less likely to report in situations of uncertainty and terrorism-related suspicious behaviour is more difficult to recognise than traditional criminal activity (FEMA, 2012). Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the public are less willing to engage with counter-terrorism issues than everyday security concerns on public transport (Rogers *et al.*, 2009a, Rogers *et al.*, 2009b) and less willing to report ambiguous terrorism-related behaviours (e.g. reading terrorist material) than more explicit indicators, such as overhearing overt attack planning (LaFree and Adamczyk, 2017).

Although a great deal of effort has been made since the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center to encourage the general public in Western states to take an active role in countering terrorism, there is surprisingly little academic research on motivations and barriers to public reporting in this context, both for terrorism related matters in general (Gallagher, 2010, FEMA, 2012) and in relation to mass transit security in particular (Loukaitou-Sideris *et al.*, 2006). There is, however, an extensive literature on encouraging public reporting for general crime control, which has established a strong positive association between procedural justice (based on perceptions regarding the

fairness of police procedures) and willingness to cooperate with the police (Lind and Tyler, 1988, Tyler and Huo, 2002, Tyler, 2007, Murphy *et al.*, 2008, Bradford, 2014). Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that this holds for the reporting of terrorism related activities, at least for communities that are the focus of counter-terrorism policing (Tyler *et al.*, 2010, Huq *et al.*, 2011, Cherney and Murphy, 2013, Murphy *et al.*, 2017).

The primary aim of the current study is to contribute to a better understanding of the factors that influence public reporting of suspicious activity related to hostile reconnaissance on rail networks. Specifically, to examine (1) the role of uncertainty as a barrier for reporting suspicious behaviour in train stations, (2) whether drivers for police cooperation identified in the general crime literature can help explain reporting behaviour in train stations, and (3) whether the '*See it. Say it. Sorted*' campaign is effective in encouraging reporting of suspicious behaviour in train stations. To assess the extent to which public vigilance campaigns can successfully employ generic calls to action in different national contexts, we collected survey data in the UK and Denmark.

Differences in the ways in which railways are policed, experiences of terrorism, exposure to public vigilance campaigns and in general attitudes towards police and crime reporting make the UK and Denmark ideal comparison countries for examining (a) whether procedural justice theory holds in the context of counter-terrorism policing on railways, and (b) assessing the extent to which generic messages need to be adapted to take into consideration local concerns. The UK rail transport system is approximately ten times larger than the Danish network (Carter *et al.* 2008), but despite its scale, overall crime on UK railways (as in Denmark) is low, with only 19 crimes recorded for every million journeys made in 2017/18 (British Transport Police, 2018). The UK public has, however, had more direct experience of terrorist attacks on mass

transportation systems, from the sustained IRA mainland bombing campaign which led to bins being removed from London's railway stations in 1981, to the 2005 bus and tube bombings which killed fifty-two people and injured more than seven hundred.

The *See it, Say it, Sorted* campaign was launched in the wake of the controlled explosion of a potentially viable device at North Greenwich station in London and British Transport Police continue to foreground counter-terrorism as a key challenge for policing Britain's railways (British Transport Police, 2018). In contrast, Denmark does not have an extensive history of attacks on mass transit and protective advice for rail passengers in this context primarily focuses on safety in relation to avoiding accidents on platforms when highspeed trains are passing (e.g. the Hovedløselille (Headlessville) social campaign). The Danish public are therefore less likely to have been exposed to vigilance requests or to consider counter-terrorism as a high priority on railways. Although the Danish public have less experience of this type of terrorism and less exposure to counter-terrorism communications, European Social Survey data indicates high levels of police cooperation in this context (Hough *et al.*, 2013) and Denmark has been identified as having exceptionally positive attitudes towards the police (Torrente *et al.*, 2017). Danish respondents may therefore be particularly receptive to cooperating with requests for information from the police.

### ***Factors influencing suspicious behaviour reporting at train stations***

Despite widespread recognition of the importance of public cooperation for protecting mass transit hubs, this is an under-researched area. Most research on countering terrorism in this context has focused on technological, organisational and policing solutions (Policastro and Gordon, 1999, Plant, 2004, Waugh Jr, 2004). Our literature review identified six sources that included some discussion of public involvement in rail

transit counter-terrorism (Riley, 2004, Loukaitou-Sideris *et al.*, 2006, Kappia *et al.*, 2009, Jenkins and Trella, 2012, Donald, 2013, Carter *et al.*, 2016). Of these, only three - Loukaitou-Sideris *et al.*, Kappia *et al.* and Carter *et al.* - involved original data collection. Kappia *et al.* and Carter *et al.* both present survey data on public acceptability of counter-terrorism measures in stations and Loukaitou-Sideris *et al.* employed interviews with transit officials to compare approaches to rail security in four national contexts, including the use of public engagement campaigns. None of these studies explored factors influencing reporting behaviours.

Although not focused specifically on mass transit, FEMA research conducted in partnership with the International Association of Chiefs of Police on improving community awareness and reporting of terrorism-related suspicious activity does provide some insight into reporting behaviours in this context (FEMA, 2012). This study employed surveys, focus groups and interviews, including questions on locations where people would be the most likely to be aware of and report suspicious activity. Focus group and surveys identified airports and mass transit systems as sites where participants felt they would be most likely 'to be on the lookout for suspicious activity' (p11). However, this research also found important differences between official and lay understandings of what constitutes suspicious activity, with the public tending to focus on traditional criminal activity, such as car theft. In fact, only 5% of their sample described activities that could be indicative of terrorism (p7).

Key barriers to reporting clustered around interpersonal factors (e.g. concern about getting an innocent person into trouble and fear of retaliation) and instrumental assessments about reporting procedures; specifically, uncertainty in relation to (a) how to report, (b) whether the report will be taken seriously, and (c) whether reporting would be a worthwhile use of police resources. Fear or mistrust of law enforcement was also

identified as a potential barrier. Based on these findings, FEMA make seven recommendations for improving community awareness and reporting of terrorism-related suspicious activities, arguing that public education efforts should focus on the importance of reporting and provide a better understanding of what suspicious activity entails. This report also highlights the need for the provision of clear and concise reporting mechanisms.

### ***Police cooperation, procedural justice and social identification***

It is well established within the criminological literature that public cooperation is a crucial element of effective policing and crime prevention (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003, Murphy *et al.*, 2008, LaFree and Adamczyk, 2017). Extensive survey research in the US has compared instrumental and procedural justice models of policing, exploring the relative influence of risk and performance (i.e. judgements regarding police efficacy in managing crime) and the perceived fairness of police procedures and personal encounters with the public (procedural justice) on cooperation (Lind and Tyler, 1988, Tyler and Huo, 2002, Sunshine and Tyler, 2003). This research has established strong and consistent links between fairness of procedures, legitimacy of police authority and willingness to cooperate with the police (Bradford, 2014).

There are several models that have been used to explain the psychology of procedural justice. The group engagement model (Tyler and Blader, 2003) builds on the group-value model (Lind and Tyler, 1988) and relational model (Tyler and Lind, 1992) to explain why procedural justice influences cooperation. All of these models are empirically supported and emphasise the relational implications of justice evaluations, but the group engagement model has a broader scope and foregrounds the role of identity judgements in cooperative behaviour, as conceptualised in self-categorisation theory (Turner, 1999). From this perspective, the primary driver for police cooperation

is the extent to which the public believe they share group membership with the police, based on common values and a shared interest in maintaining group norms. Interactions with the police that are considered fair promote a sense of shared identity, which in turn encourages cooperation – i.e. social identification with the police mediates the relationship between procedural justice and police cooperation. This hypothesis has been supported in both a US and UK context (Tyler and Blader, 2003, Bradford, 2014).

Whilst there is good evidence that procedural justice influences public cooperation with the police in relation to crime in general, this does not necessarily mean that it will hold in the context of reporting terrorism-related suspicious behaviour in train stations. There is evidence of procedural justice effects on cooperation for counter-terrorism community policing amongst Muslims in the US (Tyler *et al.*, 2010), UK (Huq *et al.*, 2011) and Australia (Murphy *et al.*, 2017), which suggests that this approach has a broader scope than general crime control. However, as with earlier research these studies focus on community policing, and transit policing operates in a very different environment, which may have both positive and negative impacts on willingness to cooperate. This includes, but is not limited to the witness being less likely to know the perpetrator, being potentially more or less familiar with situational behavioural norms (depending on whether they are a regular passenger) and being in a crowded, time-pressured environment that is conducive to bystander effects (Fischer *et al.*, 2011).

Additionally, police operating in a mass transit environment will not have the opportunity that community police have to develop long term relationships with citizens. Therefore, the public may not be as well placed to assess the fairness of police interactions in this context. Furthermore, procedures for redressing transport policing complaints may be less familiar or accessible than for the regular force. If it is assumed

that the public treat ‘the police’ as a social category, it is not unreasonable to expect that personal encounters with community police may be used as a basis for judgments about procedural justice that will transfer to different policing contexts. However, this may not be the case in the UK, where railways are policed by British Transport Police (BTP), a specialised unit which operates under an independent body that is funded by train companies (Railways and Transport Safety Act, 2003).

There is evidence to suggest that most of the UK public are aware that BTP are responsible for policing Britain’s rail network (British Transport Police, 2017). This raises questions about whether the group engagement model of procedural justice will hold in this context. However, it is not known whether the UK public consider BTP to be conceptually different from ‘the police’ or whether it is viewed as a subunit of the regular force that would be subject to the same rules and procedures for correcting unfair decisions. As Denmark does not have a dedicated police force for its railways, the comparative element of this study should help establish whether these distinctions matter.

Consequently, further empirical evidence is required before it can be assumed that factors that influence cooperative behaviours in relation to community counter-terrorism reporting will hold in the context of policing public transportation systems. This notwithstanding, the high value of public reporting for countering terrorism on mass transit systems makes this an important context in which to explore factors that influence cooperative behaviours (Parker *et al.*, 2017).

### **Research questions and hypotheses**

To contribute to a better understanding of the factors that influence public reporting of suspicious activity related to hostile reconnaissance on rail networks, we formulated the following research questions and hypotheses.

Our first research question focused on the impact of uncertainty on intention to report suspicious behaviour in train stations. Specifically, in line with FEMA (2012) and Lafree and Adamczyk (2017) which suggests that people will be less likely to report in situations of uncertainty, *Hypothesis 1* states that people will be more likely to intend reporting unattended items (a familiar request which involves high levels of certainty) than suspicious behaviour, which is more difficult to recognise. To further examine the impact of uncertainty, we presented our participants with a two-stage scenario which described a young man filming CCTV cameras in a train station. We used this scenario to test *Hypothesis 2*, that people will be more likely to intend reporting suspicious behaviour if they are provided with information to reduce uncertainty about the activity they are observing.

Our second research question focused on individual level factors predicting willingness to cooperate with the police for general crime reporting in comparison with reporting suspicious behaviour in train stations. In line with Tyler and Blader (2003) and Bradford (2014), *Hypothesis 3* is that procedural justice will predict police cooperation for general crime, but this relationship will be mediated by social identification with the police. If procedural justice theory holds in the context of transit policing, *Hypothesis 4* will find that procedural justice also predicts willingness to report suspicious behaviour in a train station via its impact on social identification with the police.

Our final research question focused on the impact of the '*See it. Say it. Sorted*' campaign on reporting intentions in response to our CCTV filming scenario. Specifically, *Hypothesis 5* holds that provision of information will increase reporting intention and *Hypothesis 6* is that people who see the full '*See it. Say it. Sorted*' guidance will be more likely to intend reporting than people who are not exposed to the

'sorted' element. This final hypothesis is in line with FEMA (2012) research which identified concerns over whether reports will be taken seriously or be a worthwhile use of police resources as barriers to reporting suspicious behaviour. It is also consistent with instrumental explanations of cooperation which focus on police effectiveness.

Due to local experiences and relationships with the police that could both increase and decrease reporting intentions in the UK and Denmark, the cross-national comparative element of our research design remains exploratory, rather than hypothesis-driven.

## **Methodology**

### ***Survey design***

In order to investigate factors that influence intention to report suspicious behaviours on rail networks, including the impact of the British Transport Police (BTP) '*See it. Say it. Sorted*' (SiSiS) campaign, this study employed a survey experiment in which participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: (1) no information (control), (2) '*See it, Say it*' information (Condition 1), and (3) '*See it, Say it, Sorted*' information (Condition 2). Initial questions, which were presented to all participants, included baseline measures of reporting intention for general crime and for unattended items and suspicious behaviour in train stations. This not only allowed us to identify whether intention to report was higher or lower in the context of protecting crowded places from terrorism in comparison with general crime control, but also enabled us to test the hypothesis that people would be more inclined to report unattended items in train stations, due to lack of certainty regarding what constitutes suspicious behaviour in this context.

Participants in Condition 1 were shown ‘See it, say it’ guidance which states that ‘*we’ve all got a role to play in keeping the rail network safe*’ and asks the reader to remain vigilant and report anything that seems out of place or unusual. This guidance also includes a list of things to look out for (e.g. someone who could be concealing something under their clothing) and says that the police would like to hear from them ‘*if you see something that doesn’t feel right*’. It also instructs the reader to let the police decide if what they have seen or what they know is important and asks them to ‘*tell a member of rail staff or police officer what you have seen*’. Participants in Condition 2 were provided with the same information as participants in Condition 1 but were also informed that the police will thoroughly check all information they receive and take reports seriously. They were then provided with a case study in which suspicious behaviour reported by a vigilant passenger led to a man being arrested and charged under the Terrorism Act 2000.

The guidance that was given in both information conditions was reproduced directly from the BTP webpage<sup>1</sup>. However, the example of ‘*someone checking security arrangements, for example filming CCTV cameras at a station*’ was excluded to avoid the inclusion of advice directly relating to the hypothetical scenario we employed to measure reporting intentions. Whilst it is usual for public information campaigns to try to be as precise as possible about required actions, one of the challenges with encouraging the reporting of suspicious behaviours is that there is no definitive list of behaviours that fall into this category. Consequently, providing a short list of exemplar behaviours runs the risk of unintentionally suggesting to the public that these are the

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<sup>1</sup> [http://www.btp.police.uk/advice\\_and\\_information/see\\_it\\_say\\_it\\_sorted.aspx](http://www.btp.police.uk/advice_and_information/see_it_say_it_sorted.aspx)

only activities of interest to the police. It is therefore important to understand the impact of the campaign on non-specified behaviours.

A two-stage hypothetical scenario which described suspicious behaviour in a train station was used to further explore the role of uncertainty and to test the impact of SiSiS guidance. At Stage 1 (the ‘uncertain threat’ stage), participants were asked to imagine that they are sitting outside a café in the concourse of a large mainline train station waiting for a friend when they observe a young man who seems to be filming one of the station’s CCTV cameras on his phone. At Stage 2 (the ‘certain threat’ stage), they were asked to imagine that some time had passed since they first observed the young man who appeared to be filming and while they have been watching he has been moving from camera to camera. They were also informed ‘*you are now certain that he is recording the location of all CCTV cameras in the train station*’.

### ***Participants and procedure***

Two identical surveys were conducted, one in the UK and one in Denmark, to test the impact of messages in different national contexts. The Danish version of the survey was a direct translation of the English questionnaire, with minor adaptations that were required as the ‘*See it, Say it, Sorted*’ (SiSiS) guidance was designed to be delivered in the UK and there have been no cases in Denmark in which a planned terrorist attack was foiled due to public intelligence. When introducing the ‘Sorted’ case study, UK participants were therefore told ‘*In 2014, the information we received from a vigilant train passenger led to a man being arrested under the Terrorism Act*’, whereas Danish participants were told ‘*In 2014, information provided to the UK police from a vigilant train passenger led to a man being arrested under the Terrorism Act*’. The survey was conducted over the internet by Lightspeed GMI (GMI) on 1505 UK-based and 1500 Danish-based respondents. Of these 1002 (33.3%) were in the control group,

1001 (33.3%) were in Condition 1 and 1002 (33.3%) were in Condition 2. Participants were drawn from GMI UK and Danish panels using conventional opinion poll methods to obtain a nationally representative sample of the adult population for each country. The sample was selected randomly from online panels based on quota targets for gender, age and region. Ethnicity and highest educational qualification were also recorded. Participants were compensated for their time using a points-based system, in which panel members accumulate points that can be exchanged for cash, vouchers or a charity donation. Data was collected between 16<sup>th</sup> January and 6<sup>th</sup> February 2017 – shortly after the SiSiS campaign had been launched in the UK, but before it had been extensively promoted on the UK transport network. A comprehensive set of quality control checks were put in place to ensure unique and valid data<sup>2</sup>.

Before beginning the questionnaire, participants were informed about the purpose of the study and told that they would be presented with some information and questions about reporting suspicious activity or unattended items in public places. No deception was employed, participants were informed about the way that their data would be stored and that they had the right to withdraw their data at any time up until the point of submission. The survey was approved by King's College London's Research Ethics Committee.

### ***Constructs and measures***

Baseline intention to cooperate with the police was measured using three items ( $\alpha = .81$ ) which replicated Bradford's (2014) 'Cooperation with the police' scale which measures intention to report crime, suspicious activity or knowledge about a criminal suspect to

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<sup>2</sup> See <http://www.lightspeedresearch.com/services/lightspeed-quality-suite/> for more details

the police. Participants were also asked how likely they would be to report an unattended item at a train station and how likely they would be to report someone behaving suspiciously in a train station. All measures used a five-point response format. Possible options were ‘strongly disagree’ (coded as a score of 1), ‘tend to disagree’ (2), ‘neither agree nor disagree’ (3), ‘tend to agree’ (4), and ‘strongly agree’ (5). Participants were also offered a ‘don’t know’ option (coded as missing data).

Due to survey length considerations, our *procedural justice* scale ( $\alpha = .79$ ) employed three of five items from Bradford’s (2014) ‘Police procedural justice’ scale. These items measured the perceived fairness of police rules and procedures, perceived opportunities to correct unfair decisions and whether police decisions were thought to be based on facts rather than personal opinions. We were unable to identify a suitable existing scale to measure social identification with the police (previous research has used national identity as a proxy, which would not be appropriate for a sample of mostly ethnic majority participants). We therefore designed two measures to directly measure the extent to which participants considered the police to represent the interests and values of their community and used these to form a *social identification with police* scale. This scale was found to be highly reliable (2 items;  $\alpha = .83$ ). *Procedural justice* and *social identity* were both measured using the same response options as above.<sup>3</sup>

At each stage of our scenario, participants were presented with the same eight response options. Three of these represent different ways of reporting the incident, either by one of the recommended routes of (a) telling a member of rail staff or police officer, or (b) calling the police, or by a non-recommended route of (c) telling a member of staff at the café. The latter option was included to provide an understanding of

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<sup>3</sup> See Appendix for item wording for all constructs and measures used.

whether the public are likely to consider a member of staff serving them at a station outlet to be a suitable authority for reporting potentially suspicious behaviour. If this is the case, it has important implications regarding the need to train the staff of private businesses operating at mainline train stations on how they should respond to reports of suspicious behaviour. The other five behavioural options represented either inaction (*'wait and see'* or *'do nothing'*) or taking actions that do not involve reporting (*'leave the station'*, *'ask other customers if they think the behaviour looks suspicious'* or *'ask the person taking photos what they are doing'*). Response options were presented in a grid format, with the order of statements randomised within each. Possible response options were 'not at all likely' (coded as a score of 1), 'not very likely' (2), 'uncertain' (3) 'fairly likely' (4), and 'very likely' (5).

### ***Analyses***

Hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used to examine predictors of cooperation in relation to (a) general willingness to report crime (police cooperation), and (b) baseline intention to report suspicious behaviour at a train station (suspicious behaviour reporting). In both models, demographic control variables were entered at Step 1, followed by procedural justice in Step 2 and social identification with the police in Step 3. The hypothesis that social identification with the police mediates the effect of procedural justice was tested using the PROCESS method (Hayes, 2013). This method uses 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals to test indirect effects.

As we were interested in testing the impact of the *'See it. Say it. Sorted'* campaign on reporting behaviours (i.e. we wanted to be able to directly compare those who intended reporting with those who did not), 'uncertain' and 'don't know' responses were coded as missing data. Behavioural outcome measures were therefore re-coded into binary variables, with 'not at all likely' and 'not very likely' given a value of 0 (not

likely), and ‘fairly likely’ and ‘very likely’ given a value of 1 (likely). In addition, participants who only intended reporting behaviours were captured by a measure which included participants with a score of ‘likely’ for ‘*Tell a member of rail staff or a police officer*’ or ‘*Tell a member of staff at the café*’ or ‘*Call the police*’ and a score of ‘unlikely’ for all other behavioural outcomes. Cochran’s Q tests were used to compare responses at each stage to identify the impact of certainty on behavioural intentions. Chi-squared tests were used to examine the associations between information received and behavioural intentions.

## Results

### *Baseline perceptions about the police and reporting intentions*

Table 1 shows demographic characteristics, baseline perceptions about the police and baseline reporting intentions by country. [TABLE 1 NEAR HERE] Reported intention to cooperate with the police was high in both countries, but perceived procedural justice was lower in the UK and British participants were also significantly less likely than their Danish counterparts to report a sense of shared identification with the police. Reporting intention in the context of a train station was lower than for general crime, although most participants in both countries indicated that they would be likely to report an unattended item (69.2% UK, 67.2% DK) or suspicious behaviour (64% UK, 52.4% DK). UK participants were significantly more likely to intend reporting both unattended items ( $t(2987) = 4.45, p < 0.0005$ ) and suspicious behaviour ( $t(2990) = 9.86, p < 0.0005$ ) than Danish participants.

In support of *Hypothesis 1*, there was more uncertainty with regards to reporting suspicious behaviour than unattended items, with 29.2% of UK participants and 30.5% of Danish participants indicating they were unsure if they would report suspicious

behaviour. Consequently, participants were significantly more likely to intend reporting an unattended item than suspicious behaviour in both the UK ( $t=3.63(1504)$ ,  $p<0.0005$ ) and Denmark ( $t=9.52(1499)$ ,  $p<0.0005$ ).

### ***Impact of certainty on reporting intentions in response to CCTV filming scenario***

Table 2 shows that the impact of certainty was consistent across countries. In support of *Hypothesis 2*, confirmation at Stage 2 that the person under observation was recording the location of all CCTV cameras in the train station significantly increased intention to report via all options provided (all  $p$  values  $<0.0005$ ). However, it had the largest impact on intention to call the police, shifting this from a minority to a majority intention amongst Danish participants. It also significantly reduced intention to consult other customers for their opinion, to wait for further evidence, and to do nothing. However, 65% of UK participants and 70.8% of Danish participants reported that they would continue to wait for further evidence at Stage 2, despite this additional information. Consequently, the proportion of participants who indicated that they would only be likely to report the observed behaviour remained low at Stage 2 ( $<25\%$ ), although this did represent a significant increase from Stage 1. [TABLE 2 NEAR HERE]

### ***Predicting general willingness to cooperate with the police***

To test *Hypothesis 3* that evaluations of the fairness of police procedures ('procedural justice') influences cooperation with police, but that this relationship will be mediated by the extent to which the police are considered to share group membership ('social identification with the police'), a hierarchical regression analysis was performed.

Demographic control variables were entered at Step 1, 'procedural justice' was added at

Step 2 and ‘social identification with the police’ at Step 3. Table 3 presents the findings of this analysis [TABLE 3 NEAR HERE].

Step 3 shows very similar effects in the UK and Danish data, with ‘social identification with the police’, ‘procedural justice’ and ‘age’ significantly predicting police cooperation in both countries. Specifically, older participants were more likely to cooperate with the police ( $\beta=0.13$ ,  $p<0.0005$  in the UK;  $\beta=0.17$ ,  $p<0.0005$  in Denmark), as were those who believed that police procedures are fair ( $\beta=0.19$ ,  $p<0.0005$  in the UK;  $\beta=0.13$ ,  $p<0.0005$  in Denmark) and felt a shared sense of identification with the police ( $\beta=0.28$ ,  $p<0.0005$  in both countries). In the UK, ‘gender’ and ‘ethnicity’ were also significant predictors, although standardised regression coefficients show that these were relatively small effects (0.06 and -0.06 respectively). The effect of ‘procedural justice’ on ‘police cooperation’ was substantially reduced in both countries with the introduction of ‘social identification with the police’ at Step 3. This suggests that social identification partially mediated the association between ‘procedural justice’ and willingness to cooperate with the police. Figure 1 confirms that there was a significant indirect effect of procedural justice on police cooperation through social identification with the police in the UK,  $ab = 0.18$ , BCa CI [0.13,0.23],  $P_M = 0.55$ . The Danish data also showed a significant indirect effect of procedural justice on police cooperation through social identification with the police,  $ab = 0.21$ , BCa CI [0.15,0.26],  $P_M = 0.69$ . Hypothesis 3 is therefore also supported. [FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE]

### ***Predicting willingness to report suspicious behaviour at train stations***

To test whether the predicted impacts of ‘procedural justice’ and ‘social identification with the police’ hold in the context of reporting suspicious behaviour at train stations, another hierarchical regression analysis was performed using the same predictor variables with ‘suspicious behaviour reporting’ as the outcome variable. The results of

this analysis are presented in Table 4. [TABLE 4 NEAR HERE]

Step 3 of the analysis shows that as for police cooperation, ‘age’, ‘procedural justice’ and ‘social identification’ significantly predicted intention to report suspicious behaviour in the context of a train station. In the UK, each of these predictors make a very similar contribution to the model, with standardised  $\beta$ - values of 0.10, 0.12 and 0.11 respectively. However, the Danish data shows a larger effect of ‘age’ ( $\beta = 0.25$ ,  $p < 0.0005$ ) than ‘procedural justice’ ( $\beta = 0.09$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ) or ‘social identification with the police’ ( $\beta = 0.11$ ,  $p < 0.005$ ). As for police cooperation, intention to report suspicious behaviour increased with age. Consistent with the mediation hypothesis, the introduction of ‘social identification with the police’ at Step 3 reduces the effect of ‘procedural justice’ on intention to report suspicious behaviour at a train station. Data shown in Figure 2 confirms that there is a significant indirect effect of procedural justice on suspicious behaviour reporting through social identification with the police in both UK ( $ab = 0.10$ , BCa CI [0.02,0.17],  $P_M = 0.43$ ) and Danish ( $ab = 0.15$ , BCa CI [0.19,0.22],  $P_M = 0.66$ ) samples. Despite similarities in the effect of ‘procedural justice’ and ‘social identification with the police’ on ‘suspicious behaviour reporting’, which provide support for *Hypothesis 4*, adjusted  $R^2$  values show that this model only accounts for 7% of the variance in ‘suspicious behaviour reporting’ in the UK and 11% in Denmark, in comparison with 23% (UK) and 21% (Denmark) of variation in ‘police cooperation’. [FIGURE 2 NEAR HERE]

#### ***Impact of ‘See it. Say it. Sorted’ (SiSiS) campaign on reporting intentions in response to CCTV filming scenario***

Table 5 shows that SiSiS guidance had a significant positive impact on UK participants’ intention to report using all three options provided at Stage 1. It also significantly influenced their intention to tell a member of staff at the café and to call the police at

Stage 2. Information provision no longer influenced intention to tell a member of rail staff at Stage 2, but >90% of UK participants indicated they would report via this route at this stage, irrespective of condition. In Denmark, SiSiS guidance increased intention to call the police at both stages of the scenario. At Stage 2, it also increased intention to tell a member of rail staff or the police. We therefore found some support for the hypothesis that SiSiS will increase intention to report (*Hypothesis 5*) in both national contexts. However, information provision did not have a significant impact on the more conservative measure of respondents who only intended reporting behaviours in either country. [TABLE 5 NEAR HERE]

Pairwise comparisons were used to test the hypothesis that people who see the full SiSiS guidance will be more likely to intend reporting than those who are not exposed to the ‘sorted element’ (*Hypothesis 6*). UK data showed that provision of additional information increased intention to call the police at both Stage 1 ( $\chi^2 = 4.70$ ,  $p = 0.03$ ) and Stage 2 ( $\chi^2 = 6.33$ ,  $p = 0.01$ ). Likewise, the ‘sorted’ information was required to encourage Danish participants to call the police at both Stage 1 ( $\chi^2 = 6.97$ ,  $p = 0.01$ ) and Stage 2 ( $\chi^2 = 9.36$ ,  $p = 0.002$ ). However, ‘See it, Say it’ information was sufficient to encourage UK participants to tell a member of rail staff or a police officer ( $\chi^2 = 11.81$ ,  $p = 0.001$ ) and to tell a member of staff at the café ( $\chi^2 = 5.05$ ,  $p = 0.03$ ) at Stage 1.

Similarly, at Stage 2, whilst both information types increased intention amongst UK participants to tell a member of staff at the café, there was no additional impact from exposing participants to the ‘sorted’ message ( $\chi^2 = 0.04$ ,  $p = 0.84$ ). We therefore found partial support for the hypothesis that providing information about how the police act on reports will encourage the reporting of suspicious behaviour.

***Impact of national context on intention to report in response to CCTV filming scenario***

Taking into account national differences in education, ethnicity, perceptions about procedural justice and social identification with the police, UK participants were significantly more likely to tell a member of rail staff or police at both Stage 1 of the scenario (adjusted odds ratio 2.62, 95% confidence interval 2.08-3.30,  $p < 0.0005$ ) and at Stage 2 of the scenario (adjusted odds ratio 2.99, 95% confidence interval 2.07-4.33,  $p < 0.0005$ ). They were also more likely to intend calling the police at both Stage 1 (adjusted odds ratio 1.59, 95% confidence interval 1.29-1.97,  $p < 0.0005$ ) and Stage 2 (adjusted odds ratio 1.55, 95% confidence interval 1.23-1.97,  $p < 0.0005$ ). UK participants also had 1.89 higher odds of intending to tell a member of staff at the café at Stage 1 (95% confidence interval 1.55-2.30,  $p < 0.0005$ ), but there was no association between country and this intention at Stage 2 (adjusted odds ratio 1.18, 95% confidence interval 0.95-1.45,  $p = 0.14$ ). Overall, UK participants were significantly more likely than Danish participants to intend only reporting behaviours at both Stage 1 (adjusted odds ratio 2.00, 95% confidence interval 1.37-2.93,  $p < 0.0005$ ) and Stage 2 (adjusted odds ratio 1.74, 95% confidence interval 1.42-2.13,  $p < 0.0005$ ) of the scenario.

**Discussion**

The primary aim of this study was to contribute to the empirical evidence base on police cooperation in the context of countering mass transit terrorism. Specifically, to support a better understanding of the factors that influence public reporting of suspicious activity related to hostile reconnaissance on rail networks. To meet this aim, we examined the influence of the nature of the cooperative request being made (reporting suspicious behaviour on rail networks vs. suspect packages and traditional criminal activity) and tested whether established drivers for police cooperation (procedural

fairness and social identification) hold in the context of mass transit policing. We also used the UK '*See it. Say it. Sorted*' (SiSiS) campaign to test the influence of direct requests for public vigilance and reporting, as well as the impact of providing information about expected benefits of reporting.

Given the potentially greater challenge of identifying what constitutes 'suspicious' behaviour in comparison with recognising a suspect package, we hypothesised that people would be less likely to intend reporting both non-specified suspicious activity (e.g. 'someone behaving suspiciously in a train station') and someone filming station CCTV cameras than unattended items or traditional criminal activity. Our results support this contention and add to existing literature which suggests that people are unwilling to report terrorism-related behaviours if they are not certain that they relate to attack planning (LaFree and Adamczyk, 2017). Furthermore, we found that even after introducing certainty about the behaviour under observation at Stage 2 of the scenario, most people reported that they would continue to wait for further evidence. This suggests that in the absence of being explicitly told that the filming of CCTV cameras may be indicative of hostile reconnaissance, the public are unlikely to consider this to be a behaviour of concern. This is consistent with the FEMA (2012) finding that official and lay definitions of suspicious activity differ.

To explore whether well-established determinants of cooperation for community policing hold in the context of appeals to the public to report suspicious behaviour on railways, we examined the impact of procedural justice on reporting intention via its influence on social identification with the police. We replicated Bradford's (2014) finding that social identity mediates the impact of procedural justice on cooperation with the police for general crime. This provides further evidence that in order to effectively engage communities, the police need to pay attention to perceived fairness in

the way that they interact with the public. We also found that this prediction held for reporting someone behaving suspiciously at a train station, suggesting that views about 'the police' in general transfer to reporting intentions beyond community policing. However, the effects of procedural justice and social identification with the police were much smaller than for general crime. In fact, our Danish data indicated that perceptions about the police had substantially less influence than age in this context, with older participants most likely to demonstrate willingness to report.

This suggests that whilst perceptions about the fairness of police procedures in general matter for reporting on rail networks, they are unlikely to be the primary driver for cooperation in this context. The positive impact of the 'sorted' element of the SiSiS campaign on intention to call the police indicates that assessments regarding the benefits of reporting may be more important. This is counter to what would be predicted by research which found that procedural justice can better explain cooperation with counter-terrorism policing than instrumental concerns (Huq *et al.*, 2011). However, this may be explained by the very positive assessments of police fairness within our sample, as previous research has found that police efficacy is most likely to be a driver for reporting in contexts where there are particularly positive attitudes towards the police (Torrente *et al.*, 2017). It is also consistent with the FEMA (2012) finding that concern as to whether reports would be taken seriously or represent a worthwhile use of police resources are key barriers to reporting terrorism-related suspicious activity. This study therefore supports the current UK approach to encouraging reporting on rail networks, which emphasises that the police will take reports seriously and that public vigilance has led to successful prosecutions under the UK Terrorism Act.

Although this study provides evidence that the SiSiS campaign is effective in encouraging reporting, it also highlights several issues that need to be taken into

consideration for future public outreach activities. Firstly, whilst the most common reporting intention at both stages of the scenario was, as recommended, to tell a member of rail staff or police officer. Most people indicated that they would also be likely to consider reporting the incident to a member of staff at a café on the station concourse. This coupled with the impact of perceived response efficacy (the ‘sorted’ element of the guidance) on intention to report, highlights the importance of the provision of training on how to respond to reports; not only for those who have direct responsibility for security at mass transportation hubs, but also to staff working for private retail outlets operating in and around train stations. That the SiSiS guidance increased intention to report someone filming station CCTV cameras, despite that fact that we removed this specific example from the ‘what to look out for’ list provides some reassurance that public vigilance campaigns can work for non-specified behaviours. However, the very large proportion of participants who indicated that they would continue to ‘wait for more evidence’ at the second stage of our scenario suggests that the inclusion of specific behaviours in public vigilance campaigns may increase reporting intention. Further research using multiple scenarios is required to confirm this.

Finally, cross-national comparisons found that although UK participants were less likely than their Danish counterparts to consider police procedures to be fair and to feel a shared sense of identification with the police, they were nonetheless more likely to intend reporting both unattended items and suspicious behaviour at train stations. They were also more likely to intend reporting someone filming CCTV camera at a train station using all options provided at both stages of our scenario. This suggests that previous experience of mass transit terrorism and/or expectations regarding the likelihood of a future attack (i.e. threat appraisal) may have more influence on intention to report in this context than for general crime reporting. It may also reflect that

sustained exposure to public vigilance campaigns in the UK has developed a reporting norm, although further research is required to confirm this.

Despite these national differences, we did find very similar patterns for the influence of perceived fairness of police procedures on cooperation via increasing social identification in the UK and Denmark. This provides additional empirical support for relational models of procedural justice developed by Tyler and colleagues (Lind and Tyler, 1988, Tyler and Lind, 1992, Tyler and Huo, 2002, Tyler and Blader, 2003). It also suggests that the reduced influence of procedural justice in the context of policing railways is more likely to do with the reporting environment than the fact that UK participants were differentiating between British Transport Police and regular police forces. Furthermore, strong similarities in the influence of the SiSiS campaign on reporting intentions in each country suggest that public vigilance campaigns developed in the UK are likely to be suitable for use in other European contexts. Future research using countries that vary along different dimensions (for example that share experience of terrorism but differ in levels of trust in the police) would be useful to establish wider applicability.

### ***Methodological limitations***

Our study measured reporting intentions rather than actual reports. This approach allowed us to target a large demographically representative sample in each country. However, it makes it difficult to establish whether our results reflect real-life reporting behaviour, particularly for participants in the experimental conditions who received SiSiS guidance which establishes reporting as a socially desirable activity. The use of an online survey which is administered by software reduces social desirability bias in comparison with interviewer-based methods (Schlenger and Silver, 2006). Furthermore, we also included a conservative measure of 'reporting behaviours', which only included

participants who indicated that they would report using any of the three routes provided, but not also intend non-reporting behaviours. This approach provides transparency regarding the gap between stated and likely intentions to avoid over-stating likelihood of reporting.

A further potential limitation relates to sample selection based on representativeness of national population rather than focusing solely on the regular railway travelling public. This may underestimate likelihood of reporting, as those less familiar with the railway environment may be less likely to recognise behaviour that is out of the ordinary. High levels of intended reporting in response to our scenario suggest that this is unlikely to have had a major impact, but future research should consider specifically targeting rail passengers. Reassurance that the observed impact of the SiSiS guidance is not a methodological artefact is provided by the fact that the British Transport Police received a monthly average of 167 texts or calls reporting something that seemed out of place or unusual prior to the launch of the SiSiS campaign in November 2016, but since its launch this figure has risen to an average of 283 reports per month<sup>4</sup>. Future research into the quality of these reports would be extremely useful to establish whether concerns about the burden of over-reporting expressed by transit officials to Loukaitou-Sideris *et al.* (2006) are well founded or if this represents genuinely useful additional information.

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<sup>4</sup> Figures provided on request by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), the lead UK government authority for protective security advice (<https://www.cpni.gov.uk/>)

## **Conclusion**

This study has contributed empirical evidence on factors that influence public reporting of suspicious behaviours on rail networks, a topic that has received relatively little academic attention to date. In so doing it has shown that the influence of procedural justice on social identification and police cooperation is likely to hold beyond the context of community policing. It does, however, also suggest that instrumental concerns are likely to influence cooperation in this context. Additionally, our results demonstrate that public vigilance campaigns can successfully encourage reporting of suspicious behaviour on rail networks. However, our data also identified several issues that need to be taken into consideration for future campaigns. Namely, that lay and official definitions of what constitutes suspicious behaviour may differ and that the public may not only report to police and rail staff, but also to other people working in the area who may not have received security training. Despite baseline national differences in perceptions about the police and willingness to report, the ‘*See it. Say it. Sorted*’ campaign increased intention to call the police in response to a suspicious behaviour scenario in both the UK and Denmark. This suggests that public vigilance campaigns developed in the UK are likely to be suitable for use in other European contexts.

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Table 1. Sample characteristics, baseline perceptions of police and reporting intentions

Sample characteristics	Country		Sig
	UK (n=1505) Frequency (%)	DK (n=1500) Frequency (%)	
<b>Demographics</b>			
Sex			
Male	753 (50%)	749 (49.9%)	$\chi^2 = 0.03, p=0.96$
Female	752 (50%)	751 (50.1%)	
Age			
18-24	219 (14.6%)	220 (14.7%)	$\chi^2 = 0.84, p = 0.66$
25-44	627 (41.7%)	601 (40.1%)	
45-65	659 (43.8%)	679 (45.3%)	
Education			
No higher education	747 (49.8%)	447 (30.0%)	$\chi^2 = 287.90, p < 0.0005$
Vocational qualification	157 (10.5%)	534 (35.9%)	
Degree or higher	595 (39.7%)	508 (34.1%)	
Ethnicity			
White British/Danish	1265 (84.1%)	1367 (91.1%)	$\chi^2 = 40.76, p < 0.0005$
Ethnic minority	225 (15.0%)	114 (7.6%)	
Prefer not to say	15 (1.0%)	19 (1.3%)	
	<b>Mean (SD)</b>	<b>Mean (SD)</b>	
<b>Perceptions about the police</b>			
Procedural justice	3.66 (0.89)	4.10 (0.93)	$t (2707) = -8.81^*, p < 0.0005$
Social identification with police	3.87 (0.91)	4.22 (0.80)	$t (2868) = -10.88^*, p < 0.0005$
<b>Reporting intentions</b>			
Police cooperation (general crime)	4.15 (0.70)	4.14 (0.69)	$t (3003) = 0.48, p = 0.63$
Unattended items (train station)	3.91 (0.99)	3.74 (1.06)	$t (2987) = 4.45^*, p < 0.0005$
Suspicious behaviour (train station)	3.83 (0.92)	3.49 (0.98)	$t (2990) = 9.86^*, p < 0.0005$

\* Since preliminary Levene's tests indicated that the variances of the two groups were significantly different, the t-tests reported here do not assume equal variances.

Table 2. Frequencies (percentages) for behavioural intentions by scenario stage

Behavioural intention	Frequency (%)				Sig	
	UK		Denmark			
	Stage 1	Stage 2		Stage 1	Stage 2	
<b>Tell a member of rail staff / police:</b>	( <i>n</i> =1037) <sup>a</sup>	( <i>n</i> =1037) <sup>a</sup>		( <i>n</i> =1081) <sup>a</sup>	( <i>n</i> =1081) <sup>a</sup>	
Not likely	166 (16.0%)	58 (5.6%)	Cochran's Q = 98.85, p < 0.0005	287 (26.5%)	94 (8.7%)	Cochran's Q = 181.70, p < 0.0005
Likely	871 (84.0%)	979 (94.4%)		794 (73.5%)	987 (91.3%)	
<b>Tell a member of staff at the cafe:</b>	( <i>n</i> =1024) <sup>a</sup>	( <i>n</i> =1024) <sup>a</sup>		( <i>n</i> =1077) <sup>a</sup>	( <i>n</i> =1077) <sup>a</sup>	
Not likely	298 (29.1%)	240 (23.4%)	Cochran's Q = 27.57, p < 0.0005	382 (35.5%)	254 (23.6%)	Cochran's Q = 88.09, p < 0.0005
Likely	726 (70.9%)	784 (76.6%)		695 (64.5%)	823 (76.4%)	
<b>Call the police:</b>	( <i>n</i> =709) <sup>a</sup>	( <i>n</i> =709) <sup>a</sup>		( <i>n</i> =864) <sup>a</sup>	( <i>n</i> =864) <sup>a</sup>	
Not likely	330 (46.5%)	210 (29.6%)	Cochran's Q = 114.29, p < 0.0005	463 (53.6%)	239 (27.7%)	Cochran's Q = 214.43, p < 0.0005
Likely	379 (53.5%)	499 (70.4%)		401 (46.4%)	625 (72.3%)	
<b>Ask other customers' opinion:</b>	( <i>n</i> =944) <sup>a</sup>	( <i>n</i> =944) <sup>a</sup>		( <i>n</i> =974) <sup>a</sup>	( <i>n</i> =974) <sup>a</sup>	
Not likely	470 (49.8%)	445 (47.1%)	Cochran's Q = 6.31, p = 0.01	568 (58.3%)	515 (52.9%)	Cochran's Q = 19.64, p < 0.0005
Likely	474 (50.2%)	499 (52.9%)		406 (41.7%)	459 (47.1%)	
<b>Wait for more evidence:</b>	( <i>n</i> =988) <sup>a</sup>	( <i>n</i> =988) <sup>a</sup>		( <i>n</i> =1103) <sup>a</sup>	( <i>n</i> =1103) <sup>a</sup>	
Not likely	98 (9.9%)	346 (35.0%)	Cochran's Q = 215.05, p < 0.0005	107 (9.7%)	322 (29.2%)	Cochran's Q = 162.19, p < 0.0005
Likely	890 (90.1%)	642 (65.0%)		996 (90.3%)	781 (70.8%)	
<b>Do nothing:</b>	( <i>n</i> =879) <sup>a</sup>	( <i>n</i> =879) <sup>a</sup>		( <i>n</i> =962) <sup>a</sup>	( <i>n</i> =962) <sup>a</sup>	
Not likely	604 (68.7%)	744 (84.6%)	Cochran's Q = 116.67, p < 0.0005	643 (66.8%)	828 (86.1%)	Cochran's Q = 154.86, p < 0.0005
Likely	275 (31.3%)	135 (15.4%)		319 (33.2%)	134 (13.9%)	
<b>Leave the station:</b>	( <i>n</i> =820) <sup>a</sup>	( <i>n</i> =820) <sup>a</sup>		( <i>n</i> =932) <sup>a</sup>	( <i>n</i> =932) <sup>a</sup>	
Not likely	591 (72.1%)	579 (70.6%)	Cochran's Q = 2.00, p = 0.20	713 (76.5%)	730 (78.3%)	Cochran's Q = 3.75, p = 0.05
Likely	229 (27.9%)	241 (29.4%)		219 (23.5%)	202 (21.7%)	
<b>Ask the person what they are doing:</b>	( <i>n</i> =1072) <sup>a</sup>	( <i>n</i> =1072) <sup>a</sup>		( <i>n</i> =1094) <sup>a</sup>	( <i>n</i> =1094) <sup>a</sup>	
Not likely	859 (80.1%)	862 (80.4%)	Cochran's Q = 0.11, p = 0.74	858 (78.4%)	867 (79.3%)	Cochran's Q = 0.93, p = 0.34
Likely	213 (19.9%)	210 (19.6%)		236 (21.6%)	227 (20.7%)	
<b>Intend only reporting behaviours:</b>	( <i>n</i> =1505)	( <i>n</i> =1505)		( <i>n</i> =1500)	( <i>n</i> =1500)	
Do not intend	1408 (93.6%)	1134 (75.3%)	Cochran's Q = 230.29, p < 0.0005	1442 (96.1%)	1237 (82.5%)	Cochran's Q = 174.38, p < 0.0005
Intend	97 (6.4%)	371 (24.7%)		58 (3.9%)	263 (17.5%)	

<sup>a</sup>n values <1505 (UK) and <1500 (DK) as only respondents who gave valid responses for the same item at both stages were included in this analysis

Table 3. Multiple regression predicting police cooperation

	Step 1		Step 2		Step 3	
	$\beta$ (SE)	Stand. $\beta$	$\beta$ (SE)	Stand. $\beta$	$\beta$ (SE)	Stand. $\beta$
<b>UK data</b>						
Constant	3.78 (0.08)		2.66 (0.10)		2.50 (0.10)	
Age	0.08 (0.01)	0.16***	0.07 (0.01)	0.14***	0.07 (0.01)	0.13***
Gender (0 = male)	0.09 (0.04)	0.06*	0.08 (0.03)	0.06*	0.08 (0.03)	0.06*
Ethnicity (0 = White British)	-0.17 (0.05)	-0.09**	-0.12 (0.05)	-0.06*	-0.12 (0.05)	-0.06*
Education1 (0=no higher, 1 = vocational)	0.02 (0.06)	0.01	0.06 (0.06)	0.03	0.04 (0.06)	0.02
Education2 (0=no higher, 1 = higher)	0.09 (0.04)	0.06*	0.07 (0.04)	0.05	0.05 (0.04)	0.04
Procedural Justice			0.31 (0.02)	0.40***	0.14 (0.03)	0.19***
Social identification with police					0.21 (0.03)	0.28***
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.04		0.20		0.23	
<b>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.04		0.20		0.23	
<b>R<sup>2</sup> change</b>	0.04		0.16		0.03	
<b>F change</b>	11.09***		269.04***		51.97***	
<b>df</b>	1343		1342		1341	
<b>Danish data</b>						
Constant	3.60 (0.08)		2.56 (0.11)		2.33 (0.11)	
Age	0.11 (0.01)	0.22***	0.10 (0.01)	0.20***	0.09 (0.01)	0.17***
Gender (0 = male)	0.09 (0.04)	0.07*	0.07 (0.04)	0.05*	0.06 (0.03)	0.05
Ethnicity (0 = White Danish)	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.03	-0.10 (0.07)	-0.04	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.03
Education1 (0=no higher, 1 = vocational)	0.11 (0.05)	0.08*	0.08 (0.04)	0.06	0.06 (0.04)	0.04
Education2 (0=no higher, 1 = higher)	0.08 (0.05)	0.05	0.06 (0.04)	0.04	0.05 (0.04)	0.03
Procedural Justice			0.28 (0.02)	0.33***	0.11 (0.03)	0.13***
Social identification with police					0.23 (0.03)	0.28***
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.07		0.17		0.21	
<b>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.06		0.17		0.20	
<b>R<sup>2</sup> change</b>	0.07		0.11		0.04	
<b>F change</b>	18.17***		168.34***		57.45**	
<b>df</b>	1316		1315		1314	

\* p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.001; \*\*\*p&lt;0.0005

Table 4. Multiple regression predicting suspicious behaviour reporting intention

	Step 1		Step 2		Step 3	
	$\beta$ (SE)	Stand. $\beta$	$\beta$ (SE)	Stand. $\beta$	$\beta$ (SE)	Stand. $\beta$
<b>UK data</b>						
Constant	3.74 (0.11)		2.97 (0.15)		2.89 (0.15)	
Age	0.08 (0.02)	0.11***	0.07 (0.02)	0.10**	0.07 (0.02)	0.10**
Gender (0 = male)	-0.05 (0.05)	-0.03	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.03	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.03
Ethnicity (0 = White British)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.01	0.02 (0.07)	0.01	0.02 (0.07)	0.01
Education1 (0=no higher, 1 = vocational)	-0.18 (0.08)	-0.06*	-0.15 (0.08)	-0.05	-0.16 (0.08)	-0.05
Education2 (0=no higher, 1 = higher)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.04	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.05	-0.09 (0.05)	-0.05
Procedural Justice			0.22 (0.03)	0.21***	0.13 (0.04)	0.12*
Social identification with police					0.11 (0.04)	0.11*
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.02		0.06		0.07	
<b>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.01		0.06		0.06	
<b>R<sup>2</sup> change</b>	0.02		0.04		0.01	
<b>F change</b>	4.87***		62.69**		6.96*	
<b>df</b>	1343		1342		1341	
<b>Danish data</b>						
Constant	2.82 (0.11)		2.03 (0.16)		1.90 (0.17)	
Age	0.20 (0.02)	0.27***	0.19 (0.02)	0.26***	0.18 (0.02)	0.25***
Gender (0 = male)	0.02 (0.05)	0.01	0.01 (0.05)	0.003	0.001 (0.05)	0.001
Ethnicity (0 = White Danish)	0.15 (0.10)	0.04	0.14 (0.10)	0.04	0.16 (0.10)	0.04
Education1 (0=no higher, 1 = vocational)	0.05 (0.07)	0.02	0.02 (0.07)	0.01	0.01 (0.07)	0.004
Education2 (0=no higher, 1 = higher)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.01	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.02	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.02
Procedural Justice			0.21 (0.03)	0.17***	0.11 (0.05)	0.09*
Social identification with police					0.14 (0.05)	0.11*
<b>R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.08		0.11		0.11	
<b>Adjusted R<sup>2</sup></b>	0.07		0.10		0.11	
<b>R<sup>2</sup> change</b>	0.08		0.03		0.01	
<b>F change</b>	21.56***		42.89***		8.61*	
<b>df</b>	1316		1315		1314	

\* p&lt;0.05; \*\*p&lt;0.001; \*\*\*p&lt;0.0005


Table 5: Frequencies (percentages) for reporting intentions by condition

Behavioural intention	UK				Denmark			
	Control	Condition 1	Condition 2		Control	Condition 1	Condition 2	
<b>STAGE 1</b>								
<b>Tell a member of rail staff / police:</b>	<i>(n=359)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=367)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=380)<sup>a</sup></i>		<i>(n=390)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=389)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=384)<sup>a</sup></i>	
Not likely	94 (26.2%)	58 (15.8%)	55 (14.5%)	$\chi^2 = 19.70, p < 0.0005$	131 (33.6%)	115 (29.6%)	102 (26.6%)	$\chi^2 = 4.59, p = 0.10$
Likely	265 (73.8%)	309 (84.2%)	325 (85.5%)		259 (66.4%)	274 (70.4%)	282 (73.4%)	
<b>Tell a member of staff at the cafe:</b>	<i>(n=381)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=373)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=375)<sup>a</sup></i>		<i>(n=407)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=381)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=393)<sup>a</sup></i>	
Not likely	145 (38.1%)	113 (30.3%)	93 (24.8%)	$\chi^2 = 15.67, p < 0.0005$	166 (40.8%)	147 (38.6%)	139 (35.4%)	$\chi^2 = 2.51, p = 0.29$
Likely	236 (61.9%)	260 (69.7%)	282 (75.2%)		241 (59.2%)	234 (61.4%)	254 (64.6%)	
<b>Call the police:</b>	<i>(n=317)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=301)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=294)<sup>a</sup></i>		<i>(n=347)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=353)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=347)<sup>a</sup></i>	
Not likely	198 (62.5%)	166 (55.1%)	136 (46.3%)	$\chi^2 = 16.19, p < 0.0005$	222 (64.0%)	219 (62.0%)	181 (52.2%)	$\chi^2 = 11.57, p = 0.003$
Likely	119 (37.5%)	135 (44.9%)	158 (53.7%)		125 (36.0%)	134 (38.0%)	166 (47.8%)	
<b>Intend only reporting behaviours:</b>	<i>(n=502)</i>	<i>(n=501)</i>	<i>(n=502)</i>		<i>(n=500)</i>	<i>(n=500)</i>	<i>(n=500)</i>	
Do not intend	479 (95.4%)	468 (93.4%)	461 (91.8%)	$\chi^2 = 5.38, p = 0.07$	483 (96.6%)	476 (95.2%)	483 (96.6%)	$\chi^2 = 1.76, p = 0.42$
Intend	23 (4.6%)	33 (6.6%)	41 (8.2%)		17 (3.4%)	24 (4.8%)	17 (3.4%)	
<b>STAGE 2</b>								
<b>Tell a member of rail staff / police:</b>	<i>(n=438)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=444)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=461)<sup>a</sup></i>		<i>(n=448)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=454)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=444)<sup>a</sup></i>	
Not likely	30 (6.8%)	18 (4.1%)	18 (3.9%)	$\chi^2 = 5.22, p = 0.07$	53 (11.8%)	36 (7.9%)	25 (5.6%)	$\chi^2 = 11.31, p = 0.003$
Likely	408 (93.2%)	426 (95.9%)	443 (96.1%)		395 (88.2%)	418 (92.1%)	419 (94.4%)	
<b>Tell a member of staff at the cafe:</b>	<i>(n=423)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=423)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=430)<sup>a</sup></i>		<i>(n=438)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=432)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=426)<sup>a</sup></i>	
Not likely	115 (27.2%)	85 (20.1%)	84 (19.5%)	$\chi^2 = 8.93, p = 0.01$	98 (22.4%)	96 (22.2%)	94 (22.1%)	$\chi^2 = 0.01, p = 0.99$
Likely	308 (72.8%)	338 (79.9%)	346 (80.5%)		340 (77.6%)	336 (77.8%)	332 (77.9%)	
<b>Call the police:</b>	<i>(n=345)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=358)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=379)<sup>a</sup></i>		<i>(n=379)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=402)<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>(n=388)<sup>a</sup></i>	
Not likely	101 (29.3%)	73 (20.4%)	51 (13.5%)	$\chi^2 = 27.59, p < 0.0005$	100 (26.4%)	91 (22.6%)	67 (17.3%)	$\chi^2 = 9.38, p = 0.01$
Likely	224 (70.7%)	285 (79.6%)	328 (86.5%)		279 (73.6%)	311 (77.4%)	321 (82.7%)	
<b>Intend only reporting behaviours:</b>	<i>(n=502)</i>	<i>(n=501)</i>	<i>(n=502)</i>		<i>(n=500)</i>	<i>(n=500)</i>	<i>(n=500)</i>	
Do not intend	382 (76.1%)	373 (74.5%)	379 (75.5%)	$\chi^2 = 0.37, p = 0.83$	428 (85.6%)	404 (80.8%)	405 (81.0%)	$\chi^2 = 5.10, p = 0.08$
Intend	120 (23.9%)	128 (25.5%)	123 (24.5%)		72 (14.4%)	96 (19.2%)	95 (19.0%)	

<sup>a</sup> n<500 per condition due to 'don't know' responses being coded as missing data



**Figure 1: Direct and indirect effects of procedural justice on police cooperation**



**Figure 2: Direct and indirect effects of procedural justice on intention to report suspicious behaviour**

## **Appendix: Constructs and measures**

### **Procedural justice**

The police use rules and procedures that are fair to everyone

The police make decisions based on facts, rather than their own personal opinions

The police provide opportunity for unfair decisions to be corrected

### **Social identity**

The police represent the values of our community

The police uphold the values of our community

### **Police cooperation**

*If the situation arose, how like would you be to [...]*

Call the police if you witnessed a crime

Report suspicious activity to the police

Provide information about a suspect to the police