Kürbis, N;
(2018)
Molnar on Truthmakers for Negative Truths.
Metaphysica
, 19
(2)
pp. 225-250.
10.1515/mp-2018-0014.
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Abstract
Molnar argues that the problem of truthmakers for negative truths arises because we tend to accept four metaphysical principles that entail that all negative truths have positive truthmakers. This conclusion, however, already follows from only three of Molnar´s metaphysical principles. One purpose of this note is to set the record straight. I provide an alternative reading of two of Molnar´s principles on which they are all needed to derive the desired conclusion. Furthermore, according to Molnar, the four principles may be inconsistent. By themselves, however, they are not. The other purpose of this note is to propose some plausible further principles that, when added to the four metaphysical theses, entail a contradiction.
Type: | Article |
---|---|
Title: | Molnar on Truthmakers for Negative Truths |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
DOI: | 10.1515/mp-2018-0014 |
Publisher version: | https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2018-0014 |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
Keywords: | negation; falsity; truth; truth makers; correspondence |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Philosophy |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10071963 |




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