Chapter Title: Water Provision for and by the Peri-urban Poor: PUBLIC-COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS OR CITIZENS COPRODUCTION?
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It is now widely recognized that the urban transition facing the developing world brings with it significant challenges in terms of meeting the water needs of the poor. In this context, it has become common place among international agencies and national governments alike to advocate governance arrangements for service provision that explicitly include the participation of civil society. However, underlying this apparent consensus there is a wide range of ideological positions. They range from pragmatic arguments for the participation of the so-called third sector to fill in the gaps left by the state and the private sector, to the more substantial redefinition of the role that citizens could and should play in the design and delivery of public policy.¹

This chapter examines the institutional arrangements adopted in relation to emerging forms of citizen coproduction in water provision, looking in particular at the way in which these reinforce or bridge the gap between current government policies and practices by the peri-urban poor. The underlying assumption is that the reciprocal collaboration of government professionals and citizens engendered by a genuine process of coproduction has the capacity to positively transform those taking part. Such transformation implies that coproduction can lead to (1) a more sensitive approach from government professionals to the water needs, experience, and expectations of the beneficiaries—in particular of the water poor—and (2) the empowerment of the latter through their increased control of water management systems and the assertion of their right to water. Furthermore, the creation of an equal platform for interaction between government professionals and citizens plays an essential role not only in improving access to water by those typically excluded but also in making the system more accountable and environmentally sustainable.

While there are many well-documented projects aimed at linking public agencies and poor communities on a one-off basis, the focus here is on the emergence of institutionalized frameworks for service coproduction in the peri-urban interface (PUI) of metropolitan Dar es Salaam.
(Tanzania) and Caracas (Venezuela). The term “institutionalized frameworks” refers to the establishment of specific channels for government-citizen service coproduction that are explicitly backed up by the state at the policy level. Given the fact that neither the state or the formal private sector alone are likely to produce water services for the urban and peri-urban poor, a focus on institutionalized coproduction in comparison to one-off project partnerships is relevant because it allows the examination of the process and outcomes of experimenting with state-citizen interfaces aimed at addressing this challenge through sustainable mechanisms.

The importance of considering the coproduction of water services in peri-urban areas arises from the fact that these areas generally lie outside the coverage of formal networked water systems, which are in most cases restricted to a relatively small urban core. This is partly because many peri-urban settlements develop outside existing formal regulations, and this affects their formal right to basic services. In reality, peri-urban water supply is in the hands of a wide range of informal agents.

Within the metropolitan context, the peri-urban interface is often the location of important environmental services and natural resources consumed in urban areas. The process of peri-urbanization is frequently accompanied by substantial pressures over natural resources (such as land and water) due to their increased marketability and greater volumes of pollution generated by higher concentrations of population and enterprises. Peri-urban areas are associated with both rural and urban physical and socioeconomic features, and their population consists of highly heterogeneous and rapidly changing socioeconomic groups. This diversity means that the needs and demands of peri-urban dwellers and water providers are also quite diverse and change rapidly over time. The identification of these needs is more complex than in urban or rural areas, due to the particular mix of newcomers and long-established dwellers, and also because farming, residential, and industrial land uses often coexist. Therefore, the peri-urban context is typically characterized by rapidly expanding unmet needs vis-à-vis a high level of experimentation in terms of the direct involvement of the poor in service provision through unorthodox organizational arrangements.

In order to contextualize the ongoing debate on and experimentation with emerging forms of water provision, section 1 explores how the privatization of services widely spread in the 1990s has resulted in an “instrumentals state,” in which the traditional functions of legislation, regulation, direct provision, and investment have been significantly transformed. However, as neither the public nor the formal private sector are filling in the gap of meeting the water needs of the urban and peri-urban poor, this in turn has led to the exploration of various forms of citizen engagement in the delivery of basic services.

Section 2 examines the variety of practices through which the urban and peri-urban poor access water on the ground and the way in which the emergence of cooperative relations between grassroots actors and the state can be conceptualized as “citizen service coproduction.” Building on this notion, section 3 examines two specific coproduction mechanisms: water users associations (WUAs) in Dar es Salaam and technical water fora (TWF) in Caracas. These two experiences represent different approaches to the involvement of citizens’ groups in service delivery, in which the latter are also the principal beneficiaries. The final section examines the extent to which service coproduction in each case has been underlined by a process of citizens’ empowerment or instrumentalization and reflects on the recent outcomes of these processes.
The Contested Governance of Water Provision

Central to the problematique outlined above is the question of who should do what. During the 1990s, the international debate became almost exclusively concerned with the question of whether these services were better run by the public or the private sector. On one side of this debate is the view that increased private sector participation (PSP) would resolve the failures of public water utilities, including their inability to reach the urban poor. On the other extreme, increased PSP is seen in fact as the problem, as it involves withdrawing from the policies and institutions required to achieve universal coverage and adequate water provision.

In this context, the international adherence to the definition of water as an economic good marks a paradigm shift in the governance of services delivery, bringing a market rationale to water management resources, arguing for the benefits of a clear separation between provider and regulator and the adoption of indicators that provide for “real” costs, water tariffs, and demand management. This line of argument foresees a reconciliation of financial and environmental concerns through the treatment of water as an economic good. The public-private controversy became then framed within the New Public Management (NPM) school of thought, assuming the failure of centralized government-led service delivery systems and the need for a more efficient division of labor usually under unbundled systems. This perspective often refers in detail to the institutions (state, market, and civic society) of Western representative democracies and has been transplanted to the developing context through policy prescriptions, arguing that the market should be used as a model for political and administrative relationships.

Jessica Budds and Gordon McGranahan argue that the above debate had very little to do with water per se but was rather subsumed in a highly ideological discussion about the effectiveness of the private sector in comparison to the public sector in almost any policy area. In practice, during the last decade PSP in water provision dramatically increased in the most densely populated areas, where maintenance and investment costs are easier to recover. As contended by Karen Bakker, this has led to the geographical segregation of service providers around three different situations: larger cities where transnational corporations (TNCs) are currently the main providers; suburban and small urban areas, where nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are seen as the main conduit for community service provision; and the rest, left to the state as direct provider. This segregation is not incidental, and it corresponds with the potential profitability (market size and consumers’ capacity to pay) of service provision in each area. A more disaggregated look reveals that the poor are not benefiting from increased PSP; rather, their exclusion from basic services has been exacerbated.

In terms of governance, increased PSP has been associated with the notion of a reduced state. However, Matthias Finger claims that within this process, the state has not necessarily become weaker or obsolete but rather instrumentalized through the logic of partnership governance in a globalized economy, which advocates a small but strong state. Such instrumentalization is evident in the transformation of the state’s four traditional functions in the governance and management of basic services: legislation, regulation, operational provision of services, and investment. It is often assumed that the privatization of water services involves a substantial change in the last two functions: the state is not any longer in charge of direct provision and its investment function
is reduced. But, as highlighted by Bakker, under increased PSP, the state still plays these four roles, although with a substantial twist. First, it performs a central role in financing, although this is not just through direct investment but through contracting loans for the development and rehabilitation of service infrastructure from which TNCs are making a profit. Second, the state acts not only as a loans guarantor but also provides the legal stability and security required to ensure that contracts will be respected and bills paid. Third, the state also acts as a guarantor of regular revenues and a crucial risk bearer. In addition, it acts as a legitimate vehicle to enforce internationally agreed norms and standards that often exclude unorthodox practices and informal providers.

As the move toward privatization has run in parallel with calls for increased decentralization, changes in the state’s functions also need to be examined in light of the increased role and responsibilities attributed to local governments either as direct providers, as regulators of the private sector, or in supporting alternative service providers to fill the gap. The instrumentalization resulting from increased PSP also extends to other actors. Financial institutions play a new function in this system and so do NGOs, who are often charged with the role of raising awareness, dwellers’ contributions, and legitimization for PSP in informal settlements.

**Access to Water Services by the Poor: Neither Public nor Private**

When looking at the specific ways in which the urban and peri-urban poor gain access to water services, it is possible to identify a wide range of practices and arrangements (fig. 1). Some of these are formal, policy-driven mechanisms supported by institutional arrangements of the state. But in addition to these, there is a wide set of arrangements that operate on the basis of solidarity and reciprocity—such as when water is provided as a gift by some members of the community to others in need—as well as cases in which these practices operate on the basis of competition, as in the case of small independent water providers. These mechanisms can be characterized as being needs-driven and correspond to the wide spectrum of practices adopted by the poor, often with little or no support from the state, its policies, or its resources. While policy-driven mechanisms can be clearly identified from the perspective of production and provision, the arrangements identified on the right-hand side of the wheel are best examined and understood from the perspective of access and from the viewpoint of highly localized strategies.

The water supply wheel provides a schematic but comprehensive representation of both policy-driven and needs-driven strategies, showing the roles of the public, private, and civic society sectors and the extent to which these are based on cooperative or competitive principles. The three sectors are far from homogeneous, as the public sector might be present in the form of highly centralized state agencies or of decentralized bodies. Similarly, the private sector might involve TNCs, medium-sized licensed water providers, or informal vendors. The civic sector is not homogeneous either, as it might involve arrangements characterized by a certain degree of formalization, such as community schemes actively supported by the public sector or external NGOs, but also by more informal relations of cooperation established among members of the community.

Multiple hybrid combinations—some of which rely on some form of coproduction or systematic cooperation between government bodies and citizen groups—can be found in the urban context of developing countries. Many of these arrangements manage to do what the more
conventional formal public, public-private, and private arrangements in service delivery often fail to achieve: to reach the poor on a sustained basis. Considering that coproduction in public services is increasingly a reality in the context of the developing world, it is surprising that, with a few exceptions, the bulk of the literature focuses on developed countries.

The term “coproduction” was initially coined in the 1970s by Elinor Ostrom and other academic sociologists and development economists looking at why neighborhood crime rates increased in Chicago when police stopped walking the streets and lost their connections with the local community. Over time, the term was extended to tackle the question of why the mainstream model of service delivery—often run by large centralized, technocratic, and hierarchical structures—was failing to meet its objectives. In the 1980s a number of political scientists started to focus on citizen coproduction as a type of citizen activity intended to enhance the reach and quality of public services. Thus, the literature on service coproduction evolved in tandem with a concern to bring a new perspective into the analysis and evaluation of public policy design and implementation.
Here I use the term “coproduction” to refer to the joint and direct involvement of citizens and public agencies to deliver a particular service, one in which “citizens can play an active role in producing public goods and services of consequence to them.”15 This is to be distinguished from the use of the term in reference to any interagent arrangement in service delivery characterized by the presence of two or more organizations, be they private, public, or civil society.

Furthermore, I focus on “institutionalized coproduction,” defined by Anuradha Joshi and Mick Moore as “the provision of public services (broadly defined, to include regulation) through a regular long-term relationship between state agencies and organized groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions.”16 This implies not only that cooperation between citizens and the state is backed up by formal and long-lasting arrangements but also that “power, authority and control of resources are likely to be divided (not necessarily equally), between the state and citizens in an interdependent and ambiguous fashion.”17

Isabelle Lemaire characterizes coproduction as a give-and-take exercise that could either lead to a mere exchange between those involved or become a more transformative process.18 As highlighted in the introduction, the central concern in this chapter is to examine the transformative capacity that institutionalized coproduction might have in terms of opening and/or expanding the political space for the poor in the governance of water provision, rather than on the actual material changes achieved in terms of improved water provision.

In their examination of the politics of poverty reduction policies, Neil Webster and Lars Engberg-Pedersen identify three dimensions through which political space manifests and can be expanded or constrained:

- The institutional channels through which policy formulation and implementation can be accessed, controlled, or contested by the poor;
- The political discourses through which poverty and poverty reduction are socially constructed, in terms of its causes, who is affected, why action should be taken to reduce it, who should take responsibility for this action, and so on;
- The social and political practices of the poor which can be used to influence decision making, agendas, policies and program implementation.19

The last section of this chapter returns to the above three dimensions, examining the extent to which citizen-government coproduction in Caracas and Dar es Salaam have deepened the political space for the peri-urban poor in the governance of water services.

**Coproduction on the Ground**

Within metropolitan areas and regions, demographic trends in the urbanization process are difficult to establish due to the frequent mismatch between jurisdictional boundaries and their spatial structure. Table 1 presents some estimates of population size and annual population growth rate of the two metropolitan contexts under consideration. What the table does not show is that in both cases the growth rate in the PUI is much higher than in the city as a whole.

According to the 2001 census, the Caracas Metropolitan Region (CMR) has a total population
Table 1. Overview of the two metropolitan areas/regions under study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population 2000 (MILLIONS)</th>
<th>Area (KM² / MI²)</th>
<th>Annual Population Growth Rate</th>
<th>Metropolitan Administrative Structure</th>
<th>WSS Metropolitan Formal System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dar es Salaam</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1,350 / 521</td>
<td>7.2 %</td>
<td>Metropolitan Dar es Salaam: three semi-autonomous municipalities under the Greater Dar es Salaam Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caracas</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6,207 / 2,397</td>
<td>3.3 %</td>
<td>Caracas Metropolitan Region: 17 municipalities belonging to 3 political-administrative entities (states)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on Cariola and Lacabana (2004a) and Kombe and Lupala (2004a).

of 4.2 million, 65.5 percent of which live in Caracas City. Although a small metropolis in the Latin American context, the expansion of Caracas in the last decade has overflowed the boundaries of the metropolitan area, giving rise to the CMR (see fig. 2). The CMR embraces seventeen municipalities, five of which form the Caracas Metropolitan Area, while the other twelve are located in four large peripheral subregions. Among these, the Middle Tuy Valley (hereafter referred to as PUI...
Tuy) is the fastest-growing subregion, recording a 50 percent increase of its population in the 1990–2001 period, which amounted to 534,752 inhabitants in 2001. While the urbanized surface of the PUI Tuy almost doubled between 1992 and 2002 (from 5.6 percent to 10.7 percent of the total area), about 25 percent of the agricultural and forested surface were lost.

The expansion of the CMR has been accompanied by a process of acute socioterritorial segregation, in which the Caracas Valley is occupied by the higher-income groups, the first peri-urban ring has become a residential alternative for vulnerable middle-income population groups, and the new emerging periphery (PUI Tuy) houses a downward-mobile population and a large part of the poor in the CMR. According to the 2001 Household Survey, 70.1 percent of all households in the PUI Tuy were poor, while this category represented 52.6 percent of the households of the metropolitan area.

The PUI Tuy plays a key role as a net water exporter region—about half of the water intake of the CMR water supply is located in this area—but at the same time its population suffers significant deficits. These include not only irregular and insufficient water supply but also serious sanitation problems. Parts of the population needs are met by municipal and private water trucks, the latter imposing high costs, especially on the poorer groups in the CMR periphery.

Dar es Salaam is the primate city of Tanzania, accounting for 25 percent of the country’s urban population. Population estimates for 2002 range from 2.5 to 3.5 million, with a daytime population of around 5 million. Administratively, the metropolitan area comprises three autonomous
Figure 4. New gated community in the Tuy Valley.

Figure 5. New housing in peri-urban Caracas, Paso Real 2000.
municipalities (Ilala, Kinondoni, and Temeke) that embrace seventy-three wards and fall under the Greater Dar es Salaam Council (see fig. 6). The population of Greater Dar es Salaam is increasing at an annual rate of 4.39 percent, which makes it the third fastest growing city in Africa.26 Urban expansion primarily takes place along the coastline and the four arterial roads of Bagamoyo, Morogoro, Nyerere (Pugu), and Kilwa. Housing development between the arterial roads is mostly
unplanned and lacks basic infrastructure. It is estimated that over 70 percent of the city population live in informal settlements, with more than 50 percent of the existing urban housing stock being informal.27

Urbanization in poverty characterizes the development of peri-urban Dar es Salaam, as poverty underpins changes in land use and land transactions, with poor migrants moving to the PUI both from inner-city areas and rural areas. This phenomenon is intimately linked to conflicting land tenure regimes and in particular to customary and quasi-customary land tenure systems in peri-urban areas. While these two systems facilitate access to unplanned and unsurveyed land for housing, some of the major adverse effects of informal urban growth include pollution and fecal contamination of groundwater sources as housing density increases.28

The PUI of Dar es Salaam comprises a diverse environment depicting a variety of socioeconomic activities. Agriculture is the main land use, with many households living in peri-urban areas subsidizing their demands for food from gardening activities. However, agriculture is gradually being displaced by housing, especially by those who cannot afford to rent a room or a house or buy land in the inner or intermediate city areas. There are also increasing number of

Figure 7. Informal housing in peri-urban Caracas, Paso Real 2000.

Figure 8. A woman carrying water in a rapidly expanding peri-urban settlement (Tungi) within metropolitan Dar es Salaam.
of middle- and high-income households which have acquired large tracks of land in the PUI for gardening and animal husbandry purposes. Emerging livelihood opportunities in this area are associated with retailing and service areas, artisanship, farming, quarrying, renting rooms, land selling, and gardening.29

The Water Poor

Field interviews with peri-urban dwellers revealed that large segments of the populations in these settlements could be characterized as the water poor, due to their experience in terms of informal/illegal access to water, access to poor-quality water, and scanty access to water. Informal and/or illegal access to water is often linked to insecure tenure of land and housing rights. This is particularly crucial in the PUI, where customary and statutory systems coexist or overlap with each other and where the emerging structure of land use “is increasingly breaking away from normative urban land development norms, concepts and standards.”30

Within the PUI Tuy, water supply and sanitation in the lower-income communities is highly heterogeneous. While some settlements lack these services entirely and only access water through public tank trucks, others tap illegally into any water main (whether it carries pure drinking water or untreated sewage), and a third group is fully connected to the networked water and sewer systems but suffer from irregular water supply. The insecurity associated with practices such as illegal connections was identified as a recurrent factor highlighted by most interviewees, as illustrated by a peri-urban resident:

here is where the water problem is most visible, on Terrace 11. We have the connection to the pipe furthest away, on the main highway . . . we installed a small (illegal) tap, but it doesn’t meet our needs. Water doesn’t reach my house at least. . . . there are broken pipes and they aren’t repaired.31

While in some areas the poor quality of water is a central concern, in other places the main problem affecting peri-urban communities is related to its irregular supply, this has significant gender implications. A woman in the PUI Tuy explains how this affects her life:

When they give me water here every fourth day, I don’t do any other chores, I just get water. . . . The next day I do all my chores, because water takes a lot of your time, fetching water, filling bottles, checking that there are no leaks.32

In peri-urban Dar es Salaam, contaminated shallow wells constitute one of the main sources for the poor. Other major sources include boreholes, rainwater, and water vendors. Many settlers in these areas cannot afford water supplied by vendors, which costs up to fifteen times the supply from wells, with water prices fluctuating depending on the availability of water and the distance walked from the water source to the customer. The deficiencies in water and sanitation suffered by the peri-urban poor bring about several diseases, including diarrhea, intestinal worms, cholera, and dysentery. In Tungi, one of the peri-urban localities studied in Dar es Salaam, the number of diarrhea cases almost tripled between 2001 and 2003 due to inadequate water supply.33
The subward chairperson in Tungi recollects the fast changes affecting water and land use in the face of rapid peri-urbanization:

Until the early 1990s most of the land was still under agricultural use. Most settlers would easily meet their water needs, from shallow wells. Then, we did not experience any water shortage for domestic and gardening. Water table was high; one did not require digging a deep well or drilling a borehole to get water. Now deep wells dry up, creating severe water shortages especially during extended dry season.94

In the face of expanding unmet water needs, many peri-urban dwellers found new livelihood opportunities. Mr. Rugenzi, a Sukuma and a former small-scale miner, recalls how he started his current business:

I have not received any formal training in digging wells or drilling boreholes, but I acquired the skill while working in Gold mines in Geita. I came here to see my brother and realized he had no water. I used my skills and knowledge from the mines to dig a well, I got good water at around ten

Figure 9. Hidrocapital free water supply in peri-urban Caracas.
meters depth. When the residents learnt about this they came one after another, requesting me to drill or dig wells for them. I started the business. I also fit pipes and pumps as well as do some maintenance of the wells when asked.35

Water vending, mostly by young men, is an important livelihood option and one of the main ways for households to access water in the study areas. Water vendors carry five to ten buckets of water, each with twenty-liter carrying capacity, and they collect water from different water sources, including boreholes, shallow wells, and public standpipes. There are also publicly run water sales outlets commonly known as water kiosks, where vendors collect water to sell to their customers. While the price of a twenty-liter bucket is twenty Tanzanian shillings (TShs) (equivalent to US$0.02) at the boreholes, shallow wells, public standpipes, and water kiosks, water vendors sell the same volume for between 100 and 500 TShs (US$0.1–0.5). A water vendor in Tungi explains how he came into the business:

Before I started water vending business, I was running a vegetable stall and I ran short of capital. In 2002 I embarked on water vending business, because water was in high demand in Tungi.

Figure 10. Informal water vendor in peri-urban Dar es Salaam.
I bought a second hand bicycle for TShs 35,000 and 10 buckets each at TShs 2,000. Currently, I have 30 buckets; I carry 5 buckets per trip, and make five or six trips per day. Starting from September through to the beginning of rainy season in March, the business is very lucrative. Some customers who do not use salty water from wells buy as much as ten buckets per day. I earn between TShs 5,000 and 6,000 per day. . . . I am paying fees for my children including TShs 80,000 for a boy studying at a Technical College in Arusha.

Inadequate water supply in the PUI might bring livelihood opportunities for some, but it also restrains the survival and livelihood opportunities for many others and enhances competition for water and overextraction. In Dar es Salaam, many households living in peri-urban areas are subsidizing their demands for food from gardening activities. While peri-urban agriculture constitutes an important source of food for most households (65 percent of the city population), it is also one of the main sources of unauthorized water connection in the city and of multiple disputes between the government and peri-urban dwellers. A group of residents from Sitakishari—another PU community studied in Greater Dar es Salaam—reflect on the impact of productive activities on the depletion of underground sources:

A large number of residents here depend on urban agriculture, particularly gardening and livestock keeping that are mainly carried out in Msimbazi valley. Because of the competition in the utilization of land as well as water, the springs in this valley have been affected. Unlike in the past when water was available all the year round, water is now only available seasonally; hence people are forced to dig more wells to get water for irrigation. Besides, the springs that used to be public have been appropriated by one of the land owners.

One of the main visible features in the PU in Dar es Salaam is that most of the entrepreneurial activities that depend on water are significantly undertaken by women. Subsequently, water shortages, unaffordable prices, or unsafe supplies hit women most. Lack of public regulatory frameworks that would check quality and improve access to water not only exacerbates hardships to which women are culturally bound, but also undermines the socioeconomic development of their households.

Institutional Background

The two case studies examined in this section fit within the notion of institutionalized service coproduction. In both cases, the emergence of cooperative arrangements between citizens and the state is laid out by a formal and long-term institutional framework.

Figure 12 provides a summary of the main problems affecting the water supply and sanitation (WSS) system in Greater Dar es Salaam and the Caracas Metropolitan Region before the reforms introduced in the early years of the twenty-first century. In both cases, the system was clearly in crisis, but the approaches adopted to restructure it were guided by very different interpretations of the roots of the problem.
In the case of Venezuela, the emergence of an institutionalized platform for service coproduction has to be examined in the light of the substantial changes introduced by the Chavez administration since 1998. In 1999 the country began a political, legal, economic, and social transition through the adoption of a new constitution and the beginning of the reorganization of the state, marking a shift from representative to participatory democracy. Since then, government’s efforts to overcome poverty have focused on a strategy of social and productive integration through the active participation of the community and emphasis on increasing access to basic services with quality and equity.

Problems affecting the WSS system in the CMR prior to the reforms included one of the highest unaccounted for water rates in Latin America. At the national level, about 55 percent of the population had water meters, but only 33 percent of them were in proper working order. In addition, more than 20 percent of water users were not registered on the cadastral system. Highly deficient measurement of water consumption was coupled by a low propensity to pay and meager legal support for penalizing fraud. The fact that water billing revenue covered only 40 percent of the system’s operating cost translated into a structural lack of capacity to expand and improve service and infrastructure on the basis of the system’s own resources. As a result, prior to the 2001 WSS reform, the revenue from water tariffs was insufficient to “cover the cost of operation and maintenance, let alone the financing of maintenance, replacement of assets or investments in new infrastructure.” The new system adopted a two-bracket tariff: one based on minimum adequate consumption and the other one penalizing wasteful consumption. An indirect cross-cutting
Subsidy was introduced whereby some sectors (commercial, industrial, and high-income residential) would subsidize lower-income residential consumption.

Within the Chavez administration, the 2001 Organic Drinking Water and Sanitation Service Act (LOPSA) articulated a long-term regulatory framework to readdress an organizational crisis that affected the water system during the 1990s. More than 100 regulatory instruments for the water system had been created in that period, leading to clashes between municipal, regional, and national authorities. The act introduced a new institutional scheme separating policy, regulation, and management functions, transferring the service to the municipalities and activating the creation of TWIF, designed as a direct channel between grassroots organizations and Hidrocapital, the public sector regional water supply company responsible for water provision in the CMR.

Historically, the absence of urban planning and the proliferation of informal settlements led the communities themselves to build precarious supply facilities through illegal connections to water taps from the main network. The 2001 act stipulated that thereafter the state and municipal governments and Hidrocapital must invest in the repair and refurbishment of this precarious and insufficient infrastructure. The plan included a process to transfer the operation of water supply services to the municipal level by 2007, through a concessionary regime in which municipalities, the private sector, and communities could participate individually or in association. In this context, the LOPSA anticipated that community participation in the service provision phase could take an organizational role through the TWIF and involve direct operation of the service under concession. However, this has not yet been implemented, as the central government fears that the concessionary regime could open the door to multinational water companies. The LOPSA is currently in the process of being reformed to stop this possibility.44 The discussion focuses on how to retain a strong role for the state to oversee the WSS system at the regional and

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Great Dar es Salaam
- The distribution system did not cater for the whole (30% with access to tap water)
- Piped network system was old and in a state of disrepair (60% of pumped water lost)
- Low levels of water tariff collection (16%) and high level of “illegal” connections
- Serious problems in terms of water quality and regularity
- For the poor, access relying on multiple practices, significantly water vendors
- Experimentation with public water kiosks, driven by NGOs

Caracas Metropolitan Region
- PUI Tuy area participates in the metropolitan WSS system as a water “producer”
- Encroachment of catchment areas through formal and informal settlements and high competition over water among peri-urban dwellers
- Highs costs to treat water heavily polluted by effluents dumped into the Tuy River
- Large numbers of “illegal” taps and informal distribution networks in informal settlements
- Poor regularity: frequency of service, varying from every other day to every other twenty-seven days

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Figure 12. The Water Supply and Sanitation (WSS) system prior to the reforms.
national level while ensuring that the local operation of service provision is responsive to the needs of the poor.

In the case of Tanzania, for decades WSS provision has been the responsibility of the Dar es Salaam Water and Sanitation Authority (DAWASA), a public utility company. Historically, services were provided almost for free, with a minimum flat-rate charge that did not cover supply, operation, and maintenance costs, thus severely limiting the coverage and quality of services, estimated to meet only 45 percent of the total water demand. Thus, peri-urban dwellers were largely left to their own devices, accessing water through boreholes, shallow wells, rainwater harvesting, and water vendors.

Over the past decade, the role of DAWASA has been the subject of significant reforms, shifting from direct provider to enabler and regulator. In 2003, following the conditions imposed by the African Development Bank (ADB) to support the rehabilitation and operations of the city water facilities, DAWASA was transformed into a holding company, DAWASA Public Granting Authority (PGA), responsible for monitoring the performance of a private operator: City Water Services (CWS).

Initially CWS was granted a ten-year lease contract to deal with the billing, tariff collection, operation, and routine maintenance component of DAWASA’s portfolio of responsibilities, while the rehabilitation and development of the whole system were to remain the responsibility of DAWASA. However, in 2005 the company was forced to withdraw when the government terminated the contract on grounds of failure to abide. A new public company (DAWASCO) was established to take over the role of CWS. According to the Tanzanian government, the WSS system in metropolitan Dar es Salaam, and particularly service provision in lower-income areas, deteriorated further during the operation of CWS.

Prior to the reform, the WSS in Dar es Salaam had been in a state of disrepair for many years. A study conducted in 1995 estimated that the rehabilitation of the existing infrastructure and the network expansion to reach unconnected communities alone demanded over US$620 million. A US$164 million loan was approved by various donors for the so-called Dar es Salaam Water Supply and Sanitation Project (DWSSP), and the privatization of the billing and revenue collection system was implemented as part of the business plan to repay the loan. Key provisions in the DWSSP concerning informal settlements included “the resettlement of families illegally settled on the transmission lines and close to the stabilization ponds” and the disconnection of illegal users along the transmission lines. In terms of expected impacts, the lending procurement acknowledged that small water vendors and larger tankers, as well as illegal users and illegal providers of service would be negatively affected by the project, whose main purpose was “to institute rational operation and discipline.”

Given that the private sector participation was intended to cover the management of the piped water supply in settlements occupied by high- and middle-income earners, the project provided for the creation of a Community Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (CWSSP)—operating under DAWASA with the assistance of specialized NGOs—“to provide a minimum service to low income communities who may not be immediately served by a piped water network.” The community component was allocated US$3.85 million, about 2.3 percent of the total cost of the project, and was conceived as a system of grants to be allocated by DAWASA to about...
50 beneficiary communities for schemes “based on point sources or relying on a bulk supply from the network.”

The CWSSP aimed to scale-up some of community-managed water supply schemes supported by external NGOs that already operated in the lower income peri-urban areas of Greater Dar es Salaam. These were based on the organization of water users associations at the ward level, responsible for implementing and managing public water kiosks and standpipes, which provide water at a subsidized bulk tariff for resale to end users at affordable rates. With this purpose, DAWASA appointed Care International, PLAN International and WaterAid to support communities in the formulation of grant requests and their implementation.

Motivating Forces behind Citizen Coproduction

The drivers or organizational motivation for coproduction are varied, although often linked to the changing (and often declining) role of the state as a universal service provider. Joshi and Moore argue that a differentiation should be established between “governance drivers” and “logistical drivers.” Governance drivers arise in response to changes in the state’s governance capacity, while logistical drivers emerge to address perceived problems in the effective delivery of services due to high transaction costs and/or highly complex environments. Although in reality, both governance and logistic drivers might be connected, the above distinction is useful to examine the impact that different organizational motivations might have on the emergence of services coproduction. A study by Tony Bovaird looks at six cases of coproduction in the developed and developing world, concluding that when linked to governance drivers, service users and communities are more likely to exert power over service planning, design, and management. By contrast, he found that when coproduction arises from logistical drivers, the role of local communities is usually confined to service delivery.

In the two case studies analyzed, citizen coproduction emerged in the context of significant changes, associated with the withdrawal of the state as direct provider in the case of Dar es Salaam, and with the democratization and decentralization of roles and responsibilities in the case of Caracas. In the case of Tanzania, citizen coproduction became institutionalized out of need, as a way to fill in the gap left by the intended privatization of water provision. By contrast, in Venezuela it emerged out of a political project aimed at enforcing the water rights of the poor within their wider rights as citizens.

Confirming the thesis advanced by Bovaird, a significant difference can also be found in the application of service coproduction in the two case studies analyzed. While the Venezuelan approach establishes an institutional platform for citizens to participate in all the stages of service provision (from needs identification and design through delivery to assessment), in the case of Tanzania, community inputs were confined to self-provision by the poor, otherwise excluded from the process of needs assessment, water policy design, formulation, and monitoring of the system.

The rationale for the allocation of financial resources within each institutional platform reinforces the notion of a transformative versus instrumental logic in the adoption of service coproduction platforms in each case. In Caracas no ceiling capped the public financial resources allocated to poor communities. On the contrary, public investment prioritizes those in need.
Although the reform placed emphasis on improving the financial sustainability of the WSS system, the 2001 act provided for a social rate for households unable to pay the entire cost of their water supply service, as well as cross-cutting subsidies.

By contrast, in Dar es Salaam, the community program (CWSSP) was allocated a marginal percentage of the total infrastructure rehabilitation project costs to meet the needs of unplanned settlements. As argued by ActionAid: “donor resources, and the Tanzanian government’s current and future tax revenues, will be used to fund a project in which 98% of the money will be spent on the richest 20% of the population.”54 A report by WaterAid also challenged many of the privatization assumptions and promises highlighting that in Temeke municipality—Dar es Salaam’s major unplanned and unserviced area—“at least 120,000 out of a projected 200,000 households remain completely unconnected to the failing water system.”55 This report also highlights that the community water kiosks approach has improved access to water in some communities but still receives mixed reactions in unserved communities, “with residents preferring the flexibility of the present system, and vendors wary of losing trade.”56

Who Drives Coproduction?

In theory the most distinctive aspect of coproduction refers to the interaction and interdependence of state agencies and citizens in the decision-making system. In this sense, citizen coproduction is often assumed as being based on a bilateral relationship between government/professionals and users/communities. However, in reality it often involves a wider set of relationships that usually evolve into fluid networks and complex adaptive systems.

Figure 13 provides a schematic representation of the two institutional arrangements under analysis.

In the case of Caracas, coproduction is at the heart of the WSS decision-making system through the TWF. This provides a universal mechanism for organized communities to interact with the state and the regional water company. The participation of the public sector is of key importance in view of Hidrocapital’s preeminence in all phases of the water cycle. The new water regime does not allow private sector participation in the stages of water extraction and production, since water is defined as a public good and these activities are reserved to the public national company responsible for operating the major water production systems. In this context, the WSS is regulated through Hidrocapital and the National Superintendence of Water Service by the National Water Office, which in turn reports to the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources. Hidrocapital, for its part, undertook an organizational change to incorporate community participation into its operating procedures through the creation of the Community Management Office. The office has been instrumental in expediting the implementation of TWF throughout the CMR, fostering the creation of more than 200 TWFs in the PUI-Tuy alone.57

Local community participation through the TWF takes place throughout the whole planning process, starting from the community water needs assessment and the elaboration of a joint diagnosis with Hidrocapital professionals, through the design of specific projects for the rehabilitation and/or expansion of the network, to the monitoring of the service provided, the state of the network, and the use of water in a sensible way. The projects engendered differ greatly in technical
difficulty, cost, and complexity, ranging from small-scale water distribution systems to large-scale systems complete with pumping stations, rural water supply systems, wastewater collectors, and others. Within this process, the project represents a common vision of a concrete future and allows for the necessary organization of its implementation. The TWF is in charge of the financial comanagement of the projects in collaboration with various state agencies and are also responsible for negotiating and regularizing water tariffs agreed to within each community.

In the case of Dar es Salaam, the provisions for community self-provision in the context of privatization present a very different picture. Here the interaction between the state and lower-income communities was structured in a more instrumental fashion. Mediated by the support of external NGOs, a number of selected communities were given the possibility to access a marginal percentage of the financial resources allocated to the improvement of the metropolitan water system. Not only was the interface between the state and local communities set up in a hierarchical way, but no link was established between the community-managed distribution networks and the main operating company.

A recent random sampling study by Mwakalila Shadrack in low- and middle-income settlements reveals that only about 10 percent of interviewed residents in Greater Dar es Salaam perceive DAWASCO as a satisfactory water provider. The majority of respondents (47 percent) identify water user associations as the most adequate and legitimate channel to improve water services because of their capacity to reach unplanned settlement dwellers through flexible arrangements. However, for a long time during the operation of CWSP, these were marginally considered and supported by the state, though more recently, DAWASCO has introduced a pro-poor unit based on the success of the program.

Table 2 summarizes the differences between the two case studies under examination in terms of roles, rights, and responsibilities. The comparison shows that when citizen coproduction mechanisms are framed within a predominantly instrumental rationale and subordinated to the single logic of cost recovery, significant asymmetries between the poor as self-providers and
What Is the Impact of Coproduction on the Poor?

The impact of citizen coproduction on the poor does not simply refer to whether or not they gain better access to certain services, but also to their status as citizens vis-à-vis the state and other citizens. For the urban and peri-urban poor, access to water is often not an individual concern but a collective problem. In this sense, the promotion and reward of collective action around water provision is potentially a powerful way to meet not just their practical needs but also their strategic needs.60

In the two case studies examined, the implementation of coproduction mechanisms in water provision is fairly recent, and, therefore, there is not enough information to assess their impact over a lengthy period. However, a number of achievements and shortcomings—summarized in table 3—seem to be emerging.

Despite the problems highlighted before, the CWSSP in Greater Dar es Salaam has been reported to have achieved some successful results. According to the government, the program has mobilized so far a total of sixty-six communities, supporting the construction of thirteen subprojects. More than US$43,000 has been collected from the communities as part of their 5 percent contribution to the total project cost. In 2007 the World Bank reported on its website some of the

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**Table 2. Roles, rights, and responsibilities**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DAR ES SALAAM (CWSSP)</th>
<th>CARACAS (LOPSA)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policymaking</strong></td>
<td>• Private contract terminated</td>
<td>• Public regional agency directly linked to the technical water fora (TWF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Public company driven by cost recovery</td>
<td>• Guiding principles: social equity and democratic control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Water as a right in theory but an economic good in practice</td>
<td>• Water as a social right, not a subsidized gift</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Financing</strong></td>
<td>• General pricing mechanisms (tariffs) aimed at covering new investments and water</td>
<td>• New investments funding by the state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>production costs (full cost recovery)</td>
<td>• Water tariff reflecting the true cost of water production (transparent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ad hoc public funding (CWSSP) matched by 5 percent community contributions</td>
<td>operating costs) linked to a new water culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity-building</strong></td>
<td>• NGO-driven and community-targeted</td>
<td>• Cross-subsidies and public investment prioritize social needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning</strong></td>
<td>• Public company, limited forward planning</td>
<td>• Water local plans formulated by TWF in association with Hidrocapital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regulation</strong></td>
<td>• DAWASA/DAWASCO</td>
<td>• Hidrocapital and TWF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation</strong></td>
<td>• Communities from selected subward (Mtaas)</td>
<td>• Open to various agents but mainly by public agency</td>
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formal public-private providers are likely to persist, leading to inequality in the control over water resources and service provision.
results achieved in the case of JUWABERI, a water users association participating under CWSSP in the Kitunda Settlement, in the Ilala District. According to the JUWABERI's chairman: “Before the project came into being, we used to buy water from mostly shallow, privately-owned boreholes and from private vendors. . . . Apart from being unreliable, some of this water was not clean and was very expensive.”61 In this case, the community has benefited from a substantial reduction in the price of water, from an average price of US$0.40 to US$0.02 for twenty liters of water, reducing their reliance on informal vendors.

In its latest evaluation report, the World Bank also highlighted the operation of the CWSSP as one of the most effective and efficient components. This was in sharp contrast with the unsatisfactory performance of the Dar Es Salaam Water Supply and Sanitation Project as a whole. By 2010, the original target of completing fifty small water-supply schemes had been exceeded, with about 275,000 persons accessing the CWSSP’s facilities. In addition, the scheme proved to be financially sustainable with revenues collected from the WUAs covering the operations, maintenance and expansion. As previously mentioned, the potential of the scheme materialized in further institutionalization through a pro-poor unit within DAWASCO. The unit emphasizes strengthening the management capacity of WUA to ensure the sustainability of the scheme, as well as providing oversight of off-network water schemes to ensure the proper operations of kiosks and to promote social connections.62 Beside accounts like the one above, there are no other independent

<table>
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<th>Achievements</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CARACAS</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Improved water access through public kiosks in some communities (66 communities mobilized)</td>
<td>• MDG already achieved: water supply coverage in urban and peri-urban areas increased from 88 percent (1998) to 92 percent (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Reduction in the price of water in selected projects reduced from US$0.40 to US$0.02 for 20 liters of water</td>
<td>• Technical expertise combined with social responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Financial contribution from the communities amounting to US$43,000 (5 percent of the project’s cost)</td>
<td>• Needs-driven public investment and transparent system of water costing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortcomings</td>
<td>• Political clientelism challenged and emergency of new community organizations and new leadership, particularly among women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• About 120,000 out of a projected 200,000 households remain completely unserved</td>
<td>• Responsible citizenship and a new water culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• About 2 percent of the total budget for 80 percent of people</td>
<td>• Fluctuations in the emergence and consolidation of TWFs, still affected by participation fatigue and emergency-driven organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Hierarchical interaction between public agencies and citizens</td>
<td>• Lower rate of achievements in better-off areas in terms of water provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mixed reactions from unserved communities</td>
<td>• Need to rework the framework in terms of transfer of responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Residents prefer the flexibility of other means of provision, such as water vendors</td>
<td>• Informal vendors wary of losing trade</td>
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Table 3. Impact of coproduction
assessments so far of the CWSSP performance in reaching unserved low-income communities in Great Dar Salaam, though its success has also been acknowledged by other organisations, such as the IRC International Water and Sanitation Centre. However, DAWASCO has implemented some of the draconian provisions stipulated under the original contract signed with the World Bank.  

In January 2008 the Tanzanian water minister publicly criticized the corporation for uprooting water pipes to make its customers pay their bills. The total estimated water demand in Dar es Salaam is 400 million liters per day, but the system pumps about 281 million liters per day, of which only 16 percent is delivered to paying customers; the rest goes to illegal connections and is lost through leakages. In this context, and given that cost recovery is the leading concern, it is not difficult to predict that the current focus on cutting off nonpayers and illegal connections is likely to have a negative impact on a large percentage of the population for whom the only alternatives are to rely on water vendors and other forms of self-provision.

Despite the success of the CWSSP, sanitation remains marginalized. Interventions in the pro-poor sanitation sector are becoming increasingly urgent in order to upgrade living conditions among the low income population. Dar es Salaam is below the national Tanzanian rate for sanitation coverage, which is already less than 50 percent. International organizations agree that the millennium development goals for sanitation will not be achieved.

In the case of Caracas, TWF have helped improve coverage of water services. Although not easily attributable to the TWF alone, in Venezuela, the government claims that the millennium development goal of halving the population without access to water and sanitation by 2015 were already met in 2005. By 2010 the World Health Organization (WHO) / United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) for Water Supply and Sanitation showed a national figure of 92 percent improved drinking water and 89 percent improved sanitation.

Miguel Lacabana and Cecilia Cariola argue that the introduction of TWF in the CMR has brought about significant transformations in four areas: (1) accountability—the management and monitoring of the service by Hidrocapital reflects the mechanisms laid down and adopted by the communities themselves; (2) transparency—the decision-making process relies on improved communication channels between communities and professionals; (3) synergy between citizens as professionals—through the articulation of the company’s technical know-how with the communities’ knowledge of their own networks and sources of water supply; and (4) higher professional responsiveness within the water bureaucracy, committed not only to high levels of performance and efficiency but also to a socially inclusive orientation to ensure high-quality service for all. In addition, TWFs have arguably helped reduce the impact of patronage politics, historically facilitated by the high revenues of the oil-rich Venezuelan state to which local and national politicians have had access as means of providing infrastructure in exchange for votes.

Lacabana and Cariola also highlight that cultural change undertaken by Hidrocapital in the CMR was a key step toward the resolution of conflicts over water, especially in the lower-income communities. Before the institutionalization of TWFs, frequent breakdowns of service were settled by activating growing protest mechanisms that ranged from blocking roads and highways to violent occupation of water company facilities. In this sense, a reactive management approach—which sought only to keep problems under control—was replaced by a new mechanism of public action. Through TWFs, Hidrocapital and the communities gained a new channel to
articulate responses, to solve service problems and to anticipate new demands and solutions. As a result, TWFs have become effective platforms for negotiation and resolution of disputes, not only in the provision of water service but also regarding other problems involving community life, as expressed by a neighborhood leader in the PUI Tuy:

The experiences I’ve had with the technical water forum are not just about water. That has opened many other doors for us, because as soon as they see the communities are well organized, the institutions take more of an interest in reaching those communities.

In the public sector, both the water supply company and the local and state governments claim benefits from the introduction of the TWF. These are linked to the reduction of open conflict, which had characterized their relationship with the population, and the reduction of the costs of providing water by tank truck.

At the community level, TWFs have strengthened solidarity ties while providing examples of participatory democracy where not only rights but also duties of community members are stressed. In addition, within the communities, TWFs have encompassed the emergence of women’s mobilization. Women represent approximately 75 percent of the TWF members and also the majority of the leaders within these organizations. However, the emergence and consolidation of TWFs is still challenged by long-term practices of political clientelism and patronage relationships, as well as by participation fatigue and an emergency-driven culture among the communities. This implies that while some TWFs have become a strong basis to expand community mobilization from water to other areas, others have disappeared after meeting their most immediate objectives.

Concluding Remarks

The extent to which the institutional arrangements analyzed in this chapter have the capacity to empower the poor as citizens—breaking down the status quo and reasserting their right to the city—can be assessed by examining the way in which such arrangements transform the political space that frames their access to and control over service production.

Partnerships or Coproduction?

The notions of public-private community partnerships and government-citizens coproduction present two very different sets of assumptions. Although both concepts have been discussed within the coproduction literature, the former is closely linked with the New Public Management (NPM) school and is primarily concerned with the principle of efficiency, while the latter has been advanced from innovations within the Public Policy school of analysis and is centrally concerned with questions of social equality and political accountability.

A differentiation of these two discourses in service provision is important because each of them places people in different positions vis-à-vis the state and the private sector. From the former perspective, individuals, groups, and even communities are defined as clients, with the potential to chip in with various resources and assets in the process of service delivery. Moreover, they are
often seen as the civic branch of the private sector. Citizen coproduction, by contrast, refers to people’s involvement in the process of governing the production and delivery of services, paying particular attention to the need to reformulate citizens’ rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis the state’s. A second difference between these two discourses is that in the first case, water provision is conceptualized as a good or commodity, while in the second case it is viewed as a universal entitlement guaranteed by the state.

The search for alternative forms of service provision in developing countries is often associated with contexts “where state authority is weak, and public agencies struggled hard to fulfill the roles we take for granted in OECD countries.” Although this is often a precise characterization, citizen coproduction should be seen not just as an institutional arrangement that emerges out of the limited (e.g., political, financial, and regulatory) capacity of the state to provide universal services—as in the case of Greater Dar es Salaam—but, as demonstrated in the case of Caracas, out of a political project, in which coproduction is intentionally (and not by default) conceived as a way of transforming governance within the realm of participatory democracy.

Do Institutional Mechanisms Matter?

So, what does the above mean in terms of the political space opened or constrained by specific institutional mechanisms like the ones analyzed throughout this chapter? According to Joshi and Moore, in comparison to conventional state or private service production, citizen coproduction as an institutional mechanism offers several advantages. First, it allows users and communities to supplement government provision in those cases where a particular service is not reaching certain groups or individuals. Second, it can help in the development of an effective interface between public/professional service providers and users/communities creating a mechanism for interaction and feedback that allows the reformulation of policy design and implementation to meet the particular needs and expectations of the end beneficiaries. Third, it can empower citizens to fully exercise their rights and to become agents of change, fostering a type of governance that is not producer-centered but people-centered. The previous analysis tells us that the extent to which these three functions are met depends of the institutional design of the mechanism in question (e.g., the way in which it establishes roles and responsibilities) and, above all, the political process and discourse within which coproduction is embedded.

In Dar es Salaam, service coproduction has been defined as a targeted strategy aimed at reaching the poor or, in other words, those unlikely to access water provision through the market mechanisms institutionalized with the failed attempt to privatize the service. This implies the coexistence of two systems: (1) a mainstream system in which water is treated as an economic good, delivered by a private and later public company through a water tariff system; and (2) an ad-hoc channel aimed at guaranteeing access by the poor, to be administered by NGOs, with cash and in-kind contributions by the targeted communities. Therefore, service delivery is structured through market mechanisms aimed to reach those who can pay, with a residual coproduction component for those who cannot be reached by the formal system. In this case, service coproduction has only delivered results in terms of supplementing government provision among some of the peri-urban communities in Greater Dar es Salaam, though the gradual institutionalization of
a pro-poor approach within DAWASCO might in turn lead to a more substantial reorganization of the operation of this agency as a whole.

By contrast, in the case of Caracas, service coproduction was framed within a political and institutional attempt to retreat from service privatization as a prevailing paradigm. This does not imply the exclusion of cost-recovery mechanisms; rather, it involves the introduction of new forms of regulation in activities like water provision, defined by the state as a strategic right and entitlement to be guaranteed to all citizens. In this case, the three advantages outlined above have been performed by the establishment and consolidation of the TWF, ranging from material improvements in service delivery to the emergence of an institutionalized space for negotiation between the poor and the state.

Instrumentalization or Transformation?

What is then the scope of coproduction to activate the transformative capacity of the social and political practices of the poor beyond the improvement of service delivery?

The notion of citizens’ participation in service coproduction has been contested by many authors, who fear that this might after all become just another means of invited participation by which users and communities are dumped with the responsibility of filling in gaps where governments are unwilling or unable to deliver. Geoff Mulgan contends that “it is hardly progressive to distribute responsibilities to the powerless.” The central concern here refers to the potential misuse of service coproduction, demanding the active engagement of the less well-off in society to produce services to which they should already have a right as citizens.

In Caracas, TWFs establish a relationship between citizens and Hidrocapital that is based on the notion of coresponsibility. For the peri-urban poor, the new institutional structure represents an opportunity to improve service, not only in terms of frequency of delivery but also through their official recognition as legally entitled citizens. In addition, as these citizen organizations consolidate, they generate practices giving way to a new water culture—a new understanding of water in environmental, social, and economic terms—involving rights and obligations that result in new forms of social inclusion and citizenship building. In this sense, the TWF’s most important accomplishment, is “obtaining the service while building citizenship.”

In Dar es Salaam, by contrast, there is a more conventional and instrumental approach to the participation of the poor, in which access to water is still framed within a market system, with a particular outlet to alleviate the needs of those outside the market but with the capacity to contribute financially to the establishment of public kiosks. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that the CWSSP has moved from being seen as a marginal initiative to being recognized as an efficient and effective alternative to respond to the demands of the poor and unserviced.

The two experiences reviewed are based on the introduction of potentially positive mechanisms to reach the poor, where they deeply differ is on the way in which they frame citizen coproduction. Their comparison suggests that, when genuinely applied, coproduction is a highly political process with the ability to promote participative democracy, challenge professional expertise, and empower users and communities. In the case of the TWF, communities were empowered through an institutionalized channel that allows them to be active players and have
a voice in the decision making process. Of course, one could argue that the TWF in Caracas could become over time yet another instrument of bureaucratic control and political clientelism and that the water users associations in Dar es Salaam could evolve into a legitimate vehicle to encompass a deeper process of negotiation with the state as far as water provision and other issues, such as land management and regularization, are concerned.

While the outcomes of relatively or entirely self-organized forms of cooperation and negotiation among citizens and the state are difficult to predict, in the two case analyzed institutionalized coproduction platforms appeared to have extended the ‘opportunity space’ for those typically disenfranchised from the decision making process to establish regular channels of communication and negotiation with the state. Building on the notions of practical and strategic needs, it could be argued that citizen coproduction might have a positive impact on the practical needs of the poor—for instance, by improving service provision and widening the practical choices among users (e.g., drawing on different technical options, reducing provision costs, improving the quality/quantity and regularity of the service provided, and opening their access to alternative providers)—or on their strategic needs, promoting inclusive forms of state-citizen interaction, enabling their entitlements as citizens, and valuing and nurturing their knowledge vis-à-vis that of professionals. Their longlasting transformative power depends on the depth and scale of the political process they generate and sustain.

NOTES


2. These were two of the five case studies examined under a three-year research project concerned with the governance of water and sanitation in the peri-urban interface (PUI) of metropolitan regions in the developing world. The project was funded by the Department for International Development (DFID) of the British Government and led by the Development Planning Unit (DPU), University College London. The project partners in Caracas and Dar es Salaam were respectively the Centre for Development Studies (CENDES) and the University College of Lands and Architectural Studies (UCLAS). For more information, visit http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu/pui.


5. NPM emerged as a response to the context of the economic and fiscal crises that afflicted a number of Western states in the late 1970s, which were largely attributed to the bureaucratic failures of the Keynesian welfare state. Over time, the principles of this school of thought were spread throughout the developing world, through the promotion of civil-service reform, privatization, management decentralization, and a host of other measures.
focusing on the rolling back of the state.


17. Ibid., 40.


20. In terms of population growth, the highest rates in the PUI Tuy were recorded for the intercensus periods 1971–1981 and 1981–1990 at 7.0 and 7.1 percent respectively, decreasing to 3.5 percent during the 1990–2001 interval.


23. Ibid.


32. Ibid.

41. The largest operating cost is electric power due to a proposed credit in the amount of SDR 45.0 million (US$61.5 million equivalent) to the United Republic of Tanzania for the Dar es Salaam Water and sanitation project, WB Africa Regional Office Report No 25249-TA (April 2003): 16, http://www.worldbank.org/afr/pari/TZ_PAD.pdf.
46. ActionAid, Turning Off the Taps.pdf.
47. The criteria for selection considered water and sanitation supply and water supply vulnerability based on five categories: low income households with inadequate access to services; cholera prone locations; dangerous free land; areas with deficient water supply; and areas distant from water sources.
48. The largest operating cost is electric power due to the pumping needs posed by the altitude differences between extraction areas and the distributional network. About 40 percent (US$53 million in 2002) of this cost is subsidized by the national government. Jacqueline Farias, Navegando Hacia Otras Aguas, Vertientes 11 (December 2002): 20–24.
58. The criteria for selection considered water and sanitation supply and water supply vulnerability based on five categories: low income households with inadequate access to services; cholera prone locations; dangerous free land; areas with deficient water supply; and areas distant from water sources.
60. Borrowing from the gender literature, the notion of practical needs is used here to signify those needs which are related to satisfying both men's and women's, girls and boys basic material needs (e.g., food, water, clothing and shelter) while strategic needs refer to the changes required to challenge the roots of social exclusion and inequality.
62. The World Bank (2011) Implementation completion and results report (ida-37710 and ida-3771a) on a credit in the amount of sdr 45 million (US$61.5 million equivalent) to the United Republic of Tanzania for a Dar es Salaam water supply and sanitation project. Water and urban unit Country Department , Africa Regional Office.
63. ActionAid, Turning Off the Taps.pdf.
contract and subloan agreement for US$6 million was approved by the World Bank in the same year to support the implementation of a so-called 100 Day Rescue Plan.


68. Lacabana and Cariola, Construyendo la participacion popular, III–33.


70. Interview with a female neighborhood leader, El Carmen, CMR, 2003; Cariola and Lacabana, WSS Practices and Living Conditions.

71. Interview with the Community Coordinator of the Hidrocapital Losada-Ocumarito System, CRM, 2003; Cariola and Lacabana, WSS Practices and Living Conditions.

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