

Perceiving Expressed Emotions

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I, Rebecca Rowson, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Abstract

It seems natural to think that we often have genuinely perceptual knowledge that other people are in particular mental states. Sometimes I walk into a room and can immediately tell by looking at my friend that they are sad. This thesis argues that we can know that another is sad by perceiving their sadness – in particular, by perceiving an expression of their sadness. The aim is to defend this argument by overcoming two obstacles. One obstacle is to do with whether we can gain genuinely *perceptual* knowledge on this basis, and the second obstacle is whether what we gain can really have the status of perceptual *knowledge*. To meet the first obstacle, I introduce a condition that we perceive intrinsic parts of emotions. This is met by conceiving of expressions as proper parts of emotions, as opposed to mere external effects. To meet the second obstacle, I introduce a condition that the expression we perceive needs to guarantee the presence of emotion. Drawing on the phenomenological tradition, an attractive way of understanding parts as non-independent *moments* allows us to meet this central condition for knowledge.

Impact Statement

This thesis aims to contribute to literature on the perception of emotions, and defend a new idea for how to solve the problem of other minds.

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Introduction

The aim of the following discussion is to defend the viability of our having perceptual knowledge of other people's emotions. It strikes me as common-sense that we are able to make correct judgments about another's emotional state at just a glance of their face. As put elsewhere, 'grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face'¹. In order to defend this intuition, I defend the following model for one way in which we are able to do this:

We can know about others' emotions by perceiving those emotions,
We do this by perceiving expressions, and
Expressions are proper parts of emotions

In Chapter 1 I introduce and motivate the specific focus of my question. I am asking not whether other people have minds, or whether we can ever know they have minds. This is an interesting question in itself, but one that I side-line for my purposes.² I take it for granted that there are other minds, and that we can know about them. My question is *how* do we know about the particular mental state another person is in? Given that it seems clear that I can walk into a room and know that my friend Sammy is sad, what is it that explains how I have this knowledge?

The answer I want to pursue is that we can know this through perceptual means – on the basis of things we see. I motivate this perceptual intuition, and then motivate focusing on a *direct* perceptual answer. I think we can know another's mental state by *seeing that mental state itself*. As such, the account I want to give is that I know that Sammy is sad by perceiving his sadness.

In talking about sadness, I have already indicated the next area of my focus – emotions. I am not only limiting my inquiry into a direct perceptual account, but also into an account of how we perceive others' emotions as opposed to mental states more generally. In section 2 of the first Chapter I motivate both my focus on emotions, and the specific theory of emotions that I will use throughout the project. This is a theory that understands emotions to be formed of component parts involving both inner and outer (visible and non-visible) parts – some of which may be facial/bodily expressions.

The Chapter ends by introducing Green's part-whole perceptual account: that we perceive other people's emotions by perceiving some characteristic component (part) of their emotion. I briefly motivate looking towards an account like this, and use it to structure my account: we know

¹ Sias & Bar-On (2016, 55)

² Dretske explains why the problem of other minds set out in these terms presents no *special* problem, since the same problem could be posed to the existence of other bodies or external objects: '*No particular, no special, problem of other minds because the way I have of knowing that there are other minds is the same way I have of knowing that there are (other) bodies (e.g. Volkswagens).*' Dretske (1973, 35)

about others' emotions by perceiving their expressions. As we will see, I depart from Green's outline by refining the account in the next two Chapters.

Two limitations should be noted, to do with the scope of the answer I am defending. Firstly, in defending a perceptual account, I am not arguing that other non-perceptual accounts cannot work. Nor am I arguing that this is the only way for a perceptual account to be spelled out. My claim is weaker, in that this is *one* possible way of understanding how we know about the emotions of others. Secondly, I do not exhaustively review all the available theories of emotion on offer in the philosophy or cognitive science literature on emotions. However, I do defend its viability as an account of what an emotion is, and explain how it accommodates the perceptibility of emotions intuition. Nonetheless, given that I do not demonstrate it to be the only account of emotions, the Thesis is again limited to saying something like: if emotions are like this, which is very plausible, this is one way to understand a perceptual account to run.

Chapter 2 motivates two further conditions on this initial proposal that are designed to meet two obstacles to the thesis that we can gain perceptual knowledge of other's emotions by perceiving expressions. The first condition is that we want an account whereby expressions guarantee the presence of emotions. This condition is to do with securing our *knowledge* of another's emotion, and is motivated by a sceptical challenge. The challenge, cashed out initially with reference to Stout's critique of Green, is that we cannot know on the basis of seeing expressions that another is in some emotional state, since there are cases where we see the exact same thing and no emotion is present. The requirement that expressions must guarantee the presence of emotion – that is, an expression cannot exist unless the emotion is present – aims to meet this sceptical challenge.

In the second section of this chapter, a second condition is motivated. This condition aims to meet the obstacle that whilst perceiving expressions that guarantee emotions may put us in a position to have knowledge of another's emotion, it leaves open whether or not that knowledge is *directly perceptual*. The condition reached by appeal to Shoemaker is that to have perceptual knowledge of the emotion we must perceive some intrinsic feature of it. The notion that expressions are intrinsic proper parts of emotions is invoked to meet this condition. The second chapter ends with a puzzle. That is, there is a conflict between the idea that expressions guarantee emotions and one particular way of understanding parts. So, there is a conflict between the guarantee condition, and the parthood proposal introduced to meet the intrinsicness condition.

Chapter 3 starts by resolving this conflict by introducing an alternative conception of parts where the parts I am discussing conform to Husserl's 'moments'. Expressions understood as moments allow us to see how expressions can meet the guarantee condition, whilst remaining proper parts of emotions. I then respond to three recent objections to a parthood proposal from Matthew Parrott. This defence of the parthood proposal is important because it plays two roles in my account. Firstly, it ensures that we have direct *perceptual* knowledge since it meets the intrinsicness condition. Secondly, an understanding of parts in terms of 'moments' explains how it

is that expressions can guarantee emotions, and thus how we are in a position to have perceptual *knowledge* of emotions.

Chapter 1

Preliminaries: other minds, perception, and emotion

In this Chapter I refine the specific focus of my account, and the question I am answering. In addressing the question of how it is we can come to know the mental states of others, I first motivate giving a perceptual answer to the question. In turn, I explain the form my direct perceptual account will take: that we can know another's mental state by perceiving that mental state itself.

In the second section I motivate another refinement of the account. Instead of discussing the perception of mental states more generally, I limit my focus to the perception of emotions. I then review some accounts of what an emotion is, and settle on my preferred understanding.

1. A perceptual theory

1.1. Motivating a perceptual account

In order to motivate a perceptual answer to the question I am focusing on, the question itself must first be distinguished. The 'problem of other minds' traditionally takes on both an epistemological form and a conceptual form.³ The epistemological problem of other minds asks us: how is it that we can know that other people have minds at all? The sort of worry that generates this problem is that all I can observe about another is their behaviour. If it is consistent with their behaving as if they have certain thoughts that they in fact do not have these thoughts, or worse yet have no mind at all, then my observation of this behaviour is surely not sufficient to warrant me having knowledge of their mind. Take a philosophical zombie who behaves exactly as I do, who furrows their brow to look like they are thinking – but does not possess a mind at all.

The conceptual problem asks the question: how can we have a concept of other people's minds? If we can only understand things by experiencing them, and we cannot experience the mind

³ This distinction has come to prominence through Wittgenstein (1953), Malcolm (1962), and Nagel (1986), amongst others.

of another, having introspective access only to our own mind, then how can we understand another's mind?⁴

For this Thesis I bracket the conceptual problem, as my focus will be epistemological. I want to ask about how we can *know* certain things. However, the epistemological problem I focus on is more refined than as described in the traditional epistemological problem of other minds. I will be assuming from the start that other people have minds and think and feel certain things, and that we can know about these things. To ask whether they have minds at all is an interesting question, but again, it will be bracketed here. My question will be: given that other people have minds and certain mental states, how is it that we gain knowledge of these mental states?

A further refinement of my focus is that I will be focusing on a perceptual answer to this question. My answer will be that we can, sometimes, know about other people's mental states by perceiving those mental states. This is to be distinguished from a sort of inferential answer to the question. An inferential answer would be as follows. I know that when I am experiencing the mental state of confusion, I widen my eyes and furrow my brow. Therefore, when I see another person widen their eyes and furrow their brow, I infer from my own case that they must also be confused, and I come to know that they are confused.⁵

I do not want to argue that an inferential, or any other account of how we know about others' minds is false. In some or many cases of our gaining knowledge of another's mind, it may well be that this happens by inference and not perception. For example, say I see that Anna's ex-husband's clothes have been slashed with a knife, and I infer that Anna is angry and therefore she is the culprit. It turns out that Anna did do it and she is angry, so I have knowledge that she is angry. It seems implausible to say that this knowledge came about perceptually, since I have not laid eyes on Anna at all in this process.

Within cases that *do* seem to be more intuitively perceptual, there are also differences. Smith recently pointed out the phenomenological differences between certain cases – in particular, that different cases of seeing how something looks involve different degrees of visual presence. He gives the following two examples:⁶

Happy Sylvia

Ivy sees happy Sylvia who is beaming. Sylvia looks happy, and, were she not happy, she would not look happy. Ivy, believing this to be so, takes her to be happy.

Poker Tell

⁴ Pickard (2003, 89)

⁵ This inferential argument is an 'argument by analogy'. See Ayer (1956, 219 – 222) for an argument of this sort. For another kind of inferential account, see Pargetter (1984) who defends an 'inference to the best explanation' argument for our attribution of mental states to others.

⁶ Smith (2015, 277)

Aarohi and Shreshta are playing poker. Aarohi sees Shreshta who is visibly scratching her chin in a distinctive way. Shreshta scratches her chin this way when and only when she is excited during a poker game. Aarohi, aware of this fact, takes Shreshta to be excited.

Smith's point is that in Poker Tell, Shreshta's excitement is less visually present than Sylvia's happiness is in Happy Sylvia. This seems right. We could find ways of explaining how knowledge of excitement and happiness is gained in both cases. We may be able to explain how this knowledge is *perceptual* – i.e. how the seeing of certain things plays a role in our coming to know about the mental states in question. But, at least on a phenomenological level, the cases feel different with regards to how visually present the mental states are. Smith contends that any account of knowledge of other minds should be able to account for this sort of difference.

My motivation, however, for focusing on understanding how a perceptual account could work is more to do with cases like Happy Sylvia than cases like Poker Tell. The intuition is that in many cases, we just walk into a room and it is plainly visually evident what someone else is thinking or feeling. There are times when it is just obvious that the crying person in front of me is sad, and it does not feel like my knowing they are sad requires any sort of inferential process. This does not mean that if an account of how we perceptually come to know about others' mental states cannot explain more complex cases like Poker Tell. But the initial sort of case that motivates my focus here is a case like Sylvia's. In this case, were you to ask Ivy how it is she knew Sylvia was happy, it seems to me most plausible that she would simply reply 'I saw it'.

Phenomenologists who think similarly include Husserl who tells us *'we intuitively ascribe to the other person his lived experiencing, and we do this completely without mediation and without consciousness of any impressional or imaginative picturing'*⁷. Likewise, Merleau-Ponty makes the following remarks in explaining how it is we come to understand others' consciousness:

"There is nothing here resembling 'reasoning by analogy'. As Scheler so rightly declares, reasoning by analogy presupposes what it is called on to explain. The other consciousness can be deduced only if the emotional expressions of others are compared and identified with mine, and precise correlations recognized between my physical behaviour and my 'psychic events'. Now the perception of others is anterior to, and the condition of, such observations, the observations do not constitute the perception. A baby of fifteen months opens its mouth if I playfully take one of its fingers between my teeth and pretend to bite it. And yet it has scarcely looked at its face in the glass, and its teeth are not in any case like mine."⁸

The idea here is that if our understanding of other's mental states is to do with an analogy with our own case, as with some inferential accounts, then this requires some comparison with our own case. This is often not a requirement. In the case of an infant knowing another's intentions, often they do not have the tools to make this sort of analogy. Nonetheless, they seem to know what's

⁷ Husserl (2006, 84)

⁸ Merleau-Ponty (2002, 410)

going on. What I know of another seems to just be there in their face, and I recognise it *'without recourse to any 'inner' experience'*⁹.

So there seem to be cases where one immediately perceptually recognises the mental state of another. My concern is to try and give an account of how this is possible.

1.2. *Kinds of perception and kinds of perceptual account*

The perceptual account I wish to pursue tells us that we can, sometimes, know that another is, say, sad by seeing the sadness itself. We know the mental state of another by directly perceiving that mental state. Before distinguishing this from an alternative kind of perceptual account, it pays to be clear about what I mean when I say 'perceive' or 'see' in this context.

Firstly, I use 'perceive' and 'see' interchangeably, for when I am talking about perception here I am talking about just visual perception and side-lining other sense-modalities like hearing. There are three uses of these words to be distinguished.¹⁰ There is a purely perceptual sense, in which I say something like 'I see the apple' and it is just to do with visually clapping eyes on some object. We could also call this object perception. There is a purely epistemic sense. This is just to do with coming to know something and usually involves a 'that' clause. For example, 'I see that Tim's reasoning is good'. A third way of understanding 'see' or 'perceive' is in the perceptual *and* epistemic sense, which involves coming to know something on the basis of what you see (in a basic perceptual sense). This is also often accompanied by a 'that' clause, for example, 'I see that Tim is wearing green'.

A way to distinguish between 'that' clause statements that are either epistemic or perceptual and epistemic is to add a directional context and see if the statement still makes sense. Basic perceptual seeing involves looking at something from a certain direction. So, it is natural to add a context of direction to epistemic and perceptual statements, but not so with purely epistemic statements. Hence, 'I see through the tunnel that Tim is wearing green' sounds fine, but 'I see through the tunnel that Tim's reasoning is good' does not.

A direct perceptual model of how we know about another's mental state involves the epistemic perceptual sense of perceiving something, as well as the basic perceptual sense. We are coming to know 'that another is sad' in the epistemic-perceptual sense by seeing something in a basic perceptual sense. In the case of the account I want to focus on, we see the mental state itself in the basic perceptual sense. For the most part, I try and distinguish throughout the Thesis the two kinds of perception by including a 'that' clause when talking about the overall knowledge we

⁹ Ibid (415)

¹⁰ French (2013, 1740)

are attaining, and not so when discussing what we perceive in a basic perceptual sense in order to give us that knowledge.¹¹

An alternative to my direct perceptual account of knowing another's mental state by perceiving *it* is an indirect perceptual account that says we know another's mental state by perceiving *something else*. For example, Cassam argues that we can understand how we gain knowledge of some individual *a*'s sadness by seeing not the sadness itself, but by seeing *a* under certain conditions.¹² Say my friend Sammy is sad, I know that he is sad by perceiving *him* under certain conditions. I therefore have a perceptual account without having to explain what it is to perceive a mental state itself.

Cassam appeals to Dretske in his account. Dretske distinguishes primary seeing from secondary seeing.¹³ To primarily see something, you need to see that *a* is *F* by seeing *a* itself. To secondarily see something you need to see that *a* is *F* by seeing something other than *a*. Dretske then offers four conditions that, if satisfied, allow us to say that we can know that *a* is *F* by seeing *a*. So, four conditions for seeing that Sammy is sad by seeing Sammy would be (as put by Cassam):¹⁴

1. Sammy is sad
2. I see Sammy
3. The conditions in which I see Sammy are such that Sammy would not look this way to me unless he was sad
4. Believing the conditions in (3), I take Sammy to be sad

Cassam holds that it is possible to see that someone is in some mental state without literally seeing that mental state, but rather by seeing the person, so long as all four conditions are satisfied. I leave aside a discussion of whether or not these conditions, or conditions like them, could be jointly sufficient to secure any kind of perceptual knowledge of another's mental state. Rather, I want to suggest that even if these conditions do secure us perceptual knowledge of Sammy's sadness, it is not the purely perceptual account in the sense I want to pursue.

McNeill is concerned that Cassam's account is not completely devoid of inference, since primary seeing can still be inferential. The type of example McNeill has that calls into question the purely perceptual nature of the account is the following.¹⁵ Suppose that Rico is colourblind and Sunny is not. They both see a traffic light and the traffic light is red. However, whilst Sunny sees the light's illuminated redness, Rico sees that the traffic light is red by seeing its brightness.

¹¹ For proponents of a direct perceptual account of this nature, see Green (2010), Stout (2010) and Krueger & Overgaard (2012)

¹² Cassam (2007, 162)

¹³ Dretske (1969, 81)

¹⁴ Cassam (2007, 162)

¹⁵ McNeill (2010, 587)

Cassam's model would say that both Rico and Sunny have primarily seen, and know, that the light is red. For in both cases, Rico and Sunny have seen that the light is red by seeing the light. By deeming it to be such that the light would not look to them as it did unless it were illuminated red, and both believing it to be red, the above conditions are satisfied.

However, McNeill argues that the features of the traffic light that are seen are relevant to whether the visual knowledge is inferential or not. Rico sees that the light is red by seeing a feature other than the redness. He sees that a is F by seeing that a is G (G being the light's brightness). Some sort of inferential step is required to justify the move from seeing that a is G to seeing that a is F. This is not the same for Sunny, who primarily sees that a is F by seeing a's Fness – by seeing the redness itself. As such, only Sunny's knowledge is non-inferential.

So this indirect perceptual account does not always accommodate the perceptual intuition I motivate above which is that sometimes the emotion itself is manifest. The indirect account tells us we can know of another's emotional state without seeing that state itself, rather it could involve seeing some other part of some person and inferring that they are sad. There may be successful ways to formulate this, but it will not be my focus. My focus will be on a direct perceptual account that says we know that Sammy is sad by seeing his sadness itself.

2. Emotions as having component parts

In the last section I described how my focus is refined in terms of thinking about how it could be that we perceive others' mental states directly. A further refinement of my focus is in the sorts of mental states I will be discussing. My focus will be just on emotions. I will be asking how we can perceive that my friend Sammy is, say, sad or angry. Again, I am not asking whether other people have or experience emotions. Rather, my question will be, given that other people experience particular emotions, how can I perceive these?

In order to proceed in answering this question, I need to be clear on what I take emotions to be. There are two reasons it is important to be clear on this. Firstly, highlighting specific features of emotions will make it clear how far we can or cannot generalise the account out to other mental states. Should our account tell us that we are able to perceive emotions because of some feature F that they have, then this may suggest that we can perceive other mental states that possess feature F in the same way. However, should feature F be special to emotions, such a generalisation will not be available.

Secondly, an answer to the question of what an emotion consists in may inform our inquiry into how we can perceive them in the first place. For example, let's look at an account of what emotions consists in that renders a perceptual account more puzzling. Take Solomon's cognitivist account:

“Human emotions are suffused with evaluation of the circumstances in which one takes oneself to be and of the characteristics one attributes to the substantive object of one's emotional response. For as we have emphasized, our emotional responses manifest what we care about (positively and negatively) and constitute our modes of engagement with our fellow human beings.”¹⁶

Solomon gives what one might call a 'pure' cognitivist account of what an emotion is. This means that it's an account in which emotions are entirely constituted out of cognitive processes like judgments, and not any behaviour or physical states. Solomon says that emotions are primarily judgments, but he has a way of distinguishing them from other judgements that we don't commonly take to be emotions.¹⁷ For example, my determining that four apples is more than three apples is a judgement, but it is not an emotion. The difference, according to Solomon, is to do with how much something matters to us with regards to our personal desires and goals. A judgment we do not care about in relation to these things will not constitute an emotion, for emotions are not dispassionate.¹⁸

Leaving aside an analysis of the success of a cognitivist account like this one, it seems to be a less obvious starting point in our discussion given the overall inquiry is into the perceptibility of emotions. One significant virtue of focusing on emotions is that they intuitively lend themselves to a discussion of how we visually perceive them, more so than discussing other mental states like my thinking that maths is a tricky subject. Pickard thinks that the 'publicity' of emotions renders them our best chance in solving the problem of other minds:

“What you can experience of others is what you can observe: their bodies and behaviour. So if the problem is to be solved in this direct, empiricist way, then the demand for a public manifestation of the mind is a demand that behaviour be a part of the mind. Our concept of mind must in some sense encompass the behaviour which we observe.”¹⁹

Remember Pickard put the epistemological problem of other minds as the problem of how we can ever know about another's mind since we can only know things from our own experience of them or observation of them. If another's mind is at least partly constituted by something observable, then the problem seems harder to generate. So, perhaps it is best to start by looking at an account of emotions that more closely associates them with behavioural/observable things.

¹⁶ Solomon (1776, 58)

¹⁷ Nash (1989, 483)

¹⁸ What about un-selfish emotions? It feels like we can be empathetically sad on behalf of another's loss – but this seems to have little to do, sometimes, with our own goals or desires.

¹⁹ Pickard (2003, 89)

2.1. *Emotions as the feeling of bodily change*

William James takes emotions *just to be* the feeling of bodily changes. He starts by noticing the following:

“If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no ‘mind-stuff’ out of which the emotion can be constituted.”²⁰

Emotions are thereby exhausted by these feelings of bodily change. Certain ‘exciting’ events trigger a bodily response and cause certain mechanisms in the body to spring into action. Our awareness of these constitutes emotional experience. The claim James is making is one of necessity: if you take away the feeling of say, tension in the muscles and a heated face, there is no emotion of anger left.

Prinz highlights the importance of an account like this in its attempt to explain the close connection between bodily changes and emotion. He explains how bodily changes can themselves induce emotions, and as such are sufficient for emotional experience:

“Mere change in facial musculature seems sufficient for an emotional response, even when we do not realize we are making emotional expressions. There is anatomical evidence that emotions can be elicited via pathways from early visual structures, such as the pulnivar and superior colliculous, to the amygdala, which instructs other structures to perturb the body (Ledouz 1996; Morris, Öhman, and Dolan 1999). These pathways trigger an emotional bodily response without the mediation of any kind of judgment.”²¹

Ekman’s studies on the close connection between certain facial expressions and certain emotions supports this. In arguing for a high level of universality in the connection between bodily and facial expressions and emotions, Ekman found that subjects who voluntarily made certain ‘universal’ facial expressions elicited the physiological effects of the associated emotion and in some cases the subjective feeling of that emotion.²² Telling a subject to smile, for example, can often elicit the feeling of happiness.

So, as Prinz notes, we have some observations that tell towards the idea that bodily changes are necessary for emotions. This is the first observation from James that if we subtract bodily changes, there is no emotion left. And we also have observations that tell towards the idea

²⁰ James (1884, 193)

²¹ Prinz (2004, 46)

²² Ekman (1993, 384)

that bodily changes are sufficient for emotions – the observations that facial movements alone can elicit an emotional response.

However, I think that even if these things tell towards a theory that connects bodily changes and emotions, they do not go so far as to prove James' account. That bodily changes are both necessary and sufficient for emotions does not tell us what emotions *are*. In fact, it leaves open the possibility that emotions are themselves just the bodily changes. It is something distinct and further to say, as James does, that they are the *feelings* of such bodily change. A further story is required on behalf of James for why this emphasis on feelings as opposed to bodily changes themselves is emphasised.

Leaving this aside, there are other problems on the table. I consider three main objections to James' account, as well as some considerations in response from both Prinz and Pickard.

Firstly, Sias and Bar-On have recently argued that the main problem with James' view is that it has no room to accommodate the different *objects* of emotions, and hence cannot accommodate the intentionality of emotions.²³ We do not just experience anger, we experience anger directed at something. Prinz distinguishes two kinds of object that emotions can have:

“Indeed, emotions are intentional in two senses. They have formal and particular objects. All fears concern dangers (the formal object), and each particular episode of fear concerns a particular danger, such as an assailant, a great height, a loud noise, a dental visit, an upcoming exam, and so on (particular objects).”²⁴

The Jamesian idea that emotions are just feelings of bodily changes does not seem to involve reference to either formal or particular objects in this sense. There is a sense in which the feelings are *about* something, in that they are about the body being a certain way. However, they are not about or do not make reference to any general or particular concerns of the individual.

Pickard considers how we may account for emotional intentionality. She suggests that we can think about the sort of intentionality involved in emotional experience in a different way to the sort of intentionality involved in other cognitive states.²⁵ First, she notices that when it comes to emotions, they sometimes feel intentional and they sometimes do not. It is of course the case that sometimes we are angry at a particular person for some particular wrong. But on other occasions, our emotions can seem more like moods. We can feel sad for no particular reason at all. Sometimes we may even be confused by our own emotion and be unaware of any object of it. Pickard describes this as our emotions being ‘open’ – they can be intentional or not.

So, what makes the difference between the ones that seem to have objects, and the ones that do not? She suggests the following:

²³ Sias & Bar-On (2016, 57)

²⁴ Prinz (2004, 54)

²⁵ Pickard (2003, 96)

“Nonetheless, this is a simple way to account for emotional intentionality: what makes your emotion intentional is that you understand the reason why you are in such a state, and so an emotion will not be intentional if you utterly lack understanding of the reason why you are in such a state.”²⁶

The idea is that intentionality is not to do with what did or did not in fact cause your anger. Rather, it is to do with what you take the cause of your anger to be. If you take nothing to be the cause, it is unintentional.

I think this mischaracterises what goes on in many cases of emotional experience. Say you start a new job and it’s wearing you down and making you consistently sad. But you don’t want to admit this to yourself because the pay is great and you think it’s a job you really should be enjoying. So, you trick yourself into thinking it is something in your personal life that is getting you down. It seems to me that, given this information, we would still want to say that you are sad about your job. The fact that you delude yourself into thinking otherwise seems irrelevant.

This does not necessarily show Pickard’s proposal to be wrong, for the proposal suggests that intentionality works differently when it comes to the emotions. As such, perhaps the intuitive response that the sadness in this case is about your job rides on the assumption that intentionality is to do with what the mental state is actually about and not just our idea of what it’s about. And this is exactly what the new understanding of emotional intentionality is questioning. But then we can ask that, given how our emotional experience seems to us, what is there to recommend a new way of understanding the intentionality?

Pickard herself notes a similar sort of phenomenological worry with the proposal. The proposal above tells us that an emotion is unintentional, lacking an object, when the subject has no understanding of why they feel as they do. But this goes against the fact that we have all sorts of emotions in response to certain things, but where we also lack understanding of why we feel that way. She uses the example of an innate fear of snakes that has nothing to do with our understanding of why the snakes in fact frighten us. We may have never seen a snake, and we may not even be aware of our fear of one – and yet it is still a fear *of* snakes. So again, the phenomenology of emotional experience seems to pull away from this notion that *our own understanding* determines the character of such experience.

A second objection to James’s theory comes from Prinz and is to do with the categorisation of the different emotions and our ability to distinguish between them. Prinz points out that emotions may resist treatment as just feelings of bodily changes because there are not enough distinct bodily changes to match the number of different emotions. Prinz cites Ekman and Friesen’s work in psychology that found there to be six basic emotions each with specific bodily changes/expressions distinctive of those emotions. But what about all the other emotions we experience that don’t fall within this list like guilt, resentment and amusement? Prinz asks:

²⁶ Ibid

“Will indignation really have a different bodily expression than anger? Will *schadenfreude* stand out from joy? Will dread have bodily changes not found in fear or grief? If emotions were nothing but [feelings] of the body, and there are only a few bodily patterns associated with emotions, then there would only be a few emotions.”²⁷

Ekman’s response here would be, for the most part, yes – these different emotions like fear and grief will have different bodily expressions. There are similarities between certain facial expressions and certain emotions, and these are categorised by Ekman as coming under the same ‘emotion family’. For example, there are around 60 different observed ‘anger expressions’ which all have ‘*related but visually different expressions*’.²⁸ Often times, the different emotions residing under one family are distinguished by differences in strength. Rage, for example, is stronger than resentment.

Moreover, Ekman describes how varied bodily expressions may be – that they extend far from the idea that there are only a few bodily patterns to go around:

“It is the morphology, the momentary configuration produced by the contraction of a particular set of facial muscles, that provides the information about whether it is anger, fear, disgust, sadness, surprise, or enjoyment. The dynamics of the movement also contains additional information about the strength of the emotion and whether it is genuine, although that information is also signalled morphologically.”²⁹

Given that different members of the emotion family can be distinguished by their strength, and strength can be distinguished in terms of the dynamics of muscle movement in expression, then these different emotions can seemingly be distinguished by their expressions.

I think the deeper puzzle is that even if there happen to be slight differences in the muscular movements between two different but similar emotions, we can still ask if it is plausible that they can be differentiated on this basis. This connects to a related issue that Prinz raises, not to do with how we differentiate between the different emotions, but rather how we differentiate emotions from non-emotions. Prinz asks why some bodily changes and not others count as constituting emotional experience. For example, we do not count the shivers caused by cold weather as an emotional experience.³⁰

One could just reply on behalf of James here by saying that something like shivers are less plausibly *feelings* of bodily change as opposed to just bodily change itself. Pickard has the following understanding of a feeling of bodily change as associated with emotions, which may help us mark their difference to things like shivers:

²⁷ Prinz (2004, 53). Prinz’s argument here conflates bodily changes with feelings of bodily changes. Just because there may not be enough distinct bodily changes to match the number of distinct emotions, this does not entail that there are not enough *feelings* of bodily changes to match the number of distinct emotions. For the sake of running through the argument, I put this worry aside and we can assume that the number of feelings of bodily change correspond to the number of bodily changes.

²⁸ Ekman (1993, 386)

²⁹ Ibid (390)

³⁰ Prinz (2004, 52)

“Once we recognise that we have a form of awareness of our whole bodies, we can see how bodily feeling can be more than the feeling of particular, located sensations, however prominent these may be. On the one hand, there may be an overall feeling to the body due to a change in hormone balance or the nervous system: of energy, lethargy, anxiety, etc. Such feelings seem to encompass the body: to fill or suffuse it, as opposed to being located at discrete places within it.”³¹

Pickard distinguishes between two ways of understanding feelings of bodily change. We could understand them in terms of localised sensations, or we could understand them in terms of the way our body feels as a whole. She draws on Martin’s idea that we have a form of awareness of our whole bodies as bounded within some space.³² We are aware of ourselves from the inside, as existing within some larger space – of which our own bodies take up room. So, perhaps it is this sort of awareness of our bodies as a whole that is operative in emotional experiences, and this is how we can distinguish emotional experiences from mere localized changes like shivers.

However, Prinz thinks that the same problem applies even when we bracket localised bodily changes. That is, within the feelings of bodily change associated with how our whole body feels, there are still many cases of whole body change that don’t involve emotional experience. Merely distinguishing between localised feelings of bodily change and, as he calls them, ‘global’ feelings of bodily change will not solve the problem because of the following kinds of examples: arousal from exercise, fatigue, starvation. We would not tend to classify these as emotions, and yet they seem to encompass the body in just the way Pickard describes.

So, we still seem to face a problem of being able to distinguish emotions from non-emotions on the Jamesian formula, as well as distinguishing between the different emotions. I am less worried about this than the following concern I wish to raise, given my overall aim. The previous objection does not tell us James is wrong that emotions are just feelings of bodily change. Rather, the objection tells us that in a sense James just hasn’t told us enough should we want to have some sort of answer about how to be able to pick out what exactly is special about emotions, and what is special about particular emotions. As Prinz says, James has not explained the ‘essence’ of emotion.

However, my task is to account for how it is we can know about other’s emotions through perceptual means. In particular, my focus is on the sorts of cases where we just see an emotion that we recognise to be what it is pretty easily. I walk into a room and can quickly tell my crying friend is sad. Therefore, appealing to a theory of emotion that cannot distinguish between niche examples of emotions does not seem to be too relevant an issue for my purposes.

³¹ Pickard (2003, 95). It should be noted that Pickard is not herself arguing that this understanding of whole-body feelings of bodily change is what distinguishes emotions from non-emotions. In fact, she is not directly engaging with this question at all. Rather, she uses Martin’s idea of how our bodies are spatially oriented to try and account for the intentionality of emotions – that we are physically and spatially directed to and engaged with particular objects. Her account is being put to different use here.

³² See Martin (1993)

What is a relevant issue for me is perception. If we want to accommodate the intuition that we can literally perceive the emotions of others, then we should be looking into a conception of emotions that makes them, somehow, perceptible. Although James' emphasis on bodily changes initially seemed to accommodate the perceptual intuition, the emphasis on the *feeling* of bodily changes does not. We have the tools to think about how it is we can perceive behaviour and bodily changes. Perceiving someone shrugging their shoulders is like perceiving a car going past – we are perceiving some object out in the world. However, to account for the perception of emotions on the Jamesian characterisation would require us to discuss how we can perceive feelings. An understanding of how to approach this discussion is not so readily available.

Sias and Bar-On describe the problem in terms of an 'inner-outer' divide. Theories like James's associate emotions entirely with something inner. If we want to take seriously the intuition that we can literally perceive others' emotions, we need an understanding of emotions where they are at least partly constituted by something outer – something visible:

"It is a curious fact about emotions – one that is sometimes thought to distinguish them from other states – that they are often (though certainly not always) simultaneously both private and public affairs."³³

"This inner/outer (or private/public) duality, can be adequately captured, we think, by taking seriously the idea that the embodied aspects of emotions – the bodily changes – constitute part of their very nature."³⁴

This echoes what Pickard says above when she describes how our concept of mind must at least partly encompass the behaviour that we observe – that behaviour is part of the mind. To accommodate the perceptibility of emotions, we need a theory of emotions that is less restrictive than James' account – one that leaves room for there to be *both* behaviour *and* something inner that constitute the mind. In the following section I briefly sketch out a few attempts to give a theory of emotions that I think, rightly, involves both inner and outer (perceptible and non-perceptible) parts.

2.2. *A componential approach*

The view I favour, given the perceptibility requirement and the assessment of a more restrictive view like James's, is a componential approach to emotions – the idea that they are constituted by different component parts. However, there are various ways to cash out a componential type view – since merely saying that emotions have component parts leaves open what these parts are.

³³ Sias and Bar-On (2016, 64)

³⁴ Ibid

Sias and Bar-On call views that talk about both the inner and outer parts of emotions 'hybrid views'. They state that the requirement of hybrid views to accommodate the perceptibility of emotions is that they '*must include among the constitutive parts of an emotion the very bodily changes that a subject feels in an emotional state – and not, or not merely, the feeling of those bodily changes*'.³⁵ They cite Damasio and Goldie as proponents of a componential view like this.

Damasio takes emotions to involve, unlike James, the bodily changes themselves. He describes the series of processes or components parts that are involved in an emotional experience as follows:

"I see the essence of emotion as the collection of changes in body state that are induced in myriad organs by nerve cell terminals, under the control of a dedicated brain system, which is responding to the content of thoughts relative to a particular entity or event. Many of the changes in body state – those in skin color, body posture, and facial expression, for instance – are actually perceptible to an external observer. (Indeed the etymology of the word nicely suggests an external direction, from the body: emotion signifies literally "movement out.") Other changes in body state are perceptible only to the owner of the body in which they take place."³⁶

This quotation clearly highlights the way in which Damasio captures the divide between inner and outer parts of an emotion, by talking about perceptible bodily changes as well as changes to the body that outward observers cannot see, such as one's heart beating faster or neural and chemical changes – some of which may not only be imperceptible to others, but unfelt by oneself. So, Damasio's account accommodates the perceptibility intuition, and gives us a clearly componential approach.

Another feature of the quoted passage is that it highlights a further part of the emotion process – the idea that part of the emotion is the response to a particular evaluation of an event or particular thoughts about that event (or entity). Damasio makes much of this idea about what gives rise to these bodily changes, and so it is unclear why Sias and Bar-On take the problem with Damasio's view to be that it has no room for the intentionality of emotions – emotions having objects/being directed towards something. Perhaps if the constituent parts of Damasio's emotions were just bodily changes and the feelings of these then we would have this issue, but he clearly involves more than just this in his discussion:

"The process does not stop with the bodily changes that define an emotion, however. The cycle continues, certainly in humans, and its next step is the feeling of the emotion in connection to the object that excited it, the realization of the nexus between object and emotional bodily state."³⁷

³⁵ Ibid (65)

³⁶ Damasio (1994, 139)

³⁷ Ibid (132)

Goldie's account similarly involves, in emotions, both inner and outer components. He describes emotions as complexes involving different elements. The main ones involved are: episodes of emotional experience (perceptions, thoughts, feelings), bodily changes, and various dispositions such as dispositions to have further thoughts and feelings or behave in certain ways.³⁸ In addition, emotions are episodic and dynamic - meaning that these different elements (or components) can come and go. Some emotions may involve bodily changes, for example, whilst others do not.

A view similar in structure to this componential view, but characterising what the components are differently, is Scherer's component process definition of emotions. Scherer takes emotions to be episodes '*of interrelated synchronized changes in the states of all or most of the five organismic subsystems in response to the evaluation of an external or internal stimulus event as relevant to major concerns of the organism*'.³⁹ He describes the five main components involved in this emotional episode to be as follows: the cognitive component (some appraisal of an eliciting event relevant to the concerns of the subject of the emotional experience), the neurophysiological component (bodily symptoms/bodily changes), the motivational component (certain action tendencies), the motor expression component (facial and vocal expressions), and the subjective feeling component (the emotional experience).⁴⁰ Again, though this account is different in exactly how the components are spelled out, it includes components that are both perceptible and non-perceptible (inner and outer).⁴¹

Since I do not have space to critically assess the many different versions of componential approach, I leave my preferred account of emotions somewhat general. I want to say that I understand emotions to be split into component parts, some of which may be outwardly observable, and some of which are more commonly taken as non-perceptible – such as thoughts and feelings. I don't want to specify within this exactly how many or what the different components are, since it would make my account vulnerable to new developments in cognitive science.

A further reason not to specify the different parts of emotions too much is that different emotions may have different parts to one another. As we have seen with Ekman's different 'emotion families', anger type emotions have a different structure and different expressions to sadness type emotions, thus making them distinguishable to us. But more than this, the difference may not be between different kinds of, say, expression, but in one emotion finding expression and another not. Think of an enduring emotion like distrust for one's rival. We think of an emotion like this as somewhat living below the surface, and as such, there is no obvious expressive element.

Not to mention, Ekman's natural kinds account of emotions that tells us there are a set number of basic emotions is far from being generally accepted. Many other theories are less rigid

³⁸ Goldie (2000, 12)

³⁹ Scherer (2005, 695)

⁴⁰ Ibid (698)

⁴¹ For an additional componential approach, see Sias' own articulation of a hybrid theory in Sias and Bar-On (2016)

when it comes to defining and categorising emotions. For example, idiographic hypotheses about emotions describe how each individual has a characteristic pattern of emotional responses that are potentially unique to them. One person has a distinctive way that they experience anger, which does not necessarily need to share anything with the way their friend experiences anger.⁴² This is a weaker view than a natural kinds view of emotions, since not only is there no pan-cultural pattern for how people experiences emotions, but no predictable pattern between those within the same culture. James Russell denies the existence of emotional categories altogether. He says the following:

“Episodes described as emotional consist of changes in various component processes, which are not themselves emotions. No one component is necessary or sufficient to warrant describing the episode as emotional. No clear boundary separates emotional from non-emotional episodes of anger from non-anger episodes.”⁴³

Russell maintains that we should abandon the folk notions of emotions as scientific concepts, and instead see them as categories we impose to try and make sense of certain episodes of experience. As such, these terms we have created to name certain of these episodes do not refer to any natural kinds, contrary to what Ekman suggests.

So, this shows us firstly that given the range in potential categorisation of emotions, it is sensible not to specify a particular list of the parts of each emotion. Secondly, it also shows that in settling on a conception of emotions as componential is still to settle on something – it still distinguishes what I take emotions to be from other options. For example, unlike Russell, the kind of componential approach I am looking at does not view emotional categories as folk concepts. I take it that there are distinguishable emotions like anger and sadness, and that each has some array of components bridging both the inner and outer. In the next section I start thinking about how we might model the perception of emotions in light of these considerations.

3. A part-whole perceptual account: Green’s model

I start my discussion into *how* we may perceive the emotions of others by looking at Green’s part-whole account of seeing emotions. Before looking at the details of his account, I briefly explain

⁴² Green (2016, 34)

⁴³ Russell (2016, 168)

why I take part-whole perception to be a natural starting point. Part-whole perception being the idea that one perceives object A by perceiving some part of A.

We have seen in the previous section that I favour an approach to emotions that distinguishes different components or parts of the emotion. This alone is not enough to motivate the idea that we perceive emotions by perceiving their parts. There are plenty of things that can be conceived as coming in parts that do not encourage analysis by way of part-whole perception. The square drawn in front of me has at least four distinct parts I can recognise when I look at it – its four sides. But it doesn't seem right for me to say that I see the square by seeing its left side. The whole square is present in front of me on the paper and I see it by seeing *it*, not some part of it.

However, say my friend comes and puts a ruler over the piece of paper and then asks me if I can still see the square. I look and see that all but the left side are covered by the ruler, and I take it I can still say that I do see the square by seeing its left side. In this instance, it seems natural for me to say I see the square by seeing part of it. What's different in this case to the previous case is that some of the parts of the object being perceived are hidden from view. So, it's not just that something has parts that suggests we may see it by part-whole perception, but in addition it's that that thing has some parts hidden from view.

Emotions, as I take them, are more similar in structure to the half-hidden square. As we have seen, componential accounts of emotions, or hybrid views, describe both the visible features of emotions (bodily expressions, behaviours) and features that are less obviously visually available to us (subjective feelings, cognitive processes).

I do not want to claim that this bridging of visible and non-visible parts is sufficient to establish that if we see emotions we see them by part-whole perception. But I do think that our analysis of what emotions are establishes two features of emotions that are necessary for something to be seen by part-whole perception, and so it is worthwhile to look at a prominent recent account in the literature that builds on this idea.

Green gives an account of how we directly know the emotions of others in terms of part-whole perception – that is, we see another's, say, sadness by seeing part of that sadness. Green claims that the way in which we know another to be sad is structurally similar to the way in which I know there is an apple in front of me. When I see an apple, I do not clap eyes on the back or middle parts of it. What is present to me is just the facing surface of the apple, but as long as 'normal ecological conditions' hold, we can be said to infer the existence of the apple from seeing its surface.⁴⁴

The normal ecological conditions stipulation just ensures that this takes place in a world where apples look like apples. And the reference to inference that Green has in mind here is distinct from the sort of inference involved in standard inferential accounts. Green likens it to a 'filling in' phenomenon, as opposed to the transition from one proposition to another as with the usual

⁴⁴ Green (2010, 49)

understanding of inference. This filling in phenomenon is supposed to be unconscious and spatial. He cites the Kanisza Triangle optical illusion as an example. The illusion consists of a number of disks and lines in such a position that we perceive two triangles in the image, even though these triangles are not actually present. Our perception that there are triangles is immediate and seems to involve no cognitive process of moving from premise to conclusion. This, Green contends, is the kind of immediate inferential step that occurs when we perceive another's sadness by perceiving a part of their sadness. For my purposes, I leave aside an assessment of whether this kind of inference is properly perceptual. As we will see, my use of Green's account is for the starting point of my own account, which makes no reference to any sort of inference.

Additionally, Green relies on a particular picture of the nature of emotions that fits with the componential sort of approach I favour. He contends that the basic emotions like anger and sadness are natural kinds comprised of an interrelated set of phenomena.⁴⁵ Thus, we can conceive of emotions as coming in parts. According to Green these include: psychological responses, cognitive processes, subjective feelings, behavioural dispositions and certain facial expressions.⁴⁶

In combining this picture of emotions with a part-whole model of perception, Green contends that we see another is sad by seeing the part of their sadness that's visually available to us; by seeing their facial expression. So, I know that Sammy is sad by seeing his expression E which is part of his mental state of sadness M, and I thereby see M.

In the next Chapter I consider a sceptical challenge to a view like this, and in defending it I will refine the account and give more detail and thus depart from Green's initial characterisation. But I do follow Green in using this key notion as a starting point for an answer to the question of how we can know about others' emotions: we perceive their expressions.

⁴⁵ Ibid (50)

⁴⁶ Ibid. In addition, see Green (2007) for a more detailed account of his conception of emotions.

Chapter 2

Guarantees and Intrinsicness

I have introduced the question of how it is that we can gain perceptual knowledge of others' emotions, and suggested the outline of the account I defend: that we can, sometimes, perceive others' emotions by perceiving the visible part of those emotions, i.e. their expressions. In this Chapter I further refine this view by motivating two conditions:

1. That expressions guarantee the presence of emotions
2. That the expression is an intrinsic feature of the emotion

The first condition is motivated by a sceptical challenge to the account. In order to combat certain pretence and acting objections, I refine what I mean by expressions, and ensure that when we perceive an expression in my sense, we are in a position to know the emotion is present.

This condition paves the way for how we can attain knowledge of another's emotion, but it does not ensure we have *perceptual* knowledge of that emotion. The second condition aims to meet this insufficiency.

What is shared with Green's account as it was outlined in the previous Chapter is the starting point that I know that my friend is sad by perceiving their sadness, and I perceive their sadness by perceiving some expression of it. In introducing the two conditions above I depart from Green and move beyond this shared starting point.

1. Why we need a guarantee

1.1. *Acting and pretence*

A sceptical challenge to address can be found in certain pretence or acting objections. The objections aim to show that we cannot know, on the basis of perceiving expressions alone, the emotional state another is in. I will run through a couple of examples of these acting objections and where they come in the literature, and then outline what I take the general sceptical challenge to be. Having done this, in the next section I draw similarities between this sceptical worry and the

sceptical worry that motivates an epistemological disjunctivist response. I then aim to show a similar response is on offer with regards to these acting objections.

At the end of Chapter 1 I outlined Green's part-whole perception model of how we know that another is angry. Imagine my friend Fran is very angry, and a component of her anger is a very red scrunched up face. Green would say that I can know that Fran is angry by seeing her anger. In particular, I see her anger by seeing this part of it – the red scrunched up face.

Green calls the parts that we see emotions by the 'characteristic components' of the emotions. He explains the notion as follows:

“Let a be an object, event, or process that is perceptible. Then we may say that relative to an organism O and ecological situation E, a characteristic component of a is a part of a that, when perceived in E without any other part of a being perceived, enables O to perceive a.”⁴⁷

So, say I am organism O, and in the ecological situation I'm in, i.e. this world where apples look like apples, Green says that the facing surface of an apple is a characteristic component of the apple. As such I can see the apple by just seeing its facing surface. So, too, with facial signatures. Fran's red scrunched up face is a static facial signature that acts as a characteristic component of her anger.

Stout objects to Green's account on the basis that it is vulnerable to cases of pretence. I outline Stout's worry and thus introduce the first sceptical pretence case. However, I will object to Stout's account in turn by showing it to be vulnerable to another kind of pretence case – an acting case.

Stout thinks Green is wrong on the basis of what counts as a characteristic component. Stout invokes a product-process distinction in order to state that Green wrongly includes *products* as the sorts of things we can see others' mental states by, whereas in fact only seeing *processes* will enable such perception:

“Starting from the assumption that one can literally perceive someone's anger in their face, I argue that this would not be possible if what is perceived is a static facial signature of their anger. There is a product-process distinction in talk of facial expression, and I argue that one can see anger in someone's facial expression only if this is understood to be a process rather than a product.”⁴⁸

Stout thinks that in order to perceive another's emotion, we need to perceive something that 'essentially involves' that emotion. Only if a facial expression is understood as a process rather than a product, can we be in a position to perceive anger on its basis.

This is because parts that are just like products can be independent existences from wholes, according to Stout. A part does not essentially involve a thing of which it is part. Green is

⁴⁷ Green (2007, 87)

⁴⁸ Stout (2010, 29)

therefore wrong about these characteristic components, since something like the facing surface of an apple could come apart from an apple – for example, I see the surface of the apple but, as it happens, that is all that’s there as there is no apple to perceive. Let’s put this into a case relevant to the perception of emotions:

Pretence case 1

Fran has decided to fool me into thinking she is very angry about the football score so that I mistakenly think our team has lost. She feigns a scrunched up red face that looks exactly like the face she pulls when she is angry.

According to Stout, Green’s account is vulnerable to a case like this. Fran’s angry face, conceived as an independent product, has been shown here to be present even when no real anger is present. Green’s account would be that we can come to know Fran is angry on the basis of seeing her red scrunched up face. But, in this case, it would not make sense since there is no anger there to be seen or know about.

This is a problem to be addressed. But it is not clear that Stout’s own account does not face the same sort of issue. Stout himself is vulnerable to pretence cases. Let’s run through more closely what Stout means by this product-process distinction. He explains it by contrasting the finished product of a written signature, with the process of writing the signature:

“Someone’s signature is a piece of writing representing their name which is actually written by them. It would not be a signature if the pattern of writing were accidental or forged. A forged signature is not a signature at all. But just by looking at a signature one cannot see that it genuinely is a signature. One may infer that it is from its various features. But it’s being genuinely a signature is not present to the viewer.”⁴⁹

“A witness to a signature is not a witness of the piece of writing existing on the page. The witness must see the signature being produced. So there is a product-process distinction in this talk of signatures. What you witness in witnessing a signature is a process; to avoid ambiguity we could call it a signing. What you look at when you look back at the document is a product of that process. The product counts as a signature in virtue of the process satisfying certain conditions. It is like sunburn in this respect. One can be aware of the product of a signing but not as such. One is just aware of it as a certain pattern of ink. But on the face of it, one can be aware of the signing as a signing. That is what one is aware of when one witnesses a signature.”⁵⁰

On the one hand, there are products which are things like written signatures that appear on the page. Another example is the redness of one’s skin that may or may not have been caused by sunburn. The point is that we could see either of these products, the writing on the page or the red skin, and not see a genuine signature or a sunburn. This is because there is no guarantee that the red skin or the writing is connected to either the genuine writing out of the signature, or exposure

⁴⁹ Ibid (34)

⁵⁰ Ibid (35)

to the sun. The piece of writing could have been a photocopy, and the red skin could be from some alternative irritation.

However, Stout thinks that in seeing someone going through a *process*, we do attain this sort of guarantee. If we see someone going through the process of the signing, then we can be said to see that there is a genuine signature. If we see the process of someone going red in the sun, then we can see the sunburn. Static facial expressions of the kind Green talks about, like smiles, are products and thus vulnerable to cases of pretence. Processes, like seeing the development of anger on someone's face from start to finish, are not vulnerable in this way. Stout thinks that by seeing the process we see through to the actual anger itself, and we get this guarantee between the anger and the expression of it.

I agree with Stout that we should be looking for a guarantee between the expression and the anger itself, and I shall discuss why this is later in this section. However, I disagree that invoking the idea of process rather than products does the job. Talking about a process rather than a product changes the case by saying that we are talking about some temporally extended expression as opposed to a 'static' one as Green discusses. But then we face a similar sort of worry:

Pretence case 2: acting

Sammy cries when he is sad. He goes through an extended process of bowing his head, hunching his shoulders, and tearing up. Normally I come to know Sammy is sad by seeing this process. However, Sammy has recently started attending acting classes. He is keen to try out his new skills, and so pretends to be sad when I next see him. He produces a string of bodily and facial movements that are exactly alike what happens when he is actually sad – thus mimicking his own process of sadness.

So Stout's condition that we perceive processes instead of products is insufficient in avoiding the same sort of pretence case he is worried about in the first place. For I can perceive the process of Sammy's sadness, but be entirely wrong about his having that emotion on that occasion.⁵¹

Now, although Stout's own solution did not do all the work, I think what he is aiming for is right. He is aiming for us to be able to say that we perceive something that guarantees the presence of the emotion. Rather than something like a facial signature that could be present whilst the emotion is not. Stout, however, is vague about why we want such a guarantee, other than pointing to this sort of pretence worry. So why exactly do we want a guarantee, and what exactly is the problem posed by these pretence cases? I look now to Gomes' description of the 'problem of error' to try and give a general form to the sort of sceptical worry raised by these challenges.

⁵¹ Sias and Bar-On have recently made this same point against Stout – that it is not clear to see why processes stand any better chance than Green's expressions, since processes can also be dissimulated from emotions. Sias and Bar-On (2016, 57)

A problem of error kind of scepticism runs as follows. The cases that fall foul of this problem are ones where one judges something to be a certain way on the basis of the way something seems, but it turns out that things weren't as they seem and so one is left with a false belief. For example, I judge Fran to be angry but in fact things aren't as they seem, she is not angry, and so I form a false belief. What Gomes cites as the sceptical challenge here is that the evidence available to me when I judge that Fran is angry is just the same as the evidence available to me when I judge correctly that Fran is angry on another occasion in which she is not fooling me.⁵² The evidence available to me is the same in each case because the cases are phenomenologically indistinguishable – both cases seem the same to me.

Let's call these cases good and bad cases, the good case is the one where I correctly judge Fran to be angry, and the bad case is the case of pretence. Since my evidence is the same in both cases, then it seems what I am warranted in believing is the same in both cases – so the epistemic status of my evidence is the same in both cases. In the bad case, since Fran is only pretending to be angry, my evidence does not warrant me believing that Fran is angry. Since the evidence has the same epistemic status in both cases, the evidence is not enough to give me knowledge that Fran is angry in the case where she *is* angry. So in general, if there is the possibility of error about how something seems, then one cannot know anything on the basis of that alone, even in cases where things are as they seem.

In the following section I outline the similarity between this sceptical challenge regarding acting problems, and the sort of scepticism that motivates a disjunctivist response. I then look to how this sort of response can be applied to our question of others' emotions.

1.2. *A disjunctivist response*

The above kind of sceptical argument is the same in structure to the kind that motivates disjunctivism about perception. For my purposes, I will be sticking to a discussion of McDowell's epistemological disjunctivism, since my overall concern is to do with how we gain perceptual *knowledge* of other's emotions. For example, how I *know that* Sammy is sad on the basis of perception. McDowell puts the problem to which he aims to respond as follows:

“Consider a pair of cases, in both of which someone is competent in the use of some claim [possesses an experientially acquired defeasible reason for the claim], but in only one of which the claim is true. [The] story is that the scope of experience is the same in each case; the fact itself is outside the reach of experience. And experience is the only mode of cognition – the only mode of acquisition of epistemic standing – that is operative...How can a difference in respect of something conceived as cognitively

⁵² Gomes (forthcoming b, 2)

inaccessible to both subjects, as far as the relevant mode of cognition goes, make it the case that one of them knows how things are in the inaccessible region while another does not – rather than leaving them both, strictly speaking, ignorant on the matter?”⁵³

Let’s run through the problem with an example of a case of illusion. Say that the pair of cases is one good case where I see a cinnamon bun in front of me on the counter and there actually is a cinnamon bun in front of me, and one bad case where I see the same thing the next day but it’s a well-designed fake cinnamon bun, to be merely used as a display (here, I am acting as the two different subjects McDowell speaks of). Given that, as McDowell says, what I perceptually *experience* in each case determines my epistemic standing (i.e. determines whether or not I have knowledge in each case), and given that it seems I experience the same thing in each case, it should be admitted that my epistemic standing is the same in each case. But since in the case of there being no cinnamon bun I do not have knowledge of a cinnamon bun being there, then it should stand that I do not have knowledge of a cinnamon bun being present in the good case either.

McDowell’s question at the end of the quotation is to push the problem that on this analysis of how things are in the good and bad case, we cannot appeal to something outside the scope of either subject’s experience (the fact that one bun exists and another is fake) in order to explain how it might be that there is knowledge in one case and not the other. The evidence for the subject (the way things look) is the same in both cases. As such, we are left in a state of having to say that I am incapable of ever having knowledge of a cinnamon bun in front of me, given the possibility of an illusory fake bun being present instead. This mirrors the form of the problem of error scepticism discussed above. I repeat its general form: if there is the possibility of error about how something seems, then one cannot know anything on the basis of that alone, even in cases where things are as they seem.

So what is McDowell’s disjunctivist response to this sort of scepticism? McDowell denies the premise that what’s available to the subject’s experience is the same in each case.⁵⁴ What I experience in the good case is different to what I experience in the bad case, since in the good case my evidence that there is a cinnamon bun there does not fall short of the fact itself that there is a cinnamon bun there. The fact that the cinnamon bun is there is made manifest. McDowell thinks that this contributes to my epistemic standing on the matter, since in the good case unlike the bad case, the evidence is good enough for me to know there is a cinnamon bun there. For McDowell, when faced with these two cases, it is *either* that one knows there is a cinnamon bun there, *or* it merely looks like there is a cinnamon bun there.

In the bad case, we see a mere appearance, but in the good case, we need not accept that what we experience is also just a mere appearance. Rather, what we see is a matter of the fact itself being made manifest. What it is for a fact to be made manifest is as follows: “*the idea of a fact being*

⁵³ McDowell (1982, 373-374)

⁵⁴ Byrne & Logue (2008, 67)

disclosed to experience is in itself purely negative: a rejection of the thesis that what is accessible to experience falls short of the fact in the sense I explained, namely that of being consistent with there being no such fact."⁵⁵ The idea is that we should reject the thesis that there is a common experiential basis between the good and bad case. If we saw the same thing in each case, then given that in the bad case there is no fact of the bun being present, then what we see in the good case is consistent with there being no bun. Since this latter claim is not the case, and since in the good case we see the fact itself made manifest, what we perceptually experience in either case is different.

We now have the tools to see how McDowell's analysis can be of use in response to the acting objections raised above. This is made clearer given that McDowell himself presents the argument in terms of the problem of other minds. He sees the problem as an example of the general sceptical worry we've been discussing; a problem of error. The problem in this context is that we cannot know that someone is happy by seeing their smile since what we perceive is the same in a case where they are smiling in pretence. McDowell objects to this picture on the basis that it is incoherent to suggest that "*knowing that someone else is in some 'inner' state can be constituted by being in a position in which, for all one knows, the person may not be in that 'inner' state.*"⁵⁶

Rather, in the case where Fran smiles when happy, my knowledge that she is happy is not constituted by the same thing as that which constitutes my experience in the case where she is merely pretending to be happy. In the good case, I am in a position where my evidence does not fall short of her being happy, unlike in the bad case. My epistemic position in either case is different. Similarly, when Sammy goes through the motions of acting sadly to try and trick me, the evidence I have *does* fall short of the emotion being present, and so I am not in the same epistemic position as I am when I see him truly going through a sad episode.

So, having made clear the connection between McDowell and the problems of pretence, I think Stout's appeal to McDowell is a good one. However, the guarantee requirement should be asserted both for cases of static facial expressions, and temporally extended expressive processes. In either case, there is the possibility of pretence, and so in either case we need to appeal to how the veridical case involves us perceiving something different than what we perceive in the deceptive case. Stout's analysis of processes did not fully explain this difference. In the next section I suggest we should understand expressions to precisely be things that do not fall short of emotions themselves, and as such providing the guarantee we require between expressions and emotions that Stout was looking for with the appeal to processes. Unlike processes, these expressions can be either static or extended facial movements, so long as they make manifest the emotion itself.

1.3. *Expressions as factive*

⁵⁵ McDowell (1982, 472)

⁵⁶ Ibid (457)

It has been shown how we can answer sceptical worries regarding cases of pretence or acting by appealing to McDowell. In particular, that we can say that in the good case where I see that Sammy is sad by seeing his crying face, I am seeing something that does not fall short of the sadness itself. This is how we can make sense of saying, along with Stout, we want a guarantee between what we see and the emotion, in order to gain knowledge of the emotion by perception.

In this section I contend that we can maintain on this basis the stance that we know about emotions by perceiving their expressions, *so long as we take expressions to be those things that do not fall short of the emotion itself*. By distinguishing a notion of expressions that covers only these cases – only facial shapes and bodily movements that are operative in the good cases where the emotion is made manifest – we can attain the guarantee between expressions and emotions that Stout is after. So if we have two smiles, where one is properly attached to happiness in the aforementioned sense, and the other is not, then only the former shall be called an expression.

Austin's remarks about how we use the term 'expression' lend support to this notion of expressions. He distinguishes our use of 'expression' from our use of 'signs or symptoms' of an emotion:

“Symptoms’ or ‘signs’ of anger tend to mean signs of *rising* or of *suppressed* anger. Once the man has exploded, we talk of something different – of an expression or manifestation or display of anger, of an exhibition of temper, and so forth. A twitch of the eyebrow, pallor, a tremor in the voice, all these may be symptoms of anger: but a violent tirade or a blow in the face are not, they are the acts in which the anger is vented. ‘Symptoms’ of anger are not, at least normally, contrasted with the man’s own inner personal feeling of anger, but rather with the actual display of anger. Normally, at least, where we have only symptoms to go upon, we should say only that we *believe* that the man is angry or getting angry: whereas when he has given himself away we say that we *know*.⁵⁷

Here, Austin is answering the question of whether we know about other’s mental states by seeing symptoms of them. His answer is no since we only ever talk about seeing symptoms of something when that thing is hidden from view. He draws an analogy here between symptoms of anger and the symptoms of a disease, where we are forced into talking only of the symptoms of the disease since the disease itself is hidden under the skin. Symptoms, therefore, are talked of with *“implied contrast with inspection of the item itself”*.⁵⁸

So for Austin, to know about other’s emotions must come about through inspection of the emotion itself. He talks of expressions and manifestations as those things that, unlike symptoms, put the emotion on full display – we are no longer talking about something hidden when we use these words. When the anger erupts, and is itself fully present, we talk of an expression of anger and not merely signs of anger.

⁵⁷ Austin (1979, 107-108)

⁵⁸ Ibid (105)

One slight difference in Austin's remarks and how I want to understand expressions is shown by the particular examples he uses. The contrast I am interested in is between symptoms or signs that do not guarantee the presence of emotion, and expressions that do. But Austin also talks about this aligning with a contrast between things like twitches, and things like a tirade of anger. He thinks twitches are more like symptoms and tirades are more like expressions. I do not want to determine what sorts of things can be expressions. On my account, it is perfectly consistent that a twitch may be an expression of anger – just so long as it guarantees the presence of anger.

Nonetheless, looking at Austin's distinction helps clarify how I want to use the term 'expression', as those things that the perception of which does not fall short of the perception of the emotion. However, I do not wish to deny that there are other uses of the term 'expression' nor other things we call expressions that would not fit within my notion of expression.

For example, work in empirical science done by Ekman and others who follow his analysis assumes a notion of expressions more wide ranging than mine. Ekman understands expressions in a way in which they can exist without emotions.⁵⁹ Expressions are just defined in terms of particular muscle movements in the face. His study is then to see how often these occur in conjunction with particular emotions in order to see how universal such expressions are. But, the starting assumption does not explain one in terms of the other. Certain expressions can be formed voluntarily, for example in our trying to trick another person into thinking we feel a certain way. (Admittedly, though, Ekman thinks this rarely happens – in fact some expressions, like the expression for enjoyment, has such a specific muscle movement (a muscle orbiting the eye) that it is very difficult to truly mimic). This would be at odds with my wanting to mark out only the facial movements found in *good cases* as ones we can call expressions.

Another take on expressions from Findlund removes reference to emotions entirely. His modern evolutionary theory links expressions with their purposes in our social interactions:

“The general idea is that facial movements commonly thought to be expressions of emotion occur as negotiation between individuals. Rather than an emotion, the cause of the facial movement is a behavioural intention (or threat). A smile, for example, is a signal to a specific audience of readiness to interact. A 'sad face' is a signal requesting comfort or aid.”⁶⁰

Expressions, on this account, don't guarantee the presence of emotion, but instead signal something about the expresser's intentions. All facial movements that occur in the context of social engagement count as expressions in this sense. Even facial movements produced when we are alone can count as expressions in this sense, Findlund suggests, because there is an 'implicit audience' involved. When I think of something sad and grimace, it is to be understood in the context of there being an imaginary audience I am playing my expression towards. Findlund would

⁵⁹ Ekman (1993, 390)

⁶⁰ Russell (2016, 161)

have no trouble saying that the actor acting angrily but in no emotional state was producing an expression, this time to an explicit audience.

As said before, I do not wish to argue for my restricted notion of expressions over any other. It seems clear that we call certain things ‘expressions’ that do not involve the manifestation of a really existing emotion. For example, the typical sad, angry, and happy faces we see in a picture book. But I do think that the distinction between these other notions of expressions and the notion of expressions I have discussed can be made. Moreover, there are benefits to making it. Firstly, given that expressions are just understood here as being the manifestation of an emotion, this does not delimit what these manifestations may be. As such, it allows for variation in the way individuals, or difficult cultures, express themselves. If my friend Sasha has an idiosyncratic way of twitching when she is happy, and I am aware of this and recognise it as such, then this notion of expression can allow for this twitch to be an expression of happiness. Secondly, and more importantly for this project, it allows us to maintain the model we started with, that we can know about other’s emotions by perceiving their expressions, without falling foul of the pretence objections previously looked at.

Having justified my taking expressions to be understood in this way, a remaining question is: do these expressions really exist? Are there expressions that act in this way such that they guarantee the presence of emotion, and if so, what explains this at the metaphysical level? I look further into this in what follows.

2. Why we need intrinsicness

I have defended the claim that if we are to know about another’s emotion by perceiving expressions, we require that which we perceive to guarantee the presence of emotion. But it may be left to ask exactly what it is about these expressions that connects them to emotions in this way. It is one thing to define them in terms of the things we perceive in the good case where I accurately perceive that my friend Sammy is sad by seeing his tears, but what is it about the expression in this case that makes it such? Specifically, I will address this residual concern by looking into the *relation* between expressions (in my sense of expression) and emotion. What is it, at the level of the metaphysical relation between expressions and emotions, that goes on in the good case?

We have developed a first condition on our gaining perceptual knowledge of others’ emotions: that expressions guarantee the presence of emotions. Through looking into how

expressions and emotions are related, we can see a second condition emerge: the condition of intrinsicness.

2.1. *Shoemaker's condition on object perception*

The first condition we have come to in establishing how we can have perceptual knowledge of other's emotions is that we perceive expressions that are *factive* – expressions that guarantee the presence of emotion. This means that whenever we see an expression, there must be an emotion present that it is appropriately related to.

Perhaps it is enough to say that there is a causal relation between expressions and emotions; that expressions are the effects of emotions. It would be possible to meet the guarantee condition on this proposal. There are some things that are always the effects of other things. Take the cinnamon bun on the counter in front of me again. The head baker George always puts his signature swirl into the bun's icing – and only George can produce this swirl. This swirl cannot possibly exist unless George creates it. So, every time I perceive a bun with this swirl in front of me, I know it has been baked by George. The presence of the swirl guarantees that George baked it. Likewise, we could say that expressions are only ever caused by certain emotions, and thus in perceiving Sammy's expression of sadness I come to know that he is sad.

However, although this relation between expressions and emotions can give us our guarantee condition and therefore show how we can have knowledge of emotions by perceiving expressions, it does not seem to show us how we can have *perceptual* knowledge of emotions. Remember, the task in this thesis is to understand how we can make sense of a *direct perceptual* account of the knowledge of others' emotions, by way of perceiving those emotions themselves. With the case of George's swirl, we come to know he baked the bun on the basis of the perception of something other than his baking of the bun. In the case of Sammy's sadness, by interpreting expressions as mere effects, we come to know about the emotion on the basis of seeing something else. These seem to be cases of coming to know about something on the basis of perception – but on the basis of the perception of something else. This doesn't seem to conform to the sort of direct perceptual model we are after, where we see George actually baking the bun, or we see the sadness itself. So, to avoid this problem, we need to add more to the account than just the guarantee condition – for we can perceive something that guarantees the presence of the emotion without perceiving the emotion itself.

Gomes makes a similar case about what's needed for paradigmatically perceptual knowledge. He takes standard cases of perceptual knowledge to involve a subjective and objective component. The subjective component is the subject's capacity to recognise things on the basis of how they look. The objective component is that there is a way the thing looks. Perceptual

knowledge consists in the subject's exploiting their capacity to recognise what the thing is on the basis of its look.⁶¹ He then describes the following two cases:

- i. Asha looks a certain way when standing at the window of her office, and standing below the window I exploit my capacity to recognise Asha on the basis of how she looks and come to know she is in her office
- ii. Sadiq always draws his curtains when he is in his office and this looks a certain way, and standing below the window I exploit my capacity to recognise his drawn curtains on the basis of how they look, together with my knowledge that when he draws them he is in his office, and come to know that he is in his office

Gomes argues that only cases like (i) are cases of paradigmatically perceptual knowledge. Both examples consist in knowledge being gained on the basis of how things look, but in (ii) things are different because we are not gaining knowledge of Sadiq based on how *he* looks, but rather based on how something distinct from him looks: specifically, based on how his curtains looked.⁶²

It seems like our case of knowing that George baked the bun is more like the case of Sadiq than of Asha, since we don't see George baking the bun himself. As such, it doesn't seem to conform to a case of paradigmatically *perceptual* knowledge on Gomes' account, even though we still *know* George baked the bun. So, what we can take from this is that positing a relation between expressions and emotions that satisfies the guarantee condition is insufficient in establishing how we can gain perceptual knowledge of others' emotions. Specifically, this is because the guarantee claim enables us to see how we can have the knowledge part, but doesn't secure us the sort of *direct perceptual* knowledge we are after in knowing others are in some particular emotional state by perceiving the emotion itself.

So, what further condition could be added to secure the perceptual element, and what sort of relation would satisfy it?

Shoemaker identifies the following condition on coming to know something directly by perception:

"The perception of objects standardly involves perception of their intrinsic, nonrelational properties. We can perceive relations between things we perceive; but we wouldn't perceive these things at all, and so couldn't perceive relations between them, if they didn't present themselves as having intrinsic, nonrelational properties. To perceive that this book is to the right of that one I must perceive, or at least seem to perceive, intrinsic properties of the two books, e.g., their colors and shapes."⁶³

⁶¹ Gomes (forthcoming a, 18)

⁶² Ibid (19)

⁶³ Shoemaker (1994, 253)

Shoemaker states to say you know something by perception can, in some circumstances, mean merely that you perceive that something is the case. I may perceive that the angles within a square add up to 360°. But if we want to talk about paradigmatic cases of having perceptual knowledge we should look to an object perception model – where we know about some object by perceiving that object. This is what we are looking for when we say that we can know that Sammy is sad by perceiving his sadness. In this case, we see the emotion which is the object of perception. Shoemaker’s condition, as above, on what it takes to perceive some object is that we perceive some intrinsic feature of it.

An intrinsic feature or property is one that an object retains regardless of changes outside of itself. If a perfect duplicate of an object is made, or some object is moved into a different environment, then it will share all the original object’s intrinsic features. An extrinsic property is a property that is not intrinsic.⁶⁴

Say I’m looking at another cinnamon bun on the counter. The mass of the bun is an intrinsic property of the bun – if I were to pick it up and take it anywhere else, or duplicate it to make two identical buns, it would remain the same mass. Its size, shape and colour are also intrinsic properties of the bun. The property *that the bun is in front of me* is an extrinsic property of the bun, since if I were to pick it up and put it on the table to my left, it would no longer have this property.

So, Shoemaker wants to say, intuitively so, that we cannot visually perceive the bun only by perceiving the property that it is in front of me – we need more, we need to see something intrinsic to the bun itself. In the case of George baking the bun, we cannot properly perceive George’s baking of the bun by merely seeing the extrinsic effect (the resultant bun) of his baking. In the case of the perception of other’s emotions, the same requirement should hold. We cannot perceive the emotion by seeing some mere extrinsic property of it, even if it is something that guarantees the existence of its maker.

It may be objected that we could resist this intuition that the proper perception of objects requires us to perceive that object via some intrinsic feature of it. Perhaps visibility of something and perception of it are less closely linked than is suggested here. Dretske, for example, argues that sometimes not being able to see an object at all, and thus not able to see its intrinsic features, renders it more perceptible than if it were fully visible. In Dretske’s illustration, we have Martians and Earthlings at war and the Martians, intent on sending spies to Earth, have two options.⁶⁵ Firstly, they can send spies that are completely invisible. However, these invisible spies induce a magnetic field around themselves attracting any nearby ferrous objects. The second option is to send spies that are visible but indistinguishable from Earthlings. Given that these visible spies will blend in, and the invisible spies will have their locations easily betrayed by the objects they attract,

⁶⁴ McKittrick (2003, 158). This is one way of understanding what it is to be an intrinsic property, and should suffice for my purposes here. See Yablo (1999) for why this definition may be circular, and see Lewis and Langton (1998) for an alternative definition of intrinsicness.

⁶⁵ Dretske (1973, 38)

the second option is chosen. The point of the illustration is to show that just because some object can be seen, this doesn't entail that it's simpler to see that it is there.

Firstly, it can be responded by conceding to Dretske that this is right. It *is* easier to know that the Martians are there in the case where you cannot see them. But knowledge that they are there is different from perception of the object itself. Shoemaker's claims about perceiving intrinsic features is supposed to be necessary to object perception, and not, perception or knowledge *that* so-and-so is the case. The Earthlings may be in a good position to know that the invisible spies are there, but this does not tell us that they have been directly perceived in the sort of way we want to say we perceive emotions in the object perception sense.

Secondly, let's ignore this distinction between perception-that and object perception and imagine that the kind of object perception we are interested in here is achieved of the invisible spies, it is not clear that the Earthlings cannot see intrinsic features of the invisible spies. Say an invisible magnetic Martian spy is betrayed by a hoard of surrounding paper clips sticking to its body. It's plausible to think that this shows the Earthlings the Martian's *shape and size*. The outline of the Martian, covered in paper clips, is visible to the Earthlings. Since shape and size are intrinsic features of the Martians, the Earthlings perceive the Martians by perceiving some intrinsic feature of them. More so than if the Earthlings see a Martian disguised as an Earthling, as per the second option, since in this case the Martian *has* lost the intrinsic features that make it detectible – since the Martians and Earthlings may share no similarities in appearance. On this way of understanding the situation, it remains true that perception of intrinsic features aids perception of the object.

Take another example that seems to be intuitively a case of perceiving an object itself but without perceiving the object's intrinsic features. Forensics teams cover a crime scene with a chemical called luminol to detect trace amounts of blood that are undetectable to the naked eye. The luminol, which starts as a pale white, turns blue over areas where there is blood. It seems perfectly natural for the team to point and say that they can see blood in those blue-lit areas. But blood is red, not blue, so it seems like what's been seen is some intrinsic feature of the chemical and not the blood itself.

But again, as with the Martians example, it is plausible to say that the team *have* seen an intrinsic feature of the blood. They may not have seen the intrinsic feature that is the colour of the blood, but they have seen the outline and shape of where the blood is – since the blue colour perfectly lines up with the outline of the blood marks. There is nothing in Shoemaker's proposal that says *which* intrinsic features must be seen to have proper perception of the object – just that some or one intrinsic feature is seen.

Moreover, even if these cases did pose outliers to Shoemaker's case, they are just that – outliers. The case is for what makes something paradigmatically a case of properly perceptual knowledge. Shoemaker himself says he is talking about 'stereotypical' cases of perception. The Martian spies and the luminol illumination are not standard cases of how we perceive things. The

question may then be, why should the perception of emotions fit standard cases? It cannot be ruled out that emotions are outliers to this general rule of object perception. However, if there is a way of understanding how we can perceive emotions along this paradigmatic case of perception, then we are at an advantage in already having an understanding of how the perception would work. According to Shoemaker, for properly perceptual knowledge, we must perceive objects themselves by perceiving their intrinsic features. On our model, we want an account of how we know about other's emotions by perceiving those emotions by way of perceiving expressions. So the question now is, is there a way of understanding the relation between expressions and emotions such that expressions are intrinsic features of emotions?

The obvious answer is to say that expressions are *parts* of emotions; thus, introducing again a part-whole relation into the discussion. Parts are commonly conceived as being intrinsic to their wholes. The notions of parthood and intrinsicness naturally seem to go together. Let's imagine the cinnamon bun in front of me again – this bun is round and on top it has white icing. This icing is part of the bun – and to remove it would alter the bun into something different; removing the part would constitute change to the bun itself and its intrinsic features. Imagine a duplicate bun is made in the coffee shop next door – it would not be a perfect duplicate if it were made without the icing.

Yablo thinks the connection between the notions of parthood and intrinsicness are so strong that he aims to find a definition of intrinsicness *in terms of* parthood: "*intrinsicness does appear to line up in nonaccidental ways with something quite fundamental: the relation of part to whole*".⁶⁶ He gives three examples of how the concepts interrelate:

- a. If u is part of v , then u cannot change intrinsically without v changing intrinsically as well
- b. If u is part of v , then u and v have a region of intrinsic match
- c. If u is properly part of v , then u and v have intrinsic differences

Let's imagine what this means with u being the icing and v being the bun. The first statement tells us that some change to the intrinsic features of the icing, say, its colour, constitutes intrinsic change to the bun itself. The second statement tells us that there is some region that both the icing and the bun intrinsically match – this being the icing. And the third statement tells us that there are intrinsic differences between the icing and the bun if the icing is a proper part of the bun. For something to be a proper part of some whole just means that the whole is non-identical to the part – it has another part or parts as well. This all seems like the right way to characterise the connection between the icing and the bun, and demonstrates that if the icing is part of the bun, it is an intrinsic feature of it.

⁶⁶ Yablo (1999, 481)

One potential worry to address in maintaining that parts are intrinsic features of wholes is the idea that if something is a relational feature of something else then it is not also an intrinsic one. Parthood is a relation, a relation of part to whole. So perhaps parts resist treatment as intrinsic to the wholes for this reason. In fact, in the quotation above from Shoemaker he stresses that “*the perception of objects standardly involves perception of their intrinsic, **nonrelational** properties*”.

However, Marshall and Weatherson say that there is no real problem with a property being both relational and intrinsic.⁶⁷ They use the example that most people possess the property of having legs longer than their arms – this is relational since it’s the property that one’s legs are *longer than* one’s arms. But nevertheless, this definitely feels like a property that one has intrinsically. If a duplicate individual were created with arms longer than legs, we would consider that person intrinsically changed. Marshall and Weatherson take the assumption that parts are intrinsic features of wholes to be so strong that they even use this itself as evidence that properties can be both intrinsic and relational.

So perhaps we can relax our interpretation of what Shoemaker is saying in the above quotation to mean that we cannot perceive objects by *only* perceiving relational properties. Rather, we must perceive them first and foremost by perceiving intrinsic properties that may or may not be relational.

We now have a good candidate for the relation between expressions and emotions, a part-whole relation, that meets the intrinsic condition, and thus enables us to say that in perceiving expressions we are not only in a position to have knowledge of the emotion expressed, but to have properly perceptual knowledge of the emotion expressed.

Before leaving this Chapter with a puzzle, we can use our new conception of expressions as both factive of the presence of emotion and parts of emotions to answer a problem raised by Gomes. Remember (i) and (ii) from above, Gomes’ two cases of Asha and Sadiq. Gomes argues that perceiving emotions by way of perceiving expressions is a case like Sadiq’s in (ii) where we lack paradigmatically perceptual knowledge. He gives the following two further examples:⁶⁸

- iii. I know there’s coriander in the fridge through exploiting my capacity to recognise coriander on the basis of how it looks
- iv. I know Sulisha is angry through exploiting my capacity to recognise her anger on the basis of its expression

Gomes thinks that (iii) is like the case of Asha, where we see something on the basis of how *it* looks, and thereby have direct perceptual knowledge. In this case, we see the coriander itself. He thinks, however, that (iv) the case of Sulisha is like (ii) Sadiq’s case. In these cases we come to know

⁶⁷ Marshall & Weatherson (2013)

⁶⁸ Gomes (forthcoming a, 21)

about something by seeing something other than the thing itself. In Sadiq's case we saw the drawn curtains, and in Sulisha's case we see the expression. The expression acts in a way to mediate between the subject and the emotion.

I think on our current understanding of expressions we can resist this conclusion and maintain that (iii) and (iv) are equivalent in structure – both allow us direct perceptual knowledge. Given the condition of intrinsicness, expressions are being taken to be proper parts of emotions. In this way, we perceive not something that interposes itself between us and the emotion, we perceive the emotion directly. The very idea of introducing the intrinsicness condition was to rule out the possibility that expressions could guarantee the presence of emotions in a way that was non-directly perceptual. For example, to rule out that expressions are just effects of emotions, where in seeing the expression we can know that the emotion is present but we haven't *perceived* it. On the idea that expressions must be intrinsic parts of emotions, the perception of them need not be seen as perception of something distinct from the emotion.

2.2. *A puzzle*

We have seen two conditions for the account that we can know another's emotion by perceiving their expression:

1. That expressions guarantee the presence of emotion
2. That the expression is an intrinsic feature of the emotion

In order to satisfy the second condition, we have taken expressions to be *parts* of emotions. The parthood account both enables us to say that we perceive something intrinsic to the emotion, and as we saw in Chapter One can be further motivated by its coherence with emotions being constituted by various *components*.

However, there is a worry here that the parthood claim conflicts with the first condition above. To make this clear, let's think about our normal conception of parts and wholes. We would normally think of a brick as part of a building. But the brick can exist before the building is built. In addition, say this brick loosens after a few years and is taken out from the building, leaving the main structure intact, we would still say that the building remains even though the brick has been removed. We can call this the building blocks conception of parthood.

Remembering that what it means for an expression to guarantee the presence of the emotion is that there cannot be an expression without an emotion helps to generate the puzzle, which we can put in terms of the following three claims:

Guarantee claim: the expression e is only present if the emotion E is present

Parthood claim: the expression e is a proper part of the emotion E

Building blocks claim: for all x , if x is a proper part of y then it is possible that either x exists and y does not exist, or y exists but x is not a part of y

So, if we take e to be x , and E to be y , we can see how the building blocks claim conflicts with the guarantee claim. For the building blocks claim tells us that the expression can exist whilst the emotion does not, contrary to what we are told in the guarantee claim.

Therefore, we can see how if the parthood claim entails the building blocks claim, we run into trouble. In the next Chapter I start by meeting this puzzle, arguing that we can understand parthood in an alternative way that does not necessarily entail that parts act like bricks in the above example; thus, I deny the building blocks claim.

Chapter 3

Defending parthood

At the end of the last Chapter we were left with a puzzle. We have two conditions that we want to meet if we can say that we have direct perceptual knowledge of the emotions of others. In order to attain the knowledge of other's emotions our account needs to meet the condition that we perceive expressions that guarantee the presence of emotion. An account of expressions as factive aims to meet this condition. The next condition aims to secure that the knowledge we gain is properly perceptual, and so the condition is that what we perceive is an intrinsic feature of the emotion. An account of expressions as parts of emotions aims to meet this condition.

However, the parthood proposal may seem to conflict with the first condition that expressions should guarantee the presence of emotion. This is because parts are generally seen to come apart from their wholes – that is, if x is a part of y , then it is possible that x can exist even if y does not. My understanding of expressions is such that things only count as expressions when the emotion they express is present. When Sammy is sad he expresses it by crying, but when he is not sad, his crying does not remain an expression of sadness. It seems parthood relations work differently. The brick is a part of the building, but still exists as a brick if removed from that building.

Fortunately, not all notions of parthood work like this. In the first section I explain another way of understanding a part to operate, and suggest that using this notion allows a parthood proposal to conform to both conditions arrived at in the previous Chapter. Once I have done this, I respond to recent objections to a parthood proposal from Matthew Parrott.

1. Expressions as moments

Not all notions of parthood understand parts to be like the branch that can be chopped down from the tree and remain a branch. Talking of parts in the sense of some extended area or mass that forms part of some larger area or mass, the sense in which a slice of cake is part of the cake, is *one* way in which we may understand parts. As Smith and Mulligan note, focus on this notion of parthood alone restricts us from making sense of what we mean when we say Styria is part of

Austria, or 'th' is part of 'thoughtful', or even that thoughts are part of this world.⁶⁹ With this they indicate the potential diversity of our uses of the notion of a part.

Husserl aimed to provide a general theory of parts and part-whole relations that captures the widest sense of 'part': "*we may call anything a 'part' that can be distinguished 'in' an object, or, objectively phrased, that is 'present in it'.*"⁷⁰ Within this wide notion of parthood, Husserl distinguished two main types of part: moments and pieces. It is Husserl's 'moments' that I will argue correspond to expressions in the sense I am taking them, and thus when I talk of expressions as part of emotions, I mean that expressions are 'moments' of emotions.

Three features of Husserl's distinction between pieces and moments that encourage treatment of expressions as moments are as follows. Firstly, Husserl's distinction between parts as pieces and parts as moments is made in terms of dependence and independence. A content⁷¹ is said to be dependent or independent when its essence or nature is bound to other contents, and as such it cannot exist unless other contents are there with it. Independent content, on the other hand, is such that its intrinsic structure leaves it 'unconcerned' with all other contents.⁷²

Husserl carves up parts in line with this distinction between dependent and independent objects, whereby pieces are independent and moments are dependent.:

"We first perform a fundamental division of the concept Part into *Pieces*, or Parts in the narrowest sense, and into *Moments* or *Abstract Parts* of the Whole. *Each part that is independent relatively to a whole W we call a Piece (Portion), each part that is non-independent relatively to W we call a Moment (an abstract part) of this same whole W.*"⁷³

With pieces, given their independence, they are capable of remaining unaffected despite modification of other objects around them. As such, the aforementioned brick that is removed from the building is a part in this sense, since it can exist as a brick despite detachment from its whole.

Moments, on the other hand, cannot be realised in isolation. It is part of the very nature of a moment that it is dependent on some other object. For example, we can look to two illustrations from Schaffer.⁷⁴ A circle is a whole and its semicircles are parts of that whole. It intuitively seems to us that the circle is prior to the semicircles - in that these semicircles, created by a line dividing up the whole, could not have existed before the circle came to be. They are understood to be semicircles only in relation to the circle itself. Likewise, take an organism and its

⁶⁹ Smith & Mulligan (1982, 26)

⁷⁰ Husserl (1970, 437)

⁷¹ Here, talk of 'content' can be interchangeable with 'object' – in the third Logical Investigation Husserl eventually wants to change all talk of content to talk of objects, as content is associated with the purely psychological realm and he wants his parthood account to apply more broadly to all things whatsoever.

⁷² Smith & Mulligan (1982, 38)

⁷³ Husserl (1970, 467)

⁷⁴ Schaffer (2010, 47)

organs. Schaffer asserts that the organism is prior to the organs that make it up – and these organs can only be defined in terms of their integrative role within the organism as a whole.

The semicircles and organs are all moments, like expressions. What expressions, by my understanding, cannot exist in isolation from is the emotion they are expressions of. Parthood in this sense captures the close tie between expressions and emotions that is not present between the branch and the tree.

A second feature of Husserl's account that makes it apt to apply to this discussion is that objects can be said to correspond to both moments and pieces. The following illustration highlights this:

“The head of corporation c, for example, qua head of c, is not a mere piece (independent part), since of course should the remainder of the corporation cease to exist then he too (in his capacity as its head) will also pass out of existence. This is not to deny that the moment of c which is its head is not – in the relevant interval of time – coincident with the independent whole which is the corresponding human being.”⁷⁵

If Nancy is the head of company c, then Nancy qua head is a moment of c. But Nancy is also, qua person, a piece of c. Husserl's account of parthood is nuanced with regards to how pieces and moments interrelate. Something can have both pieces and moments, and moments themselves can be divided into pieces, as well as pieces having moments of their own. This works well when aligning moments to expressions, since although an expression qua being an expression of sadness is a moment of that sadness, this does not require us to deny that the expression corresponds to something more commonly thought of as a piece. The moment of sadness, the expression, is also coincident with some particular facial shape; a particular frown. Just understood as facial movements, frowns are independent. Unlike an expression of sadness, a frown facial shape is not dependent on the presence of the emotion of sadness in order to exist – for, as we have seen, a frown can be common between someone who is sad and someone who is merely faking sadness. So a frown is a *piece*, but this does not mean that the *moment* of the expression of sadness does not correspond to it.

This can be helpful in noting what is different between what we called the good and bad cases in the previous Chapter. Say the good case is one where Sammy is actually sad and crying and the bad case is the one where he's been taking acting classes and has learnt to cry on cue. The sceptical challenge was that in either case we see the same thing, and so in neither case can we be said to be in a position to gain knowledge. McDowell denies that we see the same thing in each case, for what we see in the good case is the fact itself being made manifest.

But perhaps this feature of Husserl's account gives us a way of understanding the sceptic's intuition that we see the same thing in the good and bad case. There is a sense in which in the good and bad case we see the same thing, because in both cases we see a *piece* – we see the crying face.

⁷⁵ Ibid (40)

Just as Nancy the person is a piece of the company, she can also be a piece of other things too. Nancy may be a member of a rock band, and as such the person of Nancy is a piece present to both the company and the band. Likewise, the crying face can appear not just in the good case, but in the bad case too – for in both cases, it’s a piece of the overall configuration of Sammy’s body.

But what explains the *difference* between the good and bad cases? Unlike in the bad case, in the good case we see a *moment* of sadness in addition to the crying face. The moment of sadness is coincident with the crying face – and this moment is the expression of sadness in the sense of being a guarantor of the presence of sadness. As such, we can understand with this pieces/moments distinction and interrelation how to maintain that we see something different in the good case, but without losing the sense to the idea that there is an element of commonality between sad Sammy and acting Sammy.

The third feature of Husserl’s discussion to focus on is his talk of ‘essence’. His discussion of it helps determine a necessary relation between moments and their wholes, and so for us, between expressions and emotions. As such it helps us see how the guarantee condition is met when understanding expressions as moments.

Let’s take Husserl’s example of Nancy (in her role as head of corporation) to be the moment under discussion, and the corporation to be the whole. When Husserl discusses how Nancy is a moment, and how this means Nancy is dependent on the corporation, he describes it in terms of Nancy having the corporation as part of her essence. Furthermore, this is cashed out in terms of Nancy *depending on* the corporation for her existence. As such, non-independent moments are cashed out as follows:

“The content is by its *nature* bound to other contents, it cannot be, if other contents are not there together with it.”⁷⁶

And non-dependent pieces are cashed out as:

“In the ‘nature’ of the content itself, in its ideal *essence*, no dependence on other contents is rooted.”⁷⁷

The dependence and independence distinction is made in terms of whether or not something else conditions the existence of the object in question, and this is explained in terms of essence (or ‘nature’). Fine understands this essence relation as follows. He takes questions of essence to be relating to questions of what something is. If x is essentially y, then it is metaphysically necessary that if x then y.⁷⁸ Put another way, if y is the essence of x, then for x to exist, it is metaphysically necessary that y. To take Fine’s example, if the singleton Socrates is essentially a set whose sole

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ Husserl (1970, 443)

⁷⁸ Fine (2015, 296)

member is Socrates, then if the singleton Socrates exists, it is metaphysically necessary that Socrates exists.

For Husserl's parts as moments, the whole is the essence of the part. As such, it is necessary that the whole exists for the part to exist. With regards to expressions and emotions, since I am aligning expressions with Husserlian moments, I can say that the presence of the emotion is necessary for the expression to exist. This is determined by the emotion being the essence of the expression. As a result, we have a relation of parthood between expressions and emotions that involves a necessary connection between the two – one that ensures the guarantee condition. The existence of the expression as a moment guarantees the existence of the emotion.

I take this conception of expressions, as parts that are like moments rather than pieces, to be the most convincing way of taking expressions to be parts of emotions. This, however, is not how recent proponents of a part-whole analysis have conceived of parts. In the following sections I defend a part-whole analysis from recent objections from Parrott, but it is important to note that Parrott's target is not a part-whole analysis conceived in terms of Husserl's moments. Parrott cites Krueger and Overgaard's part-whole account as the target of objection. For the most part, I defend Krueger and Overgaard from Parrott in their own terms, making no reference to a specific conception of 'part', but I will indicate at times where thinking about expressions as *moments* as we have seen above can provide further defence of their position.

2. The Causal Objection to Parthood

Parrott targets Krueger and Overgaard's parthood thesis as the object of his attack. They describe their account as follows:

“Taking “expression” in a constitutive sense is the idea that certain bodily actions are expressive of mental phenomena in that they actually make up proper parts of some mental phenomena. In other words, some mental phenomena have a hybrid structure: they straddle internal (i.e., neural) and external (i.e. extra-neural, gross bodily) processes. When we perceive certain forms of behaviour and expressive actions, we quite literally perceive aspects of some mental phenomena.”⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Krueger & Overgaard (2012, 245)

A *proper* part as opposed to just a part means that the part is not identical to its whole; when talking in terms of proper parthood, wholes cannot be parts of themselves. We can assume, given that Krueger and Overgaard do not qualify their notion of parthood further than this, that they mean parts as taken in the usual sense that would conform to Husserl's pieces.

Parrott first objects to the parthood thesis that takes expressions to be proper parts of emotions on the basis that this conflicts with the idea that expressions are caused by emotions:

“First, if Angry Patrick Stewart is possible, then we know that someone can be angry without expressing anger, which means that the expression is not an *essential* part of being angry. So Krueger and Overgaard must think that it is only in cases where a subject is actually expressing anger that the expression is a proper part of the subject's anger. However, this goes against the thought that expressions are *responses* to anger or are somehow *caused* by anger. The embodied perception theorist wants to reject this conception of the mental, but then it isn't clear how exactly we should understand everyday interactions that appear to presuppose it. When, for example, we ask our friend why she screamed at us and she replies ‘because I was very angry about your being late to my recital’, we naturally take her to be offering us a kind of causal or reason-giving explanation of her behavioural response. This type of response is perfectly natural but it would be a bit more puzzling if the expression were simply a proper part of her anger.”⁸⁰

Before responding to this objection, it pays to note that something like a causal assumption is strong in the literature on expressions and emotions. By causal assumption I mean the assumption that there is a causal relation, somehow conceived, between expressions and emotions. Roelofs has recently presented an alternative view to Krueger's on the basis that Krueger's account wrongly rests on the claim that expressions partly constitute emotions. Roelofs thinks that since most people accept the relationship to be causal rather than constitutive, we should look for an account that maintains this causal link.⁸¹ And Russell and Dols note “*that certain facial expressions actually ‘express’ emotions presupposes that they are caused by emotion*”.⁸² In what follows I note why this assumption may not be warranted, but also that if we do want to maintain it, it is not necessarily a problem for the idea that expressions are parts of emotions.

2.1. *Understanding the objection*

Parrott's claim is that the idea that expressions are proper parts of emotions renders the idea that expressions are caused by emotions puzzling. To explain the puzzlement, he says “*this goes against the thought that expressions are responses to anger or are somehow caused by anger*”, but it is slightly unclear what ‘this’ refers to here. He has preceded this sentence with a discussion of how the parthood

⁸⁰ Parrott (2017, 1048-1049)

⁸¹ Roelofs (2018, 213)

⁸² Russell & Dols (1997, 17)

thesis takes expressions to be **non-essential** parts of emotions. So it may be wondered whether it is merely that expressions are parts of emotions that conflicts with the causal claim, or whether it is specifically something about the non-essential nature of the parts that is troublesome.

By non-essential, what is meant here is that there can be an emotion without an expression of it. We have seen this idea before with the notion of unexpressed emotions. And it is perfectly consistent with the idea of expressions as either moments or pieces of emotions. Parts as pieces are not dependent on their wholes, as such if expressions are pieces of emotions they can be detached, leaving the emotion intact. Moments are dependent on their wholes, but only *when* they are present – whenever there is an expression as a moment, there is an emotion, but this does not hold the other way around. Again, I take expressions to be *moments* of emotions, but for the sake of responding to this objection, expressions could be conceived under either notion of a part.

I think it is easier to see what Parrott's objection here is if we understand the 'this' to refer just to the idea that expressions are proper parts of emotions, rather than also referring to the non-essential claim. It is hard to see why the fact that expressions only *sometimes* occur with emotions jars with the idea that expressions are caused by emotions. There are plenty of things that cause other things only sometimes. There is a causal relation between someone running into the road and the car swerving. But today someone ran into the road and there were no cars about, so the swerving didn't occur. Parrott's friend may on another occasion not want to upset anyone by showing her anger, so she suppresses it and doesn't shout. This does not mean that when she does choose to shout, the reason for her shouting was her anger.

There may be an intuitive way to understand the problem of a causal relation between two things occurring in conjunction with a parthood relation. We don't tend to think about causal relations when discussing things as part of other things. If we have a Humean conception of causation relations holding between *distinct* existences, then it seems less intuitive to talk about these distinct existences being part of one another. But, there are plenty of counterexamples that may show that we can think of two things related by *both* causation and parthood. Imagine a plant that sprouts a leaf. We can give a causal story of the leaf's existence in terms of the plant, and consistently maintain that the leaf is part of the plant. So it does not seem like there is any rule in general that something cannot cause one of its parts to come into existence, despite how it may seem.

Additionally, we may respond to the objection by denying that we *need* to accommodate the causal relation between expressions and emotions. Parrott supports his claim about us having an idea of a causal relation by referring to how we often talk of emotions as things that provide *reasons* for our expressive actions. If someone asks me why my face is so scrunched up I'll say it's because I'm confused.

However, not all explanations of one thing in terms of another imply a causal relation. Relations of metaphysical grounding are explanatory but not causal. The notion of metaphysical

grounding builds on the notion of something obtaining *in virtue of* something else. As Fine describes, it's a more distinct relation than mere necessity.⁸³ When I'm smiling it's necessary that the angles in a triangle add up to 180 degrees. But we wouldn't want to say I am smiling in virtue of the angles adding up. This is because of a lack of explanatory connection, for which grounding requires. That a shape has four and only four equal internal angles grounds that it is a square. As such, the square is explained in terms of its angles but without their being a causal element.

So if we want to respond to Parrott on his own terms, by using a part-whole notion where parts are like pieces, then it suffices to show that the move from saying that one thing is explained in terms of another to saying that thing must be causally related to the other is not always true.

But we can go further in our response in thinking about my taking expressions to be like moments. In this case, we can not only use the grounding example as one that denies the necessary move from explanation to causation, but rather we could suggest that a grounding relation is *present* in the case of expressions of emotion. We can maintain that expressions are parts of emotions, and maintain that emotions ground expressions and this is what explains their reason-giving nature.

As we have seen in the discussion of moments, moments have their wholes as at least partly their essence. As such, on my account of expressions, expressions have emotions as their essence. By Fine's account, this means that emotions are a necessary condition for the presence of expressions. Fine also describes the close connection between the notions of essence and grounding – that they compliment one another and provide “*support for the very same structure*”.⁸⁴ While something's essence provides a necessary condition or conditions for its existence, something's ground provides sufficient conditions for its existence. So if emotions ground expressions, emotions are sufficient conditions for the existence of expressions.⁸⁵ As such, both essence and ground can be explained in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, and so it is natural to understand emotions (which provide necessary conditions through being the essence of expressions and provide sufficient conditions through grounding expressions) to *explain* why we pull a face when we have a particular feeling. Fine's discussion of how the two relations compliment each other shows us that we can plausibly have an account that involves both parthood in terms of moments and grounding relations.

2.2. *Causation between which relata?*

⁸³ Fine (2012, 38)

⁸⁴ Fine (2015, 297)

⁸⁵ Ibid (306)

Not only may we want to deny we need to accommodate a *causal* relation, we may deny we need to accommodate a causal relation *between emotions and expressions*. Even if we disregard the arguments from the previous section and admit that there *is* a problem posed to parthood by accepting with Parrott that emotions cause expressions, this is not the only option on the table for accommodating something like the causal assumption.

Even if we accept that the reason giving explanations we talk of imply a causal link, this doesn't determine that the link is between, say, the sadness and the crying. Rather, we could explain it in terms of a relation between the expressions of crying, and other parts of sadness. And perhaps this more plausibly reflects what goes on. As we have seen, Green understands emotions as an interrelated set of phenomena, and similarly, Goldie takes emotions to be a term we ascribe to a complex of various elements.⁸⁶ These include episodes of emotional experience, involving thoughts, feelings and perceptions, physiological changes, and dispositions to behave in certain ways. Some of these will be more relevant to 'resulting' expressions than others, and so if something is doing the causal work, it is plausible some other part or parts of the emotion as opposed to the emotion as a whole.

This is further highlighted if we think not just about different parts of emotions being causally operative, but if we think about componential approaches to understanding *expressions*. Frijda and Tcherkassof describe emotions as states of action readiness, and expressions as: "*relational activities, social signals, activation manifestations, and inhibitions, all of which flow from a state of readiness to maintain or change the relationship with the environment.*"⁸⁷ Leaving aside how this account understands the so-called 'intimately bound' relationship between expressions and emotions, it follows from their functional analysis of expressions that they too come in parts or components:

"Facial expression at any given instant of time can be understood from the functions of the composing elements in protection, orientation of attention, motor realization of activation, signaling affiliative intent, and the like. This analysis clearly leads to a componential view of facial expressions."⁸⁸

Similarly, Smith and Scott argue emotional expressions have a 'systematic, coherent, and meaningful structure'.⁸⁹ They ground their reasoning for favouring a componential approach over a 'purely categorical' approach in empirical findings. A categorical model would understand facial expressions as being primitive, where they themselves are basic units of meaning. Each expression indicates its associated emotion. But this, they argue, would be to ignore the fact that various expressions for different emotions share similar traits. For example, the downward turn of an

⁸⁶ Goldie (2000, 12)

⁸⁷ Frijda & Tcherkassof (1997, 95)

⁸⁸ Ibid (93)

⁸⁹ Smith & Scott (1997, 230)

eyebrow is present in anger, sadness and disgust.⁹⁰ But we are still able to distinguish the expressions of anger from disgust, and this is because expressions span across a range of muscle actions and activities on the face. It is this pattern that is distinct for the various emotions, and thus we should understand expressions as being constituted by components.

The considerations above show that there are four basic options to explain the causal relation:

Emotion	→	Expression	Emotion Part	→	Expression
	<i>causes</i>			<i>causes</i>	
Emotion Part	→	Expression Part	Emotion	→	Expression Part
	<i>causes</i>			<i>causes</i>	

The table shows the four different ways that the supposed causation relation running from emotions to expressions may be understood. There would of course be many more possibilities within all but the top left box dependent on how many parts the expression or emotion had.

To make things more complicated, there are two further options to consider. Firstly, studies have shown that sometimes it is not just emotions (as a whole or specific parts) that cause expressions, but that expressions can cause emotions. The Ekman, Levenson & Friesen 1983 study shows that when individuals are asked to voluntarily produce a particular facial expression, they can elicit the corresponding subjective feeling of emotion.⁹¹ Though Ekman notes this doesn't conform to the usual pattern, it does occur. Say I tell myself to sit up in a confident stance in class, I may then elicit the feeling of confidence through outwardly expressing it.

This does present a complication for my picture of expressions. Remember, I want to say that my sense of expressions only deems something an expression if the emotion is present. So, by my account the production of a confident stance would not be an expression *until* the emotion is elicited – only then does the stance become an expression proper. So, to be precise, the above argument put in my terms is not that expressions can cause emotions, but that facial movements can cause emotions.

This, however, feeds into the second option to consider. This time it is not that emotions cause expressions or expressions cause emotions, it is the possibility of both being simultaneously caused by something else. Appraisal theories of emotion provide a framework in which expressions and emotions are correlated but not causally connected, rather they are caused by a perceptual

⁹⁰ Ibid (231)

⁹¹ Ekman (1993, 385)

process in a social context.⁹² Say I'm at dinner for a friend's birthday and a cake is brought out to my friend's delight, it is my perception of this that causes both my smile and my happiness.

Given the myriad of potential causal relationships, we may question which one conflicts with a parthood analysis. In fact, some of the causal options like the ones that obtain between different parts of emotions and their expressions are only viable *if* we understand emotions to have parts. Of course, it is a further step to say that one of the parts of the partitioned emotion is the caused expression, but we certainly have room to say this. It seems that parthood can only help and not hinder in understanding how causation is in play.

Before moving on I want to flag the difference between what has been discussed here, and a different sort of causal objection.

Adams and Aizawa raise what they call the 'coupling-constitution objection' to a part-whole analysis. They describe the objection as follows:

"Sometimes, however, there is a more or less subtle move from the observations about the causal dependencies between cognitive processes, on the one hand, and the body and environment, on the other, to a conclusion that there is some constitutive dependency between the cognitive processes and the brain-body-environmental process."⁹³

"It simply does not follow from the fact that process X is in some way causally connected to a cognitive process that X is thereby part of that cognitive process."⁹⁴

"One cannot simply move from an observation of a causal dependency between cognition and the body and the environment to the conclusion that cognition extends *into* the body and environment."⁹⁵ (*emphasis added*)

I think there are two main points. The first is present in the former two quotes, where the complaint is simply that there is a conflation between causation and constitution if one moves from noting a causal relation to concluding a parthood relation. The third quote puts the point slightly differently, complaining that just because a mental state may cause a bodily expression, it does not mean that the mental state is *in* that bodily expression.

Krueger convincingly responds to this latter point by saying that he in particular, and thereby parthood proponents in general, need not be committed to claiming that the emotion is present within the expressive component.⁹⁶ This seems right. None of the accounts of emotion discussed so far have explained emotions to be inside one of their constituent parts. Moreover, given that parthood is an asymmetric relation, and we can better understand the parts of something to be within the whole, the very notion of the emotion being within its part is ruled out. The

⁹² Russell (2016, 160)

⁹³ Adams & Aizawa (2008, 88-89)

⁹⁴ Ibid (91)

⁹⁵ Ibid

⁹⁶ Krueger (2012, 167)

complaint may be better made against an embodiment account that describes how an emotion is embodied within its expression, but we have so far not discussed that here merely by considering that expressions are parts of emotions.

With regards to the former point, it is interesting to note that this causal challenge is almost opposite to the challenge Parrott makes. The objection that Adams and Aizawa are making that causation shouldn't entail a parthood relation. The assumption behind this, or the target of the criticism, is that people make this leap. Parrott's whole case rests on the idea that there's an obvious conflict between a causal relation and a parthood relation. Thus, the starting assumptions for either objection are very different. Having denied Parrott's assumption, I would respond to Adams and Aizawa by noting that what has been said so far is not vulnerable to their objection since we have not used causation to motivate the claim that expressions are parts of emotions. The parthood relation was assumed from the start and then shown to be compatible with a possible causal relation. But importantly, the parthood analysis can be maintained, as we have seen, without the causal analysis, and as such there has been no conflation between these two kinds of 'dependencies'.

Bearing in mind the thoughts raised above about the structure of emotions and expressions, I move to consider Parrott's second objection.

3. The ontological objection to parthood

Parrott argues that work in the ontology of mind shows emotions and expressions to be of different ontological categories, and so it is hard to see how one could form a *part* of the other:

“The temporal character of expressive behaviour is not obviously of the right kind for it to be a proper part of a mental state. Several philosophers writing on the ontology of mind have noted the differences in the temporal profiles of states and events indicate that the two belong to fundamentally different ontological categories (e.g., Soteriou 2013 and Steward 1997). States are entities that are, in some sense, wholly present at each moment of the interval of time during which they exist. This is connected to their lacking a progressive verb form (e.g., one cannot answer the question ‘what are you doing’ with ‘being happy’). Events, on the other hand, seem to be entities that unfold or develop over time and are not wholly present at each moment of the interval during which they exist.”⁹⁷

⁹⁷ Parrott (2017, 1049-1050)

He cites Soteriou, who claims that mental states *obtain* over intervals of time, whereas mental events or processes *unfold* over time.⁹⁸ This means that if a mental state occurs between t1 and t2, then it will remain wholly present unchanged during this duration. Whereas, should a mental event occur between t1 and t2, it will be in development and thus changing. Soteriou says that this goes to show that even if a mental event and a mental state ‘occupy’ the same interval of time, their temporal character will differ.

Firstly, although Soteriou points out the different temporal characters of states and events, it is unclear exactly what Parrott takes from this in order to make the move that says that something of one temporal character cannot be a part of something of another temporal character. In fact, Soteriou goes on to describe a theory in which mental states and mental events are ‘intimately’ related: “*the event/process and state in question have a certain kind of interdependent status*”.⁹⁹ This relation arises due to our sensory experience involving mental events which cause a subject to have properties they would not otherwise have. As such, the subject is in a mental state that wouldn’t otherwise be occurring. In turn, the state of the subject then goes to determine the nature of the event that grounds the existence of that state. Leaving aside the features of this account, it goes to show that stating the temporal character differences of states and events does not determine that they do not relate to one another.

Secondly, Soteriou’s claims are about *mental* states and *mental* events. Whilst we might be talking about something at least partly mental when we discuss emotions, we are talking about something behavioural or physical when we discuss expressions. It is not clear that the analogous problem regarding the temporal profiles of states and events can be made when discussing non-mental or part-mental events and states.

Even if we can locate the problem with saying events and states are part-whole related due to their temporal characters, we need not be committed to analysing expressions as events, nor emotions as states. If states are characterised by Soteriou as being unchanging in each instance of their existence, then it is not clear that contemporary accounts of emotions would class them as states defined in this way. As we’ve seen to be in line with my favoured componential account of emotions, Scherer’s view takes emotions to be an *episode of interrelated changes* in the body that respond to a triggering event.¹⁰⁰

The five main components making up this process view of emotions are a mixture of cognitive, neurophysiological, motivational, expressive, and subjective elements. The elicitation of changes within each of these in response to a specific event constitutes an emotional episode. So for Scherer, the very nature of emotions consists in their changing over time. He claims “*while we are in the habit of talking about “emotional states” these are rarely steady states. Rather, emotion processes are*

⁹⁸ Soteriou (2013, 27)

⁹⁹ Ibid (50)

¹⁰⁰ Scherer (2005, 697)

undergoing constant modification".¹⁰¹ Goldie echoes this perspective on our talk of emotional states, claiming that just because we call something a state does not imply that it is *actually* unchanging.¹⁰²

In addition to emotions not necessarily conforming to Soteriou's notion of 'states', we may question whether expressions need always be thought of as events that unfold and change over time. As we saw in the previous section, what is pertinent to something's being an expression is that it expresses the emotion. This does not delineate what sort of thing stands in as an expression in instances of emotions being expressed. Often it seems that these things will be akin to events that unfold over time. For example, if Sammy is expressing his sadness by crying, the falling tears seem to have an event-like structure. But it isn't clear that Greenian static facial shapes, when these are expressions, have the same structure. Sammy's frown may be more akin to an unchanging state, rather than something that develops over the course of the interval through which it exists. A frown is just something that we snap into on different occasions, and seems to be wholly present on each of these occasions, just as Parrott and Soteriou claim states to be.

Finally, although Parrott's worry in terms of temporal differences between emotions and expressions may be questioned, it seems there may be a more obvious way to present an ontological worry. A worry that builds on the differences between the temporal profiles of different *aspects* of the mind may not be the most direct way to proceed to criticise the part-whole analysis, since expressions and emotions are not even two aspects of the same sort of thing. Rather, expressions are physical things whereas emotions are less clearly so. The worry may therefore be: how can something physical be a part of something that is non-physical? The more pressing worry is not temporal, but spatial. How can something that takes up space be part of something that does not?

I do not have room to answer this question here, but I do not think that the answer is straightforwardly that it cannot. We often talk about physical things being parts of the non-physical, for example I may say that my lamp is a part of the ambience of my room. Here, I talk of something non-physical being composed or made up of partly something physical.

Moreover, this objection mischaracterises what is going on. Given what we've seen about the nature of emotions, it does not follow that we have something physical (the expression) being a part of something non-physical. Rather, we have something physical being a part of something that is made up of both physical and non-physical parts – the emotion is partly physical in its expression or neurological response, but partly mental, for example the other mental states it may involve. So it is no great mystery how something partly physical and non-physical can be partly physical. If the objection were still to be made, it would have to be characterised as saying something like a whole cannot be both physical and non-physical. But again, I do not see why this would be maintained, and merely pointing to the trend in psychology of componential views of emotion processes provides a counterexample here.

¹⁰¹ Ibid (702)

¹⁰² Goldie (2000, 13)

4. The objection from perceptual *knowledge*

Parrott makes a final and more forceful objection to the account of perceiving emotions by perceiving expressions that are part-whole related to emotions. The target of the objection is slightly different. The previous objections we have looked at target the plausibility of the very idea that expressions could be proper parts of emotions. This criticism asks, instead, what could a part-whole analysis really tell us with regards to *knowledge* of emotions. The objection is as follows:

“Finally, my biggest concern with Krueger and Overgaard’s appeal to parthood is that it does not even guarantee that we have perceptual knowledge of others’ minds. For one thing, one’s having perceptual acquaintance with a part of something does not mean that one perceives the whole thing (cf. McNeill 2012). Martin 2010a offers an example wherein one looks through a slit and sees a flash of turquoise that is part of a scarf. As Martin rightly concludes, one does not thereby see the scarf. In response to this sort of concern, Overgaard has recently argued that, although it is true that seeing a part of an object does not generally entail that one sees the object, it is plausible that one ‘counts as seeing’ the whole in cases where one is perceptually acquainted with a sufficiently significant part (2014, p.139; cf. Neta 2007). I do not know what would settle whether or not expressive behaviours were sufficiently significant for seeing an entire mental state. But regardless, **the broader concern is that seeing an object is an extensional relation. From the fact that a perceiver is perceptually acquainted with a certain object, nothing follows about which facts involving that object the perceiver sees.** To use Dretske’s example, ‘the cat can smell, and thus be aware of, burning toast as well as the cook, but only the cook will be aware that the toast is burning’ (1993, p.266). So even if we suppose that the embodied perception approach is right, this would only show that we are perceptually acquainted with some mental states, not that we have perceptual knowledge of others’ minds. It would seem that the embodied perception theorist would need to say more, at least if they intend their proposal to be an account of our knowledge of others’ minds.”¹⁰³ (*emphasis added*)

Two concerns can be distinguished here in what Parrott says. To understand the difference, we should distinguish between perceiving in the basic perceptual sense, and perceiving in the epistemic perceptual sense. The basic perceptual sense is just to do with seeing an object; what we literally clap eyes on. The epistemic perceptual sense is to do with coming to *know* something on the basis of what we see. We can perceive something in the purely perceptual sense without perceiving it in the epistemic sense – without knowing anything about what it is that we see.

McNeill makes a distinction along these lines in terms of transparent vs. opaque seeing.¹⁰⁴ Transparent seeing is just about being able to visually distinguish something. This sort of seeing is

¹⁰³ Parrott (2017, 1050-1051)

¹⁰⁴ McNeill (2012, 578)

non-epistemic, since to transparently see something does not entail one knows about that thing. With this type of seeing, we can substitute equivalent terms for what's been seen whilst still maintaining the truth of the sentence. McNeill's example is the following:

“If you see the iceberg and it is currently the largest object afloat in the North Atlantic, you see the largest object afloat in the North Atlantic.”¹⁰⁵

Smith seems to be discussing this same kind of seeing when he talks about seeing being extensional. He gives the following similar example:

“Claims about what a subject sees, whether they concern objects or property instances, are extensional. If Ivy sees Sylvia, and Sylvia is the youngest person in the room, then Ivy sees the youngest person in the room. It does not follow that she sees her *as*, or otherwise takes her to be, the youngest person in the room.”¹⁰⁶

This kind of seeing is contrasted by McNeill with ‘opaque’ seeing, where terms *cannot* be substituted whilst preserving the truth of the sentence. This is because this epistemic kind of seeing tells us something about what the subject sees something *as* or *to be*. It entails more than just visually distinguishing something, but rather *identifying* that thing or some feature of that thing.

The first worry presented by Parrott in the above quotation is to do with transparent seeing. Even with non-epistemic transparent seeing, it does not follow that if we see some proper part of an object, we see that object itself. As McNeill points out, the following three things are jointly possible: 1) you see some trees, 2) the trees are part of the wood, 3) you don't see the wood.¹⁰⁷ Transparent seeing means that seeing is, as Smith puts it, extensional – but only when one can substitute equivalent terms for what's been seen whilst maintaining truth. This is not the case for proper parts and their wholes, since wholes cannot be equivalent to their proper parts. As such, if we say we see some proper part of something, *x*, we cannot replace *x* with its whole, *y*, and maintain truth, since *x* and *y* are not equivalent terms. So, even in this more restricted non-epistemic sense of seeing, we have a problem in saying that in seeing a part we thereby see its whole.¹⁰⁸

But Parrott's worry moves on to a second, broader concern. This time, the worry is to do with an opaque kind of seeing – seeing in both the epistemic and perceptual sense. The point is that even if one can see the whole by seeing the part, in the sense of transparent seeing, this tells us nothing about whether they have *knowledge* of the whole. So, even if it is the case that you see

¹⁰⁵ Ibid

¹⁰⁶ Smith (2015, 279)

¹⁰⁷ McNeill (2012, 583)

¹⁰⁸ McNeill himself notes, however, that just because seeing a part does not *entail* seeing its whole, this does not mean it may not sometimes be sufficient. The point here is that the extensionality of seeing does not give us any guarantee that we see the whole by seeing the part, but it does not rule it out. This leaves open whether seeing parts of emotions leads to seeing those emotions.

the wood by seeing the trees in the transparent sense, this doesn't mean you know you're in the woods. In other words, even if by transparently seeing the trees you transparently see the wood, you certainly do not thereby opaquely see the wood.

This is a forceful objection to a parthood proposal that says that in seeing a part of something, we gain knowledge of the whole. However, it is only an objection to a perceptual account of knowledge of others' emotions *if* parthood is being proposed as a complete or sufficient answer to the epistemic question. Remember that my account that we can know about others' emotions by perceiving expressions was defended by pointing to two conditions that needed to be met. The first was to do with establishing the epistemic claim to *know* about the emotions, and it was that a guarantee is required between expressions and emotions. The parthood proposal, however, was being used in order to meet the second condition which was to secure that the knowledge we gain is properly perceptual. It was the condition that what we perceive must be intrinsic to the emotion. Therefore, although Parrott may be right that parthood alone cannot explain how we have knowledge of the whole by perceiving the part, the appeal to parthood here is still relevant to securing our perceptual knowledge of other's emotions. The aim here was not to give a total account of all the conditions of propositional knowledge. Rather, it was to explain how one particular condition of propositional knowledge that, say, Sammy is sad, can be met by appealing to parthood.

We have seen the proposal that expressions are proper parts of emotions to be a more robust proposal than it at first seemed. The initial puzzle concerning how parts could guarantee the presence of their wholes was solved by introducing Husserl's notion of parts as 'moments'. The idea that these expressions are moments of emotions was shown to be both metaphysically and ontologically possible. And importantly, the main objection to a parthood proposal was shown to be misplaced with regards to how parthood is being used in this account.

Concluding remarks and future considerations

It is a natural thought that in some cases we have genuinely perceptual knowledge of other minds. I walk into a room and I can just see that my friend Sammy, who is crying, is sad. In this thesis I have aimed to vindicate this thought to the extent that two significant obstacles to its possibility have been overcome. One obstacle was to do with whether we gain genuinely *perceptual* knowledge, and the second obstacle was to do with whether what we gain can really have the status of perceptual *knowledge*.

To meet the first obstacle, the condition that we perceive intrinsic parts of expressed emotions was generated. This is met by conceiving of expressions as proper parts of emotions, as opposed to mere external effects of emotions. This coheres with the conception of emotions established in the first chapter that understands emotions to have component parts, often including visible expressions.

To meet the second obstacle, we generated a condition that the expression we see needs to guarantee the presence of emotion. Drawing on the phenomenological tradition, an attractive way of understanding parts as non-independent *moments* allows us to meet this central condition for knowledge.

I discussed in the first chapter how the scope of this project was limited to both *visual* perception, and the perception of *emotions*. The account is not supposed to be taken as a one size fits all answer to the problem of other minds. However, it may be interesting to think in the future about how the account may or may not apply to other sense modalities, or other mental states.

For example, one possible extension of the account could be in the perception of mental states other than just emotions. To develop this, we would need to think of mental states that shared with emotions this aspect of having both visible and non-visible parts. Perhaps intentions to act are a possible example of another mental state that bridges the inner/outer divide – involving both the intention to, say, raise one's arm and the raising of the arm.

Additionally, could this account also tell us about how, if ever, we have direct audio-perceptual knowledge of other's emotions through our hearing? Say I hear Sammy shouting in the next room and come to know he is angry. It seems plausible to say that his shouting is an expression of his anger in the sense of expression I have discussed, as such, we could satisfy the guarantee condition by saying we hear this shouting. Likewise, we could think of his shouting as a proper part of his anger – thus satisfying the condition that we audibly perceive an intrinsic feature of the emotion.

However, the difficulty here would be generating the intrinsicness condition since Shoemaker's condition that to have perceptual knowledge of something we need to perceive some

intrinsic feature of that thing itself is made in terms of visual perception. But it does not seem implausible that the same considerations would apply. Say there is a thunderstorm, and two possibilities. The first option is that I hear the thunder itself – a proper part of the storm. The second option is that I am inside my room and hear the creek of my window that only ever occurs in a thunderstorm. Hearing both the thunder and the creek could give me knowledge that there is a thunderstorm, but it does seem intuitive to say that only in the former case have I directly *heard* the storm itself.

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