
**Abstract:** In this chapter we map out an interdisciplinary approach to historical experience, understood as the affects and sensations activated when people, in a given present, enter into relationship with the past. In the nineteenth century, professional historiography arose by embracing principles of the scientific method such as rationality, impartiality and a dispassionate approach to research, thereby displacing genres such as poetry, art, and literary fiction that had previously conveyed knowledge of the past in more sublime modes. While the dichotomy between subjective empathy and objective understanding continued to be negotiated within the history profession, in wider society people continued to engage in all manner of sensory relationships with the past including spiritualism, psychometry and occasional bouts of Stendhal Syndrome. Technologies such as photography, phonography, and film provided new media that incited yet richer sensorial and sentimental experiences of the past. With the advent of video games and virtual reality beginning in the late twentieth century, yet more immediate engagements with the past have proliferated. This essay surveys this variety of historical experiences in Western societies; their social relationship with professional historiography; the present(ist) demand for a personal experience of the past; and the future of historical experience portended by digital technologies.

Stephan Palmié and Charles Stewart

**THE VARIETIES OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE**

In the tale of human passion, in past ages, there is something of interest even in the remoteness of time. We love to feel within us the bond which unites us to the most distant eras, -- men, nations, customs perish; THE AFFECTIONS ARE IMMORTAL! -- they are the sympathies which unite the ceaseless generations. The past lives again when we look upon its emotions, -- it lives in our own! That which was, ever is! The magician’s gift, that revives the dead, that animates the dust of forgotten graves, is not the author’s skill, -- it is the heart of the reader.

Edward Bulwer-Lytton, *The Last Days of Pompeii* (1834)

Nonetheless, it did not take long for me to register, in the apparent silence of these corridors, that there was some movement, some whisper which was not dead. These papers, these parchments deposited long ago were asking nothing less than to come into the light of day. These papers are not just papers, but the lives of men, provinces and populations […] And as I blew away their dust I saw them rise up. They rose out of the crypt; here a hand, there a head.
like that in the Last Judgement of Michelangelo, or in the Dance of the Dead. The galvanic dance that they performed around me, that is what I have tried to reproduce in this book.\(^1\)

Jules Michelet. *Histoire de France* (1835)

**The Feeling of Knowing the Past**

Going by the title, a reader might pick up this book expecting to learn how people in the past experienced life. At least since the rise of the New Social History in the 1960s, the elucidation of the historical experience of “common people” has become central to the discipline of History. As E.P. Thompson urged the members of his discipline in 1968, their task was no longer to recount the history of “great men”. It was to rescue the experience of “the poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the ‘obsolete’ hand-loom weaver … from the enormous condescension of posterity” (Thompson 1968:12). Thompson’s injunctions fell on fertile grounds. His methodological intervention in a field then dominated by quantitative methods and the epistemology of structural Marxism led, among other things, to the flourishing of histories focused on the everyday lives of working classes, ethnic minorities, women, and other marginalized subjects (not, however, without incurring criticism concerning the reification of subaltern experience – e.g. Scott 1991). Whereas social historians, and many other historians along with them, seek to recover the full range of people’s daily experiences in past times, this volume addresses a much more circumscribed domain of experience, namely the activities, techniques and sensations through which people feel they come in touch with, or even enter into the past – the types of experience that Bulwer-Lytton and Michelet extol in the epigraph.

Social historians’ attempts to know the past from the inside thus remain central to this volume, but with an important twist: rather than exploring the experiences of past populations in
order to approximate how it might have been to live through, for example, the Conquest of Mexico as a Native American woman or a Spanish foot soldier; the French Revolution as an aristocrat or sans coulotte; or the American Civil War as a southern slave or northern industrial worker, we ask a rather more restricted, but at the same time substantially different question. This volume explores the experiences people in a given present undergo in order to relate to the past as a significant and often affectively charged aspect of their current lives. This volume concerns, in other words, how history is subjectively experienced by people in the process of orienting their present toward the past.

In presenting case studies of practices such as the reenactment of a Jim Crow-era lynching (Auslander, this volume), the temporal transportation felt while listening to indigenous Brazilian music (Agnew, this volume), or the cultivation of emotional responses during exhumations of Spanish Civil War victims (Rubin, this volume), our contributors consider the diverse ways in which the past may be activated and felt in a here and now. How and why the past can and does become palpable in our present-day experience is a genuinely anthropological question, and this volume aims to probe exactly this issue. Neither is this merely a matter of theoretical interest. If otherwise ostensibly irreconcilable high modernist thinkers such as Karl Marx and Henry Ford could agree on one thing it was that the past no longer held any relevance for the present: “Let the dead bury their dead,” and “history is bunk” they opined respectively. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, such a consensus (never mind between such ideological opposites) no longer exists. The profusion of living history exhibits, historical docudramas, past-themed computer games, or battlefield re-enactments, belie such confident opinions. A systematic demand for “experiences of the past” (not just the sporadic tendency to meditate on the past or recall it nostalgically) is currently expanding and detailed work goes into
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scripting, engineering, and staging the most popular forms. With what desired results in mind, for example, are Civil War films shot (Ross, this volume), or creationist museum exhibits conceived and mounted (Bielo, this volume)? In addressing “the varieties of historical experience” this volume opens for social scientific consideration the techniques that produce, induce or otherwise conduce to the feeling of “being in touch” with the past.

Historical reenactments, historical feature films, docudramas and video games such as *Brothers in Arms: Road to Hill 30* (Rejack 2007) and other manifestly performative and highly sensorial modes of engaging the past have not generally been conceded the status of “history.” At the same time, historiography is not usually thought of as an activity geared toward, or informed by, “experience” (though it undoubtedly is, see below). The practice of professional historians appears to stand apart as the yardstick against which other historicizing practices are judged to be “experiential”, a label implying insufficient detachment and lack of critical reflection resulting in a less trustworthy version of the past. The reasons for this are well known. As Tacitus famously proclaimed in the first century AD, history should be written “*sine ira et studio*” without anger or favor; without bitterness or partiality. Though the Renaissance and Baroque periods saw rather different – namely sensually persuasive – deployments of narratives of the past (Burke 1969, Maravall 1985), this view of history as dispassionate was reemphasized in the nineteenth century when the discipline of history espoused a rigorous form of reasoning influenced by procedures developed in legal scholarship and the natural sciences (Conn, this volume). History eventually solidified as an academically enshrined activity centered on the methodical critique of evidence of the past, the colligation of the data so derived, and the marshalling of these data into the most plausible narrative of the past. These and other procedures governing objective analysis, which history shares with many other social science
and humanities disciplines, including anthropology, distinguished professional historiography from less acceptable practices, such as popular antiquarianism or historical fiction.

The ideal of objectivity, furthermore, implied a view from nowhere occupied by an observing subject who stood apart from, comprehended, and ultimately represented the object of study -- the past, in the case of historians (Novick 1988). To date most discussions of objectivity in history have concerned the matter of veracity under a correspondence theory of truth. This volume concentrates on a different concomitant of objectivity, namely the question of experience and embodiment. A view from nowhere supposes not only an ideal perspective, but also the elimination of bodily or affective interference that could cause bias. In historiography as in science too much emotion and embodiment putatively impeded good research (Lawrence and Shapin 1998: 4). As the historians of science, Daston and Galison (2007: 375) have shown, epistemology required insulation from “the tumult of experience” and the seductive projections of the imagination. Scientists in the nineteenth century thus hoped to eliminate the distorting factor of human subjective involvement by utilizing meters, graphs, mechanical measuring devices and photography in order to allow nature “to speak for itself” (Daston and Galison 2007: 120; see also Turkel and Jones-Imhotep, this volume). Historiography’s parallel contention has been that immersion in documentary evidence could practically allow the facts of the past to speak for themselves.

If we adopt a general definition of experience as a form of interiority based on the registration of sensory impressions by an individual then even the historian reading quietly in an archive or sitting at a desk typing is having experiences, even possibly historical experiences where the past is directly felt or perceived. Historical experiences occur along a spectrum from narrow to broad sensory bandwidth; from mentally processing information in the climate-
controlled calm of one’s study, to running across a Civil War battlefield on a 90-degree day carrying a pack and authentic rifle through a cacophony of shouts and explosions. One of the original departures of this collection is that it juxtaposes the practices of professional historiography with popular modes of engaging the past such as public history (Conn, this volume), reenactments (Auslander, this volume), historical fiction (Rigney, this volume), biography (Chumley, this volume), pictorial media and film (Ross, this volume), web-crawlers, and digital storage or retrieval mechanisms (Turkel and Jones-Imhotep, this volume) as varieties of media that convey or induce historical experience. Acquiring knowledge is not cordoned off as an exclusively cerebral and conceptual enterprise, but widened to include sensual and performative ways of knowing, many of which are backed by their own implicit philosophies and cosmologies. A genuinely anthropological approach to history (Palmié and Stewart 2016, Stewart 2016) requires this ethnographic appreciation of the ways in which people – in this case, our “modern” Euroamerican contemporaries -- know the past: not in the manner in which educational institutions impress indexical dates like 1066, 1789, or 1939 upon primary and high school students in Western nation states, but in the way that iconic signifiers such as the “Norman Yoke”, the “Declarations of the Rights of Man”, or Nazi Germany’s attempt at global totalitarian domination inform how we all view and experience our respective worlds and anticipate their futures (cf. Wineburg 2010, Hodges forthcoming)

Although modern historians teach their students to avoid anachronism, the cardinal sin of “presentism” (i.e. reconstructing the past in the light of contemporary concerns) cannot be avoided. As Benedetto Croce (1921:12) famously argued, “every true history is contemporary history” – in the sense that the historian’s interest and engagement with a particular period or figure of the past inevitably grows out of the historian’s present experiencevi. What is more, the
experiences of historians and those of reenactors may not always occupy polar extremes. Jules Michelet’s epigraph to this Introduction in which he describes his experiences upon entering the Archives de France for the first time, may be booked as romantic rhetorical excess. But consider as sober a thinker as the great Dutch historian Johann Huizinga commenting on what he termed “historical sensation.” On viewing some unexceptional engravings by the seventeenth-century Dutch artist van der Velde depicting people moving to a new house he reported:

[I]t may well be that such a historical detail in an engraving, or in a notarial act for that matter, while it may be indifferent to me, may suddenly give me the conviction of an immediate contact with the past, a sensation as profound as the profoundest enjoyment of art, an (don’t laugh) almost ecstatic experience of no longer being myself, of a flowing over into the world outside myself, of a getting in touch with the essence of things, of the experience of Truth by history. ... It is a pathos, an ebriety of the moment.… It is familiar to you, is it not?.... This is the nature of what I call historical sensation” (Trans. Ankersmit 2005: 126).

Although the means of arriving there are very different, Huizinga’s description of this experience converges on that of an African-American participant in the re-enactment of a slave auction in St. Louis. As this man, Arthur, told the anthropologist Mark Auslander (2013: 162):

I can’t explain it, something happened to me up there, standing on that block. I looked out there, and it wasn’t just my eyes I was seeing through. I was seeing what somebody else saw, a long time ago, being torn away from everyone they loved. I felt what my ancestors must have gone through.… Up there on the same block, I guess you could say I was touching the past and, the past, well, it was touching me.
The adherence to scientific protocols such as dispassionate reason has by and large prevented historians from publicizing their own personal, affective experiences of the past and the excitement of its retrieval. Perhaps it is the case that heuristics are deemed much less important than the validation of whatever was found.\textsuperscript{vii} Sensitive to the possibility of ridicule, Huizinga asks the reader not to laugh at his account while at the same time he ventures on the generality of the experience: “[Historical sensation] is familiar to you, is it not?” In her contribution to this volume Lily Chumley draws on confessions divulged by biographers about their – at times astonishingly intense –emotional relationships to the (often deceased) people they write about. Such registrations of intimate historical experiences lead one to suspect that similar data could be collected from a wide range of historians (Wineburg 2010).

Frank Ankersmit (2005) has focused on a particular type of sublime historical experience exemplified above in the quotations of Huizinga and the reenactor Arthur; an experience which, in his words, ”pulls the faces of past and present together in a short but ecstatic kiss” (p. 121). Many historians besides Michelet report sensations of this sort while visiting archives, handling original documents and breathing in the musty smell of the historical record (Robinson 2010). Such experiences may not easily be dismissed as outliers; they arguably arise from a passion for the past which drives modern historiography. As Emily Robinson (2010: 504) contends, this affective dimension of historical experience has not only endured; it may have been instrumental in seeing off the sceptical challenges of post-structuralism and postmodernism, which would reduce history to a set of optional stories. Far from being daunted by the unknowability of the past, historians have never lost the conviction that they can recover it with, as it were, “high fidelity” to that which really was (Conn, this volume). Certainly their publics, have now entered an ever more adventurous affective turn (Agnew 2007), informed, or so we would argue, by
forms of virtual mediation that have come to saturate our lifeworlds to a degree unthinkable only twenty years ago. We will return to this issue. For now we would just emphasize in concluding this opening section that Ankersmit’s sublime historical experience (which has come in for criticism, e.g. Domanska [2009]), is not the only focus of this volume. There are manifestly many other types of historical experience and diverse inter-mediary techniques for producing them.

**The Tension within History**

Determining the correct experiential bandwidth for encountering the past has been a matter of ongoing debate within the history profession and reference to the broader framework of Judeo-Christianity sets this dilemma in cultural context. In a substantial chapter on “Religious Collective Memory” Maurice Halbwachs (1992 [1925]: 84-119) asserted that religions produce symbolic histories for those who practice them. The challenge to Christians, for instance, was how to preserve knowledge of Christ after living memory had vanished. Two alternative techniques for recuperating the past emerged, which Halbwachs labelled “dogmatism” and “mysticism” respectively. The priesthood and theologians approached the truth of Christ through intensive study of the canonical texts, while mystics held that they could sense it directly in visions, dreams, during prayer, or via other forms of personal revelation. In his own parallel formulation of Weber’s charisma and routinization thesis, Halbwachs maintained that Christian historical consciousness derives from the ebb and flow between mysticism and dogmatism. Bouts of pious absorption followed periods of rational scholarship because it was not enough to read about Christ and know him textually and intellectually; the truth needed periodically to be
re-grounded sensorially and emotionally. We could describe this as two types of authenticity: one philological and external, the other psychological and internal. As Halbwachs put it: “The mystics seek the meaning of a sacrament not exclusively in what the Church teaches, but above all in the feelings that participation in the sacrament evokes for them, as if it were then possible directly to reach the event or the sacred personage that the sacrament commemorates” (1992: 118).

The relevance of this example for our discussion of history is not difficult to see. Professional historians work in a mode comparable to scholastic theology, while Halbwachs’s mystical dimension models the more performative experiential relationship to the past. Halbwachs’s configuration is, however, more than just an elaborate analogy for the relationship between scholarly historiography and experiential historicizing practices. The particular Judeo-Christian heritage of Passover seders and Eucharistic communions – both anamnestic rituals – has long conditioned Western sensibility about the past, producing a “historically effected consciousness” (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein), to use Hans-Georg Gadamer’s (2004[1960]: xv, 300) terms. In other words, current attempts to historically understand Jesus or the exodus have been shaped by these original episodes (whether or not they actually happened is immaterial), and the history of practices for recuperating them. This matter will come to the fore further below, where we observe that technological innovations have continually provided new media for recording a given present, while also offering the present new techniques and metaphors for understanding its relationship to what preceded it. For example, Ivan Ross (this volume) studies the successive application of new visual media to represent the American Civil War. He thus shows how emerging technologies affect the ways in which the past may be conceived, represented, and consequently experienced. In the case at hand, the rituals and
theologies of Western mainstream religions have, we would argue, created a dichotomy between experiential immediacy and synoptic scholarship which has conditioned everyday thought about the past along those lines.

This duality between dispassionate scholarship and sensorial/emotional immersion has been fundamental within professional historiography ever since Ranke’s Berlin seminars in the late 1820s. Most people take Ranke’s famous dictum that history is the endeavor to present the past “as it actually was” to be a call for increased archival research. The copious use of footnotes (Grafton 1997: 45) – partly motivated by the desire to distinguish proper historiography from historical fiction – displayed the erudition, factual basis and critical reasoning validating historians’ assertions. This image of Ranke anchored the scholarly ambitions of historiography in America (Iggers 1962: 18), setting a tyrannizing research standard for practitioners to live up to, pushing them to the precipice of pedantry as historians such as Becker (1932: 234; Conn, this volume) lamented.

Yet Ranke has also been foundational for a very different trend in historical thought: the hermeneutic, interpretive tradition. To know the past “as it really was” also involved capturing the inner feel of that past, the subjective situation of past actors; a feat of transhistorical understanding on the part of the contemporary historian. Guided by what Ranke’s followers recognized as “intuitive cognition” (ahnende Erkenntnis), this involved empathically grasping the past through an idealism verging on the mystical (Iggers 1962: 32ff.). Ranke’s historicism stressed the particularity of culturo-historical worlds, each of which required understanding on its own terms, and so anticipated a radical cultural relativism half a century before anthropology took up this idea (e.g. Boas 1896, Hocart 1915).
In the view of his pupil Dilthey\textsuperscript{xiii}, however, Ranke erred in thinking that a historian could successfully occupy the thought world of the past because the historian’s connection to the present could not be transcended (Makkreel and Rodi 1996: 15).  Ranke, the hardcore archival historian, thus features as an extreme Romantic within the hermeneutic tradition for his assumption that the historian could enter into an immediacy of “empathy” (\textit{Einfühlung}) with the past.  Dialling back his entertaining teacher a notch in the direction of empirical reason, Dilthey stipulated a mediated and more critical “understanding” (\textit{verstehen}) of the past – an exercise in which contextual psychological and social data modified “intuition” (\textit{Anschauung}).  In his view, the student of the past needed to pursue the contrapuntal processes captured by Kierkegaard’s aphorism: “Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards” (cited in Makkreel 1975: 328).  The historian could relive the past retracing the footsteps of the original actors to “re-experience” (\textit{nacherleben}) their lives as they unfolded (Dilthey 2002[1910]: 235).  This movement, however, required counterbalancing by the procedure of \textit{verstehen} in which the researcher evaluated past actions and their social interpretations against the researcher’s own experience of life and general expectations of human action (Holborn 1972: 137).  This reduced the affective dimension of historical experience, but did not eliminate it entirely.  Some potential for feeling the past remained, but Dilthey considered the exclusive resort to empathy or intuition to be a faulty method for producing history because immersion in the thoughts and feelings of historical actors implied an attenuation of the present subjectivity of the historian that rendered understanding “uncritical” (Makkreel and Rodi 2010: 5).  A latter-day instantiation of this concern not to tip over entirely into empathy may be seen in Chumley’s consideration (this volume) of the admissions of contemporary biographers who confide that, in imaginary
conversations, they sometimes ridicule, argue with, or curse their biographical subjects in order not to become overwhelmed by them.

Another problem with empathy as a historical method is that the researcher might experience sensations and attribute them to past actors without any way of knowing whether these were accurate (cf. Wineburg 2010). Dilthey’s hermeneutics addressed this by moderating the sensorial and emotional heights of transhistorical identification with a cautious reasoning that has become basic to modern social scientific thought. Nor was he alone in trying to map out what were to become disciplinary boundary lines between scholarly diegesis and unruly mimetic re-enactment, let alone inadmissible, viscerally “experienced” encounters with the past. His formulations were endorsed and further developed in the 1920s and 30s by Collingwood, who proposed that historians “re-enact the past”; not through intuition, but (as Peirce might have said) “abductively” through the exercise of an informed “historical imagination” rooted in a priori reason (1946: 241, 248).\textsuperscript{xiv}

Collingwood used the term “re-enactment” to describe a situation where the historian mentally restaged past thought but always in full awareness of doing so, even in the depths of imaginative reflection.\textsuperscript{xxv} Historians thus avoided the dissolution of their subjective control, and maintained a critical relationship to the past re-constituted (re-enacted) in the mind as a discrete object (i.e. in an act of metaconsciousness). One could know the past by this procedure, but Collingwood did not believe that one could “experience” the feelings felt in the past (1946: 297, 303; D’Oro 2000: 92, 95). While for Bulwer-Lytton the affections were “immortal” (i.e. transhistorical), for Collingwood they remained timebound. Past sensory experience attached to the moment of its original registration and could not be repeated later in time. Re-enactment only captured the conceptual level of past thought; the sensorial immediacy of the original
experience was flattened into an “objective spectacle” (Collingwood 1946: 299) in the historian’s mind. Thus it could be said that Collingwood reeled in the hermeneutics of history still further toward a rational imagination occupying a very narrow experiential bandwidth. It remains a curiosity, however, and a point of occasional confusion, that the term “re-enactment” describes both Collingwood’s bloodless imagination and the activities of those who dress up in period clothing with the goal of wading into the emotions and sensations of the past – even if some of them may be trained historians themselves (McCalman 2004).

**Communicating with the Dead, and other Telecommunications**

Collingwood considered that the past was gone and therefore unavailable to present perception: “Historical thought is of something which can never be a this, because it is never a here and now. Its objects are events which have finished happening, and conditions no longer in existence. Only when they are no longer perceptible do they become objects for historical thought” (1946: 233). Yet even Collingwood conceded that this seemingly inevitable sense of distance was itself the product of a relatively recent shift in “regimes of historicity” (Hartog 2015[2003], this volume; Phillips 2011). Writing in 1759, Adam Smith could still express a relation between past and present in which reading about the past appeared to provide far more vivid experiences than even Gadamer’s (2004 [1960]) notion of “fusion of horizons” would allow for:

“When we read in history concerning actions of proper and beneficent greatness of mind, how eagerly do we enter into such designs? How much are we animated by that high-spirited generosity which directs them? How keen are we for their success? How grieved
at their disappointment? In imagination we become the very person whose actions are represented to us: we transport ourselves in fancy to the scenes of those distant and forgotten adventures, and imagine ourselves acting the part of a Scipio or a Camillus, a Timoleon or an Aristides” (1790: 66).xvi

Less than two generations later, this was no longer so. As the eminent British historian Thomas Babington, Lord Macaulay noted in 1828 (1848 I: 65 [“Hallam”]):

To make the past present, to bring the distant near, to place us in the society of a great man or on the eminence which overlooks the field of a mighty battle, to invest with the reality of human flesh and blood beings whom we are too much inclined to consider as personified qualities in an allegory, to call up our ancestors before us with all their peculiarities of language, manners, and garb, to show us over their houses, to seat us at their tables, to rummage their old-fashioned wardrobes, to explain the uses of their ponderous furniture, these parts of the duty which properly belongs to the historian have been appropriated by the historical novelist. On the other hand, to extract the philosophy of history, to direct our judgment of events and men, to trace the connexion of causes and effects, and to draw from the occurrences of former times general lessons of moral and political wisdom, has become the business of a distinct class of writers. Of the two kinds of composition into which history has been thus divided, the one may be compared to a map, the other to a painted landscape. The picture, though it places the country before us, does not enable us to ascertain with accuracy the dimensions, the distances, and the angles. The map is not a work of imitative art. It presents no scene to the imagination; but it gives us exact information as to the bearings of the various points, and is a more useful companion to the traveller or the general than the painted landscape could be […].xvii
This shift from iconic to indexical mediation, from mimetic evocation to analytical abstraction, that Macaulay captures in the comparison of the aesthetics of landscape painting with the mensurational logic of cartography not only spelled the end to eighteenth century sentimentalism in the academically disciplined study of history; it was part and parcel of a larger sea change in European historical consciousness and experience. As Reinhart Koselleck (1985) argued, it was only in the 19th century that “History” as a collectively singular -- and so universal -- human condition became available as an ideological template. xviii

To the degree that the present came to be oriented toward an ever-accelerating march toward the future, the past became over and done with. No longer magistra vitae -- the central topos of what Hartog (this volume, 2015) identifies as the characteristic historicity of the ancien régime -- but not amenable either to being recuperated into the emerging modernist regime of historicity as anything but what had successfully been superseded; so alien, in ontological terms, that it seemed to demand its own form of secular anamnesis, namely disciplined historiography, a science of the traces the past had left on the surface of the contemporary world to be studied for their own sake.

Consider here how one of the prime analysts of “historicism”, at the point of its unquestionable triumph, phrased the relation between cause and effect. “It is not historiography which brought us historicism” wrote Karl Mannheim in 1924 (1952: 850). Rather “the historical process through which we have lived turned us into historicists”. This statement provides another illustration of the circularity of historically effected consciousness where conditions lived through inform the terms in which the world, including the past, is framed. xix Such considerations led Mannheim to qualify “historicism” as the “Weltanschauung of Modernity” -- a highly self-conscious cultural formation suffused with a structure of feeling celebratory of its
own relentless progress towards a (however uncertain) future. Still, despite these crucial insights, Mannheim spoke of “the historical process” in agentive terms, and so revealed himself to be among the believers: history, now with a capital “H” had come to be the “space of experience” (Koselleck 1985) conjoined to a horizon of expectations of future presents in relentless and irreversible supercession of the past. In other words, Mannheim’s was a world in which historicism’s project of rationalizing social being and becoming had already left no other alternative than to attribute these changes to the “historical process”.

Difficult as it may be to step back beyond that threshold, it isn’t hard to see how Mannheim’s diagnosis of a new regime of historicity dovetails with Latour’s (1993) diagnosis of the “modern constitution” as a project of purification productive of its own hybrids. And indeed, even among the educated bourgeoisie of the late 19th and early 20th century (for whom Mannheim spoke), there were indications of uneasiness about the effects of the historicist conceptual separation between the past and the present: extreme forms of sublime historical experience thrived before, during and after the moderating pronouncements of Dilthey, Macaulay, and Collingwood. Prime examples would be personal reactions to ancient ruins, beginning with the reports of travelers on the “Grand Tour” in the second half of the eighteenth century. Stendhal’s syncope in Florence belongs to this genre, as does Freud’s “Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis” (1964[1936]) a century later. As Georges Poulet (1954) has argued, paramnesia, the experienced fusion of past and present, was actively cultivated by European intellectuals ranging from Mme de Staël to Coleridge, Byron, De Quincey, Baudelaire, and of course Marcel Proust (opium often helped in the process). The latter-day creation of psychiatric nosological categories such as Jerusalem Syndrome (first denominated as such in 2000) speaks to this issue: here, typically, devout Christian tourists come progressively unhinged
while visiting Israel’s holy sites, until one day they tear up their hotel room sheets and descend toga-clad onto the streets acting as if they were Biblical figures. Consider also Stendhal Syndrome, first described by Stendhal himself in 1817 but only recognized as a syndrome in 1979 (though not included in the DSM). It manifests in disorientation, heart palpitations and fainting that overcome visitors to Florence. In other words, academic historicism, has not, and perhaps cannot neutralize other ways of experiencing the past. These other modes have not been diminished, only pathologized by it (Bar-El et al. 2000, Bamforth 2010).

An even more dramatic countercurrent to the rising tide of historicism directly paralleled its emergence as the “Weltanschauung of Modernity”. Ironically, it fed on the same positivist scientism that, as Macaulay had predicted, was gaining ground in academic historiography. Thus, while Marx was cautioning his contemporaries to let the dead bury the dead and forge ahead toward a future of unalienated social being, some of them – including Friedrich Engels – were at least curious about one of historicism’s illegitimate Western doubles (sensu Nandy 1995): spiritualism, a (however variegated) mode of giving voice to historicism’s ultimate subalterns – the dead. Ever since the Hydesville incidents in 1847, when a dead peddler revealed a hitherto unknown aspect of the past (his own murder) to the Fox sisters, the dead were no longer in need of representation. They spoke for themselves, and garrulously so. As is well known, the voices of the dead, mediated through table rapping and, later, by means of photography, automatic writing, and direct voice manifestations, attracted some of the best minds of the late 19th and early 20th century. Crookes, Wallace, Galton, Conan Doyle, William James, you name them. Spiritualist séances and their print promulgation offered a way of communicating with the dead not just through the traces their lives left on the surface of contemporary worlds – documents, objects, and other evidence for their perceptually inaccessible agency in the past; rather,
Spiritualism made the dead contemporaneous with the living. It gave the dead the means to affect the here and now through their presence; and it afforded them the kind of agency for producing evidence of their own existence that the newest communications media – particularly telegraphy, but later also telephony and wireless radio – also afforded the living in their real-time interactions with others at a significant spatial remove.

If Michelet’s “galvanic dance” of the dead in the Archives de France (in our epigraph) had drawn its metaphorics from the electrical sublime that had begun to impact the European imagination from the late 18th century onward, then Anglo-American spiritualism of the late 19th and 20th century drew ever newer technologies into its orbit. Although it was not until two decades after Daguerre’s invention of photography that spirits began to manifest in this medium when William Mumler published the first images of ectoplasmic manifestations in the 1860s, analog media capable of arresting past actuality – thus binding time and space in ways that superseded written documentation -- became subject to necromantic investments. If musty whiffs of dust exuded by papers and pergaments had once allowed Michelet to enchant the archive itself, conjuring the deceased up from the records they had left, then photography and phonography visually inscribed and audibly echoed that which was no more. Indeed, the very modernity of the recording, storage and circulation systems (“Aufschreibsysteme”, in Friedrich Kittler’s [1992] sense) that superseded writing and print in the course of the 19th century enabled a seemingly paradoxical counterpoint to the abstract cartographic imagery that Macaulay envisioned as the touchstone of the historicist imagination. As the saying went (before the advent of digital photoshopping, at any rate): a photographic picture (or analog audio record) was worth more than a “thousand words” in its seeming capacity for unmediated transcendence of temporal distance: less an interface between the present and the past, than a portal to bygone times.
If writing and print had once provided the infrastructure to Halbwachs’s “scholastic” modes of transcendence, the technologies of remediating the past that began to supersede writing in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries came to serve the “mystical” pole of his dialectic. The kind of “paradoxical positivism” (Porter 2005) characterizing spiritualism – especially once some of its proponents took the turn towards Parapsychology around the turn of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century – might thus be seen as a running commentary on, perhaps even a critique of, the rise of historicism as a kind of secularized, materialist idealism\textsuperscript{xxiv}. Historicism, we might say, was able to claim the high ground, but the “Weltanschauung of Modernity” produced problems as fast as it solved them. Alternatives, such as Spiritualism offered “experience-near” solutions to the death of the past and found willing followers. Many more solutions have since been socially demanded, and offered, as new technologies and novel phenomena inspire us to think in different ways about the past.

\textbf{Technologies of/and historical experience}

Having considered two of historicism’s alters, paramnestic “loss of self” (in a more dramatic form than Dilthey and Gadamer probably imagined) and spiritualism, we now turn to another example, namely the psychometric science proposed by the 19\textsuperscript{th} century geologist William Denton (1823-1883), because it highlights the ways in which technologies of mediation not only are intrinsic to historically effected consciousness, but can come to set the pathways for specific forms of historical experience (Ross, this volume, Turkel and Jones-Imhotep, this volume) Inspired by daguerrotypy, Denton (1863) posited that events imprint traces on all kinds of matter, and that these traces can trigger vivid visual and sensory experiences of just such
events in the minds of what he called “sensitives” – i.e. people capable of rendering accessible to the senses (very much akin to photographic development) the past so recorded in brute matter\textsuperscript{xxv}.

Happily Denton’s wife was one such “sensitive”, and while a good number of the experiments he conducted with her fall in the geological realm, he also saw how the then nascent disciplines of history and archaeology might benefit from psychometric science. Such as when, in the course of experiments with a fragment of a fresco, pieces of tuft, and other specimens procured from Pompeii and Herculaneum, wrapped up in paper and placed in Mrs. Denton’s hand, she psychometrically corroborated the dread and terror Pliny the Younger conveyed in his narrative of his uncle’s death (in the Vesuvius eruption) in AD 79 – and she did so without any previous knowledge of the nature and origins of the specimens.

Denton’s methodology involved the haptic inspection of objects, thus allowing the past to “speak for itself” through the consciousness and sensorium of privileged observers. His was a spectrographic approach to the past, an alternative optics before the advent of x-rays, ultraviolet and infrared photography. That Mrs. Denton spoke of the remains of the dead in terms resembling the plaster casts that Giuseppe Fiorello was manufacturing of them at just the same time – revealing their bodies from the “negatives” they left in pyroclastic matter – certainly provides ground for intriguing speculations (Denton 1863:178-93):\textsuperscript{xxvi} Here one sees a remarkable convergence of older “low tech” impression taking with novel technologies of photographically re-mediating the (now absent) past in reshaping forms of historically effected consciousness. Up to this point there had been divergences in practice regarding, for example, the iconic visualization of the past in genre painting, bird’s-eye views (Ross, this volume), or panoramas (Rigney, this volume, Ross, this volume). But the rise of new indexical media such as photographic image impression and internal “darkroom development” of the past, the equally
novel sonic evidencing of the past in Edisonian phonography, and the possibilities for “replay” afforded by the Lumiére brothers’s cinematograph now began to impinge upon the type of cognitive processing necessary to produce textual accounts of the past.

In part, what may have been at issue was a competition for a monopoly over *hypotyposis* \(^\text{xxvii}\) -- the ability to make a particular description so vivid as to be compelling. Contemporaries of Walter Scott though they were, Ranke and Macaulay thought historiography could and should surpass historical fiction, whereas later thinkers otherwise as different as Herbert Butterfield and Georg Lukacs agreed on the superior *effectiveness* of the historical novel for the inculcation of (both liberal and proletarian) historical consciousness. With the advent of cinematography, however, optics flipped around from Denton’s emphasis on registration/detection, to the concerted, visual representation of historical topics in films such as D. W. Griffith’s *Birth of a Nation* (1915) and Sergei Eisenstein’s *Battleship Potemkin* (1924). Film removed historiography’s cornerstone: the written word. And hypotyposis has been completely reconfigured in the age of digital, 3-D and interactive media. \(^\text{xxviii}\) It strikes us that academic historians’ belated coming to terms with the *rhetorical* aspects of their praxis -- traceable, perhaps most prominently to Hayden White (1973) -- may owe a good deal to the competition that historical fiction and film posed by the middle of the 20th century. That so many recent films -- e.g. *Argo, 42, The King’s Speech, The Butler, 12 Years a Slave* or *Dunkirk* -- are accompanied by explicit riders advertising that they are “based on a true story” indicates that cinema and history are negotiating for space. \(^\text{xxix}\)

We thus need to take into account how the specific affordances of different media “inflect the historical imagination” (Ross, this volume); how specific “media ideologies” \(^\text{xxxi}\) shape our experience of interacting with the technologies in question; how such media are perceived as
transducing and amplifying what we judge to be not only authentic, but *experientially significant*, “signals from” a certain past over the sheer noise constituted by the data stream of which such signals inevitably form part (an old archival problem only partly solved by institutional appraisal of sources and finding aids – cf. Hedstrom 2002). This is a moment well exemplified in Bielo’s essay (this volume) where we see professional designers working for a Kentucky-based creationist museum (whose most ambitious project – a “life size” replica of Noah’s Arc – has meanwhile been realized) struggling to generate multi-mediated forms of hypotyposis in the absence of an academic endorsement that the message is “based on a true story”. But we also see this moment at work in Murray’s chapter (this volume) where state-ordained legal recognition of indigenous visions of the past forces curators in an academic institution to resort to ways of dealing with the past that stand in marked contrast to the historicist strictures against contaminating past with present and vice versa. In Murray’s case study the forms of mediation are remarkably “low tech,” involving the overcoming of institutional fire regulations for burning smudge sticks, or the imposition of menstrual taboos on female employees in the presence of Native American remains among the more dramatic mediating measures. The protective strictures of NAGPRA reorient the historicist tendencies of academic museology back to the uncanny pre- or non-historicist relationship to the past sensed in the archives by Michelet and given freer play in spiritualism or the paramnestic rapture of the Stendhal Syndrome. Or consider the implicit dissonance, discussed in Rubin’s chapter (this volume), between activists in the Spanish movements to recover the memory of Fascist crimes during that country’s civil war, and that of the archaeologists and forensic scientists involved in the exhumations of Franco’s victims. Here the objective forensic scientific procedure – locating mass graves, carefully exhuming the human remains, assembling osteological profiles of
identifiable victims, conducting DNA tests, contacting survivors who might corroborate such finds by personal memory – are a vital but distinctly subordinate element of a larger project: that of instilling a sense of the incompleteness of Spain’s return to democracy after generalissimo Franco’s death. To achieve this, Spain’s ARMH (Asociaciones para la Recuperación de la Memória Histórica) movement activists resort to diverse techniques for arousing affective responses among witnesses to such exhumations: they select testimony from descendants of victims not on the basis of richness of historical information but performative pathos; they stage pedagogical exercises where volunteers at excavations are invited to assume the place of the fallen; and they produced a video where the process of unearthing a victim of Franco’s violence is presented from the point of view of the dead person whose bones are slowly being released from his or her untimely grave, transferred to a laboratory, and eventually reunited with his or her descendants.

What could be more powerful an incitement to virtually “re-experience” the past in its relation to the present than to look through the eyes of the dead? But what if the intended subjects to such experience fail to let themselves be interpellated into such spectacular forms of mise-en-scene – as in the case of the resistant MA students who feature at the beginning of Rubin’s chapter? To be sure, the past is always only accessible to us in mediated – and so ultimately virtual – form. No matter what disciplines and techniques go into their making, a historical monograph is no less a virtuality than the kinds of “universal capture” hybrids between old style cinematographic methods, 3-D imaging, and digital animation that Lev Manovich (2006) hails as the infrastructure of a new “information aesthetics” that has begun to override older senses of the rhetorical trope of hypotyposis. What we should reckon with, in other words, are novel – and now decidedly “non-modern” (in Latour’s sense), perhaps post-historicist –
practices of mediation that play on a variety of human sensory capacities in order to not only suggest verisimilitude, but to synesthetically elicit visceral response: to generate, in other words not mere representational interfaces between present and past, but to engineer a “fusion of horizons” to the extent that the medium becomes the message: a portal to the past.

An example suggestive of both promises and failures of novel forms of technological mediation comes from the African American sociologist Alondra Nelson’s (2016) account of the genomic “reveal”: a term directly borrowed from reality TV shows. Here African Americans (usually prominent public figures) who have taken genomic ancestry tests are asked to ascend to the podium at elaborately staged events so as to publicly exhibit their reaction to the genomic disclosure of their (probabilistically calculated) biogeographical origins in Africa. Nelson who spends much energy in her book on hailing DNA-based ancestry searches as a potential means towards restitutive justice eventually recounts taking such a test herself, and participating in a public “reveal” ceremony. The results are anticlimactic. Where others break down in tears of joyful realization that a past denied to them by the violent genealogical rupture of slavery has finally been restored, Nelson finds herself anxiously glancing at the genomic scientist she had been working with. No pathos, no catharsis. Just a glance towards the biogenetical gatekeeper to her African past. In the end Nelson admits that she “felt like a fraud”. No matter how sophisticated the technology involved was, no matter how important Nelson feels its effects may be for some African American heritage-seekers, or what weight the evidence so produced can lend to claims for restorative justice: for her, it remained an interface – as between oil and water, in the original physical sense of the word – not an entry point into an affectively convincing past. No cathartic unification with a lost past; only resigned skepticism.
The Anthropology of Historical Experience

As Steven Conn (this volume) observes, we are in the midst of a generic turn. Before the advent of professional historiography Western societies looked to many diverse media for knowledge of the past – song, poetry, weaving, and graphic arts among others. With the rise of history as a discipline the number of credible genres for the transmission of history shrank dramatically in the face of a historiography governed by protocols of evidence, research, objectivity and dispassion. The earlier modes of relating to the past and producing statements about it did not entirely disappear, however, and other modes have come and gone over the last two centuries. But they have all occupied marginal positions in informing mainstream society about the past. Now, like a delayed return of the repressed, a new variety of alternative historicizing genres have appeared in modern societies and they look to be displacing the singular authority of conventional historicism. This transition did not happen in the last year, or even in the last decade. The new generic moment has been gestating since the introduction of photography and film. It increased in size with the arrival of television and digital media, and it will likely expand yet further as the public take up virtual reality devices and as the various media re-mediate each other (Rigney, this volume): historical fiction into films and into video games; internet culls of medieval monster lore made over through computer graphics and film special effects into Biblical era “dinosaurs” for display in an experiential museum of Noah’s Ark (Biolo, this volume). Each new technology has created new genres opening new experiences of the past and the present.

Neither the availability of technologies nor their particular capabilities are, however, sufficient to account for the increasing demand for historical experiences. This change in sensibility requires social and historical context and we may turn to Hartog’s contribution to this
volume, which extends the ideas presented in his book *Regimes of Historicity* (2015). There he proposed that the West has entered an epoch of “presentism” in which it has come to see itself against a limited horizon of the now, as if in a Las Vegas casino with no clocks (2015:xviii). This regime of historicity does not derive from Croce’s presentism; it arises, among many other factors, from the social consequences of twentieth-century pessimism after two major wars. At best the past could no longer be taken by the present as a useful guide and at worst it was irrelevant (as Henry Ford more or less put it). At the same time the future became dystopic, clouded by the possibilities of nuclear Armageddon, large-scale pollution, and global warming. With the past and the future foreclosed, “there is no longer anything but the present” (Hartog, this volume).

As indicators of this truncation, we judge events to be “historical” the moment they occur, arrogating thereby the ability to speak for the future. And we live the future in the present through strategies of risk-assessment, insurance underwriting, and debt accrual. While conventional historians still address the past across the gulf of time assumed by Macaulay and Collingwood, a heritage industry has sprouted around them governed by market considerations of entertainment and profitability and approached by the public as a consumable good. The past becomes part of a contemporary “experience economy” (Pine and Gilmore 1998) which involves the staging, themeing, memorability (souvenirs) and sensual engagement of consumer activities. Within this logic of presentism emotional engrossment in the past is actively “preferred to the values of distance and mediation” (Hartog 2015: 191).

In addition to the above, the presentist regime we seem to be inhabiting has been inflected by the challenge memory studies made to history beginning in the 1980s, a challenge analogous to Halbwachs’ opposition between “mysticism” and “scholasticism.” In remembering,
a person may confidently assert what it felt like to live a past in all its subjective emotional and sensory immediacy. A good example of this power of memory to summon forth the interior of historical experience may be found in Vanessa Agnew’s (this volume) study of the French Calvinist traveler de Léry’s reaction to hearing the music of the Brazilian Tupi. Their sublime harmonies left him enraptured and decades later he claimed the ability to re-experience this initial rapture whenever he summoned up the event in his aural memory. Like olfaction, music has a particular power to collapse the distance between past and present across a singular experience that belongs both to then and now. The question then arises as to whether listening to this music could allow others not present in the 16th century alongside de Léry to enter into an historical experience of the Tupi. Can music audition transfer beyond personal memory to become a collectively available historical instrument, another portal to the past? Does the phrase “the soundtrack of our lives” convey a mere slogan geared towards the consumptive choices of ageing baby boomers, or does it indicate a moment of broader, genuinely historical, let alone anthropological interest? In any event, Agnew’s case not only highlights the different qualities and constraints of history and memory; it shows how ideas from the field of memory studies come into dialogue with history and possibly prompt historians to explore broader experiential bandwidths in their research.

Listening to music may be a form of reenactment, and in other publications Agnew (e.g. 2004, 2007) has considered the value of all manner of reenactments for learning about the past – again with a view to expanding the methodology of history. Practices of reenactment have been on the rise, and in many cases they are bound up with the heritage industry as when visitors to a medieval site watch a combat between knights in armor. What is more striking than this kind of spectatorship is the number of people who themselves dress in period costume to reenact battles
or just enjoy an Edwardian picnic in their local park. In only a minority of cases is popular reenactment a quest to know the past “as it really was” (and, at this point, our placing that old Rankean phrase in apostrophes ought to be justified). As Handler and Saxton (1986) have shown, a number of competing impulses drive reenactment; surprisingly, they may all be addressed through a single term: authenticity.

Historicist authenticity means fidelity across time to an original, and reenactors go to great lengths to acquire or make clothing and accessories that conform to that expectation. A good many of them also read history books to get a more informed sense of the past. They diverge, however, over the extent to which they want reenactments to be historically accurate. Among German “Indianists,” who gather on an annual Waldlandtag (Woodland Day) in eastern Germany to reenact the historic lifeworld of Native Americans, political rifts have opened between those advocating scholarly correctness and those who see authenticity residing elsewhere. Some Indianists contend that too much anthropology stifles the authentic personal experience of reenactment, which offers valuable self-knowledge and self-transformation (Kalshoven 2015: 571). In this latter view the playing of Bohemian folk music in lieu of Native American songs should be allowed as a way of capturing the inner experience of the Indian world through analogy with the present. Civil War reenactors are similarly willing to travel only so far with historical facts, which serve as a springboard off which they launch into their own adventures that have authenticity (and factuality) because one experienced them oneself (Handler and Saxton 1988: 247, 253). Coherence with a present that the past is expected to enhance and experientially deepen is what appears to be sought after, not necessarily correspondence to an evidence-based theory of truth.
Then there is at least one more important sense of “authenticity” at play in modern reenactments, the one advanced by Heidegger and taken forward in existentialism; a set of ideas that may well have contributed to the rise of the presentism diagnosed by Hartog (this volume) by asserting that one must aim to be free to act in a given present. In an ironic twist on Marx, authentic being nowadays seems to derive from self-authorized choices that diverge from the expectations of historical tradition or the consensus of the madding crowd (cf. Handler and Saxton 1988: 250), and find fulfilment in individualized acts of consumption. Putting on a Confederate uniform, or joining the Society for Creative Anachronism are such steps toward producing oneself as an authentic individual. Yet one is united with thousands of others doing broadly the same thing. Authenticity of the Heideggerian existentialist sort may, thus, not be successfully achieved by mere affiliation or outward participation. It resides at a deeper level, in the ecstasies and transformations realized at the core of actual reenactments; in sublime historical experiences such as the one described by Arthur earlier in this Introduction.

The idea of authentication via personal revelation has been loaded with potential in Western practice since the rise of Protestantism with its insistence on the validity of personal experiences of God, the Spirit and Holy Scripture. The prominence of such convictions have ebbed and flowed, but the current fluorescence of charismatic Evangelical Christianity (e.g. Guyer 2007; Luhrmann 2012) -- where people may form personal relationships with, and converse with, holy figures -- has conditioned a broad swathe of society whose religious experiential tropes could easily inform their approach to the past. The New Age movement (Heelas 1996) has encouraged the pursuit of personal spiritual practices that can expand and improve the self, an orientation consistent with the reading of reenactment above, and like Evangelism a potential general influence on approaches to the past. Those practicing traditions
descended from spiritualism, such as channeling (Brown 1997), usually mediate spirits and gods, such as Thor and Freya, but occasionally they do also commune with historical figures. An example would be Jane Roberts who famously channeled a non-physical (i.e. non-historical) guru named Seth whose teachings became a cornerstone of the New Age. Later, she wrote a book detailing her communications with none other than the spirit of William James (Roberts 2001). Undoubtedly there are many more sources influencing the expanding variety of historical experiences. The regime of presentism broadly designates this conjuncture of forces, notably the turn to immersive, self-expanding ventures into the past which are often more concerned with present experience than past experience, thus completely upending the assumptions and priorities of academic historiography. While the majority of these emerging forms and genres of historical experience pull the individual off the touchline of dispassion in the direction of fuller sensory engagements, variety is also expanding in the other direction, and stretching the bounds of quietude. Turkel and Jones-Imhotep (this volume) call attention to the use of internet spiders, bots, and search engines that can cut down the amount of effort involved in research and make traditional scholarly practice look impossibly energetic. And as Ernst (2006) suggests, eventually the digital archive might be made to speak to us like an Intelligent Personal Assistant such as Siri or Alexa. Whether that would be a low bandwidth or a broad bandwidth historical experience (in Michelet’s sense or that of Spike Jonze’s 2013 movie Her) cannot yet be said.

This type of historical experience will not, however, and perhaps intrinsically can no longer, yield to the kind of class-based collective historical being that Marx and his successors once imagined. In the age of big data – to whose scrutiny every internet past-seeker now willingly submits – we may all well be acquiring heritages of our individual, but not necessarily for our collective selves. Never mind the genuine potential of digital media for the retrieval of
data on our pasts (Turkel and Imhotep-Jones, this volume, cf. Rosenzweig [2011] for a measured account by a pioneer of “digital history”). Yet, our aggregate choices (a click here, a click there), may well come to haunt us in the form of pasts composed of stochastic accumulations of choices that machines read off of our clickstream behavior. Transduced into humanly readable text such (principally meaningless) patterns of binary code might then come to indicate what kind of past we appear to be most likely to consume. In other words, as computational processes (programmed by humans, to be sure) second-guess our experience of the past so as to predict our future behavior we become part of anonymous collectivities of individual consumers, socially unconnected in what scholars of virtual reality tend to call RL (real life)? We all know that Google, Amazon, and other IT giants already tell us that people (like us!) who ordered the latest biography of Abraham Lincoln, a book about colonial atrocities in the Belgian Congo, or Apicius’s Late Roman culinary breviary “might also be interested in…” . Could this be the future of historical consciousness and experience in the online age?

In sum, the current proliferation of techniques for relating to the past has made the issue of historical experience thinkable in new ways that this interdisciplinary collection brings forward in aggregate and in its various synergies around topics such as technologies, remediation/transduction and (post-)historicism. Conventional historiography consistent with the precepts developed in the nineteenth century still reigns supreme in the West but this should not render us incurious about other ways of gaining knowledge about the past. Our title alludes to a famous work by William James (1982[1902]) who surprised conventional Christians with his descriptions of the seemingly unconventional, even weird forms that Christian practice could take even within respectable denominations. His work was ethnographic in its descriptions of the luxuriant variations of practices that, according to the sensibilities of instituted theology, should
simply not have existed at all. This volume shows how many types of historical experience are flourishing in the shadow of historicism, the theology of modern history. To conventional historiography the proliferation of forms of historical engagement such as commercialized mediatization, heritage-ization and reenactment may seem like so many barbarians at the gate (they might, on the contrary, prove to be so many career opportunities). Like James, our approach undertakes to describe them, understand them in their own terms, and to study what sorts of pragmatic effects they may have on the world. For a discipline like anthropology whose mission once was to study the barbarians on Europe’s colonial peripheries (and their supposedly mythically warped visions of their own past), turning the mirror towards our own relations with the past seems not only a logical, but a necessary critical task.

References


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i Toutefois je ne tardai à m’apercevoir dans la silence apparent de ces galleries, qu’il y avait un movement, un murmure qui n’était pas de la mort. Ces papiers, ces parchemins laissés a la dépui long-temps ne demandaient pas mieux que de revenir au jour. Ces papiers ne sont pas des papiers, mais de vies d’hommes, de provinces, de peuples […] Et en mesure que je soufflais sur leur poussière, je les voyais se soulever. Ils tiraient du sépulcre qui la main, qui la tête comme dans le Jugement dernier de Michel-Ange, ou dans la Danse des morts. Cette danse galvanique qu’ils menaient autour de moi, j’ai essayé de la reproduire en ce livre.

ii We employ historiography either in its literal sense as “history writing”, or to refer more generally to the history profession for which writing books and articles about the past is central. Historiography can also mean the study of styles of history writing, but we do not use it in that sense.

iii This volume generally focuses on the experiencing of pasts that one did not live through and which are not, therefore, accessible to personal memory. Memory is, undoubtedly, a conduit for historical
experience because sensations felt in the past can be reactivated, or at least serve as the basis for activating strong new emotional reactions. This is an important topic, but a large one, which we leave to one side here, except to say that the phenomenon of memory and the rise of memory studies do condition, among several other influences, the historical experience of the more distant past. For critiques of the “history vs. memory” literature of the 1990s see Huyssen (2000), Klein (2000) and Rigney (this volume).

iv The concept of colligation in history – the identification of individual events as forming a conceptual whole as part of an epoch (e.g. the Renaissance) or in relation to particular trajectories (such as the expansion of liberty, or a build-up to war; McCullagh 2009: 160) – exemplifies this modeling on natural science procedures. The paradigmatic example of colligation, identified by Whewell in 1847, was Kepler’s plotting of the various positions of Mars, which allowed him to determine that its movement formed an ellipse (Walsh 1978; McCullagh 1978).

v Some might consider the activity of thinking not to be an experience (Williams 1976: 12f.). We view it, along with other relatively tranquil activities, as perhaps less striking and sensational than other experiences, but as experiences nonetheless.

vi As Croce explains, “When the development of the culture of my historical moment presents to me (it would be superfluous and perhaps also inexact to add to myself as an individual) the problem of Greek civilization or of Platonic philosophy or of a particular mode of Attic manners, that problem is related to my being in the same way as the history of a bit of business in which I am engaged, or of a love affair in which I am indulging, or of a danger that threatens me. I examine it with the same anxiety and am troubled with the same sense of unhappiness until I have succeeded in solving it” (Croce 1921: 13).

vii A view associated with the philosopher of science Carl Hempel (e.g. 1942: 44f.), who marginalized discovery procedures in his focus on the explanation and validation of findings (Apel 1987: 135; Stueber 2002: 25).

viii As an example, in 2013 British politicians and historians debated the pedagogical value of experiential exercises such as dressing up in period costumes or standing tightly packed to feel what transportation on a slave ship might have been like. Some claimed that this sort of “child-centred” learning had prevented generations of children from learning history properly (Ferguson 2013).

ix Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) was one of the founders of a modern historiography characterized by the rigorous critical approach to historical sources.

x Ranke wrote: “In making the comparison [between historical fiction and the use of historical documentary sources] I convinced myself that the historical tradition is more beautiful, and certainly more interesting, than the romantic fiction” (Bei der Vergleichung überzeugte ich mich, dass das historische Ueberlieferte selbst schöner und jedenfalls interessanter sei, als die romantische Fiction.) (Grafton 1997: 38).

xi Ranke (1881 [1854]) wrote: “I would maintain, however, that every epoch is immediate to God, and that its value in no way depends on what may have eventuated from it, but rather in its existence alone, its own unique particularity.” [Ich aber behaupte, jede Epoche ist unmittelbar zu Gott, und ihr Wert beruht gar nicht auf dem, was aus ihr hervorgeht, sondern in ihrer Existenz selbst, in ihrem eigenen Selbst.] Reference to the English-language expression “We are all God’s children” possibly illuminates Ranke’s use of “God” in this assertion about equal validity despite difference.

xii Furthermore, historians thought deeply about how to bridge the chasm between past and present, an issue that recurs in anthropological worries about translation and radical alterity. The two disciplines are indeed closely related.

xiii Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) studied under Ranke in Berlin and he recollected this “liveliest of figures”, in the following words: “An inner movement, which also manifested itself outwardly, seemed to always transfer him into the event or the human being of which he was speaking. I remember the effect as he spoke of the relation of Alexander VI to his son Cesare [Borgia]: He loved him, he feared him, he hated him. I was greatly influenced by Ranke, even more by his seminar than by his lectures. He was like a mighty organism assimilating chronicles, Italian politicians, ambassadors, historians…- transforming
everything into the power to objectively intuit what has been. To me he was the embodiment of historical insight as such” (2010[1903]: 389).

xiv Tellingly, Collingwood (1946: 266) recurrrd to the analogy of detective fiction: arguably commencing with E.A. Poe -- the genre itself was barely a hundred years old by then. It was revived, and incorporated into anthropology by none other than Marcel Griaule (1957) in his bizarre comparison of the native informant with the criminal and the ethnographer as the trial judge determining the “social fact” at issue. It is hard to say what the status of Collingwood’s formulation is among historians today – that is an empirical question that an ethnography of historical practice might answer. Our sense is that it has filtered into the widely held assumption that historians necessarily use their imagination to recover the past for their accounts. It has certainly found its way into the teaching of history in schools (Pattiz 2004, but see also Wineburg 2010).

xvi Consistent with his notion of mutual sympathy, Smith (ibid.: 13) elsewhere elaborates on feelings for the dead that uncannily seem to anticipate some of Heidegger’s thought on death and finality in relation to historical being.

xvii Here we should note that this reductionist program comes from the pen of none other than the author of the infamous Minute on Education (1835) in which Macaulay lashed out against local forms of knowledge, thus laying the foundations for the colonization of the Indian past. As Macaulay wrote then, “It is said that the Sanscrit and the Arabic are the languages in which the sacred books of a hundred millions of people are written, and that they are on that account entitled to peculiar encouragement. Assuredly it is the duty of the British Government in India to be not only tolerant but neutral on all religious questions. But to encourage the study of a literature, admitted to be of small intrinsic value, only because that literature inculcated the most serious errors on the most important subjects, is a course hardly reconcilable with reason, with morality, or even with that very neutrality which ought, as we all agree, to be sacredly preserved. It is confined that a language is barren of useful knowledge. We are to teach it because it is fruitful of monstrous superstitions. We are to teach false history, false astronomy, false medicine, because we find them in company with a false religion”. http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00generallinks/macaulay/txt_minute_education_1835.html Since the present volume focuses on the (however uneven) spread of historicism in its original homeland (“The West”), this is not the place to discuss this fascinating and important moment (see Nandy 1995, Feierman 1999, Chakrabarty 2000, Palmié and Stewart 2016).

xviii This novel conception enabled a variety of characteristically “modernist” projects and notions that drove human becoming back into what became Darwinian biology (Trautman n 1992), forward into what Marx and Engels saw as a coming new political-economic dispensation, and towards the more general structure of feeling that Henry Adams, at the end of that century, diagnosed as a pervasive sense of acceleration of social eventuation.

xix The hermeneutic circle at the core of historically effected consciousness is consistent, if not identical, with the circular interchange between Erlebnis (particular experience) and Erfahrung (cumulative experience) formulated by Dilthey and developed by many thinkers in his wake (Jay 2005: 11, et passim; Carr 2013: 220). Any given sailing excursion – the first one especially -- is an experience (Erlebnis); having undertaken many such trips makes one a sailor with experience (Erfahrung). This accumulated experience modulates the experience of each new sailing trip and each further voyage contributes something to the overall experience-derived understanding of sailing in a loop.

xx Or, alternatively – the other side of the coin – a melancholic mourning of the passing of the past as seen in the rise of folklore as a field of study, or even in Durkheim’s mechanical vs organic solidarity, and the focus of his early sociology on the ills brought on by industrialization.

xxi Drawing on Poulet (1954) we define paramnesia as: ‘a a condition or phenomenon involving distorted memory or confusions of fact and fantasy, such as confabulation or déjà vu.’ This covers a wide range of phenomena from false memories, to disorienting temporal confusion as seen in Jerusalem Syndrome (see below).
In a more anguished fashion, the sense of fusion of temporal horizons also animates both Ernst Bloch’s reflections on the simultaneity of the non-contemporaneous ("Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen") and Benjamin’s meditations on “messianic time”.

One is reminded of Marx’s own evocation of the imagery of dancing tables in his denunciation of the queer metaphysics generated by commodity fetishism.

In part, this is the sense of “historicism” in which Karl Popper (1957) would come to (however mistakenly) denounce Marxian teleologies. But it is also present in the way that, e.g., Ernst Troeltsch – who coined the phrase “crisis of historicism” in 1922 – began to worry about the radical critique of any meaning of and in History for which Nietzsche (and in a different sense the historical biblical criticism of Feuerbach, Renan, Robertson Smith, and Troeltsch’s own earlier work) had paved the way.

Denton was likely not aware that the general idea – sans the photographic analogy – was all but new (he cited the Cincinnati physician Joseph R. Buchanan who coined the term “psychometry” as his crucial source of inspiration). Most proximately, it was none other than Charles Babbage who in his polemically self-titled Ninth Bridgewater Treatise’s (1837) chapter ix “On the Permanent impression of Our Words and Actions on the Globe We Inhabit” expounded remarkably similar ideas.

That Freud (1959[1907]) would later recur to Jensen’s Gradiva to hone his archeological metaphors regarding memories inaccessible to conscious introspection – buried – beneath surface “screens” only adds to the – shall we say uncanny? – nature of Denton’s psychometric science.

Hypotyposis: “vivid description of a scene, event or situation bringing it, as it were, before the eyes of the hearer or reader” (OED).

Ann Rigney has written that ‘given the new media ecologies in which we are presently immersed’… ‘the core business of professional historians’ [namely WRITING about history] might not any longer be the same business, even though it appears the same (2010: 117, see also Beck 2012:119 et passim).

In journals such as Rethinking History, founded by a historian who advised on films, the pros and cons of history on the big screen have long been debated.

Gershon(2010). Socially salient apperceptions of what can or cannot be communicated through specific channels of information conveyance (about the past, for example).

Such as when the problem of establishing the plaintiffs’s legal standing (which has long hobbled reparation suits) is circumvented by molecularbiological means.

Cf. Guyer (2007) for a sophisticated anthropological reflection on the consequences of recent trends in macro-economics for Western experiences of time that dovetails with Hartog’s assessment, but also references prophetic modes of temporality.

In saying so we readily concede that – as scholars who lived the better part of their lives in the 20th century – we remain haunted by what Derrida once diagnosed as the spectres of Marx. Of course, “RL” (real life) has become just as much a convenient technological fiction as AI (artificial intelligence) and VR (virtual reality) have long been. Cf. Brey (2014) for a useful parsing of the philosophical issues involved in these distinctions.