Psychoanalytic literature on migration often focuses on individual case studies of migrants, describing the psychic mechanisms that make up the subject’s experience (e.g. splitting, dissociation, mourning, melancholia...). This literature is important, but it is written through a methodological individualism which offers little critical analysis of the broader political and cultural contexts of migration. As a result, it does little to help us address the pressing question of our time, which is how people can live together in a world where migration, displacement, and cultural diversity are the new normal. A psychoanalytic approach which addresses this question must maintain an emphasis on subjectivity, but it must also link subject-formation to the circulations of fantasies about self, others, and community within specific national and local contexts. In this chapter we draw on a range of empirical case studies to show how identification with such fantasies defines a community’s experience of immigration and diversity.

Migration and displacement are taking place on an unprecedented scale today. The movement of people throughout the world is diversifying the demography of cities and challenging established norms of identity, community and belonging. In many countries it is also putting pressures on social cohesion, public services, and political stability. According to a recently published UN report, there are approximately 244 million people worldwide living outside of their country of birth (United Nations 2016). In addition, there are millions more who do live in their country of birth but whose parents were migrants or refugees. Understanding how and why individuals and communities
respond to migration and diversity, and what it takes for them to flourish in the context of mass global movement is one of the main challenges facing the world today.

Psychoanalysis is well-positioned to address these issues from the standpoint of subjectivity as the relationship between psyche and society. While most academic analyses of migration and diversity focus on the economic, social, cultural and political effects of migration and diversity, a psychoanalytic approach can develop an account of how these processes contribute to specific modes of subject-formation and experiences of the subject’s relationship to itself and others. Psychoanalytic practitioners, furthermore, have the unique opportunity to observe and understand the intimate, often unconscious, psychic experiences that result from personal histories of migration and encounters with different cultures, people and places. Consequently, there are a number of significant contributions that draw on clinical data to develop theories about the psychodynamics of immigration and identity change (e.g. Ainslie 2009, 2011; Akhtar 1999; Lobban 2006; Walsh and Shulman 2007; Youakim 2004). Such clinically-based approaches aim ‘to develop […] [a] perspective based on the qualities of the attachments between the newcomer and the receptor group’ – an approach based on ‘the types of object relations the individual had before he immigrated and […] the object relations of the community that receives him’ (Grinberg and Grinberg 1989: 2).

Other psychoanalytically informed approaches have focused on the rigours of assimilation and the parameters of loss. For example, Lobban argues that in the specific context of the United States where there are strong pressures for immigrants to assimilate, it is difficult for immigrants to ‘meld experiences derived from […] [their]
original culture and American culture, so [...] [the] two sets of experiences often remain disconnected’ (Lobban 2006: 74). The vital connection between the subject’s sense of self and their country of origin becomes disrupted, but it yet remains preserved in the psyche, albeit in a partially dissociated form. Migrants under such conditions, Lobban argues, can develop complex internal conflicts, whereby negative feelings about the country of origin (resulting from pressures to assimilate) can coexist with nostalgic longing for ‘the motherland’ as a place where one can comfortably belong. Similarly, Walsh and Shulman (2007) examine the effects over time of the ‘splits in the self’ that result from immigration. A ‘split’ in this context refers to the process of developing multiple experiences of belonging, linked to loss, nostalgia, and a sense of exclusion or confusion. Such experiences impel the subject to find different ways of coming to terms with the psychological tensions of multiplicity through processes such as dissociation, mourning, idealization of the country of origin, or acceptance of one’s own multiply constituted selfhood. For Walsh and Shulman, the key question for psychoanalysis is ‘to what extent or under what circumstances such splits in a sense of self are a healthy and adaptive defense activated after immigration in order to protect the ego or self from overwhelming anxiety [...]’ (Walsh and Shulman 2007: 357).

Psychoanalytic works such as these are crucial for understanding the psychodynamics of immigration and the unconscious conflicts that lurk beneath the conscious experiences of being a migrant. What is foregrounded in such work are questions of belonging, and the multiple forms belonging can take. But questions of belonging are always linked to a prior question about how we are formed within social life, not just in terms of the relation between the psyche and the external world, but more specifically as a consequence of inhabiting a specific place and time. Subjectivity
is inevitably tied both to history and to the restructuring of the political understood as the restructuring of political possibilities. The psychoanalytic insight that is of most assistance here is the notion that subjectivity is bound up with representations, forms of fantasy and structures of feeling that create pleasure and identification, as well as repudiation, disavowal and prejudice. Projects of identification and difference are imaginative, and thus fantasy is a key component of our relations with others, as well as the hopes, desires and hatreds we project onto them (Mintchev 2018, Moore 2011; 2013). Both subjectivity and fantasy have histories, and this forces us to attend to the intelligibility of subject formation within given historico-political schemes and relations of value. As Butler would have it, there is ‘no self-making outside of the norms that orchestrate the possible forms that a subject may take’ (Butler 2005: 17). But two questions require consideration here: the first is how do these ‘norms’ transform within the process of history; and the second is what happens when such norms are themselves animated by difference and/or are the product of multiple and contradictory fantasies internal to specific historico-political schemes?

In order to address such questions, we turn in this chapter not to subject formation for those who move and face pressures to assimilate, but for those who have to assume the role of host or inhabit, however partially, the majoritarian position. It is worthy of note that there has been far more psychoanalytically informed research on immigrants and processes of loss and adaptation than there has been on how resident/host communities respond to migration. Where such work exists, it is frequently refigured as an aspect of discussions on nationalism, with a focus on the bond between subjects and nation – investment, affect, enjoyment (jouissance), libidinal investment (e.g. Auestad 2013; Laclau 2004; Stavrakakis and Chrysoloras 2006). For
psychoanalytic scholars, subjectivity is always intersubjectivity, formed and challenged by relations with others, and while different theoretical traditions within psychoanalysis give different accounts of the processes of subject formation, most theorists stress its fluid and unfinished nature. But what must be emphasized here is that identification is not achieved on the basis of a pre-determined pathway, but is rather a contingent process – it may occur in relation to some people or ideas but not others, it may succeed or fail in achieving its grasp of the subject’s psyche and body, and it may be accepted or refused when imposed onto the subject by authority (Butler 1990, 1997). This contingency of identification means that understanding people’s relationship to contexts of immigration and diversity must not be over-theorized – it must not be explained simply through theoretical concepts as if these operate in the same way in all places and at all times (something which psychoanalytic writers often assume). On the contrary, understanding immigration and diversity psychoanalytically requires empirical description and close attention to the types of identifications that define self-other relations, as well as the social and historical circumstances in which these identifications are established. In what follows we put forth a number of examples from different parts of the world in which specific forms of identification (or disidentification) with representations and fantasies about self and others underpin the ways in which people experience immigration and diversity in everyday life.

**Beirut, Lebanon**

One evening in 2011, in Beirut’s district of Bourj Hammoud, a fight broke out between a local man and a Syrian migrant. The fight escalated to the point where the Lebanese army had to intervene. As the anthropologist Joanne Randa Nucho (2016: 44-49) points
out in her ethnographic account of Bourj Hammoud and the events that followed the incident, it was extremely unusual for the state army to intervene in such a fashion. Whenever fights broke out in Bourj Hammoud, they were usually handled by the local police unit, but this particular incident was different because it involved a local Armenian Lebanese and a Kurdish Syrian migrant.

Bourj Hammoud is the Armenian quarter of Beirut, and most of its residents are Lebanese citizens of Armenian descent. Lebanon’s political terrain is divided along religious/sectarian and ethnic lines and in Beirut, as elsewhere in the country, this confessional system of governance permeates into numerous other aspects of social and economic life: it defines local spatial organization whereby patterns of residence are largely defined by sectarian divisions; and it also determines the management and distribution of public services, social care and education, all of which are run at the level of local authorities and in line with local sectarian affiliation (Monroe 2016). In Bourj Hammoud, the party in charge is the Tashnag party which represents Armenian interests in parliament and organizes local activities ranging from public service provision to housing development projects.

In Lebanon there is a strong sense of community among members of different confessional groups, and the Armenians are no exception. For them, the Armenian community’s solidarity and capacity to mobilize was a source of protection during the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), and is still seen as essential for ensuring people’s physical and economic security in the event that violence breaks out again. The Armenian communal solidarity, however, is not only held together by the recent memory of war and the persistent anxiety of future conflict, it is also constructed around
a shared history of persecution, genocide and survival. The majority of Lebanon’s ethnic Armenians came to the country as refugees fleeing the Ottoman Empire’s Armenian genocide of 1915-1919. As with other Armenian diaspora throughout the world, the collective memory of genocide weighs heavily on Lebanese Armenians, and it plays a central role in defining their sense of history and origin, as well as their experience of community and identity: ‘Being Armenian, namely in the diaspora, meant being a survivor of genocide, and therefore a member of a community of sufferers’ (Panossian 2002: 136). In this context, Armenian identity is based on a historical narrative of persecution in which the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman Turks play a key role as perpetrators. What is more, this history also features Kurds as the people who carried out the atrocities of the genocide.

The role of Kurds in the historical consciousness of Lebanese Armenians was clearly an important factor in how the Bourj Hammoud fight was handled, and it also played a role in the subsequent events which saw the expulsion of Syrian Kurds from Beirut’s Armenian district (Nucho 2016). The fight was a flashpoint in which a historical antagonism between Armenians and Kurds erupted into public life with enormous impact on the relationship between locals and migrants. Crucially, the fear and hostility towards Syrian Kurds following the fight did not extend to all Syrians; it was only aimed towards Syrians who were also Kurds, and it was only the Armenian Lebanese – not those affiliated to other Christian denominations – who made the distinction between Kurdish and non-Kurdish Syrians. As Nucho observed during her fieldwork,
After the fight there was a major shift in the focus of my Armenian interlocutors’ fear of migrant workers. Many of them emphasized the particular threat of Kurds and not Syrians or any other migrant worker community. There was a kind of exceptionalism by which Kurds were perceived as especially dangerous and distinct from Arab Syrian workers. While both groups were citizens of Syria, traveled with similar papers, and occupied similar positions in the Lebanese labour market, Armenian interlocutors tended to single out Kurds as particularly dangerous (Nucho 2016: 45).

In the days following the fight, many Kurds were expelled from Bourj Hammoud for reasons which were opaque. The Lebanese media speculated that the expulsion was politically motivated because the Tashnag party was politically aligned with the Syrian regime, while Syrian Kurds were in opposition to it. The expulsion would prevent Kurds from organizing activities in Beirut to oppose the Syrian government and so both the Tashnag party and the Syrian government would benefit. The Tashnag party’s official statement denied that any expulsion had taken place on political grounds, claiming that the only people who were affected were those without proper documentation.

What was crucial, however, as Nucho’s ethnography shows, is that the political and legal narratives that explained/justified the expulsion of Kurds from Beirut’s Armenian quarter, intersected with strong hostility and fear justified on historical grounds by members of the community. Anti-immigrant rhetoric in this case evoked
histories of the Armenian genocide as well as the Lebanese wars which emphasized the threat of foreigners and the need to keep the Armenian community safe:

Many who were in favour of Kurds being evicted started to contextualize their feelings within older histories of the genocide. I lost count of how many times I heard people say that Kurds were the ones who carried out the genocide and acted as mercenaries […] Histories of the genocide started blurring into narratives about the Lebanese wars and then again into accounts of violent crimes […] directly attributed by my interlocutors to the rise of Kurdish migration into the area (Nucho 2016: 48).

This example of hostility towards Kurdish Syrian migrants in Bourj Hammoud illustrates how host-immigrant relations and people’s orientations towards others are overdetermined by a series of different factors. These range from diasporic historical consciousness, to models of national governance, and patterns of ethnic co-habiting within the city. These factors shape the circulations of discourses and fantasies about self and others with which people on the ground can identify. After the fight in Bourj Hammoud, Armenians strengthened their already existing identification as people who were historically persecuted with the complicity of Kurds, and also as people who constantly face the threat of violence and war in their country’s delicate sectarian balance. This also translated into wider anxieties about insecurity and crime in Bourj Hammoud, as well as seeding a climate of hostility in which Syrian migrants were expelled for no reason other than being Kurds.
The role of representations of identity and nationhood is crucial here. Benedict Anderson (1983) famously described the nation as an imagined community, but a psychoanalytic approach goes further in figuring the nation not just as a social construct, but as a fantasy ideal that is by its nature unattainable. As Ghassan Hage has argued for Maronite-Muslim relations in Lebanon, the ideal of an uncomplicated belonging to a nation that faces no impediment is itself a fantasy; an unrealizable object that functions as the object cause of desire in Lacanian terms. The permanent crisis of the other who threatens the realization of the fantasy is actually part of the structure of the fantasy’s reproduction, turning what is an impossibility into a deferred possibility (Hage 1996). The Armenian struggle for survival in the face of persecution and genocide is an undisputed fact, but it would be a mistake to imagine that all that is being invoked in the aftermath of the Bourj Hammoud fight is a series of historical events or the repetition of a nationalist myth. As Hage (1996: 123) suggests, the repeated threat of erasure at the hands of the other might be better understood as a performative staging of the symbolic existence of the Armenian people, a contemporary staging of what makes them who they are, a confirmation of what it means to be Armenian.

The ideal nation is the ideal communal life in which the subject is positioned, and within which belonging is never in question. However, the psychological and often unconscious reality of belonging is complicated, and within an overall fantasy structure, subjects will experience different modes of belonging and forms of attachment, and these will change over lifetimes and through historical time. There is therefore always a degree of anxiety occasioned by the desire to belong, and by the perception that someone or something is impeding the ability to belong. What this in essence means is that fantasies are not unchanging, rather there is much work to be done to assure their
reproduction across changing social and historical circumstances. We need to attend here not just to the fantasy structure, but to the active work of its reproduction under changing historico-political schemes. The changing lived reality of the subject has to be incorporated into the symbolic space of the fantasy (Hage 1996: 131), and contemporary social relations need to be fixed into symbolic and institutional orders in a manner that makes them liveable for the subject. Hence the necessity for the Armenian community to seek to strengthen the links between the historic genocide, the Lebanese wars and the experience of contemporary violent crime, renewing the symbolic standing of the community and refashioning and repurposing the fantasy for changing historical circumstances.

London, United Kingdom

The resurgence of populist politics across Europe has been interpreted by many as a return to forms of chauvinistic nationalism. However, the apparent stability and force of national identifications require a more in depth ethnographic analysis than a mere assertion of a return of old nationalist sentiments. In the UK, new forms of subjectification are emerging as a consequence of the changing role of others and otherness. These new forms of otherness signal transformations in ways of life that have both experiential power and value for different sections of the community. In this section, we focus not on differences between the nation and others, but on the differing relations to otherness that jostle and coalesce in different communities and circumstances in the UK. These differences ‘within’ draw attention to forms of identification that incorporate aspects of, but also go well beyond the nation and the national.
Successive waves of immigration from countries all over the world have turned London into what has been termed a ‘super-diverse’ city (Vertovec 2007). This means that in many parts of the city large numbers of ethnic groups live together, but also that within each group there are significant differences in length of residence, social status, legal/citizenship status, class, religious identity and linguistic proficiency, among other factors. These internal differences apply to the ‘indigenous’ White British group as much as they apply to other groups. The demographic composition of London is quite different from that of the rest of the UK. While in the country as a whole the ‘White British’ ethnic group comprises 81.9% of the population (according to the most recent census in 2011), in London this figure is only 44.9%. In some boroughs such as Newham, the White British form only 17% despite being the largest ethnic group in the area (CoDE 2013). One of the consequences of such widespread social differentiation between and within groups, is that it is very difficult for any one ethnic group to form a large and cohesive community.

London’s demographic transformation has resulted in both losses and opportunities with regard to social relations with others. On the one hand, the older sense of community based on ethnicity is now lost for many people as ethnic affiliations are no longer as strong and as significant as before. This is why so many Londoners, especially of the older generation, feel that they have lost their community (e.g. Dench et al. 2006, Gest 2016). On the other hand, however, London’s super-diversity has opened up the potential for radically new experiences of identity and difference. Since ubiquitous difference dominates so many public spaces in the city, it is now easier than ever before for people to feel secure with their own difference. In a place where
everyone is different, it becomes very difficult, impossible even, to stand out as different in specific ways from a single reference community (Mintchev and Moore 2016a). Diversity becomes a normal part of daily life.

As we show in our recent research on the London Borough of Newham (Mintchev and Moore 2016b), many local residents in that borough see diversity as a positive attribute of the area, and take pride in engaging in a community that includes people from different parts of the world. For the Newham residents that we worked with, community was about active engagement with, and contribution to, the neighbourhood and its residents. The activities that made an individual a legitimate member of the local community in Newham included a number of different elements from volunteer work at a local school, to participation in different cultural events, and even involvement in a local neighbourhood watch scheme designed to deter crime.

However, acceptance of diversity does not foreclose the possibility of anti-immigrant anxieties and prejudices. It is not uncommon for London residents to support diversity while opposing immigration. The key point here is that the dividing line which distinguishes the newly arrived migrants from the more established residents is not one of ethnicity but rather one of being able to make a claim of belonging in virtue of length of residence and local engagement. In fact, members of ethnic minorities who are themselves immigrants or the descendants of immigrants often voice opposition to new immigration (James 2014: 658-662, Cohen 2013: 315, Wessendorf 2014). This is not so much the consequence of the racialization of otherness in the accepted sense of the term, as it is about fear (whether justified or not) that new immigration will put pressure on already scarcely available jobs, school places, and public services, while at the same
time it will increase crime rates, make neighbourhoods less safe, and increase anti-social behaviour. The key difference between this fear of immigration and more traditional forms of exclusion is that in the case of London’s diverse regions both sides of the divide – the established residents and the newcomers – are ethnically diverse. This raises the question of how to account for forms of identification that both celebrate difference and yet still figure new arrivals as potentially threatening. In other words, what are the forms of subjectification that are relevant to the construction of such complex and contradictory subject positions?

One possible set of explanations starts with the idea that identities are never unitary, and are always bound up with the language, ideas, debates, perceptions and experiences of others (Mintchev 2018; Moore 2007; Moore and Wekker 2011). But, here we perhaps see forms of subjectification that are formed through the enjoyment of difference, where otherness is constitutive of the subject, not as lack but rather as plenitude. London’s long history of colonialism, trade and wealth creation undergirds its late twentieth and early twenty first century embrace of free markets, deregulation, and financialisation. The promise of London as a global capital is one in which everyone will benefit, while the capitalist marketplace offers access to every good and all experiences. In this marketplace of desire, differences become commodities – Thai food, Pashtun shawls and the like – are the mere epiphenomenon of a global system of consumption that can provide everything. The subjective enjoyment of cultural difference marks a subject who is not only knowledgeable about this world, but able to demonstrate their facility to function in it and to succeed in persuading it to release its riches. This too is a fantasy and one based on the marketization of desire, on an imaginary subject who transcends the nation, being inherently diverse and multicultural.
This is a subject rooted not in the symbolic, but in a set of imaginary identifications that have formed out of transformations in social and economic circumstances, and the embrace of globalization (Dean 2008). There is a fantasy here of a freedom from the nation and from communal identities, whilst simultaneously benefitting from the interoperability of difference.

What London’s super-diversity shows is that communal identities undergo transformation under changing socio-economic circumstances. However, such transformations involve new modes of otherness that go beyond changes in the content of the self-other relation to involve structural variations in forms of identification and subjectification. Under the conditions of globalization, transformations in ways of life, experiences, motivations and values have refigured cultural distinctiveness as consumable cultural difference, where it is the plenitude of difference that forms the basis of subjective enjoyment rather than the binary of inclusion/exclusion characteristic of self-other relations predicated on more familiar forms of majoritarian/minoritarian politics. The origins of new modes of otherness are themselves multiple, as both Nava (2002) and Kristeva (1993) suggest, and link back to early twentieth century ideas of imagined inclusivity that transcended the nation and were linked to countercultural trends and progressive politics. The normalization of difference was part of a longer European fascination with the ‘allure of elsewhere’ (Nava 2002: 91), one that was connected both to the colonial project, and to its critique.

The larger point here is that the intimate economy of self-other relations links difference inescapably to desire, and where difference itself becomes an object of desire new relays of relation between self and other become possible. Subjectivity is not a
finished process, nor does it proceed as Foucault constantly reminded us, through processes of complete domination or over determination (Butler 2005: 22-25; Moore 2011: chap 1.) Dissonant patterns of desire, ways of valuing and seeing the world that do not form part of dominant cultural forms, can take hold at specific cultural moments and transform the nature of the political, refiguring the politics of the possible. Certain places, people and forms of representation have at specific moments come to ‘represent an “elsewhere” of the imagination associated with pleasure, freedom and hope’ (Nava 2002: 87, 89). Novel forms of belonging not only involve novel performances of self, but new ways of relating to others and to the wider social and cultural worlds we engage with through media and technology. Self-other relations can also have different spatial scales within the same temporal frame. More distant and imaginary relations with others get caught up in the relays of affect, emotion and desire that characterize our most intimate relationships, and simultaneously our most intimate relationships are enlivened by the pleasures and desires arising through our imaginary engagements with others elsewhere. Imaginary identifications are often attached to relays of affect and longing that do not respect the boundaries of gender, race, ethnicity, religion or nation (Moore 2011: 78-79). However, the super-diversity of London goes further than this perhaps. It is not just a matter of the pleasures of difference, ‘elsewhere’, culture, but of a series of identifications predicated on a fantasy of plenitude, of difference without limit. This may account both for the celebratory nature of multiple differences in super-diverse communities like those in London, and for the fact that these multiply constituted communities/subjects still fear the arrival of additional others. Plenitude must have limits, it cannot be infinite and it could be lost.
It may also account for the reaction of many outside London to the city’s diversity, and its perceived limitless opportunities. The UK’s Brexit vote in 2016 reflected growing public discontent with the stark inequalities between the capital and a few other affluent cities on the one hand, and the rest of the UK on the other. A widely articulated public discourse suggested that that for years the political establishment had been more interested in defending immigrants than it was in supporting white Britons in disadvantaged regions (see Dorling 2016). The success of the Leave campaign was seen by some as a triumph for politically and socially marginalized White Britons against the concentration of power in London and other large cities. However, post-referendum analysis of the vote showed that throughout the UK there was an inverse correlation between levels of immigration/diversity in an area and support for the Leave campaign (Lawton and Ackrill 2016, Goodwin and Heath 2016). The fewer immigrants there were in a constituency, the more likely people were to oppose immigration and vote to Leave the EU. This pattern suggests that a large proportion of Brexit supporters were not worried about the actual number of immigrants in their communities, the number of jobs lost to outsiders in their areas, or actual changes in living arrangements that they experienced as a result of local migration; rather, they were worried about an imaginary relation with more distant others/outsiders. Outside of cosmopolitan cities, many Leave voters were reportedly more concerned with the general level of immigration in the country, which they perceived as detrimental to the quality of their lives.

As Arjun Appadurai (2006) has argued national narratives of social cohesion and homogeneity can be challenged by very small numbers of others. Strangers or
others do not have to be a threat to be perceived as such. Hence, Žižek’s (1997: 32) emphasis on the ‘theft of enjoyment’, the idea that what is rightfully ours has been stolen from us, that others have acquired something that should rightfully be ours. Many ‘urban myths’ prevalent in the UK emphasise that immigrants have preferential access to housing, access to free mobile phones, and are consuming the finite resources of the National Health Service, among other claims. Assertions such as these are immune to evidence or fact. In the context of very real inequalities and deprivation in the UK, immigration is associated with the displacement of majoritarian white Britons away from the nation’s centres of political, social and economic power (Gest 2016). Unsurprisingly, the Brexit vote unleashed a toxic combination of a series of ‘thefts’ by others: immigrants, elites, the government, the undeserving. The fiction of a form of democracy synonymous with the good life is premised on the conceit that the market will meet all our needs, that no one will lose out. The problem, of course, is that the fantasy of belonging to the nation based on economic reward has become increasingly hollow.

Without shared enjoyment, a community can no longer be a community, whether this be located in a mythologized past or in an idealized future. The changing organization of enjoyment has deeper consequences too because under such circumstances the majoritarian subject/community is no longer the object of desire for the other. The political rhetoric of the recognition of exclusion further reinforces this point through the forms of signification it deploys. The white working class community – which is itself a broad brush characterisation of different groups and subject positions – has found itself renamed in the UK as the ‘just about managing’ or JAMS, and the ‘left behind’. These are clearly not socially valued subject positions, and as forms of
signification they performatively reinscribe the loss of value, and of the other’s desire. They provide only a punitive basis for subjective identification – even if certain forms of enjoyment adhere to subject positions based on victimhood – and they further distance the white majority from its rightful position at the centre of the nation.

Processes of subjectification are not just about universal mechanisms of identification, but have to take account of how people make their lives meaningful and viable under changing circumstances, and as such subjectivity has to be placed, as we have already suggested, in wider socio-economic and historical frameworks. We can see the value of such an approach by comparing the case study just discussed on London with a related, but different set of processes in Poland.

**Warsaw, Poland**

On September 12, 2015, thousands of people assembled in the centre of Warsaw and in other Polish cities to demonstrate against the European Union’s plans to resettle Syrian refugees across the continent. During the rallies, far-right demonstrators chanted slogans such as ‘Poland free of Islam’ and ‘Today refugees, tomorrow terrorists’ (Gander 2015). The anti-immigrant and Islamophobic sentiments these slogans express are not uncommon in Poland. According to data from the 2013 Polish Prejudice Survey, 69% of respondents declared that they do not want more people with different skin colour to come to the country, and 63% said that immigrants would be detrimental to the economy (Górak-Sosnowska 2016: 195-196). According to another study, ‘Muslims are the most disliked religious group (44% dislike them compared to 23% who like them) and around 20% of Polish people do not wish to have a Muslim colleague or
neighbour’ (Górak-Sosnowska 2016: 193). Yet, Muslim communities have existed in Poland for centuries without attracting such opprobrium (Narkowicz and Pędziwiatr 2017a; 2017b).

Needless to say, Poland does not in any way hold a monopoly over Islamophobia and anti-immigrant or anti-refugee attitudes in Europe. In fact, Islamophobia and xenophobia are present throughout Europe in many countries. But what is of note is that Poland has among the lowest numbers of refugees in Europe, as well as a very small number of ethnic minorities. According to data from the 2011 census, over 97 percent of the country’s residents identify as ethnic Poles, while only 1.5 percent claim to be of non-Polish origin (Górak-Sosnowska 2016: 195). Furthermore, at approximately 20,000-strong, Poland’s Muslim minority amounts only to about .05 percent of the country’s population (Wasik and Foy 2016). This number is so small that it is estimated that only 12 percent of Polish people have met a Muslim in their lifetime (Górak-Sosnowska 2016: 196). What these figures suggest is that anti-immigrant and Islamophobic attitudes in Poland have little to do with actual concrete experiences and face to face encounters with immigrants and Muslims. Instead, they are based on an imagined relationship between the Polish nation-state and the ‘others’ against which it defines its identity. But this relationship has clearly changed over time and has multiple aspects to it that must be ascertained. The nation’s ‘others’ are not just the Muslim refugees mentioned above. While national identity is constituted for many Poles as violently opposed to Muslim refugees and other migrants, it is also situated in a larger geopolitical context of national representations, and the circulation of ideas, images and values that are connected both to wider economic and political
transformations, as well as to the migration of Poles to other parts of Europe, especially the UK (Gawlewicz and Narkowicz 2015; Grabowska and Garapich 2016).

Many countries in the Central and East European region, including Poland, occupy an uneasy position in relation to ‘the West’. This is for a number of reasons: the region is geographically located between what are commonly known as ‘the Occident’ and ‘the Orient’; many of the local national languages are of Slavic origin (as opposed to Latin origin); and most countries in the region were governed by socialist/communist regimes for much of the 20th century and are now haunted by the specter of economic ‘backwardness’ that has continued to be associated with communism since the Cold War. In this context, fears that immigrants may be a threat to the economy carries particular significance. What is more, Central and East European countries can boast neither the cultural hegemony of large western nations such as the UK, France, and the United States, not their military power, economic affluence, and high standards of living. Needless to say, the Central and East European region is far from a homogenous one and the cultural politics of identity within it are complex. Yet, many of the countries in the region – from Poland and Slovakia to Serbia and Bulgaria – express an uneasy relationship to ‘the West’, both as an imagined category and as a hegemonic economic and political force, that translates into specific forms of aspiration and anxiety with regard to ethnic and national identity, as well as an aspiration to achieve the status and hegemony of powerful western countries. Working alongside this is a concomitant anxiety about not being Western enough in virtue of geographical position, as well as linguistic, cultural, economic, and historical differences vis-à-vis western Europe and North America (Salecl 2004: 11-12).
Practices of Islamophobia, xenophobia and racism – from public demonstrations, to political rhetoric against immigrants and vigilante attacks on refugees – evoke a series of stereotypical religious, racial, economic and geopolitical binaries between Christianity and Islam, white and non-white, developed and developing, ‘the West’ and the rest of the world (Pędziwiatr 2015). Opposition to immigrants and refugees is not just an expression of an opinion about whether the consequences of immigration are good or bad; instead, it is a performative act through which the subject identifies with the first terms of the binary oppositions mentioned above by rejecting, and opposing itself to the second terms. When Poles protest the entry of Muslims refugees in Poland and in Europe more generally, they put themselves in the position of Europeans who are actively defending the continent, even as they are criticised by other European nations for their apparent ‘prejudice’. The irony is that as Polish citizens engage with a performative assertion of identity in an attempt to resolve the unease of being marginal in relation to ‘the West’, they simultaneously invoke exclusionary discourses from ‘western Europe’ that reassert the fragile nature of their European belonging.

In this context, it is perhaps no surprise that there was a sharp rise in anti-immigrant and Islamophobic attacks in Poland in 2016, at the same time as the UK’s Brexit campaign (Wasik and Foy 2016). Poles are one of the largest minorities in the UK and the largest foreign-born population in the country. In fact, in many contexts in the UK, they constitute a significant part of the country’s urban super-diversity. As mentioned above, immigration was a central issue in the referendum, and Poles, as a large community of EU migrants, were inevitably implicated in the reasons many Britons gave for opting to leave the EU.
This suggests a link between Poland’s rise in hate crimes at home and the simultaneous attacks – both symbolic and at times physical – faced by Poles in the UK as a consequence of the Brexit referendum’s outcome (Wasik and Foy 2016). The success of the Brexit campaign was a challenge to European solidarity and a rejection of the right of EU citizens to freely work and live in the UK. For East European countries, and especially for Poland (because of its large migrant population in the UK), Brexit was a gesture of rejection which rendered East Europeans undesirable and unwelcome, devaluing them via the gaze of the other. While, Brexit was challenging the legitimacy of Polish European identity by rejecting Poles in the UK, Poles in Poland were trying to reaffirm this legitimacy through rejecting migrants and minorities. Key to understanding these process is the transfer of ideas, practices, values and norms, as individuals and communities move, but also as their intimate relations are continuously reanimated by more virtual and extended relations with imagined others. Anti-Muslim prejudice is itself a transnational phenomenon, and some commentators have documented how negative discourses about Muslims have been disseminated and learnt in the UK, only to be exported back to Poland, in a complex figure of overlapping forms of subjective identification and engagement with the desire for European belonging (Grabowska and Garapich 2016, Gawlewicz and Narkowicz 2015).

**Conclusion**

Global migration is affecting countries, cities and communities all over the world, whether they are recipients of migrants or not. It is driving demographic, economic, political and cultural changes on an unprecedented scale and at a rapid pace. But
understanding these changes alone does not explain how and why people respond to their local and national circumstances in some ways and not others: why are they hospitable to some immigrants but hostile to others? Why do they accept or reject political discourses that oppose immigration? Why do they hold xenophobic views even if they rarely encounter foreigners? Psychoanalysis, as a theory of the subject and subjectivity can begin to address these questions by understanding the complex internal dynamics through which people relate to themselves and others in context of migration and diversity. However, as the case examples presented above demonstrate, this cannot be sufficiently done in a historical and cultural vacuum, without attending to the larger social and historical contexts that define subjectivity.

The subject of psychoanalysis is constituted in and through identifications with objects, people, images, and representations, and these carry with them meanings about who the subject is, what it means to be a member of a community, and how one’s identity differs from that of others. The subject is multiply constituted; it is comprised of multiple identifications and subject positions, which often create unconscious intra-psychic conflict that it tries to resolve. The theory of multiply constituted subjectivity has been a central pillar of psychoanalytic theory since Freud. This theory has been extremely influential in the social sciences and humanities, and today it is crucial that any nuanced understanding of migration and diversity acknowledges the multiple nature of the subject’s relationship to itself and others, and how this changes over historical time. Psychic identifications always take place in relation to an outside world, which in turn is invariably rich in cultural and historical meanings. It is the experience of this outside world of meaning that defines how people imagine their relationship to those
who are like them and those who are different, and that helps or hinders their ability to live together in today’s world on the move.

References


