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Matching donations without crowding out? Some theoretical considerations, a field, and a lab experiment

Adena, M; Huck, S; (2017) Matching donations without crowding out? Some theoretical considerations, a field, and a lab experiment. Journal of Public Economics , 148 pp. 32-42. 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.02.002. Green open access

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Abstract

Is there a way of matching donations that avoids crowding out? We introduce a novel matching method where the matched amount is allocated to a different project, present some simple theoretical considerations that predict reduced crowding out or crowding in (depending on the degree of substitutability between the two projects) and present evidence from a large-scale natural field experiment and a laboratory experiment. Similar to findings in the literature, conventional matching for the same project results in partial crowding out in the field experiment and, as predicted, crowding out is reduced under the novel matching scheme. The lab experiment provides more fine-tuned evidence for the change in crowding and yields further support for the theory: the novel matching method works best when the two projects are complements rather than substitutes.

Type: Article
Title: Matching donations without crowding out? Some theoretical considerations, a field, and a lab experiment
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.02.002
Publisher version: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.02.002
Language: English
Additional information: This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.
Keywords: Charitable giving, Matched fundraising, Natural field experiment
UCL classification: UCL
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10066639
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