Looking Forward: Disasters at 40
Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, UCL

Introduction
In this article - based on a keynote lecture offered at the Disasters 40th Anniversary Conference - I offer a reflection on the current state of studies of and responses to disasters. I argue, inter alia, that research, policy and practice to date has demonstrated the necessity of looking back (through historical analyses), looking around us (through geographically-sensitive lenses attentive to scale and space, and by acknowledging the significance of Southern-led responses), and through different lenses (through intersectionalist and interdisciplinary research, and also by questioning the locus of our gaze). From the premise that historical, spatial and intersectional modes of analysis are essential, I take as one of my starting points that ‘the’ (normative, Northern-led) ‘international humanitarian community’ is only one of a plurality of ‘international communities of response’, some of which work with, and others explicitly against, ‘the’ hegemonic Northern-led humanitarian system. It is in part precisely by acknowledging this plurality of ‘communities of response’ across time and space that we can, and must, engage critically with the increasingly mainstream depiction –in official policy discourses and agendas- of selected contemporary responses to disasters as ‘positive’ ‘paradigm shifts’.

In the first part of the article I focus on the (recurrent) invocation that the international community must interweave short-term with long-term responses to disasters, and support multiscale and multistakeholder responses. With reference to the latter, I discuss the ‘localization of aid’ and the UN’s Syria Regional Refugee Resilience Plan (‘3RP’), which emerges in official policy and discourse as one of the quintessential ‘paradigm shifts’ of the 21st Century. Building on the theme of interconnected scales of response and analysis, I then propose the importance of responses to mass disasters that centralise rather than postpone engaging with the implications of intersecting identity markers and structures of inequality. As a further example of the importance of exploring intersections in disaster studies, I draw the first part of the paper to a close by briefly reflecting on the relationship between research and policy agendas in relation to the UK Research Council’s Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF).

In the second part of the article I then turn to three key themes that are and will continue to be central to Disasters Studies in the 21st Century: migration (including in the context of climate change), forced displacement, and Southern-led responses to disasters. Through examining these processes in a tempo-spatially sensitive manner, I warn against the discursive or policy framing of migration ‘as’ a crisis, and instead posit the importance of further research into three under-researched dynamics: immobility, the overlapping nature of forced displacement, and refugee-refugee relationality. I then conclude by focusing on ‘South-South Cooperation’ (SCC) in relation to (or contra) the localization of aid agenda. I argue that exploring the principles of South-South cooperation, rather than promoting the incorporation of Southern actors into the ‘international humanitarian system’ via the localization agenda, offers a critical opportunity for studies of and responses to disasters.

Key Approaches in Contemporary Disasters Studies and Response

Paradigm shifts, recycling and the importance of looking back to move forward
It is now widely accepted that disasters are not ‘natural’ but rather that vulnerability to environmental hazards is framed by social, economic, political structural factors and processes (Disasters, passim); equally, it is now also increasingly ‘mainstream’ to acknowledge that it both insufficient and incorrect to conceptualise disasters as ‘unpredictable’ immediate urgencies that require ‘immediate’ short term responses in a
‘humanitarian mode’ that we cannot plan for in advance. As such, it is now almost standard for international agencies, donors, and even research council initiatives such as the GCRF (discussed below) to acknowledge the necessity of interweaving short-term response elements alongside long-term planning. In essence, this entails starting from the principle that development and humanitarian work must be forward looking rather than reactive and responsive, for instance, by identifying and implementing means to reduce risks, to mitigate and plan for, and to prevent disasters (ie see Disasters 25(3)). In practice this often entails designing longer-term elements into ‘immediate’ scale responses rather than vice-versa – thereby ultimately remaining reactive in nature. Nonetheless, policy-makers, practitioners and scholars from across the wide arena of disaster studies acknowledge the need to start from the perspective of long-term planning and prevention, into which reactive responses can be inserted as and when necessary as both anticipated and unanticipated disasters emerge.

This acknowledgement and mainstreaming is commonly presented as an ‘advance’ in international approaches to disasters, providing an essential move away from reactive, emergency-mode, care and maintenance approaches. However, even the briefest historical reflection demonstrates that this ‘forward-looking’ policy- and funding-agenda is itself a ‘return’ to, or even a ‘recycling’ of, long-standing debates. In the field of refugee response alone, this goes back to at least the 1960s (see Crisp, 2001), including in the form of UNHCR’s ‘integrated zonal development approach,’ followed by the UN agency’s 1980s ‘refugee aid and development’ strategies, the ‘upsurge of interest’ in the ‘relief to development’ continuum in the 1990s (Borton, 1994), and the widespread official institutionalisation of diverse ‘development assistance programmes’ in the 1980s and 1990s (UNHCR 2005). While this is undoubtedly an essential approach with potentially wide-reaching implications, it is neither an ‘innovation’, nor is it a paradigm with its origins either in the 1990s (as asserted by Hinds, 2015) or the 2000s (as claimed by UNHCR, 2005); such forward-looking approaches at the UN, INGO and donor level have existed for over half a century, even if these approaches have remain only partially implemented (if at all) since then (see Crisp, 2001). Indeed, over the past few decades members of the ‘international humanitarian community’ – composed inter alia by UN agencies, international NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movement, and donor states1 - have often continued to justify ‘immediate,’ ‘emergency’ modes of operation rather than longer-term planning, including through the persistent invocation of the exceptional, unexpected, sudden and unavoidable nature of crises.

However, alternative frameworks and modes of response – including those framed around prevention, longer-term planning and capacity building - have been at the core of responses by many states and organisations, including those framed around principles of South-South cooperation (SSC). For instance, shortly after hurricanes Irma and Jose ravaged the Caribbean in September 2017, the Cuban state deployed circa 750 Cuban health workers across the region. While their deployment was covered in the international press (Khan, 2017), it is less widely acknowledged that Cuban doctors worked alongside Central American and Caribbean doctors who were educated in Cuba, assisting people affected by the hurricanes and their aftermath in the region. The combined mobilisation of both Cuban and non-Cuban doctors educated in Cuba, is precisely the result of the Cuban government having a longstanding history of providing forward-planning ‘cooperation’ with Central American and Caribbean states (and elsewhere) since the 1960s; such cooperation expanded significantly in the late-1990s when, in 1998, Hurricane George hit Haiti, and Hurricane Mitch killed over 30,000 people across Central America and displaced more than 106,000 in Guatemala alone

1 Other conceptualisations of the members of ‘the international humanitarian community’ or ‘the international disaster community’ exist (as I discuss below), and yet these are the key entities which are typically associated with this ‘international community’ (ie see Telford and Cosgrave, 2007).
(Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015a:19). In the aftermath of Hurricanes George and Mitch, the Cuban state not only sent internationalist medical brigades – ie. Cuban doctors– to the region, but also established a transnational education programme to train Central American and Caribbean citizens to become health workers in their own right (ibid). The first students enrolled in the Latin American School of Medicine in Havana in May 1998, with the official aim of rendering Cuban (and other international) doctors redundant and to develop sustainable models of national- and local-level response, in the future (ibid).

On the one hand, this example reflects the extent to which capacity building and forward-looking interventions have historically been developed and implemented around different parts of the world. At the same time, however, Cuba’s historical and contemporary role also highlights the importance of interrogating and reconceptualising the notion of ‘the international humanitarian community’ itself. As such, while terms such as ‘the international humanitarian community’ and ‘the international system’ continue to be widely used as if describing fixed and internally-coherent frames of reference (see Telford and Cosgrave, 2007), it has nonetheless become particularly important, if not yet mainstream, to interrogate, critique and resist who is identified, included or excluded from these categories. Academic, policy-makers and practitioners are thus increasingly acknowledging that a plurality of ‘international communities of response’ exist – and indeed have long existed; in turn, researchers are interrogating why, and with what effect, ‘the Others’ of humanitarian and disaster response have been erased from the normative history of humanitarianism (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015a; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Pacitto, 2016; Davey and Scriven, 2015).

In parallel with research programmes such as the Global History of Modern Humanitarian Action project led by Humanitarian Policy Group between 2011-2015 (see Davey and Scriven, 2015), my own past and ongoing research into South-South humanitarianism has explored how, why and with what effect historical and contemporary responses have been developed and implemented by state and non-state actors ranging from the Cuban state since the 1950s and Libya since the 1960s, to refugee-led responses developed in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey to support diverse refugees from Syria in those countries (ie Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2010, 2012, 2015a, 2018). While I return to the significance of Southern-led responses to disasters below, at this stage this brief reflection highlights the increasing acknowledgement - in research, policy and practice – of the importance of history and geography in analyses of and responses to diverse forms of disasters.

Geographies and Scales of Response: Roles and Relationships

In addition to acknowledging the extent to which diverse actors from across both the global North and the global South have developed different forms of response to disasters over time, it is equally essential to consider the question of the plurality of ‘communities of response’ from a multi-scalar and multi-stakeholder perspective. In this regard, research is increasingly acknowledging the significance both of examining the roles played by different actors - including individual, household, community, and sub-national and national actors, regional organisations and international organisations – and of exploring the nature of relationships that exist within, between and across these different responders (also Pantuliano et al, 2013).

The ‘localization of aid’ agenda is one of the key paradigms that has been promoted as being particularly ‘innovative’ and ‘essential’ to maximizing the efficiency of responses to disasters, with the international community officially asserting its commitment to supporting ‘local’ responses during and since the 2015 World Humanitarian Summit; indeed, the World

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2 For a critical discussion of different ways of conceptualizing ‘the South’ and ‘South-South encounters’, see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Daley (2018).
Disasters Report in 2015 documents the increased tendency for international actors to support nationally-led strategies for disasters worldwide. In essence, the localization of aid agenda has been grounded upon an official acknowledgement of the roles played by national and regional actors in responding to disasters, and of the concomitant need for ‘the international system’ to support such ‘local’ responses in different ways. In essence, here the importance of multi-scalar analysis in recognizing the plurality of actors involved in response has been matched by a stated commitment to change modes of operation and the funding of response mechanisms (even if this shift is largely itself a response to the various financial and political crises which have led to pressures on European and North American states’ aid budgets). This includes the increasing trend to promote national and regional aspects of disaster management, perhaps especially, although not exclusively in contexts of trans-boundary and regional disasters (Hollis, 2017).

One particular ‘regional response’ which has been repeatedly identified as providing an invaluable ‘paradigm shift’ is the UN’s Syria Regional Refugee Resilience Plan (3RP). Indeed, since its launch in 2014, UN documentation has repeatedly and consistently used the term ‘paradigm shift’ to describe the 3RP (ie 3RP, 2014); notably, the extent to which the Plan embodies a ‘paradigm shift’ is highlighted as one of the “key messages” and “topline messages” that officials are meant to widely share when discussing the Plan (see 3RP, 2017). It is presented as being innovative – indeed, “a UN first” – as follows:

“The Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) is a UN first. It represents a paradigm shift in the response to the [Syrian] crisis by combining humanitarian and development capacities, innovation and resources.”

(3RP, 2015: 6)

The 3RP has thus been presented as demonstrating the ‘international community’s’ commitment both of ‘forward-looking’ policies and programmes and of supporting national and regional actors in the global South, embodying a “paradigm shift” to a “nationally-led, regionally coherent strategy” (3RP, 2014), which “aims to combine humanitarian assistance with development and resilience of host countries” (ILO, 2015). However, repeatedly framing and ‘messaging’ this as a “paradigm shift” and “a UN first” does not, of course, render this plan ‘a paradigm shift’, as should be evident from the earlier discussion of the long history of the humanitarian-development continuum.

This is not to say that the approach is not a welcome one (if it were to be implemented with appropriate funding), and the 3RP Progress Report for 2015, alongside others, does helpfully centralise the importance of mainstreaming support for local municipalities and institutions into various programming activities to maximise positive outcomes and experiences amongst refugee and host communities alike in the Middle East. Indeed, the existing evidence confirms that regional, national and municipal level actions and coordination are key to disaster response (ie Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016d). However, evidence also confirms that, repeatedly, appropriate levels of funding and localised modes of partnership do not result from official assertions and commitments.

A further critique of the localization framework is that although national and regional responses are often equated with ‘localised responses’, there is also a need to move towards a localization agenda that is even more ‘local’ in nature: focusing on individuals, communities and neighbourhoods, alongside other national and sub-national actors, not just as ‘experiencing’ and being affected by disasters, but also as responding to these in different ways (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2018). Indeed, a key challenge remains to explore the interconnections and diverse relationships between different actors across all scales (micro, meso and macro) as processes that change across time and space. This must in turn be
completed by developing intersectionalist modes of analysis on individual and communal levels in relation to the sub-national, national, regional and international.

**Mass Experiences and Intersectionality**

As suggested above, an important dimension pertaining to scales and levels of analysis is the need to reconcile ‘immediately’ responding to ‘mass’ emergency experiences and needs, with attention to intersectionality: this is because not all people, individuals, households, communities, are equally or similarly affected in a mass disaster, or have ‘standard emergency’ needs. This acknowledgement must be streamlined from the onset, even in, or before, an ‘emergency’ phase.

A clear example of the urgency of doing so emerges from the challenges of providing assistance following the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, where the very definition of basic needs was demonstrated to be intimately connected to the intersecting identities of different members of the affected communities. With the Tsunami hitting the coast-line early in the morning, individuals and families had, as a whole, been asleep or inside their homes, with Muslim women not wearing the hijab indoors when the Tsunami struck. In this context, UNFPA rapidly acknowledged that, even if aid packages were to be delivered to the community, women (here veiled Muslim women) would be unable to access these aid packages in dignity – here, the hijab was a basic needs item that was a prerequisite for Muslim women to be able access aid packages in dignity (Dakkak, cited in Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Ager, 2012).

In other contexts, which highlight the significance of specific belief systems, the framing of basic needs and dignity also transcends a basic need to live a life in dignity, to the importance that different communities and individuals may give to celebrating key rituals pertaining both to life, and to death; in this regard, dying in dignity, and being able to bury a loved one in and with dignity can be as, if not more, important than what the international community often assumes to be the ‘immediate’, emergency needs for food and shelter (see Allen and Turton, 1996; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Ager, 2012). However, international agencies have often been reluctant, or have even actively ‘resisted,’ when disaster-affected people have used tarpaulin ‘officially’ designated for ‘living spaces’ to create mosques or temple spaces, or to bury loved ones instead (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Ager, 2012). This demonstrates a disjuncture between the assumptions held by international agencies and people affected by disasters, and the extent to which a reconceptualization of ‘basic needs’ requires sensitive consideration of who the people are who have been affected by a given disaster.

As demonstrated in the case of the 2004 Tsunami, for instance, the identification of basic needs transcends the assumption that all ‘women’ will have the same ‘basic needs,’ precisely because there is no homogenised ‘woman’ affected by disasters. It is of course notable that it was only in the 1990s that the humanitarian system even acknowledged that millions of people affected by disasters would have menstrual hygiene needs: sanitary materials were only provided to women and girls as standard emergency procedure in the mid-1990s (see Sommer, 2012). Against this backdrop, it is perhaps unsurprising that it has only been relatively recently that intersectionalist analyses have been applied in disaster contexts.

As applied in the context of Disaster Studies, the application of an intersectionalist lens has facilitated the development of a more nuanced understanding of gendered experiences and consequences of disasters, including in a way that transcends the long-standing equation that

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3 Intersectionality as a concept and analytical framework originated in the 1980s and early-1990s when Crenshaw (1991) first developed it as a means of exploring and explaining the overlapping experiences of oppression and marginalization faced by African American women by virtue of their race and gender in a society characterized by everyday, institutionalized racism and patriarchy

‘gender = women’. On the one hand, key contributions to Disaster Studies in the 1980s and 1990s sought to redress women’s and girls’ earlier invisibility in androcentric studies and policies by purposefully tracing women’s and girls’ diverse experiences of disasters (ie. Rovers, 1982; Enarson, 1998). On the other hand, an intersectionalist analysis starts from the understanding that experiences are framed and constituted according to diverse intersecting, overlapping and mutually constitutive identity markers (including gender, ethnicity, religion, class, sexual orientation, gender identity and age), and also by corresponding power structures such as patriarchy, xenophobia, Islamophobia, classism, homophobia, transphobia, and ageism). Such analyses have highlighted the extent to which the relative significance of these identity markers - whether self-ascribed or imposed by others - and related power structures shift across time and space, including in contexts of forced migration (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2014a) and other disasters (ie Gaillard et al, 2017).

Inter alia, I would suggest that it is through adopting a forward looking, intersectionalist, multiscalar, multistakeholder mode of analysis that we must move beyond technical policies framed around ‘empowerment’ and ‘promoting agency’. Far from denying the significance of people’s agency and the realities of gender inequity and inequalities around the world, I offer this provocation as a way of putting a spotlight on the structural barriers that prevent individuals, households, communities, and states from finding and acting upon their own solutions in dignity. This is to say, for instance, that is inadequate to propose reactive and responsive measures to ‘empower’ people in contexts characterized by diverse (local, national and international) barriers that prevent people from making decisions and acting upon these. Indeed, the framework of empowerment has been extensively critiqued for becoming part of a technical and technological solution that does not challenge the status quo (ie. see Zakaria, 2017). In contrast, an intersectionalist analysis highlights precisely the extent to which certain individuals, social groups, and organisations benefit from particular disasters, while other people are exploited, marginalized and excluded both by individuals, social groups and organisations, and by diverse systems of inequality and exploitation.4 It is through acknowledging that there are barriers and systems that prevent people from being able to act, that we can then strive to find ways to lift these barriers and enable people to find ways to live –and die– in dignity.

This is, of course, a key theme throughout Disaster Studies and responses: vulnerability to disasters is neither ‘natural’ nor inherent. Rather, vulnerabilities and risks are heightened by structural factors and inequalities. Intersectionality helps us move forward with this kind of analysis, because different barriers and opportunities prevent or enable people differently. In addition to being important on individual and communal levels (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2014a; Gaillard et al, 2017), this also includes addressing the structural factors and processes that prevent lives from being lost, when knowledge and mechanisms clearly exist to do so. A recurrent theme in the Disasters 40th Anniversary Conference was how to implement what we already know, rather than continuing to find new avenues for research and practice which ultimately often end up ‘recycling’ long-standing proposals (ie. Gaillard, 2017). One key challenge, in the context of current and future disasters, is indeed how to put into practice what we have collectively come to know, when resources are either not provided or are implicitly or explicitly blocked, and when responsibilities are shunned or dodged rather than upheld.

In effect, a poignant reminder in the context of the hurricanes which ravaged the Caribbean in the autumn of 2017, emerges in the 2014 article by Joyette et al on catastrophe modeling and loss calculations in small Caribbean states vulnerable to natural catastrophes, in which the authors highlight this ongoing vulnerability and call for more efficient ‘local governance’ to

4 This is, of course, also argued in political economy approaches to Disaster Studies, including Keen (1991) and de Waal (2018).
be put in place to mitigate for and prevent disasters. However, as numerous commentators have highlighted following the devastation of Irma and Jose: how can efficient local governance be demanded, when local governance systems are themselves dependent upon national governments which fail to ‘oversee’ ‘their’ ‘Overseas territories’, including of course the British Overseas Territories affected by Hurricanes Irma and Jose in the Caribbean.

In drawing this first part of my reflections together, I will note that in spite of ongoing challenges, we are, not just ‘as a community’ of scholars and practitioners, but as communities and networks of analysis and response (who/which may or may not identify with ‘the international humanitarian community’), getting better at looking ‘back’ (undertaking historically-grounded analysis), looking ‘elsewhere’ (towards Southern-led responses and beyond the ‘international’ definition of ‘humanitarian’), and by through different ‘lenses’ (including intersectionalist lenses) to keep on looking forward.

Interdisciplinarity and policy relevance
Indeed, studies such as those showcased in Disasters are multidimensional, multiscalar, and interdisciplinary, and are also engaged in the ‘dual imperative’ of research which posits that “research should be both academically sound and policy relevant” (Jacobsen and Landau, 2003: 185). There is an increasing institutionalization in academic and donor spheres of the promotion of research not only being ‘in conversation’ with policy and practice, but also of developing sustainable ways of working together across disciplinary and institutional silos to ensure that the world does continue, progressively, getting better at anticipating, preventing, managing and responding to disasters.

These are amongst the underlying principles of Disasters, and have now also been strategically ‘mainstreamed’, amongst others, by the UK Research Councils’ Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF), “a £1.5 million fund announced by the UK government in late 2015 to support cutting-edge research that addresses the challenges faced by developing countries.” While concerns may be raised that the GCRF could be perceived as institutionalizing a dangerous instrumentalist approach – not least of which because it re-designates Overseas Development Aid (ODA) funding towards research in ways that may make some researchers feel uncomfortable –, as part of a broader research agenda in the context of the UK, the GCRF starts from the acknowledgement that although a lot has been learnt in the field of development and humanitarian studies, different and more creative ways of thinking through and about, and acting in response are required. In the context of the UK Research Councils, this is framed as requiring the development of more interdisciplinary approaches – including by bringing together and bridging different disciplines and schools of thought and action. The approach to interdisciplinarity equally posits that it is essential to develop multidimensional understandings that push us to ask different questions, and meaningfully listen to different voices that challenge diverse stakeholders to continue getting better at responding.

This suggestion - that it is through bringing different disciplines and approaches together that we can ask different questions and ‘get better’ at addressing key global challenges -, is in many ways a direct challenge to the view noted above that more research is not needed since ‘we’ already ‘know’ the solutions and now need to put this knowledge and these solutions into practice. However, this framework could also precisely provide an alternative entry point to identify, and trace ways to overcome, the structural barriers that prevent these solutions actually being implemented and carried through.

Here, a question for the future ‘interdisciplinarity’ of Disaster Studies is how we can envisage a role for the Arts and Humanities, not just ‘instrumentally’ (to secure grants) or as ‘seasoning’ (to what ultimately remain ‘social science’ or ‘political science’ studies), but to
challenge and reconfigure what it is that we take for granted. Indeed, in the *Disasters* special issue on the roles of historical and archival analysis, Davey and Scriven (2015) argue that an historical approach is particularly valuable because of “the challenges it can pose to habitual ways of thinking and in the skills of investigation and interpretation it fosters.” The editors then “[advocate] integrating history into a more reflective attitude to change and a more adventurous and holistic approach to innovation, as opposed to simply using it to ‘learn lessons’.”

With this increasing space – and acknowledged need - for historical analysis in disaster and humanitarian studies, a question which emerges is whether there is also space in *Disasters* and related journals for engagement with the Arts and Humanities more broadly? For this to be meaningful in nature, I would argue that this would necessarily entail transcending the view of the Arts and Humanities as providing a way of ‘better’ ‘intervening’ in disasters (for instance, to provide more efficient modes of trauma relief, as argued in Huss et al, 2015), but also – as my co-investigators and I argue in our Refugee Hosts research project³⁷ - , as a potential way to document and resist mainstream ways of thinking about, representing and responding to disasters per se.

**Approaching the Future:**

With these approaches, discussions and critiques in mind, and acknowledging the existence of multiple ‘communities of response’ rather than a singular ‘international community’ of analysis, policy or practice, in the remainder of the article I reflect – with sensitivity to tempo-spatial dynamics - on three key themes which are increasingly significant in Disaster Studies across all scales, levels and directionalities: migration (including in relation to climate change); forced displacement; and Southern-led responses.

**Migration: beyond a disaster and crisis paradigm**

Perhaps counter-intuitively for an article pertaining to key themes in Disaster Studies, the first key trend I will highlight is the increasing call for analysts and practitioners to challenge and resist the (mis/ab)use of the label ‘disaster’ and ‘crisis’ when describing migration-related phenomena. While existing well before then of course, since 2015 in particular the rhetoric of ‘disasters’ and ‘crises’ has been widely mobilized when referring the intersecting processes of human movement and migration. State and media discourses centralizing a ‘crisis’ and ‘disaster’ rhetoric have been used to justify regressive policies of control, surveillance and, amongst other things, draconian border controls, the withdrawal and criminalization of maritime rescue missions, and explicit pushbacks in direct violation of international law. In turn, when international organisations like the UNHCR have drawn on this rhetoric - ostensibly to secure humanitarian donations and public compassion -, this has risked reinforcing despondency and fear amongst diverse populations (Crisp, 2017).

In contrast, historically- and geographically-situated analyses have ‘debunked’ numerous elements of the discourse of ‘migration crises’, challenging claims that we are currently facing ‘unprecedented’ levels of migration or displacement worldwide, let alone facing a ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe (see Crisp, 2015; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016b; de Haas, 2016; Ferris, 2017). On a historical level, scholars have consistently demonstrated that the proportion of the global population engaging in international migration has remained remarkably stable over time. although the total number of people moving has increased as the global population has done so - i.e. in 2013, there were an estimated 232 million international migrants globally; by 2015, this had increased to 244 million (UN, 2015) - , Massey et al (2005) and de Haas (2016, 2017) amongst others have long reminded us that far from living in ‘an age of unprecedented migration’, a consistent proportion of circa 3% of the world’s population since the 1960s have engaged in international migration. While there has been an increase in the proportion between 1990 and 2015 (2.9% of the world’s population were international
migrants in 1990, 3.2% in 2013, and 3.3% in the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ year of 2015), a core question which remains of particular interest is why, consistently, circa 97% of the world’s population do not migrate internationally.

Against this backdrop of remarkable consistency in terms of international migration flows, it is also notable that in spite of the hypervisibility of the rhetoric of a ‘European refugee crisis’, refugees only represent between 7-8% of the global international migrant population. Furthermore, in spite of assertions of a European refugee crisis, only about 0.4% of the total EU population is a refugee in 2017, a figure that was in fact higher between 1992-1995 at 0.5% (de Haas, 2017), while 85-86% of all refugees live in developing countries, typically in the countries neighbouring their countries of origin. In turn, 25% of all refugees reside not only in the global South but in the world’s least developed countries (UNHCR, 2017). In terms of the directionality of migration more broadly, it is notable that in 2013, the number of international migrants engaging in South-to-North migration (ie people born in the global South migrating to countries in the North) almost equaled the number of migrants engaging in South-South migration (ie migrants born in the South who resided in other countries in the global South); while definitions of who and what ‘belongs’ to the South or the North are contested, the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs has more recently recorded that South-South migration now slightly exceeds South-North migration, with 82.3 million South-South international migrants and 81.9 million South-North migrants (on South-South migration, see Crush and Chikanda, 2018). Exact figures remain contested, and yet these numbers, proportions and percentages all point towards a particular trend that will remain highly pertinent for scholars, policy-makers and practitioners working in the field of disaster prevention, mitigation and response. This is likely to become even more significant as a theme over the coming years, including as a result of anticipatory movements to avoid the real or assumed effects of climate-change.

However, once again challenging popular assumptions that climate change will inevitably lead to a ‘crisis’ of migration (ie Taylor, 2017), perhaps a more accurate way of analyzing this situation is through the assertion: “No change from climate change” (Kelman, 2014). In essence, research from around the world proves that anticipatory movements and migration as part of longer-term planning may, or may not, be central to people’s interpretations of climate-related phenomena and processes in their localities. As is now largely mainstream in academic spheres, climate change will not cause migration, and it remains essential that assessments of and responses to climate change do not depoliticise the challenges that affect people whose environments will indeed change or even disappear over the coming years.

Refuting deterministic and causal frameworks is not to deny that a relationship between climate change and migration may exist, but rather to acknowledge that the relationship between movement, mobility and climate-events will remain complex and non-deterministic: there may be shifts and accentuations in migratory movements, or a total reluctance to this (ie. Paul, 2005: Kumar Saha, 2016), as people anticipate, adapt, resist or develop diverse coping strategies (ie. Simatele and Simatele, 2015).

In essence, “disasters do not always create out-migration” (Paul, 2005): in some contexts, active resistance to migration following cyclones, tornados and hurricanes is the norm. For instance, “all households want[ing] to avoid migration” following Cyclone Aila in coastal Bangladesh (Kumar Saha, 2016: 505), and yet structural conditions which prevent livelihoods being re-established may mean that “some form of widespread migration is inevitable after a disaster such as [Aila].” Even in light of this widespread reluctance, migration may “have the potential to serve as a key adaptive response to environmental events, as evidenced by the improved economic conditions of a substantial number of the migrated households” (ibid). As such, when households affected by disasters do migrate, this may lead to improved socio-
economic outcomes, rather than migration itself resulting in losses or crises on different levels. Indeed, migration and mobility are normal, everyday features of livelihood strategies around the world (Carruth, 2017), as demonstrated through long-standing research with members of communities with pastoralist and nomadic backgrounds and livelihood strategies, even in contexts of forced displacement (ibid; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2014b).

As such, in some contexts migration can be an “adaptive strategy to climate variability” (Simatele and Simatele, year), while in other contexts (such as the examples from Bangladesh cited above) people may express an active reluctance to migrate, to be relocated or resettled elsewhere. This reluctance is a key trend both in the global North and in the South, as evidenced in relation to Hurricane Sandy (Bukvic and Owen, 2016) and, more recently, as echoed in many local responses both in the Caribbean and in United States of America before, during and after Hurricanes Irma and Jose made landfall, in which people from across the whole spectrum of socio-economic backgrounds remained reluctant to move.

Concurrently, not being able to move - including due to structural barriers, and physical ones such as the erection of border walls and the establishment of enforced ‘safe zones’ in Syria and elsewhere - can be indicative of an existing or emerging crisis. In essence, immobility is often a marker or indicator of particular risk on individual and communal levels alike (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016b). While a search of the Disasters archive in 2017 only revealed 3 articles including the word ‘immobility,’ as I have argued elsewhere (ibid), immobility will become a key theme of research in disaster studies, both on the levels of internal and international migration, echoing the interest given to immobility within the context of migration and mobility studies (Hannam et al, 2006).

**Forced Displacement: urban, protracted and overlapping displacements**

As already suggested above, involuntary immobility is a key and yet invisible dynamic within processes of forced displacement (ie see Lubkemann, 2008), while the latter is hypervisible, especially during the early onset of mass displacement (and even more so when displaced people reach not only European television screens but also European borders – Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016b). However, in spite of mass migration being at the core of popular, political, academic and policy responses to forced migration, I would propose that the implications of three intersecting trends related to forced displacement require further consideration in the coming years. These three trends are the urban, protracted and overlapping nature of displacement.

The first and second of these – urban displacement and protracted displacement - became extensively researched processes from the 1990s onwards. This attention and the development of international policies – such as UNHCR’s ‘alternative to camps’ policy - were heralded by many observers as a significant paradigm shift challenging international humanitarian organisations’ outdated (many would argue inhumane, inefficient, inadequate - Malkki, 1995; Harrell-Bond, 1986) camp-based ‘care and maintenance’ policies. Such accounts regularly indicate the extent to which refugees’ residence in non-camp, urban settings has “increased” numerically; the challenges of supporting refugees who live in towns and cities for protracted periods of time thus requires increased attention and the development of new, context-specific modes of analysis and forward-looking responses which merge short-term humanitarian and longer-term development elements.

However, some classic examples from Disasters – including Chambers (1979) and Pantuliano’s introduction to the *Disasters* Special Issue on ‘Refugees and The Displaced’ – help us situate the ‘urban turn’ in displacement studies, by reminding us that in the late-1970s “too much attention was being paid to refugees in urban areas” (Pantuliano, 2011). This over-emphasis on refugees in urban settings in essence led Chambers to focus on the *differential*
experiences of rural and urban refugees and to acknowledge the particular problems faced by rural refugees. With UNHCR having seemingly encountered major operational challenges in addressing the needs and rights of refugees in urban contexts since the 1990s onwards – with its first urban refugee policy being critiqued from diverse angles, including by Crisp (2017; Crisp et al, 2012) – we can read the UN’s programme title Adapting to an Urban World as being as much about ‘refugees’ need to ‘adapt’ to urban settings as it has been about UN agencies’, including UNHCR’s, need to ‘adapt’ to urban spaces. Nevertheless, as suggested above, this has is in fact perhaps been a ‘return’ to the urban ‘bias’ that had prevailed not so long ago and had prompted Chambers in the late-1970s to look beyond urban refugees.

Echoing Chambers’ and Pantuliano’s commitment to centralizing the heterogenous needs of refugees and the displaced around the world, and the need to balance a focus on different spaces of arrival and settlement (camp, rural, urban and everything in between). I would also highlight the importance of focusing on the relationships and interactions that exit between different groups of refugees in a diversity spaces, and indeed, of complementing a focus on what I refer to as ‘refugee-refugee relationality’ (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016a) with a focus on relationships between heterogenous members of different groups of refugees and different groups of hosts across time and space. These relationships are particularly significant in light of the third major trend, which is intimately related to the urban and protracted nature of displacement: that of overlapping displacement.

While a great deal of academic and policy attention has been given to urban and protracted displacement, very little research has been conducted into the nature and implications of what I refer to as ‘overlapping’ displacements, including with regard to the relationship between refugees and local communities. I use the term ‘overlapping’ to refer to two spatio-temporal dynamics. Firstly, refugees and IDPs have often both personally and collectively experienced secondary and tertiary displacement. This is the case of thousands of Sahrawi and Palestinian refugees who left their refugee camp homes in Algeria and Lebanon respectively to study or work in Libya before being displaced by the outbreak of conflict there in 2011, and of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees who had originally sought safety in Syria only to be displaced once more by the conflict there (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2012; 2015a). Secondly, refugees are increasingly experiencing overlapping displacement in the sense that they often physically share spaces with other displaced people. For example, Turkey hosts refugees from over 35 countries of origin, Lebanon from 17 countries, Kenya 16, Jordan 14, Chad 12 and both Ethiopia and Pakistan 11 (Crawford et al, 2015).

The implication of these intersecting processes it that, precisely because displacement is increasingly urban and protracted, refugees share spaces for longer periods of time both with local host communities, and with other displaced people themselves. Inter alia this means that, over time, refugee groups often become members of the communities which subsequently offer protection and support to other groups of displaced people.

The significance of overlapping displacement is perhaps particularly evident when considered in relation to the drive for longer-term programming and of going beyond linear approaches to disaster response, as noted by Twigg in his introduction to the Disasters issue on ‘Recovery’: “The old, simplistic, notions of disasters as a temporary interruption in development, and recovery as a return to pre-disaster normality, are clearly no longer viable” (emphasis added). What I refer to as the process of overlapping displacement precisely indicates not only the extent to which people continue to experience ongoing forms of vulnerability and precariousness over time - or indeed, increased vulnerability as displacement becomes increasingly protracted, as noted by Barbelet and Wake (2017: 24) -, but also the extent to which, for many people the ‘new norm’ (if not the ‘new normal’) may be to be displaced or affected by crisis again and again, either individually or as families and
members of communities which have experienced displacement on more than one occasion in their lifetimes, or as people who remain displaced and then become ‘hosts’ to newly displaced people.

A contemporary example is that of Palestinian refugees in the urban Baddawi refugee camp in North Lebanon, who have resided in the camp since the 1950s and who have ‘hosted’ refugees arriving from Syria since 2011. These refugees include not only displaced Syrians but also Palestinian and Iraqi refugees who had been living in Syria at the outbreak of the conflict and who have found themselves refugees once more (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2012, 2015a). In the context of Baddawi, Palestinians are simultaneously refugees and hosts, and urban camps are spaces that are shared between not only different generations of refugees but also refugees of different nationalities and countries of origin. Furthermore, this is also not the first time that Baddawi camp and its refugee inhabitants have welcomed ‘new’ refugees, as Baddawi also hosted over 15,000 ‘new’ Palestinian refugees who were internally displaced from nearby Nahr el-Bared refugee camp when that camp was destroyed during fighting in 2007. With an estimated 10,000 refugees from Nahr el-Bared still residing in Baddawi camp, these ‘internally-displaced-refugees-hosted-by-refugees’ have become part of the established Baddawi community hosting ‘newly’ displaced refugees from Syria (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016e).

Such processes of overlapping displacement and shared spaces indicate the importance of examining refugee-refugee relationality, requiring that research, policies, and practices transcend and critique the implications of the assumption that citizen-host communities are ‘affected’ by refugees, or that ‘citizens’ ‘support’ or ‘reject’ displaced people. Instead, it is essential to carefully examine the relationships that exist, emerge and change over time and space between different groups of people who have been directly and indirectly affected by and involved in complex emergencies and disasters, including protracted displacement.

Highlighting the relational nature of displacement, and destabilising the assumption that refugees are hosted by citizens, is evidently not to idealise the encounters that characterise refugee-refugee encounters, since these are also often framed by power imbalances and processes of exclusion and overt hostility between members of new and established refugee communities. However, rather than viewing these tensions as inevitable, I offer this reflection to argue that certain policies and programmes may activate resentment and insecurity among hosts, and there is an increased need to fulfil the above-mentioned commitment to implement development-oriented programmes that aim to support both refugees and host communities (as is ostensibly at the core of the 3RP and dozens of initiatives and programmes since at least the 1960s). In the context of overlapping displacement and refugees-hosting-refugees, these tensions may be the result of the uneven development and implementation of programmes for different ‘generations’ of refugees and for refugees according to their country of origin. This is particularly visible in Baddawi, whose long-term residents have received limited (and increasingly insecure) assistance from UNRWA since the 1950s, while new arrivals from Syria have the potential to receive support from an expanding range of inter/national organisations, including UNHCR (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016e, 2019).

A challenge that remains for researchers, policymakers and practitioners in acknowledging the widespread reality and implications of overlapping displacement, is to simultaneously meaningfully engage with the agency of refugees and their diverse hosts as active responders in disasters, while also recognising the challenges that characterise such encounters. At a minimum, new programmes and policies must avoid re-marginalising established refugee communities which are hosting newly displaced people; at best, with appropriate attention (and political will) they can be sensitive to supporting the needs and rights of all people affected by displacement, whether they are hosting or being hosted.
Southern-led Responses: beyond instrumentalisation

As I have suggested above, far from passively waiting for externally provided assistance, regional organisations, states, communities, households, families and individuals across the global South have been responding to disasters every year, decade, and century. The case of refugees-hosting-refugees can, in this regard, both be examined through the framework of the ‘locally-provided aid’, but also as one of a myriad of ‘Southern-led’ responses.

Recognizing the roles of diverse Southern-actors in disaster situations has been enhanced, and indeed ‘institutionalised’, via the above-mentioned ‘localisation of aid’ agenda. On the one hand, we must remain concerned about the instrumentalisation of Southern actors and the extent to which the localization agenda may be a way for Northern states to shift resources, and responsibilities, Southern actors, or to simply withdraw from international responsibilities without sharing the promised funding and resources (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015a, 2018, 2019). On the other hand, this also provides an opportunity to recognise the extent to which Northern approaches are limited while Southern-led initiatives can have major advantages. For instance, Wamsler and Lawson argue that “Northern cities could learn some valuable lessons from the rich range of comparatively more advanced local coping strategies used to face disaster risk in the Global South” (2012). In turn, the UNDP’s ‘headline story’ of its 2013 Human Development Report, The Rise of the South, is: ‘The South needs the North, and increasingly the North needs the South’ (ibid: 2). Furthermore, beyond incorporating local/Southern actors into the ‘international system’, or identifying the transferability of ‘lessons learned’ from the South to the North, I would argue that there is also a prime opportunity to reconsider the role of ‘local’ actors in and of the global South actors, in developing alternative modes of response which can at times work alongside or explicitly challenge ‘normative’ Northern-led responses (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016b, 2018).

There is of course a major paradox inherent in the localization of aid agenda outlined above, in so far as it aims to ‘support’ local responses precisely by institutionalizing them within the broader paradigm and parameters established by the ‘international system.’ In this context, we can view the localization of aid agenda as promoting a particular form of North-South relations, in which Northern states have recognized and are increasingly mobilising Southern actors to ‘share the burden’ (precisely through ‘keeping the burden’ in the South) in undertaking assistance and protection activities (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015). The mainstreaming of support for Southern-led initiatives by UN agencies and Northern states is especially paradoxical when situated within the context of ‘South–South cooperation’, as the latter was purposefully developed in the era of decolonization as a necessary means to overcome the exploitative nature of North–South relations, and has historically been associated with the Non-Aligned Movement, and anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015, 2018; also see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Daley, 2018).

As such, I argue that a focus on Southern-led responses must transcend identifying and offering (certain forms of) support to specific actors from the global South; instead, it invites us to consider what role diverse modes of South-South cooperation may play in terms of responding to disasters, and what role the principles and modalities of both formal and informal South-South cooperation might have in reconceptualising existing, and formulating new or hybrid forms of response, including responses that challenge structural inequalities. It is this relationality between diverse actors between and across the global South, at all scales, levels and directionalsities, and the divergent principles, motivations and modes of action, which remain to be explored in detail (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2018).

Of course, while the UNDP’s 2013 The Rise of the South Human Development Report noticeably fails to address South–South cooperation in the context of conflict-induced displacement, Southern states have worked individually and together to develop regional
initiatives to protect people affected by disasters, including displacement, well before the ‘paradigm shift’ announced with reference to the 3RP discussed above (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015a, 2018). There is, as noted above, a long-history of Southern-led responses in contexts of disaster relief, including responses officially driven by the principles of South-South cooperation. These include Cuba’s abovementioned involvement in Central America and the Caribbean for instance, with Cuba’s involvement explicitly positioned as a means to enhance the region’s ‘self-sufficiency’ and reduce dependence upon externally-provided assistance/protection.

However, while South-South cooperation (SSC) has been officially perceived as being central to development and responses to environmental hazards, until recently SSC has often been perceived – in principle – to be incompatible with responding to conflicts and conflict-induced displacement. Here, SSC in disaster response can be understood as a means of providing assistance to a disaster-affected state to strengthen that state’s ability to offer assistance to its own citizens on its own territory after an ‘environmental disaster’. In contrast, delivering assistance in conflict and displacement situations in which the state is either involved as a belligerent party or has demonstrated little or no political will to offer protection to its population, could be understood as a breach of the South–South principles of respect for national sovereignty and non-interference when such involvement does not take place at the explicit behest of the state itself. And yet, historical and contemporary analyses demonstrate a diversity of Southern-led modes of assistance to and protection of refugees and IDPs, including those funded, designed and implemented by states and regional organisations.

In spite of this ‘evidence,’ it remains the case that the actual and potential role of SSC (whether in its principles, aims or modes of operation) in conflict and displacement situations has remained almost ‘unimaginable,’ including by the very UN agency (UNDP) that carries the ‘South-South Cooperation portfolio.’ For instance, UN agencies and INGOs often assume that South-South cooperation can only take place when ‘time’ is available, with humanitarian situations excluded almost a priori. This is clearly reflected in the following quotation from a senior UNDP employee interviewed by Omata (2018):

Making South-South initiatives requires a long-term vision and strategic planning. Before making a deal, it involves numerous negotiations between involved actors and UNDP... I know UNHCR staff need to respond quickly to emergencies to save people’s life. These emergencies usually emerge in an unpredictable way. Such situations are not conducive to the modalities of South-South partnerships.

As such, while UNDP has an established track record of promoting SSC in the context of development, it has often been assumed by and about UN agencies that SSC is incompatible with ‘humanitarian’ work because SSC requires long-term planning, while UNHCR needs to operate from one hour to the next. Of course, we know this is not the case overall, and diverse Southern actors – regional organisations, states, sub-national actors, communities and

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5 For instance, Southern states and regional organisations have developed dynamic national and regional legal frameworks to protect refugees and IDPs, including the Organisation of African Unity’s 1967 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (Omata 2018) and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (Cantor 2018); in turn, the world’s first ‘international’ convention on internal displacement was drafted by the African Union and entered into force in 2009: the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (on Southern-led responses to displacement see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2018).

6 Between 1974–2004 UNDP was home to the ‘Special Unit for Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries’; in 2014 this was renamed the ‘Special Unit for South-South Cooperation of the United Nations Development Programme’.
individuals - will continue to play key roles in responding both to different forms of disasters, including conflict-induced displacement.

With reference to human displacement, for instance, I would argue that South-South cooperation must be more meaningfully explored in existing, and new and emerging displacement situations precisely because conflict and displacement-related ‘crises’ are often predicted or even ‘announced’ weeks, months, years in advance, and of course precisely because displacement is increasingly protracted in nature. UNHCR is indeed making (very slow) headway into institutionalizing modes of South-South cooperation, for instance through UNHCR’s promotion of the ‘solidarity resettlement scheme’ between the Middle East and specific solidarity Latin American countries (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015a, 2018; see Omata 2018). However, there is also a need to complement such approaches, by recognising the extent to which forward-looking initiatives developed under the remit of South-South cooperation have not only historically existed around the world, but have legacies that still echo to date. For instance, from the 1970s to the present Cuba’s international scholarship system has offered secondary and tertiary level education to refugee youth including Palestinians, Sahrawi, Namibians and South-Sudanese refugees (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2010, 2015a); inter alia, this has meant that many Syrian and Palestinian students who trained in Cuba to become doctors and surgeons between 1970s-2000s have been providing medical assistance to people displaced within and from Syria, including Syrians, Palestinians, Kurds and Iraqis (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2018).

Given the reality of such responses, it could be argued that it is in conflict situations that Southern-led responses (whether through modes of SSC or via the localisation agenda) have not only been met with particular resistance - precisely because they directly question ‘international’ humanitarian principles and institutionalised modes of response -, but also precisely because they have the potential to challenge the current system in ways that would require fundamental changes to its very foundation.7

**Concluding Remarks: looking forward**

As I have noted throughout this article, there are different ways of imagining and implementing responses to disasters, including models based on principles of South-South cooperation and horizontal learning that can provide longer-term responses to emerging and protracted displacement scenarios. By highlighting a series of examples which are officially or informally framed as modes of South-South cooperation it has not been my intention to idealise such responses (for critiques, see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015, 2018). Rather, I have aimed to exemplify, firstly the extent to which diverse actors are, and have long been, involved in responding to disasters and secondly, the extent to which their underlying principles, aims and objectives may differ from, and challenge, those of the more mainstream ‘members of the international humanitarian system’. While global North actors may continue to reject many of these interventions for being political and ideological rather than categorizing these as modes of ‘humanitarian’ assistance - Cuba, for instance, has often been depicted as engaging in ideologically-motivated forms of ‘disaster diplomacy’8— one key question that remains to be explored further is how people affected by disasters themselves experience, enact, respond to and conceptualise these different processes and modes of response. This is essential since people affected by disasters do not merely ‘experience’ or ‘respond’ to disasters, but are also everyday theorists who conceptualise, negotiate and resist different modes of action and inaction.9

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7 I thank the review of this piece for encouraging me to develop this line of analysis further here.
8 For a critical discussion of ‘disaster diplomacy, see Kelman (2007).
9 On the relationship between viewing refugees and stateless people who ‘experience’ displacement and lack of legal protection, and as people who conceptualise their own situation and that of others, see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2016c).
Throughout my research with Sahrawi and Palestinian refugees who studied in Cuba in the 1990s and 2000s before returning to work in their home-camps in Algeria and Lebanon respectively, for instance, Cuban-educated graduates repeatedly referred to the scholarship programme through reference to a combination of ‘ideology’, ‘politics’, ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘human values’ (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2015a). Ultimately, they maintained that Cuba’s programme for refugees is ‘humanitarian’ in nature, but they offered different perspectives regarding the balance between these different dimensions, implicitly and at times explicitly noting the ways in which these overlap or are in tension. Hence, rather than describing the programme as a humanitarian programme per se, my interviewees offered remarkably similar humanitarian ‘qualifiers’, describing Cuba’s scholarship programme as having ‘a humanitarian component’, ‘a humanitarian dimension’, a ‘humanitarian aspect’, and ‘humanitarian ingredients’; while other interviewees argued that it is ‘a mainly humanitarian system’, which ‘carry[es] humanitarian elements’, and ‘shares its humanitarian message in spite of the [US] embargo [against Cuba]’ (cited in ibid).

On the one hand, acknowledging peoples’ ‘experiences’ of disasters, and indeed the ways in which local stakeholders ‘respond’ to disasters, has been key both to improving operational responses in the field, and to recognizing the agency of people who are vulnerable to disasters due to diverse structural and social inequalities. In turn, I have suggested that acknowledging people’s needs and their ‘agency’ in a tempo-spatially sensitive, intersectionalist manner must now be a foundational premise for analysis and action alike; this is essential precisely to establish the ways in which diverse identity makers and structures of oppression and opportunity interact to enable or prevent different modes of action and being. In this regard, it is particularly urgent to continue interrogating the relationship between what external analysts assume are, and should be, ‘the’ priorities of people affected by disasters on the one hand, and what different people affected by disasters, conflict, displacement, may themselves prioritise, and which systems and structures may be limiting their ability to live meaningful and dignified lives. The examples of the veil as a basic need for dignity in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, and of disaster-affected people using ‘shelter-tarpaulin’ as mosques or temples or to bury loved ones, all demonstrate the need to consider, through an intersectionalist manner, whose priorities and basis needs are prioritized by which actors and which structures oppress or marginalize them.

On the other hand, however, it is once we have that foundational approach in place that it also becomes essential to go beyond looking at people’s ‘experiences’ and even of focusing on the ways that people ‘act’ in response to displacement; instead, or rather catalyzed by that foundational approach, it becomes essential to more systematically centralize both how people ‘conceptualise’ their own situations, positions and responses, and to focus intently on identifying and challenging the diverse structural barriers - including political, economic, cultural and social ones – that prevent specific people in specific disasters from living in dignity.

In the context of highlighting key trends for Disaster Studies, in the final section of the article I have proposed the value of analyzing historical and contemporary forms of South-South cooperation on diverse scales (rather than an instrumentalisation of Southern actors via the ‘localisation of aid’ agenda), and of critically engaging with the principles and modalities of SSC. Inter alia, I would like to suggest that the framework of SSC may be a useful lens through which to examine disaster response as it has, from its birth, blurred and/or combined rather than inscribed institutional and programmatic distinctions between long- and short-term

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10 For an analysis of this scholarship programme through the application of tempo-spatial, multiscalar, and intersectionalist analyses, see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2015a).
responses: the very term ‘cooperation’ has the potential to encompass both development and humanitarian initiatives, thereby potentially enabling us to transcend the impasse of the recycled ‘development-humanitarian continuum’ (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2017, 2018). In turn, South-South actions and principles have distinctive spatialities, directionalities, and imperatives of response at their core, including a particular attention to developing modes of challenging and redressing structural inequalities which ultimately ‘create’ – or at least magnify - vulnerabilities to and in diverse disasters.

Highlighting these potentialities is not a matter of idealizing them, but rather a means of proposing that further research is precisely required, firstly, to better understand how different actors, on different scales and levels experience, perceive and conceptualise how, why and with what effect different forms of response are implemented by Southern responders (including in both formal and informal forms of South-South cooperation), and, secondly, to trace, resist and challenge the diverse structural barriers that prevent the development of meaningful responses that meet individual and collective needs and rights around the world.

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ii This part of the article draws on my ongoing project, Southern Responses to Displacement from Syria: Views from Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey (www.southernresponses.org), which has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (Grant Agreement No. 715582). While beyond the scope of this chapter, that project and my research more broadly involves a critical analysis of conceptualisations and taxonomies of ‘the South’, and proposes the value of Southern, anti-colonial, decolonial and postcolonial theories to enrich our understanding of, and ways of responding to, the world (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Daley, 2018).

iii For more information on the GCRF see: https://www.ukri.org/research/global-challenges-research-fund/.

iv See www.refugeehosts.org.