15. Conclusion

In recent years, the relevance of inter-organizational relations in international security has increased. Whilst during the Cold War, multilateralism was concentrated on the globalist United Nations (UN), since the 1990s a growing number of regional Multilateral Organizations (MO) have come to the fore. As noted across the chapters of this book, this shift within the multilateral landscape is a reflection of increasing globalization and interdependence, the trans-national nature of many contemporary security issues and the growing acceptance that cooperation and multilateralism is the most promising avenue for managing many of these global shifts. This need to negotiate, manage and legitimize responses to complex contemporary security challenges has seen the development of increasingly complex multilateral instruments and arrangements, operating across local, national, regional and international processes and scales.

Against this background, this volume has outlined the growing complexity of interactions between MOs, which are both shaping and shaped by the macro and micro dynamics within local, regional and global security contexts. These multilateral interactions are often driven by and through a cooperation-competition dynamic. A dynamic which is the product of various dimensions to the relationship between MOs, including the degree of complementarity and overlap of their security functions, their sources of and claims to legitimacy, their capacities of act, how they arrange a division of labor, their resource capacity and/or their role in alliance building. In addition, because MOs are by definition composed of nation-state memberships, the preferences of individual or coalitions of member states are always an important factor shaping the cooperative-competitive patterns of inter-organizational relationships.

This final chapter will highlight important common themes within politics of inter-organizational relations in international security. Following the book’s framework, we consider this in relation to the differing scalar and cross-scalar types of inter-organizational relations examined in the case studies of the previous chapters, namely global-regional; inter-regional; intra-regional, and multi-scalar. Drawing out key dynamics specific to these different scalar relationships, we investigate the politics of nesting between the UN and regional MOs, the negotiation of overlap in intra-regional and inter-regional relationships, and the complexity of governing specific security issues across multiple scales.

The politics of nesting and hierarchy between the United Nations and Regional Organizations

The hierarchical nature of the relationship between the UN and regional MOs remains key to the debate about ongoing shifts in the global order. The UN continues to be the most important multilateral forum for managing international peace and security, and its primary role, as codified in the UN Charter, is widely recognized. However, a common complaint is that the UN is “overburdened, underfunded and overstretched”, which functions to undermine its relevance in practice. This criticism of the nature and relevance of the UN system reflects the growing complexity of international security affairs in the 21st century. In recent decades, the UN’s mandate has been expanded and it has taken on a much wider range of security management functions. At the same time, a rapidly expanding number of regional MOs and other local governance arrangements have claimed a greater role for themselves within international security. As a result, tensions have arisen about the relative value of the role,
mandate and legitimacy of the UN vis-a-vis regional MOs in managing international security, and how the relationship between them should operate and be hierarchically ordered?

*The UN’s position in the inter-organizational hierarchy*

The relationship between the UN and regional MOs is the clearest case of a nested inter-organizational relationship in international security. Since its foundation, the UN has in principle enjoyed a position at the top of the hierarchy of multilateral international security, a hierarchical ordering that is both legally and politically robust. Articles 52 to 54 of Chapter VIII of the UN charter testify to the normative and practical supremacy of the UN over regional MOs. Accordingly, the activities of regional MOs aimed at managing international peace and security need to be consistent with the broader principles of the UN Charter.

However, in practice, the organizational hierarchy between the UN and regional MOs remains highly contested. As noted by Martin Welz in chapter four, Chapter VIII of the UN charter represented a compromise between those that favored a regional and those that favored a global multilateral security architecture. Since then, tensions between global and regional multilateral arrangements have never fully receded. However, it was only due to a confluence of developments in the 1990s that questions about the nature of the relationship between the UN and regional MOs emerged as a key theme for international security governance. The end of the Cold War and its bipolar dynamic of world politics, the increasingly number and growing importance of regional MOs and a series of disastrous UN peace operations in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia in the first half of the 1990s combined to bring the UN-regional MO relationship to the fore. Since the mid-1990s, the UN has come to perceive regional MOs as a potential solution to some of its long-term problems, including its lack of capacity, the reputational damage it suffered during the first half of the 1990s and the lack of agreement amongst the UN Security Council’s (UNSC) Permanent Five members concerning how to respond to security crises. As a result, we have witnessed an accelerated trend towards the establishment of a closer nested relationship between the UN and regional MO.

Yet, the politics and practicalities of joint activities between the UN and regional MOs remains problematic. As Franke notes in chapter two, the UN’s attempts to transform its previously rather ad hoc relations with regional MOs into more institutionalized modes of operation from the mid-1990s onwards has opened up as many questions about the nature of this relationship as it has closed. This process inevitably resulted in increased questioning of the hierarchy underlying the UN-regional MO relationship. From the point of view of the UN, an important dimension to this effort to formalize these relationships is its attempt to reaffirm its primacy over regional MOs. In so doing, further enshrining the UNSC as the preeminent multilateral actor on questions of international security.

However, this process of streamlining and institutionalizing the division of labor and negotiating relations of hierarchy and nesting between the UN and regional MOs has proven much harder to realize in practice, than it is to agree on in principle. Indeed, as Franke reminds us, whilst in principle most regional organizations accept a subordinate hierarchical position vis-a-vis the UN, some, such as Western MOs like the EU and NATO, are not beyond challenging it in practice. As Blavoukos and Bourantonis suggest in their chapter, when these formalized relationships are exercised in practice to respond to a particular security crisis or issue, agreement on which MO participates, is responsible, sets policy and has the most credibility and legitimacy to act is disputed. In this way, these attempts to formally define the nature of the nested relationship between the UN and regional MOs have often resulted in increased contestation and controversy within the relationship. Although there is continued
focus on trying to reduce the problem of overlapping responsibilities and institutional rivalry between the UN and regional MOs, by establishing a clear division of labor and hierarchy in the relationship, this debate and effort remains essentially unresolved and disputed. A situation that is reinforced by the continued tensions between the UN and particular regional MOs over their respective distribution of roles and responsibilities, division of labor and legitimacy on particular security crises and issues.

Patterns of Cooperation and Conflict

In chapter three, Blavoukos and Bourantonis single out three push and pull factors – resource scarcity, normative congruence and extra-organizational drivers – as shaping inter-organizational relations in international security, including that of the nested relationship between the UN and regional MOs. All three are said to impact on the cooperative-competitive dynamic at play in this global-regional interaction. They suggest that resource exchange can strengthen cooperation, as regional MOs can act to provide the UN with a much needed additional pool of resources. Conversely, if a regional MO focuses on amassing resources for their own mandated activities, this can serve as a drag on the UN’s resources, such as during certain UN-EU interactions on peace operations. Similarly, the pooling of legitimacy and normative congruence can have both positive and negative impacts on the degree of cooperation in the UN-regional MO relationship. On the one hand, the support and endorsement of a regional MO can enhance the UN’s claim to legitimacy in responding to particular crisis. On the other, a regional MO may seek to manipulate the UN into bestowing its legitimacy upon its activities to the end of narrow and local interests, rather than those of global peace and security. Thirdly, extra-organizational forces may significantly influence the cooperative-conflictive dynamic between the UN and a regional MO. Notably, the UNSC Permanent Five members, by virtue of their veto power, often render a disproportionate influence over the UN’s response to security crises and issues. This includes the regional MO(s) with which the UN chooses to engage, and the nature of these interactions, in its response to a particular crisis or issue. Similarly, member states of regional MOs may also be tempted to act – collectively or individually – to manipulate the nature of their regional MO’s relationship to the UN in the name of their political interest.

Furthermore, inter-organizational relationships are often perceived very differently by the individual MOs involved. This is, arguably, especially relevant in the case of a relationship based on an overtly hierarchical and nested arrangement, such as that between the UN and regional MOs. Martin Welz’s chapter demonstrates this dynamic in the UN’s relationship with the African Union (AU). This relationship developed rapidly and mostly cooperatively in the 21st century, with the UN focused on capacity-building and the AU concentrated on peacekeeping. In spite of the seeming synergy in their agendas, a significant competitive dynamic (alongside cooperation) continues to animate the relationship. The two MOs have reached little agreement on the exact nature of the division of labor between them. Whilst the AU prefers to label the relationship as “complementary”, the UN talks instead of a relationship based on “subsidiarity”. Furthermore, at various times, such as the Libyan crisis in 2011 or in relation to the hybrid operation in Darfur, individual members states have exploited the misalignment and competitive dynamic between the UN and AU to pursue their own interests and preferences in responding to security crises. As aptly illustrated by the UN-AU relationship, formalizing inter-organization relations is often easier in principle – at the policy and procedural level – than it is in practice – at the level of concrete diplomatic consultation and the conduct of joint operations –, opening space for political contestation and competitive dynamics to emerge between MOs that are on paper nested.
The Politics of Overlap in Intra-Regionalism

The global-regional relationship of the UN and regional MOs is not the only inter-organizational relationships in international security that are shaped by how the mandates, capacities and legitimacy of MOs are negotiated in relation to one another. These issues are also evident in intra-regional inter-organizational relations. However, the cooperation-competition dynamic in these relationships tends to be centered less on cases of nesting and more on the politics of overlap. In intra-regional relationships between MOs, it is common that the overlapping, but distinct, memberships of regional MOs goes hand in hand with diverging conceptions of regional identity and boundaries, security and crisis management.

In many regional contexts, there is more than one MO that proclaims to represent, speak on behalf of and be responsible for the same region. In some contexts, there may be significant overlap in the memberships of these MOs, which itself may be a sign of ongoing and potentially unsolvable debates about the politics of governing a particular regional space. In other contexts, regional MOs may contain distinct member states. In such cases, the cooperative-competitive dynamic between these MOs can be driven by the promotion of one MO by its member states over that of another. In both scenarios, the result is that the relationship between MOs is embedded in wider political contestation about a particular region’s political order, geographical limits, security practices, legitimate representatives and multilateral processes.

To trace the politically contested nature of intra-regional relationship between MOs, this section summarizes how this is playing out in Europe, Asia, South America, and Eurasia, the four case-study chapters in this volume.

Europe’s security architecture

Europe is often heralded as having one of the most solid and established regional security ecosystems in international security. Indeed, the inter-organizational relations between NATO, the EU and the OSCE can be characterized as having a high degree of overlap in terms of their membership and mandate, with all three MOs actively engaged in regional crisis management. This set of interlocking institutions, as Koschut suggests in chapter five, was built on the principles of voluntary and flexible participation, non-hierarchical cooperation and an ad-hoc division of labor. It was also designed to function as a flexible inter-organizational arrangement to ensure an efficient use of each MO’s complementary capabilities. NATO serves as an anchor for the US (and Canada) within the European regional security landscape and specializes in military deterrence and defense against threats from outside the region. The EU represents an autonomous European political MO and functions to uphold a rule-based form of security multilateralism, aimed at combatting internal and external threats. Whilst the OSCE was conceived and continues to operate as a pan-European institution, spanning the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok, and focusing primarily on trust-building and conflict resolution across this much wider-geographical space.

Although the configuration of forces, interests and institutional divisions remains stable and the vast majority of their member states support the principle of the indivisibility of European security, as Koschut shows, tensions remain among the three MOs. It is during security crises, such as those of Kosovo 1999 or Ukraine 2013-, that these tensions manifest themselves most clearly, becoming moments of stress on this multilateral system of ‘interlocking regional security’. During such crises, it becomes apparent that the MOs advance divergent views about how to delineate their roles vis-à-vis one another in terms of geographical scope, hierarchy and
division of labor. Furthermore, they articulate distinct approaches towards security crisis management: security-as-collective defense; security-as-ruled-based multilateralism; security-as-trust-building. In this context of contestation over how to approach security crisis management and how to manage their overlapping mandates, authority and legitimacy, this inter-organizational arrangement often slides from being one of “interlocking” to “inter-blocking”. Nonetheless, the inter-organizational relationship between these three MOs continues to offer their member states a set of overlapping platforms, with which to discuss and manage their oftentimes incompatible visions of regional order, security and crisis management.

East Asia’s search for a new security architecture

As compared to Europe, East Asia’s architecture for governing international security is much more fluid and continues to evolve. Critically, this region continues to suffer from a lack of general agreement about which actors, MOs, spatial demarcations and functional scopes should form the basis for a regional multilateral security architecture.

This state of affairs reflects the evolution of security politics within the region. East Asia’s multilateralism arrangements have been built from the inside out and shaped by middle-sized powers, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at its core and expanded outwards to encompass wider East Asia. In spite of ongoing questions about its efficiency and effectiveness, a key success for ASEAN as a MO has been its role in driving and positioning itself as at the center of a wider set of differentiated multilateral arrangements – ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) – in which both regional and global powers, such as China and the US, participate. As Tan suggests in chapter six, ASEAN functions as the key MO for the emergence of a “‘multi-multilateral’ collage of institutions for consultation and cooperation in economic and politico-security terms.” As such, the principles of the “ASEAN Way” guide East Asian security multilateralism, which frame this “multi-multilateral” arrangement as based on intergovernmental relations, strict adherence to non-interference and decision-making by consensus and consultation.

However, the politics of this inter-organizational relationship remain very contested. In a context in which great power rivalry and competition over regional hegemony takes place alongside several explosive unresolved security crises and disputes, various actors advocate alternate versions of multilateral arrangements to manage regional security. As Tan notes, such debate is “about the prioritization of [multilateral] arrangements and the regional countries that ought to lead them”. In this politics of inter-organizational relations, ASEAN’s self-proclaimed centrality as the driver of East-Asia’s intra-regionalism is also in doubt. According to Tan, ‘mixed multilateralism’ is perhaps a more likely outcome, which would combine the principle of an inclusive and non-hierarchical set of inter-organizational relations – that prioritizes variable geometries over the establishment of a fixed regional architecture – with a functionalist and results-oriented institutional format. However, it remains to be seen whether or not both China and the US will buy into this vision of intra-regional multilateralism. What seems more certain is that the fluid and contested politics of inter-organizational relations will remain feature of East Asian security politics over the next decade.

New and old patterns of intra-regionalism in South America

The context of multilateralism in South America has also changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, security multilateralism in the Americas was organized around US hegemony, with the Organization of American States (OAS) as its central
organizational pillar. However, in recent years, key regional actors such as Brazil and Venezuela have sought to shift the regional multilateral context away from a US-led order towards a more regionally-focused one, anchored around the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and other subregional MOs. In membership terms, these new regional MOs are all nested within the OAS. However, as Nolte and Weiffen outline in chapter seven, they all also reject the establishment of a hierarchical inter-organizational order based on nested memberships as the organizing principle for multilateralism.

In this context of contested politics between continental, regional and subregional scales, there is an ambiguous relationship between multilateralism and state-led initiatives. With the result being a proliferation of MOs that take on ever-expanding mandates, which creates an increasingly complex network of inter-organizational relations between interregional, regional and subregional MOs. In the politics of South American multilateralism, the overlapping mandates between regional and subregional MOs is less consequential than the overlaps and differentiation in memberships, because the latter defines the geographic and spatial reach of the MO’s jurisdiction. And, thus, the difference between an interregional jurisdiction inclusive of the US, and a regional or subregional one exclusive of the US.

Alongside these overlapping mandates and activities, Nolte and Weiffen note that inter-organizational relations continue to be articulated around state-centric nodes. While this organizational architecture has, to some extent, sought to manage traditional interstate rivalries, national security interests and practices remain paramount and drive much of the security multilateralism in the region. Notably, Brazil has, in recent years, actively sought to promote the roles of certain regional MOs, such as UNASUR, as tools in support of its wider foreign policy goals and national interests. In this way, patterns of cooperation-competition in inter-organizational relations in South America remain heavily dependent on the preferences of individual state actors and reaffirms their critical role in multilateral and regional processes.

The geopolitics of multilateralism in-between Europe and Asia

Multilateralism within Eurasia is framed by the attempt to recreate a region following the end of the USSR. The development and shape taken up by intra-regionalism in Eurasia is heavily dominated by the policies put forward by the two predominant regional powers, namely Russia and China. Therefore, dynamic of cooperation and competition between MOs in the region is, to a great degree, predicated on the relationship between these two actors.

The visions of multilateralism put forward by Russia and China are rather different. The CSTO and the EEU are Russian-led initiatives to foster interstate cooperation in the post-Soviet space, functioning as complementary parts of a fairly coherent vision of closed regionalism. It also seeks to demarcate the Eurasian space from alternative regional power blocs and contexts, from the EU and NATO to the West, from the proclaimed “instability” to its South and, to a lesser degree, to its East. By contrast, the SCO’s vision of regional multilateralism is more difficult to grasp. The organization is co-led by China and Russia and, recently, expanded its geographical scope to include South Asia, with India and Pakistan becoming full members. The SCO leans towards a more open idea of regionalism. While with its recent expansion in membership, the SCO’s role is increasingly becoming that of a pan-Asian diplomatic forum aimed at recalibrating the broader international order, rather than operating as an instrument of joint region-building in the Eurasian space.

In this context, as Aris contends in his chapter, the inter-organizational relationships between the SCO and the CSTO and EEU is characterized by “competitive complementarity”. There is
a clear difference between the EEU as an inward-looking micro-economic zone and the SCO as a more open macro-economic economic project, aiming at decreasing tariffs and opening up the region to investment along China’s “one road, one belt” corridors. Therefore, the relationships between MOs in Eurasia are shaping and shaped by a wider politics of region-building.

The Politics of Networks and Inter-Regionalism

Although global-regional and intra-regional relationships between MOs remain more common, inter-regional multilateralism has increasingly come to prominence in recent years, with new networks and relationships between MOs based in what were previously disparate regional spaces, being formed and emphasized. In this way, inter-regional inter-organizational relationships transcend both the global-regional paradigm and intra-regional MO arrangements. The former, because they are not based on a nested arrangement. The latter, because they both encompass a much wider geographical span and exhibit much greater institutional agency, as these relationships are less tightly coupled to regional inter-state dynamics. Although most inter-regional relationships between MOs display a fairly reciprocal political dialogue, some MOs, such as the EU, are clearly identifiable as network hubs due to their greater financial and institutional capacities. Nonetheless, even here, state interests continue to play a role, with both great and rising powers influencing inter-regionalism in important ways. For example, key state actors can use their influence on a regional MO of which they are a member, and via this MO’s relationship to another regional MO, seek to shape the order of another regional context.

Networks and hubs of inter-regional relations

As Oelsner and Dominguez detail in chapter nine, networks of inter-regional security relations have become denser in recent times. This has served to both reinforce existing hierarchies and create new networks of and hubs for inter-organizational interaction in international security. In inter-regional networks, the EU is a key hub, reflecting its strong institutional agency, substantial resource base and its diplomatic work in recent years to tighten its connections to MOs in other regions. ASEAN and the AU are also well-connected MOs, albeit in subtly different ways from the EU. Most of the AU’s inter-organizational links are unidirectional and asymmetrical in nature, with these relationships often being centered on the transfer of resources and norms in the manner of a donor-recipient logic, in which the direction of travel largely continues to be from outside in. This includes the EU-AU relationship, which is probably the most significant inter-regional MO relationship involving the African region. This pattern is somewhat different when it comes to the ASEAN. As well as its relationship to the EU as an institution, ASEAN operates as a hub through which inter-regionalism is practiced by not only other MOs, but also state actors, most notably China and the US. Indeed, as Oeslner and Dominguez argue, the increased efforts to institutionalize inter-regional relations offers not only MOs, but also regional and global state powers, substantial opportunities for power-projection, norm diffusion and resource-transfer.

Taking this into account, when studying the networked relationships of inter-regionalism, it is not sufficient to look simply at a singular relationship between MOs. It is important to also examine both the prevalence and density of the wider networks these in which inter-organizational relationships are embedded and how such networks form new hubs of inter-regional interactions. In other words, the role of hub MOs represents another important feature of the contemporary international security landscape, especially when it comes to the politics of inter-organizational relations.
Asymmetric inter-regional relation between the EU and the AU

From the macro perspective of networked inter-regional relations in Oeslner and Dominguez’s chapter, the book moves to a micro examination of, arguably, the most developed inter-regional relationship in contemporary international security: the EU-AU relationship. In many respects, this relationship serves as an exemplar case of what inter-regional relations between MOs look like in practice and how the cooperation-competition dynamic in the relationship is negotiated.

As Engel notes in chapter ten, although the linkages between the two MOs are quite extensive, the question of whether this partnership has proven successful in terms of policy harmonization and norm convergence is much less obvious. In spite of an established process of diplomatic exchange and working practices, Engel notes that the core interests and modus operandi of the two organizations remain rather divergent. Hence, each MO continues to view their partnership differently, because they are motivated by distinct interests. The AU approaches the relationship as a way to attract resources and finances towards this aim of establishing a distinctive African regional security community. By contrast, the EU views the partnership through the lenses of its foreign relations, and as a way of exporting its normative model and stability-building strategy into a politically important region. As a result, tensions often arise due to mismatches between these two perspectives. For example, the AU views the EU as failing to give sufficient consideration to the specificities of the African context or recognize the priority status that should be given to the voice of African actors on security affairs in Africa. Conversely, the EU is critical of the AU’s lack of a coherent position on democratic governance. Therefore, even in this example of a well-established and apparently productive inter-regional relationship between MOs, the relationship is still subject to difficulties and ongoing frictions between the two sides, often as a result of insufficient convergence in their perspectives on the relationship.

Brazil and ZOPACAS – inter-regional multilateralism in the Global South

As Abdenaur, Mattheis and Seabra show, in chapter eleven, new forms of inter-regionalism can also arise out of older forms of multilateralism. They detail the case of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS), which having seemingly faded into obscurity was revived, primarily by the efforts of Brazil, as a new form of inter-regional multilateralism in the Global South. ZOPACAS is a maritime-centered MO, based on a loose intergovernmental format, and which seeks to transcend the regional division between South America and Africa, by emphasizing their common geography of the South Atlantic Ocean. ZOPCAS, as Abdenaur, Mattheis and Seabra note, is a multilateral arrangement that simultaneously includes aspects of inter-regionalism and intra-regionalism.

ZOPACAS’s reversal of fortune has largely come about as a result of Brazil seeking to reinforce its own position as a rising power, both in South America and on the global stage. Hence, ZOPACAS is another case of the politics of multilateralism being embroiled in and developed in relation to wider debates within international security, in this example that of the changing nature of the international security order. Via the promotion of an inter-regional MO, Brazil sought to raise its standing as a global and regional power, whilst simultaneously seeking to establish a clear separation between a South Atlantic and North Atlantic context of security multilateralism. Within this context, the revival of ZOPACAS was constructed according to an exclusionary logic, aimed at keeping the US-led NATO out of South Atlantic affairs and in order to build a more region-led coalition. This case, thus, also demonstrates how the politics
of inter-regional inter-organizations relations can be shaped by state actors seeking to direct their development towards their own ends.

The Politics of Governing Security Issues across Multiple Scales

In the last section of the book, the delineation of inter-organizational relationships by scalar and cross scalar type is cast aside, in favor of investigating the role played by the relationships between MOs within wider attempts to manage specific security issues, such as child trafficking, sanctions regimes and health, financial or humanitarian crises. Indeed, all the authors in this section suggest that inter-organizational interactions, as well as all other political relationships, evolve in an ad-hoc, messy and difficult to define way. Managing security challenges, crises and issues very often involve multiple MOs (global, regional and others), national and sub-national actors, which may be either state or non-state in nature. From this perspective, neat scalar categories of national, regional, and global levels are sometimes blurred in the practice of governing international security issues.

The multi-scale practices of governing child trafficking in West Africa

In chapter twelve, Bernards outlines that when it comes to the management of child trafficking in West Africa, patterns of cooperation and/or competition in the relationship between MOs cannot be analyzed in isolation from their interactions with other public and private actors active in the management of this issue. Employing an actor-network approach, Bernards presents the governance of child trafficking in West Africa as a messy and highly localized set of interactions between local, national, regional, and global actors.

Aside from scalar multiplicity, Bernards highlights the management of functional differentiation as important to how the relationship between these MOs is practiced. Child trafficking is both an economic problem linked to forcible labor recruitment and a security problem linked to illegal migration. The concrete practices employed against child trafficking in a local context are, thus, the product of the integration of conceptually and organizationally separate economic and security policy frames of the different MO at a global level, namely the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). From this standpoint, the relationship between MOs focused on the same specific issues is less about each MO seeking to assert its authority and defend its autonomy, and more about a negotiation between their concrete competences and resources and the management of their interdependencies.

Cross-border crisis management and multi-scale inter-organizational relations

The complex and often fluid nature of actors’ responses to a security crisis is a theme that is also pick up upon in Maier-Knapp’s chapter. Chapter thirteen highlights the ways in which cross-border crises often become drivers of inter-organizational cooperation and transformation. Taking three cross-border crises – the Asian Financial crisis; the Avian Influenza Crisis; and the Boat People crisis – as empirical case studies, Maier-Knapp traces how the relationship between multiple MOs and other actors have evolved in the context of a multi-scalar Southeast Asian security governance context.

In tracing the responses of the Thai government, regional MOs (ASEAN), interregional relationships between MOs (EU-ASEAN) and global MOs (the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Health Organization (WHO), Maier-Knapp demonstrates the ways in which the politics of crisis management may facilitate greater cross-scalar inter-organizational cooperation or, conversely, may result in cross-scalar inter-organizational competition. From the point of view of global or regional MOs, crises often become opportunities for norms diffusion and intervening to shape a coherent set of responses. Conversely, viewed from the perspective of a national government, this top-down mechanism of policy intervention may be problematic, as MOs force them to implement unpopular domestic reforms or costly policies. In all three case-studies, the global and regional MOs were integral to shaping and supporting the Thai government’s response to these trans-border crises, by way of their institutional and technical support. These crises served to redefine the responses of and relations between actors across multiple scales.

### The multi-scalar practices of sanctions cooperation

The final case-study chapter of the book considers inter-organizational relations in the practice of international sanctions, a tool usually deployed across multiple scales of governance. As von Borzyskowski and Portela outline, there is a growing trend for sanctions regimes to not only be transnational in nature, but also to operate through actors representing different scales. While the US is the principal state actor that imposes sanctions on others, the EU is the only regional MO that imposes sanctions primarily against non-members. At the same time, an increasing number of other regional MOs have begun to use sanctions as a punishment tool against some of their own members; in practice this often means membership suspensions or a cut in economic exchange.

However, this cross-scalar inter-organizational coordination on sanctions is neither unproblematic, nor geographically even. Viewed from the perspective of those who are targeted by these sanctions, inter-organizational cooperation is regionally very diverse. Africa stands out from the other regions when it comes to sender cooperation. This reflects the close inter-organizational partnerships between regional MOs, the US, and the EU. Similarly, sanctions regimes are also present in the Middle East. Here, the US, often in tandem with the EU, imposes sanctions on local actors, with some “local” sanctions regimes deployed by regional MOs. By contrast, in Asia, state actors seem to reject sanctions as a policy tool and regional sanctions regimes are non-existent. This reflects a confluence of a stricter adherence to the principle of non-interference and the oftentimes underdeveloped crisis management tools of regional MOs. Most sanctions in Asia are, thus, imposed by outside organizations, usually based on cooperation between the EU and the US. Unlike in other regions, sanctions as a practice in the Latin America has come to be dissociated from the US. In this region, sanctions sent by Western actors are infrequent, with regional MOs rejecting moves by the US to impose its power on the region and the EU carrying little interest and influence within the region. Therefore, as von Borzyskowski and Portela note, in spite of the rising prevalence of inter-organizational sanctions regimes in international security, the exact nature and forms that these regimes take varies across and between regional contexts.

### Conclusion

This book has sought to investigate the nature of the hierarchical structures and cooperative-competitive dynamics constituting the inter-organizational relations of international security. As argued throughout its chapters, the contemporary landscape of international security has in recent decades witnessed a proliferation of a multifarious set of relationships between MOs. In turn, this ever changing and evolving ecosystem of inter-organizational pushes forth the production of new forms of interactions and practices of security.
It is noteworthy that the chapters in this volume have suggested that the politics of nesting remains a key feature of inter-organizational relations between the UN and regional MOs. However, whilst the foundations of these relationships are hierarchical in principle, they are never fully asymmetrical in practice. As the specific case studies of global-regional relations in this book testify, these inter-organizational relationships remain heavily seeped in a cooperative-competitive dynamic.

Indeed, the dialectical dynamic of cooperation-competitive is very powerful in accounting for inter-organizational relations between MOs across the board. In the context of intra-regionalism, this manifests itself most evidently in the politics of overlap. These inter-organizational relations are often set within a complex pattern of memberships and the management of overlapping mandates, resources, interests, power dynamics and perspectives. In such a context of overlap, it would seem prudent for regional security architectures to organize these intra-organizational relationships around principles of flexible participation, non-hierarchical cooperation, and non-permanent division of labor. In practice, however, this configuration is elusive. The likelihood that such a coordinated arrangement of inter-organizational relationships emerges seems to turn on whether these MOs can find a tacit understanding of organizational complementary between themselves, in terms of key actors, geographic space, and functional scope. Furthermore, intra-regional security governance remains quite state-centric in nature and is, thus, heavily influenced by national agendas and preferences. This dynamic is mutually reinforced by a multilateral context of overlapping but non-coordinated MOs, because this creates political space for institutional choice, forum-shopping, and interest projection. In sum, the politics of intra-regional inter-organizational tends to be very complex, with cooperative and competitive dynamics operating side-by-side, whereby distinguishing them from one another is often problematic.

By contrast, inter-regional relations between MOs exhibit distinct cooperative and conflictive dynamics. In this regard, the degree of institutional agency and the capacity of a MO is decisive for establishing its position in the global network of other MOs. Relatedly, patterns of inter-regional relationships between MO are less tightly coupled to inter-state cooperative and competitive dynamics than those of intra-regional multilateralism. Nonetheless, regional and global powers seek to use inter-regional relations between MOs as a tool through which to extend their influence to other regions.

The chapters examining how the politics of inter-organizational relations play out within wider attempts to govern a security crisis or issue illustrate another way in which the cooperative-competition dynamic operates. From this perspective, the dynamic of cooperation and competition between MO and other actors cannot be fitted neatly into top-down scalar categories of relationships between specialized “niche” organizations with clearly differentiated mandates. Viewed from a bottom-up perspective, policy distinctions and separate mandates collapse into a far messier picture of highly localized interaction between multiple actors across multiple scales. From this standpoint, inter-organizational relations are less about authority and organizational autonomy and more about concrete competences and resources.

Taken as whole, the chapters of this book have all highlighted that, in different ways, the relationships between MOs are politically constituted, contested and always evolving. By way of this politics, inter-organizational relationships are all determined by both cooperative and competitive tendencies and dynamics, with the balance between the two something that is constantly being negotiated. An important theme brought out across the book is that of the role of states, and indeed other actors. While MOs often seek to engage one another on an institution-
to-institution basis, the dynamic driving this relationship is also influenced by political ideas and practices that extend beyond the formal boundaries of MOs as institutions. The agendas, interests, political rivalries and alliances of states often play a strong role in shaping inter-organizational relations. Equally, other political actors can impact on a relationship between MOs. However, it is also important not to forget that the relationships between MOs have political influence on all other aspects of security politics, including that of inter-state relations.