

**Segregation in Civic Life:
Ethnic Sorting and Mixing across Voluntary Associations**

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ABSTRACT

To what extent do voluntary organizations like sports, leisure, and neighborhood associations provide a platform where ethnic groups mingle and ethnic boundaries are overcome? This study uses unique panel data from the Netherlands Longitudinal Life Course Study (NELLS) to shed light on the integrative power of voluntary associations. I investigate decisions to join and leave associations of different ethnic composition, as a member or a volunteer, among individuals of Turkish, Moroccan, and native Dutch origin. In general, all ethnic groups are equally likely to join voluntary organizations, but ethnic minorities are more likely to leave than are Dutch natives, even after accounting for relevant sociodemographic characteristics. This alone explains ethnic minorities' lower involvement rates. Moreover, joining decisions are characterized by strong ethnic sorting across organizations of different ethnic composition: people are much more likely to join associations containing fewer ethnic out-group members. This limits the potential of voluntary associations as pathways to social integration. In contrast, once the initial hurdle of getting involved has been taken, people are no more likely to disengage from organizations with more ethnic out-group members. Inter-ethnic neighborhood contact and the local supply of involvement opportunities are most influential in explaining the strong sorting tendencies in people's joining decisions.

INTRODUCTION

Public and academic interests in voluntary association involvement have been rising in recent decades. One of the core reasons for this is the widely held conviction that participation in voluntary associations (e.g., neighborhood groups, school organizations, political parties, and sports clubs) yields benefits like improved well-being and enhanced labor market prospects (Borgonovi 2008; Ruiter and de Graaf 2009). In addition, voluntary association involvement is thought to foster social cohesion (Putnam 2000), increase political participation, and

contribute to the functioning of democracy (McFarland and Thomas 2006), although certain involvement patterns could amplify preexisting social inequalities and sharpen social boundaries (DiMaggio and Garip 2011; Lim 2010).

Various governments promote involvement in voluntary associations as a response to the downsizing of welfare state programs and concerns about diminished solidarity in increasingly diverse societies. In the lead-up to his election as prime minister of Great Britain, David Cameron (2010) coined the term “Big Society” to describe his vision of active citizenship, whereby people of different backgrounds work together to solve community issues. He argued: “It’s not the big state that will tackle our social problems and increase wellbeing. It’s the Big Society.” He called for every adult to become a member of a neighborhood association. Similar agendas have been pursued elsewhere, such as in the Netherlands under the label of “Participation Society” (Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2013).

Whereas many policymakers and scholars claim voluntary association involvement has a positive influence on social integration, rising levels of ethnic diversity are regularly cited as an urgent threat to social cohesion (Putnam 2007). Ethnicity is indeed shown to have a powerful stratifying impact on many kinds of social ties, including marriage, friendships, and work relationships (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001), supporting the portrayal of ethnic diversity as impetus to social fragmentation. Thus, the question arises whether voluntary associations help overcome ethnic boundaries and foster intergroup cohesion, or whether they instead reproduce and reinforce existing fault lines (Blau and Schwartz 1984). This question directly scrutinizes one of the underpinnings of the Big Society model.

However, existing knowledge on this topic does not reach far beyond the common observation that ethnic minorities generally have lower volunteering and membership rates than do members of the ethnic majority (Gijsberts, Van der Meer, and Dagevos 2012; Musick, Wilson, and Bynum 2000). Much less is known about the ethnic composition of the organizations that different ethnic groups typically get involved in. Therefore, it remains unclear how much ethnic mixing takes place in voluntary associations.

In this study I use Dutch panel data to investigate decisions to join and leave voluntary organizations of different ethnic composition among people of Turkish, Moroccan, and Dutch origin. As such, this study enriches broader debates on ethnic integration and assimilation.

Previous work has considered such processes regarding, for example, educational attainment (Kao and Thompson 2003), labor market outcomes (Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008), religious participation (Edwards, Christerson, and Emerson 2013), and electoral behavior (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999). Here I assess whether ethnic differentials and hierarchies observed in those settings extend to civic engagement.

At the same time, this study contributes to the literature on voluntary association involvement and civic participation more generally. First, and in contrast to the conventional practice of looking at cross-sectional snapshots of who is involved at a single point in time (notable exceptions include Rotolo [2000] and Lancee and Radl [2014]), I focus on people's involvement trajectories by analyzing decisions to start and quit volunteering or memberships. This angle provides richer insights into the dynamics behind the common cross-sectional finding that ethnic minorities have lower civic involvement rates than do native majorities. Does this reflect that minorities are less likely to get involved, more likely to drop out once involved, or a combination of the two?

This question is of interest, because while *getting* involved is a precondition for reaping any well-being or labor market benefits of voluntary association involvement, one's success in this regard is probably strongly affected by whether one *stays* involved for a sustained period of time. Similarly, relationships formed within associations may not last and mature if one only "stops by" for a little. Moreover, joining and leaving are fundamentally distinct processes. Joining decisions are, for example, heavily influenced by recruitment efforts and opportunities, whereas leaving decisions also reflect evaluations of experiences within voluntary associations. This point is widely recognized by social movement scholars (Corrigan-Brown 2013; Klandermans 1997) but rarely applied in research on voluntary association involvement.

Another novel element of this study is its attention to the organizational contexts in which membership and volunteering activities are embedded, in particular the ethnic composition of organizations. This composition may well have a defining impact on the degree to which voluntary associations reinforce preexisting ethnic divides or boost inter-ethnic cohesion. Driven by similar concerns, scholars of religion have been debating whether multiracial congregations reproduce or challenge racial inequality, with the jury still out (Edwards et al. 2013). Other research demonstrates that voluntary association membership is not equally strongly related to generalized trust, community reciprocity, and social network diversity

across different types of organizations, possibly reflecting the influence of organizational contexts (Glanville 2004; Stolle and Rochon 1998). In light of these findings, this study explores *general* ethnic differences in starting and quitting volunteering and memberships, and also how such differences vary by the *ethnic composition* of voluntary organizations. This perspective enables an appraisal of the degree of ethnic sorting and mixing taking place across associations.

In looking at the social composition of voluntary associations, I build on work by McPherson and colleagues (McPherson and Rotolo 1996; Popielarz and McPherson 1995), who show that people are more likely to be members of associations that contain more people with similar characteristics as themselves (see also McPherson, Popielarz, and Drobnic 1992). Ethnicity is not part of their analyses, but given that ethnicity is one of the most salient stratifiers of social networks (McPherson et al. 2001), one would expect strong ethnic sorting in volunteering and membership decisions. Such tendencies would limit the scope for inter-ethnic contact in voluntary associations.

Further extending the work of McPherson and colleagues, I consider membership *and* volunteering. Whereas membership concerns the consumption of services provided by associations, or subscribing to their mission, volunteering usually represents a firmer commitment. Volunteering entails the unpaid work to run associations and generally requires more intense interaction with co-members. Additionally, I look at the composition of *individual* organizations instead of *types* of organizations. Previous research has focused on the latter, but this ignores important variation in social composition across organizations falling within the same category (e.g., neighborhood associations, sports clubs, and religious groups). As a final contribution, I test several mechanisms that could cause segregation tendencies in people's joining and leaving decisions.

The first of these mechanisms concerns intergroup attitudes. I examine to what extent any ethnic sorting across voluntary associations is explained by people preferring to associate with others from their own group. The second mechanism relates to the ethnic composition of social networks, with the underlying assumption that these networks affect the likelihood of being aware of and being recruited by particular organizations. Third, I consider the local supply of involvement opportunities for organizations of different ethnic composition, recognizing that this is a key constraint in shaping volunteering and membership decisions.

My empirical analysis uses unique data from the Netherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse Study (NELLS; Tolsma et al. 2014). This data source contains information on the ethnic composition of the voluntary associations that people are involved in, alongside rich information on inter-ethnic attitudes, contacts, and networks. Furthermore, its two-wave panel design enables me to track joining and leaving transitions between 2010 (wave 1) and 2013 (wave 2). The NELLS also oversamples individuals of Moroccan and Turkish origin, allowing for comparisons between these minority groups and the native Dutch majority.

Moroccans and Turks are the largest ethnic minorities in the Netherlands: each make up 2.3 percent of the total population, and they jointly represent approximately 40 percent of all non-Western minorities (data for 2015 from Statistics Netherlands).¹ Both groups originate from labor migration in the 1960s and 1970s; immigration has continued ever since, mainly via family formation and reunification. The fact that most initial immigrants had few qualifications and were recruited for low-skilled jobs had negative implications for Moroccans' and Turks' social status, and this lower social status has remained for later immigrant generations (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Indeed, Moroccans and Turks rank lower in the ethnic hierarchy than Dutch natives, but they also rank lower than minorities from former colonies like Indonesia and Suriname. Both their structural and sociocultural integration into Dutch society are subjects of concern (Huijnk and Dagevos 2012; Huijnk, Gijsberts, and Dagevos 2014), with possible consequences for their assimilation into civic life.

The limited structural integration of Turks and Moroccans is expressed in lower rates of labor force participation (primarily among women), lower occupational status, and higher rates of unemployment, poverty, and benefit dependence (Huijnk et al. 2014). These groups also often live in areas with higher ethnic minority concentrations and deprivation levels, even though residential segregation in the Netherlands is less pronounced than in, for instance, the United States (Musterd 2005). On top of this, the sociocultural distance from Moroccans and Turks to the native Dutch population is greater than for most other minorities. This is expressed in high rates of intra- versus inter-ethnic contact, and a relatively weak command of the Dutch language, especially among Turks (Huijnk and Dagevos 2012). The role of religion deserves emphasis as well, with immigrants' religion being regarded as a bigger barrier to integration in Europe than in the United States (Foner and Alba 2008). Not only does Moroccan and Turkish minorities' Muslim background contrast with the predominantly Christian background of

Dutch natives, but religion is in general much more important for Moroccans and Turks than for the highly secular native majority.

The ensuing cultural distance between the Moroccan and Turkish minorities and the native majority gives rise to discrimination and social exclusion. Notwithstanding that the Netherlands has traditionally been more open to accommodating Muslim minorities than have most countries in Western Europe, Statham (2016) demonstrates that Dutch natives hold discriminating views toward Muslim minorities, and Huijnk and Dagevos (2012) note that about 40 percent of Moroccans and Turks in the Netherlands perceive that they sometimes experience discrimination. More generally, the social climate toward Moroccans and Turks has sharpened in recent years, following terrorism by radical Muslim groups abroad and domestic events like the murder of the Islam-critical filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004. These events have fueled native hostility against Muslim minorities, illustrated by the success of self-acclaimed “anti-Islam” politician Geert Wilders (Statham 2016). Such negative sentiments could constrain the integration of Moroccans and Turks in civic life, partly by evoking a sense of “reactive ethnicity” among minorities (Voas and Fleischmann 2012). Huijnk and Dagevos (2012) indeed find that the proportion of Moroccans and Turks identifying with the Netherlands rather than their origin country has stagnated since the turn of the century.

Before proceeding, I should stress that this article looks only at voluntary association involvement and not more informal forms of volunteering and participation. Such activities tend to occur on a more casual and individual basis, structured around preexisting family and neighbor relations (Wilson and Musick 1997), reducing their potential payoffs for social cohesion on a wider scale (Putnam 2000). Nevertheless, more active participants in formal organizations are usually more active in informal networks as well (Wilson and Musick 1997). This holds for all ethnic groups in the NELLS data, although Turks and Moroccans provide relatively more help to parents and other family.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

The Volunteering and Membership Market

Previous theorizing on voluntary association involvement has often been done on an ad hoc basis, bestowing resources or values on individuals with particular sociodemographic profiles

to explain observed volunteering and membership patterns. A coherent model that systematically accounts for different involvement transitions is generally lacking. Against this backdrop, I propose the volunteering and membership market as an auxiliary framework for approaching people's decisions to join and leave voluntary associations.

This market framework is especially suitable for my analysis of joining and leaving transitions, as it offers clear predictions regarding various mechanisms that can be directly tested using my data. It is analogous to market models in the fields of social movements (Klandermans 2004), religion (Sherkat and Wilson 1995), and marriage (Kalmijn 1998). Within the volunteering literature, Wilson and Musick (1997) also refer to a marketplace for voluntary labor, where volunteers and organizations meet. Lim and Laurence (2015) implicitly rely on a market model as well, contrasting demand- and supply-side explanations for a decline in volunteering in Britain following the Great Recession.

In the volunteering and membership market, matches are made between potential participants and voluntary associations. In the case of volunteering, potential volunteers offer voluntary labor, and associations offer volunteering opportunities. The behavior of both parties is governed by their preferences, resources, and external constraints. Matches between individuals and organizations result from the interplay of these factors.

The preferences of potential volunteers and members relate to their motives for being civically involved, which could reflect, for example, certain values or desires to strengthen social relationships or improve career opportunities (Hwang, Grabb, and Curtis 2005). Valuation of competing time uses, such as paid work, household tasks, and involvement in more informal networks, matters as well. The resources of potential participants comprise the amount of time and money at their disposal, but also less tangible assets like communication skills and psychological resources like efficacy perceptions. Social networks represent another important resource, providing support and advice, channeling information, reinforcing norms, and imposing group sanctions (Kalmijn 1998; Wilson and Musick 1997). The most prominent external constraint faced by potential participants concerns the menu of volunteering and membership opportunities available. The breadth and depth of this supply are heavily influenced by the local presence of voluntary associations (cf. Lim and Laurence 2015).

The aims of voluntary associations often boil down to the expansion, improvement, or continuity of their service provision. These goals are reflected in the numbers of volunteers and members they are looking for, as well as the desired characteristics of prospective participants. Some organizations strive to enter new segments of society, increasing their overall legitimacy, while others focus on consolidating the niches they occupy (cf. Brady, Schlozman, and Verba 1999; McPherson and Rotolo 1996). An important resource of voluntary organizations is their stock of current participants, who form a bridge via which associations can reach out to prospective participants. Indeed, Lim (2010) shows that political activists disproportionately target people who are easily reachable through the social networks of existing activists. Finally, the main external constraint faced by voluntary associations arises from the limited availability of (suitable) potential participants, and competition from other associations in attracting and retaining those individuals (McPherson and Rotolo 1996; Sandell 2001).

A limitation of the market framework as described here is that it takes the wider institutional context in which individuals and organizations are embedded as given. This is not to say that macro-social factors have no impact on volunteering and membership decisions—and ethnic differentials therein. Quite the opposite, the broader context of migration histories, ethnic hierarchies, and discrimination in the Netherlands (see the first section of this article) may very well leave a mark on civic life. Therefore, these factors are worth keeping in mind, even though their impact cannot be directly assessed with the present data.

General Ethnic Differences in Joining and Leaving

Previous research on ethnic differences in voluntary association involvement points out that ethnic minorities are less likely to be civically engaged than are native majority groups. Musick and colleagues (2000) demonstrate that black-white differentials in the United States remain even after controlling for differences in socioeconomic status and religious networks. European studies show similar patterns (De Rooij 2012; Gijssberts et al. 2012). These findings fit with a broader literature on the social integration and assimilation of ethnic minorities, which shows that these groups lag behind in terms of educational achievement, labor market outcomes, and political participation (Heath et al. 2008; Kao and Thompson 2003; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999). As of yet, however, it remains unclear to what degree these differentials reflect that ethnic minorities are less likely to become involved in voluntary associations or are more likely to drop out once involved.

There are good reasons for expecting ethnic minorities to have both lower chances of joining and higher chances of leaving voluntary associations. Thinking of prospective participants' time use, for instance, we know that non-Western minorities are traditionally more actively engaged in informal networks and informal volunteering (Sundeen, Garcia, and Raskoff 2009). This is especially true for the Turkish minority in the Netherlands (Huijnk and Dagevos 2012). Such dispositions could explain a lower propensity to get involved in voluntary associations to begin with, but they could also reduce minority group members' loyalty to the associations they are involved in, translating into higher quitting propensities.

Similarly, differences between the human, cultural, and social capital stocks of ethnic minorities and the native majority likely play a role for both joining and leaving. Shortfalls of financial resources, language skills, social support, and information about involvement opportunities all form barriers to getting involved. In addition, they make ethnic minority individuals less popular recruitment targets. At the same time, smaller stocks of civic and communication skills hinder successful participation and gratifying interactions within associations, giving rise to higher quitting propensities. Such tendencies may be exacerbated by prejudice and in-group biases among organizations' native majority members, as well as opaque organizational structures and practices. These forces could be especially strong in organizations that are heavily dominated by natives, where minorities have little power to stand up for change. Related research on religious congregations in the United States finds that even in racially diverse congregations, norms and practices are often geared to the white majority, leaving it up to minorities to either adapt or exit (Edwards et al. 2013).

The local supply of involvement opportunities is another possible driver of ethnic differences in joining and leaving voluntary associations. In this context, it is well-known that ethnic minorities often live in more deprived neighborhoods with a sparser civic infrastructure (Vermeulen, Tillie, and Van de Walle 2012). As a consequence, they are less likely to be approached with recruitment requests and to come across associations in their daily lives. The influence of a scarce supply of involvement opportunities on quitting decisions is, on the other hand, less clear-cut. Whereas opportunity-rich environments allow for better matches between individuals and associations, leading to lower exit rates, such environments also offer more alternatives to people who are dissatisfied in their current association, making leaving a less costly decision. Despite this ambiguity, my first core hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Compared with Dutch natives, people of Moroccan and Turkish origin are less likely to start volunteering and memberships (1a) and are more likely to quit (1b).

The Ethnic Composition of Organizations and Joining and Leaving Transitions

For assessing ethnic integration in voluntary associations, it is not sufficient to analyze general differences in joining and leaving decisions. We should also determine whether ethnic groups mix with each other or sort across voluntary organizations; researchers must thus pay attention to the ethnic composition of organizations that people join and leave. Some previous studies already point to composition-related arguments for explaining volunteering (e.g., Lewis, MacGregor, and Putnam 2013) and distinguish between “bridging” and “bonding” organizations (Putnam 2000; Stolle and Rochon 1998). However, the interplay of individuals’ characteristics and the social composition of organizations has generally escaped direct scrutiny.

Work conducted by McPherson and colleagues, using longitudinal data from the Ten Towns in Nebraska Survey, represents a major landmark in this area (McPherson et al. 1992; McPherson and Rotolo 1996; Popielarz and McPherson 1995). It develops a model for the evolution of “niches” of voluntary associations in social space, founded on the principles that people join organizations via recruitment through homogenous networks and organizations compete for members. Empirically, Popielarz and McPherson (1995) find that members are more likely to leave organizations dominated by the opposite gender and as their distance to the educational niche of the organization type widens. Similarly, Scheitle and Dougherty (2010) find that minority members in multiracial congregations have shorter membership durations as the share of majority members in a congregation rises, arguably reflecting individual and organizational pressures that make them leave faster.

Extending this line of research, I consider both memberships and volunteering, both joining and leaving, and I shift the focus to ethnicity as one of the strongest divides in social life (McPherson et al. 2001). Furthermore, I measure the composition of voluntary organizations for *individual* organizations instead of by *type* of organization (e.g., religion, sports, politics, and school).² The variation in composition across organizations that belong to the same

category is far from negligible. Compare, for example, a tennis club consisting of rich, highly educated members from the ethnic majority with a soccer club comprising mostly ethnic minorities from lower socioeconomic strata. Likewise, even though religious congregations are notoriously segregated along ethnic lines (Edwards et al. 2013), religious associations as a category are extremely diverse in terms of their members' ethnicity. Therefore, composition measures at the level of individual organizations are vastly superior indicators of the concrete organizational contexts in which participants are embedded. Finally, I inspect several mechanisms that could produce ethnic sorting across voluntary associations, observing that such tendencies could be driven by a variety of forces (see the next section).

My initial hypotheses on the role of the ethnic composition of voluntary associations are in line with the aforementioned findings of the few previous studies in this area, as well as the observation that social networks display high degrees of ethnic homogeneity:

Hypothesis 2: Dutch natives are more likely to join organizations containing *fewer* ethnic minority members (2a), and more likely to leave organizations with *more* ethnic minority members (2b).

Hypothesis 3: People of Moroccan and Turkish origin are more likely to join organizations containing *more* ethnic minority members (3a), and more likely to leave organizations with *fewer* ethnic minority members (3b).

Mechanisms behind Ethnic Sorting

I consider three mechanisms that could generate the ethnic sorting in volunteering and membership transitions predicted by Hypotheses 2 and 3. These mechanisms are derived from the analytic framework of the market for volunteering and memberships and relate to inter-ethnic attitudes (preferences), the ethnic composition of social networks (social resources), and the local supply of involvement opportunities (external constraints).³ The first mechanism deals exclusively with potential participants, whereas the latter two also cover the voluntary associations side of the market: social network ties form a bridge between potential participants and associations, and the very presence of voluntary organizations determines the involvement opportunities available to potential participants.

Inter-ethnic attitudes. Social identity theory asserts that individuals strive to achieve a positive self-image (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Such self-esteem is partly derived from how people view the social categories to which they belong, and is fostered by perceiving their own social group as favorably differentiated from other groups. Following these principles, potential participants likely have ethnic in-group biases. Such in-group favoritism and its counterpart of out-group hostility feature prominently in ethnic conflict theories about the effect of ethnic diversity on social cohesion (Van der Meer and Tolsma 2014). The in-group biases might explain why people are more likely to join associations that contain more members of their ethnic in-group. Moreover, if someone does get involved in an association with many out-group members, such in-group biases plausibly imply a lower commitment level and less satisfaction from their involvement, increasing the chance of quitting. If in-group biases are widespread, people are also more prone to experience discrimination and exclusion in out-group dominated associations. The same point is made by students of multiracial congregations in the United States (Edwards et al. 2013; Scheitle and Dougherty 2010). Accordingly, my hypothesis concerning this preference-based mechanism is as follows:

Hypothesis 4: Ethnic sorting in people's decisions to join and leave voluntary associations with more or fewer ethnic minority members can be explained by inter-ethnic attitudes.

The ethnic composition of social networks. The second mechanism deals with structurally induced homophily rather than preference-based homophily. The starting point is that people's networks of friends, family, colleagues, and neighbors are valuable resources that reinforce social norms, channel information, and provide support. From this perspective, having ethnic out-group ties in one's personal network expands one's knowledge about involvement opportunities for associations with more ethnic out-group members, as well as one's support base for involvement in such associations. Additionally, most (successful) recruitment occurs via current participants asking others in their networks to join as well, whether looking at civic organizations, protest movements, or religious congregations (Brady et al. 1999; Corrigan-Brown 2013; Edwards et al. 2013; Klandermans 1997; Lim 2010). The presence of ethnic out-group ties in one's network of friends, family, colleagues, and neighbors therefore enhances one's chances of being asked to join, of ending up in, and of integrating and staying involved in associations containing more ethnic out-group members. Given that social networks exhibit

strong ethnic homogeneity (McPherson et al. 2001), this recruitment mechanism can evoke powerful sorting across voluntary associations. Thus, I hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 5: Ethnic sorting in people's decisions to join and leave voluntary associations with more or fewer ethnic minority members can be explained by the ethnic composition of social networks.

Not all ties are necessarily equally influential, though. For example, it is unclear whether strong and weak ties matter equally. The former probably carry more persuasive power when it comes to recruitment requests and may represent a richer source of support, but weak ties are better able to expand people's awareness of different options (Granovetter 1983). Most scholars argue that strong ties are more successful recruiters than weak ties (e.g., Brady et al. 1999), but Lim (2008) finds it is the context in which ties are embedded that matters: for example, neighborhood ties are more effective for recruitment into community politics, whereas ties embedded in civic associations are particularly effective for protest recruitment. For this reason, my analysis discerns social ties by strength as well as the environment in which they are situated.

The local supply of involvement opportunities. Local levels of organizational activity largely shape the opportunity structures faced by potential participants. Analogous to the marriage market axiom that there is "no mating without meeting," people are more likely to get and stay involved in associations with a particular ethnic composition if such associations are well-represented within close proximity. The idea is that potential participants have a limited menu of options due to residential clustering of ethnic groups, with most ethnic minorities in the Netherlands living in urban areas, and especially within particular neighborhoods within the big cities (Musterd 2005; Tolsma et al. 2014). As a consequence, a person of minority origin living in a deprived urban area where native-dominated associations are only sparsely represented has a much higher chance of joining an association that predominantly contains ethnic minority members rather than a native-dominated association (cf. Vermeulen et al. 2012). What mainly matters here are the "market shares" of organizations of different ethnic composition (in terms of their organizational activity), because those shares determine their competitiveness (McPherson and Rotolo 1996; Sandell 2001). This leads to my last hypothesis:

Hypothesis 6: Ethnic sorting in people's decisions to join and leave voluntary associations with more or fewer ethnic minority members can be explained by the local supply of opportunities to be involved in ethnically diverse or homogenous organizations.

DATA AND METHODS

Data Source

The first wave of the NELLS was carried out between December 2008 and May 2010, and the second wave between February 2013 and December 2013. The former combined a face-to-face interview with a self-administered questionnaire; the second interview was conducted entirely via face-to-face or computer-assisted interviewing. The sampling frame included an oversampling of people of Turkish and Moroccan origin. First, 35 municipalities were quasi-randomly selected; three random samples were then drawn from the population age 15 to 45 in each of those municipalities: one for people born in Turkey or whose father and/or mother were born in Turkey, another for people born in Morocco or whose father and/or mother were born in Morocco, and a third for everyone else.⁴

The net response rate in the first wave was 56 percent among Dutch natives, and 50 and 46 percent among respondents of Turkish and Moroccan origin, respectively. These rates compare favorably to earlier attempts at interviewing ethnic minorities in the Netherlands (Tolsma et al. 2014). The second survey wave achieved a net re-interview rate of 75 percent. After excluding the heterogeneous subsample of respondents who are neither native Dutch, Turkish, nor Moroccan (i.e., first- or second-generation immigrants from any other country; 229 in total), and respondents with missing values for any variable included in my analyses (47 in total), I am left with a panel sample of 2,553 individuals, containing 1,693 Dutch natives, 421 Moroccans, and 439 Turks.⁵

Voluntary Association Involvement

The NELLS distinguishes eight types of voluntary associations covering the following areas: sports, leisure (music, hobby, or culture), neighborhood, professional/consumer interests, immigrants, politics, religion, and environment/international solidarity. For each type,

respondents are asked whether they are a member, and whether they do any voluntary work. Subsequently, they have to indicate how many of their co-members belong to an ethnic minority, which is clarified as people of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, or Antillean descent (the last two groups together form the next largest non-Western minority in the Netherlands). The response options are “none,” “a few,” “quite a lot,” and “nearly all.” Because the latter two options are chosen relatively infrequently, I collapsed them into one category, which I label as “many” from here onward.

Wave 2 only repeats the composition questions for sports, leisure, and neighborhood associations. Therefore, while my analyses of joining and leaving in general consider all eight organization types, I subsequently zoom in on sports, leisure, and neighborhood associations when analyzing ethnic sorting across organizations. It is unfortunate that religious and immigrant associations cannot be included in all analyses, because those organizations are popular among Turks and Moroccans and strongly segregated in wave 1. Yet, among minorities, involvement in sports, leisure, and neighborhood associations is at least as common as involvement in religious and immigrant associations, ensuring that my analyses capture the majority of volunteering and memberships among all ethnic groups.⁶ Nevertheless, not including religious and immigrant organizations likely leads me to underestimate the segregation of the civic landscape.

Table 1 shows the percentage of respondents who report being a volunteer or member in at least one survey wave by organization type and ethnic composition, as well as respondents’ ethnicity (focusing on sports, leisure, and neighborhood associations). The table shows that Turkish and Moroccan respondents generally have lower involvement rates than do Dutch natives. In addition, the highest involvement rates for each group are for organizations that contain the most ethnic in-group members.

<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE>

Explanatory Variables

Ethnicity. I distinguish between Dutch natives, respondents born in Turkey or whose father or mother was born there, and respondents born in Morocco or whose father or mother was born

there. Approximately 60 percent of both minorities are first-generation immigrants, 35 percent belong to the second generation, and 5 percent are from the 2.5 generation.

Inter-ethnic attitudes. For measuring inter-ethnic attitudes, I constructed social distance scales from a battery of questions that ask respondents whether they would have a problem with someone of a particular ethnic origin (a) being appointed as their boss, (b) becoming their neighbor, or (c) marrying their child. These questions are repeated for “someone” of Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese or Antillean, and Dutch origin, with the response options “not at all” (0), “no” (1), and “yes” (2). I generated two scales from these items: one that averages respondents’ answers to the items for “someone” of Dutch origin (Cronbach’s alpha equals .81), and one that averages respondents’ answers to the items for “someone” of Turkish, Moroccan, or Surinamese/Antillean origin (Cronbach’s alpha equals .93).

The ethnic composition of social networks. I include several measures for the ethnic composition of people’s social networks, distinguishing strong versus weak ties, and ties situated in different environments. For the strong tie indicators I rely on a question about people’s core discussion networks, asking respondents to nominate up to five people with whom they have discussed “important matters” over the past six months. From this information, I first constructed two dummy variables for whether a respondent has any family members of native Dutch or ethnic minority origin with whom they discuss such matters. Similarly, I constructed two dummy variables for whether a respondent selected any non-family contacts of native Dutch or ethnic minority origin. For capturing weaker ties, I constructed a dummy variable indicating whether a respondent had any friends of native Dutch origin and a dummy variable for having friends of ethnic minority origin. I also include measures that capture contact with Dutch natives and contact with ethnic minorities in one’s neighborhood. I derived these contact variables from the following questions: “How often do you have personal contact with someone of [origin X] in your neighborhood?” with the clarification that personal contact implies regular interaction and knowing someone by name. Responses are measured on a seven-point scale from “never” to “every day” and treated as continuous variables. I created similar indicators for contact with Dutch natives and ethnic minorities at work or at school. For all social network variables, ties or contact with “ethnic minorities” refer to relations with people of Turkish, Moroccan, or Surinamese/Antillean origin.

The local supply of involvement opportunities. I measure the local supply of involvement opportunities by three indicators derived from the NELLS data. These variables approximate the level of organizational activity at the municipality level by looking at local membership rates for organizations with no, a few, and many ethnic minority members. They signify how strongly organizations of different ethnic composition are locally represented, which in turn determines how many opportunities there are to be involved in associations of a particular composition, how likely it is that individuals are aware of such opportunities, and how likely it is that people are approached by members of such associations.

To construct each variable, I first counted how many respondents within each of the 35 municipalities were members of an association with respectively no, a few, and many ethnic minority co-members. Then, I divided these numbers by the total number of respondents in the municipality. This provides estimates of the local membership densities (the market shares) for organizations of different ethnic composition, measured in percentages.⁷ These calculations are based on all respondents to wave 1 of the NELLS (i.e., not just respondents who also took part in the second wave), to exploit as much information as possible. The estimates are based on 32 to 420 respondents per municipality, with the average respondent living in a municipality with 211 respondents. I applied weights to correct for the oversampling of individuals of Moroccan and Turkish origin, thus arriving at more representative estimates of the true membership densities in each municipality.

Control variables. The analyses control for a variety of factors that are known to affect memberships and volunteering: age (in years divided by 10), age squared, gender (a dummy variable for being female), educational attainment (on a five-point scale from “only primary education” to “having a university degree,” treated as continuous), religious service attendance (on a five-point scale from “never” to “at least once a week,” treated as continuous), parental status (a dummy variable for having children under 18 living at home), marital status (a dummy variable for marriage/cohabitation), housing tenure (a dummy variable for ownership versus renting), employment and occupational status (dummy variables for being employed, unemployed, in full-time education, or otherwise outside the labor force; the employed are subdivided by the quartile of the ISEI distribution their job falls into), language proficiency (number of correct answers to a vocabulary test with nine items), and country of birth (a dummy variable for being born in the Netherlands). Because some of these factors may partially mediate the relationships between ethnicity and voluntary association involvement, I estimate

all models with and without the control variables. The Appendix presents descriptive statistics for all explanatory variables.⁸

Methods

I use the two-wave panel structure of the NELLS to identify which individuals have the opportunity to start or quit volunteering and memberships (i.e., are “at risk” of starting or quitting), and who indeed experienced such a transition between the two survey waves. Because individuals could simultaneously be involved in multiple types of associations (e.g., sports, leisure, and neighborhood), they could also experience starting and quitting events for multiple types of associations. Therefore, my units of analysis are respondent–association type combinations, with observations nested within respondents, which are in turn nested in municipalities. I correct for this nesting by estimating clustered standard errors.⁹

In the first part of the analysis, when examining ethnic differences in joining and leaving organizations in general, I look at all eight organization types distinguished in the NELLS. Subsequently, when analyzing ethnic sorting across organizations, I consider only sports, leisure, and neighborhood associations, because wave 2 of the NELLS contains ethnic composition information only for those types.

I estimate separate regression models for volunteering and memberships, and for starting and quitting. The starting models are restricted to observations (i.e., respondent–association type combinations) for which an individual could experience a starting transition; that is, exclusively association types for which the individual *is not* a member or volunteer in wave 1. In contrast, the quitting models are confined to observations for which a quitting transition could potentially occur; that is, all association types for which the individual *is* a member or volunteer in wave 1. For the first part of the analysis, the ethnic composition of the organizations joined or left does not matter. Later on I take this ethnic composition into account (see the model descriptions below).

It is possible for a person to experience a starting *and* a quitting transition for the same association type, for example, leaving a sports club with no ethnic minority co-members and joining one with many. In these data, however, such switching events cannot be distinguished from continuous involvement in an organization with a changing composition. To ensure that

“true” starting and quitting events are analyzed, I classify a transition as “starting” only if the person is initially not involved at all for the association type in question, and count a transition as “quitting” only if the person disengages altogether from the association type; all other scenarios are treated as “non-events”. I thus analyze 86 percent of all potential volunteering transitions, and 77 percent of all potential membership transitions. Among the potential events I ignore, upward and downward moves along the ethnic composition axis are equally common across all ethnic groups, so there is no obvious bias to the results due to treating those cases as non-events. Table 2 reports the number of starting and quitting transitions by association type and ethnic composition for sports, leisure, and neighborhood associations.

<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE>

Starting models. For analyzing joining transitions, I start by estimating binary logit models as summarized in Equation 1a. These regressions address Hypothesis 1a on ethnic differences in starting volunteering and memberships in general. They model the log odds of being involved in a particular organization type in wave 2, given that one was not yet involved in such an organization in wave 1 (and thus at risk of starting). All independent variables are measured at the time of wave 1, to ensure they precede any changes in volunteering and memberships. Next, I turn to estimating multinomial logit models as depicted in Equation 1b. These models take into account the ethnic composition of the “destination organization” (i.e., the organization being joined), thus testing Hypotheses 2a and 3a on ethnic sorting across voluntary associations—and later on Hypotheses 4 to 6. They model the log odds of being involved in an organization with composition k in wave 2, conditional on not being involved in wave 1. In this context, k can refer to organizations with no, a few, or many ethnic minority members. The coefficients of the independent variables are here allowed to vary by the ethnic composition of the destination organization.

$$\log \left(\frac{P(Y_{i,t+1} = 1)}{P(Y_{i,t+1} = 0)} \mid Y_{i,t} = 0 \right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Moroccan}_i + \beta_2 \text{Turkish}_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_x \mathbf{X}_{i,t} \quad (1a)$$

$$\log \left(\frac{P(Y_{i,t+1} = k)}{P(Y_{i,t+1} = 0)} \mid Y_{i,t} = 0 \right) = \beta_{0k} + \beta_{1k} \text{Moroccan}_i + \beta_{2k} \text{Turkish}_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_{xk} \mathbf{X}_{i,t} \quad (1b)$$

Quitting models. I estimate closely related models for analyzing quitting transitions. Equation 2a describes the binary logit model that I use in the first part of the analysis, modeling the log odds of no longer being involved at the time of wave 2 in an organization type in which one was still involved in wave 1. All independent variables are again measured at the time of wave 1. Equation 2b illustrates the models that explore ethnic sorting in people's quitting decisions. The left-hand side represents the log odds of having disengaged from an organization with ethnic composition k between the two survey waves. The definition of k is the same as for the starting models, and the coefficients of the predictors are now allowed to vary by the composition of the origin organization (i.e., the organization being left).

$$\log\left(\frac{P(Y_{i,t+1} = 0)}{P(Y_{i,t+1} = 1)} \mid Y_{i,t} = 1\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Moroccan}_i + \beta_2 \text{Turkish}_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_x \mathbf{X}_{i,t} \quad (2a)$$

$$\log\left(\frac{P(Y_{i,t+1} = 0)}{P(Y_{i,t+1} = k)} \mid Y_{i,t} = k\right) = \beta_{0k} + \beta_{1k} \text{Moroccan}_i + \beta_{2k} \text{Turkish}_i + \boldsymbol{\beta}_{xk} \mathbf{X}_{i,t} \quad (2b)$$

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

General Ethnic Differences in Joining and Leaving

Tables 3 and 4 show the results of eight binary logit models that analyze starting and quitting decisions in general. For each combination of the two transitions (starting and quitting) and the two types of involvement (volunteering and membership), two models are presented: one with only ethnicity as a predictor, and another adding the control variables described in the Explanatory Variables section. The presented estimates are the average marginal effects of each predictor across the samples of analysis, holding any other predictors in the model at their actual value for each observation.¹⁰ The models in Tables 3 and 4 look at all eight organization types distinguished in the NELLS, including religious and immigrant organizations.¹¹

<INSERT TABLE 3 AND TABLE 4 HERE>

The estimated effects of ethnicity in the starting models in Table 3 strongly contradict Hypothesis 1a, which posits that people of Moroccan and Turkish origin are generally less likely to start volunteering and memberships than are Dutch natives. The average marginal

effects of the ethnicity variables are close to zero and not statistically significant. This holds true for Moroccans and Turks, for volunteering and memberships, and regardless of whether the controls are included. On the other hand, the quitting models in Table 4 largely corroborate Hypothesis 1b, which states that ethnic minority members are generally more likely to disengage from voluntary associations than is the native majority. Both Moroccans and Turks have, on average, a significantly higher probability of terminating memberships than do Dutch natives, with average marginal effects of close to 20 percentage points. Moreover, people of Turkish origin are significantly more likely to stop volunteering, although only at the 10 percent level once all controls are included. Overall, the results in Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that ethnic minority members are not any less likely to *get* involved in voluntary associations, but they are less likely to *stay* involved. This is especially the case for the Turkish minority.

The Ethnic Composition of Organizations and Joining and Leaving Transitions

Figures 1 and 2 plot the average predicted probabilities of starting and quitting across the samples of analysis, based on models that estimate different effects of ethnicity depending on the ethnic composition of the organizations joined and left.¹² The models summarized here include only ethnicity as a predictor. Similar results are obtained from models including all controls, although the confidence bands of those predictions are wider (see Figures S1 and S2 in section I of the online supplement). Notice that the volunteering and membership graphs in Figure 1 have vertical axes with different scales, reflecting that volunteering is less common. Also, the distinct scales of the vertical axes between Figures 1 and 2 reflect that the probabilities of quitting (conditional on being involved) are much higher than the probabilities of starting (conditional on not being involved). All analyses from here onward are restricted to sports, leisure, and neighborhood associations. As such, they are not directly comparable to Tables 3 and 4, which encompass five additional organization types, but rather to Tables S3 and S4 in section I of the online supplement.

<INSERT FIGURE 1 AND FIGURE 2 HERE>

Figure 1 reveals powerful sorting tendencies as far as joining transitions are concerned, with respect to both volunteering and memberships. This supports Hypotheses 2a and 3a, which presume that people of minority origin are more likely to get involved in organizations with more minority members, whereas Dutch natives are less likely to join such organizations. The

predicted probabilities of Moroccans and Turks joining associations with many ethnic minority members are four to five times as high as their predicted probabilities of joining associations with no ethnic minority members, and the reverse is true for the native Dutch majority.

In contrast, Figure 2 does not show any ethnic sorting with regard to leaving transitions. This is especially apparent for Dutch natives, with their probabilities of quitting volunteering and memberships unaffected by the ethnic composition of their organizations. The estimates for minority respondents are less precise, but if anything, these groups seem more likely to leave organizations with *many* ethnic minority co-members. Hypotheses 2b and 3b, on segregation tendencies in quitting transitions, are therefore refuted. Figure 2 suggests that once the initial hurdle of getting involved has been cleared, there is no further sorting via selective disengagement from organizations of different ethnic composition.¹³

This absence of ethnic sorting on the leaving side may signify socialization processes taking place within voluntary organizations, in line with contact theory (Brown and Hewstone 2005). In this scenario, participants in organizations with more ethnic out-group members grow more tolerant toward ethnic out-groups and nourish a shared superordinate organizational identity (see also Braunstein, Fulton, and Wood 2014; Edwards et al. 2013). However, the lack of ethnic sorting with regard to quitting could also reflect that we are dealing with selective subsamples when analyzing quitting transitions. Bekkers (2012) shows, for example, that the positive association between volunteering and trust is completely due to selection, with people who become volunteers being more trusting to begin with. In the present context, people who are *most* likely to join organizations with many out-group members are plausibly the *least* responsive to strong concentrations of out-group members when it comes to quitting decisions.

In support of this selection narrative, people who join out-group dominated associations already have more favorable out-group attitudes and more out-group ties *before* joining those associations. However, these patterns mainly pertain to ethnic minorities. Indeed, applying propensity score matching methods, as proposed by Xie, Brand, and Jann (2012), I find that the absence of ethnic sorting with respect to quitting can partially be attributed to selection bias and effect heterogeneity among Moroccans and Turks, but such explanations can be refuted more resolutely for Dutch natives. More detailed results of these additional analyses can be found in section II of the online supplement.

Mechanisms behind Ethnic Sorting

To gain insights into the mechanisms driving the strong ethnic sorting with regard to starting volunteering and memberships, I have estimated several models that address Hypotheses 4 to 6 on the role of inter-ethnic attitudes, the ethnic composition of social networks, and the local supply of involvement opportunities. I estimate such models only for starting transitions, because Figure 2 does not show any ethnic sorting concerning quitting. To avoid overcontrolling for factors that are correlated with the mediators of interest, the control variables included earlier have been omitted here. Nonetheless, incorporating those controls does not alter the key conclusions.

Table 5 reports, for each ethnicity, the differences in the average predicted probabilities of starting volunteering and memberships for associations with *no* ethnic minority co-members versus associations with *many* ethnic minority co-members, on the basis of a variety of models (holding any predictors other than ethnicity at their actual value for each observation). The larger the absolute value of these differences, the stronger the degree of ethnic sorting. Every row in Table 5 represents a separate model, adding a set of potential mediators to the baseline model with only the ethnicity variables. If the potential mediators help explain ethnic sorting with respect to starting, the differences in the predicted probabilities should move toward zero when adding these factors. The asterisks report whether each difference is indeed significantly smaller than the corresponding difference predicted by the baseline model. Table 5 also reports results of Wald tests on the joint significance of every set of mediator variables added.¹⁴

<INSERT TABLE 5 HERE>

The first row in Table 5 echoes the story of Figure 1, showing strong segregation tendencies in people's starting decisions. Dutch natives are much more likely to join organizations with no minority members than organizations with many minority members, and vice versa for individuals of ethnic minority origin. For Dutch natives, for example, the predicted probability difference is 2.5 percentage points for volunteering and 3.8 percentage points for memberships. These are considerable amounts compared to the overall starting probabilities of 5.4 and 9.2 percent reported at the bottom of Table 5. Indeed, all predicted probability differentials for the baseline model—for all ethnic groups and for volunteering and memberships—are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level.

The second row of Table 5 supplements the baseline models with the measures for attitudes toward Dutch natives and ethnic minorities. This improves the explanatory power of the models, as indicated by the Wald statistics, and leads to modest reductions of the residual in-group biases for all ethnic groups. However, only some of these reductions are statistically significant, and all of the predicted probability differentials remain substantial in size. Hence, Hypothesis 4 is only partially supported: to the extent that inter-ethnic attitudes matter for explaining ethnic sorting in people's starting decisions, they at least do not tell the full story.

Essentially the same conclusion can be drawn regarding Hypothesis 5, based on the next five rows of Table 5. Although the probability differentials shrink after including indicators for the ethnic composition of social networks, they are in most cases still considerable, and many of the observed reductions are not statistically significant. Weak ties appear to have a bigger mediating influence than strong ties, however, and concerning the context in which ties are embedded, the role of neighborhood contact deserves highlighting. This factor significantly improves the explanatory power of both the volunteering and membership models (see the Wald statistics), and implies large and highly significant reductions of the remaining ethnic sorting in people's joining decisions, far greater than for any of the other indicators for social network composition. It is worthwhile to recall here that this part of the analysis looks at sports, leisure, and neighborhood associations. These organizations usually have a strongly local character, which could explain why neighborhood contact is an influential recruitment channel for attracting new participants.

Next, Table 5 provides partial support for Hypothesis 6 on the role of the local supply of involvement opportunities. Although the density variables for the local presence of associations with no, a few, and many ethnic minority members seem less important than inter-ethnic neighborhood contact in accounting for ethnic sorting, they significantly reduce the predicted probability differentials for all ethnic groups and both types of involvement. Moreover, the Wald tests demonstrate that these environmental conditions contribute to the total explanatory power of the models. This underlines the importance of the local context.

The evidence so far suggests that each mechanism only partially accounts for the ethnic sorting in people's joining decisions. To explore whether the mechanisms can explain more of this sorting when we consider them jointly, the models in the penultimate row of Table 5

simultaneously add the measures for inter-ethnic attitudes, neighborhood contact (the most important social network mechanism), and the local supply of involvement opportunities to the baseline models. These factors all translate into significant improvements in model fit when added on their own, and their incorporation leads to significant reductions of the predicted probability differentials of joining organizations with no versus many ethnic minority members. As it turns out, together they explain still more of the observed ethnic sorting. For the Moroccan and especially the Turkish community, the differences in the probabilities of joining associations with no versus many ethnic minority co-members almost vanish. These differences were highly significant for the baseline model, but have now become non-significant, or only significant at the 5 percent level (for Moroccans starting memberships). Among Dutch natives, stronger sorting remains, but this sorting is significantly weaker than for the baseline model or any of the other models.

CONCLUSIONS

This study connects two prominent themes in sociology: civic participation and the social integration of ethnic groups. Harmonious inter-ethnic relations are commonly seen as a key ingredient to a thriving society, and civic participation appears a fruitful avenue for establishing such relations. Because anyone can, in principle, take part, voluntary associations have the potential to nurture inter-ethnic ties that might not develop in other contexts. However, the nexus between civic participation and ethnic integration remains understudied to date.

I bridge this gap using unique Dutch panel data for analyzing ethnic differences in joining and leaving voluntary associations, to check whether these associations are the integration vehicles some purport them to be. In doing so, I go beyond most previous work on voluntary association involvement by analyzing joining and leaving transitions, instead of cross-sectional snapshots, and by investigating social sorting across organizations of different composition. My study is also the first to test several mechanisms that may drive such sorting.

Earlier research consistently finds that, at any point in time, ethnic minorities have lower participation rates in voluntary associations than do majority groups (Gijsberts et al. 2012; Musick et al. 2000). Yet, my findings demonstrate it would be wrong to infer from this that ethnic minorities are less likely to join organizations. People of Moroccan and Turkish origin are actually just as likely as Dutch natives to start volunteering or memberships—a sign of

assimilation. Nevertheless, Moroccans and Turks do have higher exit rates after becoming involved, and this causes their lower cross-sectional involvement rates.

Despite the lack of meaningful differences in starting volunteering and memberships in general, ethnic groups differ substantially in the organizations they join. More specifically, all groups are significantly more likely to get involved in organizations that contain more ethnic in-group members. This applies to volunteering and memberships, underscoring the similarities between both behaviors found throughout my analyses. One cannot conclude that people are more likely to join organizations with more ethnic in-group members *because* those organizations have more ethnic in-group members (Shalizi and Thomas 2011), but the fact that there *are* pronounced sorting tendencies is important in its own right, implying a strong degree of ethnic segregation in civic life. If data limitations had not forced me to exclude immigrant and religious organizations from the second part of the analysis, we may have observed even stronger sorting, as those organizations are heavily segregated in wave 1 of the NELLS. The observed sorting has implications for the role of voluntary associations as a pathway to integration and assimilation. After all, ethnic sorting across associations limits the scope for inter-ethnic contact in associations, and may thus reinforce rather than attenuate preexisting ethnic boundaries and hierarchies (cf. Blau and Schwartz 1984). Speaking on a related topic, Edwards and colleagues (2013) argue that segregation across religious organizations can legitimate and reinforce attitudes of white supremacy in U.S. society.¹⁵

That said, similar segregation tendencies are absent from people's quitting decisions. Even though there are ethnic differences in the probability of quitting in general, ethnic sorting across voluntary organizations of different ethnic composition is observed only at the starting stage. This suggests that once the initial barrier of joining has been cleared, volunteering and memberships offer opportunities for building ties that cut across ethnic boundaries. To better assess whether such opportunities really materialize, more research is needed on what happens within associations. Braunstein and colleagues (2014) set a great example in this context, using ethnographic and survey data to show how prayer practices help "organize differences" in U.S. faith-based community organizations with high rates of internal diversity. Whether similar bridging practices occur in Dutch voluntary associations remains to be established, but my analyses indicate that the absence of sorting with regard to quitting is not merely due to selection effects, especially for the native majority.

In explaining segregation tendencies in people's joining transitions, my findings stress the importance of the local context. The amount of neighborhood contact with different ethnic groups is the standout factor. This factor not only contributes to the overall explanatory power of the joining models, but it also accounts for more of the observed ethnic sorting than do inter-ethnic attitudes, the ethnicity of people's strong ties, or inter- and intra-ethnic contact in work and school settings. Hence, neighborhood ties appear to be influential recruitment channels. The local representation of organizations of different ethnic composition is also relevant, explaining part of the sorting across all ethnic groups and volunteering and memberships. This further emphasizes the importance of local contexts and, in particular, the opportunity structures available to potential participants.

But even when several explanations are considered simultaneously, part of the observed ethnic sorting remains unaccounted for. Dutch natives are still more likely to join organizations with fewer or no ethnic minority members. This may signify that inter-ethnic mixing means something else for the native majority than for ethnic minorities. People of minority origin could, for example, have additional motives for joining native-dominated organizations that override any in-group biases they might have. Indeed, some ethnic minority members may fiercely oppose inter-ethnic marriage, but still want to mix with Dutch natives in other domains, out of a desire to mingle with people of higher socioeconomic status. On the other hand, Dutch natives largely escape ethnic mixing in voluntary associations, even under conditions that are conducive to inter-ethnic contact. This may reflect more subtle forms of prejudice or differences in opportunity structures not picked up by this study, which make inter-ethnic mixing more easily avoidable for Dutch natives.

Future research should try to uncover the precise mechanisms at work here, addressing, for example, how the influence of the ethnic composition of social networks interacts with their composition along intersecting social dimensions (e.g., socioeconomic status). Once more data become available, one could further dissect the mechanisms by conducting separate analyses for different organization types. This could, for instance, reveal whether neighborhood contact is as important for sports, religious, or political associations as it is for neighborhood associations. Also, the operationalization of some of the mechanisms could be improved, most notably the measures for the local supply of involvement opportunities. These are currently based on the number of respondents in a municipality who report being a member of organizations with a particular ethnic composition. As such, they capture only a fraction of all

organizational activity at the local level, and they rely on people's subjective estimates of the composition of the associations they belong to. Future collection of information on the location, size, and sociodemographic composition of organizations would enable superior measures of the supply of involvement opportunities.

On a related note, my measures for the ethnic composition of voluntary organizations have a few limitations. First, they are based on subjective evaluations, which may closely resemble the composition as perceived by participants, but which may also be affected by people's attitudes toward ethnic out-groups, giving rise to endogeneity issues (Van der Meer and Tolsma 2014). However, controlling for inter-ethnic attitudes, like in the Mechanisms behind Ethnic Sorting section, implicitly tackles this concern and does not substantially change the amount of ethnic sorting observed. Second, measures for the ethnic composition of voluntary associations would ideally be more fine-grained, and capture the presence of members from specific ethnic groups (e.g., Turks or Moroccans), rather than the presence of ethnic minority members in general. If Moroccans and Turks are mainly attracted to their own group, and less to other minorities, the current measures would likely lead to an underestimation of ethnic sorting among these groups. Critically, though, Turks and Moroccans can, to some degree, still be regarded as each other's in-group, given that they share a Muslim background and disadvantaged socioeconomic position, and they are often lumped together in public debates. Such shared experiences foster the development of a common group identity. Evidence from the NELLS substantiates this claim, showing that people of Moroccan and Turkish origin have relatively positive attitudes toward each other and frequent contact (see section III of the online supplement).

Returning to recommendations for future work, the present analysis could be extended in various ways. One worthwhile task—once more data become available—is to analyze whether there is any change over time in the strength of ethnic sorting in people's joining decisions. Whether those sorting tendencies strengthen or weaken determines whether civic life will gradually become more or less segregated. Another extension is to look at the composition of voluntary associations along more dimensions, such as gender, age, education, and religiosity. Previous studies already point toward the possible relevance of those dimensions (McPherson and Rotolo 1996; Popielarz and McPherson 1995), and it would be enlightening to examine how they interrelate with the ethnic dimension.

The importance of each factor probably varies across contexts. Ethnic differences in the United States, for instance, are mostly perceived through a racial lens, whereas in Europe religious variation between ethnic groups is considered more problematic (Foner and Alba 2008). Notwithstanding such contextual differences, the general dynamics and mechanisms studied in this article likely apply elsewhere, too. More than that, the presence of pronounced ethnic sorting across voluntary associations in a relatively open and multicultural society like the Netherlands (Musterd 2005; Statham 2016) suggests that even stronger sorting may occur in many other places.

Aside from being geographically transportable, the mechanisms can also be translated to other life domains. Social movement scholarship, for instance, often argues that the social composition of movement organizations affects individuals' involvement trajectories (Corrigan-Brown 2013; Klandermans 1997). Similar dynamics probably apply to phenomena like the evolution of friendship networks, residential mobility, hiring practices, and congregational switching (Crowder, Pais, and South 2012; Edwards et al. 2013; Rivera 2012; Rude and Herda 2010). My study contributes to this wider body of literature.

In terms of policy implications, we can draw several lessons. First, if policymakers and organizational leaders want to raise minorities' engagement in civic life, they should think not only about how to get ethnic minorities involved, but especially about how to *keep* them involved. My investigation suggests that the latter is the core challenge. Without more sustained engagement, ethnic minority participants may miss out on the labor market and well-being payoffs of voluntary association involvement. Second, policymakers who advocate increased civic participation as a remedy against waning levels of social cohesion should take note of the strong ethnic sorting in people's decisions to join associations. Stimulating general involvement is not sufficient if one wants to increase inter-ethnic contact and break down ethnic boundaries. Indeed, ethnic segregation in civic life could seriously sabotage the capacity of voluntary associations to spur social integration. More research on the causes of ethnic sorting across organizations will help policymakers target their efforts in this regard. To evaluate whether ethnic sorting across voluntary associations ultimately undermines social cohesion, additional work is required on how the sorting dynamics discussed in this study influence the integration of ethnic groups in other areas. In any case, the mere existence of such sorting merits ongoing attention.

NOTES

1. The next largest non-Western minority groups are from Indonesia, Suriname, and the Netherlands Antilles, reflecting the Netherlands' colonial past.
2. In their analysis of membership dissolution in Nebraska, Popielarz and McPherson (1995) measure the gender composition of individual associations, but they still measure educational niches at the level of association types.
3. This is a non-exhaustive list of potential sorting mechanisms, dictated by what can be tested with the current data. It is, for instance, not possible to address the influence of discrimination or organizational practices.
4. The target age range of the NELLS was chosen to capture people's major life transitions, for example, entering the labor market or forming a family.
5. Section IV of the online supplement (<http://asr.sagepub.com/supplemental>) contains the Stata code underlying my data preparation and statistical analyses.
6. Among Moroccans, 14 percent volunteer for sports, leisure, or neighborhood associations in at least one survey wave, versus 11 percent for religious or immigrant associations (and 42 versus 26 percent for memberships). For Turks, these percentages are 15 versus 15 for volunteering, and 41 versus 34 for memberships. Moreover, among all minorities who volunteer for religious or immigrant associations, around 43 percent also volunteer for sports, leisure, or neighborhood associations, and for memberships this number rises to 54 percent.
7. Because the second part of my analysis is restricted to sports, leisure, and neighborhood associations, the supply measures take only those organization types into consideration.
8. Incorporating controls for the duration between the two interviews, participation in other organizations (i.e., different from the one in question), and organization types (e.g., sports, leisure, or neighborhood) does not substantially alter the results. The same holds for controls for the presence of ethnic minorities, average housing values, and income levels at the district level (i.e., level between municipalities and neighborhoods).

9. There are no substantial changes to the results if I use multilevel modeling. Section IV of the online supplement contains Stata code to estimate three-level models for all analyses presented in this article.

10. Because my observation units are respondent–association type combinations, the predicted probabilities and average marginal effects in Tables 3 and 4, as well as Table 5 and Figures 1 and 2, do not resemble probabilities and average marginal effects per respondent, but per respondent–association type combination. For example, the reference probability of starting volunteering among Dutch natives of 2.5 percent in the first model in Table 3 implies that a Dutch native who does not yet volunteer for any type of organization in wave 1 has a total predicted probability of 20 percent to start volunteering. This is because this person is at risk of starting volunteering for eight different organization types.

11. Tables S3 and S4 in section I of the online supplement summarize similar regressions restricted to sports, leisure, and neighborhood associations. Although most findings stay the same when applying this restriction, Turks seem somewhat less likely to join associations in the restricted models.

12. The underlying regressions are summarized in Tables S5 and S6 in section I of the online supplement.

13. Figure S3 in section I of the online supplement, summarizing analyses similar to those in Figure 2 but considering all eight organization types, shows this even more clearly.

14. Irrespective of the extent to which the mediators can explain the ethnic sorting, their coefficient estimates align well with intuitive expectations (e.g., more neighborhood contact with ethnic minorities stimulates involvement in organizations with more ethnic minority co-members).

15. Some studies, however, claim that segregation across associations can be a stepping stone to longer-run assimilation. Foner and Alba (2008), for example, argue that ethnic congregations may be “safe havens” where minorities develop civic skills and social trust, eventually fostering broader civic participation.

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Table 1 Percentage of respondents that are volunteers or members in at least one survey wave, by ethnicity, association type, and the ethnic composition of associations

| | | Native Dutch (n = 1,693) | Moroccan (n = 421) | Turkish (n = 439) |
|--|-------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Volunteer in wave 1 and/or wave 2 (%) | Sports | 17 | 8 * | 6 * |
| | Leisure | 17 | 5 * | 8 * |
| | Neighborhood | 6 | 6 | 5 |
| | Any of the three above | 32 | 14 * | 15 * |
| | Any volunteering at all | 39 | 23 * | 25 * |
| Member in wave 1 and/or wave 2 (%) | Sports | 34 | 30 | 24 * |
| | Leisure | 27 | 14 * | 16 * |
| | Neighborhood | 15 | 12 | 12 |
| | Any of the three above | 56 | 42 * | 41 * |
| | Any membership at all | 77 | 63 * | 64 * |
| Volunteer in wave 1 and/or wave 2 (%) | No EM co-members | 21 | 2 * | 2 * |
| | A few EM co-members | 15 | 5 * | 5 * |
| | Many EM co-members | 2 | 9 * | 8 * |
| Member in wave 1 and/or wave 2 (%) | No EM co-members | 37 | 7 * | 7 * |
| | A few EM co-members | 30 | 20 * | 18 * |
| | Many EM co-members | 4 | 24 * | 23 * |

Notes: People can be involved in multiple associations at the same time. The statistics for associations of different ethnic composition only look at sports, leisure, and neighborhood associations, for which composition data are available in both survey waves. Asterisks denote statistically significant differences with Dutch natives, based on two-sample tests of proportions: * $p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table 2 Number of events by the type and ethnic composition of voluntary associations

| VOLUNTEERING | No EM <i>Start / Quit</i> | A few EM <i>Start / Quit</i> | Many EM <i>Start / Quit</i> | Total <i>Start / Quit</i> |
|--------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Sports | 54 | 49 | 11 | 114 |
| | <i>74</i> | <i>51</i> | <i>18</i> | <i>143</i> |
| Leisure | 64 | 61 | 34 | 159 |
| | <i>55</i> | <i>49</i> | <i>10</i> | <i>114</i> |
| Neighborhood | 22 | 26 | 16 | 64 |
| | <i>28</i> | <i>15</i> | <i>11</i> | <i>54</i> |
| Total | 140 | 136 | 61 | 337 |
| | <i>157</i> | <i>115</i> | <i>39</i> | <i>311</i> |

| MEMBERSHIP | No EM <i>Start / Quit</i> | A few EM <i>Start / Quit</i> | Many EM <i>Start / Quit</i> | Total <i>Start / Quit</i> |
|--------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Sports | 73 | 100 | 46 | 219 |
| | <i>107</i> | <i>124</i> | <i>55</i> | <i>286</i> |
| Leisure | 80 | 91 | 49 | 220 |
| | <i>88</i> | <i>88</i> | <i>31</i> | <i>207</i> |
| Neighborhood | 50 | 54 | 15 | 119 |
| | <i>55</i> | <i>41</i> | <i>33</i> | <i>129</i> |
| Total | 203 | 245 | 110 | 558 |
| | <i>250</i> | <i>253</i> | <i>119</i> | <i>622</i> |

Notes: Upright numbers refer to starting events (top of each cell); italicized numbers refer to quitting events (bottom of each cell). The overall starting rate (total number of events divided by total number of at risk spells) is 4.7% for volunteering and 8.6% for membership; the overall quitting rate (similarly defined) is 60.7% for volunteering and 52.9% for membership. Tables S1 and S2 in the online supplement to this paper contain the number of at risk spells for each cell as well as the number of events by ethnicity.

Table 3 Binary logit models of starting volunteering and memberships, regardless of the type and ethnic composition of the association joined

| All association types | STARTING | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|-------------|----------|
| | VOLUNTEERING | | | | MEMBERSHIP | | | | |
| | No controls | | With controls | | No controls | | With controls | | |
| Ethnicity | Moroccan | -0.2 | (0.3) | -0.2 | (0.5) | -0.5 | (0.7) | 0.2 | (0.8) |
| (ref = Dutch) | Turkish | 0.3 | (0.4) | 0.1 | (0.6) | 0.4 | (0.6) | 0.6 | (0.8) |
| Female | | | | -0.5 | (0.3) | | | -0.6 | (0.4) |
| Age (years/10) | | | | 0.3 | (0.3) | | | 1.2 | ** (0.4) |
| Born in NL | | | | -0.2 | (0.5) | | | -0.1 | (0.9) |
| Education level (0-4) | | | | 0.2 | (0.2) | | | 1.1 | ** (0.2) |
| Language test score (0-9) | | | | 0.2 | * (0.1) | | | 0.1 | (0.1) |
| Employment | 2nd ISEI quartile | | | -0.3 | (0.3) | | | -0.8 | (0.5) |
| (ref = employed, | 3rd ISEI quartile | | | 0.5 | (0.3) | | | 0.2 | (0.6) |
| 1st ISEI quartile) | 4th ISEI quartile | | | 0.0 | (0.3) | | | -0.1 | (0.6) |
| | Education | | | 1.4 | * (0.7) | | | 0.5 | (0.9) |
| | Unemployed | | | 0.2 | (0.7) | | | -0.9 | (1.3) |
| | Household etc. | | | 0.6 | (0.5) | | | 0.4 | (0.8) |
| House ownership | | | | 0.4 | (0.3) | | | 1.1 | (0.6) |
| Married/cohabiting | | | | -0.1 | (0.4) | | | -0.4 | (0.7) |
| Children at home | | | | 0.7 | (0.4) | | | 0.4 | (0.6) |
| Service attendance (0-4) | | | | 0.7 | ** (0.1) | | | 1.2 | ** (0.1) |
| Reference probability | | 2.5% | | 2.6% | | 6.8% | | 6.7% | |
| | | [2.2 ; 2.8] | | [2.2 ; 2.9] | | [6.1 ; 7.5] | | [6.0 ; 7.3] | |
| Number of individuals at risk | | 2,553 | | | | 2,553 | | | |
| Number of spells at risk | | 19,623 | | | | 18,128 | | | |
| Number of events | | 501 | | | | 1,234 | | | |

Notes: Coefficient estimates are presented as average marginal effects (in percentage points), calculated across the samples of analysis while holding any other predictors at their actual value for each observation. Standard errors are presented between parentheses. The 'Reference probability' row presents the average starting probabilities among Dutch natives, with their 95 percent confidence intervals, again holding any other predictors at their actual value for each observation. ** p<0.01; * p<0.05 (two-tailed tests)

Table 4 Binary logit models of quitting volunteering and memberships, regardless of the type and ethnic composition of the association left

| All association types | | QUITTING | | | | | | | |
|--|-------------------|--------------|----------|---------------|---------------|-------------|----------|---------------|---------------|
| | | VOLUNTEERING | | | | MEMBERSHIP | | | |
| | | No controls | | With controls | | No controls | | With controls | |
| Ethnicity (ref = Dutch) | Moroccan | 2.9 | (5.6) | 0.2 | (8.5) | 20.6 | ** (3.8) | 12.1 | * (5.0) |
| | Turkish | 17.3 | ** (6.0) | 15.6 | (8.6) | 23.0 | ** (4.2) | 16.6 | ** (5.2) |
| Female | | | | 4.5 | (3.5) | | | 2.5 | (2.2) |
| Age (years/10) | | | | 6.7 | (3.9) | | | -3.9 | (2.3) |
| Born in NL | | | | -6.8 | (7.3) | | | -5.8 | (4.8) |
| Education level (0-4) | | | | 1.2 | (1.6) | | | 1.4 | (1.1) |
| Language test score (0-9) | | | | 0.2 | (0.9) | | | -1.1 | (0.6) |
| Employment (ref = employed, 1st ISEI quartile) | 2nd ISEI quartile | | | -3.4 | (5.6) | | | -3.3 | (4.6) |
| | 3rd ISEI quartile | | | -9.9 | (5.5) | | | -9.1 | * (4.4) |
| | 4th ISEI quartile | | | -12.4 | * (5.5) | | | -6.8 | (3.9) |
| | Education | | | -0.3 | (6.7) | | | -7.6 | (5.7) |
| | Unemployed | | | 10.6 | (15.2) | | | 1.1 | (9.7) |
| | Household etc. | | | -6.4 | (6.2) | | | 1.8 | (6.2) |
| House ownership | | | | -15.2 | ** (5.1) | | | -8.8 | ** (2.8) |
| Married/cohabiting | | | | -1.1 | (4.0) | | | -1.4 | (3.5) |
| Children at home | | | | -10.4 | (5.7) | | | 0.8 | (3.4) |
| Service attendance (0-4) | | | | -6.7 | ** (1.2) | | | -4.3 | ** (0.7) |
| Reference probability | | | | 55.3% | 55.9% | | | 40.7% | 42.9% |
| | | | | [51.1 ; 59.5] | [50.4 ; 61.4] | | | [37.4 ; 43.9] | [39.2 ; 46.5] |
| Number of individuals at risk | | | | 618 | | | | 1,413 | |
| Number of spells at risk | | | | 801 | | | | 2,296 | |
| Number of events | | | | 464 | | | | 1,077 | |


Notes: Coefficient estimates are presented as average marginal effects (in percentage points), calculated across the samples of analysis while holding any other predictors at their actual value for each observation. Standard errors are presented between parentheses. The 'Reference probability' row presents the average quitting probabilities among Dutch natives, with their 95 percent confidence intervals, again holding any other predictors at their actual value for each observation. ** p≤0.01; * p≤0.05 (two-tailed tests)

Table 5 Differences in the average predicted probabilities of joining organizations with no versus many ethnic minority co-members

| Sports, leisure, and neighborhood associations | STARTING VOLUNTEERING | | | | STARTING MEMBERSHIP | | | |
|--|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------|-----------|
| | Dutch | Moroccan | Turkish | Wald test | Dutch | Moroccan | Turkish | Wald test |
| Baseline model (BM) - No mediators | 2.5 | -1.7 | -1.3 | | 3.8 | -3.7 | -2.6 | |
| BM + [Inter-ethnic attitudes] | 2.2 ** | -1.2 | -1.0 | 7.1 ** | 3.5 ** | -3.2 * | -2.2 * | 4.8 ** |
| BM + [Ethnicity of family in CDN] | 2.0 ** | -1.3 | -0.8 | 1.2 | 2.9 ** | -2.6 | -1.2 | 0.8 |
| BM + [Ethnicity of non-family in CDN] | 2.5 | -1.3 | -0.8 | 1.9 | 3.8 | -3.5 | -2.3 | 0.6 |
| BM + [Ethnicity of friends] | 2.2 * | -1.7 | -1.2 | 1.9 | 3.6 | -3.8 | -2.5 | 1.2 |
| BM + [Inter-ethnic neighborhood contact] | 1.9 ** | -0.7 ** | -0.3 ** | 8.2 ** | 3.0 ** | -2.1 ** | -0.9 ** | 8.9 ** |
| BM + [Inter-ethnic work/school contact] | 2.3 ** | -1.3 ** | -0.9 * | 3.5 * | 3.6 * | -3.3 * | -2.1 * | 3.3 * |
| BM + [Local supply - density] | 2.0 ** | -1.1 * | -0.7 ** | 6.7 ** | 3.2 ** | -2.9 * | -1.6 ** | 4.3 ** |
| BM + [Attitudes, neighborhood contact, and local supply density] | 1.6 ** | -0.1 ** | 0.3 ** | 3.9 * | 2.6 ** | -1.5 ** | -0.2 ** | 2.4 |
| Overall starting probability (%) | 5.4 [4.9 ; 5.9] | 3.7 [2.5 ; 4.9] | 3.2 [2.2 ; 4.2] | | 9.2 [8.2 ; 10.1] | 8.1 [6.1 ; 10.2] | 7.2 [5.8 ; 8.5] | |


Notes: Differences are presented in percentage points; the underlying average predicted probabilities are derived from multinomial logit models, and calculated across the samples of analysis while holding any other predictors than ethnicity at their actual value for each observation. Each row represents one model; the abbreviation ‘CDN’ stands for ‘core discussion network’, i.e. the people with whom one discusses ‘important matters’. The bottom row represents the overall probabilities of starting by ethnicity, regardless of the ethnic composition of the organization. In the ‘Dutch’, ‘Moroccan’, and ‘Turkish’ columns, asterisks mark for each model the statistical significance of the reduction in the predicted probability differentials as compared with the baseline model (based on seemingly unrelated estimation of both models, and applying the delta method to obtain the relevant standard errors). The ‘Wald test’ columns present the test statistics of Wald tests on the joint significance of the mediators added to the baseline model. ** p<0.01; * p<0.05 (two-tailed tests)

Figure 1 Average predicted probabilities of starting volunteering and memberships, by individual ethnicity and the ethnic composition of voluntary associations



Notes: Predictions derived from multinomial logit models that only include ethnicity as a predictor. Predictions based on models including all control variables can be found in Figure S1 of the online supplement to this article. The bars represent average predicted probabilities across the samples of analysis, with the error bars denoting 95% confidence intervals. The abbreviation ‘EM’ along the horizontal axis stands for ‘ethnic minority members’.

Figure 2 Average predicted probabilities of quitting volunteering and memberships, by individual ethnicity and the ethnic composition of voluntary associations



Notes: Predictions derived from logit models that only include ethnicity as a predictor, which is allowed to have different effects depending on the 'origin organization' in which one is involved in wave 1. Predictions based on models including all control variables can be found in Figure S2 of the online supplement to this article. The bars represent average predicted probabilities across the samples of analysis, with the error bars denoting 95% confidence intervals. The abbreviation 'EM' along the horizontal axis stands for 'ethnic minority members'.

Appendix A Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables

Table A1 Descriptive statistics for the control variables

| | Native Dutch (n = 1,693) | | Moroccan (n = 421) | | Turkish (n = 439) | |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----|-----------------------|-----|----------------------|-----|
| Female (%) | 54 | | 58 | | 53 | |
| Age (years/10) | 3.2 | 0.9 | 3.0* | 0.9 | 3.1 | 0.9 |
| Born in NL (%) | 99 | | 37* | | 43* | |
| Education level (0-4 scale) | 2.2 | 1.0 | 1.6* | 1.1 | 1.6* | 1.1 |
| Language test score (0-9 scale) | 6.5 | 2.0 | 3.8* | 2.7 | 3.4* | 2.6 |
| Employment 1st ISEI quart. (%) | 15 | | 13 | | 17 | |
| 2nd ISEI quart. (%) | 16 | | 14 | | 16 | |
| 3rd ISEI quart. (%) | 20 | | 13* | | 15 | |
| 4th ISEI quart. (%) | 23 | | 10* | | 10* | |
| Education (%) | 19 | | 24* | | 23 | |
| Unemployed (%) | 2 | | 6* | | 5* | |
| Household etc. (%) | 4 | | 20* | | 14* | |
| House ownership (%) | 81 | | 23* | | 54* | |
| Married/cohabiting (%) | 64 | | 57* | | 60 | |
| Children at home (%) | 50 | | 58* | | 59* | |
| Service attendance (0-4 scale) | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.5* | 1.6 | 1.6* | 1.6 |

Notes: For the categorical variables relative frequencies for each category are presented. For the continuous variables means (left figure in each cell) and standard deviations (right figure in each cell) are presented. Asterisks denote statistically significant differences with Dutch natives, based on two-sample tests of proportions and t-tests: * $p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table A2 Descriptive statistics for inter-ethnic attitudes and the ethnic composition of social networks

| | | Native Dutch (n = 1,693) | | Moroccan (n = 421) | | Turkish (n = 439) | |
|---|-----------------|-----------------------------|-----|-----------------------|-----|----------------------|-----|
| Hostility towards Dutch natives (0-2 scale) | | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.6* | 0.5 | 0.7* | 0.5 |
| Hostility towards ethnic minorities (0-2 scale) | | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.6* | 0.4 | 0.8* | 0.5 |
| Native Dutch family in CDN (%) | | 91 | | 19* | | 19* | |
| Ethnic minority family in CDN (%) | | 1 | | 73* | | 72* | |
| Native Dutch non-family in CDN (%) | | 52 | | 14* | | 20* | |
| Ethnic minority non-family in CDN (%) | | 1 | | 21* | | 28* | |
| Any native Dutch friends (%) | | 97 | | 79* | | 81* | |
| Any ethnic minority friends (%) | | 38 | | 92* | | 95* | |
| Frequency of contact with Dutch natives (0-6 scale) | In neighborhood | 5.0 | 1.4 | 4.8* | 1.6 | 4.8* | 1.6 |
| | At school/work | 2.0 | 2.1 | 4.8* | 1.7 | 4.9* | 1.6 |
| Frequency of contact with ethnic minorities (0-6 scale) | In neighborhood | 5.5 | 1.4 | 4.8* | 2.2 | 4.9* | 2.1 |
| | At school/work | 3.4 | 2.4 | 4.4* | 2.4 | 4.5* | 2.3 |

Notes: For the categorical variables relative frequencies for each category are presented. For the continuous variables means (left figure in each cell) and standard deviations (right figure in each cell) are presented. The abbreviation ‘CDN’ stands for ‘core discussion network’, i.e. the people with whom one discusses ‘important matters’. Asterisks denote statistically significant differences with Dutch natives, based on two-sample tests of proportions and t-tests: * $p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed tests).

Table A3 Descriptive statistics for local supply of involvement opportunities for organizations of different ethnic composition

| | | Native Dutch (n = 1,693) | | | Moroccan (n = 421) | | | Turkish (n = 439) | | |
|--------------------|----------|--------------------------|----|-----------|--------------------|----|-----------|-------------------|----|-----------|
| | | Mean | SD | IDR | Mean | SD | IDR | Mean | SD | IDR |
| Supply density (%) | No EM | 25 | 12 | [11 ; 45] | 15* | 7 | [7 ; 18] | 15* | 6 | [9 ; 18] |
| | A few EM | 19 | 5 | [13 ; 24] | 19 | 5 | [13 ; 26] | 18* | 4 | [13 ; 24] |
| | Many EM | 3 | 3 | [0 ; 5] | 5* | 4 | [1 ; 10] | 6* | 3 | [2 ; 10] |

Notes: The columns present means, standard deviations, and inter-decile ranges. Asterisks denote statistically significant differences with Dutch natives, based on two-sample t-tests: * $p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed tests).