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TARANET: Traffic-Analysis Resistant Anonymity at the Network Layer

Chen, C; Asoni, DE; Perrig, A; Barrera, D; Danezis, G; Troncoso, C; (2018) TARANET: Traffic-Analysis Resistant Anonymity at the Network Layer. In: Proceedings of the European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) 2017 IEEE. (pp. pp. 137-152). IEEE: Danvers (MA), USA. Green open access

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Abstract

Modern low-latency anonymity systems, no matter whether constructed as an overlay or implemented at the network layer, offer limited security guarantees against traffic analysis. On the other hand, high-latency anonymity systems offer strong security guarantees at the cost of computational overhead and long delays, which are excessive for interactive applications. We propose TARANET, an anonymity system that implements protection against traffic analysis at the network layer, and limits the incurred latency and overhead. In TARANET's setup phase, traffic analysis is thwarted by mixing. In the data transmission phase, end hosts and ASes coordinate to shape traffic into constant-rate transmission using packet splitting. Our prototype implementation shows that TARANET can forward anonymous traffic at over 50 Gbps using commodity hardware.

Type: Proceedings paper
Title: TARANET: Traffic-Analysis Resistant Anonymity at the Network Layer
Event: European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)
Location: London, UK
Dates: 24th-26th April 2018
ISBN-13: 978-1-5386-4228-3
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.1109/EuroSP.2018.00018
Publisher version: https://doi.org/10.1109/EuroSP.2018.00018
Language: English
Additional information: This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.
Keywords: Protocols, Cryptography, Throughput, Peer-to-peer computing, Shape, Reliability
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10059182
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