Chari, VV;
Kehoe, P;
(1998)
On the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union.
(Working Paper
589).
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Department: Minneapolis, USA.
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Abstract
We show that the desirability of fiscal constraints in monetary unions depends critically on the extent of commitment of the monetary authority. If the monetary authority can commit to its policies, fiscal constraints can only impose costs. If the monetary authority cannot commit, there is a free-rider problem in fiscal policy, and fiscal constraints may be desirable.
| Type: | Working / discussion paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | On the need for fiscal constraints in a monetary union |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/working-pa... |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This is the published version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10058263 |
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