Kappos, G;
Yousaf, H;
Maller, M;
Meiklejohn, S;
(2018)
An Empirical Analysis of Anonymity in Zcash.
In: Enck, W and Felt, AP, (eds.)
Proceedings of USENIX Security '18.
(pp. pp. 463-477).
USENIX Association: Baltimore, MD, USA.
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Abstract
Among the now numerous alternative cryptocurrencies derived from Bitcoin, Zcash is often touted as the one with the strongest anonymity guarantees, due to its basis in well-regarded cryptographic research. In this paper, we examine the extent to which anonymity is achieved in the deployed version of Zcash. We investigate all facets of anonymity in Zcash’s transactions, ranging from its transparent transactions to the interactions with and within its main privacy feature, a shielded pool that acts as the anonymity set for users wishing to spend coins privately. We conclude that while it is possible to use Zcash in a private way, it is also possible to shrink its anonymity set considerably by developing simple heuristics based on identifiable patterns of usage.
| Type: | Proceedings paper |
|---|---|
| Title: | An Empirical Analysis of Anonymity in Zcash. |
| Event: | 27th USENIX Security Symposium |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| Publisher version: | https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18... |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science > Dept of Computer Science |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10055500 |
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