Bouton, L;
Llorente-Saguer, A;
Malherbe, F;
(2018)
Get Rid of Unanimity Rule: The Superiority of Majority Rules with Veto Power.
Journal of Political Economy
, 126
(1)
pp. 107-149.
10.1086/695477.
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Abstract
We study unanimous decision making under incomplete information. We argue that unanimous decision rules are not all equivalent. We show that majority rules with veto power are (i) Pareto superior to commonly used unanimous rules and (ii) ex ante efficient in a broad class of situations.
| Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Title: | Get Rid of Unanimity Rule: The Superiority of Majority Rules with Veto Power |
| Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
| DOI: | 10.1086/695477 |
| Publisher version: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/695477 |
| Language: | English |
| Additional information: | This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
| UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science > UCL School of Management |
| URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10055451 |
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