UCL Discovery
UCL home » Library Services » Electronic resources » UCL Discovery

Get Rid of Unanimity Rule: The Superiority of Majority Rules with Veto Power

Bouton, L; Llorente-Saguer, A; Malherbe, F; (2018) Get Rid of Unanimity Rule: The Superiority of Majority Rules with Veto Power. Journal of Political Economy , 126 (1) pp. 107-149. 10.1086/695477. Green open access

[thumbnail of Veto.pdf]
Preview
Text
Veto.pdf - Published version

Download (728kB) | Preview

Abstract

We study unanimous decision making under incomplete information. We argue that unanimous decision rules are not all equivalent. We show that majority rules with veto power are (i) Pareto superior to commonly used unanimous rules and (ii) ex ante efficient in a broad class of situations.

Type: Article
Title: Get Rid of Unanimity Rule: The Superiority of Majority Rules with Veto Power
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.1086/695477
Publisher version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/695477
Language: English
Additional information: This version is the version of record. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions.
UCL classification: UCL
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL BEAMS > Faculty of Engineering Science > UCL School of Management
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10055451
Downloads since deposit
136Downloads
Download activity - last month
Download activity - last 12 months
Downloads by country - last 12 months

Archive Staff Only

View Item View Item