Southern-led Responses to Displacement: Modes of South-South cooperation?
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Introduction
Global displacement is primarily a process that takes place within and across diverse territories of the global South, with circa 84-86 per cent of all refugees living in “developing countries,” typically in states neighbouring their countries of origin (UNHCR 2017). Moreover, 25% of all refugees -in 2017 approximately 4 million people- reside in the world’s least developed countries (ibid). In turn, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) recorded that in 2016 alone, over 31.1 million people were newly displaced within their own country (becoming ‘internally displaced people’, IDPs) due to conflict, violence and disasters; again, the vast majority of IDPs remain within the countries of the global South.

With displacement primarily being a ‘Southern’ and (in the case of international displacement) ‘South-South’ phenomenon and dynamic, it is equally the case that diverse Southern actors have historically responded to displacement. States and regional organisations have developed dynamic national and regional legal frameworks to protect refugees and IDPs. These include the Organisation of African Unity’s 1967 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (see Omata this volume) and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (see Cantor this volume), and the world’s first ‘international’ convention on internal displacement, which was drafted by the African Union and entered into force in 2009 (the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa). States and regional organisations have also funded, implemented and coordinated emergency responses to disasters, and have taken the lead on supporting mid- to long-term capacity building and post-disaster reconstruction activities within and outside of their own regions. These range from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) securing permission from the Myanmar government to coordinate the delivery of relief to 2.4 million people affected by the category 4 cyclone that hit Myanmar in 2008 (Marr 2010; also Cook 2010), to Venezuela, Brazil, and Cuba rapidly providing essential medical personnel and supplies, and financing and delivering material and technical assistance following the 2010 Haitian earthquake (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015, p.16). In turn, contemporary state-led responses to disasters themselves are often part of a longer-history of Southern-led responses to displacement and modes of South-South cooperation. In September 2017, for instance, 750 Cuban health workers were deployed
across the Caribbean after Hurricanes Irma and Jose ravaged the region (Khan 2017), working alongside local doctors who had themselves been educated free of charge in Havana’s Latin American School of Medicine. That School was established by Castro in 1998 (after Hurricane Mitch killed over 30,000 people across Central America and displaced more than 106,000 in Guatemala alone that year) with the official aim of helping Caribbean and Central American states develop sustainable models of national- and local-level response to disasters (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015, p. 19).

In addition to these highly institutionalized, state-led modes of response and capacity-building, non-state groups including local communities are first responders in processes of disaster- and conflict-induced displacement (Ager et al 2015). Indeed, since the outbreak of the conflict in Syria in 2012, commentators have argued that civil society groups – rather than states or regional bodies – are the most significant actors supporting refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey (i.e. IRIN 2012; Gatten and Alabaster 2012). For instance, members of Syrian civil society have funded and delivered aid to Syrian IDPs and to refugees from Syria in neighbouring countries (i.e. Svoboda and Pantuliano 2015; Carpi and Fiddian-Qasmiyeh forthcoming), faith-based communities have provided shelter, food and spiritual support to refugees seeking sanctuary in Lebanon and Jordan (El-Nakib and Ager 2015; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Pacitto 2016), and protracted Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have provided assistance to ‘new’ refugees fleeing Syria, including Palestinians, Iraqis, Kurds and Syrians displaced from that country (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015b, 2017).

However, in spite of the existence of historical and contemporary examples from across the global South, Southern-led responses to displacement have typically been rendered invisible, and largely un-acknowledged by (Northern- and Northern-based) academics, policy-makers and practitioners, with sustained academic engagement only arising relatively recently (i.e. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Pacitto 2016; Sezgin and Dijkeul 2016). This absence of literature examining the nature, modes of operation and implications of Southern-led responses to displacement is especially notable given the extensive body of literature on South-South cooperation that has been published in the broad area of development studies since the 1990s (i.e. Mytelka 1994; Sridharan 1998; Woods 2008; Mawdsley 2012, this volume; this volume, passim). In that field, the ‘emergence,’ ‘rise’ or ‘(re)discovery’ of Southern states as key development actors has been paralleled by extensive academic research into (and critiques of) alternative forms of development, alternatives to development and a potential paradigm shift to post-development (i.e. Rahnema and Bawtree 1997; Pieterse 1998; Escobar 2000; Six 2009). Instead of an expansion of literature in the broad field of
humanitarian studies, however, the mainstream assumption that has long been held, reproduced, and constituted by academics, policy-makers and practitioners (in and from the global North and increasingly by some Southern states) is that crises of displacement in the South require ‘humanitarian’ programmes and policies funded, developed, and implemented by ‘the international humanitarian system.’ The latter is composed inter alia by UN agencies, International NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movement, and rich donor states.⁴

In turn, when Southern actors’ responses to displacement have been analysed – including a plethora of studies into the activities of Islamic faith-based organisations post-9/11, and of ‘non-traditional’ donor states which are not members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC), such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE and Kuwait - Northern academics and policy observers have often implicitly or explicitly delegitimized such responses. This has often taken place through the application of securitization frameworks which position these responses as potential or actual threats to national and international security (Harmer and Cotterell 2009; Barakat and Zyck 2010; Binder et al 2010; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Pacitto 2016). Indeed, Northern analysts have often expressed concerns that Southern responses are motivated by ideological and faith-based priorities and are intrinsically incompatible with the core ‘international’ humanitarian principles, including in particular the principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence (see Ferris 2011; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2011; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Ager 2013; Ager et al 2015; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Pacitto 2016; also see Reeves in this volume on Chinese philanthropy).

In this chapter I thus start by briefly examining the extent to which Southern-led responses have been marginalized from view by Northern analysts, policy-makers and practitioners, or, indeed delegitimised as not truly ‘being’ worthy of being identified as ‘humanitarian’ responses at all. I then turn to highlighting the heterogeneity of Southern-led responses to different forms of displacement that have been developed and implemented across the global South. In so doing, I examine both the multiplicity of state-led responses undertaken within an institutional framework of South-South cooperation (SSC) and community-based responses which are less clearly related to the official principles of SSC. Noting the extent to which Southern actors have often resisted, rejected and developed alternatives to the hegemonic aid regime, I then examine why, and with what effect, specific Southern actors have at times been actively mobilised by ‘international humanitarian community’. In particular, I focus on the proposed incorporation of Southern national and regional level

actors into the international system, as part of the (post-2016) ‘localisation of aid agenda,’
while community- and neighbourhood-level responses – including those developed by
refugees themselves - continue to be marginalized from view. By focusing on both formal and
informal, and state- and community-led responses in relation to the localization of aid agenda,
I argue that exploring diverse principles of South-South cooperation -rather than promoting
the incorporation of specific Southern actors into the ‘international humanitarian system’-
offers a critical opportunity for studies of and responses to displacement. I conclude by
highlighting the need, firstly, for further research into the diverse modalities, spatialities,
directionalities, relationalities, and conceptualisaitons of Southern-led responses to
displacement; and, secondly, of continuing to trace, resist and challenge the diverse structural
barriers that prevent the development of meaningful responses that meet individual and
collective needs and rights around the world.

**Situating Southern-led Responses to Displacement**

Southern-led responses to displacement have long been overshadowed in academic and policy
literature by the widely-held assumption that ‘humanitarian’ responses to displacement have
historically been developed and funded by Northern members of the ‘international
humanitarian community’ and implemented in the global South. In part, the failure to
acknowledge Southern-led responses to displacement ‘as’ a form of humanitarian response is
related to the assertion that “modern humanitarianism’s origins are located in Western history
and Christian thought” (Barnett and Weiss 2008, p.7, emphasis added; also see Fassin 2011,
p.1). Indeed, throughout the 2000s, numerous studies have examined the history, evolution
and nature of ‘humanitarianism,’ typically tracing its birth and origins to Europe and the
Enlightenment period (i.e. Barnett and Weiss 2011; Wilson and Brown 2011; Barnett and
Stein 2012). Against this backdrop it is perhaps unsurprising to note that the ‘humanitarian’
epithet has traditionally been reserved for members of the (normative, Northern-led)
‘international humanitarian community,’ while the roles played by ‘Others’ throughout
history and around the world have been erased from view (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Pacitto

On the one hand, academics and practitioners are increasingly recognizing the existence of a
multitude of humanitarianisms in the plural, including “humanitarianisms of Europe, of
Africa, of the global, and of the local” (Kennedy 2004: xv). And yet, on the other hand,
responses not borne of the Northern-dominated and highly institutionalized international
regime have remained largely neglected in academia (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Pacitto
2016). In essence, unless forms of capacity and action emanating from the South have been expressed in the form of Northern-style institutions or in other ‘recognizable’ ways, they have often been willingly ignored or marginalised by outsiders (Juma and Shurke 2002, p.8), often being rejected a priori as illegitimate courses of action which are not worthy of being identified ‘as’ humanitarian (also see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Pacitto 2016).

Indeed, in spite of an increasing interest in ‘non-traditional’ high-GDP state donors and ‘non-traditional’ humanitarian actors –especially since national and global financial crises have applied pressure to ‘traditional’ donors–, Davey notes that “there is a fear [amongst Northern humanitarians and formal institutions] that ‘non-Western’ groups may not subscribe to the principles underpinning the formal system, and may have a misguided understanding of what it is to be ‘humanitarian’” (2012, p.2, emphasis added). This raises the question of the standard (as a set of principles and as a hegemonic framework) against which Southern-led responses are evaluated, and often denominated as misunderstanding or misapplying. It also leads us to interrogate whose perspectives should be centralized when considering whether, and why specific Southern-led responses are or are not labelled as ‘forms of humanitarianism,’ and by whom.

**Beyond critiquing North-South Humanitarianism**

One of the main critiques of the contemporary humanitarian regime is that ‘humanitarianism’ is perceived as a “Northern-driven and Northern-controlled enterprise” (Donini et al 2004, p.190) and is identified as a contemporary manifestation of colonial imperatives. In this regard, hegemonic humanitarianism (as ideology and as practice) –embodied by the ‘international humanitarian regime’, guided by ‘international humanitarian principles’ and implemented by ‘international’ humanitarian agencies– is identified as justifying the continuation of Northern-led interventions that reproduce rather than transcend or disrupt neocolonial forms of control over, and appropriation and exploitation of, the South (Chimni 2000; Duffield 2007, 2013). In effect, the ‘international humanitarian community’ has constantly been re-constituted as ‘responding’ to the needs of the South (which is depicted as being unable to respond to the needs of those based in and across the South) and, in so doing, embodying and enforcing a particular, intrinsically hierarchical, mode of North-South relations.

Critics resist Northern-led interventions which have long been justified through neocolonial ‘white savior narratives’ and paternalistic protection scenarios which position actors from ‘the
North’ as having the moral and political imperative to help ‘them’ (Southerners), ‘over there’ (in the South) (ie. see Abu-Lughod 2002; Rajaman 2002; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2014; see Carpi this volume). For instance, Northern interventions –whether through aid programmes or military invasions– have often been justified as being a moral imperative for Northern actors to “save brown women from brown men” (Spivak 1993, p.93), reproducing ‘them’ and ‘there’ as inherently violent, oppressive and oppressed people and spaces while ‘we’ and ‘here’ are positioned as democratic, free and empowered (see Abu-Lughod 2002; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2013).

However, critiques of the dynamics, implications and outcomes of diverse forms of Northern-led humanitarian assistance and protection must also be paralleled –and indeed preceded- by acknowledging the extent to which actors from across the South have throughout history and across geographies developed a multiplicity of responses to displacement on different scales. As such, rather than further restating the extensive criticisms of Northern-led humanitarianism that have been explored elsewhere (including in Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Pacitto 2016), in the remainder of this chapter I focus on diverse modes of engagement by and between actors of the global South, whilst, where appropriate, considering their position in relation to a diversity of communities, modes, and principles of response (all in the plural).

In so doing, I do not aim to compare and contrast Southern-led responses to those led by members of the hegemonic humanitarian regime, a process which positions Southern responses negatively, as ‘non-Northern’ responses which are ‘different’ from Northern responses which are, in turn re-inscribed, as ‘the norm’. In this sense, recognising the existence of diverse Southern-led strategies and responses ensures that we do not reproduce the oppositional and colonialist formulations which are inherent in much post-development literature; the latter frequently maintains, rather than disrupts, the notion that power originates from and operates through a unidirectional and intentional historical entity, that is ‘the West’ or ‘the North’ (Brigg 2002). Instead, acknowledging the historical and on-going significance of different forms of Southern-led responses to displacement –including those framed as modes of South-South cooperation- enables us to (re)inscribe and critically examine, rather than continue erasing Others from the multifaceted history of humanitarian action writ large (also see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Pacitto 2016).

While resisting the tendency to reconstitute the power of ‘the North’ in determining the

contours of the analysis, it is nonetheless important to recognise that many Southern-led responses are purposefully positioned as alternatives and challenges to hegemonic, Northern-led systems. Many Southern actors purposefully, and politically, frame their modes of response as an institutionalised form of South-South cooperation, and often explicitly justify their mode of engagement as aiming to directly challenge and overcome structural inequalities and forms of violence imposed by actors and systems from the global North. Southern and Northern-led responses, as noted by Aneja (this volume), “can thus be said to exist and evolve in a mutually constitutive relationship,” rather than in isolation from one another. While this is especially the case with regards to institutionalised, state-led and regionally-led responses, it is simultaneously important to acknowledge that many responses developed by actors from the South -including local communities and locally-based organisations- take place independently from the aims and positions of either Southern or Northern states or state-led institutions.

I thus start from the premise that responses to displacement are diverse and implemented by a multiplicity of state and non-state actors from across the global South, including actors that variously work with, independently of, or explicitly against, ‘the’ hegemonic Northern-led humanitarian system. In some instances, including less institutionalized and more informal ones, the principles of South-South cooperation are not formally invoked, and it may thus be appropriate to examine these responses outside and beyond the framework of either Northern-led humanitarian or modes of South-South cooperation. This includes analyzing them through reference to the conceptual frames mobilized and centralized by diverse Southern stakeholders themselves (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015).

In particular, in this chapter I engage both with state-led responses framed through an institutional model of South-South cooperation and its concomitant principles –including solidarity, self-sufficiency and mutual interest–, and community-based and other forms of non-state initiatives which may be less clearly related to the official principles of South-South cooperation. In so doing, I neither aim to reify nor idealise state, communal or individual level of responses, nor to forcibly interpellate them ‘as’ forms of South-South relations. Rather, I intend to highlight the extent to which responses, assistance, solidarity and capacity-building processes in situations of displacement may take place through a diversity of directionals and modalities.

State-led Southern Responses to Displacement: Resisting ‘the humanitarian’?
If ‘the international humanitarian system’ has often withheld the label ‘humanitarian’ from actors or actions from the South, it is equally worth stating that many members of the Group of 77 (G77) – ‘the largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries in the United Nations’ – purposefully refrain from using terms such as ‘humanitarian assistance’ or ‘aid donor’ as this vocabulary is intimately related to the Northern-led regime (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015). Southern states’ purposive distancing from mainstream/hegemonic terminology is one way of discursively affirming the unique approach taken by Southern actors, and is paralleled by recurrent references in official state and organisational statements to the underlying principles that motivate and frame South-South cooperation: mutual benefit, solidarity, reciprocity, the absence of political conditionalities, and non-interference in the national sovereignty of other states (see Aneja, this volume). Importantly, the principles of the G77 are closely linked to those of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), including NAM’s established aim of developing both national and collective self-reliance, to enable Southern states to operate and thrive outside of Northern states’ economic, political and ideological spheres of influence (ibid).

Amongst other things, these underlying principles appear to clearly differentiate South-South cooperation from the ‘traditional’ Northern-led model of assistance, whilst simultaneously highlighting the roots of the discourses of solidarity, equitable partnerships and self-sufficiency that emerge in many examples of both state and non-state Southern-led responses to displacement (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Pacitto 2016). In this framework, North-South relations are conceptualised as hierarchical ones characterised by vertical impositions, while South-South cooperation is conceptualised as a horizontal relationship, where state interlocutors work to advance mutual interests and complement one another’s abilities and resources (see Aneja, this volume; on whether states can advance mutual interests in responses to displacement, see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015 and Omata, this volume).

Far from suggesting that all Southern states, or even all states which are members of the Group of 77 adhere to or enact a unified model of ‘South-South Cooperation’, it is of course essential to highlight the diversity of positions that are officially held by states from different parts of the global South, and the relative significance that different principles of South-South cooperation may hold in different regions. While regional depictions in turn risk hiding internal heterogeneity, Fiori (2013, p. 5) proposes the following broad regional frames of reference:
In South East Asia, neutrality and impartiality have been seen as secondary to the principle of non-interference. In China, where the notion of the state as guarantor of the welfare of its people is grounded in Confucian tradition, the independence of humanitarian agencies from governments is not considered to be necessary, desirable, or possible. And in Latin America, support for those affected by conflict, extreme poverty and disaster has often been guided by a solidarity that precludes neutrality and impartiality.

It is of course worth reasserting that, while many Southern states and regional organisations have purposefully distanced themselves from the label, and the very ‘system’ of humanitarianism, it is equally the case that the principles of South-South cooperation are perceived by the adherents and defenders of the core ‘international humanitarian principles,’ as being inherently incompatible with ‘humanitarianism.’ From a mainstream conceptualisation of humanitarianism which positions “politics [as] a moral pollutant” (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 4) – even when this position is itself debated – the centrality of different forms of politics in Southern actors’ modes of response have historically been invoked to justify, or require, their exclusion from the ‘history’ and ‘present’ of humanitarianism. This is the case both for those states that have explicitly aligned themselves with and invoked discourses of South-South cooperation, and those state and non-state actors which have not done so.

**Differential modes of South-South cooperation in disasters and conflict/displacement**

The joint, horizontal South-South principles of engaging in bi-lateral and multi-lateral cooperation between states in order to meet states’ needs (as opposed to the needs of individuals or communities) and of non-interference to protect national sovereignty, also have a practical implication in terms of the forms of assistance that Southern states will or will not offer in ‘humanitarian’ scenarios. In essence, while South-South cooperation on national and regional levels has been extensively implemented in contexts of development to promote economic and material benefits (ie. see Omata this volume; Aneja, this volume) and also in contexts of ‘disaster relief,’ it is the role of South-South cooperation in situations of conflict-induced displacement that has remained less visible and more under-researched.

Here, disaster response can be understood as a means of providing assistance to a disaster-affected state to strengthen that state’s ability to offer assistance to its own citizens on its own territory after a ‘natural disaster.’ In contrast, delivering assistance in conflict and
displacement situations in which the state is either involved as a belligerent party or has demonstrated little or no political will to offer protection to its population, could be understood as a breach of the South-South principles of respect for national sovereignty and non-interference when such involvement does not take place at the explicit behest of the state itself.

This distinction between the scenarios in which Southern states may feel it is appropriate or inappropriate to become involved has led to extensive criticisms by academics, policy-makers and practitioners alike: by prioritising state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention, such states effectively fail to denounce human rights violations committed by other states, including war crimes and crimes against humanity (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Pacitto 2016). Although analysing such dynamics is beyond the scope of this chapter, it must be noted that these criticisms parallel the equally extensive debates regarding the moral dilemmas faced by International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOS). Hence, while the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) has historically held the position that not denouncing human rights violations is necessary to ensure its on-going access to populations in need of assistance, other organisations such as Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) and Amnesty International have centralised the moral imperative of witnessing and denouncing such violations even if it leads to the expulsion of its staff. In MSF’s case, this has included making public statements announcing their withdrawal from crisis situations to avoid being seen as being complicit in upholding structural forms of violence (MSF 2017). I include this brief aside here as a means of acknowledging that when Southern responses are critiqued as not ‘truly’ being humanitarian because they are linked to political or ideological aims and objectives, or because they fail to denounce human rights violations, these critiques must be situated within the context of extensive criticisms that Northern-led responses are themselves typically tied to diverse forms of conditionalities which are intimately related to political and ideological priorities.\(^{\text{x}}\)

In spite of the state-to-state nature of institutional modes of South-South cooperation, and the principle of non-interference which has historically prevented (or justified a lack of) a critique of widespread human rights violations in other Southern states, another key ‘Southern’ principle is of central significance here: an anti-colonial commitment to support the right to the self-determination of peoples, and the commitment to promote national and communal self-sufficiency independent of externally (Northern-provided) aid. Hence, as explored in Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2015), from the 1960s to the mid-2010s this commitment led the Libyan
and Cuban states to offer different forms of support to non-state interlocutors, including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguiat el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its constituent factions as, respectively, the ‘legitimate representatives’ of the displaced and dispossessed Sahrawi and Palestinian peoples. While Cuba’s and Libya’s ideological positions and priorities are distinct (broadly reflecting internationalist and Pan-Arabist paradigms respectively—see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015), both states expressed their solidarity for these liberation movements and their respective refugee populations, and politics was consequently a central feature of the development and implementation of these states models of South-South cooperation with non-state anti-colonial actors.

In this context, offering free educational opportunities to Sahrawi refugee children and youth and to Palestinian refugee youth were historically justified by the Cuban and Libyan states, and by the Polisario and PLO, as providing the means to maximise refugees’ self-sufficiency and the foundations to establish and run the independent nation-states of Western Sahara and Palestine (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2010, 2011b, 2015). Far from upholding an absolute commitment to non-interference, these positions have directly involved not only critiquing but offering different forms of support that directly challenge the territorial claims of other members of the G77 and the Non-Aligned Movement, including Morocco.

However, while the centrality of politics and ideology in Cuba’s and Libya’s responses have led many external analysts to question whether such state-led responses can ever ‘truly’ be considered to be ‘humanitarian’, a more central concern acknowledged towards the end of this chapter is the extent to which refugee participants themselves conceptualise and describe these initiatives as political, ideological and/or humanitarian in nature (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015).

**Parallel systems, cooperation and cooptation**

While many Southern state and non-state actors have resisted, rejected and developed alternatives to the hegemonic aid regime, it is equally the case that many others have actively engaged with Northern institutions, organizations and programmes, and have often aimed to become part of the ‘international’ development and humanitarian system. Furthermore, in spite of Northern-led interrogations of, or rejection of, Southern led responses, it is equally the case that Northern actors have long depended upon Southern-based NGOs, national organisations and states as implementing partners, or as ‘Southern’ wings of international
agencies. In the following section I examine Southern-led responses to displacement in relation to, and indeed contra, the post-2016 ‘localisation of aid agenda,’ which I argue offers an example of the instrumentalisation and co-optation of Southern actors into the ‘international regime.’

**Southern-led Responses and/contra the Localisation of Aid agenda**

The localization of aid agenda – advanced in particular since the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS)- has been grounded upon an official recognition that a plurality of actors respond to different forms of displacement. Indeed, the 2015 *World Disasters Report* documented the increased tendency for international actors to support nationally-led strategies for disasters worldwide, and following the 2016 WHS, the international community officially committed to support ‘local’ responses by changing its mode of operation and the funding of response mechanisms (even if this shift is largely itself a response to the various financial and political crises which have led to pressures on European and North American states’ aid budgets). This includes the increasing trend to promote national and regional aspects of disaster management, perhaps especially, although not exclusively in contexts of trans-boundary and regional disasters (Hollis 2017). Such regionally-based response mechanisms, including the UN’s Syria Regional Refugee Resilience Plan (the ‘3RP’) I have discussed elsewhere (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2018/forthcoming), centralise the importance of mainstreaming support for local municipalities and institutions into programming activities to maximise positive outcomes and experiences amongst both refugee and host communities in conflict affected areas. Indeed, the existing evidence confirms that regional, national and municipal level actions and coordination are key to disaster response (i.e. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2016). However, evidence also confirms that, repeatedly, appropriate levels of funding and localised modes of partnership do not result from official assertions and commitments by the UN and (Northern) donor states.

Furthermore the very process of enhancing the roles of, and institutionalizing ‘Southern actors’ within the context of ‘the localization of aid’ itself requires careful analysis. In effect, we must remain concerned about the instrumentalisation of Southern actors and the extent to which the localization agenda may be a way for Northern states to shift resources, and responsibilities, onto Southern actors, or to simply withdraw from international responsibilities without sharing the promised funding and resources (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015).
Indeed, there is a major paradox inherent in the localization of aid agenda, in that it aims to ‘support’ specific ‘local’ (read ‘Southern state and regional’) responses precisely by institutionalizing them within the broader paradigm and parameters established by the ‘international system.’ In this context, we can view the localization of aid agenda as promoting a particular form of North-South relations, in which Northern states are increasingly mobilising Southern actors to ‘share the burden’ (precisely through ‘keeping the burden in the South’) in undertaking assistance and protection activities (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015). The mainstreaming of support for Southern-led initiatives by UN agencies and Northern states is especially paradoxical when situated within the context of South–South cooperation: as outlined above, the latter was purposefully developed as a necessary means to overcome the exploitative nature of North–South relations, and has historically been associated with the Non-Aligned Movement, and anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015; see Aneja this volume; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Daley this volume).

As such, I argue that a focus on Southern-led responses must transcend identifying and offering (certain forms of) support to specific actors from the global South (here, Southern states and regional organisations). Instead, it invites us to consider what role diverse modes of South-South cooperation may play in terms of responding to disasters, and what role the principles of South-South cooperation might have in reconceptualising existing, and formulating new or hybrid forms of response, including responses that challenge structural inequalities. It is this relationality between diverse actors between and across the global South, at all scales, levels and directionnalities, and the divergent principles, motivations and modes of action, which remain to be explored in detail.

Importantly, while South-South cooperation (SSC) has been officially perceived as being central to development and responses to disasters, as outlined above, SSC has also often been perceived –in principle– to be incompatible with developing Southern-led responses to conflicts and conflict-induced displacement. This is, amongst other things, due to the South-South principles of non-interference and respecting state sovereignty outlined above, but also due to international organisations’ assumptions that South-South cooperation can only take place when ‘time’ is available, with Southern-led responses to humanitarian situations excluded almost a priori. This is clearly reflected in the following quotation from a senior UNDP employee interviewed by Omata and cited in his chapter in this volume:

Making South-South initiatives requires a long-term vision and strategic planning. Before making a deal, it involves numerous negotiations between

involved actors and UNDP… I know UNHCR staff need to respond quickly to emergencies to save people’s life. These emergencies usually emerge in an unpredictable way. Such situations are not conducive to the modalities of South-South partnerships.

As such, while UNDP has an established track record of promoting South-South Cooperation in the context of development, it has often been assumed by and about UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies that SSC is incompatible with ‘humanitarian’ work because SSC requires long-term planning, while UNHCR needs to operate from one hour to the next. Of course, we know this is not the case overall, and diverse Southern actors – regional organisations, states, sub-national actors, communities and individuals – have historically played key roles in responding to diverse forms of disasters, including conflict-induced displacement.

Indeed, the potential to further explore the roles of South-South cooperation in existing, new and emerging displacement situations is highly significant precisely because conflict and displacement-related ‘crises’ are often predicted or even ‘announced’ weeks, months, years in advance, and also precisely because displacement is increasingly protracted in nature. UNHCR is indeed making (very slow) headway into institutionalizing modes of South-South cooperation, for instance through UNHCR’s promotion of the ‘solidarity resettlement scheme’ between the Middle East and specific solidary Latin American countries (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015; cf. Cantor this volume). As such, specific modes of state-state cooperation under the framework of South-South Cooperation and its underlying principle of ‘solidarity’ are being explored, and actively supported, by international organisations such as the UN Refugee Agency.

However, while particular actors are being actively supported in this way by the international community, there is also a need to continue recognising the extent to which diverse forward-looking initiatives have been developed under the remit of South-South cooperation by actors which have purposefully disengaged from, or aim to challenge, the international system. Such initiatives have not only historically existed around the world, but also have significant legacies that still echo to date. For instance, long before Castro established the above-mentioned Latin American School of Medicine, from the 1970s to the mid-2010s Cuba offered secondary and tertiary level education to refugee youth including Palestinians, Sahrawi refugees via an international scholarship system (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015); this has
meant that many Cuban-educated Syrian and Palestinian refugee doctors and surgeons have been providing medical assistance to people displaced within and from Syria since the outbreak of conflict in that country in 2011, through what I conceptualise as forms of refugee-refugee humanitarianism (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2016, 2017).

Indeed, a further critique of the localization framework is that although national and regional responses are often equated with ‘localised responses’ that can be captured and supported by the international system, there is also a need to move towards a localization agenda that is even more ‘local’ in nature: focusing on individuals, communities and neighbourhoods, alongside other national and sub-national actors, not just as ‘experiencing’ and being affected by disasters, but also as responding to these in different ways (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2017, 2018). Indeed, while Egeland claimed in 2011 that the growth in civil society movements in Southern societies “is probably the single most important trend in global efforts to combat poverty and conflict” (2011, p. xxi), localized responses have throughout history been led by individuals and communities, whether organized or labeled as ‘civil society movements’ or not.

In addition to acknowledging the extent to which diverse actors from across both the global North and the global South have developed different forms of response to disasters throughout history, it is thus equally essential to consider the question of the plurality of ‘communities of response’ from a multi-scalar and multi-stakeholder perspective. In this regard, research is increasingly acknowledging the significance both of examining the roles played by different actors -including individual, household, community, and sub-national and national actors, regional organisations and international organisations– and of exploring the nature of relationships that exist within, between and across these different responders across all scales (micro, meso and macro), and as processes that change across time and space.

**Geographies and Scales of Response: Roles and Relationships**

The case of refugee-led responses to displacement noted above can thus be examined through the framework of ‘locally-provided aid’, but also as one of a myriad of ‘Southern-led’ responses. In this regard I would like to highlight the importance of focusing on the relationships and interactions that exit between different groups of refugees in a diversity of spaces, and indeed, of complementing a focus on what I refer to as ‘refugee-refugee relationality’ (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2017) with a focus on relationships between heterogenous members of different groups of refugees and different groups of hosts.

(www.refugeehosts.org). These relationships are especially significant in light of what I refer to as the *overlapping* nature of displacement.

While a great deal of academic and policy attention has been given to urban and protracted displacement, very little research has been conducted into the nature and implications of overlapping displacements, including with regard to the relationship between refugees and local communities. I use the term ‘overlapping’ to refer to two spatio-temporal dynamics. Firstly, refugees and IDPs have often both personally and collectively experienced secondary and tertiary displacement. This is the case of thousands of Sahrawi and Palestinian refugees who left their refugee camp homes in Algeria and Lebanon respectively to study or work in Libya before being displaced by the outbreak of conflict there in 2011, and of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees who had originally sought safety in Syria only to be displaced once more by the conflict there (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2012, 2015). Secondly, refugees are increasingly experiencing overlapping displacement in the sense that they often physically share spaces with other displaced people. For example, Turkey hosts refugees from over 35 countries of origin, Lebanon from 17 countries, Kenya 16, Jordan 14, Chad 12 and both Ethiopia and Pakistan 11 (Crawford et al, 2015).

The implication of these intersecting processes is that refugees share spaces for long periods of time both with local host communities, and with other displaced people themselves; this means that refugee groups often become members of the communities which are subsequently called upon to offer protection and support to other groups of displaced people. What I refer to as the process of overlapping displacement precisely indicates not only that people continue to experience ongoing forms of vulnerability and precariousness, but also the extent to which, for many people the ‘new norm’ (if not the ‘new normal’) may be to be displaced or affected by crisis again and again, either individually or as families and members of communities which have experienced displacement on more than one occasion, or as people who remain displaced and then become ‘hosts’ to newly displaced people.

A contemporary example is that of Palestinian refugees in Baddawi refugee camp in North Lebanon, who have resided in the camp since the 1950s and who have ‘hosted’ refugees arriving from Syria since 2012. These refugees include not only displaced Syrians but also Palestinian and Iraqi refugees who had been living in Syria at the outbreak of the conflict and who have found themselves refugees once more (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2012). In the context of Baddawi, Palestinians are both refugees and hosts, and urban camps are spaces that are shared
between not only different generations of refugees but also refugees of different nationalities and countries of origin. Furthermore, this is also not the first time that Baddawi camp and its refugee inhabitants have welcomed ‘new’ refugees, as Baddawi also hosted over 15,000 ‘new’ Palestinian refugees who were internally displaced from nearby Nahr el-Bared refugee camp when that camp was destroyed during fighting in 2007. With an estimated 10,000 refugees from Nahr el-Bared still residing in Baddawi camp, these ‘internally-displaced-refugees-hosted-by-refugees’ have become part of the established Baddawi community hosting ‘newly’ displaced refugees from Syria (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015; also see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Qasmiyeh 2016/2018).

Such processes of overlapping displacement and shared spaces indicate the importance of examining refugee-refugee relationality, requiring that research, policies, and practices transcend and critique the implications of the assumption that citizen-host communities are ‘affected’ by refugees, or that ‘citizens’ ‘support’ or ‘reject’ displaced people. Instead, it is essential to carefully examine the relationships that exist, emerge and change over time and space between different groups of people who have been directly and indirectly affected by and involved in complex emergencies and disasters, including protracted displacement.

Highlighting the relational nature of displacement, and destabilising the assumption that refugees are hosted by citizens, is evidently not to idealise the encounters that characterise refugee-refugee encounters, since these are also often framed by power imbalances and processes of exclusion and overt hostility between members of new and established refugee communities. However, rather than viewing these tensions as inevitable, I offer this reflection to argue that certain ‘international’ and ‘national’ policies and programmes may activate resentment and insecurity among hosts, and there is an increased need to fulfil the above-mentioned commitment to implement programmes that aim to support both refugees and host communities (as is ostensibly at the core of the 3RP – see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh forthcoming). In the context of overlapping displacement and refugees-hosting-refugees, these tensions may be the result of the uneven development and implementation of programmes for different ‘generations’ of refugees and for refugees according to their country of origin. This is acutely visible in Baddawi, whose established residents have received limited assistance from the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine in the Near East (UNRWA) since the 1950s, while new arrivals from Syria have the potential to receive support from an expanding range of inter/national organisations, including UNHCR (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2017).
Within the context of South-South cooperation, local level responses to displacement from Syria, including those developed by refugees themselves, are not formally articulated through reference to the SSC principles of mutual assistance or reciprocity, and yet these non-state responses are intimately related to other principles which intersect with those discourses on different levels: notions of ‘refugee-refugee solidarity’, a sense of reciprocity between people who have historically been displaced, and a range of faith-based principles (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015, 2016, 2017). For others, a commitment to fill the gaps not left by, but in fact created by Northern states and institutions, is articulated through a combination of political, ideological and faith-based rhetoric. These forms of communal self-sufficiency are ultimately unsustainable in situations of acute precarity, and yet they an essential component of the strategies that people develop and negotiate both to stay alive and to try to live meaningful lives in displacement.

Conclusion

As I have noted throughout this chapter, there are different ways of imagining and implementing responses to disasters, including models based on principles of South-South cooperation and horizontal learning that can provide longer-term responses to emerging and protracted displacement scenarios. By highlighting a series of examples which are officially or informally framed as modes of South-South cooperation it has not been my intention to idealise such responses (for critiques, see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015). Instead, I have aimed to exemplify, firstly the extent to which diverse actors are, and have long been, involved in responding to disasters and secondly, the extent to which their underlying principles, aims and objectives may differ from, and challenge, those of the more mainstream members of ‘the international humanitarian system.’

While global North actors may continue to reject many of these interventions for being political and ideological rather than categorizing these as modes of ‘humanitarian’ assistance -Cuba, for instance, has often been depicted as engaging in ideologically-motivated forms of ‘disaster diplomacy’– one key question that remains to be explored further is how people affected by displacement themselves experience, enact, respond to and conceptualise these different processes and modes of response. This is essential since people do not merely ‘experience’ or ‘respond’ to displacement, but are also everyday theorists who conceptualise, negotiate and resist different modes of action and inaction.

Throughout my research with Sahrawi and Palestinian refugees who studied in Cuba in the

1990s and 2000s before returning to work in their home-camps in Algeria and Lebanon respectively, for instance, Cuban-educated graduates repeatedly referred to the scholarship programme through reference to a combination of ‘ideology’, ‘politics’, ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘human values’ (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015). Ultimately, they maintained that Cuba’s programme for refugees is ‘humanitarian’ in nature, but they offered different perspectives regarding the balance between these different dimensions, implicitly and at times explicitly noting the ways in which these overlap or are in tension.\^vi

In this chapter I have proposed the value of analyzing historical and contemporary forms of South-South cooperation on diverse scales (rather than an instrumentalisation of Southern actors via the ‘localisation of aid’ agenda), and of critically engaging with the principles of South-South cooperation. Indeed, I would suggest that the framework of South-South cooperation may be a useful lens through which to examine responses to displacement since forms of SSC, from their birth, have blurred and/or combined rather than inscribed institutional and programmatic distinctions between long- and short-term responses, with the very term ‘cooperation’ having the potential to encompass both development and humanitarian initiatives (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2017). In turn, South-South actions and South-South principles have distinctive spatialities, directionalities, and imperatives of response at their core, including a particular attention to developing modes of challenging and redressing structural inequalities which ultimately ‘create’ – or at least magnify - vulnerabilities to and in diverse disasters.

Highlighting these potentialities is not a matter of idealizing them. Rather, it is a means of proposing that further research is required to better understand how different actors, on different scales and levels, firstly, experience, perceive and conceptualise how, why and with what effect different forms of response are implemented by Southern actors (especially in the in/formal context of South-South cooperation), and, secondly, to trace, resist and challenge the diverse structural barriers that prevent the development of meaningful responses that meet individual and collective needs and rights around the world.

References


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1 On South-South migration more broadly, see Crush and Chikanda this volume.
2 This percentage is estimated by the UNHCR, but neither the UNHCR’s absolute ‘refugee figures,’ nor the percentage of refugees within the ‘developing world,’ include the almost 6 million Palestinian refugees who do not fall under UNHCR’s remit, but rather under that of ‘the other’ refugee agency: the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). UNRWA operates in the main Palestinian host countries and territories (Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Gaza and the West Bank), all of which are ‘in the global South.’ The percentage of refugees remaining in what the UNHCR denominates “developing countries and regions” increases to circa 90% once we include all refugees irrespective of their place of origin or institutional mandate.
3 On Myanmar’s refusal to allow ‘Western’ organisations to provide such assistance, see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Pacitto (2016).
4 While other conceptualisations exist, these are the key entities which are typically associated with ‘the international humanitarian community’ (i.e. see Telford and Cosgrave 2007).
5 In other cases, as explored below, Southern actors may wish to join ‘the international humanitarian community,’ highlighting another dimension of a ‘mutually constitutive’ framework through which Southern actors aim to become part of, or are variously incorporated into Northern frameworks.
6 The Group of 77 -originally established in 1964 by 77 ‘developing countries’ at the first conference of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, and which, by 2017, had over 134 member states- ‘provides the means for the countries of the South to articulate and promote their collective economic interests and enhance their joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues within the United Nations system, and promote South-South cooperation for development’. Available at [http://www.g77.org/doc/](http://www.g77.org/doc/) last accessed 8/03/2018, emphasis added.
7 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to trace the extent to which states do or do not uphold these principles in practice – however, as noted by Aneja (this volume), the “divergence between principles and practice has in some way amplified the importance of the principles, as a performative device that helps obscure sources of competition within the South, while reinforcing the project of a distinct Southern identity and purpose.” On the political benefits of mobilising the discourse of South-South cooperation and NAM principles, also see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Pacitto (2016).
8 On the particularities of China’s historical approach to philanthropy, see Reeves (this volume).
9 There are many who critique the assertion that humanitarianism should, and can be separated from politics. Furthermore, as I have argued elsewhere, claims of impartial, apolitical universality in the international principles institutionalised by the ICRC, can equally be interpreted and understood to be partial, politicized neo-imperialism (see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2015). In effect, Pacitto and I have argued elsewhere that politics pervades humanitarianism, and not just humanitarianism in the sense of the practices carried out by ‘humanitarian’ organizations; it is interwoven within the fibers of the epithet itself. It is this lexical politics that has for so long footnoted Other actors and Other modes of action in the study of humanitarianism (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Pacitto 2016).
10 This section builds upon Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2015, chapter 2).
11 Indeed, a European diplomat I interviewed in Beirut in April 2017 (as part of my research examining local and international responses to displacement from Syria) noted that his state’s aid programmes in Syria and neighbouring countries are intimately related to his state’s
foreign policy priorities: his state actively prioritizes and supports aid programmes within rebel-held areas in Syria and anti-regime/opposition Syrian civil society organisations in Lebanon and Turkey. He frankly acknowledged that European responses to the Syrian crisis are neither ‘impartial’ nor ‘neutral.’ He subsequently recognized that the international community’s partiality regarding the Syrian conflict requires a broad-scale re-evaluation of the position of these ‘principles’ in Northern-led humanitarian action in contexts of conflict-induced displacement. While he effectively situated the birth of what we can refer to as a ‘crisis of international humanitarian principles’ within the context of European responses to the Syrian conflict, the position of politics and ideology within ‘humanitarian’ responses has been debated, contested and challenged for decades.

xii Between 1974-2004 UNDP was home to the ‘Special Unit for Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries’; in 2014 this was renamed the ‘Special Unit for South-South Cooperation of the United Nations Development Programme.’

xiii Long before the outbreak of the 2012 conflict in Syria, Baddawi camp, like towns, cities and camps across Lebanon, had a long history of hosting (primarily male) migrant workers from Syria. Since 2012, the demography of people from Syria living from Lebanon has expanded to also include women and children.

xiv For a critical discussion of ‘disaster diplomacy’, see Kelman (2007).

xv On the relationship between viewing refugees and stateless people who ‘experience’ displacement and lack of legal protection, and as people who conceptualise their own situation and that of others, see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2016).

xvi Rather than describing the programme as humanitarian per se, my interviewees offered remarkably similar humanitarian ‘qualifiers’, describing Cuba’s scholarship programme as having ‘a humanitarian component’, ‘a humanitarian dimension’, a ‘humanitarian aspect’, and ‘humanitarian ingredients’; other interviewees argued that it is ‘a mainly humanitarian system’, which ‘carr[ies] humanitarian elements’, and ‘shares its humanitarian message in spite of the [US] embargo [against Cuba]’. For an analysis of this scholarship programme through the application of tempo-spatial, multiscalar, and intersectionalist analyses, see Fiddian-Qasmiyeh (2015).