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Declaration

I, Kristen M. Hartmann, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Kristen M. Hartmann
Abstract

This dissertation examines how transnational flows of capital from the Persian Gulf are shaping the urban landscape of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. It seeks to answer the following question: what role are transnational flows of capital playing in urban redevelopment in Sarajevo? The thesis also investigates the following sub-questions: how do the residents of Sarajevo respond to such urban change? How is Sarajevo's changing urban space informing new conceptions of the sacred and the secular, of the East and the West and of the post-conflict identity of the city? What kinds of discourses are emerging in terms of identity? The thesis begins with an introduction followed by a literature review focusing on public space, sacred space, transnationality, and identity and Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After this, it discusses the methodology based on qualitative methods and discourse analysis for data interpretation. A chapter examining the history of the city spaces and its identity precedes the empirical chapters based on fieldwork undertaken in Sarajevo. The first empirical chapter analyses commercial developments especially in relationship to corruption and investor urbanism. The second empirical chapter explores sacred spaces in the city and the blending of the sacred and the secular in public space, and the final empirical chapter considers residential spaces and explores the construction of the Arab ‘other’. This thesis concludes that such transnational flows are urging the residents of the city to position themselves along the imaginary binaries of East/West, Sacred/Secular and Global/Local to come to terms with the processes in the city. It contributes to the literature on sacred space in the public sphere and identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In Sarajevo, new additions to the urban landscape affect the relationship between the city dwellers and their identity, driving public debates about role of religion in public space.
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1. Introduction

1.1 Sarajevo and Urban Redevelopment

Over twenty years since the signing of the Dayton Accords ending the bloody conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, its capital city Sarajevo buzzes with tourists and visitors from around the globe seeking out the beauty and history of the city and its surrounding areas. Especially in the summer around the time of the Sarajevo Film Festival, the city swells with people enjoying the warm nights and outdoor cafes in the historic old city. Running parallel to this growth in tourism to the city is the redevelopment of its physical spaces, which have slowly begun to shed the remnants of conflict: bullet holes, marks from mortar shells and abandoned and empty spaces too dangerous to access. Although these scars in the urban landscape continue to mark and shape the city, new urban projects with funding from various transnational actors are pushing Sarajevo out of its post-conflict and post-socialist age into a new era marked by greater transnational flows of capital, people and ideas. Conspicuous amongst these new investments, especially in terms of their publicity, are those with capital originating in the Persian Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and others. With projects ranging from commercial shopping centres to private villas to new mosques, funding for urban investment from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – is propelling development in Sarajevo and its urban future.

This type of investment, however, is not unique to Sarajevo. In fact, capital from the Persian Gulf has been financing urban projects in many major cities around the world, including London. It is unsurprising in the twenty-first century that such transnational flows appear worldwide; there has been an intensification of such capital exchanges and movements of people and ideas. Like no other time in history, vast amounts of wealth are being transferred between all corners of the globe. Although
these exchanges in so-called ‘global cities’ (Sassen, 2001) are neither new nor surprising, in Sarajevo, this phenomenon is remarkable, especially in comparison to other foreign direct investment and especially with an understanding that Sarajevo is a Muslim-majority city. Ostensibly secular spaces in Sarajevo such as shopping malls and hotels have increasingly been built using shari’ah compliant Islamic financing from Muslim countries. According to Wazir Jahan Karim (2010), ‘Islamic banks and finance institutions cannot receive or provide funds for projects which are concerned with or involve alcohol, gambling, pornography, tobacco, weapons or pork’ (110). Thus these buildings restrict activities in their spaces accordingly.

This thesis examines how such transnational flows of capital from the greater Muslim world, especially countries from the Persian Gulf, are shaping the urban landscape of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. As Sarajevo is a Muslim-majority city, although one with a multi-ethnic past, this research investigates the reception of such investments by the people of Sarajevo and what this means in terms of the city’s identity and its future development. With a focus on capital from GCC countries, it explores the effects of transnational flows on the social lives of city dwellers and the processes of becoming global in an increasingly globalising world. Outside of a ‘West-to-rest’ conception of contemporary transnational processes, the investments arriving in Sarajevo are enabling the emergence of hybridity and novel new cultural forms. At the cusp of these globalising processes, Sarajevo is both moving beyond its history and conflict and still indelibly marked by the Siege of Sarajevo and the war in the 1990s. It is at a transitional point, and the new developments are guiding this growth.

My interest in transnational flows of capital and people into Bosnia and Herzegovina began nearly fifteen years ago in 2003. As a student of architecture at the time, I was invited to help the reconstruction of the Karadžić Bey Mosque in Mostar with a group called Builders for Peace. My mother’s family is Croatian by ancestry, and I was focusing on post-conflict reconstruction; the project was a perfect fit for me. While
in Mostar, I noticed that the mosque had received funding for its reconstruction from Saudi Arabia, and I began to question what other governments and institutions had donated money and in-kind services for the redevelopment of the country. As my interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina grew, I continued to follow this type of capital flow, which led me to Sarajevo. I was fascinated by development aid originating outside of Western Europe or North America because at the time I had little understanding of this type of process or of non-‘West-to-rest’ ideas of globalisation. My interest in these flows brought up many questions, especially regarding how this type of phenomenon was understood and received by the people in the city.

This thesis is a continuation of that exploration into redevelopment funding in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Based on fieldwork undertaken over a year in Sarajevo, it analyses the overarching discourses surrounding new investments in the city. Following along the ideas of Alev Çinar and Thomas Bender (2007), discourses and imaginary binaries (or imaginaries) that are discussed in this thesis, ‘serve urban dwellers by locating the city and themselves in it... the city is located and continually reproduced through such orienting acts of imagination, acts grounded in material space and social practice’ (xii). Thus how city dwellers imagine and discuss the city and their identity constitutes both social reality and urban space. When using the terms ‘discourse’ and ‘imaginary’ in this thesis, I refer to the ways in which Sarajevans imagine themselves within their urban environment, often by positioning themselves along binaries such as East/West.

Focusing on commercial developments, sacred spaces and residential projects with funding from GCC countries, this research argues that Sarajevan identity is currently in crisis, and that the residents of the city are now positioning their identity in reaction to the global flows of capital, people and ideas from the Arab world along three imaginary binaries: East/West, Sacred/Secular and Global/Local. In order to come to terms with an ever-shifting and complex urban reality that is engendering multiplicity
and hybridity through new globalising urban projects, Sarajevans are attempting to maintain a stasis of identity through the discourses that polarise Sarajevo towards the West, the Secular and the Local. While these discourses form their own ‘regimes of truth’ (Lees, 2004: 102-103), the processes occurring in Sarajevo are more complex than such binary understandings.

This research contributes to academic debates in South East European studies and in geography. Within South East European studies, it adds to the literature on identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the implications of identity for post-conflict development. It also contributes to ethnographic analyses of the ex-Yugoslav space focusing on identity construction outside of ethno-religious belonging. Away from an area studies focus, it contributes to theoretical discussions about sacred space and transnationality outside of ‘global cities’. With multiple sources of novel empirical data, it adds to the unfolding understanding of post-conflict and post-socialist cities and their march toward market economies and global linkages. By analysing the responses of the people of Sarajevo, this thesis speaks to questions regarding how populations adapt and adjust to increasing transnational influences from myriad source countries. It also commits to maintaining the complexity of such flows without reducing or flattening understandings of identity and spatial production. In this, it pulls away from ideas of bounded categories of space and belonging.

1.2 Context

The city of Sarajevo has a long and complex history. The Ottomans founded Sarajevo in the middle of the fifteenth century, and following what was called the millet system, they organised the different faith communities into mahalas – or neighbourhoods – within the city landscape. This system formed the basis for the urban structure of Sarajevo (Donia, 2006 and Karahasan, 1993); communities built their own churches and mosques within the mahalas, giving the city multi-confessional character.
With the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878, the Vienna-based government began to expand the city using a more Western European design, creating the stylistic East/West blend for which Sarajevo is known (Donia, 2006). After the Second World War, Socialist Yugoslavia began developing the city westward away from the Ottoman old city with buildings that followed a more modern design (Ibelings, 2010: 14). The socialist government also invested in concrete blockhouses, reminiscent of many ex-socialist countries in Europe and Asia. At this time a pan-Yugoslav identity was fostered, adding to the richness of belonging both in the urban environment and its people.

However, this diverse landscape soon became the battleground for nationalist interests. Around the 1970s and 1980s, religion regained a prominent place in society in tandem with the global Islamic revival (Mandaville, 2007 and Merdjanova, 2013), and this re-emergence coincided with a nationalist turn in Yugoslavia. When Slovenia and Croatia left Socialist Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, Bosnia and Herzegovina fell into bloody conflict between its three main ethno-religious communities: the Catholic Croats, the Orthodox Serbs and the Muslim Bošnjaks. The Siege of Sarajevo enforced by Bosnian Serb troops from 1992 and 1996 altered the face of Sarajevo forever. Many important and historic buildings and landmarks were targeted and destroyed at this time, scarring the remaining buildings and footpaths to this day. After the signing of the Dayton Accords ending the conflict, reconstruction of the urban environment commenced. However, Sarajevo began a dual transformation from socialism and from conflict, which has dictated the direction of urban redevelopment. Catherine Baker (2012) has referred to this dual transformation as a ‘double lens’ (868), and Bougarel, Helms and Duijzings (2008) explain that ‘despite the burden of the war legacy, the political difficulties faced by post-war Bosnia share much in common with those experienced by other post-socialist countries’ (32). Thus redevelopment in Sarajevo must be looked at in terms of both the post-socialist legacy of the city as well as its
post-siege aspect. Because of the population dynamics after the conflict, Sarajevo has become a Muslim-majority city with estimates up to 80% of the population being Muslim according to the latest census data (Popis, 2013).

Sarajevo has historically maintained what many call a ‘multicultural’, or more precisely multi-ethnic, identity, meaning it preserves spaces for the traditional ethno-religious communities and their populations (Greble, 2011: 2). The post-war city, however, is physically morphing, caused in part by its ethnic homogenisation and the privatisation process after socialism. This process allowed a minority elite to claim majority shares in state corporations, giving the few an advantage over the many, leading to, among other things, perceptions of corruption in urban development projects (to be discussed further in this thesis). In the past twenty years, prime real estate in the city centre has been auctioned for redevelopment projects to various different global actors. I have chosen to analyse some of these projects as case studies, especially those with funding from countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

In this thesis, I focus on five specific case studies broken down into three chapters: one chapter on commercial spaces, one on sacred spaces and a third on residential developments. The case studies are the BBI Centar, the Sarajevo City Centre, the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Complex, Poljine Hills residential complex and the Buroj Ozone tourist and residential complex (Figure 1).
Using qualitative research methods for data collection during my fieldwork in 2015, I interviewed project stakeholders and urban professionals in Sarajevo, approached people on the streets to discuss urban investments in what I call ‘field interviews’, sent out a survey on urban development to different internet communities and observed the people as they interacted with the urban environment. To triangulate my findings, I analysed media articles and comments on internet forums. This data has given me an insight into the role that these capital flows are playing in the development of Sarajevo.
and how the city's people are responding to such changes. As Sarajevo is undergoing a dual transformation from socialism and from conflict, the new urban interventions from GCC countries are pushing the city outside of its historical identity into new understandings of its place in the globalising world. I argue that in reaction of the case studies, the city's population is positioning its identity towards one end of three imaginary binaries: East/West, Sacred/Secular and Global/Local. I claim that this positioning is an attempt to regain control over their identity, which is in crisis, and over their city, which is being redeveloped by elite-approved market-driven forces.

1.3 Research Aims

This thesis explores transnational flows of capital for urban development in Sarajevo. Since the end of the Siege of Sarajevo, the city has been redeveloping and reconstructing its urban spaces, and in addition to funding from bodies such as the European Union and the World Bank, GCC countries and the governments of states such as Indonesia and Malaysia have also contributed substantially to these processes. This study examines these flows of capital from Muslim-majority countries, their effect on the built environment and their reception by the city’s residents. It seeks to answer the following question: what role are transnational flows of capital playing in urban redevelopment in Sarajevo? The thesis also investigates the following sub-questions:

• What kind of discourses are emerging in terms of identity and how do they relate to imagined binaries such as East/West, Sacred/Secular and Global/Local?

• How are such flows of capital embedded in local political struggles and agendas?

• How is Sarajevo's changing urban space informing new conceptions of the sacred and the secular, of the East and the West and of the post-conflict identity of the city?
As a receiving city for transnational flows of capital from the greater Muslim world, Sarajevo’s context is unique. Not only is the city a post-socialist space, but it is also a post-conflict urban area; it is undergoing a dual transition. In order to answer the questions above, the complexity of the city and the current processes must be understood. To do so, I have used qualitative research methods along with media analysis to come to an understanding of the dominant discourses at work in Sarajevo. By focusing on the reception of the investments by the population, their role in the urban redevelopment can expand beyond the physical spaces of the city into the social lives of the city dwellers and their perceptions of the changing city.

1.4 Contributions

This research contributes to scholarship in South East European studies, geographies of religion and transnationalism. Within the literature of South East European studies, a great deal has been said about identity and belonging in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially before, during and after the conflict in the 1990s (see for example Markowitz, 2010; Robinson, Engelstoft and Pobrić, 2001; or Robinson and Pobrić, 2006). This research sheds new light on contemporary conceptions of belonging in Sarajevo and how these conceptions are being formulated. As much of the literature on identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina focuses exclusively on the three ethno-religious communities, these ideas have flattened and reduced belonging along national lines. Expanding beyond such bounded categories, my findings show that scholarship focusing on ethno-national belonging in Bosnia and Herzegovina (such as Robinson, Engelstoft and Pobrić, 2001 and Robinson and Pobrić, 2006) misses the more complex nuances of identity taking place. While ethno-national belonging certainly does still contribute to identity formation in Sarajevo and in BiH, I show that identity is actually being constructed along different axes outside of this ‘identitarian
matrix’ (Jansen, Brković and Čelebići, 2017: 8), which has been the focus of much of academic research since the conflict in the 1990s.

This research adds to anthropological and ethnographic works on the ex-Yugoslav space that demonstrate how identity is formed outside of ethno-religious belonging through the construction of different discourses (see, for example, Bougarel, Helms and Duijzings, 2008; Helms, 2008; Jansen, 2015; and Jansen, Brković and Čelebići, 2017). While these studies have looked at the formation of identity through the mobilisation of various imaginaries and dichotomies, such as urban/rural and East/West, my research supports and furthers such notions that identity formation in the region (and in Bosnia and Herzegovina specifically) is much more complex than identitarian politics focused on ethno-nationalism. It also furthers this corpus of research by looking at the discourses for identity formation within a Bosnian Muslim-majority city and in reaction to global flows of people and capital, broadening the scope of such research beyond an insular focus on the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. This focus on global flows in the city is new to this body of literature and illuminates how identity is being constructed with respect to this phenomenon.

Within the geography literature, this thesis contributes to new conceptions of sacred and secular space. Building upon the research of Lily Kong (2001) and Banu Gökarkinşel (2009), the findings in this thesis show how simultaneous realities can be produced at once within the same space. In terms of the sacred and the secular, this means that clear distinctions between the two are not always apparent and that a blurring or crossing over is not only possible but also probable. Outside of conceptions of sacred space that focus on awe and wonder (della Dora, 2011) or that see the sacred as produced only in juxtaposition to the profane (Kedar and Werblowsky, 1998 and Gottschalk, 2013), this research argues for a more complex understanding of sacred space as it functions in tandem with the secular. This follows a conception of the city as produced outside of bounded categories, allowing for the existence of
multiple realities and spaces (Farias and Bender, 2010). Focusing on how entire public spaces such as shopping centres can be conceived of as both sacred and secular simultaneously, my research breaks new ground in the geography literature by broadening the idea of this simultaneous reality outside of spaces for religious practice and personal expressions of this simultaneous reality.

This thesis also contributes to new understandings of how Islam manifests in the built environment. I argue that Sarajevo is becoming more Muslim in character in terms of city spaces and in terms of demographics, which I call the ‘Islamic shift’. However, more than just speaking to one monolithic idea of the Muslim community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and more than organising solidarities for the worldwide Muslim community – the *umma* (Kusno, 2012) – the findings in this thesis argue that Islam can be expressed in the built environment for various different factions within the Muslim community and that there can be perceptions of exclusion within the Muslim population of one city. This research goes further than assuming one homogeneous and coherent idea of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in addition to that, there are multiple ways that Islam is produced and represented in the urban landscape. This conception of Islam in the built environment is less studied in the literature, especially scholarship on the built environment of Bosnia and Herzegovina. My research goes beyond representations of a homogeneous and coherent community or the imaginary unity of the *umma*.

Finally, this research contributes to the scholarship on transnationality and globalising cities. Using Roy and Ong’s (2011) conception of ‘worlding cities’, I argue that the case studies analysed in this thesis are ‘worlding practices’, or projects simultaneously generating the global and the urban, ‘being at once heterogeneously particular and yet irreducibly global’ (9). Such projects are contributing to hybridity and emergent cultural forms outside of a ‘West-to-rest’ model of globalisation. The case studies are attempting to ‘solve’ the urban problems in Sarajevo of post-socialist and
post-conflict redevelopment, and they are doing so by pushing Sarajevo towards the globalising world. Using this theorisation of transnational flows for urban redevelopment, this research demonstrates how in the context of Sarajevo ‘the urban and the global are constitutive of one another’ (Baker and Ruming, 2014: 63). The problems of post-socialist and post-conflict redevelopment are being solved through elite-approved visions for the city emanating from GCC countries, and the city’s population is actively contesting these movements of ideas, people and capital. There have been no studies of Sarajevo using this theoretical model, and it adds to the ‘worlding’ literature by showing how elite-approved interventions from GCC countries are bringing Sarajevo into the globalising world and into the global market economy.

1.5 Thesis Summary

This thesis is made up of eight chapters. In the second chapter titled, ‘Urban Space, Transnationalism and Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, I review scholarship that is relevant to this research, arguing for certain conceptions of how to view the city, transnationality and identity politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Underscoring key literature in geography and South East European studies, I highlight scholarship that provides more complex understandings of both the urban environment and of identity and belonging in the Sarajevan context. Through this literature review, I argue for maintaining the complexity of the phenomena occurring and refraining from over-simplification and the employment of bounded categories. I explore ideas present in the literature relating to the urban landscape, public space, sacred space, Islam and nationalism in the built environment, ‘global cities’ and worlding, transnationality, identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Islam as practiced in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Building from this literature review, chapter three titled, ‘Research and the Muslim City: Studying Spatial Development and Global Flows of Capital in Sarajevo’, lays out the methodological foundation for this project. Focusing on qualitative research
methods, this chapter explains the rationale behind the methods chosen and the analysis of the data collected through those methods. During my fieldwork in Sarajevo, I employed various different qualitative methods, including: interviews with project stakeholders and urban professionals in the city, ‘field interviews’ (in which I approached people on the street to discuss urban redevelopment), a survey on urban development in Sarajevo sent to various internet forums and observation of the population of Sarajevo in urban spaces. To triangulate this data, I also analysed media articles and comments on internet forums. Using discourse analysis, I analysed these sources of data in order to understand the overarching discourses present in the city and how these discourses contribute to understandings of the built environment, identity and transnational flows of people, ideas and capital originating in GCC countries. In this chapter, I also explore ethical considerations of the project, my positionality as an American researcher in Sarajevo and the challenges and drawbacks that I faced while conducting my fieldwork in 2015.

Chapter four ‘Sarajevo’s Identity Crisis: the City’s Multi-ethnic History, the Islamic shift and Post-War Urban Processes’ gives a broad overview of the current context of Sarajevo. In this chapter, I give a breakdown of Sarajevo’s history in terms of its urban development and the forces that have forged its multi-ethnic historical identity. I argue that, since the end of the Siege, Sarajevo has been undergoing an identity crisis and that the city is becoming more Muslim in character, which I call the ‘Islamic shift’. The ‘Islamic shift’ is a two-pronged process in which both the demographics of the city are becoming more homogeneous (the last census counted 80% of Sarajevo’s population as Muslim) and in which the city’s spaces are also taking on a more Muslim character in terms of shari’ah compliant spaces and increasing numbers of mosques and mesjids. This chapter also looks at processes of urbanisation after the war in the 1990s and discusses the problems associated with the privatisation of state assets. In
total, this chapter sets the foundation for the following three chapters, which analyse
my empirical data focusing on the case studies in the city.

The first empirical chapter of this thesis, chapter five ‘Sarajevo’s Commercial
Investments: Perceptions of Corruption and Investor Urbanism in Post-Conflict and
Post-Socialist Urban Development’, focuses on two new shopping centres in the city:
the BBI Centar (BBI) and the Sarajevo City Center (SCC). Concentrating on
perceptions of corruption and market-driven urbanism, it analyses the intense public
debates around the buildings and their connection to GCC capital. I argue that the
people in the city view issues of corruption as particularly ‘eastern’ in opposition to
ostensibly ‘western’ transparency, and because of this, BBI and SCC are catalysing a
positioning of Sarajevo identity towards the ‘West’ of the East/West binary. Focusing on
data obtained from interviews, field interviews, survey responses and media reports, I
show how the elite-approved worlding projects that are ‘quasi-public’ spaces contribute
to identity formation in Sarajevo, especially in reaction to perceived ‘eastern’ forces
operating in the country.

Chapter six, the second empirical chapter in this thesis titled ‘Redefining
Sarajevo’s Relationship to Islam: the Blending of Sacred and Secular Spaces’ analyses
spaces in Sarajevo that are sacred in nature. Again using BBI and SCC as case
studies along with the Saudi King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre, I argue that all of
these buildings maintain a blending of sacred and secular space and the existence of
both sacred and secular realities simultaneously. Because BBI and SCC are spaces
where religious ritual takes place and where there are religious restrictions upon the
activities allowed in the spaces, they cannot be understood as purely secular in nature.
Similarly, the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre provides educational services for
the people of Sarajevo regardless of religious affiliation, making the reality of its space
more complex than purely sacred space in the conception of Veronica della Dora
(2011), which focuses on awe and wonder. All three are at once both sacred and
secular. First, I analysed the discourses around BBI and SCC with respect to perceptions of conspiracies to ‘Islamise’ the city and fears of expanding shari’ah compliant spaces. The second part of this chapter focuses on the King Fahd Mosque and ideas that it spreads radicalism and preys upon poor and vulnerable populations. Sarajevans are reacting to these case studies by positioning their identity along the East/West and the Sacred/Secular binaries towards the ‘West’ and the ‘Secular’, viewing radicalism as ‘eastern’ and the ‘Islamisation’ of the city as against Yugoslav secular ideals.

The final empirical chapter in this thesis, chapter seven titled ‘Understanding Arabophobia: Residential Projects as Catalysts for New Constructions of the “Other” in Sarajevo’ examines new residential and tourist complexes in Sarajevo: Poljine Hills residential complex and Buroj Ozone tourist village. Exploring themes of the construction of the Arab ‘other’ and ideas surrounding neighbourliness and flows of people into the city, it analyses how the case studies are catalysing discourses around visitors and residents in Sarajevo from Arab countries, focusing on concepts such as exclusion, cultural colonisation, safety, clashes of behaviour and the new ‘other’. Drawing upon interviews, field interviews, survey responses, media analysis and an examination of online comments, it argues that Sarajevans are attempting to position their identity along the imaginary binaries of East/West and Global/Local toward the ‘West’ and toward the ‘Local’. This chapter examines perceptions of Arabs being uncultured in contrast to more cultured, educated and ‘European’ Sarajevans and fears that Sarajevans are being excluded from the local property market by Arab buyers. It also highlights anxieties that the Bosnian population will have to adapt to the customs of the new residents instead of the reverse. These flows of people into Sarajevo can be seen as contributing to urban change, creating spatialised social divisions in which one part of the city is inhabited by the wealthy and middle class and the other by the less fortunate (Spirou, 2011: 196). The positioning of Sarajevan identity along the binaries is
thus a way to contest such processes as transnational flows of people, capital and ideas increase.

To conclude this thesis, chapter eight titled ‘Conclusion: Worlding Projects, Urban Problems and Identity in Crisis’ lays out the arguments and interpretations of the thesis and its theoretical and empirical contributions to scholarship. This thesis contributes to conceptions of how Sarajevan identity is developing in the contemporary post-socialist and post-conflict climate, especially in relation to its transforming urban landscape. As a whole, the discourses surrounding the case studies in this thesis can be read as a means for the local population to assert control over their changing built environment and identity. Although the ‘worlding practices’ that are the case studies contribute to greater hybridity and emerging cultural forms, Sarajevans are positioning their identity along the three binaries East/West, Sacred/Secular and Global/Local in order to achieve stasis in this ever shifting environment. These findings offer new conceptions for sacred space, the representation of Islam in the built environment and the globalising effects of transnational capital flows for post-socialist and post-conflict reconstruction and development. This research also offers new ways of conceptualising Sarajevan identity and how the built environment engenders processes of identity formation.
2. Urban Space, Transnationalism and Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina

2.1 Introduction

This research examines urban investments in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina with funding from the Persian Gulf. Attending to both sacred and secular architecture, especially buildings relying on Islamic funding from countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, this research uncovers new processes taking place in Sarajevo. The urban environment plays a crucial role in the formation of identity, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, identity has proven in the past to be a divisive – even deadly – concept. Yet, investments in the built environment from Muslim countries, often emanating from rich oil-producing nations around the Persian Gulf, appear in many major cities around the world. London’s Shard skyscraper, for example, is the result of Qatari funding and is partially owned by the State of Qatar. That such funding exists on a massive scale should come as no surprise in the twenty-first century; capital flows and exchanges have reached an intensification never before witnessed on the planet, and vast amounts of wealth are being transferred from all corners of the world. While such urban interventions in so-called ‘global cities’ may astonish no one, in Sarajevo – a small, multi-ethnic, post-conflict and post-socialist European capital – the abundance of such urban interventions originating in the Middle East and Asia, especially in comparison to other foreign direct investment, is substantial. What role are transnational flows of capital playing in the urban redevelopment of Sarajevo? And how do the residents of the city respond to such change?

Answering these questions requires a broad investigation through multiple disciplines and sources of literature and a commitment to maintaining the complexity of the phenomena occurring. This means refraining from over-simplification in terms of creating bounded categories. In Sarajevo, a blurring of boundaries between different
spheres – the public and private and the sacred and secular – plus transnational capital and cultural flows are colliding with little-regulated privatisation and urbanisation practices to create urban interventions that produce solidarities for specific groups. However, such flows are also increasing hybridity and new cultural forms not only within the city’s multi-ethnic population, but also within singular ethno-religious groups. In this literature review, I will explore ideas relating to the urban landscape, public space, sacred space, Islam and nationalism in the built environment, ‘global cities’ and worlding, transnationality, identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Islam as practiced in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Having a broad understanding of these literatures will be important for understanding the role of transnational flows of capital for urban redevelopment in Sarajevo and the responses of the residents to such urban change.

2.2 The Urban Landscape

Urban centres are sites of contestation and tension. They are arenas where political, economic and social transformations commence and where challenges to structures of authority are lived out. The multitude of connections and networks inscribed within cities and the activities that take place within their spaces are what make urban centres special. Although much of the literature on the city refers to it as a bounded object – a concrete spatial form, an economic unit, and a cultural formation (Farias and Bender, 2010: 9) – cities in fact defy such categorisation in their heterogeneity and the complicated, chaotic and unpredictable activities that are produced through the enmeshing of various actors in urban areas. Building upon Bruno Latour’s (2005) conception of Actor-Network Theory (ANT), Farias and Bender (2010) have developed an alternative way of thinking about cities based on three central notions. The first is the ‘mode of existence’ of a city, which ‘resembles less a notion of “out-thereness” than one of “in-hereness”’. In other words, the practices and activities on site create cities, and these are varied and changing, making cities greatly diverse.
The second notion is that the city is ‘enacted into being in networks of bodies, materials, technologies, objects, natures and humans... the enactment of objects, such as the city, is not just social, but also material, and involves the heterogeneous ecologies of entities acting at sites and contexts of practice.’ Conceptualising cities in this manner grants agency to humans and materials alike and does not rely upon their construction by a ‘constructor’ – society, culture, discourse, etc. Thirdly, they see the city as a ‘multiple object’ where:

different realities are being enacted at one time...touching upon the Bergsonian assertion of the multiplicity of reality...Through time and space the same object proves to be multiple...it certainly applies to cities being enacted in multiple different ways at different sites and time. (13-14).

This multiplicity breaks the moulds of the conception of the city as a bounded object and cultural formation and allows for multiple enactments of the city simultaneously.

By viewing cities from this perspective, the complexity of the networks and activities taking place in the urban environment can be maintained. Thus, instead of bounded objects of homogeneous economic and cultural activity, they become multiplex – ‘multiple spaces, multiple times and multiple webs of relations’ (Amin and Graham, 1997: 419). They can be ‘considered as a set of spaces where diverse ranges of relational webs coalesce, interconnect and fragment’ (Ibid., 418). Seeing the city outside the conception of ‘a bounded unit and a stable object: a spatial form, an economic-political entity, a cultural formation’ (Farias and Bender, 2010: 12), the concept of urban culture and identity can be questioned and reformed. Farias and Bender state:

Looking at cities as culture raises the same type of dilemmas we observe above for spatial and economic understandings of cities. The problem lies in the stability of the object. As cultural formations, cities are imagined as fluid objects that remain identical despite slight variations from case to case. They are fluid, for their manifestations vary, but keep their shape and identity. Thus, while it is possible to look at many lively Euro-American cities as resembling expressions of a fluid urban culture, as soon as differences go too far between and within cities, one is confronted with the paradox of cities to which an urban
culture cannot be ascribed. And this is precisely the dilemma: understood as fluid cultural objects cities are either the locus of a fluid urban culture or they are not. Seen in this way, it is not surprising that authors writing in the tradition of everyday urbanism point to a profound gap between the city and the urban life (Ibid.).

This is especially useful for Sarajevo, which has been home to various international actors since the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and which does not consist of simple ‘West-to-rest’ connections and flows. In fact, as will be discussed further in this dissertation, the idea of a Sarajevan city culture and identity is not just in flux, it is in crisis in the minds of the residents of the city. This has precisely to do with the ‘profound gap between the city and the urban life’ described above. If the city is re-envisioned outside the parameters of a bounded cultural object, the true complexity of the processes and networks working to enact the city become visible.

2.2.1 Public Space

As cities are sets of spaces created through the networks of human and non-human activity on site, public spaces become arenas for intensely varied webs of relations. Yet there are two streams of literature on public environments: the literature following Jürgen Habermas on the public sphere and the geography literature on public space. While related, these two currents do not often overlap, depicting instead two quite different conceptions of the public arena. The main difference between these two ways of thinking is that public space is ‘explicitly spatial’ (Low and Smith, 2006: 5), and the public sphere literature describes ‘the sphere of private people coming together as a public’ (Habermas, 1989: 27). However, according to Low and Smith:

It would be regrettably and self-defeating if the distinction between these literatures was summarily reduced to one of materialist versus idealist approaches; both literatures are far too internally diverse to be characterized usefully in this way. Yet they have not really come together... Where the weakness of the public space literature perhaps lies in the practical means of translation from theories of political and cultural economy to the materiality of public space, the public sphere literature offers an historically embedded discussion of the continual
making and remaking of the public vis-à-vis the state and related institutions, and ideologies and modes of communication and power (6).

Because the buildings in Sarajevo often inhabit spaces that blur the public and the private but that are accessible to the public, it will be important to merge some of the ideas of the public sphere and public space, especially with regard to religion in the public sphere.

Scholars have significantly discussed the idea of public space in the geography literature. Ali Madanipour et al (2014) see public spaces as a, ‘crossroads, where different paths and trajectories meet, sometimes overlapping and at other times colliding; they are the meeting place of politics and culture, social and individual territories, and instrumental and expressive concerns’ (1). While this definition allows for a broad view of public spaces, the term is contested. Public spaces are often discussed as an ideal type, and the notion conjures ideas of the Greek Agora, the Roman Forum, and Renaissance plazas and their link to direct democracy and the participation of citizens in public affairs (omitted from this image is the fact that only certain members of society could participate in such political activities, namely men of specific ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds). In this idealised image, public spaces serve three fundamental functions; they are places for political, economic and social activities (Stanilov, 2007: 269), including political protest, free trade and leisure. Don Mitchell (1995) has deemed this ideal image ‘true’ public space – an area in which people have the freedom to organise politically, exchange goods, and meet socially without fear of coercion or control. True public spaces ‘encourage unmediated interaction, a place where the power of the state can be held at bay’ (110).

Today, true public spaces as defined by Mitchell are rarities, as many sites traditionally associated with public space – parks, squares and plazas, for example – increasingly belong to private interests. According to Judit Bodnar (2015), ‘Commercialisation and privatisation were identified as the two main trends in the
transformation of public space bringing its decline’ (2095). The lines between the public and the private have been blurring consistently in the past century, especially with the acceleration of neoliberal policies after the Second World War. In fact, this blurring of the public and private has had an anti-democratic effect on urban governance. Susan S. Fainstein and Scott Campbell (2011) explain that, ‘for cities, neo-liberalism narrows the options open to decision makers whether they are elected or not. Cities cannot afford to preserve democratic public spaces for citizens (plazas, parks, squares) when they can develop privatised, revenue-producing spaces for “idiots” (malls, offices, condominiums)’ (47). Because they can no longer be conceptualised as true public spaces, these urban areas become ‘quasi-public’ spaces – legally private areas that form part of the public sphere and that may be subject to regulation and control. In these ‘quasi-public’ spaces, access may become quite exclusive or may not be granted at all (Carmona, 2003: 111; Miljački, 2012: 187; Stanilov, 2007: 276).

Although public spaces in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe were often already highly regulated and controlled (the political and economic functions would have been severely curtailed), the social aspect of the spaces would have been open to the public without much regulation (Stanilov, 2007: 270-271) despite the fact that many public spaces in socialist countries were designed to prevent loitering on the premises (Duijzings, 2011: 139). Beginning in 1989 and reaching into the early 1990s, the political function of public spaces opened up as people took to the streets in Prague, Moscow, Belgrade and other major cities (Stanilov, 2007: 269-270). Since the collapse of these systems, however, privatisation has proceeded to morph these spaces into so-called ‘quasi-public’ spaces controlled by private interests and security companies. The countries of the former Eastern Bloc have not all followed the same trajectories with respect to post-socialist privatisations and the urban landscape, but there are many similarities with respect to market forces on public space (Diener and Hagen, 2013: 496). In Sarajevo, the war in the early 90s stalled the processes of
privatisation and economic transition, but new privatisations and developments are emerging, and surveillance cameras and private security guards control most of these interventions and the access granted to the citizens of the city.

The loss of ‘true’ public space, however – if it ever actually existed – should not necessarily be mourned nostalgically. As Margaret Crawford (2011) has pointed out, everyday public spaces exist in the form of streets, vacant lots, pavements, parking spaces and other such spaces, which can often be used for mostly uncontrolled gatherings and exist ‘somewhere in the junctures between private, commercial and domestic’ (347). Regan Koch and Alan Latham (2012) critique those decrying the loss of public life through the forces of privatisation with a case study describing the ‘domestication’ of the Prince of Wales Junction in London. By reimagining and reconfiguring the junction, including exerting control over the activities taking place, the space became an area safe for all groups, instead of a dangerous corner housing only drug users and vagrants. In fact, the different publics that inhabit public spaces even after privatisation must negotiate the codes and rules governing the space in order to ‘make a home in the city’ (Ibid., 1-2). Although they might be regulated by private security forces (which can encroach on the democratic nature of public space), different publics ‘keep confrontation at bay’ by maintaining certain codes and ‘conviviality’, which according to Ash Amin (2013) is ‘not the product of civic virtue or interpersonal recognition, but a habit of negotiating multiplicity and the company of unknown other as a kind of bodily training’ (4). Anna Barker (2017) adds upon this conception with what she calls ‘mediated conviviality’ which argues for the facilitation of social order, recognising ‘the importance of safety to the development of a convivial public realm’ (848-849). When spaces are deliberately configured for multiple publics and the codes surrounding them negotiated, they come into being as public space, regardless of whether they can be considered ‘true’ public spaces or ‘quasi-public’ spaces. Thus speaking in terms of bounded categories and binaries (public/private,
sacred/secular, etc.) limits the notion of public space. The complexity of the space itself must be considered through the publics – the networks and actors – inhabiting the space to understand the more nuanced processes taking place.

2.2.2 Sacred Space

More than ever, the concept of sacred space proves difficult to adequately define. It does not necessarily exist only within the boundaries of church, mosque, temple or synagogue walls, but rather blends into everyday spaces. Sacred and secular (or profane) are contested terms, but despite the messy nature of the sacred versus the secular, some scholars insist that it is, indeed, possible to demarcate where the sacred begins and where the secular (or profane) ends. Such conceptions focus on sacred spaces as sites of ritual (Finlayson, 2017: 304) or as spaces defined by their juxtaposition to the profane (Kedar and Werblowsky, 1998: 13 and Gottschalk, 2013: 2). Other conceptions reach toward divine connection; according to Roger W. Stump (2008), sacred space is ‘a space that bears a direct connection to the superhuman entity or entities postulated to exist within a religious system, or that is directly involved in the interactions between humanity and such entities’ (26). Similarly, Veronika della Dora (2011) attempts to delimit sacred space from secular space by insisting that wonder – the awe one feels inside a sacred space – distinguishes the sacred from the secular (167). Although these definitions touch on elements that could separate sacred and secular spaces, their insistence on creating clear boundaries between the two signals the weakness of their analysis. Scholars such as Peter Gottschalk (2013) warn against simple binary distinctions between the sacred and the secular or the profane. In fact, elements of the sacred blur into the secular and vice-versa.

Some scholars argue that a shift has taken place with respect to the public significance of faith-based groups during modernisation, which can loosely be labelled secularisation (Bruce, 2011 and 2002). Secularisation has been defined as ‘the decline
in the social significance of religion’ (Bruce, 2011: 2), which supposedly occurred in many parts of the world in the last century. Secularisation, however, has been argued to be a plural and multiform process whose complexities signal not one secularism but multiple secularisms occurring simultaneously (Shakman Hurd, 2012). Other scholars, however, question the extent to which religion disappeared from social significance during the modern era (see, for example, Hjelm, 2015; Ley, 2011 and Shah, 2012), although the visibility of religion may have disappeared from the public sphere.

Coincident with the decreasing visibility of religion in the modern era, some societies developed entire frameworks to keep religion in the private sphere, outside of politics or society at large. The socialist countries in Eastern Europe, including Socialist Yugoslavia, were just some of the countries that advanced secular ideals and pushed religion to the margins, attempting to keep the sacred far away from the secular. This decrease in visibility of religion in the public sphere did not equate to a disappearance of religion, but rather it signalled ‘the disengagement of religion from political power and rational decision-making during the modernisation process’ [emphasis in the original] (Cloke and Beaumont, 2012: 35).

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the visibility of religion has dramatically re-emerged (Wilson and Steger, 2013: 481). Cloke and Beaumont have described this as, ‘reflecting a particular form of “crossing-over” in the public arena between the religious and the secular’ (28). Religion has re-emerged publicly, and:

not only are previously assumed divides between secular (=public) and religious (=private) being challenged and rendered permeable, but the current mix of neoliberal governance and postpolitical public engagement is opening out opportunities for professional and voluntary participation that transcends previously divisive boundaries of involvement between religious and secular motivation (Ibid.).

In the city (Beaumont and Baker, 2011), ‘new spaces of rapprochement between religious and non-religious actors’ are being created, manifesting the blurred nature of
the public and the private, the sacred and the secular (260) and creating transitional areas between comfort zones and such areas of rapprochement.

In the past few decades, scholars in geography have been conceptualising sacred space following these currents and engaging with notions of the sacred that transcend binary divisions. Lily Kong (2001) explains that:

At the material, symbolic and ideological levels, the separation between sacred and secular is more fluid than rigid...Even while the sacred is often constructed, and gathers meaning in opposition to the secular, place is often multivalent, and requires an acknowledgement of simultaneous, fluctuating and conflicting investment of sacred and secular meanings in any one site (212).

Thus the multiplicity of space allows for the simultaneous production of different realities, both sacred and secular and in between. Caitlin Finlayson (2017) argues that it is the ‘collective, emotional engagement with space that makes it sacred’, although the materiality of the environment may not produce the awe and wonder that Della Dora (2011) argues is necessary for sacred space. Finlayson’s conceptions reflect the ideas of embodied sacrality of Muslim women producing simultaneously sacred and secular spaces discussed by Banu Gökarıksel (2009). Gökarıksel further contends that:

The ‘secular’ and the ‘religious’ are place-based, meaning that they are formed through the specific set of political and social relations, ideologies and practices in particular sites. But they are also productive of places, in the sense that the particular ideas and practices of the secular and the religious produce space – from the body to city spaces’ (2012: 5).

Within these strains of thinking about the sacred, not only can the sacred and the secular blend into one another, they can co-exist within the same space.

With current trends in Islam, this is all the more evident, as it is increasingly impossible to separate the public and private in Muslim communities. According to Peter Mandaville (2007), ‘Islam is often represented as a “comprehensive” way of life that pervades all sectors of human activity and experiences among its adherents. In Islam it makes no sense to speak of the separateness of religion from any other domain of life’ (12). This notion in Islam is called tawhid, or ‘oneness’ (Ibid.). Islam,
especially, is present in both spatial public spaces (in the material organisation of urban space) as well as in the idealist public sphere (Islam governs behaviours, attitudes and practices in all aspects of life, not just the private life). The networks of the built environment and the actors in those spaces determine the activities that take place, creating ‘third spaces’ or ‘in-between’ areas (AlSayyad, 2001).

Asef Bayat (2013) argues that a greater emphasis on Muslim practices, virtue and visibility in Muslim communities reflects a conceptual shift that he calls post-Islamism, which has come about with greater secularism on the political stage. Post-Islamism ‘emphasises religiosity and rights. Yet, while it favors a civil and nonreligious state, it accords an active role for religion in the public sphere’ (8). The public sphere in Muslim communities increasingly includes Islamic values, even in politically secular societies such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. Gökarıksel and Secor (2017) state that, ‘Instead of being confined to the spaces of mosques or formal politics, Islamic teachings and virtue are today being made integral to every aspect of life through ritual, prayer and daily conduct’ (648). This turn in Muslim societies is increasingly allowing for simultaneously sacred and secular spaces, and this includes places where rituals occur as well as spaces with multiple and conflicting meanings.

Sarajevo’s spaces encapsulate this complexity. Socialist Yugoslavia, (at least in its early years), dictated clear divides between the sacred and the secular in public life. Before the dissolution of the Yugoslav state and continuing thereafter, religion has played a very important part in the public sphere, mixing with politics and decision-making at high levels. Although BiH is a plural society, Sarajevo’s Muslim majority carries with it the weight of the Islamic Community (Islamska Zajednica or IZ), which is based in the city, and also the Bošnjak (Bosnian Muslim) political party, the SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije), which runs the Cantonal government in coalition with the multiethnic but Bošnjak dominated SDP (Socijaldemokratska Partija Bosne i Hercegovine). Islam in Sarajevo is not contained within the strict boundaries of mosque
walls, and its reach extends to new spaces of rapprochement where secular and sacred actors meet.

2.2.3 Islam and Nationalism in the Built Environment

Nationalism continues to play a strong role in BiH’s post-war society, including in its post-war urban environment. However, while other post-socialist societies constructed nationalism in the built environment on state-sponsored programmes (street name changes, removal/erection of monuments, etc. (Diener and Hagen, 2013)), nationalism in the built environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina is somewhat more complex based on the presence of the three main ethno-religious groups. The built environment can serve as a vehicle for nationalism when its ‘semiotic functioning organises solidarities for a limited community’ (Kusno, 2012: 213). Through its form and function the built environment can ‘sell’ specific lifestyles and shape identity, collective memory and power structures (Vale, 2008). Examples of nationalism in the built environment include the Nazi architecture before and during the Second World War. Nazi Germany launched a campaign of ‘thorough spatial reorganisation’ in order to ‘re-orientate Germany's cultural, political and economic life to support the regime's objectives’ (Hagen, 2009: 690). The urban environment in socialist countries under Stalin similarly transformed to uphold the power of the regime (Tarkhanov and Kavtaradze, 1992: 9-10). During the Yugoslav era, public spaces and architecture would not have served one ethno-religious group over any other; the state sponsored the creation of Yugoslav nationalism and the unity of the republics. Buildings constructed during this era (except for mosques, churches and synagogues) would have belonged to all the people of the country in symbolism and function. However thinking in terms of state-sponsored nationalism is too simplistic, and a nation may be unconnected to the nation-state and have separate interests (Kusno, 2012: 214).
Within Islam an overarching nation of Muslim believers ruled by shari’ah law exists called the *umma*. Although it often functions as more of a political device when solidarities need to be organised, the *umma* represents, ‘a deep horizontal comradeship that crosses the temporary convenience of nations’ (Simone, 2012: 206). The *umma* is, ‘a nation that exceeds the trappings of governmental and juridical particularity, a fundamental locus of identification and means of consolidating an unyielding sense of togetherness’ (Ibid., 207). The *umma* was employed during the Bosnian War of the 1990s to gather fighters from abroad for the Muslim front. The population of Sarajevo is officially eighty percent Muslim according to the 2013 census (Popis, 2013), and there is a large concentration of buildings erected with funding from the Muslim world in its built environment, much of which emanates from the Persian Gulf.

Interestingly for this study, the built environment in the Gulf States, but specifically in the United Arab Emirates, reached a level of worldwide fame for innovation and the ostentatious display of wealth before the financial crisis in 2008. Architects and city planners pushed the limits of the built environment, creating artificial islands, luxury villas, and towering skyscrapers (Elsheshtawy, 2009). Although there is no traditional idiom of Islamic architecture in these constructions – they are similar to new urban interventions in cities such as London and New York – the Gulf region has greatly impacted the vision of architecture in the Islamic world (Rabbat, 2012: 9) and linked it to vast oil wealth and modernity. The *umma* here manifests itself in such wealth and novelty, and, according to AbdouMaliq Simone (2012):

> The Emirates…represent the concrete diffusion of a form of the *umma* through massive investments in the built and financial environments of the Muslim world…In other words…the Emirates cannot only intervene into built environments around the world, but establish ‘parallel’ worlds within them. These become in some important ways the concrete machinery through which an *umma* is further recognized (207).
While traditional forms of Islamic architecture, including arches and domes, may be absent from these constructions, they still organise solidarities within Muslim communities by their pronounced displays of wealth and sleek modern touches interspersed with subtle Islamic touches – the inability to eat pork, gamble or drink alcohol on the premises, for example.

However, the Islamic Community in BiH remains committed to local interpretations of Islam despite the presence of other practices throughout the country, and this holds true for most Muslim communities throughout the world. The umma discourse has effectively been employed to call Muslims to action on behalf of their coreligionists (as was the case during the Bosnian war in the 1990s). Yet, time and again, the umma has failed to grow into a real, global movement. In fact, most Muslims worldwide identify on national and local terms instead of within a global community (Mandaville, 2007: 341), and, according to Merdjanova (2013):

In the Balkans, the recourse to the umma as a form of political identity has been sporadic rather than systematic and has never translated into an ideological program. The war-time endorsement of the image of Bosnia as an outpost of the umma by the Bošnjak Party of Democratic Action can be seen to a great extent as a tactical move to gain the support of the Islamic world at a time when the West failed to respond effectively to its plight (58).

Islam in BiH will most likely continue to follow the traditional and dominant form brought by the Ottomans, but there are many currents at work in the country, especially in Sarajevo, all of which belong to the umma and which are susceptible to the employment of the umma discourse. Yet analysing Muslim funded buildings cannot simply rely on the idea of Bosnian Muslims belonging to a global nation or accepting different interpretations of Islam at face value; all networks of Muslims in the city are composed of various actors that influence how buildings are constructed, used and interpreted within the city. Nationalism in the built environment does exist and can organise solidarities for Muslims through the umma discourse, but oversimplifying such processes risks missing more nuanced activities, actors and interests at play.
2.2.4 Global Cities and ‘Worlding’

Since the late twentieth century, the concept of globalisation has permeated the urban studies and geography literature. This literature has focused extensively on the ‘global cities’ discourse; however the ideas advanced by researchers such as Saskia Sassen (2001) limit the scope of what a ‘global city’ can be, embedding it in the concept of economic globalisation that transcends the nation-state and functions independently within global capitalism. This discourse overlooks cities experiencing global flows of ideas, people, goods and capital originating outside of North America or Europe. Although scholars such as Donald McNeill (2017) contend that the concept of ‘global cities’ still holds conceptual value, within the literature there has been a move away from this bounded category toward ‘how the urban and the global are constitutive of one another’ (Baker and Ruming, 2014: 63 and Farias and Bender, 2010). Ananya Roy and Aihwa Ong (2011) have countered the ‘global city’ literature with the idea of ‘worlding’. In their book Worlding Cities, they explain that:

the city is viewed not as an exclusive site of capitalism or postcolonial activism, but as a milieu that is in constant formation, drawing on disparate connections, and subject to the play of national and global forces… we thus focus not on established criteria of city achievements, but on the ongoing art of being global (3-4).

Roy and Ong view global or transnational interventions as ‘worlding practices’ or projects that push the boundaries of urbanism and urban situations beyond the city itself, ‘being at once heterogeneously particular and yet irreducibly global’ (9). It is a view of a world being constructed, and the interventions ‘instantiate some vision of the world in formation’ (11). Worl ding cities do not fit neatly into the global cities discourses, but rather this conceptualisation allows for cities outside of the ‘New York, London, Tokyo’ model to act in the formation of global configurations and different globalisms. Roy and Ong identify three ‘styles of being global’: modeling, inter-referencing practices and new solidarities. Worl ding practices serve as urban models
from one city to another where there is a concrete acknowledgement of a city’s achievements. Inter-referencing alludes to and aspires to certain practices from one city in another, and new solidarities are practices that use public-private partnerships to shape new styles of urban governance (14-21). These practices can also ‘exceed the domain of governing and transnational elites’ (McCann et al, 2013: 585) through practices such as migration and trade.

However, worlding practices can certainly be problematic, including in the case of interventions in and from Arab and Muslim countries. The wealth and novelty originating in the Gulf region and exported abroad have come to signify a certain anxiety towards Arab development and advancement. Using Dubai as the model, Roy explains, ‘Dubai, a desert frontier of speculation and calculation, circulates as a global referent. But in both academic and popular discourses, it is narrated through modes of hysteria, a worlding practice that signals anxieties about Arab wealth and power’ (2011: 314). The extravagance and novelty of such constructions, both in Arab countries and abroad, have become a caricature. Looking at such interventions in Sarajevo as they inter-reference practices from Arab states in the Gulf, it will be important to remain aware of this hysteria and to trace the connections and actors to understand the processes taking place.

2.3 Transnationality

The dawn of the twenty-first century has risen in conjunction with incredible changes in the flows of information, technology and cultural forms around the world. Although such exchanges are not necessarily new, having existed in eras of great development such as in the nineteenth century (Dicken, 2011: 6), the degree of the contemporary world’s connections and linkages has never previously existed. The time-space compression of what has been labelled ‘globalisation’ is a phenomenon of rapid-paced transfers of goods, people, ideas and technology across borders around
the world, including transfers of capital and ideas between Bosnia and Herzegovina and other countries in Western Europe, North America, the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Oceania. Yet the term globalisation itself has become too vast for analytical purposes, and many assumptions about the nature of these transfers eliminate the complexity of the phenomena occurring. In order to gauge how new constructions originating in the Muslim world are shaping the urban landscape of Sarajevo, a more nuanced interpretation of these flows highlighting cultural hybridity and heterogeneity must be taken into account. Although the networks and actors involved in such flows must be traced to analyse the specificity of the phenomena taking place in BiH, the literature on globalisation and transnationality highlights a number of more general processes taking place worldwide.

Globalisation has been analysed across multiple different academic disciplines, generating various definitions for the term, but throughout most of the literature, three main arenas for the study of global or transnational flows have emerged: the economic, the political and the cultural (Ong, 1999: 5; Short, 2006: 63; Sassen, 2005: 3; Thorns, 2002: 85-86). While many scholars have focused on the economic aspect of these processes, especially the power of global capitalism vis-à-vis the nation-state (see, for example, Beck, 2003 and Strange, 1996), transnational flows are certainly not limited to economics, and they often involve significant implications for cultural forms around the globe. Many of the definitions of the term globalisation carry similar meanings, and the majority seem to agree that globalisation is an intensification of global processes or the ‘flows’ (Castells, 2010) of capital, goods, ideas and people across time and space, connecting networks and cultures.

Yet the term globalisation in its ubiquity has lost much of its analytical value. Globalisation focuses mostly on the capital flows that are not anchored in territorial states, exceeding the control of governments. According to Ulrich Beck (2003), ‘Globalization denotes the processes through which sovereign national states are criss-
crossed and undermined by transnational actors with varying prospects of power, orientations, identities and networks’ (1). In Sarajevo, the capital flows between BiH and Muslim countries transcend the state and exist within the realm of globalisation. However, globalisation in this economic sense is not the only force at work. In order to overcome this analytical hurdle, some scholars have theorised concepts such as ‘transnational’ and ‘translocal’ to describe different facets of the contemporary age’s time-space compression. For example, Michael Peter Smith (2001) specifies that the difference between globalisation and transnationalism is the role of the state. He sees globalisation as ‘largely decentred from specific national territories’, but he believes transnational processes are ‘anchored in while also transcending one or more nation-states’ (3). Peter Mandaville (2007) elaborates on this concept and decouples the governments and territories, stating that ‘transnational refers to a wider range of social formations and transactions which are structured across the borders and spaces of nations, but which do not necessarily entail a primary role for sovereign governments’ (276). This definition allows for non-nation-state-bound groups and cultures to act within these processes.

The literature on globalisation and transnationalism is vast, and because these processes continue to shape the world in which we live, a constant reformation of concepts and competition between these perspectives exist on a large scale. Murray Fraser (2013) has developed five myths or fallacies about globalisation, which summarise much of the past and current debates surrounding the issue across disciplines. To Fraser, the five fallacies are: 1. the economic fallacy (that globalisation is all about capitalism and global markets); 2. the homogenisation fallacy (that globalisation is creating a homogenous world order or ‘McWorld’ (Barber, 1992)); 3. the origination fallacy (that the processes are about ‘Americanisation’ or ‘Westernisation’); 4. the novelty fallacy (that globalisation is a completely new phenomenon – the current acceleration of these processes rests on ‘centuries-old structures of world trade and
imperial conquest’); and 5. the technological fallacy (that globalisation is driven by information flows – technology ‘can only ever be a concretisation of existing social relations, never a major driver in itself’) (387-388).

For the city of Sarajevo, the economic fallacy, the homogenisation fallacy and the origination fallacy will prove quite important, as transnational flows in Bosnia and Herzegovina are creating new cultural forms and cultural and spatial hybridity, and many of these flows are not originating in North America or Western Europe, but rather in the Middle East and in Asia. In short, globalisation and transnationalism are processes that ‘breed hybridity’ (Short, 2006: 62) but that also produce emergent cultural forms in their transactions and connections (Mandaville, 2003; Ong, 1999 and 2011; Tsing, 2005). Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing (2005) describes how emergent cultural forms develop from global encounters in her book *Friction*. She argues that: ‘Cultures are continually co-produced in the interactions I call “Friction”: the awkward, unequal, unstable and creative qualities of interconnection across difference’ (4). It is at this meeting point of encounters between diverse actors that new formations of culture and power develop. She believes, however, that this production of new cultural forms can go both ways, not simply informing new situated emergent cultural formations, but also global cultural formations.

By highlighting the hybridity and novelty created through transnational flows, binaries such as ‘global’ versus ‘local’ or ‘West’ versus ‘rest’ become problematic and hinder the understanding of the complex transactions and exchanges produced in these processes. Many scholars, such as Tim Edensor and Mark Jayne (2012), Murray Fraser (2013), Aihwa Ong (2011), and Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing (2005), have similarly underlined the necessity to back away from simplifying dichotomies. Murray Fraser explains:

> Globalization can thus be conceived as a field in which a multitude of actors and agencies are constantly operating, rather than the linear process with unmediated flows of influence under ‘classic’ imperialism.
This suggests a cultural model that rejects binary divisions such as centre/periphery, global/regional or global/local – or indeed any notion that a single ethnic group or country can hold some kind of truth which they then ‘diffuse’ or ‘disseminate’ to others via colonisation or other means. Instead, what do exist are complex trans-cultural networks of exchange in which any attempt to posit a hierarchy is futile. The result of all this, as many observers point out, is that the defining basis of globalization is the hybrid. Above all, global hybridity creates and also thrives in a condition which is heterogenic, fluid and fissured (390).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, transnational flows are creating emergent and hybrid cultural forms that cannot be boxed into categories of ‘global’ or ‘local’ or ‘Western’ or otherwise. These processes are much too intricate to reduce to binaries and require more sophisticated analyses that trace the specific actors and processes taking place.

The collapse of Socialist Yugoslavia and the ensuing war brought numerous actors from around the world in the form of foreign journalists, NGOs, foreign fighters (mujahideen), NATO and EU forces and others. Additionally, as a post-socialist state, the implementation of neoliberal practices and privatisation after the war created an atmosphere ripe for foreign direct investment, which has also drawn investors and entrepreneurs from around the globe. There are Turkish Universities operating in English and shopping centres financed from the Persian Gulf housing the offices of Al Jazeera’s Balkan Service. A strikingly large international presence in Sarajevo has characterised the city since the siege, and all of these flows of people, goods, capital and ideas – far from ‘Westernising’ the country – are producing hybrid and emergent cultural forms and novel ways of viewing the city, its spaces and its inhabitants.

2.4 Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In the decades following the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War of the 1990s, scholars have investigated the issue of identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina nearly to excess. However, at the same time that the body of literature surrounding identity in BiH and in the former Yugoslavia has become unwieldy, the concept of identity in the region itself has simultaneously been
flattened and reduced to its most basic, ethno-religious components (Robinson and Pobrić, 2006: 248). There is more to identity in the Balkans than the bounded ethno-religious categories that have developed, especially as these groups blend into one another and new cultural forms emerge. Historically, BiH’s three main religious groups developed after the Ottoman occupation of the region and mass conversions to Islam in the fifteenth century. After this time, the majority of people in what is today Bosnia and Herzegovina subscribed to one of the three main religious confessions in the region: Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam, although a large Jewish population also existed in the area after their expulsion from the Iberian peninsula during the Spanish Inquisition. Religion and politics have become intertwined at numerous points in Bosnia’s history, making national belonging, which often coincides with confessional association, the main focus point for identity in the Balkans. This also logically follows from the separation of and the conflicts between the three ethno-religious groups before and during the collapse of Socialist Yugoslavia. Because of the flattening of identity politics in BiH and the reduction of belonging to the three official nationalities – Catholic Croat, Muslim Bošnjak and Christian Orthodox Serb – a more critical assessment of identity construction in the country is needed in order to understand the influence of urban interventions on subjectivities, especially within the context of the city of Sarajevo.

Identity is a complex and fluid construction, one that involves many overlapping and conflicting notions of the self and others (Markowitz, 2010: 13; Ong, 1999: 20). In fact, Michel Foucault would argue that no person has a ‘real’ identity, but rather that identity is a production of discourses about one’s self that is constantly being produced and may shift and change over time, even significantly (Hall, 2000). The construction of one’s identity, including the group identities to which he or she belongs, can also be viewed through the exclusion of the other and differences between individuals or groups (Smith, 2001). However, identity is not solely established through the presence
of an external other, but it is also based on negotiations and contestations within communities (Mandaville, 2003: 106). Groups may propagate essentialising notions of themselves, reducing their own self-identity to fixed categories and eliminating any hybridity or complexity (Ibid.: 40). Because identity in the Bosnian context is so often only linked to ethno-religious belonging, literature frequently highlights Benedict Anderson’s (2006) idea of ‘imagined’ communities, which allows for the construction of group sameness and harks back to the development of nationalism in the eighteenth century along with the Enlightenment (see, for example, Hayden, 2007). While ethno-religious identity is indeed an important indicator in the ex-Yugoslav space, it is not always stable (neither internally nor externally) and it is by no means the sole component of belonging. Additionally, in urban contexts, other social categories regularly become more salient determinants of identification.

Religious practices, notably in Sarajevo, have also historically tended to blur boundaries, even between Islam, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. People officially belonging to one of the three constituent faiths sometimes pray and visit other religious edifices or adopt customs or rituals pertaining to different belief systems. A newspaper article from 2008 recounted the story of an old Muslim Sarajevan who frequently entered the Catholic cathedral to pray to St. Ante, as she believed in St. Ante’s healing powers (Jestrović, 2013: 189). These ‘Sarajevan beliefs’ – the crossing over between different faiths and sites of worship – are not exclusive to Sarajevo, but can be found in many parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the greater Balkans, including Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro (Duijzings, 2000: 2).

Yet identity in BiH cannot and should not be limited to religious belonging, no matter how blurred and unstable it may become. By focusing on the three constituent religious communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the identity politics that have been and continue to be played out in the public sphere, group identities that still hold currency, particularly among older generations and mixed families, become silenced.
Specifically, many people continue to define themselves as either (or both) Yugoslav and/or Bosanac (a person from Bosnia and Herzegovina, encompassing all ethno-religious variants). When BiH became a republic of Socialist Yugoslavia, official discourses developed an overarching Yugoslav identity throughout the entire country. Most citizens at this time assumed compound identities, which embraced both ethno-religious affiliation and the socialist Yugoslav belonging (Robinson, Engelstoft and Pobrić, 2001: 961). Being a Yugoslav meant adopting anti-fascist and socialist ideals, often being entwined with the common South Slav language, at that time referred to as Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian (even though languages such as Albanian, Slovenian and Macedonian were also widely spoken in the country). Although the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist, the Yugoslav identity cultivated during its forty-seven-year life remains an important marker of belonging for many, especially among diaspora populations (Moll, 2013: 2).

In addition to the Yugoslav identity, the identity of Bosanac (Bosnian) bridges the fractious nationalist landscape in the country. Not to be confused with the term Bošnjak, which refers to Muslims, Bosanac transcends nationalist identity discourses and incorporates all the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of faith or descent. This idea of belonging stems from the shared culture and history of living in BiH, which separated the people of BiH from the other republics of Yugoslavia. In Socialist Yugoslavia, Croats and Serbs in their respective republics commonly distanced themselves culturally and dialectically from Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs, while at the same time, Muslims in Bosnia did not always identify with Muslims in other areas of Yugoslavia, including the Sandžak. Thus an overarching Bosanac identity allowed for the unification of all the people of the republic based on shared narratives, culture and history. While being Bosanac granted the children of mixed marriages a neutral space for belonging, often people who identified as Bosanac during
the Socialist period did so in addition to ethno-religious affiliation, allowing for multi-layered and complex concepts of identity (Hromadžić, 2013: 266).

In spite of the official Yugoslav discourse that urged a common identity based on anti-fascism and socialist values, the Yugoslav constitution created ‘bureaucratised nationalism’, officially entrenching ethno-religious differences (Robinson, Engelstoft and Pobrić, 2001: 961). Beginning around the 1970s when Muslims were allowed to identify as such on the census, these tensions began to grow, causing a steady homogenisation in identity politics throughout Socialist Yugoslavia. This homogenisation was marked by a 26.5% decrease in census numbers of people identifying as Yugoslav between 1981 and 1991 (Ibid.). With economic crisis and power struggles between the country’s leadership after Tito’s death, nationalism rose significantly, eventually leading to violent conflict along ethnic lines, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The post-Dayton political atmosphere, which has separated the country into ethno-religiously defined entities, has, unfortunately, only exacerbated these tendencies. Almost 90% of Bosnians and Herzegovinians live in religiously homogenous communities, which is a result of Dayton and official identity discourses (Robinson Pobrić, 2006: 248). In Sarajevo (excluding East Sarajevo which forms part of the Republika Srpska), the population is officially 80% Muslim.

Driving the official homogenisation of the country is the narrowly defined census categories. While the pre-war Yugoslav censuses listed at least twenty identities, including Yugoslav, Roma, Jew and others, the post-war census lists only four categories: Croat, Bošnjak, Serb and Ostali (remaining). Anecdotal evidence, especially in Sarajevo, suggests that other groups have not disappeared, but rather have been absorbed into the four official categories. Fran Markowitz’s (2010) analysis of identity in Sarajevo shows that census takers have reacted to unexpected diversity by squeezing such outliers into one of the four census groups, surprisingly not always Ostali. For example, Markowitz describes how a Czech woman living in Sarajevo
officially became a Croat on the census, since Czech people are Catholic and Catholic equals Croat (2010: 89). Similar processes occurred with the Roma population, who counted as Bošnjak because of their Islamic faith. Markowitz and others continue to argue for the ‘multicultural’ nature or ‘subconscious’ (Jestrović, 2013: 186) of Sarajevo, claiming that official homogenisation obscures the actual plurality of the city and of the country as a whole. The reality surrounding identification in BiH and, especially in Sarajevo, remains complex, multilayered and heterogeneous.

Looking beyond ethno-religious belonging and identity scholarship focusing on such categories, Sarajevo itself as an urban centre becomes a locus of multiplicity, not just regarding ethnicity and nationality, but also through markers based on other sources of social differentiation. Within the urban context, differentiation and compartmentalisation of various levels of identity become a ‘vial ingredient of the urban experience’ (Short, 2006: 9). Identity and its enactment function differently in the city than in rural areas, not simply because the population may contain more officially diverse populations, but because the anonymity of the city allows for individuals to play a variety of different roles in different contexts (Ibid.: 38). Ulf Hannerz’s Exploring the City (1980) examines ethnography in the city and the significant difference between ethnographic research in urban centres and in the countryside. Hannerz pays special attention to the fluid and shifting nature of identity in the urban context, focusing not only an individual’s different roles, but also on his or her changing relationships and networks (270). This underlines the multiple and varied roles and conceptions of self that urban dwellers develop depending on the different activities that they engage in during the day. He posits that an anthropology of the city, not just in the city, is possible by examining the interrelationships between the different roles that individuals perform and the networks in which they are engaged. Thus living in the city is distinctly different than living in the countryside in that each individual must construct multiple layers of
identity and ‘roles’ which will be presented at different times and to different audiences and networks.

With these ideas in mind, investigating identity in Sarajevo must go further than simply counting the number of Croats, Bošnjaks and Serbs inhabiting the city; it must also take into account the multiple roles that individuals assume and trace these networks. Social characteristics outside of ethno-religious affiliation, such as socio-economic class, gender, sexual orientation, age and hybrid forms of some or all of these can not only reflect, but also shape, urban culture (Short, 2006: 47). For example, the city of Sarajevo has a long history of divisions pertaining to urban and rural origin (Stefansson, 2007: 59-77). Sarajevans have historically tried to maintain a cosmopolitan, ‘cultured’ and European image, excluding more conservative and traditional ‘peasants’ and people from the countryside, although these categories, too, become blurred and unstable. In fact there is a long history of a civic identity based on belonging to the city itself. The people from Sarajevo are referred to as *Sarajlije* (Sarajevans), and according to Emily Greble (2011) this civic identity is often more important than ethno-religious belonging. Discussing interwar Sarajevo, she states:

> Uniting these communities was a larger civic identity that had also cemented over several generations: that of the *Sarajlije* – or Sarajevans. Unlike residents of some of interwar Europe’s other multicultural cities, where such identities survived mainly in the hearts and souls of minority groups left out of nationalizing programs, in Sarajevo members of every confessional background still felt a personal, almost familial connection to their hometown… For many intellectuals, the connection to Sarajevo encompassed and reflected the qualities and values associated with cities generally – cosmopolitanism, sophistication, urbanty, civility and modernity (15-16).

The civic identity of Sarajevo – the *Sarajlije* – still exists in the minds of the residents of the city. However, since the war in the 1990s the mass arrival of internally displaced people has increased the tension between urbanites and newcomers. ‘Native’ Sarajevans see these arrivals from the countryside as invaders, exiling the true locals abroad. The urban/rural divide is just one of the many different social identifiers at work.
in Sarajevo’s urban fabric, necessitating a more critical analysis of identification in the city.

2.4.1 Ethnography and Identity

Ethnographers of the region have shown how various notions of belonging, often outside of ethno-religious belonging, have been mobilised by the populations of the ex-Yugoslav region for identity construction. In these works, the ethnographers focus on how such ideas of belonging are constructed and employed and how these discourses then serve to reify or destabilise essentialised versions of identity politics. For example, a number of ethnographers have demonstrated how entrenched the urban/rural divide is when considering notions of identity in the ex-Yugoslav space. Stef Jansen has written extensively about ‘evocations of cosmopolitanism’ in the former Yugoslavia and its prominence in identity discourses in the region, especially as a reaction to rising ethno-nationalism (Jansen, 2005a, 2005b and 2008). In his works, urban dwellers mobilise notions of ‘cosmopolitanism’ as an opposition to rising ‘hegemonising nationalisms’. In these studies, Jansen shows that city dwellers define their urban identities counter to newcomer, nationalist ‘peasants’ (2005a and 2005b), and this allows them to subvert the rising tide of ethno-nationalist politics by ‘othering’ these newcomer ‘peasants’ who engaged in the nationalist discourses. Bojan Bilić and Paul Stubbs (2015) also discuss the urban/rural divide in the post-Yugoslav space, arguing that ‘a line needs to be drawn between “real” rural-urban differences in former Yugoslavia and the “symbolic” ways these have been reinscribed as both causes and consequences of the wars of the Yugoslav succession’ (120). Similarly, Xavier Bougarel has written about the ‘Revenge of the countryside’ (1999), showing how ideas were mobilised that painted besieging forces as uncultured newcomers (157).

Outside of the urban/rural divide, another binary often mobilised for identity construction in the ex-Yugoslav space and in BiH in particular is the East/West binary.
For example, Xavier Bougarel (1999) shows that notions of East and West have been mobilised to differentiate Serb and Croat populations in the former Yugoslav space. He highlights how this notion has been employed, stating ‘in their opinion, the war in Croatia is a mere confrontation between two cultural areas, the Western and Catholic one, represented by the Croats and Slovenes, and the Eastern and Orthodox one, represented by the Serbs and Montenegrins.’ (160). In Sarajevo, specifically, this binary is often mobilised for identitarian purposes, focusing on Islam as ‘eastern’.

Elissa Helms (2008) discusses this notion in her article ‘East and West Kiss: Gender, Orientalism, and Balkanism in Muslim-Majority Bosnia-Herzegovina’. In this article, she shows how the ideas of a ‘superior west and a backward east’ have been employed for identitarian politics, reaffirming ‘such dichotomous representations, masking a much greater complexity of global, regional, and local dynamics at play’ (90). Helms discusses the ‘pattern of “nesting orientalisms” in what was Yugoslavia, in which members of one nation have attempted to portray themselves as superior/western/European while casting their southern and eastern neighbours as part of the inferior, oriental “east”’ (91). Thus, identity discourses in the former Yugoslav space and in BiH employ ideas of ‘East’ and ‘West’ in order to convey specific notions about oneself and one’s community.

As a continuation of the East/West binary employed for identity discourses, Xavier Bougarel (2008) has shown that while Islam may be seen as part of the ‘East’ through the nesting orientalisms of the former Yugoslavia, within the Bosnian Muslim community itself, the idea of ‘European’ Islam is employed as a way to distinguish the Islamic tradition in Bosnia from other, ‘less tolerant’ variants. He states that:

The will to present Bosnian Islam as a sort of positive cultural exception sometimes entails a conception of this ‘European and tolerant’ Islam as homogeneous and *sui generis*, set in opposition to another, implicit Islam, considered ‘intolerant since non-European’, which is located beyond the Bosporus and the Strait of Gibraltar, or represented by the ‘non-autochthonous’ Muslim populations living in Western Europe (97).
Ethnography, again, in this case shows how the construction of identity in the former Yugoslav space and in BiH in particular is much more complex than a strict adherence to ethno-religious nationalisms and their politics.

In general, many works on the anthropology of post-socialism in the former Yugoslavia, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, have shown that the salience of ethno-religious belonging dissolves in many everyday contexts. For example, Stef Jansen’s work *Yearnings in the Meantime* (2015), which is an ethnography of the lives of residents in the Dobrinja neighbourhood of Sarajevo, goes beyond questions of ethno-national identity. Jansen state, ‘I contend that a focus on identitarian questions, important as they are, fails to account for very important dimensions of life in Sarajevo or, for that matter, BiH (11). Xavier Bougarel, Elissa Helms and Ger Duijzings (eds) make similar claims in their book *The New Bosnian Mosaic* (2008). They state in the introduction that, ‘our intention...is to show that local-level realities defy reduction to such simple categories. It is not enough to presume that ethnic nationalism informs every aspect of Bosnian political and social life’ (19). Stef Jansen, Čarna Brković and Vanja Čelebičić (2017) also argue that the contribution of ethnographic studies of the former Yugoslavia (especially BiH) is that they go beyond the ‘identitarian matrix’. They explain that:

> It is here that ethnographic studies have made their first important intervention in knowledge production about BiH. Aiming to subvert dominant representations of lives in the country, many of them contributed to the deconstruction of the ethnonational identitarian matrix as the primary one through which to understand all things Bosnian. (8)

Thus, by looking at the realities of everyday life in BiH, the focus on ethno-religious identification can be shifted to other notions of belonging, which, in many cases, can be more salient to the populations involved.

Like these works of ethnography in the ex-Yugoslav space, in order to gauge the importance of new urban interventions on the population of the city, complex constructions of identity must be taken into account, especially outside of ethno-
religious belonging. New forms of Islam, especially those espousing stricter moral and behavioural codes than those traditionally found in Sarajevo, could find more willing audiences in certain socio-economic classes. Other interventions could bring out senses of Yugoslav or Bosanac belonging amongst the population, and hybrid or multilayered forms of identity might allow for greater acceptance of new cultural forms and spaces. By understanding that urban populations maintain a multiplicity of roles, which they perform to different networks and audiences, the plurality of the urban fabric can be maintained. Sarajevo has always been a multi-ethnic city, and even though identity politics in the country have officially homogenised the urban centre, intricate and multilayered conceptions of self and others are not only possible but also apparent in the city. How individuals interact with architecture and public places and how these interventions affect their lives depends not only on ethno-religious affiliation, but also on education, origin, gender, sexual orientation and affiliation with various networks outside of the established faith-based communities. Simplifying and flattening identity in Sarajevo will not accurately reflect the intricate processes at work in the city and will only serve to continue the focus on ethnicity that is so prevalent in scholarship on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2.5 Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Because the urban interventions studied in this dissertation emanate from the Muslim world and are tied to the Islamic community in BiH, a brief evaluation of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina will help situate the new buildings within a greater religious context. Islam in BiH proves to be far from a monolithic entity, and this heterogeneity extends throughout the Muslim world. In fact, the diversity and plurality of Islam worldwide makes speaking of it as a singular religion quite difficult. There is no ‘universal’ Islam, and many believe that it is more accurate to speak of ‘Islams’ in the plural rather than of one Islam. When speaking of multiple ‘Islams’, however, the
underlying unity of Muslim community worldwide, the *umma*, may be lost. Because of
this unity and because most Muslims see themselves as belonging to a single Islam
despite its diversity (Mandaville, 2003: 55-56), I will refer to Islam in the singular as a
‘master signifier’ for the entire spectrum of Islams in existence (Ibid.).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the traditional and dominant form of Islam follows
the Hanafi *Madhab* (school of legal thought) within Sunni Islam, which was practiced
widely throughout the region of the Ottoman Empire, and which continues to be
practiced throughout Central Asia, India, Pakistan and Turkey (Karčić, 2010a). The
Hanafi *Madhab* holds less fundamental beliefs than other schools of Islamic legal
thought, such as the very conservative Hanbali *Madhab* found in Saudi Arabia. The
Hanafi school is notable for its recognition and acceptance of personal opinion as well
as for its lack of precedent (*Hanafiyah*). Although Islam in BiH has traditionally followed
the Hanafi *Madhab*, plurality has always existed within Islam in the Balkans and in BiH,
and there have long been influences from Shi‘i groups and Sufi orders.

Islam first came to the region of today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina around the
tenth or eleventh centuries when tribes from Asia began to settle in the region.
However, mass conversion to Islam only occurred after the Ottoman conquest of the
Balkan Peninsula in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Although some have argued
that the Christian population of South East Europe was forced to convert to Islam at
this time, the process was probably more complex and multiform prompted by the
heightened social and economic status of the converted. The Ottomans did not
regularly practice forced conversions, except for the system of child levy, or *devshirme*,
in which Christian boys were taken from their families, converted to Islam and ‘trained
as soldiers in the elite Janissary troops’ (Merdjanova, 2013: 2). In the late nineteenth
century, the Austro-Hungarian Empire occupied Bosnia. Under their rule, the Islamic
Community was established to oversee all Muslim affairs in the territory, including the
religious hierarchy, Islamic education, shari’ah courts and religious endowments (Ibid., 30).

Islam in BiH changed significantly after the Second World War with the socialist suppression of religious institutions, including the IZ. For the two decades following its establishment, the socialist government abolished the shari’ah courts, nationalised the religious endowments, banned the veil and closed almost all of the madrassas, or Islamic schools, except for the Gazi Husrev-Begova madrassa in Sarajevo (Schwartz, 2002: 83; and Merdjanova, 2013: 31). The new government persecuted and imprisoned religious scholars and active members of all the religious communities, and some were even sentenced to death (Karčić, 2010b).

After two decades, due to changing foreign and domestic policies, especially the establishment of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 and a decentralisation of the state, the Yugoslav government began to liberalise its attitudes toward religion in the country. This liberalisation caused a revival of religious belonging in Yugoslavia, including within the Islamic community. The Non-Aligned Movement, which counted numerous countries in the Muslim world as partners, allowed far-reaching cooperation between Yugoslavia and the Middle East and Asia. Contracts between alliance partners and Yugoslavia permitted many Bosnian Muslims to work and study in other Muslim countries, and this flow of people and information between Yugoslavia and the greater Muslim world nurtured a revival of Islam in Bosnia (Bringa, 2002: 31). The re-emergence of Islam in BiH also occurred at the same time as a global move toward Islamism (‘forms of political theory and practice that have as their goal the establishment of an Islamic political order’ (Mandaville, 2007: 57)). In the 1970s, Islam became a powerful ‘social and political force’ globally (Merdjanova, 2013: 32), which is sometimes referred to as the ‘Islamic Revival’, and which coincided with the Iranian Revolution in 1979 (Mandaville, 2007: 58). The Bosnian Islamic revival similarly.
intensified during this period, spurred by ideas from the greater Muslim community and by the importance of Islam within the NAM.

In BiH, these forces translated into a reopening of Islamic institutions and the reparation and reconstruction of mosques and other religious edifices, of which the IZ was granted control. Religious education both within and outside Bosnia expanded at this time, and madrassas and the Faculty of Islamic Studies opened their doors once again in the 1970s (Merdjanova, 2013: 32). Politically, as well, Islam emerged as a force within the country, bolstered by Alija Izetbegović and other Muslim intellectuals and pan-Islamic activists. Izetbegović even penned his Islamic Declaration, calling for an Islamic renewal in 1970, for which he was imprisoned in 1983 (Ibid., 33). The IZ in the 60s and 70s aligned closely with the priorities of the state, especially with its involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement, and it became the voice of all practicing and non-practicing Muslims within Yugoslavia. Yet during this time, Islam in BiH remained diverse, and according to Husrev Tabak (2017), ‘while the official Islam was represented by the Islamic Community, the popular Islam was, however, by [sic] the religio-political intellectuals (such as the members of Mladi Muslimani/Young Muslims [a pan-Islamist organisation]), the local clerics and Sufi orders (300).

The Islamic revival in BiH corresponded with growing nationalism in the country, and within the IZ, a national belonging linked to Islam began to take shape. This national identity based on Muslim heritage did not insist on the religiosity of its people, and an entire ‘imagined community’ developed as a counter Croat and Serb nationalisms. Although Muslim nationalism in BiH first came into being during the interwar period, it only gained official status in 1971 when Muslims could identify as ‘Muslim in the national sense’ on the census (Merdjanova, 2013: 36). However, this category excluded Turkish, Roma and Albanian Muslims while including atheists of Muslim descent, creating the ‘understanding of Islam as a nationality or nation’ (Ibid.). According to Ina Merdjanova, ‘the Muslim nation was established primarily as a means
of countering Serbian and Croatian nationalist claims on Muslim Slavs, but also with a view of foreign policy interests regarding the Muslim countries in the Non-Aligned Movement (Ibid.). Because of its semi-privileged position vis-à-vis Yugoslavia's foreign interests, the state recognised Muslims as a national category. In 1990, with the backing of the IZ, Alija Izetbegović and other pan-Islamists founded the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka Demokratske Akcije or SDA), a pan-Islamist party representing Bosnian Muslims. In 1993, Bosnian Muslims took the national appellation Bošnjak instead of Muslim. Other Muslim populations in Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro also eventually adopted this ethnonym (Ibid., 37).

Throughout this process, foreign Islamic ideas continued to spread within the Balkans. Muslim Yugoslav students studying abroad in NAM countries such as Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Malaysia brought differing interpretations of Islam back to Yugoslavia and transmitted these ideas amongst their communities (Karčić, 2010b). Although the flow of non-traditional practices intensified from the 1960s through the 1980s, new Islamic interpretations from the global Muslim world came to an apex during the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation and the war in Bosnia during the 1990s. At this time, a wave of people and organisations originating in Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Egypt entered Bosnian territory ostensibly with the goal of aiding co-religionists. Many of the people who arrived in BiH did so with the intention of fighting on the front lines. These foreign Muslim combatants – the mujahideen – arrived specifically to fight jihad for the umma. This group of fighters, importantly, was not homogeneous, but many believed in more conservative and stringent interpretations of Islam (Ibid.). Islamic charitable organisations, such as the International Islamic Council for Da’wah and Relief, also came to BiH during the war. This foreign presence in the form of the mujahideen and the Islamic charitable organisations sometimes proselytised different interpretations of Islam and searched for converts within the Bosnian Muslim population. Although most of these people and
organisations left with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, some did remain and continued to proselytise, including the youth organisations Active Islamic Youth and al-Furqan (Bougarel, 2001: 454 and Karčić, 2010a: 165). Notably, a marginal, but evident, Salafi movement has been established in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Today a large body of literature exists on the Salafi movement in the Balkans, especially in relation to extremist movements (see, for example, Deliso, 2007; Morrison, 2008; and Shay, 2007). However many other forms of Islam exist alongside the dominant Hanafi school and the marginal Salafi groups. It is worth noting that salafism follows the Hanbali Madhab, whose tenets include a literal interpretation of the Qur’an and Hadith for legal decisions and a rejection of personal opinion (Hanabilah). This type of conservative Islam is mostly found in Saudi Arabia today, although Salafi movements exist throughout the world. The term Wahhabi (Vehabi in Bosnian), is sometimes used synonymously with Salafi, however it has pejorative connotations, making its employment in scholarly texts somewhat problematic. The Salafi community in BiH lack the support of the majority of Bosnian Muslims, especially after the 11 September 2001 and the attack on the American Embassy in Sarajevo in 2011. Importantly, while the existence of extremist movements associated with the Salafi community exist in BiH, these individuals represent a very small minority.

Outside these transnational movements of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina, some scholars have discussed Islam in BiH as a ‘European Islam’, meaning a form of Islam that exists within a secular state and is ostensibly more tolerant (Bourgarel, 2008; Van Dijk and Bartels, 2012 and Jevtić, 2017). Van Dijk and Bartles ask, ‘whether a “local” variant of Islam is emerging in Europe, distinct from Islamic traditions found in other parts of the world, and whether we can call this a real “European Islam”’ (467-468). They conclude that a form of this ‘European Islam’ surviving within a secular state exists in practice in Sarajevo (480). Jana Jevtić (2017), however, argues for a more
multiform understanding of Bosnia’s Islamic tradition outside the ‘European and tolerant’ model, which flattens the internal diversity of Islam as it is practiced in Bosnia and Herzegovina. She concludes that, ‘Muslims act as a fragmented rather than a unified group… [different internal factions] structure their campaigns on the back of Europe’s ontological relevance and express them in relation to an array of postwar “newcomers”’ (74). While the concept of ‘European Islam’ remains present in BiH, and as show in the section above is mobilised as an identity marker against other forms of ‘intolerant’ Islam (Bougarel, 2008: 97), the true nature of Islam in the country continues to be diverse and hybrid.

Like Islam globally, urban interventions in Sarajevo that have been financed by Muslim groups and states are similarly plural in form, originating from many different areas of the world and advancing various interpretations of Islam. Religious edifices that have been built since the war include mosques from Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait. Often actors from the donor countries choose the imams of these mosques, allowing for a certain amount of control over the teachings they advance. A new Sufi tekke, which was finalised in 2013, has also been constructed primarily with Turkish funds from the municipality of Seljuk, and the new headquarters for the Islamic Community received funding from Libya. However, the building remains unfinished, as funding abruptly ceased after the revolution in 2011 that ousted Colonel Gaddafi.

Secular projects, too, receive financing from the greater Muslim world. A complex of condominiums built with Malaysian resources sits outside of the Marijin Dvor quarter of the city, and there are two very large shopping malls – the BBI Centre and the Sarajevo City Centre – which have been built with Gulf (Saudi and UAE) funding and which will serve as case studies later in this dissertation. There are multiple agendas at play with these constructions, both from local actors as well as from foreign investors, and these interests clash and work in harmony at various stages and within different networks.
2.6 Conclusion

This literature review has focused on a diverse set of concepts from multiple different fields. Collectively, it argues for an inter-disciplinary and multi-faceted approach in understanding different phenomena present in urban environments and within identity as it relates to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the currents of Islam practiced in Sarajevo. As capital from the Arab States of the Gulf move into the country for urban investments, looking toward hybridity of new cultural and global forms will allow for a more nuanced understanding of the processes taking place in the city, outside of bounded categories. Such conceptions support the existence of multiple realities existing simultaneously within the urban landscape, defying binaries such as sacred and secular, East and West, and global and local. In the following chapters, I will use these ideas to underscore my empirical data and analyse how transnational flows of capital, people and ideas are shaping the post-conflict redevelopment of Sarajevo and the reactions of the city’s residents to such flows.

3.1 Introduction

Studying complex social, economic and political processes at work in the city poses the following questions: how do researchers examine, analyse and measure such dynamic flows and networks, especially in an urban context? What are the best ways to investigate such phenomena? In this chapter, I will discuss the research activities I undertook to analyse urban processes in Sarajevo, the rationale behind my choice of methods and the challenges I experienced during my fieldwork. In the first section – my project foundation – I will define the setting, project, research questions and case studies. I will then outline the methodological approach. Following upon that general framework, I will discuss and analyse my research design, highlighting the justification and rationale behind my chosen methods, which include: stakeholder interviews, survey, field interviews, observations and media and internet analysis. After discussing my methods in detail, I will explain how I processed my data and analysed my results. To round out the discussion, I will examine the context of Sarajevo as a setting, my reflexivity and ethical considerations for my project.

3.2 Project Foundation

This project examines global flows of capital for architectural and real estate development in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s capital city, Sarajevo, focusing on commercial, sacred and residential urban interventions that have been built using Islamic financing. In the past two decades, after the siege of Sarajevo, funding has come into the city from all areas of the world to aid with the reconstruction of the urban environment and infrastructure, and since the year 2000, much investment in real estate and architecture has emanated from Muslim-majority countries such as Saudi

Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia and Kuwait. This study examines these flows of capital from Muslim-majority countries and the resulting spaces produced in the built environment of Sarajevo. It seeks to answer the following question: what role are transnational flows of capital playing in urban redevelopment in Sarajevo? The thesis also investigates the following sub-questions:

- What kind of discourses are emerging in terms of identity and how do they relate to imagined binaries such as East/West, Sacred/Secular and Global/Local?
- How are such flows of capital embedded in local political struggles and agendas?
- How is Sarajevo's changing urban space informing new conceptions of the sacred and the secular, of the East and the West and of the post-conflict identity of the city?

Sarajevo is a receiving city for global flows of capital from the greater Muslim world. Not only is the city a post-socialist space, but it is also a post-conflict urban area, making its transition from socialism a double or dual transition. Since the Siege of Sarajevo, the demographics of the city have transformed considerably, and the 2013 census estimates that the city of Sarajevo is over 80% Muslim or Bošnjak (Popis, 2013). This majority-Muslim character of Sarajevo – especially contrasted with its ‘multicultural’ or multi-ethnic past identity (for more about this, see chapter four on the ‘Islamic shift’) – plays an important role in the contemporary development of the city, especially in terms of foreign investment for architectural and real estate projects and in terms of new demographic movements in the city.

### 3.3 Case Studies

The study involves three categories of case studies: commercial developments, sacred structures and spaces and private residential complexes and tourist villas. The chosen case studies demonstrate some of the more interesting and contested
examples of the new construction projects in Sarajevo. For commercial developments, I will be focusing on the BBI Centar (funding from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) and the Sarajevo City Center (SCC), which is an investment from Saudi businessman Sulaiman Al-Shiddi and forms part of the Al-Shiddi group (see Figure 1 for a map of all case studies). These two shopping centres have been integral to the post-conflict urban development of Sarajevo, and they occupy two main squares in the city and function as central meeting points for the citizens. Locally their connection to the Arab world is often discussed and debated. As central figures in the discourses about foreign, and specifically Arab, financing in Bosnia, much has been written about the BBI Centar and SCC in the media and on internet forums, including speculation about political motivations behind the structures and corruption connected to them. They are significant not only for the physical development of the city, but also for debates about attitudes about foreign financing and market-driven urbanism, Islam (‘our Islam’ v ‘Arab Islam’) and Arab flows of capital and people amongst the architectural community and everyday citizens.

For my chapter on sacred spaces, I will again focus on BBI and SCC, as I believe that they are spaces where the sacred and the secular exist simultaneously, but I will also examine the Saudi King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre. Since the Siege of Sarajevo and the breakdown of the Yugoslav state, Muslim communities from around the globe (including many governments) invested in the rebuilding of BiH’s Islamic Community’s endowment for sacred buildings and spaces, its waqf or vakuf in Bosnian, often building mosques where none had existed prior to the conflict. The King Fahd mosque is one of these spaces, and it forms part of the Saudi diplomatic complex. The building of mosques after the war became a subject of debate, especially given the existing damage to housing and non-religious infrastructure and the economic disparities amongst the population. The Saudi complex has been the subject of much controversy and media stories, and it was even showcased in the film Na Putu...
Known locally as a mosque preaching a stricter, Saudi-inspired version of Islam (see chapter on sacred spaces for more about this), it is central to discussions about Islam and sacred spaces in the city. All of the case studies, however, bridge the sacred and the secular, reflecting the shifting dynamics of sacred and secular spaces in Sarajevo.

Because these flows of capital exist within the private domain as well as within the public sphere, my final empirical chapter will analyse the private gated community Poljine Hills, which is also an Al-Shiddi investment that targets buyers in GCC countries as well as elsewhere, and the proposed Arab tourist village Buroj Ozone that has financing from the United Arab Emirates. The chapter will look at the phenomenon of Arab tourists and residents who buy property in Sarajevo for holiday homes, examining Sarajevan attitudes towards these newcomers and ideas of neighbourliness. The local media has given significant coverage to both Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone, and Buroj Ozone in particular became enormously contested with respect to the environmental implications of the project and its enormity in terms of cost and land use. Tourism and other temporary demographic flows of people from the Arab world have increased dramatically in the past ten years, and local media have picked up on the phenomenon. Studying these projects and private villas bought by Arab families will add complexity to the discussion of local and international political struggles and how they are informing the built environment in the city. As these groups of people are more visible in a real sense in Sarajevo (usually by their dress), they add to discourses surrounding investment from Muslim-majority countries and the reaction of Sarajevo’s citizens to such flows.

3.4 Methodological Approach

Qualitative methods have become widely accepted in social research, including in geography, since the so called paradigm wars in the 1970s and 80s (Alastalo, 2009:
and a more interpretive idea of the social world has gained traction among scholars in the past decades, supporting the validity of using such methods and the results they yield. Interpretive qualitative methods offer a way to study lived experiences, beliefs, and cultures and to gain insights into subjective social realities, such as the transformations taking place in Sarajevo and its urban environment. Based largely on an interpretivist epistemological position and a constructivist ontological position, qualitative research allows scholars to avoid essentialising while also being able to take an inductive view of the relationship between theory and research. In other words, qualitative research allows for the theory to be generated from the empirical data (Bryman, 2008: 366). In Geography, this approach can be especially appropriate when using case studies as ‘theory-generating endeavours’ (Baxter, 2016: 136).

This project required data collection using qualitative methods including semi-structured interviews, surveys, observation and media and internet forum analysis. Because this project investigates interpretations of the social reality of city spaces and its citizens – including how international and local political struggles are played out in the built environment – qualitative methods are the most appropriate research tools for the project. According to Hilary P. M. Winchester and Matthew W. Rofe (2016), ‘Qualitative geographical research tends to emphasise multiple meanings and interpretations rather than seeking to impose any one “dominant” or “correct” interpretation’ (8). Understanding the changing urban setting and the attitudes of the citizens of Sarajevo means discussing these processes with individuals in the city and analysing their responses to such discussions.

Interviews can help researchers assess an individual’s understanding of an issue, and it is the most widely employed method used with qualitative research (Bryman, 2008: 436). The format of semi-structured interviews – which follows a given question schedule but which allows researchers and participants flexibility regarding...
responses – gives leeway for participants to expand on areas of interest while also remaining organised and focused. The semi-structured interviews that I conducted with 42 various stakeholders and urban professionals in Sarajevo (a list of which can be found in Annex A) best address the main research question by allowing interview respondents the flexibility to discuss the relationship between foreign capital and urban development in Sarajevo.

This study also explores how the citizens of the city themselves – not just professionals engaged in the development of the city – react to new interventions in the urban environment and foreign financing for architectural and real estate development in Sarajevo. I have addressed this part of the project in two ways: through a self-completion survey and through what I call ‘field interviews’ with everyday Sarajevans in public and quasi-public spaces. Self-completion questionnaires are an effective means of gathering qualitative data as they allow respondents the time to reflect on questions and answer in a convenient environment. They are similar to structured interviews, but they tend to have fewer open questions, and they are not subject to ‘interviewer effects’ that may bias the responses (McGuirk and O’Neill, 2016: 265). However, there are drawbacks to using this method; it is impossible for researchers to probe for more information, questions have to be limited, and there is a greater risk of missing data.

Anonymous field interviews were conducted in both true public spaces (on the walkways and green spaces in the neighbourhood of Alipašino Polje) as well as quasi-public spaces (in BBI and SCC shopping centres). They involved ‘inhabiting’ or spending significant time within the buildings and spaces in question and asking users about their feelings regarding the spaces and foreign investment in the city. This inhabiting of the space amounts to a form of participant observation modified for the specific context of the city. One of the difficulties of conducting qualitative research in the city is the inability to adequately conduct participant observation – the logistics of following groups as they go about their daily routines in cities becomes quite difficult if
not impossible. Roger Sanjek (2000) argues for new ways of thinking about qualitative fieldwork in urban areas that do not focus solely on semi-structured interviews. By using examples from research in New York neighbourhoods, he shows how participant observation is possible in urban environments through such loitering methods (283). By inhabiting two case study shopping centres – BBI and SCC – and a residential neighbourhood around one of the mosques involved in this study (Alipašino Polje near the King Fahd mosque), I was able to better understand processes taking place on site. The field interviews from Sarajevo citizens address how Sarajevans understand their city and new processes taking place in urban spaces, and thus it helps answer the sub-questions concerning how the citizens of the city are reacting to new construction projects and investment from Muslim-majority countries. In addition to these field interviews, I also kept a research notebook in which I remarked on my observations in the city and my experiences in the spaces in question.

In order to help eliminate interviewer effects and to triangulate some of my findings, I researched online forums – some specifically targeting architecture (http://www.skyscrapercity.com) and some connected to news media in Bosnia and Herzegovina – where citizens of the city discussed various urban interventions (http://www.klix.ba and http://www.forum.avaz.ba, for example). In the past 20 years, internet use has spread world wide, and with that spread has come new and innovative ways of gathering qualitative data online. Virtual qualitative data collection has become much more widespread in the past decades (Winders, 2016: 334-336). Although access to the internet is unevenly distributed across different countries and urban and rural areas, the ‘increasing centrality of new media [internet forums, social media, etc.]… has changed the ways that human geographers think about qualitative research’ (Ibid., 335). I have analysed many of the comments listed on these forums, especially in response to the case studies I have selected. Using internet data – or new media – allows researchers to incorporate the changing reality of social environments (including
virtual spaces) into their project designs, as ‘the virtual and material realm complement, rather than supplement, each other in practice and, thus, should do so in our research’ (345). Internet data collection, however, does have its challenges, as these media allow for the construction of plural identities (Taylor, 2012: 5), especially given the anonymous nature of many internet forums and comment threads. According to Taylor (2012), ‘The phenomenon of plurality and anonymity lead us directly into questions about verifiability and reliability’ (9). Using internet data to complement other qualitative research methods thus necessitates some careful considerations. For this research, which looks at public forums and comments sections, the most important consideration is whether it is possible to determine if participants are ‘trolling’, or trying to incite reactions by making radical or offensive comments. This can be done by carefully examining the context of comments in the discussions taking place (and the reactions of other participants). Other considerations include those of access. In Sarajevo, only a certain population of people in the city would comment on such forums; the demographics are quite limited to younger people with internet access and (in the case of the architecture forum) interested in urban development and architecture. However, I believe that in addition to the survey data and field interviews that I collected, this analysis adds to a solid corpus of data regarding the responses of Sarajevo’s citizens to new urban interventions in the city.

To round out the methods described above, I also conducted extensive media analysis regarding not only the case studies in question but also urban development and foreign influence in the country. This media analysis triangulates all of the original data collection and places it within the greater context of Sarajevo’s media treatment of political and current events. It is important to note that politicians or close associates of politicians own various media sources in the city, so often their treatment of urban development issues reflects the greater political and cultural context of the city. Media analysis combined with interviews with urban professionals and those involved in the
development of the city have targeted the sub-questions regarding the political agendas and struggles being played out in Sarajevo's built environment. Many of the responses to the survey also support these findings; however, as they are anonymous opinions of the people, their usage will be reserved to discussions concerning hegemonic discourses in the city.

All of these methods combined contribute to a deeper understanding of the processes taking place in Sarajevo, especially with respect to urban development, foreign investment, political struggles in the built environment, and the reaction of everyday citizens to such processes. Qualitative methods including semi-structured interviews, survey data, field interviews, and analysis of internet and press sources are the most appropriate means of answering the research questions stated above, as they allow for nuanced interpretations and understandings of phenomena in the social and urban world. While more positivistic studies might focus on replicable findings and quantitative data, this project is more concerned with an interpretive understanding of the urban development of Sarajevo and the global flows of capital that are driving new architectural and real estate investments.

3.5 Research Design

3.5.1 Stakeholder Interviews

To address the research questions above, I conducted 42 semi-structured interviews with various different respondents in Sarajevo who fell into an ordered typology: 1. Financiers/Project Stakeholders, 2. Urban Professionals/Architects, 3. Institutional Representatives (EU, OSCE, IZ), 4. Journalists, 5. Activists/NGO Sector, and 6. Real Estate Agents. A detailed list of interviewees can be found in Annex A, and a list of interview themes can be found in Annex B. I selected these interviewees based on their connection to my case studies or their involvement in the urban development of the city. I wanted to see how accurate media attitudes to the projects proved to be and
how the stakeholders themselves processed citizens’ reactions to projects. This selection of respondents reflected my desire to obtain a broad range of views on the issues and to seek perspectives from those who might not be directly involved in the projects, but who might be able to shed new light on the processes from a different angle. It proved also to be a reflection of my interests in the political motivations behind the projects and how such political interests were being played out in the urban environment. For example, I spoke to the terrorism expert at the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) and a representative of the OSCE’s press and public information unit. While these individuals do not seem directly connected to the case studies I have chosen, their views of the processes taking place in the city added richness and depth to the investigation.

Of the respondents directly involved with the case studies, I interviewed the directors of BBI Centar and Sarajevo City Center, the CEO of MDC (the company responsible for overseeing the construction of the Sarajevo City Center), the director of Poljine Hills and the cultural attaché to the Saudi embassy responsible for running the King Fahd cultural complex. Unfortunately, despite repeated efforts to contact Buroj Ozone, I was unable to schedule an interview with anyone from the company. A colleague of mine working on a similar project in Sarajevo was also denied access to Buroj Ozone’s direction after repeated requests for interview.

Each interview with project stakeholders and people involved in the urban development of the city differed in its exact content and structure; these were tailor-made to the individuals being interviewed and the information sought from each interviewee. My questions for the respondents focused on the politics of urbanism and investment in the city, obstacles that different projects encountered, the reaction of the citizens, how the interviewees assessed the media representation of the project and changing demographics of the city. For example, when interviewing Enes Kazazić the director of SEIC (South European Investment Company), I asked, ‘What can you tell
me about FDI trends? Is there increasing interest in Bosnia as a site for investment from GCC countries? Why, if so?’; ‘What are the main obstacles investors face in BiH?’ and ‘Has there been any backlash from BiH citizens regarding investment from GCC countries? How has it manifested if so?’ I tried in all cases to keep the questions open-ended to give respondents the room to elaborate, but I also tried to form my questions in such a way as to spur further discussion that might go beyond the reach of the question itself. Semi-structured interviews allow for this flexibility, and using this method I was able to carefully delve into the phenomena with my interviewees, allowing them to provide as much information as they felt comfortable.

Such questioning gave me the ability to address the research questions in a broad manner, opening up the space for multiple and interlocking factors shaping the development of the city. Especially since, at times, I was targeting sensitive information about the politics behind investments and the processes through which investors received permission for construction, this loose questioning method was invaluable for wiggling into the more hidden details of the projects and the involvement of different actors. In most cases I endeavoured to establish a trusting rapport with my interviewee in order to create an open atmosphere for dialogue. This would have been more difficult had my question schedule been rigidly fixed. However, this also depended on the language in which I was conducting the interview.

When conducting interviews in English, my question design was more open, allowing for this flexibility and adaptation based on the interviewee’s responses. For example, while interviewing Edin Safo, the CEO of MDC, my questions loosely touched on the themes that interested me about the project, but they allowed for Mr. Safo to expand or elaborate on the various processes. I asked him questions such as, ‘could you please tell me about the privatization process?’ and ‘what kind of obstacles did you face before construction began?’ Although I was interested in the media backlash against the project, he discussed these issues in relation to the obstacles that were
faced before construction began. This also gave me the freedom to ask more pointed
questions about media treatment of the project when he brought up the issues
surrounding media and especially Arab investment in Sarajevo. While doing this type of
interview in English, my strategy tended towards posing as few questions as possible
and letting the interviewees speak about the project. Although some guidance was
necessary to keep the conversation on track, I found that often people explain more if
they are given the freedom to openly discuss their work without strict question
schedules.

This strategy worked for interviews conducted in English, but my method
necessarily changed slightly when I needed to conduct an interview in Bosnian. My
language skills in the Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian language are sufficient for conducting
interviews, but I am not yet fluent enough to maintain the type of spontaneity that I do
in English language interviews. Therefore, when preparing for an interview in the local
language, I tended to stick to a stricter question schedule that I would in English. As it
is clear that I am not a native speaker of the language, my respondents often spoke
more slowly and answered questions more directly than they would have done had the
interview been more open-ended. This was true of my interview with Fatima Šišić at the
Centre for Islamic Architecture, which is a part of the Islamic Community (IZ). I
designed more pointed questions about the IZ’s vakuf and how imams are chosen for
the mosques run by the IZ, and the interview followed a much stricter format than many
of my interviews in English.

This difference in design between interviews conducted in English and those
conducted in the local language worked relatively well in most instances. However, I
was confronted with an interview that I thought I would conduct in English but that in
the end I needed to undertake in Bosnian. Unfortunately, I was unprepared for an
interview in the local language, and I was unable to obtain the kind of information that I
normally would have been able to gain using my more open, English language method.
3.5.2 Survey

In order to explore the factors that are shaping the urban redevelopment of Sarajevo, I needed to develop a way to gauge how the citizens of the city responded to urban changes and processes. I did this in two ways – with an online survey on the internet platform SurveyMonkey and with on-site field interviews (discussed further below). Creating a survey for people in the city to fill out seemed like the best way to address how the citizens were responding to changes, as it gave people in the city a comfortable and easy way to express their opinions about urban development in a totally anonymous format. I had hoped that this would be a way to reach a large number of Sarajevan citizens from many different demographic backgrounds, and the questions (which can be found in Annex C) sought out the opinions of these citizens regarding urban development and foreign investment in architecture and real estate. I designed my survey to reflect all of my case studies – commercial, sacred and residential, and I asked questions regarding culture, politics and urbanism in general.

While designing the online survey, I was very aware of the fact that I needed to stay away from leading questions while also making the questionnaire easy to complete and as short as possible. I discussed this issue with other researchers and colleagues while I was designing the questions – first in English, then translated into Bosnian with the help of three Bosnian friends. I tried wherever possible to format questions in either vertical or horizontal closed answers, often using a Likert scale. For example, I asked, ‘on a scale from one to ten, do you believe urban development in Sarajevo (new architectural investments, urbanization, and reconstruction) since 1995 has been successful?’ In addition to these closed questions and Likert scales, I added optional comment boxes after each question in the event that respondents would want...
to qualify their answers or comment on why they chose the responses they chose. I decided to add these comment boxes from the advice of one of my friends who found the questionnaire too closed and short without them. I have noticed that many of the respondents did indeed use these comment boxes to give additional information about their views of urban development in the city, and these responses are invaluable information to the study, especially for answering the research question related to the reaction of Sarajevo’s citizens to new investments in the built environment. They add a great amount of detail for explaining the overarching discourses surrounding these investments.

In order to reach as many different voices in the city as possible, I posted the link to my survey on internet forums: the architectural forum SkyscraperCity and also on Facebook. Additionally, friends of mine shared the link with their networks and took paper copies to different cultural institutions in the city to find the voices of older citizens. The survey reached a number of students in the architectural faculty and other people interested in architecture and urbanism. However, there was a sampling problem regarding demographics of the respondents. While those who responded were likely those interested in the issue, other voices, especially from older generations were left out. To counter this sampling problem, I conducted 40 field interviews (to be discussed below) and tried to target as large a range of people in terms of demographics as possible.

In my survey, I received 154 online responses from Sarajevans aged 18 to 59. I was able to supplement that with 13 paper surveys (ages 16 to 43), making a total of 167 responses. One of my worries about the online survey was that it would not reflect the true demographics of the city, and that I would not adequately represent the voices of older generations, specifically. Bryman (2008) has also discussed the problem of sampling in online surveys, stating ‘internet users are a biased sample of the population in that they tend to be better educated, wealthier, younger… although, as
internet access diffuses more and more, it is possible that some of these biases will become less prominent or even disappear’ (647). In fact, a majority of respondents from the online survey (67 responses) came from the 25-29 age group, while there were only 24 responses from people aged 40 to 59 and no respondents older than 60.

The online survey also had a sampling problem in terms of gender. Of the 167 respondents, a very large majority (102) were women. There were only 64 male respondents and one who chose not to declare either gender. This sampling error may be explained due to my own distribution of the survey. I asked female friends and colleagues to distribute the survey or share the link, and it is possible that those female friends and colleagues had mostly women in their networks.

It was important to find voices from all ethno-religious communities in the city, and one of the first questions on the survey asks for ethno-religious affiliation. Because this information is often considered sensitive, respondents had the option of leaving the question blank. It is estimated that the city of Sarajevo is about 80% Muslim or Bošnjak, and I tried to match this percentage in my sample. Of the online surveys, 73 respondents gave an answer for their ethno-religious or national belonging, while 94 abstained. That over half of the survey respondents decided not to answer the question is quite telling in terms of how citizens – at least those who are internet savvy and interested in urban development – view national belonging in the city. The majority of respondents who did list an ethnic affiliation – 34 people – identified as ‘BiH’ or Bosanac, the overarching Bosnian identity that does not stress ethno-religious or national belonging but rather includes all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. After that, 23 respondents answered Bošnjak or Muslim, two identified as Serb (one Bosanac of Serbian cultural heritage), and four stated Croat. Additionally there was one ‘human being’, one ‘Yugoslav’ (Jugosloven), two ‘other’, one ‘multiculturalist’ (Multikulturalan), one ‘countryman’ (Zemaljac), one ‘nonexistent’ (Nepostojeći), one
‘mixed’, one ‘European’ (*Evropljanin*), and one ‘Bosanski Huran-Mohawk’. Clearly the anonymity of the online survey allowed for some improvisation.

Despite the sampling problem with the online survey in terms of age and gender, these responses are still valuable for answering the research question aimed at assessing the citizens’ responses to new urban processes in the city. Respondents were able to comment on the questions, allowing them to express their views of the processes taking place in Sarajevo, which gave me broader data to analyse. Demographically, there is representation from the three ethno-religious groups, which is important for gauging the opinions of the population as a whole.

3.5.3 Field Interviews

I chose to conduct on-site, anonymous field interviews for two main reasons. As described earlier, the field interviews gave me a way to ‘inhabit’ public and quasi-public spaces, and in addition to the survey, the field interviews proved to be a second way for me to measure and gauge the reaction of Sarajevans to the processes taking place in the built environment. I designed the field interviews according to a strict question schedule (see Annex D for a complete list) that followed from some of the questions on the survey seeking out the responses of the citizens to urban developments, especially in terms of the case studies. My question schedule necessarily had to be shorter than the survey as people who are passing through public and quasi-public spaces will generally only have enough patience for a five-minute interview. Thus the field interview questions had more relevance to the actual setting – the space or building in question – and to some more general themes, including opinions about new investments, political motivations behind them, shopping centres and mosques in the city. I tried to keep these questions as open-ended as possible to let respondents answer how they wished. All of these interviews were conducted in the local language, and I had a research assistant to aid me with the recruitment of interviewees and small
translations and interpretations. These questions included, ‘what do you think about the ban on alcohol, pork and gambling in shopping centres such as BBI, SCC and Bosmal in Sarajevo?’ and ‘what kind of buildings or spaces does the city of Sarajevo need?’

In total, I conducted 40 field interviews with the citizens of Sarajevo: 10 in both the BBI Centar and the Sarajevo City Center and 20 in the residential neighbourhood of Alipašino Polje. To counter the sampling problems that I faced with the survey, I targeted respondents who hailed from older generations, and I tried to maintain a more equal gender balance. Respondents ranged from 76 years old to 19 years old. The largest demographic for the field interviews was the 30-39 years old (14 respondents). I believe that I was able to balance the demographic sampling problem that I faced with the online survey, adding five respondents aged 65-76. Additionally I tried to mirror ethno-religious demographics with the field interviews, and while respondents were not obliged to answer regarding their ethnic belonging, 33 interviewees did respond and only four abstained. Three other respondents were clearly Muslim, as they were women wearing the hijab and one woman wearing a full-face veil, the niqab. Seven respondents identified as ‘BiH’ or Bosanac, 19 stated they were Bošnjak/Muslim, two identified as Croat and there was on Serb. The general avoidance of stating one’s ethnicity in census terms (Bošnjak, Croat, Serb) seems to speak to the fatigue in the general population regarding nationalism and national belonging in the country. The Roma and Jewish communities are missing from this study or were among the respondents who chose not to state their ethnic belonging. The field interviews also allowed me to target people who are not involved in the architectural community in the city, as I am aware that many of my survey respondents hailed from the architecture faculties at the universities in Sarajevo.

For each field interview, I recorded the interviewees responses – there were a number of people who refused to be recorded and thus did not complete the interviews. These field interviews were conducted in the local language with the help of a local
student who acted as my transcriber and research assistant. Unfortunately, while my
Bosnian is sufficient enough to conduct more structured interviews, I needed help
negotiating participation with the citizens on-site – especially the fact that the interviews
were anonymous. I could not adequately explain why I wanted their opinion specifically
on the subject of foreign investment. I believe the fact that I am foreign also contributed
to my difficulty in approaching and conducting the field interviews on my own behalf. Of
course, having a research assistant can skew results, as the relationship between the
interviewer and interviewee changes slightly. I do not believe, however, that having a
research assistant negatively affected my results substantially but rather facilitated the
collection of data and its analysis.

3.5.4 Observation

For all qualitative studies, researcher observation of the site and the participants
yields imperative additional data. In this study, I conducted two types of observation:
general observation of the city of Sarajevo and its spaces and more pointed
observation of case study spaces during field interviews. These observations I noted in
a research journal for later analysis. It is important when conducting qualitative
research focusing on the interpretations and understandings of phenomena to be able
to analyse and reflect upon the processes taking place as they are observed. I noted
my observations throughout my fieldwork in Sarajevo in order to come to a more
complete picture of the processes taking place on the local level, how the city was
adapting to global flows, and how citizens reacted to urban change. Keeping a journal
allowed me to fill in the blanks, so to speak, with respect to the phenomena I was
studying.

For example, discussions with friends and colleagues in the city opened my
eyes to how people in the city regarded the neighbourhood of Ilidža on the western
edge of the city. Some had mentioned that this was the ‘little-Istanbul’ or ‘little-Arabia’ of
Sarajevo, remarking that many of the new Arab and Turkish residents of the city resided and occupied the area. Because I had noted this comment, I was able to visit Ilidža keeping such characterizations of the neighbourhood in mind. This led to photo documentation of the many businesses catering to Arab-speaking clients and how that was shaping the neighbourhood. These observations also helped me to formulate questions for the real estate agents that I visited in Ilidža who target Arab buyers of property.

Although pure observation of the research area cannot be used alone to determine which factors are shaping the architectural redevelopment of post-conflict Sarajevo, it is necessary for going beyond interview and media data. A researcher’s eye will pick up on interesting occurrences on-site, and these must be documented and analysed like all data to adequately answer the research questions and arrive at sophisticated conclusions about the phenomena at hand. In terms of supporting interviews and surveys, observations is one way to ensure a well-rounded view of the topic of study.

3.5.5 Media and Internet Forum Analysis

One of the most fruitful avenues for understanding the processes of urban redevelopment in Sarajevo is reading the local press and online media, taking into account the role of the media in daily life and the slant of different media outlets, especially in terms of political influence. With this in mind I cast a broad net in order to target different reports and news sources, both print media and strictly online portals. To add to the reactions of the citizens of the city, I studied comments left on online forums (http://www.skyscrapercity.com, http://www.klix.ba, http://www.forum.avaz.ba, for example) to see how the people were talking about these issues amongst themselves and on an anonymous platform for commentary.
In order to find media reports related to these structures, it was necessary to find an archive of BiH newspapers. Luckily, MediaCentar Sarajevo has developed an online archive of media and historical sources that can be accessed through personal subscriptions (http://www.idoconline.info). I used this online archive to collect media reports about the case studies for this project, urban development in general in Sarajevo and anything related to the presence of Arabs in the city. I paid attention to each different newspaper and media sources in terms of their political independence or political associations, as this helped focus my research around how political struggles were being played out in the built environment. It is important to keep in mind that politicians or those close to politicians often own media sources in BiH, so the stories they cover and how different events are treated are not always neutral. For example, there are clear media campaigns against different investments in the city, and newspapers and media outlets that support certain politicians lead these campaigns (for more about this, see the chapter on commercial investments in Sarajevo). I also looked at online news portals such as http://www.klix.ba and Al Jazeera Balkans for media stories relating to urban development in the city. These stories help to triangulate the data that I obtained in my interviews, field interviews and in the online survey.

Finally, to gain yet one more source of data for the responses of the citizens of Sarajevo to the changing built environment, I analysed comments on different internet forums, including http://www.skyscrapercity.com, http://www.klix.ba and others. Although this type of research can be problematic, as respondents are generally anonymous and hail from certain demographic groups (often young men), in this instance internet forum analysis serves to triangulate the responses of the citizens I collected through other methods. Many times people will self-censor during face-to-face interviews, but they will be more candid on internet forums. Although there are people who try to incite strong reactions by ‘trolling’ – which, as described above, consists of
saying radical or offensive things in order to receive emotional responses – I tried to limit including such comments by paying attention to the context of the conversations. Internet forum comments can be analysed using discourse analysis to show the discourses present in the city regarding new investments in the urban environment and financing originating in the greater Muslim world.

3.6 Data Processing and Analysis

After a year’s worth of fieldwork, I was left with hundreds of pages of research notes, transcriptions, articles and surveys to analyse and code. Although this was by no means an easy task, I set about data processing and analysis in as organized a fashion as possible. First, after a thorough read-through of my materials, I came up with a table of codes and themes (see Annex E) that would allow me to classify and catalogue my data according to different problems and phenomena found in the field and in the literature. After creating this table of codes and themes, I was able to then go back through my data and catalogue my findings in an efficient and coordinated manner, including separating my materials into different folders and binders based on the relationship the literature or data had to the case studies and discourses existing in city. I also found colour-coordinating my list of codes and themes to be a good way for me personally to make sense of the coding. Using discourse analysis for geography, I analysed my findings to understand how Sarajevans are interpreting the processes taking place in the urban landscape and the important implications this can have for the construction of identity and social lives of the city dwellers.

3.6.1 Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis arose in the twentieth century as an approach for understanding social processes, and this ‘discursive turn’, which accords an active role for language in constructing social lives, has become pervasive in the social sciences
and humanities, including in geography (Dittmer, 2010: 274). However, discourse analysis has developed into a broad field of study that has grown numerous offshoots following different scholars and their preferred methods of interpretation and analysis. The term ‘discourse’ itself is ‘a notorious term within human geography and other social sciences because of the messy multiplicity of meaning associated with it’ (Ibid., 275). Likewise, the term ‘discourse analysis’ itself has become vastly diverse in nature, incorporating not just one approach but rather multiple avenues for exploring the social world within numerous different fields. According to Jørgensen and Phillips (2011), ‘there is no clear consensus as to what discourses are or how to analyse them’ (2), but all discourse analysis approaches do share a similar foundation based on social constructionism; this is the understanding that language is not a neutral reflection of the social world but rather an active agent in producing it (Ibid.). Thus the social world and the way we talk are co-constitutive.

In order to analyse my fieldwork and media data, I have employed a Foucauldian understanding of discourse analysis for geographical research. Much has been written about Foucault and Geography. For example, Loretta Lees (2004), describes two strands of discourse analysis for geographical research, the second of which follows Foucault. She explains that, in this second strand, ‘discourse is part of a process through which things and identities get constructed. In Foucauldian terms, discourses are not simply reflections or (mis)representations of “reality”; rather they create their own “regimes of truth” – the acceptable formulation of problems and solutions to those problems,’ (102-103). This second strand is different from the first strand, which:

descends from the long Marxist tradition of political economy and ideology critique. Here discourse analysis is a tool for uncovering certain hegemonic ways of thinking and talking about how things should be done that serve certain vested interests... In this context, discourse is almost synonymous with ideology itself in so far as it functions to conceal the power of vested interests and to induce the consent of the dominated to their own domination (102).
While Lees highlights only these two approaches to discourse analysis, there are many other ways of carrying out discourse analysis, including, for example, methods such as critical discourse analysis, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s discourse theory and discursive psychology (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2011: 2). These other approaches, especially those that rely upon a version of structural Marxism, take a normative position on power relations in society (Ibid., 3). While a Foucauldian approach does not necessarily oppose such a view, the way in which I apply a Foucauldian analysis to my fieldwork data does not take an overtly normative stance on the power relations in society.

However, according to Stuart Elden and Jeremy W. Crampton (2007), ‘Foucault’s position in relation to geography remains unclear.’ (13). Foucault’s vast corpus of work can be applied to geographical studies in many ways, depending on the work in question and the analysis to be undertaken. For example, scholars such as Felix Driver (1985) have used Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish* (2012) to analyse institutions of power and their relationship to spatial production and surveillance. More generally, Foucauldian discourse analysis relies upon the notion that ‘discourse simultaneously produces and reproduces knowledge and power (power/knowledge) through what it is possible to think/be/do’ (Waitt, 2016: 288), and by applying discourse analysis, researchers can reveal social realities. Gordon Wait (2016) argues that, ‘given Foucault’s interest in the role of knowledge production in making and remaking the co-constitutive relationships between people and place, his conception of discourse is inherently geographical’ (289). Thus such an approach allows for the possibility of exploring why these ‘regimes of truth’ have become dominant (or not), especially in terms of spatial production. How populations discuss spatial developments necessarily relates to the production of space and the production of knowledge/power. This critical exploration of discourses allows researchers to uncover processes of power/knowledge...
production and how these processes might mobilise the reinforcement of societal norms or the creation of social change (Ibid.).

With this general notion of how a Foucauldian analysis can contribute to geographical research, I will use Foucault's interview ‘Space, Knowledge, and Power’ (1984) as a springboard for analysing my fieldwork data instead of doing a close reading of one of his works and its relationship to geography (like Driver, 1985). ‘Space, Knowledge, and Power’ remains one of the only primary sources from Foucault in which he explicitly discusses conceptions of space and the built environment.

Foucault (1984) says:

I think it is somewhat arbitrary to try to dissociate the effective practice of freedom by people, the practice of social relations, and the spatial distributions in which they find themselves. If they are separated, they become impossible to understand. Each can only be understood through the other…Space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power…So it [architecture] is not only considered as an element in space, but is especially thought of as a plunge into a field of social relations in which it brings about some specific effects (246-253).

From this discussion, the relationship between the social world and spatial production becomes clearer: space, the social world and, by extension, language use are all co-constitutive. From this understanding, I have sought to pull out the overarching discourses surrounding my case studies to analyse the ‘regimes of truth’ that are imbedded in them. These discourses unearth processes of power/knowledge relating to the spatial development of the city, including notions such as cultural colonisation, exclusion and the power of wealthy investors to change the landscape of the city. I have also looked at how these discourses are contributing to novel ideas surrounding identity and belonging. By using this Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis, I have analysed the way in which individuals use language in order to create meaning, often by focusing on omissions or by reading between the lines. Focusing on the ‘co-constitutive relationships between people and place’, I was better able to obtain an understanding of how new urban investments are shaping the city of Sarajevo and how
the population of the city is reacting to such processes. Importantly, by employing discourse analysis to my data, I was able to critically explore particular ‘truths’ about the processes occurring in the city and come to an understanding of the social realities of Sarajevo.

3.6.2 Data Processing

For interviews with project stakeholders and other urban professionals engaged in the development of the city of Sarajevo, I analysed my interview notes and transcriptions searching for the themes and codes mentioned above. Often, the themes proved to be embedded in the language used by the interviewee but were not directly spoken. Analysis of these notes and transcriptions required me to read between the lines, so to speak, to understand the interplay of various discourses related to urban development in Sarajevo. I then tried to triangulate this data with media reports or online information regarding the projects in question. Some of the main themes that I pulled out from these interviews were: biases towards Arab investment and perceptions of corruption. For example, one architect that I interviewed described Arab investments as ‘C-class’ investments, far behind investments from Western Europe. Many of my interviewees discussed rumours of corruption related to the case studies in the thesis.

I evaluated the field interview data in much the same way – reviewing the transcriptions and pulling out major themes and discourses. These interviews focused on the citizens’ responses to new urban interventions in the city and new financing for architectural developments, so it was necessary to triangulate this data with analysis of internet forums and other media describing these processes in order to understand the discourses in the city. I pulled out comments that blatantly discussed themes or alluded to them in the language. Some of these themes included: biases against Arabs
('Arabophobia'), ‘our’ Islam v. ‘their’ Islam, Yugoslav ideals of tolerance and ‘Islamisation’ of the city.

The online survey was supported on the http://www.surveymonkey.com website, which also includes data analysis features. These data analysis features include graphs and statistics relating to the questions, and a collation of the comments left in the optional comment boxes. The platform gives researchers an easy way to collect and analyse their data, and the online analysis allows for a clean and efficient way of consolidating the data obtained from the survey. Again, as this data targeted the research questions pertaining to the reaction of Sarajevans to the changing built environment, and SurveyMonkey helped to gather the data in a neat and tidy format, ensuring clean analysis. When triangulated with media and internet forum analysis, it shows the overarching discourses relating to new investments in the city. Much of this analysis centred on the optional comment fields that respondents were allowed to use, as they proved to be the most interesting aspect of the survey. Themes for coding through the survey data were similar to those from the field interviews, but because the demographics proved to be a bit different due to my sampling problem, I found the data from the survey was often more reflective of an educated and elite socio-economic segment of the population. Some of the codes and themes I found in this data included: fear of radicalism, Yugoslav ideals of tolerance and corruption.

In addition to coding interview transcriptions and the survey data, I also had to reread my research journal and code and theme my own findings from my observations. For example, I had heard unofficially in the city that the employees in the Sarajevo City Center talked about how many of their customers were Arab and how many Arab families spent their time on holiday in Bosnia and Herzegovina shopping. None of my field interviews with SCC employees supported this directly, and I did not want to ask leading questions about it, but I did find evidence of these perceptions in internet form comments. I found these observations quite striking, and in my own
observation of the Sarajevo City Center and the BBI Centar I noticed for myself the prevalence of Arab families walking about. That they might frequent spaces in which they felt comfortable (as many GCC countries have a strong shopping culture where families spend their free time in shopping centres) should come as no surprise, and it adds to the richness of the study to include information on Arab tourists and their occupation and usage of the case studies.

To analyse the data from media sources, I sorted articles into groups relating to the case studies or to urbanization in Sarajevo. I also kept and classified articles that dealt with issues of radicalism in Islam or Arab investment/tourism generally. It was important for me to remain aware of the source of these articles, as news outlets in Bosnia and Herzegovina often have ties to political parties or politicians directly. This is true of the Dnevni Avaz, for example, which is the news source connected to BiH politician Fahrudin Radončić. I analysed them with respect to their coverage of the issues and buildings in question as much as gleaning information from the reports. Many articles written about Arab movements and investment in Sarajevo have contributed to discourses of ‘Arab hysteria’ or ‘Arabophobia’ in the country, and this was just one of the major discourses I looked for an analysed while reviewing my press sources.

This type of analysis also helped when using internet forum comments as a data source. Often I found these comments connected to media stories (the comments section on http://www.klix.ba, for example, allows readers of news articles to comment on the stories), and so I sorted them depending on those case studies or themes. Much of the commentary could be coded with respect to Bosnian attitudes towards Arabs, ‘our’ Islam v. ‘their’ Islam, rumours surrounding certain politicians and gossip about corruption/political ties in investment.

3.7 Context, Reflexivity and Ethical Considerations
3.7.1 Context and Reflexivity

The research setting of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina affects data collection, as there are context-specific obstacles that make qualitative methods in the country – and especially in Sarajevo – more difficult than in other settings. To begin with, it is often quite difficult to request and receive an interview simply by emailing a potential interviewee. More often than not, if you are even able to find the contact’s email, he or she will not respond to your enquiry for an interview. Getting the email itself may also prove difficult. Many times, people from Bosnia and Herzegovina prefer to call one another instead of communicating by email. This poses the problem that it requires Bosnian language skills developed enough to be able to communicate effectively by telephone. Even though my own language skills are sufficient enough for this task, Bosnians often schedule their days at the last minute, and so I received responses such as, ‘call me tomorrow and we’ll arrange something,’ or ‘let me get back to you tomorrow to see if I have time’. This type of response can be quite frustrating when trying to arrange a time to chat. Additionally, one potential interviewee simply stopped responding to me while others never managed to find the time to speak. Many of these problems boil down to differences in culture between the locals and researchers. As an American, I am relatively forthright and persistent, which can be seen as a bit forceful in BiH.

A greater problem than simply the means of communication and scheduling is that in BiH, and especially in Sarajevo, accessing people in the first place can be quite difficult and frustrating. While it is not the case for all interviewees, more often than not, access requires contacts and sometimes contacts of contacts. I realised early on in my fieldwork that access in Sarajevo was a potential problem for me, and I continually cast my net as wide as possible to find people who knew stake holders and other individuals engaged in the development of the city. I count myself lucky to have had a pre-established network of friends and colleagues in Sarajevo before I began my fieldwork;
I spent three summers in Sarajevo before research began in order to take Bosnian language classes, conduct research for my Masters dissertation and carry out an internship. This network assisted me myriad times over the course of the year, and it became clear that it was truly an invaluable asset when conducting on-site research in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In most cases when trying to gain access to an individual, I pointedly asked friends, colleagues and other professional contacts whether they had the contact information to specific people and whether they would be willing to introduce me virtually or otherwise. In some instances, I had to go through two or three channels to arrive at a contact I was seeking, and for one important contact, I only gained access days before leaving the country. Being recommended to a potential interviewee in the city opens doors that are otherwise very difficult to unlock, and while this may be true in other research settings as well, it seems to be the unwritten rule in Sarajevo.

Apart from accessing various actors and stakeholders, Sarajevo as a setting is difficult for qualitative research because of its status as a post-conflict and post-socialist city, which suffers from many of the ills of post-socialist and post-conflict environments, including corruption and distrust. Suspicion became a major factor for me when working amongst the Bosnians living in Sarajevo, and it weighed heavily upon me as a researcher. I had often encountered problems of suspicion in Sarajevo before commencing my fieldwork; I cannot count the number of times someone in Sarajevo jokingly (or not so jokingly) accused me of being a spy, for example. However, it was only once I started doing interviews with members of the academic and intellectual architectural and urban planning community in Sarajevo that I confronted this suspicion in a more head-on fashion. In fact, one contact of mine explained to me that:

"It would be also fantastic to try to bring your UCL people and resources here as it would be interesting to discuss with them about collaborations on different formats. Bosnians are lately very suspicious and demanding"
as there was a lot of foreign researchers and architects around and not much was left to/for Sarajevo. I think you can surely contribute! [sic]

This suspicion of foreigners – and of foreign researchers – is pervasive in the city. Another contact of mine spoke somewhat derisively of one of my colleagues hailing from Western Europe, especially in that he was ‘another foreign researcher’. It is understandable how the intellectual and academic communities in Sarajevo may feel threatened by foreign researchers coming to study not only their city but also their society. Added to that is the fact that foreign researchers are winning grants and studentships to research themes that Bosnians feel very strongly about or would like to study themselves, given the means. They feel – according to chats I have had with Bosnian friends and colleagues – that Bosnians are left to the side and isolated when it comes to opportunities to work abroad or contribute to more international programs regarding research and professional development. To counter this, I did try to offer what I could to my contacts in terms of access to literature. I also discussed co-authoring papers or presenting at conferences, but these plans never came to fruition.

This suspicion of foreigners seems deeply ingrained in BiH society, possibly originating in the failures and missteps of the international community during the conflict and after. In fact, the ‘Monument to the international community, from the grateful citizens of Sarajevo’ which is a statue of a tin of beef, representing those given to the starving citizens during the siege, cements in the built environment the attitude of the citizens to the international community (see Sheftel, 2012 for an analysis of Bosnians’ dark humour, especially directed at the failures of the international community). Conducting qualitative research in Sarajevo as an American PhD student thus requires not only a very thick skin, but also the ability to empathise with the frustrations of the local community. Unfortunately, I only came to this understanding toward the end of my research, and I feel that some of my relationships with various contacts suffered for my previous ignorance.
In terms of distrust, people are also reluctant to speak frankly about political motivations behind investments or political forces at play behind different processes in the city. I had a number of interesting interactions with Bosnians as I was conducting my field interviews and inhabiting public and quasi-public spaces. It is important to note that my interviewees were all made aware that their answers were anonymous, but that I needed to record them for data collection purposes (my research assistant discussed this with them in the local language). One woman working in a shopping centre in Sarajevo asked to see my list of questions before agreeing to the interview. When she read the questions, she became visibly agitated, and stated (in very clear English, although we had been speaking in Bosnian) that she refused to answer any of the questions or take part in the interview. She then proceeded to follow us out of her shop, and she watched us walk away in a clear act of intimidation. Her reaction was alarmingly aggressive, and clearly she felt threatened by my presence as a foreigner asking questions related to Islam and investment in Sarajevo. Unfortunately we never asked her to clarify her reaction, and we felt too intimidated to approach her again. Other people also refused to be recorded or participate in the field interviews, and in many instances it seemed as if they were protecting themselves from an unknown danger. As a post-socialist and post-conflict city dealing with ingrained corruption, it is possible that feelings of distrust toward the politicians and elites flows over into other areas of life, causing fear amongst the people. While this is an understandable reaction by the citizens, it makes conducting qualitative research in the city that much more difficult, especially for foreigners.

As an American researcher in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is important to keep my positionality in mind. My cultural background, values and biases inevitably influence the outcome of my results, especially considering the vast difference between US and BiH worldviews. I am aware that my background may lead to judgements and interpretations – especially of Islam – that may have a cultural skew. By reflexively
considering this potential problem, I hope I have been able to avoid such inherent biases as much as possible. I also realise that my cultural background and position of privilege in terms of my nationality, age and education level may have influenced the responses that I received from interview participants. These power relations probably played a part in how willing respondents were to give me information. Marsha Henry, Paul Higate and Gurchathen Sanghera (2009) suggest that the researcher and the power relations between researcher and researchee ‘may be read in multiple and paradoxical ways’ (477), making for complex and challenging research. Being aware of the power relationships taking place during the fieldwork is the first step to dealing with any negative consequences arising from them.

Within the environment of pervasive distrust in Sarajevo, I found it necessary at times to downplay my exact interests in order to reduce suspicion. I believe levels of suspicion might have been augmented as I study Muslim buildings and financing from Muslim-majority countries in the city – a touchy subject in today’s globalised and securitised world. When conducting interviews, I tried to limit the details of my research and explain that I am focusing on urban processes and urbanisation in Sarajevo. I also tried to downplay the focus on Islam and specifically Arab financing while I was conducting my fieldwork, but this sometimes came through despite my efforts. The woman who refused to speak to us in one of the shopping centres became agitated after my research assistant mentioned ‘Arab investment’ instead of the more neutral ‘foreign investment’, which I believe led her to aggressively decline the interview.

On a more personal note, while conducting my fieldwork in Sarajevo, I came to know a number of Arabs living in the city, specifically from Syria and Libya. Having Arab friends living in Bosnia and being able to ask them questions about how welcome they feel in the country definitely gave me a broader understanding of the processes at work. I also think these friendships opened my mind and changed my perceptions of not only Arabs and the Arab world, but also of Islam in general. I believe my research
benefitted substantially from these relationships, giving me a different perspective and allowing me to see multiple viewpoints of transnational flows of people, capital and goods.

3.7.2 Ethical Considerations

In order to conduct this study, I needed to apply to the UCL ethics committee to obtain permission to interview human subjects. I received this permission from the ethics committee for my application 3853/002 in February of 2014. Part of the application for to the ethics committee included consent and information forms for the interviewees who would be taking part in the study (see Annex F). This study was deemed to be of minimal risk to participants, even in a post-conflict context, and the probability of harm to participants would not be greater than that usually encountered in daily life.

Although I designed permission forms for interviews and information leaflets to explain my study, I found that in the Bosnian and Herzegovinian context, these formal measures were not only extraneous, but also caused respondents to feel more uncomfortable about the interview than they would otherwise. Therefore, I chose to impart the information about the study in person and obtain permission for the interview verbally or by email. For my interviews with people engaged in the development of the urban environment in the city, this type of permission and the information about my project was given before the interview commenced through email or over the telephone. I also made it clear in the interview itself that respondents did not have to answer any of my questions. Some, in fact, chose to answer certain questions only off the record. I have honoured their wish. I have also agreed to share what I have written about certain respondents before this thesis is officially handed in or published.

When conducting the field interviews, gaining consent and discussing the project became slightly more difficult. As I mentioned above, I hired a local research
assistant to help me approach and vet different respondents as we ‘inhabited’ the public and quasi-public spaces around Sarajevo. I realized early on that I could not adequately explain the project and describe why I was interested in exactly their opinions alone in the local language. Having my research assistant with me to carry out these interviews allowed me to not only explain the project and my interests adequately, but also to gain proper permission from the respondents and explain their rights, including their right not to take part or respond. More than one person refused to take part, and often we gave respondents the question schedule ahead of the interview so that they could see what kind of information we sought. Using paper permission sheets would not have been adequate in this situation, as it would have taken too much time (people already seemed pressed for a five-minute interview), and it also would have conflicted with the anonymity of the study.

After gaining the consent of interviewees, I asked each urban development respondent whether I could record the interview. Most agreed to this measure, but some asked not to be recorded – especially those who also asked that some information remain off the record. Again, I honoured their wishes. When an interviewee asked not to be recorded, I took elaborate notes to make up for the lack of transcription. For the field interviews, we also made it clear that we wished to record respondents for data processing purposes. We again assured anonymity, but despite these assurances, some respondents refused to take part after they learned that we wished to record the interview.

Conducting research with live participants always carries the risk of unintentional harm to the research subjects, which could manifest in multiple different ways. Although I did not always use printed consent forms as I found that format interfered with data collection in the context of BiH society, I did always make sure to receive informed consent from all of the participants involved, and I have protected confidentiality by maintaining anonymity when necessary. By default, participants in the
field interviews and survey data are anonymous, but for interviews with stakeholders and urban professionals, I have used pseudonyms unless they specifically ask to be named or unless participants are public figures such as CEOs. In a post-conflict environment and when dealing with ideas of identity formation and reconciliation, it is possible to cause harm by bringing up past traumas. I have tried to avoid this by creating questions that do not hint at past traumas. Additionally, while interviewing stakeholders on the various projects, I sought out and received some sensitive and/or private information that the respondent did not necessarily wish to reveal. Anything they have asked to keep off the record will remain off the record. I made it clear to the individuals involved that they are not required to answer my questions and that it is their right as an interviewee to stop the interview at any time.

3.8 Conclusion

With 42 semi-structured interviews, 167 survey responses, 40 field interviews, and an extensive research journal, I have collected a substantial corpus of data for my study of the ongoing processes in Sarajevo’s built environment. These methods combined with media and internet forum analysis best respond to the research questions, as they allow for a deeper understanding of not only the transnational flows of capital and people into Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also of the responses of everyday citizens of the city. Because this is a qualitative study, I have analysed this data using discourse analysis to highlight the discourses surrounding such investment and the influence of elite political agendas that have the power to impact the development of the urban environment. Although some sampling problems arose with respect to the survey data, when triangulated with media and forum research, these responses still contribute to the overall findings of the study. In all, this data shows a clear picture of the processes taking place and how foreign investment in architecture and real estate affects the development of post-socialist and post-conflict cities.
4. Sarajevo’s Identity Crisis: the City’s Multi-ethnic History, the Islamic Shift and Post-War Urban Processes

4.1 Introduction

Between long established urban identities and new trends in urban development, cities struggle between various representations of the urban environment and the implications that these representations have for local and international populations. In Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, multiple contested representations of the city have evolved since the founding of the city by the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth century. Today, in the aftermath of war, Sarajevo’s particular urban identity is anything but fixed, and both domestic and foreign actors play a crucial role in forging and moulding an emerging reality of the post-conflict city. In fact, as Husukić and Zejnilović (2017) state, Sarajevo’s identity is in crisis. New urban interventions from the greater Muslim world are shaping the urban environment and clashing with previous representations of the city and projects to bring BiH toward the European Union (sometimes referred to as ‘Europeanisation’ (Troncota, 2015)). Despite the idyllic historical image of Sarajevo as ‘multicultural’ (Greble, 2011: 2), which in this sense means sheltering relatively large populations of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s four traditional ethno-religious communities (Catholic Croats, Muslim Bošnjaks, Orthodox Serbs and Sephardic Jews) and providing urban spaces and places of worship for these groups, Sarajevo’s urban space has been undergoing an overall ethnic homogenisation since the war in the 1990s.

This ethnic homogenisation has come about both demographically and structurally. Not only has the Muslim population itself become a significant majority in the city, but also many urban spaces have become Muslim, either by becoming sacred spaces of worship for Sarajevo’s Islamic communities or by restricting usage of the space through shari’ah law. All of these processes organise solidarities for Muslim
groups in the city, even those that are not strictly Bosnian Muslim, as the idea of the umma can then be employed (Kusno, 2012: 213 and Simone, 2012: 206, see literature review for more on Islam and nationalism in the built environment). Added to this trend is the fact that common cultural heritage sites – buildings and monuments that represent all ethno-religious communities – are being neglected. Although it would be an exaggeration to claim that all new constructions in the city have either overt or subtle ties to Islam, a large percentage of the new urban interventions are indeed influenced by Islam. This means that while Sarajevans might still believe in the multi-ethnic identity of the city that was forged over centuries of coexistence and tolerance, Sarajevo’s spaces are gradually becoming more Muslim in nature.

Yet to describe this trend as Islamisation becomes problematic. The term Islamisation has taken on a vast number of connotations in the past decades. It implies a process of conversion to Islam and Islamism, or political Islam, including proselytism and a move to establish Islamic order and jurisprudence (Mandaville, 2007: 20 and Bayat, 2013: 4). In popular culture, however, especially in Europe and North America, references to Islamisation and Islamism tend to portray radical Islam, ‘intolerance, misogyny and authoritarianism’ (Bayat, 2013:4), and the agenda of terrorists to create an Islamic world order. The process in Sarajevo does not necessarily reflect the society’s conversion to Islam – most of the citizens are already Muslim – and radical Muslims and terrorists are certainly not driving these changes. Thus the term Islamisation carries with it a certain amount of anxiety coupled with suggestions of conversion, which leave it wanting in conceptual value. Similarly, Muslimisation bears popular understandings associated with fear and the threat of radical Islam. In order to describe a process that includes a move toward Bosnian Muslim ethnic homogenisation (in terms of census demographics) and an increase in Muslim spaces in Sarajevo, including spaces that are not strictly sacred but which follow shari’ah rules, I will employ the phrase ‘Islamic shift’.
More than any other city in the Balkan region, Sarajevo has historically maintained a very special, ‘multicultural’, or more precisely multi-ethnic, identity. In fact, it has often been described as a meeting point of East and West, or a ‘European Jerusalem’ (Makas, 2012). Yet, the post-war city is physically morphing, caused in part by the Dayton Accords and its provisions for separate spaces and by the privatisation process after socialism, which allowed a minority elite to claim majority shares in state corporations. To understand how post-war Sarajevo has changed, especially in terms of city spaces and demographics, an analysis of the city, its history, its culture and its identity as an urban space is necessary. In this chapter, I will outline Sarajevo’s urban history from its foundation until the 1990s, investigate popular and contested representations of the city’s identity and discuss urbanism and changes in the urban environment since the war. The Islamic shift taking place in Sarajevo, brought about in part by worlding practices, such as investments from GCC countries, and post-conflict urban processes, sets the stage for emergent cultural forms to grow and take root. These transformations have far-reaching implications for post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the city undergoing an identity crisis.

4.2 Sarajevo’s Urban History

The Ottomans founded the city of Sarajevo in the middle of the fifteenth century as an ‘expression of Ottoman Islamic civilisation’ (Donia, 2006: 8). The Ottoman millet system, which organised the distinct religious communities in the Empire, allowed different confessional groups to maintain their own legal systems and imbued them with certain powers. Religious leaders in these communities controlled members of their congregations and acted on their behalf in dealings with other authorities (Abu Jaber, 1967: 212). The millet system not only organised religious communities together, but it also formed the basis for urban development in Sarajevo. Each confessional community in the city lived in its own mahala – or neighbourhood – and
these *mahalas* encircled the central business district or *Čaršija* (Karahasan, 1993: 8). The *Čaršija* became one of the only spaces in the city in which members of different faiths mixed and carried out daily business. Communities erected their own places of worship within the *mahalas*, lending a multi-confessional character to the city, which has remained to this day. Christian groups – both Catholic and Orthodox – existed on the territory of today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina before the Ottomans arrival, and a wave of Sephardic Jews entered Sarajevo in the sixteenth century after their expulsion from Spain, increasing the multi-ethnic nature of the city and its religious buildings. However, because a hierarchy existed within the Ottoman Empire and Muslims held a privileged position, the religious edifices of non-Muslims could not exceed the height of the tallest mosque, which made early churches and synagogues quite small in comparison (Donia, 2006: 16). This fundamental feature of the city has been carried on through the centuries.

Although the multi-ethnic nature of the city refers to the four main ethno-religious groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina, other occupying forces and historical epochs also left their mark on the city. After a short-lived movement by the People’s Government following Ottoman rule, in 1878, Austro-Hungarian troops occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina, officially beginning a new phase of urban development in Sarajevo and in other cities. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Vienna-based order implemented an entirely new city plan for Sarajevo based on models of urban design in Western Europe, which created the blend of East and West for which Sarajevo is known. The Habsburgs focused a great deal of attention on urban development, especially in Sarajevo, which they wanted to shape into ‘an example of Habsburg administrative success’ (Ibid., 60). The Austro-Hungarian administration in Sarajevo, led by Benjamin Kállay von Nagy-Kálló, attempted to foster a multi-confessional Bosnian nationalism that they called *bošnjaštvo* in reaction to rising nationalist sentiment in the Serb and Croat communities (Ibid., 63). This new tactic created by the
administration contributed to planning that situated Christian religious buildings in the
centre of the city outside of their prior mahalas, ostensibly creating a more egalitarian
urban environment. Donia explains that:

Kállay oversaw a rearrangement of central urban space. Under his
direction the major religious, cultural and educational institutions of each
religious community were clustered around a downtown square, and
these small neighborhoods were placed in close proximity to one
another. He therefore continued the policy, implicit in the building of the
new Serbian Orthodox church…of divesting Muslims of their monopoly
on monumental structures in the city centre (Ibid.)

The Austro-Hungarian administration similarly built a number of major buildings for
official use, including the Sarajevo city hall, also known as the Vijećnica, which they
built in a pseudo-Moorish or neo-Oriental style featuring decorative motifs recalling
Islamic architecture. Other buildings of note include the Regional Government or
Presidency Building, styled with a neo-Renaissance façade, and the post office
building. During this epoch, Sarajevo became what Felix Driver and David Gilbert
(1999) refer to as an imperial city. It was based on the Viennese national model and
became a project to highlight empire’s power through the built form. The new plan was
based on Western European urban models, and the Sarajevan urban environment took
on the ‘spirit of competition’ between imperial cities of this time (Ibid., 9). There is also
the notion that, in this master plan, the Austro-Hungarian administration wished to bring
Sarajevo back to Europe, so to speak, by Europeanising the city’s spaces and
buildings.

After the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the descent into war
that followed, urban development in Sarajevo came to much of a standstill until after
the Second World War and the implementation of the socialist state. Bosnia and
Herzegovina became part of the new Kingdom of Yugoslavia following the First World
War, but unlike the massive urban plan that accompanied the regime change with the
Habsburgs, Sarajevo saw very little urban development and only a few new buildings
were constructed under the administration of the Kingdom (Ibid., 130). Because of
preference for Serb, Croat and Slovene cities – namely Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana – little attention was paid to more marginal areas of the new state, including Sarajevo. This time also saw increased economic stagnation, which led to the decrease in development and urbanisation. Of the few structures erected during this time, the most notable is the neoclassical Jewish synagogue in the middle of the old city. Until its construction, Jewish places of worship only existed outside of the centre (Ibid., 164). No other buildings significantly contributed to the city’s skyline or its identity as a multi-ethnic urban centre under the rule of the Kingdom.

Figure 2: Sarajevo 1929, courtesy of www.discusmedia.com, The 1900 Map Collection.

Unlike other socialist countries after the Second World War, Socialist Yugoslavia broke with the tradition of Socialist Realism early on, especially with respect to urban developments (Ibelings, 2010: 14). Instead of the neoclassical path favoured by early post-war Stalinist urbanism, Yugoslav buildings followed a more modernist design. Buildings made of steel and glass, such as the UNITIC towers and the parliament building, began to emerge from the skyline, adding to the already diverse character of the urban environment. The urban centre itself shifted during the post-war years, moving westward into the Marijin Dvor quarter of the city and further. In fact, by the 1960s, Marijin Dvor was considered to be part of the centre of Sarajevo, whereas it had been mostly residential before the Second World War (Karahasan, 1993: 21;
compare Figures 2 and 3). This growth westward also included numerous concrete residential complexes, which are typically socialist in character, in neighbourhoods such as Grbavica and Dobrinja. This architecture reflects a pan-Yugoslav identity, which was fostered after the Second World War and which increases the diversity of styles in Sarajevo’s built environment.

The Bosnian War of the 1990s and the Siege of Sarajevo, especially, changed the face of the city forever. Not only were major landmarks and historic buildings destroyed in the shelling of the city, but also reconstruction has altered the fundamental nature of the urban centre (Ibelings, 2010: 20). According to Hans Ibelings, ‘Post-war reconstruction has not meant reconstructing the country’s pre-war appearance’ (Ibid.), instead urban centres, including Sarajevo, are undergoing transformations, which are consequences of the privatisation process in the country and post-socialist transformation in general. While such changes have occurred in most post-socialist countries following pushes towards privatisation, the situation in BiH is somewhat special given its post-conflict nature. In fact, new constructions in Sarajevo’s built environment are overwriting the city on a fundamental level, and an Islamic shift of the city space is taking place in terms of new structures as well as in terms of demographics, both of which serve to create Sarajevo’s identity as a plural or multi-ethnic city.

4.3 Sarajevo’s Identity

Cities as spaces where humans live and circulate maintain specific identities and characteristics. Spatial identity not only involves the identities of the people that live and work within the urban areas – their cultures and ideals – but it is also based on the built environment and its influence in creating a climate for various visions and values. Structures and buildings give urban space a concrete foundation on which to build an identity, often influencing collective memories based on places of worship and
historical assets. That individual cities project specific identities should come as no surprise; many major cities throughout the world profit from these imaginaries. For example, Paris, ‘the city of light’, draws millions of tourists per year to experience its cafes and art nouveau architecture, while New York, ‘the city that never sleeps’, offers a 24-hour expanse of bars and restaurants, neon lights and trendy neighbourhoods. In a similar fashion, Sarajevo has been known for centuries by its particular idyllic multi-ethnic urban identity (Greble, 2011: 2), which continues to represent the city and also influences tourism. However, this identity is in crisis; it is being torn between the city’s Islamic shift and notions of ‘Europeanisation’, making new interventions in the urban landscape particularly salient to the construction Sarajevan identity.

From the sixteenth century onward, Sarajevo became known as a ‘European Jerusalem’ (Makas, 2012), presented as embodying an innate multi-ethnic character of Muslim, Catholic, Eastern Orthodox and Jewish influences. Although the term ‘European Jerusalem’ allegedly originally referred to Sarajevo’s role as a safe haven and new homeland for Sephardic Jews expelled from Spain (Ibid.), in later years it took on the significance of the multi-ethnic city. Only in Jerusalem and Sarajevo, it is claimed, can places of worship from the West’s four main religions be found within 100 metres of one another. Although other cities with this particularity do exist (Ibid.), Sarajevo’s built environment is indeed rare in its religious and cultural plurality. Many authors and public figures cite the city’s multi-ethnic nature as its most remarkable identifier, the basis of its local and international image, and they believe that Sarajevo’s plurality continues to exist, despite the events of the twentieth century (Karahasan, 1993; Jestrović, 2013; Lagunina, 2012; and Markowitz, 2010).

The multi-ethnic image of Sarajevo originates from two sources: the city’s built environment and its demographics (Makas, 2012), but both of these are in flux. Sarajevo has always had a Muslim majority. However before the war in the 1990s, the ratios between the main ethno-religious groups in the city were slightly more balanced.
In the early twentieth century, for example, 38% of the population was Muslim, 27% was Catholic Croat and 24% was Serb Orthodox with 11% identifying as other (Ibid.). Just before the collapse of Socialist Yugoslavia, the citizens identifying as Muslim in the city accounted for 49.2% of the population. The Serb Orthodox population at this time numbered 29.8%, while Catholic Croats had 6.6% and people identifying as Yugoslav or ‘other’ brought up the remaining 14.3% (Markowitz, 2007: 55). The post-war census numbers are staggeringly different. Now the Muslim majority makes up roughly 80% of the city’s population, dwarfing the numbers of Catholic Croats, Serb Orthodox and others (Makas, 2012; and Markowitz, 2007: 55. See also the 2013 census statistics on population demographics, Popis, 2013). Because of this ethnic homogenisation of the city in terms of strict census demographics, the city’s identity as multi-ethnic – and a home for the four ethno-religious communities in BiH – is in danger. In fact, some have claimed that the multi-ethnic nature of Sarajevo is dead (Markowitz, 2010: 13 and Troncota, 2015: 132). However, the persistent vision of the city as a multi-ethnic space continues despite this demographic shift.

In terms of the built environment, the identity of Sarajevo as a multi-ethnic city is additionally threatened. As with demographics, Muslim religious structures in Sarajevo have always outnumbered the places of worship for the Christian and Jewish populations (See Figures 3 and 4 below). In the 1990s before the war, there were dozens of mosques in the city, but there were only about ten churches and synagogues (Makas, 2012). Since the war and with transnational capital from Muslim countries and diaspora populations around the world, the number of mosques in Sarajevo has skyrocketed (Makas, 2012; and Markowitz, 2010: 46). Many of these buildings do not adhere to the traditional architecture for mosques in Bosnia and Herzegovina, following instead modern designs from places as distant as Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Kuwait. The number of churches in Sarajevo has remained relatively the same since the war (Ibid.), although a couple of new churches have been built in the western quarters of
the city, including the Church of St. Ignatius in the Grbavica area of the city, which was finished in 2014. Thus, if Sarajevo’s multi-ethnic identity is based on demographics and the built environment, yet both of these are Muslim dominated, then the continued use of multi-ethnic imaginaries to describe and represent the city must be beneficial to specific actors.

Figure 3: Sarajevo 1997, mosques and Muslim places of worship as circles, Christian and Jewish places of worship as squares (map and data taken from Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas, Austin, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/bosnia.html)
Despite the reality of the city’s Islamic shift, Sarajevo’s image as a multi-ethnic city exists in the present. ‘Multicultural Sarajevo’ is continually constructed and represented for various audiences, and this discourse serves specific actors in the city for touristic and political purposes. According to Makas, ‘Urban identities are similarly shaped by specific actors, who selectively remember and strategically forget, and who consciously seek to create an image that serves political or other motives in the present. In the case of cities often that motive is attracting tourists, and it is even described as city-branding in much of the literature’ (Makas, 2012). Sarajevo has been branded a ‘multicultural’, multi-ethnic city, drawing from its real history as a city that has housed people from various different ethno-religious groups. Its built environment still reflects that history, despite the city’s turn towards an Islamic shift demographically and

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1 The locations of new buildings in Sarajevo were taken from http://www.openstreetmaps.org, which shows the contemporary city, including places of worship and new shopping centres. This data was overlayed onto the map taken from Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas, Austin, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/bosnia.html
architecturally, and this multi-ethnic nature is highlighted for tourist purposes (Ibid.). A somewhat recent example that shows exactly how the city has been branded is the website for the commemoration of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand – *Sarajevo Srce Europe* (Sarajevo Heart of Europe), which can be found at http://www.sarajevosrceeuurope.org. The very first line of the website reads, ‘Sarajevo, deemed as “the Jerusalem of Europe”, holds a special place in European history’ (http://www.sarajevosrceeuurope.org). The website clearly banks on the image of Sarajevo’s multiconfessional past. Similarly, Emily Makas has shown that the Tourist Association, guidebooks, and various museums in Sarajevo reflect and promote the historical multi-ethnic fabric of the city (Makas, 2012). Makas claims that:

> Stressing Sarajevo’s history of coexistence and the heightened claims for a multicultural image in the past twenty years can be understood in large part as a reaction to wartime and postwar threats to that identity posed by Serb, Croat and Muslim nationalists. The image of Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, as a multicultural city of centuries of peaceful coexistence is at once a statement of fact about the city’s history as well as an understanding of the city constructed in the present (Ibid.).

Despite post-war Islamic shift, Sarajevo is actively being constructed in the present as a plural and multi-ethnic city. This image is important for many actors in the city – both international and local – and it continues to play a role in how local inhabitants view and experience their city.

In addition to ‘multiculturalism’ or its multi-ethnic nature, Sarajevo has also been known as a ‘meeting point’ of eastern and western cultures. Sarajevo, according to this image, is the bridge from the West (understood as Europe) to the East (ostensibly Asia), making it an exotic locale, especially for tourists from Europe and North America. Makas states that, ‘despite its recent domination of the discourse, multiculturalism is not the only image of Sarajevo that has existed historically or that exists today. Seeming almost as a contradiction, Sarajevo has also been envisioned as an oriental, exotic, Islamic city’ (Ibid.). This second representation of the city stands slightly in contrast with the ‘multicultural’ representation, seeing Sarajevo as the beginning of the
Islamic world (or, perhaps, the end of the Christian world), highlighting Islam as a key factor in the city's identity.

However, while the city’s eastern influences are certainly a focus in this representation of the city, especially for tourist purposes, there is some overlap between the two main visions of Sarajevo. The city brands itself as a meeting point, not just an Islamic city, as Makas would suggest. In fact, the Sarajevo Meeting of Cultures project (http://www.smoc.ba) has recently added a pavement instalment at the entrance to Baščaršija, the historic Ottoman old town. This instalment exists of tiles in the shape of a compass pointing to the East and the West. On each side of the compass the words ‘Sarajevo Meeting of Cultures’ are written for pedestrians passing (Figure 5). Additionally, there is an informative sign nearby that gives information about the Sarajevo Meeting of Cultures project. The idea of the city as a bridge has, thus, literally been inscribed into the urban environment of Sarajevo. While this bridging of cultures and ethnic mixing are continuously used in discourses about Sarajevo, nowhere is there a representation of the city as purely Muslim.
Figure 5: Sarajevo Meeting of Cultures 2014, Author’s photo.
Adding another layer to the complex matrix of Sarajevan identity, some scholars have argued that Bosnia and Herzegovina has been in a process of ‘Europeanisation’ since the nineteenth century, which coincides with notions of cosmopolitanism attributed to the city. According to Maria Todorova (2009):

There is a widespread notion that the Balkans began losing their identity once they began to Europeanize. That this phrasing implies their difference from Europe obvious. Far more interesting is the fact that the process of ‘Europeanization,’ ‘Westernization’ or ‘modernization’ of the Balkans in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries included the spread of rationalism and secularization, the intensification commercial activities and industrialization, the formation of a bourgeoisie and other new social groups in the economic and social sphere, and above all, the triumph of the bureaucratic nation-state. From this point of view the Balkans were becoming European by shedding the last residue of an imperial legacy, widely considered an anomaly at the time, and by assuming and emulating the homogeneous European nation-state as the normative form of social organization. It may well be what we are witnessing today, wrongly attributed to some Balkan essence, is the ultimate Europeanization of the Balkans. If the Balkans are, as I think they are, tantamount to their Ottoman legacy, this is an advanced stage of the end of the Balkans (13).

Beginning with the Austro-Hungarian occupation, Sarajevan identity took on an aspect of ‘Europeanisation’. According to Emily Greble (2011) ‘with the importation of Viennese arts, architecture, and ideology, many of Sarajevo’s elite began to think of their city as a special cosmopolitan enclave.’ (6) Since this time, Sarajevo’s identity has held a tension between the bridging of East and West discussed above and ‘Europeanisation’. Since the conflict in the 1990s, this trend has been maintained, especially as Bosnia and Herzegovina is taking part in the Stabilisation and Association Process necessary for admittance into the European Union. Europe, then, is somewhat of an end goal for Sarajevo, as the country moves closer to attaining EU status.

Sarajevo’s various representations stand in contrast to the real processes that the city has been undergoing since the war in the 1990s. The city’s image as a multi-ethnic city and as a meeting point between the West and the East pervades the discourses about the city, despite demographic trends in the census toward ethnic homogenisation and an increase in architecture with Islamic influences. In such a
setting, any urban interventions that add to a loss of ethnic plurality in the city will have
to endure a backlash against the ‘multicultural’ imaginary, which underscores
multiplicity. Constructed in the present, but based on its historical roots, Sarajevo is
represented both locally and internationally as the Jerusalem of Europe, an image that
is constantly employed by residents, tourist agencies, the international community and
government actors alike. Yet many of these same local and international actors have
created policies including the Dayton Accords and privatisation measures that have
contributed to the overwriting of Sarajevo’s plurality in real terms, even in the face of
the continued employment of these urban representations.

4.4 Urbanism and the Urban Environment

4.4.1 City During War and Urban Destruction

The urban environment plays a leading role in Sarajevo’s Islamic shift, yet, perhaps ironically, these processes could not have been possible without the massive
destruction of the city during the Siege of Sarajevo by Serb forces trying to cleanse the
city of Muslims. The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina arrived in Sarajevo in 1992 when
Bosnian Serb forces surrounded the city, besieging it and closing it off from external
access. The attack on the city and its people began in April of that year and lasted
1,425 days, finally ending on 29 February 1996 after the signing of the Dayton Accords
on 14 December 1995. Not only did tens of thousands of people – military as well as
civilians – lose their lives in Sarajevo during the siege, but the urban environment also
suffered mass destruction and the loss of irreplaceable, historic buildings. Sacred and
secular structures in the city from all ethnic groups became the objects of targeted
destruction, which left the city scarred and devastated for years after the cessation of
conflict. In fact, to this day bullet holes and craters from mortar shells on buildings,
streets and pedestrian areas still testify to the brutal attack on the city and its
architecture during the siege.
The Bosnian Serb forces surrounding the city destroyed a vast number of residential, cultural and commercial buildings in Sarajevo, but the targeted destruction of cultural and religious edifices in the city became a prominent feature of the siege. This seemingly intentional elimination of both sacred and secular cultural structures led scholars to label the devastation during the Bosnian War and during the Siege of Sarajevo, specifically, as ‘urbicide’ (Boyer, 2012: 329 and Herscher, 2008: 40).

According to Martin Coward (2008), ‘the term “urbicide” became popular during the 1992-95 Bosnian war as a way of referring to widespread and deliberate destruction of the urban environment. Coined by writers on urban development in America, urbicide captures the sense that the widespread and deliberate destruction of buildings is a distinct form of violence’. However, even though Serb forces were perpetrating the crimes against the city, no ethno-religious group’s structures were safe from their mortar shells and bullets. In fact, the central Serbian Orthodox cathedral and other Orthodox religious buildings sustained damage during the siege (Donia, 2009: 314), making the destruction often seem random rather than targeted. Despite this, cultural institutions with no ethno-religious affiliation suffered more than any other type of structure, and one of the most important cultural institutions in Sarajevo – the Austro-Hungarian city hall or Vijećnica, which housed the National Library – burned to the ground along with most of its contents during the night of the 25 and 26 August 1992. The bombing of the Vijećnica resulted in the loss of invaluable and irreplaceable books, collections and archives, adding to the devastating loss of the historic building itself. Librarians, fire fighters and everyday citizens worked throughout the night to save what they could from the burning building, but Serb forces ensured its complete annihilation (Riedlmayer, 1995). Other common cultural institutions that the Serbs targeted and destroyed included the Olympic Museum (held in a historic Austro-Hungarian villa) and the Oriental Institute, which housed Ottoman-era manuscripts and artefacts testifying to the cultural achievements of all the ethno-religious groups of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Almost all sacred buildings – mosques, churches and synagogues alike – bore some destruction during the siege.

However, cultural institutions and buildings were not the only structures targeted during the siege. Government buildings also incurred great damage, and chief among these was the modern glass and steel parliament building in the Marijin Dvor section of the city, which was built in 1982 and then shelled and burned in 1992. The UNIS towers – major commercial structures in the city also located in Marijin Dvor – had similar fates and were completely shelled and burned during the siege. Civil structures such as hospitals and the post office also became the objects of attacks. The main hospital in the city, Koševno Hospital, went without electricity and critical supplies throughout much of the war, and Dragan Kalinić, the minister of health of the Republika Srpska, suggested that the hospital be attacked and destroyed to deprive the enemy of medical assistance (Ibid., 315). In an attempt to halt the independent flow of news from outside Sarajevo, Serb forces attacked press institutions. They shelled the offices of the newspaper Oslobodjenje and hit the television and radio outlets, although theses were able to withstand the multiple attacks and continued to function throughout the siege (Ibid.). Almost all the buildings in the city experiences some damage, evidence of which remains today throughout Sarajevo in the form of unrepaird bullet holes and mortar craters.

Not only was the urban environment devastated during the siege, but daily life in the city also became arduous and difficult to endure. The besieging Serb forces strangled the flow of necessary goods and utilities into the city. Electricity, gas, water, food, public transportation and medical supplies all became targets, and the city went mostly without these goods and services throughout the siege. The scarcity of such necessities led people to risk their lives just to find bread and water, lining up for such goods at public markets and making themselves vulnerable to sniper attacks and shellings. In fact, Serb forces more than once attacked public places where citizens
were queuing for food and water, killing and injuring many innocent civilians. To add insult to injury, they then also attacked ambulances and rescue services attempting to help the wounded after such attacks (Ibid., 316). Simply crossing the city to find the staples for survival put one’s life at risk, yet such outings were necessary for basic survival.

The people of Sarajevo, however, did not simply give up throughout the siege, although some international journalists painted such a picture of Sarajevans at the time (Jestrović, 2013: 120). A sense of solidarity amongst the citizens of the besieged city grew throughout the war, and a vibrant cultural life actually existed despite the harrowing daily struggle for survival, reminding residents of life before the war (Maček, 2000: 60). According to Silvija Jestrović (2013), ‘During the war, 3102 artistic and cultural events took place or on average 2.5 events per day!’ (121) Sarajevans themselves organised most of these events and cultural activities, although some foreigners – notably Susan Sontag – also arranged cultural events in the city during the siege. Additionally, a very dark aspect to the traditional Bosnian humour was born during the war, and people joked and laughed throughout the siege. This contradiction of the image of the people of the city as passive suffering victims attests not only to the strength of character of the average citizen, but also to their ability to comment and critique the situation, all while maintaining the typical, self-deprecating Sarajevan humour (Maček, 2000: 60-61).

The Siege of Sarajevo destroyed some 60% of the city’s buildings (Bollens, 2007: 242) and damaged most of the historic, culturally significant structures in the city. In addition, important buildings used for government, press and commercial purposes also suffered at the hands of the besieging forces. Because of the widespread destruction in the city, reconstruction has proven to be a monumental task that has been greatly impaired by a lack of funding in general. Of the funding that has been given to reconstruction in Sarajevo, much has come from varied international sources,
including the European Union, diaspora communities and countries from the greater Muslim world.

4.4.2 Post-war Sarajevo: Bounding, Separating and Homogenising

The post-war urban environment in Sarajevo has been transformed greatly since the end of the Siege of Sarajevo. Although many post-socialist cities in Europe experienced massive changes to the urban landscape after the fall of the socialist systems (to be discussed more below), Sarajevo has dealt with both a post-socialist transition and a transition from a zone of conflict, giving way to extensive shifts in the composition of the built environment. This change in composition – both demographically as well as architecturally – has been a consequence of the Dayton Peace Accords. Dayton signalled the end of violent conflict in late 1995, but as a whole, the accords have created an incredibly complex governmental structure that, for Sarajevo, inhibits urban planning and growth. Because of Dayton’s creation of ethnically homogenous entities – the Federation of Muslims and Croats and the Republika Srpska (RS) – fundamental changes to the populations resulting from this organisation have led to developments in the urban environment. For Sarajevo this has been one of the main causes of the city’s Islamic shift.

The dual-entity system established with the Dayton Accords creates bounded, ethnically homogeneous areas within the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Figure 6). The Federation of Muslims and Croats, or simply the Federation, encompasses cities such as Mostar and Tuzla, while the Republika Srpska holds Banja Luka and Trebinje. Sarajevo’s status within the system of entities in BiH proves to be somewhat special. The majority of the urban land of the city exists within the Federation, but the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) cuts through the urban area of the city outside the main city centre. This part of the Republika Srpska, called Istočno Sarajevo or East Sarajevo, is at once part of the city and a different area altogether. Importantly, the
IEBL signals the transition from one ethnically homogeneous area to another inside the urban sphere of Sarajevo. Yet, while this boundary exists, Sarajevo is not a divided city along the lines of Jerusalem, Nicosia or even Mostar (Bollens, 2007: 243). The majority of the city is Muslim, including most of the commercial areas and the old town. The RS only exists in the outer suburbs of the city.

A large Serb population weathered the siege alongside Muslims and Croats in solidarity with the city’s population (Ibid.). However, the multi-ethnic city that had existed before the war ‘died at the peace-making table’ (Bollens, 2008: 1272), and most of the city’s Serbs departed into the RS soon after the signing of Dayton. Bollens explains that, ‘Dayton’s ethnic circumscription of space after the war catalysed a mass exodus in early 1996 of some 62,000 Sarajevo Serbs from inside what would be the Dayton borders of Sarajevo city and its suburbs and created the more mono-ethnic city of today (Ibid.). The international community and local politicians discussed a plan to
reincorporate Sarajevo’s Serb population back into the centre of the city, but this would also mean their incorporation into the Muslim-Croat Federation. Bollens posits that had a ‘spatially expansive zone that spanned entity boundaries’ (Ibid.) been created for Sarajevo specifically, more of the Serb population would have stayed in the city, giving it a more diverse demographic.

Along with Serbs leaving the Federation for the RS, Muslims caught within the boundaries of the Republika Srpska after the signing of Dayton also fled en masse to Muslim dominated parts of the Federation, especially Sarajevo. These immigrants to the city took up shelter in abandoned houses, and increased the percentage of Muslim residents in relation to other ethno-religious groups. Efforts to help displaced people return to their pre-war homes within the city mostly failed due to fears of inter-group tensions and conflict (Bollens, 2007: 244). The failure of return programs for displaced people means that many people originally from Sarajevo continue to live in other areas of Bosnia or abroad, including in Croatia and Serbia, and that the current population of the city comprises a mostly mono-ethnic number of Muslims originating from various parts of BiH.

4.4.3 Post-war Sarajevan Urbanism: Reconstruction, Planning, Privatisation

Ethnic homogenisation of the city has been one side of the changing urban landscape in Sarajevo; the built environment has also undergone a substantial change in appearance due to post-war reconstruction, planning and post-socialist privatisation. As a post-conflict society, reconstruction is a necessary process, but Bosnia and Herzegovina also transitioned from a socialist economy. Post-socialist societies in Central and Eastern Europe all witnessed similar processes in the urban environment, especially in terms of the nationalizing of spaces and the development of privately owned commerce. In many cases, politicians pushed forward changes in the built environment – such as the renaming of roads and the instalment of new monuments –
that eliminated reminders of the socialist rule and emphasised the pre-socialist nation (Diener and Hagen, 2013). A ‘flash malling of post-socialist Central Europe’ also occurred, and privatisation led to a massive increase in the number of shopping centres and retail establishments in many countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Garb and Dybicz, 2006: 232). Foreign direct investment has been a major source of this ‘retail revolution’, transforming these societies into competitive markets. Similar processes have been at work in Sarajevo as well, but the post-conflict reconstruction has compounded the extent to which the urban environment is changing. Since the war, the number of mosques and other Muslim religious structures constructed within the city limits has grown greatly, altering the multi-ethnic nature of the city’s urban fabric (Makas, 2012; and Markowitz, 2010: 46). Additionally, secular constructions such as shopping malls and hotels have increasingly been built using shari’ah compliant financing from Muslim countries, which stipulates that after the construction of the building, activities on the site must conform to certain rules. These rules indicate that there should be no eating of pork, no gambling and no selling or consuming of alcohol on the premises of a structure built with Islamic financing (Karim, 2010: 109-110). The city was in dire need of new investment in order to continue its economic and architectural reconstruction, and new interventions bring vital capital into the city. However, they also add to the mono-ethnic character of the urban environment, and there is some suggestion, as I will discuss below, that corruption in privatisation practices favoured investments with Islamic financing. In addition to an overall nationalizing of spaces akin to processes in other post-socialist cities, speculation in Sarajevo hints at the idea that corruption in planning, reconstruction and privatisation have all contributed to the Islamic shift of Sarajevo’s city space.

In terms of general urban trends, despite the massive destruction that Sarajevo suffered during the siege, the old city structure of mahalas surrounding the old town centre is still visible. These neighbourhoods continue to exist, although they have
begun to change in accordance with the evolving urban landscape of the city. Old Town does not often receive new, modern constructions, but it is the location for reconstructions of historic buildings such as the Austro-Hungarian Town Hall or Vijećnica, whose reconstruction finished in 2014. This makes logistical sense, as more useable plots of land exist outside of historic city centre. The main commercial centre has now shifted to the Marijin Dvor quarter of the city extending westward towards Ilidža. Most of the newer constructions in the city are built between Marijin Dvor and Ilidža, including new shopping centres, all of which are examples of post-war FDI in Sarajevo: the Saudi- and UAE-funded BBI Centre, the Saudi-funded Sarajevo City Centre (both of which will be used as case studies later in this thesis), and the mostly American-funded Alta Shopping Centre.

As with other post-socialist cities, Sarajevo has transformed its socialist legacy in the urban environment. Many post-socialist cities tried to either bury or minimize the socialist past in the urban environment by renaming streets and removing monuments. In Hungary statues from that era were even uprooted from their original locations and grouped together in a communist-themed statue mortuary outside of Budapest called Memento Park. However, BiH’s relationship with its socialist past is somewhat more complicated than other countries from the region. Many people believe life was better under the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and this shows in the built environment as well. In Sarajevo, the main street leading from Old Town to Marijin Dvor is still called Tito’s Street (Titova Ulica), and the eternal flame commemorating the partisans who died in the Second World War burns to this day. Yet the renaming of streets occurred on a large scale after the end of the war. A commission run mostly by Bosnian Muslims renamed most of the city streets associated with Serbs or with Serbia, and these streets took on names directly associated either with Sarajevo or with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Not all of the new names reflected Bosnian Muslims, but many did (Robinson et al., 2001: 967). Before the war, most street signs were blue and
were written in both the Cyrillic and the Latin scripts. The commission after the war removed these street signs and replaced them with green signs solely in the Latin script, reflecting the move towards a mono-ethnic city (Maček, 2000: 171).

In terms of city planning, gaining permission for a new construction or for a reconstruction proves to be a complex, time consuming and frustrating process. Each of the municipalities is responsible for building permissions within its boundaries, and individuals and companies must apply to the municipality for permission. Gaining permission takes at least a year if all the paperwork has been correctly submitted, and after initial permission has been granted based on urban requirements and the city plan, the second phase, which includes permission for utilities such as water and electricity, begins. The municipalities look toward the Canton for the city plan, which was originally mapped out in 1986. The Canton also controls the regulatory plans for the different quarters of the city, and the municipalities must refer to the Canton and its documents when deciding on permission for a structure. However, in my interview with a city planning professional in Sarajevo, my contact (to be kept anonymous) stated that the Canton’s plans can easily be modified or circumvented depending on the construction and who is asking for permission. Knowing how to play the system and having high-level political contacts seems as important for new constructions as having sound engineering and architecture. According to Bollens, ‘illegal construction and the influence of political connections significantly shape the location and magnitude of development’ in Sarajevo (Bollens, 2006: 100). Not only is it an incredibly old system that needs to be redesigned, but connections and corruption also play a major role in the urban planning of the city.

Urban planning is just one side of the developing urban environment in Sarajevo. Another factor greatly influencing what new urban interventions are being constructed is, of course, the privatisation of the land and properties in and around the city. Like all post-socialist countries, privatisation after the collapse of the socialist
system became an important factor in political and economic development, but because of the particularities of the post-conflict environment in BiH, privatisation in the country did not follow the best practices and lessons learned from other countries in the region (Martin, 2004: 1118). The international community following USAID’s lead took the reins of BiH privatisation, but the process became complex, and they implemented a mixture of privatisation methods. The main methods they employed were voucher privatisation and tenders of state assets (Ibid.).

According to my interview with an investigative journalist in Sarajevo, the tendering of state assets has been highly corrupt. Properties have been repeatedly sold for a fraction of their value, favouring ‘well-connected insiders of the “right” ethnicity’ over all others (Donais, 2002: 3). In Sarajevo, the ‘right ethnicity’ in terms of political connections is Bosnian Muslims, extending to all those with ties to Islam. At auction, bidders can bring down the price of a property using loopholes in the law. Companies and individuals usually pay 10% of the initial price of a property as a deposit and a fee of 1% before auction (Federal Agency for Privatisation). Those who do not win the bid will receive this money back in full, but the winner must pay the deposit and fee. However, the winning individual or company is not legally obliged to honour the deal, and except for the deposit and fee, there are no guarantees to back these transactions. Additionally, a list of individuals and companies that have not honoured their deals does not exist, so anyone privy to this system can back out of their commitments time and again. Once the highest bidder has refused to pay for the property, there is a second or a third auction, at which the price for the asset will have been slashed. It is assumed that, since the first bidder backed out of the deal, the land or property is not worth the value of the previous bid. Through this system it is possible for one individual or company to pay other individuals or companies slightly more than the initial deposit and fee for the auction, benefitting both parties. To illustrate this, an example of this corruption would take the following form: Company Z would pay
Company X (the first bidder) to bid and back out of the deal. They would pay slightly more than the deposit and fee, giving Company X a profit. When the asset goes to auction for a second time, Company Z would pay Company Y (the second bidder) similarly. At the third auction, once the property is being sold for a fraction of its worth, Company Z would finally make its own tender, snapping up important real estate for just pennies on the dollar, including the money paid to Company X and Y, according to my interview with an investigative journalist working on corruption in Sarajevo.

Corruption in privatisation was not limited to the auctioning of assets. The voucher system also proved highly problematic and benefited mostly the elite and their cronies. Donais (2002) explains that, ‘[there was not] much concern that the voucher component of Bosnia’s privatisation programme… would tend to reinforce ethnic divisions and provide opportunities for the wealthy, the corrupt and the politically-connected to consolidate power’ (6). This system gave all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina shares of the state-owned companies and assets during the privatisation process in the form of vouchers called certifikati. Individuals could take the vouchers and transform them into shares ‘directly or through managed investment funds’ (Ibid., 8). However, the wealthy and politically-connected quickly learned how to amass these shares and gain a majority stake. Because the everyday people at the time did not see a direct cash payout from investing in the newly privatised assets, many sold their vouchers for a fraction of their actual value (Ibid., 9). Men working for the elite camped out at places such as the eternal flame in Sarajevo offering to give cash for vouchers. Soon a secondary market was created, which gave rise to the development of a small elite holding majority shares – sometimes through dummy corporations – in important properties and companies throughout the country (Ibid., 10 and interview with BiH journalist working on corruption). This privatisation process has affected the development of the urban landscape in Sarajevo in a major way, as a small fraction of the population owns the most highly sought-after land and properties in the city.
Political agendas have been mixed with economic development and reconstruction, and some scattered evidence suggests that certain politicians are pushing for a stronger Muslim presence in Sarajevo’s space. For example, in 2003, Bosna Bank International (BBI) – an investment bank founded by the Islamic Development Bank in Saudi Arabia, the Dubai Islamic Bank, and the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank (to be discussed further in the following chapters) – bought the main socialist department store in the centre of the city for a mere 10 million BAM, or around €5.1 Million. Considering that the Italian company Benetton had previously bid €38 Million for the site, the final selling price of only €5 Million seems somewhat odd. This coupled with the fact that a major Bošnjak (Muslim) politician, Bakir Izetbegović, received a monthly allowance of 5,000 BAM to ‘oversee’ the construction of the BBI Centre (‘Weekly Profiles: Bosnia’s Wealthiest Politicians’, September 10, 2008) points to the utilisation of the corrupt privatisation method described above and personal agendas mixed into reconstruction.

4.4.4 Post-war Sarajevo: Spaces for All Citizens?

There has been an overall Islamic shift in the city spaces in Sarajevo, and alongside this process, open public spaces for everyday citizens and common cultural heritage have been neglected. Along with the destruction of the war, little by little, urbanisation and privatisation in the city has led to diminishing parks and garden spaces, public spaces that have been privatised, and common cultural heritage in crisis without funding. The three of these combined result in fewer open public spaces that have no ethno-national affiliation for the citizens of the city to enjoy, thus reducing the multi-ethnic nature of city and the everyday quality of life of its citizens.

Common cultural heritage – heritage sites that attest to the common history and culture of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that bridge all ethnic groups in the country – are currently in crisis, and the main cause of this crisis is the structure of the
Dayton Accords. Dayton makes no provision for a state-level ministry of culture, leading to confusion regarding the responsibility for these institutions. Because no body of government is directly responsible for the funding of common cultural heritage, they are left without reliable budgets and must apply for basic operating funds on an annual basis. While Dayton does not provide for a state-level ministry of culture, a commission responsible for the preservation of national monuments (Annex 8) was developed (Musi, 2012: 2), but this still does not solve the problem of funding for common cultural heritage. The result of this omission from the Accords is the slow administrative death of major cultural institutions. For example, the National Museum was forced to shut its doors between 2012 and 2015 because it could not afford to maintain regular working hours and pay its bills, and the National and University Library, which was once housed in the historic Austro-Hungarian city hall – the Vijećnica – has to fight to provide salaries for its staff and to pay its electrical bills in its current location in the old army barracks. The reconstruction of the Vijećnica has finished, but the library will only partially be housed in its walls and will instead be a home for the city administration (Hartmann, 2016).

As mentioned above, a number of shopping centres have been built in the city since the war, giving the people places to stroll and shop. However, these spaces are all heavily controlled and policed by private security firms, making them ‘quasi-public’ spaces – or spaces that are legally private but which form part of the public sphere (Carmona et al, 2010: 111). When these developments have been built using Islamic financing, the activities on the site are controlled. These shopping centres often have large squares associated with them; the BBI Centre, for example, sits on a large square with cafes and benches. People can sit on these areas, but they are not green areas, and activities such as picnicking would be uncomfortable on cement and might not be allowed by the security firms. Thus while they are in essence public spaces,
shopping malls allow only passing traffic for shopping and the consumption of authorised food and beverage in approved cafes.

The number of parks has similarly been severely diminished since the war, leaving the people few outdoor places to relax on warm summer days. As an unfortunate consequence of the large number of human casualties during the war, many of the city parks that had existed prior to the conflict were used for cemeteries during and after the siege. Thomas Sacher (2012) remarks that, ‘most former parks and green spaces have been turned into cemeteries. The largest one, in the Kosevo quarter, covers the entire football pitch of one of the former Olympic stadiums’ (1). In relation to other European cities, the percentage of parks and natural spaces in the city of Sarajevo is quite low and decreasing with urbanisation and post-war development (Kunovac et al, 2005). A new Marriott hotel in the Čobanija area of the city, for example, will control the small park nearby, diminishing the number of outdoor public areas accessible to the general population. With respect to this new hotel, the online forum Sarajevo Construction (www.sa-c.net) states that, ‘having in mind that the usage of park in the vicinity of the construction site will not be possible for personal security reason [sic] the investor has undertaken all necessary measures to protect the green areas. In addition, the SEIC and committed to rearrange the park and provide it a new content once the construction works are finalized’ (Sarajevo Construction). It seems that after construction of the hotel is finished, the park will be re-landscaped for the benefit of the hotel and its guests. It is not clear how much access the general population will have to the area, but like with the shopping centres, this once public area will exist as a legally private part of the public sphere and subject to control and regulation by its private owners.

4.5 Conclusion
Analyzing the post-conflict urban environment in Sarajevo is necessary for understanding the impact of new interventions within this historically multi-ethnic city. The history of the city’s growth and its identity shape how residents see their urban landscape, especially when, as in Sarajevo, the image of the city is deeply ingrained in the urban imaginary. Cities are key sites for change around the world, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo holds a special place within the country as the largest city and as the governmental and administrative capital. It is here, often, that new ideas are shaped and formed and where the rest of the country looks for leadership. Yet the Islamic shift, with its new urban interventions from GCC countries and post-conflict urban processes, is changing the very nature of the city, allowing for emergent cultural forms to develop. These forces are shaping the city away from the idealised version of Sarajevan identity based on ‘multiculturalism’.

Examining the changing urban space of Sarajevo requires a somewhat sensitive approach. There is a certain amount of hysteria that surrounds popular understandings of Islam, especially in Europe and in North America, and some scholars have even discussed the rising tide of radical Islam in the Balkans with as much panic (see, for example, Deliso, 2007; Morrison, 2008; and Shay, 2008). That transnational processes are bringing more Muslim investments to Sarajevo should not necessarily be taken in and of itself as something suspicious or dangerous. In fact, Sarajevo needed an injection of foreign direct investment after the war to help rebuild its economy and urban spaces. However, a phenomenon is now taking place in the city in which Sarajevo’s spaces and demographics are becoming more Muslim in character. In order to avoid the negative connotations associated with the word Islamisation, I have described this process as an Islamic shift in the city.

These processes are contributing to the city’s identity crisis. As the country moves towards European Union membership and as the city’s historically accepted identity erodes in the face of the Islamic shift, tensions between what is perceived as
the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ are growing. This mono-ethnic character of the city is a direct result of post-conflict policies, including Dayton’s ethnic partitioning and the privatisation process, which has been corrupt and has favoured certain individuals and cultures over others. Although the city’s Islamic shift should not be viewed as negative, in the context of a historically multi-ethnic city, it does have implications for how the city’s residents respond to new urban interventions with funding from the Gulf. In the following chapters, I will explore exactly how these new interventions in the urban landscape are being debated and discussed and the implications that this has for Sarajevo’s identity crisis in the globalising world.
5. Sarajevo’s Commercial Investments: Perceptions of Corruption and Investor Urbanism in Post-Conflict and Post-Socialist Urban Development

5.1 Introduction

Public space is integral to a city’s identity, and in Sarajevo this includes large-scale commercial developments that have been built since the Siege of Sarajevo. The new commercial investments that arrived in Sarajevo during this time of economic, social and political transformation have been paving the way for economic growth in Bosnia and Herzegovina and laying the foundation for greater flows of people, capital and ideas. Sarajevo’s dual transformation – from socialism and from conflict – with its breakneck rush to a capitalist market economy in a war-damaged city, creates a unique context for studying contemporary transnational investments and the urban redevelopment of the city. Constituting part of the public sphere, the origin of capital for large commercial developments in Sarajevo and the political struggles surrounding these investments have made these buildings contested spaces within the Sarajevan urban environment. Although public space is not a simple concept, I will refer to it as a ‘crossroads, where different paths and trajectories meet, sometimes overlapping and at other times colliding; they are the meeting place of politics and culture, social and individual territories, and instrumental and expressive concerns’ as defined by Ali Madanipour et al (2014: 1). In the case of commercial developments in Sarajevo, these public spaces are not ‘true public spaces’ where there is little to no control on the activities taking place (Mitchell, 1995). Rather, the case studies in this chapter represent quasi-public spaces: legally private areas that form part of the public sphere and remain under the control of private interests (Carmona, 2003: 111; Miljački, 2012: 187; Stanilov, 2007: 276).

In this chapter, I will examine two new commercial investments in Sarajevo: The BBI Centar (BBI) and the Sarajevo City Center (SCC). These investments have many
similarities. Both shopping centres were built with funding from Gulf countries – the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, specifically – and both occupy city squares in the very heart of Sarajevo, giving them a prominence in the urban landscape. Although there are other large-scale, noteworthy structures in Sarajevo such as Alta Shopping Center and the UNITIC towers, BBI and SCC have been among the most controversial urban interventions since the end of the Siege of Sarajevo. Not only has the source of their funding been a cause for popular discussion, but also the buildings’ alleged ties to certain Bosnian political elite have caused speculation and unease throughout the country as a whole. While commercial buildings such as the Alta Center and the Bosmal Centar (American and Malaysian investments, respectively) were also fraught with complications and controversy, both witnessing considerable financial difficulties during construction and operation, neither Alta nor Bosmal faced quite the media and popular reaction as BBI and SCC. These centres are globalising, bringing transnational and local actors together. BBI and SCC are what Ananya Roy and Aihwa Ong (2011) refer to as ‘worlding practices’ – ‘projects that attempt to establish or break established horizons of urban standards in and beyond a particular city’ (4). Through inter-referencing to projects in the Gulf, these centres are both particular to Sarajevo and global, and they attempt to solve the ‘urban problem’ (Ibid.) of post-socialist and post-conflict reconstruction and development.

As contested, quasi-public spaces, BBI and SCC are the subject of public debates in Sarajevo, which are being used to position Sarajevan identity along the imagined binary of East/West. I argue that Sarajevans view certain issues surrounding BBI and SCC as particularly ‘eastern’, especially the issue of corruption. Corruption can be defined here as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’ (Labelle, 2014: 4). Corruption is a real phenomenon occurring around the globe that can perpetuate social injustices keeping elites in power (ibid.), yet in Sarajevo, it is also mobilised as a discourse to separate activities deemed ‘eastern’ in contrast to ostensibly ‘western’
transparency. Corruption has been a real problem in the country since the Siege of Sarajevo, and as will be discussed below, most Sarajevans believe government officials are corrupt and self-serving. In fact, in 2014, protests against corruption erupted across the country and citizens’ plenums were established leading many to believe there would be large-scale changes especially in the political elite (see Arsenijević, 2014). However, to the disappointment of many Sarajevans, little changed in terms of the political establishment as these movements were co-opted and silenced.

The case studies in the chapter have also been vehicles for discourses about corruption in the city. As Sarajevo is undergoing an identity crisis, these public spaces become central to this discussion. In order to show this, I will analyse the media representation and the public perceptions of these buildings in two parts. First, I will examine the allegations and rumours of corruption surrounding BBI and SCC and how this focus on corruption is functioning in terms of legitimising or delegitimising political power. Second, I will focus on market-driven urbanism in Sarajevo and perceptions that investors’ power to shape the city is changing the character of spaces in Sarajevo with respect to its historical and idealised identity. Before moving to the analysis of my data, however, I will discuss investor urbanism – or market-driven urbanism – as a concept. I will then move on to give a more detailed look at the case studies themselves. In Sarajevo, as in other societies, imagined social binaries play a crucial role in the perception of city life and how the city and its inhabitants fit into the contemporary global reality. Analysing how Sarajevans are discussing BBI, SCC and the development of their city will allow a richer view of the anxieties and fears of city dwellers as the urban environment opens up to transnational flows of capital, people and ideas, especially those coming from areas of the world that are understood as the ‘East’.
5.1.1 Data Collection

The debates circulating around BBI and SCC are being played out in the media and in the public perceptions of the buildings. In order to demonstrate the effect of these discourses upon the positioning of Sarajevan identity, I drew from a large and varied selection of data, including: articles from different media outlets in BiH, interview data with stakeholders and people working in urban related fields in Sarajevo, field interviews (whereby I approached people on the street and in the shopping centres themselves to discuss the buildings) and survey data from my online survey about urban development in Sarajevo. I have also drawn from comments on an internet forum called SkycraperCity.com. This is a new and somewhat unconventional source for qualitative data, but I believe that this data supports my own findings and contributes viewpoints that interviewees might self-censor. I have tried to provide the context for the forum conversations and avoid people who are obviously looking to incite reaction. I endeavoured to keep the sources of my data as broad as possible in order to reflect the true debates and contestations taking place in Sarajevo regarding BBI and SCC.

In the first part where I will discuss allegations and rumours of corruption in the city, I will draw upon excerpts and notes from eleven interviews with project stakeholders and people working within urban development in Sarajevo. To add to this, I will analyse five field interviews from within BBI and SCC and from the Alipašino Polje area of the city. After discussing the perceptions of these individuals, I will examine media reports of corruption surrounding BBI and SCC, especially from the daily newspaper Dnevni Avaz, which according to USAID’s ‘Assessment of the Media Sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (Brunwasser et al, 2016) is the second most popular news portal in BiH and the most read newspaper in Sarajevo, according to my interview with a representative of the OSCE’s Press and Public Information Unit.2 I will also analyse

2 In conversation with representative of OSCE Press and Public Information Unit, 11.08.2015.
an article from *Slobodna Bosna*, a weekly political magazine and the 13th most popular news portal in BiH, according to USAID (Ibid.).

For the second part of the chapter, which will examine how Sarajevans are reacting to BBI and SCC in terms of their perceptions of market-driven urbanism and the power of investors to shape the city, I will draw from a similarly varied collection of data. I will use data from eight interviews with project stakeholders and urban professionals, and I will draw from my field interviews and survey responses. To add to this, I will analyse comments found on the internet forum *SkyscraperCity.com*. This is an architectural forum where people discuss architecture and urban development around the world. My data comes from the forum thread about Sarajevo’s development. Media reports centered around investor driven urbanism are less abundant than those dealing with the rumours of corruption with BBI and SCC. Therefore, I will also draw upon one article written in the weekly news magazine *Dani*, which is a rival to *Slobodna Bosna*, and one of two most important weeklies (according to Tarik Jusić in his analysis of media ownership in BiH (2004)). I will also draw from an article from *Al Jazeera Balkans*, a Qatari owned media source and the third most popular news portal in BiH, according to USAID (Brunwasser et al, 2016).

5.1.2 Investor Urbanism

Market-driven urban planning, or investor urbanism, is a feature that scholars of post-socialist cities are examining increasingly in the literature (see, for example, Van Assche and Salukvadze, 2013 and Vujošević, Zeković, and Maričić, 2010). According to Slavka Zeković, Miodrag Vujošević, and Tamara Maričić (2015), ‘The global economic and financial crisis in SEE is deeper than elsewhere, with low development status, low economic growth, high unemployment, an informal (“gray”) economy, massive informal building, uncertainties related to the impact of the globalisation process, an inappropriate institutional framework, poor technical infrastructure, huge
public debt, poverty, a prolonged regulatory gap in the economy, investment, urban development, and urban land economics,' (66). With all of these challenges to development and the difficulty in bringing in investors as described above, it is not a surprise that those willing to invest in Sarajevo's urban landscape are given some leeway regarding how the buildings fit into the urban plan. However, with this ushering in of capitalism at a breakneck speed, especially as BiH is undergoing a dual transformation, the perception exists that these new investments are dictating the development of the city instead of being a part of a more organised plan for the development of Sarajevo (as will be shown below in part two of this chapter).

Because much of the city was destroyed during the Siege of Sarajevo, investor urbanism becomes distinctive as the whole city is in the process of post-conflict redevelopment and reconstruction. Investors have more power in Sarajevo than in other post-socialist cities to dictate the long-term vision of the city. Clearly investment in the urban environment and the construction of shopping centres such as BBI and SCC may not be damaging to the city in and of themselves. BiH and Sarajevo need investment in order to continue developing. The problems with these investments arise, it is suggested, when investors begin to have power over the development of the city at the detriment of urban planning professionals and the overall quality of city life in terms of the environment and public spaces for the people.

One of the main challenges in Sarajevo is that the institutions that oversaw urban planning in the socialist era lack the power and ability to perform the work that they once carried out, according to my interviewees.³ The city is fighting to cope with the change from socialism to post-socialism, but the urban planning offices simply have limited resources when it comes to planning and development. A common theme in

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³ In conversation with an architect in Sarajevo 04.11.2015.
interview data is that permissions get pushed through quickly when money is involved, frustrating urban professionals and others trying to maintain a balance in the city. The collective thinking of socialist urban planning has given way to ‘strict individuality.’

Those with money can circumvent urban laws and regulations simply by changing their plans in accordance with a new Law on Spatial Planning that was brought into effect in 2005 (‘Zakon o prostornom uređenju’, 2005). This law and its articles 46 and 81 give investors the power to change plans that have already been given permission without public consent. It simply states that the ‘basic concept’ must remain the same, (Ibid.). The idea of what the basic concept of the plan is, however, can be and is debated. Only the agreement of three people is needed to change the plans after permission is given: the municipality’s mayor, the city mayor and the head of the canton. According to Nasiha Pozder, speaking in Dani, ‘legal constructions, and construction in accordance with the plans, also carry their hazards arising from the constant change of plans through the corrections that are provided by law, or to be applied to the detriment of the space and its users, and according to the wishes of investors and local authorities,’ (quoted in Omeragić and Redžić, 2014).

5.1.3 Case Studies: BBI and SCC

The BBI Centar (Figure 7) was the first shopping centre in Sarajevo built with funding from the Gulf region. BBI Real Estate – the real estate branch of Bosna Bank International (BBI) – was founded with capital from the Islamic Development Bank (based in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, Dubai Islamic

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4 For example, the mayor of Trnovo signed an agreement for a large tourist development Buroj Ozone in a rushed fashion on 15 October 2015, according to a town meeting that was held two days later, which I attended.
5 In conversation with Amer Vuk Zec, architect, 12.11.2015.
6 ‘U slučaju evidentnih nedostataka, nedorečenosti ili razlika u grafičkom i tekstualnom dijelu plana može se izvršiti korekcija provedbenog plana. Korekcijom provedbenog plana ne može se mijenjati osnovni koncept,’ (Zakon o prostornom uređenju, 2005: 11).
7 In conversation with Nasiha Pozder, Faculty of Architecture, University of Sarajevo, 05.03.2015.
8 ‘pravna gradnja, odnosno gradnja u skladu sa planovima također nosi svoje opasnosti koje proizlaze iz stalnih promjena planova kroz korekcije koje su zakonom predviđene, ali koje se primjenjuju na štetu i prostora i njegovih korisnika, a prema željama investitora ili lokalnih vlasti’
Bank, and Bosna Bank International, launching the project in 2006 and opening the completed shopping centre in 2009 (http://www.bbicentar.ba/bh/). At 5,500 m², BBI comprises a 479 vehicle capacity car park, 125 retail units with brands such as L’Occitane en Provence and Tommy Hilfiger, a food court, a mesjid (prayer room) and a tower of office spaces home to Al Jazeera Balkans and Bosna Bank International. Although BBI Real Estate originally considered constructing a five-star hotel on the premises, this idea was later abandoned in favour of the office tower due to practical considerations such as the lack of space that would be needed for a swimming pool and a laundry large enough to support such a business.\(^9\) Built on the site of the socialist-era department store known locally as the Sarajka, BBI sits on one of the busiest city squares and has become a meeting point in the city.\(^10\) Bosna Bank International purchased the war-destroyed Sarajka in 2002 during its privatisation, and the company ANS Drive became the contractor for its construction under the architectural guidance of Sead Gološ, who also designed the interior. The BBI Centar has a modern glass and steel design reminiscent of high-end shopping centres found throughout the world from the United States to Saudi Arabia. BBI allows groups and individuals the opportunity to apply to organise events on the square surrounding the shopping centre, and any activities in the space must be pre-approved. The entire investment is valued at 70 million BAM (27.8 million GBP).

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\(^9\) In conversation with Sead Živalj, general manager of BBI Real Estate 05.01.2016.
\(^10\) In conversation with Sead Živalj and anonymous architects in Sarajevo 04.11.2015.
The Sarajevo City Center (Figure 8) sits in the city quarter known as Marijin Dvor, only a ten-minute walk from BBI. Its investor, Al Shiddi Group, is an investment and development company based in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and founded by Sulaiman Al Shiddi. After acquiring the premises from the privatisation of the Yugoslav company Magros (a consortium of Magros Export-Import and Magros Veletrgovina), Al Shiddi Group began construction of SCC in 2008 and opened the shopping centre in 2014. The entire project is comprised of four parts: the 49,000 m² shopping area, which houses 80 retail units including Zara; a full car park with over 1000 parking spaces; a 6,000 m² office tower; and a 13,900 m² five-star hotel tower (soon to be a Weston hotel\textsuperscript{11}) with over 220 guest rooms, including presidential suites (scc.ba). Additionally SCC has entertainment facilities such as a bowling alley, an arcade, and a spa. Inside the shopping centre there is a mesjid with male and female ablution areas. Like the BBI

\textsuperscript{11} In conversation with Tarik Bilalbegović, Ascendant Project Finance 22.09.2015.
Centar, ANS Drive became the primary contractor for the construction of the complex, and architect Sead Gološ designed the building and the interior. SCC is also a modern glass and steel design, and it is adorned on the exterior with a very large plasma LED screen for advertisements and announcements, reminiscent of those found in Times Square or Piccadilly Circus. Although SCC does not have a square like BBI for organising events and small retail enterprises, it still controls the activities on its premises, and individuals wishing to conduct any activities other than shopping at SCC must apply first for permission. The entire investment is estimated at over 160 million BAM (63.3 million GBP).
As these investments originated in Muslim-majority countries, both BBI and SCC were built using Islamic financing, which has mandated certain rules regarding the use of the space. Because of this, it is impossible for profit to be made on items that
are considered haram – or forbidden – in Islam, including pork and alcohol.

Accordingly, both of the large Konzum supermarkets in BBI and SCC refrain from selling such products. There is also no gambling permitted on the premises. Islamic financing dictates that there must be an area for people to pray on the premises, thus both of the shopping centres have mesjids complete with male and female ablution areas.12

5.2 Corruption in the Building Process: Rumours and Legitimacy

In Sarajevo, my data (including interviews, field interviews, survey data and media analysis) suggests that perceptions of corruption on the part of the political elite are linked to new buildings with funding from GCC countries, especially BBI and SCC. There have been many rumours and allegations of corruption connected to these shopping centres, and this discourse serves two functions. First the allegations of corruption surrounding BBI and SCC position Sarajevan identity between the imaginary binary of East and West, especially as the funding source of these buildings stems from what Sarajevans see as the ‘East’. Second, such narratives serve to legitimise or delegitimise those who have the power to control the development of the urban environment and their networks. In this section, I will first set out how corruption is perceived as one of the major issues in BiH and in Sarajevo, generally and then within the building process, examining how Sarajevans and internationals working in Sarajevo discuss this issue. I will then analyse media reports about BBI and SCC that contributed to what has been called a media campaign against these buildings in my interviews with project stakeholders such as Samid Sinanović of Shad Invest and Sead Živalj the general manager of BBI Real Estate. Because much of what was said to me

12 Shopping centres with Muslim facilities exist around the world, including both Westfield shopping centres in London. Airports often have non-denominational prayer rooms as well, although they may or may not have full ablution facilities.
in my interviews is sensitive in terms of rumours and allegations of corruption, I have chosen to keep many of my informants anonymous.

5.2.1 Perceptions of Corruption

Perceptions of corruption and the causes of corruption highlighted in the UNODC BiH Business Corruption Report (2013) show that large percentages of business owners and representatives see corruption as a problem when conducting business, especially when dealing with officials and politicians. The report states:

When asked whether certain issues represent an obstacle to doing business in their country, business owners and representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina rank corruption as the sixth most important issue. In fact, corruption is considered a major obstacle by more than a third (36.5 per cent) of business representatives, after high taxes (64.3 per cent), complicated tax laws (50.1 per cent), political instability (42.5 per cent), labour regulations (40 per cent) and limited access to financing (37.2 per cent). However, an additional 37.2 per cent of respondents consider corruption a moderate obstacle to doing business, while 26.3 per cent consider it no obstacle...The data show that almost half (47.8 per cent) of business representatives consider lack of transparency a common cause of corruption. In addition, between 40 and 45 per cent of business representatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina consider great powers of public officials, absence of evaluation mechanisms, lack of integrity of officials, lack of integrity within businesses, inappropriate influence of politicians and influence of powerful individuals to be a common cause of corruption (41-44).

Very generally, this quote demonstrates the prevailing view amongst people in Bosnia and Herzegovina – local business owners and internationals alike – that corruption is deeply entrenched in politics as well as in the economy. Suggestions of corruption surround most political and economic issues, including the redevelopment of the city of Sarajevo. While the UNODC report focuses extensively on bribery among petty officials as the most obvious form of corruption, the perceptions of the causes of corruption by business owners also point at larger forces taking place in the country and are quite telling. It refers to the ‘great powers of public officials’ and the ‘inappropriate influence of politicians and influence of powerful individuals’ as common causes of corruption, as observed by 40-45 per cent of business representatives. That is a staggering statistic
that points at an understanding by BiH individuals that those in the country who have wealth and power are complicit in corruption.

Sentiments about the general level of corruption in the country were reflected in an interview I conducted with a female student at the architecture faculty. While discussing urban development in Sarajevo, she said:

So I guess that this is something like the entrance to Europe. You know, it’s always been like that. We’re the crossroad of everything! You know, people come from the East and the West and they meet here, the drug trafficking meets here as well and prostitution rings I guess. It’s just I think… there’s a diagram I found online a while back which basically said that all the paths crossed in Bosnia. It’s actually worrying because you don’t get in touch with that because you can’t really tell, but when you think about the crime rate, it actually makes perfect sense, and also by the way… we also have the biggest corruption level in entire Europe, the fact that our borders are not guarded by anything literally, err, also you can get a Bosnia passport like that [sound of fingers snapping].

While she focuses on symptoms of corruption, such as drug trafficking and prostitution, she also alludes to an interesting dynamic involving influences originating in the ‘East’. She states that BiH is ‘something like the entrance to Europe’ and that people come from both ‘East’ and ‘West’ at this ‘crossroads’. However, as BiH is part of Europe, the underlying suggestion is that the influences from the ‘East’ cause the high levels of corruption. By explaining that, ‘when you think about the crime rate, it actually makes perfect sense’ she is alluding to the fact that BiH has Eastern influences, which cause it to ‘have the biggest corruption level in entire Europe’. The borders are not guarded, allowing for all manner of elements from the ‘East’ into this ‘Entrance to Europe’.

While the quote above shows general attitudes about corruption in BiH, the issue of corruption surrounds foreign investment more specifically as well. When discussing foreign investments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one male interview respondent working for an international organisation (to be kept anonymous) explained:

They [Arab investors] have a lot of money, you know… So in Bosnia, lots of money during the war was came and gone [sic], and we never saw it. We don’t have solid proof, but lots of these foreign investments, it’s money that is being laundered. Like you find some Arab, you pay him a salary, and he’ll act as investor.
This quote constructs corruption, such as money laundering, as something that is connected to foreign investments, specifically in this case Arab investments. He depicts the process of laundering money as incredibly easy; it only takes finding ‘some Arab’ and paying him a salary in order to cover money laundering. Of course he does not explain the logical details of how this might work, but the suggestion is that Arabs can be easily bribed or used in corrupt schemes, and that they are, perhaps, more corrupt than other investors in BiH. There is a hidden suspicion of investments originating in the Arab world, especially with those who have ‘a lot of money’.

In my interviews with people working in the architectural and urban development sectors and with people working with government institutions, a recurring theme of corruption in investment and as an obstacle to investment arose. In fact, for large projects, more than one interviewee stated that it is necessary to have strong political connections to build, and that without some political protection, large-scale commercial investments are extremely difficult if not impossible. For example, one female respondent working for a governmental institution stressed that it is nearly impossible to build without good connections and that there are no public consultations in urban development, ‘everything is 100% top-down – no public consultation.’ She also explained that of today’s tycoons in BiH, ‘maybe 70% are war profiteers’. She does not state who these ‘tycoons’ are. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a small country and there are few rich and powerful people. Another woman I interviewed, who works in investment in Sarajevo, stated that, ‘big projects require shelter from one of the three main political parties. Everything can be done with the right connections.’ In other words, who you know is more important than how much you own.

Many of my interviewees explained that it is the corruption already existing in BiH that hinders investments from areas of the world that are not considered part of the
‘East’. One interviewee, a man working in urban development, described the situation in the following way:

The biggest impediment to investment in Bosnia is corruption. Most western investors avoid Sarajevo for this reason. It creates confusion, no clarity. The math cannot be applied. It creates unease, and a huge return on investment is needed. Nobody comes here; those that do take a big risk.

Thus, because there is so much corruption in Sarajevo, investors from the ‘West’ believe the risks are too large. That investors from Arab countries would not be deterred by the levels of corruption in investment assumes that for these investors, such a thing is normal or expected. However, another interview respondent who works at the architecture faculty described it in the following way, ‘the eastern world is more tolerant of the administration and bureaucracy in the Bosnian investment process. Americans, for example, would not tolerate it.’ This account is more diplomatic, and does not paint investors from GCC countries as necessarily corrupt or accepting of corruption.

The discourse that foreign investment from GCC countries is tied to corruption also points to who exactly is believed to be the perpetrator of this corruption. It is assumed in Sarajevo that the political elite are deeply involved in economic issues for their own personal advancement, and many people in the city (as will be examined below) implicate the SDA (Stranka Demokratske Akcije or Party of Democratic Action, a main Bošnjak political party in BiH) and the personage of Bakir Izetbegović, the Bošnjak member of the tripartite presidency who happens to be the son of Alija Izetbegović (the famous war-time politician). Bakir Izetbegović is a member of the SDA, and on his website, he claims he was the ‘coordinator of the building of BBI Centar in Sarajevo’ and that he ‘organised or significantly helped build mosques in Sarajevo’, including many foreign funded mosques (‘Biografija’,
For coordinating the building of BBI, Izetbegović received 2,500 BAM (993 GBP) monthly between 2005 and 2006 (Imovina Političara, http://imovinapoliticara.cin.ba/). Although he clearly has had a hand in bringing investment from the Middle East, many – including press sources, as will be discussed below – have speculated on his own personal gain from these investments.

To demonstrate the perception of Bakir Izetbegović in Sarajevo, one man working for a governmental organisation in the city explained Izetbegović’s influence in the following way:

You talk about Bakir Izetbegović, and he’s got a fortune around him. The other one is Radončić, the head of the political party SPB. They’re punching each other all the time, mentally, through newspapers through press releases... Every opportunity they get. You hear stories that there are people who have information that will put them both away for a long time. But those people, through fear or because they’ve been paid off, won’t come forward. You have to think that only twenty years ago these characters were the political mouthpieces of murder gangs. The henchmen of those gangs are still alive. Some of them are in prison, some have been killed by other gang members, but the majority are still alive. Would you go up against somebody like that if you had to live here?

I will discuss the rivalry between Izetbegović and Radončić further on in this chapter. This quote clearly describes the aura of fear and intimidation that surrounds people of great wealth and power in Sarajevo, specifically Bakir Izetbegović. He indicates that Izetbegović is involved in corrupt activities and that ‘there are people who have information that will put them both away for a long time’. However, by using the words ‘murder gangs’ and ‘henchmen’ and by explaining how some of the ‘gang members’ have killed other members, he underscores the prevailing discourse around this personage: Izetbegović is dangerous and would not be afraid of killing those who speak out against him.

Bakir Izetbegović had a stake in the construction of both BBI and SCC, and there have been many rumours and accusations of corruption levied at him for both

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13 ‘Bio je koordinator izgradnje BBI centra u Sarajevu...Gospodin Izetbegović je organizovao ili značajno pomogao izgradnju džamija u Sarajevu (Istiklal, Kralj Fahd, Koševo, Jordanska džamija, Malezijska džamija, Sokolje)’
investments. One of my interviewees, a man working for an international organisation, explained that:

There are rumours that Bakir Izetbegović is behind it [SCC], that he might have a stake in the ownership somehow... We have done a check into Al Shiddi, it is not as dodgy as in the Dnevni Avaz [more on this will be discussed below]. It's not as shady as it appears. The arrangements – the permits and permission and privatisation – was all completely non-transparent. Izetbegović was definitely involved in this. There is something dodgy there. Many things are done under the table, no transparency.

Izetbegović and his business practices are associated with ideas such as ‘non-transparent’, ‘shady’ and ‘dodgy’, and while the construction of SCC is ‘not as dodgy as in the Dnevni Avaz’, Bakir Izetbegović is still characterised as somewhat crooked and unscrupulous.

Many of my field interviews also pointed to Bakir Izetbegović and the SDA as hidden political forces behind foreign investments such as SCC and BBI. For example one man, a waiter working in the Alipašino Polje area of the city stated, ‘there are hidden political motivations, big political motivations.’\textsuperscript{14} When I asked him who he thought might have hidden political motivations behind the investments, he replied, ‘SDA, the thieving party [lopovska stranka]’. In another of my field interviews, a female shopkeeper in BBI stated:

Yes, yes. There are hidden political motivations, here everything is politically bound, and I think that everything is in the interest... and these large centres, I think everything is beautiful and well-visited, for us it is lovely for the people to use something so beautiful, but behind everything stands politics and the biggest profit goes in the pockets of the politicians.\textsuperscript{15}

When I pressed her to state which politicians or political parties had hidden motivations, she answered without any hesitation, ‘Bakir Izetbegović, SDA, we all know

\textsuperscript{14} ‘Krije, krije... i to veliki politički motiv’

\textsuperscript{15} ‘Da, da. Krije se politički motiv, ovđje je sve politički uvezano i mislim da je sve u interesu... I ovi neki veliki centri, mislim sve je to lijepo i posjećano, nama je to divno, za narod da koristi tako nešto lijepo, ali iza svega togo stoji politika i najveća dobit ide u džepove političara.’
that, but not everyone will say it." There is a great deal of fear connected with corruption in Sarajevo and with personages such as Bakir Izetbegović, as this field interview respondent suggests. People are reluctant to talk about who or which forces might be behind foreign investment in Sarajevo. One woman even refused to continue further with our interview after being asked about political connections. Indeed, many seem to fear some sort of retribution from political leader, even when speaking anonymously with me.

Many of my field interviews reflect this fear. One male, Muslim shopkeeper explained:

There are [hidden political motivations]. That means, to you it is a public secret. Everybody alive knows about it being so, but nobody says so because people are afraid of something, I don’t know what. Another woman, a young economist, couched her answer in such a way as to not outwardly name any parties specifically. She said:

Of course, of course, everything is political... well, I think it is those who are in power. I would have a lot to say, believe me, but... well, I think about those who are ruling now, about the presidents let’s say, about one head president who has taken the wheel of this state, unfortunately, after his father [Alija Izetbegović] he continued and so on. I hope not much longer [that he will be in power].

She does not explicitly state that she thinks Bakir Izetbegović is behind foreign investments in the country, but she greatly alludes to it by mentioning ‘those who are ruling now... one head president who has taken the wheel of this state...after his father’. However, she is reluctant to say any more, explaining that ‘I would have a lot to say, believe me’, but she does not, presumably out of fear. Likewise, another female shopkeeper responded that:

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16 ‘Bakir Izetbegović, SDA, svi to znamo, a neće svako da kaže.’
17 ‘To se krije...znači, to vam je javna tajna. Svako živ zna o tome da je to tako, ali niko ne govori zato što se ljudi boje nečega, ne znam čega.’
18 ‘Naravno, naravno, sve je politički... Pa mislim o ovim što su na vlasti. Imala bih ja puno toga da kažem, vjerujte mi, ali ovaj...pa mislim o ovim što vladaju sada, predsjednicima recimo, jednom glavnom predsjedniku koji vodi kolo u ovoj državi, nažalost, poslije svog oca on je nastavio i tako dalje. Nadam se da neće još dugo.’
Political motivations are hidden in everything here. I think that there doesn’t exist anything that doesn’t hide [them]. That is a rarity really… who do I think [is behind the investments]? Uh, I don’t want to respond. I’m sorry, I don’t want to. I think that maybe that is clear to everyone who it is.19

The perception in the city that certain politicians are behind the investments and that they are potentially dangerous, even to non-elites, is quite pervasive.

On the other hand, however, two of my interviewees described this perception as part of the problem when courting investment into Bosnia and Herzegovina. In my interview with Enes Kazazić, the director of South European Investment Company (SEIC), he explained that:

The major problem is our mentality. Here in Bosnia... when we speak about GCC, among Bošnijački... that always there might be some bad scenario. Who’s coming? Is it some politically motivated something? You know, I think this terrorism word is always a kind of umbrella. Who is checking whom, you know?

Interestingly, as someone engaged in courting investment from GCC countries, he downplayed any and all talk about politics and corruption. His response indicates that the mentality of the people connects investment from the Gulf region with terrorism, and this is the real reason that people are afraid. Samid Sinanović, the director of Shad Invest, a member of the Al Shiddi group, had a similar response. He said:

Bosnia has always been part of the East and West. They all want to be part of the EU. They would like investors from the West – from Germany. In their minds, if they are not from the West it is degrading them as part of the West, part of the EU. There are mainly eastern investors. We cannot afford to tell them no.

According to Sinanović, it is the people’s prejudices that are a major obstacle. They want to be seen as a part of the West, which is why the discourses surrounding BBI and SCC have been constructed in such a way as to position Sarajevan identity along the East/West binary.

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19 ‘U svemu se kod nas krije politički motiv. Ja mislim da ne postoji ništa što se ne krije. To je rijetkost, stvarno...Ko mislim? E, to neću da odgovorim. Izvin, to neću. Mislim da je to možda svima i jasno čiji je.’
As many of the quotes above indicate, the perception exists in Sarajevo that corruption has been tied to movements of people, capital and ideas from the ‘East’ or from Islamic countries. People in the city see Bakir Izetbegović as someone who is perhaps outside the law and also the individual who is instrumental in courting investments from GCC countries and elsewhere in the Muslim world. Thus the two things have become entwined in the popular construction of this narrative: corruption and investment from the Arab world. People in the city use the connection to corruption to position Sarajevan identity towards the ‘West’ and towards Europe and the EU. Little discussion of corruption from countries such as the United States of America or Germany is mentioned, although this undoubtedly exists. By focusing on corruption with respect to BBI and SCC and Bakir Izetbegović, the spaces become contested, especially in terms of the city’s identity.

5.2.2 Press Campaigns Against BBI and SCC

According to my interviews with Samid Sinanović, the director of Shad Invest, part of the Al Shiddi group, and Sead Živalj, the director of BBI, (and hinted at by other interviewees off the record), there were media campaigns launched in certain BiH media outlets against the building of both BBI and SCC. The negative media coverage of these two buildings and their connection to, especially, Bakir Izetbegović, contributed in no small way to the prevailing discourses surrounding the investments, especially in terms of corruption. These discourses that circulated in the press served to, in many cases, delegitimise the power networks that brought the investments into the city. In this section, I will explore media’s portrayal SCC (and to a lesser extent, BBI), notably by the BiH media outlet Dnevni Avaz. While also contributing to the discourse of corruption discussed in the section above, this media coverage also discredited Bakir Izetbegović, the SDA and their Arab business partners. These discourses, in addition to serving the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the power networks, also serve to again
position Sarajevan identity between the imagined binaries of East/West in terms of corruption as discussed in the section above.

Media outlets in Bosnia and Herzegovina are strongly connected to political interests. In fact, according to Davor Marko (2011), ‘In the analysis of the media landscape and media reporting on political candidates in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 2010 general election campaign, it was noticed that major media were affiliated to various political groups and openly advocated for or riled against voter choices,’ (167). One of the most widely read newspapers in Sarajevo is the Dnevni Avaz, according to a representative of the OSCE’s Press and Public Information Unit. Fahrudin Radončić, a Bošnjak politician who currently heads the political party Savez za bolju budućnost BiH (Union for a Better Future of BiH), owned the Dnevni Avaz after the war (Kurspahić, 2003: 156). However, the newspaper has now been handed over to his ex-wife Azra Radončić,²⁰ ostensibly to curb criticisms of conflict of interest. The Dnevni Avaz has been instrumental in the above-mentioned media campaigns against SCC that delegitimise Bakir Izetbegović and his business partners.

Fahrudin Radončić and Bakir Izetbegović have been known political adversaries. Michael Pugh (2016) has even commented somewhat indirectly on the media campaigns against Izetbegović, explaining:

This did not deter a subsequent campaign in the daily newspaper Dnevni Avaz (e.g. 4 June 2012), owned by Radončić. It denounced Selimović [another BiH politician] as personifying privatization trickery (also alluding to the construction activities of Bakir Izetbegović, son of Alija, also on the Dani list)...Radončić certainly had business interests, and two prestige skyscrapers in Sarajevo, that could benefit from political engagement. Splitting from the Izetbegović-dominated SDA he created the Union for a Better Future for Bosnia (SBB), which divided the Bosniak vote in the 2010 and 2014 general elections (180).

Of the media that has been the most negative against the shopping centres, Dnevni Avaz has been by far the most active in campaigning against the alleged political connections, corruption and financial crime connected with the buildings. Behind these

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²⁰In conversation with representative of OSCE’s Press and Public Information Unit, 11.08.2015.
campaigns lies a struggle for prime real estate in the city of Sarajevo and control of the urban environment. Radončić is not only a media mogul and politician, but he also owns at least two major buildings in Sarajevo: the Avaz Twist Tower and the Radon Plaza Hotel. What makes these media campaigns telling is that Radončić also bid on Magros as it was being privatised and lost out to Al-Shiddi, and thus SCC.²¹

Izetbegović has many friends in the Muslim world and is very close to people such as Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. His business partners hail from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia and other Muslim-majority countries. Radončić, on the other hand, has, ‘cultivated international opinion as a pro-European and anti-corruption crusader,’ (Pugh, 2016: 180). SCC and BBI (and by contrast the Avaz Twist Tower, especially) thus become embodiments of greater international political encounters, the East and the West.

Looking first at articles that were published in the Dnevni Avaz, the wording of many of the stories and headlines point to such a campaign against Bakir Izetbegović and his business partners as mentioned by my interviewees. For example, Bakir Izetbegović is portrayed as a scrupulously unethical man of connections, a corrupt war profiteer in the pockets of Islamists. Fahir Karalić (2013a) wrote an article for the Dnevni Avaz titled “Ševe oversees all Bakir’s buildings’. Ševe was a secret police organisation that was formed during the war and that allegedly received training from Iran (Pugliese, 2015). Karalić describes Ševe as a ‘terrorist unit’²², and he states that Sead Gološ, the architect of both BBI and SCC was a member of this terrorist unit and:

one of the key links connecting the circle with Bakir Izetbegović at the centre, which, with the construction of several buildings and the acquisition of valuable real estate in the capital, judging by everything, laundered several hundred million marks, as shown by the research of “Dnevni Avaz”²³ (Karalić, 2013a).

²¹ In conversation with anonymous businessman and Šamid Sinanović 19.10.2015.
²² ‘teroristička jedinica’
²³ ‘Jedna je od ključnih karika koje povezuju halku s Bakiro m Izetbegovićem u centru, a koja je izgradnjom nekoliko objekata i otimanjem vrijednih nekretnina u glavnom gradu, sudeći po svemu, oprala nekoliko stotina miliona maraka, pokazalo je istraživanje “Dnev nog avaza”!’
Karalić thus connects the architect of BBI and SCC with very serious allegations of corruption against Bakir Izetbegović, while also implicating all involved in a ‘terrorist’ organisation that received training from Iran. Corruption, then, is again tied to Islamic countries and their influences in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The author continues by saying, ‘In fact, all of the one million suspicious and often illegal building jobs in Sarajevo, which were tied to Izetbegović’s pro-Iranian circle, are not built without Gološ’s architectural studio.’

Employing words such as suspicious and illegal in reference to Izetbegović and his business activities delegitimises these investments and brands them as criminal businesses, and by including Iran (pro-Iranian circle), the author links Izetbegović and his business activities directly to the greater Muslim world.

Karalić furthers this by incriminating specific individuals affiliated with BBI and SCC. He states:

And the research shows that it is precisely ‘Group Arh’ [Gološ’s architectural studio] that is the proof of this unbreakable connection between Izetbegovic and his ‘operatives’ Amer Bukvic, the director of ‘Bosnia Bank International’, Sulaiman Al-Shiddi, the phantom Saudi investor, tycoon Hilme and Muje Selimović, who with the help of the SDA invested in more than 120 state-owned companies, and Sefkija Okeric, also a tycoon close to the SDA and the builder of Bosmal ...

Gološ also oversees the construction of the Al-Shiddi business center in Marindvor in downtown Sarajevo, and was also authorized to supervise the construction of the Gazi Husrev-bey Library and Hotel Europe. Bakir Izetbegović, the Bošnjački member of the Presidency of BiH, appeared in almost all projects, in one way or another, whether he was a consultant in the construction (as is the case with the BBI Centar), a supervisory authority or coordinator. Also, insiders say that the contractors on some of these construction projects, when the investor did not pay them on time, went to Izetbegović asking him to order the payment of money! (Ibid.).

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24 ‘Naime, svi sumnjivi i često nezakoniti milionski poslovi izgradnje objekata u Sarajevu, a koji su se vezali za Izetbegovićev proiraninski krug, nije rađen bez Gološevog arhitektonskog studija.’

25 ‘A istraživanje pokazuje da je upravo “Grupa Arh” dokaz neraskidive veze između Izetbegovića i njegovih „operativaca” Amera Bukvića, direktora „Bosnia Bank Internacional”, Sulejmana el-Šidija, fantomskog saudijskog investitora, tajkuna Hilme i Muje Selimović, koji su se uz pomoć SDA domogli više od 120 državnih kompanija, i Šefkije Okerića, također tajkuna blikskog SDA te graditelja „Bosmal”… Gološ nadzire ugradnju „Al-Šiddi” poslovnog centra na Marindvoru u centru Sarajeva, a bio je i ovlašten za nadzor u izgradnji Gazi Husrev-begove bibliotekе te hotela „Europa”. U skoro svim projektima, na ovaj ili onaj način, pojavljivao se i Bakir Izetbegović, bolnjački član Predsjedništva BiH, bilo da je bio konsultant u gradnji (košto što je slučaj s BBI centrom), nadzorni organ ili koordinator. Također, upućeni govore da su izvođači radova na nekim od ovih građevinskih projekata, kada im investitor nije plaćao na vrijeme, išli upravo kod Izetbegovića može i ga da naredi isplatu novca!’
The author thus suggests that both BBI and SCC were involved in corruption in one way or another through Bakir Izetbegović and Sead Gološ’s architectural studio. It furthers the construction of the narrative that both shopping centres were built using corrupt practices, but it also ties BBI and SCC to the ‘pro-Iranian’ ‘terrorist organisation’, which delegitimises the power networks involved in the building of the centres. The members of Izetbegović’s circle are characterised as ‘phantom Saudi investor’ and ‘tycoon’, which paint them as shady individuals, possibly involved in criminal activity (as such words suggest).

Later in 2013, Karalić (2013b) wrote another article in the Dnevni Avaz titled, ‘The prosecutor's office has extensive documentation of the crimes of Bakir’s partners’ accompanying a photo of Bakir Izetbegović and Sulaiman Al-Shiddi. He suggests that the Cantonal Prosecutor's Office has found that actions are being taken to conceal the real origin of money for investment into SCC, using an offshore company based in the Cayman Islands called Istethmary Sarajevo City Center-II Ltd. (and apparently a sister company called Istethmary Sarajevo City Center-I Ltd.). He states, ‘namely, "Istethmary Sarajevo City Center-II Ltd." is the owner of 28.31% of "Magros Veletrgovina". At the same time, the owner of this Cayman company is "Istethmary Sarajevo City Center-I Ltd.", which is also registered on these exotic islands, and it was founded by "International Investment Bank" from Bahrain.’ (Karalić, 2013b). This article alleges that Izetbegović and his partners are committing criminal acts in the privatisation of Magros for SCC by using an offshore company to buy the property. Interestingly, Karalić mentions that Istethmary Sarajevo City Center-I Ltd. was founded by the IIB in Bahrain, making its connection to the ‘East’ more explicit.

In a commentary published in June of 2014, Karalić (2014a) claims, ‘Bakir behind the back: Lenient punishment for Al-Shiddi is a clear sign that he has powerful

26 ‘Tužilaštvo ima obimnu dokumentaciju o kriminalu Bakirovih partnera’
aides and political patrons like Bakir Izetbegovic,\(^27\) (3). He also claims Izetbegović helped with the privatisation of Magros before the construction of SCC (Ibid.). Using phrasing such as ‘lenient punishment’ suggests that those close to Izetbegović are somehow above the law, making their dealings murky in nature and delegitimising the business connections. Later that year, the same author wrote another article titled, ‘Bakir got SCC and “Bristol” for three million KM, damaged the state for hundreds of millions.’\(^28\) (2014b). In this article, Karalić reported money laundering of donor funds between Izetbegović, Bukvić (of BBI) and Al-Shiddi (Ibid.). The construction of this discourse of corruption blends all of these business links together, painting a simple picture of Izetbegović’s power circle and swiftly defaming the people involved and their buildings and businesses. The report also states, ‘otherwise the financial support for the suspicious activities of Al-Shiddi and Bakir Izetbegovic has been provided by BBI, which is headed by one of their close associates, Amer Bukvić.’\(^29\) (Ibid.). That their dealings have ‘damaged the state’ and are ‘suspicious’ portrays the building SCC as very much illegal and delegitimises the political and business networks involved.

Another headline from the Dnevni Avaz research team in 2014 questions, ‘Who are the members of Bakir’s secret circles? A group of unscrupulous Mladi Muslimani [The Young Muslims, a defunct pan-Islamist group] descendents who want to rule with the state,’\(^30\) (Research Team [Istraživački tim], 2014). Again, words such as unscrupulous serve to discredit Izetbegović’s business networks and links them to pan-Islamism. They go on to claim to know the ‘relations to Bakir’s groups and the Muslim Brotherhood,’\(^31\) (Ibid.). By associating Izetbegović and his business partners involved with SCC and BBI with the Muslim Brotherhood, the authors of the article link the

\(^27\) ‘Bakir iza leđa: Blaga kazna ze El-Šidija jasan je znak da iza sebe ima moćne sarađnike i političke pokrovitelje poput Bakira Izetbegovića.’
\(^28\) ‘Bakir dobio SCC i “Bristol” za tri miliona KM, oštetio državu za stotine miliona!’
\(^29\) ‘Inače finansijsku podršku za sumnijeve poslove El-Šidija i Bakira Izetbegovića godinama pruža “Bosnia [sic] Bank International” (BBI) na čijem je čelu bliski im saranck Amer Bukvić.’
\(^30\) ‘Ko su članovi Bakirove halke? Državom želi vladati grupa beskrupuloznih mladomuslimanskih potomaka.’
\(^31\) ‘Veze Bakirove grupe i Muslimanskog bratstva.’
shopping centres to the Middle East where the Muslim Brotherhood is most active.

There is even a photo in this article of Bakir Izetbegović with ‘the delegation of the Muslim Brotherhood’\(^{32}\). These allegations of corruption and of links to Islamist groups contribute to the media campaigns that delegitimise the power networks surrounding Bakir Izetbegović, and by proxy the shopping centres themselves as public spaces in the city.

*Dnevni Avaz*, however, was not the only media outlet to report on corruption linked to SCC and Bakir Izetbegović. In a *Slobodna Bosna* report titled ‘Halal investments: thank God’\(^{33}\) that questions the transparency of the financing of SCC (specifically Al-Shiddi’s Cayman Island-registered subsidiary Istethmary Sarajevo City Center-II LTD that helped finance its construction (Fazlić, 2014)), there is also a suggestion of financial interest on the part of Izetbegović. The report states:

> And if it is already known that the above-mentioned bank [International Investment Bank from Bahrain] concluded an agreement on participation in the construction of the Sarajevo City Center with Al-Shiddi in 2009, the question is why was this work done through an offshore company registered in the Cayman Islands? The answer to this, and other issues related to the (il)legality of the building and implementation of the Sarajevo City Center certainly could be provided by Sulaiman Al-Shiddi, and perhaps the Bošnjak member of the Presidency Bakir Izetbegović\(^{34}\). (23).

This report continues the narrative of corruption surrounding Izetbegović and the building of SCC. The wording (il)legality suggests a high level of corruption on the part of Izetbegović, making the entire enterprise suspicious – an invalid addition to Sarajevo’s urban fabric.

Although BBI and businessmen associated with BBI are often implicated with SCC in these articles, the shopping centre itself did not witness the same level of

\(^{32}\) ‘Bakir Izetbegović s delegacijom Muslimanskog bratstva’

\(^{33}\) ‘Halal investicije: šućur Allah’

\(^{34}\) ‘A ako se već zna da je spomenuta banka sa al-shiddijem još 2009. godine zaključila sporazum o učešću u izgradnji “Sarajevo City Centra”, postavlja se pitanje zašto se taj posao realizuje preko offshore kompanija registrovanih na Kajmanskim otocima? Odgovor na ovo, ali i druga pitanja koja se tiču (i)legalnosti prilikom izgradnje i realizacije projekta “Sarajevo City Centar” sigurno bi nam mogao dati Sulejman al-Shiddi, a možda i bošnjacički član Predsjedništva Bakir Izetbegović’
scrutiny during its building as the SCC campaigns in terms of actively serving to discredit the power networks. However, there was a petition to stop construction of BBI in favour of a public square (see, for example, Filipović, 2006). This was a more overt challenge to the control of the public space, which in the end failed. However, the media campaign to collect signatures for the public square did become a major obstacle to BBI’s construction, according to my interview with Sead Živalj. Both BBI and SCC are thus contested spaces in the city, whose legitimacy depends upon the legality of their privatisation and development.

In opposition to this, BBI and SCC project stakeholders have discussed the media reports against the buildings. They stressed in interviews with me that the media campaigns proved to be some of the major obstacles that they encountered. When interviewing the director of SCC, Goran Kahvedžić, and Edin Sefo, the CEO of Management Development Consulting (MDC) who oversaw the construction of SCC, both underscored their commitment to transparency and their willingness to discuss the buildings with both researchers and the media. Samid Sinanović, the general director of Shad Invest, and Sead Živalj, the director of BBI, also echoed these sentiments.

I have argued that corruption is an issue constructed as particularly ‘eastern’ in the Sarajevo imaginary, in contrast to ostensibly ‘western’ transparency, and that Sarajevo is undergoing an identity crisis, part of which pulls Sarajevan identity between the two imaginary poles of ‘East’ and ‘West’. BBI and SCC with funding from GCC countries are contested spaces in the public sphere, and they have been closely linked to corruption. The sustained media campaign in Dnevni Avaz served to question the legitimacy of these buildings, their funding and their place within the city spaces of Sarajevo. This helps to position Sarajevan identity along this imaginary binary away from the corrupt ‘East’ and towards an assumed transparent and democratic ‘West’. In

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35 In conversation with Sead Živalj 05.01.2016.
36 In conversation with Sead Živalj of BBI, Samid Sinanović of Shad Invest, and Edin Safo of MDC.
the next section, I will discuss investor urbanism and the power of money to determine urban practices in the city, which will investigate ideas of control over public spaces such as BBI and SCC and what that means for the identity of the city.

5.3 ‘Money is the Only Standard’: Investor Urbanism in Sarajevo

Market-driven urban planning, or investor urbanism, as discussed above is a feature of post-socialist cities, in which elites give investors leeway in the urban environment – even outside the bounds of urban planning offices – to create the spaces in the city that they would like with little to no public consultation. In Sarajevo, public debates about how the capital itself has functioned to dictate the growth of the city focuses on whether development should be decided by elites or whether the public should also have a say. By questioning the role of the urban planning office (or its lack of control in dictating the development of the city, especially in terms of what Sarajevans believe the city needs), and by examining the feeling of exclusion of Sarajevans from public spaces such as BBI and SCC, narratives are constructed that position Sarajevan identity along the East/West binary. In this section I will first analyse interview, survey and media data about investor urbanism in Sarajevo with respect to how building projects such as SCC and BBI circumvent urban planning officials. In the second part of this section, I will examine Sarajevan perceptions of investor urbanism and how it is changing the nature of the city.

5.3.1 ‘Those Who Have Money Build’ – Global Forces in Control of Urban Development

When it comes to post-socialist and post-conflict urban development in Sarajevo, people believe that money is the driving force behind all building projects. Although money dictates much of urban planning in other cities in the world as well, in Sarajevo with its socialist legacy, people see money sweeping aside their concerns for the environment and the general quality of life in the city. While the primacy of money
for urban development is almost a given in today’s world, in Sarajevo, it is the source of
that capital that stands behind the unease of the people, especially when these
investors – often foreigners – and their capital and political connections determine the
development of Sarajevans’ city. The perceived problems with these investments arise
when investors begin to have power over the development of the city at the apparent
detriment of urban planning professionals and the vision Sarajevans have for the
overall quality of city life.

Investor urbanism comes in stark contrast to Sarajevo’s socialist history of
urban planning, and this becomes part of the discourse surrounding BBI and SCC as
commercial buildings. In my interview with Sarajevan architect Amir Zec, he echoed
such ideas, saying, ‘before people thought collectively – now there is strict and rigid
individuality. We are losing public space and relation to others’. Public space has thus
become a battleground between the collective, the pre-siege socialist way of life and
the individual, post-siege capitalist order. Underlying this statement are the assumed
ideals of collectivity and community in socialist public space versus the cold
individualism and impersonal nature of capitalist cities. It belies the belief in a dying
urban planning profession at the hands of capitalism, where social constructions that
were common before the breakup of Yugoslavia are disappearing and foreign investors
are given free rein to build commercial buildings outside ordinary rules and regulations.

Adding to the perception of a dying socialist urban planning profession is the
fact that urban planning offices are struggling to adapt to contemporary realities of a
globalising city. Institutions that oversaw urban planning in the socialist era lack the
power and ability to perform the work that they once carried out, which blends into
these discourses of social space vs. capitalist space. According to one architect in
Sarajevo:

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37 In conversation with Amir ‘Vuk’ Zec, 12.11.2015
There have been many changes in the last twenty years, and one of the major shifts is from this large socialist planning to a total free market driven government...the institutions are the same, nothing has changed...I think that urban planning and spatial planning is one of the most complex things that one can imagine...All cities are struggling, all societies are struggling to keep a good balance, and we can see here that institutions are not best equipped to cope with the process...but even... if they develop regulation plans with good intentions...they’re not very appropriate any more, they're very old style. In addition, you have the investors with a lot of powers who overrun them, who upscale them, making it impossible.  

Investors are pitted against the urban planners, and it is the capital in the end that edges out more socialist-minded ideas of how the city should develop. He portrays a quasi battle between the investors and urban planning offices, but it is the investors ‘with a lot of powers who overrun them, who upscale them'. Because these investors are mostly foreign, and because they hail from the Arab world, an underlying message is that ‘eastern' forces are controlling the city with their money, while European Sarajevans fight to demand more social spaces and parks. A common theme in interview data is that permissions get pushed through quickly when money is involved, frustrating urban professionals and others trying to maintain a balance in the city. One architect in the city, who I will keep anonymous, stated that, ‘Investors push through permissions for big projects. There is little to no resistance from authorities or from the people.' Another architect working in Sarajevo, who I will also keep anonymous, explained that, ‘Things get pushed through very quickly when money is involved.' Capitalism, and foreign, Arab capital specifically, is perceived as dominating the fight to control space in the city. 

To intensify this, investors can go around urban laws and regulations simply by changing their plans in accordance with a new Law on Spatial Planning (‘Zakon o prostornom uređenju', 2005), which I have discussed above. Investors, then, legally have great power when it comes to the development of the city. These changes often

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38 In conversation with anonymous architects 04.11.2015.
39 For example, the mayor of Trnovo signed an agreement for a large tourist development Buroj Ozone in a rushed fashion on 15 October 2015, according to a town meeting that was held two days later, which I attended.
take place against the wishes of the citizens, again cementing the view in the
Sarajevan consciousness that foreign capital is controlling their city at the detriment of
their quality of life. The Sarajevo City Center and BBI Centar are themselves both
products of investor-urbanism, contributing to the changing of the city spaces with little
oversight. Strictly in terms of planning provisions and the regulations of the city, both
SCC and BBI changed their plans after the construction permits had already been
granted, according to the Law on Spatial Planning from 2005. Both of the shopping
centres added floors to their designs after permissions had already been given.\(^\text{40}\)
Although these changes are legal, they point to the fact that the investors skirt around
gaining permission on the actual desired height of the building in the beginning stages
of the construction project in order to go back and have such additions permitted by
politicians.

More than just circumventing urban professionals, BBI and SCC as vehicles for
investor-urbanism have actively gone against the wishes of the people for their city.
With BBI this is clear, as there was a petition against the construction of the building
brought by Sarajevo architect Aida Daidžić. The petition collected around 3,500
signatures and called for the square to be used for the common good (Filipović, 2006).
According to Daidžić, quoted in the \textit{Dnevni Avaz}, ‘Instead of building a large business
centre, we propose creating a town square,’\(^\text{41}\) (N.P., 2006). Daidžić designed an entire
counter-concept for the square, complete with ice skating rink for the winter and green
spaces in the summer. She even suggested that the citizens of the city buy the state-
owned department store that became BBI’s before construction commenced (‘Bila sam
depresivna’, 2006). Some Sarajevans thus actively fought to gain control of the city
square over the foreign investors, making a distinct partition between capitalist spaces
in the interest of foreign businessmen and socialist spaces for the local population.

\(^{40}\) In conversation with Nasiha Pozder, 05.03.2015. and in conversation with Edin Safo, CEO of MDC, 05.10.2015.
\(^{41}\) ‘Umjesto izgradnje velikog poslovnog centra, predlažemo da se napravi gradski trg.’
With SCC, a concert hall had been planned for the square of the former Magros company that Al-Shiddi eventually bought, as revealed in my interview with Nasiha Pozder at the architecture faculty in Sarajevo. According to my notes, she explained that before the privatisation of Magros, they were going to have a concert hall on the SCC location. The famous Iraqi-British architect Zaha Hadid was running the competition with her London office, and they were going to build a huge park with a cultural centre and a concert hall. Then the plans began to shrink, and they wanted to put a skyscraper on the location without public knowledge. The concert hall plans continually decreased in size – smaller and smaller. Then Al Shiddi began to take up more and more of that space.\textsuperscript{42} There is currently an online petition open to support a campaign to build this concert hall, albeit on a space near to SCC (Concert Hall Sarajevo Campaign, 2018). The petition states:

Invitation to sign petition for Sarajevo Concert Hall
We invite professionals, all citizens and friends of Sarajevo and Bosnia and Herzegovina to support campaign to build the Concert Hall Sarajevo in Marindvor, according to the anticipated regulatory plan and programs of development of Sarajevo and the Sarajevo Canton. This is an unduly neglected project that, by international agreement, through the world competition, was prepared in 1998 by Sarajevo Canton and the City of Rome. The project was chosen by a jury headed by the world-famous architect Zaha Hadid, with the participation of Bosnian architects Nedzad Kurt and Saida Jamaković and representatives of international associations of architects. The project was presented at numerous international architecture trade fairs (Venice, etc.) and published in professional journals and books. It is considered one of the best projects of the new generation.

Sarajevo Philharmonic Orchestra held on 9 February 2017 concert in honor of Zaha Hadid and supported the construction of Concert Hall Sarajevo as a natural seat for Philharmonic orchestra and the seat of musical life in Southeast Europe.

Department of Urban Planning, Faculty of Architecture in Sarajevo, submitted to the competent institutions petition opposing the changes to the regulation plan Marindvor where was planned construction of Concert Hall.

Regulatory Plan Center Marindvor approved the construction of a Concert Hall Sarajevo, which will be located on the current parking lot, next to the Bridge of Suada Dilberović. At Contest for Concert Hall design participated architects from 43 countries. (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{42} In conversation with Nasiha Pozder 05.03.2015
Although there is now a petition supported by the architectural faculty, it does not state how such a project would be funded.

The perceived problems of investor urbanism were even laid out in an article in the weekly magazine _Dani_ titled ‘He who has money builds’ by Darko Omeragić and Edin Redžić (2014). They explained that, ‘Sarajevo has unfortunately become an urban jungle, a township where only those who have money build, in violation of all possible rules of construction, and often laws. The only criterion is – money.’ The article interviews many urban professionals in Sarajevo. The authors argue that money rules when it comes to building in Sarajevo, and on the title page of the article they state, ‘The only measure of construction in Sarajevo has become – money, and all plans are adjusted to the wishes of the investors.’ They contend that investor urbanism is a ‘violation of all possible rules of construction, and often laws’ and that the ‘wishes of investors’ trump the needs of the city in terms of space.

An article on _Al Jazeera Balkans_ similarly deals with market-driven urbanism. Titled ‘Investors, politics and new constructions are turning Sarajevo into a ruin’ (Avdukić, 2016), it states that ‘There are practically no public competitions for conceptual urban and architectural solutions in the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina...Under the influence of investors, it would very easily be possible for the traditional image of Sarajevo to be lost, and for the city to be turned into a urban ruin, experts warn.’ The author is careful to express multiple viewpoints, especially about what is considered the ‘traditional image of Sarajevo’. She quotes Sarajevan architect Dušan Jovanović, who explains that, ‘the stories that new investors threaten the authentic appearance of Sarajevo are put by people who have no idea about

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43 ‘Gradi ko ima novca’
44 ‘Sarajevo, nažalost, postaje urbana džungla, kasaba u kojoj gradi onaj ko ima novca, kršći sva moguća pravila gradnje, a nerijetko i zakone. Jedino mjerilo je – novac.’
45 ‘Jedino mjerilo gradnje u Sarajevu postao je - novac, a svi planovi se prilagođavaju željama investitora.’
46 ‘Investitori, politika i novogradnja pretvaraju Sarajevo u ruglo’
47 ‘Javni konkurs za idejna urbanističko-arhitektonska rješenja u glavnom gradu Bosne i Hercegovine praktično ne postoje...Pod utjecajem investitora, vrlo lako bi se moglo desiti da se tradicionalna slika Sarajeva izgubi, a grad pretvori u urbanističko ruglo, upozoravaju stručnjaci.’
architecture, or they are people who are in connection with architecture, but have never
drawn anything in their life.”48 Although the author makes sure to include this message
supporting new investments, the overall theme of the article, as expressed by its title,
follows the prevailing narrative that investor urbanism is ‘turning Sarajevo into a ruin’.

These views have also been reflected in my survey data. One survey
respondent, a female economist, explained, for example, ‘Investments are ok, but the
problem is that no urban standard exists. Money is the only standard49 and a male
chauffeur stated, ‘those who have money and power – make what they want, where
they want’.50 These perceptions clearly imply that Sarajevans believe they have lost
control of their own urban environment and that whoever has money can do with it as
they please, even in the face of destroying the historical urban identity. For many, as I
will show below, this is also a threat to the identity of Sarajevo as a European city.

5.3.2 The ‘Orientalising’ Effect of Foreign Capital

The fact that BBI and SCC are investments from the Arab world has a distinct
effect on the Sarajevan imaginary, and when connected to investor urbanism and the
tension between the past socialist traditions and the new market economy, some
Sarajevans believe they are changing the nature of the city in terms of its ‘eastern’
character. The power of investors and the commodification and commercialisation of
city squares is not a new phenomenon, and most would point to Times Square in New
York or Piccadilly Circus in London as obvious examples of this. BBI and SCC, in their
sleek steel designs and luxurious furnishings, resemble shopping centres that can be
seen around the world – from the United States to London to Riyadh to Dubai and on to
Tokyo. However, because of the source of their capital, they have begun to stand for

48 Priče da novi investitori ugrožavaju autentični izgled Sarajeva plasiraju ljudi koji nemaju pojm o arhitekturi, ili oni koji
su u vezi s arhitekturom ali nikada u životu ništa nisu nacrtali.
49 Ulaganja su OK, ali problem je sto ne postoji urbanistički standard. Novac je jedini standard
50 Onaj ko ima pare i vlast – pravi šta hoće i gdje hoće!"
the Muslim world in BiH. They are reminiscent of oil wealth of the Gulf and the extravagance that is often shown in news portals and on social media. Many of the shops within these buildings are quite expensive; for example, products from L’Occitane en Provence (inside BBI) are relatively expensive even for someone with an average salary in London. Products can easily cost around 15-20 GBP (37-50BAM) for one item. When the average monthly salary in Sarajevo is around 875 BAM (‘Cost of Living in Sarajevo’, 2018) and an average rent is between 300 and 500 BAM, 50 BAM becomes a very large amount of money for something as insignificant as a bottle of body lotion, for example. As will be shown below, perceptions of exclusion from these spaces exist, especially in terms of purchasing power, creating tension between the local population and visiting shoppers from the Middle East.

The discourses that have been constructed around BBI and SCC quite often focus on its eastern-ness or Middle Eastern or Islamic character. One student at the architecture faculty that I interviewed explained:

> We are not in the Middle East. I know that these are the rules in the Middle East, but this is not us...we're at a crossroads, we have both influences from the East and West, and I kind of think that the West has already...they already gave up and they just let us be literally trampled by these investors that are completely ruining the city.  

Her wording that the investors from the Middle East are trampling Sarajevo is quite telling; it implies that they have taken control and can do what they like, regardless of the effect on the citizens or the development of the city. The notion that the West has abandoned Sarajevo further shows how these constructions are forcing a renegotiation of identity between East and West.

In another interview I conducted with a Sarajevan architect, who I will keep anonymous, similar concerns about the changing urban spaces due to investor urbanism were expressed:

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51 Interview with student at faculty of architecture at the University of Sarajevo, to be kept anonymous.
We are aware that something is going on – buildings showing off and a lot of investors are coming and changing our landscapes... We are very aware that something is going on, but we don't want to think of it.

This quote implies that investments from the Middle East ('buildings showing off') suggests the new, luxury constructions built with GCC financing) are changing the city spaces, the 'landscapes'. This individual also creates a divide between the investors, who are coming and changing the city, potentially with an agenda ('something is going on'), and Sarajevans. They are changing 'our landscapes' and 'we are very aware that something is going on'. This constructs the investors as an 'other' in the city, something foreign that has come in and dictated the course of urban development without the agreement of the local people. Similarly, another very prominent architect in Sarajevo, who I will also keep anonymous, told me that he saw these investments as 'c-class' investments, where investments from Europe and North American presumably took the 'a-class' position. This echoes the idea that the 'West' has abandoned Sarajevo, leaving it to be 'trampled' upon by investors from the Middle East (to quote the student mentioned above).

Not only do some of my interviewees and survey respondents see investors from GCC countries as active agents in the redevelopment of the city without the agreement of the local people, but some have also expressed the concern that this is changing the identity of the city itself at the exclusion of the local population. For example, one survey respondent, a female economist, stated, ‘Sarajevo is losing its old identity, [it's] getting some twists, directed by money. Yes, it is orientalising.’\(^5\) This quote demonstrates the perception that foreign capital coming from Muslim-majority countries, especially Arab countries, is shifting Sarajevo in terms of its identity, ‘orientalising’ the city and pulling it away from its multicultural, cosmopolitan and European image.

\(^{5}\) ‘Sarajevo gubi svoj stari identitet, dobiva neki naknadni, diktiran novcem. Da, orijentalizira se.’
As the city is changing, the local population is finding itself at odds with the new developments, which seem to not only ‘orientalise’ the city, but also to exclude the local population. One female field interview respondent in BBI, an employee in one of the shops, observed:

Well, to put it this way, the customers here, well ... Since we are a country ... to say a poor country, I think in most cases, 70% of the population here barely live, our customers [those from Bosnia] are not very good consumers when it comes to all these centres. You can count maybe 30% of people who might have money to spend. But foreign customers... Arabs and others, they are great customers and spend a lot of money.  

As mentioned above, the prices in many of the brand-name shops in BBI and SCC are simply out of the budget for many residents of Sarajevo. These shopping centres are often referred to as spaces for foreign spenders, especially those from Arab countries and Turkey. In my survey responses, a female professor wrote that in SCC, ‘every third person is Bosnian [Bosanac], the rest are Arabs.’  Such ideas were discussed in online forums as well. In the forum SkyscraperCity.com (an urban development forum) amongst a discussion about future plans for a hotel in the building and other commenters’ first impressions, one commenter with the username BosniaHerzegovina described his first visit to SCC on 2 June 2015 saying, ‘I finally was in SCC the day before yesterday and yesterday. The centre is ok, nothing special. There weren’t many customers, mostly Turks and Arabs’ (http://www.skyscrapercity.com). Another commenter with the username Tango Zulu stated on 24 August 2015:

This is almost the first time I saw it live [SCC]. I cannot believe it. As if I've come to another country. Phenomenal! A lot of Arabs. They spend like crazy. I've seen girls who drink coffee and sit next to about 20 bags of goods that they purchased. That for each shirt, you can imagine how much they spend. I was there for half an hour, not planning on buying anything, but I emptied my pockets. I witnessed an Arab in L'Occitane

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53 ‘Pa, da kažem ovako, kupci ovdje, pa... Obzirom da smo mi zemlja... da kažem siromašna jedna zemlja, mislim da u većini slučajeva, 70% stanovnika ovdje jedva živi, naši kupci nisu baš dobro potrošači što se tiče svih ovih centara. U tih čemo ubrojati 30% ljudi koji možda imaju novaca da troše. A o stranim kupcima... Arabi i ostali, oni su super kupci i troše dosta novca.’

54 ‘U njemu je svaki treći čovjek Bosanac, a sve ostalo Arabi.’

55 ‘Bio sam prekjučen i jačer konačno u SCC. Centar je ok, nista posebno. Slabo je kupaca bilo, najviše je Turaka i Araba.’
buy 500 KM of some cream. I'm a man whose basic hygiene is compiled from soaps, shampoos and deodorants, I did not stop being amazed. The staff working there is so pleasant, smart, thoughtful, competent.\textsuperscript{56} (Ibid.).

In both of these comments, there is an underlying suggestion that Bosnians cannot afford any of the goods in the shops and that the entire centre is oriented to visiting Arabs and Turks, and thus fundamentally excludes non-elite Bosnians in certain ways. Despite the fact that Bosnians visit these centres, mostly for social visits and to drink coffee in the cafes, the implication exists that they are not the main focus for the investment. They are almost foreign in their own city, as if they have 'come to another country'.

In Sarajevo market-driven urbanism from GCC countries has created the perception that the city is being changed and developed according to the will of foreign investors for the benefit of foreigners in the city. Some see this as having an 'orientalising' effect on the city, making it fundamentally more 'eastern' in nature. As Sarajevans are grappling with their identity in a globalising world, they are constructing these discourses that articulate along the East/West binary in order to position their own identity, which is itself in flux and which has always bridged the so-called 'East' and 'West'.

5.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have explored how Sarajevans are reacting to new commercial developments in Sarajevo with funding from GCC countries, specifically the shopping centres BBI and SCC. I have examined their reactions focusing on perceptions of corruption and investor urbanism, and I have analysed discourses that understand corruption as particularly 'eastern' and that see investor urbanism as changing the

character of the city toward the ‘East’. Sarajevo is being worlded through investments such as BBI and SCC, meaning such investments are ‘globalising’ the city. The case studies are elite-approved worlding practices that inter-reference the luxury of similar buildings in Gulf cities such as Dubai. These interventions form part of the public sphere in Sarajevo, underlining their importance for the city. As public space is a meeting place and a crossroads it becomes an arena for multiplicity and hybridity to develop, as transnationalism encourages the development of emergent cultural forms (Mandaville, 2003; Ong, 1999 and 2011; Tsing, 2005). In Sarajevo, this means that BBI and SCC are pushing new understandings of the city and its identity, which go beyond simple binaries such as ‘East’ and ‘West’.

As I have shown above, many people in Sarajevo perceive the development of BBI and SCC as corrupt and linked to the personal and private interests of elite politicians and foreign investors. They also view market-driven urbanism as contributing to the ‘ruin’ of Sarajevo and its historical identity, especially as foreign private interests control these quasi-public spaces and the activities that take place on them. As Sarajevo’s historical identity has firmly entrenched the notions of ‘multiculturalism’, cosmopolitanism, tolerance and ‘European-ness’, the current processes that are developing the city are challenging these notions and how Sarajevans view themselves in the globalising world. These processes are compelling Sarajevans to position their identity along the imaginary East/West binary away from what is understood as ‘East’, especially the conceptual ‘eastern-ness’ connected to SCC, BBI and their rumours and allegations of corruption, despite the fact that the case studies actually contribute to the development of multiplicity in Sarajevo. By doing so, Sarajevans are asserting their ‘western-ness’, their European-ness and their closeness to the ostensibly transparent and cosmopolitan values associated with Europe.

Worlding practices in Sarajevo are attempts to solve the ‘urban problems’ (Ong, 2011: 4) of post-conflict and post-socialist reconstruction and development. As
described above, ‘worlding practices’ push the boundaries of urbanism beyond the city itself, ‘being at once heterogeneously particular and yet irreducibly global’ (9). The case studies in this section are ‘expressions and agents of global urban imaginaries’ (Baker and Ruming, 2014: 63). Such expressions and agents, both human and material, are actively creating emergent cultural forms outside of binaries such as East/West, but they are also elite-approved and beyond the control and consent of the city’s residents. Although they are sites of developing multiplicity, Sarajevans have reacted to the case studies by distancing themselves from the elements of these projects that they view as ‘eastern’, as they endeavour to solidify an understanding of their identity and the identity of the city that they see as being ‘ruined’ by the elite and by foreign investors. The post-conflict and post-socialist urban landscape of Sarajevo is a prime location for development solutions that hail from all areas of the globe, potentially inter-referencing cities such as Dubai. Yet, the reactions of the Sarajevans to these projects speak to an underlying fear of novel cultural forms and new urban identities outside the pre-war ‘multicultural’ idyll. This fear, a reaction to corruption and investor urbanism, also extends more explicitly to Islam in the built environment and the perceived threat of ‘Islamisation’ of the city and extremism, as I will discuss in the next chapter on sacred spaces.
6. Redefining Sarajevo’s Relationship to Islam: the Blending of Sacred and Secular Spaces

6.1 Introduction

Sacred spaces have traditionally been understood as overt manifestations of religiosity in the built environment and as places imbued with feelings of awe and wonder, according to scholars such as Veronica della Dora (2011: 167). In Sarajevo, traditional sacred spaces such as churches and mosques are representations of the ethno-religious communities, their histories and their conflicts. Yet the line between the sacred and the secular is proving ever more difficult to define and describe. What makes a purely ‘sacred’ space and what makes a ‘secular’ space in a city where religious ties and ethno-religious nationalism exist along with the recent memory of secular socialism? Feelings of wonder and awe that can define these spaces may also develop in nominally secular spaces, and traditional sacred spaces may also exist without these feelings of wonder when they take on secular functions (such as cultural centres). The terms ‘sacred’ and ‘secular’ remain contested, and academics such as Justin Beaumont and Christopher Baker (2011), Banu Gökarıksel (2009 and 2012) and Lily Kong (2001) contend that the ‘sacred’ and the ‘secular’ transcend binary understandings, allowing for the simultaneous production of different realities.

Sarajevo’s history is inseparable from the religious and political movements that have shaped its architecture and identity. From its founding, religion carved out mahalas for the different denominations in the city, and the presence of the sacred in the built environment continues to permeate Sarajevan urban spaces even outside of mosques, churches and synagogues.

In this chapter I will examine new spaces in Sarajevo imbued with elements of the sacred that have been built since the end of the conflict in 1995 with funding from the greater Muslim world, focusing on examples of the most contested spaces: the
shopping centres BBI and SCC and the Saudi King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre. After much consideration, I have decided to use BBI and SCC as case studies for both chapters on commercial spaces as well as sacred spaces. While this may be unusual, I believe this is exactly what is necessary for the contemporary reality of Sarajevo. SCC and BBI are privately owned, quasi-public spaces (legally private buildings that form part of the public sphere and which are controlled by private interests), and because they were both built using Islamic financing from GCC countries, there is a blending of the sacred and the secular. Both shopping centres host mesjids (prayer rooms), complete with ablution areas, and as stated in the previous chapter on commercial buildings, both are shari’ah compliant, meaning the activities on the premises are restricted (no gambling, eating pork, selling or drinking alcohol). One colleague of mine has insisted to me in private conversations that BBI and SCC are in fact wholly sacred spaces due to their religious undertones. I disagree. I believe that, similar to Gökarıksel (2009 and 2012) and Kong (2001), the production of space transcends binary divisions, allowing for different realities to exist simultaneously ‘through the specific set of political and social relations, ideologies and practices in particular sites’ (Gökarıksel, 2012: 5).

These buildings are at once sacred and secular. BBI and SCC are symbolically imbued with Islamic sacred elements (such as their prayer rooms and shari’ah restrictions), they are sites of ritual prayer in their mesjids, and they are shopping centres hosting different multinational retail stores. In a similar fashion, the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre – a site of ritual prayer – also contains a cultural and sporting complex outside the scope of the religious leaders and open to all people in Sarajevo.

These contested spaces have been the subject of public debates that reinforce the imagined binaries of Sacred/Secular and East/West in order to position Sarajevan identity. Urban interventions such as the King Fahd Mosque, BBI and SCC are ‘worlding practices’ as described earlier in this thesis – ‘projects that attempt to establish or break established horizons of urban standards in and beyond a particular
city’ (Ong, 2011: 4). As such, they defy traditional binary thinking: ‘this notion of the
production of emergent spaces from the flows of ideas, actions and objects is a radical
departure from a conventional view of the world as stabilized into binary orders’ (Ibid.,
12). They create a contradiction; new urban interventions demand an understanding
outside of binaries while the public debate surrounding them articulates around
imagined binaries, demanding conceptual stasis of what the city is and what the city
should be.

Analysing how Sarajevans are discussing new urban interventions imbued with
sacred elements, I will examine the case studies in two parts: first I will explore the
public debates around the shopping centers SCC and BBI in terms of their links to
Islam and the sacred elements imbued in the spaces. I will look at the shopping centres
by concentrating on two themes: narratives around conspiracies to ‘Islamise’ the city
with such investments and fears of expanding shari’ah compliant spaces. I use the
term ‘Islamise’ in this section to refer to the perception by Sarajevans of increasing
encroachment of Islam into the public sphere (‘the sphere of private people coming
together as a public’ (Habermas, 1989: 27)). In the second part of the chapter, I will
focus on the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre. In this section, I will evaluate the
public debate, especially focusing on the themes of radicalism and security risks and
the perception that the mosque and cultural centre preys upon the poor and vulnerable.
Before analysing my data, however, it will be important to discuss the recent history of
Islam in BiH from the end of the Second World War. This history is important for
understanding the global flows of ideas and people into the country and how the
Sarajevan population has understood the sacred versus the secular and Islam as
practiced in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I will discuss global movements within Islam,
how they pertain to Sarajevo, and how the socialist history of secularism affects such
ideas. I will then give a brief overview of the case studies. In all, I will demonstrate how
Sarajevels attempt to position their identity, especially around the imagined binaries of
Sacred/Secular and East/West. The movement of people and ideas through BiH and Sarajevo is informing new conceptions of the sacred, Islamic belonging and Sarajevo’s placement in the globalising world, and because of this, Sarajevans are scrambling to make sense of a rapidly changing city and its identity.

6.1.1 Data Collection

In order to come to an understanding about the debates taking place in Sarajevo regarding the case studies, I have drawn on a very broad selection of data, which includes media articles, interview transcripts from my fieldwork, field interview conversations (in which I stopped Sarajevan residents on the street and in shopping centers to discuss current trends such as the transnational flows of capital and people from GCC countries) and data from my internet survey about urban development in Sarajevo. I have also drawn from some unconventional sources, such as a blog written by a Bosnian journalist (Latal, 2009) and the Klix.ba forum (Klix.ba being the top news portal in BiH, according to USAID in its report titled, ‘Assessment of the Media Sector in BiH’ (Brunwasser et al, 2016)). I have used these internet sources as a means to support my data, as the responses from interviewees are often not as candid as many online comments. The risk of using these sources is that some commenters online are ‘trolls’, ie, they say the most radical opinions with the aim of inciting arguments between people. I have done my best to recognise and avoid such commentary and analyse the comments in the context of the conversation taking place in the forum thread. To understand the attitudes of the people of Sarajevo regarding these buildings, I sought data from many of the most popular and highly read sources in BiH and in the Balkans as a whole, as I will show below. My interviews were with people engaged professionally in the development of the city or with the projects themselves, and my field interviews included people using, working in or living around the case studies.
In the first part of this chapter that focuses on the shopping centres BBI and SCC, I will draw upon three interviews with urban professionals and stakeholders in Sarajevo. This will include the general director of Shad Invest, Samid Sinanović, a student at the architecture faculty and an urban professional who I will keep anonymous but who is active in architectural and urban planning circles in the city. In addition to these interviews, I will use the data from two field interviews (in which I approached people on the streets and in the shopping centres of Sarajevo) and four of my survey respondents. To triangulate this data and to expand on the debates in the city, I will also analyse three media articles originating from some of the most popular news sources in BiH. The first quotes a BiH politician in the Nezavisne Novine, which is a Banja Luka (Republika Srpska) based news source. Its name means the ‘Independent Newspaper’, and it has one of the largest readerships in BiH (Jusić, 2004). Second, I will look at a Balkan Insight article, which is a publication of the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), and which is considered one of the remaining true investigative reporting service in Sarajevo, according to a representative of the OSCE’s Press and Public Information Unit. The Balkan Insight website states that it, ‘has built a reputation as the most comprehensive, professional and independent source of news in English in the Balkan region, which provides the public with relevant and insightful reporting on key regional issues’ (http://www.balkaninsight.com). Third, I will examine an article from the Dnevni Avaz, which is the highest read newspaper in Sarajevo and probably in BiH, according to the OSCE’s press representative and Jusić (2004). USAID (Brunwasser et al, 2016) lists the both Dnevni Avaz and Nezavise Novine in the top three of the top 15 news portals in BiH (the first being Klix.ba, as mentioned previously). Finally, although considered slightly unorthodox, I will analyse a blog post written by a Sarajevan journalist and political analyst. In his post, he discusses the then newly opened BBI and the

57 In conversation with representative of the OSCE's Press and Public Information Unit 11.08.15.
sentiments in the city about the building at that time. I believe it is a valuable source that shows how residents reacted to the building of BBI.

In the second part of this chapter, I will focus on the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre, and my analysis will draw upon a similarly varied list of sources. I will analyse one interview with the director of the King Fahd Cultural Centre and three field interviews that were taken in the area of the city where the mosque is located. For media analysis, I will examine excerpts and headlines from Balkan Insight and Nezavisne Novine, which were described above. However, I will also draw upon an article from Dani, a weekly news magazine from Sarajevo with an estimated readership of 100,000 people, according to its marketing team (https://www.bhdani.ba/portal/marketing) and an article that appeared in the Serbian newspaper, Politika, which is daily paper published in Belgrade. It is, according to its website, the ‘oldest and most read daily newspaper in this part of Europe’ (‘O Nama’, http://www.politika.rs/scc/stranica/4/O-nama),\(^5^8\) and is read in BiH as well as in Serbia. In addition to these media sources, I will analyse comments left on the Klix.ba forum about the King Fahd mosque. As noted above, Klix.ba is the number one accessed webportal in BiH, and its forums are also popular with the public. Considering such comments as part of my data is unconventional (as with blog posts), however it does allow for viewpoints that interviewees might self-censor during a face-to-face interaction.

6.1.2 Islam in Sarajevo: From Secularism to Salafism

I argue that it is not possible to separate the religious and secular in Sarajevo and that defining the sacred in terms of awe and wonder falls short of the contemporary reality of the city. In contrast to the city’s secular, Yugoslav identity, there is a current ‘Islamic shift’ in the city, meaning its spaces and demographics are becoming more

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\(^{58}\) najstariji i najuticajniji dnevni list u ovom delu Evrope.
Muslim in nature (see chapter four on Sarajevo’s Islamic shift). Instead of there being a strict delineation between the two, the sacred and the secular are merging, blending into one another and being produced simultaneously in the same spaces. Religion, which existed only behind closed doors throughout much of the twentieth century, has emerged with the spread of global religious ideas and movements, the influence of religion in the national politics and the influx of people from Muslim-majority countries into BiH. All this has allowed for religion, and Islam particularly in the case of Sarajevo, to become part of the public sphere.

The current dynamics of media and popular discourses surrounding the case studies can only be conceived of in light of the city’s history with religion and secularism. Sarajevo has a long religious history, and BiH society only shifted towards secularism after the Second World War with the rise of the socialist Yugoslav state (Merdjanova, 2013 and Karčić, 2010a). Sarajevo was founded as an Ottoman city, one in which Islam has played a decisive role in the production and arrangement of urban space. Islam was a dominant force in the urban environment until the occupation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1878, and it was only after this time that the large cathedrals – both Catholic and Orthodox – were built in the centre of the city (Donia, 2006). This dominance of Islam in the urban environment is a historical reality, and although other religious communities have always existed in Sarajevo, Islam’s presence has overshadowed other religions until the Habsburg occupation (Ibid., 60). This Ottoman aspect of Sarajevo’s identity still influences the identity of the city as a whole.

Religiosity in what is now Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to influence both public and private spheres until 1945 when the political establishment changed dramatically, altering the place of religion in society and the future development of the city (Merdjanova, 2013: 31). With the new socialist government, religion was relegated entirely to the private sphere, and religious leaders were persecuted under the new
regime. They abolished the shari’ah courts, closed the madrassas, nationalized the religious endowments, and banned the full-face veil (Merdjanova, 2013: 31 and Karčić, 2010b). This hostile environment for religious worship led to the decline in religiosity in the public sphere until the later part of the twentieth century when the visibility of religion re-emerged.

With the establishment of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, the socialist government began to liberalise its attitudes toward religion, causing a revival of religiosity in the public sphere generally. In the 1970s, the Faculty of Islamic Studies at the University of Sarajevo was reopened, and the madrassas followed suit. This was especially apparent in the Islamic community, as it corresponded with a global Islamic revival and the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The NAM facilitated the communication of ideas and people from Yugoslavia to the Middle East, North Africa and Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia, allowing for a strengthening of religious adherence from Yugoslav citizens who studied and worked in these countries (Karčić, 2010b).

In addition to these influences, Islam returned to the political front as well within the Yugoslav state with the rise of Alija Izetbegović (father of Bakir, the current Bošnjak president) and other Muslim intellectuals and pan-Islamic activists. Although Izetbegović’s ‘Islamic Declaration’ dreamed of an Islamic state that progressed along with modern technology, he claimed this was a utopia. According to John V. A. Fine (2002), ‘It was not his goal, and though Izetbegović may well have liked the idea of such a state, it was anathema to his SDA associates, who, as ethnic and not religious Muslims, were secular Europeans who did not think that religion had a place in governing a modern state,’ (15). So while nationalist political currents in the Serb and Croat ethno-religious communities twisted the ‘Declaration’ to stir up fear of a push towards an Islamic state in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the reality was that there was very little chance of such a thing ever occurring (Ibid.). Although the reality did not match the discourses, this seed of fear of an Islamised BiH has propelled Islamophobia in the
country, not only influencing the massacres of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica and other localities during the conflict in the 1990s, but also continuing to this day and perpetuating fears of Islamism in politics and in city spaces.

Parallel to the rising tide of Islamophobia was an actual emergence of Islam on the political scene, but only as late as 1993, according to Fine (16). He explains that, ‘the anti-Islamic propaganda became a self-fulfilling prophecy,’ (Ibid.). Once ethnic partition by the international community became a reality, and ‘owing to the exodus of Christians from the area under the control of the Muslim-led government, religious Muslims found themselves able to enter the sphere of Bosnian politics. As a result, if one was a religious Muslim, new opportunities arose; but if one was a secular Muslim, or a non-Muslim, new dangers emerged.’ (Ibid.). In my research, I also encountered these attitudes from Sarajevans. They described how people during this time feigned religiosity in order to gain influence and power. For secular Muslims, these tendencies entered into the discourses around Islam in Sarajevo and the fears that have been linked to the rise of Islamic religiosity in BiH beginning in the last decade of the twentieth century. Islamophobia from secular Muslims and non-Muslims then mixed with the sentiment that religiosity was a necessity for political and social assent, allowing for growing resentment towards Islam in BiH.

During the war, movements of people and ideas from the greater Muslim world accelerated, as both foreign Islamic fighters and Islamic charities rushed to the support of Bosnian Muslims. Much has been written about these influences, including the fact that some charities offered money to Bosnian Muslim families in ‘exchange’ for women wearing the veil. Other charities were later unmasked as fronts for terrorist operations (see, for example, Kohlmann, 2006). The foreign Islamic fighters, or mujahideen, hailed from regions in the world such as Saudi Arabia, and they brought with them more conservative understandings of the practice of Islam that had been developing in the greater Muslim world in the twentieth century. These ideas were at odds with the
lifestyles many of the men in the Bosnian army, their so-called co-religionists. For the Bosnian Muslims on the front lines – men who had grown up in a secular society where the state actively discouraged religious practice, men who often drank alcohol, had premarital sexual relationships and rarely if ever went to mosque – obvious conflicts of ideology began to develop (Tziampiris, 2009).

While Bosnians who worked and lived abroad under programmes promoted by the NAM were exposed to global practices of Islam (and brought them back home) and while those in rural areas tended to be more religious than city dwellers, those who stayed in urban areas of Yugoslavia remained exposed to the secular ideal promoted by the state. The foreign influences during the war from the mujahideen and Islamic charities did have an effect on religious practices in BiH, but this effect has been mostly exaggerated in the media and literature (Ibid.). There surely were Salafist trends coming into the country – i.e., the move to emulate the religious practices of the companions of the Prophet Mohammed. Unfortunately, there is much confusion surrounding the idea of Salafism and Wahhabism, the Saudi brand of Salafism. In order to truly understand the current dynamics of Islam in BiH and the discourses surrounding Islam in Sarajevo, it is necessary to first discuss the concept of ‘Bosnian Islam’ or ‘naš Islam’ (our Islam), after which global movements of Islamic thought can be discussed in relation to this understanding.

In the year 2006, the IZ (Islamska Zajednica, or the regulatory body for Islam in ex-Yugoslav countries) published its constitution, which spells out some aspects of the concept of ‘Bosnian Islam’, although they are very careful to never use this terminology, preferring instead the ‘Islamic tradition of Bošnjaks’. This coincided with a rise in Islamic investment in real estate, the building of mosques with foreign funding, the visible arrival of Arabs and Turks in the country for tourism and education, and the rise in global terror networks. Importantly, Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to the IZ, is to follow the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence (madhab). Article 8 of
the constitution states, ‘The Islamic community preserves the credibility of Islamic norms and ensures their interpretation and application. The Hanafi madhab shall be applied in interpretation and practice of the Islamic worship (ibadat) duties in the IZ.’ (Neimartija, 2006). Additionally, the constitution mentions in Article 2 that, ‘the autonomy of the IZ in BiH is based on religious and legal institutions of Bosnian Muslims from the time of Ottoman administration.’ (Ibid.). Such a constitution, while again not specifically talking about ‘Bosnian Islam’, does set religious Islamic practice in BiH apart from Islamic practice in other areas of the Muslim world, especially Saudi Arabia. In fact, according to scholars such as Xavier Bougarel (2007) and Elissa Helms (2008), Bosnian Muslims have emphasised that their tradition of Islam is ‘European’, perceiving the ‘Muslim “east”’ (Helms, 2008: 105) as less tolerant.

Two years after the publication of the constitution, the IZ founded the Institute for the Islamic Tradition of Bošnjaks (Institut za Islamsku Tradiciju Bošnjaka, or IITB). The creation and founding of the IITB is another move to solidify the concept of Islam in Bosnia and to set it apart from other currents in the Islamic world. According to the IZ, the IITB’s mission is as follows:

Institute of Islamic tradition of Bošnjaks is a scientific research institution of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The scientific fields in which the Institute strives to achieve scientific research and academic excellence are:
1. The concept of the Islamic tradition of Bošnjaks
2. The contribution of Bošnjaks to the Islamic sciences
3. Religious practice of Bošnjaks
4. Migration and demographic processes of Bošnjaks
5. Genocide against Bošnjaks
6. Bošnjak surroundings [and encounter with the ‘other’]
The focus of the Institute is the Islamic tradition of Bošnjaks through theoretical and empirical research. ('O Institutu', http://iitb.ba/o-institutu/).

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59 Islamska zajednica čuva vjerodostojnost islamskih normi i osigurava njihovo tumačenje i primjenu. U tumačenju i izvršavanju ibadetskih islamskih dužnosti u Islamskoj zajednici primjenjuje se hanefijski mezheb.
60 'Autonomija Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini utemeljena je na vjerskopravnim institucijama bosanskih muslimana iz vremena osmanske uprave u Bosni.'
61 'Institut za islamsku tradiciju Bošnjaka je naučnoistraživačka ustanova Islamske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini. Naučne oblasti u kojima Institut nastoji postići naučnoistraživačku i akademsku izvršnost jesu:
1. Koncept islamske tradicije Bošnjaka
2. Dopinosa Bošnjaka islamskim naukama
While the institute is a research centre, its focus is on codifying the Islam practiced in Bosnia against other currents of Islam, especially basing this concept on the traditions of Bosnian Muslims. There is quite a lot of emphasis placed on the Islamic and cultural traditions of the Bošnjaks as elements that differentiate the Bosnian Islamic tradition from Islam practiced in other parts of the world. Fikret Karčić, working with the IITB, specifies that the ‘Islamic tradition of Bošnjaks’ consists of:

1. *Ahl al-sunnah* branch of Islam [Sunni], including application of Maturidi thought in *aqaid* [Islamic creed] and Hanafi *madhab* in *fiqh* [Islamic jurisprudence], with respective Sufi orders (tariqats)...
2. Belonging to Ottoman-Islamic cultural zone...
3. Existence of elements of ‘Islamized’ practice of inhabitants of pre-Ottoman Bosnia...
4. Tradition of Islamic reformism (*islah*) in interpretation of Islam...
5. Institutionalization of Islam in the form of the Islamic Community...

Again, while the expression ‘Bosnian Islam’ is avoided, the implication of this detailed description of the ‘Islamic tradition of Bošnjaks’ is that the Islam practiced in BiH is to be distinguished from other ‘Islams’, especially those ‘less tolerant’ versions from the ‘East’ (Bougarel, 2007 and Helms, 2008). These concepts form part and parcel of the discourse of ‘Bosnian Islam’ or ‘*naš Islam*’ to which Sarajevans often refer, setting themselves apart from other Muslims – especially Muslims from GCC countries.

The public discourse surrounding Islam particularly aims to separate ‘*naš Islam*’ from what is commonly called Wahhabism. However, there is much confusion about what is actually meant by this term, and there are other global movements in Islam that become entangled within such categorisations. Wahhabism is the particularly Saudi brand of Salafism, a conservative current of Islam that aims to follow the exact practices of the, ‘pious forefathers (*al-salaf al-salih*), the first three generations of Muslims who had first-hand experience of the rise of Islam and are regarded as

3. Religijska praksa Bošnjaka
4. Migracijski i demografski procesi Bošnjaka
5. Genocid nad Bošnjacima
6. Bošnjačko okruženje

Fokus rada Instituta je na islamskoj tradiciji Bošnjaka i to kroz teorijska i empirijska istraživanja.
exemplary for the correct way to live for future Muslims.’ (Meijer, 2014: 4). Salafism, including Wahhabism, emphasises the idea of tawhid or the complete oneness of God in all daily affairs as the basis for Islamic creed. Importantly tawhid does away with any innovations that might be seen as intermediaries between God and the believer, including veneration of tombs and saints, astrology or idolatry of any kind. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, the father of Wahhabism, insisted on a very fundamentalist interpretation of tawhid, and, ‘he was willing to call all those who did not adhere to the doctrine of tawhid unbelievers (kafir/kuffar) or apostates (murtaddun), who can be excommunicated (takfir), which was a precondition for waging jihad against them’ (5). This is the crux of the matter, especially in Bosnia, when considering Salafism and Wahhabism: although many strands of Salafism shun violence, like the so-called quietist Salafists (Shepard, 2013: 173-175), others do not. In addition to this, followers of Salafism are often (though not always) more visible, as they adhere to traditional dress codes in which women veil their faces and men grow long beards. Some brands of Salafism reject adherence to the schools of Islamic jurisprudence, but the Saudi Wahhabis follow the Hanbali madhab.

Salafism, however, is not the only global force within Islam. Raymond William Baker (2015) argues that a global Islamic midstream, the ‘Wassatteyya’, is the basis for Islam’s continuing strength and endurance (3-4). This current – what Tariq Ramadan calls ‘Universal Islam’ (Ramadan, 2003) – stresses the guiding force of the midstream of Islamic thought and a connection with the global umma for Islamic renewal. Baker asserts that:

In the view of its adherents, the Wassatteyya functions as a vital yet flexible midstream, a centrist river out of Islam. Today, the Wassatteyya has made itself a presence everywhere Muslims are found. It connects, but does not unify, all parts of the Islamic world or ummah. It plays an important role even in those parts of the globe where Muslims are a minority. The midstream defines Islam for the vast majority of Muslims, even as it acts as a wellspring for all manner of tributaries that allow Islam to renew itself in the most diverse ways (3).
While Salafism is a growing trend that excludes all but those purporting to follow the pious forefathers, midstream Islam – the Wassatteyya – is more tolerant and stresses the universalist and peaceful aspects of the religion. These ideas, too, have found their way to Sarajevo and are influencing how Bosnian Muslims understand their faith and the faith of Muslims around the world. Of lesser note, trends such as Quranism, which rejects the Hadith as religious authority, have also found a foothold in Sarajevo.

6.1.3 Case Studies BBI, SCC, King Fahd

In the first part of this chapter’s empirical analysis, I will focus on the shopping centres BBI and SCC, which were built with Islamic financing from the Gulf region. As discussed in the previous chapter on commercial investments, Islamic financing mandates certain rules for spaces built using this type of funding, and it is forbidden for the restaurants, cafes and supermarkets within the buildings to profit from the sale of pork and alcohol. Strictly no gambling is permitted on the premises, so betting agencies – or kladionice – are not allowed to buy space within the shopping centres. In addition to these rules, the buildings must also provide a clean area for people to pray. Both BBI and SCC have Islamic prayer rooms (mesjids) on the premises, complete with male and female ablution areas, and are specifically designed for Muslim prayer. The mesjids are beautiful spaces that use light to create a feeling of awe (Figure 9 and Figure 10). Although these are Muslim prayer rooms, worshipers of other faiths would be welcome to use such spaces if they wished.
Sead Živalj, the general manager of BBI Real Estate, explained that if the Christian community asked for a prayer space, he would be happily oblige. The difference in frequency and format of formal prayer between Islam and Christianity makes this unlikely,\(^{62}\) as Christians generally do not need access to prayer areas during daily working hours. Because Muslims are required to pray five times daily, and because their prayers involve prostration to the floor, they need access to clean prayer spaces throughout the day.

\(^{62}\) In conversation with Sead Živalj, general manager of BBI Real Estate, 05.01.2016.
In addition to the BBI and SCC as case studies of spaces that blend the sacred and the secular, I am also including the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre (Džamija i Kulturni Centar Kralj Fahd), which is the Saudi-funded mosque and cultural centre in Sarajevo (Figure 11). Built in 2000, the King Fahd mosque is an investment from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which ‘tends toward’ the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence. It is the largest mosque in the Balkans, with a 1,500 person capacity. Adjacent to the mosque, and forming part of the Saudi complex on the site, is an education centre and sports terrain. Any person living in Sarajevo or the surrounding area can sign up to take entirely free classes in multiple subjects, including English, Arabic, calligraphy, and IT skills. Residents can also sign up to use the sports terrain free of cost, although this part of the complex is separated by sex. The entire project is

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63 In conversation with Dr Khalid AdDamigh, the Cultural Attaché and head of the Saudi Cultural Centre.
estimated at around EUR 20 million (‘Alipašino B faza’, 2013). The King Fahd mosque has been the most controversial mosque built in Sarajevo, as residents have seen it as a home for Salafis, and often there is an aura of fear surrounding the building, as will be demonstrated in the discussion below. However, like with BBI and SCC, the King Fahd mosque is not a purely sacred space, as its cultural centre and sporting terrain blend the sacred and secular aspects of the site.

6.2 Islam in the Public Sphere: ‘Islamisation’ and the Perception of Increasing Shari’ah Compliant Spaces

Urban interventions in Sarajevo including mosques such as the King Fahd Mosque and shopping centres such as BBI and SCC have propelled public debates in the city around the ‘Islamic shift’ that I discussed earlier in this dissertation, meaning the increasing Muslim nature of the city spaces and its demographics. While I have
shown that there is a real movement towards an expansion of Muslim spaces in the city over Orthodox Christian, Catholic and Jewish spaces, this has as much to do with demographics and the ethnic partitioning that has occurred since the signing of the Dayton Accords. However, the narrative constructions in the city surrounding new urban investments prey on fears of an agenda towards ‘Islamisation’ of the city driven by certain political elite. And while there is a de facto phenomenon taking place in the city whereby the sacred – linked to Islam – is blending into the secular, this complex reality is being used to play upon the fears of the population that the secular, multi-ethnic nature of the city is under attack by Islamists and Islamic financing for projects.

As a continuation of this fear, media articles, interview and survey data suggest the perception exists in the city of an agenda to not only ‘Islamise’ the city spaces, but also to impose stricter Islamic regulations upon the people. These regulations, according to such perceptions, could involve limiting the availability of alcohol and pork or instituting dress codes in public places. In this section, I will analyse the discourses surrounding BBI and SCC and how Sarajevans attempt to position their identity along the Sacred/Secular binary. I will focus on the theme of ‘Islamisation’ of the city – the city spaces and regulations. By ‘Islamisation’ in this case I mean an active agenda to incorporate Islam into the city spaces and impose Islamic regulations upon the people. Those constructing the discourse describe political agendas on the part of BiH politicians to ‘Islamise’ the city and the expansion of shari’ah compliant spaces such as BBI and SCC.

6.2.1 Asserting a Political Agenda to ‘Islamise’ Sarajevo

With its recent secular history and multiethnic imaginary, urban investments in Sarajevo such as BBI and SCC are becoming the focus of many media reports and discussions. As related to the last chapter on commercial buildings in Sarajevo, my data suggests that the perception exists that there is a political agenda related to the
Islamic shift in the city. This is often linked to the SDA and Bakir Izetbegović, who has been instrumental in courting Arab investment in BiH. There are many examples of these narratives operating in the city, reacting to the new buildings, their funding and assumed agendas on the political elite, all which attempt to position Sarajevan identity accordingly on the Sacred/Secular binary. I will begin generally with examples hinting at an agenda to ‘Islamise’ the city and move to cases specifically centered around BBI and SCC and their political connections.

Religion came to the fore directly before the conflict in the 90s and after. However, in Sarajevo, as ethnic cleansing created a mostly Muslim populace, the public debates invariably target Islam and the fear of imposed Islamic regulations, asserting that there is a conspiracy to ‘Islamise’ the city. For example, in 2010, Nezavisne Novine – one of BiH’s most highly read daily newspapers – quoted Nikola Špirić (a Bosnian Serb politician, who at the time was the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina) stating that for Serbs and Croats, ‘if they want to survive in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it would be best for them to convert to Islam.’ (Arslanagić, 2010). The usage of the phrase ‘to survive’ brings about feelings of life or death. In a country that witnessed mass murder due to ethno-religious affiliation, it suggests a vengeful turn of events where Serbs and Croats might find themselves the victims. The legacy of the Muslim massacres in places such as Srebrenica, something many qualify as a genocide, lives on in the collective memory of Bosnian Muslims. Muslims were persecuted and executed en masse, and using terminology such as ‘if they want to survive’ conveys an urgent, life-threatening situation for non-Muslims in BiH, yet it spins it to switch the victim and perpetrator roles. The article states, ‘Špirić was referring to the ideas promoted by the multi-ethnic Social Democratic Party, SDP, which emerged as the strongest political force in Bosnia’s Croat-Bosniak part and at the level of the state’ (Ibid). Absent in form from Špirić’s declaration, but present in meaning is the idea that in order to advance politically, one must have ties to the
Bošnjak political elite (here the SDP, which is ‘multi-ethnic’ but mostly Bošnjak, but also the SDA, which regained power from the SDP in 2014). This alludes back to the change from a secular elite to a religious elite mentioned earlier and how at one time it was advantageous to attend mosque (or church) in order to progress in one’s career. Survival in BiH, then, is depended on not only faith, but adhering to the ‘right’ faith, and those outside these areas of belonging are not only excluded, but somehow at risk.

_Balkan Insight_, a publication of the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), published a report from 2014 by Elvira Jukić that states further:

Hoping to re-win the Bosniak seat on the tripartite Presidency, Bakir Izetbegović has promised to create 100,000 new jobs – but he is often criticized for his close ties to Turkey and for radicalizing the SDA... With the 58-year-old Izetbegović leaning more towards Muslim and Turkish options, Tihic [a former political rival in the SDA] stood for a more centrist ideology... Contrary to Tihic’s policy of directing the SDA towards the pursuit of democratic values, Izetbegovic's sharper rhetoric has tended to undermine reconciliation. While Tihić tried to distance religion from politics, Izetbegović did the opposite, preferring to position Bosniaks as a Muslim community rather than a group of citizens with an ethnic affiliation (Jukić, 2014).

This article not only implies an active agenda on the part of Bakir Izetbegović towards Islamism, but it does so by juxtaposing Izetbegović’s links to Turkey and the Middle East – his moves towards ‘radicalising the SDA’ – with ‘centrist’ policies and the ‘pursuit of democratic values’. Thus, the implication is that the agenda towards Islamism in ranks of the Bošnjak political elite linked to the Middle East and GCC countries are contrary to the Western ideas of secularism, ‘undermin[ing] reconciliation’ as a whole in BiH. Linking with Middle Eastern allies on the part of Izetbegović is a tactical move that positions Bosnian Muslims toward religion instead of simply belonging to an ethnic group. The language of the article implies a clear preference for secularism, but it also has Islamophobic undertones. Jukić warns of ‘radicalism’ in the SDA, while such words would never be used to describe the religious influence of practicing Croats or Serbs.
In terms of investment from Muslim-majority countries, narratives in Sarajevo are constructed to continue the fear of an active agenda on behalf of the Bošnjak political elite to ‘Islamise’ the city and the country by courting funding and influence from the Middle East. In a short piece in the Dnevni Avaz, one of the most highly read daily newspapers in Sarajevo, Omer Čevra (2015) warns, ‘Dangerous attempts to sell BiH sovereignty: What is behind Izetbegović’s fear of creating a rule of law.’ The article then continues with:

Who was in power in 1992? Who brought the mujahideen into BiH and later gave them BiH citizenship? Who during the war stole and used billions of marks that came to help defend the country? Who and why [sic] prevented the RBH Army from freeing Mostar and thus surrendering Herzegovina’s leadership to the so-called Herceg-Bosna? Who recognised and legalised the Republika Srpska? Who ordered numerous political assassinations? Who built megalomaniac shopping malls and ‘Beverly Hills’ on Sarajevo’s hills and with whose money? The answer to these questions the article indicates is, ‘the Bošnjak political establishment with Bakir Izetbegović at the head who is selling BiH ‘sovereignty’ to Turkey and the Middle East, which is, ‘a serious indication that Izetbegovic and SDA are trying to forcibly change the ethnic structure in BiH. In a multinational country it is clear that such a model unnatural Islamisation and Afro-Asian-isation can only produce inter-Bosniak conflict and a variety of radicalisms.’ The article constructs influences from the Middle East as ‘unnatural’ to BiH, including their variants of Islam, and the author suggests that these influences are an attempt to change the ethnic structure not only towards a greater Muslim majority, but also towards a larger Salafi (and possibly

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64 ‘Oпасни пokušaji prodaje bh. suvereniteta: Šta se krije iza Izetbegovićevog straha od stvaranja pravne države.’
66 ‘bošnjački politički establistment s Bakirom Izetbegovićem na čelu’
67 ‘pредставља озbiljan indikator da Izetbegović i SDA pokušavaju nasilno promijeniti etničku strukturu u BiH. U multinationalnoj zemlji jasno je da takav model neprirodne islamizacije i afroazijacije može samo proizvesti međubošnjački sukob i razne radikalizme.’
African or Asian) population. This is stressed as a threat to the ‘multinational country’, something that will ultimately produce radicalism.

The idea in Sarajevo that there is an active agenda to ‘Islamise’ the city and the population and that part of this agenda involves actively attracting Islamic investment from the Middle East clearly resonates here. BBI and SCC – the ‘megalomaniac shopping malls’ (Ibid.) are key aspects of this agenda, according to Čevra; they are just the latest manifestation of the process that began with bringing in the mujahideen during the conflict in the 1990s. The wording of the article necessarily creates fear and apprehension. The title leads with ‘Dangerous attempts to sell BiH sovereignty’; it is a warning to the readership that something sinister is happening, and this something has everything to do with the coming wave of Islamic investment. The focus is ‘Afro-Asianisation’ and ‘Islamisation’ and the threats these pose to the ‘sovereignty’ and multinational character of BiH.

Thus, there is an implicit understanding that to remain free of this encroaching threat of Islam in the public sphere, secular financing (ostensibly from Europe and North America) would not only be preferable, but would save the country from radicalism.

Yet it goes further; by suggesting that BiH’s sovereignty is a risk through these investments and ties to the Middle East, the article suggests that these businessmen and politicians linked to the Bošnjak political establishment and Bakir Izetbegović somehow have power to rule over the people in the city, if illegitimately or from behind closed doors. Thus the hidden conspiracy of the SDA and Izetbegović risks creating Islamism: a city ruled by shari’ah law. There is an implicit fear that this loss of sovereignty will eventually lead to forced dress codes and dietary restrictions à la Saudi Arabia, following upon the restrictions already present in BBI and SCC and other Islamically financed businesses in Sarajevo. In fact, the public debates surrounding the case studies hinge very much on this fear of tighter Islamic regulations in the public sphere, especially with respect to dress codes, as I will discuss further below.
Čevra suggests that there is an active and planned, long-term agenda dating back to 1992 at work in the country. He indicates a step-by-step process that has led up to the selling of Sarajevo’s public spaces to Islamic investors. This agenda began with the SDA and Izetbegović actively ‘bringing’ the mujahideen into BiH, as if for some larger plan. It indicates that the mujahideen, far from being individually inspired freedom fighters, were actually a mercenary force able to be contracted into fighting.

There is the underlying idea in this article that the long-term plan of the SDA and Izetbegović was to import stricter Islamic observance into the country by inviting people, ideas and capital from Muslim-majority countries, and this is what is behind Izetbegović’s ‘fear of creating a rule of law’, as such moves have gone outside legal boundaries. The ever increasing Islamic nature of Sarajevo and the Muslim-majority areas of BiH thus has little to do with ethnic cleansing during the conflict, the siege of Sarajevo and failed refugee return schemes, but rather it is the ‘unnatural Islamisation’ brought into the country by the Bošnjak political elite.

In my field interview data, in which I spoke to people while within the spaces of BBI and SCC, some responses also indicated this discourse of ‘unnatural Islamisation’ or the conspiracy to ‘Islamise’ the city. When asked whether he thought there was a political motive behind large investments, one respondent that I spoke to in BBI, a young, male student who identified as ‘Bošnjak’ responded, ‘Political motive? Well, I think 50/50 yes, and maybe a religious motive’. As I have stated before, many of my field interview respondents seemed somewhat uneasy when responding to questions concerning political motivations for investments. However, although this answer is quite short, it shows that people in the city view BBI and SCC as having a sacred or religious function and that they suggest an active and planned agenda of ‘Islamisation’ in the city and in the Muslim-majority areas of the country generally.

68 ‘Politički motiv? Pa 50-50% mislim da, a možda i vjerski motiv.’
Similarly, survey responses tended towards the same discourse of planned ‘Islamisation’ in the city on the part of the political elite through Islamic investments in the built environment. When asked his opinion on whether investments such as BBI and SCC had an effect on the culture of Sarajevo, one male project manager for an international organisation replied that it was, ‘Islamisation in the Arabian peninsula style (as opposed to secular, Yugoslav variants).’ Although the response is somewhat unclear with respect to ‘secular, Yugoslav variants’ (he possibly meant it as a comparison to the former secularisation of the city spaces, although this is speculation), the respondent clearly expresses the idea of an Islamisation occurring in the city driven by GCC funding and transnational Islam. He juxtaposes ‘Islamisation in the Arabian peninsula style’ to secularism as an ideal, constructing the financial and ideological influences from the Middle East as foreign to the city. The usage of the term ‘Islamisation’ carries very negative connotations in this quote when set side by side with the idea of Yugoslav secularism, as nostalgia for the Yugoslav era in Bosnia often revolves around ideas of pan-Yugo brotherhood and multi-ethnic harmony and peace. The reverse, then, the creation of Islamically regulated spaces in the city as an active agenda of the Bošnjak political elite, threatens the notion of multiculturalism and the ideals of the secular, multi-ethnic past.

Of course, there are two sides of the debate. One urban professional I interviewed in Sarajevo shot down this idea, saying ‘he [Bakir Izetbegović] is not so clever to have an agenda. The networks just came. It snowballed. In the beginning he didn’t have an agenda; he inherited connections’. While this urban professional downplayed the idea of an overarching agenda, the fact that it was mentioned at all shows how pervasive this discourse in the city is. In the context of our conversation, this comment came as if it was anticipated. I had the feeling that she was not only used

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69 ‘Islamizacija u stilu Arabiskog poluostrova (za razliku od sekularne, YU varijante)’

70 In conversation with anonymous urban professional in Sarajevo.
to hearing this idea, but that she needed to strongly counter it to set the record straight. At the same time, she minimises the idea of an agenda by completely discrediting the ability of Izetbegović to conceive of and execute such a plan. Despite voices like hers to the contrary, the idea that Sarajevo is being ‘Islamised’ through investments is a real and active discourse surrounding the new urban interventions with Islamic financing from the Middle East, and these voices attempt to position Sarajevan identity on the Sacred/Secular binary, often by implying that there is a greater threat at play. This threat is that if this agenda continues, stricter Islamic regulations will be enforced on the general public.

6.2.2 Fear of Shari’ah Regulations on the Public

Building upon the perception that there is an active and planned agenda on the part of the Bošnjak political elite to ‘Islamise’ the city of Sarajevo by courting capital, ideas and people from the Middle East and GCC countries, people in Sarajevo speak of the fear of expanding shari’ah compliant spaces and increasing Islamic regulations imposed upon the public. This narrative warns of a real and imminent threat to secular public spaces due to the slow encroachment of these investments taking over the formerly-secular public spaces of the city. Seeing the movement as a challenge to ‘naš Islam’ which exists with a secular state, the construction of this discourse serves to position Sarajevan identity away from the Islam of the Middle East and GCC countries and Islamism in general. In this section I will analyse the public debate surrounding the case studies BBI and SCC in terms of fears of increasing shari’ah compliant spaces and public regulations.

The prohibitions on alcohol, pork and gambling in the new shopping centres caused reverberations throughout the city. As mentioned above, I have decided to use some internet sources in order to obtain a more complete view of the debate in the city, and this includes a blog by a Sarajevan journalist Srećko Latal, who is now a political
analyst for the UNDP in BiH (http://www.ba.undp.org/). In his post about the building’s opening, Latal (2009) researched whether public displays of affection were on the banned list, stating, ‘Later I came back to the BBI with my wife for a final test, to investigate reports that the security guards were preventing couples from hugging and kissing on the premises. We kissed and hugged repeatedly in front of a guard but he paid no attention whatsoever and eventually left.’ This account shows that Islamic restrictions on the spaces caused concern regarding the loss of freedoms in previously secular spaces, and some people in the city tried to test how far these restrictions went. Rumours that the imposition of very strict Islamically-inspired rules of conduct circulated throughout the city. In this example, Latal tested whether public displays of affection would be permitted. It is known in Sarajevo that in countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE such displays are not tolerated in public. That he is even testing this shows apprehension that the public sphere in Sarajevo might be moving in the direction of such tight Islamic regulations on behaviour and conduct. His investigation of these boundaries inside BBI attest to the prevailing attitude in the city: the fear of Islamism becoming the predominant ideology and a loss of the secular to ‘Islamisation’. Within this, there is the fear of losing the multi-ethnic character of the city’s spaces (tied to the secular, Yugoslav ethic), sustaining the deep suspicions and misgivings about Islamic financing and the movement of capital, people and ideas from the Middle East and GCC countries.

According to Latal, a rumour even circulated through the city that 15 people had been arrested after entering BBI when guards realized they had not made wudu – the Muslim ritual ablution – before entering (Latal, 2009). Although exaggerated in its attempt to demonstrate the threat of encroaching religious regulations in the public sphere, this rumour speaks to concern present in the city that the secular public sphere is at risk. Although it has now been years since BBI and SCC opened, rumours still circulate about buildings with Islamic financing from GCC countries. In fact, in my
interview with a Samid Sinanović, the general director of Shad Invest (also part of the Al Shiddi Group), he stated that when Hotel Bristol reopened in 2011, people thought it would be necessary for women to cover their hair in order to come to the café for a coffee. The headscarf has always been a contested symbol, and in Sarajevo, the topic of Islamic dress is as charged as it is in other areas of Europe (Mesarič, 2013).

That the public debate around these investments is constructing an atmosphere of fear and suspicion around Islamic financing speaks to the power of the secular Yugoslav ideology and its link to the idea of a multi-ethnic city, which is being overtaken by the ‘Islamic shift’. This may also be influenced by wider fears of Islam worldwide that have grown since the beginning of the century.

With respect to this fear of restrictions on the dress of women – either explicitly imposed or imposed through changing social norms – one survey respondent, a female architect, explained:

With the arrival of foreign investors who allegedly leave money in BiH, there is an increase in and entrance of their population that brings its own cultural habits and imposes them on the existing environment. Unfortunately, this is about a population that is not ready to adapt to the surroundings in which they come, so they impose their own, appearing in loud, large groups in public. For example, as a female and free European woman [evropljanka] in her own city, I am no longer able to move freely because I am attacked by the looks and commentary of members of certain groups that are moving through the community like a flock of sheep. As a free European woman, I'm no longer able to walk the streets normally without judgment and prejudice wearing what I want and buying products that I want – because I'm surrounded by the people described above and I fear for my own safety! In my own city I longer feel comfortable because of their impact on the community, surroundings and the environment in which we live.

According to this respondent, the investments from the Middle East, and specifically GCC countries, are influencing the social norms in the city's public spaces in such a way that:

71 In conversation with Samid Sinanović, general director of Shad Invest 19.10.2015.

72 ‘Dolaskom stranih investitora koji navodno ostavljaju novac u BiH povećava se i uđo njihovog [sic] stanovništva koji sa sobom dovodi svoje kulturološke [sic] navike i nameće ih postojećoj sredini. Nažalost, riječ je o populaciji koja nije spremana da se prilagodi okruženju u koje dolazi već nameće svoje, samom pojavom u velikim grupama i glasnim pristupavom u javnosti. Primjer, kao zensko i slobodna evropljanka u svom gradu više nisam u stanju da krećem slobodno jer me pogledima i komentarima [sic] napadaju pripadnici određenih skupina koji se kreću kroz zajednicu poput stada ovaca. Kao slobodna evropljanka nikam više u stanju da normalno, bez [sic] osuđivanja i predrasuda hodam ulicama, odjekom se kako želim i kupujem proizvode koje želim - jer sam obrušena navedenim uzorcima i strahujem za svoju sigurnost! U svom na svom se više ne osjećam ugodno zbog njihovog utjecaja na zajednicu, sredinu i okruženje u kojem živimo.’
way that she no longer feels free to dress in an implied western style – ie, not adhering to Islamic dress and probably exposing her arms and legs. While she is not discussing explicitly imposed Islamic restrictions, such as the ban on pork and alcohol, she suggests that the investments, their Islamic restrictions and the increase in people coming to Sarajevo from the Middle East and GCC countries (and Bosnian Salafis) are all changing the norms for behaviour and dress in public spaces. Here, it is a chain reaction – starting with capital for investment – and ending with feelings of fear and discomfort from being judged by those adhering to stricter Islamic rules, which influences social norms and imposes de facto rules for behaviour on the public. This, it is implied, goes against Europe, as she is a European woman, an ‘evropljanka’, who no longer feels at home in this European city due to investment from Muslim-majority countries and the influence it is having on people and their behaviour. She constructs her identity as a Sarajevan and a European, which she characterises as diametrically opposed to those in GCC countries and Salafis generally, marginalising their perceived influence in BiH and casting them as foreign and threatening (she fears for her own safety). She fears a loss of freedom with the loss of secularism in the public spaces and the inability to do as she pleases without judgment. Positioning Sarajevan identity along the Sacred/Secular binary (and the East/West binary) towards the Secular pole, she separates herself from transnational Islamic influences from the Middle East by stressing that such regulations should not be imposed on European or on European public spaces.

The fear of greater Islamic regulations in public spaces is a common and recurring theme in interview and survey data. It is often juxtaposed to the ideal of a multi-ethnic, secular city. For example, when asked about the ban on alcohol and pork in BBI and SCC, one of my field interview respondents from the Alipašino Polje area of the city, a pensioner replied, ‘I think it's nonsense. Let me tell you, we are a multinational, multicultural state, always have been. Bosnia and Herzegovina has
always been Europe. These restrictions are constructed as going against the secular, Yugoslav ethic and the ideal of a western, secular state. Not only do such investments counter the idea of secularism, the imposition of Islamic regulations on public spaces erodes away at the multi-ethnic, ‘multi-cultural’, plural fabric that has been the identity of Sarajevo. BBI and SCC and other investments with Islamic financing in the city then become threats to this imagery. They take Sarajevo away from ‘Europe’ and towards the Islamism of Saudi Arabia and the lack of freedom that that implies, especially for women.

According to my data, BBI and SCC are perceived as some of the earliest manifestations of an Islamised future. One of my interview respondents, a student at the architecture faculty in Sarajevo, discussed this issue. She said:

If you have new generations, and they grow up in this new, modified city that we never had, but they grow up in a city where it’s forbidden to drink alcohol in certain places – and it’s going to be forbidden in many more to come with the way that this development is going – then it is going to influence a whole new generation of people and they are going to think differently. Definitely! All these things influence people, they are completely connected – the politics, the socio-economic thing, the socio-economic status of the country, the people, everything. Everything is completely connected. So yeah, I guess the new generations are going to be influenced by this, especially if they don’t have anyone to explain why this is happening, if they just accept it as something that is completely normal – because the majority of the population does that. People don’t really think, it’s like ‘oh cool, we have a really cool mall in the middle of the city, we don’t have to walk that much, we have a lot of parking space.’ And you have everything you need there.

She believes younger generations might suffer for some perceived ignorance of contemporary society. There is a sense of regret imbedded in this statement – that she believes the people of the city will regret their complacency in the future, after all is said and done and Sarajevo is no longer secular. She is frustrated that the population is allowing this shift away from secularism towards Islamic regulation in the public sphere.

73 ‘Mislim da su to gluposti. Da Vam kažem, mi smo jedna multinacionalna, multikulturalna država uvijek bili. Bosna i Hercegovina je uvijek bila Evropa.’
and that they are content to have new developments without thinking about the social consequences.

One survey respondent, a 27 year-old female student, described new developments in the city as ‘the suppression and gradual destruction of the cultural scene, but also the promotion of a non-secular lifestyle that does not progress but regress.’ Words such as ‘suppression’, ‘destruction’ and ‘regress’ to characterise the phenomenon are telling. This quote shows that a turn towards the sacred – including the Islamic regulations on the spaces – is seen as backwards and against the secular progress of western, European society, especially, perhaps, by educated young people such as this student. BBI and SCC are not additions to the architectural wealth of the city, but rather they are manifestations of its destruction. Again, danger is implied in the loss of the secular in the public sphere, and along with this danger there is an implied feeling of regret at having lost something valuable. Another respondent, a male economist, stated:

The more land and property BiH continues to sell to Arabs, the more often it will happen that our shopping centers do not sell alcohol and pork, and at the same time have mesjids or that they build mosques in the area … it is not a problem to bring in foreign investors, the problem is when foreign investor dictate ALL the rules and impose their culture, which is 180 degrees different than ours.

Again, this quote implies the move away from secularism is a ‘problem’, and that the foreign Islamic financing is dictating ‘ALL’ the ‘rules’ in the city. This ‘imposition’ of culture and Islamic regulation in the discourse is diametrically opposed to Sarajevan ideals of secularism and multiculturalism, ‘180’ degrees different.

However, not all Sarajevans see the restrictions in BBI and SCC as a threat. In my field interviews, when asked about the ban on alcohol and pork in SCC and BBI,
one respondent, a female sales assistant, said: ‘I support it [the ban]. Totally.’

Another respondent, a shopkeeper, explained: ‘for me, that's OK [the ban]. I mean, there's somewhere to go to drink, that ... Well, yeah, you have bars, and in the bars there is drink. That's my opinion.’ The public debate is not one-sided, and although many in the city oppose such regulations, others are indifferent or even supportive of such measures.

6.3 Radicalism: the East/West Binary

In this section, I will focus on the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Center as a case study. The King Fahd Mosque is one of the most contested spaces in the city, and the controversy surrounding it falls into the themes of security risks, victimisation of the poor and uneducated and a rejection of Islamic tradition outside of the codified version of Islam practiced in Bosnia outlined above. In the following analysis, I will draw upon media reports, interview transcriptions and survey responses, focusing on how Sarajevans attempt to position their identity along the imagined East/West binary. Threatened by the ‘Islamic shift’ in the city, this construction of Sarajevan identity aligns with western secularism and the idea of a multiethnic city and state. It is important to note that the data does not always explicitly refer to the East vs. the West. However, there is an implicit reference to this imagined binary though the stress placed on the othering of GCC countries, especially Saudi Arabia, and the attempt to distance Bosnia’s Islamic practices and political relationship to Islam from those of the Persian Gulf.

6.3.1 Perceived Security Risks and Threats to ‘Naš Islam’

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76 ‘Pa, podržavam. Potpuno.’

77 ‘Za mene je to OK. Mislim, ima gdje treba da se iđa da se pije, da to... Pa, ja, imaš kafanu i u kafani i pij. To je moje neko mišljenje.’
In much of the press and internet data about currents of Islam and capital arriving into Sarajevo, BiH and, on a larger scale, the Balkans, such movements are discussed with problematically vague and confused terminology, especially when referring to ideas such as extremism, radicalism, fundamentalism, terrorism, Islamism and schools of thought within Islam such as Salafism, Wahhabism and Takfirism. In many cases, Wahhabism – a current of Salafism as discussed above – is paired together with radicalism and/or extremism without much thought. While a follower of Wahhabism might be a radical or an extremist or both, that individual might also be neither, just as followers of any ideology could become radicals or extremists (or not). Because the press and commentators often use this problematic language, the discourses surrounding sacred spaces – especially the Saudi King Fahd mosque – have been constructed around threats and fear. Threats to the security of the city and the state from Saudi- or GCC-inspired Islam allow Sarajevans to position their identity toward the opposite end of this spectrum, identifying ‘naš Islam’ with peace and freedom instead of terrorism and oppression. Media and interview data describe an imminent and alarming security risk circulating around the case studies in terms of their role in proliferating ‘extremism’ or ‘radicalism’ in the form of Salafism or Wahhabism. In this section, I will examine the themes of national security and attempts to convert people through access to education and financial assistance for faith centred around the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre. Throughout this section, I will demonstrate how narratives are created around Wahhabism or Salafism as a direct threat to ‘naš Islam’, and how the tradition of the Bošnjaks is maintained as the ideal form of Islam in a secular state.

Generally, there is an idea in Sarajevo that anything coming from Saudi Arabia, especially, but also from other GCC countries, Iran and South Asia, is a potential risk to security and to the idea of ‘naš Islam’. For example, one Balkan Insight article from 2007 is titled ‘Emissaries of Militant Islam Make Headway in Bosnia: Saudi-based
Wahhabi Fundamentalists Infiltrate Complacent Religious Structures’. In this short title, Islam from Saudi Arabia becomes ‘militant’ and ‘Wahhabi fundamentalists’ are ‘infiltrating’ the Islamic Community (IZ) in BiH. The underlying threat of Islam from other parts of the world, but especially Saudi Arabia, is clearly outlined for the reader. The IZ is complacent, and these ‘militant’ forces are marching into the country to conquer with no one to fight for ‘naš Islam’. Another Balkan Insight title cautions, “Bosnia’s Wartime Legacy Fuels Radical Islam” (Džidić, 2015), and the body of the article states, ‘Saudis wanted to spread Wahhabism and that is why they funded the Mujahideen and that continued after the war. You could see all of a sudden, mosques were being built which were huge and they had no relation in size and style to the ones you normally see in Bosnia; this is all intentional and deliberate’. This article describes a ‘deliberate’ plan on the part of the Saudis beginning with the mujahideen to ‘spread Wahhabism’, which is, according to the title, ‘radical’. Part of this plan to spread Wahhabism also includes the building of mosques, such as the King Fahd Mosque in Sarajevo.

Although anything relating to Saudi Arabia in the media is often portrayed as a security risk and a threat to ‘naš Islam’ in Sarajevo, this is especially true for the King Fahd Mosque. In an article from Balkan Insight, ‘Emissaries of Militant Islam Make Headway in Bosnia: Saudi-based Wahhabi Fundamentalists Infiltrate Complacent Religious Structures’ (Ahmetašević, 2007), the author explains:

SFOR arrested four of the Saudi staff and shut down the organisation [The High Saudi Committee]. The most visible physical legacy of Saudi Arabian influence is the King Fahd mosque in Sarajevo, built after the war. For years, it was not run by staff responsible to Bosnia’s Islamic Community. Although the latter has since posted its own man to head the mosque, it remains a popular gathering place for local Wahhabi faithful (21).

According to this statement, the mosque is a ‘gathering place for local Wahhabi faithful’ – which is implied as ‘militant’ from the headline. There is a suggestion that although there is now someone from the IZ at the head of the mosque, it is still somehow outside of control as the title states that the Wahhabis have ‘infiltrated the complacent religious
structures’ ie the Islamic Community. Underlying all this is the threat and danger of Saudi-style Islam in Sarajevo and for the people of BiH. Not only is it against the principles of ‘naš Islam’, it is a force that is seeking to corrupt the practices of BiH’s Muslims and turn them into radicals.

The danger associated with the King Fahd mosque puts the mosque and the cultural centre in an untouchable realm, outside the reach of the law. Because the complex officially sits on diplomatic land, there has been speculation that it is beyond the authority of the state. The Nezavisne Novine in 2008 (Čubro, 2008) ran an article with the headline, ‘The police cannot enter the King Fahd mosque’ followed by statements that qualify the grounds as a ‘place for the gathering of radical Islamists.’

The article also explains that, ‘Federal police are checking several people who gather in the center and who are known for extremist views.’ The discourse constructed around King Fahd paints the Saudi complex as a place where dangerous people meet to discuss dangerous ideas. They are ‘extremists’ and ‘radical Islamists’ who have found a safe haven in King Fahd away from the inspections of the police. In response to this particular article, the King Fahd Mosque had a letter published in Nezavisne Novine titled, ‘Reaction: The Police Can Enter’ (Imamović, 2008). However, while the original article used large fonts and photos to grab the reader’s attention, the reaction from King Fahd is tiny in comparison and does not even mention King Fahd in the title.

Their letter states:

We believe that the activities mentioned are very humane and do not constitute an ‘extreme action’. The media, but also your newspaper in recent years, wants to present the mosque as a ‘gathering place for radical Islamists’... We expect that you will, in the future, be objective in writing articles that concern the King Fahd mosque.

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78 ‘Policija ne može da uđe u džamije Kralj Fahd’
79 ‘mjesto okupljanja radikalnih islamista’
80 ‘Federalna policija provjerava nekoliko osoba koje se okupljaju u ovom centru, a poznate su po ekstremističkim stavovima.’
81 ‘Reagovanje: Policija može da uđe’
82 ‘Smatramo da su pomenute aktivnosti veoma humane i da ne predstavljaju nikakvo “ekstremno djelovanje”. Džamiju kroz medije, pa i kroz vas list u posljednjih nekoliko godina, žele predstaviti kao “mjesto okupljanja radikalnih islamista”…Očekujemo da ćete ubuduće biti objektivni u pisanju tekstova koji tretiraju džamiju Kralja Fahd.’
It is telling that the mosque had to defend itself against reports that it is a place where extremists gather outside the rule of law of BiH; the media has presented the complex as a dangerous place that breeds terrorism and Islamic ideals that counter the tradition of Muslims in the country represented by ‘naš Islam’.

A similar article was published in Politika, a Serbian news portal, about the King Fahd Mosque under the title, ‘King Fahd Mosque Gathers Radical Islamists’ (Sarajjić, 2008). Although Politika is a Serbian paper, people in Sarajevo access and read such articles online. The article claims that, ‘there are speculations that this place has an extraterritorial status and that it is under the rule of the Saudi Ministry of Religious Affairs, and also that national intelligence and security services keep it under constant surveillance.’ The article continues by stating that, ‘According to some media in BiH, "at the Cultural Center, owned by the Saudi Ministry of Higher Education, Wahhabis run ideological sermons and political speeches," and among them there are individuals who could, allegedly, “be linked to certain illegal activities”.’ The article mixes illegality, danger and the ideology of Wahhabism, constructing the King Fahd Mosque as not only dangerous in terms of sheltering would-be terrorists but also for its programmes to convert Bosnian Muslims to Wahhabism. These are activities and modes of thinking coming from the Middle East and especially Saudi Arabia: the East versus BiH’s westernised Islam.

In my field interviews, I encountered similar views regarding the mosque and cultural centre as well. When asked about King Fahd, one respondent, a female pensioner, simply said, ‘King Fahd? Potential danger.’ Many people in the city see King Fahd as a threat – to their way of life if not to their physical lives. There is both an ideological fear represented by the gathering of ‘radical Islamists’ and their missionary

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83 ‘Джамија Краљ Фахд окупља радикалне исламисте’
84 ‘Спекулише се да ово место има екстериторијални стаус и да је под управом саудијског министарства за верска питања, као и да је домашње обавештајне и безбедносне службе држе под сталним надзором.’
85 Краљ Fahd? Петенцијална опасност.
activities, as well as the fear of terrorist activities that such gathering might generate. In one field interview with a housekeeper, this fear again became the focus of the discussion. Here my interview questions are marked with (K) and the interviewee’s answers are marked with (I):

(K) What do you think about this mosque, King Fahd?
(I) It scares me a little. I’m afraid of this mosque.
(K) Why?
(I) Well, there are, terrorists and there… Everything comes to mind. It really angers me when I pass by, and, well, I’m a Muslim too, Bošnjaka, but anyway, I fear it in my bones [fear flows in my bones].

The King Fahd Mosque has thus become associated with terrorism and extremism to the extent that passersby fear it. Although it is known to the security services that no real threat comes from King Fahd – in my interview with a representative at the State Investigation and Protection Agency, my interviewee explained that those who might be an actual threat to security would not go to the King Fahd Mosque, but rather would organise their own religious services. Yet the King Fahd Mosque continues to be one of the most contested buildings in the city, one marked by the perception of an encroaching Islamic ideology that is opposite ‘naš Islam’ and promotes radicalism, extremism and terrorism. It does not stop there, however, as the media, interview, survey and internet data also implies that these ‘radical Islamists’ are courting favour with the public through programmes that take advantage of Sarajevo’s poor.

6.3.2 Rumours of Agendas to Target the Poor

The King Fahd Mosque and other charitable organisations from GCC countries have been the subjects of debates that present the goodwill on the part of financiers from these countries as hidden plans to convert the gullible, impoverished masses to Salafism. These discourses see benevolent activities as a front for more sinister

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86 (K) Šta mislite o ovoj džamiji, Kralj Fahd? (I) Malo me strah. Strah me te džamije. (K) Zašto? (I) Pa, ovo sad, teroristi i ovo...Svašta pada na pamet. Baš me ono jeza kad prođem, a, eto, muslimanka sam i ja, Bosanka, ali džaba, strah u kosti ulijeva.

87 In conversation with SIPA representative 22 July 2015.
ambitions and an obvious and imminent threat to ‘naš Islam’. The Saudis do have a political agenda in BiH that may or may not include missionary work. In my interview with Prof. Dr. Khalid AdDamigh, the Cultural Attaché and head of the Saudi Cultural Centre (part of the King Fahd Mosque complex), he described this as ‘soft power’.\footnote{In conversation with Prof. Dr. Khalid AdDamigh, General Director of the King Fahd Cultural Centre, 15 February 2015.} However, it should not be forgotten that the United States, the EU and many Western European countries also have active diplomatic missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the US embassy in Sarajevo is actually the largest US embassy in Europe.\footnote{I was told this while I was an intern at the US embassy in Sarajevo in the summer of 2012.} The Saudi cultural centre and mosque do play a role in Saudi Arabia’s mission for ‘soft power’ in the country, but little attention is paid to other national agendas in BiH, such as the American agenda. As I will show below, media, internet and interview data suggest that Salafism or Wahhabism would not have a foothold in Sarajevo were it not for the ‘gullible, ignorant poor’ being preyed upon by the rich Arabs to proliferate stricter versions of Islam and to ‘Islamise’ the city. Going further than this, however, by painting followers in this light and by challenging the proliferation of Salafism, Sarajevans act to position Sarajevan identity towards the West on the East/West binary, rejecting the flows of ideas and people from GCC countries in favour of western secularism and pluralism.

There have been many media reports that place Saudi charitable activities – such as the free English, Arabic and computer classes at the King Fahd cultural centre – as weapons in the Saudi arsenal against BiH Islam. Often this is linked to terrorism, as shown in the above section on security risks. For example, in the article entitled ‘Wahhabis are divided into two currents’\footnote{‘Vehabije su podijeljena dvije struje’ from Dani, a popular BiH weekly magazine, (Bećirbašić 2010), the author states: Financial sponsorship of mosques and economic aid by Saudi Arabia aimed to cement the Saudi global leadership (vs. Iran) in order bring Bosnian Muslims closer to the beliefs and practices acceptable in} from Dani, a popular BiH weekly magazine, (Bećirbašić 2010), the author states: Financial sponsorship of mosques and economic aid by Saudi Arabia aimed to cement the Saudi global leadership (vs. Iran) in order bring Bosnian Muslims closer to the beliefs and practices acceptable in
Wahhabism ... The King Fahd Cultural Center in Sarajevo ... [is an example] of this process ... Its results are changing the traditional Hanafi viewpoint with Wahhabism, the radical and intolerant Saudi version of Islam, which in some cases, causes and makes possible terrorist activity\textsuperscript{91} (32).

In the same article, the subheading ‘Jihadi Wahhabism’\textsuperscript{92} is juxtaposed with a photo of the Saudi mosque. Here outwardly benevolent activities, such as ‘financial sponsorship of mosques and economic aid’, on the part of the Saudis actually hide the sinister agenda of converting Bosnian Muslims to Wahhabism, making terrorist activity possible and threatening the existence of traditional BiH Islam. Saudi ‘soft power’ according to this media report is an attempt to cement Saudi leadership amongst Muslims.

Yet this idea goes somewhat deeper in the Bosnian psyche, and those who have converted to Salafism or who are sympathetic to the Saudis in one way or another are very often portrayed as ‘ignorant’, ‘poor’ or ‘uneducated’. Thus, those who are duped by the obvious power grabs and coercion through charity reflect the less intelligent sections of society. In the article ‘Emissaries of Militant Islam Make Headway in Bosnia: Saudi-based Wahhabi fundamentalists infiltrate complacent religious structures’ from Balkan Insight, Nidžara Ahmetašević (2007) furthers this idea, stating:

A public opinion poll conducted by Prism Research, a private agency, shows that 69 per cent of Bosnia’s Muslims oppose Wahhabists and their interpretation and practice of Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while 12.9 per cent support them one way or another. The poll also shows the Wahhabi are predominantly supported by the poorly educated section of the population. ‘Many of their supporters come from rural areas and the bottom of the social ladder. These people are desperate.’ (5).

This quote not only serves to position BiH Islam and identity away from that practiced in Saudi Arabia, articulating on the East/West binary, but it also aims to convince the population that only the peasants from ‘rural areas’ who are at the ‘bottom of the social ladder’ – the ‘poorly educated section of the population’ – could possibly find any value

\textsuperscript{91}‘Finansijsko sponzoriranje džamija i ekonomska pomoć od strane Saudijanske Arabije imala je za cilj da zabetonira saudijko globalno vodstvo [vs. Iran] kako bi bosanske muslimane približila vjerovanjima i praksi prihvatljivoj za vehabizam...Kulturni centar Kralja fahda u Sarajevu...[je primjer] ovog procesa...Njegovi rezultati su upravo mijenjanje tradicionalnog hanefijskog gledista s vehabizmom, radikalnom i netolerantnom saudijskom verzijom islama, koja u nekim slučajevima prouzrokuje i moguće terorištke aktivnosti.’

\textsuperscript{92}‘Dzihadski vehabizam’
in the ideas of the Wahhabis. The article cleverly persuades the population against this form of Islam by describing their supporters in this way.

This discourse appears repeatedly throughout the media. Such a portrayal delegitimises the charitable activities of the Saudis – directly related to the King Fahd mosque or not. There are more general assertions about Saudi charities, such as the article ‘Bosnian Muslims: Threat or Opportunity’ from Balkan Insight (Nikšić, 2009) in which the author states:

Saudi Arabia funded a number of charities that tried to convince the traditionally more moderate Bosnian Muslims to abandon their version of the faith. In a country ruined by war and with unemployment between 80 and 90 per cent, the economic incentives these charities were offering tempted many people to adopt the Saudis’ ‘true’ variety of Islam...Wahhabi activists preached to all those who felt neglected by society – the young, the uneducated, the poor and the confused...’Bosnian Muslims were greatly offended,’ recalls Ziga. ‘They were unwilling to accept these trouble-makers who believed they spoke for God and turned women into walking tents.’

Again, this article suggests that the charity from Saudi Arabia is laced with bad intentions: to impose Wahhabism on ‘all those who felt neglected by society – the young, the uneducated, the poor and the confused’ and to turn ‘women into walking tents’. By default, anyone adopting such practices, according to this viewpoint, must be ‘uneducated’ or ‘poor’; they must be victims the Saudi propaganda machine. While the above quote did not mention any of the case studies specifically, the King Fahd mosque has been at the centre of such discussions, as it is the Saudi epicentre in Sarajevo.

Other media sources implicate King Fahd more directly in this plot to deceive and conquer the country’s poor, destitute and uneducated. For example, Nezavisne Novine on 26 October 2010 had a headline, ‘Poor Targeted by Radical Islam’93 which is accompanied by a photo of the King Fahd mosque. The articles states that:

From Bosnia to Kosovo huge amounts of money flow into this region, mainly from countries like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, but also

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93 ‘Siromašni nametiradikalnogislama.’
from missionaries of Wahhabism, targeting mainly the young and the poor, who live in a country dominated by unemployment and corruption. In Sarajevo, the BiH capital, the huge King Fahd mosque is one example of this.94

Again, Wahhabism is ‘radical’ and it is coming from the East, targeting Bosnia’s poor.

The victims are made to be helpless in a ‘country dominated by unemployment and corruption,’ which makes them easier prey for such dangerous movements, according to the tone of the article. That there is a photo of King Fahd in the middle of the article shows that this space – along with its cultural centre – is highly contested in the city and seen as the epicentre for Wahhabism.

These concepts in the media are echoed in the speech of the people of Sarajevo in comments left on internet forums and in field interview data. Although unconventional as a data source, forum comments allow for data collection of viewpoints that might not be expressed in face-to-face interviews or that interviewees might self-censor. On the internet forum Klix.ba, in the thread titled ‘About the Mosque and Cultural Centre King Fahd,’95 people in the city discuss the rumour in Sarajevo that Saudis give families financial compensation for overt displays of faith such as wearing the headscarf or growing a beard. One commentator with the username kokuz_sa swears that:

I have a neighbour who lives a couple doors down from me and who has a covered wife (one [wife] left him because she did not want to cover) and he grows his beard and he personally told me that he receives compensation for covering his wife and for growing his beard... only he did not tell me how much and from whom96 (Forum Klix.ba, 2010).

Although this user cannot say for sure who exactly is funding such activities, that it was written in the thread on King Fahd implies that the commenters believe the Saudis are

94 ‘Od Bosne do Kosova ogromne količine novca se slijevaju u ovaj region i to uglavnom iz zemalja poput Saudijske Arabije i zalivskih država, ali i od misionara vehabizma, čija su meta uglavnom mladi i siromašni, koji žive u zemljigde prevladavaju nezaposlenost i korupcija. U Sarajevu, bh. prijestonici, ogromna džamija kralja fahda je jedan od primjera ovoga.’

95 ‘o džamiji i KC Kralj Fahd’

96 ‘evo imam ja komsiju do menet j vrata do mojih zivi i on ima pokrivenu zenu(jedna ga je napustila nije htjela da se pokrije) i pusta bradu i on mi je licno kazao da prima naknadu za pokrivanje zene i za pustanje brade...samo nije htjelo da kaze koliko i od koga...’
the funders for such measures of faith. Another commenter with the username statix discusses compensation from the Saudis in this thread and states:

My three high-school friends found refuge in the Wahhabis. Interestingly, all three were catastrophic students with problem behaviour. :D After finishing high school they spent two to three years sneaking and tramping around, so that in the end their question of existence was solved exactly in said mosque [King Fahd] and with the Wahhabis. Immediately they got married and now have two or three children, and for each receive financial compensation like women do to cover. A couple of times I met them and they started to tell me stories about Islam and Muhammad, and how I need to come by so they can educate me97 (Ibid.).

Although some Muslim women in Sarajevo see the headscarf as a goal or ideal, the issue is just as contested as it is in Western Europe, and many see Islamic dress as foreign and against Bošnjak tradition (Mesarić, 2013). The author of this quote paints the ‘three high-school friends’ as uneducated or stupid, ‘catastrophic students with problem behaviour.’ It again follows the perspective that the Wahhabis at King Fahd and the Saudis generally prey upon the weakest in society to convert them to their creed. The sarcastic tone reveals the author’s incredulity that these uneducated ‘catastrophic students’ might then try to educate him. The three school friends described in such a manner continues the discourse that only the poor and uneducated fall victim to the Saudi missionary work, those who don’t have the sense to know that such ways are foreign to BiH and against ‘naš Islam’.

In field interview data as well this idea of compensation for faith is expressed. When discussing the King Fahd Mosque with an older resident of the area (a 76 year-old pensioner), he spoke tentatively about the programmes offered at the cultural centre and its implications:

I mean this mosque is more than a mosque. You know, there are... it gathers... I live here so I’ve followed them and I know. I’m from Old Town, but I moved here. They created this centre here for the youth, for

97 ‘Moja tri srednjoškolka druga su nasla utocište u vehabijama. Interesantno, ali sva tri su bili katastrofalni ucenici i problematicnog ponasanja. :D Nakon završene srednje dvije-tri godine su se smucali i klosarići, da bi na kraju svoje pitanja egzistencije rjesili bas u navedenoj dzamiji i vehabijama. Odmah su se ozenili i sad imaju po dvoje-troje djece, i za svako primaju novcanu naknadu kao i zena za pokrivanje. Par puta sam ih sreo i poceli su mi sa pricom o Islamu i Muhamedu, i kako trebam doći da me edukuju,’
young people. When Bosnia had no money, they were the first to make centres with electronics, with computers, with... of course they had money and then they purchased and bought [electronics and computers]. And our youth, our young are eager for knowledge and learning. You know... and it attracted them, because all young people... look I have a few years on me, 76, and I like to sit at a computer, I like Facebook, I like, I like everything, but you young people especially do. It is thus totally understandable that they find ways to attract them. And how... now how much can they influence them, how much further will they affect them? That I really don’t know, but I think that it's, uh, one mistake of our government. If you are allowed to make a mosque, then the mosque serves as a place of worship. Is that right? But there's some... some other education. You know what that means? That they do not educate people in a different direction, but rather they educate them to be believers. But the latter may be left to other institutions.98

While this respondent does not perpetuate the discourse that only the uneducated fall victim to the ‘plot’ of the Saudis to convert them, he does suggest that there is a plan in place to entice the youth with courses, electronics and computers. He also discusses these activities very carefully and with an underlying concern that they are threatening to the youth of the city. The words he uses 'attract' and 'influence' show an active agenda from the Saudis to use the King Fahd Cultural Centre to bring in easily influenced young people and to ‘educate’ [odgajati] them, to raise them and bring them up. It is implied that this ‘education’ or rearing involves conversion to Wahhabism, as he states that they are ‘educated’ or reared to be believers. And while the youth in this case do not receive direct financial compensation, they are given access to things they desire: computers, electronics and knowledge.

Thus, the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre is perceived as having an agenda to convert the young and the gullible, impoverished masses to Salafism through aid and access to resources. These are not the practices of a perceived sophisticated, Bosnian Islam in line with the ‘West’ and a secular state as envisaged in

98 ‘Ali, mislim, ta džamija je sve viče nego džamija. Znate, ona ima... ona okuplja... ja tu stajjem, pa sam malo pratila i znam. Ja sam iz starog grada ovdje doselila. Oni su tu stvorili centar za omladinu, za mlade ljude. Oni su prvi kad u Bosni nije bilo para da se naprave centri sa elektronikom, sa kompjuterima, sa... oni su, naravno, imali pare i onda su to nabavili i pokupovali. A omladina naša, naša mladost je željna znanja i učenja. Znate... I to je njih privuklo, jer svi mladi... evo ja imam toliko godina, 76, pa volim sjet za kompjuter, volim Facebooku, volim, sve volim, a pogotovo vi mladi. To je tako razumjet ljivo da su našli načini kako će ih privući, i kako... E, sad, koliko mogu uticati na njih, koliko dalje utiču na njih, to stvarno ne znam ali mislim da je to, ovoj, jedna greška naše vlasti. Ako su dozvolili da se napravi džamija, onda ta džamija neko služi samo kao bogomolja. Je li tako? Da nema tu nekog... nekih drugih odoja. Znate šta to znači? Da ne odgajaju ljude u drugom smjeru, nego da ga odgaja da bude vjernik. Ali ovo drugo neka prepuštiti nekim drugim ustanovama.'
the IZ’s constitution. These activities and ideas are dangerous and threatening to the traditions of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, as a consequence, to the multi-ethnic nature of the city of Sarajevo. By portraying those who take on Salafi ideas as the ‘uneducated poor’ and ‘unemployed youth’ such ideas dissuade Bosnians from following Salafism. It is a means to position Sarajevan identity towards the West on the imagined binary, advocating, instead, western secularism combined with ‘naš Islam’ – an idea created in direct opposition to the Salafi ‘other’ that proliferated during the war and directly after.

6.4 Conclusion

In this chapter I have explored the discourses around sacred spaces in Sarajevo, understanding that with the ‘Islamic shift’ in the city, public spaces such as the shopping centres BBI and SCC have become imbued with the sacred. The line between the sacred and the secular in Sarajevo has been blurred, and the case studies – the King Fahd Mosque, BBI and SCC – represent this mixing of the sacred and the secular where the simultaneous production of both exist on one site. Public debates in Sarajevo are challenging the Islamic shift, and they are attempting to reclaim some version of a simplified secular public sphere, asserting the ideals of Yugoslav secularism. Sarajevans also defend the idea of ‘naš Islam’ against new currents of Islam, but especially against Salafism. They perceive their tradition of Islam as ‘European’ and ‘tolerant’ as opposed to ‘eastern’ variants that are less tolerant (Bougarel, 2007 and Helms, 2008). As a direct reaction to these new urban investments in Sarajevo, Sarajevans are positioning their identity around the imagined binaries of Sacred/Secular and East/West.

All three of the case studies have been implicated in what has been termed the ‘Islamisation’ of the city: the perception that there is an active agenda on the part of the Bošnjak elite to bring Islam into the public sphere through Islamic financing of public
spaces and the expansion of mosque building in the city. For BBI and SCC, Sarajevans are defining their identity in terms of the Sacred/Secular binary, asserting the Yugoslav ideal of secularism and the preservation of the multi-ethnic city against Islamic homogenisation of the city spaces. Fear of the imposition of Islam on Sarajevo extends further into the regulations of these spaces. As ‘naš Islam’ is defined in relation to a secular state, including a secular public sphere, the threat of Islamic regulations upon the people from new urban interventions has inspired discourses that challenge any such regulations as against ‘our traditions and our Islam’. This positions Sarajevan identity – that of the city and the population – towards the secular, despite the fact that the true nature of these spaces and the city generally is more multiplex and defies binary definition.

Constructed along the East/West binary, the discourses surrounding the King Fahd mosque portray Islamic currents from Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Arab world as a threat to the security of the country as well as a threat to the Islamic tradition of Bošnjaks. Seen as a foreign import from the ‘East’, Sarajevan identity is positioned in direct relation to the ‘other’ that is ‘eastern’ Salafism, where ‘naš Islam’ is aligned with western secular ideals and a secular state. The Islam practiced at the King Fahd Mosque and its followers are perceived as potential threats to the security and stability of the country and of western liberal democracy. The perception exists that this ‘radical’ and ‘extreme’ form of Islam is not native to BiH, and must therefore be treated with caution. To challenge the threat of Salafism from King Fahd, narratives in the city underscore the idea that there is a Saudi/Wahhabi plot to convert vulnerable people in the country to Salafism through access to free educational services at the King Fahd Cultural Centre and through financial assistance in exchange for certain faith practices. By representing converts to Salafism in Sarajevo in such a way, adherence to anything but traditional, Hanafi Islam practiced in BiH is actively discouraged, which aligns
Sarajevan identity with the ‘West’ in terms of ideals, its cohabitation with a secular state and its rejection of terrorism.

BBI, SCC and the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre are worlding practices, which are attempting to solve the ‘urban problem’ (Ong, 2011: 4) of post-socialist and post-conflict redevelopment. They are bringing new conceptions of Islam and of sacred space into Sarajevo from different corners of the earth, and as agents of multiplicity and hybridity where simultaneous realities may exist at once, new cultural forms are emerging through these worlding practices. These projects act as ‘expressions and agents of global urban imaginaries’ (Baker and Ruming, 2014: 63), but they are elite-approved and mostly outside the control of the population of the city. To challenge the perceived elite-approved rise of Islam in the public sphere that is linked to the new investments, there is a move to flatten the phenomena and create an easily digestible and defendable version of Sarajevan identity based on the historical ‘multicultural’ idyll, which aligns with the ostensibly transparent and safe ‘secular’ ‘West’. By positioning their identity along the imagined binaries of East/West and Sacred/Secular, Sarajevans are attempting to interpret the new currents and information flowing through the city and the city’s link with both Europe and the Middle East; they are attempting to solidify an understanding of their identity and of the identity of the city in the twenty-first century. This positioning of Sarajevan identity along the two binaries speaks to a fundamental fear of the unknown emerging cultural forms developing in the city. Such fears also extend to the movement of people into Sarajevo from different parts of the Muslim world, as I will discuss in the following chapter on residential spaces in the city.
7. Understanding Arabophobia: Residential Projects as Catalysts for New Constructions of the ‘Other’ in Sarajevo

7.1 Introduction

In Sarajevo, a noticeable number of foreigners in the past decade has arrived on the bustling cobbled streets of the old town, where, especially on warm summer nights, groups of tourists and new residents stroll along the passageways, smoke nargila (shisha or flavoured tobacco in water pipes) under awnings and drink coffee in the many cafes. These new arrivals are distinguishable from the Sarajevan population mainly by their dress, which is often characterised as being regional variants of Islamic attire, especially (but not exclusively) for the women. Bosnia and Herzegovina has become attractive to tourists and visitors from the Middle East, and according to my interview data with people working in the tourism and real estate sectors in Sarajevo, growing numbers of people from these regions are not only visiting but also buying property in and around Sarajevo. This growing trend has been explored by both local and international news sources as well, including The Economist in their article ‘Ottoman Comfort: Bosnia’s New visitors’ (2016). To cater to this new demand for property and accommodation, both Arab and Bosnian companies have proposed new developments targeting tourists and buyers from GCC countries. In Sarajevo, real estate agencies run by business owners from the Middle East focus exclusively on the Arab property market in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Likewise, Arabic speakers around the capital are profiting from the tourist boom to BiH by providing Arabic-language services to these tourists (Arabic-language tours, for example, have become a common offering to the new visitors), according to my interview data with real estate agents and tour operators in Sarajevo.

99Aida Musagić, Helvetas tourism expert; Tarik Bilalbegović, Ascendant Finance; Samid Sinanović, General Director of Shad Invest; Enes Kazazić, Director of SEIC
Amongst these new residential and tourist developments are Poljine Hills residential complex and Buroj Ozone tourist village (see Figure 12 below). Poljine Hills is a gated community of private villas northwest of Sarajevo’s city centre. It offers a number of residential options for upper middle class Bosnians and foreigners wishing to buy property in BiH. Owned by Shad Invest, which is part of the Saudi Al Shiddi Group, Poljine Hills’ business model consists of the management of all properties, which allows for upkeep when foreign buyers are away from their homes. Buroj Ozone is a proposed tourist village in the Sarajevan municipality of Trnovo from the Dubai-based Buroj Property Development, which will specifically target Arab tourists and cater to their needs. At an estimated cost of 2.3 billion Euros, this investment will be the largest in South East Europe.

As with the case studies in the previous chapters, both of these projects are ‘worlding practices’ (Ong, 2011), or projects pushing urbanism beyond the city and
driving new flows of people and ideas into Sarajevo. Such flows, however, are not a new phenomenon. Cities such as London and New York have been experiencing this type of urban change for centuries as waves of immigrants and visitors have arrived from various areas of the world. Sarajevo itself has also witnessed this type of migration when it welcomed Sephardic Jews in the sixteenth century after their expulsion from Spain (Donia, 2006: 16). In the contemporary Sarajevan context, such flows differ from cities like New York and London in a number of ways. For one, Sarajevo is a Muslim-majority city, and these networks of people and ideas also belong to the Muslim world. New flows of people from Muslim-majority countries to cities in North America and Western Europe are met with some more fundamental religious differences, (see for example Kassam, 2016). However, there are ideological differences between newcomers in Sarajevo and the local population, as will be discussed below. Secondly, the people coming to Sarajevo from the Middle East and North Africa are often more materially wealthy than the average person in Sarajevo, whose typical monthly salary is around 875 BAM or about 395 GBP (‘Cost of Living in Sarajevo’, 2018). These people are not usually economic migrants. Spatial inequalities that exist in cities like London, in which economic migrants find themselves in unattractive, low-income neighbourhoods (Keith, 2005: 13 and Sassen, 2005: 39), are not the same in Sarajevo, where property buyers from the Muslim world seek out gated communities, villas and tourist resorts. Wealthy buyers from oil-rich countries do also purchase exclusive properties in London, New York, Paris, etc. (‘UAE, Saudi buyers target London’s elite homes’, 2010), but there are not as many of these buyers relative to the rest of the New York or London population, and it is mainly the middle class that find themselves in Bosnia instead of the super wealthy (‘Ottoman Comfort’, 2016). Finally, these new flows of people consist mostly of visitors who do not seek long-term
residence and only stay for a short time in the country each year,\textsuperscript{100} as opposed to economic migrants in London, New York or Paris who would reside there continuously.

As the case studies in this chapter are a new phenomenon in Sarajevo, Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone have generated public debates around the themes of exclusion, safety, cultural colonisation and the new ‘other’. The controversy around these projects – and, especially, the discussions around Arab tourists and residents that the projects have mobilised – has proved to be intense and divided. In this chapter, I will examine the way in which Sarajevans are constructing the Arab ‘other’ as a reaction to new residential complexes such as Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone and how this construction helps position Sarajevan identity. While gathering media, interview, survey and internet data, the theme of the Arab ‘other’ expanded beyond focused discussions about the case studies themselves. These investments prompted and catalysed conversations about Arab residents and tourists on a larger scale, which recurred repeatedly during my data collection. Because residential developments such as Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone are by definition private or exclusive to paying visitors, the debate then focuses on who can and should inhabit such places, how these residents compare to the rest of the population and what attributes they contribute to the larger community. By allowing the data to expand away from a strict focus on Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone, but while keeping within the framework of residential spaces and the idea of what constitutes a ‘good’ neighbour, I was able to analyse better how new residential spaces are marshaling the positioning of Sarajevan identity, especially along the binaries of East/West and Global/Local. Although the issue of race has not been explored much in the literature on the ex-Yugoslav space, Catherine Baker’s work \textit{Race and the Yugoslav Region} (2018) shows that attitudes in BiH contribute to global formations of race. This chapter explores how some of these discourses are mobilised for identity formation in Sarajevo.

\textsuperscript{100} In conversation with real estate agents focusing on the Arab market in Sarajevo, 02.11.15.
I will examine how Sarajevans are discussing residential spaces and the accompanying phenomenon of the Arab neighbour and ‘other’ by drawing on five types of data: first, I will look at media articles and editorials; second, I will examine the data from my interviews with Sarajevans working in urban development or studying urban development; after that I will analyse responses from my field interviews with people on the streets of Sarajevo and in shopping centres; I will then add survey data; and finally, I will explore internet data taken from the comments sections of articles and from internet forums. Throughout all of these sources of data, certain themes recur, including: exclusion, cultural colonization, security and safety, and clashes of behaviours and values or ‘Arabophobia’. I will highlight these themes as they arise, and analyse the construction of the Arab ‘other’ in relation to the themes.

7.1.1 Data Collection

For the media data, I will explore a cross section of media available to the Sarajevan audience. Although I cannot discuss all articles and publications that have been written about new residential spaces in Sarajevo and the accompanying phenomena of Arab residents and tourists, I have attempted to select articles from a wide range of sources, which demonstrate the breadth of the debate. It is not simply a subject for one or two specific news portals, but rather, many news portals in BiH, even those writing in English, contribute to the public debate surrounding residential spaces in Sarajevo. I will analyse articles and editorials from sources such as Radio Slobodna Evropa, the US government’s Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty local language news source for the Western Balkans, which is widely read by the Sarajevan population. Radio Slobodna Evropa markets itself as anti-nationalist and pro-democracy, making it attractive to urban and university educated audiences. An interview I will examine comes from the Blic online portal, a Serbian news portal that is popular in BiH. The interview from the Blic article I have chosen was shared or reported by at least ten
different online news portals in BiH, including Slobodna Bosna, BNTV, and others, thus reaching a very large audience simply by its spread. Another article that adds to the debate about Arab residents comes from Dani, a weekly news magazine from Sarajevo, described earlier in the chapter on sacred spaces. Slobodna Bosna also provides data for this analysis. It is a weekly political magazine in Sarajevo that has now become a digital publication and is a very well known publication in BiH and a rival of Dani. According to Marko (2011), Slobodna Bosna offers a strong critical stance of authorities in the country and maintains a secular point of view (7). Additionally, I will examine an article that appeared in both Balkan Insight and Justice Report, in English and in Bosnian. A BIRN journalist wrote this particular article. As described in the previous chapter, BIRN stands for the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, and it is one of the last investigative news sources in BiH.101 Finally, I have chosen to analyse an editorial that appeared on the DEPO news portal. DEPO boasts over 300,000 unique viewers daily and describes itself as ‘one of the leading online news sources in BiH’102 (‘O Nama’, http://depo.ba/stranica/o-nama-depo). DEPO is linked to its partner BLIN, which has exactly the same format and content as DEPO, and the editorial I will be analysing was shared on at least three different online forums in BiH, including Klix forum, Skyscraper City forum and Bosanski forum.

While media articles and editorials are crucial for understanding the debate about residential spaces and the rise of Arab residents and tourists, I will also draw upon my interview, field interview and survey data, as these offer insights into the phenomenon. However, it is important to note that due to the nature of interviews, interviewees are aware that their responses might be analysed, leading to somewhat less candid responses. This can be especially true when dealing with a controversial topic. I will analyse interview segments I had with a student of architecture at the

101 In conversation with representative of the OSCE’s Press and Public Information Unit 11.08.15.  
102 ‘DEPO Portal je jedan od vodećih online medija u BiH.’
University of Sarajevo and a local architect working in Sarajevo. I did not set out to discuss their views on the new coming residents, but the subject was raised during the interview, as it is linked to urban investments with links to GCC countries. In addition to these in-depth interviews, my field interviews (in which I stopped Sarajevan residents on the street and in shopping centers to discuss current trends such as the transnational flows of capital and people from GCC countries) also provide invaluable data on this public debate, and I will be analysing six field interview segments from women and men that I approached in different areas of the city. Finally, my survey data supplies an added source of data for this discussion, and I will draw upon a few responses to my survey that I thought added interesting insights to the discussion.

As this is a public debate, I did not limit myself to traditional sources of data (media, interview and survey), but I allowed myself to use public internet comments on news portals and on internet forums as data as well. Using such data is not a familiar technique within the social sciences, but it is gaining in repudiability and popularity. It is advantageous for this study because it allows me to gather viewpoints that traditional interviewees might self-censor. However, due to the anonymous nature of internet forums and comments sections and the propensity for commenters to ‘troll’ (to incite strong reactions from others by expressing sometime outlandish and radical viewpoints), this method does have its drawbacks for social research. I have tried to exclude viewpoints that seem to be ‘trolling’ by understanding the context of the comments and the responses they received, while also focusing on how these comments construct the ‘other’ with respect to Arab residents and tourists. I analysed comments that were left in the comments sections of online articles, especially those linked to the case studies. These comments are on the Radio Slobodna Evropa website and the Klix.ba website, which is the most visited news portal in Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to USAID (Brunwasser et al, 2016). In addition to the comments on articles themselves, I also drew from the internet forums
SkyscraperCity.com and Klix.ba’s forum. SkyscraperCity.com is an architectural and urban environment forum that operates worldwide. I chose to use it as a source of data because the people who comment on it are interested in developments in the urban environment and often work in or study fields relating to urban development. Thus, comments on this forum will look at the trend of Arab residents and tourists through the lens of urban development. Klix.ba’s forum section is very popular and highly visited by the population of BiH, which allows for the data obtained from this forum to encapsulate a larger sample of viewpoints (not just from those people working in urban development). These non-traditional sources of data support and reaffirm the media, interview and survey data, and are valuable for analysing how Sarajevans are constructing the ‘other’ in environments where they can offer anonymous opinions.

7.1.2 Case Studies: Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone

In this chapter, I will be using the residential complexes of Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone as case studies. There are, in fact, many different residential developments in Sarajevo that have funding from GCC countries, and there are real estate agencies specifically focusing on the Arab market in Sarajevo. According to my interview data with such estate agencies, people from Arab countries and especially the GCC are seeking out residential properties in BiH for a number of reasons. Among these are the lush green nature found in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its location in Europe, which some buyers use as a hub for travelling around the rest of Europe. A strong selling point for this market is the climate and greenery combined with the fact that Sarajevo and other parts of BiH are Muslim-majority areas. Many buyers visit during the month of Ramadan, as it is much cooler and greener in BiH than it would be in Kuwait or the UAE, for example, making the month of fasting more pleasant while
also allowing for night prayers at the local mosque. Arabic-speaking visitors and residents have become so prevalent in Sarajevo that the municipality of Ilidža has become something of a ‘little Arabia’, where shop signs in Arabic and Turkish seem to equal or outnumber those in Bosnian (Figure 13 and Figure 14).

Figure 13: Storefronts in Ilidža, photo courtesy of author.

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103 In conversation with Arab-focused real estate agencies, 02.11.2015.
Supporting this trend is the fact that there are now direct flights to and from Dubai and Istanbul from the Sarajevo airport (but there is no direct flight to London or Paris).

The residential complexes Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone are amongst the most well known and contested of these developments appearing in and around Sarajevo. Although they differ from each other in their aims and targets, both case studies provide residential and living spaces for people from Arabic-speaking countries wishing to visit BiH or reside on a longer-term basis in the region. Both Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone are at the time of writing this chapter unfinished; Poljine Hills still has not built all of its villas, and Buroj Ozone is still only in the initial phases of its development.

Poljine Hills is a Shad Invest project, which is part of the Saudi Al-Shiddi Group (along with Sarajevo City Center). A luxury, gated community, Poljine Hills comprises, ‘211 urban villas, spread over 180,000 m2, giving you the opportunity to choose your dream home from five different available villa types’ (http://www.poljinehills.com). In
addition to the private villas, buyers may also purchase one of some 260 flats contained within ten different buildings. Amongst the flats are rooftop, two-storey penthouse units. According to the website, ‘The penthouses are sized from 195 to 280 squared meters [sic], and feature three bedrooms, a pool, and a terrace with a view of the whole development as well as the city’ (Ibid.). The Poljine Hills website describes all of the amenities that will be available to buyers within the community in the English language. At the time of writing this chapter in July 2017, the website includes buttons to change the language to either Bosnian or Arabic. However, even after choosing Bosnian, the majority of the text remains in English. Interestingly, when Arabic is chosen, selected areas of text are fully translated into Arabic, and these areas include the description of the villas available (Figure 15).

Figure 15: Image from Poljine Hills website with Arabic translations, http://www.poljinehills.com/

This section is not translated into Bosnian for the Bosnian language version of the website, showing a clear targeting of buyers from Arabic speaking countries or non-native Bosnian speakers (perhaps Bosnians from the diaspora). In my interview with
Samid Sinanović, the director of Shad Invest, he explained that, while many Bosnians think the properties are exclusive and only for Arab buyers, the homes at Poljine Hills are not as far out of reach for regular Bosnians as most think. According to Sinanović, the villas and flats available at Poljine Hills could be bought by middle class Bosnians and members of the diaspora, and that they market to these groups of buyers as well as to foreigners from all over the world. However, this was countered by my empirical data discussed below, which suggests that middle class Bosnians are not targeted by the marketing for Poljine Hills and that they feel excluded from such developments. As visible in the image above from Poljine Hills, the architectural style of the villas resembles a transnational, modern style that could be found anywhere in the world. They are quite different from Sarajevan houses that often are built with red tile roofs in a more traditional Balkan style.

Much larger in scope than Poljine Hills, Buroj Ozone is a luxury tourist resort targeting Arab tourists that has been planned for construction in the Sarajevan municipality of Trnovo. It is an investment of Buroj Property Development based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates and will consist of: over 1,000 luxury villas, luxury hotel flats, a shopping centre called the Zayed Mall (which will house 800 brand name stores), a sports complex and various activities such as a zipline and kids’ park and ski area (Figure 16).

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104 In conversation with Samid Sinanović, 19 October 2015.
Buroj Ozone has been hailed the largest investment in South East Europe at 2.3 billion Euros (http://www.burojo3.ba), and international news organisations such as the BBC and the Economist have written about the project and its implications for BiH and the Balkans (Brunwasser, 2016 and ‘Ottoman Comfort’, 2016). According to the company’s website, Buroj Ozone will be, ‘The largest tourist city in South Eastern Europe...built in the metropolis of Trnovo’ (http://www.burojo3.ba). Having laid its cornerstone in September 2016, Buroj Ozone promises the creation of thousands of jobs for Bosnians. Like the website of Poljine Hills, Buroj Ozone’s website can be read in English, Arabic and Bosnian. However, unlike Poljine Hills, the website has been completely translated into these three languages. During my field research, I tried multiple times to speak with someone from Buroj Property Development, even calling the UAE multiple times. However, I was never granted an interview with anyone from the company.

7.2 ‘This Picture Is Not Idyllic’: Constructions of the Arab ‘Other’ in BiH Media
Articles and editorials in BiH media are an important source of data for analysing how people in Sarajevo are constructing the ‘other’ when referring to residential spaces such as Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone. In an article from *Radio Slobodna Evropa* (the Western Balkan branch of the US funded *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* as described above that has a pro-democracy, anti-nationalist stance) on the 5 October 2015 titled ‘United Bosnian Emirates’, author Dženana Halimović (2015) discussed Buroj Ozone and the exchange of people, capital and ideas from GCC countries. The article was written ten days before the final contract signing between the mayor of the municipality of Trnovo, Ibro Berilo, and Buroj Property Development. The online version of the article begins with a large photo of ostensibly Arab women walking with their children in Sarajevo’s old town wearing niqabs and abayas (Figure 17).

The title ‘United Bosnian Emirates’ suggests that Bosnia and Herzegovina – the state created from the dissolution of Yugoslavia – has ceased to exist, and that in its place, only an extension of the United Arab Emirates has been left. The photo caption reads:

105 ‘Ujedinjeni bosanski emirati’
‘foreign citizens in Sarajevo, August 2015’\textsuperscript{106}, placing emphasis on the othering of these women (they are ‘foreign citizens’) through their dress alone. The caption of the photo eliminates the possibility that these women could be Bosnian, even though their faces are covered; they could realistically have any nationality, including Bosnian.

The article begins by describing an idyllic scene: men, women and children ‘apparently of Arab origin’\textsuperscript{107} picnic by the source of the river Bosna (Vrelo Bosne), sharing photos and comments about this ‘pearl’\textsuperscript{108} of Bosnia and Herzegovina on their social networks. The article then changes its tone, becoming suddenly ominous:

\begin{quote}
No matter how it sounds, this picture is not idyllic. It is far from that in which rich Arab tourists see Bosnia and Herzegovina as an attractive destination in which they come to leave [ostave] money and to enjoy the natural beauty. In recent years, these tourists have found a way to permanently reside in Bosnia and Herzegovina, buying vast areas of the country, but also houses around Ilidža, but also many other parts of BiH.\textsuperscript{109} (Ibid.).
\end{quote}

The article underlines that Arabs buying property and permanently residing in BiH is ‘not idyllic’. Instead of just coming for a short while to ‘leave’ their money in the economy, which the author implies would be acceptable, Arabs are deciding to stay and buy up property, something that is unwelcome. Halimović constructs the Arab ‘other’ who overstays his or her welcome in BiH (a welcome based on leaving as much money as possible in as short a timeframe as possible) as objectionable to not only Sarajevans around Ilidža but also to ‘vast areas of the country’ and ‘many other parts of BiH’.

Moving from this introduction of the phenomenon, the article expounds upon the feelings of exclusion surfacing in the debates about the case studies and about Arab residents in particular. Halimović states:

\begin{quote}
[107] ‘očito arapskog porijekla’
[108] ‘jedan od bisera BiH’
[109] ‘Ma kako zvučalo, slika i nije idilična. Daleko je od one da bogati arapski turisti Bosnu i Hercegovinu vide kao privlačnu destinaciju u koju dolaze da ostave novac i uživaju u prirodnim ljepotama.U posljednjih nekoliko godina, ti turisti su pronašli način da se trajno nastane u BiH kupivši tako ogromne površine zemlje, ali i kuće oko Ilidže, ali i brojnih drugih dijelova BiH.’
\end{quote}
Citizens in places where neighbours in the Arab world are building their closed oases are not overly enthusiastic...in the places that are most attractive for purchase, Arabic has became the second language. From the notification of the sale of apartments to the prices of kebabs – everything is in Arabic, and everything is dependent on investors. And they invest only in their own comfort.\textsuperscript{110}(Ibid.).

At the heart of these sentiments is a perceived power imbalance between the rich Arabs and the poor Bosnians, who are losing their country to the encroachment of all things Arab and Arabic, including whole neighbourhoods turning into ‘Little Arabias’ where Bosnian is pushed aside for the convenience of Arab investors. These ‘closed oases’ are not open to BiH citizens, thus excluding them from their own territory. That the Arabs ‘invest only in their own comfort’ indicates that the author has constructed the Arab ‘other’ as a demanding presence in the city that refuses to conform to BiH standards, including maintaining Bosnian as the dominant language of the city. This suggests that there is a fear being circulated through these discourses that indicators of ‘Bosnian-ness’ in Sarajevo such as language will be lost with the increasing numbers of Arab residents and tourists.

Articles in the media such as ‘United Bosnian Emirates’ underline this sense of fear and exclusion associated with new flows of capital and people. Mirna Buljugić, the director of The Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, BIRN, wrote an article published in both Bosnian and English on the websites of Balkan Insight and Justice Report titled ‘Wealthy Arabs Buy Slice of “Heaven” in Bosnia’ (Buljugić, 2016). These portals are popular news sources amongst the international community (many working for foreign embassies and international organisations in BiH) and the bilingual Bosnian community in Sarajevo, who also often work in such organisations. Yet this article, too, constructs an Arab ‘other’ with an undertone of fear. Buljugić’s article begins by describing the situation, ‘Bosnia is becoming an attractive destination for Arab and Gulf

\textsuperscript{110}‘Građani u mjestima na kojima komšije iz arapskog svijeta grade svoje zatvorene oaze nisu pretjerano oduševljeni...na mjestima koja su najattractive više za kupovinu, arapski je postao drugi jezik. Od obavještenja o prodaji stanova do cijene kebaba - sve je na arapskom, te sve podređeno investitorima. A oni ulažu samo u vlastiti komfor’ (Ibid.).
state visitors, many of whom are buying real estate – but while some welcome the
influx, not everyone is delighted.’ (Ibid). Words used such as ‘influx’ hint that the author
sees the movement in terms of large numbers of people, even though later in the article
the author states, ‘Data from the Bosnian state agency for foreign investments show
that, despite talk of big investments, Gulf state countries are not important investors in
Bosnia.’ (Ibid.). The construction of an ‘influx’ or wave of Arab people into the country
adds to the othering and creates a sense of fear in terms of being outnumbered.
Buljugić also sets Arabs apart from Bosnians in two additional ways: through their
physical difference and their assumed wealth. In the introduction of the article, she
describes a scene in Sarajevo, ‘In one of the most popular hotels in the Ilidža district of
Sarajevo, the Hotel Hollywood, a dark-skinned middle-aged man sits in the lobby
beside a sign of the AlAyyad Company.’ (Ibid.). Arabs become othered by their skin
tone, marked as different from apparently light-skinned Bosnians. She continues later
in the article that, ‘Aside from its natural charms, Bosnia is a cheap destination for
wealthy Arabs’ (Ibid.). There is an assumption that all the visitors and residents from
GCC countries and the Middle East are rich, creating a divide between the Bosnian
population (who has suffered economically since the conflict in the 1990s) and the
newcomers who are buying property in the country.

As a piece of investigative journalism, the article interviews ‘ordinary people’ in
Sarajevo about their views of the phenomenon. They state:

‘East investment is good, but we need to check the source of funding…
we do not know the source of this money from Arab countries and that
worries me,’ one Sarajevo citizen told BIRN...Some Bosnians, especially
Serbs and Croats – who are not Muslim – worry about the growing
influence of Muslim Arab culture. ‘These Arabs came and they have
their own rules,’ one bystander said. ‘I know a woman who had a
problem with an Arab and people came from their embassy… If this
continues, we will not be able to tell them anything,’ he said. ‘It hurts that
they want to have such influence on our territory. I want to know who is
selling this country to them.’ (Ibid.).
These interviewees in the article each construct the Arab ‘other’ as something to be feared and as something that is becoming a dominant influence in the country. The first interviewee suggests that the source of the money could be illicit and that is a cause for worry. He or she implies that there is corruption amongst the new Arab population. These respondents fear the ‘growing influence of Muslim Arab culture’, in other words, Salafism, and that the Arabs ‘have their own rules’ and do not abide by assumed Bosnian standards of conduct. The third interviewee constructs the Arab ‘other’ as someone beyond the law, and that representatives from embassies will intervene in problematic cases, leaving Bosnians with no recourse for justice. And finally, the last interviewee overtly positions Arabs versus Bosnians by stating, ‘that they want to have such influence on our territory. I want to know who is selling this country to them’ [emphasis added].’ Again, the Arab ‘other’ is constructed in contrast to Bosnians. They are depicted as having influence on Bosnian territory, producing a dynamic in which ‘we’, the Bosnians, are losing ‘our territory’ and that someone is ‘selling this country’ to ‘them’. It is an unnatural and illegitimate process in this construction, a theft of the natural right to the land by the Bosnians themselves.

Although not stated outright in the beginning of the article, the discussion of Arab visitors and residents hinges upon the case studies Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone. Towards the end of the piece, Buljugić states, ‘in the past few months construction has begun on three large-scale real-estate projects. These are the Sarajevo Resort in Hadžići, the Poljine Hills above Sarajevo and the luxury tourist Buroj Ozone in Trnovo.’ (Ibid.). She then interviews a worker on one of the projects, an academic and local residents living around Poljine Hills for their input on these projects specifically. Recounting the interview with the worker, she states:

A handyman, putting in the air conditioning and curtains in a finished villa, says the arrival of the Arabs is good for Bosnia’s economy. He revealed that the villas are being constructed so that the lower section houses the maids and the upper section is for the families. This is
because many wealthy Arab clients are expected to travel to Bosnia with their servants. (Ibid.).

This interview shows a generally positive attitude toward the case studies in terms of helping Bosnia’s economy, but the quote continues to construct the Arab ‘other’ as extremely wealthy in contrast to the relatively poor Bosnians. Having maids and constructing a house that has areas specifically for the maids is far beyond the means of the majority of BiH citizens. Buljugić continues

However, academic Esad Duraković said he feared that Bosnia and Herzegovina is selling its resources off cheap. ‘I can guarantee we will have problems, if not now, then in ten to 15 years,’ Duraković opined. Significantly, he declined to speak more plainly, claiming that after previous statements in which he criticized Arab investments, he had received threats.’ (Ibid.).

This undermines the previous positive statement, and suggests a level of corruption with Arab investments that could potentially cause harm to anyone who speaks out against them. It places Arab residents and visitors – and by association the Bosnian politicians ushering in these projects – within a category of the corrupt and violent. It also reiterates a notion mentioned previously in the article, that ‘someone’ is selling off ‘their territory’ to the Arab ‘other’ for cheap. Further on in the section speaking specifically about the case studies, Buljugić explains that for Buroj Ozone, ‘The apartments were supposed to be offered first to Bosnian citizens, and then to buyers from Arab countries under different prices. However, Buroj has since changed this plan.’ (Ibid.). Again, there is a direct contrast in the article between ‘Bosnian citizens’ and ‘buyers from Arab countries’, and she highlights that Bosnians are now being excluded from the market in favour of Arab buyers, who are ‘wealthy’ and can afford the higher prices.

Hinted at in the BIRN article is the fear of security risks associated with new Arab residents and tourists (‘he declined to speak more plainly, claiming that after previous statements in which he criticized Arab investments, he had received threats.’). Throughout the media, BiH politicians have further propagated this discourse that
Arabs coming to BiH to buy property have become a security risk. In November 2013, Milorad Dodik, the president of the Serbian entity in BiH, the Republika Srpska, gave an interview to Blic online magazine, a Serbian news portal mention above (the contents of which was shared and discussed on many news portals in BiH, as I will show), in which he said that:

In Bosnia and Herzegovina the Islamisation of society is happening. There are serious projects to settle between 300,000 and 500,000 people from the Islamic world who could change the image of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is a precise plan, and the lowest layer of the Arab world would come,\textsuperscript{111} (Kozomora, 2013).

These ‘serious projects’ refer to projects such as Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone, and with 300,000 to 500,000 people (the population or more of Sarajevo itself) coming from the ‘Islamic world’ the image of BiH could become entirely, or almost entirely, Muslim. Not only will BiH become ‘Islamicised’, but also it will be the ‘lowest layer’ of the Arab world that will come. It is not clear what this ‘lowest layer’ refers to, but judging from the hysteria in the media and popular discourse around Salafis, one could conclude that according to Dodik this would be comprised of violent religious fundamentalists. This comment was picked up by other local newspapers and news portals, including Dani, a popular, weekly news magazine in BiH. In their article titled ‘What do Arabs want in BiH?’\textsuperscript{112} from the 6 December 2013 issue (Redžić, 2013), author Edin Redžić discusses the new investments coming into BiH and Sarajevo, including residential investments such as Poljine Hills. He references the statement made by Dodik, saying:

Stories of expatriate nationals from Arab countries in BiH have experienced their peak now with the famous statement from Milorad Dodik on the arrival 500,000 Arabs in BiH. Minister of Security Fahrudin Radončić has also somewhat actualised things, as he said that his ministry will pay particular attention to Arabs. Furthermore, Radončić announced that the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina should adopt a law with which the settlement of Arab citizens in Bosnia

\textsuperscript{111} ‘U Bosni i Hercegovini se radi na islamizaciji društva. Postoje ozbiljni projekti da se iz islamskog sveta u BiH naseli između 300.000 i 500.000 ljudi koji bi mogli da promene sliku BiH. Postoji tačan plan i tu bi dolazio najniži sloj iz arapskog svet.’

\textsuperscript{112} ‘Šta hoće Arapi u BiH’
and Herzegovina would be sanctioned, as well as their practice of buying real estate.\(^{113}\) (Ibid.).

Building upon the statement from Dodik, the author combines the Minister of Security’s announcement that his ministry will ‘pay particular attention to Arabs’, as if there is something inherently risky about Arab people, and that their ability to reside and buy property in the country should be ‘sanctioned’. However, the author of the article balanced this view from the politicians, adding:

However, data from the Ministry of Security not only says differently, but even the opposite. From a total of close to 10,000 foreign nationals currently residing in BiH, most were citizens from the area of neighbouring Western Balkan countries, Russia, China, Turkey, etc., while those of Arab origin are at the very bottom of the list,\(^{114}\) (Ibid.).

Thus while politicians attempt to create an atmosphere of Arabophobia through their statements that are picked up in the media, the facts of the debate do also come into play. Redžić adjusts the tone of the article by adding actual figures that contradict the fearmongering of the politicians.

*Slobodna Bosna*, another popular news portal in Sarajevo, ran a similar story at approximately the same time (26 November 2013). Titled ‘Radončić: law to sanction Arabs massively buying real estate’ the article quotes Fahrudin Radončić as he discusses the Ministry of Security’s plans to sanction Arabs from buying real estate. It says:

Minister of Security Fahrudin Radončić announced today that in due course in the BiH Parliamentary Assembly a law may be adopted that would sanction citizens of Arab countries en masse coming to BiH, buying property and settling down. ‘In the foreseeable future concrete sanctions can be expected for such persons if the Parliamentary Assembly adopts a law. I do not expect that it will be a problem that such a law is adopted, and then it is for the Prosecution to do its job, meaning justice,’ said Radončić. He stressed to BH Radio One that this is a problem that the Ministry of Security of BiH is seriously working on.

\(^{113}\) ‘Priče o emigraciji državljanima iz arapskih zemlja u BiH doživjele su svoj vrhunac sada već famoznom izjavom Milorada Dodika o dolasku 500.000 Araba u BiH. Stvar je unekoliko aktuelizirao i ministar sigurnosti BiH Fahrudin Radončić, koji je izjavo da će njegovo ministarstvo na Arape obratiti posebnu pažnju. Radončić je, štavši, najavio da bi u Parlamentarne skupštine BiH mogao biti usvojen zakon kojim bi naseljavanje arapskih državljanina u BiH bila sankcionisano, kao i njihova praksa kupovine nekretnina.’

\(^{114}\) ‘No, podaci Ministarstva sigurnosti BiH ne govore samo o drugačije, nego čak i suprotno. Od ukupno blizu 10.000 stranih državljanina koji trenutno borave u BiH, najviše je riječ o državljanima sa područja sudsjednih zemalja Zapadnog Balkana, Rusije, Kine, Turske itd, dok su oni arapskog porijekla na samom začelju te liste.’
"We are talking with foreign partners, we are educating local political partners, and we will act as in the case of the expulsion of Iranian diplomats who were abusing the service, when I introduced restrictive measures for Iran. We will look for legal solutions for the country to be defended from these types of viruses," said Radončić...In his opinion, BiH pays the price of levity for when the mujahideen were brought in the war. ‘After that we got the Wahhabis, now we have the departure of young people to Syria and the intimidation and political patronage brought by so-called Kuwaitis in BiH and their settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina,’” said Radončić.\(^{115}\)

Radončić constructs people coming from the Middle East as ‘viruses’ who are taking advantage of BiH and creating security risks through violent religious fundamentalism.

The suggestion that Arabs buying real estate could be linked to ‘radical extremism’ is made more blatant in this article, as Radončić is quoted connecting the mujahideen, Wahhabis, radicalised youth leaving to fight for Daesh in Syria and new residents from GCC countries (specifically Kuwait). He also suggests that such Arab residents might have political control through their ‘patronage’, making the threat that much more severe.

Radio Slobodna Evropa’s article ‘United Bosnian Emirates’ analysed above also associates new Arab residents and visitors to security risks. The author Dženana Halimović (2015) quotes mayor of Kiseljak, Mladen Mišurić Ramljak, who said, ‘Always chose your neighbour, because it is not all the same who will be your neighbor. Do you know what is happening in the last few years when it comes to the world, terrorism or fear of people – that fear is justified,’\(^{116}\) (Ibid.). Further on in the article, Halimović references the quotes by both Dodik and Radončić, and quotes Radončić again saying:

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\(^{116}\) ’Uvijek se birao susjed, jer vam nije bilo svejedno ko ćete vam biti susjed. Znate li ćeta se dešava u posljednjih nekoliko godina kada je u pitanju svijet, terorizam ili bojan ljudi - taj strah je opravdan.’
‘There is some truth in the fact that someone wants to bring in foreign residents to Islamise Bosnia and Herzegovina, although not in such numbers, nor will anyone permit it. In the vicinity of Sarajevo the construction of settlements is being prepared for about 20,000 people who are originally from Kuwait and those countries, and it is much less than the figure mentioned by Mr. Dodik. We should be an open country, but also need to implement the laws,’ said Radončić.\footnote{ima istine u tome da neko želi da dovođenjem stranog stanovništva islamizira BiH, mada ne u tolikom broju, niti će to iko dozvoliti. U okolini Sarajeva se priprema gradnja naselja za oko 20,000 ljudi koji su porijeklom iz Kuvajta ili tih zemalja, i to je mnogo manje od cifre koju je spomenuo gospodin Dodik. Mi treba da budemo otvorena zemlja, ali također treba da provodimo zakone”, ističe Radončić.}

These public figures are opening declaring that the public should be afraid of the influx of Arab residents into BiH, and that this fear is ‘justified’. They are coming to ‘Islamise’ the country, and they need to be sanctioned by law to protect the vulnerable citizens of the country from ‘terrorism’. While the ideal of being an open country is noted, (‘We should be an open country’), Arabophobia is subsequently justified by the need for rule of law.

Such commentary by political leaders about the incoming Arab residents perpetuates and incites Arabophobia in the general population. The discourse presents Arabs as a threat to security and should be sanctioned from buying property. With this focus on Arabs, it is implied that foreigners from ‘western’ countries in North America and Europe would not be a threat to security and would not need to be sanctioned by law from buying property in BiH. Dodik, Radončić and other politicians effectively place Arab residents in opposition to Bosnians and position Sarajevan identity away from the Middle East and GCC countries. Thus exclusive settlements like Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone, which cater to the Arab market, become havens for fundamentalism and extremism, something that the Ministry of Security needs to seriously address.

Unlike the focus on security shown in the previous articles, the Arab ‘other’ is also constructed in terms of cultural differences that do not conform to Bosnian standards of behaviour. On the internet news portal DEPO.ba, one ‘anonymous frustrated Sarajevan’\footnote{Anonim ni isfrustrirani Sarajlja} wrote an editorial that was published on the 17 August 2015.
(again, in the middle of negotiations between the municipality of Tnovo and Buroj Property Development) which was titled, ‘Letter of an anonymous frustrated Sarajevo: carpet spread out in the middle [of everything], lunch cooking, and when in the toilets…’ (‘Pismo anonimnog isfrustriranog Sarajlije’, 2015). The title itself hints at the perceived ill-mannered nature of the new tourists; they take more than their share of space, impose the smell of their lunch on the public, and apparently have poor manners in the toilet. The editorial is accompanied by photos of women in niqabs and their families having picnics in grassy areas (Figure 1).


The article begins by explaining the recent high numbers of Arab tourists in Sarajevo and that Sarajevans are trying to be ‘tolerant and good hosts’ and trying to understand the sometimes ‘abnormal behaviour of their guests’. Already, the relationship between Sarajevans and Arabs is being constructed; Bosnians are the ‘tolerant and good hosts’ and Arabs are the ill-mannered ‘guests’. While the editorial is

119 ‘Pismo anonimnog isfrustriranog Sarajlije: Prostrla cilim nasred, kuha ručak, a kod WC-a…’
120 ‘tolerantni i dobri domaćini’
too long to copy here in its entirety, it characterising Arab tourists and visitors as something entirely other and ill-mannered. The letter begins by saying:

In recent days, I could not help but notice just how many foreign citizens there are in our country. Nothing bad, right? However, citizens of Middle Eastern and North African countries occupied my attention, mainly those who respect the so-called shari’ah law and the like. They have became of interest to all citizens but mostly in a not so pleasant way.\textsuperscript{121}

The letter constructs the difference between the Arab ‘other’ and Bosnians by contrasting ‘just how many foreign citizens there are in our country’ [emphasis added]. Not only is there a direct distinction between ‘us’ versus the Arab ‘other’, but also the author of the editorial indicates that there is a very large number of these people, hinting at an ‘influx’, as some have stated. This difference is also highlighted by ‘those who respect the so-called shari’ah law and the like.’ All practicing Muslims follow shari’ah law; it is simply Muslim law and not something as sinister as it has been described in the media. However, its usage to denote an oppressive system that spurs hatred has been the norm in most countries where Muslims are not in the majority. It is used in this context as well to construct difference and fear of the Arab ‘other’. The author continues:

In fact, I was witness to how, in one of the only open shopping centres...the same so-called ‘tourists’ (let's call them so, although their tendencies in this city and the country seem to be very, very different) demolished sanitary facilities, did not respect the basic norms (throwing garbage wherever they can), norms of behavior at the table or walking in public buildings and areas, order in markets etc. [sic].\textsuperscript{122} (Ibid.).

The letter goes on with a list of grievances that the author has against the apparent bad behaviour of Arab tourists in the Sarajevo. By calling them ‘so-called “tourists”’, she questions their motives in the country, implying that they have an agenda to stay on a long-term basis, and on top of that, they are upsetting the social norms of Bosnian

\textsuperscript{121} ‘Posljednjih dana nisam mogao, a da ne primijetim koliko je samo stranih državljana u našoj zemlji. Ništa koše, zar ne? Međutim, moju pažnju zaokupili su državljani bliskoistočnih i država sjevera Afrike, uglavnom oni koji poštuju tzv. Šerijatski zakon i sl. Postali su interesantni svim građanima ali većinom na ne tako ugodan način.’

\textsuperscript{122} ‘Naime, bio sam svjedok kako u jednom tek otvorenom tržnom centru..., isti ti “turišti” (nazivamo ih tako, mada su njihove tendencije u ovom gradu i državi, čini se, mnogo mnogo drugačije) demoliraju sanitarne prostorije, ne poštuju osnovne norme (bacanje smeća gdje stignu), norme ponašanja za stolom ili hodanja po javnim objektima i površinama, reda u marketima itd.’
society by throw rubbish wherever they please and committing other acts against Sarajevan values, such as cooking lunch in parks and leaving marks in the grass from where they sat on carpets (Ibid.). There is a clear separation between the ‘good hosts’, the Sarajevans, who are characterised in opposition to the Arabs as being well-behaved in public spaces and more orderly, and Arab residents and tourists, who are portrayed as chaotic, ill-behaved and plotting to buy property in BiH.

The articles examined in this section form a tapestry of the public construction of the Arab ‘other’ in Sarajevo. I have tried to draw from a cross section of Bosnian media to show how these differences are being created in the public imaginary. The narratives follow themes such as exclusion, corruption, security risks and the bad behaviour of new coming Arab tourists, all of which add to the public debates surrounding new residential projects such as Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone that target Arab buyers and tourists. Furthermore, they position Sarajevan identity in opposition to these attributes, especially along the imaginary binaries upon which Sarajevans are locating their identity.

7.3 ‘I Feel Like An Alien’: Perceptions of Cultural Colonisation in Interview, Field Interview and Survey Data

7.3.1 Interviews

In addition to the media data that shows the construction of the Arab ‘other’, my interview data also contains elements of these narratives. However, as mentioned above, self-censorship in interviews is common, especially when discussing controversial topics. Despite this, two of my interview subjects both working in the urban development sector in the city discussed the incoming flows of Arab and Middle Eastern residents. In these interviews, I have analysed the discussion in terms of residential spaces and the idea of neighbourly sentiments and ‘multiculturalism’, even
though the interviews below strayed from a conversation focused on the case studies.

One female architecture student at the faculty of architecture explained that:

You know how we have majorities and minorities in population? I believe that the Turkish population in Bosnia and Herzegovina can soon apply as a minority here. I think that they’re going to be able to do that because there’s a lot of Turkish citizens here, a lot of Turkish students. I guess basically a lot of students from the Middle East which is not something I mind because it happens everywhere, but I think that... Angela Merkel actually said something like this a while back... The thing is I think that Germany is one of the biggest melting pots in Europe – a lot, a lot of different nationalities live there. And I think that she said something along the lines of ‘we don’t actually live together, we live next to each other’ – and she was completely right!... I don’t expect people to accept my culture, but I think that they are supposed to respect it in a way. You know, you should obviously keep yours, I’m not asking for anyone to become Bosnian, but you shouldn’t have to change mine in order to accommodate yours. You know, these things should co-exist. Obviously I don’t know how that’s going to work here, but we’ll see. Time will tell I guess.¹²³

Although she began by stating that there is a lack of integration of people from the Middle East (‘we don’t actually live together, we live next to each other’), she then implied that there was an expectation for Bosnians to change their culture with the growing flows of people arriving from the Middle East (‘I don’t expect people to accept my culture, but I think that they are supposed to respect it in a way. You know, you should obviously keep yours, I’m not asking for anyone to become Bosnian, but you shouldn’t have to change mine in order to accommodate yours.’). By saying that she should not have to change her culture in order to accommodate people from the Middle East, there is an implication that the growing flows of people from the Middle East are not only excluding local residents from residential complexes, but they are also forcing Bosnian citizens to conform to their way of life. She implies that there is a form of cultural colonisation occurring, and she is characterising new residents from the Middle East as a domineering presence in the city. It can be read as resentment at having to change her culture in order to ‘accommodate’ the culture of the new residents in the city, implying perhaps a stricter observance of Islamic regulations, including dress.

¹²³ In conversation with a mid-20, female architecture student at the Faculty of Architecture in Sarajevo.
In one of my interviews with local architects, one young, female architect from Sarajevo made similar comments. She explained to me:

When I go to the mountains, for example, during the winter, I see a lot of weird people. I don't know... it's like... I don't have anything against their nature of dressing, of living, but there are too many of them. It's like they are taking over. A lot of people are. That's how I feel... I know my friends... I'm saying that the mountain was the good example because I saw them, and it was very weird. There's too many of them so suddenly. So suddenly... I'm just afraid... I'm just afraid that we're wondering – or not wondering – when is it going to stop? Or is it going to stop? What if they buy everything? Ok, then, when they buy everything and they come here to live, so it's becoming a problem. They're changing the mentality, they're changing the appearance, the environment, and most of... I mean, I'm thinking about it, I don't want to live here like that. I don't know, maybe I'm sounding too national, but it's just somehow I didn't imagine my environment like that. It's my country, it's my place of living. What happens if they come? They can change. It's like I'm talking about aliens... But I feel like an alien, really, I feel like an alien now.\(^\text{124}\)

She states explicitly that she feels like a takeover is occurring, and that this takeover is through a change in mentality, appearance and environment along with Arabs buying ‘everything’. She feels that Bosnians are losing the actual territory of their country through real estate sales and tourist villages, but importantly, there is the perception that they are losing their local identity by being absorbed or changed in terms of mentality and appearance. It is as if an acceptance of the global flows of capital and the people and ideas that they bring is a negation of Bosnian tradition, including naš Islam (explained further in the previous chapter). This architect constructs the Arab ‘other’ as a strange, colonising presence in the city. She uses words such as ‘weird people’ to describe them, but she also states that she now feels like an ‘alien’ in her own city, further separating Sarajevans from new Arab tourists and residents in the city. The following phrase from the interview, specifically, demonstrates how Sarajevans are constructing the Arab ‘other’ in terms of neighbourly sentiments, ‘I didn't imagine my environment like that. It's my country, it's my place of living. What happens if they come? They can change. It's like I'm talking about aliens... But I feel like an alien,'

\(^{124}\) In conversation with a young, female architect in Sarajevo, identity kept anonymous.
really, *I feel like an alien now* [emphasis added]. She characterises the introduction of new Arab residents into Sarajevo's domestic sphere as a perceived invasion of an alien species, something that will take away her values and way of life, her country, her place of living. In doing this, she believes she will become an outsider – an alien – in Sarajevo. These global flows of people into the residential spaces of Sarajevo can thus be seen as threatening to the local population who fears losing local tradition and way of life to a transnational force.

7.3.2 Field Interviews and Survey Data

To supplement my interview data, I performed field interviews in which I approached Sarajevans on the street and in shopping centres and discussed urban phenomena in the city. These discussions often provided data on the phenomenon of Arab residents and tourists in the city. During one of these field interviews, I spoke to a young woman working in one of the shops of the BBI shopping centre. Describing her feelings regarding new flows of people and capital into the city, she said:

Sometimes, frankly tell you, when I walk down the street, I feel that I am in Dubai. So really ... I have really nothing against anybody, you understand, but somehow you no longer have the feeling that you are in Sarajevo. Wherever you go, from Ilidža down, it's, I mean, everyone is covered, everyone has a beard, everyone is some kind of sheik, I think really what ... Yes indeed, there is enough of that... And especially I hear that there will be even more of that.  

This interviewee expresses exclusion and cultural colonisation. Here Sarajevo has become a little Dubai, and she no longer has ‘the feeling that you are in Sarajevo’, and what creates this feeling for her are the visible signs of Islamic dress (‘everyone is covered, everyone has a beard’). For this Sarajevan, it is not just the buying of property by Arabs, but it is also the changing mentality, where Sarajevans are taking on the characteristics of the newcomers, the markers of transnational Islam. In contrast, the

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125 'Nekad, iskreno vam kažem, kad hodam ulicom, imam osjećaj da sam u Dubajju. Znači stvarno... Nemam stvarno ništa protiv nikoga, razumijete, ali nekako nemaš više taj osjećaj da si ti u Sarajevu. Gdje god odel, na Ilidžu dole, to je znači, sve su pokrivene, sve su brade, sve šeikovi neki, muslim stvarno ono ... Jest stvarno, ima dosta toga... A pogotov kako čujem da će još više toga.'
local identity is perceived to be in crisis and attacked by forces coming specifically from GCC countries and other areas of the Middle East. Another female field interview respondent working in BBI expressed the same fear of the consequences of this cultural exchange on the identity of Bosnians:

The biggest problem is that foreigners are buying land in Bosnia and Herzegovina, specifically Arabs, and it is now very trendy to sell land to these foreigners, especially Arabs. And now, these same people also bring a part of that culture, which is normal for us, [but] totally different from our culture, and I hope that it will not have any consequences on the life of Bošnjaks and Bosnians in this country.126

According to this interviewee, it is ‘very trendy’ to sell property to Arab buyers. She implies that there is a large demand for property, and also possibly that Bosnians can sell their land at a higher price due to the real or perceived wealth of the buyers. However, she explains that this trend is problematic due to the cultural exchange taking place. By stating that she hopes there will not be any consequences on the life of Bosnians, the implication is that the local identity and its traditions are being threatened.

During my field interviews in the Alipašino Polje area of the city, which is near Ilidža, the more Arabicised part of the city, my interview respondents shared similar sentiments about the new residential complexes. When asked about exclusive residential complexes and cultural exchanges in the city, one man working as a waiter replied:

Like Poljine Hills...Here above [pointing to the hills above Sarajevo and referring to residential complexes] what the Arabs opened. I do not like it at all. Many settled here in Sarajevo. What will be? How will it be? Ask God...I have no idea, but I do not like it. That their settlements will be up there and that. I say to you again, I'm a Muslim, but what they're making up there and what they're doing, I just heard that a huge settlement of theirs will be up there, and I do not like it at all. What will be, how will it be, I do not know, to tell you the truth ... I tell you, I work, but for around four months I haven’t had my salary...And those that come from there, all the Arabs, and all Arabs come here to buy real estate and land that

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126 ‘Najveći problem je što stranci kupuju zemljište u Bosni i Hercegovini, da kažem Arabi i što je sad veoma aktuelno da se prodaje zemljište stranim tim državljanima, odnosno Arabima. E, sad, samim tim i donose jednim dijelom tu kulturu koja je za nas normalno, skroz drugačija od naše kulture i nadam se da to neće imati nekih posljedica na život Bošnjaka i Bosanaca i Hercegovaca u ovoj državi’
they buy in the area, which is cheap for them, and they make their settlements. I do not like it at all. What will be, how will it be ... I do not know... Here, watch here where I work in the hotel, they bring their culture, they do not take our culture at all. They cultivate their own. They do not take our culture at all, you understand. I work in the hotel down there, and with us these purchases are very much carried out, and they come and buy, and everything around up there that they buy, everything is around 12 KM for an acre of land. No, I don’t know how it goes, square metre, or what do I know? Everything around up there that they buy is cheap. And right here, they will move all that is theirs [svoje] here that comes from there. They will move their people and they will take their culture here. They do not take anything from our culture [naše]. I’ve done a lot with them, and they do not respect us [oni nas ne fermaju] even one percent.127

The construction of the divide between the Bosnian ‘us’ versus the Arab ‘them’ is quite pronounced in this quote. For example, he stresses that he is a Muslim, but ‘what they’re making up there and what they’re doing, I just heard that a huge settlement of theirs will be up there, and I do not like it at all [emphasis added].’ He uses the same repetition of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ when he discusses culture, ‘they bring their culture, they do not take our culture at all. They cultivate their own. They do not take our culture at all… they will move all that is theirs here that comes from there. They will move their people and they will take their culture here. They do not take anything from our culture…they do not respect us even one percent [emphasis added].’ He perceives a deep divide between Bosnian culture (and to Bosnian identity) and that of Arab residents, a divide that does not seem to be bridgeable, and he fears the ‘cultivation’ [gajiti] of Arab culture in BiH due to this divide and perceived lack of respect on the Arab residents’ part. His almost poetic repetition of ‘what will be, how will it be, I do not know’ [štće biti, kako će biti, ne znam] suggests a real fear for the future of his understanding of Bosnian culture and lifestyle. There is an ominous undertone to what

127 ‘Kao Poljine Hils...Tu gore ono što Arapi otvaraju. Da mi se nimalo ne sviđa. Puno se naseljavaju ovdje u Sarajevu. Šta će bit’, kako će bit’, ptaj boga...nemam pojma, ali ne sviđa mi se to. Da će biti to gore njihovo naselje i to. Ja vam o pet kažem, musliman sam, ali šta oni gore to prave i šte rade, samo sam čuo da je ogromno naselje, to njihovo da će biti gore i to mi se ne sviđa nikako. Šta će biti, kako će biti, ne znam, da vam pravo kažem...Sad vam kažem, radim, a po četiri mjeseca namam platu...A ovi što dolaze od tamo, sve Arapi dolaze i sve Arapi kupuju ovdje nekretnine i zemlju što kupuju o kolo, što im je jeftino i prave svoja naselja. To mi se ne sviđa nikako. Šta će biti, kako će biti...ja ne znam....Evo gledam ovdje gdje ja radim u hotelu, oni donose svoju kulturu, oni našu kulturu ne uzimaju nikako. Oni gaje svoje to. Oni nikakvu našu kulturu ne uzimaju tu, razumijete. Ja radim u hotelu dole i kod nas se baš vrše ti kupoprodajni, i što dolaze i kupuju, a sve oko gore što kupuju, to sve po 12 maraka dulum zemlje. Onaj, ne. Ne znam kako to ide, kvadrat ili šta ja znam. Sve oko gore je to jeftino što oni kupuju. I prave tu i uselit će svoje tu što dolaze od tamo. Uselit će svoje ljude i oni uzimaju svoju kulturu ovdje. Oni niste ništa ne uzimaju. Jas am puno sa njima i oni nas ne fermaju ni jedan posto.’
he says, and he compares his own situation, (that he has not even received pay in four months), to how cheap and easy it is for new Arab residents to buy land. Thus there is an implied exclusion of local residents in terms of culture and access to the property market, and he expresses this in terms of ‘ours’ and ‘theirs’, completing the othering and exclusion between new Arab residents and BiH citizens.

Another field interview respondent from the Alipasino Polje area of the city expressed related sentiments regarding residential complexes in and around Sarajevo. A retired, ethnically Croat, civil engineer, he stated, ‘now this has begun in the settlements of Ilidža and Hadžići that they are making buildings for these foreign citizens, so that I do not know how it will end. For the multi-ethnic city that it once was, it won’t be any more, not in this case, it isn’t even now, but it will be the worst thing [ali će biti najgora stvar].’ While he lacks details about the problems that will make this ‘the worst thing’, he suggests that it has to do with the fact that the city will no longer be ‘multi-ethnic’. He, thus, sees what is ‘multiethnic’ as mostly pertaining to religious diversity, which was explored previously in the chapter on the ‘Islamic Shift’ in Sarajevo. Certainly a more heterogeneous population including Arabs, or ‘foreign citizens’ as he says, along with the Bosnian citizens would increase the level of multiethnicity, but in Sarajevo, ‘multiculturalism’, ‘multiethnicity’ and pluralism are seen in terms of religion. Since the newcomers are religiously Muslim, he hints that the ‘worst thing’ will be the Islamisation of the city, especially if the population of Salafis grows.

Sentiments hinting at the Islamisation of the city through the coming populations of Arabs buying real estate also arose in my survey data. One respondent, a male lawyer, ‘I heard that where Arabs buy property, people look more like they are on their way to mosque’, touching on the visual markers that define the Bosnian ‘us’ from the Arab ‘them’. However, the undertone is that Islamic dress and visual markers spread to the rest of the population when Arabs arrive in the community. Another respondent, a
female student, hinted that, ‘with the arrival of new residents in larger groups, new standards are also coming (for example Ilidža)’. These ‘new standards’ could conceivably be anything, but because she chose to highlight Ilidža as an example, it suggests that these new standards relate to Salafism and especially stricter Islamic dress codes (niqabs, beards, abayas, etc.). As the previous respondent illustrated, people that, ‘look more like they are on their way to mosque.’ Again, this can be read as a fear of the changing nature of Bosnian culture and traditions in the face of incoming flows of people and ideas from the Middle East, something that many Sarajevoans see as a threat to their identity and values.

This threat to Sarajevoan identity and values is often directly paired with perceived increases in Islamic dress, as one survey respondent demonstrated. A female clerk explained that, ‘Sarajevo is an Olympic, multicultural city, and it should remain that way. I don’t want some veiled ninja to condemn me because of the way I dress when it’s over 40 degrees in the city where I was born.’ She stresses here the international renown of Sarajevo (that it is Olympic) and its ‘multicultural’ identity, implying that an increase in the presence of ‘veiled ninjas’, or women wearing niqabs, would cause the city’s Olympic and ‘multicultural’ nature to disappear. This places the idea of ‘multiculturalism’ itself as the focal point; why would an increase in ethnic diversity in Sarajevo cause the city to become less ‘multicultural’? As explained previously, Sarajevoan ‘multiculturalism’ is based on religious identification, and with the influx of people from the Middle East, the proportion of the population identifying as Muslim and being visibly Muslim in public increases. More importantly, however, she uses ‘multiculturalism’ here as a discursive tool to position Sarajevoan identity in opposition to Arab tourists and residents, instead of using it conceptually as a notion in and of itself.
7.4 ‘Tolerating Uncultured Tourists’: Arabophobia and the Arab ‘Other’ in Online Commentary

7.4.1 Article Comments

In order to supplement my media, interview, field interview and survey data, I have also analysed online comments that appeared next to articles and on the forums Klix.ba and Skyscrapercity.com. These sources offer a response to the possible self-censorship of interviewees, as the anonymity of online environments allows for commenters to be more candid. For the article ‘United Bosnian Emirates’ discussed above, one online comment reveals some of the feelings of BiH citizens towards Buroj Ozone. On 8 October 2015 the reader with the username ‘sar-bos’ observed that, ‘some of our citizens are following what the presidents [mayors] of the municipalities are doing in Ilidža, Hadžići, or what greater misery still awaits us in Trnovo [where Buroj Ozone will be located]. Will our children be a minority here too. [sic] We have to have public opinion. Good luck to us all!’ This commenter describes the development of Buroj Ozone as a ‘misery’, something that could potentially lead to Bosnians becoming a minority in their country. He attributes the project (and other similar projects) to the mayors of the municipalities, suggesting that there is no public consensus or agreement to the projects (‘We have to have public opinion’) and that these mayors have an agenda that they are fulfilling.

While this comment focuses on ideas of exclusion, possible political agendas and fears for the future, other comments focus on Arab residents and tourists as potential neighbours and additions to Sarajevo’s urban community. In May, 2015 in the middle of negotiations between the municipality of Trnovo and Buroj Property Development, Klix.ba published an article titled, ‘Everything about Arab tourists in BiH:

why they come, what they visit, how much they spend,129 (N.N., 2015). The article itself is reasonably well balanced and even says in the first paragraph, ‘Those who are familiar with the "business with Arabs" say that they are some of the most rewarding guests,130 (Ibid.). However, in the comments section of this article, the greater Sarajevo community discusses other views of the phenomenon, and the anonymity of the internet allows for the unveiling of deeper, hidden sentiments.

To illustrate this, one anonymous male user with the username back2track states, ‘does anyone want to mention that an important factor is also sex tourism?’131 During my fieldwork, I came upon this idea more than once while I was discussing Arab investment with people in Sarajevo. Some mentioned that Arab men come to Bosnia to search for a wife or to enjoy the local women more generally during their visit. Balkan Insight also wrote an article about Arab men marrying Bosnian women titled ‘Arabs Marry Bosnian Women to Establish Parallel Families’ (Sorguc, 2016), which explains that these Bosnian women are usually second or third wives and that there is:

a new trend in which Bosnian women, usually with the consent of fathers or brothers, marry businessmen from Arab countries who are increasingly coming to Bosnia, either for business or for holidays which they spend in apartments or houses they rent or buy here… Bosnian brides usually remain living in the country and are waiting for their husbands to visit them. (Ibid.).

Using the phrase ‘sex tourism’ to describe this phenomenon constructs the Arab ‘other’ in a deeply negative way, suggesting a similarity to other ‘sex tourists’ around the world who might seek out prostitutes. This commentary flips the morality on its head; instead of Arabs influencing stricter observance of Islamic practice in BiH, commenters are painting them as immoral, bringing a demand for sex tourism to a poor country where over 40% of the young population is officially unemployed.

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129 ‘Sve o arapskim turistima u BiH: Zašto dolaze, šta posjećuju, koliko troše’
130 ‘oni koji su upućeni u "biznis s Arapima" kažu da su to jedini od najzahvalnijih gostiju.’
131 ‘A hoće li neko spomenuti da je bitan faktor i sex turizam?’
In response to back2track, another male commenter on this article with the username Miralem Šečić similarly uses immorality to characterise Arab tourists. He says, ‘Yes, they spend, and also they kill themselves with alcohol like they have a free pass [kao s lanca pušteni, literally as if released from chains] and offer girls 50-60 euros for a blowjob and the like.'\(^\text{132}\) He constructs the Arab 'other' coming to Sarajevo as someone being 'released from chains' who falls into alcohol consumption and solicited sex, both of which are haram or forbidden in Islam. There is a contradiction between the various characterizations of Arabs in the data: they are both making Sarajevo more Islamic, and they are bearers of immorality and consumers of ‘sex tourism’.

Apart from direct accusations of sex tourism, the article attracted other comments of a more general variety. One female reader with the name ‘evet’ commented that, 'To them 300KM is what 3KM is to us. I don't like those who are rich by accident...Ok, you have money because back home you have oil, but to me, you're still a Gypsy only that you bathe more often.'\(^\text{133}\) The Bosnian word cigan or Gypsy denotes people of Roma origin, and it can be used colloquially to indicate someone who is not cultured or educated. The commenter then portrays Arabs as people who are uneducated or uncultured and who are ‘rich by accident’, who do not have the skill to become rich any other way. It underlines their perceived inferiority in terms of education and culture, despite their wealth.

These sentiments directed towards Arab residents and tourists appear in other comment sections as well. Around the time that the contract was signed between the municipality of Trnovo and Buroj Property Development for Buroj Ozone, Klix.ba ran an article titled, ‘Tourist town at the foot of Bjelasnica and Treskavica: initial investment of one billion euros,’ (Klix.ba, 2015). Comments on this article echo the Arabophobia

\(^{132}\) ‘Da, troše a također i ubijaju se alkoholom kao s lanca pušteni i nude curicama po 50-60 eura za pušenje i sl.’

\(^{133}\) ‘Njima je 300KM ko nama 3KM. Ne volim ove što su igrom slučaja bogati...Ok, imaš para jer u dvorištu imaš nafte, ali meni si i dalje cigan samo što se češće kupaš.’
described above. The reader ‘Rudar iz oza’, who writes using the Serbian variant of the language, stated:

The building of thousands of housing units, hotels, the largest shopping center in BiH, sports and recreational and cultural facilities for the world's elite is anticipated. ????. . . . but who will come here? Who needs this? What does the state really get out of this? What do WE get out of this frankly except that we will have to look at all these STRANGE people as they move on our roads and we must ignore them as if they were air because we can't start anything with them... We are left only to wonder how strange and ugly ... am I wrong ... ???.

Mixed with disbelief that Buroj Ozone is even real, he uses the incredulous feelings towards the project to propel the discussion of Arab visitors, who he describes as strange and ugly. He makes the division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ very clear by capitalising ‘WE’ and the adjective for the Arabs, ‘STRANGE’. Repeating the word ‘strange’ to qualify Arab visitors can be read as a way for the commentor to set up a barrier between the Arabs and ‘us’, othering them and positioning Sarajevan identity opposite the ‘strange’ Arabs.

7.4.2 Comments on Internet Forums

Constructions of the Arab ‘other’ that focus on behaviour and culture are more abundant in online forums, including the architectural forum SkyscraperCity.com and the Klix.ba forums. These venues allow for in depth discussions of issues, while also maintaining relative anonymity of the users. This anonymity can be beneficial for uncovering true sentiments, but it can also engender ‘trolling’, or saying radical or nonsensical things in order to provoke reactions. As stated above, I have tried to eliminate all instances that could be deemed trolling in this data by analysing the context of the comments and any reactions to them. While comments on articles have less of a conversational tone to them (they sometimes, but not always, respond to each

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134 'Predviđena je izgradnja na hiljade luksuznih stambenih jedinica, hotela, najvećeg trgovačkog centra u BiH, sportsko-rekreacionih i kulturnih sadržaja za svjetsku elitu. ????. . . pa ko ce ovde dolaziti? Kome ovo treba? Sta drzava ima od ovoga realno? Sta MI imamo od ovoga iskreno osim da ce mo morati gledati sve ove CUDNE ljudi kako se krecu nasim putevima a mi ih moramo ignorirati i kao da su zrak jer s njima ne mozemo nista zapoceti ... Ostaje nam samo da se cudimo kako su cudni i ruzni ... ili se varam ...???' [sic].
other), internet forums do have a conversational quality, so I have tried to explain their context. The following excerpts from online forums were all published online in the summer of 2015, in the middle of negotiations between the municipality of Trnovo and Buroj Property Development, as the entire city was debating the topic of Arab tourists at this time and Buroj Ozone. Klix.ba had an entire forum thread titled ‘Arabs in Sarajevo’\textsuperscript{135}, which is now locked but which was open for about a year. The forum thread began in August, 2015, with questions surrounding the increase in Arabs coming to BiH at that time.

During a discussion about the possibilities of forbidding Arabs from immigrating to BiH, some commenters described those who feared Arab immigration as ‘paranoid’ and others responded by saying the former were ‘naive’. As a response, and perhaps to justify being ‘paranoid’, on 10 August 2015, the user ‘EmiRem’ expressed strong sentiments towards Arabs, stating that:

\begin{quote}
I only know that those who have come have no kind of connection with us. Primitive, noisy, walking barefoot around hotels, arrogantly behave as if they came from the jungle, doing this and we are on all the black lists in the world… I’m Bošnjak, but I do not want to be put in any kind of context with these uneducated savages and primitives. We are Europeans, we look so regardless of our crazy mentality.\textsuperscript{136}
\end{quote}

This commenter constructs The Arab ‘other’ as: ‘primitive, noisy, walking barefoot’, arrogant, ‘came from the jungle’, ‘uneducated savages and primitives’. It is a caricature of the uneducated and uncultured. Significantly, this view of the Arab tourists and newcomers shows that the positioning of Sarajevan identity as European is meaningful in the eyes of many Sarajevans and that, conversely, the Arabs that they are identifying themselves in opposition to become ideal types of uneducated, uncultured, ‘primitive’ people.

\textsuperscript{135} ‘Arapi u Sarajevu’

\textsuperscript{136} ‘samo znam da ovi što su došli nikakve veze nemaju s nama. Primitivni, galame, bosi hodaju po hotelima, bahato se ponasaju ko da su iz džungle došli, radi ovakvih i jesmo na svim crnim listama u svijetu... Bošnjak sam ali ne želim da me bilo ko stavlja u bio kakav kontekst s ovim neobrazovanim divljacima i primitivcima. Mi smo evropljani izgledamo tako bez obzira na nas ljudi mentalitet.’
While the *Klix.ba* forum does not necessarily concentrate on any one theme, *Skyscrapercity.com* is a forum that is more focused on discussions about the urban environment. However, this does not mean that it is free from Arabophobia. In the forum thread ‘Other city discussions,’ new Arab investments including Buroj Ozone and Poljine Hills have been debated, and this has led to expressions of Arabophobia. After the conversation began about Arab behaviour in public and the ‘invasion of the Arabs’\(^{137}\), the user ‘atlantis’ on 10 August 2015 replied: ‘This is the fucking dilemma. On one side we have the "uncultured" tourists, and on the other the need to profit from tourism. The question is can we ourselves at the moment afford to be choosy? There must be a compromise between these two fires.’\(^{138}\) He reduces Arabs tourists to their perceived wealth, rich foreigners whose bad behaviours and uncultured ways need to be ‘tolerated’ in order to profit from them. Further on in the discussion on the 12 August 2015 ‘dragikom’ responded:

> This is an online forum, which means that each "contribution" is subject to dissection. The argument is that we need to endure the rude tourists because they leave a lot of money. However, there is no data (and statistics are most relevant here) to support the claim that these rude tourists leave a lot of money, but the question leads itself the original statement that we need to tolerate them.\(^{139}\)

Dragikom’s suggestion is that, since he believes there is no statistical evidence that Arabs bring in a lot of money, then there is no need to actually ‘tolerate’ them. The word ‘tolerate’ itself is full of meaning, implying that they are a nuisance that must be endured. The examples of overt racism and Arabophobia on the internet in the form of comments on forums and media articles are abundant, and there are too many to list here.

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\(^{137}\) ‘Najezda Arapa’

\(^{138}\) ‘Ovo je zajebana dilema. Na jednoj strani imamo "nekulturne" turiste, a na drugoj potrebu za zaradom od turizma. Pitanje je možemo li mi sebi u ovom trenutku priustiti da budemo izbirljivi? Mora postojati neki kompromis izmedju ove dvije vatre.’

\(^{139}\) ‘Ovo je on-line forum, što znači da je svaki "doprinos" podložan seciranju. Argument je da trebamo istrijeti nepristojne turiste zato što ostavljaju puno para. Međutim, ne postoji podaci (a statistika je tu najelevantnija) koji potkrepljuju tvrdnju da ti nepristojni turist ostavljaju puno para, pa se u pitanje dovodi i sama prvobitna tvrdnja da ih trebamo tolerirati.’
7.5 ‘Cosmopolitan Values’: the Other Side of the Debate

The public debate, however, does have two sides, and these sides are expressed online as well as in my interview and survey data. For example, in response to the Arabophobic comments in the SkyscraperCity.com forum thread discussed above, on 12 August 2015, the user ‘sarma’ asserted:

We simply have no tolerance for anyone, but especially for those from the East. We overestimate ourselves and underestimate others, a typical example of the closed environment without a shred of cosmopolitan values. If you're open, you're open to everyone, be it Chinese, Arabs, Yankee or black. Nobody’s forcing you love them, but show them a minimum of respect and provide a service for which they will return next year and again leave their money in your country. Of course, all the while respecting the laws here. When they do not respect the laws, express deportation. So it is not necessary in all of this to lose your spine, but we need to adapt a little.  

Although many of the underlying prejudices are still present here (Arabs are good for leaving money in the country) and although the commenter still positions Sarajevan identity to the ‘West’ in opposition to people from the ‘East’, it is clear that there are people in Sarajevo who are opening their minds to ‘cosmopolitan values’, perceived as different from Sarajevan ‘multiculturalism’ as it does not focus on religious affiliation but rather sees greater diversity (‘Chinese, Arabs, Yankee or black’). Likewise, field interview respondents shared feelings that aligned more closely with this open-minded approach. One woman, a merchant explained that:

Bosnia has always been with different cultures, so that we are simply a people who accept all. Why not, why not? If one America has hundreds of nations, hundreds of different cultures, why shouldn’t we have that? It is true that Europe is an old continent and holds it all somehow under one roof, but I am for diversity, indeed.

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140 ‘mi jednostavno nemamo tolerancije ni prema kome, a posebno ovima s istoka. sebe precjenjujemo a druge podcjenjujemo, jedan tipičan primjer zatvorene sredine bez trunke kozmopolitskih vrijednosti. ako si otvoren, otvoren si prema svima, bio on kinez, arap, jenki ili crnac. niko te ne tjerda da ga voliš, ali putiži mu minimum poštovanja i pruži uslugu zbog koje će se vratiti naredne godine i opet ostaviti svoj novac u tvojoj zemlji. naravno, sve dok poštuje ovdajnje zakone. kada ne poštuje, ekspresna deportacija i gotovo. dakle ne treba u svemu ovome izgubiti křžu, ali se moramo malo prilagoditi.’

141 ‘Bosna je uvijek bila sa raznim kulturama, tako da smo mi jednostavno narod koji sve prihvata. Zašto ne, zašto ne? Ako jedna Amerika ima sto nacija, sto različitih kultura, zašto ne bi i mi imali. Jeste da je Evropa stari kontinent i drži sve to nekako pod krovom, ali ja sam za različitost, zaista da.’
This interviewee stresses the accepting nature of Sarajevo citizens, stemming from the historical identity of the city. She does not see ‘multiculturalism’ as strictly religion based, and this allows for a broader acknowledgement of difference in the population.

Echoing these sentiments, another field interviewee, a female entrepreneur stated:

I think that, in any case, it is not bad [the transfer of culture]. Maybe they bring a part of their culture, I think it is not bad, but they still accept ours more because they have to. I think it's normal. When we go somewhere we have to adjust to those where we go. So I think that they, too, when they come here they adapt more to us. And that they have their own culture, it is in any case positive. I think, from every culture we can, as a nation, draw and learn something positive. ¹⁴²

Not only does she feel that visitors are, in fact, respecting the norms of Sarajevo society (in contrast to many comments on internet forums), but also she thinks it might be possible for BiH society to take something positive from their culture. This is far from the blatantly Arabophobic statements seen in the internet data, showing that the public debates surrounding the case studies and the phenomena that they are bringing into the city are clearly not one-sided.

Additionally, one of my survey respondents, a young male researcher explained that, 'Wherever capital comes from so too does culture. The influence of Turkish and Arab culture has significantly increased, but it should not be a problem for an open society. Finally, culture is dynamic category, that is subject to a socio-historical dynamics.' As a researcher, this respondent potentially had a better understanding of the dynamics of cultural than others, but his comment shows that these ideas are being discussed in relation to Arab tourists and residents. Although statements from politicians, media reports and internet comments show the fear surrounding Arab residents and tourists, this discourse is being actively countered. There are, however, fewer examples of this opposing viewpoint in the empirical data.

¹⁴² ‘Mislim da to u svakom slučaju nije loše. Možda oni donose dio kulture, mislim da nije loše, ali ipak oni više prihvataju našu jer moraju. Mislim, to je tako normalno. Kad mi negdje dođemo moramo se prilagoditi nekome gdje odemo. Tako mislim da i oni, isto, kad dođu ovdje da se više prilagođavaju nama. A to što imaju svoju kulturu, to je u svakom slučaju pozitivno. Mislim, iz svake kulture možemo mi, mi kao nacija, nešto pozitivno izvući i naučiti.’
From the viewpoint of the investors and real estate agents working in Sarajevo, they are providing a service that is increasing tourism in the city, and this increase in tourism directly benefits the economy. In my interview with Tarik Bilalbegović of Ascendant Project Finance, an investment banking firm focused on tourism and real estate projects in South East Europe, this increase in tourism was underscored. He explained that the real estate sector was bringing in tourism, which was increasing at 3-4% annually, and that the tourists from Arab countries are coming to enjoy the beauty of the natural landscape. Similarly, when discussing the real estate sector with estate agents focused on the Arab market, they explained that most Arab buyers only stay in BiH for one or two weeks per year or up to three months maximum. According to these interviewees, only a small percentage stay longer (5-10%), but those who do buy a home in BiH often use it as a hub from which they can visit other areas of Europe (Switzerland and Austria, for example). Although the estate agents I spoke to were Arab themselves, neither stated that they had personally experienced much discrimination in Sarajevo, although one mentioned that there might be some jealousy from the local population when they see people with resources moving in. These viewpoints stress the idea that Arab visitors are simply tourists enjoying the green mountains and countrysides in BiH, far from cultural colonisers taking over the country.

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the ways in which new residential projects such as the case studies Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone are understood and debated in Sarajevo, including how Sarajevans construct the Arab ‘other’ in reference to new Arab residents and tourists for these complexes. Drawing upon media analysis, my fieldwork data (interviews, field interviews and survey responses) and an examination of online data.
comments, I have shown that the public debates are focusing on the themes of exclusion, cultural colonization, security and safety, and clashes of behaviours and values or ‘Arabophobia’.

Residential projects in the city are forcing new conceptualisations of Sarajevo’s placement in the globalising world. Sarajevo’s identity is in flux, and this dynamism has produced a sense of insecurity in the city’s population. With the advent of residential projects such as Buroj Ozone and Poljine Hills that actively seek out and attract Arab buyers and tourists, Sarajevans have begun positioning their identity in terms of East/West and Global/Local as novel new cultural forms emerge. In the discussion above, the construction of the Arab ‘other’ in relation to the case studies positions Sarajevan identity toward the ‘West’ and toward the ‘Local’. Arab residents and tourists are characterised as being uncultured and uneducated in contrast to ‘European’ Sarajevans, splitting the ‘East’ and the Arab ‘other’ from the ‘West’ and the European. This follows the findings of ethnographic scholarship focusing on the ex-Yugoslav region showing how identity has been constructed within the Bosnian Muslim community through discourses that emphasize the ‘European’ and ‘tolerant’ nature of Bosnia’s Islamic tradition (Bougarel, 2007 and Helms, 2008). However, the flows of capital and people from Arab countries are also creating cultural colonisation and exclusion in the perceptions of Sarajevans; Arab residents are buying up the land and forcing their customs upon the local population. These global forces are in opposition to the city’s Bosnian population, who position Sarajevan identity toward the ‘Local’ end of the binary. The placement of Sarajevan identity along these binaries entrenches the differences between Sarajevans and the new Arab visitors and residents, obscuring the hybridity and novelty created by these flows.

Despite the fact that the new Arab visitors and residents belong to the majority religion in the city, these flows are nonetheless adding to growing diversity in Sarajevo. Such new networks of people are contributing to processes of urban change. Although
migrant flows that drive urban change in cities such as London, New York and Paris often reinforce inequality in the form of spatialised social divisions, in which there is a ‘ghettoization and marginalization of immigrants’ (Arapoglou, 2012), in Sarajevo this dynamic is somewhat reversed. Tourism, in this case, is creating inequality between visitors and residents where one part of the city is inhabited by the wealthy and middle class and the other by the less fortunate (Spirou, 2011: 196). In this case, the exclusive communities Poljine Hills and Buroj Ozone contribute to a process in which, ‘long-established landscapes are gradually transformed by the interplay of global and local forces and produce a new set of urban socio-spatial inequalities’ (Arapoglou, 2012: 232). Sarajevans perceive these networks as excluding the local population from the property market and enforcing their customs upon the city. Their reactions to these flows can be read as a rejection of what they see as cultural colonisation by Arab residents and a loss of civic belonging; they are resisting the new socio-spatial inequalities that they perceive are emerging in the city. By positioning their identity along the East/West and Global/Local binaries, they are attempting to halt the dynamic processes that are currently taking place in the city, which are creating novelty, hybridity and the unknown, and which they perceive may also generate disadvantageous development of the city for the local population.
8. Conclusion: Worlding Projects, Urban Problems and Identity in Crisis

8.1 Interpretations and Arguments

The reverberations of conflict can still be felt in the city of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Walking along the city streets, physical manifestations of conflict still scar the urban landscape of the city over twenty years after the Siege. Yet the city is also transforming; its spaces are developing with transnational flows of capital from around the globe. This thesis has examined how such transnational flows of capital for urban development in Sarajevo have impacted the post-conflict and post-socialist city landscape. I have argued that the case studies analysed in this work are ‘worlding projects’, following the conception by Roy and Ong (2011), which are creating hybridity and emergent cultural forms. They are projects that are attempting to solve the urban ‘problems’ of post-conflict and post-socialist redevelopment but that are also part of networks that are enacting the city into being (Farias and Bender, 2010). As ‘the urban and the global are constitutive of one another’ (Baker and Ruming, 2014: 63), these projects are pulling Sarajevo towards the global; they are enabling greater flows of people, ideas, cultures and capital between Sarajevo and countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, and they are bringing market capitalism to the post-socialist city.

The ‘problems’ of post-conflict and post-socialist redevelopment are embedded in many different developmental areas. For example, aesthetically, the city still contains visible scars from the conflict: bullet holes in the exterior plaster of buildings, marks called ‘roses’ where mortar shells hit concrete (which are often filled with red resin for remembrance), and abandoned spaces too dangerous to inhabit. Economically, the city needs redevelopment to contribute to growth and job creation, especially as unemployment among the youth remains a serious issue (Bičo and Bajram, 2013) and as the country falls well behind its neighbours (Croatia and Serbia) in terms of official
unemployment numbers (officially 25.4% in 2016 – CIA World Factbook, 2017). The case studies examined in this thesis can be seen as ‘expressions and agents of global urban imaginaries’ (Baker and Ruming, 2015: 63) trying to solve such urban problems. The shopping centres BBI and SCC have redeveloped abandoned city squares and created jobs for the local population. The King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre offers free educational opportunities to Sarajevans, regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation, including free English and Arab language instruction, computer classes and a sports terrain. Finally, the residential projects Buroj Ozone and Poljine Hills encourage tourism from middle class and wealthy Arab visitors, who enjoy the greenery of BiH's countryside, injecting the local economy with added monetary streams.

Such redevelopment, however, does not come without friction. As increasing numbers of visitors and residents from the greater Muslim world take an interest in Sarajevo and as greater capital flows from GCC countries come into the country for urban projects, the residents of the city react. I have analysed the reactions of Sarajevans to these new projects, especially in terms of how they have attempted to position their own identity in relation to the new phenomena arriving in their city. In the fourth chapter of this thesis titled ‘Sarajevo’s Identity Crisis: the City’s Multi-ethnic History, the Islamic shift and Post-War Urban Processes’, I have argued that Sarajevan identity is in crisis and that the city is becoming more Muslim in terms of space and demographics. Because of this crisis of identity, the case studies in this thesis have become sounding boards onto which people in the city project an idealised identity, one that references a historical ‘multicultural’ idyll.

Using discourse analysis based on what Loretta Lees (2004) describes as the second strand of discourse analysis for geographical research, I analysed how Sarajevans discuss the case studies and related phenomena around them, such as Arab migration and ideas of neighbourliness. In this second strand, Lees states that, ‘Here discourse is part of a process through which things and identities get
constructed. In Foucauldian terms, discourses are not simply reflections or (mis)representations of “reality”; rather they create their own “regimes of truth” – the acceptable formulation of problems and solutions to those problems,’ (102-103).

Focusing on how individuals use language in both media reports but also in face-to-face interviews and survey responses, I pulled out the meanings they created. Using discourse analysis gave me a better way to understand how the population of the city is responding to new urban investments and what greater meaning this has for Sarajevo as a city.

In the fifth chapter of this thesis titled, ‘Sarajevo’s Commercial Investments: Perceptions of Corruption and Investor Urbanism in Post-Conflict and Post-Socialist Urban Development’, I have analysed the discourses surrounding the BBI Centar (BBI) and the Sarajevo City Center (SCC), focusing specifically on perceptions of corruption and market-driven, or investor, urbanism. These buildings are contested, quasi-public spaces, which have been the subject of intense public debates in Sarajevo. I have argued in this chapter that Sarajevans view issues of corruption surrounding BBI and SCC as particularly ‘eastern’ in character, as opposed to ostensibly ‘western’ transparency. The reactions of many the residents of the city to these case studies position Sarajevan identity along the imaginary East/West binary away from what is perceived as ‘eastern’, especially corruption and the ‘Orientalising’ effect of foreign capital flows from GCC countries. The data that I analysed from media reports, interviews, field interviews and survey responses separates an idealised ‘western’ and European Sarajevan identity, one that upholds transparency and democracy, from the corrupt and colonising ‘eastern’ force of GCC capital flows, manifested in the material environment with the two shopping centres. BBI and SCC are elite-approved worlding projects that inter-reference similar luxury buildings in places like Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Forming part of the public sphere, they are important for the identity of the city, but they are also spaces that encourage the emergence of multiplicity and hyrbidity.
Following from this chapter on commercial investments, chapter six of this thesis titled ‘Redefining Sarajevo’s Relationship to Islam: the Blending of Sacred and Secular Spaces’ analyses spaces in Sarajevo that are sacred in nature. I have used BBI and SCC as case studies for this chapter as well as the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre, arguing that all of these buildings represent a blending of sacred and secular space, allowing for different realities to exist simultaneously. Religious ritual takes place in all three buildings (the shopping centres have Muslim mesjids for prayer and are shari’ah compliant, meaning certain activities such as the sale of alcohol are forbidden), but their secular functions also determine their production of space. All three are at once both sacred and secular. I analysed the discourses around BBI and SCC first, focusing on their link to Islam and the sacred elements in the spaces. Here I explored two themes: perceptions of a conspiracy to ‘Islamise’ the city and fears of expanding shari’ah compliant spaces. Secondly, I examined the discourses around the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre, focusing on radicalism and the perception that the mosque seeks out or preys upon the poor and the vulnerable populations of the city. The reactions of Sarajevans to these case studies attempt to position their identity along the Sacred/Secular and East/West binaries. In reaction to perceptions of a conspiracy to ‘Islamise’ the city and fears of expanding shari’ah compliant spaces, I found that Sarajevans positioned themselves toward the secular end of the Sacred/Secular binary, asserting a Yugoslav ideal of secularism. Views of radicalism connected with the King Fahd Mosque placed an emphasis on the ‘eastern’ nature of such ideologies and their attempts to garner converts, consistent with the idea of ‘eastern’ corruption analysed in the preceding chapter. Thus, Sarajevans positioned their identity, especially connected with ‘naš Islam’ toward the ‘western’ side of the East/West binary in reaction to such perceptions. With the ‘Islamic shift’, Sarajevo has become more Muslim in character, and these worlding projects are contributing to this changing nature. However, while the population fears homogeneity in terms of the
increasing influence of Islam, the case studies are fields of multiplicity where simultaneous realities exist at once.

Moving away from a focus on Islam in the built environment, chapter seven of this thesis titled ‘Understanding Arabophobia: Residential Projects as Catalysts for New Constructions of the “Other” in Sarajevo’ explores new residential and tourist complexes in Sarajevo, the construction of the Arab ‘other’ and ideas surrounding neighbourliness and flows of people into the city. I examine two case studies: the Poljine Hills residential complex and Buroj Ozone tourist village, both of which are still under construction. Drawing upon media analysis, my fieldwork data (interviews, field interviews and survey responses) and an examination of online comments, I argue that the case studies are catalysing discourses around new visitors and residents in Sarajevo from Arab countries, such as the UAE and Kuwait, concentrated around concepts such as exclusion, cultural colonisation, safety, clashes of behaviour and the new ‘other’. Through these discourses, Sarajevans are attempting to position their identity along the imaginary binaries of East/West and Global/Local toward the ‘West’ and toward the ‘Local’. Arab residents and tourists are portrayed as being uncultured in contrast to more cultured, educated and ‘European’ Sarajevans, who make up the local population. Additionally, fears are expressed that Sarajevans are being excluded from the local property market by Arab buyers and that the Bosnian population will have to adapt to the customs of the new residents. Such flows of people and capital can be interpreted as contributing to urban change in the sense of spatialised social divisions in Sarajevo, following along the lines of the ‘two cities’ conception where one part of the city is inhabited by the wealthy and middle class and the other by the less fortunate (Spirou, 2011: 196). Sarajevans’ reactions to these flows can be read as a rejection of perceived cultural colonisation and exclusion and a resistance to new socio-spatial inequalities. The positioning of their identity along the imagined binaries is an attempt
to stop the dynamic processes at work in the city and create a static conception of Sarajevo and belonging in the city.

As a whole, the discourses surrounding the case studies in this thesis can be read as a means for the local population to assert control over their changing built environment and identity. With elite approval, global actors are managing the development process, creating a conflict in which the people themselves have little say in the redevelopment of their own urban landscape. While this is not an uncommon or novel phenomenon, in Sarajevo, this lack of control seems to be catalysing narratives that aim to create stasis in the ever-changing and morphing city environment. Global flows are enabling the creation of cultural hybridity, but as a reaction, Sarajevans are attempting to concretize shifting ideas related to belonging and the city. Tensions between the three ethno-religious groups in the city undoubtedly still exist, but these historical struggles seem to take a secondary place in contemporary Sarajevo, especially with the ‘Islamic shift’ that is making the city more Muslim in character.

From my analysis above, the stabilised and controlled Sarajevan identity being created and formed as a reaction to global flows of capital, people and ideas from GCC countries exists at the ends of three imaginary binaries: East/West, Sacred/Secular and Global/Local. According to Alev Çinar and Thomas Bender (2007), discourses and imaginary binaries (or imaginaries), ‘serve urban dwellers by locating the city and themselves in it... the city is located and continually reproduced through such orienting acts of imagination, acts grounded in material space and social practice’ (xii). The ways in which residents of the city imagine and discuss the urban environment and their identity constitutes both social reality and urban space. Aligning itself with vague concepts such as democracy, transparency, equality and cosmopolitanism, this Sarajevan identity speaks to the historical idyll of ‘multiculturalism’, but it also reaches into an idealised future in which Sarajevo forms part of an integrated Europe exemplifying these traits.
Such positioning can be interpreted as going beyond identity formation as well. In terms of Sarajevo’s urban landscape, the analysis above can also be read as a rejection of the city’s spaces’ growing Muslim character, or the ‘Islamic shift’. Although the nature of transnational flows of capital and people creates multiplicity and the existence of simultaneous realities, the residents of the city are rejecting what they perceive as an ‘Islamisation’ of the city spaces, including increasing shari’ah compliant spaces. Expanding this beyond a focus on Islam and Islamic values, Sarajevans’ responses to the changing urban landscape centered around the case studies in this thesis can also be read as a rejection of urban space that is perceived of as exclusive to new Arab residents or tourists. This is especially true when the people of the city view urban redevelopment as excluding the local population or as creating separate urban spheres dividing the local population from newcomers. Finally, the analysis shows a lack of tolerance for corruption and corrupt practices that are driving the development of the urban landscape. Through the discourses surrounding the case studies, they are asserting an ethical vision for Sarajevo’s urban environment, which would eliminate the power of foreign capital to dictate redevelopment projects and urban goals. While Sarajevans have little control over these processes, through these discourses, they are creating a means of contesting new urban redevelopment projects that they feel go against idealised Sarajevan values located at the ends of the imaginary binaries. Thus their reactions to the case studies serve two functions: identity creation and contestation of elite-approved urban redevelopment.

Of course, there are multiple sides to the debate, and there are Sarajevans who do not view the case studies or related phenomena as problematic. As I have discussed in previous chapters, there are voices in the city that see the new developments in an entirely positive light, especially in terms of economic growth and job creation. Additionally, there have been reactions to ‘Arabophobia’ and the othering of newcomers to Sarajevo with calls for tolerance and acceptance. It is my belief,
however, that these voices are less pronounced and prominent than those that I have highlighted. From the analysis of my data, I contend that the dominant reactions of the residents of Sarajevo continue to position Sarajevan identity along the imaginary binaries as a reaction to the worlding projects coming into the city.

8.2 Theoretical Contributions

The data and interpretations in this thesis have made both empirical and theoretical contributions and have cleared the way for future research areas. Empirically this research contributes to knowledge on Sarajevo and on post-socialist and post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in terms of identity. As identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains the focus of a considerable corpus of literature (see for example Markowitz, 2010; Robinson, Engelstoft and Pobrić, 2001; or Robinson and Pobrić, 2006), especially in terms of ideas of ‘reconciliation’ between the three main ethno-religious communities, the findings in this thesis reach beyond nationalism and religious affiliation towards new ideas of what Sarajevan identity means in the current context.

The observations and data collected in this thesis provide an avenue for exploring Sarajevan identity and belonging in a more complex way. This research does not attempt to flatten or reduce identity in Sarajevo to its most basic, ethno-religious components; instead, the empirical data shows how new conceptions and understandings of belonging can be highlighted in the face of transnational movements of people and capital. Although tensions between the three religious communities do still exist, a more nuanced understanding of current social dynamics is necessary for understanding the reality of the current phenomena. Moving away from a strict focus on reconciliation between the three ethno-religious communities also allows for the analysis of solidarities between members of different religious groups and how such connections might provide fruitful avenues for peace research and policy making. I
show that scholarship that focuses on identity in terms of ethno-national belonging in Bosnia and Herzegovina (for example, Robinson, Engelstoft and Pobrić, 2001 and Robinson and Pobrić, 2006) flattens more complex understandings of identity in the country, missing the true nature of social relations taking place.

This thesis contributes to the anthropological and ethnographic literature on the ex-Yugoslav space, which goes against strict ethno-national identity formation in BiH. These works demonstrate how identity is formed outside of ethno-religious belonging through the construction of different discourses (see, for example, Bougarel, Helms and Duijzings, 2008; Helms, 2008; Jansen, 2015; and Jansen, Brković and Čelebići, 2017). This research adds to the understanding of identity formation through the mobilisation of various imaginaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina, showing how such processes are much more complex than identitarian politics focused on ethno-nationalism. However, it pushes this body of research further by looking at how identity is being constructed within the Muslim community and in reaction to global flows of people and capital. This opens up the literature to global flows outside of a strict focus on the peoples of the former Yugoslavia.

Theoretically, this research contributes to geographical research on the production of space and on transnationality. Firstly, it contributes to new conceptions of sacred space. Following along the ideas of Lily Kong (2001) and Banu Gökarıksel (2009), this thesis has conceptualised sacred space outside of binary understandings. I have shown how the case studies BBI, SCC and the King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Centre produce simultaneous realities that are at once both sacred and secular. Reaching beyond conceptions of sacred space that focus on feelings of awe and wonder (della Dora, 2011) or that view the sacred in opposition to the secular or profane (Kedar and Werblowsky, 1998 and Gottschalk, 2013), this research argues for more complex understandings of the sacred that can be imbued with the secular in various contexts. Because the case studies are all spaces where religious ritual takes
place and where there are religious regulations on activities on site, they cannot be
described as fully sacred or secular. As Sarajevo globalises, spatial production
becomes more complex. It is no longer possible to make clear delineations between
the sacred and the secular in the case studies examined. This research shows that
spaces as nominally secular as shopping centres can be both sacred and secular, and
that nominally sacred spaces such as mosques can also produce both. Importantly,
this thesis expands the geography literature on sacred space and the simultaneous
production of the sacred and the secular by showing how such simultaneous realities
can exist in large public spaces such as shopping centres. It broadens the idea of this
simultaneous reality outside of spaces for religious practice and personal expressions
of this reality (such as wearing the hijab explored by Banu Gökanksel (2009)). Such
findings could be expanded beyond Sarajevo to other cities in the Muslim world that are
recipients of transnational capital for urban redevelopment based on Islamic financing
principles. These findings could also be fruitful avenues for exploring sacred spatial
production in secular spaces such as airports and shopping centres around the world
that offer spaces for prayer and reflection.

Secondly, the findings in this thesis point to new ideas for conceptualising Islam
and nationalism in the built environment, especially in the context of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. I have argued that Sarajevo is undergoing an ‘Islamic shift’ in its built
environment and in its demographics, meaning that the city is becoming more Muslim
in character. Although Kusno (2012) describes how solidarities can be organised in the
built environment for larger national communities, such as the umma, I have found that
this is not always the case in Sarajevo and that the idea of the umma is not as salient
an identity as others. Simone (2012) defines the umma as, ‘a deep horizontal
comradeship that crosses the temporary convenience of nations’ (206). In Sarajevo,
the ‘Islamic shift’ includes processes that can be read as excluding of Bosnian
Muslims, especially in terms of how they understand ‘naš Islam’. It is reductionary to
assume that Sarajevo’s increasing Muslim character is simple enough to organise
solidarities for the entire umma. In the city’s built environment, global flows of capital
and people are creating spaces that Sarajevan Muslims find exclusionary and against
their ideologies, and they are reacting against such spatial production. This research
underscores the multiplicity of the city and goes beyond simplified notions of belonging,
such as the umma. The notion of competing Muslim spaces within a Muslim-majority
city breaks new ground in the literature on Islam in the built environment, expanding
beyond notions of one homogeneous and coherent Islamic community or the imaginary
unity of the umma. Outside of Sarajevo, such findings could look at Islam in the built
environment in cities such as London, where there are multiple Muslim communities
and differing solidarities amongst such groups.

Finally, this thesis adds to the literature on transnationality. Following upon Roy
and Ong’s (2011) conception of ‘worlding cities’, I have argued that the case studies in
this thesis are ‘worlding projects’ that are bringing the global to Sarajevo and that this is
creating novel cultural forms. Adding to Tsing’s (2005) idea of ‘friction’, I have argued
that such flows are bringing hybridity to Sarajevo – not homogeneity. Outside of a
‘West-to-rest’ model, the processes analysed in this thesis prove that transnational
flows exceed the simple economic models of early globalization literature and that their
effects can be felt in all aspects of life. The literature on transnational flows in Sarajevo
and in Bosnia and Herzegovina focuses mostly on diaspora relations (see, for example,
Valenta and Ramet, 2011) and the role of the international community and NGOs
before and after the war (Petersen, 2012 and Kostić, 2014 for example). This thesis
adds a much-needed conceptualisation of the contemporary processes taking place in
the city and in the country as a whole with special attention to the effects on spatial
properties in the city. Using Sarajevo as a case study adds to the ‘worlding’ literature,
as Sarajevo has not been studied using this theoretical model. This research shows
how elite-approved interventions from GCC countries are bringing Sarajevo into the
globalising world and into the global market economy. It also adds a much-needed analysis of new global flows that are not related to the Bosnian diaspora or NGO and international organisations working in the country.

8.3 Critical Reflections

This thesis has examined how transnational flows of capital are informing the urban redevelopment of Sarajevo. It has done so through the use of qualitative research methods and discourse analysis. Throughout my analysis, I have tried to deal fairly with the data I have collected, especially the interview and field interview data. At times, however, the nature of these results became somewhat sensitive, especially when considering Sarajevan attitudes towards new visitors and residents from GCC countries. It is not productive to interpret these findings as bigoted, as there are many nuanced viewpoints behind them. My analysis may have been too severe when dealing with these ideas. This could also be a reflection of the fact that I am not Bosnian and lack certain understandings of the subtleties of language and cultural expression. This can also be extended further. My positionality as a foreigner directed my research, despite my attempts to control for this effect. As mentioned in my methodology chapter, this certainly contributed to both the data I received (people surely self-censored and edited knowing my position as a foreign researcher) and my analysis of that data. While I have tried to be as objective as possible, I am aware that this positionality could have led to differences in analysis from that of a native Bosnian researcher.

Unlike much of the literature on post-conflict Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, this thesis gives only a very superficial account of the inter-ethnic tensions and problems associated with nationalism. Some scholars might argue that this omission is problematic for the research as it ignores the main source of conflict that has existed in the city for over two decades. While I recognise this concern, I believe that Sarajevo as a city is moving beyond these historical conflicts and tensions between the ethno-
religious communities. I also believe that, with the ‘Islamic shift’, these ideas are not as salient to the processes occurring in Sarajevo at the current moment. Following the scholarship of Emily Greble (2011), I underscore the power of the civic identity of Sarajevo over those of the ethno-religious communities, and I argue that this identity is in crisis. Undoubtedly, the tensions between these communities do exist, and in other parts of the country, they are still a major consideration in all aspects of life. This would be especially true for divided cities like Mostar where the communities are separated spatially from one another and where there exists a ‘Muslim’ side of the city and a ‘Croat’ side of the city (Calame and Charlesworth, 2011). However, Sarajevo has a different ethos, which has been grounded in centuries of cohabitation between different religious communities and the continuing narrative of ‘multiculturalism’ that keeps that idyll alive (Ibid.). The results of my data showed me that the inter-ethnic tensions, while certainly not forgotten, are not necessarily as prominent or as mobilising as they perhaps once were. For this reason, such forces in the city fell into the background of my analysis.

In another vein, my focus on investments from GCC countries could be seen as somewhat narrow. I have mentioned in passing that there are shopping centres in the city that were investments originating in the United States and Croatia, for example. There is also a large residential tower that was built using Malaysian funding, and there are other infrastructure and architectural projects that have been built and developed with Malaysian funds. Added to this, reconstruction of the city has been occurring since the end of the siege with the help of the international community, especially the European Union, the United States, the World Bank and other countries such as Norway (Stroschein, 2014). With so many flows of capital and people (in the form of diplomatic and international organisation employees) from the EU, the United States and other European countries, why focus on Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, etc.? Could their role in the redevelopment of the city be so much more substantial? I would
argue that the flows from GCC countries are not more substantial, per se, but that there are more discourses mobilised around these investments. They are more controversial and the buildings themselves are more contested than investments and funding from the EU, the USA or countries like Norway. For this reason, they are a phenomenon unto themselves that deserve focused research.

Methodologically, I believe this research could have benefitted from focused interviews with members of the Salafi community in Sarajevo and with interviews with more Arab residents in the city. Although I did carry out a field interview with a fully covered woman, the voices from this community are somewhat absent from my analysis. While reaching out to this community would have been very difficult, having their viewpoints surely would have added a layer of complexity to this thesis and would have enriched this research. Additionally, I did interview two Arab businessmen working in real estate and tourism, but having more of their voices would have added depth to the analysis, especially in terms of how they feel they have been welcomed in Sarajevo or any difficulties that they have found. Fieldwork is a difficult time full of uncertainties, and it is only in retrospect sometimes that our omissions come into focus. Despite this, I do believe I was able to obtain enough data to understand the processes taking place regarding the case studies and the overarching discourses surrounding them.

With this in mind, this thesis sets the stage for future research. I have argued that the case studies are driving the emergence of new cultural forms in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Except for hybridity in spatial production, I have not described what I believe these new cultural forms are, as this goes beyond the scope of the thesis. I believe research into emerging Islamic practices in Sarajevo could shed some light on the effects of these transnational flows. Specifically, it could be fruitful to investigate Muslims in Sarajevo who are ‘Quranists’ or Muslims who have taken certain practices from Salafi movements while leaving others. Research following the marriages of
Bosnians to Arabs might also include how hybridity is developing in Sarajevo, how the children of these marriages understand their belonging in the city and how these families practice Islam. These flows can also be driving language use and learning. Future research could focus on the use of Arabic and Turkish as second languages in Sarajevo, especially for business and tourist purposes. In terms of geography, this research could be used as a stepping-stone for investigating investments in other cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially those cities that do not have a Muslim majority. Research into Russia’s investments, for example, might prove quite interesting in a comparative analysis. In all, the avenues for future research are wide and potentially important not only for South East European studies but for various different fields.

As a whole, the findings in this thesis are significant for the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially the city dwellers in Sarajevo. By exploring the ways in which transnational capital flows are mobilising discourses in the city around identity and belonging, it points to underlying social power struggles and nascent movements that are developing and that will shape the future of the social fabric of the city. Uncovering such shifts will allow for a more critical analysis of social relationships and the creation of policy or best practices for the continuing redevelopment of the city. Additionally, this thesis contributes to understandings of inter-Islamic relationships on a global scale and how tensions within the umma might catalyse conflict. These findings could help pave the way for greater understanding between Islamic currents in other cities worldwide, especially cities with large Muslim populations such as London and other Muslim-majority cities. This could be especially relevant for cities where ‘traditional’ Islamic practices are being challenged by global movements such as Salafism.
Bibliography


*Balkan Insight*, 21.


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Vancouver


Vancouver


Vancouver


Vancouver


### Annex A – Detailed List of Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation/Profession</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Investigative journalist at CIN – Centar za istraživačko novinarstvo (Centre for investigative journalism)</td>
<td>July 2014</td>
<td>Discussed corruption and building projects, gas stations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Clerk, Stari Grad Municipality Department of Urban Planning</td>
<td>17 January 2015</td>
<td>Discussed permissions for building in Sarajevo. In local language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sead Gološ</td>
<td>Architect of BBI, SCC, and Bosmal</td>
<td>20 February 2015</td>
<td>Discussed buildings, investment. Would not agree to follow up interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof. Dr. Khalid AdDamigh</td>
<td>Saudi cultural attaché</td>
<td>25 February 2015</td>
<td>Gave tour of entire complex, discussed mission, challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>26 February 2015</td>
<td>Met in café, discussed problems of urbanism. In local language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasiha Pozder</td>
<td>University of Sarajevo Faculty for Architecture, Poitician</td>
<td>05 March 2015</td>
<td>Problems of urbanism in Sarajevo, political issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Cantonal Agency for</td>
<td>10 March</td>
<td>Discussed issues of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title/Role</td>
<td>Date</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>29 March 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Member of orthodox community</td>
<td>03 May 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Radomir Lazović</td>
<td>Ne Da(vi)mo Beograd</td>
<td>12 May 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>International contractor for IOs in Sarajevo</td>
<td>18 May 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>10 June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>International organisation</td>
<td>12 June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Organisation/Role</td>
<td>Date</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Enes Kazazić</td>
<td>SEIC (South Eastern Investment Corporation)</td>
<td>17 June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Governmental organisation</td>
<td>18 June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>OSCE representative</td>
<td>22 June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Investigative journalist</td>
<td>13 July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA)</td>
<td>22 July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Fatima Šišić</td>
<td>Centre for Islamic Architecture (<em>Islamska Zajednica</em>)</td>
<td>23 July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Governmental organisation</td>
<td>27 July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name/Surname</td>
<td>Organization/Role</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Edin Šabanović</td>
<td>Director and founder of Bosmal Centar</td>
<td>31 July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Student, University of Sarajevo faculty of architecture</td>
<td>03 August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>OSCE Press and Public Information Unit</td>
<td>11 August 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Helvetas, tourism</td>
<td>09 September 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>21 September 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source Code</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Tarik Bilalbegović</td>
<td>Director, Ascendant project finance</td>
<td>22 September 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Goran Kahvedžić</td>
<td>Director, SCC</td>
<td>01 October 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Edin Sefo</td>
<td>CEO, Management Development Consulting (MDC)</td>
<td>02 October 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>03 October 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Financial consultant, Investment banking firm</td>
<td>08 October 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Samid Sinanović</td>
<td>General Director, Shad Invest</td>
<td>19 October 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Borisa Mraović and Hana Curak</td>
<td>Crvena</td>
<td>29 October 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>30 October 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Organization/Role</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Entrepreneur and estate agent, Arab-focused services</td>
<td>02 November 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Estate agent, Arab-focused estate agency</td>
<td>02 November 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Anes Podić</td>
<td>Eko Akcija</td>
<td>03 November 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Architects</td>
<td>04 November 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Cantonal Planning Office</td>
<td>05 November 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Amir Zec</td>
<td>Architect</td>
<td>12 November</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
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<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Sead Živalji</td>
<td>Director, BBI Centar</td>
<td>05 January 2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex B – Interview Themes/Sample Interview Questions

Financiers/Project Stakeholders (directors of BBI, SCC, MDC, etc.)

• What can you tell me about the initial idea for the project? How was the project conceived?
• Can you describe the privatization process for me?
• What was the process for gaining the relevant permissions? What phases of construction required which permissions?
• What kind of obstacles did you encounter along the way?

Urban Professionals/Architects

• What are your thoughts on the urban development of Sarajevo since 1995?
• What are the main problems in urbanization and architectural development?
• How are politics enmeshed in architectural development and urban planning?
• What do you think the city needs in terms of spaces or buildings?
• What kind of solutions could help the current situation in Sarajevo?

Institutional Representatives

• What can you tell me about the link between politics and urban development?
• What can you tell me about corruption in Sarajevo? Are there links to foreign investment?
• What can you tell me about press freedom in Sarajevo and media campaigns against certain foreign investors?

Journalists

• Do you think there is a link between politics and investment in the urban environment? What do you think this link is?
• Who do you think might be behind such investments? Why?
• What can you tell me about the property holdings of politicians in Sarajevo?
• What do you know about urban planning in Sarajevo?

Activists/NGO Sector
• What can you tell me about the environmental impact of new construction projects?
• What can you tell me about green spaces in Sarajevo?
• Do you think Sarajevo lacks cultural spaces? Why or why not?
• What kind of spaces are needed in the city?
• Why do you think people are or are not active in the urban development of the city?

Real Estate Agents

• Why are people from the Arab world buying property in Sarajevo/BiH?
• Do you market in Arab speaking countries?
• Have any of your clients complained of discrimination?
• Do Arab buyers prefer to live amongst Bosnian neighbours or do they prefer Arab settlements?
Annex C – Survey (English Translation)

Age:
Gender:
Occupation:
Ethnicity (optional):

1. On a scale from 1 to 10, how successful do you believe urban development (new investments in architecture, urbanization, and reconstruction) in Sarajevo has been since 1995?

Unsuccessful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Successful

Comments:

2. What is your opinion on the number of shopping centres in Sarajevo?
   a. There are too many
   b. There are not enough
   c. There is a good amount

Comments:

3. What is your opinion on foreign real estate developments (shopping centres, private villas, tourist villages, hotels, and other commercial properties) in Sarajevo?
   a. There are too many
   b. There are not enough
   c. There is a good amount

Comments:

4. If you believe there are too few or too many, are there specific countries that have produced too few or too many?
   a. yes
   b. no
   c. undecided

5. Please list any countries you believe have invested too much or too little in Sarajevo.

6. Do you believe the style of new architectural developments (shopping centres and mosques) is appropriate for Sarajevo?
   a. yes
   b. no
   c. undecided

Comments:
7. Do you believe new buildings and mosques should follow traditional designs seen in Sarajevo?
   a. yes
   b. no
   c. does not matter

   Comments:

8. For Sarajevo City Center, BBI, and Bosmal Centar, Hotel Bristol, do the investors’ regulations banning alcohol, pork, and gambling on the premises affect whether you go to those spaces?
   a. Yes, I don’t go to them because of the ban
   b. Yes, I specifically try to go to them because of the ban
   c. no
   d. undecided

   Comments:

9. On a scale from 1 to 10, how do you feel about the banning of alcohol, pork, and gambling in shopping centres and other privately run commercial spaces such as hotels?

   Strongly negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Strongly positive

   Comments:

10. Do you believe Sarajevo City Center, BBI, and Bosmal have improved Sarajevo’s urban development?
    a. yes
    b. no
    c. undecided

    Comments:

11. What is your opinion on the development of mosques in Sarajevo?
    a. There are too many
    b. There are not enough
    c. There is a good amount
    d. No opinion/unsure

    Comments:

12. Do you think there is a need for exclusive residential communities such as Poljine Hills?
    a. yes
b. no

c. undecided

Comments:

13. Do you think foreigners should be allowed to buy property in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

a. yes

b. no

c. undecided

Comments:

14. Do you think only certain nationalities/foreigners should be allowed to buy property in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

a. yes

b. no

c. undecided

Comments:

15. If yes, which nationalities/foreigners should be allowed to buy property?

16. Are there any nationalities/foreigners that you believe should not be allowed to buy property in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

17. Do you think real estate investment since the war has been politically motivated?

a. yes

b. no

c. undecided

Comments:

18. If yes, which politicians or political parties do you believe have been the most involved?

19. Do you believe the origin of financing for urban developments (shopping centres, mosques, private villas, and tourist villages) can have an affect on the culture of Sarajevo?

a. yes

b. no

c. undecided

Comments:
20. Do you think real estate development is affecting the identity of Sarajevo as a plural/multicultural city?
   a. yes
   b. no
   c. undecided

   Comments:

21. On a scale from 1 to 10, how do you feel about the construction of tourist villages such as Buroj Ozone that cater specifically to Arab and Muslim tourists?

   Strongly negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  Strongly positive

   Comments:

22. Do you believe such tourist villages will be beneficial to the Sarajevo economy?
   a. yes
   b. no
   c. undecided

   Comments:

23. What kind of buildings or spaces would you like to see developed in the city?

24. Do you have any other comments about architecture, urbanization, and real estate development in Sarajevo?
Annex D – Field Interview Questionnaire (English translation)

Age:  
Gender:  
Occupation:  
Ethnicity (optional):  

What do you think about shopping centres in Sarajevo like the Sarajevo City Center, BBI, and Bosmal?

What do you think about banning alcohol, pork, and gambling in spaces such as the Sarajevo City Center, BBI, and Bosmal?

What do you think about the construction of mosques in Sarajevo? (In terms of style? Quantity?)

What do you think about exclusive residential communities such as Poljine Hills?

Do you think foreigners should be able to buy property in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Do you believe there are political motivations behind foreign investments in Sarajevo?

If yes, who do you think is behind them?

What kind of buildings or spaces would you like to see developed in the city?

Do you have any other comments about architecture, urbanization, and real estate development in Sarajevo?
Annex E – Table of Codes and Themes

Case Study Type:

- Commercial
- Sacred
- Residential

Islam

- Blurring of sacred/secular
- *Tawhid* – Muslim idea of oneness
- *Umma* – transnational identification
- Bošnjak nationalism
- Islamism
- Radicalism/terrorism
- Islamophobia/Fear of Islamism in BiH
- Islamic financing/Halal investment
- ‘our’ Islam v. ‘their’ Islam
- East v. West
- Visibility of Islam

Political themes

- Bakir Izetbegović
- Fahrudin Radončić
- Corruption/Government Misconduct
- Interests of international actors (Saudis, Turks, UAE, Russia, etc.)
- Anti-Russian/Anti-Arab
- Power/Wealth Statements
- Luxury projects v. general poverty
- Crises in the Middle East
- New Arab demographics/refugee crisis
Urbanization

- Illegal constructions
- Investor-driven urbanism
- Urbanization laws/amendments
- Permissions
- Privatization

Foreign Influence in BiH

- Tourism/Arab tourism
- Inter-referencing Dubai
- Turkish Influence
- Saudi Influence
- Russian Influence
- Generic ‘Arab’ influence
- Western influence
- American influence
- Sacred v. secular

Mentalities

- ‘Multiculturalism’/new multiculturalism (new demographics)
- Arab hysteria
- Arab discrimination/trust issues with Bosnians
- Short-term v. Long-term thinking
- Arab ‘c-class’, inferior investment
- Global v. Local
- Urban v. Rural
- ‘Bosnian’ mentality
- Exclusion
Annex F – Consent Forms

Information Sheet for Participants

You will be given a copy of this information sheet.

Title of Project: Sarajevo’s Post-Conflict Urban Environment: Interventions in the Urban Landscape and Peace Building in a Plural Society

This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID Number): 3853/002

Name: Kristen Hartmann

Work Address: 16 Taviton Street, London WC1H 0BW, United Kingdom

Contact Details: Email: Kristen.Hartmann.11@ucl.ac.uk

We would like to invite you to participate in this research project.

Details of Study:

This project seeks to examine which factors are shaping the architectural and urban redevelopment of the post-conflict city of Sarajevo. Specifically, I will analyze the impact of new foreign financing for building constructions on the plural social fabric of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Focusing on major construction projects in Sarajevo since the Bosnian War, such as the BBI Centar and the Sarajevo City Center, I will attend to both sacred and secular architecture, especially buildings relying on funding from countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Qatar, and Kuwait. By investigating the entire building process – from privatization to design selection to completion and everyday use – I will be able to examine the negotiations and contestations that have surrounded the architecture during and after construction. I will employ ethnographic research methods, including interviews and participant observation, and I will consult archive, press, and internet materials to collect data.

I am recruiting Bosnians from all ethnicities to comment on their usage or experience with these buildings and how they have changed their understanding of the urban environment in Sarajevo. I will also recruit people who are currently working on these architectural projects in order to gain a better understanding of the negotiations that have taken place.

By agreeing to take part in the study, you will agree to a short interview of about one or two hours at a location convenient to you.
Risks of participating could include disclosing sensitive information. By default, I will use pseudonyms for all participants unless they specifically ask to be named or unless participants are public figures. Along with pseudonyms, I will change facts about participants, such as age, gender, and occupation.

By participating in the research, those interviewed will be aiding a project that is trying to understand how architecture may influence peace building in post-conflict societies. If desired, participants can receive a final copy of the written report.

You may withdraw your data from the project at any time up until it is transcribed for use in the final dissertation, which will be written in 2017.

Recorded interviews will be transcribed (written up) and the tape will then be wiped clear.

If you decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form.

Please discuss the information above with others if you wish or ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.

It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not, choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. If you do decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.

All data will be collected and stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998.

Informed Consent Form for Participants

Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and/or listened to an explanation about the research.

Title of Project: Sarajevo’s Post-Conflict Urban Environment: Interventions in the Urban Landscape and Peace Building in a Plural Society

This study has been approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee (Project ID Number): 3853/002

Thank you for your interest in taking part in this research. Before you agree to take part, the person organising
the research must explain the project to you.

If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you to decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any time.

Participant’s Statement

I

• have read the notes written above and the Information Sheet, and understand what the study involves.
• understand that if I decide at any time that I no longer wish to take part in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and withdraw immediately.
• consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study.
• understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998.
• agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to take part in this study.
• I understand that my participation will be taped/video recorded and I consent to use of this material as part of the project.

Signed: ____________________________ Date: ____________________________