UCL Discovery
UCL home » Library Services » Electronic resources » UCL Discovery

Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like CEOS? Substitution Between Incentives and Resources Among School Administrators in China

Luo, R; Miller, G; Rozelle, S; Sylvia, S; Vera-Hernández, M; (2020) Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like CEOS? Substitution Between Incentives and Resources Among School Administrators in China. Journal of the European Economic Association , 18 (1) pp. 165-201. 10.1093/jeea/jvy047. Green open access

[thumbnail of Luo_jvy047.pdf]
Preview
Text
Luo_jvy047.pdf - Published version

Download (1MB) | Preview

Abstract

Unlike performance incentives for private sector managers, little is known about performance incentives for managers in public sector bureaucracies. Through a randomized trial in rural China, we study performance incentives rewarding school administrators for reducing student anemia—as well as complementarity between incentives and orthogonally assigned discretionary resources. Large (but not small) incentives and unrestricted grants both reduced anemia, but incentives were more cost-effective. Although unrestricted grants and small incentives do not interact, grants fully crowd-out the effect of larger incentives. Our findings suggest that performance incentives can be effective in bureaucratic environments, but they are not complementary to discretionary resources.

Type: Article
Title: Can Bureaucrats Really Be Paid Like CEOS? Substitution Between Incentives and Resources Among School Administrators in China
Open access status: An open access version is available from UCL Discovery
DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvy047
Publisher version: https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvy047
Language: English
Additional information: © The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of European Economic Association. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Keywords: Performance Pay, Public Service Delivery, Managerial Incentives, Nutrition Programs, China
UCL classification: UCL
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS
UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of S&HS > Dept of Economics
URI: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10053150
Downloads since deposit
73Downloads
Download activity - last month
Download activity - last 12 months
Downloads by country - last 12 months

Archive Staff Only

View Item View Item