Cagnoli Fiecconi, E;
(2018)
Aristotle on the Structure of Akratic Action.
Phronesis
, 63
(3)
pp. 229-256.
10.1163/15685284-12341350.
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Abstract
I argue that, for Aristotle, akratic actions are against one’s general commitment to act in accordance with one’s correct conception of one’s ends overall. Only some akratic actions are also against one’s correct decision to perform a particular action. This thesis explains Aristotle’s views on impetuous akrasia, weak akrasia, stubborn opinionated action and inverse akrasia. In addition, it sheds light on Aristotle’s account of practical rationality. Rational actions are coherent primarily with one’s commitments to one’s conception of the good and only secondarily with one’s decisions to perform a particular action.
Type: | Article |
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Title: | Aristotle on the Structure of Akratic Action |
Open access status: | An open access version is available from UCL Discovery |
DOI: | 10.1163/15685284-12341350 |
Language: | English |
Additional information: | This version is the author accepted manuscript. For information on re-use, please refer to the publisher’s terms and conditions. |
Keywords: | Prohairesis; practical rationality; ends; Aristotle; akrasia |
UCL classification: | UCL UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities UCL > Provost and Vice Provost Offices > UCL SLASH > Faculty of Arts and Humanities > Dept of Greek and Latin |
URI: | https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10049433 |
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