In *The Aftermath of Feminism*, Angela McRobbie (2009) defines postfeminism as the *simultaneous* rejection of feminism by critics who argued it was outmoded because it aggravated for an irrelevant political issue (women’s equality), and the commodification of feminism through forms of faux-feminism or a ‘postfeminist masquerade’ that appropriated feminist rhetoric to sell products. Rosalind Gill’s (2007) conceptualisation of a “postfeminist sensibility” illustrated by the co-optation of feminism through contemporary advertising and other media, demonstrated this dynamic of the market-harnessing feminism. Gill and colleagues have shown how faux feminism and commodity feminism can work in many diverse forms; from aid campaigns where Western women and girls are inculcated to save women and girls in the ‘third world’ from their less empowered forms of femininities (Koffman and Gill 2011), to ‘Love Your Body’ discourses that co-opt fat activism and body positivy in the service of expanding capitalist markets to ever wider nets of consumers (Gill and Elias 2014). Thus, postfeminist media culture has been deemed to be a space where feminism is *either vehemently rejected, or it is a form of cultural appropriation* that subverts genuine feminist coalition, solidarity and politics.

However, recent scholarship suggests that the analytical lens offered by postfeminism may no longer be as useful as it once was. Catherine Driscoll (2016) maintains that postfeminism is a totalizing framework that invokes a temporal frame of before and after
feminism that is reductive but also Eurocentric, giving it limited purchase in global contexts. Indeed, some debates about postfeminism seem oblivious to their partiality and location, and fail to engage with an intersectional view of media culture and power relations, falling into a form of neo-colonial feminism (Butler, 2013; see also Moorti, this volume). In this chapter, we continue to be troubled by our own and other feminist media studies’ scholars reliance on postfeminism as a concept that describes contemporary media culture when we are faced with ever more visible forms of popular feminisms (Retallack et al. 2016).

Our chapter asks whether we are instead, in a period characterised by increasingly intense confrontations between feminists and anti-feminists, and between varying forms of feminisms, which indicates renewed political struggle and debate? Have we perhaps moved beyond postfeminism into a post-post-feminist moment (see Gill 2016) or are we in a fourth wave of feminism (Munroe 2013)? We need only look at the growth of anti-feminism evident through the spread of Men’s Rights Activists to see the intensification of vehement anti-feminism, particularly evident in the context of social media technologies and innovative participatory communities (Ging, 2017). Yet at the same time we see enormous representation of feminist discussion on social media that defend feminism, and reject and mock anti-feminist groups and sentiment. Whist we do not wish to reject the idea of postfeminism entirely, given it was developed to analyse mainstream media and corporate appropriations of feminism as part of a dominant media “sensibility” (Gill 2007); we suggest we need to be careful about how we understand the limitations of postfeminism for explaining feminism in a social media landscape post-2010 that is markedly different from the media environment of the mid-late 2000s when much of the initial writing on postfeminism was first published. In other words, we may ask how everyday users who self-define as feminists are promoting and proliferating feminisms in multiple and complex ways across digital cultures.
In this chapter we consider how social media platforms have produced new spaces for debates over feminism. The undeniable mass uptake of feminism via social media shows us that self-identified feminists are fighting against anti-feminism in ways that enable mass participatory audiences via platforms such as Twitter. In particular, we explore how social media feminist humour and irony is used as rhetorical and debating strategies to challenge problematic arguments against or about feminists by re-staging anti-feminist claims as absurd, ridiculous and illogical. We argue that humorous posts play a central role in increasing feminist audiences and mobilising feminist connectivity (Paparachissi 2012), collectivity, and solidarity.

To demonstrate this, we explore three different manifestations of social media feminist humour that challenge rejections of feminism or anti-feminism. First, we look at the hugely popular Twitter account @NoToFeminism, which posts witty rejoinders to anti-feminist discourses, and was created specifically to parody the #womenagainstfeminism movement (see Cohn, this volume), and has amassed a large following and popularity beyond social media into the mainstream publishing market. Next, we examine the Twitter hashtag #FeministsAreUgly, interrogating how feminists have intervened into the sexist logic that women are feminists because they are sexually undesirable to men. We explore how hashtags can be co-opted in ways that mutate far outside their original aims, given the hashtag became a space that reinforced Eurocentric, (hetero)normative beauty norms its founders intended it to interrogate. Finally, we explore “misandry” posts which ironically present female superiority in an attempt to parody anti-feminist claims that feminists are man-hating. This tongue in cheek action can be considered a way of mocking wilful misunderstandings of feminism. We also consider whether some of the memes celebrate violence against men in gender binary and essentialising ways. Overall we argue that social media affordances offer women opportunities to engage with and defend feminism in novel and exciting ways that
complicates claims that our media culture is overwhelmingly postfeminist and that we are living in a moment that marginalizes sustained feminist political dialogue and critique.

**Fourth wave digital ‘call out’ culture**

Since 2005, both popular and academic writers have argued that we are in a new wave of feminism (Peay 2005; Baumgardner 2011; Cochrane 2013). This “fourth wave” era is characterised by new media technologies, where digital tools are allowing women to build a resilient, popular, reactive movement online. Ruth Phillips and Viviene Cree (2014, p. 930) suggest that “we are currently witnessing a resurgence of interest in feminism across the world,” with their claim that we are experiencing a “fourth wave in the global North that has its birthplace primarily on the Internet.” This fourth wave of feminist engagement has been critiqued by those who argue that increased usage of the Internet and new digital media affordances such as social media is not enough to determine a new era of political activism. Nonetheless, it is increasingly evident that the Internet has enabled the creation of a global community of feminists who are challenging misogyny and sexism in new and innovative ways.

It is arguably the immediacy and connectivity of the internet which has enabled this shift from “third-wave” to “fourth-wave” feminism. Social media sites allow users to interact and create spaces for discussion and what has led to a “call-out” culture, in which problematic behaviour such as misogyny can be identified, “called out” and challenged. This culture is indicative of the continuing influence of the third wave, with its focus on micro-politics and challenging sexism and misogyny insofar as they appear in everyday rhetoric, advertising, film, television and literature and the media (Munro 2013; Wrye 2009). Feminists are turning to social media sites to make visible marginalised voices and bodies, either through amplifying the stories of others or through drawing attention to their own
experiences, which has opened up significant spaces for resistance to hegemonic femininities. Indeed, social media sites are so integral to the idea of a new era of feminism that research has positioned them as the birthplace of the fourth wave (Solomon 2009). Jennifer Baumgardner (2011) suggests that movements such as riot grrrl were innovations of the third wave, but the fourth wavers introduced the use of blogs, Twitter campaigns and online media with names like *Jezebel* and *Feministing* to feminist discourse.

Here we aim to highlight how feminism takes shape and flight through the connective tissues of social media. Feminist activism is asserting itself in new ways via technology and various social media platforms that make it accessible especially for younger generations (see Keller 2015). We see increasing evidence of a desire to tackle the feminist backlash, to seek an equality that demobilises the power of one gender over another, and to shame sexist and violent behaviour wherever it is found (see also Cochrane 2013). What is also significant, however, is how these battles over feminism also provide space for discussing and debating differences between feminisms and debates over inclusive or “intersectional” forms of feminism, versus feminisms that are overly simplistic, reproducing forms of ‘white’ entitlement or gender binaries that limit the political potential of these forms of feminist humour. These battles over what it means to be a feminist and what feminism is are being staged through the affective modalities of humour online. We explore how a shared sensibility is cultivated through irony and wit to expose inequality, but also how feminist humour is can be misread, transmutes, and even works in ambivalent ways to repeat the sexist, divisive logics it is seeking to challenge.

**Researching digital feminist humour**

Feminist humour attempts to expose and criticize “the bizarre value systems that have been regarded as ‘normal’ for so long that it is difficult to see how ridiculous they really are”
Social media sites provide a platform for the production and distribution of humour and offer an opportunity to question power dynamics by disrupting traditional, well-established stereotypes and therefore exposing gendered power structures. The use of humour online is relatively unexplored, despite the Internet being a microcosm of society, and providing a new terrain for the construction and dissemination of humour. Limor Shifman and Dafna Lemish (2010) conducted a content analysis of internet humour and argued that a great majority of internet humour is sexist. They, and others, suggest that gender representations are rooted in well-entrenched, historical constructions of femininity and masculinity as binary notions, as well as hierarchical oppositions (Van Zoonen 1994) and that Internet humour replicates and reproduces these hegemonic norms. Gallivan suggests that feminist humour in contrast is “humour which reveals and ridicules the absurdity of gender stereotypes and gender based inequalities” (1992, 373).

Our interest in social media feminist humour emerged from a research project on digital feminist activism and responses to rape culture (see Keller et al 2016). Whilst researching how women were fighting back against the legitimation of sexual violence in rape culture we became increasingly interested in their uses of humour. We took inspiration from Carrie Rentschler’s (2015) exploration of the Twitter hashtag #SafetyTipsForWomen, which analysed the humorous way in which women were rejecting the victim blaming focus of many rape prevention campaigns. The #SafetyTipsForWomen hashtag worked by shifting attention from the tired trope of women “staying safe” by tweeting nonsensical advice, such as “remove your vagina” or “consider not knowing any men.” Tweets from the hashtag were retweeted and widely shared via other platforms, due to how they satirically rebutted the traditional anti rape rhetoric so commonly doled out to women and approached the issue in an accessible, easily consumable manner.
Considering the enormous affective power of humour to connect and mobilize people to engage in a critique of rape culture (Thrift, 2015) we began exploring further examples of ‘hashtag feminism (Berrige and Portwood-Spacer, 2015) that used humour and irony to deflate anti-feminism. We adopted a snowball sampling method to explore hashtags that were calling out anti-feminism, and we also found evidence of links to other media content such as Tumblr posts and memes as part of the multi-platform inter-textual web of social media. Rentschalar and Thrift have further considered the use of humourous memes as a form of digital feminist ‘warfare’ in the network given memes’ ability to combine visual and textual references to create inside jokes (see also Kanai, 2017).

Snowball methods are part of “cyber-ethnography” (Ashford 2009) where content connects and leads virally to further content (Browne 2005). To keep our search bounded we decided on several “exemplars” of feminist humour that tell us something about current struggles over the status of feminism. Emma Jane (2016) suggests that this type of selective mapping is part of an emerging field of internet “histiography” and critical histories of the present. We agree that this mapping is valuable in developing a case study approach where we purposefully selected posts that we felt were representative of the account, hashtag, or site in terms of content and structure, while also considering how the digital affordance of the platform enabled different types of interaction.

What is unique to our aim in this chapter is to demonstrate how feminist humour is invoked to critique anti-feminism. Feminist humour is mobilised as a ‘weapon’ to fight back against the side-lining of feminism as irrelevant, outmoded, or desperate (Rentschlar and Thrift, 2015). We consider how feminist humour may take on many forms; satirical, parody and irony as feminists find new ways to engage with sexism and anti-feminist narratives online. We are reluctant to ascribe a specific form of humour to each campaign through fear of essentialising and trivialising the complex ways in which each works to trouble and resist antifeminist
rhetoric but we do discuss how the final example – misandry memes – can be interpreted as veering between humour and anger at times, and how this presents an interesting challenge to researchers when exploring if it condones violence or is merely an effective visual outlet for legitimate anger.

**Fighting Anti-Feminism: @NoToFeminism**

Perhaps one of the biggest personal disappointments we have faced in researching this topic is confronting the plethora of women led, anti-feminist backlashes seen widely on Twitter and other social media platforms (see Cohn, this volume). Whilst anti-feminist rhetoric has existed long before social media sites amplified the discord (Steuter 1992), the platforms give new ways for anti-feminist narratives to be heard. Often tied to a positioning of social media sites as risky for women, this anti-feminist backlash can manifest as trolling, e-bile (Jane 2012, 2014), doxxing (Quodling 2015) and other forms of online harassment.

The women against feminism movement often embodies postfeminist articulations of individualism, arguing that women have achieved equality and that feminism is outdated. Our first example, the @NoToFeminism account on Twitter works to parody anti-feminist ideas and was created in an attempt to mock the #womenagainstfeminism hashtag that circulated widely in 2014. Initially anonymous, the @NoToFeminism account uses an avatar of a white, able bodied woman to signify the lack of diversity it perceived within the #womenagainstfeminism movement (Figure 1). The account was recently attributed to Bec Shaw, a queer journalist and comedian, who was interviewed by I-D magazine in 2016 with the headline “@notofeminism's bec shaw is the internet’s favourite feminist troll. Meet the writer taking on the patriarchy, one ridiculous internet statement at a time.” The account is now so popular that a book is being published of the tweets. Whilst a book negates the participatory power of social media responsiveness, it offers an opportunity to spread awareness of this type of campaign beyond Twitter and provides financial compensation to
Shaw. It also demonstrates the transcendence of online/offline boundaries in interpreting and internalising this kind of humour and thinking, showing an impact beyond the immediacy and transience of social media forms of feminism.

Insert Figure 1

The @notofeminism account produces content that refutes the claims that feminism is no longer needed by humorously drawing attention to instances of sexism and racism. This works to highlight how inequality is still an issue in society, and how feminism needs to be inclusive as it moves forward in order to challenge injustice, yet utilises a playful manner to make the content witty, ironic and clever, encouraging a buy-in to the message. What is interesting is that the account appears to embrace what we may call an implicit ‘intersectional’ approach dominant in self-proclaimed fourth wave feminism (Munroe 2013) which critiques feminism operating from positions of privilege that fail to consider intersecting forces such as race, ability or sexuality on how an individual experiences and moves through society. Tweets such as “why didn’t she turn into a white man?” following the abusive, racialized harassment that actress Leslie Jones faced on Twitter manages to incorporate the need for feminism to work to tackle racial inequality whilst identifying how white men are the most privileged in society (Figure 2). In addition, a tweet suggesting that men who are white, rich, good at sports etc. are able to avoid punishment for sexual crimes sheds light on the very real issues within the justice system that enable and uphold male privilege such as low conviction and sentencing rates for instances of domestic and sexual violence (Figure 3).
The account uses humour to introduce intersectional feminist issues such as racialized power dynamics, male dominance of public spaces, and political policies that aim to limit access to abortion or birth control. Tweets such as “I don't need feminism because women are well represented on tv and in movies there is thin and white, thin and more white, thin and whitest” or “I don’t need feminism I love seeing lively debate online!!!! between one woman on twitter & hundreds of men threatening to rape and kill her” are important examples of the way the site parodies anti-feminist articulations by drawing attention to social inequalities such as the lack of diversity in media and the prevalence of online abuse levied at women. By making the tweets humorous they encourage critical thinking by inviting audiences to be part of a complex set of understandings about power and privilege. They also spread an intersectional feminist sensibility since they become part of the collective consciousness associated with the account and others like it as they get retweeted and liked.

Some of the tweets deliberately misspell words including misspellings of feminism, in an attempt, we suggest, to parody the anger and haste with which trolls may type online, so incensed and enraged that there is no time to spellcheck. Another reading of this mocking, however, could be of classism as it is perhaps suggesting that the angry individuals who spout these anti-feminist views are illiterate and uneducated. Again it creates insider/outsider dynamics of being part of a clever, intersectional feminist sensibility that has the power to ‘correctly’ read the tweets. Indeed, the Internet has produced new ways of communicating (Crystal 2001), from emojis, to shorthand styles which are often employed by specific
communities to demonstrate collective thinking or identity which both include insiders and exclude those not considered part of the group (McLeese 2015; Danesi 2016).

The account draws attention to instances of systematic inequality and injustice through humour rather than via anger, frustration, or the sadness characteristic of being a “victim” of sexism. In doing so it offers participants new, potentially empowering, ways to understand and engage with topics like the wage gap and sexual violence. We find a potentially therapeutic element to this practice or form of self-care, which deserves further academic attention, perhaps through work that could explore the affective experience of using humour to deal with social injustices.

**Debating Dominant Beauty Ideals: #FeministsAreUgly**

The #FeministsAreUgly hashtag was initially created in 2014 by two American feminists of colour, @cheuya and @LilyBoulourian, who wanted to create a space where people of colour could speak back to cultural privilege and dominant beauty norms, and challenge perceptions of what counts as attractive (Figure 4).

Christine Yang and Lily Boulourian started #feministsareugly as a way to trouble those “absolutely silly and completely unattainable” standards under which “every single woman is [considered] ugly, especially if you’re a woman of colour,” Boulourian told online news site, (Dickson, 2014). She continued, “I wanted to find a way to change the narrative on that and
thought I could help inspire others to reclaim that narrative and define for ourselves what ‘beautiful’ or ‘ugly’ mean.”

Despite the hashtag being created to satirise the notion that feminists are unattractive and to provide a space for people of colour to trouble dominant beauty norms, it changed shape in 2015 following a Twitter software update that saw headlines, hashtags and images from the site’s users pulled and collated on its homepage. #feministsareugly was featured on the Twitter homepage and gained considerable attention when it was falsely attributed as being developed by misogynists and MRAs. With its resurgence, the hashtag became a space for feminists to upload and share selfies, to validate each other’s experiences with trolls and to collectively convene to counter anti-feminist attacks. Yet some of the uses of the hashtag ran counter to the explicitly politicized critique the founders used to reject heteropatriarchal and white beauty norms. Instead the hashtag became a way of talking back to trolls who relied on e-bile (Jane 2012) in the form of hurtful, appearance-related judgments which fall back on narrow beauty norms and sexual shaming. In doing so, posters sometimes reinforced problematic Eurocentric feminine beauty norms (Figure 5).

Insert Figure 6

Many of the posters using the hashtag were outraged at the idea they would be considered unattractive and they protest and defend themselves by using the hashtag to share selfies, affirmations of “self-love,” and picture of attractive celebrity feminists. In each case, however, the women defend their own attractiveness without directly critiquing the hegemonic beauty norms through which these judgements are actually being made. Founder, @LilyBoulourian responded by tweeting, “Proximity to whiteness means safety, upward mobility, opportunity, etc., but proximity also plays a major factor in who is deemed
beautiful.” She continues, “If white women were here for abolishing them, they’d be long gone. But they’re still here because those standards still benefit whiteness.”

An intersectional view helps us to understand white-centric globalised beauty ideals which are also racialized, culture specific and classed in varying contexts (Sastre, 2014). The speed with which users were quick to upload images of globally recognized white feminist celebrities such as Emma Watson to refute suggestions that feminists are ugly demonstrates the validity of Boulourian’s arguments (Figure 6). Widespread circulation of images of Watson rather than non-celebrity selfies indicates the hashtag aligning with commodified feminism and a reproductive logic rather than the possibility for disruption of the dominant postfeminist media economy theorized by Rosalind Gill (2007).

We have chosen to highlight tweets featuring Emma Watson as particularly interesting because individuals have chosen to draw attention to a normatively attractive celebrity rather than post selfies which could potentially disrupt normative beauty conventions (see Lawrence 2016). The degree to which writings on postfeminism remain a useful lens with which to critique celebrity appropriations of feminism is perhaps evident here as Watson could be seen as a paradoxical postfeminist figure who both embodies commercial beauty ideals but presents an edgy confident side by proclaiming herself to be a feminist. Here, we see the slide of feminism into corporate sell-ability. Indeed Watson was chosen to be the face of *Elle Magazine*’s “rebranding of feminism” in 2014 (Keller and Ringrose 2015). But the version of feminism Watson sells (both on magazine covers and to the UN Assembly) has been called into question as a problematic form of celebrity feminism because it positions itself as non-threatening and appealing to men. Watson’s #HeForShe campaigning is about constructing a form of palatable feminism that placates men, assuring
them women present no threat, rather than offering hardline challenges that would highlight the enormous scale of structural change needed to equalize gendered (racialized and classed) power relations.

Whilst images of non-white celebrities were included, focus was concentrated on and limited to mixed race stars such as Beyonce, Nicki Minaj and Rihanna, all of whom may be racially mobile as they perform whitened forms of blackness (Sastre, 2014). The repeated celebrity feminist postings under the hashtag thus shows us not only corporate appropriation of feminist discourse, but how widespread women’s own buy-in to this message is, again affirming the utility of Gill’s concept of a dominant “postfeminist sensibility” and McRobbie’s “postfeminist masquerade” the idea that identifying as a feminist is only acceptable if you also align with dominant hegemonic white feminine beauty norms. Thus, this viral uptake of the hashtag worked in the reverse of the creator’s intentions, re-valuing Eurocentric norms as the epitome of beauty.

We could critique the hashtag in a number of ways; it is body centric and reduces users to their appearance; it is exclusive and denies access to people who are already maligned in mainstream depictions of beauty; it drew a lot of negative attention from trolls who systematically trawled the hashtag sending hostile comments to users; it misinterpreted the original aims, missing the irony of the hashtag originators by positioning men’s opinions on women’s beauty as paramount. Nonetheless, it is important to consider the process of viral spread and mutation of the hashtag and ensuing debates that took place through the #FeministsAreUgly hashtag, which is part of a larger movement that is changing the normative relations of power (such as racialized hierarchies of feminine beauty or sexiness) through humour - its playful and satirical functions as well as misinterpretation are part of a wider, complex, shifting and sometimes ambivalent assemblage of social media feminist humour.
Mocking Misandry

As noted, feminism has long been associated with man-hating and anger (Scharff 2010; Moi 2006) and the introduction of social media has heightened the visibility of feminist anger towards men. As a result of social media sites providing a platform for women to share their experiences of sexism and sexual violence and to call out instances of both, feminists have been accused of promoting “misandry.” Defined as the hatred of men, the term is utilised particularly by some MRAs who use the label to construct all feminist resistance as “man hating.” Rachel Schmitz and Emily Kazyak suggest that, “The growth and dissemination of MRA ideology is highly dependent on vast social networks of men connecting with other men” (2016, 1). Debbie Ging (2017) has termed these networks the “manosphere,” offering a complex mapping of the online collection of various MRA websites which promote extreme, misogynistic viewpoints that blame women, particularly feminists, for the downfall of society.

The upsurge of the use of the word “misandry” by the MRAs has led to responses from feminists, who have ironically embraced the term (Figure 7). There is limited academic research into pro-misandry discourses as an online feminist tool against misogyny and sexism, yet popular commentators suggest it is a way of “sticking a tongue out a school yard bully” (Summers 2015) and protesting the fact that white men still hold the majority of political, social and economic power in society (Valenti 2015). In this section, we will attempt to theorize ironic misandry comedy as a way of allowing women the space and tools necessary to be angry, while also questioning the potential limitations of some of these approaches.

Popular writer, Amanda Hess suggests that, “ironic misandry is more than just a sarcastic retort to the haters; it’s an in-joke that like-minded feminists tell even when their critics aren’t
looking, as a way to build solidarity within the group” (Hess 2014). Tweets like figure 8 draw on this idea.

Insert Figure 9

These tweets work to decenter male comfort and refute notions of women being accommodating and passive by simply tolerating instances of sexism. They also aim to draw attention to how patriarchy and sexism harms men as well as women. For example, the tweet above tells men to blame misogyny instead of misandry for them seeing ballet as off limits to themselves. Often the gender binaries placed on toys, activities, careers, and subject choices are the result of long held gendered norms being internalised and positioned as natural, and tweets such as telling men to blame misogyny for ballet being considered a feminine pastime are important in that they aim to destabilise these norms by drawing attention to their absurdity.

The purpose of some of these misandry tweets is to highlight structural and systematic misogyny by pointing out how the term is often deployed when women create discussion or collectively share negative experiences of sexism. They are also intent on suggesting that misogyny is a structural and systematic form of discrimination against women, whereas misandry does not have the same power, it is not “real” in the same ways. Therefore, it attempts to deflate the claim that feminism is about hating men rather than challenging inequality.

Going beyond textual hashtags or images on Twitter, the development of misandry memes on Tumblr combines visual images with textual slogans to create symbols of feminist humour (Figure 9). Carrie Rentschler (2015) and Samantha Thrift (2014) both argue that the construction, use and distribution of memes depict new forms of feminist communication and open up avenues of community and conscious raising. Indeed, they suggest feminists are
“deploying humour as a weapon of cultural critique” which create new models of political agency for doing feminism in the network (Thrift and Rentschler 2015: 331). Similarly, Akane Kanai (2016: 2) explores the gendered, raced, and classed nature of meme culture in constructing teen feminine subcultures, exploring how “shared literacies” can be developed through the digital relationships to social media artifacts. She argues memes can be circulated and repeated and create new forms of “spectorial girlfriendship.” Sarah Connelly (2015, 24) has researched Tumblr communities that have cultivated knowledge of ‘misandry’ noting the phenomenon emerged as a satirical response to notions that feminists must be man haters and goes on to claim that “the Tumblr feminist community…participates in an ironic exaggeration of those stereotypes.” A meme can reference a shared feminist literacy without the poster having to articulate or spell out the views themselves. Memes that originate on Tumblr can also migrate to Twitter or other social media platforms showing inter-platform contagion. Thus misandry memes present new mimetic and viral communicative tools for women to use online to express their anger and frustration at male dominance.

Memes that jokingly claim that “men are temporary; cats are forever” open up space rejecting women’s reliance on men for value and esteem, and offer new ways of celebrating objects coded as feminine and cute (cats.)

The memes from the Tumblr site ‘Misandry Mermaid’ such as “bathing in male tears” illustrate the mocking of the implication that feminism harms or upsets men. These memes also play with long held notions of subservience and passivity to male sexual fantasies (the mythology of mermaids). Women may choose to visibly engage with misandry via
circulating memes such as these to perform exaggerated displays of disregard for men’s feelings. As per Kanai’s “spectatorial girlfriendship” users can “bond” over shared antagonism towards male supremacy, playing into the man-hating stereotype. Jillian Horowitz (2013) writing about a misandric meme that says women should have eyeliner wings “so sharp they can kill a man” argues that “all of these sites of misandry trade on the bizarre assumption that women who hate men are necessarily unfeminine; thus, the consciously cartoonish expressions of femininity (like a mermaid bathing in male tears) function as both an in-joke and a strategic manoeuvre.” When paired with articulations of ironic violence or earnest rage “misandry” is not only emptied of the meaning ascribed to it by men’s rights activists, but simultaneously weaponizes feminist anger and the devalued trappings of femininity. It also operaes as a type of fantasy space of reversal that feminists are capable of inflicting injury and tears upon men in retribution for injustices against women.

This form of fantasy of control (Austin, 20017) is apparent again in the misandry memes (figures 12 and 13) that showcase extreme anger and violence. A (white) religious icon fights against female heterosexist rivalry and Men’s Rights Activists underscoring women’s potential for aggressive retaliation against dominant or coercive masculinity. This form of misandry meme are the most reactive, defensive and binary driven of all the tactics, pitting ‘women’ against ‘men’. As Emma Jane (2016, 12) has argued about some forms of feminist internet conflict, it is embroiled in a binary of “adversary/enemy” and “antagonism” rather than sparking room for debate, critical change and transformation. This critique is
applicable to some of these misandry memes, which re-inscribe sexual difference and essential male/female. These memes employ a logic of reversal, a space to contain feminine rage, but we wonder about the intersectional appeal of these reversals and their limited purchase to challenge male violence through the promotion of female violence. If creating a violent white goddess for feminism is funny, for whom is it humourous? When responding to “two girls fighting over a boy” or confronting an MRA troll, a misandric meme may seem an appropriate response but how useful are they if deployed in discussions of sexual violence or domestic abuse or the wage gap, which is differentiated by race, class, citizenship and other axes of structural privilege and disadvantage? Whilst women may use a meme as a tool for expressing boredom or indifference at something a man may say to them online as a way of shutting down discussion, this could arguably be demonstrative of the privilege the woman in question has; in her ability and relative safety to dismiss a man outright, in her refusal to engage with men online, and to reduce discussion to anti-male violence.

Conclusions: New Shared Digital Feminist Literacies?

In this chapter we have explored examples of how Twitter and Tumblr offer digital spaces for those who identify with various forms of feminism to connect and defend their views against anti-feminist positions through the use of humour. These new forms of feminist interaction and engagement draw on digital tools and new methods of feminist activism that were inconceivable when postfeminist media culture was initially written about. Rather than a postfeminist moment, then, we ask whether are we in a period defined by ever more extreme pro and anti-feminism hastened by the continuing spread of MRAs and the Alt-right via social media? (Ging, 2017; Marwick and Lewis, 2017). Those of us interested in contributing to theories of postfeminism need to take such questions about anti-feminism very seriously.
Our chapter has demonstrated how feminist debate and dialogue against MRA discourses is gaining strength and employing the tools of intersectional thinking to challenges anti-feminism as deluded and absurd (Gallivan, 1992). The @NoToFeminism account for example, has gathered an extensive following because it humorously explores the contradictions of denying the intersectional structural and discursive conditions that underpin sexism such as gender pay gaps or widespread violence against women. We showed why the account works as a new form of social media feminist literacy widely understood and celebrated because it is cleverly exposes the absurdity and ignorance of anti-feminist views to highlight the ‘facts’ and evidence that feminism is still needed.

We also argued discussions of postfeminism need to open up to thinking about the rising power of new forms of digital and fourth wave feminist activism for younger generations of girls and women enabling them to join into widespread online conversations critiquing idealised beauty norms, but how critical feminist discourses can easily be coopted into familiar postfeminist tropes of femininity defined through good ‘looks’, which we found in our analysis of the hashtag #FeministsAreUgly. Similarly, our exploration of the mocking humour of Tumblr misandry memes, demonstrates a shared feminist literacy (Kanai, 2016) created through the circulation of memes that humorously exaggerate man-hating. However, we argued the simplistic knee jerk violence in memes like “cut the fucker in half” accompanied by a white female religious icon operates through binary gender and white privilege in ways that fail to adequately consider which women and which men are being hailed by such memes. Whilst using humour and sarcasm to articulate female rage is a critical component for feminism (Austin 2007), we think the claims of pro-misandry violence may be limited for whom it may compel into political action given it is not attending to complex intersectional power relations in how misogyny articulates itself in the public sphere through structural sexism combined with racism and classism, as evident in examples like larger wage
gaps facing women of colour. Failing to account for the complexities of violence amongst and between women enlivened through histories of colonization and racism makes the anger in the misandry memes exclusionary and defensive rather than inclusive, potentially delimiting their appeal. What is clear, however, is that social media provides an unrivalled space for redefining, debating and defending emergent feminisms against widespread detractors and for using humour to galvanize new audiences, discussions and debates about what feminisms are at stake.

Works Cited

Ashford, Chris. 2009. Queer theory, cyber-ethnographies and researching online sex environments. Information & Communications Technology Law, 18, no. 3: 297-314

Barreca, Gina. 1991. They used to call me Snow White … but I drifted: Women's strategic use of humor. New York: Viking


Cochrane, Kira. 2013. All the rebel women: The rise of the fourth wave of feminism (Vol. 8). Guardian Books.


Danesi, Marcel. 2016. The Semiotics of Emoji: The Rise of Visual Language in the Age of the
Dickson, EJ. 2014 ‘Feminists Are Ugly’ Last modified December 11.
http://www.dailydot.com/irl/feminists-are-ugly-hashtag/


Ging, Debie. 2017. Alphas, Betas, and Incels: Theorizing the masculinities of the manosphere, Men and Masculinities , 10.1177/1097184X17706401


Jane, Emma. 2012. “‘You’re a Ugly Whorish Slut’ Understanding E-bile.” Feminist Media Studies 14, no. 4: 531–546

Jane, Emma. 2014. “‘Back to the Kitchen, Cunt: Speaking the unspeakable about online misogyny.” Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies 28 (4): 558-570.


Keller, Jessalynn and Jessica Ringrose. 2015. “‘But then feminism goes out the window!’: Exploring teenage girls’ critical response to celebrity feminism.” Celebrity Studies 6, no. 1: 132-135.


Munro, Ealasaid. 2013 "Feminism: A fourth wave?." Political insight 4, no. 2: 22-25.


Scharff, Christina. 2010 "Young women’s negotiations of heterosexual conventions: Theorizing sexuality in constructions of ‘the feminist’. " *Sociology* 44, no. 5: 827-842.


Summers, Chelsea. 2015 ‘The Year in Male Tears’ Vice.com

Thrift, Samantha. 2014 “#YesAllWomen as Feminist Meme Event.” *Feminist Media Studies* 14, no. 6: 1090–1092


Valenti, Jessica. 2015. ‘Feminists Don’t Hate Men. But It Wouldn’t Matter if We Did.’
*The Guardian.com*


**Tweets**

Campus Carrie (@CarriePotter__). ‘#INeedMisandryBecause apparently, any activity done by a group of women that doesn’t place men at the very centre qualifies as misandry.’ 1 September 2014, 3:26 a.m. Tweet

Cicely (@lllemonade). ‘#FeministsAreUgly YEAH SORRY I CAN’T HEAR U.’ 7 August 2014, 11:19 p.m. Tweet

Feminist (@itsfeminism). ‘#FeministsAreUgly uhhhh if they are ugly can i please be ugly
too.’ 6 August 2015, 12:30 a.m. Tweet.

HBIC (@thisisntjulia). ‘#FeministsAreUgly ??????? I see no ugliness, only good genes and enlightenment.’ 7 August 2014, 10:16 p.m. Tweet.