

economics studies of partner choice (Choo & Siow, 2006; Menzel, 2015). With our data we find that $m = 1.58$ for school-type homogamy, and significantly above zero ($p=0.000$). This index compares with a value of $m = 2.32$ for homogamy by education-level (graduate/non-graduate).

Since private schooling is socially exclusive, given its high price for most pupils, school-type homogamy is likely to reflect, in part, the social closure brought about by social background. To what extent, then, is the school-type of the husband associated with a woman's private school attendance *per se*, after controlling for her social class background, as implied by the hypothesis of equation (2)? To examine this question, we restrict our attention to married women and estimate four probit models, the results of which are summarised in table 2.⁸ In each the private school dummy is interacted with age groups, to allow for different effects at varying life course stages, and the table presents the average marginal effects of private school attendance on the probability of being married to a privately educated husband.

In the first column, only age group and ethnicity are controlled for, and the estimated coefficient approximately restates what was revealed in the descriptive table above, showing a large tendency for school-type homogamy. There is a 14 percentage point higher chance of being married to a private-school-educated husband for a woman who is privately educated than for a woman who is state educated.

In column 2, we also include as controls the women's social background. Compared with column (1) the estimated degree of school-type homogamy is substantially reduced by about a half. As expected, part of the preference for private school educated spouses can be attributed to the social background that usually determines private school participation. Yet even after accounting for social background, attending private school still raises the probability of being married to a privately educated husband by 7 percentage points. This is our best estimate describing school-type positive homogamy among observably similar women. However, we caution that, if interpreted as a causal effect, it could be biased if there are elements in the individuals' background not captured by parental social class and parental education, which affect

both choice of school type and the likelihood of partnering with a privately-educated husband.

The hypothesis of equation (1) is that school-type homogamy potentially derives from two elements, one being a by-product of education-level homogamy, the other being an additional direct element. The education-level element here is binary: whether or not the women obtained higher education. To what extent, then, is the homogamy just a reflection of achieving higher education? Column (3) adds to the model a dummy for women's attainment of higher education. As can be seen, while higher education in itself increases the chances of being married to a privately educated husband, private-school-educated women were still 6 percentage points more likely to be married to a man of the same school type. Thus the school-type homogamy cannot be explained by the woman's educational level and social background. We take this as indicative of a positive average value for β , reflecting the direct element of the tendency for school-type homogamy.

But is this direct element less strong, as expected, among those who do go on to higher education, than among those who leave education at the secondary stage? Column (4) introduces an interaction term between higher education and private schooling. Among those who do not proceed to higher education, the chances of being married to a privately educated husband are 11 percentage points higher for privately educated women, as compared with state-educated women. Among those who do proceed to higher education, however, the chances are not significantly associated with private school status. Thus, while educational homogamy is a route through which school-type homogamy takes place (private schools raise entry to higher education, which itself raises the probability of school-type homogamy), nevertheless within that higher level of education school-type homogamy is attenuated, as expected, reflecting the wider social and cultural environment of university life and beyond. In this sense, the experience of higher education involves a reduction of social boundaries.

Females' private schooling and their husband's earnings

Given that there is education-level homogamy, that private schools in Britain are of high quality as

measured by their pupils' educational achievements, and that in addition there is school-type homogamy in Britain, do privately-educated married women benefit from a premium on their husbands' earnings over those of state-educated women, as hypothesised in equation (4)?

From this point on, we are able to address our key questions using both sets of data. Using BHPS-UKHLS, table 3a shows the descriptive pattern of husbands' real gross monthly earnings, according to the school-types of each partner. As shown in the final column, women's private school attendance is

associated with higher-earning husbands. The spouse of the average state-educated married women earned around £2,794 per month compared to £3,686 among women who attended private school – a raw premium of 32%. It is also of note that, among married women who attended private school, those in homogamous unions had on average husbands with the greatest gross monthly labour income (£3,834). Using BCS, table 3b shows that, at age 42, the raw weekly husband's earnings gap by school type was substantially higher at 62%.

Table 2: School-Type Homogamy: Probably of marriage to a privately educated spouse

Pooled BHPS-UKHLS 1991-2015. Average marginal effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Private School	0.140*** (0.031)	0.0737** (0.024)	0.0618** (0.023)	
Higher Education			0.0502** (0.017)	0.0579** (0.019)
Private School (within graduates)				-0.00613 (0.044)
Private School (within non-graduates)				0.107** (0.036)
Demographics (R)	X	X	X	X
Social Background (R)		X	X	X
N	42,957	42,957	42,957	42,957

Notes: Pooled probit estimator using the cross-sectional survey weights with robust standard errors in the unbalanced panel of married women aged 24–59 years. Dependent variable is 1 if partner has attended a private secondary school and zero otherwise. All models include a set of period dummies and a London dummy to account for differences across time and regions. Demographics comprise age-groups and ethnicity; social background is captured by highest parental socio-economic group and level of educational attainment. Women's highest level of educational achievement is captured by an indicator for higher tertiary educational attainment. Private school effect averaged over age-groups. Standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3a: Husbands' real gross monthly earnings among married women in GBP (CPI 2015=100)

Pooled BHPS-UKHLS 1991-2015, N=29,103

Women's school type	Married Partner's school type		Mean
	Private	State	
Private	3,833.85	3,621.02	3,685.52
State	3,314.53	2,763.44	2,794.19
Mean	3,408.26	2,806.07	2,844.68

Table 3b: Husbands' weekly earnings among married women in GBP

BCS-70, 2012, N=2,036

Women's school type	Mean spousal earnings
Private	930.16
State	575.75
Mean	635.22

We address the questions formally in tables 4a and 4b. Our basic estimating model operationalises equation (3) by treating private school status as a 0/1 dummy categorical variable (τ_w):

$$Y_h = a_0 + a_1\tau_w + a_2 \sum_l \phi^l Z_w^l + \varepsilon_h, \text{ with } E(\varepsilon_h) = 0 \quad (4)$$

The Z_w^l are observables capturing demographic characteristics (age, ethnicity, region), social class background, prior cognitive skills (BCS only), and birth characteristics (BCS only), which could be correlated with husbands' labour market outcomes as well as with women's own school-type, as described above. The first model (in both 4a and 4b) gives the estimates for a_1 with just the demographic characteristics included. Then the second model shows our core estimates of equation (4), including the whole range of other controls, giving the associations of husbands' earnings with women's school-type for observably similar women. We also include a third model that adds in indicators of the husband's social class, school type and education achievement, in order to see whether the private school premium we are investigating can be crudely accounted for by those characteristics.

To investigate outcomes other than just the mean linear effect on hourly earnings, we also investigate whether there are associations with husbands' earnings being in the top decile of the distribution, as well as the opposite association with husbands' earnings being in the bottom half of the distribution (thereby helping to protect against downward social mobility). We also examine the association of women's private education with their

husband's attainment of a high occupation status (a professional or managerial job).

Estimator choice depends on the scale of the dependent variable and follows standard practices. For binary outcomes we employ a probit estimator. In all models shown, the tables report average marginal effects (AME). Since private school attendance is a time-constant individual characteristic in BHPS-UKHLS, we rely on cross-sectional estimators. To account for the repeated observations within individuals over time in the panel, potential heteroscedasticity, and changes in composition due to sample attrition, we use the supplied cross-section survey weights and a robust variance-covariance matrix in the estimations. With the BCS data, given that multiple imputation has been used for some variables, as recommended by Carpenter and Kenward (2013) we present estimates derived from 20 alternative imputation outcomes, using the Stata multiple estimation routines, with robust standard errors.

In this set-up there are inevitable limitations and caveats that would have to be borne in mind if the estimates were to be interpreted as implying causal effects of private schooling and if they were to be used to compute women's choice-relevant investment returns from private schooling via marriage. The main complication arises from the two-sided nature of the matching processes. In our data, we are able to observe neither all the feasible matching alternatives nor all the relevant factors that might inform the marriage decision. Thus unobservables on both sides may confound the estimates if they are related to the participation in

private secondary education. We return to these caveats in the concluding discussion below.

Column (1) shows a substantial association with husbands' outcomes after controlling just for demographic characteristics. Married women who had attended private schools were matched with men who were considerably more successful in the labour market than the husbands of state-school educated women. In the case of the BHPS-UKHLS data, the husbands of these women received on average 26.0% ($=\exp(0.231)-1$) higher hourly earnings. In the case of the BCS, the privately educated age-42 cohort members' husbands received 37.9% ($=\exp(0.327)-1$) higher weekly earnings. With both data sets, the husbands of the privately educated women were significantly more likely to be in the top ($\geq 90\%$) earnings decile, more likely to work in high status, managerial or professional occupations, and less likely to earn incomes below the median.

Some of these effects may be attributable in part to respondents' social background. Private-school-educated women are more likely to come from well-off families (Dearden et al., 2011), increasing the opportunity to access marriage networks of potential high earners. Hence we condition on respondents' social background, to give the estimates from equation (5). While the controls reduce the estimates substantially – see the average marginal effects in column (2) compared with those in column (1) – the remaining effects are still quantitatively significant. The conditional husbands' pay premium is 15% for hourly earnings in the BHPS-UKHLS, and 20% in BCS.

Similarly, the husbands of privately educated women remained more likely to be situated in the top earnings decile and to work in high-status occupations. Spouses of privately educated women were 10 percentage points more likely to be in the top pay decile as the husbands of state-educated women (8 points for BCS at age 42), and again 10 percentage points more likely to work in a high-status occupation (BHPS-UKHLS) though this effect is insignificant in the BCS data. In the BCS data (but not with the BHPS-UKHLS) there is also a weakly statistically significant protective effect of private school attendance against below-median earnings husbands, lowering that probability by 8 percentage points.

Column (3) in each table adds controls for husband's characteristics and respondent's post-secondary educational attainment (graduate/non-graduate). These reduce the average marginal effects considerably and in some cases the effect is not statistically significant, indicating that these characteristics mediate much of the association with husbands' outcomes. However, in two cases (top earnings for the BHPS data, log earnings for the BCS) the association remains weakly statistically significant. In these cases the estimates imply that private-educated women are matched with partners that earn more than their observed characteristics suggest on average. We conclude there are some unobserved husband characteristics associated both with their pay and with their wives' school type; in the case of the BCS this could include the husband's school-type which is unobserved.

So far our sample has excluded cohabiting but unmarried couples from the analyses. We do not have information about intra-household resource sharing in our data sets, but it could be expected that resources are shared at least partially among a substantial proportion of cohabiting, unmarried couples. For these, similar arguments about school-type homogamy and education-level homogamy apply. We therefore re-ran our analyses including all cohabiting couples, whether married or not. We found the same pattern of results with only small changes in the estimated coefficients. As a further test of robustness, we took account of differences within the state sector of education, distinguishing between grammar schools, which are academically selective schools available in a minority of regions of Britain, and all other state schools that are not permitted to select on academic merit. Including a separate dummy variable for grammar school attendance made only small differences to the estimated associations of private school attendance with subsequent marriage to a privately educated man, and with the husbands' labour market outcomes. Since a few women at the age of 24 may still have been in full-time education such as in postgraduate research programmes, we also run a robustness check with a BHPS/UKHLS sample limited to the age bracket 30–59 years. This has no effect on the estimated patterns.⁹

Table 4a: Husbands' labour market outcomes, pooled BHPS/UKHLS 1991–2015

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	(I) Log real hourly pay (log points)		
Private School	0.228*** (0.045)	0.142** (0.045)	0.0667 (0.042)
N	28,660	28,660	28,660
	(II) Real hourly earnings in 90% decile of distribution (AME)		
Private School	0.161*** (0.034)	0.0999** (0.031)	0.0548** (0.024)
N	28,961	28,961	28,961
	(III) Real hourly earnings in the bottom half of distribution (AME)		
Private School	-0.0771** (0.029)	-0.0168 (0.033)	0.0358 (0.033)
N	28,961	28,961	28,961
	(IV) High Status Occupation (AME)		
Private School	0.184*** (0.032)	0.0930** (0.034)	0.0287 (0.030)
N	35,209	35,209	35,209
Demographics (R)	X	X	X
Social Background (R)		X	X
Higher Education (R)			X
Demographic, Social Background, Higher Education (H)			X

Notes: Pooled estimations using cross-sectional survey weights and a heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust variance-covariance matrix. Unbalanced panel of married women aged 24–59 years. Dependent variables: (I) husbands' usual log real gross hourly earnings; (II) dummy if husbands' real gross hourly earnings were in 90% decile; (III) dummy if husbands' real hourly earnings were below the grand median of the hourly earnings distribution; (IV) dummy if husband holds a high status occupation (SOC1990 or SOC2000, major groups 1&2). Including a set of period dummies for survey period and region of residence. For social background and education, see notes to table 2. Model 3 adds a range of husbands' observed characteristics (5-year age dummies, ethnicity, parental socio-economic group, parental level of education, private school attendance, and tertiary attainment). Standard errors in parentheses. Private school effect averaged over age-groups. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4b: Husbands' labour market outcomes, BCS-70, age 42

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	(I) Log weekly earnings		
Private School	0.327*** (0.068)	0.184** (0.073)	0.125* (0.069)
N	2,028	2,028	2,028
	(II) Weekly earnings in 90% Decile. AME		
Private School	0.172*** (0.039)	0.0728** (0.036)	0.0423 (0.033)
N	2,028	2,028	2,028
	(III) Weekly earnings below the median. AME		
Private School	-0.137*** (0.035)	-0.0790* (0.043)	-0.0523 (0.045)
N	2,028	2,028	2,028
	(IV) High Status Occupation. AME		
Private School	0.102** (0.032)	0.0200 (0.027)	-0.0206 (0.022)
N	2,509	2,509	2,509
Demographics	X	X	X
Childhood cognitive attainment, social background (R)		X	X
Higher education (R)			X
Partner's age, level of education (H)			X

Notes: Mean differences in spousal labour market outcomes by female private school attendance. (I) Effect on log weekly earnings. (II)/ (III) differences in the likelihood of spousal income in the 90th percentile/ below the median. Cut-points derived from BCS. (IV) female private school effects on likelihood to match with spouse in higher managerial and professional occupations (based on NS-SEC groupings). Column (1) reports differences adjusted by demographic characteristics (ethnicity, region of residence). Column (2) adds controls for socio-economic background during childhood (social class at birth, parental educational attainment, housing tenure, persons per room ratio, number of days read to in reference week, free school meal receipt, family income band), information on early cognitive developments at age 5 and 10, and controls for mother's age at birth, birth order, weight at birth and whether ever breast-fed). To address missingness, estimations based on multiple imputations. Standard errors in parentheses * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.001$

Conclusion

In this paper we have presented evidence that there is a substantive degree of school-type homogamy in Britain, whereby a privately educated woman, compared with a state-educated woman with otherwise similar social background, is 7 percentage points more likely to marry a privately educated man. Our explanation is that homogamy by school-type partly reflects education-level homogamy, owing to the high quality of private schooling in Britain, but that it also follows directly from shared values and networks inculcated in private schools. We found that homogamy by school-type is especially strong among non-graduates, and absent among graduates, testimony to the widening social environment associated with university life and beyond.

We have also found that the husbands of privately educated women have an estimated 15% greater hourly pay using BHPS-UKHLS, and 20% greater weekly pay using age 42 BCS data, than the husbands of state-educated women. The husbands of the privately-educated were much more likely to work in high status occupations, more likely to be earning in the 90th percentile, and less likely to be earning below the median, than the husbands of the state educated.

A number of limitations to the analysis should be noted. We have reasonable controls for social background and educational credentials, including especially good ones in the BCS data. However, some other factors that are unobserved, such as parental attitudes, could be positively related both to private school choice and the matching outcomes investigated. If so, any causal effect of private school attendance would be lower than our estimates of the conditional association suggest. Measurement error of school-type, on the other hand, might suggest an underestimate of its effects. Even though school-type when leaving school is accurately recorded in retrospect by the vast majority of cases, we do not have information on the length of time in private school, or on differences in private school quality. Finally, another issue is that surveys such as BHPS/UKHLS and BCS do not adequately track those going abroad. There are relatively few of these, but especially in recent years, when some elite schools have become the training ground for some high earners in a globally integrated world, trimming from the sample those who leave the country might

alter the estimated association with private school attendance.¹⁰

Nevertheless, the finding of strong relationships between females' private schooling and their husbands' earnings raises anew the issue of the negative association between private schooling and social mobility. This link is already implied by the labour market returns enjoyed by both men and women, and the exclusivity in access implied by the relatively high fees charged in most schools. The findings in this paper reinforce this link: school-type homogamy, and associated educational homogamy, combine to help retain economic and social advantages within the family. In asking whether private school girls marry rich, a natural extension of this line of research would be to examine the accumulated wealth of partners, and the consequent links with household income. Future research can also be extended to the marriage returns for males. One would expect to find similar effects in other countries or regions where private education is both sharply separated from the state in governance and funding, and associated with high earnings. Other sharp institutional dividing lines in education with potential implications for adult social and economic outcomes, such as between religious and secular schools, may also provide fruitful areas for research on homogamy linked to school type, though in such cases the school typology might reflect a different institutional dichotomy, more salient for different countries or contexts.

Our findings also may have implications for school choice by parents, seemingly raising the returns to private education. One potential further extension to the analysis of school-type homogamy would be to allow for the prospective marriage market return to affect the choice of private education and, further, the level of investment. Chiappori, Iyguin and Weiss (2009) developed a model of equilibrium education and marriage choice in the presence of educational homogamy underpinned by complementary preferences. In empirical work Ge (2011) and Lafortune (2013) each report effects of changing marriage prospects on college educational investments in the US. Yet the possibility that choice of school-type in Britain is also affected by marriage prospects is a further reason for caution in interpreting our findings as unbiased estimates of causal effects.

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Endnotes

1. The following citation from Mail Online, 12/2/2014, illustrates this point under the headline: "I spend a fortune to send my girl to private school – so she'll marry rich and never work". The citation proceeds: "my husband ... and I place great importance on her learning. Indeed, we hope she will go on to study at Oxford University, (... which is...) the ideal place for her to find a husband with the right background and career prospects to make enough money so Matilda can become a stay-at-home mother." See also "Private schools continue to divide 'them and us' Britain", *The Week*, 2/11/2011; "Kate Middleton's family and the Upper Middleton", *Evening Standard*, 7/5/2015.
2. A new scheme to enable boarding education for disadvantaged students on the edge of the care system has recently launched on a small scale; see <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/more-help-for-vulnerable-children-to-attend-top-boarding-schools>
3. The source of the superior quality of private schooling in terms of educational outcomes is not fully understood, but is held to lie in some combination of their superior resources, autonomous governance and beneficial peer effects from privileged and supportive social background of the pupils. The resource gap is especially large in Britain, with fees alone being of the order of three times the unit expenditure on state school pupils.
4. <https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps/>; <https://www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/> Since the specific question on private school attendance is not included in UKHLS, we are unable to incorporate its larger sample.
5. These key indicators could be supplemented by other controls available in the data at various waves, though typically there will be considerable multiple collinearity among the indicators.
6. Inevitably, recall data might be liable to some recall error. Nevertheless where multiple reports of participation were available, the retrospective data proved to be reliable in the large majority of cases: in fewer than 1% of cases did the age 42 recall data differ from the contemporary information sources (Green et al., 2018).
7. Plewis, Calderwood, Hawkes and Nathan (2004) provide an analysis of all samples up to age 30.
8. Generating a similar pattern of conclusions we also tried an alternative approach, embedding the decision in a multinomial model of marriage and husband's school types, comparing for women the option of remaining unmarried with heterogamous marriage or homogamous marriage. Menzel (2015) shows that for large marriage markets the conditional choice problem can be approximated by a logit model.
9. The findings for both these sensitivity analyses are available on request.
10. Overall, 2% of the BCS age 16 sample had ever emigrated by age 42, including 3% of those at private secondary school.

Appendix

This appendix presents details of variable descriptions and tables of descriptive statistics of all variables from both data sets used in our analyses.

Table A1 Variable descriptions

Variable	Description
<i>Demographics</i>	
Age	Categorical variable. Cutpoints differ between females and males to account for the persistent age difference in marriages <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Respondents: 24–29, 30–34, 35–39, 40–44, 45–49, 50–54, 55–59. • Partner: <27, 27–31, 32–36, 37–41, 42–46, 47–51, 52–56, 57–61, 62+
Ethnicity	Binary indicator to distinguish between whites and non-white respondents (self-reported)
<i>Social Background</i>	
Paternal education (at age 14)	Categorical variable that distinguishes between <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Neither parent had formal qualifications - At least one parent with some qualifications/further education quals - At least one parent with a university/higher degree - No valid data for either parent
Paternal socio-economic group class (at age 14)	Categorical variable that groups parents into 5 classes based on the highest reported socio-economic group: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - High: large managers, large employers, self-employed and employed professionals - Intermediate: small managers and intermediate level supervisors, intermediate level non-manual workers - Small employers: small employers and own account workers (non-farm and farm) - Services: junior non-manual, personal services, armed forces - Manual: foreman manual, (semi-)skilled and unskilled manual and agricultural workers - Unemployed/Inactive: neither parent in paid work - Other/ missing: no information
<i>Educational Attainment</i>	
Educational attainment	Categorical variable to distinguish between higher tertiary attainment and below: Higher tertiary (=1) or lower (=0)

Table A2: Descriptive statistics, married women, BHPS/UKHLS

	mean	sd
Log monthly household income	8.223	0.603
Not in work	0.269	0.444
Private school	0.062	0.241
Tertiary attainment	0.138	0.345
24–29	0.081	0.273
30–34	0.131	0.337
35–39	0.157	0.364
40–44	0.166	0.372
45–49	0.160	0.367
50–54	0.156	0.363
55–59	0.148	0.355
Non-white	0.037	0.188
London	0.236	0.425
<i>Parental SEG</i>		
Neither parent had formal qualifications	0.323	0.468
some qualifications/ further education	0.426	0.494
university/ higher degree	0.073	0.259
Missing	0.179	0.383
large managers, large employers, employed professionals	0.165	0.371
small managers and intermediate level supervisors	0.125	0.331
small employers and own account workers	0.131	0.337
junior non-manual, personal services	0.175	0.380
foreman manual, (semi-)skilled and unskilled manual	0.319	0.466
neither parent in paid work	0.043	0.202
no information	0.042	0.201
<i>Highest parental qualification</i>		

no formal qualifications	0.323	0.468
some qualifications/ further education	0.426	0.494
university/ higher degree	0.073	0.259
Missing	0.179	0.383
<i>N</i>	44035	

Table A3: Descriptive statistics, husbands, BHPS/UKHLS

	mean	sd
Log hourly wages	2.641	0.608
Earnings in 9 th decile	0.139	0.346
Earnings below median	0.351	0.477
SOC MG1/MG2	0.351	0.477
Private school	0.060	0.238
Higher education	0.179	0.383
27–31	0.015	0.122
32–36	0.084	0.277
37–41	0.150	0.358
42–46	0.178	0.382
47–51	0.177	0.382
52–56	0.161	0.368
57–61	0.132	0.338
62+	0.103	0.304
Non-white	0.035	0.183
<i>Parental SEG</i>		
large managers, large employers, employed professionals	0.162	0.368
small managers and intermediate level supervisors	0.125	0.331
small employers and own account workers	0.124	0.330
junior non-manual, personal services	0.171	0.377

foreman manual, (semi-)skilled and unskilled manual	0.330	0.470
neither parent in paid work	0.037	0.188
no information	0.051	0.221
<i>Highest parental qualification</i>		
no formal qualifications	0.332	0.471
some qualifications/ further education	0.428	0.495
university/ higher degree	0.064	0.245
Missing	0.175	0.380
<i>N</i>	29347	

Table A4 Descriptive statistics for the married women in the British Cohort Study at age 42

	mean	sd
Annual household income >£55.9k	0.237	0.425
Not in work	0.181	0.385
Log Husband's weekly pay	6.167	0.676
Husband's weekly pay in 9 th decile	0.166	0.373
Husband's weekly pay below median	0.313	0.464
Husband's occupation MG1/ MG2	0.138	0.345
Private school	0.069	0.253
Higher education	0.333	0.622
<i>At Birth</i>		
V unskilled	0.043	0.203
IV partly-skilled	0.146	0.353
III manual	0.431	0.495
III non manual	0.152	0.359
II managerial and Technical	0.162	0.368
I professional	0.062	0.242
Other (not in work/ other)	0.003	0.056

Birthweight (in g)	0.055	0.229
livebaby	1.989	1.197
Mother's age at birth	26.089	5.248
<i>Age 5</i>		
Breast Feeding	0.407	0.491
Housing tenure (own)	0.650	0.477
Housing tenure (social rent)	0.255	0.436
Housing tenure (private rent)	0.050	0.218
Housing tenure (other)	0.045	0.207
Persons per room	1.012	0.250
English Picture Vocabulary Test [max 56]	35.600	10.044
Schonell Reading Test	1.986	4.385
Copying Designs Test	4.962	1.900
Number of Days Read to in Last Week	4.709	2.484
European UK	0.973	0.161
European Other	0.008	0.091
Other	0.018	0.134
<i>Age 10</i>		
banded family income (1)	0.051	0.220
banded family income (2)	0.264	0.441
banded family income (3)	0.350	0.477
banded family income (4)	0.185	0.388
banded family income (5)	0.080	0.272
banded family income (6)	0.070	0.255
Free school meal recipient	0.117	0.321
Friendly Maths Test	45.978	10.925
Edinburgh Reading Test	44.008	11.239

BAS Word Definitions	10.517	4.842
<i>Age 42</i>		
Number Of Children in HH	1.840	1.013
North	0.060	0.238
Yorks and Humberside	0.091	0.287
East Midlands	0.072	0.259
East Anglia	0.045	0.208
South East	0.289	0.453
South West	0.105	0.307
West Midlands	0.089	0.284
North West	0.107	0.309
Wales	0.058	0.234
Scotland	0.084	0.278
<i>Partner</i>		
Age	44.244	4.558
Age left ft-education (<18)	0.612	0.487
Age left ft-education (18/19)	0.152	0.359
Age left ft-education (20/21)	0.087	0.282
Age left ft-education (22/29)	0.135	0.342
Age left ft-education (30+)	0.013	0.115
<i>N</i>	2529	